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A

DIGEST OF INDIAN LAW CASES

CONTAINING

HIGH COURT REPORTS, 1862—1909;

AND

PRIVY COUNCIL REPORTS OF APPEALS FROM INDIA,
1836—1909,

WITH AN INDEX OF CASES,

COMPILED UNDER THE ORDERS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

BY

B. D. BOSE,

OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW; ADVOCATE OF THE HIGH COURT, CALCUTTA,
AND EDITOR OF THE INDIAN LAW REPORTS, CALCUTTA SERIES.

IN SIX VOLUMES.

VOLUME I: A—C.

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PREFACE.

THE present edition of the consolidated Digest of Indian Law Cases is based on Mr. J. Vere Woodman's Digest (1836 to 1900) in which the subsequent Digests (1901 to 1909) by Messrs. F. G. Wigley, C. E. Grey and B. D. Bose, Barristers-at-Law, are incorporated.

The different sets of Law Reports, in which the same cases have been published, are specifically noted in the second columns of the Index of Cases forming the last volume of this work.

For the sake of brevity, all prefixes, titles, etc., *e.g.*, Shahzada, Maharajah, Maharani, Rajah, Rani, Nawab, Moulvi, Moonsee, Kumar, Babu, Lalla, Sri, Srimutty, Musammat, etc., are generally omitted except those which are given in such forms as—"Maharajah of Vizianagram," "Rajah of Shivagunga," "Nawab Nazim of Bengal," etc.

A number of words and phrases expounded in the judgments digested, are entered in a separate list, in alphabetical order, under the heading "Words and Phrases," for easy reference.

B. D. BOSE.

HIGH COURT, CALCUTTA :

The 1st October 1911.

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
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he holds are rated higher than those of the same description and with similar advantages held by raiyats of the same class in the vicinity. Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 18, refers to an alteration of area owing to a portion of the land having gone away by diluvion or otherwise—not to some difference in the length of the measuring pole in use at different periods. *BABUN MUNDLE v. SHIP KOOMAREE BURMONEE* 21 W. R. 404

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25 W. R. 89

Affirmed in *OMUR SIRDAR v. PERTAB CHUNDER BANERJEE* 25 W. R. 212

11. ——— **Damage to land by cyclone**
—*Right of under-tenant to get remission of rent.* A landlord receiving remission from Government on account of damage done to his estate by a cyclone is not on that account bound to allow a remission to his under-tenants, unless he received the former on the understanding or agreement that he would allow it in turn. *GOLUCK CHUNDER MYTEE v. PARBUTTY CHURN DASS*
15 W. R. 167

12. ——— **Land less than stated in lease—Decree apportioning rent, reserved in a mokurari lease, to the land transferred—Lessee getting possession of less land than stated in lease—Act XI of 1859, s. 54—Right of lessee to abatement of rent.** A decree had determined that land leased in mokurari to a lessee, with a fixed rent thereon, were less in extent than they were specified to be in the pottahs that comprised them, the lessors not having title to the whole; and the lessee had obtained possession of the less estate:—*Held*, that the lessee was entitled to a corresponding abatement of the rent reserved. The revenue-paying mehal, within which were the lands subject to the mokurari, such lands being shares of mouzahs therein, was afterwards sold for arrears, under Act XI of 1859. The purchaser at that sale was sued by the mokuraridar to make good her incumbrance under s. 54 of the Act. The lease was maintained by the decree that followed, but only as to part of the shares specified in the pottahs and the lessee obtained possession of that part only. In this suit for mesne profits brought by the lessee against the purchaser's heir, who filed a cross suit against her for rent, it was *held* that, as the lessee had not proved that she, having had possession under the leases, had been dispossessed by the purchaser, there had not been an eviction in the proper sense of the word. But when, in her suit for possession, part only was decreed to her, and she was precluded by the result from getting a substantial part, her position was the same as if she had been evicted. She, therefore, had the same equity for an apportionment, as if she had been evicted. On the facts it was rightly found by the first Court that the leases were not taken with knowledge on the part of the lessee that the title was a doubtful one. *IMAMBANDI BEGUN v. KAMLESWARI PERSHAD*
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 1005
L. R. 21 I. A. 118

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13. ——— **Error in measurement of land—Land found to be less than stated.** A lease providing for enhancement if the lands are found on measurement to exceed the quantity stated in the lease, does not necessarily give the right to abate if the lands are found to be less than that stated in the lease. *RAM KANT CHOWDHRY v. BINDABUN CHUNDER GOPE*
2 W. R., Act X, 71

14. ——— **Construction of pottah—Default of tenant.** Though a pottah provided for an abatement of defendants' rent if on measurement the land was found to be less than 145 bighas, yet it was held that if defendant came to be in possession of that less quantity by his own default, and not that of the lessor, the mere fact of defendant having been in possession of less than 145 bighas would not entitle him to an abatement. *SEETANATH BOSE v. SHAMCHAND MITTER*
17 W. R. 418

15. ——— **Raiyat having paid no rent—Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 19.** A raiyat who has held his land for a few months, and paid no rent at all, cannot sue for an abatement of rent on the ground that the land, on measurement, is less than the quantity mentioned in his pottah. *BROJONATH KOONDOL CHOWDHRY v. UNANT RAM DUTT* 17 W. R. 449

16. ——— **Misrepresentation as to quantity of land.** In a suit by a patnidar to recover rent in accordance with the terms of a dar-patni lease, the defendant claimed an abatement of his patni rent on the ground that his predecessor had obtained such abatement in a previous rent suit, in which it appeared that the lessor's share was slightly less than what was described in the lease. *Held*, that unless the defendant could show that he had been damaged by the plaintiff's misrepresentation as to the extent of his share, he could not be relieved from his contract, in this form of suit at least. *GOUR MOHUN ROY v. RADHA ROMUN SINGH* 21 W. R. 372

17. ——— **Delay in suing.** In 1859 *G* entered into negotiations with respect to the purchase of a certain talukh at a premium of R42,411 and an annual rent of R48,070, and in January 1860 he signed a sale-bond which contained an enumeration of the mouzahs purchased, the actual sale being completed on the 2nd June following. Until his death in December 1861 he paid the stipulated rent according to the terms of the deed. Subsequently his widow brought a suit for abatement of the rent on the ground that her husband had been misled as to the amount of rent payable by the under tenants. *Held* (affirming the decision of the High Court of Calcutta), that under the circumstances the suit could not be maintained. *DARIMBYA DEBBYA v. NILMONEY SINGH DEO*
5 C. L. R. 465

18. ——— **Act X of 1859, ss. 18 and 23, cl. 3.** S. 18, Act X of 1859, is not applicable to a case in which a plaintiff pat-

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nidar sues for an abatement of rent, on the ground of fraud caused by the concealment from him of the existence of an intermediate tenure created by the zemindar. Cl. 3, s. 23 of that Act, is wide enough to admit of such a suit being tried by the Revenue Courts. *SHOKOOR ALI v. UMOLA AHALYA* 8 W. R. 504

19. ————— *Denial of right to assess lands in tenure.* A suit in which the plaintiff alleges that rent was wrongly assessed on him for lands not covered by his pottah, and contends that in assessing his rent these lands should be included, is not in the nature of a suit for abatement of rent. *OBHOY GOBIND CHOWDHRY v. KENNY* 8 W. R. 518

20. ————— *Breach of contract—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.* In a suit for damages by a lessee, where the plaint shows a distinct prayer for abatement of rent, and also sets forth as the main ground of the suit a fraudulent breach of contract by misrepresentation and refusal of deduction and refund stipulated for, so much of the claim as refers to abatement is, by cl. 3, s. 23, Act X of 1859, beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Court; but the rest of the suit is properly cognizable by such Court. *NILMONY SINGH v. ISSUR CHUNDER GHOSAL* 9 W. R. 92

21. ————— *Reduction of rent payable by landlord to Government—Act X of 1859, ss. 17 and 18.* Sections 17 and 18 were passed for the benefit of the raiyat, and not for the protection of the zemindar. S. 18 was intended to give the raiyat a right to abatement in certain cases, but not to protect the zemindar from liability to make abatement in any other case. In a suit for abatement of rent on the ground that the jumma payable to Government had been reduced upon condition that the rents of the raiyats should be reduced in a like proportion: *Held*, that the right to abatement applies only to the case of rents of which the amount had been fixed before the jumma was reduced by Government, and not to rents fixed by pottahs or kabuliats entered into subsequently. *SUKHAWATOOLLAH v. PUTHOO GOL-DAR* 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 7

22. ————— *Loss of portion of land—Suit for declaration of liability to pay less rent—Equitable relief.* A suit by a tenant against his original lessors for a declaration that he is not liable to pay them the whole rent payable under his pottah in consequence of a third person having, subsequently to the grant of such pottah, by suit established a right to a share of the rent, is not a suit for abatement of rent. But where, under such circumstances, the tenant is holding more land than is covered by his pottah, it is not necessary that his landlords, if desirous of enhancing the rent, should be referred to a separate suit for that purpose. The suit of the tenant being for equitable relief, the claim of the landlords must be taken into consideration in determining what relief the plaintiff is entitled to obtain. *CHANDMONT DASI v. LOKE NATH CHATTERJEE* 6 C. L. R. 494

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23. ————— *Land taken for public purposes—Suit to recover share of money taken as compensation for land.* In a suit to recover the proportion of money paid into Court as compensation for land taken for a railway, to which the plaintiff, a dar-patnidar, may be entitled, and in which suit the zemindar and patnidar are defendants, the plaintiff cannot claim abatement of rent under Act X of 1859, s. 18, since such a claim is cognizable only in a suit instituted under that Act. *GORDON STUART & Co. v. MOHATAB CHAND* Marsh. 490

24. ————— *Claim to deduction from rent.* A claim for rent being a recurring cause of action, a tenant is entitled to set up against it for any particular year any right which he had to a deduction or abatement, notwithstanding that he has paid full rent for several previous years. When land is taken away for railway purposes, and compensation made, which is divided between the zemindar and those holding under him, any deduction of rent claimed from the zemindar must be reckoned with reference, not to the gross amount of compensation, but to the proportion which passed into his hands. *MOHATAB CHAND v. CHITTRO COOMAREE BIBEE* 16 W. R. 201

25. ————— In a suit for rent by a zemindar against a patnidar, the latter claimed abatement of the rent on the ground that part of the land included in the patni tenure had been acquired by the Government for public purposes. The kabuli-*liat* executed by the patnidar contained a provision to the effect that, if any of the land settled should be taken up by Government for public purposes, the zemindar and the patnidar should divide and take in equal shares the compensation money, and a further provision to the effect that the patnidar should "make no objection on the score of diluvion or any other cause to pay the rent fixed or reserved by this kabuli-*liat*." *Held*, that the patnidar was entitled to abatement of the rent. *UMA SUNKUR SIKKAR v. TARINI CHUNDER* I. L. R. 9 Calc. 571 : 11 C. L. R. 366

26. ————— *Ijara settlement—Deduction from rent.* An ijaradar took on lease certain lands, giving a kabuli-*liat* which contained the following clause: "In regard to the aforesaid rent we take upon ourselves the risk of flood and drought of death and flight, of alluvion and diluvion, of profit and loss. In no case shall we be able to claim a reduction in the rent, nor will it be open to you to demand more on account of alluvion, etc." During the lease part of these lands were taken up by Government for the purpose of a railway, and compensation was paid to the lessor therefor. The ijaradar claimed to make a deduction from his rent for the land taken away from him. *Held*, that such a claim did not come under the meaning of the word "abatement" as used in the rent law, nor was it intended by the parties to be within the clause of the lease, but the land having been taken from the whole area demised, not by natural causes, but by *vis major*, the ijaradar was entitled to a deduc-

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tion from the rent, on his showing that there were tenants of his on the land who, before the land was taken by Government, paid rent to him which they had now ceased to pay. *WATSON & Co. v. NISTARINI GUPTA* . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 544

27. ——— In a suit for arrears of rent, a claim for abatement may be made by way of set-off in respect of land taken up by Government for the purposes of a road. *DEEN DYAL LALL v. THUKROO KOONWAR* . . . 6 W. R., Act X, 24

28. ——— *Proceedings under Land Acquisition Act, 1870—Purchase at sale for arrears of rent—Beng. Reg. VIII of 1819.* Portion of certain land held under a patni having been taken up by the Government for public purposes under the Land Acquisition Act, the zemindar declared his intention of granting no abatement of rent, and acting upon this declaration the patnidar was allowed to appropriate the whole of the compensation. The patni was subsequently sold under Regulation VIII of 1819, with notice of the amount of the original rent, and the purchaser now sued for abatement of that rent. He did not allege that he had no notice of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. *Held*, that the plaintiff must be presumed to have had notice of these proceedings, and that it was therefore incumbent upon him to have made inquiry regarding the position of the patni, and that under the circumstances he was not entitled to the abatement sought for. *PEARI MOHUN MUKERJEE v. AUDHIRAJ AFTAB CHAND* . . . 10 C. L. R. 526

29. ——— Previous suit for abatement, effect of—*Onus probandi*. There is no provision in the Rent Law prescribing that suits for enhancement or abatement shall not be brought within a certain period after the determination of a similar suit on the same grounds. And there is no provision throwing upon a plaintiff in a suit for abatement of rent the burden of proof that there has been some change in circumstances since a decision in a previous similar suit was passed. *CHEDA v. NUNHOO BEG* . . . 2 N. W. 348

30. ——— Claim to abatement—*"Otherwise vary" the rent*. The words "otherwise vary" in s. 153, Act X of 1859, are meant to include abatement claimable by the ryot; and this reservation is made in respect of questions of right to vary the rent, whether raised by the landlord or by the tenant. *ANUND CHUNDER DEGHEE v. NUBOCOOMAR CHATTERJEE* . . . 8 W. R. 192

31. ——— Right to sue—Patnidar. A patnidar can sue for abatement of rent under the Rent Act, 1859. *PROSUNOMOYEE DOSSEE v. SOONDUR COOMAREE DEBIA* . . . 2 W. R., Act X, 30
MAN GUROBINEE DASSEA v. KHETTUR CHUNDER GHOSE . . . 2 W. R., Act X, 47

32. ——— *Lessee—Act X of 1859, s. 23*. A patnidar or any other leaseholder may bring a suit against the zemindar for abatement of rent under s. 23, Act X of

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1859. *RAMNARAYAN BANERJEE v. JAYAKRISHNA MOOKERJEE* . . . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 70
HOROKISHEN BANERJEE v. JOYKISHEN MOOKERJEE . . . 1 W. R. 299

33. ——— Howladar. A howladar has a right to sue for abatement of rent. *KOMLAKANT DOSS v. POGOSE* . . . 2 W. R., Act X, 65

34. ——— Tenant without right of occupancy—*Act X of 1859, s. 18*. A tenant not having a right of occupancy is not entitled to an abatement of rent under Act X of 1859, s. 18. *NOBODEEP CHUNDER SIRCAR v. LALLA SEEB LOLL* . . . Marsh. 325

35. ——— Under-tenants—*Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 2—Illegal exaction of rent*. Cl. 2, s. 23, Act X of 1859, relating to the illegal exaction of rent, was not limited to suits at the instance of the raiyat, but applied to any under-tenant. *GOPAL PAUL CHOWDRY v. GRISH CHUNDER PANDEY* . . . 14 W. R. 269

36. ——— Form of suit—*Act X of 1859, s. 23—Jurisdiction of Civil Court*.—A obtained from B a patni lease, whereby it was agreed that A should prepare a hustabud (rent-roll); that if it should appear that there was any deficiency in the jumma stated in the pottah, the correct jumma should be ascertained as therein provided; and that the rent should be made up to A by B, and B should return a proportionate amount of the consideration-money. A sued B for an abatement of rent, for a refund of rent paid in excess, and for a proportionate refund of the consideration-money. *Held*, the suit was not a suit for abatement of rent within s. 23 of Act X of 1859, and the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the different questions together in the same suit. *NILMONT SINGH v. ANNADAPRASAUD MOOKERJEE* . . . 1 B. L. R. F. B. 93
10 W. R. F. B. 41

37. ——— *Suit for apportionment of rent—Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 19*. In 1877 certain batwara proceedings were terminated, and the amount of land held by the plaintiff in the portion of the estate allotted to the defendant was ascertained. The rent payable was admitted to be at the rate of R4 per bigha. In 1881 the defendants sued the plaintiff for rent of a larger amount than the plaintiff admitted to be due, and obtained a decree on the 31st May 1881. On the 20th September 1881, the plaintiff instituted a suit, nominally under the provisions of s. 19 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, for abatement of rent, upon the ground that the defendants were seeking to charge him rent upon a larger amount of land than he actually held. The Court found that the amount of land held by the plaintiff was the amount stated by him in his plaint, and not that alleged by the defendants. *Held*, that the suit was rather one for the apportionment of rent after the batwara proceedings, and not one for abatement of rent. *DURGA PERSHAD v. GHOSITA GORIA* . . . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 284

ABATEMENT OF RENT—*contd.*

38. ———— **Rate of deduction—Jurisdiction of Revenue Court.** A granted a patni to B, to which a certain mehal appertained. The Government, to which the mehal belonged, in reversion upon an ijara held by A, sold it to C. Held, that B was entitled to abatement of rent from A, and that a suit for abatement, under the circumstances, was cognizable by the Revenue Court. *Semle*: Where there is no specification in the original contract of the amount of rent payable for the portion of land for which abatement is claimed, such a sum ought to be deducted from the whole rent as would bear to that whole rent the same proportion as the annual value of the portion of the land which has disappeared bears to the annual value of the land originally leased. **BRIJANATH PAL CHOWDREY v. HIRALAL PAL** . 1 B. L. R. A. C. 87: 10 W. R. 120

39. ———— **Procedure—Suit for arrears of rent.** A claim by defendant for abatement of rent under remission granted to plaintiff by Government may be tried in a suit for arrears. **BOIKUNTO PARAKI v. SURENDRONATH ROY** . 1 W. R. 84

40. ———— **Plea of abatement in suit for arrears of rent.** In a suit to recover arrears of rent it is competent to a Court to adjudicate upon a plea of abatement. **GOUR KISHORE CHUNDER v. BONOMALEE CHOWDHRY** . 22 W. R. 117

41. ———— **Effect of decision of Civil Court on decree of Revenue Court—Suit for excess payments of rent after decree for abatement.** A patnidar sued his zemindar and obtained a decree for abatement of the patni rent, on the ground that the assets of the patni fell short of the amount stated in the lease. While this suit was pending in the Civil Court, the zemindar brought a suit for the rent of two years upon the full jumma; and though the patnidar objected that his suit for abatement was pending, the Collector decreed the rent suit in full. In execution, the zemindar recovered the full rent, and the patnidar then sued for a refund of excess payments and of the interest realized by the zemindar thereon. Held, that the decree of the Revenue Court was superseded and modified by the decree of the Civil Court, which was subsequently affirmed in appeal. Held, that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued on the date on which the zemindar recovered from him rent in excess of what he was justly liable for and also interest on such excess. Held (on reference to the decree), that the abatement was to take effect from the commencement of the patni lease. **NILMONEY SINGH DEO v. SHARODA PERSHAD MOOKERJEE** . 18 W. R. 434

42. ———— **Landlord and tenant—Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)—Patnidar, whether entitled to abatement of rent and compensation—Proportion—Principle.** Where a portion of a patni is acquired by Government under the Land Acquisition Act, the patnidar is entitled to abatement of rent at the hands of the zamindar, as the land taken up by Government is absolutely lost to the patnidar; and he is also entitled to some share of the compensation

ABATEMENT OF RENT—*concl.*

money. Principle as to the rule of proportion as to abatement of rent and amount of compensation discussed. *Burdwan Raj Case*, S. D. A. for 1860, p. 336; *Sama Prosunno Bose Mojumdar v. Brakoda Sundari Dasi*, I. L. R., 28 Calc., 146, discussed. **BHOJANI NATH CHUCKERBUTTY v. LAND ACQUISITION DEPUTY COLLECTOR OF BOGRA (1902)**

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See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 496

I. L. R. 17 All. 172, 286

See Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 365.

I. L. R. 30 All. 49

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 368, 371.

See INSOLVENT ACT, s. 36.

6 B. L. R. 119

10 Bom. 58

See RIGHT OF SUIT—SURVIVAL OF RIGHT.
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 799

1. SUITS.

1. ———— **Lands washed away—Suit for possession and mesne profits.** A suit for possession with mesne profits does not abate by reason of the lands having since been washed away. **UNNA POORNA DEBIA v. RAM LOCHAN GHOSE**

5 W. R. 227

2. ———— **Death of sole plaintiff—Revivor—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 363, 365, 366, 371—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 171, 178.** Upon the death of a sole plaintiff, if no application to revive is made within sixty days from the date of the plaintiff's death, the suit abates. But the Court may, under s. 371 of the Code of Civil Procedure, revive the suit, on the application of the legal representative of the plaintiff, within three years from the time when the right to apply accrues, if he can show that he was prevented by sufficient cause from continuing the suit. **BHOYRUB DASS JOHURRY v. DOMAN THAKOOR**

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 139

4 C. L. R. 374

3. ———— **Civil Procedure Code (1859), s. 102, (1877) s. 371—Institution of fresh suit.**—Where a suit was declared abated in 1868 under s. 102 of Act VIII of 1859 for non-prosecution by the representative of deceased plaintiff: Held, that the Civil Procedure Code, s. 371, was no bar to a fresh suit instituted in 1880 on the same cause of action. **PALLIKUNATH RAMEN MENON v. MULLANKAJI SRI KUMARAN NAMBUDERI**

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 31

4. ———— **Civil Procedure Code (1882), ss. 365, 366, 371—Revival of suit.** The plaintiff died on the 28th August 1883, and in December 1884, letters of administration to his estate were granted to the Administrator General.

ABATEMENT OF SUIT—contd.**1. SUITS—contd.**

The defendant died in June 1884, leaving a widow and one son him surviving. By his will he appointed two executors. On the 3rd February 1885, the Administrator General took out a summons to revive the suit. *Held*, that notwithstanding the provisions of s. 365 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882) and of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), it was competent for a Judge in chambers to revive the suit by making an order for abatement under s. 366 of the Code, coupled with an order under s. 371 setting aside the order for abatement. *FULVAHU v. GOCULDAS VALLABHDAS* I. L. R. 9 Bom. 275

5. **Insolvency of plaintiff—Civil Procedure Code (1859) s. 106, (1882), s. 370—Order for security for costs by Official Assignee when made a party.** S. 106 of the Civil Procedure Code means that a suit abates by the insolvency of the plaintiff, but that the defendant shall not plead the abatement without giving the Official Assignee an opportunity of prosecuting the suit. Where, therefore, the plaintiff, after the institution of a suit, became insolvent, and the defendant thereupon obtained an order that the Official Assignee should give security for the cost of the defendant within fourteen days, and should be made a party to the suit within one month, and that, in default of such security, the suit should be set down for dismissal within eight days after the expiration of the time so limited. *Held*, that such order was irregular. *Held*, also, that the Official Assignee, having notice of the order, was not entitled to further notice of the setting down of the suit for dismissal, he not having given the security required, and that the giving of such security was a condition precedent to his being made a party to the suit. *IBRAHIM BIN MAHASIN v. ABDUR RAHMAN BIN ALLI. GAMBLE v. ABDUR RAHMAN BIN ALLI* 12 Bom. 257

6. **Civil Procedure Code (1859), s. 106, (1882), s. 370.** If an assignee, who has been substituted for the plaintiff under s. 106, Act VIII of 1859, declines to furnish security for costs within such reasonable time as the Court may order, the defendant may, within eight days after such neglect and refusal, plead the bankruptcy or insolvency of the plaintiff as a reason for abating the suit. *HEERA LALL SEAL v. CARAFIET* 13 W. R. 431

7. **Survival of cause of action.** During the pendency of a suit by a Hindu widow to recover possession of her husband's estate, the widow died. *Held*, the cause of action was one which, from its very nature, survived on the death of the plaintiff, and therefore the suit did not abate. *PARBUTTY v. HIGGIN* 17 W. R. 475
PARBUTTY v. BEIKUN 8 B. L. R. Ap. 98

8. **Suit by son to set aside father's alienation of ancestral property—Death of son—Hindu mother.** Where a Hindu minor, governed by the law of Mitakshara, on whose behalf a suit to set aside his father's alienation of ancestral property had been instituted, died : *Held*,

ABATEMENT OF SUIT—contd.**1. SUITS—contd.**

that no right to sue survived in favour of his mother, but the suit abated. *PADARATH SINGH v. RAJA RAM* I. L. R. 4 All. 285

9. **Personal cause of action.** *Held*, that under the circumstances the suit which had arisen on account of some illegal act of the widow, had abated on her death pending the suit, and that the question as to the plaintiff's reversionary right, which was raised by an intervenor, must be decided in a separate suit. *RAMJUN v. LACHEE* 1 Agra 49

10. **Act VIII of 1859, s. 100, (1882) s. 362.**—A and B, as joint owners of certain land, brought an action for damages on account of trespass. B died after action was brought. *Held*, that the cause of action survived to A. *Semble*, The words "cause of action" in s. 100 of Act VIII of 1859 mean right to bring an action. *CHUNDERMOHUN DUTT v. BISWAMBHUR LAHA* 1 B. L. R. O. C. 42

11. In a suit to recover possession of timber, the first defendant had ceased to have any interest, and after the settlement of issues he died. *Held*, that the cause of action against the other defendants survived, and that, the first defendant having no interest in the subject of the suit, it was not necessary that the suit should be revived against his representatives. *MOUNG KHINE v. BURN* 6 W. R. Civ. Ref. 2

12. **Act X of 1859, s. 20 (Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 21).** A cause of action accruing against an agent for money received and accounts kept, falling within the class mentioned in s. 20, Act X of 1859, survives the death of the agent. *HILLS v. SHOKHEE MONEE DOSSEE* 10 W. R. 59

13. **Suit by original mortgagor against mortgagee and sub-mortgagee—Death of mortgagee pending suit—Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 368.** Plaintiff sued to redeem a mortgage passed by his deceased father to defendant No. 1, and joined defendant No. 2 as being the sub-mortgagee of defendant No. 1 and in possession of the property. After suit, defendant No. 1 died, and no steps were taken by the plaintiff within time to make his legal representatives parties. This suit was, however, allowed to be continued against defendant No. 2, and a redemption decree was passed in plaintiff's favour :—*Held*, on second appeal, that defendant No. 2 being the sub-mortgagee, and not the assignee of defendant No. 1, on the death of the latter, no cause of action survived to the plaintiff against defendant No. 2, and the suit abated under s. 368 of the Civil Procedure Code. *PADGAYA v. BAJI BABAJI MOHOLKAR* I. L. R. 20 Bom. 549

14. **Interest of mother on partition—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 361, ill. (c).** Upon a partition D was

ABATEMENT OF SUIT—*contd.*1. SUITS—*contd.*

allotted a one-third share of certain premises as a Hindu mother. A suit brought by her to restrain the defendant from encroaching upon her share was compromised by the defendant agreeing to purchase her share, and the question of the value of her share was referred to arbitration. After the award of the arbitrators, but before decree thereon, *D* died, leaving two sons. The sons obtained an *ex parte* order reviving the suit in their names. On an application by the defendant to set aside the *ex parte* order on the ground that the suit abated on the death of *D*: *Held*, that the suit did not abate by the death of *D*, and the right of action on the award survived to the sons. *DENOMYEE DASSEE v. CHOONEY MONEY DASSEE* . 4 C. W. N. 280

Affirmed on appeal in *CHOONEY MONEY DASSEE v. RAM KINKUR DUTT* . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 155
5 C. W. N. 242

15. ———— *As against heir of a deceased wrong-doer—Civil Procedure Code, s. 361—Tort—Malicious prosecution, suit for—Act XII of 1855—"Actio personalis moritur cum persona," application of.* The plaintiff sued to recover damages from the defendant's father, *R*, for wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution. During the pendency of the suit *R* died, and the plaintiff substituted the defendant as his heir and representative. The defendant contended that the suit abated. Both the lower Courts disallowed the defendant's contention, and awarded damages to the plaintiff, to be recovered from the estate of the deceased. On appeal by the defendant to the High Court: *Held*, reversing the decision of the lower Courts, that the suit abated on the death of *R*, his estate having derived no benefit, but, on the other hand, suffered loss, in consequence of his wrong-doing. It was contended for the plaintiff that Act XII of 1855 gave the plaintiff a right to continue his suit against the heir of *R*. *Held*, that Act XII of 1855 did not apply to a suit, such as this, brought originally against the wrong-doer himself, and only subsequently sought to be continued against his heir. *Phillips v. Homfray*, L. R. 24 Ch. D. 439, followed. *HARIDAS RAMDAS v. RAMDAS MATHURADAS* . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 677

16. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 368, 588 (18)—Death of one of several defendants—Order declaring suit to have abated—Appeal.* *Held*, that an order made under the penultimate clause of s. 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure, declaring a suit to have abated, is appealable, not as a decree, but as an order under s. 588 (18) of the Code. Where a defendant to a suit for the recovery of a mortgage-debt who was on the record as a surety personally for the payment of the mortgage-money, died, and the plaintiff declined to place on the record such defendant's legal representative, it was *held* that this only amounted to a waiver of the plaintiff's rights as against the surety, and did not preclude him from continuing the suit against the mortgagor. The

ABATEMENT OF SUIT—*contd.*1. SUITS—*concl'd.*

suit did not abate. *MEHDI HUSAIN v. SUGRA BEGAM* (1902) . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 206

2. APPEALS.

1. ———— *Death of appellant.* The death of an appellant was held to be no reason for the abatement or postponement of a case which was being conducted by an agent of the deceased defendant, and was not in any way prejudicial. *JUGMOHUN SINGH v. DABEE PERSHAD*

W. R. 1864, Act X, 47

2. ———— An appellant having died and no application having been made before the lapse of two months to enter appearance on behalf of the representatives, the appeal was held to have abated. *KHETRONATH DEY v. GOSSAIN DASS DEY* . . . 11 W. R. 543

BHAGIAN v. PALMER . . . 20 W. R. 267

3. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 102 (1882, ss. 365, 366) and 348 (1882, s. 561), and Act XXIII of 1861, s. 37 (Act X of 1882, s. 582)—Issue based on objections by respondent.* Where the special appellant died after the High Court had referred for trial to the Court below an issue based upon objections taken by the respondent under s. 348 of Act VIII of 1859: *Held*, that the appeal must abate in accordance with s. 102 of Act VIII of 1859 and s. 37 of Act XXIII of 1861; and that the respondent could not require that it should proceed, in order that he might have an opportunity of taking objections to the decree of the Court below. If the respondent desires to secure the right of asking for a decision on his objection, he must file a separate appeal. *JAITA BIN KALU v. BALU BIN RAGHU*

3 Bom. A. C. 81

4. ———— *Death of appellant during pendency of appeal—Only one of three legal representatives brought upon the record—Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 365—Representative of deceased person.* The words "the legal representative" in s. 365 of the Code of Civil Procedure must, where there are more than one legal representative, be read in the plural. Hence where a sole appellant died during the pendency of his appeal, leaving three legal representatives, and only one of such legal representatives was brought upon the record in the place of the deceased appellant within the prescribed period of limitation: *Held*, that the appeal must abate. Either all the legal representatives of the deceased appellant should have been brought upon the record as appellants, or, if any had refused to be joined as appellants, they should have been brought on as respondents. *GHAMANDI LAL v. AMIR BEGAM*

I. L. R. 16 All. 211

5. ———— *Appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 366—Application by legal representative to carry on appeal.* The appel-

ABATEMENT OF SUIT—*contd.*2. APPEALS—*contd.*

lant's father having died during the pendency of an appeal lodged by him, a notice was served upon the appellant's two adult brothers; but they having failed to apply within sixty days, the appellant, who was a minor, applied several months afterwards to be put on the record in his deceased father's place as his legal representative, which was done. The Assistant Judge who heard the appeal was of opinion that, in consequence of the omission on the part of the brothers of the appellant to apply, the appeal abated, and he passed an order accordingly. *Held*, that the application having been made by the minor son within the time limited by law, the order of abatement made by the Judge was wrong. Although the complete legal representation vested in the minor son and his two brothers, s. 366 of the Civil Procedure Code only required an application to be made by a person claiming to be the legal representative, in order to prevent an order of abatement being made. If neither of the brothers was willing to have his name placed on the record, the respondent was entitled to have them made defendants, so that they might be bound by the decree. The minor son could then proceed alone with the appeal. **BHIKAJI RAMCHANDRA v. PURSHOTAM . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 220**

6. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (1882), ss. 365, 366—Application by representatives to be brought on record—“Legal representative”—Effect of application being made by some only of several legal representatives.* During the pendency of an appeal two persons applied under s. 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be brought on the record as legal representatives of the appellant, who had died. In their petition they stated that there were two other persons having interests equal to their own in the representation, who did not join in the application and were not made parties by the applicants for reasons that were given. The applicants were duly placed on the record as representatives of the deceased appellant within the time limited by art. 175A of Sch. II of the Limitation Act. After the period of limitation had elapsed, the respondents applied under ss. 366 and 582 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an order that the appeal had abated on the ground that the former petitioners had not added all the persons who had interests equal to their own in the representation. The Subordinate Judge held that the representation of the two applicants was sufficient to prevent the abatement of the appeal, but he made the other two representatives respondents on the record. He subsequently heard and allowed the appeal. On its being contended, on second appeal, that the appeal to the Subordinate Court had abated and should have been dismissed by reason of the non-joinder of the other two representatives:—*Held*, that though, in art. 175A of Sch. II of the Limitation Act, the application is expressed to be an application under s. 365 of the Code of Civil Procedure and s. 366 is not mentioned,

ABATEMENT OF SUIT—*contd.*2. APPEALS—*contd.*

yet for the purpose of considering the question of abatement, the two sections must be read together. When there are more than one legal representative of a deceased appellant, all those representatives must, so far as it is possible for this to be done, join in an application under s. 365 and the words “legal representative” in s. 365 of the Code of Civil Procedure (and similarly the words “any person” and the legal representative” in s. 366), strictly construed, must, in such a case, be read in the plural and as including all the legal representatives. But where all the representatives cannot be joined as applicants, ss. 365 and 366 should not be construed so as to have the effect of rendering the application no application by “the legal representative” within the meaning of the sections, so that the appeal must be held to have abated. *Bhikaji Ramchandra v. Purshotam, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 220*, and *Ghamandi Lal v. Amir Begam, I. L. R. 16 All. 211*, considered. **MUSALA REDDI v. RAMAYYA**

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 125

7. ———— *Claim to guardianship based on a will.*—One K applied to be the guardian of the person and property of her minor son. Her application was opposed by G, the grandmother of the minor, who alleged that she had been appointed guardian by the will of the minor's father. The Judge found the will not proved, and he appointed K to be guardian. G appealed, and pending the appeal she died. G's brother, one M, thereupon applied for leave to prosecute the appeal as G's representative. *Held*, refusing the application, that the appeal must abate by reason of G's death. Her appointment, alleged to have been made under the will, was a matter of personal preference and trust. A claim based on personal trust could not survive to her representative. **GANGABAI v. KHASHABAI**

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 719

8. ———— *Death of one of two joint decree-holders—Appeal by decree-holders—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 231.*—A suit was instituted against two joint decree-holders under s. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a declaration that certain property which had been attached by them belonged to the plaintiffs, and was not liable to be taken in execution of the decree. The suit was dismissed by the Court of first instance, but decreed by the lower Appellate Court. The decree-holders appealed, but during the pendency of the appeal one of them died and no steps were taken to bring his representatives on the record within the prescribed period. *Held*, that the appeal abated. *Ghamandi Lal v. Amir Begam, I. L. R. 16 All. 211*, referred to. **KAMLAPAT v. PAITRO**

I. L. R. 22 All. 222

9. ———— *Death of principal, pending appeal—Principal and agent.* The plea of abatement on account of the death of the principal, pending the suit in appeal before the lower Appellate Court, was disallowed, it being shown from the circumstances of the case that appellant, though

ABATEMENT OF SUIT—*contd.*2. APPEALS—*contd.*

an agent, intended himself to be the plaintiff. Had he acted as an agent, the whole authority was determined on the death of the principal, and the appeal must have abated until resumed by substituting the heir of the deceased principal as a party to the suit. *THORNHILL v. TAYLOR* . . . 1 *Agra* 215

10. ———— **Death of respondent—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 368, 582, 591—Order or decree—Order as to abatement of appeal embodied in the judgment and decree—Rules of the Court, rule 9.** Where one of four respondents (plaintiffs) in the lower Appellate Court died, and no application was made within six months to put the legal representative on the record, and in the application that was eventually made, the wrong person was named as legal representative: *Held*, the appeal was one where the right to appeal did not survive against the surviving respondents, but against them and the representatives of the respondent who had died. Under the circumstances, s. 368 read with s. 582 of the Code applied, and the proper order was to have directed the suit to abate. *Held*, further, that where the order of the lower Court as to abatement was embodied in the judgment and decree, objection was properly taken thereto by way of second appeal against the decree. *Sheo Nath Singh v. Ram Din Singh*, I. L. R. 18 All. 19, *Sher Singh v. Diwan Singh*, I. L. R. 22 All. 366, *Dhari Upadhia v. Raushan Chaudhri*, *Weekly Notes All.* 1899, 136, *Sant Lal v. Sri Kishen*, I. L. R. 14 All. 221, and *Chandarsang v. Khimabhai*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 718, referred to. *HEM KUNWAR v. AMBA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 22 All. 430

11. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 368, 371—Change of procedure pending suit.** An appeal having been declared to have abated on the 12th December 1881 under s. 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877, because the appellant had not applied within sixty days of the date of the death of the respondent to bring in his representative, an application was made in January 1882 to set aside the order and was heard after the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, came into force: *Held*, that the application must be disposed of under the Code of Procedure as it stood at the date of the application, and, therefore, that it was not open to the appellant to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period. S. 371 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to the case in which a defendant or respondent dies. *SURI BHATTA v. SITARAMA BHATTA*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 195

12. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, ss. 365, 582—Substitution of second applicant as respondent.** A respondent having died, a conditional order was, on the application of the appellant, made substituting the name of his alleged representative on the record. That order was cancelled upon the application of another person, who

ABATEMENT OF SUIT—*contd.*2. APPEALS—*contd.*

satisfied the Court that he, and not the person whose name had been conditionally substituted, was the real representative, and who asked to have his name put on the record: *Held*, that the Court had no power to substitute the name of the second applicant upon the record, and no further application having been made by the appellant to complete the record, the appeal was ordered to abate. *SADHU SARUN SINGH v. DWARKA SINGH*

12 C. L. R. 45

13. ———— **No application for substitution of deceased's representative—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 368, 582—Act XV of 1877 (Limitation Act), Sch. II, Art. 171B.** *Held* by the Full Bench (MAHMOOD, J., dissenting), that s. 582 of the Civil Procedure Code does not make the provisions of chapter XXI, relating to the death of a defendant in a suit, applicable to the death of a plaintiff-respondent in an appeal, so as to render it obligatory on the defendant-appellant to make an application to the Court praying that the legal representatives of the deceased be made parties to the appeal; and that, where there has been no such application, the appeal does not abate. *Per PETHERAM, C.J.* The words "so far as may be," in the second clause of the first paragraph of s. 582, must be construed as meaning "so far as may be necessary to carry into effect the remedies contemplated by chapter XXI." *Per MAHMOOD, J., contra*, that the object of s. 582 of the Civil Procedure Code is to obviate the necessity of repeating the provisions of chapter XXI, so as to make them applicable to appeals, and the words "appellant" and "respondent" as used in the section include both plaintiffs and defendants in an appeal; that the whole Code maintains the analogy between the position of a respondent and that of a defendant for the purposes of being impleaded and brought before the Court; that chapter XXI applies to cases where a plaintiff-respondent has died; and that, in such a case, and where no application has been made, within the period prescribed therefor, praying that the legal representatives of the deceased be made parties in his place, the appeal abates. *Also per MAHMOOD, J.* The word "defendant" as used in Art. 171B of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), must be taken to include a respondent, whether plaintiff or defendant in the suit. *Lakshmbai v. Balakrishna*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 654, *Rajmonee Dabee v. Chunder Kant Sandel*, I. L. R. 8 Cal. 440, and *Bai Javer v. Hathising Kerising*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 56, referred to. *NARAIN DAS v. LAJJA RAM* . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 693

14. ———— **Application for declaration of insolvency—Appeal from order rejecting application—Death of decree-holder-respondent—No application by appellant for substitution of deceased's representative—Act XV of 1877 (Limitation Act), Sch. II, Art. 171B—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 344-348, 350, 351, 368, 553, 582, 590.** The decree-holder-respondent, in an appeal from an order refusing an application by the judgment-debtor for declaration of insolvency under s. 344 of

ABATEMENT OF SUIT—*contd.*2. APPEALS—*contd.*

the Civil Procedure Code, died, and the judgment-debtor, appellant, took no steps to have the legal representative of the deceased substituted as respondent in his place: *Held*, that Art. 171B, Sch. II of the Limitation Act, applied to the case, and that, as no one had been brought on the record to represent the deceased respondent within the period prescribed, the appeal must abate. *Per* MAHMOON, J., that whatever the position of the parties might have been in the regular suit, in the insolvency proceedings the judgment-debtor occupied a position analogous to that of a plaintiff, and the decree-holder occupied the position of a defendant *Narain Das v. Lajja Ram*, I. L. R. 7 All. 693, distinguished. *RAMESHAR SINGH v. BISHESHAR SINGH* . I. L. R. 7 All. 734

15. ————— *Suit to recover share of joint family property sold in execution of decree—Death of plaintiff-respondent—Survival of right to sue.* In a suit for the recovery of a share of ancestral family property which had been sold in execution of a money-decree for a debt contracted by the plaintiff's grandfather, the plaintiff obtained a decree in the lower Appellate Court, from which the defendant appealed to the High Court. While the appeal was pending, the plaintiff died, and, on her application, his widow was made respondent in his place. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant contended that, upon the plaintiff's death, the right to sue did not survive, and the appeal should therefore be decreed by the suit being dismissed:—*Held* by the Full Bench, that judgment having been obtained before the plaintiff's death, the benefit of the judgment, or the right to sue, would survive to his legal representative, though whether the deceased plaintiff's representative could enforce the whole of the judgment in this case was a different matter. *Phillips v. Homfray*, L. R. 24 Ch. D. 439, and *Padarath Singh v. Raja Ram*, I. L. R. 4 All. 235, referred to. When a person desires to be added as such representative upon the death of a plaintiff after judgment, he must satisfy the Court that he is the proper person to be so added. *MUHAMMAD HUSAIN v. KHUSHALO* . I. L. R. 9 All. 131

16. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 368, 582—Death of plaintiff-respondent—Application by defendants-appellants for substitution—Application presented after the 1st July 1888—Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888), ss. 55, 66—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 175C.* The plaintiff respondent in an appeal pending before the High Court died on the 17th September 1885. Subsequently D applied to the High Court to be brought on the record as legal representative of the deceased. On the 15th April 1886 he was referred to a regular suit to establish his title as such representative, and on the 25th February 1887 such suit was dismissed. On the 8th February 1886 the defendants-appellants applied to the High Court for judgment, but the application was dismissed under the decision of the Full Bench in *Chajmal Das v. Jagdamba*

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Prasad, I. L. R. 10 All. 240. On 21st July 1888 they applied to the High Court to bring certain persons upon the record as the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff-respondent. *Held*, that the application, having been made subsequent to the 1st July 1888, when the Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888) came into force, and being an entirely fresh application not in continuation of any former proceedings between the same parties, must be dealt with under that Act, and not under the Civil Procedure Code as it stood before the amendment; and that as it was made more than six months after the death of the deceased plaintiff-respondent, the appeal abated, with reference to s. 368 of the Code and Art. 175C of the Limitation Act. *Held*, also, that the petitioners had not shown "sufficient cause" within the meaning of s. 368 of the Code for not making the application within the prescribed period. *Ram Jiwan Mal v. Chand Mal*, I. L. R. 10 All. 587, referred to. *CHAJMAL DAS v. JAGDAMBA PRASAD* I. L. R. 11 All. 408

17. ————— *Defendant.* The word "defendant" in art. 171B of the Limitation Act, 1877, does not include a respondent. *UDIT NARAIN SINGH v. HAROGOURI PRASAD* I. L. R. 12 Calc. 590

18.—*Death of appellant—Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882) ss. 361 and 582—Death of appellant after appeal filed, but before hearing of appeal—Defamation—Maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona"—Practice.* In a suit for defamation, the plaintiff obtained a decree for damages against the defendant, and executed the decree. The defendant filed an appeal, but died before the hearing. His son and legal representative was placed on the record as appellant. When the appeal came on for hearing, the respondent (plaintiff) objected that by the death of the defendant the appeal had abated, and that the defendant's son had no right to continue the proceedings. *Held* by FULTON and CROWE, JJ., that the appeal did not abate, and that the defendant's legal representative had a right to continue the proceedings as appellant. *GOPAL GANESH ABHYANKAR v. RAMCHANDRA SADASHIV SAHASRABUDHE* (1902) I. L. R. 26 Bom. 597

19. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 361, 362, 363, 544 and 582—Parties—Death of one of several appellants—Survival of right of appeal—Abatement of appeal.* Where several plaintiffs or defendants jointly appeal against a decree to which s. 544 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies, the death of one of such appellants, if no legal representative of the deceased appellant is brought upon the record within limitation, can only have the effect of causing the appeal to abate so far as the deceased appellant was concerned: it cannot have the effect of causing the appeal as a whole to abate. *Chandarsang v. Khimbhai*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 718, referred to. *Ghamandi Lal v. Amir Begam*.

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I. L. R. 16 All. 211, distinguished. *Kamlapat v. Baldeo*, *I. L. R. 22 All. 222*, overruled. *RAM SEWAK v. LAMBAR PANDE* (1902)

I. L. R. 25 All. 27

20.—Death of respondent—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 368, 582—Death of respondents pending appeal—Abatement of appeal. Six persons held a decree, in execution of which an application was made to attach certain property as the property of the judgment-debtors. Objections were made under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and were allowed. Thereupon four out of the six decree-holders filed a suit for a declaration as to the ownership of the property in question, making the other two decree-holders (who refused to join as plaintiffs) defendants. The suit was dismissed, and an appeal from the decree in that suit was likewise dismissed. The plaintiffs appealed to the High Court, but pending the hearing the two decree-holders who had been made defendants-respondents died, and no representatives of these respondents were placed upon the record. *Held*, that the appeal did not abate. *Chandarsang v. Khimabhai*, *I. L. R. 22 Bom. 718*, referred to. *Kamlapat v. Baldeo*, *I. L. R. 22 All. 222*, distinguished. *ALLA BAKHSH v. MADHO RAM* (1900) . . . *I. L. R. 23 All. 22*

21.—Practice—Procedure—Abatement—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) ss. 368, 582—Death of some of the respondents—Legal representatives not brought on the record—Abatement of appeal as against them—Appeal continuing against the remaining respondents. The plaintiff filed an appeal in a District Court. It was admitted, and then adjourned *sine die*. At the hearing, which took place nearly two years afterwards, it appeared that two of the respondents had died in the meanwhile, and their legal representatives had not been brought on the record. The lower Appellate Court thereupon ordered the appeal to abate as against all the respondents. *Held*, that the appeal should abate only as against the respondents who had died; but as against the remaining respondents it should proceed. *Chandarsang v. Khimabhai*, *I. L. R. 22 Bom. 718*, followed. *Bai Full v. ADESANG PAHADSANG* (1901) . . . *I. L. R. 26 Bom. 203*

ABDUCTION.

See KIDNAPPING.

See PENAL CODE, SS. 362—369.

ABETMENT.

See BIGAMY . . . 6 C. W. N. 343

See CONSPIRACY.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 797

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE—EXTORTION.

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS—OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN ONE DISTRICT—ABETMENT.

ABETMENT—concl'd.

See PENAL CODE, SS. 109, 366.

I. L. R. 26 All. 197

8 C. W. N. 519

9 C. W. N. 69

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—NATURE, FORM AND SUFFICIENCY OF SANCTION.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 905

See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.

5 C. W. N. 250

1. ——— Omission to give information of offence—Penal Code, s. 107. An omission to give information that a crime has been committed does not, under s. 107 of the Penal Code, amount to abetment, unless such omission involves a breach of a legal obligation. A private individual is not bound by any law to give information of any offence which he has seen committed. *QUEEN v. KHADIM SHEIK* . . . 4 B. L. R. A. Cr. 7

2. ——— Penal Code, s. 107—“Illegal omission.” To prove abetment under s. 107, Penal Code, by “illegal omission” it would be necessary to show that the accused intentionally aided the commission of the offence by his non-interference. *NOORUL HOSSAIN alias WAHEED JAN v. FABRE-TONNERRE* . . . 24 W. R. Cr. 26

3. ——— Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 107, 143—Wilful absence—Abetment of the offence of being members of an unlawful assembly—Sympathy with unlawful object—Instigation. The Court below being of opinion that persons of influence being aware of the objects of the members of an unlawful assembly and deliberately absenting themselves from the locality where such assembly was formed shewed such sympathy as amounted to instigation. *Held*, that such conduct did not amount to “instigation” within the meaning of s. 107, Penal Code, or abetment of an offence under s. 143. *ETIM ALI MAJUMDAR v. EMPRESS* . . . 4 C. W. N. 500

4. ——— Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 107—Instigation by means of letter—Place where offence may be tried—Jurisdiction of Criminal Court. Where one person instigates another to the commission of an offence by means of a letter sent through the post, the offence of abetment by instigation is completed so soon as the contents of such letter become known to the addressee, and such offence is triable at the place where such letter is received. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SHEO DIAL MAL* . . . *I. L. R. 16 All. 389*

5. ——— Bombay Police Act (Bombay Act IV of 1890), ss. 51 and 52—Duty of a Police-officer to shelter a person in custody—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 330—Using violence for the purpose of extorting a confession—Abetment of causing hurt—Illegal omission to act—Maxim “Respondent superior.” A policeman who stands by, acquiescing in an assault on a prisoner committed by another policeman for the purpose of extorting a confession, is guilty of abetment of an offence under s. 330 of the Penal Code. Nothing but fear of instant death is a defence for

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a policeman who tortures any one by order of a superior. The maxim *respondet superior* has no application in such a case. Under the Bombay Police Act (Bombay Act IV of 1890), every Police-officer is bound to shelter a person in custody, and to arrest persons committing assaults likely to cause grievous bodily injury. If he omits to perform this duty, he is guilty of abetment. When the law imposes a duty to act on a person, his illegal omission to act renders him liable to punishment. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LATIFKHAN*

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 394

6. _____ Non-commission of offence abetted. It is not necessary to constitute the offence of abetment that the act abetted should be committed. *IN THE MATTER OF DINO NATH BEROA* 18 W. R. Cr. 32

7. _____ Abetment of abetment of offence—*Penal Code, s. 108, Exp. 2 and 4.* It is not necessary to an indictment for the abetment of an abetment of an offence to show that such offence was actually committed. *EMPRESS v. TROYLUCKHO NATH CHOWDHRY.* I. L. R. 4 Calc. 366
3 C. L. R. 525

8. _____ Acquittal of principal—*Conviction of abettor.* The offence of abetment under the Indian Penal Code is a substantive offence. The conviction of an abettor is, therefore, in no way dependent on the conviction of the principal. *REG. v. MARUTI DADA*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 15

9. _____ *Penal Code, s. 109.*—S. 109 of the Penal Code contemplates that the act abetted should be committed in consequence of the abetment. *QUEEN. v. RAJCOOMAR BANERJEE*
1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 105

10. _____ Supplying food to person about to commit a crime—*Facilitating commission of crime.* The supplying of food to a person about to commit a crime is not necessarily an abetment of the crime; but if food were supplied in order that the criminal might go on a journey to the intended scene of the crime, or conceal himself while waiting for an opportunity to commit the crime, the supplying of food would be in order to facilitate the commission of the crime and might facilitate it. *EMPRESS v. LINGAM RAMANNA*

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 137

11. _____ *Penal Code, s. 114.* According to s. 114 of the Penal Code, if the nature of the act constitutes abetment, the abettor, if present, is to be deemed to have committed the offence, though in point of fact another actually committed it. *ANONYMOUS* 4 Mad. Ap. 37

12. _____ In order to bring a prisoner within s. 114 of the Penal Code, it is necessary, first, to make out the circumstances which constitute abetment, so that, "if absent," he would have been "liable to be punished as an abettor," and then to show that he was also present when the offence was committed. *QUEEN v. NIRUNI*
7 W. R. Cr. 49

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13. _____ When a person abets the commission of an offence and is present at the time when it is committed, he should be tried under s. 114 of the Penal Code for the same offence as the principal. *REG. v. CHIMA*

8 Bom. Cr. 164

14. _____ *Presence of person at commission of offence—Proof necessary to abetment.* The mere presence as an abettor of any person would not, under the terms of s. 114 of the Penal Code, render him liable for the offence committed. *Empress v. Chatradhari Goala, 2 C. W. N. 49,* explained. In order to bring a person within s. 114 of the Penal Code, it is necessary, first, to make out the circumstances which constitute abetment, so that, if absent, he would have been liable to be punished as an abettor, and then to show that he was also present when the offence was committed. *Queen v. Niruni, 7 W. R. Cr. 49,* relied on. *ABHI MISSER v. LACHMI NARAIN*
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 566
4 C. W. N. 546

15. _____ *Continuing abetment—Withdrawal before offence is committed.* If an abettor of a crime is, on account of his offence at its commission, to be charged under s. 114 of the Penal Code as principal, his abetment must continue down to the time of the commission of the offence. If he distinctly withdraws at any moment before the final act is done, the offence is not committed with his continuing abetment. *REG. v. AMRITA GOVINDA* 10 Bom. 497

16. _____ Abetment by instigation—*Intention of abettor.* The offence of abetment by instigation depends upon the intention of the person who abets, and not upon the act which is actually done by the person whom he abets. *QUEEN v. IMAMDI BHOOTAH* 21 W. R. Cr. 8

17. _____ Assault. Where, of several persons constituting an unlawful assembly, some only are armed with sticks, and A, one of them, is not so armed, but picks up a stick and uses it, B (the master of A), who gives a general order to beat, is guilty of abetting the assault made by A. *QUEEN v. RASOO KOOLLAH* 12 W. R. Cr. 51

18. _____ Bigamy—*Illegal Marriage.* Mere consent of persons to be present at an illegal marriage, or their presence in pursuance of such consent, or the grant of accommodation in a house for the marriage, does not necessarily constitute abetment of such marriage. *EMPRESS v. UMI* I. L. R. 6 Bom. 126

QUEEN v. KUDUM W. R. 1864 Cr. 13

19. _____ *Penal Code, ss. 109, 494.* A Mahomedan guardian of a married female infant, who, while her husband is living, causes a marriage ceremony to be gone through in her name with another man, but without her taking any part in the transaction, does not commit the offence of abetment under ss. 109 and 494 of the Penal Code. The practice of instituting criminal

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proceedings with a view to determining disputes arising in cases of this class condemned. IN THE MATTER OF THE EMPRESS *v.* ABDOL KURREEM

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 10 : 3 C. L. R. 81

20. ———— **Conspiracy—Penal Code, s. 108, expl. 5.** Under expl. 5, s. 108, Penal Code, it is not necessary to the commission of the offence of abetment by conspiracy that the abettor shall concert the offence with the person who commits it. It is sufficient if he engage in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is committed. *QUEEN v. GOBIND DOBEY* . . . 21 W. R. Cr. 35

21. ———— **Conspiracy what must be proved to establish—Evidence Act (I of 1872) s. 10—Hearsay evidence—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) ss. 363, 109.** A little child was kidnapped by persons some of whom were servants of *T.* *N* was for many years *T*'s mistress. *N* was fond of the child, and she used to send for her. The child was missed after a visit to her. The child was found with the assistance of *T.* *N* was thereupon charged with abetment of kidnapping, but no charge was brought against *T.* There was no evidence to shew that the persons who kidnapped the child acted under the orders of *N* or carried out any wish expressed by her. *Held*, that the evidence was insufficient to establish the charge of abetment, or that, if there was any conspiracy, the accused was a party to it; that s. 10 of the Evidence Act could not be properly applied so as to convict *N* by the admission of evidence of what had been "said, done or written by others"; and that a conspiracy within the terms of s. 10 of the Evidence Act contemplates more than the joint action of two or more persons to commit an offence. *NOGENDRABALA DEBEE v. EMPRESS* . . . 4 C. W. N. 523

22. ———— **Criminal breach of trust—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 408, 114—Abetment of criminal breach of trust by servant—Want of knowledge of the commission of the breach of trust—Evidence of an accomplice.** To support a conviction for abetment of criminal breach of trust by a servant, it must be proved that the transaction was a dishonest transaction; that the accused knew that, in respect of such transaction, the servant was acting dishonestly, and was committing a breach of trust; and that the accused abetted the servant in effecting it. *BALGOBIND SHAHA v. EMPRESS* . . . 4 C. W. N. 309

23. ———— **Execution of unstamped document—Receipt of unstamped document.** The mere receipt of an unstamped instrument does not constitute the offence of abetment of the execution of such an instrument. *EMPRESS v. JANKI* I. L. R. 7 Bom. 82

24. ———— **Penal Code, s. 107—Act I of 1879 (Stamp Act) s. 6—Abetment of making an unstamped receipt.** A debtor, having paid a sum of money to his creditor, accepted from the latter an unstamped receipt promising to affix a stamp thereto. *Held*, that this did not constitute abetment, within the meaning of s. 107 of the Penal

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Code, of the offence of making an unstamped receipt. *EMPRESS v. BAHADUR SINGH, Weekly Notes All. 1885, 30*, distinguished. *EMPRESS v. JANKI*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 82, and *EMPRESS v. BHAIROM, Weekly Notes All. 1884, 37*, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MITTHU LAL* . . . I. L. R. 8 All. 18

25. ———— **Extortion—Village chowkidar—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) s. 384.** The mere fact that the offence of extortion under s. 384 of the Penal Code is committed in the presence of the village chowkidar, without eliciting any disapproval on his part, will not render him liable as an abettor of the offence. *In the matter of the Petition of GOPAL CHUNDER SIRDAR. GOPAL CHUNDER SIRDAR v. FOOLMONT BEWA* I. L. R. 8 Calc. 728

11 C. L. R. 223

26. ———— **False charge—Giving false evidence.** There being no abetment of an offence after it has been committed, a person cannot be convicted of abetting the offence of instituting a false charge, on evidence which shows only that he gave evidence in support of a charge found to be false. *In the matter of JUGUT MOHINI DASSEE v. MADHU SUDAN DATTA* . . . 10 C. L. R. 4

27. ———— **Giving evidence in support of false charge—Penal Code, ss. 109 and 211.** A person cannot be convicted of abetment of a false charge, solely on the ground of his having given evidence in support of such charge. *QUEEN v. RAM PANDA* . . . 9 B. L. R. Ap. 16
QUEEN v. PAUN PANDAH . . . 18 W. R. Cr. 23

28. ———— **False evidence—Intention.** In order to convict a person of abetting the commission of a crime, it is not only necessary to prove that he has taken part in those steps of the transaction which are innocent, but in some way or other it is absolutely necessary to connect him with those steps of the transaction which are criminal. There can be no offence of abetment of giving false evidence unless the person charged with abetment intended, not only that the statement should be made, but intended that the statement should be made falsely. *QUEEN v. NIM CHAND MOOKERJEE* 20 W. R. Cr. 41

29. ———— **Asking witness to suppress evidence.** The prisoner asked a witness to suppress certain facts in giving his evidence against the prisoner before the Deputy Magistrate on a charge of defamation: *Held*, that this was abetment of giving false evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding, and was triable before a Court of Session only. *In re ANDY CHETTY* . . . 2 Mad. 438

30. ———— **Grievous hurt.** Where *A* ordered *B* and *C* to seize and forcibly take *D* in the contemplation of an assault upon *D*, and *D* was so beaten and tortured as to have died in consequence: *Held* that *A* was guilty at least of abetting the commission of voluntarily causing grievous hurt. *QUEEN v. DOORGESSUR SURMAH* 7 W. R. Cr. 97

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31. ———— Where *A* gave a *dao* to *B*, who had given out his intention to coerce the party against whom he was acting, and who inflicted grievous hurt on such party with the *dao*, *A* was guilty of abetment within the 2nd head of cl. 3 of s. 107, Penal Code. *QUEEN v. ESHAN MEAH* 12 W. R. Cr. 52

32. ———— **Murder—Proof of offence.** There can be no conviction for abetment of murder without proof of murder. *QUEEN v. ASKUR* W. R. 1864, Cr. 12

33. ———— **Murder by impossible means.** *Quære*: Whether abetment to murder by sorcery or other impossible means is an offence under the Penal Code. *REG. v. PESTANJI DINSHA* 10 Bom. 75

34. ———— **Penal Code, s. 111—Knowledge of abettor—Probable consequences of abetment.** *M* and *C* were proved to have conspired at a robbery in which excessive violence was used, resulting in the death of the persons robbed. The Sessions Judge convicted *M* and *C* of abetment of murder, on the ground that the death was "a probable consequence of the intention known and abetted" by them. *Held*, that the test of guilt in charges of abetment must always be whether, having regard to the immediate object of the instigation or conspiracy, the act done by the principal is one which, according to ordinary experience and common sense, the abettor must have foreseen as probable; and that, having regard both to the strictness of the tests which should be applied to the interpretation of a penal statute, and specially of a section such as s. 111 of the Penal Code, and also to the necessary difficulty of questions as to the state of a man's mind at a particular moment, it could not, in the present case, be said that, because the accused knew of and conspired at the intended robbery, they must be presumed to have foreseen that such excessive violence as was used was probable. *QUEEN EMPRESS v. MATHURA DAS* I. L. R. 6 All. 491

35. ———— **Penal Code, ss. 114 and 302—Constructive murder—Standing by and doing nothing to prevent murder.** Where the actual commission of the murder was by some other person, and the accused were present standing near without doing anything, and there was no evidence to shew that when the accused left the place they started from with the actual perpetrator of the deed they shared with him the common object of causing the death of the deceased or knew that his death was likely to be caused, or that the number of assailants with a common object was five or more, but it was proved that they were armed with lathis and did nothing to prevent the murder, they cannot be convicted of constructive murder under s. 302 read with s. 149, Penal Code, but they ought to be convicted of constructive murder under s. 302 read with s. 114. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHATRADHARI GOALA* 2 C. W. N. 49

ABETMENT—*contd.*

36. ———— **Suicide—Assisting leper in sacrificial act.** *Held* (*PEARSON, J. dissenting*), that where certain persons assisted a leper in the ceremonies connected with the performance by the leper of the sacrificial act, they were rightly found guilty of abetment of suicide. *GOVERNMENT v. GOPAL SINGH* 1 Agra Cr. 21

37. ———— **Assisting in Sutte.** Evidence that a woman prepared herself to commit suicide in the presence of the accused, that they followed her to the pyre and stood by her, her stepsons crying "Ram, Ram," and one of the accused admitting that he told the woman to say "Ram, Ram, and she would become *suttee*," proves active connivance and unequivocal countenance of the suicide by the accused, and justifies the inference that they had engaged with her in a conspiracy for the commission of the *suttee*. *QUEEN v. MOHIT PANDEY* 3 N. W. 316

38. ———— **Theft—Penal Code, s. 107, expl. 1.** A person can be convicted of abetment of theft, under the first explanation of s. 107 of the Penal Code, only if he either procure or attempts to procure the commission of the theft. Mere subsequent knowledge of the offence is insufficient. *QUEEN v. SHUMEERUDEEN* 2 W. R. Cr. 40

39. ———— **Penal Code, ss. 107, cls. 2 and 3, and 109.** A prisoner who consented to form one of a party who committed theft, and resiled from his agreement, but was present at the commission of the theft, does not come within cl. 2, s. 107, Penal Code, and ought not to have been convicted of the theft, but of the abetment thereof, under cl. 3, s. 107, and s. 109, Penal Code, read together. *QUEEN v. BODHUN MOOSHUR* 8 W. R. Cr. 78

40. ———— The carrying off of certain buffaloes belonging to the complainant by order of the accused, and the retention of them in the custody of the latter's servant, were held to be an abetment of theft as defined in the Penal Code. *In the matter of the petition of TARINEE PERSAD BANERJEE* 18 W. R. Cr. 8

41. ———— **Torture—Common object.** Where several prisoners were all concerned in a case of torture, and were prosecuting a common object, each was held guilty as a principal, and not as an abettor of others. *QUEEN v. TARINEE CHURN CHUTTOPADHYA* 7 W. R. Cr. 3

42. ———— **Penal Code, s. 107, expl. 2—Keeping out of the way with knowledge that offence is to be committed.** Where a head constable, who knew that certain persons were likely to be tortured for the purpose of extorting confession, purposely kept out of the way, it was held that he was guilty of abetment under the words of s. 107 of the Penal Code, exp. 2. *QUEEN v. KALI CHURN GANGOOLY* 21 W. R. Cr. 11

43. ———— **Act XIV of 1866 (Post Office Act)—Penal Code, s. 109.** Act XIV of 1866 does not provide for the punishment of abet-

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ting an offence under that Act. Under s. 109 of the Penal Code, the abetment must be of an offence punishable under that Act, and not of an offence punishable under a distinct and special law. *QUEEN v. RAMLUGUN LALL* . 7 W. R. Cr. 54

44. ————— Excise Act XXI of 1856. The Excise Act of 1856 contained no provision for the punishment of abetment. *QUEEN v. KULLIMOODEEN* . 7 W. R. Cr. 53

45.—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 211—False information to police—False charge, prosecution for—Facts amounting to offence—Abetment, knowing that charge is false—Advice with knowledge—Prejudice. In the course of a quarrel between Ramlogan and Bandhan, Topsi, who was sitting near, took Ramlogan's part and struck Bandhan, whereupon Bandhan fled. Ramlogan then directed Topsi to lodge an information in the thana to the effect that Bandhan had stolen a bag of money of Topsi's and made off with it. Topsi laid the information. The story was disbelieved, and subsequently both Ramlogan and Topsi were convicted under s. 211 of the Indian Penal Code. On the contention that there was no finding which would justify the conviction of Ramlogan, in that he did nothing but give Topsi a piece of advice: *Held*, that as Ramlogan was present at the time when the theft was alleged to have been committed, the story, if false, was false to Ramlogan's knowledge. That, having made Topsi lodge an information which he knew to be false, Ramlogan was guilty of abetting an offence under s. 211, Indian Penal Code. *Held*, also, that although the conviction was for the substantive offence, as the sentence was sustainable under ss. 211/109, and there was also no ground for supposing that the accused had been prejudiced by the conviction under s. 211, it was not necessary to alter the conviction. The making a false charge before the police falls within the first portion of s. 211, Indian Penal Code. *Queen-Empress v. Karim Buksh*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 633, followed. *RAM LOGAN LAL v. EMPEROR* (1903) . 7 C. W. N. 556

46.—Conspiracy—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) s. 109. *Per* BHASHYAM AYYANGAR, J. Under the Indian Penal Code, conspiracy, except in cases provided for by ss. 311, 400, 401, 402 and 121A of the Code, is a mere species of abetment where an act or an illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and amounts to a distinct offence for each distinct offence abetted by conspiracy. *KING-EMPEROR v. TIRUMAL REDDI* (1901) . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 523

47.—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) s. 498—"Enticing away" a woman—Charge of abetment against the woman enticed—Validity. Where a man has been convicted of enticing away a woman, under s. 498 of the Indian Penal Code, the woman who was enticed away by him cannot be guilty as an abettor. Whether a woman could be convicted of abetting the taking away of herself within the meaning of s. 498—*Quere*. *In re BALAMBAL* (1902) . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 463

ABKARI LAWS.

See BENGAL EXCISE ACTS.

See BOMBAY ABKARI ACT (V OF 1878).

See LORD'S DAY ACT. 1 B. L. R. A. Cr. 17

See MADRAS ABKARI ACT.

ABSCONDING OFFENDER.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 88.

I. L. R. 27 All. 572

See PENAL CODE, s. 172.

5 W. R. Cr. 71

7 N. W. 302

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 393

9 W. R. Cr. 70

1. ————— Evidence of guilt. A prisoner's absconding is but a small item in evidence of his guilt. *QUEEN v. SAROB ROY* . 5 W. R. Cr. 28

2. ————— Evidence of absconding is some evidence of guilt, but where it is shewn that the accused may have run away to avoid the consequence of being charged with an offence different from that for which he was being tried, no effect should be given to his running away. *RAKHAL NIKARI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

2 C. W. N. 81

3. ————— Proclamation—Forfeiture of property—Criminal Procedure Code (1861) s. 183, (1872) s. 171. Before the passing of an order declaring the property of an accused person, who cannot be found, to be at the disposal of the Government, there must be a proclamation, under s. 183, Code of Criminal Procedure, specifying a time within which such person is required to appear. But before a Magistrate can issue such a proclamation, he must be satisfied that such person has absconded or is concealing himself for the purpose of avoiding the service of the warrant. *SHEODYAL SINGH v. GIRBAN SINGH* . 6 W. R. Cr. 73, 79

4. ————— Criminal Procedure Code (1861), ss. 183, 184, (1872), ss. 171, 172—Issue of proclamation for appearance—Forfeiture of property. In order to lay a sufficient foundation for the issue of a proclamation under s. 185, Act XXV of 1861, and the accompanying order of attachment under s. 184, the Magistrate must, on some sufficient materials, find judicially that the person against whom the proclamation is to be issued has absconded or concealed himself for the purpose of avoiding the service of the warrant of arrest previously issued against him. *Semble*: *Per* PHEAR, J. The period of thirty days, which is prescribed in s. 183 as the minimum period within which the person is to be required by the proclamation to appear, runs from the date on which the publication in the mode prescribed by the same section should be effected, not from the date of the issue of the proclamation. The declaration of forfeiture directed to be made in s. 184 was intended to be in furtherance of a matter of procedure, and not simply as a mode of punishment for contempt of process: therefore, where it is not made before the person

ABSCONDING OFFENDER—contd.

affected by the proclamation has come in, or has been brought in, it ought not to be made at all. *In the matter of the Petition of RAMKISHAR SEIN*

10 B. L. R. Ap. 14
19 W. R. Cr. 12

5. ————— *Procedure—Forfeiture of property.* Sections 183 and 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861 (proclamation and attachment of property of absconding parties), do not apply to offences punishable with imprisonment extending to six months only. There is no rule which requires a Magistrate to satisfy himself that a party has absconded before issuing a proclamation, but the party, on suing to recover his property, may prove by evidence that he had not absconded. Before a Magistrate proceeds to declare attached property forfeited, he should take evidence to prove compliance with the formalities laid down by law with regard to proclamation. *QUEEN v. MUDDUN MOHUN PODAR* . . . 3 W. R. Cr. 34

6. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (1882), ss. 87, 88, 89, and 537—Proclamation for person absconding—Attachment of his property—Irregularity in publication of proclamation.* An accused person for whose arrest a warrant had been issued having absconded, a proclamation was issued and affixed to the Court-house on the 6th of November requiring him to appear on the 11th of December 1893, and his property was attached. The proclamation was not published at the village where the accused resided until the 15th of November. The accused surrendered on the 25th of June 1894, and applied for restoration of the property under the Criminal Procedure Code, s. 89, and an order was made by which the restoration of his property was refused. The accused preferred a petition to the High Court for the revision of that order: *Held*, that there had been no legal proclamation under the Criminal Procedure Code, s. 87, and that the order should be set aside and the attachment declared void. *QUEEN EMPRESS v. SUBBARAYAR* . . . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 3

7. ————— *Proclamation, effect of—Contempt—Application on behalf of accused person absconding.* An accused person, against whom a proclamation has been issued, must, until he has surrendered, be regarded as in contempt, and the Court will not entertain any application on his behalf. *QUEEN v. BISSUR PERSHAD* 2 N. W. 441
Agra F. B., Ed. 1874, 236

8. ————— *Striking off of case, effect of, on contempt order for absconding.* An order striking off a case on account of the little prospect of bringing the guilty parties to trial, cannot dispose of the question of contempt of Court arising out of the fact of the accused having absconded to evade justice. *QUEEN v. MADHOOSUDUN* . . . 7 W. R. Cr. 40

9. ————— *Proclamation, proof of—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 87, 88—Penal Code, s. 176—Presumption—Omnia præsumuntur rite esse acta.* Where K was convicted under s. 176, Penal

ABSCONDING OFFENDER—contd.

Code, of having intentionally omitted to inform the police of the presence of V, a proclaimed offender, at a certain village: *Held*, it could not be presumed by the Court that V was a proclaimed offender, because it was proved that his property had been attached under the provisions of s. 88 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1882. *Held*, the prosecutor was bound to prove the fact of proclamation: *In the matter of the petition of PANDYA NAYAK*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 436

10. ————— *Attachment of property—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 184—Forfeiture of property.* The words "order the attachment of any moveable or immovable property" in s. 184 of the Criminal Procedure Code are enabling and not restrictive, and the Magistrate may attach both kinds of property. But he must issue his warrant of attachment simultaneously with the proclamation, if he resorts to attachment at all: *ANONYMOUS CASE* . . . 4 Mad. Ap. 48

11. ————— *Reason for absconding—Forfeiture of property.* The forfeiture of the property of an absconding offender, who appears within two years from the attachment of his property, should not be carried into effect until after a regular inquiry into the causes of the offender's absence. *In the matter of BISHONATH SIRCAR* . . . 3 W. R. Cr. 63

12. ————— *Power to make order as to property—Penal Code, s. 174.* Where property of an absconding offender had been attached and declared to be at the disposal of Government under s. 184 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the offender was subsequently convicted under s. 174 of the Penal Code, and such conviction was upheld on appeal: *Held*, that the High Court had no power to make any order with respect to such property. *In the matter of the petition of the GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL* . . . 9 B. L. R. 342

GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL v. SURWAR JAN
18 W. R. Cr. 33

13. ————— *Power to try claim of third parties—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 184, 185.* A Magistrate has no power under ss. 184, 185 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, to investigate the claims of third persons to property which has been attached, as that of absconding offenders. *QUEEN v. CHUMROO ROY*
7 W. R. Cr. 35

In re CHUNDER BHON SINGH . 17 W. R. Cr. 10

14. ————— *Power to try claims of third parties—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 88, 89—Proceedings of Magistrate—"Judicial proceedings."*—There is no provision of law requiring a Magistrate, who has attached property under s. 88 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to investigate the claims of third persons to the ownership of such property. *Queen v. Chumroo Roy*, 7 W. R. Cr. 35, followed. The proceedings of a Magistrate under s. 88 of the Criminal Procedure Code are therefore not "judicial proceedings" in

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the sense of s. 4 (d) of that Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SHEODIHAL RAI* . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 487

15. *Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 88—Attachment of property as of an absconding person—Claim to property attached—Procedure—Right of suit—Revision.* When a claim is made to property attached under s. 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate should stay the sale to give the claimant time to establish his right. If the Magistrate errs, the remedy of the aggrieved party is by civil suit, and not by criminal revision petition. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KANDAPPA GOUNDAN.* I. L. R. 20 Mad. 88

16. *Title given by Magistrate's sale—Sale in execution of decree—Sale by Magistrate—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872) s. 172.* A, having been accused of an offence under the Penal Code, absconded, and his property was, on the 7th of August 1878, attached by the Magistrate under s. 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Act X of 1872. While the property was so under attachment, it was attached by B in execution of a money-decree against A and sold on the 15th of January 1879, B being the purchaser. On the 21st of April 1880, the Magistrate sold the property to C. It did not appear whether the time fixed by the Magistrate's proclamation for A's appearance had expired at the date of the sale to B. *Held*, in a suit for possession by B against C, that the title obtained by C under the Magistrate's sale was superior to the title (if any) obtained by B at the sale in execution of the money-decree. *See* *semble*: that after the date of the attachment by the Magistrate under s. 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and during its continuance, no title could be conferred by an attachment and sale subsequently made in execution of a money-decree. *GOLAM ABED v. TOOLSEERAM BERA* . . . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 361
12 C. L. R. 411

17. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 87, 88, 89—Proclamation and attachment—Sale of attached property—Title of purchaser.* Where property was attached and sold as property of a proclaimed offender under ss. 87 and 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was *held* that, although the proclamation was irregular, yet the property having vested in third parties, strangers to the proceedings in which the proclamation was made, the sale could not be set aside. *ABDULLAH v. JITU* . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 216

18. *Defence—Right of private defence—Public servant—Unlawful assembly—Public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office—Institution of proceedings—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 87, 88 and 190—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 99, 143 and 182.* A Magistrate issued a proclamation under s. 87 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and an order of attachment, under s. 88, of the property of certain absconding accused persons. During the attachment an objection was raised that the property being attached did not belong to the absconders.

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The police officer, on being informed by the *patwari* that it was their property, continued the attachment. A mob, among whom were the accused, assembled, and, by assuming a threatening attitude, prevented the police officer from further attaching the property. *Held*, that the conviction of accused under ss. 143, 183 of the Penal Code was right. *Held*, further, that even supposing the property attached was not the property of the absconders, the rightful owner had no right of private defence of his property, inasmuch as the evidence showed that the police officer was acting in good faith under colour of his office; and, even supposing the order of attachment might not have been properly made, that would in itself be no sufficient ground for such a defence. *Held*, also, that where the attaching police officer sent a person to inform the Magistrate of what had taken place, and the Magistrate thereupon sent the Senior Inspector to the spot to take up the case, instructing him to take the statement of the attaching police officer as the first information of the occurrence and to send it in to him (the Magistrate), so that proceedings might be taken, it could not be said that the proceedings in the case had not been properly instituted. *BHAI LAL CHOWDHRY v. EMPEROR (1902)* . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 417:
6 C. W. N. 680

ABSENCE FROM BRITISH INDIA.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 7.

1 B. L. R. S. N. 25

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 13.

ABSOLUTE BEQUEST.

See WILL . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 364

ABSOLUTE ESTATE.

See GRANT . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1069

See HINDU LAW . . . 12 C. W. N. 231

ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

ABUSE, SUIT FOR DAMAGES FOR.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—
ABUSE, DEFAMATION, AND SLANDER,
SUITS FOR.

See SLANDER.

ABWABS.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885), s. 74. . . 12 C. W. N. 175

See CESS . . . 6 C. W. N. 360
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 17

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 13.
9 C. W. N. 469

*Cesses—Puja kharach—
Road and Public Works Cesses—Bengal Tenancy.*

ABWABS—concl'd.

Act (VIII of 1885) s. 74—Interest—Miscellaneous cases—Arrears of rent—Contract subsequent to the passing of the Act—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 67, 178 (3), cl. h (1). Where by the terms of the kabuliati a tenant agreed to pay, in excess of the rent, Road and Public Works cesses at the rate of one anna per rupee and puja kharach at the rate of half anna per rupee according to the kist of rent: *Held*, that the puja kharach was an abwab, but that the cesses would not come within the definition of an abwab in s. 74 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and the contract to pay more than the proportion payable by the tenant under the Road Cess Act was legal. *Surnomoyee Dabee v. Koomar Purresh Narain Roy*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 576, referred to. S. 178 (3), cl. (h) of the Bengal Tenancy Act is applicable to a contract entered into after the passing of the Act, namely, the 14th March 1885, and the parties would not be competent to contract themselves out of the provision in s. 67, which limits the interest to simple interest at 12 per cent. per annum by the device of making the rent payable otherwise than quarterly, and such a contract would not be enforceable in so far as it may provide for payment of interest at a rate higher than 12 per cent. *Hemanta Kumari Dabi v Jagadindra Nath Roy*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 214: L. R. 21 I. A. 131, explained. *NARENDRA KUMAR GHOSH v. GORA CHAND PODDAR* (1906) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 683

ACCESSORY.

Accessory after the fact. Under the Indian Law, no one is liable for being an accessory after the fact. *RAKHAL NIKASI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . 2 C. W. N. 81

ACCIDENT.

See DAMAGES, SUIT FOR.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 381

loss by—

See CARRIERS.

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

I. L. R. 23 All. 367

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 126, 597

ACCOMMODATION ACCEPTOR.

See BILL OF EXCHANGE.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 174

ACCOMMODATION DRAWER.

See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY—DISCHARGE OF SURETY . . . 7 B. L. R. 535

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 132

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 241

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 172

ACCOMPLICE.

See APPROVER.

See CHARGE TO JURY—MISDIRECTION.

6 W. R. Cr. 17, 44

6 Bom. Cr. 57

8 W. R. 19

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 196

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 642

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 1

ACCOMPLICE—concl'd.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 611

See PARDON . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1353

1. *Corroboration, necessity for—Setting aside conviction for error in law.* The uncorroborated testimony of one or more accomplice or accomplices is sufficient in law to support a conviction. The evidence of accomplices should not be left to the jury without such directions and observations from the Judge as the circumstances of the case may require, pointing out to them the danger of trusting to such evidence when it is not corroborated by other evidence. The omission to do so is an error in law in the summing up by the Judge, and is, on appeal, a ground for setting aside the conviction, when the Appellate Court thinks that the prisoner has been prejudiced by such omission, and that there has been a failure of justice. The nature and extent of the corroboration requisite, explained and illustrated. *QUEEN v. ELAHI BAK*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 459

5 W. R. Cr. 80

QUEEN v. BAKANTHANATH BANERJEE

3 B. L. R. F. B. 2 note

QUEEN v. CHUTTERDHAREE SING

5 W. R. Cr. 59

2. *Evidence of accomplices.* Observations on the necessity of requiring corroboration, in material particulars, of the evidence of an accomplice. *Queen-Empress v. Ram Saran*, I. L. R. 8 All. 306, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. IMDAD KHAN* . I. L. R. 8 All. 120

3. *A prisoner should not be convicted on the sole and uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice who was made a witness after a pardon was granted to him.* *QUEEN v. NUNHOO* . . . 9 W. R. Cr. 28

4. *The testimony of an accomplice is not alone sufficient for a conviction. The corroboration must be on matters directly connecting the prisoner with the offence of which he is accused; and the evidence of two or more accomplices requires confirmation equally with the testimony of one.* *QUEEN v. DWARKA*

5 W. R. Cr. 18

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 100

5. *Charge to assessors.* There is no rule of law that the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice is sufficient for a conviction. The proper form of the charge to the assessors in such cases stated. *ANONYMOUS*

4 Mad. Ap. 7

6. *Evidence Act (II of 1855), s. 28.* A jury may convict upon the evidence of an accomplice, though not corroborated so as to show the prisoner's actual participation in the offence. S. 28, Act II of 1855, applied only to the old Supreme Courts, and the rules and practice prevailing in them; and does not show that in the Courts of the mofussil corroborative

ACCOMPLICE—contd.

evidence is legally requisite to support the testimony of an accomplice. *QUEEN v. GODAI RAOUT*

5 W. R. Cr. 11

7. *English practice.*

The English practice should be followed as to the amount of corroboration required to support the evidence of an accomplice, which is, that when he speaks to two or more persons as having been concerned in the same offence, his testimony should be confirmed, not only as to the circumstances of the case, but also as to the identity of the prisoners; and that any prisoner as to whom his testimony is not supported should be acquitted. *REG. v. IMAM VALAD BABAU*

3 Bom. Cr. 57

See *REG. v. GANU BIN DHAROJI*

6 Bom. Cr. 57

8. *Witness erroneously*

treated as accomplice. Where the Magistrate erroneously treated a witness as an accomplice, and granted him a conditional pardon: *Held* that the evidence did not require corroboration. *REG. v. FATTECHAND VASTACHAND*

5 Bom. Cr. 85

9. *Evidence of ac-*

complice. The evidence requisite for the corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice must proceed from an independent and reliable source, and previous statements made by the accomplice himself, though consistent with the evidence given by him at the trial, are insufficient for such corroboration. The confession of one of the prisoners cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of an accomplice against the others; tainted evidence not being made better by being corroborated by other tainted evidence. *REG. v. MALAPA BIN KAPANA*

11 Bom. 196

QUEEN v. BALJOO CHOWDHRY

25 W. R. Cr. 43

10. *Evidence of ac-*

complices. It is an established rule of practice that an accomplice must be corroborated by independent evidence as to the identity of every person whom he impeaches. *Reg. v. Malapa, 11 Bom. 196,* and *Reg. v. Nanku, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 475,* followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KRISHNABHAT*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 319

11. *Evidence Act,*

1872, s. 114. *Held* on a consideration of the Evidence Act, 1872, s. 114, that the Legislature intended to lay down as a maxim or rule of evidence that the testimony of an accomplice is unworthy of credit so far as it implicates an accused person, unless it is corroborated in material particulars in respect to that person; and it is the duty of a Court, which has to deal with an accomplice's testimony, to consider whether this maxim applies to exclude that testimony or not, and in a case tried by jury to draw the attention of the jury to the principles relative to the reception of an accomplice's testimony. *QUEEN v. SADHU MUNDAL*

21 W. R. Cr. 69

ACCOMPLICE—contd.

12. *Evidence Act, 1872, ss. 114 and 133.* S. 133 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) in unmistakable terms lays it down that a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, and to hold that corroboration is necessary is to refuse to give effect to this provision. The rule in s. 114 of the Evidence Act coincides with the rule observed in England, that though the evidence of an accomplice should be carefully scanned and received with caution, and may be treated as unworthy of credit, yet if the jury or the Court credits the evidence, a conviction proceeding upon it is not illegal. *REG. v. RAMASAMI PADAYACHI*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 394

QUEEN v. KOA

19 W. R. Cr. 48

13. *Evidence Act, 1872, ss. 114 and 133—Evidence unworthy of credit.* Although under s. 133 of the Indian Evidence Act the conviction of a prisoner on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is not illegal, the Court, having reference to illustration (b), s. 114 of that Act, considered in this case that the accomplice was unworthy of credit. *QUEEN v. LUCHMEE PERSHAD*

19 W. R. Cr. 43

14. Although by s. 133, Act I of 1872, an accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person, and a conviction would not be illegal merely because it proceeded upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, yet it would be unsafe, where the testimony of the accomplice is not corroborated in any material point except by the confession of a fellow-prisoner whose testimony likewise requires corroboration, to convict the accused. *QUEEN v. UDHAN BIND*

19 W. R. Cr. 68

15. *Evidence Act, 1872, s. 133. Per EDGE, C.J.*—Although as a general rule it would be most unsafe to convict an accused person on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, such evidence must, like that of any other witness, be considered and weighed by the Judge, who, in doing so, should not overlook the position in which the accomplice at the time of giving his evidence may stand, and the motives which he may have for stating what is false. If the Judge, after making due allowance for these considerations and the probabilities of the story, comes to the conclusion that the evidence of the accomplice, although uncorroborated, is true, and the evidence, if believed, establishes the guilt of the prisoner, it is his duty to convict. *Reg. v. Ramasami Padayachi, I. L. R. 1 Mad. 394, Empress v. Hardeo Dass, Weekly Notes All. 1884, 286, and Queen-Empress v. Ram Saran, I. L. R. 8 All. 306, referred to, Queen-Empress v. Ram Saran, I. L. R. 8 All. 306, explained and distinguished by STRAIGHT, J. Per BRODHURST, J., contra.*—Observations as to the necessity of corroboration in material particulars of the evidence of accomplice witnesses. *Queen-Empress v. Ram Saran, I. L. R. 8 All. 306, Queen v. Ramsaday Chuckerbutty, 20 W. R. Cr. 19, and Reg.*

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v. Budhu Nanku, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 475, referred to. *Per EDGE, C.J.*, and *STRAIGHT, J.*—Every case as it arises must be decided on its own facts, and not on supposed analogies to other cases. *QUEEN-EM-RESS v. GOBARDHAN* . **I. L. R. 9 All. 528**

16. *Evidence of accomplices—Act I of 1872, ss. 114 (b), 133.* The law in India, as expressed in s. 133 and s. 114 of the Evidence Act, and which is in no respect different from the law of England on the subject, is that a conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is not illegal, that is, it is not unlawful; but experience shows that it is unsafe and hence it is the practice of the Judges, both in England and in India, when sitting alone, to guard their minds carefully against acting upon such evidence when uncorroborated, and when trying a case with a jury, to warn the jury that such a course is unsafe. There must be some corroboration independent of the accomplice, or of a co-confessing prisoner, to show that the party accused was actually engaged directly in the commission of the crime charged against him. A second accomplice does not improve the position of the first, and, if there are two, it is necessary that both should be corroborated. The accomplice must be corroborated not only as to one but as to all of the persons affected by the evidence, and corroboration of his evidence as to one prisoner does not entitle his evidence against another to be accepted without corroboration. *R. v. Webb, 6 C. & P. 595, R. v. Dyke, 8 C. & P. 261, R. v. Addis, 6 C. & P. 388, and R. v. Wilkes, 7 C. & P. 272*, referred to. The possession of property taken from a murdered person is not adequate corroboration of the evidence of an accomplice charging such person in possession with participation in the murder, though it would, no doubt, be corroboration of evidence that the prisoner participated in a robbery, or that he had dishonestly received stolen property. In the trial of *R, S, and M* upon a charge of murder, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of (i) the confession of *P*, who was jointly tried with them for the same offence; (ii) the evidence of an accomplice; (iii) the evidence of witnesses who deposed to the discovery in *R's* house of property belonging to the deceased; and (iv) the evidence of witnesses who deposed that, on the day when the deceased was last seen alive, all the prisoners were seen together near the place where the body was afterwards found. *Held*, that there was no sufficient corroboration of the statements of the accomplice or of the co-confessing prisoner *P*. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAM SARAN* **I. L. R. 8 All. 306**

17. *Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 133.* A Magistrate should not convict a person upon the evidence of witnesses who are no better than accomplices and whose evidence is not corroborated in material respects by other independent evidence in the case. *JOGENDRA NATH BHAWMIK v. SANGAP GARO* . **2 C. W. N. 55**

18. *Compulsion as an excuse for crime—Pretence as evidence of common*

ACCOMPLICE—contd.

intention—Fear of instant death—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) ss. 34 and 94—Evidence Act (I of 1872) s. 133—Power of High Court in Revision. The accused, who were classers employed in the Revenue Survey Department, were charged, under s. 161 of the Penal Code, with taking bribes from the raiyats of certain villages. The only evidence against the accused was that of persons who had either subscribed to the bribes or collected subscriptions or paid the money to the accused. They stated that they had offered the bribes, because the classers had threatened to raise the assessment, cut down the hedges, and erect new boundary-marks. As regards this evidence, the trying Magistrate remarked that, even if all the witnesses for the prosecution were treated as accomplices, it was open to him to convict on their uncorroborated testimony, as "there was inherent truth in their statements, and circumstances existed which negated the presumption of a conspiracy, and evidenced signs of truthfulness." The Magistrate was also of opinion that there was a distinction between accomplices who volunteered to assist in the receipt of illegal gratifications and those who assisted under compulsion. In the opinion of the Magistrate, the witnesses in the present case belonged to the latter class, and there was no reason to disbelieve their evidence. He therefore convicted the accused under s. 161 of the Penal Code, and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment and fine:—*Held* (*SCOTT, J.*, dissenting), that the convictions were illegal, there being no evidence to corroborate the witnesses for the prosecution, all of whom were accomplices. *Held*, also, (*SCOTT, J.*, dissenting), that there was such error in the consideration by the Magistrate of the evidence as to prejudice the accused, and such a failure of justice as to justify the Court in revision in setting aside the convictions. *PER CURIAM*: The limits of the application of the doctrine of necessity as an excuse for an act otherwise criminal are those prescribed in s. 94 of the Penal Code. Therefore, witnesses who, in order to avoid pecuniary injury or personal molestation, had offered or given bribes to a public servant were abettors of the offence of taking an illegal gratification, and their evidence should be treated as that of accomplices. By the law both of India and England the evidence of an accomplice is admissible, and a conviction is not illegal because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice (s. 133 of the Evidence Act, I of 1872). But the presumption that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless corroborated in material particulars, has become a rule of practice of almost universal application. *PER SCOTT, J.* There may be, however, cases of an exceptional character in which the accomplice evidence alone convinces a Judge, and if he acts on that conviction, with the character of the witnesses clearly present in his mind, a Revisional Court ought not to interfere, in the absence of other circumstances showing a want of judicial discretion. *PER JAR-DINE, J.* The mere circumstances of a person being present on a lawful occasion does not raise a presumption of that person's complicity in an offence then committed so as to make s. 34 of the Penal Code

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applicable. *Reg. v. Farler*, 8 C. & P., 106. Where the Magistrate on that ground did make that presumption against an accused person, and applied the provisions of s. 34, he committed an error in law, and the High Court, as a Court of Revision, might acquit the accused. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MAGANLAL* **I. L. R. 14 Bom. 115**

19. ————— The Court (MITTER and PONTIFEX, JJ., GLOVER, J., dissenting) refused to convict in this case on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice who had previously been convicted of the same offence on her own confession. *QUEEN v. RAMSODOY CHUCKERBUTTY* **20 W. R. Cr. 19**

20. ————— *Accused acquitted, but under arrest, pending appeal under s. 272, Criminal Procedure Code.* K and B were accused of being concerned in the same offence. K was first apprehended, and the Magistrate inquired into the charge against him and committed him for trial, but the Court of Session acquitted K. The Local Government preferred an appeal against his acquittal, and the Magistrate arrested him with a view to his detention in custody until such appeal was determined. While K was so detained, the Magistrate inquired into the charge against B, who had meanwhile been arrested, and made K a witness for the prosecution and committed B for trial. K's evidence was taken on B's trial. *Held per STUART, C.J.* (SPANKIE, J., doubting), that K's arrest was lawful, and that his evidence was admissible against B. *Held per SPANKIE, J.*, that, assuming that the Magistrate looked on K as an accused person and his arrest was lawful, the Magistrate should not have examined him as a witness against B, and that, assuming that K's arrest was unlawful, and that, when he made his statements, he was a free man, his evidence, if admissible, was not evidence on which a Court should place much reliance. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. KARIM BAKHSI* **I. L. R. 2 All. 386**

21. ————— *Person charged with offence and discharged for want of evidence.* There is no law or principle which prevents a person who has been suspected and charged with an offence, but discharged by the Magistrate for want of evidence, being afterwards admitted as a witness for the prosecution on the ground that he is an accomplice. *QUEEN v. BEHARY LALL BOSE* **7 W. R. Cr. 44**

22. ————— *Person cognizant of crime taking no means to present it.* An accused person cannot be convicted solely upon the evidence of persons who are more or less participators in the crime of which he is accused. Where a witness admits that he was cognizant of the crime as to which he testifies, and took no means to prevent or disclose it, his evidence must be considered as no better than that of an accomplice. *QUEEN v. CHANDO CHANDALINEE* **24 W. R. Cr. 55**

23. ————— *Informant cognizant of offence—Omission to disclose commission*

ACCOMPLICE—contd.

of offence. Where an informer was, upon his own statement, cognizant of the commission of an offence, and omitted to disclose it for six days, the Court was not prepared to say that he was an accomplice, but held that his testimony was not such as to justify a conviction except where it was corroborated. *ISHAN CHANDRA CHANDRA v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 328**

24. ————— *Witnesses who have acted as accomplices.* Where witnesses appeared to have taken an active part in carrying away a person after he had been grievously assaulted and was in a helpless condition, and then leaving him in a field where he was subsequently found dead: *Held*, that their evidence was no better than that of accomplices: at any rate, it would be most unsafe for the Court to rely upon their evidence, unless corroborated in material respects, in convicting the accused. *ALIMUDDIN v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* **I. L. R. 23 Calc. 361**

25. ————— *Spy—Distinction between a spy and an accomplice—Detective officer.* The action of a spy and informer in suggesting and initiating a criminal offence is itself an offence, the act not being excused or justified by any exception in the Penal Code or by the doctrine which distinguishes the spy from the accomplice. But the act of a detective in supplying marked money for the detection of a crime cannot be treated as that of an accomplice. Distinction between a spy and an accomplice pointed out. *Rex v. Despard*, 28 State Trials 489, *Reg. v. Mullins*, 3 Cox. C. C. 526, *Queen-Empress v. Mona Puna*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 661, referred to and followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JAVECHARAM* **I. L. R. 19 Bom. 363**

26. ————— *Evidence Act (I of 1872) ss. 114 and 133—Public Officer, offer of bribe to—Corroboration.* A person who offers a bribe to a public officer is an accomplice. *Per BIRDWOOD, J.* A conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. Such evidence, being admissible, furnishes as legal a basis for a conviction as any other evidence which is admissible. The omission to follow the established rule of practice as to the corroboration of such evidence does not constitute an error in law; but where the evidence of an accomplice is not of a character to warrant the refusal of a Court to apply to it the maxim enunciated in illustration (b) of s. 114 of the Evidence Act, a conviction based on such evidence alone would be of questionable propriety. *Per JARDINE, J.* Sections 114 and 133 of the Evidence Act are to be read together, and neither section is to be ignored in the exercise of judicial discretion. The illustration (b) of s. 114—"that the Court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars"—is, however, the rule, and when it is departed from, the Court should show, or it should appear that the circumstances justify, such departure. Accordingly where a conviction was based solely on the evidence

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of accomplices, and the circumstances connected with the preparation and conduct of the case as disclosed by the record, and portions also of the evidence adduced at the trial, showed that it would not be proper to act on that evidence, the Court set aside the conviction. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHAGAN DAYARAM*. I. L. R. 14 Bom. 331

27. ———— *Witness present on occasion of giving a bribe—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) ss. 114, 161—Illegal gratification.* D, a Sub-Inspector, and F, a Head Constable, were charged under s. 161 (giving a bribe) and s. 161 read with s. 114 (abetment of the offence of giving a bribe) of the Penal Code, respectively, and it was contended that these charges were not sustainable, because they rested entirely on the testimony of persons alleged to have been accomplices, who had not been corroborated in material particulars. *Held*, that the mere presence of a person on the occasion of the giving of a bribe, and his omission to promptly inform the authorities, do not constitute him an accomplice, unless it can be shown that he somehow co-operated in the payment of the bribe, or was instrumental in the negotiations for the payment. *Queen v. Chundo Chundalinee*, 24 W. R. Cr. 55, *Queen-Emress v. Magantal*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 115, *Queen-Emress v. Chagan Dayaram*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 331, *Queen-Emress v. O'Hara*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 642, *Ishan Chundra v. Queen-Emress*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 328, *Jogendra Nath Bhawmik v. Sangap Garo*, 2 C. W. N. 55, *Rajoni Kant Bose v. Asan Mullick*, 2 C. W. N. 672, and *Alimuddin v. Queen-Emress*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 361, distinguished. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DEODHAR SINGH* I. L. R. 27 Calc. 144

28. ———— *Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 133—Person accompanying another to witness payment of a bribe—Nature of accomplice evidence.* Where certain persons accompanied another, who was entrusted with and carried the money intended to be given as a bribe to the head constable, with knowledge that it was to be so paid and in order to witness and assist in such payment: *Held*, that they were accomplices. Accomplices are not like ordinary witnesses in respect of credibility, but their evidence is tainted, and should be carefully scrutinized before being accepted. Where the only evidence of the payment of a bribe to the accused, apart from hearsay statements which were not admissible, consisted of the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, which was further in itself improbable, and to some extent inconsistent with the story of the other accomplices, the High Court set aside the conviction. *RAJONI KANT BOSE v. ASAN MULICK* 2 C. W. N. 672

29. ———— *Wrongful confinement—Extortion—Money lent in ordinary course of business to pay amount extorted—Lender—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 213, 342, and 334.* The accused, a Sub-Inspector of Police, arrested one J, wrongfully confined him, and extorted from him Rs200 under a threat that he, the accused, would not release J unless the money

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were paid. This money was paid on this account by P, a money-lender, who lent J the money for this purpose. Accused was convicted under ss. 342 and 384 of the Penal Code. In appeal the Sessions Judge held that P was not an accomplice, and having considered his evidence accordingly dismissed the appeal. *Held*, that P paying such money under the circumstances could not be regarded as an accomplice of the Sub-Inspector in such misconduct. *AKHOY KUMAR CHUCKERBUTTY v. JAGAT CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY* I. L. R. 27 Calc. 925

4 C. W. N. 755

30. ———— *Corroboration, necessity for—Corroboration of evidence given by accomplice—Accomplice by implication or in a secondary sense—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 114 and 133—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 381.* Ordinarily speaking, the evidence of an accomplice should be corroborated in material particulars. At the same time, the amount of criminality is a matter for consideration. When a person is only an accomplice by implication or in a secondary sense, his evidence does not require the same amount of corroboration as that of the person who is an actual participator with the principal offender. In dealing with the question what amount of corroboration is required in the case of testimony given by an accomplice, the Courts must exercise careful discrimination, and look at the surrounding circumstances in order to arrive at a conclusion whether the facts deposed to by the person alleged to be an accomplice are borne out by these circumstances, or whether the circumstances are of such a nature that the evidence purporting to be given by the alleged accomplice should be supported in essential and material particulars by evidence *aliunde* as to the facts deposed to by that accomplice. *KAMALA PRASAD v. SITAL PRASAD* (1901). I. L. R. 28 Calc. 339: s.c. 5 C. W. N. 517

31. ———— *Evidence—Bribery—Evidence Act (I of 1872) ss. 114, 111. (b), and 133—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) s. 161.* It is generally unsafe to convict a person on the evidence of accomplices unless corroborated in material particulars. But, in considering whether this general maxim does or does not apply to a particular case, it must be remembered that all persons coming technically within the category of accomplices cannot be treated as on precisely the same footing: the nature of the offence and the circumstances in which the accomplices make their statements must always be considered. No general rule on the subject can be laid down. A person who gives bribes is an accomplice of the person who receives them; and, while it is usually unsafe to convict a public servant of receiving bribes on the uncorroborated evidence of persons who say they have given them, the question as to the amount of corroboration depends on the circumstances of each case. *KING-EMPEROR v. MALHAR MARTAND KULKARNI* (1901) I. L. R. 26 Bom. 193

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32. ——— **Corroboration, sufficiency of**—*Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 114, 133—Evidence of accomplice.* Certain persons were charged with the murder of N. The confessional statement of one of them, and the evidence of an approver showed that the accused first attacked N, at a spot described as D; that they then carried him from D to a spot described as E; and that from E they carried him to a spot described as F, where he was killed. Three other witnesses deposed to the presence of the accused at D. *Held*, that the evidence of the approver was sufficiently corroborated to justify a conviction. *Reg. v. Wilkes, 7 C. & P. 272*, and *Queen v. Elahi Bax, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. (F.B.) 459*, referred to. **KING-EMPEROR v. MOHIUDDIN SAHIB (1901)** . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 143

33. ——— **Evidence of an accomplice—Compulsory payment of bribe—Corroboration, amount of—Witnesses present at the time of payment of bribe.**—Where the complainant did not willingly offer the bribe, but the accused, a police officer, demanded it before taking up the charge lodged by the complainant and made use of his official position to enforce his demand: *Held*, that the circumstances were such as would justify a conviction on the testimony of accomplices with a much slighter degree of corroboration than would be the case, if the accomplices were entirely voluntary accomplices. *Akhoy Kumar Chuckerbutty v. Jagat Chunder Chuckerbutty, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 925*, approved of. *Emperor v. Malhar Martand Kulkarni, I. L. R. 26 Bom. 193*, referred to. *Held*, also, that those who lent money to the complainant and those who were present, when money was paid to the accused, could not be said to be accomplices, unless they had co-operated in the payment of the bribe or were instrumental in the negotiations for its payment. *Queen-Empress v. Deodhar Sing, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 144*, approved of. *Queen v. Chando Chandaline, 24 W. R. 55*, distinguished. **DEO NANDAN PERSHAD v. EMPEROR (1906)** . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 649

ACCOUNT.

See APPEAL . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 584
See CONTRACT . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 1
See COPYR GHT . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 358
See CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1108
See DECREE—CONSTRUCTION OF DECREE—ACCOUNT.
See DECREE—FORM OF DECREE—ACCOUNT.
See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 34 . 9 C. W. N. 421
See EXECUTOR . 7 C. W. N. 476
 13 C. W. N. 557
See GUARDIAN AND WARD . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 211
See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 106, s. 7 . 9 C. W. N. 537

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See MAHOMEDAN LAW. I. L. R. 29 Bom. 267
See MORTGAGE . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 332
See PARTNERSHIP. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1108
See PARTNERSHIP—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTNERS. . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 53
See PRACTICE . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 267
See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—PARTIES. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 609
See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 298
See PROBATE. . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 628
See PROVINCIAL S. C. COURTS ACT. I. L. R. 28 Mad. 394
See RECEIVER. . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 568
 12 C. W. N. 1035
See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE.
See STAMP DUTY. . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 111
See SUIT FOR CONTRIBUTION . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 303

—— alteration of—

See FORGERY . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 955

—— falsification of—

See FORGERY . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 956

—— liability to—

See MORTGAGE—POSSESSION UNDER MORTGAGE . I. L. R. 25 All. 287

See MORTGAGE—ACCOUNTS.

See ONUS OF PROOF—ACCOUNT.

See PLEDGOR AND PLEDGEE.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 322

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—DUTY OF AGENTS TO ACCOUNT.

See VARIANCE BETWEEN PLEADING AND PROOF—SPECIAL CASES—ACCOUNT

Agra F. B. 47, Ed. 1874, 35
 1 N. W. 28, Ed. 1873, 26
 15 W. R. 24

—— right to an—

See EXECUTOR . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 281

See HINDU LAW—PARTITION—RIGHT TO ACCOUNT ON PARTITION.

See JURISDICTION . 13 C. W. N. 493

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 99. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 463

—— re-opening of—

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 493

—— suit for—

See GUARDIAN AND WARD.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 892

See LIMITATION ACT, SCH. II, ART. 89. 13 C. W. N. 212

ACCOUNT—contd.

1. ———— **Power of Court to order Account instead of referring party to separate suit.** In a suit by the heirs of a deceased Mahomedan to recover from his widow landed property of which she claims to be in possession as absolute owner under a mukurari deed alleged to have been executed in lieu of her dower, where she wholly fails to prove execution of the deed, it is competent to the Court, instead of referring the plaintiffs to a separate suit, to direct an account to be taken of the mesne profits received by the widow and of the amount due to her on account of dower with a view to the settlement of the claims of both parties. *ASLOO v. UMDUTOONISSA*; *UMDUTOONISSA v. ASLOO* . . . 20 W. R. 297

2. ———— **Partition suit—Account of past transactions.** In a partition suit no coparcener has any right to an account of past transactions. *NARAYAN BIN BABAJI v. NATHAJI DURGAJI* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 201

3. ———— **Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 72—Mortgagee in possession expending money to defend his title against mortgagor.**—A mortgagee in possession is, under s. 72 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), entitled to add to his mortgage-debt, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, sums spent by him for making his own title thereto good against the mortgagor. The mere fact that in a redemption suit the mortgagee in possession did not give details of the sums either in the course of the trial or in his written statement is not sufficient to deprive him of his right, seeing that those details can be gone into after the redemption decree providing for an account has been passed. *DATTA RAM v. VINA YAK* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 18

4. ———— **Agreement—Restraint of trade—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 23, 27—Continuous course of action—Damages—Transfer of business to a limited Company—Effect.** Held, that an order directing a Company to furnish an account will not extend beyond, or include contributions, which accrued later than the date when the business of such Company was transferred to a limited Company. *FRASEE AND COMPANY v. THE BOMBAY ICE MANUFACTURING COMPANY* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 107

5. ———— **Contract—Construction—Custom of trade in Bombay—Vendor and purchaser—Principal and agent—Goods ordered nett free godown—No remuneration fixed—Variance between printed and written terms.** Held, that according to the custom of trade in Bombay, when a merchant requests or authorizes a firm to order and to buy and send goods to him from Europe, at a fixed price nett free godown, including duty, or free Bombay harbour, and no rate of remuneration is specifically mentioned, the firm is not bound to account for the price at which the goods were sold to the firm by the manufacturer. And it does not make any difference that the firm receives commission or trade discount from the

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manufacturer, either with or without the knowledge of the merchant. *PAUL BEIER v. CHOTALAL* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 1

6. ———— **Settled accounts—Settlement of accounts by passing a promissory note—No fraud or coercion used—Waiving of examination of accounts by plaintiff of his free will—Accounts not to be re-opened.** The plaintiff and defendant had mutual dealings and accounts. In settling these accounts, the plaintiff of his own free will and accord and without any fraud practised or undue influence exerted by the defendant waived his right to an examination of the accounts for the purpose of ascertaining the balance due and agreed to treat a gross sum of Rs. 3,556 as due from him and accordingly executed a promissory note for that amount. The plaintiff then sued for a declaration that the promissory note in question was fraudulent and had been obtained from him by undue influence, and was good only to the extent of such sum as might be found due on taking an account between the parties. At the trial, the allegations of fraud and undue influence on the part of the defendant and want of free consent on the part of the plaintiff were held not proved. Held, that, on the principle enunciated by the Privy Council in *McKellar v. Wallace*, 5 Moo. I. A. 372, the promissory note must be treated either as the result of a settled account or a settlement by compromise. In either case, it could not be re-opened. *MAGNIRAM v. LAXMINARAYEN* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 353

7. ———— **Will—Executor—Intermeddling with estates—Degree of interference necessary to charge executor—Account on footing of wilful default—Practice—Limitation.**—The plaintiff brought a suit against the executors of the will of her grandfather, praying for a declaration that she was absolutely entitled to the property of her grandfather and for an account of the property in the hands of the executors. The plaintiff claimed as heir and not under the will. Held, that she was only entitled to accounts for six years preceding the suit as she took no interest in the property under the will, and the executors were not trustees for her and the property did not vest in them for any specific purpose in her favour. Such a suit is not a suit for the purpose of following such property in the hands of the executors and trustees. *AYESHABAI v. EBRAHIM* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 364

8. ———— **Settled accounts—Errors—Action.** The requisites for making an account a settled account depend on the circumstances of each case and the mode of dealing between the parties. *Clancarty v. Latouche*, 1 Ball and Beatty 420, 428; *Parkinson v. Hanbury*, L. R. 2 H. L. 1; *McKellar v. Wallace*, 5 Moo. I. A. 372; 8 Moo. P. C. 378, referred to. If a settled account is impeached for errors, particular errors must be stated and proved and the same rule holds even when the account has been settled, errors excepted. Where the plaintiff made no averment in his plaint

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that accounts had been settled, but commenced action on the footing that no accounts had been rendered: *Held*, that the plaintiff could not after the suit had been tried out on that footing be allowed to convert the case into one for re-opening of accounts on the ground of errors contained therein. Procedure in account suits indicated, and that adopted in the present case condemned. In a suit for account, if liability to account is denied by the defendant, the question of accountability is to be tried first. It is only after an adverse decision against the defendant upon this question that he may be called upon to render an account. *Hari Nath Rai v. Krishna Kumar Bakshi*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 147, referred to. *MOHESH CHANDRA BOSU v. RADHA KISHORE BHATTACHARJEE* (1907) . . . 12 C. W. N. 28

9. ———— *Principal and agent—Suits for accounts—Contract in writing registered—Hypothecation of property—Suit to enforce charge—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877) Sch. II, Arts. 89, 116, 132.* Where a gomastha hypothecated certain properties to secure moneys that might be found due from him upon taking accounts: *Held*, that a suit by the principal, in which he not only asked for accounts, but also sought to enforce the charge created in his favour, fell within Art. 182 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act and was not governed by either Art. 89 or Art. 116 of the said schedule. *Semble*: A suit by a principal against his agent for accounts is not "a suit for compensation for breach of a contract in writing registered," when the contract between the parties is embodied in a registered document, and Art. 89 and not Art. 116 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act should govern such a suit. *Motilal Bose v. Amin Chand Chatterpadhya*, 1 C. L. J. 211, doubted. *Ashgar Ali Khan v. Khurshed Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 24 All. 27; *Jogendra Nath Roy v. Deb Nath Chatterjee*, 8 C. W. N. 113; *Madhub Chunder Chuckerbutti v. Debendra Nath Dey*, 1 C. L. J. 147, followed. *HAFIZUDDIN MONDOL v. JADU NATH SAHA* (1908) 12 C. W. N. 820
s.c. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 298

10. ———— *Suit for account—Officer employed by Receiver—Discharge of Receiver—Right of proprietor to sue for account—Agent and sub-agent.* Where a Receiver was appointed in respect of certain properties about which there was a litigation, in which the plaintiff was found to be the proprietor: *Held*, that a suit for account at the instance of the plaintiff does not lie against the *tehsildars* employed under the Receiver as they were his sub-agents and were not liable to render account to the plaintiff. *JATINDRA NARAIN ACHARYA CHOWDHURY v. MOHARAM AKAND* (1908)
12 C. W. N. 1035

11. ———— *Decree—No specific direction as to accounts in the decree—Court cannot direct accounts to be taken before the Commissioner when parties have arrived at an agreement after the decree—Appeal against such an order—Practice.* A decree of the High Court on the Original Side contemplated an

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account being taken between the parties but it was silent on the question as to how that account was to be taken, whether by the Commissioner or by some person selected by both the parties. The Court of first instance decided that where a direction as to account ought to have been incorporated in a decree when passed it was competent to the Court at any stage of proceedings to direct necessary inquiries or accounts to be made or taken. *Held*, on appeal, that as some account was taken under the decree by a person appointed jointly by the parties, a new agreement had come into existence superseding the decree, and the Court was not competent to make the order appealed against. *JEHANGIR COWASJI v. THE HOPE MILLS, LIMITED* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 2

12. ———— *Accounts, suit for—Plaintiff in possession of account papers, if may be allowed to sue—Relief in equity to be granted only to honest plaintiff.* A plaintiff who is in possession of the account papers cannot be allowed to sue the defendant for accounts, unless he produces the papers in Court with a succinct statement of what they contain and what the balance is, whether in his favour or against him. Until he does that it is impossible to call upon a defendant to answer a charge of misappropriation of money or being liable to the estate on the accounts. A person who seeks equity must do equity. *Chand Ram v. Brojo Gobinda Doss*, 19 W. R. 14, followed. *UPENDRA KISHORE RAI CHAUDHURY v. RAMTARA DEBYA CHAUDHURANI* (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 696

ACCOUNT, ADJUSTMENT OF.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 64 (1859, s. 1, CL. 9).

See PARTNERSHIP—SUITS RESPECTING PARTNERSHIP.

1. ———— *Contract to purchase land—Necessity to sell land for arrears.* Where an estate was sold under a contract at 10½ years' purchase of the net annual rent collections, and various sums of money were left in deposit with the vendee to meet various charges which were expected to arise, and the amount of these charges was regulated by the vendor's expectations, and formed portions of the stipulations of which the contract was composed, but the net annual collections eventually fell short of those expectations: *Held*, that the agreement at the root of the contract, viz., that the property was taken at 10½ years' purchase, should govern the whole transaction, and that the accounts between the parties should be adjusted accordingly. In a suit to have an account taken of what was payable, and had been paid, by either of the two parties in pursuance of the contract, and to have a decree for any balance found to be due to either—the contract distinctly providing for an adjustment after the net annual collection, and containing a stipulation that any injury accruing to the interests of one party by any laches in the payment of rent

ACCOUNT, ADJUSTMENT OF—*concl'd.*

by the other, should form a ground for compensation:—*Held*, that it was not necessary that the land should be sold up for arrears in default of payment before the account could be adjusted; and that even a decree, taken out by the zemindars against defendant for the rents of the land in suit, did not affect plaintiff's claim to the money owing under the contract. *OPENDER NARAIN MOOKERJEE v. GUDADHUR DEY* . . . 25 W. R. 472, 476

2. ——— Proof of adjustment—*Parol evidence*. The adjustment of an account may be proved by verbal evidence, and need not necessarily be in writing signed by the party to be bound. *PUKUMA CHOWDRAIN v. NITTANAND SHAH*.

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ACCOUNT, STATED.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 19—ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBTS; SCH. II, ART. 64.

1. ——— Suit on account stated—*Hypothecation bond for the amount due—Obligor presenting registration of bond by denying execution*. The plaintiff sued (i) for registration of a hypothecation-bond executed by the defendant: (ii) in the alternative, for recovery of the amount of the bond upon an account stated. The defendant denied execution of the bond, and that she had had any dealings or stated any account with the plaintiff. The Courts below disallowed the first claim as barred by limitation, and disallowed the second on the ground that the bond had effected a novation of the contract implied by the statement of accounts:—*Held*, that this decision was wrong, and that the plaintiff was entitled to sue upon the account stated. *Sardar Kuar v. Chandrawati*, I. L. R. 4 All. 30, distinguished. *KIAM-UD-DIN v. RAJJO* . . . I. L. R. 11 All. 13

2. ——— Cause of action
—*Evidence of the existing debt—Fresh contract—Interest—Damdupat*. In June 1883 the plaintiff's father advanced a loan to the defendant at compound interest. The account of this debt with interest was adjusted and signed from time to time. In June 1893 it was adjusted and signed, the amount found due being R28-8-0. In February 1896 the plaintiff sued to recover this amount. *Held*, that the account (ruzukhata) was merely an acknowledgment of the debt and of the correctness of the calculation of interest upon it. *Held*, also, that the plaintiff was not entitled to treat the amount so found due as principal and to claim interest upon it. The debt to be sued on was the amount originally advanced, and the interest recoverable was limited by that amount according to the rule of damdupat. By English law an account stated could be sued on as implying a promise to pay. Formerly this was the rule also in Bombay (as shown by the earlier cases), where the account was signed. If, however, it was not signed, it could not be sued on as a new contract. The Indian Limitation Act required an acknowledgment or

ACCOUNT, STATED—*concl'd.*

admission of a debt to be signed: and an admission not made in the manner prescribed by law (*i.e.*, signed) for the purpose of preventing a debt from becoming barred does not imply a promise to pay it if it should become barred. According, however, to the later authorities, an account stated or adjusted (ruzukhata) cannot be sued on as a fresh contract. The suit must be brought in respect of the original transaction, and the subsequent stated or adjusted accounts are only evidence of the debt arising from them, and serve to prevent the operation of the Act of Limitation. *SHANKAR v. MUKTA* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 513

ACCOUNT, SUIT FOR.

See *BENGAL RENT ACT* (VIII OF 1869), s. 30 . . . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 303, 314

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 89

8 C. L. R. 285

16 W. R. 149

3 C. L. R. 444

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 425

See *DECREE*. . . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 393

See *DEKHAN AGRICULTURISTS RELIEF ACT*, s. 15D. . . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 351

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 469

See *GUARDIAN WARD*, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 892

See *GUARDIANS AND WARDS ACT*, s. 41. I. L. R. 22 All. 332

See *INTEREST*. I. L. R. 31 Calc. 233

See *LIMITATION*. 8 C. W. N. 113

See *LIMITATION ACT*, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 89 . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 27

See *MORTGAGE—ACCOUNTS*.

See *PARTITION—JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS IN SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION* . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 769

See *PARTNERSHIP—SUITS RESPECTING PARTNERSHIP*.

See *PLAINT—FORM AND CONTENTS OF PLAINT—FRAME OF SUITS GENERALLY*.

See *PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—STAY OF PROCEEDINGS*. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 627

See *PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT*, s. 98. 8 C. W. N. 113, 572, 578, 625

See *SMALL CAUSE COURT, MORUSSIL—JURISDICTION—ACCOUNT, SUIT FOR*.

See *VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS*.

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 22

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 675

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 517

1. ——— Liability to account—*Administrator General as executor of the surviving trustee of religious endowment*. An account was decreed against the Administrator General, who had been appointed the executor of the last surviving trustee under the will of the founder of a religious institution. *THACOR DASS SETT v. HOGG*

Cor. 68.

ACCOUNT, SUIT FOR—*contd.*

2. ——— **Lumbardar—Account of rents uncollected.** *Held*, that a lumbardar is ordinarily bound to account for rents not collected if he does not exercise his power of distraint with due diligence. *SEES RAM v. CHAIT RAM*

2 Agra 266

3. ——— **Account of rents uncollected.** *Held*, that a lumbardar is not liable for the rent which he, without any wilful default on his part, has never received, if he shows that he has done his duty in endeavouring to collect the same. *ENAYET HOSSEIN v. GHOLAM ALLY*

2 Agra 276

4. ——— **Mahomedan widow in possession for dower—Suit not framed for an account.** In a suit by the only brother and heir-at-law of a Mahomedan of the Shiah sect, claiming the whole of the deceased's estate, and for mesne profits, the issues raised by the pleadings were, *first*, whether a marriage had taken place between the deceased and the party in possession, who claimed to be his widow, and, *secondly*, the validity of a deed of dower executed by the deceased in her favour. The Courts in India found these issues in favour of the widow, and dismissed the suit. The Judicial Committee, in affirming the Court's decrees upon these points, held further that although the estate of the husband was hypothecated for the dower, yet as the heir-at-law would be entitled to the residue after satisfying the widow's claim, he was by right entitled to an account, but as the plaint was so framed as not to admit of an account being taken, the appeal was affirmed, without prejudice to a suit being brought for administration of the deceased's estate upon the footing of the marriage and deed of dower being admitted in the suit. *AMEEROONISSA v. MORADONNISSA*

6 Moo. I. A. 211

5. ——— **Mother appointed administratrix of minor son—Bombay Minors Act (XX of 1864), ss. 6, 9, and 19—Account of minor's estate after his death—District Court.** Where a mother is appointed administratrix to the estate of her minor son, under Act XX of 1864, s. 6: *Held*, that unlike a curator or other person appointed administrator under s. 9, she is not bound to render an account, unless a suit should be instituted for the purpose, under s. 19, by a relative, during the minority. No application for an account can be made after the death of the minor, though his representatives are entitled to an account. When the minor is dead, the District Court is no longer capable of representing him under the Act. The only way of calling the administrator to account is a suit instituted by a person interested. *In the matter of the petition of NARMADABAI*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 14

6. ——— **Right to an account—Person with title barred by lapse of time—Hereditary Office, administration of trusts of.** The plaintiff brought a suit to establish his right to and for possession of the hereditary office of dharmakarta of a pagoda and to remove the defendant, but it was

ACCOUNT, SUIT FOR—*contd.*

held that his title was extinguished by lapse of time. *Held*, that plaintiff, having no longer any title to the property, was not in a position to treat defendant as a trespasser and to call upon him for an account of the past administration of the trust upon that footing: and further, that the suit being substantially one to remove the defendant from the trust and establish plaintiff's title to the hereditary office or, on failure of this, to secure the appointment of a fit and proper person to fill defendant's office, the account was only prayed for on that understanding, and, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to call for an account of the past administration of the trust, as a person interested in the religious trust. *MANALLY CHENNA KESAVARAYA v. VAIDELINGA*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 343

7. ——— **Landlord and tenant—Rent set off against advances—Suit for rent—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Arts. 85, 89, Sch. II—Form of decree.** The plaintiffs executed a lease for nine years in favour of the defendant No. 1 at a fixed annual rent payable by instalments. The defendant, under instructions from the plaintiffs, paid from time to time Government revenue, cesses, expenses of litigation, etc., on their behalf, and used to set off those sums against the rent due to them under the lease; no sum of money by way of advance or otherwise from the plaintiffs ever came into the hands of the defendant. After the expiry of the lease, the plaintiffs instituted this suit against the defendant for an account:—*Held*, that the suit for an account was not maintainable; the relationship between the parties as created by the lease was simply that of landlord and tenant, and the only relief which the plaintiffs could have properly asked for was a decree for rent, if any was still due. *BHEKDHARI LAL v. BADHSINGH DUDHARIA*

I. L. R. 27 Cal. 663

8. ——— **Principal and Agent—Method of taking accounts—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 394, 395.** In a suit for an account against an agent, the plaintiff stated that the defendant had not submitted proper accounts of his agency, and prayed that the defendant might be ordered to produce certain papers, and that, on failure to submit the accounts, he might be decreed to pay the plaintiff Rs. 1,200 by way of damages. The plaintiff also alleged that, in consequence of the defendant's negligence and mismanagement, the plaintiff believed that he had sustained a loss of Rs. 5,000, and prayed for a decree for this sum. *Held*, that no decree could be made for the sums mentioned, or any other sum, until an account had been taken and the amount due from the defendant ascertained. Method to be followed on taking accounts in the mofussil stated. If the taking of accounts by the Judge would occasion a waste of public time, he should resort to the provisions of ss. 394 and 395 of the Civil Procedure Code, and furnish the Commissioner with such part of the proceedings and such detailed instructions as may appear necessary. *ANNODA PERSAD ROY v. DWARKA NATH GANGOPADHYA*

I. L. R. 6 Cal. 754

8 C. L. R. 321

ACCOUNT, SUIT FOR—*contd.*

9. ———— *Suit by principal for an account—Object of a decree for an account as distinguished from a decree made upon the hearing—Costs.* A continued agency, or employment as *dewan*, for the purpose of drawing and expending the money of a principal, resulted in a suit by the latter, who alleged that more had been drawn than expended for him, and that a specific sum, or balance, stood against the defendant, having been misappropriated by him. The principal claimed also any further sum that might be proved to be payable. The *dewan* having denied the receipt of the money and any kind of accountability, it was found against him that the relation of agency existed between the parties. But, on the ground that it was impossible to decide, upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, how much of the principal's money was unaccounted for, though the attempt had been made to prove a balance due, the Appellate Court dismissed the suit:—*Held*, that such a suit was essentially one for an account, and that the Courts below should have followed the regular course, *viz.*, to order an account to be taken of the defendant's dealings with plaintiff's money. This was without any expression of opinion that, in a suit for an account, an issue may not be raised, at the outset, so clearly as to be ready for decision. But the general rule being the other way, this suit was an example of it. HURRINATH RAI *v.* KRISHNA KUMAR BAKSHI

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 147; I. R. 13 I. A. 123

10. ———— *Form of suit for account—Procedure on taking accounts—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 250, 395, and 396, Sch. IV, Form 157—Form of keeping accounts of joint property in mofussil.* In a suit for an account by a principal against his agent, the plaintiff should ask in his plaint that a proper account may be taken. If the defendant is found liable to render such account for a certain period, the Court should make an interlocutory decree declaring that he is so liable, and direct him to file an account in Court within a fixed period. This decree may be enforced under s. 260 of the Civil Procedure Code. After an account has been filed, the plaintiff should be allowed reasonable time to examine it. If the objections are numerous, the procedure prescribed by ss. 394 and 395 and Form 157 of Sch. IV to the Code should be followed. When the accounts have been taken, the Court must determine the amount due, and the final decree should be for the payment of this amount, and also, if necessary, for the delivery of any papers, vouchers, or other documents which have come into the hands of the agent in the course of his employment. Form of keeping accounts of joint property in the mofussil considered. DEGAMBER MOZUMDAR *v.* KALLYNATH ROY

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 654
9 C. L. R. 265

11. ———— *Fraud or specific error in account, allegation of.* *M* sued for an account of all moneys received and paid on his behalf by *T*, deceased (represented by his widow), and *F* as his agents from 1st August 1859 to 30th April

ACCOUNT, SUIT FOR—*contd.*

1865. It was alleged in the plaint that *M* "left India in 1858, and has since resided in Scotland; that at the time he left he was, and still is, possessed of extensive property in the Province of Bengal, chiefly landed property;" that *T* and afterwards *T* and *F* were his agents and managers. In his written statement, *M* stated that "in the month of June 1861, the deceased rendered an account to the plaintiff showing that all moneys due to him by the plaintiff in respect of his salary and commissions up to the 31st January 1861, being the whole of deceased's claim against him up to that date under their above-mentioned arrangements, had been duly paid by the plaintiff. In the month of April 1865, deceased transmitted to the plaintiff the agency accounts of himself and his firm with the plaintiff in continuation of the accounts rendered by him as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, brought down to the end of February 1865; and again in May 1865, the deceased transmitted the continuation of the said account brought down to the 30th April preceding, being the date of the termination of the agency. The said accounts rendered have been examined by the plaintiff, who verily believes that the true balance now due to him thereon exceeds Rs. 1,00,000, without including interest." There was no allegation in the plaint, written statement, or opening of counsel, of fraud or specific error. *Held*, that *M*, in his plaint and written statement, had not disclosed any cause of action. MAKINTOSH *v.* TEMPLE

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 333

12. ———— *Suit against gomasta—Duty of Court to look into accounts.* In a suit against a gomasta to obtain accounts of moneys which had come into his hands, it was held that it was not enough for the lower Courts to make a decree ordering the defendant to render nikash papers to the plaintiff: it was the business of the Court to have these papers brought before it and examined, and to determine whether they were correct and fair accounts between the parties. SHUSHEE SHEKHUR AUDHIKAREE *v.* SULEEM BISWAS

22 W. R. 191

13. ———— *Decree for account against agent.* Where a decree requires an agent to render accounts, he can only discharge himself by accounting for all the moneys that have come into his hands, and it is always open to the decree-holder to show that this has not been done. WOOMANATH ROY CHOWDHRY *v.* SREENATH SINGH

15 W. R. 260

14. ———— *Refusal to account—Destruction of account books.* Where a defendant refused to render accounts, and there was evidence of spoliation of the banking books, the Court charged him with the principal sum for which he was accountable, with interest at 12 per cent. per mensem in lieu of the profits he failed to account for. RAMPERSHAD TEWARRY *v.* SHEO CHURN DOSS, THOOKRA *v.* RAMPERSHAD TEWARRY

10 Moo. I. A. 490

15. ———— *Right to re-open settled account—Principles of Court of Equity in re-open-*

ACCOUNT, SUIT FOR—concl'd.

ing accounts—Principles which regulate a Court of Equity in opening stated and settled accounts. Accounts of long standing and great complication of a mercantile firm at Calcutta, one of the partners of which afterwards acted as agent in England, involving charges for agency and partnership transactions, were mutually agreed to be investigated and closed. After long negotiations and discussion respecting some of the charges, an agreement was come to, the parties agreeing to strike the general balance at a given sum, reserving one item of the account, amounting to a considerable sum, for future investigation. This reserved item was subsequently settled by the acceptance of a bill of exchange for a lesser amount, as such reserved item, if re-opened, would have disarranged the settled general account. The bill of exchange was dishonoured and an action brought to recover the amount. A bill was then filed for an injunction for the cancelment of the bill of exchange, and praying that the accounts so settled might be opened. The Supreme Court at Calcutta held that the reserved item being left open was evidence that the account was not finally closed, and decreed the accounts to be opened, referring the cause to the Master. On appeal, held by the Judicial Committee (reversing such decree, and dismissing the bill with costs), that the transaction amounted to an adjustment of the general account between the parties, subject to the reserved item which was subsequently settled, and that the accounts so settled and closed could not, in the absence of fraud, be re-opened. *McKELLER v. WALLACE* . . . 5 Moo. I. A. 372

16. ———— *Impeachment of accounts on ground of fraud—Mode of proof—Re-opening of accounts.* Where accounts are impeached on the ground of fraud, two or three instances of particular items, which can be taken as false and fraudulent, must be brought to the notice of the Court before it can be called upon to order the accounts to be re-opened from the first. *Williamson v. Barbour, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 529*, followed. *BOO JINATBOO v. SHA NAGAR VALAB KANJI* I. L. R. 11 Bom. 78

17. ———— *Running account for portion of which hundis are given—Obligation to sue on hundis.* Where there is a running account between the parties, a portion of which relates to an amount due upon dishonoured hundis, plaintiff is not bound to sue upon the hundis, but may base his claim upon the running account. *RAM CHAND v. PUNNA LAL* . . . 3 N. W. 323

18. ———— *Necessity to go into accounts in suit for profits.* The mere fact that in a suit for profits by a co-sharer it is necessary to go into the accounts will not alter the character of the suit and make it one for settlement of accounts. *DABEE DEEN v. DOORGA PERSHAD* 3 N. W. 49

ACCOUNT BOOKS, ENTRIES IN—

See BANKERS' BOOKS EVIDENCE ACT.
4 C. W. N. 433

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See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNT BOOKS.

See PROMISSORY NOTES—ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS ON, PROMISSORY NOTES.
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 334

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See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—ACCOUNT SALES . . . 5 B. L. R. 619

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 5
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See MORTGAGE—ACCOUNTS.

——— keeping two sets of—

See BOMBAY TOLLS ACT, s. 7.
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 668

——— mutual accounts—

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 85.

——— Procedure. Procedure to be observed in a judicial enquiry into accounts laid down. *ALAI AHMAD alias BOOLAKI v. NUSIBUN*

24 W. R. 70

See COMMISSIONER FOR TAKING ACCOUNTS.
5 C. W. N. 692

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—ACCOUNTS.

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6 C. W. N. 710

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ACCRETION.

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I. L. R. 29 Calc. 518

1. NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND.

(a) GENERALLY.

1. ——— Beng. Reg. XI of 1825. Bengal Regulation XI of 1825 regards accreted land as the right of that party to whose estate the land is an accretion, and does not divide the accreted land according to the extent of each party's loss by diluvion. The mere fact of a lessee having received a malikana allowance from the Collector during the period of his temporary lease will not bar the right to a permanent settlement of any party who, under the law of alluvion, is entitled to settlement. *CALLY CHUNDER CHOWDHURY v. MONIKURNIKA CHOWDHRAIN* W. R. 1864, 149

BISSESSUREE DOSSEE v. KALEE KOOMAR ROY

18 W. R. 198

2. ——— Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, application of. Cl. 1, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825, applies only to lands gained by alluvion either gradually or suddenly, and not to lands existing as waste land subject to inundation and in one year rendered culturable by a deposit of earth by the action of the river. *RAMJEEWAN RAI v. DEEP NARAIN RAI* Agra F. B. 78, Ed. 1874, 60

3. ——— Regulation XI of 1825 applies only to land gained by gradual accession from the recession of a river or sea, and has no application to land formed by the drying-up of a bhiil or marsh. *Suroop Chunder Mozoomdar v. Jardine, Skinner & Co., Marsh., 334*, relied on. *KHONDEKAR ABDUL HAMID v. MOHINI KANT SAHA*

4 C. W. N. 508

ACCRETION—*contd.*1. NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—*contd.*

(a) GENERALLY—*contd.*

4. ——— s. 4, cl. 1—Alluvion—Title to land acquired by gradual accretion—Limitation. Cl. 1 of s. 4 of Regulation XI of 1825 does not depend for its operation on the capability of identification of the accreted lands. Whether the accreted lands are capable of identification or not, the clause applies where the lands have been gained by gradual accession by the recession of a river. In the case of gradual accretions, the ordinary rule of acquisition by prescription does not apply, but each accretion as it occurs comes under the same title as that upon which the land to which it is made is held. *DEBI BAKHSH SINGH v. TIRBHAWAN SINGH*

I. L. R. 19 All. 238

5. ——— Suit for accreted land. In a suit for possession of alluvial land, which plaintiffs claimed by right of accretion under the provisions of Regulation XI of 1825 and in which the question of accretion was put in issue, the lower Court's judgment was held not to be good in law, because it contained no clear finding as to whether the lands in dispute had re-formed on the original site of diluviated lands of plaintiff's estate or whether they were accretions to that estate by recession of the river. *WISE v. JUGGOBUNDOO BOSE* 12 W. R. 229

Affirmed on review, *JUGGOBUNDOO BOSE v. WISE*

12 W. R. 409

6. ——— cls. 1 and 3. In a suit for possession where certain lands were decreed to plaintiff on the ground that, having formed opposite to his villages, they subsequently became contiguous thereto by the gradual silting up of the bed of the river which had previously flowed between: Held, that the decision was not in conformity with cl. 1 or cl. 3, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825, and that it was necessary to determine how the land formed, whether it was thrown up as an island in the bed of the river, or was formed by gradual accretion to an estate; and if by gradual accretion, to what lands it so accreted. *UNNOPOORNA DEBIA v. SREEMUTTY DASSEE* 14 W. R. 254

7. ——— Proprietor of resumed mehal. The Government, when it holds a resumed mehal on its rent-roll as its khas property, holds it as, and with all the rights and liabilities of, a private zamindar, and is therefore entitled, under Regulation XI of 1825, to claim accretions to the khas estate. *COLLECTOR OF PUNNA v. SURNO MOYEE* 17 W. R. 163

8. ——— Suit for possession of chur lands. The plaintiff sued for possession of a chur which he alleged had accreted to the remnant of the plaintiff's original estate, which had been left when all the rest of his estate was washed away: Held, that the Court must decide what particular parcel (if any) was the remnant of the original estate, and must

ACCRETION—*contd.*1. NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—*contd.*(a) GENERALLY—*contd.*

also decide whether the chur claimed was formed by accretion to that remnant. *RASHMONEE DOSSEE v. BHUBONATH BHUTTACHARJEE* . 12 W. R. 252

9. ——— Land forming bed of canal—*Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, cl. 4.* Land forming the dry bed of a canal belongs to the estate in which the canal itself was included. In cl. 4, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825, the words "subject to the provisions stated in the first clause of the present section" do not apply to the formation and position of the newly-accreted land, but to the owner's rights in them in relation to the Government. *SYOOLLAM v. BHUTTON* 10 W. R. 68

10. ——— Accretion to estate on opposite side of river. Accretion on one side of a river is not claimable as belonging to an estate on the opposite bank. *PUNCHANUN MULLICK v. HEERA LALL SEAL* . 1 W. R. 173

11. ——— Gradual accretion—*Lakhi-rajdar.* Gradual accretion may be claimed by a lakhi-rajdar as his property. *PUTHURAM CHOWDREY v. KUTHENARAIN CHOWDREY* . 1 W. R. 124

12. ——— Right of zamindar to accreted land. As long as any portion of an estate is in existence, the zamindar is entitled to claim the land accreting to it as forming by law part of that estate. *BHOOBUNMOHUN SIRCAR v. WATSON & Co.*

W. R. 1864 64

13. ——— Accretion to riparian village—"Ancestral" property—*Alluvial land*—"Ancestral" riparian property—*Alluvial land held on same title as riparian land.* Held, that the ownership of alluvial land which had accreted to a riparian village must rest upon the same title as that upon which the original village was held, and that, as the riparian village was ancestral, the accreted property must be ancestral also. *RAM PRASAD RAI v. RADHA PRASAD SINGH*

I. L. R. 7 All. 402

14. ——— Evidence—*Alteration of surface of land*—*Obliteration of landmarks.* The question whether land is formed by gradual accretion depends on evidence; but it would be an error in law to consider it as conclusive of that fact that the surface of the land had all been changed, and the marks all obliterated, so that no old houses, or trees, or mounds, or vestiges of boundary could be found, and that all the surface of the land was fresh land which had been brought down by the river. *Lopez v. Maddan Mohan Thakur*, 6 B. L. R. 121, commented on. *PAHALWAN SINGH v. MAHESSUR BUKSH SING. MAHESSUR BUKSH SING v. MEG-BURN SING* . 9 B. L. R. 150

16 W. R. P. C. 5

15. ——— Accretion by washing away lands of another. The party to whose lands new formations accrete is entitled to them, though the

ACCRETION—*contd.*1. NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—*contd.*(a) GENERALLY—*concl'd.*

accretion may have been caused by the washing away of the lands of another person. *ADOO MEAN v. SHIBO SOONDOOREE* . 2 W. R. 295

(b) RIVERS OR CHANGE IN COURSE OF RIVERS.

16. ——— Gradual accretion from river receding—*Riparian proprietors*—*Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, cl. 5.* In a suit for lands gradually gained by recession of a river the plaintiffs and defendants are equally bound to prove their titles, and where they fail to do so, the accretion under the 5th clause of s. 4 of Regulation XI of 1825 should be so divided that the owners of the land forming each bank of the original bed of the river must receive the land newly formed opposite their respective holdings. *BHAGEERUTTEE DABEA v. GREESH CHUNDER CHOWDHRY* . 2 Hay 541

17. ——— Gradual accretion from river. Land gained from a river by gradual accretion belongs to the owner of the adjacent soil by the title of occupancy. *NASAVANJI PESTANJI v. NASARVANSI DARASHA*

2. Bom. 366, 2nd Ed., 345

18. ——— *Nadi bharati.* *Nadi bharati*, or land raised out of the river, is not an accretion, and belongs to the person to whom the river was re-leased by the Resumption Authorities. *HARI KISHORE DUTT v. COLLECTOR OF DACCA* . 3 B. L. R. Ap. 116

19. ——— Bed of navigable rivers. The East India Company as representing the Indian Government had a freehold in the bed of navigable rivers in India, and to the land between high and low-water mark. Land formed by gradual accretion belongs to the owner of the adjacent soil. *DOE d. SEEBKRISTO v. EAST INDIA COMPANY*

6 Moo. I. A. 267

20. ——— Land dry only in dry season below high-water mark—*Private property.* A strip of land which, in the dry season only, is left dry between the permanent bank and the river cannot be private property until it rises beyond high-water mark, so as to become fit for cultivation; and when it does so rise, the public will be entitled to the same access to the river as before. *ODHIRANEE NARAIN KOOMAREE v. NAWAB NAZIM OF BENGAL* . 4 W. R. 41

21. ——— *Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 1, cl. 4*—*Right of jalkar.* Before cl. 4, s. 1, Regulation XI of 1825, can have the effect of depriving a party of the title given by cl. 1, the opposite party must prove that the land in question was the bed of a small and shallow river which, with the jalkar right of fishing over it, was recognized as the property of such opposite party. *RAM SHURN SHAHA v. BHOTE KINKUR* . 14 W. R. 268

ACCRETION—*contd.*1. NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—*contd.*(b) RIVERS OR CHANGE IN COURSE OF RIVERS—*contd.*

22. ——— Land accreting from bed of khal. Land which accretes to an estate from the bed of an adjoining khal, not being a canal, but a river, belongs by law to the owner of the estate. DATARAM NATH v. ESHAN CHUNDER LAL

11 W. R. 116

23. ——— Change in course of river—*Alluvion and diluvion.* Land gained by the gradual accession of a river, and added by the operation of nature to A's tenure must be held to be A's property, although it be also established by evidence that this land has re-formed on a site which was formerly part of B's property. If it should be proved that the river flowed over the original site, and, receding, left the new formation and a fordable channel between it and B's property, B would be entitled to retake possession of the newly-formed land on the old site, and he would not be deprived of it because the river was either fordable on A's side, or had wholly dried up. MASYK v. HEDGER

W. R. 1864, 306

24. ——— Land capable of identification. *Semle:* That the general law of alluvion in India, as well as in Europe, does not entitle a landholder to land which is annexed to his estates by a sudden change in the course of a river, and is still capable of being identified as part of the estate of another. ISREE SINGH v. SHURFOODEEN

1 N. W. 142, Ed. 1873, 224

PRAGDUTT RAOOT v. LUCHMUN PERSHAD

3 N. W. 111

25. ——— *Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, cl. 2—Land separated from estate.* When a party has proved that land which formed part of his state has, by a sudden change in the course of the river, been separated, he is entitled to recover such land under cl. 2, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825. RAI MANIK CHAND v. MADHURAM

3 B. L. R. P. C. 5; 11 W. R. P. C. 42
13 Moo. I. A. 1

26. ——— Lands bounded by river—*Custom of dhardhoora—Riparian proprietors.* Held, that the mere fact that the river forms the constant boundary between two districts cannot, in the absence of any dhardhoora custom, affect the rights of riparian proprietors. DHOOLHIN HURPAUL KOONWARREE v. UBBUCK SINGH

3 Agra 18

27. ——— Boundary fluctuating—*Agreement as to mode of fixing boundaries—Riparian proprietors—Custom—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 2.* The plaintiffs sued to obtain possession of land on the ground of the existence of a custom in the district that where land which had once been alluvial lies between two branches of a river, or two rivers, and from time to time the volume of water shifts, so that alternately one of those channels is deep, and the other is fordable, then the whole of

ACCRETION—*contd.*1. NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—*contd.*(b) RIVERS OR CHANGE IN COURSE OF RIVERS—*contd.*

such intermediate land belongs to the land-owner on the side of the channel which at any given time is fordable. Held (without deciding whether such a custom falls within s. 2, Regulation XI of 1825), that no clear and definite usage had been established. A fluctuating boundary between zillas does not necessarily affect the rights of landed riparian proprietors. An ikarnama between two zamindars as to the mode of determining the boundaries of their estates, in the event of changes in the channel of river, cannot bind persons claiming under one with whom the perpetual settlement was subsequently made as to the lands in his possession, he being a stranger to that ikarnama. BISSESSURNATH v. MOHESSTUR BUKSH SING BAHADUR

11 B. L. R. 265; 18 W. R. 160

L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 34

28. ——— *Accretion by gradual accession—Riparian proprietors—Effect of sudden change in course of boundary river—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 2, and s. 4, cls. 1 and 2.* The lands in suit in Tirhoot were settled under Regulation XI of 1825, s. 4, cl. 1, with the plaintiff's predecessor in 1837, as the proprietors of an estate to which the lands had become an accretion by gradual accession, and the plaintiffs continued in possession thereof till the expiration of the settlement in 1847, which was made on the same principle. Prior to the renewal of that settlement in 1857, the river, which was to the south of the plaintiff's zamindari in Tirhoot, and to the north of the defendant's in Sarun, has suddenly and so completely changed its course that the lands in suit, which were formerly on the north side of the river, were capable of being identified on the south side of it, and were, notwithstanding, summarily settled with the defendant, who obtained possession of them:—Held, that in the absence of proof of usage within the meaning of s. 2 of the Regulation, that the river should be not merely the boundary between the two districts of Tirhoot and Sarun, but also the boundary between the two zamindaries, the plaintiffs were entitled to the lands. RAGHOOBUR DYAL SAKOO v. KISHEN PERTAB SAHEE

L. R. 6 I. A. 211

29. ——— *New formation of alluvial lands—Rivers or change in course of rivers—Tidal navigable river—Cause and nature of variation in high-water line.* The rules of English law, according to which the rights of the Crown or of riparian owners to accretions caused by alluvion are determined with reference to the character of the river and the manner in which the accretion is occasioned, are applicable in British India unless excluded by enactment or local usage. Accordingly, where a rapid variation in the natural high-water line of a tidal navigable river in Malabar had been caused by acts unlawfully done by the tenants of the riparian owner:—Held, that the

ACCRETION—*contd.*1. NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—*contd.*(b) RIVERS OR CHANGE IN COURSE OF RIVERS—*concl'd.*

Crown was entitled as against the riparian owner to the accretion caused by such variation. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA *v.* KADIRIKUTTI

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 369

30. ————— *Changes in a river's channel—Rights of riparian owners—Accretion by alluvion distinguished—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, cls. 1 and 5.* The current of a river changing its course encroached upon either bank alternately detaching land from one bank, followed by the effect that land was added to the opposite bank. The river having taken a course more to the east than its original one, the area of the defendant's village (till then only partly on the western side, inasmuch as the river traversed it throughout) appeared entirely on the west bank. Some land of the plaintiff's village on the eastern side was also carried away, the river continuing its eastward tendency. By another change, in the opposite direction, the current resumed its original channel more towards the west with the effect that the piece of land that had belonged to the defendant's village, and had been submerged when on the east bank, during the above change in the river's course, emerged in the end on its former site on the east bank. This restored land was identifiable. But the owner of the village on the east bank now claimed it as an accretion by alluvion to his property, which it adjoined. *Held*, that the right of property remained in the original owner, the defendant. The owner of the adjoining village on the eastern side could not make out a title to it either under cl. 1, under cl. 5, of s. 4 of Regulation XI of 1825, or in virtue of any known principle. There was no proof of a custom giving this land to him on account of contiguity, and there had been no gain to him from the river by alluvion within the meaning of the Regulation. JAGGOT SINGH *v.* BRIJ NATH KUNWAR

I. L. R. 27 Cal. 768

L. R. 27 I. A. 81

4 C. W. N. 555

(c) CHURS OR ISLANDS IN NAVIGABLE RIVERS.

31. ————— *Accretion to chur—Fordable channel.* An accretion to a chur belongs to the owner of the chur, whether the channel between the main land and the chur is fordable or not. KALLY NATH ROY CHOWDHRY *v.* LAWRIE

3 W. R. 122

32. ————— *Under Reg. XI of 1825, chur land belongs to the proprietor of the estate to which it accretes, provided it is not separated from such estate by an unfordable stream.* SHUBCHUNDER GHUTTUCK *v.* COLLECTOR OF TIPPERA

5 W. R. 139

33. ————— *Formation of churs—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 5, cls. 1 and 4—Right of fishery.* According to cl. 4, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825, churs thrown up in small and shallow rivers, the beds of which are private pro-

ACCRETION—*contd.*1. NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—*contd.*(c) CHURS OR ISLANDS IN NAVIGABLE RIVERS—*contd.*

perty, belong to the proprietor of the bed of the river; but by cl. 1 of the same section, churs thrown up in rivers, not small and shallow, the ownership of the beds of which remains in the public are an increment to the tenure of the riparian owner to whose land or estate they are annexed. The fact of the right of fishery being in another person, does not take the case out of the operation of the former clause. CHUNDERMONEE CHOWDHRAIN *v.* CHOWDHRAIN

4 W. R. 54

34. ————— *Diluvion—Re-formation—Title—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4.* Where a chur formed in the middle of a river, and was settled with A, and by the recession of the river new land appeared, which was really a deposit on the ancient site of B's lands, though adhering to the chur, it was held to be B's land. The first rule established by s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825, does not apparently contemplate land other than that commonly known as alluvion, *viz.*, land gained by gradual and imperceptible accretion, the *incrementum latens* of the civil law. There is no express provision in the Regulation for the case of land which has been lost to the original proprietor by the encroachment of the sea or a river, and which, after diluvion, reappears on the recession of the sea or river, and there is nothing to take away or destroy the original proprietor's right; such a case is to be determined by the general principles of equity and justice under the 5th rule contained in s. 4. A title founded on the original ownership and identification of land re-appearing is to be confined *primâ facie* to the re-formation on that site. The cases of *Imam Bandi v. Hurgobind Ghose*, 4 Moore's I. A. 403, *Lopez v. Maddan Mohan Thakur*, 6 B. L. R. 121, and *Eckowri Singh v. Heeralal Seal*, 2 B. L. R. P. C. 5, commented on. NOGENDER CHUNDER GHOSE *v.* MAHOMED ESOF

10 B. L. R. 406: 18 W. R. 113

35. ————— *Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, cl. 3.* If alluvial land be surrounded by water fordable at any point, the owner of the land to which the chur adjoins has a *primâ facie* title to it under cl. 3, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825. WISE *v.* AMEERUNNISSA KHATOON

2 W. R. 34

WISE *v.* ABDUL ALI

2 W. R. 127

PORESH NARAIN RAI *v.* WATSON

5 W. R. 283

36. ————— *Formation of chur—Alluvion—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4—Re-formation on old site.* Under Regulation XI of 1825, a right of property in land gained by alluvion from a river (the bed of which is not the property of an individual) is acquired in two modes: first, where the land is gained by gradual accession by the recess of the river, in which case it becomes the property of the person in possession of the estate to which the land is an increment; and, secondly, when a chur or island

ACCRETION—contd.**1. NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—contd.****(c) CHURS OR ISLANDS IN NAVIGABLE RIVERS—contd.**

is thrown up in a large navigable river, and the channel between such chur or island is fordable at any season of the year, the accession is an accession to the land or tenure most contiguous. **MOHINI MOHUN DOSS v. JUGGOBUNDU BOSH**

9 W. R. 312

37. ——— Gradual accretion—Land “most contiguous”—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, cl. 3. The land “most contiguous” to a chur, as that phrase is used in Regulation XI of 1825, s. 4, cl. 3, is intended only to comprise the estate or estates with which the chur comes into contact along the length of the fordable part of a channel; and the whole chur becomes an accession to the land and part of the tenure of the party to whom such estate belongs, and no portion of it will cease to belong to him merely by reason of the deep water between it and the estate of another becoming shallow and fordable. *Held*, also, that after the chur had, by the first occurrence of the fordable channel, become part of A’s property, all further accretions to it, if gained by “gradual accretion,” would also belong to A, even though the result would, in the aggregate, be a prolongation of the chur in front of estates on the river bank not belonging to him. **GOLAM ALI CHOWDHRY v. GOPAL LALL TAGORE**

9 W. R. 401

38. ——— Navigable river—Rights of riparian proprietors. Where a chur or island is thrown up in a large navigable river, originally surrounded by deep, unfordable water, but between which and the estate of the zemindar a fordable channel has since been created, the criterion for deciding whether the Government has the right of disposing of that island, or whether the owner of the land to which it is most contiguous has that right, is to consider the state of circumstances at the time of the formation of the island,—that is, at the time when it was thrown up, and not the state of things at any subsequent or fluctuating period, such as the subsequent silting up of the bed of the river between the island and the contiguous estate so as to form a fordable passage. **BUDRUTISSA CHOWDHRAIN v. PROSUNNO KUMAR BOSE**

6 B. L. R. 255: 14 W. R. F. B. 25

CANNON v. BISSEONATH ADHICAREE

5 C. L. R. 154

39. ——— Fordable river—Beng. Reg. XI, s. 4, cl. 3—Island in navigable river—Right of riparian proprietor to. Under cl. 3, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825, a riparian proprietor has no right to an island thrown up in a large navigable river, when the channel which intervenes between his land and the island is, under ordinary circumstances, and at the most favourable seasons, unfordable for sixteen out of twenty-four hours. **NOBIN KISHOR ROY v. JAGES PRASAD GANGOPADYA**

6 B. L. R. 343: 14 W. R. 352

ACCRETION—contd.**1. NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—contd.****(c) CHURS OR ISLANDS IN NAVIGABLE RIVERS—contd.**

40. ——— Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, cl. 3. A river that can be crossed from one side zigzag in the dry season only, when the water is breast-high, and the main stream of which is indubitably on the other side, is not a “fordable” stream within the meaning of cl. 3, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825. **ISSURCHUNDER SEIN v. KALBE DOSS HAJRAH**

3 W. R. 95

41. ——— Formation of chur. The fact that, under certain circumstances, a river is in some places, and at extreme time of low water, fordable, does not warrant the presumption that the river was a fordable stream at the time of the formation of the chur. **WISE v. AMEERONISSA KHATOON**

3 W. R. 219

42. ——— When the Government sues for alluvial land as an ordinary riparian zamindar, it is bound to prove, under the latter part of cl. 3, s. 3, Regulation XI of 1825, that the stream between the chur and the main land is fordable at some time of the year, and that it was fordable when the alluvium formed. **TABIRA v. GOVERNMENT**

6 W. R. 123

— Affirmed on review. GOVERNMENT v. TABIRA

7 W. R. 513

43. ——— Re-formation on old site—Beng. Reg. XI, s. 4, cl. 3—Island in navigable river—Right of Government. Under cl. 3, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825, Government has no right to land thrown up as an island in the bed of a navigable river, when such island is formed on the site of land which had been washed away. **MANI LALL SAHU v. COLLECTOR OF SARUN**

6 B. L. R. Ap. 93: 14 W. R. 424

44. ——— The Government is not entitled, under cl. 3, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825, to take possession of land which has re-formed on an old site of land belonging to another, although the re-formation forms an island, and is surrounded by a channel which is not fordable. **COLLECTOR OF RAJSHAHYE v. SHAMASOONDREE DEBEA**

14 B. L. R. 219: 22 W. R. 324

45. ——— Navigable river—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, cl. 3. The words “a large navigable river” in cl. 3, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825, are not applicable to the Goomta, but to such rivers as the Ganges and the Megna, upon which navigation can always be carried on. **MOHINEE MOHUN DOSS v. ASSANOOLLAH**

17 W. R. 73

46. ——— Unfordable stream. Land cannot be legally proved to be an accretion to a talukh, or a re-formation of diluviated land of that talukh on its original site, where the stream between the land in question and the talukh is found to be an unfordable stream, nor can possession under such circumstances give a plaintiff a right to a declaration

ACCRETION—*contd.*1. NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—*contd.*(c) CHURS OR ISLANDS IN NAVIGABLE RIVERS—*contd.*

of his title. NOBEEN KISHORE ROY v. JOGESH PROKASH GANGOOLY . . . 10 W. R. 272

47. ———— Formation of island in river adjacent to zamindari—*Zamindars, Right of—Waste lands.* Where an island was formed in a river, the lands adjacent to the banks of which were part of zamindari: *Held*, that the island was not the waste land of any village, or a portion of the holdings of any raiyats in the zamindari, but that the zamindar possessed in it all the incidents of ownership, including the power of making leases. SUBBAYA v. YARLAGADDA ANKINIDU 1 Mad. 255

48. ———— Land forming in river and gradually accreting to land on bank—*Beng. Reg. XI of 1825—Right of Government.* Where land came up originally from the river as a small island, and gradually joined on to the plaintiff's estate after having been taken possession of by the defendant: *Held* by TREVOR, J., that the Government alone was entitled to the land, and not the plaintiff, to whose estate the land had joined. *Held (contra)* by GLOVER, J., that as the land was an accretion to the plaintiff's estate, he was entitled to take possession of it under Regulation XI of 1825, the defendant's possession notwithstanding. MOHINEE MOHUN DOSS v. JUGGOBUNDU BOSE

7 W. R. 103

49. ———— Formation of land in navigable river—*Proof of title.* The re-formation of land in the bed of a navigable river is not *prima facie* to be ascribed to a loss from any particular riparian estate, nor is the land which has been removed from an estate by sudden avulsion reclaimable, unless the circumstances supply evidences of identity. A title by accretion is not established by mere proof of general inclusive boundaries at a time preceding the formation of the chur, but there must be proof of the nucleus of accretion. The land gained will follow the title of the particular land forming the nucleus. ECKOWRI SINGH v. HIRALALL SEAL 2 B. L. R. P. C. 5 : 11 W. R. P. C. 2

12 Moo. I. A. 136

SHAM CHAND BYSACK v. KISHEN PERSAUD SURMA 18 W. R. 4 : 14 Moo. I. A. 595

50. ———— Island in large river—*Proprietorship of alluvial land—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4.* Though an island or land thrown up and surrounded by a river may become vested in Government under the provisions of Regulation XI of 1825, s. 4, cl. 4, it does not follow that, if the river which separates the island from the main land dries up after the island has been resumed by Government, the bed of the river becomes the property of Government in cases in which the bed of the river is not gained as an accretion to the island by gradual accession within the meaning of cl. 1. SURNOMOYEE v. JARDINE, SKINNER & CO. SURNOMOYEE v. WATSON & CO. . . . 20 W. R. 276

ACCRETION—*contd.*1. NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—*contd.*(c) CHURS OR ISLANDS IN NAVIGABLE RIVERS—*contd.*

51. ———— *Formation of lands—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825.* In a suit brought on the 11th March 1872 to recover certain plots of land (a) as re-formations after diluviation of lands which had belonged to the plaintiffs and as accretions thereto; (b) under a title by prescription; it appeared that the lands had formed in the bed of a river in 1859, and that the plaintiffs took possession thereof as of re-formed lands, and had been maintained in possession under awards under Act IV of 1840, but that in 1868 they were ousted by the Collector, who assessed the same under Regulation XI of 1825 and settled them with his co-defendants: *Held*, that whether or not in consequence of Act IX of 1847 the Government were entitled to assess the lands, they were entitled to oust the plaintiffs and to take possession of the lands as lands which had originally formed as an island, and were at their first formation surrounded by water which was not fordable. WISE v. AMEER-UNNISSA KHATOON. WISE v. COLLECTOR OF BACKER-GUNGE . . . L. R. 7 I. A. 73

52. ———— *Formation and attachment to estate of island chur formed in river.* Defendants were owners, by purchase from Government, of a property called Oojan Chur, which in its origin was an island thrown up in the bed of the river. Plaintiff was owner of the original estate of K, of which a great part was cut off by a stream channel of the river; but afterwards re-appeared, and for some time lay in contiguity with defendant's chur, and separated from plaintiff's estate by the said channel. By the gradual filling up of the *seta* reformation became more and more extensive until the land again lay in contact with the plaintiff's estate. As it has been clearly ascertained by boundary marks and measurements that the reformation took place on the original site of the plaintiff's land, the right of the plaintiff as by re-formation was held to be preferable to that of the defendants, which rested upon accretion. BUDDUN CHUNDER SHAHA v. BEPIN BEHAREE ROY 23 W. R. 110

53. ———— *Gradual accretion to a formation of dry land already existing and appropriated to an owner of land; on a river's bank—Ownership of the bed of the river not the subject of contest below—Variation of claim disallowed.* Although there is not in Madras, as there is in Bengal, an express law embodying the principle that gradual alluvion enures to the land to which the accretion is made, following the ownership of that land, the rule is equally well established in both those provinces. Both parties were riparian proprietors of adjoining estates on both banks of the river Godavari. The plaintiff claimed the right to newly-formed land, in mid-stream, which she alleged to have been formed by accretion upon an already existing *lan ka* or alluvial island which belonged to her. On that point

ACCRETION—*contd.*1. NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—*concl.*(c) CHURS OR ISLANDS IN NAVIGABLE RIVERS—*concl.*

there were concurrent findings against her. The accretion had taken place upon a *lanka* owned, not by her, but by the Government, and higher up stream than hers:—*Held*, that the plaintiff must abide by the ground of claim which she had presented below, that being that the new land was formed by gradual accretions to definite and visible portions of a *lanka* previously belonging to her. This she could not now vary to a claim founded on an ownership of the river-bed on the strength of her being zamindar and owner of the land on both banks of the river, without either issue or evidence directed to such subaqueous ownership. *BALUSU RAMALAKSEMAM v. COLLECTOR OF THE GODAVARI DISTRICT*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 464
L. R. 26 I. A. 107

2. RE-FORMATION AFTER DILUVIATION.

1. ———— Ownership in re-formed land. Ownership in soil is not lost because the subject of it becomes submerged; the owner of the site or sub-soil remains owner of the surface, and on re-formation of the surface soil takes whatever falls within his known boundaries. Ordinarily there can be no right of accretion when the new formation is on the site of what was formerly held by an individual as his private property. *DWARKANATH ROY v. DINOBUNDHOO SINGH CHOWDHRY*

15 W. R. 461

2. ———— *Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, cl. 1.* Where new land is formed, whether it be a re-formation on an old site or whether it is formed where no land ever previously existed, ownership is determined by the ownership of the adjacent land to which it has accreted. To defeat or prevent the right by accretion, the person who claims the land as a re-formation of his old land is required to prove some continuing right of property in himself; it is not enough for him to rely merely on identity of site. *KATTEMONEE DOSSEE v. MONMOHINEE DABEE*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 353: 3 W. R. 51

LYON v. GRAY 11 W. R. 189

3. ———— *Land inundated and re-formed.* The owner of land before it is inundated remains the owner of it when it is covered with water and after it becomes dry. *IMAM BANDI v. HUR GOBIND GHOSE*

7 W. R. P. C. 67: 4 Moo. I. A. 403

4. ———— *Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, cls. 1, 2, 3.* Claims to alluvial lands under cl. 2, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825 (i.e., to lands as re-formed lands), are not superior to claims under cls. 1 and 3 of s. 4, or under s. 5 of that Regulation, i.e., to lands as newly alluviated. *WISE v. AMEER-UNNISSA KHATOON*

2 W. R. 132

5. ———— *Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, cls. 1 and 3—Re-formation on old site.*

ACCRETION—*contd.*2. RE-FORMATION AFTER DILUVIATION—*contd.*

Proof of re-formation on an old site will not suffice to establish a claim under Regulation XI of 1825. Re-formations are governed by cls. 1 and 3, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825. A claim to hold the land under cl. 2 can only be maintained by the old proprietor when the land has not been diluviated, but cut off by a change of the stream. *KENNY v. SUMEEROONISSA*

3 W. R. 68

KALEE MONEE DEBIA v. COLLECTOR OF MYMENSINGH 5 W. R. 55

6. ———— *Land diluviated by river—Riparian proprietors.* Where property is wholly submerged by a river, land forming afterwards on the site will, when the ownership of that site is proved to exist in the former owner, remain in him, and the accretion will not belong to the adjacent proprietor. The decision in *Kattemonee v. Monmohinee Dabee*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 353, is erroneous in not regarding the site of the increment. *LOPEZ v. MADDAN MOHAN THAKOOR*

5 B. L. R. 521
14 W. R. P. C. 11
13 Moo. I. A. 467

7. ———— *Quare: To whom lands diluviated and afterwards re-formed belong.* *KIRTEE NARAIN CHOWDHRY v. PROTAB CHUNDER BUROOAH*

W. R. F. B. 129

8. ———— *Re-formation of lands washed away—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4.* Lands washed away and afterwards re-formed upon the old site, which can be clearly recognized, are no lands "gained" within the meaning of s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825; they do not become the property of the adjoining owner, but remain the property of the original owner. *ROMANATH THAKOOR v. CHUNDERNARAIN CHOWDHRY*

Marsh. 136
W. R. F. B. 45
1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 44

COLLECTOR OF TIPPERAH v. DOORGA PERSAD PARAY W. R., 1864, 302

COLLECTOR OF DACCA v. KISHEN KISHORE CHATTERJEE W. R., 1864, 273

9. ———— *Diluviated lands—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, cl. 2.* Cl. 2, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825, does not apply to the case of an estate entirely lost by diluvion. *KESMUBLALL CHOWDHRY v. WATSON & Co.*

W. R., 1864, 64

10. ———— *Diluviated lands, re-forming on old site—Title by long possession—Adverse possession.* The doctrine in *Lopez v. Maddan Mohan Thakoor*, 5 B. L. R. 521, that diluviated lands, re-forming on their old site, remain the property of their original owner, does not apply to lands in which after their re-formation an indefeasible title has been acquired by long adverse possession, or otherwise. Where a plaintiff relies on an alleged adverse possession of lands for more than twelve years after their re-formation, the question to be decided is whether he has had such possession for

ACCRETION—contd.**2. RE-FORMATION AFTER DILUVIATION**
—contd.

twelve years. **RADHA PROSHAD SINGH v. RAM COOMAR SINGH**

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 796: 1 C. L. R. 259

varying on appeal. **COURT OF WARDS v. RADHA PROSHAD SINGH** **22 W. R. 238**

11. ——— Land re-formed on site that can be identified. Where land re-forms by alluvion on a site capable of identification, the right of the owner of the original site to the chur is indisputable. **SARAT SUNDARI DEBY v. SOORJYA KANT ACHARJYA** **25 W. R. 242**

12. ——— Lands temporarily or permanently settled. Where lands submerged by a river re-form, and can be identified as having formed a part of a particular estate, they belong to the owner of that estate, whether his estate consists wholly of permanently-settled lands or whether it has been partly acquired as an alluvial accretion under temporary settlements made by Government with him as owner of permanently-settled lands. **HURSAHAI SINGH v. LOOTF ALI KHAN**

14 B. L. R. 268
23 W. R. 8: I. R. 2 I. A. 28

13. ——— Land re-formed on old sites. When land is gradually re-formed on two old sites, identity of site can give no title to the former owners of the two old sites to the land re-formed on such old sites respectively; nor can identity of site give any title to land gradually formed, when it is formed by gradual accession partly to one estate and partly to another. A person in possession of land is *prima facie* entitled to it, and to all increments to it. **MUTHOORANATH MUZOOMDAR v. TARINEE CHURN SINGH** **8 W. R. 164**

14. ——— Submersion of land—Riparian rights—Identification of site of land. In a suit for possession, where it was found that a rivulet had come in from a river and formed a disjunction between the disputed land and plaintiff's property, but that the rivulet was closed up and the river had returned to its proper channel, and on the surface of the disputed land there still remained marks of its having belonged to the plaintiff: *Held*, that the finding sufficiently identified the land in suit as the property of the plaintiff, within the meaning of the Full Bench ruling in *Kattemonee Dossee v. Monmohinee Dabee*, **B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 353: 3 W. R., 51**. *Held*, also, that as the last person found to have had the land in occupation was the plaintiff, and as his possession had never been disturbed (the lands having ever since been submerged), there was a sufficient finding of possession to entitle plaintiff to a decree in confirmation of title. **INDURJEET KOOR v. JUMNA DOSS** **14 W. R. 164**

15. ——— Condition of land when re-formed—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4—Right to possession. The rule, where question arises as to the right to the possession of land, either gained by gradual accession or re-formation, or thrown up

ACCRETION—contd.**2. RE-FORMATION AFTER DILUVIATION**
—contd.

in a river or the sea, is that the condition of the land where it was originally gained by alluvion or thrown up, and became the subject of property and capable of cultivation or occupation as such, must be looked to. If, after the land comes into existence and is capable of cultivation, it is taken into possession and occupied, the subsequent drying up of the channel between such land and the shore does not affect the occupier's right to possession as against every one except the Government or one who can show a better title. **S. 4, Regulation XI of 1825**, is not against this view. **KALIPRASAD MAZUMDAR v. COLLECTOR OF MYMENSINGH**

6 B. L. R. 261 note: 13 W. R. 366

16. ——— Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, Construction of—"At the disposal of Government." The words "at the disposal of the Government" in cl. 3, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825, mean that the property in, and absolute right of disposal of, the land is vested in the Government, and not that the Government has merely a right to the revenue. **KHELUT CHUNDER GHOSE v. COLLECTOR OF BHAUGULPORE** **W. R., 1864, 73**

3. PROCEDURE.

1. ——— Procedure where rules under Beng. Reg. XI of 1825 are inapplicable. Where the special rules laid down in Regulation XI of 1825 for the adjudication of questions of title to alluvial land are inapplicable, and no special custom exists, the decision of the case ought to proceed on general principles of equity and justice. **SHEGOLAM TEWARÉE v. FAQUERA MISSEER** **3 Agra 400**

2. ——— Chur lands, re-formation on old site—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, cls. 3 & 5. *Held*, that cl. 3, s. 4, Regulation XI of 1825, is applicable when the chur land is thrown up for the first time, and is not capable of being identified; but where the land thrown up forms a portion of the old mouzah, and can be identified, cl. 5, s. 4 of the said enactment, would be applicable; and in the absence of any particular local custom the claim in respect of such land must be decided according to the principles of equity. **TODEE SINGH v. GARDNER**

2 Agra 342

3. ——— Suit for alluvial lands—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 5, cl. 5. In a suit for alluvial lands, if the defendant pleads, and can establish his plea, that the lands in question were gradual accessions to his estate, neither the ground of re-formation on the old site, nor that of prior possession for a short period, can avail the plaintiff. If, however, the plea be found against the defendant, the matter must be disposed of according to cl. 5, s. 5, Regulation XI of 1825. **GOVIND NATH SANDYAL v. NUBOCOOMAR BANERJEE** **8 W. R. 206**

4. ——— Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4, cl. 5. Where plaintiff alleges that his and the defendant's villages were washed away, and

ACCRETION—*concl'd.*3. PROCEDURE—*concl'd.*

have re-formed on the same site, and no third party claims the new formation as an increment to his estate, the question of title will have to be determined by cl. 5, s. 4 of Regulation XI of 1825. *JANNOBEE CHOWDHRAIN v. COLLECTOR OF MYMENSINGH*

8 W. R. 287

4. RIGHT OF PURCHASERS TO ACCRETIONS.

1. ——— Re-formation since purchase. The purchaser of an estate found by actual measurement the year before to consist of a certain number of bighas with a specified rental can have no claim to re-formations of land belonging to the mehal as it originally stood. *JUGOBUNDHOO BOSE v. KOOMOODINEE KANT BANERJEE CHOWDHRY*

19 W. R. 89

2. ——— Increments not mentioned in certificate of sale. Where a mehal which has been diminished by diluvion is sold at auction by the Collector, who apprizes the public of the existing area, his specification of such area in no way limits the terms of the certificate of sale, or restricts the right of the purchaser to claim thereafter any accretion to the estate, the increment being always a contingent right which the zamindar has. *GUNGA NARAIN CHOWDHRY v. RADHIKA MOHUN ROY. RADHIKA MOHUN ROY v. GUNGA NARAIN CHOWDHRY*

21 W. R. 115

Affirmed on review. *RADHIKA MOHUN ROY v. GUNGA NARAIN CHOWDHRY*

22 W. R. 23

See *IDAN v. NUND KISHORE*

25 W. R. 390

3. ——— Lands taken on settlement from Government. Parties settling with Government are entitled to all the proprietary rights of the Government, including the re-formed lands, unless they take the estate at a reduced jumma from that fixed at the original settlement, in which case they are in the position of a proprietor who has accepted a remission of revenue in consideration of the loss of area of the land, a situation which disentitles them to the lands re-formed. *KRISHTO MOHUN BYSACK v. COLLECTOR OF DACCA*

24 W. R. 91

4. ——— Purchase of land from Government—Right to increments. Plaintiff brought a certain chur, situated between two branches of a river, from the Government, the sale notification stating that the chur contained a certain area and was subject to a certain jumma. It appeared that at a former time the chur had been much larger and extended over a site afterwards covered with deep water, but on which, and before the plaintiff's purchase, new land had formed by accretion to the opposite side of the channel. In a suit for possession of the newly-formed land on the ground that it was re-formation on an old site: *Held*, that what the Government sold and what plaintiff bought was the chur as it existed at the date of the purchase. *Gunga Narain Chowdhry v. Radhika*

ACCRETION—*concl'd.*4. RIGHT OF PURCHASERS TO ACCRETIONS—*concl'd.*

Mohun Roy, 21 W. R. 115, cited and distinguished. *GHOLAM ALI CHOWDHRY v. COLLECTOR OF BACKER-GUNGE*

2 C. L. R. 39

5. ——— Property not attached because submerged—*Submersion of contiguous estate—Sale in execution of decree—Right of purchaser.* *F* owned a share in a village, *M*, which in 1875 was divided into two separate mehals, *K* and *U*, and Government revenue was separately assessed on each mehal. In 1876, *K* was entirely submerged by the Ganges. On the 20th September 1877, *F*'s share was sold in execution of a decree and the auction-purchaser was put in possession. In the sale certificate the village *M* was named, without specific mention of either of the two mehals, and the Government revenue referred to was the amount assessed on *U* only. Subsequently the river receded, and part of *K* was again left dry, and it was treated by the revenue authorities as having accreted by alluvion to *U*, in the proprietary possession of the auction purchaser. *Held*, that this view was erroneous, inasmuch as, before the auction-sale of 20th September 1877, the two properties were separate, being separately assessed with revenue, and the incidents of the ownership of one could not affect the ownership of the other; and since there was no such rule of law as would justify the proposition that simply because two mehals are contiguous, and one of them is liable to be submerged, therefore it is nothing more or less, than an accretion to the other. *Held*, also, that inasmuch as the mehal *K*, being at the time under water, was not attached in execution of the decree against *F*, and was not advertized for sale, and the revenue assessed thereon was not referred to in the sale-proceedings, and the sale certificate contained no reference to it as the property sold, the sale of the 20th September 1877 did not convey any rights to the auction-purchaser in respect of *K*. *Mahadeo Dubey v. Bhola Nath Dichit*, I. L. R. 5 All. 86, referred to. *FIDA HUSAIN v. KUTUB HUSAIN*

I. L. R. 7 All. 38

ACCUMULATIONS.]

See HINDU LAW—ALIENATION—ALIENATION BY WIDOW—INCOME AND ACCUMULATIONS.

See HINDU LAW—JOINT FAMILY—NATURE OF, AND INTEREST IN, JOINT PROPERTY—ANCESTRAL PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 316

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 349

See HINDU LAW—WIDOW—INTEREST IN ESTATE OF HUSBAND BY INHERITANCE

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 478

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 861

See HINDU LAW—WIDOW—POWER OF WIDOW—POWER OF DISPOSITION OR ALIENATION.

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 861

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 574

ACCUMULATIONS—*concl.*

See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS.

9 W. R. P. C. 1
12 Moo. I. A. 41
I. L. R. 7 Calc. 269
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 684
I. L. R. 12 I. A. 103
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 571
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 589
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 662
2 C. W. N. 389

1. ——— Income—*Hindu widow*. Accumulations are not income, and cannot be dealt with by a Hindu widow as such; they should be treated in the same way as the *corpus* of the estate. *GROSE v. AMIRTAMAYI DASI*

4 B. L. R. O. C. 3; 12 W. R. O. C. 13

2. ——— But income and accumulations are not the same thing; therefore, *quere*, whether she can deal with accumulations as she can with income. *In the goods of HARENDRANARAYAN. KAILASNATH GHOSE v. BISWANATH BISWAS*

4 B. L. R. O. C. 41

3. ——— Right of Hindu widow—*Accumulations of income from her husband's estate*. A Hindu widow is entitled to the accumulations of income from her husband's estate. *PANNALAL SEAL v. BAMASUNDARI DASI*

6 B. L. R. 732

4. ——— *Immoveable property purchased with accumulations*. Immoveable property purchased by a Hindu widow with the profits of her husband's estate, there being no proof of any distinct intention on her part to sever such purchases from the estate and appropriate it to herself, held to form part of her husband's estate. *GONDA KOOR v. KOOR OODEY SINGH*

14 B. L. R. 159

See CHOWDHRY BHOLANATH THAKOOR v. BHAGABATTI DEVI

7 B. L. R. 93

In that case it was held that, though a Hindu widow cannot alienate property acquired by her out of funds derived from her husband, yet where she held under a deed which conveyed the property to her to enjoy for her lifetime and to incur all needful expenses, she was entitled to invest sums out of the income for the benefit of her daughter and granddaughter in the purchase of immoveable property for their maintenance. But this decision was, on the construction of the deed, reversed by the Privy Council. *BHAGABATTI DEVI v. BHOLANATH THAKOOR*

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 104

ACCUSED PERSON.

See BAIL . . . 1 B. L. R. A. Cr. 7
10 W. R. Cr. 16
I. L. R. 1 All. 151

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT.

See CONFESSION. I. L. R. 32 Calc. 550

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 528.
I. L. R. 28 All. 331

ACCUSED PERSON—*contd.*

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 107.
13 C. W. N., 151

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 133, 183, 342 . . . 9 C. W. N. 983

See DETENTION OF ACCUSED BY POLICE.

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

See DISTRICT MAGISTRATE.
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1090

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION OF ACCUSED.

See EXAMINATION OF ACCUSED PERSON.

See POLICE CUSTODY. 11 C. W. N. 554

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

——— affidavit of—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 528.

——— effect of compounding on co-accused—

See COMPOUNDING OFFENCE.
7 C. W. N. 176

——— error in charge—

See ERROR . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 481

——— liability of—

See DYING DECLARATION.
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 659

——— necessity for notice to, before passing order to prejudice of—

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 41

——— notice to—

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—NOTICE OF SANCTION. I. L. R. 26 Mad. 592

——— right of, to copies of documents—

See COPIES OF DOCUMENTS.
I. L. R. 30 Mad. 466

——— right of, to show cause—

See FURTHER INQUIRY.
11 C. W. N. 316

——— wrong description of—

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CRIMINAL CASES . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 399

1. ——— Definition of "*accused person*." An accused person is a person over whom a Magistrate or other Court is exercising jurisdiction. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MONA PUNA*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 661

JHOJA SINGH v. QUEEN-EMPRESS
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 493

2. ——— "*Accused person*" —*Criminal Procedure Code*, 1882, s. 437. Held, that a person against whom proceedings under Ch. VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure are

ACCUSED PERSON—*concl'd.*

being taken is "an accused person" within the meaning of s. 437 of the Code. *Queen-Empress v. Mona Puna*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 661, and *Jhojha Singh v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 493, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MUTASADDI LAL*
I L. R. 21 All. 107

3. ————— *Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 208, 213, 215 and 526—Commitment in the absence of accused, whether legal—Witness, examination of, in the absence of accused, if proper—Cross-examination of prosecution witnesses—Postponement, application for, refusal of—Transfer—Credible information of order of stay of proceedings by High Court, procedure on receipt of—Bias—Cancellation of bail and remand to custody, on application for time to move for transfer.* It is illegal to make a commitment in the absence of the accused. A Magistrate acts injudiciously in proceeding with a case after he has been credibly informed, by a telegram from one of the accused to his mukhtear, that a rule for the transfer of the case from his file and for stay of further proceedings had been granted by the High Court. *Ratnessari Persad Narayan Sing and another v. Empress* 2 C. W. N. 498, referred to. It is illegal to examine an additional witness in the absence of the accused: and a Magistrate, by refusing an application for postponement of a case, further proceedings in which have been stayed by an order of the High Court, to enable the accused to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution with a view to obtain, before commitment, a cancellation of the charges framed against him, and to enable the Magistrate to receive the orders of the High Court, and by taking such precipitate action in the matter, shows his bias against the accused. It is desirable to transfer a case from the file of a Magistrate who, on an application made by the accused under s. 526, cl. (8), for stay of proceedings pending an application to the High Court for transfer, immediately cancelled their bail and committed them to custody. *In the matter of SURJYA NARAIN SINGH* (1900) . . . 5 C. W. N. 110

4. ————— *Notice to accused person necessary before order in his favour can be set aside.* An order by a Magistrate directing payment of compensation to the accused ought not to be set aside on appeal without notice to the accused. It will also be safer to give notice to the officer appointed by the Local Government referred to in s. 422 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *EMPEROR v. PALANIAPPAVELAN* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 187

ACCUSED PERSON, RIGHT OF.

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES—
CROSS EXAMINATION;
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 594

SUMMONING WITNESSES.
7 C. W. N. 188

See PRISONER, PRIVILEGES OF.

ACCUSED PERSON, RIGHT OF—*cont'd.*

1. ————— *Notice and specification of offence—Criminal Process.* An accused person is entitled to have conveyed to him by the process, whether summons or warrant, the same amount of information relative to the accusation made against him which should specify not only the technical designation of the offence, but the acts for which the accused would have to answer. *RAMZAN ALI v. DURPO KOMILLA*

24 W. R. Cr. 58

2. ————— *Application by accused for copy of Police charge-sheet—Police diaries—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), ss. 161 and 172—Revision.* At the beginning of a trial in the Court of a Presidency Magistrate, an application was made, on behalf of the accused, for a copy of the Police charge-sheet which contained the whole of the prosecution evidence as set forth by the Police, and extracts from, if not copies of, the Police diary. The application was rejected by the Magistrate:—*Held*, that the High Court should not on revision interfere with the order of the Magistrate. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. VENKATARATNAM PANTULU*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 14

3. ————— *Right of an accused to copies of Police reports before trial—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), ss. 157, 168, and 173—Public documents—Right of accused to inspect and have copies.* *Held* by the Full Bench (*SUBRAMANIA AYYAR, J., dissentiente*)—Reports made by a Police-officer in compliance with ss. 157 and 168 of the Criminal Procedure Code are not public documents within the meaning of s. 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, and consequently an accused person is not entitled, before trial, to have copies of such reports. *Held* by *COLLINS, C.J., and BENSON, J.*—The same rule applies to reports made by a Police-officer in compliance with s. 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Held* by *SHEPHERD and SUBRAMANIA AYYAR, JJ.*—Reports made by a Police-officer in compliance with s. 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code are public documents within the meaning of s. 74 of the Evidence Act, and consequently an accused person, being a person interested in such documents, is entitled, by virtue of s. 76 of the Evidence Act, to have copies of such reports before trial. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ARUMUGAM* I. L. R. 20 Mad. 189

4. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (1882), ss. 161 and 172—Police diaries—Right of accused or his agent to see the special diary or have copy of statement in it.* In no case is an accused person entitled as of right to a copy of any statement recorded by a Police-officer in the special diary prepared under the authority of s. 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the special diary is used by the Court to contradict the Police-officer who made it, or by the Police-officer who made it to refresh his memory, the accused person or his agent has a right to see that portion of the diary which has been referred to for either of these purposes, that is to say, the accused person or his

ACCUSED PERSON, RIGHT OF—

concl'd.

agent is entitled to see the particular entry which has been referred to, and so much of the diary as in the opinion of the Court is necessary in that particular matter to the full understanding of the particular entry so used, but no more. So held by the Full Bench, *per* EDGE, C.J., KNOX, BLAIR, and BURKITT, JJ.—A Police-officer investigating a case may lawfully reduce into writing in the special diary the full and unabridged statement made to him by person whom he is examining or has examined under s. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and if he does so, his record of such statement is part of the special diary and is just as much privileged as any other entry in the diary. *Per* BANERJI, J., and AIKMAN, J.—Statements recorded under s. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by a Police-officer making an investigation were not intended by the Legislature to be entered in the special diary, and, if they are so entered, do not form an integral part of the diary, and are not privileged, but the accused person or his agent is entitled to see them. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MANNU*. I. L. R. 19 All. 390

5. *Accused, right of retrial before jury where conviction set aside for misdirection.* When a case has been tried before a jury and the conviction has been set aside on the ground of misdirection, the accused is entitled to have his case retried before a jury. *Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales*, L. R. [1894] A. C. 57, referred to. *SADHU SHEIKH v. EMPRESS* 4 C. W. N. 576

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

See *BENGAL TENANCY ACT*, SCH. III, ART. 6. I. L. R. 21 Calc. 1043
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 168, 470

See *EXECUTION.*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 1043
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 168, 470

See *LIMITATION ACT* (XV of 1877), s. 19.
I. L. R. 26 All. 313

See *LIMITATION ACT* (XV of 1877),
ss. 19 to 22 I. L. R. 33 Calc. 613
10 C. W. N. 874, 959
9 C. W. N. 868
I. L. R. 29 All. 90

See *MAHOMEDAN LAW—ACKNOWLEDGMENT.*

See *STAMP ACT*, 1879, s. 3, CL. 4.
I. L. R. 14 Bom. 511
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 757

See *STAMP ACT*, 1899, SCH. I, ART. 1.
I. L. R. 27 All. 84

See *TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT.*
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 53

—by letter.

See *STAMP ACT*, 1879, s. 61.
I. L. R. 8 Mad. 11
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 329
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 324
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 54

ACKNOWLEDGMENT—concl'd.

—of liability—

See *PLAINT—AMENDMENT OF PLAINT.*

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 699

—of title—

See *LIMITATION ACT*, 1877, s. 19—*ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF OTHER RIGHTS.*
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 34

Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 19—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 50. In reply to a letter enclosing a bill for work done, the defendant wrote: "The bill glanced over is incorrect; large amounts have been wrongly introduced. I will first have the work examined, although I know that the whole of the work is not yet finished; then I will examine the estimates, and, after deducting what has to be deducted, I will see what is due." Held, that the writing was not an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of s. 19 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). *Green v. Humphreys*, L. R. 26 Ch. D. 474, referred to. Under s. 50 of the Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiff cannot take advantage of any ground of exemption from the law of limitation, which has not been set up in the plaint. *JOGESHAH ROY v. RAJ NARAIN MITTER* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 195
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 168

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBT.

See *DOCUMENT—ALTERATION OF.*

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 616

See *LIMITATION ACT*, 1877—

ss. 5 AND 19;

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 782

s. 19—*ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBTS*;
SCH. II, ART. 64.

I. L. R. 23 All. 502

" 26 Mad. 186

See *PARTNERSHIP—DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP.* I. L. R. 26 Bom. 42

See *STAMP ACT—*

(I OF 1879), SCH. I, ART. 1;

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 687

(II OF 1899), SCH. I, ART. 1;

I. L. R. 23 All. 213

(II OF 1899), SCH. I, ARTS. 1 AND 5.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 373

See *STAMP DUTY* . 11 C. W. N. 1120

—Part payment—

Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 19. In order that an acknowledgment of a debt should be effectual to save limitation under s. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act it must be signed by the person to be bound thereby. Similarly a part payment of the principal of a debt must appear in the hand-writing of the person making the part payment and not in that of any other person, however authorized. *DHARAM DAS v. GANGA DEVI* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 773

ACQUIESCENCE.

See ARBITRATION—REFERENCE OR SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION.

I. L. R. 28 Cal. 303

See DECREE—EXECUTION—ESTOPPEL—HINDU LAW.

See EASEMENT . I. L. R. 35 Cal. 661

See EVIDENCE ACT (I of 1872), s. 115.
I. L. R. 28 Bom. 393, 540
8 C W. N. 146

See ESTOPPEL—ESTOPPEL BY CONDUCT
See HINDU LAW.

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 400

See JURISDICTION—QUESTION OF JURISDICTION—CONSENT OF PARTIES AND WAIVER OF JURISDICTION.

See LACHES . 2 Mad. 114

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
I. L. R. 27 All. 338

NATURE OF TENANCY :

I. L. R. 28 Cal. 738

BUILDINGS ON LAND, ETC. ; RIGHT TO REMOVE, AND COMPENSATION FOR IMPROVEMENTS.

5 C. W. N. 843

See MORTGAGE—CONSTRUCTION—USUFRUCTUARY MORTGAGE.

L. R. 29 I. A. 148

See USUFRUCTUARY MORTGAGE.
I. L. R. 31 All. 325

1. ——— Laches—*Doctrine of laches and applicability of—Limitation.* The equitable doctrine of laches and acquiescence does not apply to suits for which a period is provided in the Limitation Acts. RAM RAU v. RAJA RAU 2 Mad. 114

TARUCK CHUNDER BHATTACHARJEE v. HURO SUN-KUR SANDYAL . 22 W. R. 267

Contra, UDA BEGUM v. IMAMUDIN
I. L. R. 1 All. 82

2. ——— Limitation. Mere laches or indirect acquiescence short of the period prescribed by the Statute of Limitation is no bar to the enforcement of a right absolutely vested in the plaintiff at the time of suit. *Semble:* The doctrine of acquiescence or laches will apply only to cases, if such there are, in which they can be regarded as a positive extinguishment of right. When they go merely to the remedy, the Courts have no power arbitrarily to substitute an extinguishing prescription different from that determined by the Legislature. PEDDAMUTHULATY v. TIMMA REDDY . 2 Mad. 270

3. ——— Delay. Circumstances constituting delay and acquiescence discussed. JAMNADAS SHANKARLAL v. ATMARAM HARJIVAN

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 133

4. ——— Delay in bringing suit. Long acquiescence held on the facts to bar a suit for posses-

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sion after assignment. JAN KOONWAR v. RAM RUTTUN NEOGHY . 18 W. R. 500

5. ——— Delay in enforcing rights with knowledge of them. Where the plaintiff in 1859 instituted a suit for a share of certain property which he admitted had been for nine years in the defendant's possession, and which the defendants alleged had been sold to them in 1820: *Held*, that the plaintiff's taking no steps during that time to enforce his alleged rights amounted to acquiescence on his part in the sale. NILATACHI v. VENKATACHALA MUDALI . 1 Mad. 131

6. ——— Presumption from long delay—*Estoppel.* In a suit by plaintiffs (who had been in possession of the land in dispute under and ever since the date of a pottah granted to them by the Collector in 1843) to have their title under the pottah declared, the defendants were held, by their long acquiescence in taking no steps within 12 years to have the pottah declared invalid, to have concluded themselves from now saying that it was illegal, and that the Collector had no power to grant it. SUNT LALL MISSEER v. BHUROSEE ISSUR 18 W. R. 57

7. ——— Contract—*Undue influence—Acquiescence by conduct—Exchange of land.* Where the owner of certain land exchanges it for certain other land, but takes a lease for one year of the former land and pays the rent thereof, and receives and retains the rents of the land he has acquired by the exchange, he shows so complete an acquiescence in the transaction that he cannot afterwards have it set aside on the ground of undue influence. SEETHARAMA RAJU v. BAYANNA PANTULU . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 275

8. ——— Acquiescence in lease by Executors which they had no power to make—*Estoppel—Representation not acted on.* Where the devisee of an estate for six years after coming of age and succeeding to the estate signed rent bills in respect of land which the executors of his testator had purported to lease for 999 years, and such rent bills contained a representation that the land had been given to the lessees on fazendári tenure: *Held*, that in the absence of any evidence that the lessees had been deceived by or had acted upon such representation, the devisee was not estopped from contesting the validity of the lease. A man cannot be precluded from asserting his own rights by acquiescence in acts of other parties inconsistent with them unless (i) he has actual knowledge as distinguished from the means of knowledge of his rights; (ii) he has knowledge that the persons acting inconsistently with them are doing so under the mistaken belief, that they are exercising rights of their own; (iii) he has encouraged the parties so acting to spend money or do other acts either directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal rights. *Willmott v. Barber.* L. R. 15 Ch. D. 96, followed. JUGMOHANDAS VUNDRAWANDAS v. PALLONJEE EDULJEE MOBEDINA
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 1

ACQUIESCENCE—*contd.*

9. ———— **Delay in making objection—Presumption of consent.** In a suit to avoid alienations effected by the plaintiff's father at a time when the plaintiff was living in commensality with his father as a member of a joint family, which suit was brought after 12 or 13 years had been allowed to go by without any objection, save the filing of a petition of protest in a Court of Justice, whereof the vendees were not made aware: *Held*, that the plaintiff was rightly considered to have consented to the alienations. **RAM KISHORE NARAIN SINGH v. ANUND MISSEER** **21 W. R. 12**

10. ———— **Knowledge . of transaction—Presumption of consent.** Before a man can be held to have given by his conduct an implied assent to a transaction, especially one which operates as a conveyance of a valuable estate, it must be shown that he was fully aware of what the transaction was, and what effect it would have upon his interests at the time he so conducted himself as to indicate assent. **JAGO BUNDHOO TEWAREE v. KURUM SINGH** **22 W. R. 341**

11. ———— **Suit to close a road—Presumption of consent.** The plaintiff not having opposed the making of a road until its completion was held not entitled to sue to have it closed. **RADHA NATH BANERJEE v. JOY KISHEN MOOKERJEE** **1 W. R. 288**

12. ———— **Suit to close road—Presumption of consent.** If A construct a road across B's land, B can sue within the ordinary period of limitation and no consent can be inferred from the fact that B did not sue immediately after the commencement or completion of the road. **HURO SOONDUREE DEBIA v. RAM DHUN BHUTTACHARJEE** **7 W. R. 276**

13. ———— **Delay in opposing erection of building—Presumption of consent.** In a suit for the demolition of a privy erected on plaintiff's land, it having appeared that plaintiff was aware of the erection of the privy and had allowed it to be completed and to remain standing for at least seven years, his application was refused. **BROMO MOYEE DEBIA CHOWDRAIN v. KOOMODINEE KANT BANERJEE. BARODA KANT BANERJEE v. KOOMODINEE KANT BANERJEE** **17 W. R. 467**

14. ———— **Erection of building without objection.** Acquiescence must be inferred when a person stands by and allows another to erect a pucca building on his land, and a suit would not lie for the demolition of the building, but only for damages or rent of land. **HURO CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. HULLODHUR MOOKERJEE** **W. R. 1864, 166**

NIL KANT SAHOO v. JUGOO SAHOO

20 W. R. 328

15. ———— **Building by trespasser on land.** When a trespasser tortiously enters upon the land of another and builds a house thereon, the party injured is entitled to recover possession of the land by destroying the house if there is no proof of acquiescence on his part in the

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Act of injury done. **GOBIND PURAMANICK v. GOOROO CHURN DUTT** **3 W. R. 71**

GUJADHUR SINGH v. NUND RAM **1 Agra 244**

16. ———— **Suit for restoration of land to former condition.** The rights of a co-sharer in a joint estate were sold by auction, but it did not appear that a site held by him in the village passed by the sale, and the site remained in the possession of his heirs, who sold it to the defendant, who erected a shop thereon. Twenty years after the auction sale, the plaintiffs, some of the co-sharers in the joint estate, sued for demolition of the house, and the restoration of the site to the village. *Held*, that under the circumstances, the claim could not be maintained. **BAHADOOR v. SHADEE RAM** **2 Agra 3**

17. ———— **Right to remove building.** Where H, knowing that B claimed certain land as his own, nevertheless purchased the land from a third person and erected a bungalow upon it which B did not interfere to prevent. It was held that the English rule of equity, which, under such circumstances, would allow B to recover the land with the bungalow upon it, ought not to be applied in India, but that H should be allowed to remove the bungalow he had erected. **NARAYAN BIN RAGHAJI v. BHOLAGIR GURU MANJIR. HORMASJI SORABJI v. BHOLAGIR GURU MANJIR. BHOLAGIR GURU MANGIR v. HORMASJI SORABJI** **6 Bom. A. C. 80**

18. ———— **Building erected on land by purchaser, owner standing by.** Where a purchaser claims to hold land which he has purchased from a third person on the ground that the owner of such land has acquiesced in the sale, the purchaser must show clearly that the real owner was aware of the sale at the time it took place. Where the owner of land was not aware of its being sold by his father to a third person, but having heard of such sale, subsequently stood by and allowed the purchaser to build upon the land. It was held that the owner could not recover the land without compensating the purchaser for the building erected by him upon the land, and three months were allowed to the owner within which to pay such compensation. **SAVAKLAL KARSAN DAS v. ORA NIZMUDDIN** **8 Bom. O. C. 77**

19. ———— **Right of way, interruption of.** A had a right of way over B's land. He allowed B to erect a house on the pathway and enjoy it for seven years. He then brought a suit to have the pathway re-opened by pulling down B's house. *Held*, that A must be taken to have acquiesced in the interruption of his right of way, and his claim was one that a Court of equity and good conscience would not enforce. **BENI MADHAB DAS v. RAMJAY ROKEH** **1 B. L. R. A. C. 213: 10 W. R. 316**

20. ———— **When a man builds a house on land supposing it to be his own, or believing that he has a good title, and the real owner, perceiving his mistake, refrains from setting him**

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right, and leaves him to persevere in his error, a Court of Equity will not allow the owner to assert his legal right against the other without at least making him full compensation. *RAMA v. JAN MAHOMED*. 3 B. L. R. A. C., 18: 11 W. R. 574

ARUNA CHELLUM CHETTY v. OLAGAPPAH CHETTY
4 Mad. 312

21. ———— *Suit for ejectment—Transferable tenure—Landlord and tenant—Permissive occupation.* B and C and their father held lands for upwards of thirty-five years, and built houses on the same. B and C sold their tenures to D and E. A, the zamindar, who had not objected to the building, now sued to eject D and E as trespassers. Evidence was given that the tenures were, by the custom of the country, transferable. Held, that A could not eject D and E. *BENI MADHAB BANERJEE v. JAI KRISHNA MOOKERJEE*
7 B. L. R. 152: 12 W. R. 495

Upholding on appeal, *KEMP, J.* in S. C.

11 W. R. 354

See *ESHAN CHUNDER GHOSE v. HURRISH CHUNDAR BANERJEE*

10 B. L. R. Ap. 5: 18 W. R. 19

and *NABU MONDUL v. CHOLIM MULLIK, per RAM-PINI J.*
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 898

22. ———— *Erection of pucca building more than 20 years ago—Presumption as to permanent character of tenancy—Second appeal, power of Court to question inference from fact in—Omission of the Appellate Court to take into consideration circumstances affecting landlord's acquiescence.* A landlord by merely not objecting to his tenant's raising a pucca building does not confer on the tenant a permanent right to remain on the land. But long possession coupled with the acquiescence of the landlord in the raising of pucca buildings and his continuing to receive rent from the raiyat after such buildings have been raised may justify the inference that a tenant has a permanent right. *Zeshwada Bai v. Ram Chandra Takaram, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 66*, referred to. But there are circumstances which may go far to weaken the force of that inference and one of these is the circumstance of the landlord's interest being let out in ijara at the time the building was raised. The absence of objection on the part of the landlord to the erecting of a permanent building by a tenant during the continuance of an ijara of the landlord's interest should not be construed as amounting to acquiescence such as might be inferred where the landlord is in direct receipt of rent from the tenant. *Beni Madhub Banerjee v. Joy Kissen Mookerjee*, 12 W. R. 495, distinguished. *KRISHNA KISHORE NEOGI v. MAHOMED ALI* 3 C. W. N. 255

23. ———— *Assignable interest—Sale in execution of decree.* The plaintiff permitted B to erect a thatched dwelling-house with mud walls on a piece of land belonging to the plaintiff, and B dwelt in it for more than forty years. Held, that B had an assignable interest on the house

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and land, which could, therefore, be seized and sold in execution of a decree against B, and that the purchaser who had obtained possession could not be dispossessed at the suit of the plaintiff. *DURGA PRASAD MISSEER v. BRINDABUN SOOKUL*
7 B. L. R. 159: 15 W. R. 274

24. ———— *Land let for building purposes.* A landlord who allows his lessee to invest capital in erecting buildings on lands let for cultivation, and raises no objection for a considerable number of years, will not be allowed to disturb the holding. The fact of buildings having been permitted without objection to stand on lands for a considerable number of years is *prima facie* proof that the land had been originally leased for building purposes. *BRAJA NATH KUNDU CHOWDREY v. STEWART*. 8 B. L. R. Ap. 51: 16 W. R. 216

25. ———— *Permissive occupancy—Right of possession as against purchaser.* Where the defendant had been in possession of land for more than thirty years, and had without objection built upon the land: Held, that he had not by such permissive occupancy acquired a right to retain possession when served without notice to quit by a purchaser of the land. *ADDATA CHARAN DEY v. PETER DAS*
13 B. L. R. 417 note: 17 W. R. 383

26. ———— *Law of landlord and tenant as to building by the tenant on the land—Acquiescence of lessor—Equitable estoppel preventing ejectment—Onus of proof.* A lessor is not restrained by any rule of equity from bringing a suit to evict a tenant, the term of whose lease has expired merely by reason of that tenant's having erected permanent structures on the land leased, such building having been within the knowledge of the lessor, and there not having been any interference on his part to prevent it. To raise an equitable estoppel against the lessor precluding him from suing, on the determination of the tenancy, for possession, the tenant should show facts sufficient to justify the legal inference that the lessor has by plain implication contracted that the right of tenancy should be changed into a right of permanent occupancy. Acquiescence by the lessor in this case was a legal inference to be drawn from such facts as were found. The onus of establishing sufficient cause for an equitable estoppel had not been discharged by the tenant in this instance. *Ramsden v. Dyson, L. R. 1 E. & I. Ap. 129*, and s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, referred to. *BENI RAM v. KUNDAN LAL*
I. L. R. 21 All. 496: I. L. R. 26 I. A. 58
3 C. W. N. 502

27. ———— *Erection of buildings by tenant—Acquiescence of landlord.* To resist ejectment by a tenant on the ground that the tenancy is a permanent one, and that the landlord stood by and permitted him (the tenant) to erect pucca buildings on the land in the belief that the said tenancy was a permanent one, it is incumbent on the tenant to show that in erecting the buildings he was acting under an honest belief that he had a per-

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manent right in the land, and the landlord, knowing that he (the tenants) was acting under such belief, stood by and allowed him to go on with the construction of the buildings. *Beni Ram v. Kundan Lal*, I. L. R. 21 All. 496; L. R. 26 I. A. 58; *Ramsden v. Dyson* L. R. 1 E. and I. Ap. 129; *Jug Mahan Das v. Pallonjee*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 1; *De Busche v. Alt*, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 286; *Kunhamed v. Narayana Mussad*, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 320, referred to. ISMAIL KHAN MAHOMED v. JAIGUN BIBI

I. L. R. 27 Cal. 570; 4 C. W. N. 210

28. ————— *Delay—Erection of buildings—Laches—Limitation.* The plea of acquiescence is applicable to suits for which a fixed term of limitation is prescribed by law, but mere delay in enforcing a right does not constitute acquiescence. The defendants took possession of, and erected buildings on, land which they knew belonged to the plaintiff and they had no claim to, without applying to the plaintiff for consent. The plaintiff abstained from suing to eject them for one or two years, knowing that the defendants were building on the land: *Held*, under the circumstances, that the delay in the institution of the suit was not sufficient to deprive the plaintiff of her right to relief. *UDA BEGUM v. IMAM-UD-DIN*. I. L. R. 1 All. 82

29. ————— *Standing by and seeing building erected—Right to removal.* In a case in which plaintiffs sought to recover possession of some land on which defendants had constructed a pucca house and in which defendants pleaded that they had purchased a building right from a third party with whom plaintiffs had settled the land, and that plaintiffs had seen them building the house in question without offering any objections: *Held*, that having stood by and allowed defendants to build the house, plaintiffs could not sue to have the house removed. *LATA GOPEE CHAND v. LIKUT HOSSEIN*. 25 W. R. 211

30. ————— *Absence of protest—Suit for removal of building—Obstruction to right-of-way.* In a suit for the removal of a building which the defendants had erected, and which was an obstruction to the plaintiffs' right to use a courtyard adjoining their residences, it appeared that the land on which the building stood did not belong to either party, but that all the inhabitants of the mohulla had from time immemorial exercised a right-of-way over it to and from their houses:—*Held*, that there was no principle of acquiescence involved in the case, inasmuch as there was no evidence that the plaintiffs had given their actual consent to the building, and the only evidence of their acquiescence could be that they did not immediately protest, and the defendants must have known that they were building upon a courtyard which their neighbours had a right to use. *Uda Begum v. Imam-ud-din*, I. L. R. 1 All. 82, and *Ramsden v. Dyson*, L. R. 1 E. and I. Ap. 129, referred to. *FATEHYAB KHAN v. MUHAMMED YUSUF. MUHAMMED YUSUF v. FATEHYAB KHAN*

I. L. R. 9 All. 434

ACQUIESCENCE—*contd.*

31. ————— *Cultivating land without objection.—Acquiescence—Owner standing by and seeing person without title cultivate land—Fraud and deceit.* In order to prevent the owner of land who is charged with standing by and allowing another person, who believes he has a good title thereto, to enter on the land and spend money in improving it, from recovering possession thereof, fraud and deceit on the part of the owner must be clearly proved. *Dann v. Spurrier*, 7 Vesey 251, and *Rama v. Jan Mahomed*, 3 B. L. R., A. C., 18; 11 W. R. 574, explained. *LANGLOIS v. RATTRAY*

3 C. L. R. 1

32. ————— *Cultivation and changing character of land—Landlord and tenant—Injunction—Delay.* The tenant of an agricultural holding planted his jote with mango trees to the knowledge, but without the consent, of his landlord, thus changing the character of the land. More than three years afterwards the landlord sued for a mandatory injunction to have the mango trees removed. *Held*, that having stood by for more than three years and allowed the tenant to spend his labour and capital upon the land without taking any action in the matter, the landlord was not entitled to a mandatory injunction. *NOYNA MISSER v. RUPKUN*

I. L. R. 9 Cal. 609; 12 C. L. R. 300

33. ————— *Malabar kanam—Change in character of land—Passive acquiescence of landlord—Estoppel—Compensation for improvements by tenant.* Land was demised on kanam wet for cultivation. The demisee changed the character of the holding by making various improvements which were held to be inconsistent with the purpose for which the land was demised. On a finding that the landlord had stood by while the character of the holding was being changed and had thereby caused a belief that the change had his approval: *Held*, on second appeal, that the demisee was entitled to compensation for his improvements on redemption of the kanam. *Ramsden v. Dyson*, L. R. 1 E. and I. Ap. 129, followed. *KUNHAMMED v. NARAYANAN MUSSAD*. I. L. R. 12 Mad. 320

Where, however, it was held that the landlord had not acquiesced in some of the improvements and compensation was therefore refused for them though the tenant was permitted to remove those for which no compensation was allowed.

See *RAVI VARMAH v. MATHISSEN*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 323 note

34. ————— *Acquiescence in title, by conduct.* In a suit to recover possession of property it was held, on the evidence, that the plaintiffs had acquiesced in defendant's title by their conduct. *JEEBUN MUNDAL v. NADYAR CHAND ROY*

25 W. R. 461

35. ————— *Conduct defeating title—Evidence of ratification.* The plaintiff, a member of an undivided Hindu family, sued to recover a parcel of land which he alleged his uncle, the first defendant, to have wrongly transferred to the

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second defendant. The second defendant alleged a sale to him by the first defendant, and a subsequent sale to the third defendant, and denied the plaintiff's title. The Munsif gave a decree for the plaintiff; on appeal, the Principal Sudder Amin, finding that the plaintiff knew of the sale and treating the knowledge as evidence of acquiescence in it, reversed the decision of the Munsif. *Held*, reversing the decision of the Principal Sudder Amin, that such knowledge would not make the plaintiff a party to the sale by the first defendant, so as to bar his right to recover the land for which he sued in ejectment. A person who seeks to bar one who is *prima facie* the legal owner, by evidence of ratification, or of facts cogent enough to prove one not a formal to be a substantial party, must make and prove such a case, for he is one who seeks to displace a legal title. *RAJAN v. BASUVA CHETTI*

2 Mad. 428

36. *Ratification of transfer of property.* A solehnama in 1847, to which were parties the sons, daughters and widow of a deceased Mahomedan proprietor, transferred the shares of two minor daughters, in their father's estate, having been executed by their mother, the widow, on their behalf. On the question whether the solehnama should be set aside, at the instance of the two daughters, on the ground of its having been beyond their mother's power to bind them, and of the instruments having been prejudicial to their interests, the evidence showed that it had been acted on and followed by possession, and that the daughters had, after attaining full age, allowed a lengthened period of twenty years to elapse without taking proceedings to dispute it:—*Held*, that if the mother had exceeded her powers in executing the solehnama on their behalf, and if they might, at one time, have had it set aside, their long acquiescence was sufficient to show ratification of the transaction; and the solehnama was upheld. *MAHOMED ABDUL KADIR v. AMTAL KARIM BANU*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 161; L. R. 15 I. A. 220

37. *Presumption from allowing grant of certificate unopposed.* In a rival claim between two Hindu widows of a deceased husband the plaintiff sued as mother and guardian of her infant son to establish his right as son and heir of his father. One defence, among others, was that the son was not legitimate, and could not inherit. His legitimacy was established, but the incapacity to inherit was sought to be proved by the plaintiff's virtual acknowledgment of the defendant's title as heiress on the grant to the defendant unopposed by the plaintiff of a certificate of heirship. *Held*, that it was not the practice of the Courts in India or of the Privy Council to press against either an infant or a Hindu female a presumption by acquiescence in a rival claim from the mere non-contestation for a limited time of an adverse title. *RAMAMANI AMMAL v. KULANTHI NAUCHEAR*

17 W. R. 1: 14 Moo. I. A. 346

38. *Not objecting to sale—Suit to recover property sold—Presumption of consent.*

ACQUIESCENCE—*contd.*

Where *R. K.*, acting ostensibly as recognized agent and manager of the family, sold part of the family property to the ancestors of the defendants, and the plaintiff, who was then of age, did not object to the sale, but afterwards sued to set aside the sale as to his share, on the ground that the property had been purchased by *R. K.* with the joint funds while the plaintiff was a minor, and that it was sold by him without authority, the first Court gave him a decree for a one-fourth share of the property. *R. K.* appealed, but the other defendants did not appeal. The Judge, assuming the lower Court's finding to be correct, held, that as the plaintiff, who was of age at the time, did not object to the sale, he could not recover possession of property sold by *R. K.* as the recognized agent and manager. *Held*, also, that *R. K.* could not found any right upon the presumption of plaintiff's consent, however such presumption might have availed the other defendants, purchasers from *R. K.*, who had not appealed. *GOPAL CHUNDER LAHOORY v. ROY KISHORE LAHOORY*

15 W. R. 467

39. *Pre-emption—Mortgage by conditional sale.* Acquiescence in a mortgage by conditional sale does not involve relinquishment of the right of pre-emption upon the conditional sale eventually becoming absolute. *AJAIB NATH v. MATHURA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 11 All. 164

40. *Account made in course of usual dealing.* The defendant in a suit for balance of payments made by plaintiff on his behalf *held* not entitled to refuse to be bound by an account made up in accordance with the course of dealing which had practically been assented to by him and had been followed between the parties for many years. *THAKOOR PERSHAD SINGH v. MOHESH LALL*

24 W. R. 390

41. *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 443—Suit against a major defendant by guardian ad litem—Subsequent objection to execution on ground of his having been wrongly impleaded.* The managing member of a Hindu family consisting of himself and two brothers, who were minors, mortgaged the ancestral property to secure a debt properly incurred by him in his capacity as manager. The mortgagee brought a suit upon the mortgage joining as defendants the three brothers, the two younger of whom were sued by the mortgagor as their guardian *ad litem*. A decree for the plaintiff having been passed, the lands were sold in execution. The two younger brothers now sued to have the decree and the sale set aside as regards them, on the ground that they had both been of age at the date of the suit, and accordingly had been wrongly impleaded. It appeared that the elder plaintiff was in fact a major at the date of the previous suit, but he was aware prior to the sale, of the suit and the execution proceedings, and still allowed his elder brother to conduct the defence and proceedings on his behalf:—*Held*, that both plaintiffs were bound by the decree in the former suit. *RAMACHARI v. DURAISAMI PILLAI*

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 167

ACQUIESCENCE—*contd.*

42. Sending agent to settle rent—*Acquiescence in rate*. The sending of an agent by a tenant to settle with the landlord as to the rent is not a virtual acquiescence in the rate of rent demanded. *STALKART v. LALLA BHURRUT LALL* . . . W. R. 1864, Act X, 115

43. Receipt of rent in lieu of grant of land. In a suit to recover possession of land it appeared that the defendant's father had in 1801 obtained possession on a lease of 280 bighas from the Government of Kulabo, and that the plaintiffs' father had in 1806 obtained a grant of 10 unspecified bighas of the same land, but that he never asked to have them marked out and given to him *in specie*, and that he, and subsequently his sons, the plaintiffs, were content up to the year 1856 to receive from the defendant's family in respect of their grant the rent formerly paid by them to the Government for the same. The District Court reversed the decree of the Munsif, and threw out the claim to recover possession of the land on the ground that the plaintiffs must be taken after such a lapse of time to have acquiesced in the arrangement that a yearly rent was to be received without any particular land being marked out as theirs. *Held*, that it was competent for the Assistant Judge to come to that conclusion under the circumstances, and that there was no ground for saying that there was any error of law in his decision, which was accordingly affirmed. *SULE v. DHUNDIRAJ VENAYAK* . . . 3 Bom. A. C. 55

44. Accepting lower rent than that entitled to for long time. Where a landlord who may originally have had a right to collect a higher rent is for a long period of years content to accept a lower, it would be manifestly unjust to allow him to turn round upon the tenant at any time he pleases and demand the higher rent. *ROOCHA RAM MISE v. NAGA DOSS* . . . 2 N. W. 92

45. Long possession by tenant without lease. An under-tenant who has dug a tank and been in possession undisturbed by the former proprietor for a long period, such acquiescence being equivalent to a lease, cannot be ejected by the patnidar. *SREEMUNT RAM DEY v. KOOKOOR CHAND* . . . 15 W. R. 481

46. Allowing part owner to work forfeiture of tenure as if full owner—*Waiver of forfeiture—Claim of portion of tenure*. If A allows B to deal with an occupancy tenure as full owner, and by an attempted transfer, to work a forfeiture thereof without any objection on his part, A will not be allowed to come in afterwards and claim a part of the forfeited holding on the ground that B was only part owner, and could therefore only work a forfeiture of his own share. *MANIRULLAH v. RAMZAN ALI* . . . 1 C. L. R. 293

47. *Equitable estoppel—Landlord and tenant—Lessee taking lease direct from zaminder—Suit by occupancy-tenant to eject zamindar's lessee*. Where a person took a permanent lease of a cultivatory holding direct from the zamindar without making any inquiries as to

ACQUIESCENCE—*concl.*

who were the cultivators and on what tenure they held; and where, the permanent lessee having commenced to build, one of the cultivators, being an occupancy-tenant, subsequently brought a suit in ejectment against him:—*Held*, that the lessee should, by the knowledge that the land was a cultivatory holding, have been put on his guard and have made inquiries as to the exact condition of the title, and not having done so the doctrine of equitable acquiescence could not be applied. *BISHESHAR v. MURHEAD* . . . I. L. R. 14 All. 362

48. *Landlord and tenant—Kabuliyat by one of several joint tenants—Rent suit against recognised tenant alone—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 65*. Where one of several joint tenants executed a kabuliyat in favour of the landlord, and the other tenants acquiesced in the representation of the holding by the tenant who executed the kabuliyat, and the landlord sued him only for the rent, and in execution of the rent-decree attached the entire holding, and the other tenants made no attempt to get themselves recognised or to pay the arrears: *Held*, that the attachment covered the entire holding, there being no fraud or collusion on the part of the landlord. *RAJANI KANT GUHO v. UZIR BIBI* (1902) . . . 7 C. W. N. 170

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See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACQUIT-TALS, APPEALS FROM.

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I. L. R. 2 All. 301

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18 W. R. 319

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I. L. R. 1 Bom. 624
2 Bom. 193 2nd Ed. 185

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See MAMLATDAR, JURISDICTION OF.
I. L. R. 14 Bom. 372

XIX, s. 13—

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—ACT XIX OF 1838.

5 Bom. Cr. 6

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4 Mad. 277

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3 Moo. I. A. 395

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3 Bom. Ap. 1

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10 B. L. R. 352, 353 note

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1840—IV—

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1 Bom. 96

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4 Mad. Ap. 53

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1 Agra 186

2 Agra 280

6 N. W. 243, 272

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3 N. W. 125

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I. L. R. 14 Bom. 170

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4 Moo. I. A. 179

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1 Agra 222

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1841—XIX—

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See CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION—CERTIFICATE UNDER BOMBAY REGULATION VIII OF 1827 AND ACTS XIX AND XX OF 1841

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 365

6 W. R. Mis. 53

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I. L. R. 20 Bom. 437

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12 C. W. N. 65

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2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 191 : 7 W. R. 199

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11 Moo. I. A. 405

1 W. R. 341

ACT—*contd.*

1841—XIX, s. 3—

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 622.

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 68

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XIX, ss. 3, 5, 8—

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622.

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1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 36

1 Hay 29, 559

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9 Moo. I. A. 26

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3 N. W. 70

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6 N. W. 373

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1 N. W., Part 3, p. 47, Ed. of 1873, 103

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4 W. R. P. C. 94

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8 Bom. Cr. 19

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACTS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.

6 Bom. A. C. 243

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8 Bom. A. C. 35

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- See HEREDITARY OFFICES' ACT, s. 9.
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- See HINDU LAW, ADOPTION—REQUISITES
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I. L. R. 1 Bom. 607
- See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—
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2 Bom. 362, 2nd Ed., 342
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3 Bom. A. C. 128
8 Bom. A. C. 83, 107
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1 Mad. 448
- See PROMISSORY NOTE—CONSIDERATION.
9 B. L. R. 441
- See CESS. I. L. R. 14 Bom. 526
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- See TOWN DUTIES, BOMBAY.
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- See FACTORS ACT.

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- See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
DEPOSIT TO STAY SALE.
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 794
- I, ss. 6 and 14—
- See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.
9 Moo. I. A. 268

s. 9—

- See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
DEPOSIT TO STAY SALE.
Marsh. 226
11 Moo. I. A. 241

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- See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—EXEMP-
TION FROM ENHANCEMENT, ETC.—PROOF
OF UNIFORM PAYMENT.
B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 623 : 7 W. R. 176

ACT—*contd.*1845—I, s. 26—*concl'd.*

- See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—LIABILITY
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BUILDINGS. W. R., 1864, Act X, 101
- See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
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s. 19) . . . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 1
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- See BARRISTER . I. L. R. 3 Mad. 138
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- See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACT
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- See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS—
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- See DISTRAINT 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 361

1847—IX, ss. 3 to 6—

- See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MAPS.
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 291

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- See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS—
REVENUE . . . 19 W. R. 127
14 B. L. R. 221 note : 18 W. R. 64

ACT—*contd.*1847—IX—*contd.*

1. ———— *Beng. Reg. XI of 1825—Chur in navigable river, right of Government to.* Act IX of 1847 does not alter the state of the law under Regulation XI of 1825, but merely lays down a procedure. There is nothing in Act IX of 1847 to prevent the Government from taking possession of a chur, after it has silted up, if the chur be one that the Government would be entitled to under Regulation XI of 1825. *BUDRUNNISA CHOWDHRAIN v. PROSUNNO KUMAR BOSE*

6 B. L. R. F. B. 255 : 14 W. R. F. B. 25

2. ———— *Right of Suit—Effect of an order for additional assessment.* Certain land, which formed part of the plaintiff's zamindari, became, on its re-formation after submergence by a change in the course of the river Ganges, attached to the zamindari of J, and it being found so attached an additional jumma was, after proceedings taken by the revenue authorities under Act IX of 1847, assessed against J in respect of it. In a suit in the Civil Court brought by the plaintiff against the Government, J, and L, an ijaradar under J, to recover possession of the land : *Held*, that the suit was not barred by the proceedings under Act IX of 1847. S. 6 of that Act makes the orders passed under its provisions final only against the zemindar, not against third persons. Nor would s. 9 bar the suit ; the words of that section do not necessarily extend to forbidding a suit brought to recover property which the Government or its officers may be instrumental in keeping away from the rightful owner. *Held*, on the facts, that the Government had not, by the proceedings under Act IX of 1847, or otherwise, interfered with the plaintiff's rights so as to entitle him to relief against it in the present suit. *COLLECTOR OF MOORSHEDABAD v. ROY DHUNPUT SINGH BAHADOOR*

15 B. L. R. 49 : 23 W. R. 38

3. ———— *Settlement by Revenue authorities.* Although a settlement made by the Revenue authorities under Act IX of 1847 is final, the fact of such settlement will not preclude a proprietor from seeking in a Civil Court to establish his right to the lands so settled. *NARAIN CHUNDER v. TAYLER* I. L. R. 4 Calc. 103 : 3 C. L. R. 151

4. ———— *Rights of third parties.* Act IX of 1847 does not affect any question between the person in possession and any person other than the Government. *KALIPRASAD MAZUMDAR v. COLLECTOR OF MYMENSINGH*

6 B. L. R. 261 note : 13 W. R. 366

5. ———— *Right of assessment by Government of accreted lands—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825.* Act IX of 1847 refers to re-surveys of zamindari lands which the Government as such may cause to be made at certain intervals, and to assessment consequent on the changes ascertained by such re-surveys, but does not interfere with the rights of the Government, in its capacity of zamindar, to take possession of, and assess all accretions to, its own

ACT—*contd.*1847—IX—*contd.*

estates under Regulation XI of 1825. *OBHOY CHURN CHOWDHRY v. COLLECTOR OF DACCA*

4 W. R. 59

6. ———— *Land added to revenue-paying estate.* The words "land has been added to any estate paying revenue directly to Government" in Act IX of 1847, s. 6, mean added to the estate as it is depicted on the survey map. *RAM JEWAN SINGH v. COLLECTOR OF SHAHABAD*

19 W. R. 127

DEWAN RAM JEWAN SINGH v. COLLECTOR OF SHAHABAD . . . 14 B. L. R. 221 note

18 W. R. 64

7. ———— ss. 6, 9—*Assessment of accreted land—Order of Board of Revenue when final under s. 6 of Act IX of 1847.* The effect of the words "whose order thereupon shall be final" in s. 6 of Act IX of 1847 is, that where an assessment has been made under s. 6, which has been approved by the Board of Revenue, such assessment is final and cannot be called in question in a civil suit ; but the fact of an assessment having been made is no bar to a suit raising the question whether the Board of Revenue had jurisdiction under s. 6 of the Act to assess. Act IX of 1847 applies to land reformed on the site of a permanently-settled estate. *SARAT SUNDARI DEBI v. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 784

8. ———— *Assessment of reformed land after diluviation—Act IX of 1847, ss. 1, 6, 7, and 9, effect of—Jurisdiction of Board of Revenue, its extent—Civil Court, power of—Survey maps, their evidentiary value.* Whereon inspection of a survey map, and after its comparison with a former thak map, the Board of Revenue assessed certain land as alluvial increment, which, however, the Civil Court, in a suit against the order of the Board, found upon further evidence to be a re-formation on the original site of a permanently-settled estate, in respect whereof the plaintiff had all along paid revenue without abatement :—*Held*, that the land was not liable to fresh assessment under the provisions of s. 6 of Act IX of 1847, nor was the comparison of the two maps by the Revenue Officer conclusive on the question of addition to the estate. *Sarat Sundari Debi v. The Secretary of State*, I. L. R., 11 Calc., 784, partially overruled.—*Held*, also, (MITTER, J., dissenting), that the order of the Board of Revenue fixing the land with liability to assessment was not final, and could be set aside by the Civil Court as *ultra vires*. *Dewan Ram Jewan Singh v. The Collector of Shahabad*, 18 W. R. 64, *Ram Jewan Singh v. The Collector of Shahabad*, 19 W. R. 127, overruled. *Held*, by the majority of the Full Bench, that the language of s. 9 was not such as would prohibit the present suit ; and, unless the meaning were clear, its operation should be limited to suits for damages on account of anything done in good faith ; for instance, in a case of ouster under s. 7. *The Collector of Moorshedabad v.*

ACT—*contd.*1847—IX—*concl'd.*

Roy Dhunput Singh, 15 B. L. R. 49, approved. *Held* (MITTER, J., dissenting), that s. 1 of Act IX of 1847 repealed everything in the Regulations which enacted by what officers and how the question of liability to assessment should be tried, and therefore took away from Collectors and Boards of Revenue the power of giving any binding decision on the point. *Held*, also, (MITTER, J., dissenting), that the effect of the words "shall be final" in s. 6 was to make the assessment final in every case in which there was jurisdiction to assess, but to leave it open to the Civil Courts to inquire in each case whether there was such jurisdiction, or whether the lands assessed were liable to assessment. *Per* MITTER, J. S. 1 has not abolished the judicial functions of the Revenue authorities under Regulation II of 1819; all that has been abolished by that section are the tribunals constituted by Regulation III of 1828. The proceedings of the Revenue authorities under s. 6 embrace an inquiry upon two questions, *viz.*, the question of the liability to assessment, and the rate of assessment, and under the express wording of the section the finality attaches to the whole order of the Sudder Board of Revenue. FAHAMIDANNISSA BEGUM v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 67

9. *Held*, on appeal to the Privy Council, that a review of the legislation anterior to Act IX of 1847 shows that whilst it was intended to bring under assessment lands not included in the permanent settlement, whether waste or gained by alluvion or dereliction from sea or rivers, yet all such lands as were comprised in permanently-settled estates were to be rigorously excluded from further assessment. Lands included in the permanent settlement having afterwards been covered by water, and having then been formed again on the same site, *held* not to be lands "gained" from the river by alluvion or dereliction within the meaning of Regulation II of 1819, that expression being confined to meaning lands gained since the period of the settlement. The effect of Act IX of 1847 was merely to change the mode of assessment in the case of land already liable to be assessed under legislation in force when that Act became law. It was not the object of that Act to bring under liability land re-formed on the site of land previously lost, within the area of a permanently-settled estate, the revenue upon which had been paid without abatement since the permanent settlement. Where an order of the Board of Revenue, purporting to be made under Act IX of 1847, subjected land included in the permanent settlement to assessment: *Held*, that the District Civil Court had jurisdiction (which, therefore, might be invoked as a matter of right) to entertain a suit brought by the landowner contesting that order, and to declare it unauthorised by law. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. FAHAMIDANNISSA BEGUM . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 590

L. R. 17 I. A. 40

ACT—*contd.*

1847—XX—

See COPYRIGHT ACT.

See COPYRIGHT I. L. R. 13 Bom. 358
I. L. R. 14 Bom. 586
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 557

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 40.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 17

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSEH—
JURISDICTION—COPYRIGHT.

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 499

1848—I—

See OFFENCE BEFORE PENAL CODE CAME
INTO OPERATION.

5 W. R. Cr. 8:1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 97

XIII—

See SURVEY AWARD . . . 23 W. R. 173

1. *Award—Decision on non-appearance of parties.* Act XIII of 1848 "for the greater security of possessory titles in the Presidency of Bengal, derived from awards made by the revenue authorities under Regulation VII of 1822, Regulation IX of 1825, and Regulation IX of 1833 of the Bengal Code," by s. 3, enacted that no suit should be entertained for contesting the justice of any award of the revenue authorities under any of these Regulations made after the passing of the Act after the expiration of three years from the date of the final award. A suit for the amendment of a map was referred by the Deputy Collector to an Ameen for the purpose of a local investigation, and the Ameen returned that, neither of the parties appearing before him, he was unable to make the investigation, whereupon the Deputy Collector struck the case out. *Held*, that this was not an award within the meaning of the Act. GOLAM KOODSEE CHOWDHRY v. RASHU CHUNDER GHOSE Marsh. 323

2. In order to apply the provisions of Act XIII of 1848 in regard to limitation, it was necessary to show that there was an award, *i.e.*, an adjudication after a contention between the parties before the survey authorities. HURREE MOHUN THAKOOR v. ANDREWS

W. R. 1864 30

3. *Suit to assess land—Boundary suit.* Act XIII of 1848 did not apply to bar a suit to assess land as rent-paying. A decision in a boundary suit decides only the question of right to possession of the land, irrespective of the right to assess. MAHOMED ALI KHAN CHOWDHRY v. JADUB CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY . . . W. R. 1864 60

4. *Awards made by Collectors—Beng. Regs. VII of 1822, IX of 1825, and IX of 1833.* Act XIII of 1848 was limited to awards made by Collectors under Bengal Regulations VII of 1822, IX of 1825, and IX of 1833, which gave to the revenue authorities judicial power to determine questions of possession and other matters with a right of appeal to the regular Courts against their

ACT—*contd.*1848—XIII—*contd.*

awards. An order of the Collector for the mutation of names in the register is not an award of the nature contemplated by the Regulation XIII of 1848, and an appeal from it was not subject to the limitation of three years prescribed thereby. *JRWALA BUKSH v. DHARUM SINGH*

10 Moo. I. A. 511

5. ———— *Settlement award—Suit to set aside.* Act XIII of 1848 applied only to suits for contesting the justice of an award as between the contending parties, and not to suits for the purpose of amending a settlement and establishing the rights of persons who were not parties contesting between themselves before the Collector. *KOMUL KISSEN SUBKHUL v. BISSONATH CHUCKERRITTY.*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. Ap. 3
W. R. F. B. 128

PURENAG SINGH v. SHIB RAM CHUNDER MUNDUL 3 W. R. 165

6. ———— *Thakbast award—Beng. Reg. IX of 1825—Act XIII of 1848—Evidence of possession.* A thakbast award of boundary made in the Lower Provinces may be an award, under Regulation IX of 1815, within the meaning of Act XIII of 1848. It would in any case be material evidence of possession. *PRAHLAD SEN v. RAJENDRA KISHOR SINGH* 2 B. L. R. P. C. 111
12 W. R. P. C. 6

7. ———— *Award—Decision under Batwara Law.* The decision of a Collector under the Batwara Law was not an award within the meaning of Act XIII of 1848. Act XIII of 1848 only applies to awards made by the revenue authorities under Regulations VII of 1822, IX of 1825, and IX of 1833. *PULTOO ROY v. GREEDHAREE SINGH*

W. R. F. B. 12
1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 5*GREEDHAREE SINGH v. PULTOO ROY Marsh. 37*

8. ———— *Order of Collector under Reg. VII of 1822.* The order of a Deputy Collector under Regulation VII of 1822, declaring the lands in dispute to be paykan jaghir lands, was an award within the meaning of Act XIII of 1848, and any suit to set it aside had to be brought within three years of the order. *MODHOOSOODUN SINGH v. PURTEE BULLUR PAUL* W. R. 1864, 140

9. ———— *Order of Collector rejecting claim to alluvial land.* The order of a Collector rejecting a claim to alluvial lands on the ground that a settlement of them had already been concluded, was not an award within the meaning of s. 3, Act XIII of 1848. *SHURAT SOONDIPPY DABEE v. THE GOVERNMENT* 7 W. R. 42

10. ———— *Rejection of claim by survey officer.* The rejection by a survey officer of a claim because it had not been brought forward sooner, was not an award within the scope of the special limitation of Act XIII of 1848. *SHAMA SOONDERY DABEE v. PROSONNO COOMAR TAGORE* 1 W. R. 114

ACT—*contd.*1848—XIII—*concl'd.*

11. ———— *Award adopting order under Act IV of 1840.* An award of survey authorities adopting an Act IV order was not illegal, and was consequently governed by limitation under Act XIII of 1848. *RAMGUTTY NAG CHOWDHRY v. BURDACHURN BOSE.* 1 W. R. 120

12. ———— *Order of Superintendent of Survey striking off appeal.* An order of a Superintendent of Survey striking off an appeal was not an award within the meaning of Act XIII of 1848. *SHAM KANT BANERJEE v. GOPAL LALL TAGORE* 1 W. R. 328

13. ———— *Order of Commissioner.* Nor was the order of a Commissioner striking an appeal off the file. *JANOKEE CHOWDHANEE v. DWARKANATH CHOWDHRY*

1 Hay 555

RAM GOPAL ROY v. OMA SOONDY DASSEE

2 Hay 4

14. ———— *Deduction for disability.* No deduction on account of minority or other legal disability could be made from the period of limitation prescribed by Act XIII of 1848. *MODHOOSOODUN SINGH v. PURTEE BULLUR PAUL*

W. R. 1864, 140

HURO CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. KISHEN COOMAR CHOWDHRY 5 W. R. 27

The limitation for awards made under Bengal Regulations VII of 1822, IX of 1825, and IX of 1833, was afterwards provided for by Limitation Act XIV of 1859, s. 1, cl. 6, and Limitation Act IX of 1871, sch. II, art. 44, and is now contained in art. 45 of sch. II of the Limitation Act, 1877.

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See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—APPEALABLE ORDERS 5 Moo. I. A. 499

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1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 126

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5 Moo. I. A. 109

6 Moo. I. A. 251

See INTEREST—OMISSION TO STIPULATE FOR, ETC.—CONTRACTS.

9 Moo. I. A. 256

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—AUTHORITY OF AGENTS 1 Bom. 34

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- 1848—XXI—*concl.*
See TAZI MANDI CHITTIS.
 8 B. L. R. 412, 415 note
- See* TROVER . . . 6 B. L. R. 581
- 1849—I, s. 9—
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- VI—
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- XI—
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- 1850—IX—
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- XXVIII—
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- XXI—
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See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—DIVESTING OF, EXCLUSION FROM, AND FORFEITURE OF, INHERITANCE.
See HINDU LAW—MAINTENANCE—RIGHT TO MAINTENANCE—WIDOW.
 I. L. R. 1 Bom. 559
See HINDU LAW—MARRIAGE.
See HINDU LAW—WIDOW—DISQUALIFICATION—UNCHASTITY.
- XXVI—
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- XXXI—
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See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.
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- XXXIV—
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 6 B. L. R. 392, 459
- XXXV—
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 6 Bom. Cr. 45

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- 1850—XXXV—*concl.*
See FERRIES ACT, XXXV OF 1850 (BOMBAY) . . . 3 Bom. Cr. 41
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 3 Bom. Cr. 11
- XLII—
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 10 B. L. R. 241
- 1851—VIII—
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- XII—
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 I. L. R. 22 Mad. 100
- 1852—XI—
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 10 Bom. A. C. 471
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 I. L. R. 11 Bom. 222
- XXV, s. 1—
See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 18 (1859, s. 19).
 B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 506
- s. 2—
See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 179 (1859, s. 20)—STEP IN AID OF EXECUTION—SUITS AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS BY DECREE-HOLDER . . . 19 W. R. 301
- 1853—VII—
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 6 Bom. Cr. 14
- XV, s. 6—
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 9 Moo. I. A. 26
- XIX—
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See ABATEMENT OF SUIT—SUITS.

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1 W. R. 251

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5 Bom. Cr. 14

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6 Bom. O. C. 98

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7 C. W. N. 876

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12 C. L. R. 161

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2 C. W. N. 234, 333

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5 B. L. R. 500 : 14 W. R. 308

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- 1856—XII, s. 3—
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 2 B. L. R. A. C. 199
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- XV, ss. 2, 5—
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- 1857—II—
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- 1857—XI—
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 8 B. L. R. 83 : 17 W. R. 80
 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 124
- See* HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—IMPART-
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- XIII—
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- XIX—
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- XXV—
See FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY.
See LIMITATION—STATUTES OF LIMITA-
 TION—ACT XXV OF 1857.
 13 B. L. R. 445 : 22 W. R. 17
- ss. 1, 2, and 3—*Construct-*
ion of. The words in s. 3, Act XXV of 1857,
 "such an offence as aforesaid," refer to the offences
 mentioned in s. 2, as well as to the offence of mutiny
 mentioned in s. 1. GANESHLAL v. AMIR KHAN
 8 B. L. R. 83 : 17 W. R. 80
- 1858—I (Compulsory Labour,
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See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPE-
 CIAL ACTS—ACT I OF 1858.
 4 Mad. Ap. 21
- s. 2.—*Labouring classes—*
Forced labour. Persons who habitually engage in
 manual labour, although they may at the same time
 be employers of labour, are included in the term
 "labouring classes" used in s. 2 of Act I of 1858
 (Madras). QUEEN v. MUTTU REDDI
 I. L. R. 6 Mad. 199
- III—
See BENG. REG. III OF 1818.
 6 B. L. R. 392, 459
- X—
See FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY.
 2 Agra 324
 2 N. W. 75, 140
- XXX—
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 9 Moo. I. A. 456
- XXXI—
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- See* MALIKANA . . . 7 C. W. N. 846
- XXXIV—
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4 C. W. N. 526See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—DIVEST-
ING OF, EXCLUSION FROM, AND
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See APPEAL—ACTS—ACT XL OF 1858.

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2 B. L. R. A. C. 129 : 10 W. R. 62
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8 W. R. 105
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I. L. R. 16 Calc. 584

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See GUARDIAN.

See JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER, ASSAM.
12 W. R. 424

See MAJORITY, AGE OF.

See MINOR—LIABILITY OF MINOR ON,
AND RIGHT TO, ENFORCE CONTRACTS.
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1 C. W. N. 435ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*See MINOR—BOMBAY MINORS ACT (XX
OF 1864). I. L. R. 15 Bom. 259

See MINOR—CUSTODY OF MINORS.

4 B. L. R. Ap. 36
13 W. R. 112
23 W. R. 340
16 W. R. 283
I. L. R. 12 All. 213See MINOR—REPRESENTATION OF MINOR
IN SUITS.See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—
JURISDICTION—ACT XL OF 1858.
15 W. R. 369

Certificate under—

See EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, s. 35.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 849
I. L. R. 18 All. 478

1. _____ s. 2—Application of Act—
Hindu Law—Power to deal with minor's property
without certificate of administration. S. 2 of Act
XL of 1858 does not preclude the natural and
legal guardian of a Hindu minor from dealing with
the minor's property by mortgage or otherwise,
within the limits allowed by the Hindu law, without
having acquired a certificate of administration from
the Civil Court. HET SINGH v. THAKOOR SINGH
4 N. W. 57

2. _____ *Hindu and Maho-
medan Law*. There is no indication whatever in Act
XL of 1858 of any intention to alter or affect any
provision of Hindu or Mahomedan law as to guard-
ians who do not avail themselves of the Act. The
scope of the enactment is merely to remove legis-
lative prohibitions, to confer expressly a certain
jurisdiction, and to define exactly the position of
those who avail themselves of, or are brought under,
the Act, leaving persons to whom any existing
rules of law apply unaffected. RAM CHUNDER
CHUCKERBUTTY v. BROJONATH MOZUMDAR
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 929
4 C. L. R. 247

3. _____ *Mahomedan Laws*.
Act XL of 1858 comprises the cases of all minors
not under the Court of Wards and not being Euro-
pean British subjects, and acts irrespective of the
Mahomedan law, which can be no guide to the Civil
Court in determining whether an applicant should or
should not have letters of administration. AKIMA
BIBEE v. AZEEM SARUNG . 9 W. R. 334

4. _____ *Mahomedan Law*.
Act XL of 1858 authorizes a Court to select a
guardian irrespective of the law of the parties (e.g.,
Mahomedan law), but does not prevent the selection
of a guardian indicated by such law if he be a fit
person. MOHUNNUDDY BEGUM v. OOMDUTOON-
ISSA . 13 W. R. 454

5. _____ *Provision made by
will for guardianship*. Where a testator makes due

ACT—*contd.*1858—**XI**—*contd.*

provision for the guardianship of his minor son, Act XL of 1858 does not contemplate the interference of the Court in its summary jurisdiction. **ANUND COOMAR GANGOOLY v. RAKHAL CHUNDER ROY**

8 W. R. 278

1. ——— s. 3—Application for certificate—*Form of application.* An application for a certificate under Act XL of 1858 need not refer to the estate of the deceased, but ought merely to set forth that there is property to which the minor is entitled, and of which the applicant claims the right to have charge. **KOOSOOM KAMINEE DEBEE v. CHUNDER KANT MOOKERJEE** . 23 W. R. 346

2. ——— *Party having no right to possession.* A certificate under s. 3 of Act XL of 1858 is purely an authority for the administration of property, and ought not to be issued where there is neither present right nor prospective possession. **NOBIN CHUNDER SHAHA v. RAJNARAIN SHAHA** . 9 W. R. 582

3. ——— *Guardian and Minor—Ground for refusal of certificate.* An application for a certificate under Act XL of 1858 (which, if successful, would, in effect, prolong the minority of an infant from eighteen to twenty-one) should not be granted when the alleged minor is admittedly on the point of attaining the age of eighteen, unless under particular circumstances, as where very great weakness of mind is proved, or where it is shown that there is some absolute necessity for making such order. *In the matter of the petition of NAZIRUN MUHAMMEE v. NAZIRUN*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 19
6 C. L. R. 210

4. ——— *Minority—Majority Act (IX of 1875), s. 3.* A certificate of guardianship under Act XL of 1858 takes effect, not from the date when it is applied for, nor when an order granting it is passed, but from the date when it is actually issued. Therefore, where an application for a certificate was made in 1877, and an order granting it was passed in December 1879, but the certificate was not issued until December 1881: *Held*, that the minor, in respect of whose property the certificate was applied for, who had between the date of the application and the issue of the certificate attained the age of 18 years, and signed a promissory note, was not entitled to take advantage of s. 3 of the Majority Act, 1875, and set up the plea of minority as a defence to a suit on the note. **STEPHEN v. STEPHEN**

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 901
13 C. L. R. 430

Affirming on appeal the decision in the same case.

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 714
10 C. L. R. 533

5. ——— *Guardian, Appointment of—Period from which appointments dates.* The making of an order appointing a guardian under Act XL of 1858, and not the subsequent

ACT—*contd.*1858—**XI**—*contd.*

taking out of the certificate, is that by which a guardian is appointed of the person and property of a minor within the meaning of s. 3 of the Indian Majority Act. **CHUNEE MUL JOHARY v. BROJONATH ROY CHOWDHRY** I. L. R. 8 Calc. 967
11 C. L. R. 315

6. ——— *Period from which authority of guardian dates—Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 6.* S. 6 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), which says that a certificate under Act XL of 1858 (among other documents) "shall not be filed, exhibited, or recorded in any Court of Justice or received or furnished by any public officer," unless a certain fee be paid, means that such certificate cannot come into existence until the person who has the permission of the Court to obtain it deposits the requisite amount of stamp duty. Independently of this section, however, the preparation of such a certificate after the order granting it is not a purely ministerial act; it must then be applied for by the grantee: and it is from the date of the certificate being actually taken out, and not from the date of the order granting it, that a guardian of the person and property of a minor is to be considered as appointed under Act XL of 1858. Where, therefore, on a petition for such a certificate by J., an order was made that the "application be allowed," and in a suit on certain bonds, in which suit the minor in respect of whose person and property the petition for a certificate was made was a defendant, he was represented by J, by whom no certificate had been actually taken out: *Held*, in a suit by the minor to set aside the decree as not binding on him, that without the certificate J had no authority to appear on behalf of the minor, and the latter, not having been properly represented in the suit brought against him, was entitled to have the decree set aside. **Stephen v. Stephen**, I. L. R. 8 Calc., 714, and on appeal, I. L. R., 9 Calc., 901, followed. **Chunee Mul Johary v. Brojonath Roy Chowdhry**, I. L. R., 8 Calc. 967, dissented from. **SAHAJ NAND v. MUNGNIRAM MARWARI**

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 542

Held, however, on appeal by the Privy Council reversing the above decision, that, when a Court to which application has been made under s. 3 of Act XL of 1858 for a certificate has adjudged the applicant entitled to have one, he then substantially obtains it, although it may not be drawn up or issued at the time. Having obtained such an order, he has in substance complied with the terms of the Act, in the same way as when a plaintiff has judgment that he shall have a decree in his suit, it may be said that he has then obtained his decree. Therefore, when a minor had been represented in a suit by a person who had obtained an order for a certificate under s. 3, but had not had it issued to him, the absence of a certificate was held to be not such an irregularity as entitled the minor, on coming of age, to have the proceedings set aside on the ground that he had not been properly represented. **MUGNIRAM MAR-**

ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*

WARI v. GURSAHAI NAND. LIAKUT HOSSEIN v. GURSHAI NAND . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 347
L. R. 16 I. A. 195

7. ———— *Guardian—Minority—Suit by minor—Certificate of Administration.* Wherever an application is made for the appointment of a guardian under Act XL of 1858, and an order is passed appointing a person to be guardian of the minor, even though no certificate be taken out by the person so appointed, the minor becomes a ward of Court, and the period of his minority is extended to 21 years. *Stephen v. Stephen*, I. L. R., 8 Calc. 714, and on appeal, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 901, dissented from; *Chunee Mul Johary v. Brojonath Roy Chowdhry*, I. L. R., 8 Calc., 967, followed. *GRISH CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. ABDUL SELAM* I. L. R. 14 Calc. 55

8. ———— *Appointment of guardian without proof of certificate being taken out—Presumption as to regularity of proceedings—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 114, illus. (e).* In a suit by a puisne mortgagee against the prior as well as the subsequent mortgagees and the mortgagor's representative it was found that the prior mortgages were executed when the mortgagor was over 18, but under 21. A guardian of his person had been appointed under Act XL of 1858, but there was no evidence as to whether a certificate of administration had also been granted under that Act. The prior mortgagees thereupon contended that under Act XL of 1858 a guardian of the person could not be appointed unless a certificate of administration was also granted, and there being no evidence of the latter being granted, this appointment of a guardian of the person alone was *ultra vires*: *Held*, that assuming (but without deciding the point) that under Act XL of 1858 a guardian of the person could not be appointed unless a certificate of administration was also granted, an independent appointment of a guardian of the person may be made, and there being no evidence to show that such a certificate of administration was not granted, the Court must presume the regularity of the order under *illus. (e)* to s. 114, Evidence Act. *RAJ COOMAREE DASSEE v. PREO MADHUB NUNDY* . . . I. C. W. N. 453

9. ———— *Certificate of guardianship—Certificate ordered, but not issued—Effect of—Limitation.* A certificate of guardianship, obtained under s. 3 of Act XL of 1858, takes effect from the time it is issued, and not from the date of the order directing its issue. *Sahai Nand v. Mungquiram Marwari*, I. L. R., 12 Calc., 542, followed. *NOWBAT ROY v. LALA KEDAR NATH* I. L. R. 13 Calc. 219

10. ———— *Right to sue without certificate—Acts of guardians without certificates.* Act XL of 1858 declares that a person shall not be competent to institute a suit in Court in respect of property of which he claims the charge until he shall have obtained a certificate; but not that every act of a guardian who has not such a

ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*

certificate shall be null for the want of one. *SHOO-GHURY KOER v. BOSHISHT NARAIN SINGH* 8 W. R. 331

11. ———— *Right to sue without certificate—Manager without certificate.* A manager has no authority to deal with the claims or debts and liabilities attaching to the estate of a minor without having taken out a certificate under Act XL of 1858. *TUSNEEF HOSSEIN v. SOOKHOO* 14 W. R. 453

SOBHA KOOEEREE v. HURDEY NARAIN MOHAJUN . . . 25 W. R. 97

12. ———— *Guardian without certificate—Validity of acts.* Without a certificate under Act XL of 1858, a Court may refuse to hear even a natural guardian as of right. When the Court, in the exercise of the discretion vested in it, does hear him, the absence of the certificate will not vitiate the proceedings. The private acts of a natural guardian without a certificate under Act XL of 1858 are not vitiated by law. *LALLA BHOODMUL v. LALLA GOWREE SUNKUR* . . . 4 W. R. 71

13. ———— *Permission to sue by guardian.* A party who sues as guardian of a minor may, for good and sufficient reasons, be allowed to sue without a certificate obtained under Act XL of 1858. *Held*, that this permission may be given by the Court in which a suit by the guardian may be brought. *TARAMONEE CHOWDHURANI v. RAJBIBEE CHOWDHURANI* . . . 2 Hay 575

14. ———— *Permission to sue, proof of.* Although the proper and regular manner of giving permission to sue on behalf of a minor is by an order recorded in the order-sheet, there is, nevertheless, nothing in the nature of the sanction provided by s. 3 of Act XL of 1858 which takes it out of the general rule of evidence that sanction may be proved by express words or by implication. *BHABA PERSHAD KHAN v. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* I. L. R. 14 Calc. 159

15. ———— *Suit on behalf of minor—Permission to relative to sue, proof of—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 440, 578.* In a suit conducted on behalf of a minor by a relative, the absence of the certificate of guardianship required by s. 3 of the Bengal Minors Act (XL of 1858) is not a fatal defect; and the fact of the Court allowing such a suit to proceed must be taken as implying that the necessary permission has been given. Even if such permission has not, in fact, been given, the irregularity is covered by s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Bhaha Pershad Khan v. The Secretary of State for India in Council*, I. L. R., 14 Calc., 159, followed. *PARMESHWAR DAS v. BELA* . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 508

16. ———— *Father.* A father cannot sue on behalf of his minor son without having obtained the certificate prescribed by Act XL

ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*

of 1858, and any decision passed in the case would be irregular, as being passed in the absence of the party *primâ facie* principally interested. **SHIAM SOONDER v. NARAIN DAS** 2 **Agra 343**

MADHO RAO APA v. THAKOOR PERSHAD 3 **Agra 127**

17. *Grandmother.* A grandmother is not competent to represent her minor grandson without having obtained the certificate prescribed by s. 3, Act XL of 1858. **RUTNEE v. ROGHOBERE DYAL** 2 **Agra 273**

18. *Mother.* A mother may be allowed, under s. 3, Act XL of 1858, to sue as guardian of her minor son without having taken out a certificate. **MUNRA JHUNNA KOONWAR v. LALJEE ROY** 1 **W. R. 121**

OODOY CHAND JHA v. DHUNMONEE DEBIA 3 **W. R. 183**

RAMDHUN DOSS v. RAM RUTTON DUTT 10 **W. R. 425**

19. *Ground for dismissal of suit.* When a Court of first instance allows a mother to institute a suit on behalf of her minor son, the Judge on appeal has no reason to dismiss the suit on the technical grounds that no certificate had been granted to her under s. 3, Act XL of 1858. **GOONOMONEE DEBIA v. RAM KOMUL SANDLE** 17 **W. R. 144**

See **AUKHIL CHUNDEE v. TRIPOORA SOONDUREE** 22 **W. R. 525**

20. *S. 3, Act XL of 1858,* gives discretion to the Court to admit a party to sue without a certificate. **ANUND CHUNDER GHOSE v. KOMUL NARAIN GHOSE** 2 **W. R. 219**

LUCHMEE KOONWAR v. BHUGWAN DOSS 6 **W. R. Mis. 116**

SHEOBURRUT SINGH v. LALLJEE CHOWDHRY 13 **W. R. 202**

BONOMALLY KESH v. HUNGSHESSUR ROY 17 **W. R. 492**

SOBHA KOOREE v. HURDEY NARAIN MOHAJUN 25 **W. R. 97**

21. *Held,* that the plaintiff, not being legally or formally appointed manager or guardian of a minor's estate or person, was incompetent to maintain the suit on his (the minor's) behalf, especially when the minor's natural father has been appointed as such under Act XL of 1858, and has not been discharged from his office. **SETUL PERSHAD v. BIRJ MOHUN DASS** 1 **Agra 25**

22. *Waiver of objection—Duty of Judge.* That the persons who sue on behalf of minors are their natural guardians is not a sufficient reason for neglecting the directions of law which require that the minors shall be represent-

ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*

ed by persons who have obtained certificates, or by persons who, when the property is of small value, are specially permitted by the Court to sue or defend the suit on behalf of minors. The fact that the defendant's pleader did not press the objection, does not relieve the Judge from the duty imposed on him of seeing that the minors were properly represented. **ZORAWAR SINGH v. JAWAHIR SINGH** 3 **Agra 167**

23. *Guardian. Held,* that the institution of a suit by a guardian on behalf of minors, without due authority having been obtained, is illegal. **DHUNRAJ KOOREE v. ROODUR PERTAB SINGH** 3 **Agra 300**
Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 155

24. *Son adopted pending suit.* When adoption takes place while a suit is pending on the part of the widow and the adopted son is a minor, it is necessary that he should be substituted for his adoptive mother as the party preferring the appeal, and be duly represented in conformity with the provisions of s. 3, Act XL of 1858. **COLLECTOR OF BAREILLY v. NURAEEN DAY** 3 **Agra 349**

25. *Stranger.* A stranger cannot bring an action on behalf of a minor without a certificate under Act XL of 1858. **GOBERDHUN v. GIRWAR** 3 **Agra 92**

26. *Surbarakar.* A surbarakar cannot sue on behalf of a minor without permission of the Court or a certificate under Act XL of 1858. **BODH SINGH v. LOCHUN SINGH** 3 **Agra 220**

27. *Permission of Court.* From the fact that in a former suit the plaintiff's mother was arrayed among the parties as his guardian as well as from the line of defence she then adopted and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it was presumed that she had the permission of the Court to appear and represent the minor's interest in that suit, and therefore the decision in that suit was held to be binding on the minor in a subsequent suit where the same question was raised. **BONOMALLY KESH v. HUNGSHESSUR ROY** 17 **W. R. 492**

28. *Suit by unauthorized guardian.* Where a person representing herself as a guardian neither took out a certificate under Act XL of 1858 nor obtained the permission of the Court under s. 3 of that Act to appear in the suit without a certificate: *Held,* that the minor was not bound by any act of the alleged guardian, nor was he bound to sue within three years from the order passed by the Court under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, rejecting her petition of objection to a sale of attached property. **GREENATH KOONDOL v. HURREE NARAIN MUDDUCK** 7 **W. R. 399**

29. *Beng. Reg. X of 1793—Suit on behalf of minors.* In a case in which Regulation X of 1793 has no application, the Court

ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*

may, under s. 3, Act XL of 1858, allow a friend or relative of the minor to institute a suit on his behalf, and where the guardian omits to take steps for the protection of the infant, the Court may allow another person to sue for the benefit of the latter. *MODHOO SOODUN SINGH v. PRITHEE BULLUB PAUL*
16 W. R. 231

30. *Guardian or next friend.* In a suit brought on behalf of a minor by his next friend, it is not necessary for the next friend to have a certificate under Act XL of 1858, provided he have in fact permission of the Court to sue. *ALIM BAKSH FAKIR v. JHALO BIBI*
I. L. R. 12 Calc. 48

31. *Next friend—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 440.* S. 440 of the Civil Procedure Code, read with s. 3 of Act XL of 1858, does not make the receipt from the Court of a written permission to sue compulsory upon the next friend of an infant plaintiff. *NEWAJ v. MAKSUD ALI*
I. L. R. 12 Calc. 131

32. *Suit on behalf of minor—Permission to relative to sue.* The mother of a minor, who had not obtained a certificate under Act XL of 1858, instituted a suit on behalf of the minor for some property of small value. She did not ask the Court in which she instituted the suit for permission to institute it, as required by s. 3 of that Act, but the Court entertained it, the defendant not raising the objection that it had been instituted without permission, and it was decided on the merits in favour of the minor: *Held*, that under these circumstances, it must be taken, notwithstanding there was no order allowing the mother to sue, that the suit was instituted with the Court's permission. *KEDAR NATH v. DEBI DIN*
I. L. R. 4 All. 165

33. *Right of holder of certificate to defend suits connected with minor's estate.* Under s. 3 of the Bengal Minors Act (XL of 1858), the Civil Court has no power to refuse to admit a person who has obtained a certificate of administration under the Act to defend a suit on the minor's behalf, as guardian of such minor. *BALDEO DAS v. GOBIND SHANKAR* . I. L. R. 7 All. 914

34. *Right to defend without certificate—Appearance on behalf of minor.* No judgment or order passed in a suit, to which a minor, subject to the provisions of Act XL of 1858, is a party, will bind him on his attaining majority unless he is represented in the suit by some person who has either taken out a certificate or has obtained the permission of the Court to sue or defend on his behalf without a certificate. Permission granted to sue or defend on behalf of a minor, under s. 3 of Act XL of 1858, should be formally placed on the record. *MIRNAMOYI DABIA v. JOGODISHURI DABIA*
I. L. R. 5 Calc. 450 : 5 C. L. R. 361

ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*

See *PIRTHI SINGH v. LOBHAN SINGH*

I. L. R. 4 All. 1

35. *Permission to relative to defend.* The mother of a minor, who did not hold a certificate under Act XL of 1858, was sued on behalf of the minor. She did not obtain permission to defend the suit on behalf of the minor, but the Court allowed her to answer to the suit on behalf of the minor: *Held*, that under these circumstances, it must be inferred that the Court had given her permission to defend the suit, as required by s. 3 of Act XL of 1858, and therefore the decree made against her in the suit as representing the minor was binding on the latter. *JANKI v. DHARAM CHAND* . I. L. R. 4 All. 177

36. *Right to represent minor without certificate—Discretion of Court.* A person who does not hold a certificate under Act XL of 1858 is not debarred by s. 3 from representing a minor as plaintiff or defendant in a suit; but the Court has the fullest discretion, when the property is of small value, or for any other sufficient cause, to dispense with the production of a certificate. *SREEMUNT KOONDOL v. SHARODA SOONDUREE DOSSEE. BHUJOHURREE PARAMANICK v. SHARODA SOONDUREE DOSSEE* 8 W. R. 197

37. *Suit on behalf of a minor—Subject of suit of small value.* A suit can be prosecuted or defended by a relative, on behalf of a minor, without a certificate under Act XL of 1858, when the subject-matter of the suit is of a small value. A suit to recover real and personal property of the value of Rs. 260 was allowed to be prosecuted by the brother of a minor, on behalf of himself and his minor brother, under s. 3, Act XL of 1858. *NABADWIP CHANDRA SIKKAR v. KALINATH PAL* 3 B. L. R. Ap. 130

HURENDER LAL SAHOO v. RAJENDER PERTAB SAHOO 1 W. R. 260

s. 5—Property in several districts.—“Residence” of minor. *Held* by LOCH, J., that the word “residence” used in s. 5, Act XL of 1858, is not the place where the minor may be dwelling at or about the time when the application for a certificate under the Act is made, but the paternal family house or the family residence of the minor in which every member of the family has an interest, and in which they usually reside; *AINSLIE, J.*, being of opinion that though ordinarily that might be taken to be the meaning of the word, yet circumstances might arise in which it might be taken to mean otherwise. *MAHOMED HOSSEIN v. AKBUR HOSSEIN*
17 W. R. 275

1. s. 6—Enquiry by Court—Conduct of applicant. A Civil Court may defer passing orders on an application for a certificate under Act XL of 1858, pending an enquiry by the Collector as to the alleged fraud of the manager, and the state of the accounts and the assets of the property. *MOHESH CHUNDER SEIN v. THE COLLECTOR OF DINAGEPORE* 16 W. R. 312

ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*

2. _____ The summary enquiry provided by s. 6 of Act XL of 1858 refers to the grant of the certificate to the parties claiming it, but no part of the Act allows third parties to demand an enquiry into matters which have nothing to do with the genuineness of the grant. *MELTOON BIBI v. GIBBON* . . . 12 W. R. 101

3. _____ *Change of guardian.* One manager cannot shift of the responsibility from himself and resign the appointment, and another one take up the appointment without the provisions of s. 6, Act XL of 1858 (requiring issue of a notice of such application or the fixing of a day for the hearing of the application), being duly carried out. *JOGODUMBA KOER v. MIRCHA KOER* . . . 17 W. R. 269

1. _____ s. 7—Qualification for guardianship—*Right to certificate.* It is not the policy of Act XL of 1858 to prevent parties from performing their natural duties by the younger members of their family who may be deprived of their parents, and it should not be considered as an axiom that an uncle or other near relative will necessarily defraud a minor, and ought therefore to be refused a certificate under that Act. *MAHOMED SALEH v. GOVERNMENT* . . . W. R. 1864 Mis. 26

2. _____ S. 7 looks as much to the fitness of the relative as to his propinquity; and when two relatives claim the right to administer, the Court is at liberty to disregard the latter qualification and look to the former. *AKIMA BIBEE v. AZHEM SARUNG* . . . 9 W. R. 334

3. _____ In the grant of a certificate to a guardian under Act XL of 1858, unless under peculiar circumstances, fitness is to be preferred to mere nearness of relationship. *AMAN KHAN v. HOSEENA KHATOON* . . . 9 W. R. 548

4. _____ Before appointing a guardian, the Judge should satisfy himself of the applicant's fitness for the office. *RAM DYAL GOOYA v. AMRIT LALL KHAMAROO* . . . 9 W. R. 555

5. _____ In appointing a manager of a minor's estate a Judge has to consider not only the nearness of kindred, but also the suitability of the person to be appointed. *KHOODEE MONEE DOSSEE GHOSANEE v. KOYLASH CHUNDER GHOSE* . . . 4 W. R. Mis. 22

6. _____ The mere fact that a near relative who desires to have charge of the property is a *parda-nashin* is not of itself a disqualification such as takes away the right to a certificate under s. 7. *KURUPPOOL KOER v. COLLECTOR OF SHAHABAD* . . . 20 W. R. 432

7. _____ Under s. 7, Act XL of 1858, a person claiming a right to have the charge of the property of a minor by virtue of a will is entitled, if the will be a genuine instrument, to a certificate of administration, notwithstanding the existence of a natural guardian of the minor in the

ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*

person of his mother. *BHOOBUN MOHINEE DEBEE v. POORNOO CHUNDER BANERJEE* . . . 17 W. R. 99

8. _____ s. 7 and ss. 4 and 6—*Appointment of guardian.* Under ss. 4, 6, and 7, Act XL of 1858, the Court has power to appoint a guardian other than the father of a minor, for the purpose of instituting suits and protecting the property of the minor. *ETWARI v. RAM NARAYAN RAM* . . . 4 B. L. R. Ap. 71
13 W. R. 230

9. _____ *Certificate of guardianship to minor—Procedure.* Where an application was made by a Hindu female for a certificate of administration under Act XL of 1858 in respect of an estate which she alleged to belong to an adopted son: *Held*, that the Judge ought merely to have enquired whether the boy was a minor, and whether the petitioner being a near relative was a fit person to be entrusted with the charge of the minor's property. *BROHMO MOYEE CHOWDHURANI v. CHITURMONEE CHOWDHURANI* . . . 8 W. R. 25

10. _____ *Accounts, filing in Court.* An administrator holding a certificate under s. 7, Act XL of 1858, is not bound to file in Court periodical accounts of moneys realized and disbursed on account of the minor. *In re SONKALLY KOONWAR* . . . 6 W. R. Mis. 53

11. _____ *Account of guardianship—Resignation of guardianship.* Under s. 7, Act XL of 1858, a manager appointed to the estate of a minor cannot in any way get rid of or resign that trust without the permission of the Court, and without duly accounting to his successor for all moneys received and disbursed by him. *KALEE PERSHAD SINGH v. POORNO DEBIA* . . . 15 W. R. 398

1. _____ s. 9—*Procedure where no near relative—Appointment of guardian—Collector—Person with certificate.* Under Act XL of 1858, s. 9, the Judge has no power to appoint the Collector as manager of the estate of the minor, until he is satisfied that no person has established title to a certificate under a will or deed, and that there is no relative willing and fit to be entrusted with the charge of the property; and both these alternatives must be proved to the Court in the ordinary way by evidence brought before the Court. *HYDER REZA v. COLLECTOR OF PURNEAH*. 22 W. R. 490

2. _____ and ss. 10, 11, and 12—*Procedure where no near relative.* The powers given by ss. 10, 11, and 12 of Act XL of 1858 only accrue upon the happening of the contingency which is mentioned in s. 9. *KURUPPOOL KOER v. COLLECTOR OF SHAHABAD* . . . 20 W. R. 432

ss. 10 and 12—*Power to cancel certificate and grant another.* When the estate of a minor consists in whole or in part of land, or any interest in land, and when such application is made, the Court can only proceed to act in accordance with the provisions of s. 12 of Act XL of 1858, and has no jurisdiction to grant another certificate to any

ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*

fit person, such a course being confined to cases in which the property is of the description indicated by s. 10. *SAKHAWAT AILY v. NOORJEEHAN BEGUM* I. L. R. 10 Cal. 429

1. — s. 12—Appointment of Collector—Power to appoint Collector to take charge of minor's estate. Under the provisions of ss. 9 and 12 of Act XL of 1858, the minor's estate cannot be made over to the Court of Wards, but the Collector should be directed, under s. 12 of that Act, to take charge of the estate of the minor, and he thereupon becomes invested with authority to appoint a manager of the property and a guardian of the person of the minor. *In the matter of the petition of SIDHOO LAL* . . . 2 N. W. 398

2. — Trust created under will for religious and charitable purposes. Where a trust is created under a will for certain purposes mentioned in the will,—e.g., the maintenance of religious worship, charitable institutions, etc.,—the properties belonging to the trust cannot be taken charge of by the Collector under Act XL of 1858. *RAJESSURREE DABIA v. JOGENDRO NATH ROY* . . . 23 W. R. 278

3. — Dispute as to guardianship. Where two persons were fighting to get hold of the property, and the probability was that the minor would suffer if the property lay in the hands of either, the Court could not say that either person was a fit person to be appointed manager, and therefore, under s. 12, ordered the property to be made over to the charge of the Collector, with direction to appoint a manager of the property and a guardian of the person of the minor. *JUGDUMBA KOER v. MIRCHA KOER* . . . 17 W. R. 269

4. — Joint property, interest in—Specification of share of minor. Where, on an application for the appointment of a manager to the estate of a deceased Rajah, a Zilla Judge, notwithstanding a contention raised before him as to the extent of the minor's interest in the property, passed an order strictly within the provisions of s. 12, Act XL of 1858, his successor was held to have acted without jurisdiction in having, upon a subsequent application, passed an order specifying the shares of the minor and the opposing party. *COLLECTOR OF TIRHOOT v. RAJCOOMAR DEO NUNDUN SINGH* . . . 10 W. R. 218

5. — Certificate under Act XL of 1858 in respect of interest of sons in ancestral property. Under Hindu law, the interest in ancestral property taken by sons immediately on their birth is an estate and interest in immoveable property in respect of which a certificate of administration under Act XL of 1858 may be granted during the lifetime of their father. *DHERAJ KOER v. ADJODHYA BUX SINGH* . . . 3 N. W. 91

6. — Property of minor—Share of minor in joint family property under Mitakshara law. Where the joint property of an

ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*

undivided joint family governed by the Mitakshara law is enjoyed in its entirety by the whole family, and not in shares by the members, one member has not such an interest therein as is capable of being taken charge of and separately managed under the provisions of Act XL of 1858. *SHEO NUNDUN SINGH v. GHUNSAM KOOREE* . . . 21 W. R. 143

AJHOLA KOOREE v. DIGAMBUR SINGH . . . 23 W. R. 206

7. — Partition. B, a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara law, died, leaving two minor sons, J and K, and also a widow, L, and two minor sons by her; the mother of J and K having predeceased him. On J's attaining majority, the Court of Wards, which had taken possession of all the property, withdrew from the management; and L then applied under Act XL of 1858 and obtained a certificate with respect to the shares of K and her two minor sons. Subsequently K having attained majority, his share was excluded from the operation of the certificate. On the death of J, leaving H, his widow, and an infant son by her, H applied for a similar certificate, under Act XL of 1858, with respect to the property of her son, and it appeared that K was incapable of managing the property. *Held*, that though the certificate granted to L had been improperly obtained, H was not entitled to one, as, no partition having taken place since B's death, the property was still the joint family property. *HOOLASH KOER v. KASEE PRSHAD* . . . I. L. R. 7 Cal. 369

8. — and s. 9—Appointment of Collector. Where a certificate under Act XL of 1858, which had been granted to the two widows of a deceased Hindu, was recalled, simply because, in consequence of their disagreement, joint management had become impossible, and the District Judge, refusing the application of the widow, who was the minor's mother, to be made sole manager, directed the Collector under s. 12 to take charge: *Held*, that in the absence of any ground to remove her summarily, the Court was bound to grant the application of the minor's mother as the nearest relative, and to allow her the management until some cause to remove her was duly made out. *NISTARINEE DEBEE v. COLLECTOR OF 24-PERGUNNAHS* . . . 23 W. R. 330

9. — Power of Court to limit nature or extent of property. Where a manager is appointed under Act XL of 1858, the Civil Court has no authority to restrict or limit, by description or otherwise, the nature or extent of the minor's property. *SHEO PROSUNNO CHOBBY v. GOPAL SURU* . . . 15 W. R. 529

1. — s. 18—Power of guardian—Certificated guardians—Power of uncertificated guardians—Managers. The rules laid down in Act XL of 1858, from s. 18 downwards, apply only to certificated managers and to guardians appointed under the Act. S. 18 applies in terms to a mana-

ACT—contd.

1858—XL—contd.

ger acting under a certificate, and to such manager only; it confers on him generally the powers of the owner, but in regard to acts of alienation beyond certain limits, it requires that his acts, in order to be valid, should have the previous sanction of the Court; such provisions are altogether unsuitable to the case of a manager entirely unconnected with the Court. *RAM CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. BROJONATH MOZUMDAR*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 929 : 4 C. L. R. 247

2. *Power of guardian to sell or mortgage—Sanction of Court.* Act X of 1858 does not prevent a guardian, who has obtained a certificate thereunder, from selling or mortgaging property in Calcutta without the sanction of the Court. *GOPALNARAIN MOZUMDAR v. MUDDOMUTTY GUPTEE*

14 B. L. R. 21

3. *Mortgage by guardian without sanction of the Court.* Where a guardian had mortgaged certain property of a minor without previously obtaining the sanction of the Court under s. 18 of Act XL of 1858, but it was found that the mortgage transaction was a proper one, and there had since been a decree in a suit in which the minor was properly represented under which the property had been sold, the irregularity as to the mortgage being made without the sanction of the Court was not allowed to prevail. *ALFUTUNNISSA v. GOLUCK CHUNDER SEN*

15 B. L. R. 353 note

4. *Grounds for recall of certificate.* Where a guardian, appointed under Act XL of 1858, mortgaged certain immoveable property of the minor without obtaining the sanction of the Court under s. 18 of that Act, and it appeared he was related to, and jointly interested with, the minor in the management of the property: *Held*, that it was not a sufficient cause to recall the certificate unless it was made clear that in the mortgage transactions he had acted in bad faith, or had injured, or was likely, or had intended to injure, the interests of the minor. *In the matter of the petition of BUSUNTO COOMAR GHOSE*

15 B. L. R. 351 note

BROJENDRO NARAIN ROY v. BUSUNTO COOMAR GHOSE

13 W. R. 300

5. *Sale by guardian without sanction of the Court—Invalidity of sale—Refund of purchase-money.* A sale of a minor's immoveable property by a guardian appointed under Act XL of 1858, and who was also the kurta of the joint family of which the minor was a member, is invalid if made without the sanction required by s. 18 of that Act, even though the sale may have been for the benefit of the minor and made in good faith to pay off the debts of the ancestor. Where, however, it was found that the purchaser had acted *bonâ fide* and had paid a fair price for the property, he was held entitled to a refund of so much of the purchase-money as had been expended for the

ACT—contd.

1858—XL—contd.

benefit of the minor. *SHURRUT CHUNDER CHATTOPADHYA v. RAJKISSEN MOOKERJEE*

15 B. L. R. 350

6. *Mortgage by Administrator of a minor's property—Purchaser with notice, title of—Duties of Purchaser.* A mortgage of the property of a minor made by the administrator appointed under Act XL of 1858 is invalid, unless the sanction of the Court has been previously obtained under s. 18 of the Act. Where the administrator was sued, as representing the minor, by the mortgagee, and made no defence to the suit, and the property was sold, under a decree so obtained, to the mortgagee, by whom it was again sold to a third person, who knew that the administrator had executed the mortgage in that capacity: *Held*, that the decree did not protect the mortgagee who purchased at the Court sale, nor her vendee, from suit by the minor for recovery of the property. *DEBI DUTT SAHOO v. SUBODRA BIBE*

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 283

25 W. R. 449

7. *Mortgage by certificate-holder without sanction—Contract Act IX of 1872, s. 23.* A mortgage by a person holding a certificate of administration in respect of the estate of a minor under Act XL of 1858 of immoveable property belonging to the minor without the sanction of the Civil Court previously obtained is void with reference to s. 18 of that Act and s. 23 of the Contract Act, even though the mortgage-money was advanced to liquidate ancestral debts and to save ancestral property from sale in the execution of a decree. *CHIMMAN SINGH v. SUBRAM KUAR*

I. L. R. 2 All. 902

8. *Purchaser from guardian.* *Per GARTH, C.J.* Previously to the passing of Act XL of 1858, where a suit was brought by a minor on coming of age, to recover property sold by his guardian during his minority, it was generally incumbent upon the purchaser to prove that he acted in good faith; that he made proper enquiries as to the necessity for the sale; and had honestly satisfied himself of the existence of that necessity. Now under s. 18 of that Act, the Civil Court not only has the power, but is bound to enquire into the circumstances of each case, and to determine whether, as a matter of law and prudence, it is right that any proposed sale or mortgage of the minor's property should take place; and if the Court, upon the materials and information brought before it by the guardian, makes an order for sale, a purchaser under such an order is not bound to make the same enquiry which the Judge has made, and to determine for himself whether the Judge has done his duty properly and come to a right conclusion. Where a plaintiff alleges fraud or illegality as a ground for setting aside a sale made under s. 18, the onus lies upon him to make out a *prima facie* case of fraud or illegality, and to show that the debt, which formed the consideration for the sale in such

ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*

case, was one for which the minor was not responsible. *Per* PRINSEP, J. A stranger purchasing from a guardian, acting under the authority granted under s. 18 of Act XL of 1858, will be entitled to every protection from the Courts, so long as it is not shown that he acted in a fraudulent or collusive manner, knowing that the debts, for the liquidation of which the purchase-money would be applied, were not debts lawfully binding on the minor. The burden of proof in such a case would lie heavily on the person seeking to set aside the alienation. But where the purchaser is himself the creditor, and therefore has the means of satisfying a Court as to the origin and nature of the debts and how they are binding on the minor, the burden of proof is shifted on the purchaser, when the plaintiff has established a *prima facie* case. *SIKKHER CHUND v. DULPUTTY SINGH*. I. L. R. 5 Calc. 363 5 C. L. R. 374

9. *Mortgage by guardian without sanction of the Court.* A mortgage without the sanction of the Judge by a guardian of a minor appointed under Act XL of 1858 is absolutely void, and a decree obtained upon a mortgage so executed cannot be enforced against the property of the minor. *BUCHRAJ RAM v. RAM KISHEN SINGH* 11 C. L. R. 345

LALA HURRO PROSAD v. BASARUTH ALI
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 909

10. *Guardian and minor—Mortgage by certificated guardian without sanction of District Court—Mortgage money applied partly to benefit of minor's estate—Suit by minor to set aside the mortgage—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 65.* S. 18 of the Bengal Minors Act (XL of 1858) does not imply that a sale or mortgage or a lease for more than five years, executed by a certificated guardian without sanction of the Civil Court, is illegal and void *ab initio*; but the proviso means that in the absence of such sanction the certificated guardian, who otherwise would have all the powers which the minor would have if he were of age, shall be relegated to the position which he would occupy if he had been granted no certificate at all. If any one chooses to take a mortgage or a lease for a term exceeding five years under these circumstances, the transaction is on the basis of no certificate having been granted. In a suit brought by the guardian of a Mahomedan minor for a declaration that a mortgage deed executed by the minor's mother was null and void to the extent of the minor's share and for partition and possession of such share, it was found that a considerable proportion of the moneys received by the mortgagor had been applied for the benefit of the minor's estate by discharging incumbrances imposed on it by his deceased father. It appeared that at the time of the mortgage, the mother held a certificate of guardianship under the Bengal Minors Act, and that she had not obtained from the Civil Court any order sanctioning the mortgage under s. 18 of that

ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*

Act :—*Held*, that the omission to obtain such sanction did not make the mortgage illegal or void *ab initio*, but relegated the parties to the position in which they would have been if no certificate had been granted, i.e., that of a transaction by a Mahomedan mother affecting to mortgage the property of her minor son, with whose estate she had no power to interfere. *Held*, that this fell within the class of cases in which it has been decided that if a person sells or mortgages another's property, having no legal or equitable right to do so, and that other benefits by the transaction, the latter cannot have it set aside without making restitution to the person whose money has been applied for the benefit of the estate. *Held*, that even if mortgages executed by a certificated guardian without the sanction required by s. 18 of the Bengal Minors Act were void, the section did not make them illegal; and, with reference to s. 65 of the Contract Act, the plaintiff could not obtain a decree for a declaration that the mortgage was inoperative as against his share, except on condition of his making restitution to the extent of any moneys advanced by the defendant under the mortgage-deed which had gone to the benefit of the plaintiff's estate, or had been expended on his maintenance, education, or marriage. *Manji Ram v. Para Singh*, I. L. R. 3 All. 852, distinguished; *Sarat Chunder v. Rajkissen Mookerjee*, 15 B. L. R. 350, *Pana Ali v. Sadik Hossein*, 7 N. W. 201, *Sahee Ram v. Mahomed Abdool Rahman*, 6 N. W. 258, *Hamir Singh v. Zakia*, I. L. R. 1 All. 57, and *Gulshere Khan v. Naubey Khan*, *Weekly Notes*, All., 1881, 16, referred to. *GIRRAJ BAKSHI v. HAMID ALI* I. L. R. 9 All. 340

11. *Certificated guardian, power of, to grant lease—Unauthorized transfer, effect of.* A lease for a term of twelve years, but renewable at the *pergunnah* rate and transferable in its character, granted by a certificated guardian without the authority of the Court, is void *ab initio*, and will, therefore, not avail the lessee, even for the period of five years, for which such guardian is at liberty to grant the lease :—*Held*, accordingly, that in the case of *ijmali* property, whether such a lease was executed by the guardian conjointly with the co-sharers of the minor, or separately, the minor was entitled to eject the lessee as trespasser in respect of his own share without making his co-sharers parties to the suit. *Quære*: whether such a lease granted by a certificated guardian conjointly with the co-sharers of a minor, and thus creating one and the same tenancy, is not also void as against the co-sharers. *Held*, also, that a transfer made by a person in the capacity of a certificated guardian before the actual issue of the certificate, but after the orders for its issue have been made in his favour, and after his recognition as a certificated guardian, is a transfer within s. 18 of Act XL of 1858. *HARENDRA NARAIN SINGH CHOWDHRY v. MORAN*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 40

ACT—contd.

1858—XL—contd.

12. _____ *Lease granted by guardian of minor's property for term exceeding five years without sanction of Court, effect of.* A lease granted by guardian of a minor's property who has obtained a certificate under Act XL of 1858 for a term exceeding five years without the sanction required by s. 18 of that Act is invalid. *BHUPENDRO NARAYAN DUTT v. NEMYE CHAND MONDUL*
I. L. R. 15 Calc. 627

13. _____ *Procedure on application for leave to deal with property—Order of Civil Court authorizing lease of minor's property.* On an application under s. 18 of Act XL of 1858 for leave to deal with the property of an infant, the Civil Court is bound to determine the question whether the proposed mode of dealing with it would, if sanctioned, be for the benefit of such infant : and the petition should contain all the materials reasonably required to enable the Court to decide that question. The decision of *GARTH, C.J.*, in *Sikher Chund v. Dulputty Singh*, I. L. R., 5 Calc. 363, followed. *In the matter of the petition of SHRISH CHUNDER MOOKHOPADHYA* I. L. R. 6 Calc. 161

1. _____ s. 21—Ss. 7 and 19—Recall of certificate—*Power of Court to recall certificate granted under s. 7, Act XL of 1858.* A certificate granted under s. 7, Act XL of 1858, can be recalled summarily under s. 21. Where the application for recall is based on charges of waste and mismanagement, the certificate may be so recalled, if a sufficient case is made out, without any account having previously been taken in a regular suit under s. 19. *In the matter of the petition of SHURWAR HOSSEIN KHAN* . . . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 720
2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 200

NAUNEE BIBEE v. SURWAR HOSSEIN

7 W. R. 522

2. _____ *Mode of revocation.* It is not necessary to institute a regular civil suit in order to obtain the revocation of a certificate of guardianship. *MAHOMED NUKSHUND KHAN v. AFZUL BEGUM* . . . 3 N. W. 149

3. _____ *An order cannot be made in the Summary Department declaring a sale made by a manager invalid as being not within the scope of s. 18, and granting an injunction to prevent the demolition of a house. That must be done by a regular suit.* *MUKRUMUNISSA v. ABDOL JUBBAR* . . . 17 W. R. 171

4. _____ *Bengal Act IX of 1879—Application to cancel certificate of guardianship and grant another.* Where an application is made under the provisions of s. 21 of Act XL of 1858 to have a certificate granted under that Act recalled and a fresh certificate granted to another, the applicant should set forth in his petition a sufficient cause for such course being taken, and the Court should thereupon proceed to enquire judi-

ACT—contd.

1858—XL—contd.

ally whether such sufficient cause is established. *SAKHAWAT ALLY v. NOORJEHAN BEGUM*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 429

5. _____ *Ground for recall.* An order for a certificate may be revoked under s. 21, Act XL of 1858, if the Judge sees sufficient cause for its revocation in the conduct of the party in whose favour it was granted. *TUSNEEF HOSSEIN v. SOOKHOO* . . . 14 W. R. 453

6. _____ and s. 12. A Zilla Judge, having ordered the grant of a certificate under Act XL of 1858 to a widow with reference to the property of her deceased husband, afterwards, at the instance of the Collector, and on hearing all the parties claiming or objecting, set aside his order and directed the Collector to take charge of the estate. *Held*, that the order, though the Judge professed to make it under s. 12, Act XL of 1858, was really made under s. 21. *CHUNDER COOMAR ROY v. COLLECTOR OF JESSORE. BUSSANT COOMAREE DOSSEE v. COLLECTOR OF JESSORE* . . . 13 W. R. 243

7. _____ *Ground for recall—Marriage of minor.* The marriage of a minor is not a sufficient cause, within the meaning of s. 21, Act XL of 1858, for withdrawing a certificate as manager granted under that Act; there must be some neglect in the performance of duty, or some cause of a similar kind rendering it improper to continue the manager in the appointment. *JUGO-DUMBA KOER v. MIRCHA KOER* . . . 17 W. R. 269

8. _____ *Neglect of duty by manager of estate—Enquiry—Manager appointed by will.* Where a case is started showing that elder sons are neglecting their duty as managers of an estate to the material injury of a minor son, the Judge is bound to institute inquiry. *ANUND COOMAR GANGOOLY v. RAKHAL CHUNDER ROY*
8 W. R. 278

9. _____ *Failure to produce accounts.* An applicant for a certificate under Act XL of 1858 having alleged that the appointed guardians had neglected their charge in various ways, the Judge called upon the guardians to produce their accounts, and on their failing to do so took away their certificate, and gave it to the applicant. *Held*, that the Judge would have been justified by s. 21 in cancelling the guardians' certificate, if sufficient cause were shown : but he had no authority to do what he did, the accounts which a Judge can call for under that section being those which a discharged guardian is to furnish to his successor in office, and the only way in which a guardian retaining office can be made to furnish such accounts is by a regular suit brought by a relative or friend of the minor. *RAM DYAL GOOYE v. AMRIT LALL KHAMAROO* . . . 9 W. R. 555

10. _____ *Waste by Hindu widow.* Acts of waste on the part of the widow in regard to her husband's property, if proved, would be a ground for withdrawing a certificate granted to

ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*

her under Act XL of 1858. *BHAGWANEE KOONWAR v. PERBUTTY KOONWAR* . . . **2 W. R. Mis. 13**

11. ————— *Interference of Court with guardians of minors.* A person apprehending danger to the health or life of a minor should ask the Court's interference under s. 21, Act XL of 1858. *LUCKHEE NARAIN AUNG BHEEM v. SOORUJ MONEE PAT MOHADAYE* . . . **2 W. R. Mis. 6**

12. ————— *Mismanagement—Procedure.* A certificate having been granted to A under Act XL of 1858 in 1872 on the death of the father of a minor, in 1882 the mother of the minor applied that the certificate should be recalled on the ground of mismanagement, and that another should be granted to herself. The District Judge, assuming that the minor was a member of a joint family, held that the original certificate ought never to have been granted, recalled the certificate, and dismissed the application. *Held*, that A, having obtained the certificate, brought himself within the jurisdiction of the Court under Act XL of 1858, and that the Court ought to have considered the charges against him. *DEORANI KOER v. PARUSMAN NARAIN* . . . **12 C. L. R. 546**

13. ————— *Selling the minor's property, or allowing portions of it to be unnecessarily sold, justifies the recall of a certificate of guardianship.* *GOONOOMONEE DOSSEE v. BHABOSOODUREE DOSSEE* . . . **18 W. R. 258**

14. ————— *Removal of guardian—Immorality of guardian.* Where charges of immorality were brought against the holder of a certificate under Act XL of 1858, it was held to be the duty of the Judge to enquire into the truth of the charges and the fitness of the certificate-holder. *MOHUNUDDY BEGUM v. OOMDUTOONISSA* . . . **13 W. R. 454**

15. ————— *Summary procedure.* Act XL of 1858 does not empower a Judge to remove summarily a guardian not appointed by the Court, but under a will of the minor's grandfather. *LAKHI PRIYA DASIE v. NABIN CHUNDRANAG* . . . **3 B. L. R. A. C. 37**
11 W. R. 370

16. ————— *Ground for removal.* A certificate of guardianship was cancelled under s. 21, Act XL of 1858, in a case where the guardian, without any sufficient cause or justification, and without legal advice, withdrew an appeal made to set aside a sale of the estate of the minors, and at the same time dealt with the auction-purchaser and obtained a putnee of a portion of that very property in the name of his own wife. *PITAMBER DEY MOZOOMDAR v. ISHAN CHUNDER DUTT BISWAS* . . . **18 W. R. 169**

17. ————— *Ground for removal.* An application for the removal of guardians or parties appointed to take charge of the estate of a minor under Act XL of 1858, s. 7, must be supported by proof of malversation or misconduct such

ACT—*contd.*1858—XL—*contd.*

as would afford sufficient ground for removal. *RAJESSUREE DEBIA v. JOGENDRO NAUTH ROY* . . . **23 W. R. 278**

18. ————— *Removal of manager of estate.—Grounds for removal.* A manager of the estate of a minor appointed by will is liable to removal only upon proof of actual malversation, or that by reason of mental incapacity, conviction of felony, or by some other incapacitating cause, he has become incapable of managing the property; but not merely on the ground that another person would manage the property better. He is, it seems, subject to removal upon summary application under Act XL of 1858, s. 21; but if the ground upon which his removal is applied for involves an investigation of accounts, such investigation must be made in a regular suit under s. 19, previous to such summary application under s. 21. *MUDHOOSOODUN SINGH v. COLLECTOR OF MIDNAPORE.* **Marsh. 244**

19. ————— *and s. 16.—Power of Judge to order accounts from Guardian—Discharged guardian.* A Judge has no power under s. 16 or 21, Act XL of 1858, to order a discharged guardian of a minor to file his account. S. 21 refers to the procedure as between discharged guardians and their successors, and not to a case where the contest is between the owner of the estate and a discharged guardian. *DOOLUN SINGH v. TORUL NARAIN SINGH* . . . **4 W. R. Mis. 3**

20. ————— *Procedure—Objections to certificate.* A certificate under Act XL of 1858 having been granted to a party as guardian of an adopted minor, it was objected that the minor's adoption had not been legal. *Held*, that as there was no doubt of the fact of adoption, whether the adoption should on enquiry prove legal or not, the certificate was rightly given, and as the objector did not claim to be appointed guardian, he had no *locus standi* to object to the appointment of another person. *KISTO KISHORE ROY v. ISSUR CHUNDER ROY* . . . **15 W. R. 166**

21. ————— *Party asserting rights adversely to minor.—Discretion of Court where a will is propounded.* Where an application is made for a certificate under Act XL of 1858, a party asserting certain rights adversely to the minor cannot be admitted as a party to the record, but must seek his remedy in a regular suit. Where the will propounded by an applicant is a genuine document, the certificate prayed for must be granted, notwithstanding the existence of any "natural guardian," no discretion being left to the Court in such a case. *PUROMA SOONDUREE DOSSEE v. TARA SOONDUREE DOSSEE* . . . **9 W. R. 343**

22. ————— *Security-bond, Order to furnish.—Power of District Judge—Assignment of bonds—Succession Act, s. 257. Quere:* Whether the Judge of a District Court is competent to call upon a person to whom he grants a certificate under Act XL of 1858 to furnish security; and

ACT—contd.

1858—XL—concl'd.

whether, where he has done so and security-bonds have been given to him, he can assign them in the manner provided in s. 257 of the Succession Act, 1865. *AMAR NATH v. THAKUR DAS*

I. L. R. 5 All. 248

23. Application for certificate—Limitation. The lapse of six years was held to be no sufficient ground for a Judge's refusal to enquire into the merits of an application for a certificate under Act XL of 1858, that law providing no limitation as to the time within which such applications are to be made. *PUROMA SOONDUREE DOSSEE v. TARA SOONDUREE DOSSEE* 9 W. R. 343

s. 28 and s. 6—Right of appeal—Creditor—Enquiry. Only persons who claim a right to have charge of property in trust for a minor under a will or deed have a right to make applications under Act XL of 1858, and they alone have a right of appeal under s. 28. A mere creditor has no *locus standi* in the proceedings before the Judge, and no right to have his objections gone into. *MELTOON BIREE v. GIBBON* 12 W. R. 101

1. s. 29, Jurisdiction—"Civil Court." The Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Assam is the Civil Court contemplated by s. 29, Act XL of 1858. *KALEEKA PERSHAD BHUTTA-CHARJEE v. DEUKHINA KALI DABEE*

W. R. 1864 Mis. 34

2. Court of District Judge. The Civil Court to which the charge of minors and their property is entrusted by Act XL of 1858 is the Court of the Judge of the district. *MOHAMUDDER BEGUM v. OOMDUTOONISSA*

15 W. R. 271

3. Estate in territories of Maharajah of Benares. An application for a certificate under Act XL of 1858 regarding estates situate in the territories of the Maharajah of Benares should be made in the Court of the Judge of Benares. *KUDUM KOONER v. BUDLA SINGH*

1 N. W. Ed. 1873, 163

1859—I—

See MERCHANT SEAMAN'S ACT.

III—

See CANTONMENT MAGISTRATE.

4 Bom. A. C. 187

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 454

VIII—(Civil Procedure Code, 1859.)

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.

See LIMITATION ACT.

IX, decree under—

See GOVERNMENT OFFICERS, ACTS OF.
5 B. L. R. 312

ACT—contd.

1859—IX, s. 20—

See LIMITATION—STATUTES OF LIMITATION—IX OF 1859.

13 B. L. R. 292
I. L. R. 13 All. 108

X—

See BENGAL RENT ACT.

See CHAUKIDARI CHAKRAN LANDS.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1021

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—DECREES UNDER RENT LAW.

1 B. L. R. A. C. 177, 216

5 B. L. R. 115

7 W. R. 8

See JURISDICTION. I. L. R. 31 Calc. 937

See LIMITATION ACT, XIV OF 1859, APPLICATION OF.

See REVIEW—ORDERS SUBJECT TO REVIEW

3 N. W. 22

4 N. W. 171

12 W. R. 195

See WITHDRAWAL FROM SUIT.

2 B. L. R. S. N. 11

10 W. R. 373

11 W. R. 3

15 W. R. 260

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 428, 514

decision under—

See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT—REVENUE COURT.

See RES JUDICATA—ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—DECREES IN RENT SUITS.

1. Object of Act X of 1859—Rights existing prior to Act. The object of Act X of 1859 was to re-enact the provisions of existing laws relative to the rights of rayats, and not in any way to destroy those rights. If, therefore, the plaintiff had a gorabundee tenure existing before the enactment of Act X (and it had been found that the plaintiff's gorabundee tenure had been recognized in a long series of decisions commencing from the year 1846), the enactment of that Act in nowise deprived him of his rights in that tenure. *LEELANUND SINGH v. NIRPUT MAHTOON* 17 W. R. 306

2. Date of passing of Act. The period of limitation within which a suit might be brought for rent due at the time of the passing of Act X of 1859 must be reckoned from 29th April 1859 (the date of the passing of the Act), and not from 1st August 1859 (the date on which the Act came into operation). *LACHMIPAT SING v. MAHOMED MOONEER* B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 32 W. R. F. B. 32

s. 77—

See STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

3 N. W. 51

Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 3

ACT—*contd.*

1859—XI—

See ONUS OF PROOF—SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE.

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT.

See REVENUE SALE LAW.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE.

ss. 3, 5, 6—

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.
7 C. W. N. 377

s. 5—Manager of estate under attachment—*Sale for arrears of revenue—Portion of estate.* Act XI of 1859 is, to a great extent, a remedial Act, passed for the benefit of the subject, and in order to relax the stringency of former Statutes, whereby the Crown was empowered to sell estates for non-payment of revenue. S. 5 of the said Act applies to estates which are under attachment issued under Act VIII of 1859, and which are in the hands of a manager appointed on the application of the judgment-debtor for the purpose of liquidating the debts. Such attachments are not superseded by the appointment of such manager. The words "arrears of estates under attachment" apply to cases where a portion only of an estate is under attachment, as well as to cases in which the whole estate has been attached. *BUNWARI LALL SAHU v. MOHABIR PERSAD SINGH*
12 B. L. R. 297
L. R. 1 I. A. 89

Affirming on appeal the decision of High Court. *MOHABEER PERSAUD SINGH v. COLLECTOR OF TIRHOOT*.
13 W. R. 423

ss. 5 and 6—Notification of sale, specification of—"Estate," meaning of. Under s. 6 of Act XI of 1859, it is not necessary that a notification should specify the owners of an estate or the owners of shares in the estate. *Secretary of State, v. Rashbehary Mookerjee*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 591, followed. All that is necessary under that section is that the notification should specify the estate or shares in the estate to be sold, and in selling a share in an estate it is unnecessary to specify the shares or mouzahs of which that share is composed. The word "estate," as there used, ordinarily means "mehal;" but the term also applies to a portion of a mehal with regard to which a separate account has been opened, but not to an undivided portion of a mehal as to which separate accounts are not kept. *RAM NARAIN KOER v. MAHABIR PERSHAD SINGH*.
I. L. R. 13 Calc. 208

ss. 5, 6, 7—

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1

s. 6—

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY
6 C. W. N. 526

ACT—*contd.*

1859—XI, s. 9—

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
DEPOSIT TO STAY SALE.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 794

See CONTRACT ACT, ss. 69 AND 70.

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 213

See CO-SHARERS—GENERAL RIGHTS IN
JOINT PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 809

ss. 10 and 11—

See CO-SHARERS—SUITS WITH RESPECT
TO JOINT PROPERTY—POSSESSION.

21 W. R. 38

ss. 13, 14—

See MORTGAGE—SALE OF MORTGAGED
PROPERTY—PURCHASERS.

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 546

s. 31—

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 10.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 234

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 120.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 51

s. 33—

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—
REVENUE COURTS—ORDERS OF REVE-
NUE COURTS.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 876

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 95
(1871, ART. 95).

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 300

See RIGHT OF SUIT—ROAD AND OTHER
CESSES, SALE FOR ARREARS OF.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 85

s. 33—

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY;

6 C. W. N. 526

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1

PARTIES

7 C. W. N. 377

1. ——— Suit for damages. S. 33, Act XI of 1859, contemplates an action against the individual wrong-doer, irrespective of Government and co-parceners. *GUNGA NARAIN BOSE v. CORNELL*.
10 W. R. 442

2. ——— Receipt of sale-proceeds. The receipt by a decree-holder of a portion of the surplus sale-proceeds lying in deposit in a Collector's Court without opposition on the part of the judgment-debtor is not such a receipt as is contemplated by s. 33, Act XI of 1859. *MOHABEER PERSHAD SINGH v. COLLECTOR OF TIRHOOT*
13 W. R. 423

s. 34—Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act VII of 1880), ss. 2 and 20—*Limitation.* S. 2 of the Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act VII of 1880) does not make the

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provision of limitation in s. 34 of Act XI of 1859 applicable to the execution of a decree annulling a sale under s. 20 of Bengal Act VII of 1880. *MAHOMED ABDUL HYE v. GAJRAJ SAHAJ*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 283

s. 36—

See BENAMI TRANSACTION—CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—ACT XI OF 1859, s. 36.

s. 37—

See ASSAM LAND AND REVENUE REGULATION, s. 65.

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 194

See GHATWALI TENURE.

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 559

11 B. L. R. 71

14 Moo. I. A. 247

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—

PURCHASERS I. L. R. 24 Calc. 334

1 C. W. N. 314

2 C. W. N. 229

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—INCUMBRANCES—ACT XI OF 1859.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—PROTECTED TENURES.

“Settlement.”—In Act XI of 1859, s. 37, the word “settlement” refers not to the permanent settlement, but to the settlement which took place after resumption by Government of the lands previously held as *lakhiraj*. *RAJ CHUNDER CHOWDERY v. BUSHEER MAHOMED*

24 W. R. 476

s. 37, cl. (4)—

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—INCUMBRANCES—ACT XI OF 1859.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 498

s. 39—

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—REGISTERS.

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 116

s. 54—

See ABATEMENT OF RENT.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 1005

L. R. 21 I. A. 118

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—PURCHASERS, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 223

XIII—

See WORKMEN'S BREACHES OF CONTRACT ACT.

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—TO ACCUSED ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT

4 Mad. Ap. 68

See CONTRACT. . I. L. R. 28 Mad. 37

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN ONE DISTRICT—CRIMINAL BREACH OF CONTRACT . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 354

ACT—cont'd.

1859—XIII—cont'd.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—MADRAS ACT III OF 1865
4 Mad. Ap. 64

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 235, 457

I. L. R. 20 All. 124

ss. 1, 2—

—Failure to comply with order of Court—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 4 (o)—“Offence.” The offence created by the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act (XIII of 1859) is not the neglect or refusal of the workman to perform his contract, but the failure on his part to comply with an order made by the Magistrate directing the workman to repay the money advanced or perform the contract. *KING EMPEROR v. TAKASI NUKAYYA* (1901) . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 660

ss. 1, 4—Breach of Contract—Jurisdiction of Presidency Magistrates—“Magistrate of Police”—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 3. A Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta may lawfully take cognizance, under s. 1 of Act XIII of 1859, of a complaint in respect of a contract made in Calcutta, the breach of which has been committed beyond the local jurisdiction of his Court. The expression “Magistrate of Police” in s. 1, Act XIII of 1859, means “Presidency Magistrate”. *LAL MOHAN CHOWBRY v. HARI CHARAN DAS BAI-RAGI* . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 637

s. 2—

See CONVICTION . . . 4 Bom. Cr. 27

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT GENERALLY. 6 Mad. Ap. 24
4 Bom. Cr. 37

1. ———— Limitation Act, 1877, Art. 120—Claim to recover an advance. Act XIII of 1859 being a penal enactment, the Limitation Act (Sch. II, Art. 120) is no bar to a claim under s. 2 to recover an advance made to a labourer. *In re KITTU* I. L. R. 11 Mad. 332

2. ———— Jurisdiction—Breach of contract to labour in foreign territory. V, having received an advance of money from G, contracted to labour for him in foreign territory. Having broken the contract, V was prosecuted under Act XIII of 1859, ordered to repay, and sentenced to imprisonment in default:—*Held*, that the order was illegal. *GREGORY v. VADAKASI KANGANI* . . . I. L. R. 10 Mad. 21

3. ———— Bricklayer—Workman—Contractor, Liability of. A person whose ordinary business was that of a contracting bricklayer, and who did not himself work, received an advance, contracted to get certain earthwork done on a race-course and committed a breach of contract. *Held* that he was not an artificer, workman, or labourer within the meaning of Act XIII of 1859. *GILBY v. SABHU PILLAI* . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 100

ACT—*contd.*1859—XIII—*contd.*

4. ——— Butcher—*Supplying skins by contract.* A butcher contracting to supply skins is not within Act XIII of 1859. ANONYMOUS

7 Mad. Ap. 13

5. ——— Coolies—*Contract for coolies to work for specified time, Breach of.* Where a contract was made by the defendant that a number of coolies should be brought by him to an estate, and remain at work on the estate for a specified time, and there had been a breach of the contract,—*Held*, that the case was within s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859. ANONYMOUS

3 Mad. Ap. 25

6. ——— *Advances to coolies in Assam.* Coolies in Assam who have received advances in contemplation of work to be done may be proceeded against under Act XIII of 1859. QUEEN v. GAUB GORAH

[8 W. R. Cr. 6

7. ——— Mahout or elephant-driver. A mahout or elephant-driver does not come within the provisions of Act XIII of 1859. MUNI CHUNDRA v. HARIRAM AHOM

8 C. L. R. 254

8. ——— Sub-contractor—*Liability for breach of contract for work undertaken upon an advance—Workman.* The petitioner, who as sub-contractor had engaged to do certain work for which he was paid an advance, but did not himself work, was convicted by a Magistrate, under s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859, of the offence of breach of contract, and sentenced to undergo one month's imprisonment in default of his failure to fulfil the contract. *Held*, that he was not an artificer, workman, or labourer within the meaning of s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859. The conviction and sentence were accordingly set aside. *In re the petition of BALKRISHNA SHALIGRAM*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 96

9. ——— *Preamble—Wilful breach of contract—Construction of Statute—Preamble, construction of—Summary trial—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 260.* Offences under s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859 are triable summarily under s. 260 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The offence made punishable by s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859 is the wilful and without lawful and reasonable excuse neglecting or refusing to perform the contract entered into by persons whom the Act concerns. Notwithstanding the preamble of the Act, it is not necessary to prove that a breach of contract is fraudulent in order to sustain a conviction under s. 2. *Taradoss Bhuttacharjee v. Bhaloo Sheikh*, 8 W. R. Cr. 69, dissented from. Where the enacting sections of a statute are clear, the terms of the preamble cannot be called in aid to restrict their operation, or to cut them down. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. INDARJIT

I. L. R. 11 All. 262

10. ——— Domestic servants—*Artificers—Workmen—Labourers.* Act XIII of 1859 does not apply to contracts for a "chakri," domestic or personal service, but to contracts to serve as artificer, workman, or labourer. *In the matter of DOMESTIC SERVANTS*

2 B. L. R. A. Cr. 32

QUEEN v. SOOBHOI

12 W. R. Cr. 26

ACT—*contd.*1859—XIII—*contd.*

11. ——— Breach of contract to supply wood. A breach of contract to supply wood does not fall within the purview of Act XIII of 1859. *In re UPPER ASSAM TEA COMPANY v. THOPOOR*

4 B. L. R. Ap. 1

12. ——— Service for agricultural and other purposes—*Breach of contract by artificers, workmen, and labourers.* Act XIII of 1859 (to provide for the punishment of breaches of contract by artificers, workmen, and labourers in certain cases, extended to all the collectorates of the Bombay Presidency by notification of the Government of Bombay dated 10th of May 1860) does not apply to a contract whereby a person, in consideration of receiving Rs45, bound himself to another to render service for "agricultural and other purposes" for the period of one year. *EMPRESS v. BHAGABAN BHIVSAN*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 379

13. ——— Labourer in silk factory—*Breach of contract by labourer.* Where a labourer contracted with the manager of a silk factory for a money-consideration to work at the factory for four months in a year for a period of three years, and broke the terms of his contract, he was held liable to a prosecution under Act XIII of 1859, and the order of the Magistrate holding that such a contract was an unreasonable one, and therefore one which ought not to be enforced by him, was set aside. *KOONJOBEHARRY LALL v. DOOMNEY. KOONJOBEHARRY LALL v. RUGHONATH DOME*

14 W. R. Cr. 29

See LYALL & Co. v. RAM CHUNDER BAGDEE

18 W. R. Cr. 53

14. ——— Non-specification of nature and extent of work—*Contract to supply labourers and get labour performed.* A contract to supply labourers and to get labour performed by them, even though the nature and extent of the work are not clearly specified, falls within the provisions of Act XIII of 1859. *ROWSON v. HANAMA MESTRI*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 280

15. ——— Advance to labourer—*Breach of contract.* Act XIII of 1859 relates to fraudulent breaches of contract, and does not apply where an advance has not only been worked off by a labourer, but an actual balance is due to him. *TARADOSS BHUTTACHARJEE v. BHALOO SHEIKH*

8 W. R. Cr. 69

16. ——— *Contract to supply labourers.* A contract, in consideration of an advance of money to supply labourers to do certain work on an estate, falls within the scope of Act XIII of 1859, and the fact that such contract contains covenants to pay penalties in default of supplying the labourers, and to repay the advance, if necessary, by personal labour for five years, does not take the contract out of the operation of the Act, so as to make illegal an order directing the contractor to be imprisoned for failure to comply with an order to repay the advance. *RAMASAMI v. KANDASAMI*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 379

ACT—contd.

1859—XIII—contd.

17. *Contract to work until repayment of advance made.* Defendant, in consideration of an advance of money received from complainant, bound himself to work for complainant until the repayment of the sum advanced. For breach of this contract the complainant proceeded against the defendant under Act XIII of 1859. *Held*, that the contract was not within the Act. ANONYMOUS . . . 7 Mad. Ap. 31

18. *Money advanced on account of work to be performed—Loan on condition that the workmen should enter into a contract of service.* A workman agreed in writing to work for the proprietors of an estate for four years and one month, from 1st March 1899 to 21st March 1903, for an initial advance of one rupee which was not to be repaid till after the expiration of the agreement. The same person subsequently obtained an advance of Rs10, to be re-imbursed by a monthly deduction of one rupee from his wages. He worked from 1st March 1899 till 18th September 1899 when he ceased to work, leaving in all a sum of Rs5 to be accounted for in the adjustment of the total advance. He was subsequently charged and convicted under s. 2 of the Criminal Breach of Contract Act, XIII of 1859 :—*Held*, that the initial advance of one rupee was not money advanced on account of work to be performed, but rather a loan made without interest on the condition that the workman would enter into a contract of service for the duration of the loan; and that the Criminal Breach of Contract Act, 1859, was inapplicable to this case; that, with reference to the ten rupees to be repaid out of wages, the Act applied, and an order should be made directing the workman to work until the expiration of the term of the contract on account of which this sum had been advanced. TANGI JOGHI v. HALL . . . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 203

19. *Loan—Deduction from wages.* Having agreed to work for wages in a tannery and received Rs10 from M, his employer, T promised to work off the advance by allowing M to deduct 8 annas a week from his weekly wages. *Held*, that the provisions of Act XIII of 1859 were applicable to this contract. QUEEN v. TALUKANAM I. L. R. 7 Mad. 131

20. *Gold and silver given to workman.* On the construction of s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859 : *Held*, that gold and silver money given to an artificer as raw material wherewith to make the article contracted for, is an "advance of money" within the meaning of the section. ANONYMOUS . . . 6 Mad. Ap. 24

21. *Criminal breach of contract—Labourer—Carrier by boat.* An advance was made under a contract by which the party who received the advance undertook to convey salt by boat, but did not bind himself to render personal labour. The party who received the advance broke the contract :—*Held*, that the parties to the contract were not an employer of labour and

ACT—contd.

1859—XIII—contd.

a labourer respectively, and consequently the contract did not fall within the provisions of Act XIII of 1859. CALURAM v. CHENGAPPA

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 351

22. *Advance of grain and money—Order to repay value of work not performed.* An advance of money and grain having been made to a labourer for work to be done, the labourer failed to complete the work, and an order was passed by a Magistrate, under s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859, directing repayment of the balance of the advance not worked off by the labourer. *Held*, that as it was not proved that the labourer was offered and accepted the grain in lieu of money to be advanced, the order was illegal. KONDATU v. RAMUDU

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 294

23. *Working off previous debts—Breach of contract of service—Labourer.* A labourer agreed to serve in consideration of money due from him on account of previous debts. He served for three months only, and then quitted service in violation of the agreement. He was prosecuted and convicted of breach of contract of service under Act XIII of 1859. *Held*, that he was not liable to be dealt with criminally, because there was no fraudulent breach of contract within the meaning of Act XIII of 1859, and because, further, no money in advance was received, the consideration for the agreement to serve being an old debt. REG. v. JETHYA VALAD VESTYA . . . 9 Bom. 171

24. *Jurisdiction of Magistrates to interfere in cases of wilful and fraudulent breach of contract—Meaning of the expression "Advance of money on account of work."* Act XIII of 1859 (an Act to provide for the punishment of breaches of contract by artificers, workmen and labourers in certain cases) applies only where there has been an advance of money on account of any work, which words do not include mere loans or old debts. The interference of the Magistrate under the Act is limited to cases where the neglect or refusal to perform is wilful and without lawful and reasonable excuse. As a rule, a mere breach of contract ought not to be an offence, but only to be the subject of a civil action : and a man cannot be treated as a criminal for not performing a contract which could not be enforced against him by civil process. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAJAB I. L. R. 16 Bom. 368

25. *s. 2—Limitation of civil claim—Order by the Magistrate for repayment of advances.* In a prosecution for breach of contract under Act XIII of 1859, it appeared that the complainant had advanced certain sums of money to the accused, but that a suit to recover the same was barred by limitation; and the Magistrate thereupon dismissed the charge :—*Held*, that there was no reason why the Magistrate should not have ordered repayment to be made by the accused under s. 2. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KONDA

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 347

ACT—*contd.*1859—XIII—*contd.*

26. ——— Advance in consideration of exclusive services until repayment—*Masters and workmen—Breach of contract on the part of workmen—"Station."* An employer of workmen residing and carrying on business in the city of Mirzapur, alleging that he had advanced money to certain workmen on the understanding that they would work for him and no one else until they had repaid such money, and that they had broken such contract by leaving his employment, made a complaint against such workmen under Act XIII of 1859, which had been extended to the "station" of Mirzapur by the Local Government. It appeared that such money was advanced by way of loan, and without any reference to the wages of such workmen or the payment for the work performed by them, and that no deduction on account of such advance was ever made from their wages or the payments made to them. *Held*, that the contract between the parties was something quite different from any contract contemplated by Act XIII of 1859, and that Act was therefore not applicable. *Held*, also, that it was doubtful whether that Act applied locally, as it was not shown that the city of Mirzapur was comprised within the "station" of Mirzapur. *In the matter of the petition of RAM PRASAD v. DIRGAPAL* . I. L. R. 3 All. 744

27. ——— Enquiry under Act—*Breach of contract by artificer.* The enquiry to be made under s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859 is not an enquiry into an offence which may be tried summarily. *POLLARD v. MOTHIAL* . I. L. R. 4 Mad. 234

28. ——— Imprisonment—*Criminal breach of contract—Procedure—Imprisonment.* Where an order has been made by a Magistrate under Act XIII of 1859, s. 2, for the fulfilment of a labour contract, a sentence of imprisonment for disobeying such order without complaint made and without taking statements from the accused, is illegal, although the accused, before the order was made, may have stated their inability to perform the work stipulated for. *SRINIVASA v. PONNAM-BALAM* . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 376

29. ——— Order of Magistrate for imprisonment for breach of contract—*Right of civil suit.* The imprisonment of a defendant by order of the Magistrate under Act XIII of 1859 does not preclude the plaintiff from proceeding by civil suit for recovery of money advanced to the defendant for the performance of work. *VERNEDE v. ABDUL GIRI CHINNA SWAMI* . 2 Mad. 427

30. ——— Former conviction—*Breach of contract of service.—Statute 4 Geo. IV, Cap. 34, s. 3—Autrefois convict.* A conviction for breach of contract of service under s. 2, Act XIII of 1859, is a bar to any subsequent conviction on the same contract for a further breach for not returning to service. *GRIFFITHS v. TEZIA DOSADH* . I. L. R. 21 Cal. 262

ACT—*contd.*1859—XIII—*concl.*

31. ——— *Breach of contract—"Offence," meaning of—Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, ss. 4 and 250.—Compensation for breach of contract.* A mere breach of contract is not, under the first part of s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859, an offence within the meaning of the term in s. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and no compensation can therefore be legally awarded under s. 250 of the Code in respect of such breach. *In the matter of the petition of RAM SARUP BHAKAT* . 4 C. W. N. 253

——— s. 3 and s. 2, cl. 1—*Procedure under, whether summary or not—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 370.* In the trial of a case under the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act (XIII of 1859), the Magistrate is not bound to frame his record in accordance with the provisions of s. 370 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is doubtful whether a proceeding under the first clause of s. 2 and under s. 3 of Act XIII of 1859 is a criminal proceeding. There is no offence committed, and there is no accused. The provisions of s. 370 of the Criminal Procedure Code are therefore inapplicable to a case of this nature. *AVERAM DAS MOCHI v. ABDUL RAHIM* . I. L. R. 27 Cal. 131 . 4 C. W. N. 201

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See LIMITATION ACT, 1859.

See LIMITATION ACTS IX OF 1871 AND XV OF 1877.

XV—

See PATENT.

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See LIMITATION ACT, 1871, ART. 11.

I. L. R. 3 Cal. 17

See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASE—GENERAL CASES . I. L. R. 5 All. 371

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See MADRAS POLICE ACT.

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XXVII—

See APPEAL—CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION.

See CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION—ACT XXVII OF 1860.

See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

Bourke Test 6

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION.

2 B. L. R. A. Cr. 27

11 W. R. Cr. 24

25 W. R. Cr. 16

ACT—contd.**1860—XXVII—contd.**

See PROBATE—POWER OF HIGH COURT TO GRANT, AND FORM OF **Bourke Test 3**
I. L. R. 6 Bom. 452, 703

See REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PERSON . . . **I. L. R. 16 Mad. 405**

See REVIEW—ORDERS SUBJECT TO REVIEW . . . **I. L. R. 1 Calc. 101**
5 Mad. 417
I. L. R. 1 All. 287

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS **I. L. R. 14 Mad. 473**

See RIGHT OF SUIT—ORDERS, SUITS TO SET ASIDE . . . **5 Mad. 283**
22 W. R. 312

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XXVIII—

See MADRAS BOUNDARY MARKS ACT.

XXXI—

See ARMS ACT.

XXXII—

See INCOME TAX ACT, 1860.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—INCOME TAX.

14 W. R. 276
11 W. R. 425

XXXVI—

See STAMP ACT.

See STAMP ACT XXXVI OF 1860.

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See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 34.
I. L. R. 14 Mad. 255

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12 B. L. R. 224, 261
6 W. R. 7
I. L. R. 2 All. 112

XLV—

See PENAL CODE.

ss. 124 A, 153. See **I. L. R. 33 Bom. 77**

XLVIII—

See POLICE ACT, 1860.

LIII, s. 2—

See REVIVAL OF SUIT.

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 5

1861—V—

See POLICE ACT, 1861.

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CHARTER ACT, s. 15.

10 B. L. R. Ap. 4

ACT—contd.**1861—IX—**

See APPEAL—ACTS—ACT IX OF 1861.
17 W. R. 551

See CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.

10 B. L. R. 125
14 Moo. I. A. 309 : 17 W. R. 77

See GUARDIAN—LIABILITY OF GUARDIANS
I. L. R. 5 All. 248

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I. L. R. 8 All. 322

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I. L. R. 9 Mad. 31

X—

See OATH . . . **4 Mad. Ap. 3**

See WITNESS—CIVIL CASES—DEFAULTING WITNESSES **1 B. L. R. A. C. 136**
10 W. R. 283

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See LIMITATION ACT, 1859—OPERATION OF ACT.

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See INTEREST—OMISSION TO STIPULATE FOR, OR STIPULATED TIME HAS EXPIRED—DECREES **I. L. R. 18 Calc. 164**

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1862—IV, s. 10—

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7 B. L. R. 653 : 16 W. R. 203

V—

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VIII, s. 4—

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—FOREIGN AND NATIVE RULERS.
7 W. R. 168

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XV, s. 1—

See SENTENCE—TRANSPORTATION.

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XVII—

See EXTRADITION . . . **8 Bom. Cr. 13**

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—CATTLE TRESPASS ACT.

1 Bom. 100

See OFFENCE BEFORE PENAL CODE CAME INTO OPERATION.

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 225
I. L. R. 1 All. 592

ACT—contd.**1862—XVIII, s. 1—**

See CHARGE—ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF CHARGE. 6 Bom. Cr. 76

s. 27—

See DEFAMATION . 4 W. R. Cr. 22

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See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—OFFENCE COMMITTED DURING JOURNEY . . . 1 Mad. 193

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See ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
1 B. L. R. O. Cr. 1, 15
15 W. R. Cr. 71 note

See CHARGE—ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF CHARGE . 1 Mad. 31
1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 49

1863—II, s. 1—

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—APPEALABLE ORDERS I. L. R. 3 Calc. 522

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See APPEAL—ACTS—ACT XIV OF 1863. 2 Agra 239

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2 N. W. 33
5 N. W. 40, 238
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See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 14 (1859, s. 14) . . . 5 N. W. 30

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—CO-SHARERS . . . 2 Agra 299

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—RENT, SUITS FOR . 2 Agra, Pt. II, 165

See RIGHT OF SUIT—REVENUE, SUIT FOR ARREARS OF . . 4 N. W. 165

See SETTLEMENT OFFICER.
2 N. W. 244, 261
5 N. W. 64

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See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—AFFIDAVITS. 2 W. R. 241

XIX—(Partition of Revenue Paying Estates)—

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REVENUE COURTS—PARTITION.
4 N. W. 7, 169
7 N. W. 9

See JURISDICTION OF REVENUE COURT—N.-W. P. RENT AND REVENUE CASES. 2 Agra 241

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See PARTITION—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.
3 Agra 298
1 N. W. 81 Ed. 1873, 134

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See APPEAL—ACTS—ACT XIX OF 1863. 1 Agra Rev. 44

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REVENUE COURTS—ORDERS OF REVENUE COURTS . . 3 Agra 161

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See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT—REVENUE COURTS.
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See PARTITION—FORM OF PARTITION. 2 N. W. 26

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7 N. W. 346

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See APPEAL—ACTS—ACT XX OF 1863.

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I. L. R. 18 Calc. 382
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See ARBITRATION—ARBITRATION UNDER SPECIAL ACTS—ACT XX OF 1863.
7 Mad. 173

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 493
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 361

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I. L. R. 16 Mad. 490
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See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—GENERAL JURISDICTION.
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See RIGHT OF SUIT—CHARITIES AND TRUSTS . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 32
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See RIGHT OF SUIT—ENDOWMENTS, SUITS RELATING TO.

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See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—
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See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622. . .
I. L. R. 10 Mad. 98, 98 note

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS.
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 148, 149 note

1. ——— Suit for declaration of trusts of a temple. In bringing a suit under Act XX of 1863 it is not necessary to show that the temple was one which was formerly under control of the Board of Revenue. The Act applies to property in Calcutta. *GANES SINGH v. RAMGOPAL SINGH* . . . 5 B. L. R. Ap. 55

2. ——— Suit to establish right to share in management of temple. The suits referred to in Act XX of 1863, as needing the authority of the Court for their jurisdiction, are solely suits charging trustees, managers, or committees with misfeasance, malversation of the temple property, or neglect of duty. There is nothing in the Act to oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts over suits to establish a right to share in the management. *AGRI SARMA EMBRANDRI v. VISTNU EMBRANDRI*. *JANADHANA EMBRANDRI v. PALA BUL KASAVA EMBRANDRI* . . . 3 Mad. 198

3. ——— Right of person interested to sue for misfeasance by managers, etc.—*Public endowment*. In the case of a public endowment transferred to trustees, managers, or superintendents of such lands under Act XX of 1863, any person or persons interested (and the interest need not be a pecuniary one) in the religious establishment, in its worship or service, or in its trusts, has a right of suit, after leave obtained from a Civil Court against such trustees, etc., for misfeasance, or breach of trust, or neglect of duty. *KUNEEZ FATIMA v. SEHEBA JAN* . . . 8 W. R. 313

4. ——— Suit for removal of mohunt and appointment of another. A suit for the removal of the present mohunt of a religious endowment and for the appointment of the petitioner in his place is not of such a nature as is contemplated by Act XX of 1863. *KISHORE BON MOHUNT v. KALEE CHURN GIREE* . . . 22 W. R. 364

5. ——— Suit to compel heir of manager to make good deficiency—*Leave of Court*. Act XX of 1863 does not apply to a suit brought by the dharmakarta of a temple and one of its worshippers to compel the defendant, as heir of the late manager, to make good, out of the property inherited by him, the deficiency in the devasthanam funds caused by breach of trust and misappropriation by the late manager. The leave of the Civil Court for the institution of such a suit is not necessary, and the suit is maintainable. The right of instituting such suits is not a privilege accorded by Act XX of 1863, but a pre-existing right. *JEYANGARULAVARU v. DURMA DOSSJI* . . . 4 Mad. 2

ACT—*contd.*1863—XX—*contd.*

6. ——— Suit to eject Dharmakarta or agents from temple—*Right of Government to divest itself of power of interfering with appointment*—*Mad. Reg. VII of 1817*. Plaintiffs, members of the committee appointed under Act XX of 1863, sued to eject defendants (the dharmakarta and his agents) from the possession and management of the temple dedicated to Sri Viraragava Swami at Trivellore and to establish their (plaintiffs') right to the possession and control of the said temple. Defendants denied the right of the plaintiffs to exercise any control whatever over the temple. This right depended upon whether, at the period of the passing of Act XX of 1863, the nomination vested in, was exercised by, or was subject to the confirmation of the Government, or any public officer. It was admitted that in 1842 the Board of Revenue did, so far as it could, divest itself of all right to interfere with the appointment of a dharmakarta, but it was contended for the plaintiffs that it was not in the power of the Board of Revenue so to divest itself of the duties imposed upon it by Regulation VII of 1817. *Held*, that assuming the Board of Revenue to have had such a right, there was nothing in Regulation VII of 1817 to prevent them from renouncing that right if they chose. *VENKATESA NAYADU v. SHAGATOPA SHRI SHAGATOPA SWAMI* . . . 7 Mad. 77

7. ——— Jurisdiction—*Clause in deed of endowment excluding jurisdiction*. The jurisdiction given to Courts by Act XX of 1863 cannot be excluded by any clause in a deed of endowment. *IMDAD HOSSEIN v. MAHOMED ALI KHAN* . . . 23 W. R. 150

8. ——— *Madras Regulation VII of 1817, s. 13—Discretionary power of a temple committee to appoint new trustees when the power of management is not hereditary—Trusts Act (II of 1882), s. 49—Jurisdiction of Civil Court*. A temple committee appointed under Act XX of 1863 may appoint new trustees when there is no hereditary trustees to add to the existing trustees, but this power, although discretionary, must be exercised reasonably and in good faith, and according to the principle, which is applicable to public trusts, embodied in s. 49 of the Indian Trusts Act. If it is not so exercised, the power may be controlled by a Civil Court of original jurisdiction. *DAVUD SAIBA v. HUSSEIN SAIBA* . . . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 212

9. ——— *Duties and Powers of committee of management—Meetings of committee—Number of members present—Resolution appointing quorum—Resolution by three out of seven—Failure of trustee to submit accounts—Ground for dismissal*. Though committees constituted under the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, are not strictly corporations, their procedure in matters relating to the management of properties and trustees under their control should be governed by the rules applicable to regular corporations. In 1879, when a committee consisted of seven members,

ACT—*contd.*1863—XX—*contd.*

a meeting was held at which five were present, and a resolution was unanimously passed that at future meetings three should form a *quorum*. This resolution had never been rescinded, and had always been acted upon. In 1895, when the committee also consisted of seven, a meeting was held after due notice to all its members, at which three were present, and a trustee of the temple was, on valid grounds, dismissed from office and called upon to hand over charge of the temple and its properties. The resolution of dismissal was unanimous, and was confirmed at a subsequent meeting:—*Held*, that the meeting as constituted was competent to pass the resolution removing the trustee. Whether unanimity of the whole committee might not have been necessary in the event of business having been transacted otherwise than at a meeting. *Quære*:—Failure on the part of a trustee to submit accounts to the committee is a breach of one of the most important duties cast upon him by law, and is sufficient to justify his dismissal. ANANTANARAYANA AYYAR v. KUTTALAM PILLAI . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 481

1. — s. 3—Power of committee appointed under the Act. A committee, appointed under Act XX of 1863, has power to dismiss the trustees or superintendents of temples described in s. 3 of the Act, without having recourse to a civil suit; but such power can only be exercised on good and sufficient grounds. CHINNA RANGAIYANGAR v. SUBRAYA MUDALI. 3 Mad. 334

2. — Removal by Committee of Superintendent of Pagoda—*Ground for removal*. Where there were not good and sufficient grounds for the removal from office of the defendants, superintendents of a pagoda, within s. 3 of Act XX of 1863, by the committee appointed under that Act, the High Court confirmed the decree of the Civil Judge dismissing a suit brought by the plaintiffs, who had been appointed by the committee as superintendents in place of the defendants for the recovery of the pagoda, and the property belonging to it. CHINNA RANGAIYANGAR v. SUBRAYA MUDALI . 3 Mad. 338

3. — Committee, suit by, to enforce right of control. The committee of a district duly appointed under Act XX of 1863 are entitled to maintain a suit in a Civil Court without having obtained the leave of the Court to bring the suit as well when the object of the suit is to establish their right of control under s. 3 of the Act as when it is sought to enforce such control against the officers of the temple subordinate to them. VENKATASA NAIDU v. SADAGOPASMA IYER . 4 Mad. 404

4. — ss. 3, 4, 11, 12—*Suit by members of a temple committee—Burden of proof—Form of decree*. Suit by the members of a temple committee appointed under Act XX of 1863 against one claiming to be the hereditary trustee of a Hindu temple for possession of certain temple property, for a declaration of their right to receive certain annual

ACT—*contd.*1863—XX—*contd.*

dues and for a perpetual injunction restraining defendant from interfering with these dues:—*Held*, that the burden of proving that the temple was of the class mentioned in s. 3 of Act XX of 1863 lay on the plaintiffs. On its appearing that the defendants' ancestor was not the founder of the temple, but was appointed trustee by the Government, as also were his successors in the office of trustee, of whom all were not members of his family:—*Held*, (i) that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree declaring the temple in dispute to be of the class mentioned in Act XX of 1863, s. 3, and, as such, subject to their jurisdiction; (ii) that the plaintiffs were not entitled under Act XX of 1863, ss. 14, 1, and 12, to be put in possession of the property of the temple nor in receipt of its income. PONDURANGA v. NAGAPPA . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 366

1. — s. 4—Power of committee to call for accounts from trustees of temple. A District Committee appointed under Act XX of 1863 has no right to call for accounts from trustees of temples which are within s. 4 of the Act. VENKATABALA KRISHNA CHETTIYAR v. KALIYANARAM AIYANGAR . 5 Mad. 48

RAMIENGAR *alias* RAMANUGA CHARIYAR v. GNANASAMBANDA PANDARASANNADA . 5 Mad. 58

2. — Right to restoration of endowment of which plaintiff had been deprived under Mad. Reg. VII of 1817. The plaintiff, claiming to be the owner of a muth and certain land attached to it under a grant from the Rajah of Tanjore, from the possession of which he had been ejected by the Collector of Tanjore in 1856 on charges of breach of trust and other misconduct, sued to recover the possession of the lands and mesne profits. The Civil Judge found that the grant was for the performance of religious ceremonies and pious observances only, and that the plaintiff had led a vicious life and been guilty of malversation in his office, and, being of opinion that the plaintiff had been properly deprived of the lands belonging to the muth, under Madras Regulation VII of 1817, dismissed the suit. *Held*, that, under s. 4 of Act XX of 1863, the plaintiff became entitled, on the passing of the Act, to the restoration of the endowment. JUSAGHERI GOSAMIER v. COLLECTOR OF TANJORE . 5 Mad. 334

3. — Right to control affairs of temple—*Transfer of property—Form of order—Right of suit*. In 1849, the Board of Revenue, acting under Bengal Regulation XIX of 1810, interfered in the management of the affairs of a temple. In a suit relating to the affairs of the temple instituted in 1878, it did not appear whether any transfer of property had been made under s. 4 of Act XX of 1863, but it did appear that, in 1865, the Judge of Patna had appointed a manager of the temple. *Held*, that the right of the Government officers to control the affairs of the temple had

ACT—contd.

1863—XX—contd.

been sufficiently proved. *DHURRUM SING v. KISHEN SINGH*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 767: 9 C. L. R. 410

ss. 4 and 5—Power to appoint trustees on vacancy in office—*Malabar Devasams—Jurisdiction of District Courts*. The District Courts have no power to appoint trustees under s. 5 of Act XX of 1863 upon a vacancy occurring in the office of trustee, unless property has been actually transferred to the former trustees under the provisions of s. 4. *ITTUNI PANIKKAR v. IRANI NAMBUDRIPAD* . I. L. R. 3 Mad. 401

1. s. 5—Vacancy in office of Manager—*Appointment by Civil Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622—Jurisdiction of High Court to entertain petition to revise order appointing Manager*. An order made by a Civil Court under the powers conferred by s. 5 of the Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863) is a judicial adjudication in the matter before it, and it is competent to the High Court to entertain a civil revision petition against such an order. Before the jurisdiction which is conferred by s. 5 of the Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863) can be exercised by a Civil Court, there must be a vacancy in the office, there must have been a transfer to the former trustee, and a dispute must have arisen respecting the right of succession to the office. The words in s. 5, "any dispute shall arise respecting the right of succession," apply to a case in which a question has arisen with reference to the person who is to succeed to the office; and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under the section is not confined to cases in which a dispute has arisen respecting the right to succeed to the office. *GOPALA AYYAR v. ARUNACHALLAM CHETTY* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 85

2. *Appointment of trustee to religious endowment—Jurisdiction of District Judge—Collector as Agent of Court of Wards*. Where a hereditary trustee of a temple died, and application was made by the Collector as agent of the Court of Wards, in whom the management of deceased's estates during the minority of the sons of the deceased had vested, to be appointed trustee on behalf of the said sons:—*Held*, that the case fell within s. 5 of Act XX of 1863, and that the Court (the District Judge) had jurisdiction to make the appointment. *SOMASUNDARA MUDALIAR v. VYTHILINGA MUDALIAR* . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 285

s. 7—Power of appointment in committee. The defendant was sued as the trustee of a pagoda to recover a certain sum of money for which he had not accounted. The defendant was dismissed by three members of the district committee, which consisted of six members, the other three members refusing to sign the order of dismissal. The plaintiffs were appointed trustees in place of the defendant by the members who dismissed the defendant. *Held*, that the appointment of the plaintiffs was invalid under s. 7, Act

ACT—contd.

1863—XX—contd.

XX of 1863, and that they were not entitled to sue the defendant. *PANDURUNGY ANNACHARIYAR v. IYATHORY MUDALY* . 7 Mad. 413

s. 8—Resignation of member of a committee of a temple. A member of a committee of a temple, appointed under s. 8 of Act XX of 1863, can retire from his office of his own will. *TIRUVENGADA v. RANGAYYANGAR*. *GOPAL RAM v. RANGAYYANGAR* . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 114

s. 10—Powers of Judge to appoint new committee of an endowment when the memberships are all vacant. Under s. 10, Act XX of 1863, the powers of a Judge are not confined to filling up vacancies in the memberships of committee of a religious endowment, but the Judge may appoint a new committee when the memberships of the committee are all vacant. *MAHOMED ATHOR v. SULTAN KHAN*

4. C. W. N. 527

ss. 11 and 12 and s. 3—*Suit by Manager for rent on muchalkas granted by the committee of religious institution—Right of suit*. Where the committee of a religious institution governed by Act XX of 1863 obtained muchalkas in its own name from the tenants of land belonging to the institution instead of in the name of its manager:—*Held*, that with reference to the provisions of the Act, that this fact constituted a mere irregularity, and that a suit brought by the manager on such muchalkas was maintainable. *KALYANARAMAYYAR v. MUSTAK SHAH SAHEB*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 395

1. s. 14—*Suit for wrongful dismissal from temple by officer*. A suit by an officer of a mosque, temple, or religious establishment for wrongful dismissal from his office is not a suit for misfeasance within the meaning of s. 14, Act XX of 1863. *AMIN SAHIB v. IBRAHIM SAHIB*

4 Mad. 112

2. *Right to sue for removal of trustees—Religious endowment*. S. 14 of Act XX of 1863 is sufficiently general in its terms to empower any person interested in any temple, mosque, or religious endowment, or in the performance of the trusts relating thereto, to sue the trustee, manager, or superintendent, or the member of a committee appointed under the Act for misfeasance, and also to empower the Court to order the removal of a trustee, etc. The tomb of a reputed saint became a place of pilgrimage, and an endowment was made for the maintenance of the shrine and for the performances of certain religious ceremonies. There was a practice on the part of the proprietors and the managers of the institution to divide among themselves the residue of the income and to dispose by way of sale or mortgage of the share enjoyed by them. *Held*, that this was a religious institution within the meaning of Act XX of 1863. The 14th section of the Act empowers the Civil Court to remove trustees for misfeasance, etc., and it does not recognize any difference in respect of

ACT—contd.

1863—XX—contd.

trustees, whether hereditary or selected. *FAKUR-UDIN SAHIB v. ACKENI SAHIB* I. L. R. 2 Mad. 197

3. ———— *Suit to remove trustee of religious endowment though unlawfully appointed.* Act XX of 1863 is applicable to an endowment whereby certain shops have been purchased by subscription and dedicated to the support of a mosque, and is also applicable in respect of a person in possession of the endowed property and professing to act as mutawalli, even though he may not have been lawfully appointed. *Dhurrum Sing v. Kissen Sing*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 767, and *Sheoratan Kuari v. Ram Pargash*, I. L. R. 13 All. 227, referred to. *MUHAMMAD SIRAJUL HAQ v. IMAM-UD-DIN* . . . I. L. R. 19 All. 104

4. ———— *Suit to restrain manager from allowing property to be removed—Form of order—Injunction—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 30.* S. 14 of Act XX of 1863 is generally applicable to all religious endowments, and while it in one sense restrains the ordinary Courts from dealing with cases against trustees of religious endowments, it gives special facilities for suits in the principal Civil Court of the district by any of the persons interested in those endowments. *Quere*: Whether, considering the provisions of s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code, the retention of s. 14 of Act XX of 1863 is at all necessary? An order under s. 14, Act XX of 1863, should be mandatory, and not prohibitory. Where a sacred book was kept at a temple, and was an object of veneration to the members of the sect entitled to worship there: *Held*, that a suit would lie under s. 14 of Act XX of 1863 by some of the persons interested in the temple, to restrain the superintendent from removing the book to another place, and that he should be directed to retain it as a portion of the furniture of the temple. *DHURRUM SINGH v. KISHEN SINGH*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 767: 9 C. L. R. 410

5. ———— *Trustee of temple, qualifications of—Duty of Committee—Misfeasance.* Act XX of 1863 does not require that a person appointed by a committee to be a trustee of a temple should be of any particular sect, and although it may be desirable that the trustee of a temple should be of the sect to which the temple belongs, the appointment of a Sivite to be trustee of a Vishnuvite temple does not amount to an act of misfeasance, neglect, or breach of trust on the part of the committee within the meaning of s. 14 of the Act. *GANDAVATHARA AYYANGAR v. DEVANAYAGA MUDALI* . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 222

6. ———— *Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Endowment—Religious endowments, application of Act to.* Act XX of 1863 only applies to certain religious trusts and endowments which had been or might come to be under the management of the Government; and s. 14 of that Act, although in its terms it appears to be more general than the earlier sections, applies in fact only to the same religious endowments to which the rest of the Act ap-

ACT—contd.

1863—XX—contd.

plies. *Panch Courie Mull v. Chunnoo Lall*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 563: 2 C. L. R. 121, cited and followed. *KALI CHURN GIRI v. GOLAPI* . . . 2 C. L. R. 128

7. ———— *Suit to recover land on behalf of temple.* The provisions of s. 14 of Act XX of 1863 (*Religious Endowments Act*) do not oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts except in the cases specified therein. A suit for recovery of immoveable property on behalf of a temple, alleging by way of misfeasance and breach of trust that the defendants (the managers of the temple) had forged documents and usurped temple property, without any prayer for the removal of the managers, or for damages, or for a decree for specific performance of any act by the managers, is not a suit for which a special jurisdiction is provided by the Act. *MAHALINGA RAU v. VENCORA GHOSAMI* I. L. R. 4 Mad. 157

8. ———— *Suit by persons interested for breach of trust and neglect of duty—Refusal of trustee without adequate reason to accept and utilise offerings for celebration of festivals—Misfeasance and breach of trust in s. 14 explained.* In a suit against the trustee of a religious institution under Act XX of 1863 for alleged breaches of trust and neglect of duty by reason of the non-performance of ceremonies, it is not necessary, in order to give jurisdiction to Civil Courts, for the plaintiffs to show that there are any special funds constituting an endowment of the institution. If it be proved that the ceremonies in question have been conducted as a custom for a series of years, and that the defendant trustee was not absolutely unable, owing to lack of funds, to carry on those ceremonial observances in the customary manner, he must be held to have been guilty of neglect of duty rendering him liable to a suit under s. 14 of the Act. Where it has been usual for the trustee to celebrate festivals with the aid of voluntary contributions, it is a breach of duty on the part of the trustee to refuse to celebrate them without adequate reasons if funds are available, and the trustee ought not, contrary to usage, to refuse to receive such offerings and perform the ceremonies for which they are tendered. *Per SUBRAHMANIA AYYAR, J.* Having regard to the fact that funds voluntarily given to public religious institutions not only enrich the institutions, but promote the interests of public worship, it must be regarded as part of the proper functions of the trustee to utilise such income for the purposes of the institution whenever it is available. It is his duty to accept the money and apply it for the specified purpose unless there are proper grounds for its rejection. Though a trustee may exercise a discretion and cannot be charged with misconduct, if he acts with an absence of indirect motive, with honesty of intention and a fair consideration of the subject, he may be proceeded against it, from corrupt or improper motives, he refuses to allow voluntary contributions offered for purposes not inconsistent with the principles, rules, or usages of the institution to be applied to those purposes.

ACT—*contd.*1863—XX—*contd.*

The Courts are bound to restrain a trustee from injuring the interests of the institution under his charge by corruptly, arbitrarily, or wantonly departing from the ordinary course of procedure in regard to essential or important matters connected with the institution. The ground upon which the Courts exercise such jurisdiction over him is that such departure on his part amounts to a breach of legal duty incumbent on him. Though the Courts cannot be called upon to decide questions of ritual and worship unconnected with civil rights, it is perfectly competent for them to adjudicate upon such questions also when the adjudication is necessary for the determination of civil rights. *Amin Sahib v. Ibrahim Sahib*, 4 Mad. 112, explained. ELAYALWAR REDDIAR *v.* NAMBERUMAL CHETTIAR

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 293

9. ———— Trustee, manager, or superintendent of mosque—*Application of Act.* The words "trustee, manager, or superintendent of a mosque," etc., mentioned in Act XX of 1863, mean the trustee, manager, or superintendent of a mosque, etc., to which the provisions of the Act are applicable, not the trustee, etc., of any mosque. And such persons are those to whom the provisions of Regulation XIX of 1810 were applicable. The mosques, etc., to which the provisions of that Regulation were applicable, were mosques for the support of which endowments had been granted in land by the Government of the country or by individuals; and the mosques, etc., to which the provisions of Act XX of 1863 apply are, not any mosques, etc., but any mosques for the support of which endowments in land have been made by the Government or private individuals. *JAN ALI v. RAM NATH MUNDUL*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 32
9 C. L. R. 433

10. ———— Suit by committee against manager for misappropriation—*Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Leave to sue.* A committee appointed under Act XX of 1863 may, without leave of the Court previously obtained, sue their manager, or superintendent, for damages for misappropriation and for an injunction. The provisions of Act XX of 1863, s. 14, do not apply to such suits by the committee themselves. *PUDDLABH ROY v. RAMGOPAL CHATTERJEE*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 133
11 C. L. R. 333

11. ———— Suit against dismissed trustee to recover temple property. A suit by the trustees to recover the property of a temple from an ex-trustee who has been properly dismissed from his office by the temple committee is not governed by s. 14 of Act XX of 1863. *VERASAMI NAYADU v. SUBBA RAM*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 54

12. ———— Hereditary trusteeship—*Suspension from trusteeship and right of puja—Maintenance in office on terms.* Suit by certain dikshadars, or hereditary trustees, of the Chitambaram temple against others of the dikshadars praying for their removal from office and for a

ACT—*contd.*1863—XX—*contd.*

money decree alleging that they had been jointly guilty of misconduct in respect of temple property in their custody and had obstructed the repair of certain shrines. The District Judge passed a decree suspending some of the defendants from the office of trustee and the right of puja for a period which was not defined; he also passed a decree for the money claimed:—*Held*, that the operation of Act XX of 1863 was not excluded by the admission that the trusteeship was hereditary in certain families; and that the District Judge had jurisdiction under Act XX of 1863 to deprive the defendants of the right of puja. *Held*, further, on the evidence that the defendants merited the punishment which had been inflicted on them. Decreed that the suspension of the defendants be withdrawn on the terms that they file an undertaking with two sureties that they would restore certain property belonging to the temple now missing, and that they would duly conform to the decision of the majority of dikshadars as to the management of temple affairs, etc. *NATESA v. GANAPATI*

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 103

13. ———— Suit to carry out endowment. In a suit by the mutwalli of a large Mahomedan establishment, acting on behalf of the Mahomedans of the neighbourhood, to secure the performance of trusts of a deed of appropriation by a Mahomedan, the plaintiff was held, with reference to the words of ss. 14 and 15, Act XX of 1863, to be a person interested in the preservation of the trust, and a proper person to bring the suit. He was not required under those sections to have any interest in the trust, direct or immediate, or any share in the management of the property. *DOYAL CHUND MULLICK v. KERAMUT ALI*

12 W. R. 382

14. ———— Religious endowment—*Applicability of the Act—Madras Regulation VII of 1817.* In a suit brought with the leave of the District Court under Act XX of 1863, to remove the trustees of a Hindu temple, it did not appear that the trustees were nominated by or subject to the confirmation of the Government or any public officer:—*Held*, that Act XX of 1863 was not applicable to the temple unless it was admitted or proved by evidence that the endowment was one which would have fallen under the provisions of Regulation VII of 1817. *MUTHU v. GANGATHARA*

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 95

15. ———— *Madras Regulation VII of 1817—Joinder of purchasers in a suit against trustee.* A temple having been endowed with immoveable property after the passing of Madras Regulation VII of 1817 and before the Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863), and the trustee having without authority sold the same, a suit was instituted under Act XX of 1863 against the trustee and the purchasers of the property, to annul the sales and to declare the right of the temple thereto:—*Held*, (i) that a transferee of trust property, under a transaction which amounts to a

ACT—*contd.*1863—XX—*contd.*

breach of trust on the part of the trustee of the institution, cannot be proceeded against under the provisions of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863; and (ii) that the trustee of a public religious institution can be sued under the provisions of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, notwithstanding the fact that the institution came into existence after Regulation VII of 1817 was passed. *SIVAYYA v. RAMI REDDI* . . . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 223

18.

Endowment—

*Endowment for benefit of family idol—Suit to remove shebais from office. Arbitration, reference to—Bengal Regulation XIX of 1810. Act XX of 1863 does not apply to an endowment which is not a public one, but which is made for the benefit of an ancestral family idol. Two plaintiffs, members of a Hindu family, applied for and (in the presence of the defendants) obtained leave to institute a suit against the defendants, who were the shebais of a certain idol, for the purpose of having them removed from their office, on the ground of misconduct. In their plaint they alleged that the endowment was a public one, all Hindus having a common right of worshipping the idol. This was denied by the defendants. After issues had been framed, the Court of first instance made an order, under s. 16 of the Act, referring certain of them to arbitration, although the defendants contended that, as the endowment was not a public one, the Act had no application, and objected to the reference. The arbitrators made an award finding, *inter alia*, that the idol was the ancestral family idol of the parties to the suit, and that the endowment was not made for the benefit of the public. They further in their award laid down certain definite rules according to which the sheba ought to be conducted, and repairs to the temple made. The Court of first instance passed a decree on that award declaring that the idol was the ancestral idol of both parties, and directing that the defendants should perform the worship in a certain manner, and should execute certain repairs to the temple within six months, and declaring that, if the parties did not act as directed, any member of the family should be able to bring a suit for the appointment of a manager. Against that decree the defendants appealed, and contended that the Act did not apply to the case on the finding of facts as to the endowment not being a public one; that the compulsory reference to arbitration was illegal and void, and that the decree was not one authorised by the terms of s. 14 of the Act:—*Held*, that, on the facts as found by the arbitrators, Act XX of 1863 did not apply to the case, and that the compulsory reference to arbitration and the decree made thereon were illegal and void. *Held*, further, that the decree itself was bad on the ground that it was not one coming within the scope of s. 14 of the Act. *PROTAP CHANDRA MISSEER v. BROJONATH MISSEER* . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 275*

17.

Suspension and dismissal

of trustee of a temple—Powers of temple committee. The plaintiff was appointed to the office

ACT—*contd.*1863—XX—*contd.*

of trustee of a Hindu temple under Religious Endowments Act, 1863, s. 3, by the temple committee constituted under that Act. Subsequently the committee, having received certain complaints against him, suspended him from office pending inquiry without calling on him for an explanation. They alleged as the grounds of his suspension that he had caused loss of property and money to the temple, and that he had conducted things in the temple contrary to custom so as to cause a disturbance of the peace. The trustee refused to acquiesce in the order of suspension and to give up certain records, etc., which he was by that order required to deliver, and denied the authority of the committee as asserted by them. Shortly afterwards the committee dismissed him. The plaintiff, denying that his suspension and dismissal were legal, brought two suits against the members of the committee, the first for damages for the suspension, and the second for an injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with the discharge of his duties as trustee. Both of these suits were dismissed, and the plaintiff preferred appeals to the High Court. In the appeal relating to the claim for an injunction, it was found that no misconduct had been proved against the plaintiff previous to the order of suspension. *Held* by SHEPARD and DAVIES, J.J., that a trustee in the position of the plaintiff cannot be dismissed from office except for good cause shown, and that his conduct subsequent to the order of suspension did not amount to such good cause. In the appeal relating to damages:—*Held* by SHEPARD, J., that the order of suspension was illegal, and that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff was entitled to substantial damages. *Held* by DAVIES, J. (finding that the committee had proceeded in the *bonâ fide* belief that they were acting for the good of the temple in suspending the plaintiff pending inquiry), that the order of suspension was not illegal, and that the suit was rightly dismissed. Owing to the difference of opinion between the two Judges, the last-mentioned appeal was referred to the Chief Justice under Civil Procedure Code, s. 575, and was heard by him sitting with the two other Judges:—*Held* by COLLINS, C.J., and SHEPARD, J. (DAVIES, J., *diss.*), that the order of suspension was illegal, and the plaintiff was entitled to substantial damages. *Per* COLLINS, C.J. The power of suspension by the committee is, in my judgment, the same as the power of dismissal. The committee, having made due inquiry and having called on the trustee for an explanation, may suspend for good and sufficient cause, but not otherwise. *SESHADRI AYYANGAR v. NATARAJA AYYAR* . . . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 179

18.

Suit for declaration—

Maintainability when ancillary to claim for dismissal of manager—Ground of dismissal—Bonâ fide claim by manager to property of the institution. In a suit brought under the Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863), a declaration that property belongs to an institution, and that a mortgage over it is

ACT—*contd.*1863—XX—*contd.*

not binding on the institution, may be asked for and made when it is ancillary to a claim for the removal of the manager. The plaintiffs in a suit under the Religious Endowments Act based their claim for the removal of a defendant from his office of manager of a mosque on the ground that he had set up a right of private property in the mosque. They sued for a declaration that certain property was the property of the mosque, and that a mortgage created over it was invalid. They also asked that defendant might be removed. *Held*, that they were entitled to the declarations prayed for. With regard to the claim for the removal of the defendant, as it seemed probable, on the evidence, that he, in setting up a right of private property in the mosque, was acting under the *bona fide* belief that it was the private property of his family, and as, apart from that, there was practically no evidence of misconduct, it was not necessary to dismiss him from his office, but he was ordered to pay the costs of the suit. *MUHAMMAD JAFAR v. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM* (1900) I. L. R. 24 Mad. 243

s. 18—

See PAUPER SUIT.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 419

1. ———— **Leave to sue—Public and private endowments—Reg. XIX of 1810—Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Suit to remove mutwalli.** A, a Mahomedan lady, executed a wakfnama purporting to dedicate the whole of her property to an imambara in her house, for the purpose of perpetuating various Shiah ceremonies. By the wakfnama she constituted herself joint-mutwalli with one B, and caused the names of herself and B as mutwallis to be substituted in the Collector's register for her own name as owner. On the death of B, A acted as the sole mutwalli. The wakfnama was publicly registered. But though the property was styled "wakf," and A the mutwalli thereof, in all documents connected with the estate, A all along continued to deal with it as absolute proprietress, and the dedication, though made in 1852, was never under the control of the Board of Revenue or of local agents. In a suit, which the plaintiffs obtained leave to institute under s. 18 of Act XX of 1863, to remove A from the mutwalliship, on the ground of misfeasance: *Held*, that the wakfnama did not constitute a public religious establishment within the meaning of Act XX of 1863, and that, therefore, the Judge below had no authority to give the plaintiffs, under s. 18, leave to sue; and that his decision was consequently *ultra vires*. S. 18 of Act XX of 1863 applies only to such religious establishments as were under the control or superintendence of the Board of Revenue or of local agents under Regulation XIX of 1810, and were transferred to trustees or managers under s. 4 of the Act. *DEL-ROOS BANOO BEGUM v. ASHGAR ALLY KHAN* 15 B. L. R. 167: 23 W. R. 453

ACT—*contd.*1863—XX—*contd.*

Affirmed by the Privy Council. So far as it held that the endowment created by the document was not of such a public character as would sustain a suit under Act XX of 1863, not dissented from. *ASHGAR ALI v. DELROOS BANOO BEGUM*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 324

2. ———— **Right of beneficiaries under deed of endowment.** Act XX of 1863, while it empowers persons to sue whose right to sue independently of the Act, may be doubtful, does not deprive persons claiming to be beneficiaries under a deed of endowment of the right to sue, which they have independently of the Act, nor does it impose on them the necessity of obtaining the sanction to institute the suit required by s. 18 of the Act. *KULAB HOSSEIN v. MEHRUM BEEBEE*

4 N. W. 155

3. ———— **Suit to have trust of endowment carried out.** An appropriator, who sues on the ground that the trust created, so far as it related to the appointment of mutwallis, had never been acted upon, and that the original rights of the appropriator remain, is at liberty to bring such a suit without leave of the Court, under s. 18 of Act XX of 1863. *HIDAITOONISSA v. AFZUL HOSSEIN*

2 N. W. 420

4. ———— **Sanction to suit—Suit brought different from the suit sanctioned—Rejection of plaint.** A and B, being worshippers at a Hindu temple, obtained sanction under s. 18 of the Religious Endowments Act to sue for the removal of the managers of the temple on the ground of breach of trust and for damages. A and B sued to remove the managers, but claimed no damages in their plaint:—*Held*, that as the suit instituted differed from the one for which sanction was given, the plaint was properly rejected. *SRINIVASA v. VENKATA* I. L. R. 11 Mad. 148

5. ———— **Order of Civil Court as to title, effect of. *Semble*:** That an order of the Civil Court, under s. 18 of Act XX of 1863, refusing leave to institute a suit, and deciding that the temple was governed by a hereditary dharmakarta, and therefore within s. 3 of the Act, was not conclusive upon the question of title between the parties. *VENKATASA NAIKAR v. SRINIVASSA CHARIYAR. SRINIVASSA CHARIYAR v. VENKATASA NAIKAR* 4 Mad. 410

6. ———— **Costs—Suit for benefit of a trust.** Where a suit under Act XX of 1863 is for the benefit of a trust, and no party to the suit is in fault,—*e.g.*, where the right to the succession is disputed, and it is necessary to secure the property,—the Court may order the costs to be paid out of the estate; but where a person is in fault, no such order ought to be made. *SOOKRAM DOSS v. NUND KISHORE DOSS* 22 W. R. 21

7. ———— **s. 18—Leave to sue—Leave to sue in High Court in case of neglect by trustee—Trustee of public charity—Acquisition by prescription of**

ACT—*contd.*1863—XX—*ccntd.*

trusteeship with power to appoint successors. The trusteeship of certain public temples was handed down from *M* to his son, and then to his grandson, after which the younger brother of the grandson succeeded to the office. He, by will, appointed his sister and her husband as trustees to succeed him, and authorised them to appoint their own successors, thus diverting the devolution of the office from the family of the original trustee. The sister and husband assumed office, but the husband died soon after. The sister continued to hold the office of trustee for over twenty-four years. She, by will, appointed as her successor her sister's son, who held office for twenty years, and, by will, appointed his son-in-law, the defendant, as his successor. Defendant was a great grandson of *M*, and assumed the office of trustee. A suit having been filed by plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and other worshippers, for a declaration that the appointment of defendant as trustee was illegal and void: *Held*, that defendant was the rightful trustee, having been appointed by one who had acquired a valid title to the trusteeship with power to appoint a successor. The sister had acquired a valid title to the trusteeship by prescription, and had entered upon it under a will which contained a provision for the appointment of a successor; and she had, acting under that provision, appointed a successor, giving him a similar power to appoint his own successor. *Semble*: that the title so acquired by the sister and her successor was not a hereditary trusteeship passing necessarily to their heirs, but one with power to appoint a successor. A trusteeship with power to appoint a successor is an estate well known to and recognised by law, and may be prescribed for. The Religious Endowments Act, 1863, was not intended to apply to a suit, brought under the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court inherited from the Supreme Court, charging neglect of duty on the part of a temple trustee. Such a suit is therefore maintainable without leave being obtained under s. 18 of that Act. *Semble*: that where a person who had no right to the office of a trustee, according to the rule of devolution established by the founder of a trust, acquires a title to the office by prescription, but restores it to one who, except for the transferor's prescriptive title, could have taken the office according to the rules laid down by the founder, such transfer should be treated as an exception to the general doctrine that a trusteeship is not assignable. *ANNASAMI PILLAI v. RAMAKRISHNA MUDALIAR* (1900)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 219

8. ———— *Leave to sue granted on application made by unverified letter, and not presented to Court by applicant or pleader—Validity—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 622, 647—Maintainability of civil revision petition against order granting leave passed with material irregularity.* Applications to District Courts under s. 18 of the Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863) for leave to sue should be duly

ACT—*contd.*1863—XX—*ccntd.*

verified, and presented either by the applicant in person or by his pleader. A grant of such leave on an unverified application not presented in Court is a material irregularity within the meaning of s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and a civil revision petition lies from the order granting it. Omission to give notice of such an application to the person whom it is intended to sue does not of itself render the leave, if granted, irregular. *Venkatapayya v. Venkatapathi* (Appeal No. 230 of 1895), I. L. R. 24 Mad. 687, approved. *AMDGO MIYAN v. MUHAMMAD DAUD KHAN* (1901)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 685

9. ———— *Leave to institute suit—Necessity for showing exercise of control by Board of Revenue.* For a Court to have jurisdiction to grant sanction, under s. 18 of the Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863), to institute a suit, it is not necessary for it to be shown that the Board of Revenue has actually exercised control over the temple in question. *Muthu v. Gangathara*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 95, explained. *SATURLURI SEETARAMA-NUJA CHARYULU v. NANDURI SEETAPATI* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 166

XXI—

See RECORDERS ACT.

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, RANGOON.

6 B. L. R. 196

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CHARTER ACT, s. 15 . 6 B. L. R. 180

XXIII—

See WASTE LANDS.

s. 5 —

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS—WASTE LANDS, SUIT FOR . 7. W. R. 349

1864—II—

See ADEN COURTS ACT.

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACTS—ACT II OF 1864.

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 258

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN ONE DISTRICT—THEFT.

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 258, 263

See LETTERS PATENT. 10 C. W. N. 185

See LOCAL GOVERNMENT, POWER OF.

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 274

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—GENERAL CASES . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 274

See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASE—LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURTS, CL. 13.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 575

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1864—III—

See WHIPPING. I. L. R. 25 Bom. 712

See FOREIGNERS. I. L. R. 18 Bom. 636

See WARRANT OF ARREST.
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 636

VI—

See WHIPPING.

XI—

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—ENDOWMENT.
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 401

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—KAZI.
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 633
I. L. R. 3 Bom. 72

XIII—

See CONTRACT—BREACH OF CONTRACT.
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 131

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY
IN ONE DISTRICT—EMIGRANTS.
4 Mad. Ap. 4

XVI—

See REGISTRATION ACTS.

XVII—

See OFFICIAL TRUSTEE'S ACT.

XX—

See COSTS—BOMBAY MINORS' ACT.
I. L. R. 2 Bom. 360

See GUARDIAN—DUTIES AND POWERS OF
GUARDIANS. I. L. R. 12 Bom. 686
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 61

See HINDU LAW—PARTITION—RIGHT TO
ACCOUNT ON PARTITION.
I. L. R. 117 Bom. 271

See MINOR—CASES UNDER BOMBAY
MINORS' ACT, 1864.

ss. 11 and 15—

See COLLECTOR. I. L. R. 1 Bom. 318

XXVI—

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY
TOWNS.

s. 9—

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 27.
14 B. L. R. 76

See COSTS—SMALL CAUSE COURT SUITS
1 B. L. R. O. C. 27, 66
10 B. L. R. 358
2 Hyde 237
I. L. R. 4 Bom. 407

1865—III—

See CARRIERS ACT.

See CARRIERS.

ACT—*contd.*

1865—V—

See MARRIAGE ACT (CHRISTIAN), 1865.
6 Mad. Ap. 20

VII

See FOREST ACT, 1865.

X—

See SUCCESSION ACT.

XI—

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL.

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, RANGOON.
6 B. L. R. 196

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—
SMALL CAUSE COURT SUITS.

XII—

See WARRANT OF ARREST.
1 Ind. Jur. 315

XIII—

See CHARGE. 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 404

See OFFENCE COMMITTED ON THE HIGH
SEAS. 1 B. L. R. O. Cr. 1

XV—

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—
BOMBAY—CIVIL.
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 302
I. L. R. 16 Bom. 136

See PARSİ MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.

See PARSİS.

See RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS.
9 Bom. 29

XX—

See COSTS—SUMMARY SUIT FOR POSSES-
SION. 15 W. R. 268

See MOOKTEAR.

See PLEADER.

XXI—

See PARSİ INTESTATE SUCCESSION ACT.
See PARSİS.

XXVIII—

See INSOLVENCY—CASES UNDER ACT
XXVIII OF 1865. 3 Bom. O. C. 25
5 Bom. O. C. 167
9 Bom. 27

1866—X—

See COMPANY.

XIII—

See OUDH REDEMPTION ACT.

XIV—

See ABETMENT. 7 W. R. Cr. 54
See CARRIERS. 3 N. W. 195

ACT—*contd.*1866—XIV—*contd.*

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—POST OFFICE ACTS.

3 Bom. Cr. 8
5 Bom. Cr. 36

See POST OFFICE ACT, 1866.

XX—

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1866.

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877.

XXI—

See NATIVE CONVERTS' MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION ACT.

XXV—

See INTESTATES ACT.

XXVI—

See OUDH ESTATES ACT.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 839

See OUDH SUB-SETTLEMENT ACT.

XXVII—

See TRUSTEES ACT.

XXVIII—

See TRUSTEES AND MORTGAGEES ACT, 1866.

See CHARITABLE TRUSTS.

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 509

1867—III—

See GAMBLING ACT (III OF 1867).

See GAMBLING.

X, s. 1—

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT.

3 B. L. R. A. C. 135

XII, s. 14—

See WARRANT OF ARREST.

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 340

XIII, ss. 20 and 30—

Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 404—*Distribution of fine—Possession of opium.* Upon the conviction of certain persons under s. 20, Act XIII of 1867, for illicit possession of opium, the Magistrate sentenced them to payment of a fine, and directed that, upon the realisation thereof, one-half should be paid to the Inspector of Police who had apprehended the prisoners, but refused to pay the other half in accordance with s. 30 (for reasons set forth in his order) to the person who gave the information. On a reference by the Sessions Judge to the High Court: *Held*, that the High Court could not interfere under s. 404 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The dis-

ACT—*contd.*1867—XIII—*concl'd.*

tribution of the fine under s. 30, Act XIII of 1867, formed no part of the Magistrate's judgment.
QUEEN v. RAMDAYAL SINGH 8 B. L. R. Ap. 7
16 W. R. Cr. 65

XVIII—

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS, N.-W. P.

2 N. W. 85

XXI, s. 15—

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.

5 Bom. Cr. 44

XXIV—

See ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL'S ACT, 1867
See ILLEGITIMACY . 11 B. L. R. Ap. 6

XXV—

See PRESS AND REGISTRATION OF BOOKS ACT.

See PRINTING PRESSES AND NEWSPAPERS ACT.

See SEDITION.

See COPYRIGHT I. L. R. 14 Bom. 586

See DEFAMATION I. L. R. 9 Mad. 387

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See NEWSPAPER I. L. R. 16 Mad. 443

XXVI—

See APPEAL—ACTS—ACT XXVI OF 1867.

See COURT FEES—ACT XXVI OF 1867.

See VALUATION OF SUIT.

6 B. L. R. Ap. 11, 12
3 Mad. 352

XXVIII—

See TRUSTEES AND MORTGAGEES ACT.

XXIX—

See FINE . 9 W. R. Cr. 62, 64

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE

5 Bom. Cr. 44

1868—I—

See GENERAL CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT.

VI (N.-W. P. Municipal Improvement Act)—

See N.-W. P. AND OUDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT, 1883, ss. 69, 71.

I. L. R. 8 All. 776

VIII, s. 1—

See STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

6 N. W. 373

IX—

See TAX . . . 4 Mad. Ap. 62
2 B. L. R. Ap. 40
11 W. R. Cr. 13, 56

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1868, X—

See SUCCESSION ACT.

XIII—

See RIGHT OF SUIT—KING OF OUDH,
SUIT AGAINST . . . 11 W. R. 116

XIV—

See PROSTITUTES 3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 70
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 163: 7 C. L. R. 197

s. 11—

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASE—ACTS—
ACT XIV OF 1868 . . . 17 W. R. Cr. 11

XVI, s. 9—

See APPEAL ORDERS . . . 14 W. R. 328

See MINISTERIAL OFFICERS, APPOINTMENT
OF . . . 11 W. R. 354
13 W. R. 197
14 W. R. 378

s. 12—

See MUNSIF, JURISDICTION OF.
19 W. R. 414

s. 18—

See BENGAL CIVIL COURTS ACT, 1871,
s. 22 . . . 1 N. W. 117, Ed. 1873, 203
5 N. W. 108: Agra F. B., Ed. 1873, 276
5 N. W. 175

s. 19—

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—TRANSFER
OF DECREE FOR EXECUTION.
1 N. W. 113, Ed. 1874, 199
15 W. R. 574
17 W. R. 551

XIX—

See OUDH RENT ACT.

1869—I—

See OUDH ESTATES ACT.

IV—

See DIVORCE ACT.

VIII—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

IX—

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASE—ACTS—
INCOME TAX ACT, 1869.
14 W. R. Cr. 71See ESTOPPEL—STATEMENTS AND PLEAD-
INGS . . . 24 W. R. 173
6 W. R. 252

See FALSE EVIDENCE . . . 5 Mad. 326

See INCOME TAX ACT, 1869.
2 N. W. 113A CT—*contd.*1869—IX—*concl'd.*See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRI-
SONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.
7 Bom. Cr. 76
14 W. R. Cr. 70

XIV—

See BOMBAY CIVIL COURTS ACT.

XV—

See PRISONER'S TESTIMONY ACT.

XVI—

See BHOOTAN DUARS ACT.

XVIII—

See STAMP ACT, 1869.

XXII, s. 9—

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
GENERAL JURISDICTION.
I. L. R. 3 Calc. 63
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 172

XXIII—

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRI-
SONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.
7 Bom. Cr. 76

1870—VII—

See COURT FEES ACT.

s. 31—

See WORKMEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT
ACT . . . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 22

VIII—

See INFANTICIDE . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 380

X—

See LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1870.

XI, s. 2—

See EXCISE ACT, 1871.
I. L. R. 3 All. 404

XIV—

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 132.
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 233See STATUTE, CONSTRUCTION OF.
6 N. W. 373Procedure of High
Court. Act XIV of 1870 (the Repealing Act, 1870)
did not affect the procedure of the High Court.
RAM CHUNDER v. CHOONEELAL . . . 12 B. L. R. 35

XXI—

See HINDU WILLS ACT, 1870.

See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION
OF WILLS.

See PROBATE.

XXIV—

See OUDH TALUQDARS' RELIEF ACT.

ACT—contd.**1870—XXVI—***See* PRISONS ACT.**XXVII, ss. 10, 294A—**

Lottery office—Institution of criminal proceedings—Sanction of Government. No charge for the offence (of keeping a lottery office) under ss. 10, 294A, Act XXVII of 1870, can be entertained without the authority of the Local Government. *QUEEN v. NGA CHO*
6 B. L. R. Ap. 98
15 W. R. Cr. 2

1871—I—*See* CATTLE TRESPASS ACT, 1871.**IV—***See* CORONERS ACT.**VI—***See* BENGAL CIVIL COURTS ACT, 1871.**VII—***See* FOREST ACT.**VIII—***See* REGISTRATION ACT, 1871.*See* REGISTRATION ACT, 1877.**IX—***See* LIMITATION ACT, 1871.**X—***See* EXCISE ACT, 1871.**XV—***See* BROACH TALUQDARS' RELIEF ACT, 1871.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS—BOMBAY.
I. L. R. 5 Bom. 135

XXIII—*See* PENSIONS ACT.**XXV—***See* RAILWAY ACT, 1871.**XXXII, s. 18—**

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES IN WHICH AN APPEAL LIES OR NOT—APPEALABLE ORDERS **I. L. R. 3 Calc. 522**

1872—I—*See* EVIDENCE ACT, 1872.*See* TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT.**I. L. R. 33 Bom. 53****III, s. 10—***See* BRAHMO SAMAJ.

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—DIVESTING OF, EXCLUSION FROM, AND FORFEITURE OF, INHERITANCE.
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 239

ACT—contd.**1872—IV—***See* PUNJAB LAWS ACT.**V—***See* INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 5 . **21 Bom. 405****VI—***See* OATHS ACT, 1872 . **21 W. R. Cr. 31****VII, s. 58—***See* ADVOCATE . . . **21 W. R. 297****IX—***See* CONTRACT ACT.**X—***See* CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.**XI—***See* EXTRADITION ACT.**XV—***See* MARRIAGE ACT, 1872.**XIX—***See* COUNTERFEITING COIN **5 N. W. 187****XXII—**

See COLLECTOR . . . **5 N. W. 221**
6 N. W. 153

See RIGHT OF SUIT—FRESH SUIT.
6 N. W. 34

1873—III—*See* MADRAS CIVIL COURTS ACT, 1873.**VIII—**

See NORTHERN INDIA CANAL AND DRAINAGE ACT, 1873.

X—*See* OATHS ACT, 1873.**XV—**

See NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT.

XVII—*See* NAWAB NAZIM'S DEBTS ACT, 1873.**XVIII—**

See NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACTS.

XIX—*See* AGRA LAND REVENUE ACT.

See NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES LAND REVENUE ACT.

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- 1874—II—
See ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL'S ACT, 1874.
See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
 I. L. R. 4 Calc. 770.
- III—
See MARRIED WOMAN'S PROPERTY ACT.
- VI—
See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL.
- s. 19—
See EXECUTION OF DECREE—ORDERS AND
 DECREES OF PRIVY COUNCIL.
 22 W. R. 102
- XI, s. 6—
See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
 WITHDRAWAL OF CASES.
 I. L. R. 8 Calc. 851
- s. 26—
See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—PRAC-
 TICE AND PROCEDURE.
 24 W. R. Cr. 29
- s. 28—
See REVISION—RE-TRIAL.
 24 W. R. Cr. 24
See SESSIONS JUDGE, POWER OF.
 2 C. L. R. 511
- XIV—
See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASE—ACTS—
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 I. L. R. 12 Calc. 536
See LOCAL GOVERNMENT, POWER OF.
 I. L. R. 10 Bom. 274
See SCHEDULED DISTRICTS ACT, 1874.
- XV—
See LAWS LOCAL EXTENT ACT.
- 1873—XVI—
See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
 SPECIAL ACTS—MADRAS ACT III OF
 1865 . . . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 223
 I. L. R. 2 Mad. 161
- 1875—IX—
See MAJORITY ACT.
- X—
See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, CH.
 XXIII, ss. 266—336.
- s. 147—
See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—GEN-
 ERAL CASES.
- XII—
See PORTS ACT, 1875.

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- 1875—XIII—
See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
 I. L. R. 4 Calc. 770
See PROBATE—POWER OF HIGH COURT TO
 GRANT, AND FORM OF.
 I. L. R. 1 Calc. 52
 24 W. R. 206
- s. 6—
See COURT FEES ACT, s. 19D.
 I. L. R. 23 Calc. 980
- XVII—
See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACTS—
 BURMA COURTS ACT, 1875.
 I. L. R. 4 Calc. 667
See BURMA CIVIL COURTS ACT.
See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—GEN-
 ERAL CASES . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 643
- XVIII—
See LAW REPORTS ACT.
- 1876—III.
See LIMITATION ACT.
- V—
See REFORMATORY SCHOOLS' ACT.
- VI—
See CHOTA NAGPORE ENCUMBERED ES-
 TATES ACT.
- X—
See BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION
 ACT.
- XI—
See PRESIDENCY BANKS ACT.
See BANK OF BENGAL.
 I. L. R. 3 Calc. 392
See PRESIDENCY BANKS ACT.
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- XII—
See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—
 JURISDICTION—COPYRIGHT.
 I. L. R. 6 Calc. 499
- XVII—
See OUDH LAND REVENUE ACT.
- XVIII—
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- 1877—I—
See SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT.
- III—
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- IV—
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- 1877—X—
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- XV—
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- XVIII—
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 I. L. R. 6 Bom. 251
- 1878—I—
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- III—
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- VI—
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- VII—
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 I. L. R. 10 Bom. 124
- VIII—
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 I. L. R. 33 Bom. 380
- XI—
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- XII—
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- 1879—I—
See STAMP ACT, 1879.
- IV—
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 I. L. R. 10 Calc. 166, 210
See RAILWAYS ACT, 1879.
- V—
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- VIII—
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- XII—
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- 1878—XII—s. 102—
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 I. L. R. 3 Mad. 98
- XIII—
See OUDH CIVIL COURTS ACT, 1879.
- XVII—
See DEKKHAN AGRICULTURISTS' RELIEF ACT, 1879.
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 I. L. R. 33 Bom. 44
- XVII, ss. 13, 15A—
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- XVIII—
See LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT.
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 4 C. W. N. 389
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- XXI—
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See EXTRADITION ACT, 1879.
- 1880—III—
See CANTONMENTS ACT, 1880.
- IV—
See PORTUGUESE CONVENTION ACT, 1880.
- XV—
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- 1881—V—
See PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT.
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See PROBATE.
- XII—
See NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACTS.
- XIV—
See BENARES FAMILY DOMAINS ACT.
- XV—
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- XVIII—
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- 1881—XXI—
See BROACH AND KATRA ENCUMBERED ESTATES ACT.
- XXIII—
See DEKKHAN AGRICULTURISTS' RELIEF ACT, 1881.
- XXVI—
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- 1882—II—
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- IV—
See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT.
- V—
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- VI—
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See APPEAL—ACTS—COMPANIES ACT.
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 758
- VIII—
See PENAL CODE.
- X—
See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.
- XII—
See SALT ACT.
- XIV—
See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882.
- XV—
See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY TOWNS.
s. 69—
See ADEN COURTS ACT.
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 708
- XX—
See PAPER CURRENCY ACT.
- XXII—
See DEKKHAN AGRICULTURISTS' RELIEF ACT.
- 1883—IX—
See CENTRAL PROVINCES TENANCY ACT.
- XV—
See N.-W. P. AND OUDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT, 1883.

ACT—*contd.*

- 1883—XIX—
See LAND IMPROVEMENT LOANS ACT.
- XXI—
See EMIGRATION ACT.
- 1884—III—
See EXTRADITION ACT.
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 333
See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—BOMBAY . . . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 333
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I. L. R. 9 All. 420
- V—
See CHOTA NAGPORE ENCUMBERED ESTATES ACT, 1884.
- XII—
See AGRICULTURISTS' LOANS ACT.
- 1885—III—
See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY AMENDMENT ACT.
- VIII—
See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, 1885.
- XVIII—
See LAND ACQUISITION ACTS, 1885 AND 1894.
- 1886—II—
See INCOME TAX ACT.
- IX—
See DEO ESTATES ACT.
- XIV—
See N.-W. P. RENT AMENDMENT ACT.
- XVII—
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See RES JUDICATA—CAUSES OF ACTION.
I. L. R. 10 All. 517
- XXII—
See OUDH RENT ACT.
- 1887—I.
See GENERAL CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT.
- VII—
See SUITS VALUATION ACT.
- IX—
See PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT.

ACT—contd.**1887—IX—contd.***See* SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL.*See* SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION
OF . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 48**XII—***See* BENGAL, N.-W. PROVINCES AND ASSAM
CIVIL COURTS ACT.*See* CIVIL COURTS ACT (VI OF 1871).**1888—II—***See* INCOME TAX ACT.**V—***See* INVENTIONS AND DESIGNS ACT.**VI—***See* ATTACHMENT—ATTACHMENT OF PER-
SON . . . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 85*See* INSOLVENCY—INSOLVENT DEBTORS
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I. L. R. 16 Calc. 85**s. 5—***See* SECURITY FOR COSTS—SUITS.
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 610**VII—***See* CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE AMENDMENT
ACT (VII OF 1888).**X—***See* CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE AMENDMENT
ACT (X OF 1888).**XII, s. 3—***See* APPEAL—BOMBAY ACTS—BOMBAY
MUNICIPAL ACT, 1888.
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 184**1889—IV—***See* MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT.**VI—***See* PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION
AMENDMENT ACT.**VII—***See* SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE ACT.**IX—***See* NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND
ODUH KANUNGOS AND PATWARIS ACT.**X—***See* PORTS ACT.**XI—***See* BURMA COURTS ACT, 1889.**XIII—***See* CANTONMENTS ACT, 1889.**ACT—contd.****1890—VII—***See* COURT FEES.**VIII—***See* GUARDIANS AND WARDS ACT.**IX—***See* RAILWAYS ACT, 1890.**XI—***See* PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS
ACT.**XX—***See* N.-W. P. AND OUDH ACT, 1890.**1891—III [Amending the Evi-
dence Act (I of 1872) and the
Criminal Procedure Code (X of
1882)]—***See* EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—CHAR-
ACTER . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 139**IV—***See* CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE AMEND-
MENT ACT, 1891.**VIII—***See* EASEMENT . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 616*See* PRESCRIPTION—EASEMENTS—RIGHT
OF WAY . . . I. L. R. 14 All. 185**XIII—***See* BANKERS' BOOKS EVIDENCE ACT.
4 C. W. N. 433**XIV—***See* OUDH COURTS ACT, 1891.**1892—VI—***See* CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE AMENDMENT
ACT, 1892.**VII—***See* MADRAS CITY CIVIL COURT ACT.**1893—IV—***See* PARTITION ACT, 1893.**1894—I—***See* LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894.**V—***See* CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE AMENDMENT
ACT, 1894.**VIII—***See* TARIFF ACT, 1894.**IX.***See* PRISONS ACT.

ACT—contd.**1895—I—**

See PRESIDENCY TOWNS SMALL CAUSE
COURTS ACT.

III, s. 5—

See WHIPPING . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 712

VI—

See DEKKHAN AGRICULTURISTS' RELIEF
AMENDMENT ACT.

VIII (Police Amendment Act)—

See POLICE ACT, s. 34.
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 855

XII—

See COMPANY—MEETINGS AND VOTINGS.
I. L. R. 27 Bom. 113

XV—

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1896—XI (Amending Legal Practitioners Act)—

See LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT.
See MOOKTEAR.
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 1023

XII—

See EXCISE ACT, 1896.

1897—III—

See EPIDEMIC DISEASES ACT.

VIII—

See REFORMATORY SCHOOLS ACT.

IX—

See PROVIDENT FUNDS ACT.

X—

See GENERAL CLAUSES ACT.

1898—I—

See OPIUM ACT.

III—

See BENGAL TENANCY AMENDMENT ACT.

V—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.
See GAMBLING I. L. R. 28 Bom. 129

VI—

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XI—

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1899—II—

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See CONTRACT—ALTERATION OF CON-
TRACTS—ALTERATION BY COURT.
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VIII—

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IX—

See ARBITRATION ACT, 1899.

XI—

See COURT FEES ACT (AMENDMENT ACT),
1899.

XXII—

See COINAGE AND PAPER CURRENCY ACT.

1900—III—

See PRISONERS ACT.

1902—V—

See ADMINISTRATOR-GENERALS ACT.

X—

See EMIGRATION ACT.

1903—IV—

See PROVIDENT FUNDS (AMENDMENT)
ACT.

1904—I—

See GENERAL CLAUSES ACT.

II—

See CENTRAL PROVINCES CIVIL COURTS
ACT.

1905—VII—

See BENGAL AND ASSAM LAWS ACT.

1908—V—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

o. VI, r. 17 I. L. R. 33 Bom. 644

VI—

See EXPLOSIVE SUBSTANCES ACT.

VII—

See NEWSPAPERS (INCITEMENTS TO OF-
FENCES) ACT.

IX—

See LIMITATION ACT.

ACT, CONSTRUCTION OF—

See STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

ACT DONE IN OFFICIAL CAPACITY.

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OF . . . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 441

ACT OF FOREIGN POWER.

See HINDU LAW—ENDOWMENT—DISMISSAL OF MANAGER.

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 600, 620 note

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See CARRIERS . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 427

ACT OF STATE.

See GRANT—RESUMPTION OR REVOCATION OF GRANT . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 431

See HINDU LAW—CUSTOM—IMPARTIALITY . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 828

See NATIVE STATES . 10 C. W. N. 361

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—GOVERNMENT . 10 W. R. P. C. 25
11 Moo. I. A. 517

See RIGHT OF SUIT—ACT DONE IN EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS.

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 244

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 273

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 11: 24 W. R. 309

See SECRETARY OF STATE.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 189

1. ———— **Seizure of Raj of Tanjore—Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts—Independent States.** The transactions of Independent States between each other are governed by other laws than those which Municipal Courts administer. The seizure by the British Government, acting as a sovereign power, through its delegate, the East India Company, of the Raj of Tanjore, with the property belonging thereto, was, with its consequences, an act of State over which a Municipal Court has no jurisdiction. *THE EAST INDIA COMPANY v. KAMACHEE BOYE SAHIBA*
4 W. R. P. C. 4

S. C. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA *v.* KAMACHEE BOYE SAHIBA . 7 Moo. I. A. 476

2. ———— **Arrest under Beng. Reg. III of 1818—Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts.** A Mahomedan subject of the Crown was arrested in Calcutta, taken into the mofussil, and there detained in jail, under a warrant of the Governor-General in Council in the form prescribed by Reg. III of 1818. *Held*, that such arrest and detainer were not acts of State, but matters cognizable by a Municipal Court. *In re AMEER KHAN*
6 B. L. R. 392

3. ———— **Resumption of Jagir by East India Company—Regulation law.** Where lands were held by a jagirdar under the sovereign of an independent State on a jaidad tenure, i.e., on a grant of land, together with the public revenues thereof, on the condition of keeping up a body of troops to be employed when called on in the service of the sovereign, and on the conquest of the State by the East India Company the jagirdar remained in the same position to the Company:—*Held*, that the resumption of the lands by the Company, and the seizure of the arms and stores appertaining to the tenure, on the death of the jagir-

ACT OF STATE—contd.

dar, was not an act of State, and therefore the Municipal Courts had jurisdiction to entertain a suit by the representatives of the jagirdar against the Government for the possession of the land and for the value of the arms and stores. This was so, although, at the time of the resumption, the Regulation law was not introduced into the territories in which the jagir was comprised. *FORRESTER v. SECRETARY OF STATE*
12 B. L. R. 120: 18 W. R. 349
L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 10

4. ———— **Confiscation of territories of King of Delhi—Forfeiture.** The status of the King of Delhi was that of a King recognized by the British Government; and the confiscation of his territories in 1857 was an act of State, and not an act done under color of any legal right of which a Municipal Court could take cognizance. His tenure of the territories assigned him by the Government was a tenure merely *durante regno*, and no power was conferred upon him of creating incumbrances which would survive his deposition. The word 'confiscation' does not necessarily import that the appropriation is to be made as a penalty for a crime, nor, when used in that sense, does it necessarily imply that the forfeiture has accrued upon conviction; but it may also be properly used as applicable to appropriations of property by Government as an act of State. *SALIGRAM v. SECRETARY OF STATE*
12 B. L. R. 167: 18 W. R. 389
L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 119

5. ———— **Confiscation by Governor of Foreign State—Title to timber.** The plaintiff brought a suit at Tonghoo in British Burma to recover possession of certain timber which he alleged the defendants had wrongfully, and in collusion with the Burmese Governor of Ninghan, taken out of his possession in foreign territory and removed to Tonghoo. The defendants stated that they had acquired the timber from the Governor of Ninghan in terms of an agreement between them and the Burmese Government. It appeared that the Governor of Ninghan had confiscated the plaintiff's timber in contravention of a royal mandate. After the institution of the suit, the defendants removed the timber from Tonghoo to Rangoon. *Held*, that a British Municipal Court might enquire into the character of the act of the Governor of Ninghan, and was not bound to accept it as an act of State. *BOMBAY-BURMAH TRADING CORPORATION v. MAHOMED ALI SHERAGEE*
10 B. L. R. 345: 19 W. R. 123

6. ———— **Resumption by Government—Act of State—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.** By the treaty of the 31st July 1801 between the then Nawab of the Carnatic and the Governor in Council at Madras, the sovereign rights of the Nawab in the Carnatic were vested in the East India Company. *Held*, that a resumption by the Madras Government of a jagir granted by former Nawabs, as Altamghah inam, before the date of the treaty and a re-grant by Madras Government to

ACT OF STATE—*contd.*

another for a life estate only, was such an act of sovereign power by the East India Company as precluded the Supreme Court at Madras from taking cognizance of a suit by the heirs of the original grantee in respect of such resumption. *EAST INDIA COMPANY v. SYED ALLY* 7 Moo. I. A. 555

7. — **Resumption of village granted by Peishwa of the Deccan.** A village, having been granted in inam by the Peishwa of the Deccan, was, after the death of the grantee, seized by the mamlatdar or farmer of the revenues for an alleged debt due to him, and retained until the treaty of Poona in 1818, when it came into the possession of the British Government. In a suit instituted by the representatives of the original grantee for possession of the village, and payment of the arrear of revenue so sequestered, it was held by the Judicial Committee, affirming the decree of the Provincial and Sudder Courts, that the original resumption was the wrongful act of an individual, and not an act of the State: the British Government were therefore ordered to restore the village, but pursuant to Bom. Reg. V of 1827, s. 3, with only six years arrears of revenue. *MILLS v. MODER PESTONJEE KHOORSHIDJEE* 2 Moo. I. A. 37

8. — **Sequestration by British Government of private property of independent Sovereign**—*Jurisdiction of Municipal Court.* A sequestration by the officers of the British Government of the private property of the Angria of Kolaba, a native independent Sovereign, though made contrary to the express orders of the Court of Directors originally given, would not be liable to question in a Municipal Court if subsequently ratified, but *aliter* where there is no such ratification. *ZULEFF ALI v. YESHVADABAI SAHEB* 9 Bom. 314

9. — **Seizure by right of conquest**—*Jurisdiction of Municipal Court.* Where an estate is seized by the Crown in right of conquest and not by virtue of any legal title, such seizure must be regarded as an act of State, and is not liable to be questioned in a Municipal Court. *Secretary of State for India in Council v. Kamachee Boye Sahiba*, 7 Moore's I. A., 476, followed. *BHAGWAN SINGH v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL* L. R. 2 I. A. 38

10. — **Resumption of inam village and re-grant, effect of**—*Waikars, status of—Treaties of 1820—Effect of grant of inam under construction—Attachment by Government of such village, effect of.* From the year 1820 down to the year 1872 the Waikar family had been in the enjoyment of the village of Pasarni under a treaty between the East India Company and one M A and K M, who were brothers and the last male descendants of M. For an alleged fraud of K M Government restricted the enjoyment of the said village to his lifetime only. A predeceased K. On the death of K M, Government, on the 31st December 1872, placed an attachment over the village. On the 13th July 1874, a judgment-creditor of A caused the lands in dispute, which were

ACT OF STATE—*contd.*

mirasi lands of the Waikar family situated at Pasarni, to be sold in execution of his decree against A, and they were purchased by the defendant, who was put in possession on the 22nd April 1876. In the meanwhile, Government, having chosen to recognise the plaintiff as a representative of the Waikar family, had removed the attachment, and re-granted the village to the plaintiff shortly before, viz., on the 3rd April 1876. The plaintiff, being dispossessed, sued the defendant, contending (*inter alia*) that A, having predeceased his brother, had no interest in the lands, which had been purchased by the defendant. The Court of first instance awarded the plaintiff's claim, and directed the defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs. The defendant appealed to the District Judge, who was of opinion that the proceedings of Government since the attachment in 1872 and restoration of the village were acts of State, and he varied the decree of the lower Court by cutting down the plaintiff's costs, made payable by the lower Court's decree, to half. On appeal by the defendant to the High Court: *Held*, reversing the decree of the lower Appellate Court, that the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed. The attachment placed by Government on the death of K M in December 1872 was limited to an exemption from assessment, and the resumption and re-grant to the plaintiff did not give the plaintiff any title to the lands in question. The proceedings of Government in 1873 and 1876, by which the plaintiff was recognised as the representative of the Waikar family, were not acts of State. The status of the Waikars and other persons, with whom the agreements of 1820 were entered into, was not that of an independent sovereign. They (the Waikars) were merely powerful saranjam-dars subordinate to the Raja of Satara, and after the annexation of the territory of the Raja in 1849 they held their lands under the East India Company. *Secretary of State for India v. Narayan Balwant Bhole*, Printed Judgments, 1883, p. 244, distinguished. *HARI SADASHIV v. AJMUDIN*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 235

ACTION IN REM.

See ADMIRALTY OR VICE-ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 402

1. — **Owner indirectly impleaded**—*Towage contract—Vice-Admiralty.* The M S, a steam tug, was hired to tow the barque N down the Hughli, and in consequence of the negligence of the master of the tug whilst so employed, and of his wilful disobedience to the order of the pilot on board the N, the latter ran foul of a sailing vessel, the S F, considerable damage being done to both sailing vessels. The S F took proceedings against the N for the damage sustained, and an action *in rem* was brought (pending the proceedings taken by the S F) by the N against the tug to recover damages, including any damages that the N might have to pay to the owners of the S F. The defence set up by the tug was protection under its towage contract,

ACTION IN REM—concl'd.

which was to the effect that the proprietors of the tug should not be responsible under any circumstances for any loss or damage to any vessel whilst in tow of the tug, whether the same should have happened through the default of the master or other sailors, etc., of the tug, or through the incompetence or want of skill of the pilot in charge. The Court below held that the accident was due to the wilful disobedience of the master of the tug in not obeying the pilot on board the N, and that such misconduct was a "default" within the meaning of the clause in the towage contract; but inasmuch as the action was one *in rem* and not against the proprietors, the clause was no answer to the suit. *Held*, on appeal, that the clause was a sufficient answer; for that, although in every case of a proceeding *in rem* the suit is directly against the ship itself, still the owner of the ship must always be considered as indirectly impleaded. *THE "MARY STUART" v. THE "NEVADA"* I. L. R. 10 Calc. 866

ACTIONABLE CLAIM.

See ASSIGNMENT.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 345

See CONTRACT I. L. R. 33 Calc. 702

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 135.

1. *Assignment of contract—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 6 (h), 130—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 23—Fraudulent object.* Property under a contract which an assignor can pass to an assignee, is an "actionable claim" within the meaning of s. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act and would under s. 7 of the Indian Insolvent Act vest in the Official Assignee on the insolvency of the assignor. Under the joint action of s. 6 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act and s. 23 of the Contract Act where the object of an assignment is fraudulent, the assignment is void and inoperative. *Decision of Sale J. in I. L. R., 33 Calc., 702*, affirmed. *JAFFER MEHER ALI v. BUDGE-BUDGE JUTE MILLS COMPANY* . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 289

2. *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 230—Claim not actionable unless cause of action already matured—Set-off—Debtor can set off against assignee independent claims against assignor—Right of set-off lost by conduct amounting to discharge of claim sought to be set off—Principal and surety—Mortgagor postponing right does not lose his personal remedy—Decree, when conditional on result of a different suit.* Under s. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act as it stood before it was amended by Act VI of 1900, a claim was not actionable unless it was "a claim in respect of a cause of action which has already matured and which subject to procedure may be enforced by suit." *Shib Lal v. Azmat Ullah*, I. L. R. 18 All. 265, followed. In an action by the assignee of a debt, the debtor-defendant is entitled to set off debt due to him by the assignor at the date of the assignment, even when the amount claimed to be set-off is due under a transaction independent of and unconnected with

ACTIONABLE CLAIM—concl'd.

the claim assigned to plaintiff. Such right of set-off will not be open to the defendant, if by his conduct he has given up his right to proceed against the assignor personally for the debt. A mortgagee who consents to postpone his rights and accept the position of a second mortgagee, with the concurrence of the mortgagor, does not thereby lose his personal remedy against the mortgagor. Where a debtor transfers his property, with directions to pay off his debts, to a trustee who does not undertake any personal liability to the creditors, the relationship of principal and surety is not constituted between the trustee and debtor, respectively. The fact that the defendant in a suit by the assignee is prosecuting a suit against the assignor, in which he might be awarded certain equitable reliefs against the assignor, is no ground for refusing an unconditional decree to the assignee in his suit, unless the claims in the two suits are based on obligations arising out of the same contract and are so closely intertwined with each other as to make it equitable that they should be set against one another. *Government of Newfoundland v. Newfoundland Railway Company*, L. R. 13 A. C. 212, and *Fleming v. Loe*, 2 Ch. D. 594, referred to and distinguished. *ARUNACHELAM CHETTI v. SUBRAMANIAN CHETTI* (1906) I. L. R. 30 Mad. 235

ACTS DONE IN EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWER.

See ACT OF STATE.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—ACT DONE IN EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWER.

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 11

I. L. R. 3 All. 829

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 344

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 273

ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE.

See MAGISTRATES, SUBORDINATION OF.
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 918

ADDRESS, SUFFICIENCY OF—

See MADRAS MUNICIPAL ACT, 1884, s. 433
I. L. R. 14 Mad. 386

ADEN, COURT OF RESIDENT AT—

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASE—ACTS—
ACT II OF 1864.

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 258

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY
IN ONE DISTRICT—THEFT.

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 258, 263

See LETTERS PATENT FOR BOMBAY, CL. 13.

See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASE—LETTERS
PATENT, HIGH COURTS, CL. 13.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 575

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 246

ADEN COURTS ACT (II OF 1864).

ss. 8 and 9—Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882), s. 69—Resident's Court—Application to state a case to the High Court—Application unconditional before delivery of judgment. A party requiring a case to be stated by the Resident at Aden to the High Court of Bombay, under s. 8 of the Aden Courts Act (II of 1864) should make an unconditional application to him in that behalf before judgment is delivered. *Ralli Brothers v. Goculbhai Mulchand*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 376 and *Bank of Bengal v. Vyabhoj Gangji*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 618, applied. S. 9 of the Aden Courts Act (II of 1864) gives the Resident the same option of either reserving his judgment or delivering it contingent on the opinion of the High Court as s. 69 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882) gives to the Presidency Small Cause Court. *BHAGAVANDAS DHARAMSI v. A. BESSE FRENCHMAN* (1909) . . . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 708

ss. 17, 20, 22, 23—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 447, 449—Resident's Court at Aden—Sessions Court—Transfer of case to the High Court—Jurisdiction of the High Court to transfer a case to itself from the Court of the Resident at Aden—Letters Patent, cl. 29. It is not competent to the Resident at Aden, to whose Court as a Court of Session a case is committed under s. 447 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, to transfer the case to the High Court, under the provisions of s. 449 of the Code, on the ground that the offence cannot be adequately punished by him. The powers of the Court of Session conferred upon the Resident at Aden by the Aden Courts Act (II of 1864), are not merely such as are defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, but such as are provided expressly in the Act itself. And s. 449 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, cannot affect those provisions. The High Court of Bombay can, under cl. 29 of the amended Letters Patent, transfer to itself a case pending in the Court of Session at Aden. *EMPEROR v. ROBERT COMLEY* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 575

ss. 29, 30—Court of Resident at Aden—Suits tried by Resident as a Court of Session—Appeals heard by Resident—Application for revision against both to the High Court of Bombay—Certificate of the Advocate-General. There is nothing in s. 29 or 30 of the Aden Courts Act (II of 1864) which can operate either by express words or by necessary implication to limit the application of those sections to cases tried by the Resident as a Court of Session or to exclude appeals from their purview. S. 30 of the Aden Courts Act (II of 1864) empowers and requires the High Court of Bombay to review the case or such part of it as may be necessary, with reference only to the points of law specified in the certificate of the Advocate-General. The section does not contemplate that any decision by the Resident on a point of fact should be questioned in review, save in so far as such decision may be dependent for its validity on the determination

ADEN COURTS ACT (II OF 1864)—concl'd.

of a point of law mentioned in the certificate. *EMPEROR v. BHAGWANDAS* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 335

ADHIARS OF BHUTAN DUARS.

See SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, s. 9.

13 C. W. N. 835

ADIMAYAVANA TENURE.

See MALABAR LAW.

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 202

See RES JUDICATA.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 203

ADJOURNED HEARING.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882), ss. 100, 108, 157, 158, 622.

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See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 100
101 (1859 s. 111).

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See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 156.

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See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 145.

8 C. W. N. 642

See PENSIONS ACT, s. 4.

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See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—ADJOURNMENT . . . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 177

See SALE . . . 8 C. W. N. 686

See SUIT, RESTORATION OF.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 150

See WITNESS—CIVIL CASES—SUMMONING AND ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES.

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— application for—

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9 B. L. R. Ap. 10

10 B. L. R. Ap. 57

— for final disposal, dismissal of suit after—

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— of criminal trial—

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See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 375

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— of sale—

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See INSOLVENCY ACT (11 AND 12 VICT.,
c. 21).

ADJUSTMENT.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF
1882), s. 258 . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 467

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10 C. W. N. 422

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10 C. W. N. 432

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— effect of—

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— suit for—concl'd.

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CL. 12 . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 315

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—DEBTS.
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 311

See SECURITY FOR COSTS—SUITS.
10 B. L. R. Ap. 25
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See WILL—RENUNCIATION BY EXE-
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— under Act XIX of 1841—

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622.
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 364

1. ——— Petition for administration
summons—*Plaint*. A petition for an adminis-
tration summons may be ordered to be taken as a
plaint, and as the foundation of an administration
suit. *In the matter of the estate of FENN MACKIN-
TOSH v. WILKINSON* . . . 3 B. L. R. Ap. 3

2. ——— Suit for share of estate of
deceased—*Recorder, power of*. Where one son of
a deceased party sued in the Recorder's Court an-
other son who had obtained a certificate under Act
XXVII of 1860 for his share of the deceased's estate,
it was held that the Recorder had no power to trans-
form the suit into a general administration suit.
OH LING TEE v. AWKINIFEE . . . 10 W. R. 86

3. ——— Heirs-at-law under Mahome-
dan law opposing grant of probate—*Right to
bring administration suit pending probate proceed-
ings—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881),
s. 34*. The plaintiffs as heirs-at-law had entered
caveat in an application by the executor for the
probate of an alleged will of the deceased. The
application was set down as a contentious cause,
and the executor appointed administrator *pendente
lite*. As heirs under Mahomedan law, the plaintiffs
were entitled to two-thirds share in the property left
by the deceased, even if the Will was not estab-
lished. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to
maintain a suit for administration by the Court
against the administrator *pendente lite*, even though
the probate proceedings have not been determined.
KURATUL AIN_BAHADUR v. BROUGHTON
1 C. W. N. 336

4. ——— Suit by creditor—*Misjoinder
—Multifariousness—Practice*. The principle of the
rules that the creditor of a deceased person suing
for administration is in the same situation with re-
gard to all other persons as if he were bringing an
action at law against the administrator, and that a
debtor to the estate of a deceased person can only
be made answerable as such debtor by the repre-
sentative of the deceased's estate, is to be adhered
to in this country, where there is a different proce-
dure. Therefore, where, to a suit brought against
the Administrator General as administrator of the
estate of one *W B* by a creditor of the deceased,
other persons who also had a claim against the

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estate were made defendants, on the allegation that they had realized and were in possession of assets of the estate of the deceased:—*Held*, that there being nothing to show that such persons were in the position of an executor or administrator *de son tort*, or that they had been partners with the deceased, or that they could not be sued, if necessary, by the legal representative himself, and there being no other circumstances which would make it equitable that they should be sued jointly with the legal representative, they were wrongly made parties, and the suit ought to be dismissed as against them for misjoinder. Even assuming the facts were such that the plaintiff was entitled to sue them as legal representatives of the estate, he should not mix his own claim with that which the Administrator-General might have against them. *DHUNRAJ v. BROUGHTON* 15 B. L. R. 296

5. ——— Claims in administration suit containing complaint of dealings by executors as acts of maladministration—*Separate causes of action*. Where the suit is one to administer the assets of a deceased person, and in the claim various dealings by the executors of the estate are complained of as acts of maladministration and sought to be redressed, such dealings do not constitute separate causes of action, and such a suit is not multifarious. *NISTARINI DASSI v. NUNDO LALL BOSE* . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 891
3 C. W. N. 670

6. ——— Suit by creditor on behalf of all other creditors—*Legal personal representative—Receiver, suit by*. Persons interested in the estate of a testator, not being the legal personal representatives of the testator, will not be allowed to sue persons possessed of assets belonging to the testator, unless it is satisfactorily made out that there exist assets which might be recovered, and which, but for such suit, would probably be lost to the estate. Such a suit may be supported where the relations between the legal personal representative and the debtor to the estate present a substantial impediment to the prosecution by the legal personal representative of a suit against the debtor to recover the assets of the testator, and where there is a strong probability of the loss of such assets unless such a suit be allowed. But where there is an administration suit already pending, the proper course to pursue is to obtain an order in the administration suit, directing either a suit to be brought in the name of the legal personal representative, or appointing a Receiver to sue, and in this country the Courts might have the power to direct such Receiver to sue in his own name. *ORIENTAL BANK CORPORATION v. GOBINLOLL SEAL*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 713

7. ——— Injunction—*Order on summons under Act VI of 1854*. The Court will restrain by injunction a creditor from proceeding in an administration suit, after an order has been made on a summons obtained by another creditor, under s. 24 of Act VI of 1854, for the administration of the same estate. *LUTCHEEMUND SETT v. KOMULMONEY DOSSEE* 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 9

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8. ——— Dividend in respect of debt against the estate—*Proof of debt—Date from which amount of debt is to be estimated*. In the administration by the Court of the estate of a deceased, the dividend in respect of a debt against the estate is to be estimated on the amount of the debt at the date of the order for payment, and not as the date of proof. *AGRA AND MASTERMAN'S BANK v. ROBINSON*. In the matter of the LAND MORTGAGE BANK OF INDIA 6 B. L. R. Ap. 140

9. ——— Decree in administration suit, effect of—*Subsequent suit to set aside sale by executor*. A decree in an administration suit brought by the parties whose interest had been sold against the executor of their father's will, by whom the sale had been made, held to be no bar to the maintenance of a suit against the purchaser to have the sale set aside. *DHONENDRO CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. MUTTY LALL MOOKERJEE*

14 B. L. R. 276

23 W. R. 6

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10. ——— Supplemental suit—*Debts due by appointed managing members under the will of the testator—Limitation*. A and B, two of the sons of one N, had been declared, in a suit brought to administer N's estate, to be indebted to the estate; it was also declared in such suit that a certain sum of money should be set apart for the performance of certain religious ceremonies, and paid into Court. A and B died without having satisfied their debt. In a suit supplemental to the former suit, the descendants of the sons of N, amongst whom were the descendants of A and B, claimed to be entitled to their share in the interest on the funds in the hands of the Court, and sought for a division of such accumulation of interest. *Held*, that notwithstanding that the debt due from A and B to the estate was barred, the descendants of A and B could not be allowed to share in the accumulations of interest in the hands of the Court without first satisfying the debt due by their ancestors to the estate. *LOKENATH MULLICK v. ODOR-CHURN MULLICK* . . . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 644

11. ——— Liability of the share of one of next-of-kin for a debt due by him to the intestate—*Debt barred at the date of the death of the intestate*. *Semble*: that the rule followed by the Court of Equity in England, whereby, notwithstanding the provision of the Statutes of Limitation, the share of one of the next-of-kin in the estate of an intestate while in the hands of the administrator is liable for a debt due by the next-of-kin to the deceased, though barred at the date of the death of the latter, is to be applied in the Courts of British India. *DHANJIBHAI BOMANJI GUGRAI v. NAVAZBAI* I. L. R. 2 Bom. 75

12. ——— Accounts—*Liability of Executor*. Without intending to rule that, in all cases when an ordinary administration account has been directed, the value in money of a specific chattel shown to have been possessed by an executor, and

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not forthcoming, is to be charged against him:—*Held*, that notwithstanding the language of the decree, it was, in the undoubted circumstances of this case, within the competency of the master in taking the account, and, within the competency of the Court upon the report, to charge the executor for the value of certain property, it being impossible to doubt that the original executor had possessed himself of the property, and that the property so possessed was not forthcoming and accounted for. As to payments stated in the schedule and in the discharge, as made on account of just demands on the estate, it is competent to the executor to prove them as having been made on other dates than those stated in the schedule and discharge. **AGA MAHOMED ROHIM SHERAZEE v. ALLY MAHOMED SHOOSTRY** . . . 4 W. R. P. C. 106

13. ——— Civil Procedure Code, ss. 213, 276, 295—Administration decree, Effect of—Attachment after date of institution under decree obtained prior to such suit—Injunction. On the 22nd July 1886, one *R L* obtained a money-decree against one *P C*. On the 5th November 1886, *P C* died: and on the 18th December 1886, *R L* applied to attach certain properties belonging to the estate of his judgment-debtor which properties were actually attached on the 8th and 12th January 1887. On the 21st December 1886, one *S* filed a suit to administer the estate of the deceased, and on the 20th January 1887 obtained the usual administration decree. On the 5th May 1887, *S* applied for an order staying all proceedings taken by *R L* against the estate of *P C*, and directing him to come in, should he think fit so to do, and prove his claim in the administration suit:—*Held*, that the attachment did not create any interest in, or charge upon, the properties in favour of the attaching creditor as against other creditors, and that the order asked for ought to be granted. **IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF SOOBUL CHUNDER LAW. SOOBUL CHUNDER LAW v. RUSSICK LALL MITTER**

I. L. R. 15 Cal. 202

14. ——— Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 202—Estate of intestate Native Christian—Suit for partition of estate by purchaser of widow's share before completion of administration—Dismissal of suit—Only remedy by way of administration suit. A person to whom the Indian Succession Act, 1865, applied having died intestate in April 1884, his widow and son were in September of the same year granted letters of administration, which were cancelled for want of stamp duty, a fresh grant being made on 19th January 1885. Plaintiff, alleging that the said widow had executed a promissory note in her favour in September 1884, filed a suit against her on 6th January 1885, and, there being no appearance of the defendant, obtained an *ex-parte* decree. In execution of the decree so obtained, plaintiff attached portions of the estate of the deceased and brought them to sale, becoming herself the purchaser of the one-third share of the widow in each lot sold. In March 1885 the son was appointed sole administrator; in Janu-

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ary 1888 he died, and the letters of administration were revoked in consequence, and the amin of the District Court was appointed administrator of the estate until October 1894, when the son's widow was so appointed in his stead. Plaintiff now sued for partition of the property comprised in the estate of the deceased in order that she might obtain delivery of the portions of it which she had purchased in execution of the decree against the widow previously obtained as aforesaid. The estate of the deceased had never been administered or distributed. The defence was that the said previous decree had been obtained by fraud:—*Held*, that under s. 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, the defendants were entitled to set up this defence; and that, the property of the deceased having become vested in his administrator under the Indian Succession Act, it remained so vested until the administrator had distributed the estate, and that, in consequence, the widow had no saleable interest in any part of the estate until in the course of the administration thereof her share had been determined and allotted to her. Until such allotment (which had not yet taken place) the only process by which plaintiff could legally claim the widow's interest in the estate was by a suit for the administration of the estate, to which suit the widow, if alive, would be a necessary party. If not alive, letters of administration to her estate would be necessary, the administrator being made a party. *Held*, also, that the suit could not be treated, as an administration suit. **SRIRANGAMMAI v. SANTHAMMAL** . . . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 216

15. ——— Adoption—Practice—Pleadings—Administration, suit for—Will, construction of—Administration, prayer for, without asking for declaration with regard to an alleged adoption—Amendment—Adoption, preliminary trial of the question of. Suit for administration and construction of a will, under which plaintiff's interest was restricted in case a son was adopted to the testator. Plaintiff, *inter alia*, stated that plaintiff was informed that in *Jaisto* 1297 the widow of the testator purported to take in adoption a son, whose natural father was at the time and is now a Brahmo and had renounced the Hindu religion. She submitted that such adoption was absolutely invalid and did not operate to pass any title to the adopted son. There was, however, no prayer asking for any declaration with regard thereto. *Held*, that upon the suit as at present constituted, the question of adoption was not in issue, and upon the pleadings the fact and validity of the adoption must be taken to be admitted. That, if a declaration with regard to the adoption is sought, the plaintiff must dispute the fact or validity of the adoption, and should contain a prayer for a declaration as to the fact or validity thereof. The whole substance in the claim for administration being dependent on the adoption being out of the way, the questions raised in the suit cannot be gone into till the question of adoption is determined once for all. *Ordered*, that on the plaintiff being amended, the issue as to the adoption be tried as a preliminary issue between the plaintiff and the adopted

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son. *KUSUM KUMARI RAY v. SATYA RANJAN DAS* (1900) **5 C. W. N. 162**

16. ————— Contested legacies—Administration suits—Practice. With regard to particular legacies which may be contested, the usual course in administration suits is to deal with them when the case comes up for further directions on the report after the usual inquiries have been made as directed by the administration decree. *FANINDRA KUMAR MITTER v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL* (1901) **6 C. W. N. 321**

17. ————— Probate or Administration—Will—Hindu will—Necessity of probate or letters of administration—Indian Succession Act (X of 1865), ss. 181 and 187. Notwithstanding the terms of s. 181 of the Indian Succession Act (X of 1865), a residuary legatee claiming under the will of a Hindu resident of Bombay can obtain a grant of administration with the will annexed which will satisfy the requirements of s. 187, and until he does so he is not entitled to establish his claim. *GORDHANDAS SOONDERDAS v. BAI RAMCOOVER* (1901) **I. L. R. 26 Bom. 267**

18. ————— Decree—Administration suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sch. IV, Form 130. After the preliminary decree in an administration suit declaring the right of a defendant to a certain share in the estate, the Court ought not to sanction a compromise between the plaintiffs and the executors to the effect that the entire estate should be made over to the plaintiffs and the executors released from further accounting, entirely ignoring the rights of the other defendants. In decrees in suits for administration the Subordinate Courts ought to follow the form prescribed in Form 130, Sch. IV of the Civil Procedure Code. *AROY KUMARI DEBI v. MANINDRA NATH CHATTERJEE* (1905) **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 561**

19. ————— Administration of estate by Court—Position of creditors—Default on creditor's part—Creditor admitted so as not to disturb past dividends, position of—Equity. The general principle governing the position of creditors of an estate under administration by the Court is that they will on due cause shown be let in at any time, while the fund is in Court, even where the money has been apportioned amongst the creditors and transferred to the Accountant-General for payment to them. *Lashley v. Hogg*, 11 Ves. 602; *Angell v. Hardon*, 1 Mad. 529; *David v. Frowd*, *Mylne & Keen* 200, referred to. Where, however, a creditor has been guilty of remissness in the assertion of his claim, his default shall not be allowed to operate so as to prejudice or inconvenience others more diligent than himself. *Cattell v. Simons*, 8 Beav. 243, referred to. The legal position of a creditor, who for some reason or other has been excluded from a first dividend and subsequently gets his claim admitted to the schedule so as not to disturb past dividends, is that, if further assets come in, he is entitled to have a preferential dividend paid to him out of such assets

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before any further dividend is paid. *Snee v. Prescott*, 1 Atkyns 243, referred to. *ROSE v. BIDDADHURRY DASSEE* (1905) **9 C. W. N. 167**

20. ————— Administration of trust by Court—Appointment of new trustee, if sanction of Court necessary—Concurrent sanction of Court. Where a suit has been instituted for the administration of a trust and a decree has been made, that attracts the jurisdiction of the Court and the trustee cannot afterwards exercise the power given to him by the settlor to appoint new trustees without the concurrent sanction of the Court. His power in such a case is merely one of nomination to be confirmed by the Court on consideration of the fitness of the nominee to be a trustee. *In re Hall*, 54 L. J. N. S. Ch. 527; s. c. 51 L. T. N. S. 901, distinguished. *AMRITA BIPER v. KANHAI LAL AGARWALLA* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 239
s. c. I. L. R. 32 Calc. 448

21. ————— Administration bond—Surety of guardian—Liability—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 128—Property not specified in the application for appointment of guardian, dealings with—Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), s. 35—Assignment of bond, it must be in writing—Mistake and misrepresentation, if ground for avoiding bond—Minor—Estoppel. When the bond executed by a surety on the appointment of the guardian of a minor's properties under Act VIII of 1890 did not impose any limits: *Held*, that his liability extended to the guardian's dealings with properties other than those specified in the petition for the appointment of the guardian. An administration bond is not invalidated by reason of mutual mistake on the part of the Court and the surety, or misrepresentation by the Court. *Debendra Nath Dutt and Banku Behari Banerjee v. Administrator General of Bengal*, 10 C. W. N. 673; s. c. I L. R. 33 Calc. 713, followed. The liability of the guardian extends to profits actually received, or profits which could have been received, but for his gross and wilful default. He is not liable for the profits of property in the wrongful possession of a stranger. The law does not require a written assignment by the District Judge of a guardian's bond. *SARAT CHANDRA ROY v. RAJONI MOHAN ROY* (1908)

12 C. W. N. 481

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See GUARDIAN AND WARDS ACT, ss. 34, 35, 36, 37.

1. ————— Assignment of Bond—Succession Act, s. 257. Upon a petition presented to the High Court for the transfer of an administration bond under s. 257 of the Succession Act, on the allegation that the administratrix had refused to pay certain moneys due to the petitioners on a promissory note given to them by the deceased, and it being admitted that the estate of the deceased was capable of meeting the alleged claim,—*Held*, on a *prima facie* case having been made out,

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that under the circumstances it was competent for the High Court, on a petition being presented to it for the assignment of an administration bond, to pass an order authorizing the transfer of it, and empowering the assignee to sue as a trustee for the benefit of the creditors. *In the goods of SAUNDERS* 6 N. W. 62

2. ———— **Breach of condition—Compensation—Succession Act, ss. 256, 257—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 74—Exception—Damages.** An administration bond executed by an administrator in accordance with s. 256 of the Succession Act is not an instrument of the kind referred to in the exception to s. 74 of the Contract Act, so as to make the obligor liable, upon breach of the condition thereof, to pay the whole amount mentioned therein; and an assignee of the bond under s. 257 of the Succession Act cannot recover more damage than he proves to have resulted to himself or to those interested in the bond:—*Held*, therefore, where neither the assignee of such a bond nor any one else had suffered any damage by reason of the breach of a condition requiring the obligor to file an inventory of the estate within a specified period, that the assignee was not entitled to recover from the obligor any compensation in respect of such breach. *LACHMAN DAS v. CHATER*

I. L. R. 10 All. 29

3. ———— **Administrator-General—Suit—Fraud—Misrepresentation—Mistake—Administration—Sureties, liability of—Assignment—Registrar—Administrator-General's Act (II of 1874), s. 33—Succession Act (X of 1865), ss. 242, 257, 269—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 20, 142, 143.** The Administrator-General of Bengal, as administrator with the will annexed to the estate of B, sued X, the former administrator of B's estate, and also Y and Z, the sureties under a bond executed by X, Y and Z, to recover the sale-proceeds of certain bank shares and cash, which X had misappropriated to his own use. Y and Z contended that they were not liable, as it was upon the representations of X that they signed the bond, and upon it being subsequently found that such representations were false and that there had been a mistake of fact essential to the agreement, they were relieved from any responsibility as sureties and they further stated that the Court had no power to assign the bond to the Administrator-General. *Held*, (HARINGTON and STEPHEN, JJ., dissenting), that the sureties Y and Z were liable for the sale-proceeds of the bank shares fraudulently misappropriated by X. *Per MACLEAN, C.J.* Under s. 257 of the Succession Act the Court has power to authorize the Registrar of the High Court to assign an administration bond to the Administrator-General, on the Court being satisfied that the engagement of such bond has not been kept. The Administrator-General is a person, and the fact that at his death all assets vest in his successor in office under s. 33 of the Administrator-General's Act as opposed to vesting in his executors or administrators, is not sufficient to debar him from accepting an assignment. Under s. 256 of the Succession Act a surety bond must be given to the

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Judge of the District Court. In the High Court such bonds must be taken out in the name of the Chief Justice. The grant of letters of administration to X was void *ab initio*. *Abram v. Cunningham*, 2 Lev. 182; *Ellis v. Ellis*, 1 Ch. 613, referred to. The sureties guaranteed the honesty of X in dealing with the estate of B, and that being so the bond was not void and the Administrator-General can sue upon it. *Per HARINGTON and STEPHEN, JJ.* The sureties are not liable under the contract, because they and also the Court were under a mistake of fact essential to the agreement, which was the authority of X as attorney of the next of kin to apply for and receive the grant of letters of administration, and but for that mistake the Court could not have granted letters of administration to X, nor have taken a bond from the sureties. The contract of suretyship was void *ab initio* by reason of the fraud against which the sureties did not give a guarantee, and s. 20 of the Contract Act applied. *Lester v. Gooch*, 17 W. R. (Eng.) 137, distinguished. *The Mayor of Kingston-on-Hull v. Harding*, 2 P. B. 494, referred to. *Per MITRA, J.* The liabilities of the sureties did not depend upon the validity of the grant of letters of administration to X, but arose under the covenants in the administration bond. *Harris v. Huntback*, 1 Burr. 373; *Kasheba v. Shrysat Narshid*, I. L. R., 19 Bom., 697, referred to. Neither the invalidity of the grant of letters of administration, nor the mistake of the Court in accepting the bond are sufficient to discharge the sureties. It was the wrongful acts of X that caused a present loss to the estate, and the sureties were bound to make good the loss. Neither s. 20 of the Contract Act nor ss. 242, 269 of the Succession Act applied. *Per GEIDT, J.* There was no mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, and there is nothing in law to indicate that sureties are entitled to evade their contract of guarantee, because of a mistake induced by the principal debtor. It would be a novel and dangerous doctrine to hold that an administration bond is invalidated by the fact that the sureties themselves had been deceived by the very person, for whose honesty they vouch. *DEBENDRA NATH DUTT AND BANKU BEHARY BANERJEE v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL* (1906)

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s.c. 10 C. W. N. 673

ADMINISTRATION SUIT.

1. ———— **Indian Trusts Act (II of 1882), s. 34—Executor—Trustee—Advice of Court as to administration of property—Executor continuing as such.** So long as an executor occupies that position, he cannot claim the advantages provided for trustees by s. 34 of the Indian Trusts Act (II of 1882). If he feels any doubt as to the manner in which he should administer the estate come to his hands, his remedy is to file an administration suit. *TRIMBAK MAHADEV v. NARAYAN HARI* (1909) I. L. R. 33 Bom. 429

2. ———— **Reference to Commissioner—Parties agreeing orally to submit**

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to Commissioner's decision—Commissioner's award—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 375—Adjustment of suits, what is—Written submission necessary.* The parties to an arbitration suit consented to it being referred to the Commissioner to take the usual accounts and to determine their respective shares. In the usual course, the matter came before the Assistant Commissioner for taking accounts, and a large mass of accounts, objections and surcharges were filed by the various parties. On appearing before the Assistant Commissioner the parties came to an understanding that the matter in dispute should be left to be decided by the Assistant Commissioner in a summary manner without going into formal evidence beyond the accounts, objections and surcharges filed before him. The 1st and 6th defendants with their attorney were present at this meeting and after their attorney had agreed to the above course suggested by the Assistant Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner himself explained to the 1st and 6th defendants in turn his proposal and told them that whatever award he made would be binding on them. To this they agreed, the 1st defendant even saying he would take one rupee if that was the sum awarded to him. It was also agreed that the Assistant Commissioner should draw up his findings in the form of a consent decree to be taken by the parties as that would save the parties a large sum in costs. At another meeting before the Assistant Commissioner the latter recorded his findings and then proceeded to draw up the consent decree embodying these findings therein, but the defendants 1 and 6 refused to be bound by his decision. Upon application being made by the plaintiff that an adjustment of the suit might be recorded under s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code on the basis of the Assistant Commissioner's decision: *Held*, that there had been no adjustment of the suit. There had been no written submission to arbitration as provided by s. 4 of the Indian Arbitration Act, and, consequently, there had been no legal and valid reference to arbitration and the Assistant Commissioner's award (for it really was an award and nothing else) had no legal foundation, and could therefore have no legal consequences. As there had been no reference to arbitration and no award there could be no adjustment to give effect to under s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Samibai v. Premji Pragji* I. L. R. 20 Bom. 304 and *Pragdas v. Girdhardas* I. L. R. 26 Bom. 76, considered and distinguished. *RUKHANBAI v. ADAMJI SHAIK RAJBHAI* (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 69

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See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 424.

See LAND REGISTRATION ACT, s. 42.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 454

See LEASE . . . 8 C. W. N. 913

See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

See PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT, 1881, s. 90.

ADMINISTRATOR—concl'd.

de bonis non—

See EXECUTOR . . . 13 C. W. N. 557

if a public officer—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 424.

right of—

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—
DECLARATION OF TITLE.

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 197

See INSOLVENCY—PROPERTY ACQUIRED
AFTER VESTING ORDER.

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 24

1. _____ Liability of administrator in distribution of assets—*Actual knowledge. Semble*: that an administrator who pays such debts as he knows of otherwise than equally and rateably as far as the assets of the deceased will extend, in accordance with the provisions of s. 282 of Act X of 1865, is personally liable for any loss occasioned to a creditor of the deceased by such improper distribution of the assets. In order to charge such administrator, his knowledge must be actual as distinguished from a constructive or imputable knowledge. *ASIATIC BANKING CORPORATION v. AMADOR VIEGAS* . . . 8 Bom. O. C. 20

_____ Liability of administrator for loss to estate—*Compromise of claim by administrator—Subsequent suit by a creditor of estate to set aside the compromise and for damages for negligence of administrator—Succession Act (X of 1865), ss. 280 and 328. Administrator's liability for neglect to get in any part of the deceased's property.* One P mortgaged certain property to H for Rs2,667. H sued P to recover the mortgage debt. Pending the suit, P died in 1878. Thereupon A, the son of P, took out letters of administration to the deceased's estate, and contested H's claim. H obtained a decree in the Court of first instance for the sale of the mortgaged property, and in execution of this decree the property was sold for Rs10 and purchased by H. The decree was afterwards, viz., 1 on 2nd August 1883, reversed, on appeal, by the Assistant Judge. Thereupon H entered into a compromise with A, by which it was arranged that A should give up his claim under the appellate decree of the Assistant Judge, to be repaid by H the sum of Rs10 which he had realized by the sale of the mortgaged property, and that H should pay to A Rs240 on account of his costs incurred in the suit and in taking out letters of administration. This compromise was effected on 16th November 1883. In the meantime, on 14th September 1883, the plaintiff had purchased from one B an old decree which was outstanding against the estate of the deceased P. On 10th September 1883, the plaintiff sought to execute this decree against the mortgaged property. Having failed in this attempt, the plaintiff filed a suit against A for a declaration that the compromise of the 16th November 1883 had been fraudulently effected with the object of defeating his (the plaintiff's) claim, and to recover

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Rs.1,000 as damages from the defendant on account of his fraudulent and negligent conduct as administrator of his deceased father's estate. This suit was dismissed by both the lower Courts, on the ground that, as there were other creditors who had claims against the estate, the plaintiff's proper remedy was an administration suit, which would enable the Court to assess the claims of all the creditors: *Held* (reversing the lower Court's decree), that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. By the compromise of the 16th November 1883, the defendant had given up his right under the Appellate Court's decree of the 2nd August 1883 to be repaid by *H* the sum of Rs.10, and had thereby occasioned a loss to the estate of that amount. He was, therefore, liable to the plaintiff to make good the amount under s. 328 of the Succession Act (X of 1865), subject, however, to a deduction, under s. 280 of that Act, of the expenses incurred by him in obtaining letters of administration, and the costs of any judicial proceeding that might be necessary for administering the estate. **KHURUBHAI NASAR-VANJI v. HORMAJSHA PHIROZSHA**

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 637

3. — Sale by administrator not so described—Administrators who are also heirs—

Purchaser, title and rights of. Certain persons who were heirs of a deceased lady, and had also taken out administration to her estate, limited to certain Government securities, sold such Government securities to a *bond fide* purchaser under a written instrument, in which the vendors were not described as administrators:—*Held*, that the failure to so describe themselves did not affect the sale, inasmuch as they were entitled to sell either as heirs or administrators; and although as heirs they could sell no more than their own shares in such securities, yet the entire purchase money having come to their hands, they, as administrators, were bound to administer the same as part of the assets of the estate, the question whether they did so or not not being one which would affect the title of the purchaser. *West of England and South Wales District Bank v. Murch, L. R., 23 Ch D. 138, and Corser v. Cartwright, L. R. 7 H. L. 731*, followed in principle. **PREONATH KARAR v. SURJA COOMAR GOSWAMI** . **I. L. R. 19 Calc. 26**

4. — Sale of immovable property by administrator of deceased person—Title—Succession Act (X of 1865), ss. 179 and 269—Administrator of trustee—Title of assignee of administrator as against cestui que trust—Priority. One Anna De Silva, a Christian inhabitant of Bombay, died intestate in May 1893, leaving her surviving a minor son (the plaintiff), her husband (defendant 1) and a daughter who died in infancy. Previously to her death, the deceased purported to purchase certain leasehold property situate in Bombay, the sale-deed of which was duly executed in her name. In August 1893 her husband (defendant 1), being called upon to make good a large sum of money for which he was responsible as cashier of Messrs. Graham & Co. of Bombay, handed over the title-deeds of the said property to two representatives of the firm, *viz.*, J. F. N. Graham

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and another, stating that his deceased wife Anna De Silva was merely a trustee of it, and that the beneficial interest was vested solely in him. On the 18th September, 1893, he executed a conveyance of the property to the said two representatives of Graham & Co. He was shortly afterwards convicted of criminal breach of trust, at the prosecution of Graham & Co. On the 1st November, 1893, J. F. N. Graham obtained a limited grant of letters of administration to the estate of Anna De Silva, under s. 221 of the Indian Succession Act (X of 1865). Subsequently Graham & Co. sold the property to the second defendant, the said J. F. N. Graham joining in the conveyance as administrator of Anna De Silva's estate. In 1902 the plaintiff, as son and heir of Anna De Silva, brought this suit, claiming to recover his share of the said property, alleging that it belonged absolutely to his mother. The second defendant (the purchaser from Graham & Co.) denied that it had belonged to Anna De Silva. He alleged that it really belonged to her husband (defendant 1), who had paid for it, and for whom she was a trustee. He further contended that, in any event, he had a good title as against the plaintiff having purchased from the administrator of Anna De Silva's estate. *Held*, that assuming that the property did belong to Anna De Silva, the second defendant had acquired an indefeasible title to it by virtue of the conveyance to him to which her administrator was a party. Her interest in it had vested in her administrator under s. 179 of the Succession Act (X of 1865), and under s. 269 he could dispose of it as he might think fit. *Held*, also, that even if Anna De Silva held the property as trustee, the second defendant was entitled. The legal estate passed to her administrator, and he conveyed to the second defendant, who also obtained the equitable estate when he received the title-deeds from Graham & Co. as assignees of the first defendant, who was one of the heirs of Anna De Silva and who asserted his own title to the whole property to the exclusion of the plaintiff. The second defendant's title was, therefore, complete unless he could have detected the falsehood of the first defendant's claim by reasonable diligence, and there was nothing to show that he could. **DE SILVA v. DE SILVA (1902)**

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 103

5. — Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13, 244—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 282—Execution sale—Suit by subsequent administratrix to set aside decree and sale—Fraud or collusion—Rateable distribution—Res judicata—Procedure in creditor's suit against estate of deceased. A decree on an award having been passed against an administrator at the instance of a creditor of the estate represented by the administrator, certain property referred to in the award was purchased by the decree-holder in execution proceedings with the sanction of the Court. Afterwards an administratrix appointed in the place of the administrator, having brought a suit to set aside the decree and the subsequent sale in execution on the ground that under s. 282 of the Succession Act (X of 1865) the decree-holder was entitled only to a rate-

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able distribution among the creditors of the estate. *Held*, that in the absence of fraud or collusion the decree and the subsequent sale in execution could not be set aside. *Held*, further, that according to ss. 13 and 244 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) the decree having been executed, the execution bound the parties and all persons claiming through them, and that the question was, therefore, *res judicata*. *Per* CHANDAVARKAR, J. The position of an executor or administrator, as the case may be, of a deceased person, as such person's legal representative, in whom all the property of the deceased vests as such by virtue of s. 179 of the Succession Act, may be said to be similar to that of the sebaite of an idol. *Prosunno v. Golab*, L. R. 2 I. A. 145, referred to and applied. A creditor's action against the estate of a deceased person should be treated as an administration suit. *BAI MEHERBAI v. MAGANCHAND* (1905) . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 96

6. ———— *Administrator, suit by—* "Letters" must issue before he can sue—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 50 and illustration (b) thereto—Non-suit. No suit is maintainable when instituted by a person in his capacity as the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, unless and until letters of administration are issued to him to entitle him so to sue in such representative capacity. *ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL v. LALIT MOHAN ROY* (1908) . 12 C. W. N. 738

7. ———— *Sureties—Administration bond—Letters of administration—Fraud—Administrator converting assets to his own use—Transfer of bond to Administrator-General—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 242—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 20—Mistake*. The appellant was one of two sureties of an administration bond given to the High Court at Calcutta, on the strength of which that Court on 15th August 1902 granted letters of administration to the estate of a person, who it was alleged in the petition had died in England intestate. The administrator, a member of a well-known firm of Solicitors in Calcutta, who represented himself to be the attorney of a fictitious person called the next-of-kin of the deceased, got possession of the assets in India, which consisted of bank shares and converted them to his own use. It was subsequently found that he had obtained the letters of administration by fraudulent misrepresentation to the Court, of which fraud, however, the sureties were not cognizant. He absconded, but was apprehended, tried, and convicted. The grant of administration in his favour was cancelled and in May 1904 letters of administration, with the will annexed, were granted to the respondent, the Administrator-General of Bengal to whom the administration bond of 15th August 1902 was transferred, and who brought a suit against the defaulting administrator and the sureties on the bond. The former did not appear. The first Court made a decree against the defendants for the amount of the proceeds of sale of the bank shares, which was upheld by a majority of the Court of appeal. *Held*, affirming the decision of the Courts in India, that the sureties were liable. The bond did not become

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void, when the letters of administration were cancelled and, while they remained unrevoked, the grantee was to all intents and purposes administrator of the estate in India of the deceased, and for his acts and defaults as administrator the sureties were and remained responsible. *DEBENDRA NATH DUTT v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL* (1908) . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 955
s.c. 12 C. W. N. 802
L. R. 35 I. A. 109

ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL.

See ADMINISTRATION BOND.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 713

See ILLEGITIMACY . 11 B. L. R. Ap. 6

See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 770

See SUCCESSION ACT, s. 282.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 929

——— certificate of—

See INTEREST ACT, 1839.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 54

——— office of—

See ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL'S ACT, s. 31.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 732

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 738

L. R. 22 I. A. 107

See STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 732

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 738

L. R. 22 I. A. 107

——— petition by—

See PRACTICE—CIVIL—CASES—PROBATE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 879

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 404

——— rights of—

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—EFFECT OF PRIVY COUNCIL DECREE OR ORDER.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 1011

L. R. 22 I. A. 203

1. ———— Authority to pay debt barred by limitation. The Administrator-General of Madras is authorized to pay a barred debt. *ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL v. HAWKINS*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 267

2. ———— Liability of Administrator-General in respect of breaches of trust by Intestate Executor. *Held*, per NORMAN, J. (PHEAR, J., dissenting), that the Administrator-General, who had taken out administration to the estate of an executor by whom a breach of trust had been committed by his pledging for his own benefit certain assets of his testatrix, and had redeemed the said assets with office money and applied the money recovered as part of the defaulting executor's estate, was not personally liable to make good the amount to the testatrix's estate. *GREENWAY v. HOGG* .

Cor. 97

2 Hyde 3

Bourke A. O. C. 111

ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL—*contd.*

3. ——— Right of retainer in satisfaction of his own debt. The Administrator-General appointed under Act VIII of 1855 has the same right of retainer in satisfaction of his own debt as that which an ordinary executor or administrator has. *RITCHIE v. STOKES* . . . 2 Mad. 255.

4. ——— Right of, to retain assets. Right of Administrator-General to retain assets in his hands in respect of contingent debts. *SHEPHERD v. HOGG* . . . Cor. 67.

5. ——— Grant of letters of administration to—Act XXIV of 1867, s. 17. When ordinary letters of administration to the estate of a deceased Hindu are granted to the Administrator-General under Act XXIV of 1867 (but not under s. 17 of that Act), his title does not relate back to the death of the deceased, nor to the date of the Judge's order directing such letters to be issued, but accrues only as from the date of the grant of such letters. *Quære*: Whether, if letters are issued to the Administrator-General under s. 17 of that Act, the case would be otherwise, or his powers greater. *LALLCHAND RAMDAYAL v. GUMTIBAI GHELLA. PEMA v. GUMTIBAI* . . . 8 Bom. O. C. 140.

6. ——— Administrator-General's Act (II of 1874), ss. 17 and 18—Order to collect assets—Decree against deceased's estate passed prior to such order—Attachment of part of deceased's estate subsequently to above order—Claim of Administrator-General prior to that of attaching creditor. On the 16th April 1898, the plaintiff obtained an *ex-parte* decree against the defendant as heir and legal representative of his deceased father. Previously to the date of the decree (*viz.*, on 4th March 1898), an order had been made by the High Court under ss. 17 and 18 of the Administrator-General's Act (II of 1874), authorizing the Administrator-General to collect the assets of the deceased and ordering him, if necessary, to take out letters of administration to his estate. On the 29th April 1898, the plaintiff, under s. 268 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), attached certain money in the hands of a third party due to the deceased's estate. On the 2nd July 1898, letters of administration were granted to the Administrator-General. *Held*, that as against the Administrator-General, the attachment was void *ab initio*. At the date of the decree obtained by the plaintiff, the Administrator-General was entitled, by virtue of the High Court's order, to take possession of the estate of the deceased. As soon as that order was made, his right to possession became paramount, and excluded that of the defendant (the son of the deceased), who was then no longer entitled to recover payment of debts due to his father. A decree, therefore, subsequently obtained against the defendant could not, as against the Administrator-General, confer any rights on the decree-holder, who could not stand in a better position than the defendant, his judgment-debtor. Under ss. 278 and 280 of the Civil Procedure Code the Administrator-General had the right to have the attachment removed, because he was exclusively entitled, at first by rea-

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son of the order under s. 18 of Act II of 1874 and subsequently by his letters of administration, to recover the debt, and was not subject to any decree which affected his title. *Lalchand Ramdayal v. Gumtibat*, 8 Bom. 140, distinguished. *BHAIJI BHIMJI v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BOMBAY* . . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 428.

7. ——— Administrator-General of Bengal—Sanction to prosecute—Administrator to estate of deceased person—Public servant, offence by—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 197—Calcutta Municipal Act (Bengal III of 1899), ss. 320, 574. The Administrator-General of Bengal, who was appointed by the High Court administrator to the estate of a deceased person, was served with a notice by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation under s. 320 (1), cl. (b), of Bengal Act III of 1899, requiring him to remodel a privy on certain premises belonging to that estate. In consequence of his not complying with the requisition he was prosecuted under s. 574 of the Act. At the trial it was contended that, as the Administrator-General of Bengal was a public servant not removable from his office without the sanction of the Government of India, he could not, under the terms of s. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, be prosecuted without the sanction of such Government. *Held*, that the sanction of Government was not necessary for the institution of the prosecution, s. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code not being applicable to a case like the present; that the Administrator-General of Bengal was in charge of the premises, in respect of which the offence charged was said to have been committed, not by virtue of his office, but by virtue of his appointment by the Court as administrator to the estate of the deceased; and that he was charged with having committed the offence in the latter capacity. *Nando Lal Basak v. N. N. Mitter*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 852, followed. *CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL* (1903) . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 927; 7 C. W. N. 750.

8. ——— Civil Procedure Code, s. 424—Suit against Administrator-General, if notice necessary—Administrator-General, if public officer—Administrator-General's Act (II of 1874 and V of 1902). All estates in the hands of the Administrator-General are held by him as Administrator-General, *i.e.*, as a public officer, and in any suit instituted against him in respect of any act purporting to be done by him in his official capacity he is entitled to notice under s. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code. The phrase "cause of action" in s. 424, Civil Procedure Code, should not be too narrowly construed, the object of the section being merely to inform the defendant of the ground of complaint. *Secretary of State v. Perumal Pillai*, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 279, and *Bachhu Singh v. Secretary of State*, I. L. R. 25 All. 187, 191, followed. The portion of s. 424, Civil Procedure Code, relating to the notice containing a statement that such notice has been left and delivered in the manner prescribed by the section is

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separable from the earlier portion, which deals with the delivery of the notice two months before suit. It is only when notice is not given that the suit is liable to be dismissed. The suit, however, may be proceeded with, if notice has been given in the manner prescribed, and subsequently the plaint is amended in order to state that fact. *BHOLARAM CHOWDHURY v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 913

9. ———— *Suit against Administrator-General—Civil Court—Jurisdiction—Bombay Civil Courts Act (XIV of 1869), s. 32.* A suit against the Administrator-General as representing the estate of a deceased private individual must be brought in the District Court and not in the Court of a Subordinate Judge, by virtue of s. 32 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act (XIV of 1869). *ANTONE v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BOMBAY* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 529

10. ———— *Administrator-General's Act (II of 1874), s. 18—Administrator-General holding estate under s. 18, position of—Administrator-General, what payments can be made by.* The Administrator-General holding an estate under s. 18 of the Administrator-General's Act is in no better position than a private administrator. Pending grant of letters of administration, he can only make payments for the benefit of, or for the preservation of, the assets of the estate. He cannot make any payment to the prejudice of the estate. *Morgan v. Thomas*, 8 *Each. Rep.* 802, 307, referred to. *HARI DAS DUTT. In the goods of* (1906)

11 C. W. N. 193

ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL'S ACT (VIII OF 1855).

See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

1 Bom. 103

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 139

Bourke Test 6

1. ———— *Recall of letters of administration granted to Administrator-General—Commission.* When letters of administration which had been granted to the Administrator-General of Madras were recalled, and he had merely taken manual possession of cash, Government promissory notes, and the title deeds of leaseholds belonging to the deceased, the High Court, under s. 22 of Act VIII of 1855, allowed him commission at the rate of 2½ per cent. on the cash and the value of the notes, but refused to allow it on the leaseholds. *In the goods of SIMPSON* . . . 1 *Mad.* 171

2. ———— *Danger of misappropriation—Debts of deceased person.* The bare possibility that the Act of Limitation may ultimately become a bar to the recovery of assets is not such danger of misappropriation as warrants the granting to the Administrator-General of an order under s. 12 of Act VIII of 1855. *Semble* : A debtor to the estate of a deceased person cannot apply for an order under that section. *In the goods of GIRDHAR DAS VALLABA DAS* . . . 1 *Mad.* 234

ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL'S ACT (VIII OF 1855)—concl'd.

Act XXIV of 1867, s. 15—

See ILLEGITIMACY . 11 B. L. R. Ap. 6

s. 17—

See ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL.

8 Bom. O. C. 140

s. 33—*Right to payment out of assets—Distribution of assets.* Plaintiff, on the 15th June 1868, immediately after the death of his debtor, brought a suit against the debtor's widow (1st defendant) for recovery of the debt, and, before judgment, obtained attachment and sale of property of the deceased, the sale-proceeds being kept in deposit in the Court. These proceedings took place in June and July : and on the 15th August administration was granted to the Administrator-General, the widow not having taken out administration. On the 28th September, the Administrator-General was, on plaintiff's application, made defendant in place of the widow, and the suit proceeded against him to decree. Before plaintiff applied to execute this decree, the amount of the sale-proceeds was, by the direction of the Civil Judge, handed over to the Administrator-General ; accordingly, on this ground, plaintiff's application to the District Munsif for execution was rejected. He appealed unsuccessfully to the Civil Court. *Held*, on special appeal, that s. 33 of Act XXIV of 1867 took away plaintiff's right to payment otherwise than rateably with the other creditors. *HANINABALU SANNAPPA v. COOK* . . . 6 *Mad.* 346

s. 60—

See RES JUDICATA—ADJUDICATIONS.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 340

See REVIEW—ORDERS SUBJECT TO REVIEW . . . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 340

ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL'S ACT (II of 1874).

See ADMINISTRATION BOND.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 713

See ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL.

See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 770

See LIMITATION . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 11

See POSSESSION I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1015

See STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 732

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 788

L. R. 22 I. A. 107

ss. 12, 16, and 17—

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—PROBATE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 879

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 444

**ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL'S ACT
(II OF 1874)—*contd.***

— **s. 17—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 31 and 32—Administrator-General taking possession without prior order of Court—Conflict between Administrator-General and Court of Wards—Nominee of Court of Wards if can be appointed administrator—Zemindaris.** The Court of Wards, as such, cannot be appointed Administrator. There is nothing, however, to prevent this Court, in certain circumstances, *e.g.*, in this case where the testator wished the minor's estate to be entrusted to the Court of Wards, from appointing the nominee of the Court of Wards (in most instances the manager) Administrator of the testator's estate with the Will annexed under s. 31 of the Probate and Administration Act. *Held*, on the facts of this case, that the Administrator-General's taking possession of the estate of the testator was illegal. *In the goods of TROYLUCKO NATH BISWAS* (1905) **10 C. W. N. 241**

— **s. 18—**

See ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL.

11 C. W. N. 193

See PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—APPELLANTS **21 Bom. 102**

— **s. 27—**

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURTS, CL. 15
I. L. R. 1 Mad. 148

— **Commission payable to—Collection of debts.** Where there has been only collection, but no distribution of the assets by the Administrator-General, an order under s. 27, Act II of 1874, allowing commission at a certain rate, ought, in accordance with the rule laid down in s. 54 of the Act, to award only half of the full commission of 5 per cent. *In the goods of CHENGALROYA NAIKER, SOMASUNDARAM CHETTI v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL* **I. L. R. 1 Mad. 148**

— **s. 31—**

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—EFFECT OF PRIVY COUNCIL DECREE OR ORDER.
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 1011
L. R. 22 I. A. 203

1. — **Transfer to Administrator-General by Hindu executor—Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870), s. 5—Succession Act (X of 1865), ss. 179, 187, and 191—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881).** *N L M*, a Hindu, died on the 22nd February 1891, leaving property in Calcutta and leaving a will, dated 5th August 1889. The executors appointed by the will took out probate on the 17th March 1891, and on the 14th August 1893 executed a deed, by which they purported, under s. 31 of the Administrator-General's Act (II of 1874), to transfer all estates, effects, and interests vested in them to the Administrator-General of Bengal:—*Held* by PRINSEP and TREVELYAN, JJ., affirming the decision of SALE, J. (PETHERAM, C.J., dissent-

**ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL'S ACT
(II OF 1874)—*contd.***

ing), that the transfer was not a valid one. The executor of a Hindu testator has no power to transfer the property of the testator to the Administrator-General under the terms of s. 31 of Act II of 1874. That section applies only to the executors and administrators of persons of the class mentioned in s. 16 of the Act, that is to say, persons not being Hindus, Mahomedans, or Buddhists. *Per PETHERAM, C.J.*, (*contra*) The transfer was a valid one. Even if s. 5 of the Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870) were sufficient to prevent such transfer to the Administrator-General under s. 30 of the Administrator-General's Act of 1867, which is by no means certain, a Hindu executor has power, if not since the passing of the Hindu Wills Act, at any rate since the coming into force of the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), to transfer his interest and estate under a will to the Administrator-General, as constituted under Act II of 1874. The course of legislation with reference to the creation of the office of the Administrator-General and to his duties and powers reviewed and considered in construing Act II of 1874. *ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL v. PREM LALL MULLICK* . . . **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 732**

Held (on appeal) by the Privy Council, that the right of executors to devolve the property of their testator, with all powers and duties relating to its administration, upon the Administrator-General, conferred by s. 31 of Act II of 1874, is not confined to any particular class of executors or of estates. The right is given to any executor in whom estate of the deceased has been vested by virtue of the probate upon the one condition that the Administrator-General shall consent. It is not required that in a consolidating statute each enactment, when traced to its source, must be construed according to the state of things which existed at a prior time when it first became law: the object being that the statutory law bearing on the subject should be collected and made applicable to the existing circumstances: nor can a positive enactment be annulled by indications of intention, at a prior time, gathered from previous legislation on the matter. Executors, having obtained probate of the will and possession of the estate of a Hindu testator, executed a deed, purporting to be in terms of s. 31, Act II of 1874, transferring the property, vested in them by the probate, to the Administrator-General:—*Held*, reversing the judgment of a majority of the Appellate Court, and affirming that of the Chief Justice, that this transfer was valid under that section. *ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL v. PREM LALL MULLICK* **I. L. R. 22 Calc. 788**
L. R. 22 I. A. 107

2. — **Transfer by executors to Administrator-General.** Where the executors of a will transfer their interest in the estate of the deceased under s. 31 of the Administrator-General's Act to the Administrator-General:—*Held*, that such a transfer would only transfer such powers of disposition over the

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estate as the executors themselves possessed.
In the goods of NUNDO LALL MULLICK
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s. 35—

See COSTS—COSTS OUT OF ESTATE.
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See COSTS—SUIT OR APPEAL ONLY PARTLY
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See SUCCESSION ACT, s. 282.
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 929

s. 35—*Right of creditors to immediate payment in full if assets sufficient*—"Rateable payment," meaning of—Costs—Meaning of "shall be liable to pay"—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 282—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 104. In a suit by a creditor, if his demand be uncontested or proved and the executor admits assets, the plaintiff is entitled at the hearing to an order for immediate payment without taking the accounts. The admission of assets for the payment of a debt is also an admission of assets for the purposes of the suit, and extends to costs if the Court thinks fit to give them. There is nothing in s. 35 of the Administrator-General's Act (II of 1874) which qualifies or restricts or otherwise interferes with the right of a creditor to demand immediate payment of his claim in full when the realizable assets in the hands of the Administrator-General are sufficient for the immediate payment of all claims in full. The "rateable payment" referred to in the above section as well as in s. 282 of the Succession Act (X of 1865), and in s. 104 of the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), is rateable payment out of the assets: it is nowhere provided that it shall be made out of the nett income of the estate or any other specific part of the assets. The language, ("shall be liable to pay costs") used in cl. 1 of s. 35 of the Administrator-General's Act (II of 1874) shows that it was intended not to impose upon a creditor, to whom the condition of exemption was inapplicable, an absolute obligation to pay the costs of the suit, but to leave a discretion to the Court to relieve him of the obligation if the circumstances of the case required it. *James v. Young, L. R., 27 Ch. D. 662*, referred to. *OMRITA NATH MITTER v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL* . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 54

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ss. 52, 54—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 424.

"Assets," meaning of—*Revenue-paying estate.* The Administrator-General is entitled to charge only one commission upon his commission. He is entitled to commission upon the entire collections of a revenue-paying estate. He is not entitled to commission on the value of the corpus of such part of the estate as is in the hands of

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a Receiver, but only on realizations made and handed over to him by such Receiver. *Per SAIE, J.* The entire rents of a revenue-paying estate, when collected by the Administrator-General, become the "property" of the estate in his hands and the application of such property in the payment of revenue is a distribution of such property in due course of administration. In this sense the property of a deceased person applied in payment of revenue is "an asset" within the meaning of the Administrator-General's Act and as such is chargeable with commission. *WATKINS v. SARAT CHUNDER GHOSH MOULICK (1904)* . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 572

s. 54—*Commission*—"Collection of Assets," Meaning of. Under s. 54 of Act II of 1874, the Administrator-General is entitled to charge commission on the collection and distribution of all assets. "Collection of assets" implies the doing of some act in connection with such assets. Where part of the estate consisted of a zamindari of which the testator had granted a patni lease subject to payment of a fixed rental, and part of the zamindari had been acquired for public purposes, the compensation money being by arrangements divisible between the estate and the patnidar in certain proportion:—*Held*, that the Administrator-General was entitled to charge commission on the rents actually collected by him and on the amount apportioned to the estate, but not on the corpus of the zamindari estate. *In the goods of Simpson, 1 Mad., 171*, followed. *In the goods of COTRJON*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 65

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s. 4, cl. 2—*Trusts Act (II of 1882), s. 72—Discharge by Court of an executor—Vesting of property in the continuing executor.* The Court has power to discharge an executor on his own application, if a proper case be made out. An executor so discharged remains liable for anything he has done or left undone, while an executor—it only relieves him from the duties of his office from the date of discharge. *Ex parte AMERCHAND MADHOWJI (1905)* . . . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 188

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1. Final decree—Administrator pendente lite, position of—Termination of his—

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Executor de son tort—Principles, if applicable to Hindus. The functions of an Administrator pendente lite terminate on the pronouncement of the final decree. *RADHIKA MOHON ROY v. BONNERJEE* (1905) . . . 10 C. W. N. 566

2. ———— *position of, after suit—Interference—Executor de son tort—Applicability of principle to Hindus.* On the termination of the appointment of an administrator pendente lite in respect of the property of a Hindu, if he continues to hold and deal with the property in the same way as he did prior to the date when his appointment came to an end, he can be sued as a *quasi* executor de son tort. *KSHITISH CHANDRA ACHARJYA CHOWDHURY v. RADHIKA MOHUN ROY* (1907) . . . 12 C. W. N. 237
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—*Admiralty jurisdiction—Arrest of a steam-ship, application for—Damage done "by a ship"—Maritime lien for damage—Injury caused to one ship by wrongful act of another—Ship as "Instrument of mischief"—Action in rem—53 and 54 Vict., c. 27.* To establish a maritime lien for damage against a ship, the damage must be the direct result of some unskilful or negligent conduct of those in charge of the ship which does the mischief, the ship herself being the "instrument of mischief." The steam-ship *T*, while lying in dock, discharged a large quantity of oil, which, floating on the dock-water and becoming ignited, caused considerable damage to another steam-ship, *C*, lying in the same dock. The charterers of the latter applied for the arrest of the former, alleging that they were entitled to bring an action *in rem* against the owners of the ship *T*. The application for arrest of the ship *T* was refused, she not being the direct cause of the damage, and the applicants not having an action *in rem* in the Admiralty Court against the owners of that ship. *The Vera Cruz*, No. 2, L. R., 9 P. D. 96; *Currie v. M'Knight* [1897] A. C. 97, referred to. *The Industrie*, L. R. 3 Ad. and Eccl., 303; *The Bataver*, L. R. 15 P. D. 37; *The Clara Killam*, L. R. 3 Ad. and Eccl. 161;

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1. ADMISSIONS IN STATEMENTS AND
PLEADINGS.**1. ———— Statement of Party—Evidence.**

A statement made by a party is not, *ipso facto*, conclusive against him, though it may be used against him and may be evidence, more or less weighty, possibly even conclusive, according to the circumstances of each case, and the result come to by judicial investigation. *AYETUN v. RAMSEBUR PODDAR* . . . 12 W. R. 156

2. ———— *Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 115—Estoppel—Admission on point of law.* An admission on a point of law is not an admission of a "thing" so as to make the admission matter of estoppel within the meaning of s. 115 of the Evidence Act. *Jotendro Mohun Tagore v. Ganendro Mohun Tagore*, 9 B. L. R. 377; L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol., 47, and *Gopee Loll v. Chundraolee Buhoojee*, 11 B. L. R. 391, referred to. *JAGWANT SINGH v. SILAN SINGH*
I. L. R. 21 All. 285

3. ———— *Proof of contents of document.* The statement of a party to a suit is admissible evidence against him to prove the contents of a written instrument. *MUTTUKARUPPA KAUNDAN v. RAMA PILLAI* . . . 3 Mad. 158

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4. ————— *Proof of contents of document.* The case of *Muttukaruppa Kaundan v. Rama Pillai*, 3 *Mad.* 158, applies to the defendant's admission of a transaction embodied in a written document not receivable in evidence, and is no authority whatever for construing a document, present to the Court, upon a defendant's admission. *MAHALATCHI AMMAL v. PALANI CHETTI*

6 *Mad.* 245

5. ————— *Statement in former suit—Evidence Act, 1872, s. 18.* A statement made by the defendant in another suit may be used as an admission within the meaning of s. 18 of the Evidence Act. *HURISH CHUNDER MULLICK v. PRO-SUNNO COOMAR BANERJEE*

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22 *W. R.* 304 note

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23 *W. R.* 27

6. ————— *Statements filed in Court.* In a suit by a daughter for property left by her father, in which the defendants relied upon certain admissions said to have been made by plaintiff relinquishing the share in the inheritance left by her father, and in which they also set up a will of the father conveying the property to others, the lower Court should have enquired into the genuineness of the will, and required the defendants to prove that the admissions, which plaintiff impugned, emanated from her, or from some one duly authorized by her to make them. The mere fact that the admissions were contained in statements filed in a Court of Justice in her name does not necessarily prove that they were made by her. *ASMUTOONISSA BEBEE v. ATTA HAFIZ*

5 *W. R.* 468

7. ————— In a former suit by *A* against his agent for an account of the collections of a certain share in land *B* intervened and was made a party. In that suit the Court declared *A* to be the zamindar, and as such entitled to the rents and to an account. *Held*, that that finding was binding against *B* in a subsequent suit against him by *A* for recovery of the same share. Similarly, an admission made by *B* in the former suit is evidence against him *quantum valeat* in the subsequent suit. *SHEO SURN SINGH v. RAM KHELANAWAN SINGH*

14 *W. R.* 165

8. ————— Admissions made in former arbitration Proceedings. Admissions, etc., made by the parties in a former arbitration proceeding may be used against them in evidence in a subsequent suit. *HURONATH SIRCAR v. PREONATH SIRCAR*

7 *W. R.* 249

9. ————— Admissions in former suit. Also admissions made in a former suit. *OBHOY GOBIND CHOWDHRY v. BEEJOY GOBIND CHOWDHRY*

9 *W. R.* 162ADMISSION—*contd.*1. ADMISSIONS IN STATEMENTS AND PLEADINGS—*contd.*

10. ————— *Acceptance in evidence of map as correct in former suit.* Where the defendants in a boundary suit accepted in a former suit a particular map as correct, their acceptance is legal, though not conclusive, evidence against them in the boundary suit, and is tantamount to an admission, and stands upon a very different footing from the decree in the first suit. *GORDON STUART AND CO. v. BEEJOY GOBIND CHOWDHRY*

8 *W. R.* 291

11. ————— *Deposition.* A copy of a defendant's deposition in a former suit having been put in by plaintiff at a late stage of the case, when defendant had no means of explaining away any supposed admission therein:—*Held*, that the first Court was wrong in accepting the same as an admission binding on defendant, and that the lower Appellate Court was right in sending for the defendant and examining him on the subject. *KOMUROODDEEN v. MONYE MUNDLE*

16 *W. R.* 220

12. ————— *Suit of different nature.* Admissions made by a defendant in other suits brought against him by third parties cannot be treated as estoppels in a suit to recover possession of a different property under different circumstances. *WISE v. RUBBA KHATOON*

19 *W. R.* 299

13. ————— Plaintiff sued in the Revenue Court for the recovery of rents fraudulently misappropriated by defendant, and upon defendant's allegation that plaintiff was etmamdar or gumasta and not ijaradar, the Deputy Collector dismissed plaintiff's suit for want of jurisdiction. Plaintiff then sued in the Civil Court, the defendant again raising the plea of non-jurisdiction. *Held*, that any admission or allegation of the defendant in the former suit, put in evidence by the plaintiff, was amply sufficient to support the plaintiff's allegation in this suit that he had been etmamdar. *BHUGWAN CHUNDER DUTT v. MECHOO LALL CHUCKERBUTTY*

17 *W. R.* 372

14. ————— *Suit for resumption of lands—Previous suit to assess the lands—Evidence.* An admission by a jagirdar in a suit brought by Government to assess the lands, that the lands were comprised in a zamindari, is evidence of that fact in a suit by the zamindar to resume those lands. *FORBES v. MIR MAHOMED TAKI*

5 *B. L. R.* 52914 *W. R. P. C.* 2813 *Moo. I. A.* 438

15. ————— *Agreement to pay interest.* In a former suit, plaintiff, mortgagor, under a usufructuary mortgage, claimed recovery of the mortgaged property, on the allegation that there had been a satisfaction of the principal sum by reason of the profits of the estate exceeding 12 per cent. interest, but having failed to prove that allegation, his suit was dismissed. He now sued for the recovery of the property under an ekrarnamah which did not

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stipulate for payment of interest. *Held*, that the case put forward by plaintiff in the former suit did not amount to an admission that there was an agreement to pay 12 per cent., and that he was entitled to restoration of the property on payment of the principal alone. *PROSUNNO COOMAR MOOKERJEE v. BULDEO NARAIN SINGH* . . . 18 W. R. 62

16. ——— Landlord and tenant—Admission by a co-tenant. An admission by a co-tenant as to who is the landlord of a holding is not binding on the other co-tenants. *KALI KISHORE CHOWDHRY v. GOPIMOHAN ROY CHOWDHRY* . . . 2 C. W. N. 166

17. ——— Admission by one of several joint tenants—*Suit for rent*. A suit for rent having been brought against two persons as joint tenants, and a decree passed thereon in favour of the plaintiff, but for a less amount than that claimed by him, an appeal was preferred by the defendants; but subsequently, pending the hearing of the appeal, one of them filed a petition admitting the correctness of the amount claimed by the plaintiff, and stating his willingness to pay half of such amount. *Held*, that the admission of the one defendant did not bind the other; and that, notwithstanding such admission, the suit having been brought against the defendants as joint tenants, a separate decree for half the amount admitted could not be made against the defendants who made the admission. *CHUNDERESHWUR NARAIN PERSHAD v. CHUNI AHIR* . . . 9 C. L. R. 359

18. ——— Admission made by one co-sharer—*Admissibility of, against the others—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 18*. In a suit between a zamindar and his ijaradars for rent, a person, who was one of several jotedars in the mahal, was called as a witness for the zamindar, and admitted the fact that an arrangement existed whereby he and his co-jotedars had agreed to pay rent to the zamindar direct; that suit was decided in favour of the zamindar. The ijaradars then brought a suit against the jotedars, amongst whom was the witness above mentioned, to recover the sum which the jotedars ought to have paid to the zamindar direct, and which the ijaradars had been decreed to pay. The jotedars disclaimed all liability to pay rent to the ijaradars; in this suit the evidence given by the jotedar in the zamindar's suit was received as evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs against all the defendants. *Held*, that the evidence was admissible. *KOWSULLIAH SUNDARI DASI v. MURTA SUNDARI DASI* . . . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 588

19. ——— Indivisibility of, as evidence—*Whole admission*. Where a person uses the admission of another as evidence, the whole admission must be put in. He cannot put in half and exclude the other half. Those who have to decide upon the evidence are not bound to believe the whole of the statement. *NILMONEY SINGH DEO v. RAMANOOGRAH ROY* . . . 7 W. R. 29

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20. ——— *Plaintiff relying on admission of defendant*. A plaintiff abandoning his own case and falling back on the admissions of the defendant is bound to take these admissions as they stand and in their entirety. *TARINEE PERSHAD SEIN v. DWARKANATH RUKHEET* 15 W. R. 451

21. ——— *Effect of, as to co-defendants*. A defendant's admission, if taken at all, must be taken as a whole; but it cannot bind co-defendants. *NIAMUTOOLLAH KHADIM v. HIMMUT ALI KHADIM* . . . 22 W. R. 519

22. ——— *Pleadings*. The rule that when an admission is relied upon by a party to a suit as against his opponent it must be taken in its entirety, does not apply to pleadings. *BROJO RAJ KISHOREE v. BISHONATH DUTT* . . . W. R. 1864, 305

23. ——— *Pleadings*. A statement under Act VIII of 1859 is not in the nature of confession and avoidance as in English pleading, where the confession is considered as an admission of the party, and the avoidance has to be proved. The statement of one party, if used as evidence against him by the other, must be taken altogether, and not in part. *PROBHOO DOSS v. SHEONATH ROY* . . . W. R. 1864, Act X, 27

SOOLTAN ALI v. CHAND BIBEE . 9 W. R. 130

24. ——— *Qualified statement—Written statement*. *Per MACPHERSON, J.* The opinion of the full Bench in *Pulin Beharee Sen v. Watson*, 9 W. R. 90, was that, if a party makes a qualified statement, that statement cannot be used against him apart from the qualification; not that, if a man makes a series of independent unqualified statements, those statements cannot be used against him. That case goes no further than to lay down that an unfair use is not to be made of a man's written statement, by trying to convert into an admission by him that which he never intended to be an admission. *BAR-KANTANATH KOOMAR v. CHANDRAMOHAN CHOWDHRY* . . . 1 B. L. R. A. C. 133: 10 W. R. 180

See PULIN BEHAREE SEN v. WATSON
B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 904
9 W. R. 190

SOOLTAN ALI v. CHAND BIBEE 9 W. R. 130
JUDONATH ROY v. BURODA KANT ROY
22 W. R. 220

25. ——— Admission in pleading—*Description of plaintiff*. In an action of contract brought by the assignee of a bankrupt against a debtor, the defendant pleaded that he had not contracted "in the manner the plaintiff assignee as aforesaid stated." *Held*, that the form of plea was not an admission of the plaintiff's title as assignee, but was only used in reference to the description the

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plaintiff had given of himself in the declaration.
CLARK v. ROUPLALL MULLICK AND CLARK v.
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26. ———— *Onus of proof.*
In a suit for confirmation of possession of, and declaration of title to, land alleged to have been purchased at a private sale from the wife (*S S*) of a judgment-debtor who had come into possession of the land by gift from her husband, defendants claimed to be *bona fide* purchasers from *S S*, to whom, they alleged, the property really belonged, and who had been all along in possession. The substance of the defence was that, "even granting that any such papers" (as a *hibbah* and a deed of sale) "were written between the parties, this can avail the plaintiff nothing, as the deeds were fraudulent." *Held*, that there was no such admission on the part of the defendants as shifted the burden of proof upon themselves. HURISH CHUNDER PAUL v. RADHA NATH SEIN . . . 11 W. R. 328

27. ———— Agreement admitted in pleading. Where, in a suit for specific performance of an agreement, the defendant admitted in his written statement the terms of the agreement and its execution:—*Held*, that the plaintiff was not called upon to prove the execution of the agreement or to put it in evidence. BURJORJI CURSETTI PANTHAKI v. MUNCHERJI KUYERJI . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 143

28. ———— Admission of title in pleading—*Suit for possession of land—Plea of limitation.* The circumstance that the defendant has in his written answer set up a defence merely of the statute of limitations in a suit for the possession of land does not constitute an admission of the title of the plaintiff so as to dispense with the obligation on the plaintiff to prove his title. SOONATUN SAHA v. RAMJOY SAHA . . . Marsh 549

29. ———— Admission in written statement of defendant. When a defendant admits any one fact contained in the written statement of the plaintiff, and thereby excludes independent evidence thereof, he is not entitled to say that the plaintiff has relied on his statement as evidence, and that he (defendant) is in consequence in a position to claim that the whole of it may be read as evidence in his own favour. SHURFURAZ MOLLAH v. DHUNOO . . . 16 W. R. 257

30. ———— Admission in written statement—*Validity of deed, proof of—Onus probandi.* The plaintiff purchased a house from the defendant under a deed of sale dated 23rd June 1886. In a suit to recover possession of the house, the defendant pleaded that the sale-deed was invalid for want of consideration:—*Held*, that the mere admission in the defendant's written statement of the execution of the sale-deed did not dispense with the necessity of establishing affirmatively the validity of

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the deed, which was expressly impugned by the defendant. JAVANMAL JITMAL v. MUKTA BAI . . . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 516

31. ———— Admission in verified petition. An admission made in a verified petition by an intervenor in an Act X suit, and repeated in a verified plaint filed by him in a regular suit, was held to be binding in a subsequent suit on the party who made it. GRISH CHUNDER LAHOREE v. SHAMA CHURN SANDYAL . . . 15 W. R. 437

32. ———— Admission by not traversing allegations. A defendant must be taken to admit all material allegations in the plaint which he does not traverse. YEKNATH BABAJI v. GULABCHAND KAHANGI . . . 1 Bom. 85

AHMEHDEE BEGUM v. DABEE PERSAUD . . . 18 W. R. 287

33. ———— Not traversing allegations. The mere fact that an allegation is not traversed does not relieve a plaintiff from the burden of proving his case. MULJI BECHAR v. ANUPRAM BECHAR . . . 7 Bom. A. C. 136

HAMEEDDOOLAH v. GENDA LALL . . . 17 W. R. 171

34. ———— In a suit for enhancement of rent, a defendant is not bound to traverse a statement made by the plaintiff in the notice of enhancement as to the description of the land in question. The doctrine of admission by non-traverse was not applicable to written statements filed under Act X of 1859. SHADHOO SINGH v. RAMANOOGRAHA LALL . . . 9 W. R. 183

35. ———— Written statement—*Entire statement.* Where defendant's written statement is referred to as evidence in plaintiff's favour, the whole of it becomes evidence in the suit, and the Court can, in its discretion, attach thereto, or to any portion thereof, so much value as seems to it fit. RADHA CHURN CHOWDHRY v. CHUNDER MONEE SHIKDAR . . . 9 W. R. 290

36. ———— Disclaimer of title—*Pleadings—Admission by one of several defendants—Relinquishment—Disclaimer of title.* *R*, holding estates in Bengal jointly with his brothers as an undivided Hindu family, died leaving a widow, *S*, and three unmarried daughters, *B*, *M*, and *N*. On her husband's death *S* continued to reside with his brothers, and was supported out of the income of the joint estate. All the daughters married in the lifetime of *S*, and *B* became a widow without having had a child. After the death of *S*, and in the lifetime of *M*, *N* also became a childless widow. *M* died after her mother, leaving a son, *R K*. *R K*, attaining majority, sued to recover, with mesne profits, a 4-anna share of the ancestral estates to which he claimed to be entitled on his mother's death as heir of *R*, and from which he alleged he had been dispossessed by the representatives of *R*'s

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brothers, whom he made defendants in the suit, joining *B* and *N* with them as co-defendants. Some time after the institution of the suit, a petition was filed purporting to proceed from *B* and *N*, by which they admitted that the plaintiff was the heir of *R*, and that they had no defence to offer. *Held*, that *N* being the heir of *R*, *R K* had not, during her lifetime, any right to any part of the estate, and that his position was not altered by the petition purporting to proceed from *B* and *N*, such petition not amounting to a conveyance or disclaimer of title in his favour. In the English Common-Law Courts and, *à fortiori*, in the Courts of Law in India, where the pleadings are less technical, an admission of a fact on the pleadings by implication is not an admission for any other purpose than that of the particular issue, and is not tantamount to proof of the fact. An admission or even a confession of judgment by one of several defendants in a suit is no evidence against another defendant. *AMIRTOLALL BOSE v. ROJONEEKANT MITTER* . . . 15 B. L. R. 10

23 W. R. 214 : L. R. 2 I. A. 113

37. ———— *Inheritance—*

Relinquishment—Admission on pleadings. A plaintiff, suing two defendants *M* and *L* for the possession of certain property by right of inheritance, admitted in his plaint the right by inheritance of the defendant *M* to a moiety of the property, and only made him a defendant because he would not join in bringing the suit. The claim, however, was for the entire property. The defendant *M* filed a written statement setting forth that he had long ago willingly resigned all his rights in favour of the plaintiff, and that the suit had been instituted with his consent. *Held*, that this statement was only an admission by *M* of the plaintiff's title, which could not be used against the other defendant *L* so as to entitle the plaintiff to a decree for the entire estate: that since *L* did not set up *M*'s title to defeat the plaintiff, he could not be affected by *M*'s disclaimer: and that the plaintiff could not be allowed in this suit to obtain *M*'s share as his representative, for that would be to decree him the share on a title he never set up. *Amirtolall Bose v. Rojoneekant Mitter*, 15 B. L. R. 10, referred to. *LACHMAN SINGH v. TANSUKH* . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 395

38. ———— *Untraversed allegations—*

Suit to set aside sale. In a suit to set aside a sale in execution of decree on the ground of fraud:—*Held*, applying the principle that pleadings should not be construed too strictly, that the defendant could not be held, by reason of their not having denied it, to have admitted the truth of the plaintiff's allegation as to the date upon which knowledge of the fraud was acquired. *NATHA SINGH v. JODHA SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 406

39. ———— *Admission by co-defendant, Effect of—Suit for possession of land.* In a suit for possession of immovable property brought by

ADMISSION—*contd.*1. ADMISSIONS IN STATEMENTS AND PLEADINGS—*contd.*

three Mahomedan brothers, their three sisters were impleaded as defendants under s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code, and two of the latter subsequently filed a written statement in which, after stating that they were on good terms with their brothers, the plaintiffs, and that the suit had been instituted with their knowledge and permission, they prayed that the suit might be decreed, subject to the condition that they would, on some future occasion, "settle with their own brothers as to their right and costs." The third sister did not appear to defend the suit. *Held*, that the Lower Courts were wrong in treating this admission as sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to a decree for possession, not only of their own share, but also of the shares of their three sisters, it being a fundamental proposition connected with the administration of justice that a plaintiff cannot sue for more than his own right, and that no defendant can, by an admission of consent of this kind, convey the right or delegate the authority to sue for more than his own share in property. *Lachman Singh v. Tansukh*, I. L. R. 6 All. 395, referred to. *AZIZULLAH KHAN v. AHMAD ALI KHAN* . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 353

40. ———— *Request to verify signature to petition—Evidence of statements made in petition.* Where a party asks others to verify his signature to a petition or to identify him as one of the petitioners, it amounts to an allegation on his party that he made the statements which appear in the petition, and is as effective evidence against the party making the request as if the petition were in fact filed. *MOHUN SAHOO v. CHUTOO MOWAR* . . . 21 W. R. 34

41. ———— *Petition, statement in—Suit to set aside deeds.* Defendant claimed to hold a mokurari tenure under deeds executed by plaintiff, zamindar. The plaintiff denied the authenticity of the deeds, and sued to set them aside. The lower Courts dismissed his suit as barred by limitation, on the ground that plaintiff had, in a petition before the Collector, admitted that defendant was mokurari-dar of the tenure, and that, this being so, limitation run against him from the date of the deeds. *Held*, that the case should have been tried on the merits as the petition was not a conclusive admission of the genuineness of the deeds, and it was not right to infer from it that plaintiff knew of their existence at the time of their professed date. *PROHLAD SEN v. RUNBAHADUR SINGH* . . . 2 B. L. R. P. C. 111
12 W. R. 6
11 Moo. I. A. 289

2. ADMISSIONS BY, OR AGAINST, THIRD PERSONS.

1. ———— *Admission, effect of, against person not party to suit.* *Held*, that the fact of defendants being allowed to appear as co-plaintiffs in a redemption suit, to which plaintiff was no party,

ADMISSION—contd.**2. ADMISSION BY, OR AGAINST, THIRD PERSONS—contd.**

cannot be received in evidence as an admission adverse to plaintiff's interest; and the admission made by the plaintiff's brother, and "lumberdar," cannot, merely on account of his being such, be held as binding against the plaintiff, unless it be shown that he was invested by plaintiff with sufficient authority in that behalf. *BUCHA v. LULEE* . . . 2 Agra 20

2. ——— Persons without title—Suit for redemption. In a suit for redemption the admission of a person having no title to the estate in question in the suit is not admissible against the mortgagor. *MUTHRA DASS v. MAGH SINGH*

2 N. W. 207

3. ——— Guardian, admission by—Previous transactions. Although a guardian of two minors may have power to manage or to make a partition of the estate, he has no authority to bind the estate of either of his wards by admission of previous transactions. *SURUJ MOOKHI KONWAR v. BHAGWATI KONWAR* . . . 10 C. L. R. 377

4. ——— Admission by Executors. The admissions of the executors of a donor are treated as the admissions of the donor. *DWARKANATH BOSE v. CHUNDEE CHURN MOOKERJEE*

1 W. R. 339

5. ——— The admission of one executor to a will would not bind another, nor would the admissions of parties other than the executor bind the estate. *CHUNDER KANT MITTER v. RAMNARAIN DEY SIRCAR* . . . 8 W. R. 63

6. ——— Admission by Agent. An agent's admission that he purchased as an agent is evidence against his heirs that the purchase was not made by him on his own account. *GOREEBOOLAH SIRKAR v. BOYD* . . . 2 W. R. 190

7. ——— Admission by Husband—Admission of joint character of property. An admission by the widow's husband that the lease was the joint property of himself and the plaintiff, though not an estoppel, was held to be good evidence to be rebutted by the widow. *SREENATH NAG MOZOOMDAR v. MONMOHNEE DOSSEE* . . . 6 W. R. 35

8. ——— Admissions of Vakil—Criminal case. Admissions made by a vakil cannot bind his client in a criminal case. *QUEEN v. KAZIM MUNDLE*

17 W. R. Cr. 49

9. ——— Admission by Pleader on behalf of client. Admission made in a statement in a case by a pleader on behalf of his client after full consideration and consultation is admissible as evidence against that client in another case in which he is a party. *COMABUTTER v. PARESHNAUTH PANDAY* . . . 15 W. R. 135

10. ——— Admission of Pleader recorded in judgment. The rule of law is that a judgment deliberately recording the admission of a pleader must be taken as correct, unless it is contradicted by an affidavit or the Judge's own admission

ADMISSION—contd.**2. ADMISSIONS BY, OR AGAINST, THIRD PERSONS—contd.**

that the record he made was wrong. *HUR DYAL SINGH v. HEERA LALL* . . . 16 W. R. 107

11. ——— Admission by Owner after sale of property. An admission subsequently made by a debtor whose property has been sold is not evidence against the purchaser of the property. *KHEMUNKUREE CHOWDHRAIN v. GHOORCHUNDER MOJOOMDAR* . . . 5 W. R. 268

12. ——— Admission by Judgment-debtor—Purchaser. A purchaser in execution of a decree of a Civil or Revenue Court is not bound by any admission made by his execution-debtor, nor ordinarily by a decree against such person. *RUNGO MONEE DEBIA v. RAJ COOMAR BEBEE* 6 W. R. 197

IMRIT KOOR v. LALLA DEBEE PERSHAD SINGH
18 W. R. 200

13. ——— Admission by Mortgagor—Suit by purchaser for cancellation of mokurari lease. Suit by a purchaser from a mortgagee against a durmokuridar for the cancellation of his mokurari lease granted without authority by the mortgagor. In a former suit brought by the mortgagee for possession, the mortgagor admitted the mortgage. Held, that although that admission was conclusive as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, the colluding parties, yet that in the present case, brought to avoid the defendant's title on the strength of an alleged collusive mortgage, it was quite competent to him to contest its *bona fide* nature. *DONUNJOY DEY v. DWARKANATH SINGH*
5 W. R. 280

14. ——— Admission by Lumberdar—Signature in patwari's diary as lumberdar. Held, that the plaintiff, being an immediate reversioner, might maintain his suit, and that his contributing his share of profit and putting his signature in the patwari's diary as lumberdar were not an admission of defendant's title as purchaser. *NUND KISHORE v. NUTHOO RAM* . . . 1 Agra 223

15. ——— Admission by Heirs—Admission as to relinquishment of title. In a suit by the grandchildren of the deceased daughter of a member of a joint Hindu family, who, though not entitled to his property as his heirs, had been long in possession, the surviving daughter, in whom, according to Hindu law, her father's interest would now be legally vested, admitted by a petition filed in this suit that by her gift or relinquishment plaintiffs had a title to her father's share. The admission was held to be evidence that such title existed anterior to the commencement of the suit. *GOUR LALL SINGH v. MOHESH NARAIN GHOSH* . . . 14 W. R. 484

16. ——— Admission by Zamindar of mokurari right. Where tenants sued for a declaration that their holding was mokurari at a given rent, and the surburakar of their zamindar admitted their right on behalf of the zamindar, who himself filed a petition corroborating his surburakar's statement it was held that these admissions would

ADMISSION—*contd.*

2. ADMISSIONS BY, OR AGAINST, THIRD

PERSONS—*contd.*

bind any subsequent zamindar not being an auction-purchaser at a sale for arrears of Government revenue. *WATSON & Co. v. NOBIN MOHUN BABU*

10 W. R. 72

17. ——— Admission by Auction-purchaser—*Admission of title indirectly.* Where an auction-purchaser in a proceeding before the Collector for the purpose of charging an estate withstands a claim to a mokurari tenure advanced by a tenant, but does not otherwise subsequently legally question the tenant's title, the presumption arises that that title has been allowed by the auction-purchaser. *CHOONEE MAHTOON v. CHATTOO MAHTOON*

25 W. R. 231

18. ——— Admission of Lessor—*Lessor and lessee.* The admission of a lessor does not bind a lessee in certain cases in which a *bond fide* act might have bound. *SUTROOGHUN DUTT v. BROJOGOPAL GHOSE*

3 W. R. 143

19. ——— Admission of Tenancy—*Evidence of tenancy.* A mere admission by the defendant of plaintiff having purchased a jote is insufficient to prove that he ever was defendant's tenant. *BAKUL ALI CHOWDHRY v. ASHKUR ALI*

5 W. R. 156

20. ——— Admission by Raiyat—*Evidence of rate of rent—Similar tenures.* An admission by one raiyat as to the rate of rent at which he holds is not evidence to prove the rate at which another holds. *NURROGHURRY MOHATO v. NARAINEE DOSSEE*

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 9 : W. R. F. B. 23

21. ——— Admission of rate of rent. In a suit for arrears of rent at enhanced rates, if plaintiff asks for rates admitted by defendant, he must abide by those intended to be admitted; and if he desire to take advantage of the finding of the lower Court, he must submit to the whole finding taken altogether. *SOORENDRONATH ROY v. BHYRUB MUNDUL*

14 W. R. 462

22. ——— Return of amount of rent made to Collector—*Rate of rent, Evidence of.* A return made to a Collector by an occupant of land stating the amount of the rent is an admission as to the amount of rent binding upon the occupant and all who claim under him. *AJUDH BEHAREE SINGH v. RAM ROY TEWARI*

18 W. R. 105

23. ——— Rate of rent, evidence of—*Presumption from conduct of defendant in not raising objection.* In a suit for a kabuliati at enhanced rates after notice under s. 13, Act X of 1859, where the defendants stood by and, though raising a good many objections on other points, raised no question as to rates, their conduct and pleadings were held to afford a fair presumption of the admission of the plaintiff's claim as to the rates sued for. *THAKOOR DUTT SINGH v. GOPAL SINGH*

14 W. R. 4

24. ——— Consideration for sale—*Suit for presumption.* The mere admission of the vendor

ADMISSION—*contd.*2. ADMISSIONS BY, OR AGAINST, THIRD PERSONS—*contd.*

that an old debt of Rs50 mentioned in the sale-deed formed part of the consideration is not conclusive evidence of the allegation as against parties claiming a right of presumption. *PEERA v. SHIMPHU*

2 Agra 348

25. ——— *Hindu Law—Mitakshara—Debts—Surety—Grandson's liability to pay debts contracted by the grandfather as a surety.* A party is not bound, generally speaking, by a pleader's admission in argument on what is a pure question of law amounting to no more than his view that the question is unarguable. *NARAYAN v. VENKATACHARYA (1904)*

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 408

3. MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

1. ——— Verbal admissions as to sum due by defendant. It is a very dangerous thing for a Court to decree in favour of a plaintiff merely upon alleged verbal admissions by the defendant of a sum due without the most clear and cogent proof of such admissions, especially when the plaintiff shrinks from bringing his accounts into Court. *LALLA SHEOPARSHAD v. JUGGERNATH*

L. R. 10 I. A. 74

2. ——— Admission of receipt of purchase-money—*Registration Act, 1866, s. 66, cl. 3.* An admission before a Registrar of the receipt of purchase-money attested by his endorsement, as required by cl. 3, s. 66, Act XX of 1866, though evidence of the strongest and most reliable description, ought not to be treated as conclusive. In the face of such admission, however, the party seeking to get out of its effects must make out his case by very clear evidence. *MAHOMED HANEEF MEAJEE v. MOZHUR ALI*

15 W. R. 280

3. ——— Admission in a mortgage as to amount of land excepted from its operation. Debutter land within the limits of a revenue-paying mouzah, which had been mortgaged by the defendants to a predecessor in title of the plaintiff, was exempted from the mortgage, the deed specifying the number of bighas making the area of the debutter. Against a plaintiff, who made title to the mortgaged mouzah and claimed possession of all of it that had passed by the mortgage, the mortgagors set up that there was more debutter in the mouzah than the deed had specified, the intention of the parties to the deed having been to exempt whatever debutter there actually was :—*Held*, that the statement in the deed as to the quantity of the debutter was a deliberate admission, imposing upon the mortgagors who had made it the burden of proving that it was untrue, or that they were not bound by it; also that the Subordinate Judge's finding that the defendants had not given proof sufficient to discharge themselves of this, was correct. *JARAO KUMARI v. LALONMONT*

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 224

L. R. 17 I. A. 145

ADMISSION—*contd.*3. MISCELLANEOUS CASES—*contd.*

4. ——— False statement as to share being separate—*Joint family—Misrepresentation.* In a suit by a member of a joint family to recover possession of certain property alleged to belong to the joint estate, but which had been purchased by the defendant at a sale in execution of a decree passed against the estate of *R*, one of the members of the family, for his separate debt, the defendant alleged, as showing the property was the separate property of *R*, that, on one occasion, when *R B*, the karta, and a third member of the family, entered into a security bond with the Collector, whereby *R* pledged the property in suit, and the two others pledged other properties, each of them described the property pledged by him as being in his possession "without the right of any co-sharers." *Held*, that the misrepresentation as to his separate ownership made by *R* in the security bond given to the Collector could not be regarded in the present suit as more than an admission inconsistent with the title now asserted by the plaintiff, the defendant not having purchased on the faith of such misrepresentation. *BOODH SINGH DHODORIA v. GUNESH CHUNDER SEN* 12 B. L. R. P. C. 317: 19 W. R. 356

5. ——— False statement by defendant. A plaintiff cannot take advantage of a statement made by a defendant which at most amounts to a piece of evidence, and not to an admission, but which is found to be untrue, unless it be shown that the status of the plaintiff had been affected, or that he had been misled by such statement. *GRISH CHUNDER GHOSE v. ISSAR CHUNDER MOOKERJEE* 3 B. L. R. A. C. 337: 12 W. R. 226

6. ——— Mitigation of effect of admission—*Showing nature of transaction when made.* Where a defendant seeks to make use of statements which have been put in evidence and to treat them as admissions by the plaintiff who put them in, it is competent for the plaintiff to show the real nature of the transaction to which they relate and to get rid of the effect of the apparent admissions. *LUTEFOONISSA v. GOOR SURUN DASS. PHOOL BIBE v. GOOR SURUN DASS* 18 W. R. 485

7. ——— Showing real nature of transaction. A party claiming under another who has made admissions as to a transaction to which that other was a party, is at liberty to allege and prove that the admissions were made with a fraudulent purpose and were not true, and to show the real nature of the transaction. *SREENATH ROY v. BINDOO BASHNEE DEBIA* . . . 20 W. R. 112

8. ——— Effect of admissions not acted on—*Admissions by person who afterwards adopts another.* A party is not concluded by his own representations unless they have been acted upon by the opposite party. If treated merely as admissions not acted upon, it may be shown by the party who made them that they were not true. *Quære*: What is the effect of admissions made by a

ADMISSION—*contd.*3. MISCELLANEOUS CASES—*contd.*

person who subsequently adopts another in binding the person adopted? *BRJENDRO COOMAR ROY CHOWDHRY v. CHAIRMAN OF THE DACCA MUNICIPALITY* 20 W. R. 223

9. ——— Admission not acted on—*Decision opposed to admission.* A mere admission is not conclusive. It is so only in certain cases,—*e.g.*, where it has been acted upon by the party to whom it was made. Thus a statement made in a former suit, in which the Court, so far from acting upon it, passed a decree opposed to it, cannot be treated as conclusive. An admission made by defendants' ancestor may be evidence of some weight that may be used against them; but it is only evidence upon which the Court, which is trying the suit, may act or not according as it considers it ought to have effect given to it. *JANAN CHOWDHRY v. DOOLAR CHOWDHRY* 18 W. R. 347

ADOPTED DAUGHTER.

See BURMESE LAW
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 978

ADOPTION.

See BURMESE LAW.
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 219
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 978

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 13.
I. L. R. 29 All. 519

See EVIDENCE . I. L. R. 31 All. 116
See HINDU LAW I. L. R. 32 Calc. 861
I. L. R. 27 All. 271, 417
I. L. R. 29 Bom. 51, 346, 400, 410
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 780

See HINDU LAW—ADOPTION.

See HINDU LAW—CUSTOM—ADOPTION.

See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION.

See LIMITATION . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 165

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II—

ART. 118;

ART. 119.

See MALABAR LAW—ADOPTION.
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 6

See MALABAR LAW—CUSTOM.
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 209

See SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE ACT, SS. 6, 7,
AND 9 . . . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 523

VESTED AND CONTINGENT INTERESTS.
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 699

See WAJIB-UL-ARZ.
I. L. R. 28 All. 483

— by Hindu woman—

See HINDU LAW—ADOPTION.
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 824

ADOPTION—*contd.*

— of daughter's son—

See HINDU LAW I. L. R. 36 Calc. 780
13 C. W. N. 920

— onus of proof—

See EVIDENCE 13 C. W. N. 370

— suit to set aside—

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—
ADOPTION I. L. R. 30 Calc. 613

See HINDU LAW—ADOPTION.
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 404

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 3, SCH. II,
ART. 118 I. L. R. 24 Mad. 405

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ARTS. 118, 119
(1871, ART. 129: 1859, s. 1, CL. 16).

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS.
I. L. R. 15 All. 378

1.—*Question of adoption—Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Res judicata—Award of committee of taluqdars appointed under s. 3 of the Oudh Estates Act (I of 1869)—Claim in former suit as adopted son—Estoppel—Evidence and proof of adoption—Evidence of adoption where lapse of time precludes proof—Presumption as to probability from conduct of parties.* In a suit by the appellant against the respondent for a share in certain family property the question was whether the respondent had been in 1853 validly adopted into another family. *Held*, that the committee of taluqdars appointed under s. 33 of Act I of 1869 (Oudh Estates Act) to decide on claims for maintenance is not such a Court as is described by s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), and their award refusing the respondent maintenance in his own family on the ground that he had been adopted into another was therefore not *res judicata* in the present suit. The committee had no jurisdiction to decide the question of adoption, and the affirmation of their award by the Financial Commissioner could not give judicial validity to their decision on a point outside their jurisdiction. The fact that the respondent had in 1879 on the death of his alleged adoptive mother claimed to succeed her as the adopted son of her deceased husband and so secure the succession to which the predecessor in title of the appellant was then entitled, though he did not oppose the respondent's claim, did not estop the respondent from denying the alleged adoption in this suit. To establish the fact of a valid adoption it was essential for the appellant to show that it was made by the direction of the deceased husband of the adoptive mother, and that the respondent's father had given him in adoption. In the absence of proof, which the lapse of time made impossible, it was incumbent on the appellant, before any presumption that those conditions were fulfilled was justified, to establish an initial probability that the adoption was likely to have been validly made, and that the conduct of the parties cognizant of the facts had at least been consistent with such an hypothesis. But the evidence rather showed the contrary; and no weight could be

ADOPTION—*contd.*

given to the statements of the respondent, as they fell short of founding an estoppel, and as he had asserted or denied the adoption just as it suited his purpose throughout the whole of the protracted litigation between the members of the family. *HAR SHANKAR PARTAB SINGH v. RAGHURAJ SINGH* (1907) I. L. R. 29 All. 519

2.—*Gift of a son by first husband in adoption by a Hindu widow after her re-marriage—Hindu Widow Re-marriage Act (XV of 1856), ss. 2, 3, 4 and 5.* According to the text the right of a female parent to give her son in adoption results from the maternal relation and is not derived by delegation from her husband. Assuming that the mother has by Hindu Law a right to give her son in adoption the Hindu Widow Re-marriage Act (XV of 1856) does not afford any indication that the Legislature intended to deprive her of it. The right of guardianship, which under the provisions of Act XV of 1856, s. 3, may, under certain conditions, be transferred from the mother to one of the other relations of the child, does not carry with it the right to give in adoption, for that is a right which can only be exercised by a parent. *Punchappa v. Sangambasawa*, I. L. R. 24 Bom. 89, considered.

PUTLABAI v. MAHADU (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 107

3.—*Hindu Law—Adoption by a widow—Alienation by the widow prior to the date of adoption—Right of the adopted son to dispute the alienation.* Where a Hindu widow, who has inherited her husband's property, adopts a son, the adoption has the effect of divesting her of the property and putting an end to her estate as heir of her husband. The adoption has the same effect as her death with this difference that after the adoption she has a right of maintenance against the adopted son during the rest of her life. But the right of maintenance so long as it is not a charge on the estate or any portion of it, does not confer on her any right to the estate or entitle her to transfer it by way of sale or mortgage. Thus, if a widow, before the adoption, severs a portion of the inheritance therefrom and transfers it to a stranger, without any proper or necessary purpose binding the estate absolutely according to Hindu Law, the transfer, logically speaking, must cease to have any effect after the adoption, since it could only operate during the time that the estate was represented by her as heir and the result of the adoption is to terminate that estate. *Lakshman v. Radhabai*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 609, and *Moro v. Balaji*, I. L. R. 19 Bom. 809, followed. *Sreeramulu v. Kristamma*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 143, not followed.

RAMAKRISHNA v. TRIPURABAI (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 88

4.—*Hindu Law—Adoption of a married man having a son—The son's gotra and rights of inheritance in the family of his birth.* When a married Hindu having a son is given in adoption, the son does not like his father lose the *gotra* and rights of inheritance in the family of his birth and does not acquire the

ADOPTION—*concl'd*

gotra and a right of succession to the property of the family into which his father is adopted. In the absence of any special custom, Jains are governed by the ordinary Hindu law.

KALGAYDA TAVANAPPA v. SOMAPPA TAMANGAYDA (1909) . . . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 669

ADOPTIVE PARENTS.

See HINDU LAW—GUARDIAN—RIGHT OF GUARDIANSHIP . . . I. L. R. 3 Bom. 1

ADULT.

See NOTICE, SERVICE OF.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 286

ADULTERATION.

— of food—

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENGAL ACT III OF 1899), s. 495.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 643

ADULTERY.

See ABATEMENT OF PROSECUTION

4 Mad. Ap. 55

See DIVORCE ACT.

See MAINTENANCE, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO. I. L. R. 17 Mad. 260

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 470

— intent to commit—

See CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

I. L. R. 19 All. 74

— of partner with wife of co-partner.

See PARTNERSHIP—DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP . . . 5 B. L. R. 109

1. — Institution of proceeding by husband—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 478. Quære*: Is the formal assent of a husband to a charge of adultery, added at the end of his deposition, a proper compliance with s. 478, Act X of 1872? *QUEEN v. LUCKY NARAIN NAGORY* 24 W. R. Cr. 18

2. — Appearing as witness for prosecution in case of rape. *K* was accused by *D* and *P*, alleged to be *D*'s wife, of raping *P*, and was committed for trial charged in the alternative with rape or adultery. *Held*, that as no complaint had ever been actually instituted by *D* against *K* for the offence of adultery, as contemplated by s. 478 of Act X of 1872 (*Criminal Procedure Code*), the circumstances of *D*'s appearing as a witness for the prosecution for the offence of rape not amounting to the institution of a complaint within the meaning of that section, *K*'s conviction for adultery must be quashed. *EMPRESS v. KALLEE* I. L. R. 5 All. 233

3. — Proof of marriage—Charge of adultery. Before a person charged with adultery can be convicted, strict proof of the marriage is necessary. *QUEEN v. SMITH*

1. Ind. Jur. N. S. 8: 4 W. R. Cr. 31

SOBRATI v. JUNGHI . . . 2 C. W. N. 245

ADULTERY—*cont'd*

4. — Evidence Act, s.

50. The provisions of s. 50 of the Evidence Act show that where marriage is an ingredient in an offence, as in bigamy, adultery, and the enticing of married women, the fact of the marriage must be strictly proved. *Queen v. Wazira, 8 B. L. R. Ap. 63, overruled. EMPRESS v. PITAMBUR SINGH*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 566: 5 C. L. R. 597

EMPRESS v. ARSHED ALI . . . 13 C. L. R. 125

5. — Evidence Act, s.

50. *K* was accused by *D* and *P*, alleged to be *D*'s wife, of raping *P*, and was committed for trial charged in the alternative with rape or adultery. The evidence of marriage between *D* and *P* consisted of their statements that they were married to each other and of a statement by *K* that *P* was *D*'s wife. *K* was convicted on the charge of adultery. *Held*, that such evidence, having regard not only to s. 50 of the Evidence Act, 1872, but to the principle that strict proof should be required in all criminal cases, was not sufficient to establish the vital incident to the charge of adultery, namely, the marital relation of *D* and *P*. *EMPRESS v. PITAMBUR SINGH, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 566, concurred in. EMPRESS v. KALLEE* . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 233

6. — Marriage illegal

by Hindu law—Custom of caste—Penal Code, s. 49—Dissolution of marriage at will and marriage (*natra*) with another man—Custom. A custom of the Talapada Hali caste that a woman should be permitted to leave the husband to whom she has been first married and to contract a second marriage (*natra*) with another man in the lifetime of her first husband and without his consent, is invalid, as being entirely opposed to the spirit of the Hindu law; and the man with whom the woman so married, having had sexual intercourse with her, and it being found that he did not honestly believe that she had become his wife, was guilty of adultery under s. 497 of the Penal Code. *REG. v. KURSAN GOJA. REG. v. BAI RUPA* . . . 2 Bom. 124, 2nd Ed., 117

7. — Marriage contrary

to Hindu law—Custom of caste—Penal Code, s. 497. Where a prisoner accused of adultery sets up in defence a *natra* contracted with the woman with whom he is alleged to have committed adultery, in accordance with the custom of his caste, the question the Court has to determine is whether or not the accused honestly believed at the time of contracting the *natra* that the woman was the wife of another man. *REG. v. MANOHAR RAJJI* 5 Bom. Cr. 17

8. — Sagai marriage—

Custom of caste. Sagai wives, i.e., widows married in accordance with the custom of Sagai prevailing amongst the Koiries and other low castes of Behar, are so far the legal wives of their husbands as to justify the punishment of persons committing adultery with them. *BISSURAM KOIRIE v. EMPRESS* 3 C. L. R. 410

9. — Proof of adultery—Sexual inter-

course—Presumption of knowledge that woman is

ADULTERY—contd.

married. In a case of adultery, sexual intercourse must be proved; the sexual intercourse required for adultery being the same identical thing as the sexual intercourse required for rape. The difference lies in the mode of proof: in rape, no presumption of sexual intercourse can be made; in adultery, it can be from evidence pointing strongly to an inference of guilt. It is not necessary, therefore, that there should be direct evidence of an act of adultery, nor that the adulterer should know whose wife the woman is, provided he knew she was a married woman. *QUEEN v. MADHUB CHUNDER GIRI*
21 W. R. Cr. 13

10. ———— **Condonation of adultery—**
Penal Code, s. 497. The Appellate Court will not uphold a conviction for adultery when the husband has shown that he has condoned the offence.
QUEEN v. SMITH
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 8:4 W. R. Cr. 31

11. ———— **Enticing away woman—**
Penal Code, ss. 497, 498—Form of conviction. A prisoner need not be convicted both of adultery and enticing away the woman: the former (if there were any enticing away) would include it. *QUEEN v. POCHUN CHUNG*
2 W. R. Cr. 35

12. ———— *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 497, 498—Condonation.* The complainant alleged that his father-in-law had detained his wife, and that with his help the accused married his wife, and since then had kept her in his house. The accused was convicted under s. 498, Penal Code. The Sessions Judge made a reference under s. 438, Criminal Procedure Code, to the effect that the conviction under s. 498, Penal Code, was *brd.* inasmuch as there was no evidence whatever to show that the petitioner enticed away the complainant's wife from her husband's or her father's house with intent to have illicit intercourse with her, and that there could not be any conviction under s. 497, Penal Code, as the circumstances of the case warranted the conclusion that the offence, if any, had been condoned by the husband by his omission to take any steps since the last six or seven years against the accused. The High Court agreed with the view of the Sessions Judge. *JASIMADDIN SHEIKH v. ICHOUAK MISTRY.* 1 C. W. N. 498

13. **Charge—Complaint—Rape—Committal of accused on charge of rape—Addition by Sessions Judge of charge of adultery—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 199, 227 and 238—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 376 and 497.** Before a criminal charge of adultery can be preferred, a formal complaint of that offence must be instituted in the manner provided by s. 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, where an accused person was committed to the Sessions to stand his trial on a charge, preferred by a husband, of rape, under s. 376 of the Penal Code, and the Sessions Judge at the trial added a charge of adultery under s. 497 and acquitted the accused under s. 376, but convicted him of rape under s. 497: *Held*, that the Sessions Judge had acted without jurisdiction. The fact that the husband appeared as a witness in the prosecution of

ADULTERY—concld.

the offence of rape cannot be regarded as amounting to the institution of a complaint for adultery. *Empress v. Kallu, I. L. R. 5 All. 233*, followed. *CHEMON GARO v. EMPEROR* (1902)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 415
6 C. W. N. 677

14. ———— **Complaint—** "*Complaint,*" meaning of—*Prosecution for adultery or enticing away a married woman—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 4, cl. (h), 199.* The word "*complaint,*" in s. 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, means a "*complaint*" as defined by s. 4, cl. (h), of that Code. *Jatra Sheikh v. Reazat Sheikh, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 483*, distinguished. *TARA PROSAD LAHA v. EMPEROR* (1903) I. L. R. 30 Calc. 910

15. ———— **Marriage—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), Ch. X, ss. 497, 498—Enticement—Marriage, de facto, if sufficient for conviction, where marriage illegal—Mahomedan law—Marriage with wife's uterine sister in wife's lifetime and within the period of iddat following the death of her first husband—Whether nika ceremony confers validity on such marriage.** The question of the validity of the marriage is vital to the commission of an offence relating to marriage under Ch. XX of the Penal Code; and, where the validity of the marriage is questioned, mere proof of a *de facto* marriage would not be sufficient for a conviction under ss. 497, 498, Indian Penal Code. Where the complainant, a Mahomedan, married in *nika* form a woman who was the uterine sister of his wife, in the wife's lifetime, and also within four months and ten days of the death of the woman's former husband: *Held*, that the marriage being unlawful upon both these grounds under Mahomedan law, the performance of the *nika* ceremony alone would not give the complainant the status of a husband in relation to the woman, and the conviction of the accused under ss. 497, 498, Indian Penal Code, was bad. *DANESH SHEIKH v. TAFIR MANDAL* (1902)
7 C. W. N. 143

16. ———— **Living in—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 438, cl. 4—Living in adultery refers to course of conduct.** A single act of adultery does not necessarily amount to "*living in adultery*" within the meaning of s. 438, cl. 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and will now justify a Magistrate in refusing maintenance. "*Living in adultery*" refers to a course of conduct and means something more than a single lapse from virtue. *Kallu v. Kaunsilia, I. L. R. 26 All. 326*, followed. *PATALA ATCHAMMA v. PATALA MAHALAKSHMI* (1907)
I. L. R. 30 Mad. 332

ADVANCEMENT.

See ENGLISH LAW . . . 2 W. R. 141
See PARSIS . . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 75

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

See BHAGDARI AND NARWADARI ACT, 1862, ss. 3, 5 . . . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 399
See Co-SHARER, POSSESSION BY.
9 C. W. N. 32

ADVERSE POSSESSION—*contd.*

- See DECREE . . . 9 C. W. N. 296
 See FORFEITURE . . . 9 C. W. N. 553
 See HINDU LAW—JOINT FAMILY.
 11 C. W. N. 478
 See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
 I. L. R. 29 All. 133
 13 C. W. N. 698
 See LANDLORD AND TENANT—NATURE OF
 TENANCY . . . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 488
 I. L. R. 27 Bom. 515
 See LIMITATION . . . I. L. R. 27 All. 348
 See LIMITATION, MORTGAGE.
 See LIMITATION—QUESTION OF LIMITA-
 TION . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 664
 See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 4.
 I. L. R. 29 Calc. 518
 See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 7.
 9 C. W. N. 795
 See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II—
 ART. 134;
 I. L. R. 27 Bom. 363, 500
 ARTS. 134 AND 144;
 I. L. R. 27 Bom. 373
 See LIMITATION ACT XV OF 1877, SCH. II,
 ART. 139 . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 514
 ART 141; . . . I. L. R. 23 All. 448
 ART. 144—ADVERSE POSSESSION;
 See LIMITATION ACT, SCH. II, ART. 144.
 I. L. R. 27 All. 395
 See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 144
 (1871, ART. 145; 1859, s. 1, CL. 12)
 —ADVERSE POSSESSION.
 ART. 147; . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 35
 ART. 148; . . . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 500
 See MAHOMEDAN LAW . . . 9 C. W. N. 625
 See MORTGAGE . . . 9 C. W. N. 201
 See MORTGAGEE . . . I. L. R. 29 All. 640
 See ONUS OF PROOF—LIMITATION AND
 ADVERSE POSSESSION.
 I. L. R. 25 Bom. 362
 I. L. R. 24 Mad. 441
 See OWNERSHIP . . . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 712
 See POSSESSION—ADVERSE POSSESSION.
 See PRESCRIPTION . . . 9 C. W. N. 292
 See REVENUE SALE LAW, s. 54.
 13 C. W. N. 407
 See TITLE—TITLE BY LONG POSSESSION.
 13 C. W. N. 835
 ——— by lessee under invalid lease—
 See DEBUTTER . . . 10 C. W. N. 738
 See MORTGAGE . . . 10 C. W. N. 906

ADVERSE POSSESSION—*contd.*

1. ——— Tenants-in-com-
 mon—Exclusive receipt of profits by one tenant
 continuously for long time—Presumption as
 to actual ouster of other tenants-in-common.
 To constitute an adverse possession as between
 tenants-in-common there must be an exclusion
 or an ouster. Sole possession by one tenant-
 in-common continuously for a long period without
 any claim or demand by any person claiming under
 the other tenant-in-common is evidence from which
 an actual ouster of the other tenants-in-common
 may be presumed. *GANGADHAR v. PARASHRAM*
 (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 300
2. ——— Suit by co-sharer
 against lambardars for profits of his share—
 Limitation—Nature of possession of lambardar.—
 Held, that the fact that a co-sharer plaintiff
 in a suit against the lambardar for his share
 of profits for three years antecedent to the suit
 have received no profits for twelve years pre-
 vious to suit is not by itself sufficient to bar the
 suit in the absence of evidence that the defendant
 lambardar was during those twelve years holding
 adversely to the plaintiff. *Raj Bahadur v. Bharat*
Singh, I. L. R. 27 All. 348, followed. *Muham-*
mad Husain v. Badri Prasad Weekly Notes, 88,
 distinguished. *Mahadeo Prasad v. Raja Sawal*
Singh, L. P. A. No. 8 of 1902, decided on the
 13th of June 1902, discussed. *MIHIN LALL v.*
BADRI PRASAD (1905) . . . I. L. R. 27 All. 436
3. ——— Adverse possession
 against tenant, where adverse to landlord—Tenant
 holding over when dispossessed—Right of landlord to
 sue trespasser—Limitation. When there is a current
 lease, and the tenant is dispossessed by a third
 party, time does not commence to run against the
 landlord, until the expiration of the lease. *Krishna*
Gobind Dhur v. Hari Churn Dhur, I. L. R. 9 Calc.
 367, and *Sarat Sundari v. Bhoba Pershad*, I. L. R.
 13 Calc. 101, followed. But when the lease has
 expired and the tenant is holding over with the
 landlord's consent, and the possession of such third
 party is adequate in continuity, in publicity and
 in extent so as to show that it is possession adverse
 to the landlord, the latter is not precluded from
 determining the tenancy and suing the trespasser
 in ejectment, and his right to sue will be barred
 after 12 years of such possession. *Radhamoni Daby*
v. The Collector of Khulna, 4 C. W. N. 507, re-
 ferred to. *KISHWAR NATH SAHI DEV v. KALI*
SANKAR SHAHI (1905) . . . 10 C. W. N. 343
4. ——— Burden of proof—
 Title—Suit for possession of alluvial land. When a
 suit for possession is made by a plea of adverse pos-
 session during the limitation period, the question of
 limitation becomes a question of title and the plaintiff
 must first furnish *prima facie* proof of subsisting
 title at the date of the commencement of his suit
 before the defendant is required to establish his
 adverse possession. *Jafar Husain v. Mashuq Ali*,
 I. L. R. 14 All. 193, followed. Where land has
 been submerged proof of actual possession at the
 date of submersion would apparently be sufficient

ADVERSE POSSESSION—contd.

prima facie evidence of possession during the submersion. *Secretary of State v. Krishnamoni Gupta*, I. L. R. 29 Cal. 575. *MAZHAR HUSAIN v. BIHARI SINGH* (1906) . I. L. R. 28 All. 760

5. ———— *Limitation Act* (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 144—*Limitation—Lease—Possession derived from a lessee not necessarily adverse as against the lessor. Held*, that possession acquired during the continuance of a lease will not ordinarily be adverse possession as against the lessor until at any rate such time as the lessor becomes entitled to possession. The principle of *Muhammad Husain v. Mul Chand*, I. L. R. 27 All. 395; *Sharat Sundari Dabia v. Bhobo Pershad Khan Choudhuri*, I. L. R. 13 Cal. 101; *Womesh Chunder Goopla v. Raj Narain Roy*, 10 W. R. 15; *Krishna Gobind Dhur v. Hari Churn Dhur*, I. L. R. 9 Cal. 367; *Sheo Sohye Roy v. Luchmeshur Singh*, I. L. R. 10 Cal. 577; and *Gunga Kumar Mitter v. Asutosh Gossami*, I. L. R. 23 Cal. 863, followed. *Bejoy Chunder Banerjee v. Kally Prosonno Mookerjee*, I. L. R. 4 Cal. 327, referred to. *Lekhray Roy v. The Court of Wards on behalf of the Rajah of Durbhangah*, 14 W. R. 395; *Brindaban Chunder Sircar Chowdhry v. Bhoopal Chunder Biswas*, 17 W. R. 377; *Prosunmoyi Dasi v. Kali Das Roy*, 9 C. L. R. 377; and *Gobinda Nath Shaha Chowdhry v. Surja Kantha Lahiri*, I. L. R. 26 Cal. 460, not followed. *THAMMAN PANDE v. THE MAHARAJAH OF VIZIANAGRAM* (1907) I. L. R. 29 All. 593

6. ———— *Possession by guardian prima facie not adverse to the ward—Hindu Law—Reversioner, acceleration of succession of—No acceleration where gift to presumptive reversioner subject to obligations. It is well established* that possession is never to be considered adverse if it can be referred to any lawful authority. Possession of the ward's property by a guardian will be presumed to be on behalf of the ward and will not in the absence of evidence to the contrary be held to be adverse to the ward. A gift by a Hindu widow of property in which she has a widow's estate to the presumptive reversioner has not the effect of accelerating the succession of such reversioner, if the transfer imposes on the reversioner obligations which would not have existed if the property had devolved on him by inheritance. *SRIRAMULU NAIDU v. ANDALAMMAL* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 145

7. ———— *Adverse possession between tenants-in-common—What constitutes adverse possession—Acts of exclusive possession—Ouster. The property in dispute belonged jointly to two brothers G and D. The plaintiffs obtained a decree on a mortgage-bond against D as manager of the family, and in execution of the decree the property was sold to V. When V sought to take possession of the property he was obstructed by G and he had to file a suit against G to remove the obstruction. In that suit it was held on the 29th November 1886 that V was entitled to recover possession by partition of a*

ADVERSE POSSESSION—concl'd.

moiety of the property. The application to execute this decree was sent to the Collector who on the 11th of December 1895 effected the partition and made over symbolical possession to V of his share. This share was sold to plaintiff on the 18th March 1898. Meanwhile, on the 4th October 1894, G sold the whole of the property to defendant's father. The plaintiff eventually sued on the 4th October 1906 to recover possession of the property from defendant: the latter contended that the claim was barred by adverse possession. *Held*, that to entitle the defendant to add to the period of his own adverse possession (which was admittedly less than 12 years before the date of the present suit) the period of his vendor G's possession, it must be shown that the latter's possession was also adverse. That it could not be, so long as the decree for partition was alive and capable of execution as against G during the period of his exclusive possession, because during that period the decree forming the basis of the mutual rights and obligations of the parties prevented them from setting up any title contradicting it and thereby giving to either a new cause of action against the other. The question of adverse possession as between tenants-in-common depends not on a severance of the tenancy-in-common by partition, but on exclusive occupation by one co-tenant amounting to an ouster of the other.

AMRITA RAVJI v. SHRIDHAR NARAYAN (1908) ▯
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 317

ADVOCATE.

See BARRISTER.

See COUNSEL.

See STAMP-DUTY . I. L. R. 36 Cal. 645.

See WITNESS—PERSON COMPETENT TO BE WITNESS . . . 5 B. L. R. Ap. 28

——— admission by—

See LIMITATION ACT, s. 19—ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBTS.
I. L. R. 18 All. 384

——— entry as an—

See STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. II, ART. 11.
I. L. R. 8 Mad. 14

1. ———— *Right to appear—Criminal Courts—Prosecution—Pleader. A counsel or pleader is entitled to appear and act on behalf of the prosecution in the Criminal Courts. CHANDI CHARAN CHATTERJEE v. CHANDRA KUMAR GHOSE*
5 B. L. R. Ap. 70.
14 W. R. Cr. 23

2. ———— *Non-intervention of vakeel or attorney—Appeal from mofussil. An advocate of the High Court may appear at the hearing of an appeal from the mofussil on the direct instruction of a client, and without the intervention of vakeel or attorney. GOBIND CHANDRA DUTT v. HENDRY*
14 B. L. R. Ap. 12: 24 W. R. 15.

ADVOCATE—contd.

3. ——— **Filing appeal in Registrar's Office.** An advocate of the High Court is entitled to appear and plead on the Appellate Side, but not to file an appeal in the Registrar's Office. *RAM TARUK BARICK v. SIDDESSOREE DASSEE*

13 W. R. 60

4. ——— **Right to take instructions directly from client—Right to "act" for client—Practice—Barrister—Letters Patent, North-Western Provinces, ss. 7, 8—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 36, 39, 635.** Reading together ss. 7 and 8 of the Letters Patent for the High Court, and ss. 2, 36, 39, and 635 of the Civil Procedure Code, an advocate on the roll of the Court can for the purposes of the Code, perform on behalf of a suitor all the duties that may be performed by a pleader, subject to his exemption in the matter of a vakalatnama and to any rules which the High Court may make regarding him. No such rule having been made to the contrary, such an advocate may take instructions directly from a suitor, and may "act" for the purposes of the Code on behalf of his clients. *BAKHTAWA SINGH v. SANT LAL*

I. L. R. 9 All. 617

5. ——— **Privilege of speech.** Question of the extent of the privilege of speech accorded to advocates and counsel considered. *REG. v. KASHI NATH DINKAR*

8 Bom. Cr. 126

6. ——— **An advocate in India cannot be proceeded against, civilly or criminally, for words uttered in his office as advocate.** *SULLIVAN v. NORTON*

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 28

7. ——— **Vakalatnama, necessity for—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 186.** An advocate appearing in defence of an accused person under s. 186 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, should not be required to file a vakalatnama. *ANONYMOUS*

7 Mad. Ap. 41

8. ——— **Right to appear for prosecution in Sessions Court.** An advocate of the High Court may appear on behalf of the prosecution in the Court of Sessions and conduct the prosecution without being specially empowered by the Magistrate of the district for the purpose. *In the matter of the petition of GUNGADHUR SIRCAR*

23 W. R. Cr. 14

9. ——— **Right to sue on promissory note given for fees—Recorder's Act, XXI of 1863, s. 18.** With reference to s. 18, Act XXI of 1863, an advocate cannot sue upon a promissory note given by anticipation for fees not taxed; nor can the Court in such suit award to the plaintiff a quantum meruit for his services. *MACLEOD v. MAH MAH YET*

7 W. R. 390

10. ——— **Suspension of Advocate—Burma Courts Act, VII of 1872, s. 58—Entering into contract contrary to public policy.** In a case in which an advocate of the Recorder's Court at Rangoon was suspended by the Recorder under Act VII of 1872, s. 58, for having entered into a contract which was contrary to public policy, the High

ADVOCATE—contd.

Court, though reprobating such a practice as improper and mischievous, yet considered that a serious warning was all that was called for under the circumstances, inasmuch as it appeared that the advocate in this instance did that which was done by other advocates, even by persons to whom he might fairly look for an example. *In the matter of MOUNG HTOON OUNG*

21 W. R. 297

11. ——— **Professional misconduct—Hindu Law—Agreement—Compromise.** In proceedings for administration of the estate of a Hindu, who died intestate, the appellant, an Advocate in the Court of the Resident in Mysore, acted as legal adviser for two groups of persons, whose succession depended on whether the property of the deceased was separate or joint: in the former case one of his clients was exclusively entitled to the whole estate; in the latter the members of both groups were entitled to divide the estate equally. By two agreements executed on 17th May and 22nd August 1899, the persons composing the two groups bound themselves to treat the estate as joint-property and divide it accordingly: and both agreements were attested by the appellant. On 24th March 1900, the person, who would, if the estate were separate property, be exclusively entitled being then dead, letters of administration of the estate were granted to his two sons. Shortly afterwards, one of the second group of persons, relying on the agreements, sued the administrators for a share of the estate and for partition. The case of the administrators as to the agreements was that they had been entered into under mutual mistake of fact, namely, under the belief that all the parties to them were entitled to share in the estates and that there was no consideration for them. The District Judge, and on appeal the Resident, held that the estate was separate property, but the Courts differed as to the agreements, the Resident holding that the compromises embodied in them were valid and binding. Charges of professional misconduct were made against the appellant in respect of the agreements to the effect that, knowing them to be invalid, he had allowed his clients to execute them, and had even attested them himself, without warning them that they were invalid and that he knew that the father of the administrators and his sons after him were alone entitled to the estate and yet allowed those clients to give away their rights by compromises. The appellant admitted that at the time the agreements were executed he thought them to be invalid. The charges were held to be proved and the appellant was suspended from practice for four months. *Held*, that the charges could not be sustained. At the time the agreements were made and up to the decision on appeal that the property was separate it was a matter of opinion whether they were invalid or not, and they were eventually held to be valid. There was nothing to show that the appellant had any knowledge or any means of knowledge, which his clients did not possess; they were fully aware of their legal position, and were under no mistake, but deliberately

ADVOCATE—*contd.*

accepted the compromise to avoid further litigation.
In re LUBECK (1905) . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 151
 s.c. 10 C. W. N. 57
 L. R. 32 I. A. 21

12. *Charges against an advocate—Evidence—Conviction reversed.*
 The appellant, a barrister and advocate of the Chief Court of Lower Burma, was charged before the said Court with gross professional misconduct, in that (i) whilst employed as an advocate for the prosecution in an abduction case he advised the prosecutor's family to say nothing about letters having been received from his abducted daughter and designedly withheld from the police and the senior advocate for the prosecution the fact that such letters had been received; (ii) that whilst the trial was proceeding, and while acting as an advocate for the prosecution, he suggested or hinted to the prosecutor that he should influence or attempt to influence by improper means a certain expert witness in handwriting to give evidence favourable to the prosecution in connection with certain letters produced. He was acquitted on the first charge, but convicted on the second and dismissed from his office as an advocate of the said Court:—*Held*, on an examination of the evidence, that he must be acquitted on the second charge also. Evidence given by the said senior advocate and by the Government advocate of the prosecutor's statements to them in the absence of the appellant, even if admissible, could not avail to contradict the prosecutor's sworn denial that the appellant had advised him to bribe. Other evidence given was wholly insufficient and the improbabilities of the appellant having acted as charged were very great. *ROMANJEE COWASJEE v. CHIEF JUDGE AND JUDGES OF THE CHIEF COURT OF LOWER BURMA* (1906) . L. R. 34 I. A. 55
 s.c. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 129

13. *Dismissal of Advocate from his office for professional misconduct—Charge of advising client to bribe a witness—Evidence, admissibility of—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 154, 155, cl. (3), 157—Probabilities of case.* The appellant, an Advocate of the Chief Court of Lower Burma, was charged with having, whilst employed as an Advocate for the prosecution of certain persons being tried at the Criminal Sessions of the Court for the abduction of a girl, the daughter of one Ohn Ghine, advised Ohn Ghine to bribe a European witness in the case, the Government of India expert in handwriting, and with being "thereby guilty of gross professional misconduct." The charge was founded on short and hurried conversations (one in the corridor of the Court and the other in the Court itself) with his senior conducting the case, who, without being able to give the exact words, stated that the appellant had used expressions to the effect that he (the appellant) had done a thing he had never done before and had advised Ohn Ghine to bribe the witness. The appellant denied having done so, or having used any such

ADVOCATE—*contd.*

expressions as alleged. Ohn Ghine stated that the appellant had hinted to him that the witness should be "watched," and it was found as a matter of fact that he was watched, but there was no evidence that any one bribed or attempted to bribe him. The Chief Court, after examining witnesses and considering the evidence, found the appellant guilty and dismissed him from his office as an Advocate of the Court. *Held*, that the evidence of persons, to whom his senior had, in the absence of the appellant, repeated the conversations out of which the charge originated, though admissible in evidence under s. 157 of the Evidence Act, did not carry any further the determination of the real issue, whether the appellant did in fact advise Ohn Ghine to bribe the witness. Particulars given by his senior of interviews he had with Ohn Ghine, in the absence of the appellant and statements then made by Ohn Ghine; and particulars given by the Government Advocate of a conversation between Ohn Ghine and himself had been admitted in evidence by the Chief Court. *Held*, that such evidence was inadmissible for the purpose of impeaching Ohn Ghine's credit under s. 155, cl. (3), of the Evidence Act, or against the appellant, and that there was, therefore, no direct evidence except that of the senior Counsel conducting the case, and this, having regard to the fact that he could not remember the exact words used, and that the words deposed to were innocent or otherwise according to the context, and considering also the circumstances under which both conversations took place, was insufficient to support the grave charge made against the appellant. *ROMANJEE COWASJEE, In the matter of* (1906)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 129 : L. R. 34 I. A. 55

14. *Power of High Court to deal with Advocate who is also a member of the English Bar—Constitution of Bench of High Court under Rules of Court—Rules 2, 180, 181, 197—Letters Patent, cls. 7, 8—Misconduct—Libel on the Judges—Contempt of Court—"Reasonable cause" for suspension.* The High Court at Allahabad is not precluded from dealing under the Letters Patent of the Court with an advocate of the Court for misconduct by reason of his being a member of the English Bar. By rule 2 of the High Court Rules, a Bench of three Judges of the Court is a tribunal properly constituted to deal with a charge of misconduct made against an advocate of the Court. Rule 197 does not make a Bench of five Judges necessary in such a case, but only provides for cases in which the High Court may for good cause and without charge or trial suspend or remove from the roll any advocate of the Court. After an altercation, during the hearing of a case, with one of the Judges of the High Court, in the course of which he alleged that he had been told by the Judge to "hold his tongue" and to "sit down" an advocate of the Court attempted to defend his conduct by publishing in a newspaper, of which he was the editor, an article which was a libel reflecting not only

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on the Judge before whom he had appeared but upon other Judges of the Court in their judicial capacity, and in reference to their conduct in the discharge of their public duties, and which amounted to a contempt of Court which might have been dealt with as such by the High Court. *Held*, that such publication constituted under cl. 8 of the Letters Patent of the Court "reasonable cause" for an order suspending the advocate from practising. Such publication was not excusable on the ground that it was written in his capacity as editor of the newspaper and not in his capacity as an advocate. The controversy arose from the misbehaviour of the advocate conducting a case before the Court, and the contempt of which he was found guilty was committed in the attempt to vindicate his professional conduct in a publication for which he was solely responsible. *In re Wallace*, L. R. 1 P. C. 283, distinguished. *SARBADHICARY, S. B., In re* (1906). I. L. R. 29 All. 95; L. R. 34 I. A. 41

15. *Unprofessional conduct—Arrangement with client without intervention of Solicitor—Threat—Compensation.* An advocate of the High Court made an arrangement to do professional work for his client, without the intervention of a solicitor, at a fee of half the usual charge; and, on another occasion, he wrote to the same client to the effect that he had an offer to work professionally against her (the client) in a case the plaintiff of which was settled by him for her, and unless she paid him ten gold mohurs (five times the usual fee) for refusing the brief offered, he would take up the case against her. *Held*, that the advocate was guilty of highly unprofessional conduct. *S. K. H., AN ADVOCATE, In re* (1907). I. L. R. 34 Calc. 72

ADVOCATE GENERAL.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882), s. 539.

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—ADVOCATE GENERAL. Cor. 68
1 Bom. Ap. 9

case certified by—

See CONFESSION—CONFESSION TO POLICE OFFICER. I. L. R. 1 Calc. 207
I. L. R. 2 Bom. 61

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURTS, CL. 26.

See MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1854, s. 267. I. L. R. 16 Calc. 238

See TRUST. I. L. R. 18 Bom. 551

sanction by, to suit—

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CHARITIES.
I. L. R. 10 Mad. 375

sanction of, when necessary to bring suit.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 539.
9 C. W. N. 151

See PRACTICE. I. L. R. 29 Bom. 19, 133

ADVOCATE GENERAL—concl'd.

1. *Right to appeal—Suit relating to charitable fund—Statute 53 Geo. III, c. 155, s. 111.* By the 53 Geo. III, Cap. 155, s. 111, the Advocate General is entitled to appear and represent the Crown in informations for the administration of charitable funds. *ATTORNEY GENERAL v. BRODIE.* 4 Moo. I. A. 190

2. *Officiating Advocate General—Right to pre-audience.* The Officiating Advocate General having claimed pre-audience, the claim was questioned by a senior member of the Bar, but was allowed. *Held*, that down to the transfer of the Government of India to Her Majesty, the Advocate General of the East India Company was not entitled as such to pre-audience in the Courts without a patent of precedence that the Attorney General and Solicitor General in England enjoy precedence as representing the Sovereign, and not by patent; and that the Advocate General and Officiating Advocate General for the time being are entitled to similar pre-audience as the Attorney General in England. *ADVOCATE GENERAL (OFFG.), In the matter of the claim of*
Bourke O. C. 224 : A. O. C. 110

3. *Affidavit of document by order of the Prothonotary against Advocate General—Power of the Court—Prerogative of the Crown—Practice—High Court Rule 88—Civil Procedure Code, s. 129.* The position of the Advocate General in India corresponds by statutory enactments to the position held by the Attorney General in England and there is ample authority for the view that, generally speaking, the Attorney General is not called upon to make discovery on oath. An order by the Prothonotary calling upon the Advocate General to show cause why a suit instituted by him should not be dismissed for want of prosecution is not one which is within the jurisdiction of the Prothonotary to make. *ADVOCATE GENERAL OF BOMBAY v. ADAMI* (1905)
I. L. R. 30 Bom. 474

4. *Suit by Advocate General at instance of relators dismissed—Appeal by Advocate General—No appeal by relators—Maintainability.* A suit having been brought by the Advocate General he is the proper party to appeal and not the relators. The relators are not parties to the suit and as relators they have no right to step in when the Advocate General, who was plaintiff, has not thought fit to appeal against the dismissal of the suit. *JAN MAHOMED v. SYED NURUDIN* (1907). I. L. R. 32 Bom. 155

AFFECTION.

See HINDU LAW. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 721

AFFIDAVIT.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—STAY OF EXECUTION. I. L. R. 15 Bom. 536

See PENAL CODE, ss. 499, 500.
8 C. W. N. 292

See POWER OF ATTORNEY.
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 625

AFFIDAVIT—concl'd.

—— affirmed before Deputy Magistrate.

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERALLY.
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 653

—— contents of—

See COMPANY—WINDING UP —LIABILITY
OF OFFICERS . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 88

—— contradictory—

See INJUNCTION—INJUNCTION UNDER
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.
14 B. L. R. 352

—— of convicted person applying for
revision.

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERALLY.
I. L. R. 19 All. 200

—— of documents.

See INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS.
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 105, 891
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 7
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 581
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 350

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—AFFIDAVITS.

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—COMMISSION
FOR TAKING ACCOUNTS.
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 158

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—INSPECTION
AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 587

See PRACTICE—CRIMINAL CASES.
8 Bom. Cr. 126
10 Bom. 102

See STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. II, CL. (b).
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 276

—— right to use—

See CERTIORARI, WRIT OF.
10 Bom. 102, 109 note

—— sufficiency of—

See RULE TO SHOW CAUSE.
3 B. L. R. Ap. 153

See SUMMONS—SERVICE OF.
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 201
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 101

AFFRAY.

See PENAL CODE, s. 150.
I. L. R. 17 All. 166

See RIOTING . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 392

**AFRICA ORDERS IN COUNCIL, 1889,
1892, 1893.**

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
GENERAL JURISDICTION.
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 54

AGE.

—— false representations as to—

See MINOR—LIABILITY OF MINORS ON, AND
RIGHT TO ENFORCE, CONTRACTS.
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 265

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I. L. R. 30 Calc. 539

—— proof of—

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 32.
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 265

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 32, CL. (5).
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 184

AGENCY.

See POWER-OF-ATTORNEY.
13 C. W. N. 1190

See COMPANIES ACT, s. 4.
13 C. W. N. 638

AGENCY COURTS IN KATHIAWAR.

See PRIVY COUNCIL.
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 219

AGENCY RULES.

See GUARDIANS AND WARDS ACT, 1890,
s. 1 . . . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 227

See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASE—GENERAL
CASES . . . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 329

—— appeal under—

See VALUATION OF SUIT—APPEALS.
I. L. R. 22 Mad. 162

See RULES MADE UNDER ACTS.
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 345

—— Agency rule 22 of 1840 made
under Act XXIV of 1839 for Ganjam and
Vizagapatam. Agency rule No. XXII made in
1840, under the powers conferred by Act XXIV of
1839, is a valid rule. MAHARAJAH OF JEYPORE *v.*
PAPAYYAMMA . . . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 329

**AGENCY TRACTS, JURISDICTION
OVER—**

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—
MADRAS, CRIMINAL.
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MADRAS—CIVIL.
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 266

AGENT.

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 595

See BENGAL RENT ACT (1869), s. 30.

See BILL OF LADING 13 C. W. N. 733

See BROKER . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 124

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 37,
38, 417, 432 (1859, s. 17).

See CONTRACT . . . 13 C. W. N. 59

AGENT—contd.

- See CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872).
I. L. R. 32 Bom. 356
- See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882,
s. 45 (1872, s. 90) 23 W. R. Cr. 60
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 603
- See HUSBAND AND WIFE.
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 140
- See INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS.
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 294
- See LIMITATION ACT, SCH. II, ART. 89.
13 C. W. N. 212
- See MAHOMEDAN LAW—PRE-EMPTION—
CEREMONIES . W. R. 1864, 219
I. L. R. 1 All. 521
I. L. R. 7 All. 41
- See OATHS ACT, s. 9.
I. L. R. 14 Bom. 455
- See POSSESSION, ORDERS OF CRIMINAL
COURT AS TO—PARTIES TO PROCEED-
INGS . 7 C. W. N. 825
- See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
- See PROBATE . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 357
- See SUMMONS, SERVICE OF.
I. L. R. 4 Bom. 416
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8 Bom. O. C. 159
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17 W. R. 33
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 733
- acknowledgment of debt by—
- See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 19—AC-
KNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBTS.
- See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 19—AC-
KNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBTS.
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 220
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KNOWLEDGMENT OF OTHER RIGHTS.
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 99
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- authority of—
- See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—AUTHORITY
OF AGENT.
- See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 20.
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 647
- liability of sons and grandsons
of—
- See ACT XV OF 1877, SCH. II, ART. 57
I. L. R. 31 All. 429
- of Company.
- See INCOME-TAX ACT (II OF 1886).
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 332

AGENT—concl.

- of Court of Wards, suit against—
See OUDE LAND REVENUE ACT, ss. 175,
176 . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 729
I. L. R. 22 I. A. 90
- of Foreign Sovereign.
- Court of Agent, Jurisdiction of—
Act XV of 1840—Bom. Regs. XXIX of 1827 and
XIII of 1830. A sanad issued to an Agent of
H. H. Holkar, under Act XV of 1840 and Regu-
lation XIII of 1830, was held not to be invalidated
by the omission to enter the Agent's name in any list
of exempted or empowered persons under Regula-
tions XXIX of 1827 and XIII of 1830. The omis-
sion to secure the agent any specific jurisdiction
under Regulation XIII of 1830 was held to disen-
title him from exercising any but the most ordinary
jurisdiction which could be exercised under that law.
SABHARAM BIN VITHAJI v. SADASHIV BIN SAYAJI
1 Bom. 96
- of Governor of Madras.
- See REVISION—CIVIL CASES.
I. L. R. 16 Mad. 229
- See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASE—GENERAL
CASES . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 329
- Agency of Ganjam and Vizaga-
patam—Agent's Court at Vizagapatam, juris-
diction of—Ganjam and Vizagapatam Agency
Court's Act (XXIV of 1839). The Agent to the
Governor at Vizagapatam has jurisdiction over all
suits of a civil nature arising in the Agency. The
rule regarding the institution of suits of a lesser
pecuniary value than Rs. 5,000 in the Divisional
Assistant's Court is, like the analogous rule con-
tained in s. 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, one of
procedure, and not of jurisdiction. Where, there-
fore, a suit which might have been instituted in the
Court of the Divisional Assistant was brought in the
Agent's Court: *Held*, that the Agent had jurisdic-
tion to entertain it. *Nidhi Lal v. Mazhar Hossain*,
I. L. R. 7 All. 230, *Matra Mandal v. Hari Mohan*
Mullick, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 155, *Krishnasami v.*
Kanakasabai, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 183, and *Augustine*
v. Medlycott, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 241, followed.
Velayudam v. Arunachalam, I. L. R. 13 Mad.
273, considered. GOURACHANDRA PATNAIKUDU v.
VIKRAMA DEO . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 367
- of Manager of railway.
- See RAILWAYS ACT, 1890, s. 77.
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 306
- of Sirdars in Dekhan.
- See PENSIONS ACT, s. 4.
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 224
- AGENT AND SUB-AGENT.**
- See ACCOUNT . 12 C. W. N. 1035
- AGGREGATE VALUE.**
- See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL.
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 400

AGRA AND OUDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT (I OF 1900).

See NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND
OUDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT (I OF 1900).

AGRA LAND REVENUE ACT (XIX OF 1873).

See NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES LAND
REVENUE ACT.

AGRA RENT ACT (XII OF 1881).

See NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT
ACT.

AGRA TENANCY ACT (II OF 1901).

1. ——— s. 4—*Tenant—License to cut grass from embankments of a Railway line—Profit a prendre—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.* A person authorized by a Railway Company to cut grass from the Railway embankments is not a tenant within the meaning of section 4 of the Tenancy Act, and the payment which he agreed to make is not rent. The right which he obtained under the agreement is in the nature of *profit a prendre*. A suit for recovery of the amount agreed upon lies in the Civil Court. *B. & N.-W. RAILWAY v. BANDHU SINGH* (1909) . I. L. R. 31 All. 342

2. ——— ss. 4 (5), 32 (2)—*Rent-free grant—“Holding”—“Tenant”.* Held, that a rent-free grant is not a “holding,” nor is the grantee a “tenant” within the meaning of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901. *Abdul Karim v. Ramzan, Weekly Notes 1908, 197*, approved. *SAGAR MAL v. MAKHAN LAL* (1908) . I. L. R. 31 All. 49

——— s. 7—*Applicability of, to mortgage executed in 1894—Mortgage of sir—Whether mortgagor obtains exproprietary rights.* *R* in 1894 made a usufructuary mortgage of his *sir* land to the plaintiff. *S*, the son of *R*, on the following day executed a *kabuliat* promising to pay rent in respect of that land to the mortgagee. The lower Appellate Court held that *S* was joint with his father at the time of the mortgage and became an exproprietary tenant and was not liable to pay a higher rent than such tenants were liable to pay. Held, that the mortgage having been made in 1894, the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1901 did not apply, and the mortgagor acquired no exproprietary rights in respect of the *sir*. *S* was therefore liable to pay rent at the rate mentioned in the *kabuliat*. *Madho Bharti v. Barti Singh*, I. L. R. 16 All. 337, followed. *SHEO LAL SINGH v. SUKHDEO SINGH* (1909)

I. L. R. 31 All. 368

——— ss. 8, 20 and 22—*Fixed rate tenant Transfer—Succession—Claim of sister to inherit.* A transferee from a zamindar under a deed which purports to confer all the rights of a tenant at fixed rates, acquires only rights of an occupancy tenant, and not those of a fixed-rate tenant as defined in s. 8 of the Tenancy Act. The fixed-rate tenant referred to in s. 20 of the Tenancy Act is a tenant described in s. 8 of that Act, and not a tenant who, under a contract with the zamindar,

AGRA TENANCY ACT (II OF 1901)— *contd.*

holds at a fixed rate of rent. The interest of such transferee cannot, under s. 22 of the Tenancy Act, devolve upon his sister. *BACHCHI v. BACHCHI* (1906) . I. L. R. 28 All. 747

1. ——— s. 20—*Statute 24 and 25 Vict., Ch. CLIV—Occupancy holding—Sale in execution of Civil Court decree—Subsequent relinquishment of holding by tenant in favour of landlord.* A in execution of a decree for maintenance got the occupancy holding of her husband sold, purchased it herself, and afterwards sold it to the defendant. Subsequently the husband relinquished the holding to the plaintiff, his landlord. Held, that the fact that the relinquishment by the husband may have been intended to defeat the defendant's claim did not prevent the defendant's claim being absolutely barred by the provisions of s. 20 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901. *Jagoe v. Harrington*, 10 L. R. Ireland, 335; *Donoughmore v. Forest*, Ir. Rep. 5 Com. L. 443 (Exch. C.), *Gilman v. Murphy* Ir. Rep. 6 Com. L. 34, referred to. *MADAN LAL v. ALI NASIR KHAN* (1905) . I. L. R. 28 All. 696

2. ——— ss. 20, 21, 31—*Occupancy holding—Rights of alienation possessed by occupancy tenants—Mortgage.* Held, that the law enacted in ss. 20, 21 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, obliterates any distinction which might have existed or have been supposed to exist between the right of occupancy and the right to occupy wherever transfers were made or contemplated by tenants, and that the tenants mentioned in these sections can no longer transfer either the right of occupancy or the right to occupy otherwise than by a sub-lease. A subsequent mortgagee of an occupancy holding, whose mortgage was executed after the coming into force of the Agra Tenancy Act, has therefore no right to redeem a prior mortgage over the same holding. *Khiali Ram v. Nathu Lal*, I. L. R. 15 All. 219, and *Brij Mohan Das v. Algu*, I. L. R. 26 All. 78, distinguished. *Madan Lal v. Muhammad Ali Nasir Khan, Weekly Notes 1906, 182*, approved. *BANMALI PANDE v. BISHESHAR SINGH* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All. 129

3. ——— *Occupancy holding—Usufructuary mortgage—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 23.* An occupancy tenant executed a usufructuary mortgage of his occupancy holding and then executed a *kabuliat* undertaking to pay rent for the mortgaged land. Held, on suit by the mortgagee for rent under the terms of the *kabuliat*, that the agreement between the parties was of a nature which, if permitted, would defeat the provisions of the Tenancy Act, 1901: that it was unlawful within the meaning of s. 23 of the Contract Act, and void. *Harnandan Rai v. Nakchedi Rai, Weekly Notes, 1906, 302*; *Banmali Pande v. Bisheshar Singh*, I. L. R. 29 All. 129, and *Madan Lal v. Muhammad Ali Nasir Khan*, I. L. R. 28 All. 696, followed. *RAM SARUP v. KISHEN LAL* (1907) . I. L. R. 29 All. 327

AGRA TENANCY ACT (II OF 1901)—
contd.

1. s. 22.—*Occupancy holding—Succession.* Under the Agra Tenancy Act of 1901 the personal law of the parties concerned is no longer applicable to the case of succession to an occupancy holding but the holding descends to all the male lineal descendants in the male line of descent of last owner, without exclusion, by the nearer of the more remote. *BHURA v. SAHAB-UD-DIN* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 128

2. s. 22.—*Occupancy holding—Succession—“Male lineal descendant”—Illegitimate son—Hindu law.* Held, that the illegitimate son of a man belonging to one of the Sudra caste by a kept woman, or continuous concubine, was capable of succeeding to the occupancy holding of his father as a “male lineal descendant” within the meaning of s. 22 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901. *Inderu Valungyooly Taver v. Ramasawmy Pandia Talevar*, 13 Moo. I. A. 141, *Sarasuti v. Mannu*, I. L. R. 2 All. 134, and *Hargobind Kuari v. Dharam Singh*, I. L. R. 6 All. 329, referred to. *RAM KALI v. JAMMA* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 508

ss. 22, 32 (2).

See ACT NO. XII OF 1881, s. 9.

I. L. R. 31 All. 51

ss. 31, 57, 179, 199.—*Suit by zamindar for ejectment of tenant and sub-lessee—Appeal—Jurisdiction.* A zamindar sued to eject one of his occupancy tenants and also certain sub-lessees to whom the occupancy tenant had sub-let part of his holding for building purposes: Held, that this was a suit falling within s. 31 (2) of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, and an appeal from the decree therein lay to the Commissioner and not to the District Judge. *LACHMAN DAS v. NABI BAKHSI* (1908).

I. L. R. 31 All. 109

1. s. 32.—*Occupancy holding—Jurisdiction—Civil and Revenue Courts.* Where plaintiffs sued in a Civil Court for possession under an agreement of part of an occupancy holding: Held, that the suit would not lie, being contrary to the intention of s. 32 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901. *ACHHEY LAL v. JANKI PRASAD* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All. 66

2. s. 32.—*Expropriatory holding—Suit for possession of half of an expropriatory holding.* The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of one-half of an expropriatory holding, and added a prayer for “any other relief which might in the opinion of the Court be deemed just and proper.” Held, that the suit for possession of half of the expropriatory holding would not lie, being opposed to s. 32 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, but that on the finding that the plaintiffs’ share in the holding was one-half, the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree declaring their right to a half share. *ASHIQ HUSAIN v. ASGHARI BEGAM* (1907)

I. L. R. 30 All. 90

AGRA TENANCY ACT (II OF 1901)—
contd.

3. s. 32.—*Division of occupancy holding—Suit for declaration of right—Suit maintainable.* A suit for a declaration of right to a share in an agricultural holding is maintainable and is not forbidden by the provisions of s. 32, Agra Tenancy Act, 1901. *Ashiq Husain v. Asghari Begam*, I. L. R. 30 All. 90, followed. *Achhey Lal v. Janki Prasad*, I. L. R. 29 All. 66, overruled. *NAJIB-UL-LAH v. GULSHER KHAN* (1909)

I. L. R. 31 All. 348

ss. 58, 197.—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 45—Joint suit for arrears of rent of several holdings.* Held, that the provisions of s. 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to a suit for arrears of rent under the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, so as to admit of a joint suit being brought in respect of arrears of rent due in respect of several holdings. On the contrary the Act contemplates that one suit should be brought in respect of each separate holding. *JAGANNATH PARSAD v. TORI* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All. 18

ss. 58, 57 (a) and (c) and 80.—*Landholder and tenant—Ejectment—Construction of document—Lease—Condition inconsistent with the provisions of the Tenancy Act.* The plaintiff leased a village to the defendant. The defendant executed a *kabuliat* containing, amongst other provisions, a covenant for payment of the rent, amounting to Rs. 7,050, half in the month of Kartik and half in the month of Baisakh, as also, in the event of the revenue of the village being enhanced, enhanced rent to the extent of the increase in the revenue. The lessee also covenanted to plant 10 bighas *kham* per plough with indigo and to transmit the indigo to the plaintiff every year and also to render in kind other produce. The *kabuliat* further contained a provision that the lessee should not allow any tenant to acquire occupancy rights, and that on failure to observe this provision he should pay to the lessor Rs. 50 per plough as enhanced rent during the term of the lease. There was a further provision that, if the lessee failed to comply with the conditions of the lease, the plaintiff should have the power to dispossess him during the term of the lease. On failure of the lessee to observe the conditions above set forth, the lessor sued for and obtained a decree for his ejectment. Held, that the condition of forfeiture for non-payment of rent was inconsistent with the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, and the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain his suit for ejectment. But, inasmuch as the lease would expire by effluxion of time within a year from the date of the High Court’s judgment, the lessee was not under s. 80 of the Act entitled to be restored to possession. *TARA SINGH v. KHUSHHAL KUNWAR* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 610

s. 63.—*Effect of tenant acquiring a share in the village.* A tenant who, during the period of his occupancy, acquires a share in the proprietorship of a village, retains nevertheless the status of a tenant in respect of his holding and is

AGRA TENANCY ACT (II OF 1901)— contd.

subject to all the incidents of his tenancy. *Kakhan-ud-din Khan v. Bhogi Tewari*, S. A. 739 of 1889, followed. *ABUL HASAN KHAN v. BHURA* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 763

ss. 79 and 81—*Civil and Revenue Courts—Jurisdiction—Suit by ejected tenant for restoration to possession—Limitation.* An occupancy tenant died leaving two daughters, who had their names recorded as occupancy tenants of their deceased father's holding, but never obtained actual possession thereof. On the contrary, the zamindar put in his own tenant. One of the daughters of the late occupancy tenant, however, gave a lease of half the holding, and the lessees ultimately sued the zamindar's tenant in a Civil Court to recover possession. *Held*, that the plaintiff's proper remedy was by suit under s. 79 of Act II of 1901, and as he had been out of possession for something like three years, his suit was barred by limitation. *Dalip Rai v. Deoki Rai*, I. L. R. 21 All. 204, referred to. *RAM LAL v. CHUNI LAL* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 372

ss. 83 et seq.—*Land-holder and tenant—Surrender by tenant of his holding—Notice.* Before a valid notice of surrender of his holding can be served on a land-holder through the Tahsildar under the provisions of s. 85 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, it is a condition precedent that the tenant should have himself given notice under s. 83 or s. 84 and that the land-holder should have refused to receive such notice. *SUMERA v. PIARE LAL* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 122

s. 134.

See PENAL CODE, s. 1884.

I. L. R. 27 All. 480

ss. 156, 164 (2)—*Lambardar and co-sharer—Liability of successor in office for uncollected profits:—Held*, that the successor in title of a deceased lambardar is not liable to account for profits which his predecessor may have failed to collect or which he permitted to remain uncollected owing to negligence or misconduct. *DIP SINGH v. RAM CHARAN* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All. 15

s. 159—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 310 A.

I. L. R. 31 All. 179

ss. 167, 177—*Execution of decree—Appeal—Revision—Jurisdiction.* A suit was dismissed by the Revenue Court as not cognizable by it and the District Judge, upon appeal, having dealt with it under sections 196 and 197 of the Tenancy Act, made a decree, execution of which was applied for in the court of the Assistant Collector of the first class who rejected the application: *Held*, that no application in revision lay against the order of the Assistant Collector refusing execution. *DAMBER SINGH v. SEIKRISHEN DAS* (1909) I. L. R. 31 All. 445

AGRA TENANCY ACT (II OF 1901)— contd.

1. ss. 175 and 180—*Appeal—Jurisdiction—Letters Patent, cl. 10.* *Held*, that the words of s. 180 (2) (b) of the North-Western Provinces Tenancy Act, 1901, "A question of jurisdiction has been decided" means "decided by the Collector as an Appellate Court." Where a question of jurisdiction had been decided by the Court of first instance (Assistant Collector), but was not raised before or decided by the Appellate Court (Collector), it was *held*, that no appeal would lie to the District Judge. *Held*, also, that s. 175 of the said Act has no effect upon the jurisdiction conferred by s. 10 of the Letters Patent of the Court. *ZAMIN ALI KHAN v. GENDA* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 375

2. ss. 175, 180 and 193—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 2—"Decree"—"Order"—Appeal.* *Held*, that no appeal will lie from an appellate order of a Collector, as distinguished from an appellate decree, in proceedings under the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901. In order to decide what are "orders" and what "decrees" under the Tenancy Act, 1901, the definitions contained in the Civil Procedure Code, s. 2, must be applied. *DHANI RAM v. BHOLA SINGH* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 21

1. ss. 176, 177, 182—*Jurisdiction—Appeal.* *Held*, that no third appeal will lie to the High Court from a decree of the District Judge passed in appeal from an appellate decree of the Collector under the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901. *Lachmi Narain v. Nirotam Das*, Weekly Notes, 1906, 251, followed. *LACHMI NARAIN v. NIROTAM DAS* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All. 69

2. ss. 176, 177 and 193—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2 and 244—"Orders"—"Decree"—Appeal.* *Held*, that an appeal will lie to the District Judge from an order of an Assistant Collector of the first class, if such order, by the force of s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, amounts to a decree. *KHARAG SINGH v. POLA RAM* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 31

3. ss. 176, 177 and 193—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2 and 244—Order—Decree—Appeal.* No appeal lies, from the order, as distinguished from the decree of an Assistant Collector of the first class. *Kharag Singh v. Pola Ram*, I. L. R. 27 All. 31, overruled. *ZOHRA v. MANGU LAL* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 753

1. s. 177—*Question of proprietary title—Jurisdiction—Civil and Revenue Courts.* *Held*, that the question whether a tenant, defendant in a suit for ejectment, is a tenant of one kind or another is not a question of proprietary title within the meaning of s. 177 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901. *Chhitar Singh v. Rup Singh*, Weekly Notes, 1906, 147, dissented from. *NIRANJAN v. GAJADHAR* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 133

2. ss. 177, 199 and 200—*Question of proprietary title—Appeal—Civil and Revenue*

AGRA TENANCY ACT (II OF 1901)—
contd.

Courts—Jurisdiction. When a Revenue Court, under the powers conferred on it by s. 199 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, decides a question of proprietary title it becomes for the moment a Civil Court; an appeal lies at the instance of either party to the District Judge, and if such an appeal is wrongly preferred to and decided by a Commissioner, such decision will have no effect in preventing the Revenue Court's decree from becoming final. *GENDA v. SUKH NATH RAJ* (1907) **I. L. R. 30 All. 25**

1. — s. 193—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 562 and 588—Remand—Appeal. There is no appeal from an order of remand passed under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure in a suit or proceeding under the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901. *VILAYAT HUSEN v. MAHENDRA CHANDRA NANDY* (1906) **I. L. R. 28 All. 88**

2. — Procedure—Order remanding case to Court of first instance for retrial—Appeal. Held, that no appeal lies from an order of an appellate Court in a suit under the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, remanding the case to the Court of first instance for trial upon the merits. *ZAHUR ALI v. SHER ALI* (1905) **I. L. R. 28 All. 283**

s. 199—

See EJECTMENT, SUIT FOR.

I. L. R. 29 All. 601

1. — Determination by Revenue Court of question of proprietary title—Res judicata. Where in a suit filed in a Revenue Court a question of proprietary title is raised and the Court, acting under s. 199 of the Agra Tenancy Act, elects to determine such question itself, such decision of the Revenue Court will operate as *res judicata* in respect of a subsequent suit in a Civil Court for determination of the same question. *Salig Dube v. Deoki Dube*, **All. W. N. 1907, I**, followed. *BENI PANDE v. RAJAH KAUSAL KISHORE PRASAD MAL BAHADUR* (1906) **I. L. R. 29 All. 160**

2. — (a)—Limitation—Defendant referred to Civil Court—Limitation Act (XV of 1877)—Sch. II, Art. 120. When under s. 199 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, an order is passed by a Revenue Court directing the defendants to file a suit in a Civil Court within the time limited by that section, the ordinary period of limitation is thereupon suspended and the special period provided by the Tenancy Act is substituted. The defendant filed a suit in the Civil Court within three months. It was decided against them. They appealed and in appeal withdrew their suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit. Held, that the fresh suit filed after the expiry of the period limited by the order of the Revenue Court, was barred and the defendants could not fall back upon the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877. *BANWARI LAL v. MUSAMMAT GOPI* (1907) **I. L. R. 30 All. 441**

AGRA TENANCY ACT (II OF 1901)—
contd.

3. — Suit for arrears of rent—Tenant not pleading proprietary title—Subsequent suit for declaration of title—Res judicata. In a suit for arrears of rent under Act No. II of 1901 the plaintiff did not set up his proprietary title to the land in suit. Held, that a subsequent suit in the civil court for establishment of his proprietary right was barred by the principle of *res judicata*. *Behari v. Sheobalak*, **I. L. R. 29 All. 601**, followed. *LAL SINGH v. KHALIQ SINGH* (1909) **I. L. R. 31 All. 323**

s. 201.—

See NORTH-WEST PROVINCES RENT ACT
s. 93.

1. — Evidence Act, I of 1872, s. 4—Evidence—Record of plaintiff's name as a co-sharer—Presumption. The presumption enjoined by cl. (3) of s. 201 of the Agra Tenancy Act is not conclusive, even in a Revenue Court, but may be rebutted, as for instance, by evidence showing that the plaintiff has not been in possession of the property in respect of which profits are claimed for more than twelve years before suit, and the defendants have openly denied the plaintiff's title for more than that period. *Niaz Ali Khan v. Gobind Ram*, **F. A. F. O. No. 70 of 1904, decided May 22, 1905**, distinguished. *DIL KUNWAR v. UDI RAM* (1906) **I. L. R. 29 All. 148**

2. — Suit for profits—Receipt of profits within 12 years of suit denied—Plaintiff's recorded co-sharers—Burden of proof. The plaintiff's recorded co-sharers sued another co-sharer for profits. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiffs or their predecessors in title had not received profits within twelve years preceding the institution of the suit, and that the suit was time-barred. Held, that it was not for the plaintiffs to prove by evidence of receipt of profits within twelve years that the right subsisted: and that s. 201 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, raised a presumption in their favour. *Mihin Lal v. Badri Prasad*, **I. L. R. 27 All. 436**, referred to. *BANWARI LAL v. NIADAR* (1906) **I. L. R. 29 All. 158**

3. — Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 4—Evidence—Presumption—Record of plaintiff's name as a co-sharer. Held, on a construction of s. 201 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, that the words "if in any suit instituted under the provisions of Chapter XI the plaintiff is recorded as having such proprietary right, the Court shall presume that he has it" mean that so far as the Revenue Court is concerned, such Court is bound to presume in favour of the plaintiff and it is for the defendant "to establish by suit in the Civil Court that the plaintiff has no such proprietary right." *Dhanka v. Umrao Singh*, **I. L. R. 30 All. 58**, and *Dil Kunwar v. Uday Ram*, **I. L. R. 29 All. 148**, dissented from. The judgment of

AGRA TENANCY ACT (II OF 1901)—
concl'd.

Richards, J., in *Dhanka v. Umrao Singh*, *Weekly Notes* 1907, 43, followed. *Banwari Lal v. Niadar*, I. L. R. 29 All. 158 explained. *BECHAN SINGH v. KARAN SINGH* (1908) . I. L. R. 30 All. 447

4. ————— *Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 4—Evidence—Presumption—Record of plaintiff's name as a co-sharer.* Held, that the presumption enjoined by s. 201, clause (3) of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, is not conclusive, but may be rebutted by evidence offered to the contrary. *Banwari Lal v. Niadar*, I. L. R. 29 All. 158 referred to. *DHANKA v. UMRAO SINGH* (1907) . I. L. R. 30 All. 58

5. ————— s. 201 (3)—*Presumption—Suit for profits in Revenue Court—Question of title decided by Civil Court.* In a suit for profits the defendants pleaded that the plaintiff had no title to certain plots. The Assistant Collector partially decreed the claim. The defendant thereafter and when an appeal was pending before the District Judge obtained a declaration of title to the plots from the Civil Courts. The lower Appellate Court held that without correction of the *khevat* the Civil Court's decree could not be given effect to in the Revenue Court. Held, that when as between parties to a revenue suit, a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction has decided the title to the property adversely to the plaintiff who claims profits, the Revenue Court is not competent to ignore that decision. *Durga Shankar v. Gur Charan*, *Weekly Notes* 1906, 1, referred to. *BHAWANI SINGH v. DILAWAR KHAN* (1909) . I. L. R. 36 All. 253

6. ————— s. 201 (3)—*Presumption—Question of title decided by Civil Court—Subsequent suit for profits by recorded co-sharers.* When a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction has decided a claim to property, and this has been followed by a wrong entry in the revenue papers: Held, that in a subsequent suit for profits the claim must be in proportion to the share obtained under the Civil Court decree and no presumption arises under section 201 of the Agra Tenancy Act. *GOBINDI v. SAHEB RAM* (1909) . I. L. R. 31 All. 257

————— s. 202—*Question of tenant right in Civil Court—Question decided by Civil Court,—Appeal—Procedure.* Where in contravention of the provisions of s. 202 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, a Civil Court heard and determined a suit in which a question of tenant right was raised, and on appeal the lower Appellate Court remanded the suit under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was held that the lower Appellate Court ought not to have remanded the case, but should itself have passed the order required by s. 202 of the Tenancy Act, and the High Court made such an order. *JAGAN NATH v. BHAWANI* (1905) . I. L. R. 27 All. 167

————— ss. 210, 211, 39—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 310A.
I. L. R. 31 All. 279

AGREEMENT.

See ACCOUNT . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 107

See ADVOCATE . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 151

See CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 420

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 375.
13 C. W. N. 1023

See COMPROMISE DECREE.

13 C. W. N. 217

See CONSIDERATION.

See CONTRACT. . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 354

See CONTRACT ACT, ss. 23, 27.

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 107

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 520

See CONTRACT ACT, ss. 2, 23, 25 AND 63.
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 66, 326
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 411

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 27.

13 C. W. N. 388

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 51.

8 C. W. N. 28

See CO-SHARERS I. L. R. 35 Calc. 331

See HINDU LAW—WIDOW.

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 446

See IMPARTIBLE ESTATE.

8 C. W. N. 186

See KABULIYAT.

See PRACTICE . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 310

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS.

See SETTING ASIDE SALE.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 226

See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

13 C. W. N. 326

See STAMP ACT . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 426

See STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. I, ART. 5.

See STAMP-DUTY . 11 C. W. N. 1120;
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 111

————— acknowledging a debt—

See STAMP ACT (II OF 1899), SCH. I, ARTS.
1, 5 . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 373

————— [between Government and Government Solicitor.

See COSTS—TAXATION OF COSTS.

17 Mad. 162

————— between husband and wife—

See DIVORCE . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 874

————— breach of, to pay a certain sum—

See PENALTY . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 960

AGREEMENT—contd.

- _____ collateral to lease—
 See EVIDENCE—PAROL EVIDENCE—
 VARYING OR CONTRADICTING WRITTEN
 INSTRUMENTS . I. L. R. 29 I. A. 138
- _____ executed both in England and
 India.
 See STAMP . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 134
- _____ for differences—
 See CONTRACT—WAGERING CONTRACTS.
 I. L. R. 25 All. 38
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- _____ for maintenance—
 See MAINTENANCE, ORDER OF CRIMINAL
 COURT AS TO . I. L. R. 25 All. 165
- _____ for not enforcing payment of
 instalments—
 See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION
 OF DECREE ON OR AFTER AGREEMENTS
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 I. L. R. 29 Calc. 810
- _____ illegal—
 See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23.
 See RECEIVER . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 696
- _____ in satisfaction of judgment-debt—
 See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 257A.
 6 C. W. N. 27
 I. L. R. 25 All. 317
- _____ no bar to partition—
 See HINDU LAW—PARTITION—PARTITION
 OF PORTION OF PROPERTY.
 I. L. R. 25 Mad. 585
- _____ not to appeal—
 See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—PRAC-
 TICE AND PROCEDURE—MISCELLANEOUS
 CASES . . . 9 B. L. R. 460
 See CONTRACT ACT, s. 28.
 I. L. R. 1 All. 267
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 I. L. R. 10 Calc. 455; 10 C. L. R. 443
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 See COUNSEL . . . 9 B. L. R. 460
- _____ not to partition—
 See HINDU LAW—PARTITION—AGREE-
 MENT NOT TO PARTITION.
- _____ of parties—
 See EXECUTION I. L. R. 36 Calc. 422
- _____ of relinquishment, validity of—
 See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION
 OF WILLS—ESTATES ABSOLUTE OR
 LIMITED . . . 7 C. W. N. 688

AGREEMENT—contd.

- _____ secret—
 See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
 I. L. R. 26 Bom. 689
- _____ to give time for satisfaction of
 judgment debt—
 See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 257A.
 I. L. R. 26 Mad. 19
- _____ to lease—
 See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
 13 C. W. N. 328
- _____ to pay interest—
 See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—
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 I. L. R. 30 Calc. 446
- _____ to re-convey on re-payment of
 purchase-money—
 See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—MISCELLA-
 NEOUS CASES . . . 6 C. W. N. 192
- _____ to refer to arbitration—
 See COMPROMISE—COMPROMISE OF SUITS
 UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.
 I. L. R. 30 Calc. 218
- _____ to remain united—
 See HINDU LAW—PARTITION—EFFECT OF
 PARTITION . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 725
- _____ to sell—
 See CONTRACT ACT, s. 65.
 I. L. R. 25 All. 618
 See LIMITATION ACT, XV OF 1877, SCH.
 II, ART. 97 . I. L. R. 31 All. 68
- _____ unregistered—
 See REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877).
 s. 17 . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 783
- 1. _____ *Agreement to refer*
 matter in dispute between the parties to a Com-
 mission appointed by Court, and to abide by his
 report—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882),
 ss. 150 and 151—Estoppel—Equitable estoppel.
 In a suit for possession of land, the plaintiff
 and defendants, while the case was in the
 Court of the Munsiff, applied that a pleader
 might be appointed as Commissioner to ascertain
 who held the land on either side of the *khal* in dis-
 pute, and agreed that, if the plaintiffs were found in
 possession of such land, they should get a decree;
 while if defendant No. 1 was found in possession the
 suit should be dismissed. Accordingly, a Commis-
 sioner was appointed, and the plaintiff's suit was
 decreed in accordance with the Commissioner's re-
 port. From this decision the defendants appealed
 to the Subordinate Judge, who remanded the case
 to the first Court. *Held*, that the agreement be-
 tween the parties to abide, by the decision of the
 Commissioner on the fact of possession was a valid

AGREEMENT—concl'd.

agreement, and that, when that agreement was given effect to and carried out, it would be inequitable to allow the defendants to resile from it, they were estopped in equity from so doing, and the order of remand passed by the Subordinate Judge was bad in law. *Protap Chundra Dass v. Arathoon*, I. L. R. 8 Cal. 445, referred to. *BAHAR DAS CHAKRAVARTI v. NOBIN CHUNDER PAL* (1901) I. L. R. 29 Cal. 306

2. ———— *Agreement of parties to refer question to Court for decision—Decision, if appealable—Court acting as arbitrator—Extra cursum curiae.* In the course of a suit for recovery of possession of some land, the parties, who owned different shares of a *pergunnah*, came to an agreement to the effect that they should ask the Court to decide the question of title on the basis of the *thakbust* map only, and the plaintiff said he would abide by that decision. The Court decided accordingly and held that "the *thak* map itself showed that the plaintiff's predecessor and his co-sharers were disputing about the land and the survey map showed that it was newly formed *chur* land, and that in such circumstances the *thak* map could not be held sufficient evidence of plaintiff's title." *Held*, that in deciding the question on the basis of the *thakbust* map, in accordance with the agreement of the parties the Court acted as arbitrator, and hence no appeal lay from that decision. *SARADINDU ROY v. BHAGABATI DEBYA CHOWDHURANI* (1906) . 10 C. W. N. 835

3. ———— *Opposed to public policy—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 23—Promise to pay money to procure resignation of public office not enforceable.* An undertaking to pay money to a public servant, to induce him to retire and thus make way for the appointment of the promisor, is virtually a trafficking with reference to an office and is void under s. 23 of the Contract Act. *Parson v. Thompson*, I. H. L. 322; 2 R. R. 773, followed in principle. *SAMINATHA AIYAR v. MUTHUSAMI PILLAI* (1907) . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 530

AGRICULTURAL TENANCY.

——— *ejectment.*

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
13 C. W. N. 949

"AGRICULTURAL YEAR."

See DEED—CONSTRUCTION.
I. L. R. 18 All. 388

——— *expiration of—*

See NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACTS (1873 AND 1881), s. 94.
I. L. R. 1 All. 512

AGRICULTURIST.

——— *definition of—*

See DEKHAN AGRICULTURISTS ACT, s. 2.
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 255

AGRICULTURIST—concl'd.

——— *definition of—concl'd.*

See DEKHAN AGRICULTURISTS RELIEF ACT.
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 469
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 504

AGRICULTURISTS LOANS ACT (XII of 1884).

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—INCUMBRANCES—NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES LAND REVENUE ACT.
I. L. R. 22 All. 321

——— s. 5—

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT (BEN. ACT VII OF 1880), ss. 2, ETC.
I. L. R. 29 Cal. 537

——— s. 5—*Ex-proprietary tenant—Mortgage of trees to secure takavi advance—Relinquishment of ex-proprietary holding to zamindars.* Certain ex-proprietary tenants, in return for loans taken from Government, mortgaged to Government some trees standing on their holding. They then purported to relinquish the holding to the zamindars. The loan not being repaid, Government caused the trees to be sold. *Held*, that the zamindars could have no claim against the purchaser for the price of the trees. *Sham Das v. Batul Bibi*, I. L. R. 24 All. 538, followed. *BABU LAL v. RAM SAHAI* (1904) . I. L. R. 26 All. 540

AIR.

See EASEMENT. I. L. R. 28 Bom. 428
9 C. W. N. 543

See LIGHT AND AIR.

AJMERE COURTS REGULATION (I of 1877).

——— ss. 17, 18, 21, 36, 37—*Reference to the High Court by the Chief Commissioner of Ajmere and Mairwara—Reference to Chief Commissioner by Commissioner of Ajmere—Appeal from Commissioner's decree made in accordance with Chief Commissioner's judgment.* On an appeal from a decision in a civil suit of the Assistant Commissioner of Ajmere to the Commissioner of Ajmere, the latter, feeling doubtful on a question of the nature specified in s. 17 of the Ajmere Courts Regulation I of 1877, referred such question, under s. 36 of that Regulation, to the Chief Commissioner of Ajmere and Mairwara. The Chief Commissioner dealt with the case as prescribed in s. 37 of that Regulation, and returned it to the Commissioner, who dismissed the suit in accordance with the Chief Commissioner's judgment. The plaintiff preferred an appeal to the Chief Commissioner from the Commissioner's decision. The Chief Commissioner did not make any order on the memorandum of appeal admitting it, or directing that it should be registered, or that the respondent should be summoned, or that the appellant should appear on a certain day under s. 551 of Act X of 1877, but issued a notice to the appellant's counsel to appear on a certain day. The appellant's counsel appeared

AJMERE COURTS REGULATION (I OF 1877)—concl'd.

on that day, and the Chief Commissioner intimated that he was acting under s. 551 of Act X of 1877. The appellant's counsel then proceeded to address the Chief Commissioner, and was heard for some time, and then stopped in consequence of the Chief Commissioner resolving to refer to the High Court the question whether the appeal from the Commissioner's decision lay to him or to Her Majesty in Council. The Chief Commissioner subsequently referred such question to the High Court. *Held* by the Full Bench (SPANKIE, J., dissenting), on a reference by the Division Bench before which the Chief Commissioner's reference came, that such question arose "in the trial of an appeal" within the meaning of s. 21 of the Ajmere Courts Regulation I of 1877, and was properly referred to the High Court. *Held* by the Division Bench (SPANKIE, J., and STRAIGHT, J.), that the appeal from the Commissioner's decision lay, in this particular case, not to the Chief Commissioner, but to Her Majesty in Council. *THAKUR OF MASUDA v. THE WIDOWS OF THE THAKUR OF NANDWARA* . I. L. R. 2 All. 819

s. 18 *et seq.*—*Reference by Commissioner of Ajmere—Powers of High Court—Jurisdiction.* *Held*, that where a point of law or a question as to the construction of a document is referred to the High Court by an order purporting to be made under s. 18 of the Ajmere Courts Regulation, the High Court cannot consider whether the point referred arises in the case in which the reference before it has been made or not, but its functions are limited to pronouncing an opinion on any point which may be so referred to it. *KALIAN MAL v. RAM KISHEN* . I. L. R. 21 All. 163

s. 33—*Mortgage—Suit for redemption—Application of the rule of "damdupat."* *Held*, that the rule laid down by s. 33 of Regulation I of 1877 applied only to cases in which money is payable by the defendant to the plaintiff, and is not applicable to a suit for redemption of a mortgage. *Nawab Azimut Ali Khan v. Jowahir Singh*, 13 Moo. I. A. 404, 414, referred to. *NEMI CHAND v. RADHA BALLABH* (1904) . I. L. R. 26 All. 354

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— by guardian.

See ACT XL OF 1858, s. 18.

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7).

— by Hindu widow.

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— Gradual accretion—
Definition. Held, that accretion to be considered "gradual" must be by gradual, slow, and imperceptible means. *Lopez v. Muddun Mohun Thakoor*, 13 Moo. I. A. 467, *Krishna Chandra v. Saeedan Bibi*, 2 A. L. J. 821, and *Ritraj Kunwar v. Sarsaras Kunwar*, I. L. R. 27 All. 655, referred to. *NARENDRA BAHADUR SINGH v. ACHHAIBAR SHUKUL* (1906)
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— Rights of ownership and easement—*Suit claiming rights of ownership and easement whether maintainable.* Held by the Full Bench, that a suit is not liable to be dismissed because the plaintiff claims in the alternative over the same plot of ground rights (i) of ownership and (ii) of easement. *Bijoy Keshub Roy v. Obhoy Churn Ghose*, 16 W. R. 198, overruled. *NARENDRA NATH BARARI v. ABHOY CHARAN CHATTOPADHYA* (1906) . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 51

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- See REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877).
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 502

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- See LOCAL INVESTIGATION.
- power and functions of, in measuring land.
See PENAL CODE, s. 186.
I. L. R. 18 Calc. 518
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 286
- report of—

- See FALSE EVIDENCE—CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS . I. L. R. 17 All. 436
- See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—REPORT OF AMEEN.

1. — Functions of Ameen—*Deputation of Ameen to ascertain liabilities of judgment-debtors.* The deputation of an Ameen to ascertain the respective liability of several judgment-creditors is not an improper course for a Court to pursue, and at all events is not a ground for interfering in special appeal with the concurrent judgment of two Courts. *KRISTO CHUNDER GUPTO v. BROJO MOHUN DEY CHOWDHRY* . 22 W. R. 183

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2. ———— *Local investigation—Act VIII of 1859, s. 180.* Functions of an Ameen appointed to hold a local investigation, under s. 180, Act VIII of 1859, discussed. ISWAR-CHANDRA DAS v. JUGAL KISHOR CHUCKERBUTTY

4 B. L. R. Ap. 33

17 W. R. 473 note; 21 W. R. 281 note

3. ———— *Local investigation.* There were no limits to the powers conferred by Act VIII of 1859 on a Civil Ameen for the purpose of making an investigation. MOHUN LALL ROY v. URNOPOORNA DASSEE

9 W. R. 566

4. ———— A Civil Court is not warranted in deputing its functions to an Ameen, and an Ameen is bound not to go beyond the points referred to him for enquiry. RAM DHUN DEY v. RAM MONEE DEY

21 W. R. 280

ISWAR CHANDRA DAS v. JUGAL KISHOR CHUCKERBUTTY

4 B. L. R. Ap. 33

17 W. R. 473 note; 21 W. R. 281 note

See BURODA CHURN BOSE v. AJOODHYA RAM KHAN

23 W. R. 286

5. ———— *Power of Mufti Sudder Ameen to set aside attachment issued by himself.* A Mufti Sudder Ameen may set aside an attachment in a suit issued from his Court, and no longer properly in force in the suit, although no express statutory power to do so exists. But on a petition to set aside such an attachment, he cannot also make a declaration as to the right to the property attached and claimed to have been acquired subsequently, and direct that possession should be transferred to the petitioner. *Ex-parte* CHELLAP. PERUMAL PILLAI

1 Mad. 135

6. ———— *Evidence taken by Ameen—Irregular order.* Where a Principal Sudder Ameen had deputed a Civil Ameen to enquire into the fact of possession, instead of hearing the evidence on the point himself:—*Held*, that, even if the Principal Sudder Ameen's order was improper, the deputation of the Ameen was legal, and the evidence taken by the Ameen was legal evidence, to be considered on its own merits. RAM CHURN MAHTOON v. SURUBJIT MAHTOON

9 W. R. 494

7. ———— *Power to examine witnesses—Duties and functions of Ameen.* An Ameen should be appointed to hold a local investigation only when it is necessary to inspect the land which is the subject of dispute, to take maps of localities, to obtain information with regard to the physical features of the place, to identify the land in maps with parcels which are the subject of the suit, and to identify the maps with one another with the aid of objects to be found in the land; and for these and similar purposes an Ameen may examine witnesses when the evidence which they have to give is of such a nature that it ought to be taken by him on the spot. Where, however, any fact can be proved by evidence taken otherwise than on the spot, that evidence ought to be taken by the Court itself in a

AMEEN—contd.

regular manner, and not by an Ameen. *Quare.* Whether, where an Ameen has in fact been, though improperly, deputed, and has examined witnesses, that evidence ought to be totally rejected. BIND-ABUN CHUNDER SIRCAR CHOWDRY v. NOBIN CHUNDER BISWAS

17 W. R. 282

8. ———— *Evidence taken by Ameen.* It is not admissible. CHAND RAM v. BROJO GOBIND DOSS

19 W. R. 14

9. ———— It was not the intention of the Legislature to allow witnesses to be examined out of Court by Ameens, except with reference to points for the determination of which local inspection is required. SHAHDOO SINGH v. RAMANOOGRAHA LALL

9 W. R. 83

10. ———— The report of an Ameen as to a local enquiry upon a matter which no personal inspection on his part could decide, and in regard to which the depositions of parties acquainted with the place could afford proper information, was held to be in no way irregular, simply by reason of his having examined witnesses on the spot. SHEO NARAIN BRUGGUT v. BUDH SINGH

11 W. R. 423

11. ———— *Local investigation—Suits for enhancement of rent—Act VIII of 1859, s. 180.* In suits for enhancement of rent it is a proper course of procedure to appoint an Ameen to make a local investigation in order to enquire as to the description of the land and as to the rates paid in the neighbourhood for similar land, and the Ameen has power, under s. 180, Act VIII of 1859, to examine witnesses in the matter. GAUR CHANDRA ROY v. RASHBEHARI DUTT

1 B. L. R. S. N. 1: 10 W. R. 43

12. ———— An Ameen appointed to hold a local investigation has power to examine witnesses relative to the matter he has to enquire into; but the Munsif has no power to direct the Ameen to try the whole case: when this course was adopted, the High Court expressed their disapproval of such a practice, and remanded the case to the Munsif for re-trial. RAGHUNATH SHAW v. RAJKRISHNA DEB

1 B. L. R. S. N. 2

13. ———— *Direction to enquire into mesne profits.* An Ameen, when directed to make an enquiry as to mesne profits, ought not, in the execution stage of a suit, to enter into enquiries as to dates of dispossession, which must be taken to have been determined by the decree. BIJOY GOBIND NAIK v. KALI PROSSONO NAIK

16 W. R. 294

14. ———— *Enquiry by Ameen as to existence and value of moveable property—Time for making enquiry.* In a suit in which the Court considers it necessary to order an enquiry by a Civil Ameen into the existence and value of moveable property, such enquiry cannot be left to be made after decree, but must be made before the final decree is drawn up. ROHINI DEBIA v. DIG-AMBUR CHATTERJEE

23 W. R. 422

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15. ——— Deputation of second Ameen to make enquiry before first Ameen's proceedings are annulled. When an enquiry has been made by a Commissioner under the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court to which it is reported ought not, unless it annuls the proceedings of the first enquiry, to order another on the same matter. *AZIM ALI KHAN BAHADOOR v. SURUSSUTTY DEBIA.*
23 W. R. 93

16. ——— Objections to Ameen's report. Where clear instructions as to a local enquiry ordered by the Court are given to an Ameen in the presence of both parties, and no objection is made to them by either party then and there, they have no ground of complaint, after the Ameen has carried out his instructions, if the Court acts upon his report. *BISSESSUR ROY v. KANCHUN ROY.*
11 W. R. 155

17. ——— Objections to the Ameen's report should be enquired into if taken within a reasonable time from the return of the report, even where the case has been struck off the file. *ISSUR CHUNDER AHREE v. SYAM KHAN CHOWDRHY.*
11 W. R. 95

18. ——— Notice of time fixed for. Reasonable notice must be given of the time fixed for hearing objections to the report. *RAM NARAIN SING v. GOBERDHUN LALL CHOWDRHY.*
21 W. R. 2

19. ——— Party not appearing at local investigation. A party who refuses to appear before an Ameen at the time he holds his local investigation, is not at liberty afterwards to take any objection to the Ameen's report. *BAMUN DOSS MOOKERJEE v. BROJO KISHORE MITTER MOJOMDAR.*
6 W. R. 130

20. ——— Misconduct of Ameen. The Court is bound to enquire into charges against a Civil Court Ameen (such as can be readily enquired into, and their truth either disproved or proved). *ABDOOL KUREEM BISWAS v. CAMPBELL.*
8 W. R. 172

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I. L. R. 35 Calc. 294

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I. L. R. 26 Bom. 326

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I. L. R. 28 Calc. 720

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12 C. W. N. 958, 966

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I. L. R. 28 All. 273

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I. L. R. 30 All. 192

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See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF
1884), ss. 263, 273 . 5 C. W. N. 331

— *Elephant—Animals feræ naturæ—Right of property—Animus revertendi—Recapture.* When a wild animal has escaped from captivity and pursuit of it has been given up, the property, which a man may formerly have had in it, ceases, and it becomes open to any one else to reduce the animal to his possession, when it will, for the time, become his property. An animal, which has gone away and may be supposed to be likely to return to a state of captivity, is not a wild animal. Where an elephant, which had apparently been in a state of domestication for a long time, disappeared from the jungle, where it regularly grazed, but resumed its domestic habits on being recaptured: *Held*, that the elephant was not a 'wild animal,' and that the property in it never ceased with the original owner. *Chytun Churn Doss v. The Collector of Sylhet*, 21 W. R. 75, and *Peel v. Campbell*, 3 C. L. R. 515, referred to. *MAHADAR MOHANTA v. BALARAM GAGOI* (1908) I. L. R. 35 Calc. 413 s. c. 12 C. W. N. 547

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I. L. R. 29 Mad. 541

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13 B. L. R. 160, 163 note

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1. ABATEMENT OF APPEAL.

1. ———— *Death of respondent pending appeal—Suit for accounts of partnership—Application for substitution of representative made out of time—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 175 (c)—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 363, 582—Act VII of 1888, s. 66.* A respondent, to whom a sum of money was due under the decree of the first Court, died pending an appeal to the High Court, and an application to have a representative substituted for him on the record was not made within six months after his death, and no sufficient cause was shown for the delay. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee, that the nature of the suit being such that the cause of action did not survive against the remaining respondents alone, the appeal abated under s. 368 (as amended by s. 66

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of Act VII of 1888) and s. 582 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) and had been rightly dismissed by the High Court on that ground. *RAJ CHUNDER SEN v. GANGA DAS SEAL AND RAMGHATI DHUR v. RAJ CHUNDER SEN* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 487
S. C. L. R. 31 I. A. 71

2. ———— *Abatement of appeal—Practice—Personal right to sue—Suit dismissed—Appeal by plaintiff—Decease pending appeal—Abatement—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 361, 582.* A suit was brought by a plaintiff, who claimed to be the sister's son of a deceased, and as such the nearest reversioner, to set aside alienations made by the widow. The suit was dismissed on the ground that plaintiff had failed to establish the legitimacy of his mother, and the plaintiff appealed. While the appeal was pending, the plaintiff died. His son thereupon applied by petition to carry on the appeal, and his petition was allowed without notice being issued to the other parties. At the hearing of the appeal it was objected that the alleged right on which the suit was based was personal to the plaintiff, even assuming that he was the reversioner, and that, such right having ceased with plaintiff's death, the appeal abated. *Held*, that the right to sue in the case was a personal right and ceased with the death of the plaintiff, and the appeal abated. *SAKYAHANI INGLE RAO SAHIB v. BHAVANI BOZI SAHIB* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 588

3. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 368—Death of one of the defendants—Heirs of the deceased defendant—Joint and several liability of defendants—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 12—Transfer—Rent—Valid transfer.* Where the liability of the defendants is joint and several, and in appeal, on the death of one of the defendants, his legal representatives are not substituted in his place, the appeal abates only so far as the deceased defendant is concerned. *Hem Kunwar v. Amba Prosad*, I. L. R. 22 All. 430, distinguished. Where a transfer of a tenure is only colourable and *benami*, such a transfer cannot discharge the transferor from liability to pay rent, even if the tenure was transferable and the transfer was made by a registered *kobala*. *Kristo Bulluv Ghose v. Kristo Lal Singh*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 462, and *Chintamani Dutt v. Rash Behari Mondul*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 17, distinguished. *JOY GOBIND LAHA v. MONMOTHO NATH BANERJI* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 580

4. ———— *No abatement by death of respondent when appeal could proceed in the absence of his representative.* An appeal does not abate by reason of the failure of an appellant to bring on record the representative of a deceased respondent within the time prescribed therefor, if the appeal can proceed in the absence of such representative to a final and complete adjudication. *RENGA SRINIVASA CHARI v. GNANAPRAKASA MUDALIAR* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 67

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5. ——— *Legal representative—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 368, 582—Substitution—Suit by joint-owners to set aside revenue sale—Death of some of plaintiffs, respondents, during pendency of appeal.* During the pendency of an appeal against a decree setting aside the sale of a joint estate for arrears of revenue, two of the plaintiffs, respondents, died and there was no application for substitution of the heirs of the deceased respondents, the right to sue not surviving against the other respondents. *Held*, that the appeal should abate inasmuch as the decree could not be reversed without the representatives of the deceased being placed on the record. That under no circumstances could the decree be affirmed as to the unascertained shares of some joint shareholders and reversed as to the unascertained shares of the other joint shareholders. DHARANJIT NARAYAN SINGH v. CHANDESHWAR PRASAD NARAYAN SINGH (1907) 11 C. W. N. 504

2. ACTS.

1. ——— Act XXXV of 1858—*Order on application for permission to alienate property of lunatic.* An appeal lies under s. 22 of Act XXXV of 1858 against an order passed on an application for permission to alienate the property of a lunatic. DINESH CHUNDER BANERJI v. SOUDAMINI DEBI 4 C. W. N. 526

2. ——— Act XL of 1858, ss. 21 and 28—*Order rejecting application for removal of guardian.* The order of a Judge rejecting an application for the removal of a guardian under Act XL of 1858 is appealable. *In the matter of the petition of* MOHENDRO NATH MOOKERJEE 7 B. L. R. Ap. 9

MOHENDRO NATH MOOKERJEE v. BAMA SOONDUREE DABEA . . . 15 W. R. 493

3. ——— *Cancelling of order appointing Collector manager.* Whether a Judge cancels his own order under Act XL of 1858 appointing the Collector to take charge of a minor's estate, a friend of the minor on behalf of the minor as the party interested is at liberty to appeal under the provisions of s. 28. SHEO PERSHUN CHOBAY v. THE COLLECTOR OF SABUN . . . 13 W. R. 256

4. ——— *Party to proceedings—Right of appeal.* Any person who, being a party to proceedings taken under Act XL of 1858, is injuriously affected by an order passed thereon, is, under s. 28 of that Act, entitled to an appeal. *In the matter of the petition of* NAZIRUN MUHAMMEE v. NAZIRUN . . . 1 L. L. R. 6 Calc. 19 6 C. L. R. 210

5. ——— *Order refusing to recall certificate under Act XL of 1858.* Where a Civil Court, in the exercise of its discretionary power, refuses to recall a certificate granted under Act XL of 1858, there is no appeal from such refusal.

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CHUMUTKAR MOHINEE DOSSEE v. RAJ RAKHAL MITTER . . . 22 W. R. 479

6. ——— *Burma Courts Act (XVII of 1875), s. 95—Certificate of administration.* The appeal given by s. 28 of Act XL of 1858 is subject to the ordinary law of appeal laid down in the Burma Courts Act. No appeal, therefore, will lie from an order refusing an application for the issue of a certificate of administration under Act XL of 1858, it being impossible to place any specific money valuation on such an application. *In the matter of the petition of* MULLA ADJIM I. L. R. 14 Calc. 351

7. ——— Act IX of 1861, order passed under. An appeal lies, under Act VI of 1871, to the Judge from an order of the Subordinate Judge passed under Act IX of 1861. SONAMONEE DOSSEE v. JOY DOORGA DOSSEE . . . 17 W. R. 551

8. ——— Act XXIII of 1861, s. 6—*Talabana, failure to deposit—Application for review of judgment.* A filed a memorandum of appeal, but failed to deposit the sum required to defray the cost of issuing the usual notice on the respondent. When the case came on for hearing, it was found that, in consequence of A's failure to deposit, no notice had been served on the respondent; and the judge dismissed the appeal under s. 6 of Act XXIII of 1861. Within 30 days after this, A presented a petition, explaining the reasons of his default, and praying that, on payment of the talabana, the appeal might be restored to its place; but the Judge, without considering the reasons which A had given in his petition, disallowed his prayer. *Held*, that no appeal lay from the order of the Judge rejecting A's petition, which was of the nature of an application for a review of judgment. KALIKRISHNA CHANDRA v. HARIHAR CHUCKREBUTTY 1 B. L. R. A. C. 155 10 W. R. 160

9. ——— *Order dismissing appeal for want of prosecution.* There was no provision in s. 6, Act XXIII of 1861, for the re-admission of appeals once dismissed under the provisions of that section. No appeal lay from the order dismissing them. RAMESSUR DUTT v. LOOT-FUNNISSA . . . 6 W. R. Mis. 130

10. ——— Act XIV of 1863—*Proceedings of Settlement Officer under Act XIV of 1863.* The proceedings of a Settlement Officer under s. 8, Act XIV of 1863, were not judgments or orders appealable to the Judge, or especially to the High Court under Act X of 1859. AHMED ALI KHAN v. NUBEEA . . . 2 Agra 239

11. ——— Act XIX of 1863—*Suit for partition under Act XIX of 1863, s. 8.* An appeal lay to the Judge, in cases of partition under Act XIX of 1863, where the objection raised by the party opposing partition is severalty of holding by virtue of a former partition. KUNCHUN SINGH v. CHOONNA . . . 1 Agra Rev. 44

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12. ——— Act XX of 1863, order passed under. An appeal does not lie from an order passed under the Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863), but the party dissatisfied with the order may seek to set it aside by a regular suit. *KHURIRAM SINGH v. SHAM SINGH POOJOORY*
W. R. 1864 Mis. 25

KALUB HOSSEIN v. ALI HOSSEIN . 4 N.W. 3

13. ——— s. 5—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 647*. An appeal lies under s. 647 of the Code of Civil Procedure against an order of a District Court under s. 5, Act XX of 1863. *SULTAN ACKENI SAHIB v. BAVA MALIMIYAR* . . . I. L. R. 4 Mad. 295

14. ——— *Order appointing trustee of religious endowment—Civil Procedure Code, s. 622—Superintendence of High Court*. No appeal lies to the High Court from the order of a District Judge under s. 5 of Act XX of 1863 appointing a trustee of a religious endowment. *Minakshi v. Subramanya, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 26*, followed. *Sultan Akeni Sahib v. Bava Malimiyyar, I. L. R. 4 Mad. 295*, dissented from. The High Court, therefore, can revise such an order under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. *SOMASUNDARA MUDALIAR v. VYTHILINGA MUDALIAR*
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 285

15. ——— s. 10—*Order of District Judge filling vacancy on committee*. It is not to be assumed that there is a right of appeal in every matter which comes under the consideration of a Judge; such right must be given by the enacted law or equivalent authority. The High Court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the order of a District Judge made by him on petition pursuant to s. 10 of Act XX of 1863 (Religious Endowments), appointing a member to fill a vacancy in a committee. Neither that Act nor the general law gives any right of appeal, which therefore does not exist, from such an order. *MINAKSHI NAIDU v. SUBRAMANYA SASTRI*
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 26
I. L. R. 14 I. A. 160

16. ——— s. 18. No appeal lies from an order passed under Act XX of 1863, s. 18. *DELRUS BANOO BEGAM v. ABDOOR RAHMAN*
21 W. R. 368

17. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 622—Order refusing permission to sue*. An order passed under s. 18 of Act XX of 1863, refusing leave to sue, is not appealable, nor, if the Judge has exercised his discretion, liable to revision under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *In re VENKATESWAR* . . . I. L. R. 10 Mad. 98

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KAZEM ALI v. AZEM ALI KHAN

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 382

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Nor is an order under s. 18 granting leave to institute a suit appealable. *PROTAP CHANDRA MISSEER v. BROJONATH MISSEER*
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 275

18. ——— *Order made without jurisdiction*. Where a Civil Judge, upon a petition applying under s. 18 of Act XX of 1863 for leave to institute a suit, made an order disposing at once of the matter in dispute, and his successor, reversing the former order, decided by an order upon the rights of the parties:—*Held*, that though both orders were made without jurisdiction, that fact did not give the High Court an appellate jurisdiction in the matter. *KAVIRAJA SUNDARA MURTEYA PILLAI v. NALLA NAIKAN PILLAI*
3 Mad. 93

19. ——— Act XXI of 1863, s. 27—*Interlocutory order of Recorder of Rangoon—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 83*. No appeal lay to the High Court under s. 27, Act XXI of 1863, from an interlocutory order of the Recorder of Rangoon passed before judgment in the suit, e.g., one passed under s. 83, Act VIII of 1859, directing a defendant to furnish security. *Quære*: Whether, under Act VIII of 1859, there was any appeal from an order to furnish security under s. 83. *AHMED ALLY MAHOMED v. GLADSTONE WYLLIE*
7 W. R. 508

20. ——— Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 84—*Order of Civil Court under*. There is no appeal from an order passed by a Civil Court under s. 84 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *GOGHUN MOLLAH v. RAMESHUR NARAIN MAHTA*
I. L. R. 18 Calc. 271

21. ——— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 588*. An order made by a Civil Court under s. 84 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not appealable, not being a decree within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and no appeal being allowed by s. 588 of the Code or by any special provision of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Goghun Mollah v. Rameshur Narain Mahta, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 271*, referred to and followed. *PEARI MOHUN MUKERJI v. BARODA CHURN CHUCKERBUTTY*
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 485

22. ——— ss. 90, 91—*Order as to measurement—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 2*. A proceeding under s. 90 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not a suit, and the order passed in such a proceeding is not a decree as defined in the Civil Procedure Code, and hence an order made under s. 91 on an application under s. 90 is not appealable, although a declaration was therein made that the petitioner was entitled to make the measurement with a pole of a certain measure. *DYA GAZI v. RAM LAL SUKUL* . . . 2 C. W. N. 351

23. ——— s. 104, cl. 2—*Special Judge—Dispute as to settlement of rent*. No appeal lies to the High Court from the decision of a Special

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Judge under s. 104, cl. 2, of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
LALA KIRUT NARAIN v. PALUKDHARI PANDEY
 I. L. R. 17 Calc. 326

24. ss. 93, 143—*Manager, application for—Suit.* An application under s. 93 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, is not a suit between a landlord and tenant within the meaning of s. 143, and no appeal lies from an order rejecting such an application. **HUSSAIN BUX v. MUTOOKDHAREE LALL**
 I. L. R. 14 Calc. 312

25. s. 153—*Appeal—Amount Co-sharer—Right of suit.* Held, for the purpose of determining whether or not an appeal lies under s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, that the term "amount" in that section does not mean merely the amount of rent claimed, but the whole amount claimed in the suit, including rent, interest, etc. **BEHARY CHURN SEN v. BHUT NATH PRAMANIK**
 3 C. W. N. 214

26. *Suit for rent—Question as to amount of rent.* Where there was a question as to the amount of rent annually payable, the plaintiffs claiming R15, and the defendants alleging the rent to be only R7-8:—*Held*, that an appeal lay under s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. **AUBHOY CHURN MAJI v. SHOSHI BHUSAN BOSE**
 I. L. R. 16 Calc. 155

27. *Appeal from decree in rent-suit under R100.* The words "amount of rent annually payable by a tenant" in s. 153 (a) of the Bengal Tenancy Act include the case of rent payable by a tenant to one of his co-sharer landlords who collects his share of the rent separately. An appeal to the High Court therefore lies in such a case, notwithstanding the amount claimed is less than R100. **NARAIN MAHTON v. MANOJI PUTTUK**
 I. L. R. 17 Calc. 489

28. *Cesses, suit for—Road Cess Act (Bengal Act IX of 1880), s. 47—Appeal in cases under R100—Meaning of "rent".* Although the Bengal Tenancy Act declares that in ss. 53 to 68 and in ss. 72 to 75 "rent" includes cesses, yet these are enabling provisions, passed to extend the meaning of "rent," and it in no way interferes with the law refusing a right of appeal in suits below R100 in value, which law is made applicable to suits for cesses by s. 47 of Bengal Act IX of 1880. **RAJANI KANT NAG v. JAGESWAR SINGH**
 I. L. R. 20 Calc. 254

29. *Suit for arrears of rent—Dāk cess when considered as rent—Appeal where subject-matter under value of R100.* Where dāk cess is claimed under the contract by which the rent is payable, it must be regarded as rent, i.e., as part of what is lawfully payable in money for use and occupation of the land held by the tenant, and where there is a dispute with regard to such dāk cess, the amount of rent is in dispute, and an appeal lies, though the amount in dispute is less than R100 and notwithstanding the provisions

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of s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. **WATSON & Co. v. SREEKRISTO BHUMICK**
 I. L. R. 21 Calc. 132

30. *Order of Remand.* The term "order" in s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not mean merely a final order, but includes an interlocutory order such as an order of remand. S. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act precludes an appeal from an order of remand made in an action for rent for less than R100, unless such order has determined any of the questions specified in s. 153. **GAGAN CHAND SARDAR v. CASPERSZ**
 4 C. W. N. 44

31. s. 173—*Appeal by auction-purchaser whether maintainable.* No appeal lies at the instance of an auction-purchaser against an order setting aside a sale under s. 173 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. **Raghu Singh v. Misri Singh**, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 825, referred to. **HARABANDHU ADHIKARI v. HARISH CHANDRA DEY PAL**
 3 C. W. N. 184

ROGHU SINGH v. MISRI SINGH
 I. L. R. 21 Calc. 825

32. s. 174, order under—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 244.* An order under s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not one under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and is therefore not appealable. **KISHORI MOHUN ROY v. SARODAMANI DAS**
 1 C. W. N. 30

SUKH NARAIN LALL v. GOROKE PROSAD
 3 C. W. N. 344

33. *Companies Act, XIX of 1857—Order placing name on list of contributories of company.* No appeal lay from an order of a District Court placing the name of an alleged allottee on the list of contributories of a company wound up under Act XIX of 1857. **JAMIYATRAM HIMATRAM v. THE GUJARAT TRADING COMPANY**
 6 Bom. A. C. 185

34. *Order under Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 58—Appeal in a case where no issue as to title is raised.* An appeal lies from an order passed under s. 58 of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882), although no issue has been directed upon a question of title. **AMRITA LALL GHOSE v. SHRISH CHUNDER CHOWDHRY**
 I. L. R. 26 Calc. 944
 4 C. W. N. 101

35. s. 162, order under—*Notice of appeal—Companies Act, s. 214—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 12.* Held, that no appeal lay from an order made under s. 162 of Act VI of 1882 by a Court under the supervision of which proceedings in liquidation were being conducted, declining to continue an investigation commenced by it under that section. Held, also, that whether or not the service of notice of appeal within three weeks provided for by s. 214 of Act VI of 1882 implies that all the formalities prescribed for the presentation and admission of an appeal by the Code

APPEAL—*contd.*2. ACTS—*contd.*s. 162—*concl'd.*

of Civil Procedure must first be gone through before notice of appeal can be served, a person appealing under the said section cannot avail himself of the provisions of s. 12 of the Limitation Act. *WALL v. HOWARD* . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 215

36. — Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 12, para. 1—*Order fixing amount of court-fee chargeable on a plaintiff—Suit by mortgagor to set aside mortgage—Valuation of suit.* There is no appeal against the order of a District Judge fixing the amount of the Court-fee chargeable on a plaintiff. The right of appeal to which the plaintiff might have been entitled under ss. 31 to 36 of Act VIII of 1859 has been taken away by s. 12, cl. 1, of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870). *NARAYAN MADHAV-RAO NAIK v. THE COLLECTOR OF THANA* . . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 145

37. — *Order rejecting plaintiff for insufficiency of valuation.* *Held*, following *Narayan Madhavrao v. The Collector of Thana*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 145, that the decision of the Court of the first instance, rejecting a plaintiff for insufficiency of the valuation and stamp for the purposes of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) not being to the detriment of the revenue, is final, and no appeal lies from it. *MONOHAR GANESH v. HAWA RAM-CHARANDAR* . . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 219

38. — *Order rejecting plaintiff—Plaint insufficiency stamped—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 1, tit. "Decree."* An appeal lies against an order rejecting a plaintiff on the ground of its being insufficiently stamped. *AJOODHYA PERSHAD v. GUNGA PERSHAD* . . . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 249

6 C. L. R. 567

RAJKRISTO BANERJI v. BAMA SOONDUREE DASSEE . . . 23 W. R. 296

39. — *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 36.* S. 12 of the Court Fees Act does not prevent a party from appealing to the High Court under s. 36 of the Civil Procedure Code, and urging that the Court of first instance was wrong as to the particular article of the schedule of fees by which the case was governed. *GUNGAMONEE CHOWDRAIN v. GOPAL CHUNDER ROY* . . . 19 W. R. 214

40. — *Appeal against an order for payment of additional Court-fees.* In a suit in a Subordinate Court by members of a Malabar tarwad to set aside an instrument affecting the whole of the tarwad property, the Subordinate Judge held that Court-fees were leviable, assessed on the value of the property, and accordingly ordered an additional payment to be made by the plaintiffs, and, on their failure to make the payment, dismissed the suit. *Held*, that an appeal lay from the order for payment of the additional Court-fees, and the High Court was not precluded by the Court Fees Act, s. 12, from revising it, and reversing the decree. *KANARAN v. KOMAPPAN* . . . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 169

APPEAL—*contd.*2. ACTS—*contd.*

41. — *Order as to valuation and class to which a suit belongs—Decision as to such class—S. 7, cl. 10 (a), cl. 4 (c).* An appeal lies against a decision as to the class to which a suit belongs, although it does not lie against a decision as to the valuation of the suit in that class. A decision of the lower Court, holding that a suit is one for specific performance of a contract of sale and to be valued according to the amount of the consideration-money, is appealable. *DADA BHA KITHU v. NAGESH RAMCHANDRA* . . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 486

See SARDARSINGJI v. GANPAT SINGJI . . . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 56

42. — *Guardian and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), ss. 22, 45—Order refusing remuneration to guardian.* A Nazir of the District Court was appointed guardian of the property of certain minors, but no provision as to his remuneration was made at the time of his appointment. Subsequently he applied for remuneration on his transfer to another appointment. The Judge passed an order refusing to allow any remuneration, on the grounds that his accounts had been badly kept and the estates had been mismanaged. The Nazir appealed against the order. *Held*, that the order was not appealable. *GANGADHAR MULL v. SHIVLINGRAO JAYDEVRAO* . . . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 95

43. — s. 39—*Appeal against order for removal of guardian.* An appeal does not lie from an order refusing an application for the removal of a guardian who has been appointed by the Court, and also for the appointment of the applicant as the guardian. *FRAN BANDHU SINGH v. BRAHMAMAYI DASIA* . . . 1 C. W. N. 693

44. — s. 43—*Civil Procedure Code (1882), ss. 492, 503—Order purporting to be passed under appealable section—Appeal entertained though Judge had no power to pass orders under the section as he purported to do.* By s. 43 (4) of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, in case of disobedience to an order passed under sub-ss. (1) and (2) of that section, in relation to the conduct or proceedings of guardians, the order may be enforced in the same manner as an injunction granted under s. 492 or s. 493 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On a petition being presented to a District Court, asking that the guardians of certain minors, who had been appointed by the Court under the Guardian and Wards Act, might be removed, the Judge passed an order in which he purported to issue an injunction under s. 492 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the attachment of the estate of the minors and to appoint a receiver to manage the estate. On an appeal being preferred against the said orders, it was contended that the Judge must be taken to have acted under the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, and that, inasmuch as no appeal was provided by that Act in respect of such an order, no appeal lay:—*Held*, that though both orders were passed without jurisdiction, the Judge purporting to have acted under s. 492 of the Code of Civil Procedure as regards the issue of an injunction, and under s. 503 as regards

APPEAL—*contd.*2. ACTS—*contd.*s. 104, cl. 2—*contd.*

Judge under s. 104, cl. 2, of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
LALA KIRUT NARAIN v. PALUDDHARI PANDEY
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 326

24. ss. 93, 143—*Manager, application for—Suit.* An application under s. 93 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, is not a suit between a landlord and tenant within the meaning of s. 143, and no appeal lies from an order rejecting such an application. HUSSAIN BUX v. MUTOOKDHAREE LALL
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 312

25. s. 153—*Appeal—Amount Co-sharer—Right of suit.* Held, for the purpose of determining whether or not an appeal lies under s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, that the term "amount" in that section does not mean merely the amount of rent claimed, but the whole amount claimed in the suit, including rent, interest, etc. BEHARY CHURN SEN v. BHUT NATH PRAMANIK
3 C. W. N. 214

26. *Suit for rent—Question as to amount of rent.* Where there was a question as to the amount of rent annually payable, the plaintiffs claiming R15, and the defendants alleging the rent to be only R7-8:—*Held*, that an appeal lay under s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. AUBHOY CHURN MAJI v. SHOSHI BHUSAN Bose
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 155

27. *Appeal from decree in rent-suit under R100.* The words "amount of rent annually payable by a tenant" in s. 153 (a) of the Bengal Tenancy Act include the case of rent payable by a tenant to one of his co-sharer landlords who collects his share of the rent separately. An appeal to the High Court therefore lies in such a case, notwithstanding the amount claimed is less than R100. NARAIN MAHTON v. MANOFI PUTTUK
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 489

28. *Cesses, suit for—Road Cess Act (Bengal Act IX of 1880), s. 47—Appeal in cases under R100—Meaning of "rent".* Although the Bengal Tenancy Act declares that in ss. 53 to 68 and in ss. 72 to 75 "rent" includes cesses, yet these are enabling provisions, passed to extend the meaning of "rent," and it in no way interferes with the law refusing a right of appeal in suits below R100 in value, which law is made applicable to suits for cesses by s. 47 of Bengal Act IX of 1880. RAJANI KANT NAG v. JAGESHWAR SINGH
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 254

29. *Suit for arrears of rent—Dāk cess when considered as rent—Appeal where subject-matter under value of R100.* Where dāk cess is claimed under the contract by which the rent is payable, it must be regarded as rent, i.e., as part of what is lawfully payable in money for use and occupation of the land held by the tenant, and where there is a dispute with regard to such dāk cess, the amount of rent is in dispute, and an appeal lies, though the amount in dispute is less than R100 and notwithstanding the provisions

APPEAL—*contd.*2. ACTS—*contd.*

of s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. WATSON & Co. v. SREEKRISTO BHUMICK
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 132

30. *Order of Remand.* The term "order" in s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not mean merely a final order, but includes an interlocutory order such as an order of remand. S. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act precludes an appeal from an order of remand made in an action for rent for less than R100, unless such order has determined any of the questions specified in s. 153. GAGAN CHAND SARDAR v. CASPERSZ
4 C. W. N. 44

31. s. 173—*Appeal by auction-purchaser whether maintainable.* No appeal lies at the instance of an auction-purchaser against an order setting aside a sale under s. 173 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Raghu Singh v. Misri Singh, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 825, referred to. HARABANDHU ADHIKARI v. HARISH CHANDRA DEY PAL
3 C. W. N. 184

ROGHU SINGH v. MISRI SINGH
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 825

32. s. 174, order under—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 244.* An order under s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not one under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and is therefore not appealable. KISHORI MOHUN ROY v. SARODAMANI DARI
1 C. W. N. 30

SUKH NARAIN LALL v. GOROKE PROSAD
3 C. W. N. 344

33. Companies Act, XIX of 1857—*Order placing name on list of contributories of company.* No appeal lay from an order of a District Court placing the name of an alleged allottee on the list of contributories of a company wound up under Act XIX of 1857. JAMIYATRAM HIMATRAM v. THE GUJARAT TRADING COMPANY
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34. Order under Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 58—*Appeal in a case where no issue as to title is raised.* An appeal lies from an order passed under s. 58 of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882), although no issue has been directed upon a question of title. AMRITA LALL GHOSE v. SHRISH CHUNDER CHOWDHRY
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APPEAL—*contd.*2. ACTS—*contd.*s. 162—*concl'd.*

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36. Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 12, para. 1—*Order fixing amount of court-fee chargeable on a plaintiff—Suit by mortgagor to set aside mortgage—Valuation of suit.* There is no appeal against the order of a District Judge fixing the amount of the Court-fee chargeable on a plaintiff. The right of appeal to which the plaintiff might have been entitled under ss. 31 to 36 of Act VIII of 1859 has been taken away by s. 12, cl. 1, of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870). *NARAYAN MADHAV-RAO NAIK v. THE COLLECTOR OF THANA* . . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 145

37. Order rejecting *plaint for insufficiency of valuation.* Held, following *Narayan Madhavrao v. The Collector of Thana*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 145, that the decision of the Court of the first instance, rejecting a plaintiff for insufficiency of the valuation and stamp for the purposes of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) not being to the detriment of the revenue, is final, and no appeal lies from it. *MONOHAR GANESH v. PAWA RAM-CHARANDAR* . . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 219

38. Order rejecting *plaint—Insufficiency stamped—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 1, tit. "Decree."* An appeal lies against an order rejecting a plaintiff on the ground of its being insufficiently stamped. *AJOODHYA PERSHAD v. GUNGA PERSHAD* . . . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 249

6 C. L. R. 567
RAJKRISTO BANERJI v. BAMA SOONDUREE DASSEE . . . 23 W. R. 296

39. Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 36. S. 12 of the Court Fees Act does not prevent a party from appealing to the High Court under s. 36 of the Civil Procedure Code, and urging that the Court of first instance was wrong as to the particular article of the schedule of fees by which the case was governed. *GUNGAMONEE CHOW-DRAIN v. GOPAL CHUNDER ROY* . . . 19 W. R. 214

40. Appeal against *an order for payment of additional Court-fees.* In a suit in a Subordinate Court by members of a Malabar tarwad to set aside an instrument affecting the whole of the tarwad property, the Subordinate Judge held that Court-fees were leviable, assessed on the value of the property, and accordingly ordered an additional payment to be made by the plaintiffs, and, on their failure to make the payment, dismissed the suit. Held, that an appeal lay from the order for payment of the additional Court-fees, and the High Court was not precluded by the Court Fees Act, s. 12, from revising it, and reversing the decree. *KANARAN v. KOMAPPAN* . . . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 169

APPEAL—*contd.*2. ACTS—*contd.*

41. Order as to *valuation and class to which a suit belongs—Decision as to such class—S. 7, cl. 10 (a), cl. 4 (c).* An appeal lies against a decision as to the class to which a suit belongs, although it does not lie against a decision as to the valuation of the suit in that class. A decision of the lower Court, holding that a suit is one for specific performance of a contract of sale and to be valued according to the amount of the consideration-money, is appealable. *DADA BHA KITHU v. NAGESH RAMCHANDRA* . . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 486

See *SARDARSINGJI v. GANPAT SINGJI* . . . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 56

42. Guardian and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), ss. 22, 45—*Order refusing remuneration to guardian.* A Nazir of the District Court was appointed guardian of the property of certain minors, but no provision as to his remuneration was made at the time of his appointment. Subsequently he applied for remuneration on his transfer to another appointment. The Judge passed an order refusing to allow any remuneration, on the grounds that his accounts had been badly kept and the estates had been mismanaged. The Nazir appealed against the order. Held, that the order was not appealable. *GANGADHAR MULL v. SHIVLINGRAO JAYDEVRAO* . . . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 95

43. s. 39—*Appeal against order for removal of guardian.* An appeal does not lie from an order refusing an application for the removal of a guardian who has been appointed by the Court, and also for the appointment of the applicant as the guardian. *FRAN BANDHU SINGH v. BRAHMAMAYI DASIA* . . . 1 C. W. N. 693

44. s. 43—*Civil Procedure Code (1882), ss. 492, 503—Order purporting to be passed under appealable section—Appeal entertained though Judge had no power to pass orders under the section as he purported to do.* By s. 43 (4) of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, in case of disobedience to an order passed under sub-ss. (1) and (2) of that section, in relation to the conduct or proceedings of guardians, the order may be enforced in the same manner as an injunction granted under s. 492 or s. 493 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On a petition being presented to a District Court, asking that the guardians of certain minors, who had been appointed by the Court under the Guardian and Wards Act, might be removed, the Judge passed an order in which he purported to issue an injunction under s. 492 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the attachment of the estate of the minors and to appoint a receiver to manage the estate. On an appeal being preferred against the said orders, it was contended that the Judge must be taken to have acted under the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, and that, inasmuch as no appeal was provided by that Act in respect of such an order, no appeal lay:—Held, that though both orders were passed without jurisdiction, the Judge purporting to have acted under s. 492 of the Code of Civil Procedure as regards the issue of an injunction, and under s. 503 as regards

APPEAL—*contd.*2. ACTS—*contd.*s. 43—*concl'd.*

the appointment of a receiver, inasmuch as orders under either of these sections were appealable, the fact that the Judge had no power in this case to pass orders under them did not bar the High Court from treating the orders as having been passed thereunder for the purpose of entertaining an appeal against the orders, since there was no provision of law under which the Judge could pass orders attaching property or appointing a receiver without such orders being subject to appeal. *Hurriah Chunder Chowdhry v. Kali Sundari Debia*, L. R. 10 I. A. 4 : I. L. R. 9 Calc. 482, referred to. ABDUL RAHMAN v. GANAPATHI BHATTA . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 517

45. ————— s. 47—*Removal of guardian—Order refusing to remove a guardian.* No appeal lies under the Guardian and Wards Act (VIII of 1890) from an order of a District Judge refusing to remove a guardian. *MOHINA CHUNDER BISWAS v. TARINI SUNKER GHOSE*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 487

46. ————— *Removal of guardian—Order refusing to remove a guardian.* Upon an application for cancelling a certificate of guardianship of the person and property of a minor, the District Judge ordered the certificate to be amended only as regards the guardianship of the person by appointing the applicant as such guardian, and ordering a monthly allowance to be paid to her for the education and maintenance of the minor. The applicant appealed to the High Court:—*Held*, that the order appealed from was one refusing to remove a guardian, and as such was not appealable under cls. (f) and (g) of s. 47 of the Guardian and Wards Act (VIII of 1890). *Mohina Chunder Biswas v. Tarini Sunker Ghose*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 487, followed. *PAKHWANTI DAI v. INDRA NARAIN SINGH*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 201

47. ————— *Appeal—Order refusing to direct the removal of a guardian.* Where an applicant for a certificate of guardianship applied for a two-fold relief, namely, that the existing guardian might be removed and that she herself might be appointed guardian, and her application was dismissed, it was *held* that no appeal would lie from the order of dismissal, such order being an order refusing to direct the removal of a guardian. *Mohina Chunder Biswas v. Tarini Sunker Ghose*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 487, *Pakhwanti Dai v. Indra Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 201, and *In re Bai Harkha*, I. L. R. 20 Bom. 667, referred to. *IMTIAZ-U-NISSA v. ANWAR-UL-LAH*

I. L. R. 20 All. 433

48. ————— ss. 47 and 48—*Order refusing to remove a guardian.* The effect of ss. 47 (g) and 48 of the Guardian and Wards Act (VIII of 1890) is to allow no appeal from an order refusing to remove a guardian. *In re Bai Harkha*

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 667

49. ————— *Land Acquisition Act (X of 1870), s. 15—District Judge's order on*

APPEAL—*contd.*2. ACTS—*contd.*

reference by the Collector—Questions of conflicting claims to title—Persons claiming interest in the compensation—"Apportionment," construction of the term. A Collector having acquired land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (X of 1870), and a question having arisen as to the right to the compensation,—each of two rival claimants claiming exclusive title to the whole of the compensation awarded,—the Collector referred the question to the decision of the District Judge under s. 15 of the Act. The District Judge having decided the question in favour of one of the claimants, the other appealed to the High Court. In appeal, it was contended that, as the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act apply to cases in which there was a dispute as to the apportionment of compensation, and not to cases in which there was no question as to apportionment, and in which each of the claimants laid claim to the entire amount of the compensation, the order passed by the District Judge was not appealable under the provisions of the Act, as there was no question of apportionment to be determined:—*Held*, that, looking to the language of s. 15 of the Land Acquisition Act (X of 1870), which clearly contemplates the reference of such a dispute being provided for in the subsequent part of the Act, and as there is no other provision in the Act made for it, the term "apportionment" in Part IV should be given a liberal construction, as including the case where the Court has to decide between rival claimants to the entire compensation. The order of the District Judge was therefore appealable. *KASHIM v. AMINBI*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 525

50. ————— s. 39—*Additional Judge—District Judge—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 647.* An Additional Judge appointed to hear cases under the Land Acquisition Act, 1870, is a District Judge within the meaning of s. 39 of the Act. Under s. 647 of the Civil Procedure Code, an appeal from the decision of an Additional Judge so appointed lies to the High Court. *In the matter of the application of PORESH NATH CHATTERJEE v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 31

51. ————— *Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), ss. 18, 19, 32, and 54—Reference by Collector to Judge as to disposal of compensation awarded for land—Appeal from Judge's order.* *Held*, that an appeal will lie to the High Court from an order of the District Judge made upon a reference by the Collector under ss. 18 and 19 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as to the disposal of compensation awarded for land taken up by Government under the Act. *Balam Bhramaratar Roy v. Sham Sunder Narendra*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 526, followed. *Held*, also, that in an appeal from the order of the District Judge above referred to the memorandum of appeal must be stamped as an appeal from an original decree. *SHEO RATTAN RAI v. MOHRI*

I. L. R. 21 All. 354

APPEAL—*contd.*2. ACTS—*contd.*

52. _____ Military Courts of Request Act, XI of 1841. An appeal lay under Act XI of 1841. *GUNTAM DOSS v. MOOLTAN MULL*

2 N. W. 229

53. _____ An appeal lay to the High Court of Judicature for the North-Western Provinces from the decree of a Military Court of Request held at Morar, Gwalior. *MOOLTAN MULL v. GUNSAM DOSS*

3 N. W. 75

54. _____ Registration Act (XX of 1866). No appeal lies to the High Court from an order passed under the Registration Act. *RAMESUR MAHATAH v. KULLYANESSUREE DEBIA*

9 W. R. 283

55. _____ ss. 32, 83, and 84. No appeal lay from an order by a Registrar refusing to exercise his discretion under s. 32, Act XX of 1866. Such an order came neither within s. 83 nor s. 84 of the Act. *SARKIES v. SANGRAM SINGH*

6 B. L. R. 578 note : 14 W. R. 194

56. _____ s. 52—Order refusing to allow amount of decree to be levied by instalments. There is no appeal from an order refusing to allow the amount due under a decree passed upon an obligation specially registered under s. 52, Act XX of 1866, to be levied by instalments, and directing immediate enforcement of the decree. *In the matter of the petition of RASH BEHARY BABU*

7 W. R. 130

57. _____ ss. 52, 53—Order in execution of decree—Bond specially registered—Registration Act, XX of 1866, ss. 52, 53. *Held*, (STUART, C. J., dissenting), that an appeal lay from an order passed in the execution of a decree obtained under the provisions of s. 53 of Act XX of 1866, upon a bond specially registered under the provisions of s. 52 of that Act. *Ramanand v. The Bank of Bengal*, I. L. R. 1 All. 377, overruled. *Petition of Rash Behary*, 7 W. R. 130 and *Har Nath Chatterjee v. Futtick Chunder*, 18 W. R. 572, dissented from. *WILAYAT-UN-NISSA v. NAJIB-UN-NISSA*

I. L. R. 1 All. 583

58. _____ s. 53. An appeal lay from an order in execution of a decree made under s. 53 of Act XX of 1866. *BHIKAMBHAT v. FERNANDEZ*

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 673

59. _____ There was no appeal from a decree, nor from orders passed in execution of a decree made under s. 53 of Act XX of 1866. *BHYRUB CHUNDER v. GOLAP COOMARY*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 517

PURUS RAM v. DEO KOER . . . 4 N. W. 29

60. _____ No appeal lying against a decree made under s. 53, Act XX of 1866, the petition was directed to be returned, with a view to its being presented to the Court, if desired, by way of motion. *RASH BEHARY BABU v. GURUDASS BABU*

7 W. R. 115

APPEAL—*contd.*2. ACTS—*contd.*s. 53—*concl.*

61. _____ Specially registered bond. No second appeal lay to the High Court against an order passed on an application for execution of a decree made in a suit on a bond specially registered under s. 53, Act XX of 1866. *Quare*: Whether an appeal lies at all against such an order passed in proceedings taken in execution of such a decree. *SRIBULLAV BHATTACHARJI v. BABURAM CHATTOPADHYA*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 169

62. _____ ss. 54, 55—Repeat, effect of. No appeal lies against orders passed in execution of decrees under Act XX of 1866, the procedure under that Act having been expressly saved by Act VIII of 1871, which repealed Act XX of 1866. *RAMANAND v. THE BANK OF BENGAL*

I. L. R. 1 All. 377

63. _____ s. 55. An appeal from an order or decree passed in proceedings had in execution of a decree made under s. 53 of Act XX of 1866 is not barred by anything in s. 55 of that Act. *SRIBULLAV BHATTACHARJI v. BABURAM CHATTOPADHYA*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 51

64. _____ In cases in which s. 55 of Act XX of 1866 bars an appeal, it does so equally in matters of execution as in respect of the decree passed. *HURNATH CHATTERJI v. FUTTICK CHUNDER SAMADDAR*

18 W. R. 512

RADHA KRISTO DUTT v. GUNGA NARAIN CHATTERJEE

23 W. R. 328

HURO SUNDURI DEBIA v. PUNCHURAM MONDUL

24 W. R. 225

65. _____ s. 84—Order refusing to register document. *Held*, that there was no appeal to the High Court from the decision of a District Court on a petition under s. 84 of Act XX of 1866, to establish the right to have a document registered; nor would the Court interfere with such a decision under Regulation XI of 1827, s. 5, cl. 2. *Ex-parte DHARAMDAS BHAVANIDAS*

3 Bom. A. C. 104

66. _____ Order of Deputy Commissioner—District of Chota Nagpore. An appeal under s. 84, Act XX of 1866, from the order of a Deputy Commissioner in Chota Nagpore, must be made to the Judicial Commissioner, who exercises the powers of a Zillah Judge in all the districts of that division. *In the matter of the petition of BUDHU MAHATOON*

8 W. R. 266

67. _____ Order of District Court. An order of a District Court under s. 84 of Act XX of 1866 was not appealable to the High Court. *SALGRAM MISSER v. JANKI KOER*

9 W. R. 122

68. _____ Decree under s. 77, Registration Act, 1877—Suit to compel registration—Appeal. An appeal lies from a decree in a suit under s. 77 of the Registration Act, 1877, to obtain registration of a document. *WISHWAMBHAR PANDIT v. PRABHAKAR BHAT*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 269

APPEAL—*contd.*2. ACTS—*contd.*

69. ——— Stamp Act (X of 1862), s. 17—*Order rejecting document tendered in evidence—Finality of order.* Held, that an appeal lies to the High Court from the decision of a Judge in a Division Court rejecting a document tendered in evidence under s. 17, cl. 1, of Act X of 1862, on the ground that there had been an intention to evade the payment of stamp duty. The point upon which the decision of the Court is to be final, under s. 17 of the Stamp Act, is as to what is the proper amount of stamp duty which the document ought to bear, and not as to whether the Court ought or ought not to receive the document in evidence. *ROYAL BANK OF INDIA v. HORMASJI KHOZEDJI*. 3 Bom. O. C. 153

70. ——— Act XXVI of 1867—*Order as to valuation of suit.* Under Act XXVI of 1867, the decision of a Court of first instance as to the valuation of the subject-matter of a suit is final. *ISHAN CHANDRA MOOKERJEE v. LOKENATH ROY*

6 B. L. R. Ap. 12
14 W. R. 451

MAFIZUDDIN v. KARIMUNNISSA BIBEE

6 B. L. R. Ap. 11
14 W. R. 381

71. ——— Sch. B, Art. 11 note—*Order rejecting plaint for under-valuation—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 30 and 36.* Where a plaint is rejected under s. 30 of Act VIII of 1859 by the first Court, on the ground that it is under-valued, an appeal lies from such order under s. 36 of Act VIII of 1859, and this appeal was not taken away by the note to Art. 11, Sch. B to Act XXVI of 1867, the object of which was to prevent appeals only where the question merely related to the amount of stamp to be impressed upon the plaint. *COLLECTOR OF SYLHET v. KALI KUMAR DUTT*

7 B. L. R. 683
16 W. R. F. B. 10

(*Contra*) *MUDHUSUDAN CHUCKERBUTTY v. RYMANI DAS*.

7 B. L. R. 664 note
13 W. R. 415

72.—Bengal Tenancy Act, s. 153—*Suit for rent by a co-sharer landlord.* S. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act covers the case of a suit for rent by a co-sharer landlord. *JOGENDRA NATH GHOSH v. PABAN CHANDRA GHOSH* (1903) 7 C. W. N. 908

73.—Companies Act (VI of 1882), ss. 169, 214—*Notice of appeal—Appeal out of time.* No appeal against an order made in the matter of the winding up of a Company under the Indian Companies Act of 1882 shall be heard by an Appellate Court unless notice of the same is given within three weeks after any order complained of has been made. *In re Estates Investment Company L. R. 8 Eq. 227*, not followed. *PROSANNA KUMAR GUHA v. BANI KANTA BHATTACHARJEE* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 758

74.—Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 12, para i—*Class to which a suit belongs—Decision as to such class—Insufficient stamp—Appeal.* S. 12,

APPEAL—*contd.*2. ACTS—*contd.*s. 12, para. i—*concl'd.*

cl. i, of the Court-fees Act is no bar to an appeal, when the question to be decided by the lower Court is merely the class of the suit, in order to ascertain under what Schedule to the Act it must be taken to fall for the purpose of fixing the Court-fee payable on the plaint or memorandum of appeal. *In the matter of Omrao Mirza v. Mary Jones* 12 C. L. R. 148; *Chunia v. Ramdial* I. L. R. 1 All. 360; *Annamalai Chetti v. Cloete*, I. L. R. 4 Mad. 204; *Kanaran v. Komuppan*, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 169; *Dada Bhau Kittur v. Nagesh Ram Chandra*, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 486, approved of. *STUDD v. MATI MAHTO* (1901)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 334

75.—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 51, 86 and 90—*Order granting permission to dispose of immovable property.* An appeal lies to the High Court against an order passed by a District Judge or District Delegate granting permission to an executor or administrator to dispose of immovable property under s. 90 of the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881). The word "hereby" in s. 86 of the Probate and Administration Act means "by the whole Act," and not merely by the Chapter in which the section occurs. *UMA CHARAN DAS v. MUKTAKESHI DAS* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 149
s.c. 5 C. W. N. 443

76. ——— Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), ss. 34, 35, 36 and 37—*Minor—Guardian—Administration bond passed to Judge—Refusal of the Judge to assign.* No appeal lies from an order passed by the District Judge under s. 35 of the Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890) declining to assign the bond. *GANPAT v. ANNA* (1905)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 164

77. ——— Appeal against order of District Court granting sanction—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 195, cls. 6, 7—*Power of High Court on such appeal.* An appeal lies to the High Court against an order of the District Judge granting sanction under cls. 6 and 7 of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure where such order has revoked the sanction granted by the Munsif for prosecution under certain sections of the Penal Code, but granted sanction to prosecute under other sections; and it is competent to the High Court on appeal therefrom, not only to revoke the sanction granted, but also to grant the sanction refused. *KANNAMBATH IMBICHI NAIR v. MANATHANNATH RAMAN NAIR* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 122

78. ——— Respondent—Appeal—Record. A respondent should not be placed on the record under s. 559 of the Civil Procedure Code, after the time for appealing against him has expired. *RAM RATAN CHUCKERBUTTY v. JOGESH CHANDRA BHATTACHARYA* (1907)

12 C. W. N. 625

79. ——— Assistant Judge hearing a claim—Value of the claim under Rs. 5,000—Appeal lies to District Court and not to High Court—Jurisdiction—Practice and procedure—Land Acquisition Act (I of

APPEAL—contd.

2. ACTS—concl'd.

1894)—*Bombay Civil Courts Act (XIV of 1869), s. 16*. Where a claim under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is heard by the Assistant Judge and the amount in dispute does not exceed Rs.5,000 in value, the appeal lies to the District Court and not to the High Court. *Laxmi v. Aba, I. L. R. 32 Bom. 634*, followed. *RANCHHODBHAI v. COLLECTOR OF KAIRA (1909)*

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 371

80. ——— *Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908), s. 115*—Appellate Court acting in contravention of s. 578 of the *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)*, ss. 59, 62, 63—Court of first instance allowing document on which suit based to be produced at a late stage—Appellate Court if may reject and on what ground—Dealing with case as if there was no evidence when in fact there was—High Court's power to interfere in revision. Where a document upon which a suit was based was not produced along with the plaint but the Court allowed it to be produced at later stage and, relying on it, gave the plaintiff a decree, but on appeal the Appellate Court rejected the document merely because it was not produced along with the plaint, and dismissed the suit. *Held*, that having regard to the provisions of s. 578 of the *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)*, the Appellate Court acted illegally and with irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction and the High Court could interfere. *Amir Hassan v. Sheo Baksh, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 6*; *Enat Mondul v. Baloram, 3 C. W. N. 581*, referred to. The policy underlying ss. 62 and 63 of the *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)* is to exclude evidence, as to the existence of which at the date of the suit there may be reasonable doubt, and as to the genuineness of which suspicion might rightly arise because it was produced at a late stage. *Devidas v. Pirjada, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 377*, and *Talewar Singh v. Bhagwan Das, 12 C. W. N. 312* : s.c. *8 C. L. J. 147*, referred to. The Appellate Court in the above circumstances should have considered whether leave for the reception of the document was properly granted, and whether the trial was prejudiced thereby, and whether by reason of the delay in the production of the document there was a well-founded ground of suspicion that this document was not genuine. The Appellate Court dealt with the case on the footing that besides the excluded document there was no other evidence to support the plaintiff's case when as a matter of fact there was other evidence on the record. *Held*, that there was no proper trial and it was incumbent on the High Court to interfere. *MEWA LAL SAHU v. KUMERJI JHA (1909)*

13 C. W. N. 797

3. APPEAL NEWLY GIVEN BY LAW.

1. ——— Proceedings instituted prior to change in procedure—Appeal from order under s. 312, *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)*—Act VII of 1888, ss. 55, 56. It is a general principle of law that an appeal newly given by law is

APPEAL—contd.

3. APPEAL NEWLY GIVEN BY LAW—concl'd.

made applicable to proceedings instituted before that change in procedure is made. *Held*, accordingly, that an appeal from an order under the second paragraph of s. 312 of the *Civil Procedure Code*, although made before Act VII of 1888 came into force, would, upon the operation of that Act, lie to the Court to which an appeal would lie from the decree in the suit in relation to which such order was made. *Hurrosundari Debi v. Bhojohari Das Manji, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 86*, explained and distinguished. In the matter of ANUND CHUNDER ROY v. NITAI BHOOMIJ . . . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 429

4. ARBITRATION.

1. ——— Arbitration by Court—Case referred to Court under Chapter XXVIII (ss. 328—330 of the *Civil Procedure Code*)—Appeal from a decree in the nature of an award—Case referred to the decision of a Court, both parties agreeing to abide by such decision. Where both parties to a suit referred the matters in dispute between them to the Court, and agreed to abide by its decision, and the Court passed a decree awarding a certain sum to the plaintiff :—*Held*, that no appeal lay from the decree, the decision of the Court being in the nature of an arbitrator's award. *SAYAD ZAIN v. KALABHAI*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 752

2. ——— Judgment on award—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 325, 327*—Finality of decree. On the application of one party to a reference to arbitration, without the intervention of a Court, to have the award filed and for judgment thereon, an objection of the other party, that the award had been come to after the arbitrators' authority had been repudiated, was overruled, and judgment was passed by the Munsif in accordance with the award. *Held*, (PAUL, J., dissenting), that an appeal lay from the decision of the Munsif. In another case the question was referred to a Full Bench, whether, when an award has been ordered to be filed, and judgment has been given in accordance with it under s. 327 of Act VIII of 1859, is such judgment open to appeal? The answer given (PAUL, J., dissenting) was: It is open to an appellant to show that the paper which has been filed is not an award. If it is an award, and judgment is given in accordance with such award, such judgment is final. *Per PAUL, J.* The judgment is final. *SASHTI CHARAN CHATTERJEE v. TARAK CHANDRA CHATTERJEE and LALA ISWARI PRASAD v. BIR BHANJAN TEWARI . . . 8 B. L. R. 315*

15 W. R. F. B. 9

BABUR MEAH v. JUMUN MEAH . . . 2 C. L. R. 362

3. ——— Finality of decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 324 and 325*. A suit in the Munsif's Court was, after issues had been settled and evidence on such issues adduced by both parties, referred by consent of parties to arbitration. The arbitrator made his award, and

APPEAL—*contd.*4. ARBITRATION—*contd.*

on the next day, an order was recorded by the Munsif that the parties were to file their objections to the award in one day, notwithstanding that s. 324, Act VIII of 1859, allows the parties ten days for such purpose. The plaintiffs, in accordance with that order, filed a petition of objection to the award, and an order was endorsed by the Munsif on this petition, that it should be laid before the Court with the papers of the arbitrator. The Munsif then gave his judgment, in which he went into the evidence, and, overruling the objection of the plaintiffs, gave a decision on the merits, which decision was in accordance with the award. *Held*, that such judgment, though in accordance with the award, was not final under s. 325 of Act VIII of 1859, but was open to appeal. In order to make it final, it should appear that all the proceedings have been regular, and the directions of Act VIII of 1859 complied with.

GUNGA NARAIN GHOSE *v.* RAM CHAND BOSE

12 B. L. R. 48 : 20 W. R. 311

4. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 325.* Judgment under s. 325, Act VIII of 1859, if given according to the award, is final; but such judgment, to be final, must be one in accordance with the provisions of s. 325, and where the Judge gave judgment without allowing sufficient time for objections to be made to the award or for the award to be set aside, the judgment was held to be not one within s. 325, and, therefore, subject to appeal. JAYMANGAL SINGH *v.* MOHANRAM MARWARI

8 B. L. R. 319 note : 12 W. R. 397

Affirmed by Privy Council. JOYMUNGAL SINGH *v.* MOHUNRAM MARWARI . . . 23 W. R. 429

5. ———— In a suit in the Munsif's Court seven issues were fixed for determination, and the suit was then referred by agreement to three arbitrators. In coming to an award, the arbitrators took up specifically some of the issues framed in the Munsif's Court, and declined to enter into others. They determined the matter in issue between the parties, and the award was signed by the three arbitrators. Two of the arbitrators subjoined to the award a suggestion which, if acted on, would prevent the necessity of carrying out the award. The Munsif dealt with this suggestion as surplusage, and gave the plaintiff a decree in accordance with the award signed by the three arbitrators. In appeal it was contended that the award was not a legal one, and it was sought to set the decree of the Munsif aside; but the Judge found that the decree was in accordance with the award, and that he was precluded by s. 325 from disturbing the decision of the Munsif. On special appeal it was contended that the award was incomplete, as all the issues were not decided, and that the decree was not in accordance with the award, as it did not embody the suggestion of the two of the three arbitrators. *Held*, that the decree was in accordance with the award, and was, therefore, final under s. 325. SARBOREE KANTO BHUTTACHARJEE *v.* ANADYA KANTO BHUTTACHARJEE

12 B. L. R. Ap. 10 : 20 W. R. 228

APPEAL—*contd.*4. ARBITRATION—*contd.*

MADHUSUDAN DAS *v.* ADOITO CHARAN DAS

8 B. L. R. 316 note : 12 W. R. 85

6. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 325.* A suit was referred by the Munsif to arbitration under s. 315, Act VIII of 1859. The arbitrators were of opinion that the case of the plaintiff was fictitious, but nevertheless gave an award in his favour. The Munsif refused to uphold the award, on the ground that the arbitrators had been guilty of misconduct in giving an award contrary to the evidence. The Judge revised their decision, on the ground that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to refer to the evidence taken before the arbitrators in order to determine whether they were guilty of misconduct or not: he gave judgment in accordance with the award. *Held*, that his decision was not final under s. 325, Act VIII of 1859: the provisions of that section refer only to the Court by which the case is referred to arbitration. The Munsif was entitled to refer to the evidence before the arbitrators in order to determine whether they had misconducted themselves or not. PARESHNATH DEY *v.* NABIN CHANDRA DUTT

5 B. L. R. Ap. 77 note : 12 W. R. 93

See BYKUNT NATH MOOKERJEE *v.* PRIONATH GHOSE . . . 22 W. R. 447

7. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 325.* Where a suit is referred to arbitration by an order of Court, and the Court afterwards gives judgment according to the award made upon such reference, such judgment is final by virtue of Act VIII of 1859, s. 325, and no appeal lies therefrom. BROJOLALL BAJPYE *v.* UMRITOLALL BAJPYE . . . Marsh. 163

GOUR CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE *v.* SODOY CHUNDER NUNDEE . . . 17 W. R. 30

SARBOREE KANT BHUTTACHARJEE *v.* ANADYA KANT BHUTTACHARJEE

12 B. L. R. Ap. 10 : 20 W. R. 226

8. ———— *Irregular procedure in arbitration—Consent to award—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 325.* A judgment in accordance with an arbitration award is, under the express terms of s. 325, Act VIII of 1859, final, if the reference to arbitration has been conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Code. And where the matter in dispute in a suit was referred to arbitration, and the provisions of Act VIII were not strictly complied with:—*Held*, nevertheless that, as the appellants had consented to the arbitration and to the appointment of arbitrators, and took part in the proceedings, and after having made objections to the award (which objections were considered by the arbitrators), they assented to the award, the Principal Sudder Ameen was justified in passing a judgment in accordance with the award, and that the High Court would not interfere with that judgment. MISSER DEO KISHUN *v.* MISSER BHUGWAN DOSS . . . 3 Agra 199

APPEAL—contd.

4. ARBITRATION—contd.

9. ————— *Decree in accordance with award.* No appeal lies against a decree made in accordance with an award upon a submission to arbitration in the suit. RAMIREDDY NARSAREDDY v. MUMAREDDY PAPIREDDY

5 Mad. 404

10. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* In an arbitration case between a mahajun and his gomasta, an award was made to the effect that R725 were outstanding and due to the kuti of which R483 were to the mahajun and R241 to the gomasta; and that the gomasta should point out the parties owing the R483, or in default make good the amount. The mahajun applied to the Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpore, under Act VIII of 1859, s. 327, to file the award. The Subordinate Judge held that it was not proved that the gomasta had done as required by the award, and ordered him to pay the deficit. The gomasta appealed to the Judge, who held that no appeal lay from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge enforcing the award. *Held*, on special appeal, that the Subordinate Judge's judgment decided a question of fact not determined by the award, and that an appeal would lie. RAMBHANJAN BHUKUT v. SRIKISHEN BHAKAT

2 B. L. R. A. C. 26C : 11 W. R. 140

11. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 520, 521.* Where, in a suit for the filing of an award made on a private reference to arbitration, the Court of first instance, holding that there was no reason to remit such award to the reconsideration of the arbitrator under the provisions of s. 520 of Act X of 1877 or to set it aside under s. 521 of that Act, did not proceed to give judgment according to such award followed by a decree, but merely directed that such award should be filed :—*Held*, that its order was not appealable as a decree or as an order. RAMADHIN v. MAHESH

I. L. R. 2 All. 471

12. ————— *Decree confirming award.* Where an award, i.e., a legal award, has been made, and judgment is passed in accordance therewith, the judgment is final; but where a question arises whether the award is a legal award or not, an appeal lies from a judgment of a Court passed in accordance with such award. DEBENDRA NATH SHAW v. AUBHOY CHURN BAGCHI

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 905 : 12 C. L. R. 525

13. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 522.* S. 522 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877, which provides that no appeal shall lie from a decree upon an award, except in so far as the decree is in excess of, or not in accordance with, the award, assumes that the award has been regularly and properly passed by arbitrators duly appointed. PUGARDIN RAVUTAN v. MOIDINSA RAVUTAN

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 414

14. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 522—Order determining validity of an award—Decree in accordance with an award.*

APPEAL—contd.

4. ARBITRATION—contd.

Objection was unsuccessfully taken before a District Munsif to the validity of an award on the ground of the arbitrator being interested, and a decree was passed in accordance with the award. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court :—*Held*, that no appeal lay to the Subordinate Court as to the validity of the award. KRISHNAN CHETTI v. MUTHU PALANDI VACHA MAKALI TEVER

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 172

15. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 522—Decree in accordance with an award.* A suit having been referred to an arbitrator, he made an award and a decree was passed, in accordance with it, in favour of defendant. On an appeal by the plaintiff, it appeared that the award was *prima facie* legal and proper :—*Held*, that no appeal lay against the decree. KOMBI ACHEN v. PANGI ACHEN

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 405

16. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 522—Award—Appeal against decree in terms of—Extension of time for presenting award—Evidence.* Where a decree purports to have been made in terms of an award under s. 522 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an appeal lies against it if there was no award in fact or in law. SUPPU v. GOVINDACHARYAR

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 85

17. ————— *Award, decree in accordance with—Civil Procedure Code, s. 522.* After issues had been framed in a suit to wind up a partnership, the matter was referred to an arbitrator, who made his award, and with regard to certain property, not part of the partnership property, he referred the parties to a separate suit. A decree was passed in accordance with the award :—*Held*, that an appeal lay against the decree passed on the award, on the ground that the award was not legal; but that the award was not illegal by reason of its comprising the reference of the parties to a separate suit. VENKAYYA v. VENKATAPPAYYA

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 348

18. ————— *Award, decree in accordance with—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 522, 525.* When an award has been filed in Court, as provided by s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment and decree based thereon must be drawn up specifically in terms of the award. If the decree merely decrees in general terms the claim of one party or of the other, it cannot be said that such decree is in accordance with the award, and being "not in accordance with the award," an appeal will lie therefrom. UMMI FAZL v. RAHIM-UN-NISSA

I. L. R. 13 All. 386

19. ————— *Award, decree in accordance with—Illegal award.* Where a decree has been passed in terms of an award, an appeal lies only where the question is whether the award was illegal, being void *ab initio*. NANDRAM DALURAM v. NEMCHAND JADAVCHAND

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 357

APPEAL—*contd.*4. ARBITRATION—*contd.*

20. ————— *Order confirming award—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 521, 522.* On appeal from a decree setting aside an award, the District Judge reversed the decree of the first Court and made a decree in accordance with the award. *Held*, that s. 522 of the Civil Procedure Code did not take away the right of second appeal against the latter decree. *RUGHOOBUR DYAL v. MAINA KOER* 12 C. L. R. 564

21. ————— *N.-W. P. Rent Act, reference to arbitration under.* Where the Court trying a suit under the North-Western Provinces Rent Act, the matters in dispute in which have been referred to arbitration, has refused an application to set aside the award, and has decided the case in accordance with the award of the majority of the arbitrators, no appeal lies from its decision. *FAHIM-UN-NISSA v. AJUDHIA PRASAD* I. L. R. 6 All. 170

22. ————— *Misconduct of arbitrators.* A judgment of a Court given in accordance with an award of arbitration is final, even if there has been corruption and misconduct on the part of the arbitrators. *RAMANOOGRA CHOBEY v. PUTMOORTA CHOBAYAN* 7 W. R. 205

SREENATH GHOSE v. RAJ CHUNDER PAUL

8 W. R. 171

ELAHEE BUKSH v. HAJOO 14 W. R. 33

S. C. In re ILAHEE BUKSH 5 B. L. R. Ap. 75

23. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 522—Grounds of appeal from a decree passed upon a judgment in accordance with an award.* *Held*, that an appeal would not lie from a decree passed upon a judgment given according to an award merely because there might have been some irregularities in the procedure of the arbitrator, such alleged irregularities having been considered by the Court which passed the decree, and having been found by that Court not to be of such a nature as to render the award no award in law. *Jagan Nath v. Mannu Lal*, I. L. R. 16 All. 231, *Bindessuri Pershad Singh v. Jankee Pershad Singh*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 482, and *Lachman Das v. Brijpal*, I. L. R. 6 All. 174, referred to. *RAM DHAN SINGH v. KARAN SINGH* I. L. R. 18 All. 414

24. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (1882), ss. 525 and 526—Arbitration without intervention of Court—Application for decree in terms of award—Denial of submission to arbitration and genuineness of award.* An appeal lies against a decree passed upon an award under Civil Procedure Code, ss. 525 and 526, when the cause shown against the filing of the award has denied the submission to arbitration and the genuineness of the award. *HUSANANNA v. LINGANNA* I. L. R. 18 Mad. 423

25. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (1882), ss. 521 and 522—Award—Decree on judgment in accordance with an award.* Where a

APPEAL—*contd.*4. ARBITRATION—*contd.*

decree has been made upon a judgment given upon an award and is not in excess of, and is in accordance with, the award, an appeal from such decree will lie on the ground that the so-called award upon which the judgment and decree are based is from one cause or another no award in law. Where an application to set aside an award on the ground of the misconduct of an arbitrator has been made under s. 521 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and such application has been refused after judicial determination, and a decree made under s. 522 of the Code, which is in accordance with and not in excess of the award, no appeal based upon any similar ground will lie from the decree so made. But an appeal will lie in the case last mentioned where an application to set aside the award on the ground of misconduct of the arbitrator having been made, the Court has passed its decree without considering such application, or where the Court has not allowed sufficient time to the parties to file objections to the award. *Bhagirath v. Ramgholam*, I. L. R. 4 All. 283, approved. *Joymungul Singh Bahadoor v. Mohun Ram Marwaree*, 23 W. R. 429, *Nandram Daluram v. Nemchand Jadavchand*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 357, and *Lachman Das v. Brijpal*, I. L. R. 6 All. 174, referred to. *IBRAHIM ALI v. MOHSIN ALI*

I. L. R. 18 All. 422

26. ————— *Decree in accordance with award with slight modification—Illegal award—Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 522.* In a suit which was defended by an agent (*am-mokhtar*) on behalf of the defendant, the agent applied for a reference to arbitration, although he had no power to do so under the *am-mokhtarnamah*. After the submission of the award, objection was made on behalf of the defendant that the agent had no authority to apply for or consent to the reference. The objection was overruled by the Court, and a decree made in accordance with the award with one slight modification in the defendant's favour:—*Held*, in answer to an objection that no appeal lay under s. 522 of the Civil Procedure Code, except in so far as the decree was in excess of or not in accordance with the award, that an appeal would lie if the award was shown to be illegal and void *ab initio*. *Nandram Daluram v. Nemchand Jadavchand*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 357, followed. *SATURJIT PERTAP BAHADOOR SAHI v. DULHIN GULAB KOER*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 469

27. ————— *Judgment in accordance with an award—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 521 and 522.* An appeal will lie against a decree given in accordance with an award under s. 522 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when the award upon which the decree is based is not a valid and legal award. *Debendra Nath Shah v. Aubhoy Churn Bagchi*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 905, *Joy Prokash Lall v. Sheo Golam Singh*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 37, *Bindessuri Pershad Singh v. Jankee Pershad Singh*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 482, *Lachman Das v. Brij Pal*, I. L. R. 6 All. 147, and

APPEAL—*cont'd.*4. ARBITRATION—*cont'd.*

Venkayya v. Venkatappayya, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 348, referred to. *KALI PROSANNO GHOSE v. RAJANI KANT CHATTERJEE* . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 141

28. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 525 and 526—Arbitration—Award—Denial of reference to arbitration—Jurisdiction of Court to determine the factum of reference. Held*, by the Full Bench, that an order under s. 525 determining that there has been no valid reference to arbitration and rejecting the application is a "decree" within the meaning of s. 2, and an appeal lies from such order. *Kali Prosanno Ghose v. Rajani Kant Chatterjee*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 141, followed. *MAHOMED WAHIDUDDIN v. HAKIMAN* . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 757
2 C. W. N. 529

29. ————— *Judgment not in accordance with award. An appeal lies from a judgment given on an arbitration award, on the ground that the judgment is contrary to the award. DEB NARAIN SINGH v. RAJMONEE KOONWAR*
3 W. R. 168

30. ————— *Addition to award. The addition in a judgment according to an award of a trifling direction upon a matter not referred to the arbitrators, which was quite separable from the other parts of the award, and did not affect the decision on the matter referred, was held to come within the concluding part of Act VIII of 1859, s. 325, and not to affect the finality of the judgment. HURO SOONDUREE DABEE v. SREEDHUR BHUTTACHARJEE* . 17 W. R. 352

31. ————— *Order varying award as to payment under decree. An appeal will lie from a decree which varies an award by containing a direction for payment by instalments which is not contained in the award. PHIRAN v. BAHORAN*
7 N. W. 367

32. ————— *Doubt as to validity of award. An appeal lies where the reality of an arbitration award is questioned on the ground of there having been no valid submission to arbitration. In the matter of the petition of JUNGLI RAM. JUNGLI RAM v. RAM HEET SAHOY* . 9 W. R. 47

33. ————— *Judgment in accordance with award—Civil Procedure Code, s. 522. Held*, that an appeal lies from a decree passed in accordance with an award, when such decree is impugned on the ground that there is no award in law or in fact upon which judgment and decree could follow under s. 522, Civil Procedure Code. *Joymungul Singh v. Mohun Ram*, 23 W. R. 429, and *Bhagirath v. Ram Golam*, I. L. R. 4 All. 283, commented on. *LACHMAN DAS v. BRIJPAL*
I. L. R. 6 All. 174

34. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 325—Finality of decree. Matters in dispute were referred to the arbitration of five persons, of whom four made their award on 27th*

APPEAL—*cont'd.*4. ARBITRATION—*cont'd.*

August 1875. On 3rd September, the same arbitrators granted an application for re-hearing. Before the matter was re-heard, one of the four died, and an order striking off the application was made by two of the surviving arbitrators. On 21st February 1876, an application was made to the Court to have the award filed, which was opposed. The Court overruled the objection, and ordering the award to be filed under s. 325, Act VIII of 1859, gave a decree to the plaintiffs. *Held*, that the award was not a valid and final award; that the decree passed thereon was not final; and that an appeal would lie. *BOONJAD MATHOOR v. NATHOO SHAHOO*
I. L. R. 3 Calc. 375: 1 C. L. R. 455

35. ————— *Finality of decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), s. 325. A case was referred by consent to arbitration, and, after having been recalled into Court, was again referred. An award was made by the arbitrator and filed in Court. The defendants then objected on the ground that they had no notice after the second reference, and that they were not heard, and that the arbitrator had otherwise misconducted himself. These objections were disallowed by the Subordinate Judge, who gave a decree in the terms of the award. This decree was upheld by the Judge on appeal, who, however, found that the arbitrator had been guilty of misconduct. Held*, that, if the decree of the first Court was not final under s. 325, Act VIII of 1859, all that the lower Appellate Court could do was to remand the case to be dealt with on its merits: but inasmuch as there had been an award and a decree thereon, which was final within the terms of that section, the lower Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal or to express any opinion on what had passed in the first Court. *WAZIR MAHTON v. LULIT SINGH*
I. L. R. 7 Calc. 166: 8 C. L. R. 505

36. ————— *Judgment in accordance with award—Appeal—Defendants not all joining in reference to arbitration. The question whether under s. 522 of the Code of Civil Procedure an appeal will lie against a decree given in accordance with an award, depends upon whether the award upon which the decree is based is a valid and legal award. A plaintiff and some of the defendants to a suit applied to refer the suit to arbitration (certain other of the defendants not having joined in the application); an award was passed and a decree made in accordance with such award. The plaintiffs objected to the validity of the award, on the ground that all the parties to the suit had not joined in referring the suit to arbitration; the objection was dismissed, and judgment given in accordance with the award. Held*, that an appeal would lie from a decree dismissing the objection and confirming the award. *JOY PRAKASH LALL v. SHEO GOLAM SINGH* . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 37

37. ————— *Order setting aside decree upon award—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 521. All matters in dispute:*

APPEAL—*contd.*4. ARBITRATION—*contd.*

in a suit were referred to arbitration. An award was duly made and filed, and a decree passed in accordance with the terms thereof. Subsequently, on the application of the plaintiff in the suit, the Court passed an order setting aside the decree and the award, and ordering the case to be set down for hearing upon the ground that the proceedings in connection with the arbitration had been taken, and the award had been filed, without notice to the plaintiff, and that, although the award was alleged to have been made with the consent of the parties, the plaintiff had not consented to it. *Held*, that no appeal lay from such order. *Howard v. Wilson*, *I. L. R. 4 Calr. 231*, dissented from. *Mothooranath Tewaree v. Brindaban Tewaree*, *14 W. R. 327*, followed. *AMBICA DAS v. NADYAR CHAND PAL*, *I. L. R. 11 Calc. 172*

38. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 521—Legality of order remitting award for reconsideration.* An award, submitted by arbitrators, to whom all matters in dispute had been referred, stated that "defendant has not produced any witness in support of his contention raised in issues Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 6, hence we have only to deal with issues Nos. 3, 4, and 7," and dealing with those issues, the arbitrators gave their finding. The award was remitted, on the ground that the arbitrators had not determined the issues Nos. 1 and 2, 5 and 6 :—*Held*, that (i) the legality of an order remitting an award for the reconsideration of the arbitrators may be challenged on appeal against the decree ultimately passed ; and (ii) that the award ought not to have been remitted : there was no illegality on the face of it, and there was a decision on the whole matter in issue between the parties. *Mathooranath Tewaree v. Brindaban Tewaree*, *14 W. R. 327*, *Ambica Dasi v. Nadyar Chand Pal*, *I. L. R. 11 Calc. 172*, *Nanok Chand v. Ram Narayan*, *I. L. R. 2 All. 181*, and *Bikramjit Singh v. Husaini Begam*, *I. L. R. 3 All. 643*, referred to. *GEORGE v. VASTIAN SOURY*, *I. L. R. 22 Mad. 202*

39. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 521 and 522—Revocation of submission—Appellate decree in accordance with award.* By reason of s. 582 of the Civil Procedure Code, where a Court of first instance wrongly sets aside an arbitration award and passes a decree against the terms thereof and a Court of first appeal, holding that the award was not open to objection upon the grounds mentioned in s. 521, passes a decree strictly in accordance with the award, such appellate decree is entitled to the same finality as the first Court's decree would have been under the last paragraph of s. 522, and cannot be made the subject of second appeal. *Pureshnath Dey v. Nobin Chunder Dutt*, *12 W. R. 93*, and *Roghubeer Dyal v. Maina Koor*, *12 C. L. R. 564*, dissented from. *NAURANG SINGH v. SADAPAL SINGH*, *I. L. R. 11 All. 8*

40. ————— *Award—Application to file award—Objection to—Decree on award, Finality of—Private arbitration—Civil Procedure*

APPEAL—*contd.*4. ARBITRATION—*contd.*

Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 520, 521, 525, 526. Certain disputes between parties were referred under a written agreement to an arbitrator, who in due course made his award. The plaintiffs then applied to the Subordinate Judge to have the award filed in Court under the provisions of s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The defendants came in and objected to the award on the following amongst other grounds :—(i) That the value of the property in suit was Rs500 only, and therefore that the application should have been made in the Munsif's Court and not in that of the Subordinate Judge ; (ii) that the agreement of submission was vague and indefinite, and did not clearly set out the matters in dispute. The Subordinate Judge overruled the objection without taking any evidence, and directed the award to be filed and a decree to be passed thereon. The plaintiff appealed. The defendants contended that no appeal lay, and that, if it did, it lay to the District Judge, and not to the High Court :—*Held*, that, assuming that in a proceeding under ss. 525 and 526 the Court has power to consider such objections as are mentioned in ss. 520 and 521, the above objections did not fall under either section, and therefore no appeal lay. *BINDESSURI PERSHAD SINGH v. JANKEE PERSHAD SINGH*, *I. L. R. 16 Calc. 482*

41. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 327 and 325—Finality of judgment on award.* S. 327, Civil Procedure Code, incorporates the provision in s. 325 as to the finality of the judgment given according to the award, and puts the award filed under s. 327 in the same position as the award filed under s. 325. Where a Court files an arbitration award and passes a decree, that decree is final. *Semble* : The word "date" in s. 327 does not mean the day written in the award as when it was made, but the time when it is handed over to the parties, so that they may be able to give effect to it. *SREENATH CHATTERJEE v. KYLASH CHUNDER CHATTERJEE*, *21 W. R. 248*

42. ————— *Agreement to refer not providing for disagreement of arbitrators—Award by umpire and one arbitrator—Appointment of umpire by Court—Decree in accordance with award—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 509, 523.* In an agreement to refer certain matters to arbitration, which was filed in Court under s. 523 of the Civil Procedure Code, and on which an order of reference was made by the Court, no provision was made for difference of opinion between the arbitrators, by appointing an umpire or otherwise. The arbitrators being unable to agree upon the matters referred, the Court, on the application of one of them, appointed an umpire, and directed that the award should be submitted on a particular date. An award was made by the umpire and one arbitrator, without the concurrence of the other arbitrator, submitted to the Court which passed a decree in accordance with its terms. On appeal by the defendants in the case, the District Judge reversed

APPEAL—*contd.*4. ARBITRATION—*contd.*

the decree. *Held*, that an appeal would lie to the Judge from the decree of the first Court, where there had been no legal award such as the law contemplated. *Lachman Das v. Brijpal*, I. L. R. 6 All. 174, referred to. *Held*, that in the present case there had been no legal award such as the law contemplated, inasmuch as the agreement to refer gave the Court no power to appoint an umpire, and required that the award should be made by the arbitrators named by the parties. *MUHAMMAD ABID v. MUHAMMAD ASGHAR* I. L. R. 8 All. 64

43. ———— *Powers of arbitrators—Payment by instalments—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 518, 522.* The arbitrators, to whom the matters in difference in two suits for money were referred to arbitration, made an award for payment to the plaintiff of certain sums by the defendant, and further directed that these sums should be paid by certain instalments. The plaintiff preferred objections to the award in so far as it directed payment by instalments, and the Court, holding that the arbitrators had no power to make such a direction, modified the award to that extent, under s. 518 of the Civil Procedure Code. On appeal, the District Judge, while allowing the power of the arbitrators to direct payment by instalments, reduced the number of instalments, which had been fixed. *Held*, that the decree of the first Court not being in accordance with the award, an appeal lay to the Judge, with reference to s. 522 of the Code. *Per MAHMOOD, J.* The word "award" used in the last sentence of s. 522 of the Code must be understood to mean an award as given by the arbitrators, and not as amended by the Court under s. 518. The words "in excess of or not in accordance with, the award," used in s. 522, were intended to enable the Court of appeal to check the improper use of the power conferred by s. 518. *JAWAHAR SINGH v. MUL RAJ*

I. L. R. 8 All. 449

44. ———— *Evidence given by party on oath proposed by opposite party—Award in accordance with such evidence—Judgment in accordance with award—Validity of award—Act X of 1877 (Civil Procedure Code), ss. 520, 521, 522—Act X of 1873 (Oaths Act).* The plaintiff in a suit, which had been referred to arbitration, offered before the arbitrator to be bound by the evidence of the defendant given on a certain oath. With the arbitrator's consent the defendant accepted such offer, and gave evidence on such oath. The arbitrator made an award in accordance with the evidence so given. The plaintiff objected to the award, not on any of the grounds mentioned in ss. 520 and 521 of the Civil Procedure Code, but on the ground that the procedure of the arbitrator had been illegal. The Court disallowed this objection, and gave a judgment and decree in accordance with the award. *Held* by STRAIGHT, J., that such decree, being in accordance with the award, was not appealable. *Held* by STUART, C.J., that the award not being open to objection on any of the grounds mentioned in ss. 520 and 521 of the Civil Procedure

APPEAL—*contd.*4. ARBITRATION—*contd.*

Code, and the decree being in accordance with the award, the decree was not appealable. *Held* by OLDFIELD, J., that the procedure adopted by the arbitrator being illegal, not being warranted by the Oaths Act, and there being in reality no award within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code, the decree therefore was appealable. *Per* STUART, C.J., that the procedure of the arbitrator did not require to be warranted by the Oaths Act, as he was entitled by virtue of his office to proceed as he did. *BHAGIRATH v. RAM GHULAM* I. L. R. 4 All. 283

45. ———— *Application to file award—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 525, 520, and 521.* When an application is made to a Court to file an award under s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and an objection is made to the filing of it upon any of the grounds mentioned in s. 520 or 521, the proper course for the Court to pursue is to dismiss the application, and to leave the applicant to bring a regular suit to enforce the award in which all the objections to its validity may be properly tried and determined. Where no such ground of objection is made to the filing of the award, and the Court consequently orders it to be filed, no appeal lies against that order. *HURRONATH CHOWDHRY v. NISTARINI CHOWDRANI*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 74

46. ———— *Order rejecting appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 525—Matters to be decided upon application to file an award—Court-fee on such application.* No appeal lies from an order upon an application to file an award under s. 525 of the Civil Procedure Code. Upon an application to file an award under s. 525 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court to which the application is made has no jurisdiction to enquire whether the defendant has agreed to the terms of the instrument referring the matter to arbitration, or whether the terms were obtained by fraud. When such objections are made, it is the duty of the Court to reject the application under s. 525, and refer the parties to a regular suit. *BIJADHUR BHAGUT v. MONOHUR BHUGUT* I. L. R. 10 Calc. 11

PALUT BHAGUT v. MONOHUR BHAGUT

13 C. L. R. 171

47. ———— *Refusal to file award in Court—Civil Procedure Code, s. 2 and s. 525—Arbitration—"Decree." Held* (OLDFIELD, J., dissenting), that an appeal does not lie from an order disallowing an application to file an award under s. 525 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Janki Tewari v. Gayan Tewari*, I. L. R. 3 All. 427, distinguished by STUART, C.J. The same case followed by OLDFIELD, J. *BHOLA v. GOBIND DAYAL*

I. L. R. 6 All. 186

48. ———— *Act VIII of 1859, ss. 325 and 327.* An application was made under s. 327 of Act VIII of 1859 to file an arbitration award, and the Court, after calling on the opposite party to show cause why it should not be filed,

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rejected the application :—*Held*, that the case did not come within the meaning of s. 325, and that the order, being simply one “rejecting an application to file an award,” was final. **RAJKUMAR SING v. KALI CHARAN SING.** 1 B. L. R. Ap. 20 : 11 W. R. 57

49. ————— *Order rejecting application to file—Act VIII of 1859, s. 327.* No appeal lies from an order rejecting an application to file an award (MITTER, J., *dubitante*). **ROY PRIYANATH CHOWDHRY v. PROSONNO CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY** 2 B. L. R. A. C. 249

PREONATH CHOWDHRY v. RAMDHUN
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CHINTAMAN SING v. UMA KUNWAR
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2 Ind. Jur. N.S. 1 : 6 W. R. Mis. 83

50. ————— *Order granting or refusing.* *Held* by the majority of the Court (PEARSON, J., *dissentiente*), that no appeal lies from an order passed under s. 327, Act VIII of 1859, whether granting or refusing the application. **JOKHAN RAI v. BUCHO RAI** 3 Agra 353
Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 156

51. ————— *Want of consent of parties—Private award.* An appeal on the allegation of want of consent of parties lies from the order of a lower Court under s. 327, Code of Civil Procedure, directing a private award of arbitration to be filed and enforced. **HULODHUR SANTAL v. GONESH SANTAL** 6 W. R. 60

52. ————— *Order refusing application—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* No appeal lies against an order disallowing an application under s. 327 of Act VIII of 1859 to file an award. **VYANKATESH RAMCHANDRA JOGEKAR v. BALAJERAV BIN ANANDRAV** 1 Bom. 184

53. ————— *Order refusing application—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* Application to file an award under s. 327 of Act VIII of 1859 should be made to the Court of the lowest grade competent to receive it, and no appeal lies to High Court from an order by a District Court confirming on appeal an order of a subordinate Court declining to file such an award. *Ex parte* **BAL-KRISHNA BHASAKAR GUPTA**
2 Bom. 96 : 2nd Ed. 91

54. ————— *Order refusing application—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* *Quære* : Does an appeal lie from the refusal of a Civil Court under Act VIII of 1859, s. 327, to order an award to be filed ? **RAJ CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY v. BROJENDRO COOMAR ROY CHOWDHRY**
21 W. R. 182

55. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 327.* The plaintiff sought to file and to enforce a private award, under the provisions of s. 327, Act VIII of 1859. The defendant objected that he was no party to the award. The Court to which the plaintiff's application was made, after enquiry into

APPEAL—contd.**4. ARBITRATION—contd.**

the matter, overruled the objection, and directed that the award should be filed, but made no decree enforcing the award under the provisions of Chapter VI, Act VIII of 1859. *Held*, that the order was not open to appeal, as it did not operate as a decree. **HUSSAINT BIBI v. MOHSIN KHAN**
I. L. R. 1 All. 156

56. ————— *Order refusing to file award—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877) ss. 525, 538.* Matters in dispute were referred to arbitration without the intervention of the Court. An award was made, and upon an application under s. 525 of the Civil Procedure Code to file the award, one of the parties showed cause why the award should not be filed, and the Subordinate Judge held the objection to be good. *Held*, that no appeal lay. **SREE RAM CHOWDHRY v. DENOBUNDHOO CHOWDHRY**
I. L. R. 7 Calc. 490 : 9 C. L. R. 147

57. ————— *Order to enforce award—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* An appeal lies from an order made in execution of an arbitration award filed under the provisions of s. 327 of the Civil Procedure Code. **VASUDEB VISHNU v. NARAYAN JUGANNATH DIKSHIT**
5 Bom. A. C. 129

HUMUTOOLAH CHOWDHRY v. HERRUN
13 W. R. 62

58. ————— *Order refusing to enforce illegal award—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* An order refusing to enforce an obviously illegal award of arbitrators under s. 327, Act VIII of 1859, is not a decree, and therefore not appealable. **DIGAMBUREE DOSSEE v. POORNANAND DEY**
7 W. R. 401

59. ————— *Order enforcing award—Private award.* An appeal lies from the order of a Court directing the enforcement of an award of arbitrators, when the matter was referred to arbitration without the intervention of a Court. **ANUND CHUNDER SINGH v. GOPAL CHUNDER DASS**
3 W. R. 154

LAKSHMAN SHIVAJI v. RAMA ESTU
8 Bom. A. C. 17

60. ————— *Private award—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 325, 327.* A decree passed by a Civil Court in accordance with an award of arbitrators made without the intervention of a Court of Justice under s. 327 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859) is not subject to appeal. **VISHNU BHAI JOSHI v. RAVJI BHAI JOSHI**
I. L. R. 3 Bom. 18

61. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 525—Filing private award in Court—Amendment of plaint, Ch. XXXVII of Civil Procedure Code, 1877.* By the amendment of the plaint, a case under s. 525 of Act X of 1877 was taken out of the scope of Chapter XXXVII of that Act. *Held*, that this being so, the decree of the Court of first

APPEAL—contd.

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instance was appealable. *JUALA SINGH v. NARAIN DAS* **I. L. R. 3 All. 54**

62. ———— Order refusing to enforce award—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 2, 540—Filing private award in Court—Order rejecting application.* Per SPANKIE, J. An order refusing an application to file a private award in Court is appealable as a decree. *Jokhan Rai v. Bucho Rai, 3 Agra 353*, and *Hussaini Bibi v. Moshin Khan, I. L. R. 1 All. 156*, impugned and distinguished. *Vishnu Bhau Joshi v. Ravji Bhau Joshi, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 18*, distinguished. Per STUART, C.J.—An order refusing an application to file a private award in Court, on grounds not mentioned in ss. 520 and 521, is a decree and appealable as such. *JANKI TEWARI v. GAYAN TEWARI*. **I. L. R. 3 All. 427**

63. ———— Order enforcing award—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* Plaintiff sued for confirmation of an award delivered by arbitrators appointed by agreement of parties to decide upon his claim to a share of ancestral property. Defendant objected that the award was illegal, principally upon the ground that he had cancelled his submission some time before the award was passed. The District Judge ordered the award to be filed, on the authority of *Pestonjee Maneckjee, 3 Mad. 183*, affirmed in *12 Moo. I. A. 112*. The defendant appealed. *Held*, that no appeal lay. *SANTANJA v. RAMARAYA*. **7 Mad. 257**

64. ———— Arbitration award—*Act VIII of 1859, s. 325.* An appeal lies from an order enforcing execution of an arbitration award or from a decree under s. 325 of Act VIII of 1859. *WALI ALAM v. BIBI NASRAN*. **3 B. L. R. Ap. 104: 12 W. R. 50**

65. ———— Order refusing to enforce award—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 622.* When a Court has refused to file an award upon an application under s. 525, Civil Procedure Code, no appeal lies against such decision, which is an order and not a decree; but the High Court can interfere under s. 622. *MANA VIKRAMA v. MALICHERRY KRISPAN NAMBHUDRI, MAHARAJA OF CALICUT*. **I. L. R. 3 Mad. 68**

66. ———— Order enforcing award—*Final order—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 522, 526.* The power to file an award includes the power to enquire if there was a submission to arbitration, and this question is concluded by the decree, which is final under ss. 526 and 522 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *MICHAIRAYA GURUVU v. SADASTVA PARAMA GURUVU* **I. L. R. 4 Mad. 319**

67. ———— Curtailment of time for taking objection to award—*Review.* When a party has been prejudiced by having the time allowed for taking objections to an award curtailed by the Court, no appeal lies, but a review should be granted by the Court of first instance. *MONJI PREMJI SET v. MALIYAKEL KOYASSAN KOYA HAJI*. **I. L. R. 3 Mad. 59**

APPEAL—contd.

4. ARBITRATION—contd.

68. ———— Order setting aside award—*Misconduct of arbitrators.* An order of a Civil Court setting aside an arbitration award, being an interlocutory order, is not open to an appeal immediately; but when the Court sets aside the award on the ground of misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, and, after hearing the case on its merits, makes its decree in favour of the plaintiff, it is competent to the defendant to appeal against that decree. *MATHOORANATH TEWAREE v. BRINDABUN TEWAREE* **14 W. R. 327**

69. ———— Setting aside award—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 313.* A regular and not a summary appeal lies to set aside an award of arbitrators passed under s. 313, Act VIII of 1859. *RAM COOMAR CHOWDHRY v. NOBIN CHUNDER CHOWDHRY*. **W. R. 1864, Mis. 33**

70. ———— Order directing submission to be filed—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 326.* No appeal lies from an order directing that an agreement to submit matters in dispute to arbitration should be filed under the provisions of s. 326 of the Civil Procedure Code. *PESTONJEE NUSSEERWANJEE v. MANECKJEE & Co.* **3 Mad. 183**

Affirmed on appeal by Privy Council

12 Moo. I. A. 112

71. ———— Order refusing to file submission—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 326.* An order disallowing an application under s. 326 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, is unappealable. *BHUGWAN v. PURMESHREE*. **5 N. W. 179**

72. ———— Application to file compromise—*Agreement of parties—Decree on compromise—Withdrawal from compromise—Code of Civil Procedure, Act XIV of 1882, s. 375.* After suit filed by the plaintiff against several defendants, one of whom was an infant, a petition of compromise entered into between the adult parties was filed in Court. The petition stated the terms of arrangement, and also that an application would be made by the guardian of the minor praying the Court to allow the compromise to be carried out on his behalf. Ten days after the petition of compromise was filed, the first defendant and the plaintiff presented petitions to the Court withdrawing from the compromise and praying that the suit should proceed. The second defendant presented a petition praying that the compromise should be recorded, and a decree passed according to its terms. The Court made a decree in accordance with the prayer of the second defendant's petition. The first defendant appealed. *Held*, that an appeal lay, s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure merely covering cases in which all parties consent to have the terms entered into, carried out, and judgment entered up. *Ruttonsey Lalji v. Pooribai, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 340*, questioned. *HARA SUNDARI DEBI v. KUMAR DUKHINESSUR MALIA* **I. L. R. 11 Calc. 250**

73.—*Decree in accordance with award—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 562, 622*

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rejected the application :—*Held*, that the case did not come within the meaning of s. 325, and that the order, being simply one "rejecting an application to file an award," was final. **RAJKUMAR SING v. KALI CHARAN SING.** 1 B. L. R. Ap. 20 : 11 W. R. 57

49. _____ *Order rejecting application to file—Act VIII of 1859, s. 327.* No appeal lies from an order rejecting an application to file an award (MITTER, J., *dubitante*). **ROY PRIYANATH CHOWDHRY v. PROSONNO CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY** . . . 2 B. L. R. A. C. 249

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50. _____ *Order granting or refusing.* *Held* by the majority of the Court (PEARSON, J., *dissentiente*), that no appeal lies from an order passed under s. 327, Act VIII of 1859, whether granting or refusing the application. **JOHAN RAI v. BUCHO RAI** . . . 3 Agra 353
Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 156

51. _____ *Want of consent of parties—Private award.* An appeal on the allegation of want of consent of parties lies from the order of a lower Court under s. 327, Code of Civil Procedure, directing a private award of arbitration to be filed and enforced. **HULODHUR SANTAL v. GONESH SANTAL** . . . 6 W. R. 60

52. _____ *Order refusing application—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* No appeal lies against an order disallowing an application under s. 327 of Act VIII of 1859 to file an award. **VYANKATESH RAMCHANDRA JOGEKAR v. BALAJERAV BIN ANANDRAV** . . . 1 Bom. 184

53. _____ *Order refusing application—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* Application to file an award under s. 327 of Act VIII of 1859 should be made to the Court of the lowest grade competent to receive it, and no appeal lies to High Court from an order by a District Court confirming on appeal an order of a subordinate Court declining to file such an award. *Ex parte* **BAL-KRISHNA BHASAKAR GUPTA**
2 Bom. 96 : 2nd Ed. 91

54. _____ *Order refusing application—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* *Quære* : Does an appeal lie from the refusal of a Civil Court under Act VIII of 1859, s. 327, to order an award to be filed ? **RAJ CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY v. BROJENDRO COOMAR ROY CHOWDHRY**
21 W. R. 182

55. _____ *Civil Procedure Code, s. 327.* The plaintiff sought to file and to enforce a private award, under the provisions of s. 327, Act VIII of 1859. The defendant objected that he was no party to the award. The Court to which the plaintiff's application was made, after enquiry into

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the matter, overruled the objection, and directed that the award should be filed, but made no decree enforcing the award under the provisions of Chapter VI, Act VIII of 1859. *Held*, that the order was not open to appeal, as it did not operate as a decree. **HUSSAINI BIBI v. MOHSIN KHAN**
I. L. R. 1 All. 156

56. _____ *Order refusing to file award—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877) ss. 525, 588.* Matters in dispute were referred to arbitration without the intervention of the Court. An award was made, and upon an application under s. 525 of the Civil Procedure Code to file the award, one of the parties showed cause why the award should not be filed, and the Subordinate Judge held the objection to be good. *Held*, that no appeal lay. **SREE RAM CHOWDHRY v. DENOBUNDHO CHOWDHRY**
I. L. R. 7 Calc. 490 : 9 C. L. R. 147

57. _____ *Order to enforce award—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* An appeal lies from an order made in execution of an arbitration award filed under the provisions of s. 327 of the Civil Procedure Code. **VASUDEB VISHNU v. NARAYAN JUGANNATH DIKSHIT**
5 Bom. A. C. 129

HUMUTOOLAH CHOWDHRY v. HERRUN
13 W. R. 62

58. _____ *Order refusing to enforce illegal award—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* An order refusing to enforce an obviously illegal award of arbitrators under s. 327, Act VIII of 1859, is not a decree, and therefore not appealable. **DIGAMBUREE DOSSEE v. POORNANAN DEY**
7 W. R. 401

59. _____ *Order enforcing award—Private award.* An appeal lies from the order of a Court directing the enforcement of an award of arbitrators, when the matter was referred to arbitration without the intervention of a Court. **ANUND CHUNDER SINGH v. GOPAL CHUNDER DASS**
3 W. R. 154

LAKSHMAN SHIVAJI v. RAMA ESU
8 Bom. A. C. 17

60. _____ *Private award—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 325, 327.* A decree passed by a Civil Court in accordance with an award of arbitrators made without the intervention of a Court of Justice under s. 327 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859) is not subject to appeal. **VISHNU BHAI JOSHI v. RAVJI BHAI JOSHI**
I. L. R. 3 Bom. 18

61. _____ *Civil Procedure Code, s. 525—Filing private award in Court—Amendment of plaint, Ch. XXXVII of Civil Procedure Code, 1877.* By the amendment of the plaint, a case under s. 525 of Act X of 1877 was taken out of the scope of Chapter XXXVII of that Act. *Held*, that this being so, the decree of the Court of first

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instance was appealable. *JUALA SINGH v. NARAIN DAS* I. L. R. 3 All. 54

62. ——— Order refusing to enforce award—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 2, 540—Filing private award in Court—Order rejecting application.* Per SPANKIE, J. An order refusing an application to file a private award in Court is appealable as a decree. *Jokhan Rai v. Bucho Rai*, 3 Agra 353, and *Hussaini Bibi v. Moshin Khan*, I. L. R. 1 All. 156, impugned and distinguished. *Vishnu Bhanu Joshi v. Ravji Bhanu Joshi*, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 18, distinguished. Per STUART, C.J.—An order refusing an application to file a private award in Court, on grounds not mentioned in ss. 520 and 521, is a decree and appealable as such. *JANKI TEWARI v. GAYAN TEWARI*. I. L. R. 3 All. 427

63. ——— Order enforcing award—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* Plaintiff sued for confirmation of an award delivered by arbitrators appointed by agreement of parties to decide upon his claim to a share of ancestral property. Defendant objected that the award was illegal, principally upon the ground that he had cancelled his submission some time before the award was passed. The District Judge ordered the award to be filed, on the authority of *Pestonjee Maneckjee*, 3 Mad. 183, affirmed in 12 Moo. I. A. 112. The defendant appealed. *Held*, that no appeal lay. *SANTANJA v. RAMARAYA*. 7 Mad. 257

64. ——— Arbitration award—*Act VIII of 1859, s. 325.* An appeal lies from an order enforcing execution of an arbitration award or from a decree under s. 325 of Act VIII of 1859. *WALI ALAM v. BIBI NASRAN*
3 B. L. R. Ap. 104: 12 W. R. 50

65. ——— Order refusing to enforce award—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 622.* When a Court has refused to file an award upon an application under s. 525, Civil Procedure Code, no appeal lies against such decision, which is an order and not a decree; but the High Court can interfere under s. 622. *MANA VIKRAMA v. MALICHERRY KRISPEAN NAMBUDDRI, MAHARAJA OF CALICUT*
I. L. R. 3 Mad. 68

66. ——— Order enforcing award—*Final order—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 522, 526.* The power to file an award includes the power to enquire if there was a submission to arbitration, and this question is concluded by the decree, which is final under ss. 526 and 522 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *MICHARAYA GURUVU v. SADASIYA PARAMA GURUVU* I. L. R. 4 Mad. 319

67. ——— Curtailment of time for taking objection to award—*Review.* When a party has been prejudiced by having the time allowed for taking objections to an award curtailed by the Court, no appeal lies, but a review should be granted by the Court of first instance. *MONJI PREMJI SET v. MALIYAKEL KOYASSAN KOYA HAJI*
I. L. R. 3 Mad. 59

APPEAL—*contd.*4. ARBITRATION—*contd.*

68. ——— Order setting aside award—*Misconduct of arbitrators.* An order of a Civil Court setting aside an arbitration award, being an interlocutory order, is not open to an appeal immediately; but when the Court sets aside the award on the ground of misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, and, after hearing the case on its merits, makes its decree in favour of the plaintiff, it is competent to the defendant to appeal against that decree. *MATHOORANATH TEWARIE v. BRINDABUN TEWARIE* 14 W. R. 327

69. ——— Setting aside award—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 313.* A regular and not a summary appeal lies to set aside an award of arbitrators passed under s. 313, Act VIII of 1859. *RAM COOMAR CHOWDHRY v. NOBIN CHUNDER CHOWDHRY*
W. R. 1864, Mis. 33

70. ——— Order directing submission to be filed—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 326.* No appeal lies from an order directing that an agreement to submit matters in dispute to arbitration should be filed under the provisions of s. 326 of the Civil Procedure Code. *PESTONJEE NUSSERWANJEE v. MANECKJEE & Co.* 3 Mad. 183

Affirmed on appeal by Privy Council
12 Moo. I. A. 112

71. ——— Order refusing to file submission—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 326.* An order disallowing an application under s. 326 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, is unappealable. *BHUGWAN v. PURMESHREE*. 5 N. W. 179

72. ——— Application to file compromise—*Agreement of parties—Decree on compromise—Withdrawal from compromise—Code of Civil Procedure, Act XIV of 1882, s. 375.* After suit filed by the plaintiff against several defendants, one of whom was an infant, a petition of compromise entered into between the adult parties was filed in Court. The petition stated the terms of arrangement, and also that an application would be made by the guardian of the minor praying the Court to allow the compromise to be carried out on his behalf. Ten days after the petition of compromise was filed, the first defendant and the plaintiff presented petitions to the Court withdrawing from the compromise and praying that the suit should proceed. The second defendant presented a petition praying that the compromise should be recorded, and a decree passed according to its terms. The Court made a decree in accordance with the prayer of the second defendant's petition. The first defendant appealed. *Held*, that an appeal lay, s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure merely covering cases in which all parties consent to have the terms entered into, carried out, and judgment entered up. *Ruttonsey Lalji v. Pooribai*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 340, questioned. *HARA SUNDARI DEBI v. KUMAR DUKHNESSUR MALIA* I. L. R. 11 Calc. 250

73.—*Decree in accordance with award—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 562, 622*

APPEAL—*contd.*4. ARBITRATION—*contd.*

—*Power of arbitrators—Error in law in award—Revision.* References to arbitration are dealt with by Ch. XXXVII of the Civil Procedure Code under three heads:—(a) where the parties to litigation desire to refer to arbitration any matter in difference between them in the suit: in that case all proceedings are under the supervision of the Court; (b) where parties, without having recourse to litigation, agree to refer their differences to arbitration, and it is desired that the agreement of reference should have the sanction of the Court: in that case all further proceedings are under the supervision of the Court; (c) where the agreement of reference is made and the arbitration itself takes place without the intervention of the Court, and the assistance of the Court is only sought in order to give effect to the award. Under (a), the agreement to refer, and the application to the Court founded upon it, must have the concurrence of all parties concerned, and the actual reference is the order of the Court; so that no question can arise as to the regularity of the proceedings up to that point. Under (b) and (c), proceedings described as a suit and registered as such must be taken in order to bring the matter—the agreement to refer, or the award, as the case may be—under the cognizance of the Court: that is or may be a litigious proceeding, cause may be shown against the application, and it would seem that the order made thereon is a decree within the meaning of that expression as defined in the Civil Procedure Code. The suit was brought in the Court of a Subordinate Judge, and, as to part of the relief asked for, was excluded from the cognizance of the Civil Courts by s. 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act (XVI of 1887); and the question as to the jurisdiction of the Court was one of the issues in the case. The whole case was referred to arbitrators for decision. They submitted their award, in which amongst the other matters in dispute, they decided that the suit was cognizable by the Civil Court. Objections to the award were overruled, and an application to set it aside was refused by the Subordinate Judge, who, under s. 522 of the Civil Procedure Code, duly pronounced a decree in accordance with, and not in excess of, the award. The Chief Court admitted an application for revision of the decree under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, (affirming the judgment of a Full Bench of the Chief Court of the Punjab), that no appeal lay from this decree. *Held*, also, that the application for revision was incompetent. It was avowedly an application to set aside the award, and as such was barred by Art. 158, Sch. II, of the Limitation Act. But even if it had been in time, it could not have been brought under s. 622. The arbitrators had power to decide the question of jurisdiction, and they did so: they may have erred in law, but arbitrators may be judges of law as well as judges of fact, and an error in law does not vitiate an award. The award having been made, and not having been corrected or modified, and the application to set it aside having been refused, the Subordinate Judge had no option but to pronounce a decree in accordance with it.

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He had not exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law, nor had he failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested, nor had he acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. GHULAM KHAN *v.* MUHAMMAD HASSAN (1901) . . . I. L. R. 29 Cal. 167 :

S. C. (GHULAM JILANI *v.* MUHAMMAD HUSSAN)
6 C. W. N. 226: L. R. 29 I. A. 51

74.—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 506, 522—Reference to arbitration—Petition not joined in by all the parties to the suit—Legality of reference.* In a suit for partnership accounts, two out of three defendants petitioned the Court, under s. 506 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to refer the matters in dispute to arbitration. The representatives of the third defendant (who was then deceased) were not parties to the application, which was, however, granted. An award was made, and a decree was passed in terms of it. *Held*, that as the reference was illegal and the award in consequence was void, an appeal lay against the decree, notwithstanding that it was in conformity with what purported to be an award. INDUR SUBARAMI REDDY *v.* KANDADAI RAJAMANNAR AYYANGAR (1902) . . . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 47

75.—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 521—Petition by both parties, requesting the District Munsif to examine site and peruse documents and agreeing to abide by his decision—Award.* In the course of a suit, in which plaintiff claimed an order directing defendant to close a doorway, and an injunction, plaintiff and defendant jointly presented a petition requesting the District Munsif to inspect the site and peruse the documents filed in the suit, and agreeing to abide by the decision which the Court might be pleased to pass, as the final decision. The District Munsif passed an order in terms of the petition, and inspected the site, and considered the documents, and ultimately passed a decree in plaintiff's favour. Against that decree, defendant appealed. *Held*, that the District Munsif had acted as an arbitrator by consent of the parties, and no appeal lay from his decision, which must be looked upon as an award. And, as no reasons had been shown for setting aside the award under s. 521 of the Code, the decree must be taken to have been passed in accordance with the award, and, as such, upheld. NIDHAMARTHI MUKKANTI *v.* THAMMANA RAMAYYA (1902) . . . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 76

76.—*Arbitration—Appeal against decree in accordance with award—Legality or validity of award—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 522.* Where on the application of the plaintiff and one of the defendants, the others not having entered appearance, a case was referred to arbitration and a decree was passed under s. 522 of the Code of Civil Procedure in accordance with the award dismissing the suit. *Held*, that the decree could not be challenged by way of appeal on the ground that there was no valid and legal award, and that it was unnecessary to go into the question whether the

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award was or was not a legal and valid award by reason of the fact that some of the defendants were not parties to the reference. *Ghulam Khan v. Muhammad Hussan*, 1. L. R. 29 Calc. 167, L. R. 29 I. A. 51, followed. *Chintamani Aditya v. Haladhar Maiti*, 2 C. L. J. 153, and *Haranunda Naskar v. Doyal Chand Naskar*, 2 C. L. J. 142, approved. *Parsidh Narain Singh v. Ghanshyam Narain Singh*, 9 C. W. N. 873, dissented from. **CHAIRMAN OF THE PURNA MUNICIPALITY v. SIVA SANKAR RAM** (1906) **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 899**

77.—Award—Objections to award—Award set aside—Appeal. Held, that no appeal lies from an order under s. 521 of the Code of Civil Procedure setting aside an award. *Shyama Charan Paramanik v. Prohad Durwan*, 8 C. W. N. 390, followed. *Nawrang Singh v. Sadapal Singh*, 1. L. R. 10 All. 8, overruled. *Pureshnath Dey v. Nabin Chunder Dutt*, 12 W. R. 93, and *Rughoobur Dyal v. Maina Koer*, 12 C. L. R. 564, referred to. **GANGA PRASAD v. KURA** (1906) **I. L. R. 28 All. 408**

78.—Private award—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 525, 526—Private award, decree made on. A private award having been filed by one of the parties under s. 525, Civil Procedure Code, the other party objected, and his objections were overruled. Held, that no appeal lay from a decree made in accordance with the award. **GEIDT, J.** The only questions that can be brought before an Appellate Court in proceedings under ss. 525 and 526 of the Civil Procedure Code are (i) Whether any matter has been referred to arbitration without the intervention of the Court and an award made thereon, (ii) Whether the decree ultimately made is in excess of or not in accordance with the award. *Ghulam Jilani v. Muhammad Ahmed*, 6 C. W. N. 226, and *Janokey Nath Guha v. Brojo Lal Guha*, 10 C. W. N. 609, considered. **ABDUL ALI v. ANWAR ALI** (1906) **11 C. W. N. 22**

79.—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 521, 522—Arbitration—Award—Decree on judgment in accordance with the award—Appeal. The matters in dispute between the parties to a suit pending in the Court of a Munsif were referred to arbitration. An award was delivered by the arbitrator to which objections were filed to the effect that the arbitrator had been guilty of misconduct. The objections were, however, overruled and a decree was passed which was in accordance with, and not in excess of, the terms of the award. Held, that no appeal from such a decree would lie, the sole ground being that the arbitrator had been guilty of misconduct. *Sham Lal v. Misri Kunwur*, 1. L. R. 29 All. 426, distinguished. *Ghulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan*, 1. L. R. 29 Calc. 167, followed. **BIHARI LAL v. CHUNNI LAL** (1907) **I. L. R. 29 All. 457**

80.—Civil Procedure Code, s. 522—Award—Decree on award made without allowing time to file objections. An appeal will lie from a decree passed in accordance with an award if such decree has been

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passed without allowing to the parties the time prescribed by law for filing objections to the award. *Ibrahim Ali v. Mohsin Ali*, 1. L. R. 18 All. 422, and *Maharajah Joymungul Singh Bahadur v. Mohun Ram Marwaree*, 23 W. R. 429, followed. **NAJIM-UD-DIN AHMAD v. PUECH** (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 584

81.—Arbitration—Arbitrator—Privy Council—Decree in accordance with award—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 622—Power of Arbitrator—Question of law—Revision—Misconduct of Arbitrator alleged—Court of Agent to Governor-General for Central India. The parties to two suits for partition were the members of a joint Hindu family, who owned property moveable and immoveable and carried on a banking and mercantile business in the Punjab and in the Native State of Bhopal. One suit was brought in 1886 by one of the members of the family in the Court of the Political Agent in Bhopal for partition of the property within the jurisdiction of that Court; and the other was instituted in 1888 by another member of the family in the Court of the District Judge of Delhi for partition of all the property both within and outside British India. By agreement of parties "all matters in dispute" were eventually referred to an arbitrator, who was to determine "what joint property moveable and immoveable (except the immoveable property outside British India) was to be partitioned between the parties," one of the matters in dispute was the jurisdiction of the Punjab Court as to the moveable property outside British India. The arbitrator finally submitted his award on 29th June, 1900. Objections to it by the defendants, mostly on the ground of misconduct of the arbitrator, were overruled, and the District Judge of Delhi made a decree in accordance with the award for appeal and in the alternative a petition for revision under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code was preferred by the defendants to the Chief Court who held that the arbitrator must be taken to have decided the question of jurisdiction, and affirmed the decree as not being assailable either by appeal or revision, the case being governed by *Ghulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan*, 1. L. R. 29 Calc. 167; L. R. 29 I. A. 51. Similar proceedings were taken in the Sehore Court (where the suit was adjourned pending the decision by the Punjab Court) resulting in the decree in accordance with the award made by the Political Agent in Bhopal being upheld on appeal by the Court of the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India, and special leave being granted to appeal to the Privy Council with liberty to the Secretary of State for India in Council to intervene on the appeal. Held, by the Judicial Committee, that there was no "misconduct" of the arbitrator within the meaning of that expression in the arbitration sections of the Civil Procedure Code; and, inasmuch as it did not appear that the decree was in excess of, or not in accordance with, the award, there was

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nothing that could justify the Court in setting aside or remitting it. *Quære*: whether an appeal lies to His Majesty in Council from the Court of the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India. **HANSRAJ v. SUNDAR LAL AND HANSRAJ v. DWARKA DAS (1908)** . . . **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 648**

s. c. **12 C. W. N. 585**
L. R. 35 I. A. 88

5. BENGAL ACTS.

1. ——— **Chota Nagpur Landlord and Tenant Procedure Act (Bengal Act I of 1879), ss. 37, cl. (4), 39, 137 and 139—Rent, Suit for—Appeal in cases where the aggregate amount claimed is above ₹100.** An appeal lies to the Judicial Commissioner and not to the Deputy Commissioner from a decree passed by the Deputy Collector in a suit for rent, where the aggregate amount of rent claimed under s. 39, Bengal Act I of 1879, is above ₹100. **PRIAG NATH LAH DEO v. MURA MUNDA** . . . **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 249**

1 C. W. N. 181

2. ——— **ss. 37, 137—Arrears of rent and ejectment, suit for.** In suits instituted under Beng. Act I of 1879 for arrears of rent and ejectment on account of non-payment of arrears of rent, a second appeal lies to the High Court, this class of cases not being within s. 137 of the same Act. **RANJAN KHAN v. RAMAN CHAMAR**

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 89

Dissented from by the Full Bench in **KHEDU MAHTO v. BUDDUN MAHTO**

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 508

3. ——— **ss. 137, 144—Suit for rent—Intervenor under s. 87—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 622, 584.** The decision of a Deputy Collector as to whether intervenor under s. 87, Act I of 1874 (B. C.), had been actually and in good faith receiving and enjoying rent before and up to the time of the commencement of the suit, is a decision upon the question whether the intervenor is entitled to collect rent; therefore it is a decision upon a question relating to some interest in land as between parties having conflicting claims thereto, and under s. 144, the appeal from the judgment of the Deputy Collector to the Judicial Commissioner. *Held*, further, that an appeal lay to the High Court from the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, and therefore s. 622, Civil Procedure Code, did not apply. **LALL BHIM SINGH v. GUMAN GHANJHU**

1 C. W. N. 341

6. BOMBAY ACTS.

1. ——— **Bombay Civil Courts Act (XIV of 1869), ss. 8 and 26—Suit for account and for balance that may be found due.** The plaintiffs sued for an account of all the business done by the defendants as their commission agents from 1854 to 1867, and prayed that whatever was found due might be awarded with interest. The

APPEAL—contd.**6. BOMBAY ACTS—contd.**

plaintiffs valued the relief sought approximately at ₹510, and this was the only valuation stated in the plaint. The suit was filed in the Court of a first-class Subordinate Judge, who rejected the plaintiff's claim. Against this decision the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that as the approximate amount of the claim was stated in the plaint to be ₹510, that must be taken to be the value of the subject-matter of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction. The appeal, therefore, lay under ss. 8 and 26 of Act XIV of 1869, not to the High Court, but to the District Court. **KHUSHALCHAND MULCHAND v. NAGINDAS MOTICHAND**

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 675

2. ——— **s. 36—Valuation of suit—Jurisdiction.** Where a suit, wherein the subject-matter exceeded ₹5,000, was instituted in the Court of a Principal Sadr Amin, but decided by a Subordinate Judge, first class, appointed under the Bombay Civil Courts Act XIV of 1869: *Held*, that an appeal lay direct to the High Court under s. 26 of the Act. **RAYASANGJI SHIVSANGJI v. GULAM RASUL** . . . **9 Bom. 286**

3. ——— **Application by Creditor for less than ₹5,000 in suit for above that amount.** Although the applicant, to have a sale set aside, was creditor for a sum less than ₹5,000, still as the sale took place in a suit for a sum above ₹5,000, an appeal lay to the High Court. **KRISHNARAV VENKATESH v. VASUDEV ANANT**

11 Bom. 15

4. ——— **Suit for declaration of right to property under attachment.** In a suit for a declaration that the plaintiff had a right of property and possession in a certain house under attachment: being in effect a suit for the removal of the attachment: *Held*, that the judgment-debt in respect of which the house was attached being less than ₹5,000, no appeal lay to the High Court. **MOTICHAND JAICHAND v. DADABHAI PESTONJI**

11 Bom. 186

5. ——— **Administration suit—Suit filed in second class Subordinate Judge's Court—Decree in such a suit—Appeal from such decree to District Court.** The plaintiff filed an administration suit in the Court of a Subordinate Judge of the second class, valuing the relief claimed at ₹130. The Subordinate Judge found that the property in suit was worth over a lakh of rupees, that the liabilities came to ₹5,729, and that the defendant was indebted to the estate in the sum of ₹15,199. He drew up a preliminary decree, directing (*inter alia*) that the defendant should pay this amount into Court within two weeks. Against this order the defendant appealed to the District Court. The District Judge returned the appeal for presentation to the High Court on the ground that the subject-matter exceeded ₹5,000. *Held*, reversing the order of the District Judge, that the appeal lay to the District Court. **SHET KAVASJI MANCHERJI v. DINSHAJI MANCHERJI** . . . **I. L. R. 22 Bom. 963**

APPEAL—*contd.*6. BOMBAY ACTS—*concl'd.*

6. ———— **Bombay Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888), ss. 298, 299, and 301—Order of Chief Judge of Small Cause Court granting compensation for land—Act XII of 1888, s. 3.** An appeal lies to the High Court from a decision of the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court of Bombay, granting compensation to the owner of land taken by the Municipality in case of a set-back under the Municipal Act, III of 1888, ss. 298, 299, and 301. **MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER FOR THE CITY OF BOMBAY v. ABDUL HUQ** . 18 Bom. 184

7. CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION (ACTS XXVII OF 1860 AND VII OF 1889).

1. ———— **Act XXVII of 1860 and Act XIX of 1841—Order granting certificate of possession.** The order granting a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 and directing possession to be given to the certificate-holder under Act XIX of 1841, *held* not to be open to appeal or review. **JUSODA KOONWAR v. GOUTREE BYJNATH PERSHAD** 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 365

2. ———— **Act XXVII of 1860—Order refusing to grant certificate.** No appeal lies from an order of a District Judge refusing to grant a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860. *In the matter of the petition of* **VISHVANATH HARI** 7 Bom. A. C. 71

3. ———— **Order refusing to recall certificate.** No appeal lies from an order of a District Judge refusing an application to recall a certificate granted by him under Act XXVII of 1860. *In the matter of the petition of* **NANUK PERSHAD** *v. LALLA NITYA LALL* . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 40 6 C. L. R. 388

4. ———— **Order as to form of certificate.** There are no general words in any part of Act XXVII of 1860 declaring that orders made by the Zillah Court under that Act as to the form of the certificate shall be subject to appeal to a High Court. **BANEEMADHUB MOOKERJEE v. NILAMBUR BANERJEE** . 8 W. R. 376

5. ———— **Case transferred under Act XVI of 1868, s. 19.** Where an application for a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 has been transferred by the High Court, in the exercise of the power vested in it by s. 19, Act XVI of 1868, from the file of a Judge to that of a Subordinate Judge, the order of the latter is appealable to the Court of the Zillah Judge, and only specially appealable to the High Court. **FUZZL HOSSEIN v. TUSSEDDUCK ALI KHAN** . 13 W. R. 395

6. ———— **Enquiry or omission to make enquiry.** An appeal lies from the result of an enquiry or omission to make an enquiry under Act XXVII of 1860. **TARINEE CHURN BROHMO v. ROMA SOONDUREE DOSSEE** 20 W. R. 312

APPEAL—*contd.*7. CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION (ACTS XXVII OF 1860 AND VII OF 1889) —*contd.*

7. ———— **Deposit of security by person entitled to a certificate.** No appeal lies under Act XXVII of 1860 on a question of the deposit of security by a person who has been declared entitled to a certificate under the Act. **MONMOHINEE DASSEE v. KHETTER GOPAL DEY** . I. L. R. 1 Calc. 127 24 W. R. 362

In the matter of **RUKMIN** . I. L. R. 1 All. 287

8. ———— **ss. 5, 6—Certificate for collection of debts.** No appeal impugning the order of a District Court requiring security from the person to whom it has granted a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, lies under that Act to the High Court. *In the matter of the petition of* **Rukmin**, I. L. R. 1 All. 287, followed. *In the matter of the petition of* **PADDO SUNDARI DAS** I. L. R. 3 All. 304

RAJ MOHINEE CHOWDHURANI v. DINO BUNDHOO CHOWDHRY . 17 W. R. 566

9. ———— **s. 6—Order for security.** An appeal will lie under s. 6 of Act XXVII of 1860, merely for the purpose of varying the Judge's order by reducing the amount of security required by him from the party declared entitled to have the certificate. When an appeal has been properly instituted under s. 6, it has been ruled that the Court may alter or vary the Judge's order with respect to security. **SOONEA v. RAM SUHA** 2 N. W. 146

10. ———— **"Fresh certificate"—Appeal to High Court.** The fresh certificate contemplated by s. 6 of Act XXVII of 1860 means a certificate granted to a person other than the person to whom the first certificate was granted. Where, therefore, a person to whom the District Court had granted a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 appealed to the High Court and prayed for a fresh certificate, on the ground that the District Court should not have made the grant of certificate conditional upon her giving security to another person:—*Held*, that no appeal lay to the High Court in the case. **NAURANGI KUNWAR v. RAGHUBANSI KUNWAR** . I. L. R. 9 All. 231

11. ———— **Order of District Judge as to security—Insufficiency of security—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 263.** No appeal lies against an order made, whether in pursuance of the directions of the High Court or otherwise, by a District Judge as to security for the grant of a certificate of administration on the ground that such security is insufficient. **Mon Mohinee Dassee v. Khetter Gopal Dey**, I. L. R. 1 Calc. 127, referred to. **LUCAS v. LUCAS** I. L. R. 20 Calc. 245

12. ———— **Act VII of 1889—Order to person holding certificate under Act XXVII**

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—*contd.*

of 1860 to furnish security where portion of the property held as security has been sold. An order by which a person who had obtained a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 was directed to furnish security to the extent to which the security originally furnished had been diminished by the sale of a portion of the property, is not an order from which an appeal lies either under Act XXVII of 1860 or Act VII of 1889. *ALTA SOONDARI DASI v. SRINATH SAHA* . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 641

13. — ss. 6 and 19
—Order for security on grant of certificate. Where a minor petitioner represented by the Court of Wards applied for a succession certificate under Act VII of 1889, and the District Court granted the certificate, but ordered security to be given by the Court of Wards:—*Held*, that no appeal lay from the order requiring security. *RAMA REDDI v. PAPI REDDI* . . . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 199

14. — ss. 9 and 10—
Order for issue of certificate subject to security being given. On a contested application for a succession certificate under Act VII of 1889, an order was made for the issue of the certificate on security being furnished by the applicant. The opposite party preferred an appeal against the order:—*Held*, that the appeal was maintainable. *ARIYA PILLAI v. THANGAMMAL* . . . I. L. R. 20 Mad. 442

15. — ss. 9 and 19—
Order granting certificate conditional on the filing of security. Where on an application for a certificate of succession under the Succession Certificate Act (Act VII of 1889) an order was made granting the certificate conditionally on the applicant's furnishing security:—*Held*, that this was not an order "granting, refusing, or revoking a certificate" within the meaning of s. 19 of the Act, and that, therefore, no appeal would lie therefrom. *BHAGWANI v. MANNI LAL* . . . I. L. R. 13 All. 214

16. — Order granting certificate on the applicant's furnishing security. The widow of a deceased person having applied for a certificate under the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), the Judge ordered the certificate to issue on the applicant's furnishing security under s. 9 of the Act. *Held*, that such an order was not an order "granting, refusing, or revoking a certificate" within the meaning of s. 19 of the Act, and was, therefore, not appealable. *Bhagwani v. Manni Lal*, I. L. R. 13 All. 214, followed. *BAI DEVKORE v. LALCHAND JIVANDAS* . . . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 790

17. — Order granting certificate, conditional, upon giving security. Where, on an application for a certificate of succession under the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), an order was made granting the certificate conditionally upon the applicant's giving security:—*Held*, that this was an order "granting, refusing, or revoking a certificate" within the meaning of s.

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—*concl.*

19 of the Act, and that therefore an appeal would lie therefrom. *Bhagwani v. Manni Lal*, I. L. R. 13 All. 214, dissented from. *RADHA RANI DASSI v. BRINDABUN CHUNDER BASACK*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 320

18. — ss. 19 and 28
—Order refusing certificate of heirship—*Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827—Practice*. An appeal lies from the order of a District Judge refusing to grant a certificate of heirship under Regulation VIII of 1827 by virtue of the provisions of s. 28 of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889). *JAVERMAL v. NAIR OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF POONA* . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 748

19. — Order refusing certificate of heirship—*Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827*. An appeal lies from an order refusing to grant a certificate of heirship under Regulation VIII of 1827, by virtue of s. 19 of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889). *RANGUBAI v. ABASI*
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 399

20. —*Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), ss. 10, 19—Order extending certificate—"Order granting a certificate."* The extension of a certificate under s. 10 of the Succession Certificate Act to additional debts is not the grant of a certificate so as to give a right of appeal under s. 19 of that Act against the extension. *VENKATESWARULU v. BRAHMARAVUTU RAJA KRISTNAJI* (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 634

8. COSTS.

1. — Discretion, exercise of—*Act VIII of 1859, ss. 187, 189, 193, 196. Held*, (MACPHERSON, J., doubting), that an appeal will lie on a mere question of costs. *GRIDHARI LAL ROY v. SUNDAR BIBI*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 496: 6 W. R. 187

See *DOWCETT v. WISE* . . . 1 W. R. 522

2. — Decree enforcing award. *Held* (by LOCH, J.), with reference to the Full Bench ruling *Gridhari Lal Roy v. Sundar Bibi*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 496: 6 W. R. 187, that an appeal lies, on the point of costs, from a decree enforcing an arbitration award. *KHODA BUKSH v. MOWLA BUKSH* . . . 14 W. R. 255

(*Contra*) *COLLECTOR OF DACCA v. KAMALA KANT MOOKERJEE* . . . 2 W. R. 33

CHOONI LAL MISSER v. PATROO DEO 6 W. R. 19

KEEMEE BAE v. LUCHMUN DOSS NARAIN DOSS

5 W. R. P. C. 59

1 Moo. I. A. 470

ACHUMBIT SINGH v. KUNHYA LAL MOHAJAN

7 W. R. 208

3. — *Semble*: A regular appeal in respect of costs will not lie where

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bona fide care and discretion have been exercised on the part of the Court below. **DESAJI LAKHMAJI v. BHAVANIDAS NAROTAMDAS**. 8 Bom. A. C. 100

LUCHMUN RAM UNOOJ v. WATSON

W. R. 1864, 146

4. ——— As a general rule, an appeal in respect of costs will only be entertained in cases in which no discretion has been fairly exercised upon the question, and the decision of the Court below has proceeded upon mistake or misapprehension. Where *bona fide* care and discretion have been exercised, no appeal in respect of costs should be allowed, and the question whether such discretion has been well or ill exercised should not be entertained. **KESHAVRAM KRISHNA JOSHI v. BHAVANJI BIN BABAJI**. 8 Bom. A. C. 142

5. ——— Where no appeal is made against the judgment passed on the subject-matter of the suit, the discretionary power of assessing costs given by s. 187 of Act VIII of 1859 should not, unless in a very exceptional case, be interfered with by the Appellate Court. **KUPPUSVAMIYAN v. NANNUVAYYAN**. 1 Mad. 74

6. ——— **Order involving matter of principle.** Though the distribution of costs is, under the Civil Procedure Code, a matter within the discretion of the Court, yet there may be circumstances which will justify an appeal upon a mere question of costs. **CHITHRAYIL alias KUNATH AHMED KOYA v. IRUMANOM VITTIL KANHAMATH HAJI**. 3 Mad. Rep. 279

DANTULURI NARAYANA GAJAPATI RAZU GARU v. SARUPPA RAZU. 3 Mad. 113

7. ——— An appeal will lie on a question of costs where a matter of principle is involved. **SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL v. MARJUM HOSEIN KHAN**

I. L. R. 11 Cal. 359

8. ——— **Order in discretion of Court—Special appeal.** When a question of costs is purely in the discretion of the lower Court, no appeal will lie; but when a matter of principle is involved, an appeal will lie. Where *A* was sued upon the allegation that he had instigated his co-defendant *B* to refuse to deliver up a document, for the recovery of which the suit was brought, and where no relief was prayed as against *A*, but the lower Courts awarded a decree in favour of the plaintiff directing *A* to pay half the costs of suit:—**Held**, that the question was one of principle, and that a second appeal lay to the High Court against the decree directing *A* to pay such costs. **BUNWARI LALL v. CHOWDHRY DRUP NATH SINGH**

I. L. R. 12 Cal. 179

9. ——— **Exercise of discretion of Court as to apportionment of costs.** An appeal as to costs will lie from an appellate decree when the Court has exercised its discretion as to costs arbitrarily, and not according to general prin-

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ciples. **Khooda Buksh v. Elahce Buksh**, 1 S. D. A. N. W. (1861), 23; and **Assa Ram v. Kashmeere Dass**, Agra, F. B., 90, followed. **DAULAT RAM v. DURGA PRASAD**. I. L. R. 15 All. 333

10. ——— **Power of Appellate Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 220.** The power given by s. 220, Civil Procedure Code, to a Court to apportion costs in any manner it thinks fit, is subject to the controlling power of the Appellate Court. **Gridhari Lal Roy v. Sundar Bibi**, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 496, **Ranchordas Vithaldas v. Bai Kasi**, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 676, and **Daulat Ram v. Durga Prasad**, I. L. R. 15 All. 333, referred to. **TARA PROSUNNO MUKHARJEE v. SATISH CHANDRA SINGH**. 4 C. W. N. 90

11. ——— **Appeal as to costs—Alteration of lower Court's costs on appeal.** On an appeal by the defendant, on, among other matters, costs, the Appeal Court held that, even on the findings of the lower Court, the order as to costs should be materially altered in favour of the defendant. **SUDDASOOK KOOTARY v. RAM CHUNDER**. I. L. R. 17 Cal. 620

12. ——— **Appeal as to costs—District Judge, jurisdiction of—Procedure.** The plaintiff sued for possession of certain land in the Court of a Subordinate Judge of the second class. The Subordinate Judge returned the plaint for want of jurisdiction, and ordered the plaintiff to pay a separate set of costs to each of the defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge on the grounds, first, that the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to entertain the plaint; and, secondly, that the order as to costs was improper. At the hearing of the appeal the plaintiff's pleader abandoned the point of jurisdiction. Thereupon the District Judge held that the appeal would not lie simply on the question of costs. He therefore confirmed the Subordinate Judge's order:—**Held**, that the District Judge had jurisdiction to hear the appeal on the question of costs. **VASUDEV RAMCHANDRA v. BHAVAN JIVRAJ**. I. L. R. 16 Bom. 241

13. ——— **Appeal as to costs—Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), ss. 220, 540, and 568—Error of lower Court under misapprehension of fact and law.** Where the original Court has made an erroneous order for costs under a misapprehension of fact and law, an appeal lies from such order under the Civil Procedure Code, although the appellant complains of nothing else but the order for costs so erroneously made. **RANCHORDAS VITHALDAS v. BAI KASI**

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 676

KHUSHAL SADASHIV v. PUNAM CHAND JUSERPJI

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 164

14. ——— **Party improperly brought on the record as representative of deceased judgment-debtor—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 244, cl. (c), 540.** One *B D* was made a party to an application for execution of a decree as one of the

APPEAL—*contd.*8. COSTS—*contd.*

representatives of a deceased judgment-debtor. It had been decided in a previous suit that *BD* was not related to the judgment-debtor in such a manner that he could become his legal representative, and in this proceeding also he objected that he was not such representative, and his objection was allowed, and the order allowing it remained unappealed and became final. The Court, however, while allowing the objection, did not give the objector his costs:—*Held*, that the objector did not, by being improperly brought into the execution-proceedings, lose his right of appeal, and further that he could, under the circumstances, appeal on the question of costs alone.

BISHEN DAYAL v. BANK OF UPPER INDIA

I. L. R. 13 All. 290

15. ——— Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 588—*Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863), s. 18—Order for payment of plaintiff's costs out of the funds of the institution—Appeal on behalf of the institution.* A suit having been instituted under Religious Endowments Act, 1863, s. 14, *bona fide* in the interests of a Hindu temple, the plaintiffs desired to withdraw the suit with liberty to sue again and an order was made permitting them to do so and directing that the costs be paid from the funds of the institution:—*Held*, that no appeal lay against the order as to costs. *RAMAKISSOOR DOSSJI v. SHRIRANGA CHARLU*

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 421

16. ——— Appealable order. If an order is itself appealable as affecting the jurisdiction of the Court or the merits of the case, an appeal will lie from that part of the order which relates to costs; but, as in the case of decrees, in those cases, and those cases only where the order is appealable, will an appeal lie against the direction as to costs, which is ancillary to the order. *BALKISSEN DASS v. LUCHMIPUT SINGH*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 91

17. ——— Return of plaint—*Jurisdiction—Code of Civil Procedure, ss. 15 and 57.* On the hearing of a suit in the Court of first instance, the Court came to the conclusion that the value of the property in dispute placed the claim beyond the jurisdiction of the Court; the suit was therefore dismissed with costs. On appeal, this decision was reversed with costs, on the ground that the plaint ought to have been returned to the plaintiff for presentation in the proper Court. The defendant appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that the defendant ought to have been allowed his costs in both Courts, and that he was entitled to an appeal on that ground. *MOSHINGAN v. MOZARI SAJAD*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 271

18. ——— Security for costs—*Non-compliance with order for security—Appeal rejected—Application to restore appeal—Application refused.* *Held*, that no appeal will lie from an order refusing to re-admit an appeal which had been rejected under s. 549 of the Code of Civil Procedure on account of non-compliance with an order to furnish security for costs. *Lekha v.*

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Bhauna, I. L. R. 18 All. 101, followed. *Kuar Balwant Singh v. Kuar Doulat Singh, L. R. 13 I. A. 57*, distinguished. *FIROZI BEGAM v. ABDUL LATIF KHAN (1908)* . **I. L. R. 30 All. 143**

9. DECREES.

1. ——— Order returning plaint—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 540—Decree, form of.* The plaintiffs, the widow and the son, respectively, of *N*, deceased, claimed immoveable property inherited from his father by *N*, and also immoveable property which had devolved upon *N* from his brother, who had predeceased him, and mesne profits of such properties. The Court of first instance, finding that the claim to the former property was admitted and that to the latter was not denied, but resisted as barred by s. 13 of Act X of 1877, and holding it not to be so barred, made a decree returning the plaint to the plaintiffs that they might, after correcting it, file it either in the Revenue Court in regard to the profits of the former property or in the Civil Court for possession of the latter property. *Held*, that, although the claim of the plaintiffs was not either decreed or dismissed, yet as the right and title asserted by them to such properties was implicitly recognised by such decree, the defendants were entitled to appeal from it. *BEHARI BHAGAT v. BEGAM BIBI* . . . **I. L. R. 3 All. 75**

2. ——— Order dismissing a suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 2 and 136—"Decree."* An order dismissing a suit under s. 136 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, is a decree under the definition contained in s. 2 of the Code, and as such is appealable. *MANSINGJI v. MEHTA HARIHARAM NARHARAM* **I. L. R. 19 Bom. 307**

3. ——— Order dismissing suit as not properly brought—*Right of appeal.* The plaintiffs in this suit claimed, as the heirs of *G*, possession from the defendants of certain lands which *G* had mortgaged to the defendants, alleging that the mortgage-debt had been satisfied from the usufruct. The defendants denied the title of the plaintiffs to redeem, asserting also that the mortgage debt had not been satisfied. The Court of first instance held that the plaintiffs were entitled to redeem, but dismissed the suit on the ground that the mortgage-debt had not been satisfied. *Held*, that the defendants were entitled to appeal, the case of *Pan Kooer v. Bhugwant Kooer, 6 N. W. 19*, not being applicable to this case. *RAM GHOLAM v. SHEO TAHAL* . . . **I. L. R. 1 All. 266**

4. ——— *Right of appeal.* *M* sued *K* and *J* to enforce a right of pre-emption in respect of property which he alleged *K* had sold to *J*. *K* denied that she had sold such property to *J*. *J* set up as a defence that *M* had waived his right of pre-emption. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit on the ground that the alleged sale had not taken place. *J* then appealed.

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to the High Court, making *K* the respondent. *Held*, that neither the appeal from the original decree in the suit nor the appeal from the appellate decree therein was admissible. *JUMNA SINGH v. KAMARUNNISSA* . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 152

5. ——— Order on death of party—*Death of sole defendant—Survival of cause of action—Legal representative—Civil Procedure Code, Act X of 1877, ss. 368, 372—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 171b.* In a suit for the recovery of land against a sole defendant, the latter died before the hearing. Sixty-three days after the death of the defendant, the plaintiff applied to the Court to enter on the record the legal representative of the deceased defendant. On the 22nd of November 1880, the Court rejected the application under the provisions of Act XV of 1877, Sch. II, Art. 171b, and ordered the suit to abate. On the same day the plaintiff applied to the Court to set aside the order directing the suit to abate, but this application was also rejected on the 20th of September 1881. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that no appeal lay against the order of the 20th of September 1881. *BENODE MOHINI CHOWDHURANI v. SHARAT CHUNDER DEY CHOWDHURY* . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 837
10 C. L. R. 449

6. ——— Order treating as a nullity order made without jurisdiction—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 102, 703.* There is no appeal from the order of a Principal Sadar Ameen setting aside as a nullity the order of a Judge who, acting for him in his absence, had admitted an appellant as legal representative of the original plaintiff, who had died *pendente lite*, the Judge having no jurisdiction to make such substitution. *BIPRO CHUNDER JOOBRAJ v. RAMLOCHUN DEB* . . . W. R. 1864, 121

7. ——— Order refusing decree-holder to execute decree against legal representatives—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 210, 364.* S. 364 of Act VIII of 1859 prohibits an appeal from an order made on proceedings taken under s. 210 of the same Act; the rule applicable in such cases being analogous to that laid down by the Privy Council in *Abidunnissa Khatoon v. Amirunnissa Khatoon*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 327. *RAYGO v. POGOSE* . . . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 709 note

POGOSE v. CATCHICK . . . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 708
2 C. L. R. 278

8. ——— Order under s. 210, *Civil Procedure Code, 1859.* No appeal lies from an order passed under s. 210, Act VIII of 1859, refusing application of decree-holder to execute decree against legal representatives of the person against whom the decree was passed. *LOOTFUR ALI KHAN v. SADDA BRUT PERSHAD* . . . W. R. 1864, Mis. 35

9. ——— Order refusing to issue notice to representatives—*Civil Procedure*

APPEAL—contd.

9. DECREES—contd.

Code, 1859, s. 217. No appeal lies from an order passed under s. 217, Act VIII of 1859, declining to issue notice as against certain alleged legal representatives of an original party. *SOHUDRA v. ROY KALIHA SAHOY* . . . W. R. 1864, Mis. 23

10. ——— Order directing suit to abate—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 366, 588 (18)*—*Death of plaintiff-appellant.* An Appellate Court rejected the application of the legal representatives of a deceased sole plaintiff-appellant to enter his name in the place of such appellant on the record, on the ground that such application had not been made within the time limited by law, and passed an order that the suit should abate. *Held*, that the order of the Appellate Court, passed under the first paragraph of s. 366 of Act X of 1877, not being applicable under cl. 18, s. 588 of that Act, nor being a decree within the terms of s. 2 from which a second appeal would lie, was not applicable. *AHMAD ATA v. MATA BADAL LAL* . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 844

11. ——— Abatement, order of—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 366—Legal representative of a deceased, mission to apply by, within sixty days—Procedure—Limitation.* An order made under s. 366 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) that a suit do abate, being virtually a decree within the meaning of s. 2, is appealable. *BHIKAJI RAMCHANDRA v. PURSHOTAM* . . . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 220

12. ——— Order for abatement of suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 366.* No appeal will lie from an order under the first paragraph of s. 366 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such order neither amounting to a decree nor being specifically appealable under s. 588. *Bhikaji Ramchandra v. Purshotam*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 220, dissented from. *HAMIDA BIBI v. ALI HUSEN KHAN* . . . I. L. R. 17 All. 172

See *SUBBAYYA v. SAMINADAYAR*

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 496

13. ——— Order dismissing application to be brought on the record as representative of deceased party—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 2 and 372.* An appeal will lie from an order dismissing an application under s. 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be brought upon a record as representative of a deceased party, such order being a decree within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code. *INDO MATI v. GAYA PRASAD* . . . I. L. R. 19 All. 142

14. ——— Order dismissing application to be made party as representative—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 372, 583, cl. 21.* An order disallowing an application of a person under s. 372, Civil Procedure Code, to be made a party defendant as assignee of a defendant is not a decree within the meaning of s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, and no appeal lies against such an order. *Indo Mati v. Gaya Prasad*, I. L. R.

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19 *All. 142*, distinguished and explained. *LALIT MOHAN ROY v. SHEBOCK CHAND CHOWDHRY*

4 C. W. N. 403

15. ——— Order rejecting application by assignees of interest in suit to be allowed to appeal against the decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 372, 538*. A defendant, pending the suit, made an assignment of his interest therein. No application was made by the assignees or the assignor to have the assignees brought on the record, and the suit was decided *ex-parte* to the detriment of the assignees. The assignees filed a memorandum of appeal, claiming that they were entitled to file an appeal under the circumstances set forth in their memorandum. The Court apparently, treating this memorandum as an application under s. 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure, dismissed it. *Held*, that an appeal would lie from the order of dismissal as from a decree. *Indo Mati v. Gaya Prasad, I. L. R. 19 All. 142*, followed. *MOTI RAM v. KUNDAN LAL* I. L. R. 22 All. 380

16. ——— Order refusing execution of decree simultaneously against person and property—*Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877), ss. 2 and 230*. An order under s. 230 of Act X of 1877 by a Court executing a decree refusing an application to execute it at the same time against the person and property of the judgment-debtor being a "decree" under s. 2 of the Act, an appeal lies against such order, and the Appellate Court is bound to consider whether the lower Court has properly exercised the discretion vested in it by s. 230 of that Act. *CHENA PEMAJI v. GHELABHAI NARANDAS* I. L. R. 7 Bom. 301

17. ——— Order directing the release of judgment-debtor—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 244, 337*. A judgment-debtor, who had been arrested in execution of a decree of a District Munsif, made an application for his release under Civil Procedure Code, s. 337 (a), and his application was granted:—*Held*, that an appeal lay against the order granting the application. *ABDUL RAHMAN v. MAHOMED KASSIM*

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 29

18. ——— Security for costs, order rejecting appeal in default of—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 549*. An order under s. 549 of the Civil Procedure Code rejecting an appeal because security has not been furnished as directed under that section is a "decree" within the meaning of s. 2, from which an appeal will lie. *SIRAJ-UL-HUQ v. KHA-DIM HUSAIN* I. L. R. 5 All. 380

19. ——— Order disallowing objection to execution—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 2, 246*—*Order in execution of decree*. An order made in the execution of a decree disallowing the objections taken by the judgment-debtor to execution of the decree being taken out by a transferee by assignment of the decree, being the final order in a judicial proceeding, and therefore a "decree" within the meaning of s. 2 of Act X of 1877, is

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appealable under that Act. *Thakur Prasad v. Ahsan Ali, I. L. R. 1 All. 668*, followed. *MURLI DHAR v. PURSOTAM DAS* I. L. R. 2 All. 91

20. ——— Order dismissing suit in its present form—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 2, 13, 540*—*Judgment*. The plaintiff in this suit sued for the possession of certain land, on the ground that he was the owner thereof in virtue of a purchase from N. The defendants claimed such land as owners, on the ground that it was included in a certain garden which they had previously purchased at a sale in the execution of a decree against N, and they also claimed it on the ground that they were lessees thereof under a lease from N, the term whereof had not expired. They also set up as a defence to the suit that it had been finally determined in a former suit between themselves and N, whom the plaintiff represented, that such land was included in such garden, and that consequently their title to such land as owners could not be questioned in the present suit. The Court of first instance held that such land was not included in the defendants' garden, and they were not the owners of it, but that they could not be ejected from it, as they were in possession under the lease, which had not expired, and that the question whether such land was included in the defendants' garden, and they were the owners of it, was not *res judicata*. It made a decree dismissing the suit in these terms: "Ordered that the plaintiff's claim as it stands at present be dismissed." *Held* (STRAIGHT, J., dissenting), that the defendants were entitled, under s. 540 of Act X of 1877, to appeal from such decree. *LACHMAN SINGH v. MOHAN* I. L. R. 2 All. 497

21. ——— Order in execution of decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 2, 3, 244, 584, 588 (j)*—*Execution of decree—Appeal from order—Act VIII of 1859—Repeal—Pending proceedings—Act I of 1868, s. 6*. The Court executing a decree for the removal of certain buildings made an order in the execution of such decree directing that a portion of a certain building should be removed as being included in the decree. On appeal by the judgment-debtor, the lower Appellate Court on the 22nd September 1877, reversed such order. *Held*, *per* PEARSON, J., on appeal by the decree-holder from the order of the lower Appellate Court, that the lower Appellate Court's order, being within the scope of the definition of "decree" in s. 2 of Act X of 1877, was appealable under s. 584 of that Act, as well as under Act VII of 1859, notwithstanding its repeal, in reference to s. 6 of Act I of 1868. The Full Bench ruling in *Thakur Prasad v. Ahsan Ali, I. L. R. 1 All. 668*, followed. *Held*, *per* STUART, C.J., dissenting from the Full Bench ruling in *Thakur Prasad v. Ahsan Ali*, that a second appeal in the case would not lie. *UDA BEGUM v. IMAM-UD-DIN* I. L. R. 2 All. 74

22. ——— Order refusing to file in Court agreement to refer to arbitration—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 28, 623*—"Decree." *Held* by the Full Bench (OLDFIELD, J., dissenting),

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that an order refusing to file in Court an agreement to refer to arbitration is not appealable. *Per* OLD-FIELD, J., that such an order is appealable. *Janki Tewari v. Gayan Tewari*, I. L. R. 3 All. 427, distinguished by STUART, C.J., and followed by OLD-FIELD, J. *DAYA NAND v. BAKHTAWAR SINGH* I. L. R. 5 All. 333

23. ——— Agreement to refer—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, ss. 523, 540—*Decision thereon is a decree—Right of appeal.* In a suit to file an agreement to refer a matter to arbitration, a decision was passed refusing a reference on the ground that the agreement to refer was not proved. On the plaintiff appealing against such refusal:—*Held*, that a decision passed under s. 523 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a decree, and an appeal lies therefrom under s. 540 of the Code. *Decision of* OLD-FIELD, J., in *Daya Nand v. Bakhtawar Singh*, I. L. R. 5 All. 333, approved. *Gowdu Magata v. Gowdu Bhagavan*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 299

24. ——— Order rejecting memorandum of appeal—*Civil Procedure Code*, ss. 254(c), 582, 622—“*Decree.*” An order rejecting a memorandum of appeal as barred by limitation is a “decree” within the meaning of s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Gajraj Singh v. Bhagwant Singh*, *Weekly Notes*, All., 1883, 255, and *Dianatullah Beg v. Wajid Ali Shah*, I. L. R. 6 All. 438, distinguished. *GULAB RAI v. MANGLI LAL*

I. L. R. 7 All. 42

25. ——— Order directing accounts to be taken—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, s. 2—*Interlocutory order.* In a suit for a share of the cost of a party-wall built by the plaintiffs, who, and also the defendant, were adjoining owners of plots of land under the Government for building, portion of the agreement being that all disputes as to the cost and maintenance of party-walls were to be settled by the Government Surveyor, whose decision was to be final—the Judge, SCOTT, J., on 11th December 1882, decreed that the defendant was liable to pay half whatever sum the Government Surveyor might certify to be due for the cost, and that the defendant was entitled to set off, in the calculation of what was due from him, the cost of any work or materials which the Government Surveyor might find had been contributed by him: and the case was thereupon adjourned for the certificate of the Government Surveyor. The Government Surveyor subsequently gave his certificate as to the cost of the unused portion of the said wall, but stated that on the evidence before him he was unable to decide as to the ownership of the foundations, etc., of the wall. The case came on again before SCOTT, J., who decided to take evidence on the points left undetermined by the Government Surveyor. Witnesses were accordingly examined, and on 11th December 1883, the Court disallowed the defendant's claim of set-off, and gave judgment for the plaintiff for half the sum certified by the Government Surveyor as the cost of the disputed

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part of the wall. The defendants appealed. *Held*, that the decree of the 11th December 1882 was not a decree or an “order directing accounts to be taken” within the meaning of s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), and that the defendants, although they had not filed an appeal against it within the period allowed by the Limitation Act, were entitled to appeal against it when appealing against the decree of 11th December 1883. *COVERJI LUDDHA v. MORARJI PUNJA*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 183

26. ——— Order rejecting appeal as barred—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, ss. 2, 540—*Presentation of appeal beyond time.* The plaintiff's claim to redeem certain lands was rejected by a Subordinate Judge on 21st December 1882. On the 1st February 1883, the plaintiff, who was an agriculturist, presented an application for review to the Special Judge appointed under the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act. His application was rejected by that Judge, who was of opinion that the plaintiff's remedy lay in an appeal to the District Judge. The plaintiff was not informed of the result of his application to the Special Judge until the following May, at which time the Court of the District Judge was closed for vacation. On the 3rd June 1883 he presented an appeal on the opening of the District Court. The District Judge dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation. On appeal to the High Court, a preliminary objection being taken that a second appeal would not lie:—*Held*, that the order of the District Judge, having the force of a decree within the meaning of s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act XIV of 1882, was appealable under s. 540 of the Code. *RAGHU-NATH GOPAL v. NILU NATHAJI*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 452

27. ——— Order allowing purchaser of decree to execute it—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, ss. 2, 232, 244. On an application under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code by the purchaser of a decree to be allowed to execute it, two of the judgment-debtors objected that the purchaser was benami for the other judgment-debtor, and that they had paid off the decree to the original decree-holder. The Munsif found both objections against them, and allowed the purchaser to execute the decree. *Held*, that the question was one between the parties to the suit or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree, and that the decision of that question was a decree under ss. 2 and 244 of the Code and therefore appealable, and a second appeal lay therefrom to the High Court. *AFZAL v. RAM KUMAR BHUDRA*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 610

28. ——— Order by Appellate Court directing that the plaint be returned—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)*, s. 2. The plaintiff sued in the Court of the District Munsif to recover his share of family property. The amount of the property exceeded, but the amount of the share claimed was within the pecuniary limit of the

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jurisdiction of the District Munsif, who passed a decree for the plaintiff. On appeal it was held that the suit was not within the jurisdiction of the Court. The decree accordingly was reversed, and it was ordered that the plaint be returned for presentation to the proper Court. The plaintiff preferred this second appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that the lower Appellate Court had not passed a decree within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code, s. 2, and that plaintiff's remedy was not by way of a second appeal, but he should have proceeded under Civil Procedure Code, s. 588. CHINNASAMI PILLAI v. KARUPPA UDAYAN . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 234

(*Contra*) BINDESHRI CHAUBEY v. NANDA

I. L. R. 3 All. 456

29. ——— Order under s. 18 of Act XX of 1863 granting leave to institute a suit—*Bengal, N.-W. P. and Assam Civil Courts Act XII of 1887, s. 20*. An order passed under s. 18 of Act XX of 1863 granting leave to institute a suit is not a "decree" under the Civil Procedure Code, and is not an appealable order. In a suit to have the defendants removed from the office of shebait of an endowment, in which, should leave to institute it had been obtained under s. 18 of the Act, it was contended that, having regard to the provisions of s. 20 of Act XII of 1887, an appeal to the High Court lay from that order:—*Held*, that s. 20 of Act XII of 1887 was intended only to define the Court to which an appeal lies from a decree or order of a District Judge, and was not intended to define the right of appeal of the class of decrees or orders from which appeals shall lie, and that no appeal lay from the order passed under s. 18 of Act XX of 1863 granting the plaintiffs leave to institute the suit. PROTAP CHANDRA MISSEER v. BROJONATH MISSEER

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 275

30. ——— Order refusing leave to sue—*Act XX of 1863, s. 18—Decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 2*. An order refusing leave to institute a suit under s. 18 of Act XX of 1863 is not a "decree" within the meaning of s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, and is not appealable. KAZEM ALI v. AZEM ALI KHAN . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 382

In re VENKATESWARA . I. L. R. 10 Mad. 98

See ANONYMOUS CASE . I. L. R. 10 Mad. 98 note

DELRUS BANOO BEGAM v. ABDOOR RAHMAN

21 W. R. 368

31. ——— Order rejecting plaint—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 53, 54, 442—Decree, what it includes*. S. 442 of the Civil Procedure Code refers to a case where the plaint on the face of it appears to have been filed by a person who was a minor. Where in a suit the plaintiffs described themselves as adults, and on the objection of the defendants an issue was raised and enquired into on the question of age:—*Held*, that the order passed under the circumstances, although it professed to have been made under s. 442 of the Procedure Code, must be treated as one rejecting the plaint or dis-

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missing the suit, on the ground that the suit was instituted by persons who were established on the evidence to be minors, and was appealable as a decree within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code. The words "rejecting the plaint" in s. 2 are not limited to the cases provided for in ss. 53, 54. BENI RAM BRUTT v. RAM LAL DHUKRI

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 189

32. ——— Order allowing withdrawal of suit, with leave to bring fresh one—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 373, 582*. Where, on appeal from a decree dismissing a suit, the Appellate Court, being of opinion that the plaint was informally drawn and its allegations regarding the cause of action not sufficiently specific, gave the plaintiff permission under s. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code to withdraw the suit with leave to institute a fresh one:—*Held*, that the order of the Appellate Court was a "decree" within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code, and afforded a proper ground of second appeal to the High Court. GANGA RAM v. DATA RAM . I. L. R. 8 All. 82

33. ——— Order permitting withdrawal of suit—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 373, and 588*. An order made by an Appellate Court under s. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code, giving permission to withdraw a suit with liberty to bring a fresh one, is not a decree within the meaning of s. 2, and is not appealable. Ganga Ram v. Data Ram, I. L. R. 8 All. 82, dissented from. Kalian Singh v. Lekhraj Singh, I. L. R. 6 All. 211, approved of. JOGODINDRO NATH v. SARUT SUNDARI DEBI

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 322

DICK v. DICK . I. L. R. 15 All. 169

RAMA KISSOOR DOSSJI v. SRIRANGA CHARLU

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 421

34. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882 s. 373*. An order under s. 373 of the Code of Civil Procedure allowing a plaintiff to withdraw his suit with leave to bring another suit on the same cause of action is not appealable, being neither one of the orders specified in s. 588 nor a decree within the meaning of s. 2 of the said Code. Kalian Singh v. Lekhraj Singh, I. L. R. 6 All. 211, and Jogodindro Nath v. Sarut Sundari Debi, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 322, followed. Ganga Ram v. Data Ram, I. L. R. 8 All. 82, dissented from. JAGDESH CHAUDHRI v. TULSHI CHAUDHRI

I. L. R. 18 All. 19

GENDA MAL v. PIRBHU LAL

I. L. R. 17 All. 97

35. ——— Appeal from order setting aside the order of withdrawal and dismissing the suit—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 373, and 588*. An order under s. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code giving permission to withdraw a suit with liberty to bring a fresh one, is not a "decree" within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code, and is not appealable. If, however,

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such an order is appealed from, and the lower Appellate Court sets aside the order and dismisses the suit, then the order of the lower Appellate Court is a "decree" within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code, and is appealable. *Jogendro Nath v. Sarut Sundari Devi*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 322, followed. *ABDUL HOSSEIN v. KASI SAHU*. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 362 4 C. W. N. 41

36. ——— Order rejecting application under Civil Procedure Code, s. 44, rule (a), and returning plaint—*Civil Procedure Code*, s. 44, rule (a), and s. 2—"Decree." No appeal lies under any of the provisions of s. 588 of the Civil Procedure Code from an order under s. 44, rule (a), rejecting an application for leave to join another cause of action with a suit for the recovery of immoveable property. In a plaint filed in the Court of a Subordinate Judge the plaintiff claimed to recover possession of a house, together with some grain which was stored in it. The plaintiff applied to the Subordinate Judge for leave, under s. 44, rule (a), of the Civil Procedure Code, to join the claim for grain with the claim for possession of the house. The Subordinate Judge refused leave, and returned the plaint, with directions that the plaintiff should institute two suits for recovery of the house and the grain, respectively, in the Court of the Munsif. *Held*, that the Subordinate Judge's order was substantially an order rejecting the plaint on the ground that the plaintiff had joined a cause of action with a suit for recovery of immoveable property; that although this might have been a misapplication of s. 44, rule (a), of the Code, its effect was to reject the plaint; that such an order was a decree with reference to the definition in s. 2, and was appealable as such to the District Judge; and that therefore a second appeal lay in the case to the High Court, and that Court was not competent to interfere in revision under s. 622. *BANDHAN SINGH v. SOLHU*

I. L. R. 8 All. 191

37. ——— Order directing commission of partition—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, ss. 2, 396—*Decree for partition—Appealable order*. Where an Appeal Court made a decree or order directing a commission to issue directed to an Amin to make a partition of certain property into certain specified shares and to allot the shares to the parties to the suit:—*Held*, that such order amounted to a decree within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that, though called a decree, it was in fact an order in the terms of s. 396 of the Code, and was a proper order to make. *BEPIN BEHARI MODUCK v. LAL MOHUN CHATTOPADHAYA*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 209

38. ——— Order in partition suit leaving proceedings to be taken in execution of decree—*Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2 and 396—*Order for partition in execution of decree*. An order under s. 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure declaring the rights of the parties in a partition suit, but leaving their shares to be determined in execution of the decree, is a

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"decree" within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code, and an appeal therefore lies from such order. *In the matter of the petition of BHOLA NATH DASS. BHOLA NATH DASS v. SONAMONI DASI*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 273

39. ——— *Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2 and 396. The proceedings contemplated by s. 396 of Act XIV of 1882 are proceedings in a suit before decree, and in order to enable the Court in that suit to determine exactly the terms of that decree. Where those proceedings, however, were left to be taken in execution of the decree, the High Court, treating it as an error in point of form, and without deciding whether or not an objection, if it had been taken, would have been fatal to the proceedings, dealt with the case in the same way as was done in *Gyan Chunder Sen v. Doorga Churn Sen*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 313, regarding the further proceedings taken after decree declaring the rights of the several parties as proceedings to obtain a decree on further consideration. Where in a partition suit an order was made in the course of such proceedings by which the position of some of the parties to the suit was determined, but no declaration was made of the exact rights of each of the parties:—*Held*, that it was a mere interlocutory order, and no appeal would lie from it. *Semble*: Such an order is not a decree within the terms of s. 2, Act XIV of 1882. *Bhola Nath Dass v. Sonamoni Dasi*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 273, distinguished. *BROOBTU MOYI DABEA v. SHURUT SUNDERY DABEA*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 275

40. ——— Order declaring the rights of parties to a partition in certain specific shares—*Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 396—*Partition suit*. *Held* by the Full Bench (PRINSEP, J., doubting), that an order in a suit for partition, which declares the specific rights of the parties and the property to be partitioned, decides that the suit must be decreed, as after such an order the suit could not be dismissed by the Court by which it was made, and is therefore an order which adjudicates upon the rights claimed and the defence set up in the suit, and which, as far as the Court expressing it is concerned, decides the suit within the definition of a decree in s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, and is therefore appealable as a decree. *DULHIN GOLAB KOER v. RADHA DULARI KOER*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 463

41. ——— Provisional decree—*Suit for partition—Form of decree—Civil Procedure Code* (1882), ss. 2, 215, 215A, and 540. In a suit for partition of family property a decree was passed declaring the share to which the plaintiff and some of the defendants were entitled in the family property, but reserving all other questions involved in the suit:—*Held*, that the decree was a provisional decree and was subject to appeal, but that it was irregular in form in that it should have contained declarations as to all the rights and liabilities which had been adjudicated on, and directions as to the accounts and inquiries remaining to be taken and made.

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KRISHNASAMI AYYANGAR v. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR I. L. R. 18 Mad. 73

42. ——— Order declaring the rights of parties to a partition suit in certain specific shares—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 2 and 591.* In a suit for partition the Court of first instance (the Munsif), on the 28th of February 1893, passed the following order:—"Plaintiff is entitled to a moiety of the lands described in the plaint and to a decree thereto. The lands set out in the plaint will, therefore, be divided into two equal shares by a Civil Court Amin, and when that is done, one of these shares will be decreed to plaintiff with costs of the suit." On the 30th June 1893, the Munsif decreed the suit in accordance with the report of the Amin. On the 11th August 1893, the defendants filed an appeal from the final decree to the District Judge, and questioned the legality of the order of the 28th February 1893:—*Held*, that the order of the 28th February 1893, declaring the rights of parties to a partition in certain specific shares, was a decree within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore appealable. *Dulhin Golab Koer v. Radha Dulari Koer, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 463*, followed. The defendants, not having filed an appeal from that order within thirty days from its date (see Art. 152 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act), were not at liberty to question the correctness of the said order, an appeal from it being then barred by limitation. *BOLORAM DEY v. RAM CHUNDRAN DEY*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 279

43. ——— Order appointing commission to effect partition after preliminary decree—*Interlocutory order—Effect of not appealing from order—Civil Procedure Code (1882), ss. 2, 244, and 591.* *Held* by the majority of the Full Bench (O'KINEALY, MACPHERSON, TREVELYAN, and BANERJEE, J.J.), that an order passed in a suit for partition, subsequently to the preliminary decree appointing a commission to make the partition, is not an order in execution, and, therefore, is not appealable under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is an interlocutory order pending the suit which has not been finally decided; and the appellant may take objection to it in an appeal against the final decree. *MACLEAN, C.J.*, thought it unnecessary under the circumstances to decide the point. *JOGODISHURY DEBEA v. KAILASH CHUNDRAN LAHRY*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 725

1 C. W. N. 374

44. ——— Order directing accounts to be taken—*Civil Procedure Code (1882), ss. 2 and 591—Suit for dissolution of partnership and an account—Omission to appeal from preliminary order—Limitation.* The right of appeal given by Act XII of 1879 in making an order directing accounts to be taken within the definition of a decree, and thus giving an appeal in a preliminary stage of a suit for dissolution of a partnership, did not alter the existing law, which allowed an appeal against such an order on the termination of the trial, that is, in the final decree. In a suit for

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dissolution of partnership and an account, the Munsif, on the 25th April 1893, passed an order declaring the shares of the parties and directing them to render accounts, stating that "this must be done within fifteen days from this date, after which the final order will be passed," and referred the case to a Commissioner to take the accounts. On the 31st May 1893, the Munsif decreed the suit, and made defendants Nos. 1 and 2 liable to pay certain sums of money in accordance with the report of the Commissioner. On the 14th July 1893, defendant No. 1 filed an appeal to the District Judge, in which he questioned the correctness of the preliminary order of the Munsif making him liable as a partner. *Held*, that the order of the District Judge, allowing the plea of defendant No. 1 and finding that he was not a partner, was right, though no appeal against the preliminary order had been filed within the period of limitation. *BISWA NATH CHAKI v. BANI KANTA DUTTA* I. L. R. 23 Calc. 408

45. ——— Order by Appellate Court remitting case to Original Court to pass decree upon award—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 2.* An appeal was preferred against a decree of an Original Court dismissing a suit, and the Appellate Court sent the case back for the purpose of certain evidence being taken, and certified to it. Pending that being done, the parties applied to the Appellate Court to refer the case to arbitration, and that Court referred that application to the original Court for disposal, although the case was still pending on its own file for disposal. Subsequently another application was made to the Original Court to refer the case to arbitration, and on the 10th May the record was sent to the arbitrator with directions to submit his award within seven days. On the 12th September, as the award had not been sent in, the Original Court passed an order recalling the record, and subsequently the award of the arbitrator, dated the 12th September, was filed. The Original Court thereupon forwarded the record to the Appellate Court for its decision. Objections were taken to the award, but overruled, and the Appellate Court passed an order directing the case to be sent back to the Original Court, with orders to pass a formal decree in accordance with the award of the arbitrator. *Held*, that a second appeal lay against the last-mentioned order, inasmuch as it amounted to a decree under the provisions of s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. *BHUGWAN DAS MARWARI v. NUND LALL SEIN*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 173

46. ——— Order disallowing objections by defendant—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 586, 584.* Where a portion of the plaintiff's claim was disallowed by the first Court, and the plaintiff appealed to the Subordinate Judge from the portion of the decree which refused part of his claim, and the defendant filed a memorandum of objections under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Judge decreed the plaintiff's appeal and disallowed the

APPEAL—*contd.*9. DECREES—*contd.*

defendant's objections :—*Held*, in an appeal by the defendant on a preliminary objection taken by the respondent, that a second appeal lay from so much of the decree of the Subordinate Judge as disallowed the objections filed by the appellant under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *GANAPATI v. SITHARAMA* . . . I. L. R. 10 Mad. 292

47. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 232, 244—*Assignment of decree—Validity of transfer—Registration of transfer.* The holders of a decree for the sale of mortgaged property transferred the same to *M* by instruments which were registered at a place where a small portion only of the property was situate. Subsequently *M* transferred the decree to other persons, and the co-transferees applied, under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code, to have their names substituted for those of the original decree-holders. The judgment-debtor opposed the application on the grounds that *M*'s name had not been substituted for the names of the original decree-holders who had transferred to him, and that the transfers to *M* were inoperative, as the instruments of transfer had not been registered at the place where the substantial portion of the mortgaged property was situate in accordance with s. 28 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). It appeared that no notice had been issued to *M* under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code; that he was dead; and that his legal representatives had not been cited as required by law. The application was allowed by the Courts below :—*Held*, that the matter involved questions arising between the parties to the decree or their representatives within the meaning of s. 244 (c) of the Code, and that the order allowing the application was, therefore, a decree within the definition of s. 2, and was appealable as such. *GULZARI LAL v. DAYA RAM* . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 46

48. ——— Civil Procedure Code, ss. 244, 411—*Application by Collector in pauper suit—Court-fees, recovery of, by Government—Question between parties to suit.* *Held*, that a Collector applying on behalf of Government, under s. 411 of the Civil Procedure Code, for recovery of Court-fees by attachment of a sum of money payable under a decree to a plaintiff suing *in forma pauperis*, might be deemed to have been a party to the suit in which the decree was passed, within the meaning of s. 244 (c) of the Code, and that an appeal would, therefore, lie from an order granting such application. *JANKI v. COLLECTOR OF ALLAHABAD* . I. L. R. 9 All. 64

49. ——— Application for permission to sue as a pauper—*Rejection of application on the ground that it had been withdrawn—Civil Procedure Code, s. 2.* *Held*, that an order rejecting an application for permission to sue as a pauper, and striking the case off the Court's file on the ground that the applicant had previously withdrawn the application and entered into a new contract with the defendants, was a "decree" within the mean-

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ing of s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, and appealable as such. *BALDEO v. GULA KUAR*

I. L. R. 9 All. 129

50. ——— Order rejecting stay of execution—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 2, 545.* An order by a District Judge under s. 545 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) refusing to stay execution is a decree as defined in s. 2, and is therefore appealable. *MUSAJI ABDULLA v. DAMODAR DAS* . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 279

51. ——— Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 54—*Dismissal of suit for insufficient Court-fee on plaint—Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 12.* The Court of first instance, being of opinion that the plaint bore an insufficient Court-fee, and the plaintiff not making good the deficiency, dismissed the suit after recording evidence, but without entering into the merits. On appeal the lower Appellate Court held that the Court-fee was sufficient, and remanded the case for trial on the merits :—*Held*, that the first Court's disposal of the suit must be treated as being under s. 54 of the Civil Procedure Code, and was therefore a decree within the meaning of s. 2, and appealable as such, and that such appeal was not prohibited by s. 12 of the Court Fees Act. *Ajoodhya Pershad v. Gunga Pershad*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 249, and *Annamalai Chetti v. Cloete*, I. L. R. 4 Mad. 204, referred to. *MUHAMMAD SADIQ v. MUHAMMAD JAN* . . . I. L. R. 11 All. 91

52. ——— Order deciding point of law arising incidentally—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 2—Decree.* An order merely determining a point of law arising incidentally or otherwise in the course of a proceeding for determining the rights of parties seeking relief is not a decree within the meaning of s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, and is not appealable. Where the judgment-creditor, after satisfaction entered upon a compromise, applied for execution on the ground of the compromise having been obtained from him by fraud, and the Court below, being of opinion that the remedy of the judgment-creditor was by a proceeding in execution, and not by a regular suit, ordered the case to be tried on its merits :—*Held*, that no appeal lay from such an order. *BEHARY LAL PUNDIT v. KEDAR NATH MULICK*

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 469

53. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 2—*Rent Recovery Act (Madras Act VIII of 1865), s. 27, Order under—Decree.* An order made under the Madras Rent Recovery Act, s. 27, is not a decree within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code, s. 2. *PERUMAL v. RAJAGOPALA*

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 248

54. ——— Order dismissing application to certify adjustment of decree—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 258, 588.* *Semble* : An appeal lies against an order dismissing an application made under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 258, that the adjustment of a decree be recorded as certified, such

APPEAL—*contd.*9. DECREES—*contd.*

order being a decree within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code. *LINGAYYA v. NARASIMHA*

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 99

55. ——— Order refusing to certify adjustment of decree out of Court—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 2, 244, and 258.* An appeal will lie from an order under s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure, refusing an application to record an adjustment of a decree made out of Court. Such an order is one determining a question in execution of a decree within s. 244, and is therefore a decree within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code. *Lingayya v. Narasimha, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 99, and Rangji v. Bhairji Harjivan, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 57, cited. JAMNA PRASAD v. MATHURA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 16 All. 129

56. ——— Order refusing to certify—*Payment to decree-holder out of Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 244 and 258.* An order under s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to payment under a decree is appealable under s. 244, as it falls under the definition of a "decree"; no separate suit lies, since the question is *res judicata* between the parties. *GURUVAYYA v. VUDAYAPPA*

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 26

57. ——— Order absolute for foreclosure—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 87—Execution of decree—Practice—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 244.* The order mentioned in s. 87 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) is an order in execution of the substantive foreclosure decree, and is appealable as a decree under s. 244 read with s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code upon the stamp payable in respect of such orders. So held by the Full Bench, *EDGE, C.J.*, doubting. Where an appeal has been erroneously presented to the High Court as a first appeal from an order, the Court will not convert it into a first appeal from a decree under s. 244 read with s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. *KEDAR NATH v. LALJI SAHAI*

I. L. R. 12 All. 61

As to latter portion, see *SANT LAL v. SRIKISHEN*

I. L. R. 14 All. 231

58. ——— Civil Procedure Code, s. 2—*Decree, definition of.* An order of a District Judge returning a memorandum of appeal to be presented in the proper Court on the ground that the value of the suit is beyond the pecuniary limits of his jurisdiction, is not a decree within the meaning of s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. *MAHABIR SING v. BEHARI LAL*

I. L. R. 13 All. 320

59. ——— Order dismissing application for participation in assets—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 244, 295.* No appeal will lie from an order under s. 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure dismissing, on the ground that the decree was barred by limitation, a decree-holder's application to share in the assets realized under another decree against the same judgment-debtor. Such an order cannot

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be regarded as a decree under s. 244 read with s. 2 of the said Code. *KASHI RAM v. MANI RAM*

I. L. R. 14 All. 210

60. ——— Transfer of Property Act, s. 87, order under—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 244 and 622—Superintendence of High Court.* An order under s. 87 of Act IV of 1882 extending the time for payment of the mortgage-money by a mortgagor is a decree within the meaning of ss. 2 and 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, and an appeal will lie from it. An application will therefore not lie under s. 622 of that Code for revision of such order. *RAHIMA v. NEPAL RAI*

I. L. R. 14 All. 520

61. ——— Order rejecting an appeal—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 582.* An intending appellant executed in favour of two vakils a vakalatnama; it was accepted only by one of the vakils, and he presented the appeal. The appeal was placed on the file by the District Judge, but on its coming on for disposal before the Subordinate Judge, he held that it had not been duly presented, and made an order rejecting it. Held, that an appeal lay against the above-mentioned order as being a decree within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *AYYANNA v. NAGARHOOSHANAM*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 285

62. ——— Order under Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 543, rejecting memorandum of appeal on account of scandalous matter therein. A memorandum of appeal presented to a District Court alleged, *inter alia*, actual partiality against the Judge whose decree was in question. The memorandum was returned for amendment on the ground that it contained language disrespectful to the Court of first instance. The appellant's pleader presented the appeal memorandum unamended, stating he wished to rely in the appeal on the passages objected to, and asking that the Court would, if necessary, strike them out. The District Judge thereupon rejected the memorandum of appeal under Civil Procedure Code, s. 543. It appeared that the objectionable portions of the memorandum were separable from the rest:—Held, that an appeal lay to the High Court against the order rejecting the appeal to the District Court. *ZAMINDAR OF JUNI v. BENNAYYA*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 155

63. ——— Order dismissing an appeal for default—"Decree," definition of—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 2 and 556.* An order dismissing an appeal for default under s. 556 of the Civil Procedure Code does not fall within the definition of "decree" in s. 2, and there is no appeal from such order. *Ram Chandra Pandurang Naik v. Madhav Purushottam Naik, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 23, dissented from. JAGARNATH SINGH v. BUDHAN*

I. L. R. 23 Cal. 115

64. ——— "Decree," definition of—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 2 and 556.* An order dismissing an appeal for default is

APPEAL—*contd.*9. DECREES—*contd.*

not a "decree" within the definition in s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, and no appeal lies therefrom. *Jagarnath Singh v. Budhan*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 115, followed. *Mansab Ali v. Nihal Chand*, I. L. R. 15 All. 359, referred to. *ANWAR ALI v. JAFFER ALI* . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 827

65. ——— Order rejecting appeal on default in furnishing security for costs—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, ss. 2 and 549. An order rejecting an appeal under s. 549 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not appealable either as an order or as a decree. *Siraj-ul-Hug v. Khadim Hussain*, I. L. R. 5 All. 380, overruled. *LEKHA v. BHAUNA* . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 101

66. ——— Appeal against order rejecting an insufficiently stamped appeal—*Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), s. 2. An appeal petition, having been presented bearing an insufficient Court-fee stamp, was returned to the appellant. After the period of limitation had expired it was presented again bearing a sufficient stamp, together with a petition that it be received. The Appellate Court made an order refusing to admit the appeal:—*Held*, that the order was not a decree, and therefore that no appeal lay to the High Court. *VENKATARAYADU v. RANGAYYA APPA RAU* . . . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 152

67. ——— Application for leave to sue in formâ pauperis—*Decree—Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, s. 409. *Held*, that no appeal will lie from an order rejecting an application for leave to appeal in formâ pauperis. *Baldeo v. Gula Kuar*, I. L. R. 9 All. 129, and *Lekha v. Bharna*, I. L. R. 18 All. 101, referred to. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. JILLO* . I. L. R. 21 All. 183

68. ——— Decree on compromise extending beyond scope of suit—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, s. 375. In a suit for the partition of a zamindari the parties effected a compromise in writing, which provided, *inter alia*, for certain reliefs which could only have been given by the Court in a suit based upon a different cause of action. The compromise was presented in Court, and a decree was passed embodying the whole of its terms:—*Held*, that an appeal lay against the decree. A decree under s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code is only final so far as it relates to so much of the subject-matter of the suit as is dealt with in the compromise. *VENKATAPPA NAYANIM v. THIMMA NAYANIM* . . . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 410

69. ——— Order dismissing application for removal of a trustee—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, s. 2—*Trusts Act* (II of 1882), ss. 55, 60, 61, and 74. No appeal will lie from an order dismissing an application for the removal of a trustee, such order not being a "decree" within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not being otherwise appealable. *WILSON v. MACAFEE* . . . I. L. R. 19 All. 181

APPEAL—*contd.*9. DECREES—*contd.*

70. ——— Final order in the execution department—*Appealable order—Civil Procedure Code*, ss. 2, 540, 588. An order of the District Court in execution proceedings limiting the recovery of mesne profits to three years from 12th November 1887, is in the nature of a final decree, as defined by s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, and is appealable under s. 540. *BHUP INDAR BAHADUR SINGH v. BIJAI BAHADUR SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 27 I. A. 209

71. ——— Order dismissing objections to the execution of decree—*Dismissal for default—"Decree"—Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882, as amended by Act VII of 1888 and Act VI of 1892), ss. 2, 244 (c), 540, 647. An order dismissing objections to the execution of a decree, for default, is a "decree" within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and an appeal lies from such an order under s. 540 of the Code as amended by Act VII of 1888. *Mansab Ali v. Nihal Chand*, I. L. R. 15 All. 359; *Jagarnath Singh v. Bhudan*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 115; and *Anwar Ali v. Jaffer Ali*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 827, distinguished. *LALNARAIN SINGH v. MAHOMED RAFIUDDIN* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 81

72. ——— Consent decree—*Compromise—Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), s. 375—*Jurisdiction*. When a decree is passed by consent of parties, the question as to whether or not the compromise decree is valid cannot be gone into on an appeal against that decree. *Ashutosh Chandra v. Tara Prosonno Roy*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 612, referred to. *Brojo Durlab Singh v. Roma Nath Ghose*, I. C. W. N. 597, distinguished. *BIRAJ MOHINI DASI v. CHINTA MONI DASI* (1901)

5 C. W. N. 877

73. ——— Decree—*Judgment*. An appeal lies from the decree, and not from the judgment of a Court of original jurisdiction. In a suit to recover possession of certain lands by setting aside a *zur-i-peshgee* lease of them, a decree was made dismissing the suit, but in the judgment of the Court there was a finding against the defendant as to some items of the consideration for the lease. *Held*, that he could not appeal against that finding. *PAN KOOR v. BEUGWUNT KOOR*

6 N. W. 19: *Agra F. B.*, 1874, 298

NOWBAT RAI v. BAJRANG LAL . . . 6 N. W. 412
SHAMA SOONDUREE DEBIA v. DEGAMBUREE DEBIA . . . 13 W. R. 1

CHOWDHRY MAHOMED MOMIN v. LUTAFUT HOSSEIN . . . 13 W. R. 239

(*Contra*) *SHEOGHOLAM SINGH v. NURSINGH* . . . 4 N. W. 120

STEPHENSON v. UNNODA DOSSEE . . . 6 W. R. Mis. 18

74. ——— Appeal by one of several defendants—*Ground common to all*. Plaintiffs sued on a mortgage bond. The defence, which was com-

APPEAL—*contd.*9. DECREES—*contd.*

mon to all the defendants, was that the mortgage was a sham. The Subordinate Judge upheld the mortgage bond and decreed in plaintiffs' favour. The fifth defendant, a subsequent mortgagee, alone appealed to the District Judge, who reversed the decree and dismissed the suit. Plaintiffs appealed to the High Court:—*Held*, that the decree of the Subordinate Judge proceeded on a ground common to all the defendants and that the decree of the lower Appellate Court enured for the benefit of the defendants, who did not appeal. *ANNAMALAY CHETTIAR v. PITCHU AYYAR* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 122

75. ———— *Order refusing application for appointment of commissioner to effect division of property by metes and bounds in partition suit—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 178.* The parties to a suit for partition entered into a compromise, which was recorded by the Court and by which their respective shares in the family property were agreed upon. An application was subsequently made for the appointment of a commissioner to effect an actual division of the property, but the Subordinate Judge dismissed it on the ground that the right to claim further relief in the matter had become barred by limitation. This order was reversed on appeal and the case was remanded by the District Judge for disposal according to law. An appeal was then preferred to the High Court against the order of remand, when it was contended that no appeal lay to the District Judge against the order of the Subordinate Judge:—*Held*, that an appeal lay. The order of the Subordinate Judge on the face of it purported to decide a question to be dealt with under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure and was therefore a decree within the meaning of that term in the Code, and that the party, against whom it was passed, was entitled to appeal therefrom. Even if there was no decree to be executed, and the Subordinate Judge erroneously supposed the matter to be one in execution, and held the application to be barred, such usurpation of jurisdiction could not make the order passed in consequence thereof less appealable than would have been the case had the order been passed in execution proceedings under a decree duly passed. *Hurkish Chunder Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Debia*, L. R. 10 I. A. 4, and *Abdul Rahiman Saheb v. Ganapathi Bhatta*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 517, followed. Such an application is not an application of the description contemplated by Article 178. *LATCHMANAN CHETTY v. RAMANATHAN CHETTY* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 127

76. ———— *Decree—No specific direction as to accounts in the decree—Court cannot direct accounts to be taken before the Commissioner when parties have arrived at an agreement after the decree.* An appeal lies against an order of a Judge sitting on the Original Side, if that order decides a question of some right between the parties. *JEHANGIR COWASJI v. THE HOPE MILLS, LIMITED* (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 216

APPEAL—*contd.*9. DECREES—*concl.*

77. ———— *Money decree—Appeal by some of the parties to a decree—Decree in appeal final—Execution—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 234, 244, 252—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 179.* Where some of the parties to a decree appeal against it, the decree in appeal is the final decree for the purpose of execution with respect to all the parties. *SHIVRAM v. SAKHARAM* (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 39

10. DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE.

1. ———— *Order refusing to issue fresh summons after dismissal—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 110—Order refusing to issue fresh summons on plaint.* Where a suit is dismissed under s. 110, Act VIII of 1859, upon default in appearing made by both parties, no appeal lies from a refusal by the Court to issue a fresh summons upon the plaint already filed. *LOKE NATH SAHOO v. TUKEER SINGH*

Marsh. 630

2. ———— *Order rejecting application to sue as a pauper—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 310.* There is no appeal open to a pauper when his application to sue as pauper is rejected for default. Where there has been no refusal under s. 310, Act VIII of 1859, the applicant may revive his application for leave to sue as a pauper. *BHOJ SINGH v. MAHA KOONWER*

3 Agra Mis. 1

3. ———— *Order dismissing suit for non-appearance after adjournment—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 540, and ss. 102 and 103.* Nothing remained to be done in a suit except to hear arguments, for which a time had been appointed. Neither the plaintiff nor his pleader appeared at the appointed time. The Court consequently dismissed the suit. *Held*, that its decree was appealable under s. 540 of Act X of 1877, and the lower Appellate Court should have entertained the appeal and disposed of it with reference to the provisions of s. 565, and ss. 102 and 103 were not applicable to the circumstances. *RAI CHAND v. MATHURA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 3 All. 292

4. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 98, 99, 157, 158.* A District Munsif struck a case off the file of his Court on neither party appearing. Subsequently, on an application by the plaintiffs, the case was restored. The order of restoration was reversed by the District Judge: *Held*, (i) that the order to strike off the case was illegal; (ii) that assuming that the case was dismissed, no appeal lay to the District Judge, whose order was accordingly made without jurisdiction. *ALWAR v. SETHANMAL*

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 270

5. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 102, 103—Dismissal of suit for non-appearance of plaintiff.* S. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code does not take away the remedy of appeal from a decree dismissing a suit under s. 102. *Lal Singh v. Kunjan*, I. L. R. 4 All. 387, *Ajudhya Prosad v. Balmukand*, I. L. R. 8 All. 354, and *Partab Rai v.*

APPEAL—contd.**10. DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE—contd.**

Ram Kishen, Weekly Notes, All., 1883, 171, referred to. ABLAKH v. BHAGIPATHI

I. L. R. 9 All. 427

6. ——— Order dismissing suit in adjourned hearing for non-appearance of plaintiff—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 102, 157 and 158.* An order dismissing a suit at an adjourned hearing for non-appearance of the plaintiff and his pleader is an order under s. 157 and its consequential section (102), and not under s. 158 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, and is appealable. *SHRIMANT SAGAJIRAO KHANDERAO v. SMITH*

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 736

7. ——— Order dismissing appeal for default. An appeal does not lie from the order of a Judge dismissing an appeal before him for default of prosecution. *MAHOMED JAN v. AMEERUN*

17 W. R. 180

8. ——— Order rejecting application for re-admission of appeal—*Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), s. 347.* No appeal lies against an order rejecting an application for the re-admission of an appeal under s. 347, Act VIII of 1859. *AMIRUDDIN v. JIBAN BIBE*

1 B. L. R. F. B. 101 : 10 W. R. F. B. 39

9. ——— Order rejecting application for re-hearing of appeal—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 347.* A special appeal lies from an order passed under s. 347 of Act VIII of 1859, rejecting an application for the re-hearing of an appeal dismissed for default of prosecution. The reasons for rejecting such an application should be stated. *HURO CHUNDER DOSS CHOWDHRY v. RAM COOMAR CHOWDHRY*

2 W. R. 254

RAM YAD v. BISSESSUR BHUTTACHARJEE

2 W. R. Mis. 23

GHOLAM MAHOMED AKBUR v. KOONJ BEHAREE LALL

5 W. R. Mis. 27

KISHEN CHUNDER PUTRONOVIS v. TARA MONEE CHOWDHRAIN

3 W. R. 4

DINOBUNDHOO CHUTTERAJ v. BEHAREE LALL MOOKERJEE

3 W. R. Mis. 23

MITTOO KHAN v. RAHMAN KHAN

8 W. R. 36

10. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 347.* When a lower Appellate Court, after eleven months' delay, and without fixing any time for disposing of the appeal, made an order dismissing the case for default, the High Court set aside the order as erroneous, holding that it was the subject of an appeal, notwithstanding s. 347, Act VIII of 1859, which only applies to cases of involuntary failure to comply with a Court's order. *SOODHAMONEE DOSSEE v. GOOROOPERSAUD DUTT*

W. R. 1864, 176

11. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 556.* Where an appeal is dismissed, under s. 556 of Act X of 1877, for the appellant's default, the order dismissing it is not appealable. *NAND RAM v. MUHAMMAD BAKSH*

I. L. R. 2 All. 616

APPEAL—contd.**10. DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE—contd.**

12. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 556, 558.* An Appellate Court, the appellant not attending in person or by his pleader, instead of dismissing the appeal for default, as provided by s. 556 of Act X of 1877, proceeded, in contravention of the provisions of that law, to dispose of the appeal on the merits, and dismissed it. The appellant preferred a second appeal to the High Court, contending that the Appellate Court had acted contrary to law. *Held*, that the Appellate Court had so acted, and its decision could only be treated as a dismissal for default, and that, so treating it, the proper and only course open to the appellant was to have applied under s. 558 for the re-admission of his appeal, and under these circumstances the second appeal would not lie. *Nand Ram v. Muhammad Bakhsh, I. L. R. 2 All. 616, followed. KANAHI LAL v. NAUBAT RAI*

I. L. R. 3 All. 519

13. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 2, 540, 556.* An order under s. 556 of Act X of 1877, dismissing an appeal for the appellant's default, is not a "decree" within the meaning of s. 2, and is not appealable. *MUKHI v. FAKIR*

I. L. R. 3 All. 382

14. ——— Dismissal of appeal for default—"Order"—"Decree"—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 2, and ss. 556, 558.* No appeal will lie under s. 10 of the Letters Patent from the order of a single Judge of the High Court dismissing an appeal for default. The decision of a Court dismissing a suit or appeal for default is an "order" and not a "decree." *Nand Ram v. Muhammad Bakhsh, I. L. R. 2 All. 616, Mukhi v. Fakir, I. L. R. 3 All. 382, Dhan Singh v. Basant Singh, I. L. R. 8 All. 519, Chand Kour v. Partab Singh, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 98, Muhammad Naim-ullah Khan v. Ishan-ullah Khan, I. L. R. 14 All. 226, cited. Ram Chandra Pandurang Naik v. Madhav Purushottam Naik, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 23, not followed. MANSAB ALI v. NIHAL CHAND*

I. L. R. 15 All. 359

15. ——— Order dismissing suit for default of appearance—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 102.* The decision of a Court passed under s. 102 of the Civil Procedure Code, dismissing a suit in default of appearance by a plaintiff, is an order and not a decree, and there is no first or second appeal therefrom. *GILKINSON v. SUBRAMANIA AYYAR*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 221

16. ——— Order dismissing suit for non-appearance of plaintiff specially ordered to appear—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 66, 103, 107, 540, 558 (8)—*Rejection of application to set aside dismissal. A plaintiff who had been ordered under s. 66 of the Civil Procedure Code to appear in person in Court upon a day specified, failed to appear, and under s. 107, read with s. 102, his suit was dismissed. He then applied to the Court, under s. 103, for an order to set the dismissal aside, but his application was rejected. He thereupon preferred an appeal from the decree dismissing the suit under the provisions of s. 540.

APPEAL—contd.**10. DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE—contd.**

Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to appeal from the decree dismissing the suit, and that his only remedy was by way of an appeal under s. 588 (8) of the Code from the order rejecting the application to set the dismissal aside. *Lal Singh v. Kunjan*, I. L. R. 4 All. 387, referred to. *KRISHNA RAM v. GOBIND PRASAD* . . . I. L. R. 8 All. 20

17. ———— **Order dismissing appeal for default—Pleader present, but unprepared to go on with case—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 556, 558.** Where, when an appeal is called on, the pleader is not absent, but is unprepared to go on with the case, the dismissal is a dismissal for default within s. 556 of Act XIV of 1882, and the appeal can therefore be re-admitted under s. 558. *Buldeo Misser v. Ahmed Hossen*, 15 W. R. 143, followed. *SHIBENDRA NARAIN CHOWDHURI v. KINOO RAM DASS* . . . I. L. R. 12 Calc. 605

18. ———— **Dismissal of an appeal for default—Pleader unprepared to proceed with a case—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2 and 556—“Decree.”** On the day fixed for the hearing of an appeal in the lower Appellate Court, the appellant appeared by a duly appointed pleader. The pleader applied to the Court for an adjournment on the ground that he had not time to fully prepare himself in the case. The Court refused to grant any adjournment, and dismissed the appeal for default:—*Held*, that the order of dismissal was bad. The mere fact that the appellant's pleader was not prepared to proceed with the case would not enable the Court to deal with the case as if there was no appearance at all for the appellant, and to dismiss the appeal for default. *Per BIRDWOOD, J.*—An order dismissing an appeal for default is one falling within the definition of a “decree” contained in s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), and is, therefore, appealable. *RAMCHANDRA PANDURANG NAIK v. MADHAV PURUSHOTTAM NAIK*. . . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 23

But see *JAGANNATH SINGH, v. BUDHAN*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 115

ANWAR ALI v. JAFFER ALI

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 827

LEKHA v. BHAUNA . . .

I. L. R. 18 All. 101

WATSON & Co. v. AMBICA DASI

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 529

4 C. W. N. 237

19. ———— **Order rejecting application for re-trial—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 119, 347—Appeal heard ex-parte.** A special and not a regular appeal will lie from an order rejecting a respondent's application for the re-trial of an appeal heard in his absence. *SREEDHURCHURN NUNDEE v. JUGGOBUNDOO PAUL*. . . W. R., 1864, Mis. 37

20. ———— **Order dismissing appeal for default—Suit struck off for default—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 119, 347—Order striking**

APPEAL—contd.**10. DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE—contd.**

off. In regular suits, where a Court of first instance refuses to re-admit a suit, there is an appeal under s. 119, Act VIII of 1859; but there is no provision under s. 347 for an appeal where an Appellate Court has refused to re-admit an appeal struck off for default. *ANONYMOUS* . . . 1 Ind. Jur. C. S. 49

FUZZOO KHAN v. ISSUR CHUNDER SIRCAR

Marsh. 30

21. ———— **Order to attend as witness—Decree against defendant—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 170.** A defendant who has been ordered to attend and give evidence under Act VIII of 1859, s. 170, and has failed to do so, is not precluded from appealing against a decree in favour of the plaintiff. *KHOMKAR ABDOL GUFFOOR v. KHODA NEWAZ*

Marsh. 568

KEDARNATH BHUTTACHARJEE v. KRIPA RAM BHUTTACHARJEE . . . 5 W. R. 270

22. ———— **Decree on default of party summoned as witness—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 170.** A regular appeal lies from the judgment of a first Court passed on the default of a party summoned to attend as witness under s. 170, Act VIII of 1859. *CHUNDER MOHUN MOJOOMDAR v. TEETOORAM BOSE*

4 W. R., Act X, 18

23. ———— **Decree on default of plaintiff summoned as witness.** The right of appeal is not lost to a plaintiff whose suit is dismissed for default by reason of non-appearance as a witness, or when the appellant wants to prove that he should not have been summoned at all. *LEKH-RAJ ROY v. BUCKLAND* . . . 5 W. R. Act X. 65

24.—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 556, 558, 591—Order for re-admission of appeal dismissed for default not capable of being used by the appellant as a ground of objection to the decree.* An order under s. 558 of the Code of Civil Procedure, re-admitting an appeal which had been dismissed for default under s. 556, is not appealable; neither is it an order “affecting the decision of the case” which “may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal” from the decree in the suit within the meaning of s. 591 of the Code. *Chintamony Dass v. Raghoonath Sahoo*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 981, followed. *GULAB KUNWAR v. THAKUR DAS* (1902) . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 464

25.—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 157 and 158—Non-appearance of plaintiff on adjourned date—Dismissal of suit for default—Remand for decision on the merits.* On a date to which the hearing had been adjourned, the plaintiff in a suit pending in the Court of a Munsif failed to appear when the case was called on; and the Munsif, acting apparently under s. 102, read with s. 157, of the Code of Civil Procedure, dismissed the suit “for default of prosecution.” *Held*, that the Appellate Court was right in remanding the suit to be disposed of under s. 158 of the Code. *BADAM v. NATHU SINGH* (1902) . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 194

APPEAL—*contd.*10. DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE—*contd.*

26. —*Counsel—Pleader—Dismissal of appeal for default—Appearance of appellants by pleader—Application for adjournment on ground of absence of counsel—Dismissal of appeal—No written judgment—Invalidity of order.* On an appeal being called on for hearing in a District Court, the pleader for the appellants duly appeared, but asked for an adjournment. He did not withdraw from the case, but urged that, as the records were in possession of counsel who was retained to lead him and who was absent, he was unable to argue the appeal. The District Judge refused to grant an adjournment, and dismissed the appeal. *Held*, on appeal to the High Court, that, though it was, no doubt, open to the Judge to refuse the adjournment, he was bound to write a judgment and dispose of the appeal. He could not dismiss it for default. The appeal was accordingly remanded to him to be heard. *Jamnadas Chhabildas v. Sorabji Kharsedji*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 27, followed. PATINHARE TARKATT RAMA MANNADI v. VELLUR KRISHNAN MENON (1902) . . . I. L. R. 28 Mad. 267

27. —*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 103, 108 and 558—Application to restore—Prevented by sufficient cause from appearing—Power of Court to restore where sufficient cause not shown.* The affirmative provisions in ss. 103, 108 and 558 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that a plaintiff or appellant (as the case may be) may prove that he was "prevented by sufficient cause" from appearing or attending when his suit or appeal was called on and dismissed, do not imply the negative, namely, that an application for restoration cannot be granted unless sufficient cause is shown. The effect of the enactments is that, if sufficient cause is shown, restoration is made obligatory on the Courts, there being no discretion in the matter; whereas in other cases the merits of the applicant's case will form an important element for consideration when the Court is asked to exercise its discretion. *SOMAYYA v. SUBBAMMA* (1903)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 599

28. —*Default—Dismissal of application for default—Revival—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 103, 318, 558, 647.* There is no appeal against an order rejecting an application under s. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code for reviving an application under s. 311 of the Code, which has been dismissed for non-appearance of the judgment-debtor: *Ningappa v. Gangawa*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 433; *Raja v. Srinivasa*, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 388; and *Hurrenath Koondo v. Madhoo Soodun Sahu*, 19 W. R. 122, followed. *JUNG BAHADUR v. MAHADEO PROSAD* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 31 Cal. 207
s. c. 8 C. W. N. 106, 318

29. —*Appeal, when to be dismissed for default—Talabana—Talabana not paid within the time ordered—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 557.* An appeal should not be dismissed for default before the date fixed for the hearing of the appeal arrives, simply because the appellant has failed to explain satisfactorily, why

APPEAL—*contd.*10. DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE—*contd.*

the *talabana* was not deposited within the period fixed by the Court and without ascertaining whether there was ample time after the deposit to serve the notices upon the respondents. *CHANDRA NATH DASS v. KALIPRASANNA CHAKRAVARTI* (1903)
I. L. R. 35 Cal. 535

11. DISMISSAL OF APPEAL.

1. ——— *Power of the lower Court to amend decree after dismissal of appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 551 and 577—Practice.* The dismissal of an appeal under s. 551 of the Civil Procedure Code (1882) leaves the decree of the lower Court untouched, neither confirmed, nor varied, nor reversed, and it remains the decree of the lower Court which can amend it, in order to bring it into accordance with its judgment. *BAPU v. VAJIR* . . . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 548

2. ——— *Effect of dismissal of appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 206 551—Amendment or alteration of decree—Power of the High Court to amend decree of lower Court improperly drawn—Practice.* The order of dismissal of an appeal under s. 551 of the Civil Procedure Code, being a final determination of, and an adjudication on, the questions raised in the appeal, is a "decree"; and in this respect there is no distinction between an appeal which is dismissed under s. 551 of the Civil Procedure Code and an appeal which is dismissed under any other section of the Code after full hearing. *Royal Reddi v. Linga Reddi*, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 1, referred to. When an appeal is dismissed under s. 551 of the Civil Procedure Code, or, in the case of a second appeal, when the decree is one of dismissal, the effect practically is to make the decree which is confirmed the final decree to be executed in the suit; and the High Court making such order has power to amend the decree of the lower Court which has been in effect confirmed by it, so as to bring it in conformity with the judgment, which is also confirmed. *UMA SUNDARI DEVI v. BINDU BASHINI CHOWDHURANI*
I. L. R. 24 Cal. 759

3. ——— *Confirmation of decree on appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 551.* The decision of the Full Bench in *Pichuwayyengar v. Seshayyengar*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 214, that the jurisdiction of a Court of first instance to amend a decree under s. 206 of the Civil Procedure Code is ousted by the confirmation of that decree on appeal, applies equally to second appeals dismissed under s. 551 of the Code and to second appeals tried after notice to the respondent. *MUNISAMI NAIDU v. MUNISAMI REDDI* . . . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 293

4. ——— *Refusal to hear application of appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 557, 582, 588 cl. 6, 622—Valuation of suit—Bengal, N.-W.P. and Assam Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887), s. 21, sub-s. 2—Jurisdiction—Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), s. 11.* No appeal lies against the order of an Appellate Court returning a memorandum of appeal for presentation to the proper Court.

APPEAL—*contd.*11. DISMISSAL OF APPEAL—*contd.*

Kumhikutti v. Achotti, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 462, dissented from. A brought a suit against B in the Court of a Munsif. B objected to it on the ground that the suit had been undervalued, and, if properly valued, it would not lie in that Court. The Munsif overruled the objection, and gave judgment for the plaintiff on the merits. B appealed to the District Judge, who held that the proper value of the suit being over rupees five thousand, he had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and he accordingly returned the memorandum of appeal to the appellant's pleader. A rule having been obtained against this order: *Held*, that the District Judge was bound to hear and dispose of the appeal, having regard to the provisions of s. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), and to determine, amongst other questions, whether the undervaluation of the suit had prejudicially affected the disposal of it on its merits. *RAGHUNATH CHARAN SINGH v. SHAMO KOERI* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 344

5. ———— *Appeal—Summary dismissal—Reasons to be recorded.* It is not necessary, where an appeal is summarily dismissed under s. 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for the Magistrate to give any reasons for his decision. It must be taken if he does dismiss an appeal summarily, that he considered there were no sufficient grounds for interfering. *Rash Behari Das v. Bai Gopal Singh*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 92, followed. *NITYA LAL v. BENI MADHAB GHOSE* (1905) . . . 9 C. W. N. 623

6. ———— *Effect of dismissal of appeal—Amendment of decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 206.* *Held*, that the dismissal of an appeal under s. 551 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a decree and supersedes the decree of the Court below. The Court, therefore, which has taken action under s. 551 is the only Court which has jurisdiction to amend the decree under s. 206 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Uma Sundari Devi v. Bindu Basini Chowdharani*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 759; *Peary Mohan v. Mohendra Nath*, 4 C. L. J. 566, and *Munisami Naidu v. Munisami Reddi*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 293, followed. *Bapu v. Vajir*, I. L. R. 21 Bom. 543, dissented from. *Rudr Prasad v. Baijnath*, I. L. R. 15 All. 367; *Thakur of Masuda v. The Widows of the Thakur of Nandwara*, I. L. R. 2 All. 819; *Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 91; *Kistokinker Ghose Roy v. Burrodacant Singh Roy*, 10 B. L. R. 101; *Akhoy Kumar Nundi v. Chundar Mohan Chatterji*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 250, *Murlidhar v. Tapesri Rai*, *Weekly Notes*, 1894, 46, *Royal Reddi v. Linga Reddi*, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 1, *Thakur Takhtsangji v. Bai Sundrabai*, Bom. P. J. 1891, 58, and *Kushal Chintaman v. Supdu Tapiram*, Bom. P. J. 299, referred to. *ASMA BIBI v. AHMAD HUSAIN* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 30 All. 29

7. ———— *Procedure—Appeal summarily dismissed—Court not bound to record a full judgment.* *Held*, that the provisions of s. 574 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable in their entirety to the case of an appeal dismissed under s. 551 of the Code. *Rami Deka v. Brojo Nath Saikia*, I. L. R. 25

APPEAL—*contd.*11. DISMISSAL OF APPEAL—*concl'd.*

Calc. 97, dissented from. *SAMIN HASAN v. PIRAN* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 30 All. 319

12. EXECUTION OF DECREE.

(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION.

1. ———— *Order refusing application to execute joint decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 207.* No appeal lay from an order of a lower Court refusing an application by one decree-holder under s. 207, Act VIII of 1859, to execute the whole of a joint decree to the execution of his co-decree-holder. *GOOROO DASS ROY v. RAM RUNGINEE DOSSIA* . . . 17 W. R. 136

ODHOYA PERSHAD v. MOHADEO DUTT BHANDAREE . . . 17 W. R. 415

2. ———— *Order on application for execution by one or more joint decree-holders—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 231 and 244.* An appeal lies from an order under s. 231 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such an order being one relating to the execution of a decree within the meaning of s. 244. *Gooroo Dass Roy v. Ram Runginee Dossia*, 17 W. R. 136, and *Odhyo Pershad v. Mahadeo Dutt Bhandaree*, 17 W. R. 415, distinguished. *LAKSHMI AMMAH v. PONNASSA MENON* . . . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 394

3. ———— *Order refusing to allow execution by one of several joint decree-holders—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 231.* No appeal lies against an order under s. 231 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), refusing to allow one of several joint decree-holders to execute joint decree. *RATANLAL v. BAI GULAB* . . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 623

4. ———— *Adjustment of decrees more than three years old—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 257, 258—Reference to High Court under s. 617 of a question arising under these sections.* On the 22nd March 1886, the applicant presented an application to a Subordinate Judge, praying that the adjustment of certain decrees, dated the 20th March 1867 and 11th July 1871, might be certified, and a sanction granted to a sankhat, dated 18th March 1880, passed to him by the defendant in satisfaction of the said decrees and in substitution of two bonds dated February 1879. The Subordinate Judge, being of opinion that the application could not be granted, inasmuch as the execution of the decrees was then barred by limitation, referred the case to the High Court under s. 617 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Held*, that the question could not be referred under s. 617 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), as the order applied for to the Subordinate Judge was appealable under s. 2 of the Code. The question raised by the application related to the satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code. *RANGJI v. BHAIJI HARJIVAN* . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 57

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

5. ——— Order in matter specially provided for—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 243, 364.* S. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 did not allow an appeal in matters already specifically provided for in the different sections of the Procedure Code (*e.g.*, ss. 243 and 364). *GREEJANUND OOPADHYA v. RUTTEE RAMAN OOPADHYA* . . . **8 W. R. 136**

6. ——— Order confirming report of Commissioner of Accounts—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11.* S. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 must be read as an amendment to the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859). That section is in terms confined to questions arising in the execution of decrees, which expression, as used in the said Code, means the enforcement of the decree on the application of one or other of the parties to it. *Held*, that an order of a Judge confirming the report of the Commissioner for taking accounts, by which he refused to require the defendants to give inspection of certain books, was not an order within the contemplation of that section, and was, therefore, not appealable. *RUSTOMJI BURJORJI v. KESSOWJI NAIK* . . . **2 Bom. 99, 2nd Ed., 94**

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 287

7. ——— Dispute among heirs of deceased decree-holder—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11.* According to s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, no appeal lay in a case of private dispute among the heirs of a deceased decree-holder as to their respective rights. *RAJCHUNDER ROY CHOWDERY v. GRISHCHUNDER ROY* . . . **5 W. R. Mis. 45**

8. ——— Order under s. 246, Civil Procedure Code, 1859—*Act XXIII of 1861, c. 11.* S. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, did not alter or modify the effect of s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, so as to give an appeal from orders passed under the latter section. *DHEERAJ MAHATAB CHAND v. PEAREE DOSSEE* . . . **6 W. R. Mis. 61**

9. ——— Order rejecting appeal in execution case—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11.* Under s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, an appeal lay from the order of a lower Appellate Court rejecting an appeal in an execution case as presented out of time. *GOPEENATH ROY v. GOPEENATH CHATTERJI* . . . **6 W. R. Mis. 106**

10. ——— *Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11.* The Munsif, on the application of a judgment-debtor, set aside a sale held in execution of a decree passed against him on the ground that the decree was barred by lapse of time. The judgment-creditor appealed to the Judge, who rejected the appeal on the ground that no appeal was allowed from such an order. *Held*, in special appeal, that under s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, an appeal lay from the order of the Munsif. *DHAN BIBEE v. HARADHAN RAM* . . . **2 B. L. R. Ap. 11 : 11 W. R. 4**

11. ——— Order passed on application for discharge from arrest in executioⁿ

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

of decree—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 273, 283, 365.* *Held*, that the procedure, on an application for his discharge under s. 273 of Act VIII of 1859, by a person arrested in execution of a decree for money, was such a question as came within the words introduced by s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, in addition to the original provision in Act VIII of 1859, s. 283; and the order passed thereon by the Court executing the decree was subject to appeal, notwithstanding that orders as to imprisonment in execution of a decree were excepted from the operation of s. 365 of Act VIII of 1859, as this exception, there being no affirmative prohibition, was removed by the provision of ss. 8 and 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, which Act, as directed by s. 44 thereof, was to be read as part of Act VIII of 1859. *YESVANTRAV AMRITRAO JAMIN v. ISMAIL ALI KHAN* . . . **2 Bom. 99, 2nd Ed., 94**

12. ——— Order refusing refund of purchase-money—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11.* A sale in the execution of a decree having been cancelled, the auction-purchaser applied for the refund of the purchase-money, which the Court executing the decree ordered, subject to the deduction of the sale fees. The auction-purchaser then applied for the return of the sum deducted. The Court passed an order refusing the application, which order the auction-purchaser questioned in appeal. *Held*, that an appeal did not lie. *HURDEE BEEBEE v. SURJOO PERSHAD* . . . **6 N. W. 309**

13. ——— Order on application to correct error in proceeding—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11.* Where an application was made to correct an error in a proceeding in which interest was calculated, the order passed on the application was open to appeal under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861. *AMANUT ALI v. BINDHOO* . . . **13 W. R. 138**

14. ——— Order as to sum due on mortgage accounts—*Usufructuary mortgage—Suit by mortgagor for possession.* In a suit by a mortgagor against a mortgagee to recover lands in the possession of the latter under a usufructuary mortgage, the only question in issue is whether the plaintiff is entitled to enter; and no appeal lies from the finding of the Judge that a specific sum is still due, it being open to the parties to dispute that decision by a separate suit. *MOTEE SOONDEREE v. INDRAJIT KOWAREE* . . . **Marsh 112**

S. C. BRIJOLALL UPADHYA v. MOTEE SOONDEREE
W. R. F. B. 33

15. ——— Order allowing mortgagor to deposit in Court amount due after date fixed—*Ministerial act—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 244, 588.* S. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates that there must be some question in controversy and conflict in execution which has been brought to a final determination and conclusion so as to be binding upon the parties to the proceedings,

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

and which must relate in terms to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree. A judgment-debtor under a decree for foreclosure made an application to the Court two days after the expiry of time prescribed by the decree for payment of the amount due thereunder, in which she alleged that, by reason of the two previous days having been holidays, she had been unable to pay the money before, and asked to be allowed to deposit the same. Upon this application the Court passed the following order:—"Permission granted. Applicant may deposit the money." The money was deposited accordingly. *Held*, that the order was merely a ministerial act, and nothing more than a direction from the Judge to his subordinate official to receive the money, which, as it did not fall within either s. 244 or s. 588 of the Civil Procedure Code, was not appealable; and that the proper remedy of the decree-holder, assuming the deposit to have not been made in time, was to apply for an order absolute for foreclosure, which order would be subject to any steps the parties affected by it might take by way of appeal or otherwise. *HULAS RAI v. PIRTHI SINGH*
I. L. R. 9 All. 500

16. ——— Order rejecting appeal in execution case—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Question whether decree is barred by limitation.* The question whether the execution of a decree is barred by limitation is a question arising between the parties to the suit; and an appeal lay under s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 from a decision on such question, whether it be raised by the Court *proprio motu* or by the parties. *HARI VISHNU v. GOPAL BIN RAOJI* 6 Bom. A. C. 181

17. ——— Order in case transferred for execution—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Beng. Act III of 1870.* Where a decree by a Deputy Collector had been transferred to the Civil Court, and application for execution was made while Bengal Act III of 1870 was in force:—*Held*, that the execution proceedings were subject to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, and an order passed therein was appealable under Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11. *CHEDEE SINGH v. PEAREEOONNISSA*
20 W. R. 19

18. ——— An order passed by a Court to which a decree has been transferred for execution is not open to appeal, unless the order has been made in the course of the actual execution of the transferred decree. *Quære*: Whether, where a decree has been transferred to the Munsif's Court for execution, an appeal will lie to the Judge from the Munsif's order in the matter of the execution? *In the matter of the petition of SUMAT DAS*
13 B. L. R. Ap. 27

SOOMUT DASS v. BHOORUN LALL

21 W. R. 292

See this case at a former stage in which the question was raised. *SOOMUT DASS v. BHOORUN LALL*
20 W. R. 478

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*¹(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

19. ——— A decree transmitted to a Court for execution is to be regarded as a decree of that Court for the purpose of execution, and an appeal therefore lies against the order of a District Judge passed in execution of a decree transmitted to his Court from a Small Cause Court. *MOBARUCK ALI v. SOOMEER RUNGA CHAREE*
3 N. W. 168

20. ——— Order as to issue of certificate—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 285.* All orders passed by a Court between parties to the decree and relating to the execution of decree are, unless they are specially barred, appealable. There is no special prohibition against an appeal from an order directing or refusing the issue of a certificate under s. 285, Act VIII of 1859. *GOPAL LALL v. MAHOMED HADEE*
6 N. W. 73

21. ——— Orders rejecting application as to mode of sale of property—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 244, 588—Question relative to the execution of decree.* A judgment-debtor having applied, under s. 284 of Act X of 1877, that certain property attached in execution of a decree against him should be sold in successive 8-pie shares, on the ground that the amount due under the decree was only Rs. 9,000, and that on a former occasion a similar share of the same property had been sold for Rs. 5,000, the Judge refused the application. *Held*, that the question between the parties was one relating to the execution of a decree; and accordingly that, although no appeal was given by the Act against an order under s. 284, there was an appeal under s. 588 (j). *CHANDHARI SITAL PERSHAD SINGH v. JHUMAH SINGH* 4 C. L. R. 27

22. ——— Order as to mesne profits subsequent to decree, and as to costs of execution—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 244.* There is no appeal against an order made under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure (X of 1877), determining the questions between the parties to a suit as to the amount of mesne profits recovered by the plaintiff subsequently to the decree and as to the amount payable on account of the costs of the execution of that decree. *DALPATBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. AMARSANG KHEMABAI*
I. L. R. 2 Bom. 553

23. ——— Order disallowing objection to attachment—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 244 (c), 281—Execution of decree—Decree against firm—Attachment of property as property of firm—Claim by partner to property as private property.* The holder of a decree against a firm caused certain property to be attached in execution of the decree as the property of the firm. One of the partners in the firm objected to the attachment on the ground that such property was not the property of the firm, but was his private property. The Court disallowed the objection, whereupon such partner appealed from the order disallowing the objection. *Held*,

APPEAL—*contd.*]12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

that such order was not one under s. 244 (c) of Act X of 1877, but under s. 281, and was therefore not appealable. *ABDUL RAHMAN v. MUHAMMAD YAR*
I. L. R. 4 All. 190

24. ——— Order of security in execution—*Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 2, 244, cl. (c), ss. 546, 588—Security for restitution of property.* Where an order, requiring the decree-holder to give security within three days, is made, under s. 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the Judge of the Court in which the decree was passed and in which the execution is pending, such order is appealable as a decree under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, s. 2, and s. 244, cl. (c). *LUCHMIPUT SINGH v. SITA NATH DOSS*
I. L. R. 8 Calc. 477 : 10 C. L. R. 517

25. ——— Order for attachment and sale of property—*Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 244 and 588, cls. (j) and (r).* An order for attachment and sale of property in execution of a decree is an order "of the same nature with" an order made in the course of a suit for attachment of the debtor's property. The latter order is appealable under s. 588, cl. (r), of the Code of Civil Procedure. It follows that an order for attachment and sale in execution of a decree is [according to the requirement of s. 588, cl. (j)] "of the same nature with appealable orders made in the course of a suit"; and therefore is appealable under that section. *POLOKDHARI RAI v. RADHA PERSAD SINGH*
I. L. R. 8 Calc. 28
I. L. R. 8 I. A. 165

Reversing the decision of the High Court in *POLOKDHARI ROY v. RADHA PERSAD SINGH*
I. L. R. 5 Calc. 50 : 4 C. L. R. 342

26. ——— Claim by legal representative to property as his own independently of deceased judgment-debtor—*Separate suit—Jus tertii—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 234, 244, 278 and 283.* Held by the Full Bench (*TYRELL, J.* dissenting), that where a judgment-debtor dies after the passing of the decree, and his legal representatives are brought on the record in execution proceedings to represent him in respect of the decree, questions which they raise as to property which they say does not belong to his assets in their hands, and as such is not capable of being taken in execution, are questions which under s. 244 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code must be determined in the execution department, and not by separate suit. There is no distinction in this respect between the positions of legal representatives added to the suit before, and those added after, the decree. Under the last paragraph of s. 234, the Court executing the decree may try and determine the question whether property in the legal representative's hands formed part of the deceased judgment-debtor's estate, and find this fact for the purpose of bringing the property to sale

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

in execution, and giving the auction-purchaser a good title under the sale; and the Court's order is subject to appeal, but not to a separate suit under s. 283. *SETH CHAND MAL v. DURGA DEVI*
I. L. R. 12 All. 313

27. ——— Questions between execution-creditor and persons placed on the record as representative of deceased judgment-debtor—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 244, 278, and 283.* Certain decree-holders obtained during the lifetime of their judgment-debtor attachment of certain immoveable property as belonging to the said judgment-debtor; but, on the decree-holders seeking to bring the property to sale, one *S D* came forward with an objection that the property was his, and was not liable to sale in execution of the decree in question. Pending the decision of the Court on this objection, the decree-holders applied to the Court to have the names of *S D* and the widow of the judgment-debtor (who died about the time the previous objection was filed) placed on the record as representatives of the judgment-debtor. *S D* filed a similar objection to this application also; but both objections, being heard together on the 6th September 1892, were dismissed, and *S D* was placed on the record as representative of the deceased judgment-debtor. On appeal by *S D* against "the order of the District Judge of Jaunpur of the 6th September 1892," it was held that the order making *S D* a party to the execution proceedings as representative of the judgment-debtor rendered any order as to his former objection superfluous, and that order was appealable under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *SHANKAR DAT DUBE v. HARMAN* . . . I. L. R. 17 All. 245

28. ——— Assignment of decree—*Limitation—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 232, 244, 540, and 588.* Where a Court, on the application of a transferee of a decree for execution, decides that he is not a transferee under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code, or that, although he is a transferee within the meaning of that section, he is not a representative of a party to the suit, or that by reason of limitation he is not entitled to obtain execution of the decree, it has determined a question or questions mentioned or referred to in s. 244 of the Code, and though not specified in s. 588, an appeal lies under s. 540. *Parmanadas Jivandas v. Vallabji Wallji*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 506, and *Gulzari Lal v. Daya Ram*, I. L. R. 9 All. 46, approved. *Ram Baksh v. Panna Lal*, I. L. R. 7 All. 457, considered. *Halahar Shaha v. Hargobind Das Koiburio*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 405, *Sambasiva v. Srinivasa*, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 511, *Rama v. Nuppil Nayar*, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 478, and *Vilayati Begam v. Intizar Begam*, W. N., All. (1893) 106, referred to. *BADRI NARAIN v. JAI KISHEN DAS* . . . I. L. R. 16 All. 483

29. ——— Question whether transferee of decree is the representative of

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

decree-holder—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 232, 244—Decree.* An order of a Court executing a decree determining whether an alleged transferee from a decree-holder or from his legal representative is or is not the representative of the decree-holder within the meaning of s. 244, cl. (c), of the Code of Civil Procedure, is an order under that section and therefore a decree, and an appeal lies from such order. *Dwar Bakesh Sircar v. Fatik Jati, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 250, and Badri Narain v. Jai Kishen Das, I. L. R. 16 All. 483, followed. Ganga Das Seal v. Yakub Ali Bobashi. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 670*

30. ——— Order refusing to allow representative to take out execution until granted certificate—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 244.* On appeal from an order allowing an application by the legal representative of a deceased decree-holder for execution, the Appellate Court, holding that the applicant must obtain a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 before he could take out execution of the decree, made an order directing that execution of the decree should be stayed until the applicant had obtained such certificate. *Held*, that such order fell under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and was therefore appealable. *Hoti Lall v. Hardeo. I. L. R. 5 All. 212*

31. ——— Order staying execution of decree. All orders staying execution of decrees, whether passed by the Court which passed the decree or by the Court to which it is sent for execution, are "questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, and relating to the execution" thereof, within the meaning of s. 244 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code, and, as such, appealable, irrespective of the provisions of s. 588. *Kristomohiny Dassee v. Bana Churn Nag Chowdry, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 733, and Luckmeeput Singh v. Seeta Nath Doss, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 477, followed.* The widest meaning should be attached to cl. (c) of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, so as to enable the Court of first instance and the Court of Appeal to adjudicate upon all kinds of questions arising between the parties to a decree and relating to its execution. *GHAZIDIN v. FAKIR BAKSH. I. L. R. 7 All. 73*

32. ——— Order staying execution of decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 2, 243, 244—Decree.* An order under s. 243 of the Civil Procedure Code staying execution of a decree determines a question relating to the execution of the decree within the meaning of s. 244, and is therefore a decree within the meaning of s. 2; an appeal therefore lies from such order. *STEEL v. ICHCHAMOYI CHOWDHRAIN. I. L. R. 13 Calc. 111*

33. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 2 and 244—Stay of execution—Amount of security required in granting of execution: a question in execution and order thereon appealable.* The defendant in a redemption suit

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

against whom a decree had been passed appealed to the High Court, which on his application granted usual stay of execution pending the appeal, upon security being given by him. The Subordinate Judge, feeling doubt as to whether the actual value of the property or the value stated in the plaint should be regarded in fixing the security, referred the case to the High Court. *Held*, that the question as to the amount of the security was a question relating to execution as contemplated by s. 244 of the Code, and, therefore, an order determining that question would be appealable under s. 2 of the Code. *ISHWARGAR v. CHUDASAMA MANABHAI. I. L. R. 12 Bom. 30*

34. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 244—Question as to what had actually been subject of sale—Question between judgment-debtor and auction-purchaser.* Land was sold in execution of a decree of a subordinate Court, and a sale-certificate was issued. A question having subsequently arisen as to what had actually been the subject of the sale, the auction-purchaser applied to the Court, and an order was made by which the sale-certificate was amended. The judgment-debtor appealed to the District Court joining the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser as respondents. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that no appeal lay. *Held*, that the question was not one which could be determined under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 244, and consequently the decision of the lower Appellate Court was right. *MAMMOT v. LOCKE. I. L. R. 20 Mad. 487*

35. ——— Order staying sale in execution of decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 244 cl. (c).* In execution of a decree on a mortgage-bond executed by the father of the judgment debtors, since deceased, which decree directed that the mortgage-lien should be enforced—*first*, by sale of the property specifically mortgaged; and *secondly*, if the debt remained unsatisfied, by the sale of the other property in the possession of the judgment-debtors, the judgment-creditor proceeded to have the mortgage property sold. After the issue of the sale-notification, and three days prior to the date fixed for the sale, one of the judgment-debtors applied to have the sale stayed on the ground that an administration suit was pending with respect to the property of his father, the mortgagor, and also asked that a receiver might be appointed and arrangements made for the purpose of paying off the mortgage-debt and saving the property from being sold. On this application the Court passed an order staying the sale. *Held*, that such order was appealable, being a question arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed and relating to the execution of that decree, and as such coming within the provision of cl. (c), s. 244, Act X of 1877. *Gambhirmal v. Chajmal Jodhmal, 11 Bom.*

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

151, distinguished. KRISTOMOHINEY DOSSEE v. BAMA CHURN NAG CHOWDHRY

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 733
9 C. L. R. 344

36. ———— Order directing application to stay sale in execution proceedings on ground of under-valuation—Decree. An application was made by certain defendants, against whom a decree had been passed, for an order that a sale at the instance of the decree-holder, in execution of his decree, should not be proceeded with on the ground that in the sale-proclamation the value of the property had been underestimated. The Subordinate Judge held the undervaluation to be immaterial, and dismissed the application, whereupon the judgment-debtor appealed to the High Court. On the preliminary objection being there taken that no appeal lay from the order of dismissal: *Held*, that an appeal lay, the order having been made with reference to a question which related to the execution, and the question being one arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed and relating to its execution, within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. SIVASAMI NAICKER v. RATNASAMI NAICKER

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 568

37. ———— Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 318, 588—Order refusing possession to purchaser at sale in execution. An order passed under s. 318 of the Civil Procedure Code rejecting an application by a purchaser at an execution-sale for possession is not appealable; no appeal is given by s. 588, and the order cannot be said to be one under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, inasmuch as it does not relate to the "execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree." Ghulam Shabbir v. Dwarka Prasad, I. L. R. 18 All. 36, approved of. Mutia v. Appasami, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 504, dissented from. BHIMAL DAS v. GANESHA KOER

1 C. W. N. 658

38. ———— Order directing account in administration-suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 244. An order directing an account is not an order in the nature of a final decree, nor one in execution of decree, and is unappealable; such an order merely directs certain proceedings to be taken, in order that a final decree may thereafter be made. SREENATH ROY v. RADHANATH MOOKERJEE

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 773

39. ———— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 293—Question for Court executing decree—Defaulting purchaser answering for loss by re-sale—Description of property at sale and resale, difference of—Regular suit. An appeal will lie against an order made under s. 293 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sree Narain Mitter v. Mahab Chund, 6 W. R. 3, Sooruj Buksh Singh v. Sree Kishen Dass, 6 W. R. Mis. 126, Jobraj Singh v. Gour Buksh, 7 W. R. 110, Bisakah Moyee

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

Chowdrain v. Sonatun Dass, 16 W. R. 14 and Ram Dial v. Ram Das, I. L. R. 1 All. 181, followed. BAIJNATH SAHAI v. MOHEEP NARAIN SINGH

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 535

KALI KISHORE DEB SARKAR v. GURU PRASAD SUKUL

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 99 : 2 C. W. N. 408

RAJENDRANATH ROY v. RAM CHARAN SINHA

2 C. W. N. 411

40.—Memorandum of appeal—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 244. An order determining any question referred to in s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, is a decree under s. 2, Civil Procedure Code. When, therefore, an appeal is preferred against such an order, it is sufficient to attach to the memorandum of appeal a copy of the order itself, and it is not necessary to attach to the memorandum a copy of the decree, even though such a decree may have been drawn up. In the case, however, of a suit or a proceeding which has the character of a suit (e.g., contentious probate proceedings, etc.), it is necessary to file a copy of the decree. KHIRODE SUNDARI DEBI v. JXANENDRA NATH PAL CHAUDHURI (1901) : 6 C. W. N. 283

41.—Mortgage. An order refusing to enlarge the time prescribed in a decree for redemption is appealable under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. RANGO v. BHOMSHETTI (1901)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 121

42. ———— Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 258—Decree—Order—Appeal—Mortgage decree, question regarding satisfaction of, when no application for execution pending. Where a Court deals with a question relating to the discharge or satisfaction of a decree, it may be said to be executing the decree in the sense of s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, although no formal application for execution may have been made to it; and an order passed by the Court is a decree, and is appealable. RAM KAMLESSURI PERSHAD SINGH v. SUKHAN SINGH (1902)

7 C. W. N. 172

43. ———— Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244—Order by High Court directing District Court to take account of amount due under mortgage—Order by District Court declaring amount due. The High Court, by its decree, directed a District Court to take an account of the amount due to a decree-holder under a mortgage. The District Court accordingly took the account, and passed an order declaring, in Court, under s. 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, the amount so due. Against that order the decree-holder appealed to the High Court, when the objection was raised that no appeal lay. *Held*, that the order appealed against was one falling under s. 244 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and an appeal lay. ARYAN BANK OF VIZAGAPATAM v. KAMMA VENKATA NARASAYYAMMA GARU (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 237

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

44.—*Possession—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 9—Decree for possession—Order in execution proceedings.* Where a decree for possession of land has been passed in a suit brought under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, and an order is passed in proceedings in execution of that decree, no appeal lies against that order. For s. 9 provides that "no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit" under that section, and, by the Explanation to s. 647 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applications for the execution of decrees are proceedings in suits. *SOUZA v. GULAM MOIDIN BEARI* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 438

45.—*Sale—Decree—Sale in execution—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 310A and 244 (c)—Order refusing to set aside a sale—Appeal from such order.* An appeal lies from an order passed under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), refusing to set aside a sale, where the dispute relates to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree and thus comes within s. 244 (c) of the Code. *MURLIDHAR v. ANAND-RAO* (1900)

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 418

46.—*Sale in execution—Purchase by decree-holder—Application for amendment of sale certificate.* A decree-holder applying for execution of his decree asked for a 2 annas 8 pies share, belonging to his judgment-debtor, to be put up to sale. This share was advertised for sale, and ultimately the decree-holder himself bought at the sale; but a sale certificate was granted to him in respect of a 2 annas 5 pies share only. The decree holder applied for amendment of the sale certificate which was refused him. He then appealed against the order of the Court refusing to amend. *Held*, that no appeal lay from such order, either under s. 588 or by virtue of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Bujha Roy v. Ram Kumar Pershad*, I. L. R. 26 Cal. 529, and *Gulam Shabbir v. Dwarika Prasad*, I. L. R. 18 All. 36, referred to. *SADDO KUNWAR v. BANSI DHAR* (1901)

I. L. R. 23 All. 476

47.—*Joint decree—Sale in execution—Purchase by decree-holders—Receipt for part of decretal money given by one decree-holder on behalf of both—Sale set aside—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 244, 294, 311.* Two persons holding a joint decree caused certain immovable property of their judgment-debtor to be sold, and, having obtained permission to bid, themselves became the purchasers. The property was knocked down to the two decree-holders jointly. An application was then made, to the officer conducting the sale, by one of the decree-holders auction-purchasers, but purporting to act in the name of, and on behalf of, the other auction-purchaser as well, asking that the purchase-money should be set off against the amount due under the decree, and that to that extent satisfaction of the decree should be entered up;

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

he at the same time paid the auction fees. This application was made under the second clause of s. 294 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A receipt for the amount of the purchase money was given to the officer conducting the sale, and by him was forwarded to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, under whose orders the sale was held. The judgment-debtor subsequently made an application under s. 311 to the Subordinate Judge, asking to have the sale set aside. That application was rejected; but the Subordinate Judge, instead of confirming the sale, set it aside, on the ground that only one of the decree-holders auction-purchasers had put in the receipt under the second clause of s. 294, and directed a re-sale, and this notwithstanding that the other decree-holder admitted that the receipt had been presented on his behalf also. On appeal to the District Judge, the order of the Subordinate Judge was set aside, and an order passed confirming the sale. From this order the judgment-debtor appealed to the High Court, on the sole ground that no appeal lay to the District Judge. *Held*, that the order passed by the Subordinate Judge was appealable, as an order passed under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *MAKKA v. SRI RAM* (1901)

I. L. R. 24 All. 108

48.—*Execution of decree—Objection by judgment-debtor that more had been delivered to the auction-purchaser than was included in his sale certificate—Objection disallowed—Civil Procedure Code, s. 244.* Certain landed property was put up for sale in execution of a decree. On the property stood a house. After the sale, the auction-purchaser obtained possession of the house. The judgment-debtor objected that the house should not have been delivered, inasmuch as no mention was made of it in the sale certificate. This objection was disallowed. *Held*, that the order disallowing the judgment-debtor's objection did not fall within s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and was not otherwise appealable. *Mammad v. Locke*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 487, and *Hira Lal Chatterji v. Gour Moni Debi*, I. L. R. 13 Cal. 326, referred to. *RAM ADHAR v. NARAIN DAS* (1902)

I. L. R. 24 All. 519

49.—*Order—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 287 (c)—Value specified in sale proclamation.* An order passed by a Court, disallowing the objection of a judgment-debtor that the value of the property specified in the sale proclamation under s. 287, cl. (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure was grossly inadequate, comes under s. 244 of the Code, and is therefore appealable. *GANGA PRASAD v. RAJ COOMAR SINGH* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Cal. 617

50.—*Transfer for execution—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 232 and 295—Sale of decree, and transfer for execution to another Court—Application by transferees for rateable distribution of*

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

assets—Court to which such application should be made. A decree was transferred for execution from Mirzapur to Gorakhpur; the decree-holder also sold his interest in the decree. The transferees thereupon made an application for execution in the Gorakhpur Court, and prayed for a rateable share of the assets which might be realized in execution of a decree held by one Bindsri against the same judgment-debtor. Upon this application the following order was passed:—"The judgment-debtors and the transferors both received notice, but none of them put in an appearance, and no objections were filed. As the prayer in this case to be allowed a rateable share of the assets in Bindsri Prasad's case, let this case be put with that case." *Held*, (i) that the Court to which the decree was transferred for execution had no power to entertain the transferee's application for a rateable share in the assets; such application could only be entertained by the Court which passed the decree; (ii) that the order passed by the Gorakhpur Court could not operate as *res judicata* so as to prevent the judgment-debtors from questioning the right of the transferees to make an application for execution to that Court; and (iii) that the order passed by the executing Court was appealable as an order under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Badri Narain v. Jai Kishen Das*, I. L. R. 16 All. 483, and *Amar Chandra Banerjee v. Guru Prosunna Mukerjee*, I. L. R. 27 Cal. 488, referred to. *TAMESHAR PRASAD v. THAKUR PRASAD* (1903)

I. L. R. 25 All. 443

51. ———— *Decree passed without jurisdiction—Decree—Execution—Jurisdiction—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 225, 228, 244, 588.* When a decree passed by one Court is sent for execution to another, the latter Court is entitled to go into the question whether the first Court had jurisdiction to pass the decree: and if that Court declines to become the executing Court, the order so passed is not an order either under s. 244 or s. 588 of the Civil Procedure Code and cannot be appealed against. *BHAGWANTAPPA v. VISHWANATH* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 378

52. ———— *Execution of decree—Order—Order passed without jurisdiction—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 278, 283, 622.* *Held*, that an order passed under s. 280 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) is not appealable. *DAYARAM v. GOVARDHANDAS* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 458

53. ———— *Provincial Small Cause Courts' Act (IX of 1887), s. 32 (2)—Small Cause suit—Jurisdiction extended pending suit.* A suit to recover Rs1-4 was filed in the Court of a Subordinate Judge who was at the time invested with the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes to the extent of Rs50. Later the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge as a Court of Small Causes was raised to Rs100 and subsequently to this the suit was decided by him as a

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

regular suit and the claim was allowed. On appeal by the defendant the District Judge held that no appeal lay on the ground that the suit was triable and must be taken to have been tried by the Subordinate Judge in the extended jurisdiction vested in him as a Judge of the Court of Small Causes. *Held*, on an application by the defendant under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), that the appeal lay to the District Judge. Under s. 32 (2) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887), it was necessary that the Judge should, before the institution of the suit, be invested with a Small Cause Court jurisdiction entitling him to hear the particular suit. *Hari Kamayya v. Hari Venkayya*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 212, followed. *Balchand v. Bularam*, 5 Bom. L. R. 398, explained. *SAMBU DHANAJI v. RAM VITHU* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 244

54. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 244—Small Cause Court decree—Execution—Transfer to regular Court—Order in execution—Second appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 586.* Where a Small Cause Court decree was sent for execution to the regular Court of the district and an order was passed under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, by that Court (which was a Court of a Sub-Judge): *Held*, that an appeal lay to the Court of the District Judge against such order. But the value of the decree being less than Rs500, a second appeal was barred by s. 556, Civil Procedure Code. *PEARY LAL SING v. RADHA NATH SINGH* (1907)

11 C. W. N. 861

55. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 244—Legal representative.* When an application by the executor to the estate of a Hindu lady to execute a decree which fell to her share upon a partition of her husband's estate between herself and her sons, was refused on the objection of the sons and the judgment-debtors that the lady had only a life-interest in the decree and that it passed on her death to her sons: *Held*, that appeal lay from the order under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, the question arising being a question between the legal representative of the lady and the judgment-debtors. *HRIDOY KANT BHATTACHARJEE v. BEHARI LAL MOOKERJEE* (1906)

11 C. W. N. 239

56. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 320, 310A and 244—Execution of decree—Sale by Collector—Application to Court by judgment-debtor to set aside sale—Refusal by the Court—Collector's power—Rules 16 and 17 of the Local Rules and Orders made under enactments applicable to Bombay.* A decree having been transferred to the Collector for execution under s. 320 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), he sold certain properties. Thereupon the judgment-debtor applied to the Court for the setting aside of the sale under s. 310A of the Code. The Court refused to set aside the sale on the ground that there was

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

another decree-holder who had taken action under s. 295 of the Code, and that it was incumbent on the judgment-debtor to pay into Court a sum sufficient to answer his claim. On appeal by the judgment-debtor, the Judge dismissed the appeal on the ground that no appeal lay. *Held*, on second appeal by the judgment-debtor that the order was appealable. An appeal lies from an order under s. 310A of the Code where the case falls under s. 244 (c). *Murlidhar v. Anand Rao*, I. L. R. 25 Bom. 418, qualified. *PITA v. CHUNILAL* (1906)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 207

57. — *Decree in appeal*—When such decree simply confirms the decree of the lower Court, it does not enlarge the time fixed by the original decree for the performance of conditions precedent. The decree of the lower Court provided that 'on the plaintiff's paying into Court the balance of consideration, Rs. 10, within a month from this date,' defendant should execute a sale-deed of the land. The money was not paid within the month and the defendant preferred an appeal after the expiry of the month. The Appellate Court simply confirmed the decree of the lower Court and dismissed the appeal. Within a month of the appellate decree the plaintiff deposited Rs. 10 and applied for execution of the decree. *Held*, that he was not entitled to execute the decree, as he had not made payment within the time fixed by the original decree, and as the appellate decree cannot under the circumstances be held to have enlarged the time fixed by the original decree. The appellate decree simply confirming the original decree cannot be read as giving the plaintiff one month from the date of the decision on appeal. Such an extension can be claimed only if expressly or impliedly given by the Appellate Court. *Bhup Indar Singh v. Bijoy Bahadur Singh*, I. L. R. 23 All. 155, distinguished. *RAMASWAMI KONE v. SENDARA KONE* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 28

58. — *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 310A, 311*—Decree—Execution—Sale at Court-auction—Application to set aside sale on the ground of fraud—Appeal lies from orders passed under s. 310A when they also fall under s. 244, *Civil Procedure Code, 1882*. Within a month of the sale at a Court-auction, the judgment-debtor applied to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground that owing to conspiracy among the villagers (including the decree-holder) the sale was at an undervalue. A week later, but within the month allowed, he again applied to the Court to set aside the sale under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), depositing the amount as required by the section. The Subordinate Judge rejected the second application on the ground that it did not lie as the judgment-debtor had already applied to set aside the sale on the ground of irregularity under s. 311 of the Code. This order was on appeal reversed by the District Judge.

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(a) QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION—*contd.*

On appeal to the High Court, it was contended, first that the order passed by the Subordinate Judge was not appealable; and, second, that the second application could not be granted because the judgment-debtor had already applied to set aside the sale under s. 311 of the Code. *Held*, (i) that the order passed by the Subordinate Judge was appealable. *Pita v. Chunilat* I. L. R. 31 Bom. 207, followed; (ii) that the allegation in the first application being that the sale had been brought about by the fraud of the residents of the village where the lands were situate and where the decree-holder resided, the application must be regarded as an application under s. 244 and not under s. 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882. Decree of the District Judge confirmed. *Gulam Ahad Chowdhry v. Jadhister Chundra Shaha*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 142, followed. *HARIHAR KANTA v. RAMA PANDU* (1909) I. L. R. 33 Bom. 698

(b) PARTIES TO SUITS.

59. — Person other than party to suit—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11. No one but a party to a suit can appeal under s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, against an order passed in such suit. *CAEMERER v. BIRCH*. *Ex parte BROOKS*

1 Mad. 8

KALUB HOSSEIN v. DEEN ALI . . . 4 N. W. 2

60. — Liability of defaulting purchaser—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 244, 293, 306*—Appeal from order under s. 293. At a sale in execution of a decree, a decree-holder, who had obtained leave to bid, was alleged to have made a bid through his agent of Rs. 90,000, but he shortly afterwards repudiated the bid, and did not pay the deposit. The property was put up for sale again on the following day under s. 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and was in due course knocked down for a smaller sum. The judgment-debtor filed a petition under s. 293 to recover from the decree-holder the loss by resale; the petition was rejected. On appeal:—*Held*, that the question at issue was one arising between the parties to the suit, and that an appeal lay against the order rejecting the petition. *VALLABHAN v. PANGUNNI*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 454

61. — *Civil Procedure Code (1882), ss. 21, 244, 293, and 306*—Default by purchaser in paying deposit—Order refusing remedy against purchaser. The purchaser at an execution-sale failed to make the deposit of 25 per cent. under Civil Procedure Code, s. 306, alleging that the property was discovered by him subsequently to the sale to be subject to an incumbrance. The property was put up for sale again and knocked down for a smaller sum. The decree-holder sought in execution to recover the amount of the difference from the first purchaser. The Court of first instance made an order dismissing the application. *Held*,

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(b) PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

that an appeal lay against the order in question. Orders made in respect of a default by the purchasers in such a case are in the nature of decrees, and the parties affected must be deemed to be parties to the suit within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code. *AMIR BAKSHA SAHIB v. VENKATACHALA MUDALI* . . . **I. L. R. 18 Mad. 439**

62. ——— Purchaser, objection by—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 246, 247, 364.* Where the holder (G) of a simple money-decree, who is at the same time a mortgagee, applies to a Civil Court to sell mortgagor's property in execution of said decree, such property having previously been sold in execution of K's decree and purchased by N (G's claim upon it being at the same time notified), and in his (G's) application inserts the name of N, and calls him a judgment-debtor in the room of the heir and representative of the deceased debtor; and a purchaser comes in and denies that he is a judgment-debtor or liable, and asks for the release of the property, and the Judge disallowed his objection:—*Held*, that, if the Judge's order was made after investigation, then, under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859, an appeal was barred; if it was an order refusing to investigate the objection, then the appeal was barred either by s. 247 or by s. 364, unless allowed by s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861. *Held*, also, that the objector was not a party to the suit, and that he was not entitled to appeal under s. 11. S. 223, Code of Civil Procedure, can have no bearing on such a case. *NARAIN ACHARJEE v. GREGORY* . . . **8 W. R. 304**

63. ——— Purchaser, substitution of, for original party in record—"Party to suit." A party who had sued, on the part of himself and of his minor brother, to recover possession of ancestral property alleged to have been alienated, sold his rights and interests in the suit to a third party, whose name was accordingly substituted in the place of plaintiff. *Held*, that the substitution of such party for the plaintiff, in respect of part of the latter's share in the subject-matter of the suit, did not make that party a party to the suit, and gave him no status which would enable him to appeal. *SAHEB ROY v. CHOONEE SINGH* . . . **9 W. R. 487**

64. ——— Intervenor—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Party to suit.* The first Court gave a decree to the plaintiff for possession of land against A, the original defendant in the suit, but exempted land in the possession of B, an intervenor, whom the Court had made a co-defendant. The Appellate Court reversed so much of that decree as adjudicated upon the claim as between the plaintiff and B and confirmed its decree for possession against A, but awarded costs against B. *Held*, that B continued to be a defendant in the suit, and had a right of appeal under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, and that he was not as "a person other than the defendant"

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(b) PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

bound to come in under s. 230, Act VIII of 1859. *HUREE KISHORE ROY v. KALEE KISHORE SEIN*

8 W. R. 114

65. ——— Claimant under title created subsequently to suit—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Party to suit.* A female plaintiff obtained a decree against certain defendants, declaring certain ekrammahs, etc., void as against her husband and his representatives. After his death she proceeded to execute the decree as one for possession, and obtained an order, under s. 223, Act VIII of 1859, for delivery of possession of property in possession of a third party as being a person claiming under a title created by the defendants subsequently to the institution of the suit. The third party appealed from that order. *Held*, that this was not a case in which an appeal lay under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, inasmuch as the questions raised by the appeal were not questions between the parties to the suit. *AMEERONISSA KHATOON v. ABEDOONISSA KHATOON* . . . **16 W. R. 307**

66. ——— Representative of deceased debtor—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Execution of decree—Limitation.* A decree was obtained in 1849, and execution issued in 1862. Several subsequent applications for execution were made, against one of which the objection was raised by some of the representatives of the judgment-debtor, that the decree was barred by lapse of time; but it was overruled by the High Court in special appeal. A further application was made, and was opposed by one of the representatives who had since attained his majority upon the ground that the suit was barred. The Munsif disallowed the objection. On appeal the Judge reversed his decision. *Held*, in special appeal, that the terms of s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, did not prohibit an appeal by a representative of a deceased judgment-debtor against an order passed in execution of a decree against his ancestor. *BISHTU NARAYAN BANDOPADHYA v. GANGA NARAYAN BISWAS* . . . **3 B. L. R. A. C. 40: 11 W. R. 368**

67. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1852, s. 244—Decree passed against representative of debtor—Attachment of property as belonging to debtor—Objection to attachment by judgment-debtor setting up an independent title—Appeal from order disallowing objection—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 283.* The decree-holders in execution of a simple money-decree passed against the legal representatives of their debtor, and which provided that it was to be enforced against the debtor's property, attached and sought to bring to sale a house as coming within the scope of the decree. The judgment-debtors objected to the attachment and proposed sale on the ground that the house was their own private property and not the property of the debtor within the meaning of the decree, having been validly transferred to them

APPEAL—contd.**12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—contd.****(b) PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

during the debtor's lifetime. The objection was disallowed by the Court of first instance. *Held*, that s. 283 of the Civil Procedure Code had no application, that the case fell within s. 244, and that an appeal would lie from the first Court's order. *Ram Ghulam v. Hazara Kuar*, I. L. R. 7 All. 547, and *Sita Ram v. Bhagwan Das*, I. L. R. 7 All. 723, followed. *Shankar Dial v. Amir Haidar*, I. L. R. 2 All. 752, *Abdul Rahman v. Muhammad Yar*, I. L. R. 4 All. 190, *Awadh Kuari v. Roktu Tiwari*, I. L. R. 6 All. 109, *Chowdhry Wahed Ali v. Jumae*, 11 B. L. R. 149, *Ameeroonnissa Khatoon v. Meer Mahomed*, 20 W. R. 280, and *Kurrgali v. Mayan*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 255, referred to. **MULMANTRI v. ASHFAK AHMAD** I. L. R. 9 All. 605

68. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 244—Representative of judgment-debtor—Agreement for satisfaction of judgment-debt.* A money-decree was passed against a zamindar by the High Court in 1883, and it was transferred to the District Court for execution. The decree-holder attached and prepared to bring to sale certain villages of the judgment-debtor. These villages were included in a mortgage subsequently executed by the judgment-debtor in favour of third parties. Both before and after the mortgage the decree-holder received from the zamindar certain sums in consideration of his agreeing to postponements of the sale; also it was agreed between them at a date subsequent to the mortgage that interest should be computed at a higher rate than that provided by the decree. Subsequently the decree-holder sought to bring the land to sale, and in computing the amount then due gave credit for none of the sums so received, and calculated interest at the enhanced rate. The mortgagee objected that the computation was erroneous in both these respects, and the District Judge upheld his objection. The judgment-debtor took no part in the contest. *Held*, that the mortgagee was a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code, s. 244, and that an appeal lay against the order of the District Judge. **PARAMANANDA DAS v. MAHABEER DOSSJI** I. L. R. 20 Mad. 378

69. ———— *Assignee of decree—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Act VIII of 1859, s. 208—Assignment of decree.* Under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, no appeal lay from an order passed under s. 208, Act VIII of 1859, substituting the assignee of a decree in the place of the original decree-holder. **MEGH NARAYAN SING v. RADHA PRASAD SINGH** 4 B. L. R. A. C. 200
13 W. R. 224

See (contra) FRAMJI RUSTOMJI v. RATANSHA PESTANJI 9 Bom. 49

70. ———— *Surety—Order between judgment-creditor and surety—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 204.* By virtue of

APPEAL—contd.**12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—contd.****(b) PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 and the provisions of s. 204 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an appeal lay from an order passed in a matter between a judgment-creditor and sureties on behalf of a judgment-debtor for the performance of the decree. **EXPARTE BHIKAJI VITHAL AMBIKAR**

4 Bom. A. C. 119
GHAZEE LALL JHA v. SHEO NARAIN SINGH 8 W. R. 24

71. ———— *Execution of decree—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 204 and 363—Act XXIII of 1861, ss. 11 and 36.* Where a person becomes a surety in the course of the proceedings on an appeal to pay all such sums as may be decreed against the plaintiff on appeal, the decree, when passed, can be executed against the surety under s. 204 of the Civil Procedure Code, and an appeal will lie from an order made in execution of such decree against the surety. **AKHUT RAMANA v. AHMED YOUSAFFJI** 7 B. L. R. 81
15 W. R. 538

72. ———— *Purchaser of interest in suit—Assignment of interest in subject-matter of suit—Right of purchaser.* The purchaser of the right, title, and interest of the defendant in a suit in and to the land the subject-matter of that suit, has no right as such to appeal from a decree passed against the defendant. **GAJADHAR PRASAD v. GANESH TEWARI** 7 B. L. R. 149
15 W. R. 485

BHEET BHUNJUN SINGH v. JOWHUR DOSS 4 W. R. Mis. 17
KRISTOMONEE THAKOOR v. BISSUMBHUR DOSS 5 W. R. 215

73. ———— *Purchaser at sale in execution—Interlocutory order obtained by purchaser at execution sale.* No appeal lies from an interlocutory order obtained by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree, who was not a party to the original suit. **BUONDER MUL v. GUNGA PERSHAD** 2 W. R. Mis. 50

74. ———— *Objector not party to suit.* An appeal does not lie by an objector who is not one of the parties, i.e., who is neither the decree-holder nor the judgment-debtor. **LUCHMIPUT SINGH v. LEKRAJ ROY** 2 W. R. Mis. 56
RAGHOONATH NARAIN SINGH v. RAM CHURN SAHOO 2 W. R. Mis. 48

GOSSAIN JHUNMI POOREE v. ANUND MOYEE DOSSEE 3 W. R. Mis. 9
SOODHA MONEE DOSSEE v. BROJONATH MOOZOMDAR 4 W. R. Mis. 14

75. ———— *Purchaser at sale in execution—Order refusing to put purchaser at sale in execution in possession.* The order of a Munsif declining to put the purchaser, at a judicial sale of immoveable property, in possession thereof, was

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(b) PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

open to appeal under s. 11, Act XXII of 1861.
In the matter of GORUPPA BIN RACHAPPA

1 Bom. 90

76. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 244 and 318—Petition by purchaser at Court-sale for possession.* On an application made in 1888 under Civil Procedure Code, s. 318, by the purchaser at a Court-sale (who was the assignee of the decree which was being executed), praying for delivery of possession of the property purchased, it appeared that the sale took place in 1885, that it was confirmed in 1886, and that in January 1887 an order was made for delivery of possession to the purchaser. The judgment-debtor had resisted the purchaser's efforts to obtain possession in 1887, and set up in bar of the application in 1888 an oral agreement alleged to have been made between him and the purchaser. The application was rejected. *Held*, that the question was one relating to the execution of the decree between the representative of the original decree-holder and one of the defendants to this suit, and fell within s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and an appeal therefore lay against the order rejecting the application. MUTTIA v. APPASAMI . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 504

77. ———— *Purchaser in execution of decree—Order refusing to recognize purchaser.* No appeal lies from an order of a Judge refusing to recognize the position of a purchaser of a decree. LALLA OJHEE LALL v. LOOFT ALI KHAN 2 W. R. Mis. 33

CHUNDIE PERSHAD MISSEER v. NILANUND SINGH 2 W. R. Mis. 38

78. ———— *Purchaser at sale in execution—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Representation of decree-holder and the auction-purchaser.* An appeal did not lie under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, from an order in execution, in which the representative of a decree-holder was on one side and a stranger (the auction-purchaser) on the other. LUCHMUN PERSHAD v. AMEER ALI

W. R. 1864, Mis. 15

79. ———— *Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11.* An auction-purchaser of property sold in execution of decree is not "a party to the suit"; he is not therefore entitled to appeal from an order passed as to the execution of the decree. LUCHMEE NARAIN v. BAIROW PERSHAD . 1 Agra Mis. 5

80. ———— *Third party—Order excluding property from sale.* No appeal lies from an order passed at the instance of a third party for excluding a particular property from sale in execution of decree. SAHEB JEHAN v. ASUDOOLLAH 5 W. R. Mis. 23

81. ———— *Order passed in execution of decree between party to suit and a third party.* No appeal lies from an order passed in execution of a decree between either of the parties

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(b) PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

to the suit and a third party, but a regular suit may be brought to set aside with the order. GOBIND-NATH SANDYAL v. RAMCOOMAR GHOSE 6 W. R. 21

82. ———— *Rival decree-holders—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 270, 271—Proceeds of sale in execution.* An appeal did not lie, under s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, from an order made under ss. 270 and 271 of Act VIII of 1859 with regard to the claims of several rival decree-holders in respect of the proceeds of property sold in execution of a decree. MISRI KOORER v. MAHESWAR BUKSH SINGH. MURDER KOORER v. MAHESWAR BUKSH SINGH; GURDI MISREE v. MAHESWAR BUKSH SINGH. SRIONGO KOORER v. MAHESWAR BUKSE SINGH B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 13 Marsh. 527; W. R. F. B. 116

CHOONEE LALL v. PULTOO BHUKUT 6 W. R. Mis. 74

ALLY HOSSEIN v. DHUNPUT SINGH W. R. 1864, Mis. 19

JUNGEE LALL MAHAJAN v. BRIJO BEAREE SINGH 2 W. R. Mis. 21

AFZOOLOONISSA BEGUM v. PARBUTTY KOONWAR 2 W. R. Mis. 41

MAHOMED KHAN KUZULBASH v. THAKOOR SINGH 3 W. R. Mis. 1

JUGOBUNDHOO SHAH PORAMANICK v. OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE 21 W. R. 194

83. ———— *Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Attachment under s. 237, Act VIII of 1859.* One of several decree-holders, who had obtained separate decrees against the same judgment-debtor, attached, under s. 237 of Act VIII of 1859, a fund in the hands of the Collector belonging to the debtor, being the surplus proceeds of a sale for arrears of Government revenue, and the fund was subsequently attached by the other decree-holders. The fund was not sufficient to satisfy all the decrees in full. The Principal Sudder Ameen, by order of the Judge, heard the various execution cases together, but recorded separate orders in each case for the rateable distribution of the fund amongst the creditors. On appeal by the first attaching creditor, who claimed to be entitled to be paid the amount of his decree in full, to which appeal the rival decree-holders, as well as the judgment-debtor, were made parties: *Held* (per PEACOCK, C.J., and SETON-KARR, JACKSON, and HOBHOUSE, J.J.), that the several orders of the Principal Sudder Ameen were substantially only one order made upon one hearing in one case, to which all the execution-creditors in the several suits were parties; that the rival decree-holders were properly made respondents in the appeal, and could not be struck out; and that the question to be determined being one between the rival decree-holders, and not between the parties in each suit, the case was not appealable under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861. *Held per*

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(b) PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

MACPHERSON, J., that though no appeal would lie as regards the rival decree-holders, the appeal was maintainable as regards the judgment-debtor alone. DEEN DYAL SAHOO *v.* RADHA MUDDUN MOHUN DOSS. HATTEE LALL BHUGGUT *v.* RADHA MUDDUN DOSS. KANYA LALL PUNDIT *v.* RADHA MUDDUN MOHUN DOSS. B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 927
9 W. R. 223

84. ——— Co-defendants—*Appeal by defendant against co-defendant.* One defendant cannot be allowed to appeal as against his co-defendants. KASHEE CHUNDER ROY *v.* DOORGA

11 W. R. 410

85. ——— *Rival defendants.* In a suit for possession, where a second defendant is admitted (though improperly), upon the record, and both defendants claiming under different titles, issues are raised between the plaintiff and each of them, and the suit is dismissed, the decision on these issues cannot be regarded as a decision between the rival defendants, so as to give one a right of appeal against the other. KALEE KINKUR BACHUSPUTTY *v.* KISTO MUNGLE BHUTTACHARJEE

11 W. R. 462

86. ——— Assignee of interest in suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 244, and ss. 278, 283—Representative.* The holders of a talukh hypothecated certain other property belonging to them as security for the rent. A decree for rent was obtained against them. Prior to attachment, the talukhdars assigned their interest in eight annas of the hypothecated property to A, and made a mau-rasi lease of the remaining eight annas to him. The decree-holder then obtained an order for summary sale for the rent due for 1876-77. She then attempted to sell the property hypothecated to her. An objection by A was allowed. A regular suit was then instituted by the decree-holder against A, and it was declared that she was, after selling the talukh, entitled to sell the hypothecated property. The decree-holder again attempted to execute her rent-decree by attaching and selling the hypothecated property, and an objection by A was disallowed. *Held*, that no appeal lay from the order disallowing the objection, as A could not be considered to be a "representative" of the talukhdars within the meaning of s. 244, cl. (c), of the Civil Procedure Code, and was, therefore, debarred from appealing under ss. 278 and 283. RASHBEHARY MOORHOPADHYA *v.* SURNOMOYEE

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 403
9 C. L. R. 79

87. ——— Attachment—*Objection to attachment by judgment-debtor on behalf of others—Order against decree-holder—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 280, 283.* Where a judgment-debtor claims property which is the subject-matter of attachment, either on his own account as his own property, under whatever right,

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(b) PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

or as the representative of third parties in which capacity he has been sued, the question between him and the attaching creditor is properly one between the parties to the suit under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But where the judgment-debtor raises the claim or objection on behalf of third parties who are not represented before the Court, the order passed thereon must be regarded as an order under s. 280 of the Code, and the only mode in which that order can be contested is in a regular suit as provided by s. 283. In execution of a decree against a judgment-debtor in his private capacity, the judgment-creditor attached certain property. Thereupon the judgment-debtor objected that the property attached had been dedicated by him some time previous as wakf under a registered wakf-namah, and that he was only in possession as mutwali under the deed. The lower Court found that the document created a valid wakf, and allowed the objection and released the property from attachment. The judgment-creditor appealed. At the hearing of the appeal it was contended that no appeal lay, inasmuch as the order was one under s. 280 of the Civil Procedure Code. On behalf of the judgment-creditor it was contended that the order was one under s. 244, and was thus appealable. *Held*, that the order was one under s. 280, and that no appeal lay, the remedy of the judgment-creditor being by way of a regular suit as provided by s. 283. ROOP LALL DASS *v.* BEKANI MEAH; MOHINEE MOHUN ROY *v.* BEKANI MEAH

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 537

88. ——— Order on claim by trustee for release of trust property attached under personal decree against trustee—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 244, 278 to 283—Appeal from such order.* A decree-holder having attached certain property in the course of execution, two of the defendants in the suit in which the decree had been passed presented a petition praying that the property might be released from the attachment on the ground that it had been set apart for charitable purposes, and that it was held by defendants as trustees. The Subordinate Judge upheld the trust, and ordered the properties to be released from the attachment. Plaintiff then appealed to the High Court, when objection was taken that no appeal lay against the order of the Subordinate Judge. The Court referred to a Full Bench the question whether an appeal lies against an order passed with regard to a party to a suit against whom there is a personal decree, in respect of a claim he may set up to hold property, attached in execution of that decree, as a trustee on behalf of third persons not parties to the suit. *Held*, that such a claim falls under s. 278, and not under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that no appeal lies against any order passed on it by the Court executing the decree. The claims of third parties, whether put forward by themselves or by a party to the suit,

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(b) PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

must be dealt with under ss. 278 to 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and not under s. 244. *Roop Lall Dass v. Bekani Meah*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 437, referred to. *RAMANATHOUR CHOTTIAS v. LEWAI MARATHOUR* . . . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 195

89. ——— Co-decree-holders—Order on questions arising between co-decree-holders—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 244, Art. (c), s. 588. A decree-holder, having assigned a share of her decree, applied several times jointly with such assignee for execution. On a subsequent application made by the original decree-holder alone, the Court, while granting the application, directed that the proceeds arising from such execution should only be paid over to the co-decree-holders jointly. *Held*, that the question in dispute being one between co-decree-holders, and not between parties to the suit or their representatives as contemplated by Art. (c), s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, no appeal would lie from such order. *GYAMONEE v. RADHA ROMON*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 592

90. ——— Collector—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 244—Refusing execution of order for costs. A Subordinate Judge admitted a plain in *forma pauperis*, but, holding that he had no jurisdiction to try the suit, returned the plaint to the plaintiff for its presentation in the proper Court, and ordered each party to pay his own costs. After the presentation of the plaint in another Court, and before the termination of the suit, the Collector applied to the Subordinate Judge for execution of the order as to costs, by seeking to recover the amount of the stamp duty from the plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge refused to execute the order, on the ground that the pauper suit was still pending in another Court. His order was affirmed by the District Judge on appeal. On second appeal to the High Court: *Held*, that there was no appeal, and, therefore, no second appeal, under s. 244, cl. (c), of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), against the order of the Subordinate Judge refusing execution of the order as to costs, inasmuch as the question was not between the parties to the suit. *COLLECTOR OF RATNAGIRI v. JANARDAN KAMAT*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 590

See *COLLECTOR OF TRICHINOPOLY v. SIVARAMAKRISHNA SASTRIGAL* . . . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 73

91. ——— Decree-holder in character of purchaser—Order in execution of decree—Fraud—Cancellation of sale in execution of decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 244, cl. (c), 311, and 588, cl. 16. Where it was shown that a judgment-creditor was himself the purchaser at an execution-sale, and the amount for which he so purchased the property of his judgment-debtor was set off against the amount due to him under his decree, and where on the application of the judgment-debtor the Court passed an order

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(b) PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

setting aside the sale on the ground of fraud practised by the judgment-creditor on the judgment-debtor in connection with the sale, in consequence of which fraud the property had been sold at an undervalue: *Held*, that, inasmuch as the order involved the decision of a question between the parties to the suit relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree (the decree having been satisfied as far as the purchase-money bid by the decree-holder went, and the order cancelling that *pro tanto* satisfaction), though not appealable under the provisions of s. 588, cl. 16, was appealable as a decree under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 2, and s. 244, cl. (c). *BALLODEB LALL BHAGAT v. ANADI MOHAPATRO* . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 410

92. ——— Purchase by decree-holder at auction-sale—Order for delivery of possession. Certain holders of a decree for sale upon a mortgage, having brought the property ordered to be sold to sale, purchased it themselves. Having taken out certificates of sale, they applied to be put in possession of the property purchased by them, and obtained an order for possession. On appeal by the judgment-debtors against this order, it was *held* that no appeal lay, the order objected to being one under s. 319 and not under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decree-holder as such was not entitled to the order for possession; he was only entitled to it in his character of auction-purchaser, which character did not bring him within s. 244 as a party to the suit. *Subhajit v. Sri Gopal*, I. L. R. 17 Al. 282, referred to. *GHULAM SHABIR v. DAWARKA PRASAD* . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 36

93. ——— Representative of decree-holder—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 244 and 308—Order cancelling sale. One who had attached a decree and obtained leave to bid at the sale of land ordered to be sold in execution, and to have the purchase-money and the amount due under the decree set off against each other, became the purchaser for a sum less than the amount due under the decree. The Court made an order under Civil Procedure Code, s. 308, cancelling the sale and ordering a resale on the ground that the purchaser had not paid the full amount due on his purchase within the time limited. *Held*, that the petitioner was the representative of the decree-holder within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code, s. 244, and an appeal by him lay against the order. *SAH MAN MULL v. KANAGASABAPATHI* . . . I. L. R. 16 Mad. 20

94. ——— Assignee of decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 244, cls. (a), (b), and (c)—Execution of decree. The ancestors of B mortgaged their share in a certain mehal to A. Subsequently B became entitled to this share in the mehal, and A obtained a decree on his mortgage, in execution of which the right, title, and interest of B was sold and purchased by C. Subsequently to this

APPEAL—*contd.*EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(b) PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

latter decree and sale, *B* obtained a decree against *D* or possession of certain lands which were proved to belong to this mehal. *B* then obtained a decree against *B*, in execution of which the right, title, and interest of *B* in this same mehal was sold and purchased by *F*. *C* and *F* transferred their rights under their respective purchasers to *E*. *E* thereupon, as purchaser of the right, title, and interest of *B* from *F*, applied to execute the decree obtained by *B* against *D*. This application was rejected by the Subordinate Judge but, on appeal to the District Judge, was allowed. *B* thereupon applied to the High Court to have this order set aside. *Held*, that the order should be set aside, inasmuch as no appeal lay from the order of the Subordinate Judge, the order not being a decree within the meaning of ss. 2 and 244 (cls. *a*, *b*, and *c*) of the Civil Procedure Code. *MOHABIR SINGH v. RAM BAGHOWAN CHOWBEY* . . . **I. L. R. 11 Calc. 150**

95. ——— Execution proceedings at instance of attaching creditor—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 244 and ss. 311, 588—Party to a suit—Right of appeal.* *A* attached a decree which *B*, his judgment-debtor, had obtained against *C*, and in execution thereof he brought to sale land belonging to *C*. *B* applied to have the sale set aside and his application was refused:—*Held*, that *B* had a right of appeal under Civil Procedure Code, s. 311, and not under s. 244. *SAMI PILLAI v. KRISHNASAMI CHETTI* . . . **I. L. R. 21 Mad. 417**

96. ——— Question between auction-purchaser and applicant to set aside sale under s. 310A of Civil Procedure Code, 1882. An order under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code is not appealable, as it decides a question between the auction-purchaser and the applicant under s. 310A, and not between the parties to the suit or their representatives. *BUNGSHIDHAR HALDAR v. KEDAR NATH MONDAL* . . . **1 C. W. N. 114**

97. ——— Order under Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 310A, setting aside sale—Deposit on one property of several sales in lots. Where at a sale in execution of a decree the properties attached were sold separately in "nine" lots, and the judgment-debtor prayed to have the sale of one of the properties set aside under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code by tendering the balance (together with the percentage required by law) due under the decree after deducting the amounts bid by the decree-holder for some of the properties and the amounts deposited by the other purchasers, and an order was made thereupon setting aside the sale:—*Held*, that an appeal lay under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, against the order made under s. 310A, as the parties stood in the position of decree-holder and judgment-debtor, and the order was made upon an application to set aside the sale. *KRIPA NATH PAL v. RAM LAKSHMI DASYA* . . . **1 C. W. N. 703**

APPEAL—*contd.*12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*(b) PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

98. ——— Appeal by some of the parties to a suit—*Decree in appeal binding parties who were not parties to the appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244, cl. (c)—Superintendence of High Court—Civil Procedure Code, s. 622—District Judge, jurisdiction of.* The plaintiffs filed a suit in ejectment against *A*, *B*, and *C*. The Subordinate Judge decreed the claim. On appeal, the District Judge rejected it. The plaintiff then preferred a second appeal to the High Court, which finally decided in plaintiff's favour. To this second appeal *A* was not made a party. In execution of the High Court's decree, *A* was dispossessed, but was restored to possession by the Subordinate Judge under s. 332 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This order was reversed on appeal by the District Judge. *A* thereupon applied to the High Court, under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to set aside the District Judge's order as *ultra vires* on the ground that s. 244 of the Code was not applicable to the case, *A* not having been a party to the appeal in which the decree under execution was passed, and that, therefore, no appeal lay to the District Judge from the Subordinate Judge's order:—*Held*, that, *A* being a party to the suit, though not to the appeal in which the final decree was passed, the District Judge had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 244, cl. (c), of the Code of Civil Procedure. *GOWRI v. VIGNESHVAR* . . . **I. L. R. 17 Bom. 49**

99. ——— Application by exonerated defendant—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 244—Right of appeal.* A defendant, against whom no decree has been passed, but whose rights are invaded in execution, is entitled to come in under Civil Procedure Code, s. 244, and to appeal against an order made in such proceedings. *Karvyali v. Mayan*, **I. L. R. 7 Mad. 255**, referred to. *Vagamuthu v. Savarimuthu*, **I. L. R. 15 Mad. 226**, and *Vasudeva Upadhyaya v. Visvaraja Thirthasami*, **I. L. R. 19 Mad. 331**, referred to. *VIBHUDAPEIYA THIRTHASAMI v. VIDIANIDHI THIRTHASAMI* . . . **I. L. R. 22 Mad. 131**

100. ——— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 583—Application for restitution of property—Execution of decree of Appellate Court—Decree, whether capable of execution against, and binding upon, person not a party to appeal—Assignment not subsequent to the decree—Lis pendens—Refund by assignee.* S. 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure can only apply to the parties to the appeal; and the decree of the Appellate Court cannot be executed against a person who was no party to the decree and who has not derived any interest subsequent to such decree. *Bhagwati Prasad v. Janna Prasad*, **I. L. R. 19 All. 136**, and *Sadiq Husain v. Lalla Prasad*, **I. L. R. 20 All. 139**, referred to and followed. *FRIZONI v. RAM NARAIN SINGH* (1901) . . . **5 C. W. N. 426**

APPEAL—contd.

12. EXECUTION OF DECREE—concl'd.

(b) PARTIES TO SUITS—concl'd.

101. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244 cl. (c), 278, 280, 283—Defendants exempted from decrees—Questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree—Claim to attached property.* Defendants, who are exempted from the operation of a decree, are not parties to the suit within the meaning of s. 244, cl. (c), of the Civil Procedure Code, and there is therefore no appeal from an order disallowing a claim preferred by them to properties attached in execution of the decree. *RAM PERSHAD v. JAGANNATH RAM* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 184; s. c. 6 C. W. N. 10

102. ———— *Death of decree-holder—Representative brought on record at a late stage.* The decree-holder died after the hearing of the appeal in the lower Appellate Court, but before that Court delivered judgment. *Held*, that the judgment should be read as from the date when the Court reserved judgment, and that it was not incompetent to the son of the decree-holder to prefer an appeal to the High Court by reason of the fact that he had not been brought on the record before the judgment of the lower Appellate Court was delivered. *Held*, also, that it was not incumbent on the appellant to apply for execution to the Court which passed the decree. He had adopted the proper procedure in applying to the High Court to be brought on the record; and, an order having been passed, bringing him on the record, he was competent to present the appeal. *RAGHUNATHA THATHA CHARIAR v. VENKATESA TAWKER* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 101

13. EX-PARTE CASES.

1. ———— *Order admitting application to set aside ex-parte decree.* Where a Court of first instance had admitted an application made after the time allowed by law, to set aside an *ex-parte* decree: *Held*, that the Appellate Court was authorized to try in appeal whether under the law the Court of first instance had power to receive the application, and if its order was made without jurisdiction to set it aside. *RADHA BENODE CHOWDHRY v. JUGGUT SURNOKAR* 6 W. R. 300

2. ———— *Order on application to set aside ex-parte decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 119.* Though an order passed for setting aside a judgment is, on the merits of the application, final, yet where a Civil Court makes an order setting aside an *ex-parte* judgment on an application presented after the period allowed by law has elapsed, an appeal against that order will lie on the ground that it has been made without jurisdiction. *KESHAVRAM VALAD HIRACHAND v. RAMCHANDRA TRIMBAK* 8 Bom. A. C. 44

TOOLSEE DOSSEE v. DOORGA CHURN PAUL
15 W. R. 175

APPEAL—contd.

13. EX-PARTE CASES—contd.

3. ———— *Appeal from ex-parte decree wrongly admitted.* Where a decree is passed *ex-parte* in an original suit, the defendant has no right to a special appeal, even though his appeal have been entertained by the Civil Court. *CHIDAMBARA PILLAI v. KAMAN* 1 Mad. 189

4. ———— *Order setting aside ex-parte decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 119.* An *ex-parte* decree of June 1865, kept alive by successive applications for execution, was subsequently set aside on an application of 14th August 1871 (within 30 days after attachment in execution) made under Act VIII of 1859, s. 119, and a judgment was passed on the merits. The lower Appellate Court reversed the order setting aside the *ex-parte* decree. *Held*, that, in so far as the Munsif had decided that the application was in time, he did not come under s. 119, and therefore his order was not final, and the lower Appellate Court had jurisdiction to enquire into his proceedings. *BIMOLA SOONDUREE DASSEE v. KALEE KISHEN MOJOOMDAR* 22 W. R. 5

5. ———— *Order refusing to set aside ex-parte decree—Act VIII of 1859, s. 119—Delay in appealing until Act X of 1877, which gave no appeal.* An application under s. 119, Act VIII of 1859, for the re-hearing of a case decreed *ex-parte*, was rejected. Under that law, this order was appealable. No appeal was, however, filed until October 1st, 1877, on which date Act X of 1877 came in force. *Held*, that the appeal was inadmissible, there being no provision in Act X of 1877 for such an appeal. *In the matter of JAN KOER* 1 C. L. R. 402

6. ———— *Order setting aside ex-parte decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 119.* A District Judge is not competent to entertain a summary or miscellaneous appeal from an order setting aside an *ex-parte* judgment. But where an *ex-parte* judgment has been set aside and a judgment afterwards come to on trial, and where a regular appeal is preferred, the Appellate Court may, amongst the matters urged in appeal, take into consideration the regularity of the proceedings of the Court below in making an order under Act VIII of 1859, s. 119. *LUCKHEE MONEE DOSSEE v. BHOOBUN MOHUN BOSE* 23 W. R. 147

7. ———— *Order refusing to set aside ex-parte decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 588.* No appeal lies under Act X of 1877 from an order made under that Act rejecting an application for an order setting aside a decree made *ex-parte* against a defendant. *GULAB SINGH v. LACHMAN DAS* I. L. R. 1 All. 748

8. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 534.* An appeal lies from an order made under s. 534 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1877, refusing to set aside an *ex-parte* decree. *LUCKMIDAS VITHALDAS v. EBRAHIM OOSMAN* I. L. R. 2 Bom. 644

APPEAL—contd.

13. EX-PARTE CASES—contd.

9. ———— Refusal to re-hear appeal—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 560, 584, 588—Hearing of appeal ex-parte.* An appeal was heard *ex-parte* in the absence of the respondent (defendant), and judgment was given against him. He applied to the Appellate Court to re-hear the appeal, and the Appellate Court refused to re-hear it. He then appealed, not from the order refusing to re-hear the appeal, but from the decree of the Appellate Court. *Held*, that he was not debarred, by reason that he had not appealed from the order refusing to re-hear the appeal, from appealing from the decree of the Appellate Court. *RAMJAS v. BAIJ NATH*
I. L. R. 2 All. 567

10. ———— Order *ex-parte* directing attachment in execution of decree. An appeal lies from an *ex-parte* order directing attachment in execution of a decree. *ZAMINDAR OF SIVAGIRI v. ALWAR AYYANGAR. SANGLI VIRAPANDIA CHINNATHAMBIAI v. ALWAR AYYANGAR*
I. L. R. 3 Mad. 42

11. ———— Order against defendant not appearing—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 540.* Under s. 540 of the Civil Procedure Code, an appeal lies from decrees passed *ex-parte*. If a defendant appears at the first hearing and files a written statement, he should not be placed *ex-parte*. *ANANTHARAMA PATTAR v. MADRAVA PANIKER*
I. L. R. 3 Mad. 264

See LUCKMIDAS VITHALDAS v. EBRAHIM OOSMAN
I. L. R. 2 Bom. 644

and *Ex-parte* MODALATHA

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 75

12. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 108, 540.* *Held* by STUART, C.J., and STRAIGHT and TYRRELL, JJ. (OLDFIELD and BRODHURST, JJ. dissenting), that a defendant against whom a decree has been passed *ex-parte*, and who has not adopted the remedy provided by s. 108 of the Civil Procedure Code, cannot appeal from such decree under the general provisions of s. 540. *LAL SINGH v. KUNJAN*
I. L. R. 4 All. 387

13. ———— Application to defend refused—*Ex-parte* decree against defendants—*Right of defendants to appeal without taking steps to set aside the decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 101, 108.* Defendants who put in no appearance at the original hearing, and who have subsequently been refused leave to appear and defend, are at liberty, where an "*ex-parte*" decree has been passed against them, to appeal to a higher Court without previously taking any steps to have the *ex-parte* decree set aside under s. 108 of Act X of 1877. *ASHEUFFUNNISSA v. LEHARBAUX*
I. L. R. 8 Calc. 272
10 C. L. R. 502

14. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 108—Decree against defendant under s. 136—“Ex-parte” decree.* A defendant failing

APPEAL—contd.

13. EX-PARTE CASES—contd.

to comply with an order to answer interrogatories, the Court, under s. 136 of the Civil Procedure Code, struck out his defence, and proceeding *ex-parte* passed a decree against him. *Held*, that the decree could not be treated, in respect of the remedy by appeal, as an *ex-parte* decree, and therefore, under the ruling in *Lal Singh v. Kunjan*, I. L. R. 4 All. 387, is not appealable, but that an appeal would lie from the decree. *CHUNNI LAL v. CHAMMAN LAL*
I. L. R. 7 All. 159

15. ———— “Appearance” of defendant under *Civil Procedure Code, s. 101—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 64, 100, 108, 157.* The first hearing of a suit was fixed for the 12th December 1833, on which day the defendant did not appear, and the case was adjourned to the 18th December, and, as the defendant did not then appear, a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff. A vakalatnama had been previously filed on the defendant's part, and he had also objected to an application filed by the plaintiff for attachment of the defendant's property before judgment. *Held*, that these acts on the defendant's part did not constitute an “appearance” by him within the meaning of s. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, which referred to an appearance in answer to a summons to appear and answer the claim on a day specified, issued under s. 64; that the decree was therefore *ex-parte* within the meaning of ss. 100 and 108, and an appeal consequently lay to the High Court under s. 588, cl. (9), from an order rejecting an application to set the decree aside. *Zain-ul-abdin Khan v. Ahmad Raza Khan*, I. L. R. 2 All. 67; I. L. R. 5 I. A. 233, distinguished. *The Administrator-General of Bengal v. Dyaram Dass*, 6 B. L. R. 688, *Bhimacharya v. Fakirappa*, 4 Bom. 206, and *Bibee Haloo v. Atwaro*, 7 W. R. 81, referred to. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*—That the Court on the 18th December seemed to have acted under s. 157 of the Civil Procedure Code, and, choosing the first of the alternative courses allowed by that section, acted under Chapter VII of the Code, and passed an *ex-parte* decree under the provisions of s. 100 of that Chapter. *HIRA DAI v. HIRA LAL*
I. L. R. 7 All. 538

16. ———— Order setting aside *ex-parte* decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 108 and 157.* No appeal will lie from an order made under s. 157 read with s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure setting aside a decree passed *ex-parte* in default of appearance of the defendant on a day to which the hearing of the suit had been adjourned. *Jonardon Dobe v. Ramdhone Singh*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 733, referred to. *BEAGWAN DAI v. HIRA*
19 All. 355

17. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 100, 101, 108, 540—Appeal from ex-parte decree.* A defendant against whom a decree has been passed *ex-parte*, and who has not adopted the procedure provided by s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, can appeal from such decree under the

APPEAL—*contd.*13. EX-PARTE CASES—*contd.*

general provisions of s. 540. *Lal Singh v. Kunjan*, I. L. R. 4 All. 387, dissented from. *KARUPPAN v. AYYATHORAI*. I. L. R. 9 Mad. 445

18. ————— *Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, ss. 108, 549—Decree passed *ex-parte* through non-attendance of defendants—Order on appeal for re-trial *de novo* on ground that defendants had insufficient opportunity for being heard—Jurisdiction of Subordinate Judge. The defendants in a suit for possession of property and an injunction filed written statements, but failed to appear, either in person or by pleader, when the suit came on for hearing in the District Munsif's Court. Evidence adduced by the plaintiff was taken and a decree passed in plaintiff's favour as prayed. Some of the defendants applied to the District Munsif for an order to set aside the *ex-parte* decree, which application was refused; and the defendants then appealed against the original *ex-parte* decree, when the Subordinate Judge reversed the said decree and remanded the suit for re-trial *de novo* on the ground that the defendants had not had a proper opportunity for being heard. *Held*, that it was not competent for the Subordinate Judge to pass such an order; that he could only deal with the case on the materials on the record; and that the decree of the District Munsif must be restored. *CAUSANIEL v. SOURES*. I. L. R. 23 Mad. 260

19. ————— Order against respondent not appearing—*Civil Procedure Code*, ss. 103, 108, 549, 560, 584—Construction of Statute—General words. *Held* by the Full Bench (STRAIGHT, Offg. C.J., and TYRRELL, J., expressing no opinion), that a respondent in whose absence the appeal has been heard *ex-parte*, and against whom judgment has been given, may prefer a second appeal from the decree, under the provisions of s. 584 of the *Civil Procedure Code*, and his remedy is not limited to an application under s. 560 to the Court which passed the decree to re-hear the appeal. *Ramjas v. Baijnath*, I. L. R. 2 All. 567, approved. *Per OLDFIELD, J.*—There is a distinction between the case of a defendant in a Court of first instance and that of a respondent in an Appellate Court not appearing, with reference to ss. 108 and 560 of the Code. *Lal Singh v. Kunjan*, I. L. R. 4 All. 387, and *Ramshet Bachaset v. Balkishna Ababhat*, 6 Bom. A. C. 161, referred to. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*—The distinction is one of detail merely and not of principle. *Lal Singh v. Kunjan* dissented from. *Zain-ul-abdin Khan v. Ahmad Raja Khan*, I. L. R. 2 All. 67; I. L. R. 5 I. A. 233, *Jamaitunnissa v. Luifunnissa*, I. L. R. 7 All. 606, *Ashrufunnissa v. Lehareaux*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 272, *Luckmidas Vitoldas v. Ebrahim Oosman*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 644, *Amantiharama v. Madhava Panikar*, I. L. R. 2 Mad. 264, and *Modallatha's case*, I. L. R. 2 Mad. 75, referred to. Also *per MAHMOOD, J.*—Where two procedures or two remedies are provided by statute, one of them must not be taken as operating in derogation of the other. *AJUDHIA PRASAD v. BALMUKAND*. I. L. R. 8 All. 354

APPEAL—*contd.*13. EX-PARTE CASES—*contd.*

20. ————— Order admitting appeal—*Ex-parte order*. An *ex-parte* order admitting an appeal is subject to reconsideration on the hearing of the appeal. *MOSHAULLAH v. AHMEDULLAH*. I. L. R. 13 Calc. 78

21. ————— Order setting aside *ex-parte* decree—*Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 108, 538—Notification in Gazette. There is no appeal from an order setting aside an *ex-parte* decree. *SHAMA DASS v. HURBUNS NARAIN SINGH*. I. L. R. 16 Calc. 426

22. ————— *Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 108, 562, 594 and 595 (a)—*Ex-parte decree*—Appeal from order refusing application under s. 108, *Civil Procedure Code*—Remand under s. 562, *Civil Procedure Code*, appeal from order of—S. 562, *Civil Procedure Code*, what can be remanded under—Final order—Interlocutory order. In an appeal from an order refusing to set aside a decree under s. 108, *Civil Procedure Code*, on the ground that that section did not apply, the only case which can be remanded by the Appeal Court, to be tried on its merits, is the application under s. 108, and not the original case, the decree in which is sought to be set aside. Such order of remand is merely an interlocutory order relating to procedure and no appeal lies therefrom. The mere fact that the High Court have certified the sufficiency of the amount and the value of the suit for an appeal to the Privy Council, cannot make appealable an order which does not fulfil the statutory conditions. *RAI RADHA KISSEN v. COLLECTOR OF JAUNPORE* (1900) 5 C. W. N. 153; s.c. I. L. R. 28 I. A. 28 I. L. R. 23 All. 220

23. ————— *Civil Procedure Code*, ss. 89, 100, 104—*Ex-parte decree*—Service of summons on defendant residing out of British India—Burden of proof. Where a defendant against whom an *ex-parte* decree has been passed appeals against that decree, it is sufficient in the first instance to establish that in the Court which passed the *ex-parte* decree the necessary proof of service of summons on the defendant was not given by the plaintiff. It is not incumbent on the appellant to show that the summons was in fact not duly served. Where a summons is sent by post to a defendant residing out of British India, it is not, in the absence of evidence that the person to be served was at the time residing at the place to which the summons was sent, sufficient proof of service to show that the summons was posted, but there must be some evidence of its having been received by the defendant. S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not limited in its application to defendants residing within British India. *FAKHR-UD-DIN v. GHAFUR-UD-DIN* (1900) I. L. R. 23 All. 99

24. ————— *Civil Procedure Code*, ss. 80, 108—Application to set aside a decree passed *ex-parte*—Irregular service of summons. Where a serving officer finds a defendant to be away temporarily from home, and knows where he is, it is

APPEAL—*contd.*13. EX-PARTE CASES—*concl.*

not a good service if he thereupon does no more than fix the summons to the outer door of the house; but he must make further efforts to effect personal service. *SAKINA v. GAURI SAHAI* (1902)

I. L. R. 24 All. 302

25. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 588, 591—Order setting aside an ex-parte decree—Order not “affecting the decision of the case.”* Held, that an order under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, setting aside a decree passed *ex-parte*, is not an order “affecting the decision of the case,” that is, affecting the decision of the case upon the merits. The alleged wrongfulness of such an order cannot, therefore, be urged as a ground of objection in an appeal from the decree in the suit, under the provisions of s. 591 of the Code. *Chintamony Dassi v. Raghoonath Sahoo*, I. L. R. 22 Cal. 981, and *Gulab Kunwar v. Thakur Dass*, I. L. R. 24 All. 464, followed. *TASADDUQ HUSAIN v. HAYAT-UN-NISSA* (1903) . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 280

26. ————— *Practice—Notice on pleader if notice to client—Appeal from preliminary decree, disposed of—Arrival of records in lower Court—Parties how to be notified.* An appeal preferred to the High Court against a preliminary decree for accounts having been dismissed for non-prosecution, the record was returned to the lower Court, which directed notices to be served on the pleaders of the parties for the further hearing of the case, a week hence. Notice was served on the defendant's pleader but he did not inform the defendant:—Held, that the notice was not a good notice on the defendant and an *ex-parte* decree passed against the defendant on the date fixed should be set aside. That the case should be reheard upon notice served on the defendant personally. *E. F. SANDYS v. UPENDRA CHANDRA SINHA ROY* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 142

14. GROUNDS OF APPEAL.

1. ————— *Objections to order of remand in appeal from final decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 333; 1877, 1882, s. 541.* It is competent to an appellant appealing from the final judgment and decree to include in his appeal any legal grounds of objection against a prior decretal order of remand. *MIZAJOO L NISSA v. BUNSHEE DHUR* . . . 1 N. W. 193, Ed. 1873, 277

2. ————— *Appellant not allowed to raise in appeal a contention inconsistent with the case relied upon in the Courts below—Variance between pleading and proof—Practice.* An appeal cannot be maintained upon a ground inconsistent with the case insisted on in the Courts below, notwithstanding that the new ground may be one that might have been brought forward in the first instance, as an alternative. In a suit between the widows of two brothers deceased, the plaintiff's title rested on this, that her and the defendant's

APPEAL—*contd.*14. GROUNDS APPEAL—*contd.*

late husbands, respectively, having been the sons of the same father, had, therefore, been sapindas to each other, so that the plaintiff as the widow of the one would be the heir of the other, expectant on the death of his widow. In this character she sued to have set aside an adoption made by the defendant. The Courts, however, found that the plaintiff's husband was an illegitimate son, and not a sapinda, and the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff, now appellant, on findings of fact that both the sons were illegitimate, urged that, though they could not inherit from their father, they yet could succeed to the estate of one another. Held, that this contention was so inconsistent with the case made below that it was now inadmissible. *Srimati Dasi v. Lalanmani*, 2 B. L. R., P. C., 64; 11 W. R., P. C., 27, referred to and followed. *GAJAPATHI RADHIKA v. VASUDEVA SANTA SINGARO*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 503
I. L. R. 19 I. A. 179

3. ————— *When review granted, no appeal lies against the final decree on grounds other than those mentioned in s. 629—Sufficiency of the reason on which review granted no ground for appeal against the final decree.* Ss. 584 and 591 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not control s. 629, and do not, where a review is granted and a final decree passed, confer a right of appeal, when such appeal is not based on one of the grounds mentioned in s. 629. Where an application for review of judgment is granted ‘for any other sufficient reason’ under s. 623 of the Code, the sufficiency or otherwise of the reason is not a good ground of appeal against the order and is not, notwithstanding the general provisions of ss. 584 and 591, a good ground of appeal against the final decree. *GOPALA AYYAR v. RAMASAMI SASTRIAL* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 49

15. LETTERS PATENT, CL. 12.

1. ————— *Order granting leave—Leave to institute suit.* An appeal lies from an order granting leave to the plaintiff to institute a suit under cl. 12 of the Letters Patent. *ISMAIL HAJEE HUBUB v. MAHOMED HAJEE YOUSUF. ROEM BYE v. MAHOMED HAJEE YOUSUF*

13 B. L. R. 91 : 21 W. R. 303

2. ————— *Order refusing leave to sue.* Where at the time of filing the plaint an application for leave to sue was granted under cl. 12 of the Letters Patent, leave being reserved to the defendant to move to have the order set aside, and the plaint was then filed, but in the settlement of issues the defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the High Court, and the Court eventually withdrew the permission to sue in the High Court. *Quære*: Whether the order appealed against, finally deciding that leave ought not to be granted to institute a suit for want of jurisdiction under cl. 12 of the Letters Patent, was an appealable order. *RADHA BIBEE v. MUCKSOODUN DOSS* . . . 21 W. R. 204

APPEAL—*contd.*

16. MADRAS ACTS.

1. ———— **Madras Forest Act, s. 10—Decision as to title to land—Appeal to High Court from decision of District Court on appeal.** An appeal lies to the High Court from a decision of a District Court passed under s. 10 of the Madras Forest Act, 1882, on appeal from the decision of a Forest Settlement Officer. *KAMARAJU v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA*

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 309

2. ———— **Madras Rent Recovery Act (Madras Act VIII of 1865)—Order of Collector.** By Madras Act VIII of 1865, an appeal from the decree of the Collector lies to the Civil Court. *OLAGA SUNDARAM PILLAY v. MUTTIEN CHETTY* 4 Mad. 227

3. ———— **Procedure.** The Civil Court, in hearing an appeal from the decision of a Collector under the Act, must be guided by the Civil Procedure Code. *SUBRAMANEY PILLAY v. PERUMAL CHETTY* 4 Mad. 251

4. ———— **s. 10—Order to eject tenant.** No appeal lies to the District Court from an order passed on an application to eject a tenant under s. 10 of the Rent Act (Madras Act VII of 1865). *MAHOMED YAKUB SAHEB v. MAHOMED JAFFER ALI SAHEB* I. L. R. 4 Mad. 167

5. ———— **ss. 10, 69, 73—Decision of Collector ejecting tenant.** An appeal lies from the decision of a Collector ejecting a tenant under s. 10 of the Rent Recovery Act (Madras), 1865. Such a decision, notwithstanding the use of the word "Order" in the section referred to, is a judgment within the meaning of s. 69. *Mahomed Yakub Saheb v. Mahomed Jaffer Ali*, I. L. R. 4 Mad. 167, not followed. *NARASIMHASWAMI v. LAKSHMANMA* I. L. R. 22 Mad. 436

17. MANAGEMENT OF ATTACHED PROPERTY.

See APPEAL—RECEIVERS.

1. ———— **Order postponing sale to enable debtor to raise amount—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), s. 243—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 305, 503—Order postponing sale—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11.** An appeal lay from an order passed under s. 243 of Act VIII of 1859, postponing the sale of the property attached in order to enable the judgment-debtor to raise the amount of the decree against him (*JACKSON, J.*, dissenting). *HANUMAN PRASAD v. AJODHYA PRASAD* 1 B. L. R. F. B. 7:10 W. R. F. B. 5

2. ———— **Order refusing application to appoint a manager.** An appeal lay from an order refusing the request of a judgment-debtor for the appointment of a manager under s. 243, Act VIII of 1859. *BISRAM SINGH v. Inderjeet Koonwar* 2 W. R. Mis. 49

3. ———— **Quære:** Is a refusal to make an order on an application for the ap-

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pointment of a manager an order from which an appeal lies under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861? *NUZMOODDEEN AHMED v. ABDOL AZEEZ*

13 W. R. 242

4. ———— **Order of Manager—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 243.** There is no appeal against the order of a manager appointed under s. 243, Act VII of 1859. *BHOOBUN MOYEE DEBEA v. MOOTY* 1 W. R. Mis. 1

18. MEASUREMENT OF LANDS.

1. ———— **Order of Deputy Collector.** An appeal from the decision of a Deputy Collector in a suit under s. 9, Bengal Act VI of 1862, lay, not to the Collector, but to the Zilla Judge. *ERSKINE & Co. v. GHOLAM KHEZUR* 9 W. R. 521

2. ———— **Question as to standard pole of measurement.** Where a question as to the standard pole of measurement in use in a pargana is properly raised and determined between parties by the Revenue Court in a proceeding under Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 9, the determination is final. *NEEM CHAND SAHOO v. RAM GOLAM SINGH* 24 W. R. 424

3. ———— **Order of Collector in survey and measurement of lands.** An appeal lay to the Judge from the decision of a Collector in matters of survey and measurement falling within ss. 9 and 10, Bengal Act VI of 1862. No appeal lay from the decision of a Collector under s. 11 of the same Act. *TARUCK NATH MOOKERJEE v. MEYDEE BISWAS* 5 W. R., Act X, 17

4. ———— **Order of Deputy Collector as to standard pole of measurement.** No appeal to the Judge lay from the decision of a Deputy Collector under s. 11, Bengal Act VI of 1862, on the question of the standard pole of measurement. *RAKHAL DAS MOOKERJEE v. TUNOO PORAMANIC* 7 W. R. 239

5. ———— **Order of Collector as to standard of measurement—Beng. Act VI of 1862, ss. 9 and 11.** When the right of a proprietor to make, under s. 9, Bengal Act VI of 1862, a measurement of a tenure, is disputed solely on the ground that the proper standard pole of measurement under s. 11 is not employed, the Collector has power to enquire into and decide the true length of the standard pole, and an appeal lay from his decision. *MANMOHINI CHOWDHRAIN v. PREMCHAND ROY* 6 B. L. R. 1:14 W. R. F. B. 4

6. ———— **Order in measurement proceedings—Decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877, ss. 2 and 540—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 37) order under.** A order made under s. 37, Bengal Rent Act (Bengal Act VIII of 1869), is a decree within the meaning of the definition contained in the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), and an appeal lies therefrom under the provisions

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of s. 540. *BROJENDRO COOMAR ROY v. KRISHNA COOMAR GHOSE* . . . **I. L. R. 7 Calc. 684**

9 C. L. R. 444

7. ———— *Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 38.* An appeal lies to the High Court from proceedings taken under *Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 38.* *AHMED ALI v. NITYANUND ROY* **24 W. R. 171**

See *ABDOOL BAREE v. NITYANUND KOONDOD* **21 W. R. 103**

where an appeal was heard, though the question was not raised.

8. ———— *Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 38.* There is no appeal against an order made by the Civil Court, under s. 38 of *Bengal Act VIII of 1869*, directing the measurement of lands. *Crowdy v. Goburdhan Roy*, **22 W. R., 491**, followed. *Goluck Kishore Acharjee v. Kesha Majhee*, **15 W. R., 23**, and *Manoo Dassee v. Ishan Chunder Banerjee*, *ib.*, **245**, cited. *KALLY CHURUN DUTT v. PRATAB CHUNDER GHOSE* . . . **5 C. L. R. 484**

19. N.-W. P. ACTS.

1. ———— *N.-W. P. Rent Act (XVIII of 1873), s. 148—Landholder and tenant—Suit in which right to receive rent is disputed—Determination of such right—Determination of Proprietary right.* *C* sued *J* for the rent for certain land, alleging that he was the tenant of such land and *J* was his sub-tenant. *J* disputed *C*'s right to receive rent for such land, alleging that he was not his sub-tenant but *S*'s, and had paid such rent to *S*. Under the provision of s. 148 of *Act XVIII of 1873*, *S* was made a party to the suit. The Collector decided on appeal in the suit that *S*, and not *C*, was the tenant of such land, and *J* was her sub-tenant and not *C*'s, and had paid such rent to *S*. Held, that there was no determination by the Collector of the title to such land, but as incidental to the question who was entitled to receive the rent, and consequently the decision of the Collector was not appealable to the District Judge. *CHOTU v. JITAN* **I. L. R. 3 All 63**

2. ———— *Suit for rent where the right to receive it is disputed—Question of title—Jurisdiction of Civil and Revenue Courts—District Judge, jurisdiction of.* *M* sued *I* and another for rent in the Court of the Collector. The defendants pleaded payment to *V*, who was accordingly brought on to the record as a co-defendant under s. 148 of the *North-Western Provinces Rent Act (XII of 1881)*. The Collector decided in favour of *V*. The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge, making all three persons respondents. The District Judge reversed the decision of the Collector, and ordered the whole costs to be paid by *V*, who thereupon appealed to the High Court. Held, that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal so far as the party brought in under s. 148 was concerned, and, that being so, had

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no power to award costs against him. *ANAND RAM v. MAUSUMA BEGAM* . . . **I. L. R. 13 All 384**

3. ———— *ss. 148, 183, 189—Landholder and tenant—Suit for arrears of rent—Right to rent disputed by third person—Appeal by intervenor.* *K* sued *B* for arrears of rent, such arrears not exceeding **R100**. His right to receive rent was disputed by *H*, a third person, who was made a defendant under the provisions of s. 148 of *Act XVIII of 1873*. The suit was tried by an Assistant Collector of the second class, who decided that *K* was entitled to the rent. *H* and *B* appealed to the Collector, who decided that *H* was entitled to the rent. *K* thereupon appealed to the District Judge, who affirmed the decision of the Collector. *K* then appealed to the High Court. Held, that the Collector was not competent to entertain an appeal by *H*; that as between *K* and *B* all that the Collector could decide was whether or not *K* was entitled to the amount of rent claimed; that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain *K*'s appeal; and that *K*'s appeal to the High Court was not entertainable, the District Judge not having decided any question of proprietary right that would justify such an appeal. *KISHNA RAM v. HINGU LAL* . . . **I. L. R. 4 All 237**

4. ———— *s. 189—Question of title—Suit for arrears of rent.* Where the defendant pleaded in answer to plaintiff's suit for arrears of rent that defendant no longer held as tenant, but as sub-proprietor under a settlement made direct with defendant by the settlement officer:—Held, that under s. 189 of *Act XVIII of 1873* the suit involved a question of proprietary title, and that an appeal lay to the Judge of the District, although the amount in suit was less than **R100**. *BISHESAR SINGH v. SUGUNDHI* **I. L. R. 1 All 366**

5. ———— *Appeal to District Judge.* An appeal lies to the District Judge under s. 189 of the *North-Western Provinces Rent Act*, as well from appellate as from original decisions of the Collector. *RAJA SINGH v. SULKA* **I. L. R. 6 All 398**

6. ———— *N.-W. P. Rent Amendment Act (XIV of 1886), s. 5—"Rent payable by the tenant"—Rate of rent.* The words "rent payable by the tenant" in s. 189 of the *North-Western Provinces Rent Act (XII of 1881)*, as amended by *Act XIV of 1886* mean the rate of rent payable by the tenant, and not merely the actual amount of money which is due at any given time by the tenant to his landlord as rent. The appeal therefore given by that section is limited to cases in which the Court of first instance has determined the rate of rent. *RADHA PRASAD SINGH v. PERGASH RAI* . . . **I. L. R. 13 All 193**

7. ———— *N.-W. P. Rent Act, Amendment Act (XIV of 1886), s. 5—Rent, rate of.* Where a zamindar sued a tenant for rent

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of certain alluvial land, the amount claimed not being above Rs 100, and the tenant objected that there was a custom in the village by which rent was paid in case of alluvial land only on the culturable portion, and that during some of the years in suit a less portion of the land than that for which rent was claimed, had been culturable:—*Held*, that in such a suit the rate of rent was in dispute, and an appeal would therefore lie. *Radha Prasad Singh v. Pergash Rai*, I. L. R. 13 All. 193, followed. *Payag Sahu v. Matadin*, Weekly Notes, 1890, 229, overruled. *RADHA PRASAD SINGH v. MATHURA CHAUBE* . . . I. L. R. 14 All. 50

8. ———— *Landholder and tenant—Rent payable by tenant—Rate of rent.* The criterion to be used in deciding whether an appeal lies under s. 189 of Act XII of 1881 is whether the decision would merely affect a particular year, or whether it would supply a plea of *res judicata*, if not appealed against, for all succeeding years in which the landlord and tenant stood in the same relation as when the suit was brought. *Radha Prasad Singh v. Mathura Chaube*, I. L. R. 14 All. 50, referred to. *MOHIB ALI KHAN v. MARTIN* . . . I. L. R. 16 All. 51

9. ———— *Suit to recover arrears of revenue—"Rent"—"Revenue."* The term "rent" as used in s. 189 of Act XII of 1881 cannot be extended so as to include revenue. Hence where a plaintiff sued to recover arrears of revenue alleged to be payable to the plaintiff by the defendants under an agreement, the defendants being admitted to be inferior proprietors of the land in respect of which the revenue claimed was payable, it was *held* that no appeal lay to the District Judge under s. 189 of Act XII of 1881. *TILAKDHARI RAI v. SOGHRA BIBI* . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 302

10. ———— *"Rent payable by the tenant" not in issue—Landholder and tenant.* Certain defendants, being sued by the zamindars for the rent of land held by them, pleaded in effect that, whatever the rent of the land in suit might be, they were entitled to retain it under an agreement between them and the predecessor in title of the plaintiffs in lieu of interest payable to them on account of a mortgage given by the said predecessor in title. *Held*, that the case was not one in which an appeal would lie to the District Judge under s. 189 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, inasmuch as the rent payable by the tenant was not in issue in the suit. *DEOCHARAN SINGH v. BENI PATEAK* . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 247

11. ———— and s. 93—*Question as to rate of rent payable by the tenant not in issue in the appeal.* Under s. 189 of Act XII of 1881, an appeal lies in a suit under s. 93 of the Act, where the rent payable by the tenant has been a matter in issue and has been determined. It is not necessary that the rent payable by the tenant should be a matter in issue in the appeal. *SARJU PRASAD v. HAIDAR KHAN*. I. L. R. 18 All. 463

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12. ———— s. 191—*Appeal to High Court from appellate decree of District Judge passed in appeal from appellate decree of Collector.* An appeal lies to the High Court from a decree of a District Judge passed in appeal from an appellate decree of a Collector. *JAI RAM v. DULARI CHAND* . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 309

13. ———— N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), ss. 113 and 114—*Partition.* Where in the course of carrying out an order for a partition and of assigning the lands to each co-sharer, certain co-sharers claimed certain plots of land as belonging to them in severalty and demanded that the same should be assigned to them, and the Collector decided that some of such plots were held in severalty and one was held in common:—*Held*, that his decision was not passed under s. 113 of Act XIX of 1873, and was therefore not appealable under s. 114 of that Act. *SHIBBAN LAL v. TILOKE CHAND* . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 619

14. ———— *Order for partition by Assistant Collector confirmed by Collector—Objection subsequently made to mode of partition—Question of title.* Upon an application made under s. 103 of the N.-W.P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873) for partition of a share in a mehal, no question of title or proprietary right of the nature contemplated by s. 113 was raised, nor any serious objection made by any of the co-sharers, and the Assistant Collector recorded a proceeding setting forth the rules which were to govern the partition, and this proceeding was confirmed by the Collector under s. 131. An Amin was ordered to carry out the partition, and, in taking steps to do so, stated the principle upon which he proposed to distribute the common land. An objection was then for the first time raised by two of the co-sharers in the Court of the Assistant Collector to the inclusion of a particular piece of land in the partition, on the ground that it appertained exclusively to their share. This objection was disallowed by the Assistant Collector and, on appeal, by the District Judge: *Held*, that at the stage of the proceedings when objections were taken, it was too late to determine questions of title under s. 113 of the Act; that accordingly the Assistant Collector could not be said to have done so; that the objections could, therefore, only be regarded in the light of objections to the mode in which it was proposed to make the partition; and that consequently there was no appeal from the order of the Assistant Collector to the District Judge, or from the District Judge to the High Court. *TOTA RAM v. ISHUR DAS* . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 445

15. ———— *Question of title—Appeal from order under first part of s. 113.* No appeal lies to the High Court from a decision of a Collector or Assistant Collector under the first part of s. 113 of the North-Western Provinces Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), declining to grant an application for partition until the question

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in dispute has been determined by a competent Court. *IMTIAZ BANO v. LATAFAT-UN-NISSA*

I. L. R. 11 All. 328

16. ———— *Order of Collector on application for partition—Decision on question of title.* An appeal will lie from the "order" or "decision" of a Collector or Assistant Collector trying a question of title raised in the course of the hearing of an application for partition under the N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873). *NAZ BEGAM v. ABDUL KARIM KHAN*

I. L. R. 14 All. 500

17. ———— **ss. 214 and 219**

—*Order in partition proceedings—Decision of question of title by a Court of Revenue—Effect of such decision when ex-parte.* Held, that the provisions of ss. 214 and 219 of Act XIX of 1873 do not apply to an *ex-parte* decision of a question of title by a Court of Revenue acting in partition proceedings under s. 113 of the said Act. An appeal to the District Judge therefore lies from an order of the Assistant Collector in such proceedings. *TULSI PRASAD v. MATRU MAL*

I. L. R. 18 All. 210

18.—Act XIX of 1873 (North-Western Provinces Land-revenue Act), s. 114—*Partition—Order refusing to stay partition—Jurisdiction of High Court.* Held, that under s. 114 of the North-Western Provinces Land-revenue Act, the High Court can only entertain appeals from orders and decisions whereby the rights of parties are declared. No power is given to the High Court to restrain the Collector or Assistant Collector from entertaining an application for perfect partition. *MUNAWAR ALI v. SHAKIRAT-UN-NISSA BIBI* (1902)

I. L. R. 25 All. 141

19.—Act XII of 1881 (North-Western Provinces Rent Act), s. 189—*Suit for rent—Appeal admissible where the question has been whether any rent at all was payable by the defendant.* Held, that the words in s. 189 of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act, 1881, "in which the rent payable by the tenant has been a matter in issue and has been determined," include cases in which the question whether any rent at all is payable by the tenant has been a matter in issue and has been determined. *Deo Charan Singh v. Beni Pathak*, **I. L. R. 21 All. 247**, referred to. *BENI PRASAD KUARI v. BATULAN BIBI* (1901)

I. L. R. 23 All. 283

20. ———— Act XII of 1887 (Bengal Civil Courts Act), s. 10—*Jurisdiction—Powers of Subordinate Judge in charge of the office of the District Judge—Revenue Court appeal.* Held, that a Subordinate Judge in temporary charge, under s. 10 of Act XII of 1887, of the office of the District Judge, is competent to take up and decide Revenue Court appeals which may be pending on the file of the District Judge. *RAHMAT ALI KHAN v. ABDULLA* (1901)

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20. OBJECTIONS BY RESPONDENT.

1. ———— *Objection, meaning of—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348; 1877, 1882, s. 561.* The word "objection" used in s. 348 of Act VIII of 1859 was not limited to written objections simply, but comprehended also verbal objections. *RAMNARAIN BHUTTACHARJEE v. MOHESCHUNDER ROY*

2 Hay 79

2. ———— *Applicability of s. 348—Special appeal.* S. 348, Act VIII of 1859, was as applicable to special as to regular appeals. *NARAYAN AYYAR v. LAKSHUN AMMAL*

3 Mad. 216

3. ———— *Time for objection.* Objections under s. 348, Act VIII of 1859, might be urged at any time in the course of hearing of an appeal. *THAKUR DASS GOSHAMEE v. GOPEE KISTO GOSHAMEE*

15 W. R. 18

4. ———— *Hearing of appeal.* It was too late to take an objection under s. 348, Act VIII of 1859, when the Appellate Court has given its decision. *ABDUL GUNNEE v. GOUR MONEE DERIA*

9 W. R. 375

5. ———— *Time for filing objection—Application to file cross-appeal, Requisites of.* An application to file a cross-appeal orally was rejected, firstly, because a written memorandum of its grounds had not been filed previously; secondly, because the objection, when taken, was not filed on the regulated stamp; and lastly, because the ground now urged had not been advanced as an objection in a regular appeal previously filed. *HOOLAS KOOREE v. SUFEEHUN. SUFEEHUN v. MAHOMED HUBBEBOULLAH KHAN*

8 W. R. 379

6. ———— *Practice.* A respondent might under s. 348 file a notice with the Registrar, specifying therein the objections which he intends to take on the hearing of the appeal. *In the matter of MADHOBE DORSEE*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 587: 6 W. R. Mis. 102

7. ———— *The notice of objections referred to in s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, must be filed not less than seven days before the date fixed for the hearing in the summonses issued to the parties.* *DEO KISHEN v. MAHESHAH SHAHAI*

I. L. R. 4 All. 248

8. ———— *Cross-appeal Notice of objection.* A notice of objection under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act XIV of 1882, must be filed not less than seven days before the date (if any) fixed for the hearing of the appeal in the notice served upon the respondent. S. 5 of Act XV of 1877 does not apply to an objection under s. 561 of the Procedure Code. *KALLY PROSUNNO BISWAS v. MUNGALA DASSEE*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 631

9. ———— *Practice.* Objections to a decree under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882) need not necessarily be filed seven days before the day originally fixed

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for hearing the appeal. When the hearing is postponed, it is sufficient if the objections are filed seven days before the day fixed for the postponed hearing, the object of s. 561 being merely to give the appellant timely intimation of proposed objections. *RANGILDAS v. BAI GIRJA* . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 559

10. ——— An appeal having been filed on the 10th April 1879, and the date for hearing fixed for May 1879, a memorandum of objections under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code was filed by the respondent on the 18th September 1879, before the actual hearing, which took place in July 1880. *Held*, that the memorandum of objections, under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by s. 86 of Act XII of 1879, ought to have been filed not less than seven days before the date fixed for hearing, and was therefore inadmissible. *RAM GOBIND JUGODEB v. DENO BUNDHU SRINUNDUN MOHAPATTEE* . 9 C. L. R. 281

11. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 561—Practice—Objections to decree by respondent—Time for filing objections—Date fixed for hearing appeal. Quære*: Whether under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure, objections to the decree by the respondent must necessarily be filed seven days before the date originally fixed for hearing the appeal, or whether it is not sufficient if they are filed seven days before the day on which the appeal is actually heard, and whether the decision of the Bombay High Court in *Rangildas v. Bai Girja*, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 559, to that effect is not correct and the decisions of the Calcutta High Court to the contrary are not erroneous. *TULSHI PERSHAD v. RAJA MISSEER* . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 610

12. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 561—Filing of objections, time for—Practice.* The expression "the day fixed for the hearing" used in s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) means the day on which the hearing actually commences, and includes both that day and the day to which the hearing may be adjourned. The purpose of the section is to give the appellant timely intimation of the proposed objections. Accordingly, a cross-objection filed by the respondent on the day mentioned as the day fixed for hearing the appeal in the notice to the respondent was held not too late. *Rangildas v. Bai Girja*, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 559, followed. *DINKAR PARSHARAM v. VINAYEK MORESHWAR* . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 698

13. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 561—Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (Act VII of 1888), s. 48—Time allowed for memorandum of objections.* An appeal cannot definitely be posted until the Court has ascertained that notice of the appeal has been served on the respondent, and a date must then be fixed not less than one month from the date of service, as the respondent is entitled, by s. 561 of the Code, to that

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period within which he may file any objection he may have. *SUNDARAM v. ANNANAR*

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 492

14. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 561—Time for filing objections—Delay in filing them—Practice.* Where a respondent, in order to save the costs of copying the judgment of the Court below, the decree, and other documents in the case, delayed sending instructions to counsel to draw objections to the decree until the paper books had been received from the appellant, at which date the period allowed for filing objections had expired, the Court refused to extend the time or permit the objections to be filed. *SULLEMAN EBRAHIMJI v. JOOSUB JAN MAHOMED*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 111

15. ——— *Hearing on appeal—Calling on of case.* The mere calling on of a case to be heard does not mean the same thing as the hearing of the case in the sense of s. 348, Act VIII of 1859. *RAM PERSHAD OJHA v. BHUROSA KOONWAR*

9 W. R. 328

16. ——— *Withdrawal of appeal.* If the case is withdrawn, objections under s. 348 cannot be heard. *RAM PERSHAD OJHA v. BHUROSA KOONWAR* . 9 W. R. 328

PURESH NARAIN ROY v. WATSON

23 W. R. 229

17. ——— Where in the course of the hearing of an appeal, the appellant desired to withdraw, in order to avoid the decision of a question raised by the respondent at the hearing: *Held*, that under s. 348 of the Civil Procedure Code, the respondent was entitled to have the case heard and determined. *VENKATARAMANAIYA v. KUPPI* . 3 Mad. 302

18. ——— *Held*, that objections under s. 348, Act VIII of 1859, can only be heard when the opposite party, being appellant, prosecutes his appeal, and not when he withdraws from it. *BAHADUR SINGH v. BHUGWAN DOSS*

1 Agra 23

SHAMA CHURN GHOSE v. RADHA KIRSTO CHAKLANUVIS . 14 W. R. 210

19. ——— *Right of respondent to have objections decided.* An appellant, finding after the hearing had commenced that his appeal was hopeless, claimed the right of withdrawing the appeal in order to prevent the objections filed under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882) by the respondent against the decree from being heard. *Held*, that, after the hearing of an appeal has commenced, the Appeal Court is seized of the respondent's objections, and that the appeal cannot be withdrawn so as to prevent the objections from being heard and determined. *DHONDI JAGANNATH v. THE COLLECTOR OF SALT REVENUE*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 28

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contd.

20. ————— Where an appeal was dismissed upon the application of the appellant himself made before the hearing, *Held*, that the respondents, who had filed objections to the decree of the Court of first instance, under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code, had no claim to have their objections heard, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal. *Coomar Puresh Narain Roy v. Watson & Co.*, 23 W. R. 229, and *Dhondi Jagannath v. The Collector of Salt Revenue*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 28, referred to. *MAKTAB BEG v. HASAN ALI*

I. L. R. 8 All. 551

21. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 561—Withdrawal of appeal—Failure of objections.* If an appeal in which objections have been filed under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure is withdrawn, the objections cannot be heard. *Bahadoor Singh v. Bhugwan Dass*, 1 Agra 23, *Ram Pershad Ojha v. Bharosa Kumwar*, 9 W. R. 328, *Shama Churn Ghose v. Radha Kristo Chaklanuris*, 14 W. R. 210, *Puresh Narain Roy v. Watson & Co.*, 23 W. R. 229, *Subhai Dayalji v. Raghunathji Vasanji*, 10 Bom. 397, *Dhondi Jagannath v. Collector of Salt Revenue*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 28, and *Maktab Beg v. Hasan Ali*, I. L. R. 8 All. 551, referred to. *JAFAR HUSAIN v. RANJIT SINGH*

I. L. R. 17 All. 518

22. ————— Dismissal of appeal for default—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348.* Where an appeal is dismissed for default, the hearing of objections under Act VIII of 1859, s. 348, cannot be allowed to proceed. *BARODA KANT BHUTTACHARJEE v. PEAREE MOHUN MOOKERJEE*

23 W. R. 57

23. ————— Dismissal of appeal for want of necessary parties—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 561—Right of respondent to have memorandum of objections heard.* The plaintiff sued to recover possession of lands demised on kanom in Malabar. The defendants were the representatives of the mortgagee, and one (defendant No. 20) who claimed title to part of the land sought to be recovered. As to the last-mentioned part of the land, the plaintiffs obtained a decree for a portion of it only. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal bringing on to the record only defendant No. 20, who preferred a memorandum of objections. The appeal was dismissed for the reason that the mortgagee's representatives were not joined. *Held*, that the appeal had been heard within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code, s. 561, and accordingly that the memorandum of objections should be heard. *KOMBI ACHEN v. KOCHUNNI*

I. L. R. Mad. 352

24. ————— What objections may be taken—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348.* S. 348 in no way restricted respondents as to the points on which they may, by way of cross-appeal, object to the decision appealed against. *HUNOOMAN SINGH v. SUDDOLALL*

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MUDHOO MOKEE DABEE v. GUNGA GOBIND MUNDLE W. R., 1864, 299

25. ————— Objection on ground of limitation—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348.* The first Court held that the plaintiff's suit was barred by the law of limitation, but the decision was reversed on appeal, and the case remanded by the lower Appellate Court for trial on the merits. The first Court then gave a decree for the plaintiff, but on appeal the lower Appellate Court dismissed the suit on the merits. The plaintiff preferred a special appeal to the High Court. *Held*, that it was competent to the defendant on such appeal, under s. 348 of the Civil Procedure Code to raise the objection that the suit was barred by the law of limitation. *In the matter of the petition of HIMMAT BAHADUR*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 429: 5 W. R. 91

See RAYEKISOHREE DOSSEE v. BONOMALLEE CHURN MYTEE 10 W. R. 209

KISHEN CHUNDER GAEN v. SREESHTEE DHUR KHATTAH 8 W. R. 208

26. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 561—Dismissal of appeal as barred by limitation—Objections not entertainable.* The entertainment of objections under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code is contingent and dependent upon the hearing of the appeal in which such objections are taken, and when that appeal itself fails, is rejected, or dismissed without being disposed of upon the merits, the objections cannot be entertained either. *RAMJIWAN MAL v. CHAND MAL*

I. L. R. 10 All. 587

27. ————— Objection on ground of jurisdiction—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348.* An appeal from an order dismissing a suit for want of jurisdiction was not such an appeal as is contemplated by s. 348, Act VIII of 1859, and on such an appeal the respondent was not entitled to go into the merits. *KAMEEKHAPERSHAD MOOKERJEE v. LARMOUR* W. R. F. B. 86

28. ————— Objections against party not appealing. A respondent, in taking advantage of the provisions of s. 348 of the Civil Procedure Code, can only take such objections as have reference to the party appealing. If he wishes to raise objections against parties who do not appeal, he must do so by independent appeal. *GANESH PANDURANG AGTE v. GANDAGHUR RAMKRISHNA*

6 Bom. A. C. 244

29. ————— Appeal only partly in respondent's favour—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 348.* If a decree is passed partly in favour of and partly against a plaintiff, and one of the defendants alone appeals as against the decree in favour of the plaintiff, making a co-defendant a respondent, there is no reason why the latter should appear or interest himself in the result, nor why the plaintiff should be allowed at the hearing to raise

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objections to his suit having been dismissed against the other defendant. *GOONOMONEE DOSSIA v. PARBUTTY DOSSIA* . . . **10 W. R. 326**

30. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348.* In a suit to recover possession of certain land against *A*, who claimed to be its proprietor, in which *J B*, who claimed to be a raiyat, was made co-defendant, plaintiff obtained a decree against the former, but his suit as against the latter was dismissed. *A* appealed from the decree, and during the course of the appeal the plaintiff was allowed to take a cross-appeal with regard to the dismissal of his suit against *J B*. *Held*, that the cross-appeal should not have been admitted. *ANWAR JAN BIBEE v. AZMUT ALI* . . . **15 W. R. 26**

31. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348.* S. 348, Act VIII of 1859, was wide enough to empower an Appellate Court on cross-appeal to re-open the whole case, and assess damages on defendants, who had been acquitted in the original suit, and who were not parties to the appeal. *ANUND CHUNDER GOOPTO v. MOHESH CHUNDER MOZOOMDAR* . . . **1 W. R. 229**

32. ———— *Altering decree on appeal where respondent makes no objection.* Where, in the lower Appellate Court, no objection to the decree of the Court of first instance was urged by the plaintiff (respondent), it is not competent to such Court to disturb the decree, by giving him a larger sum than that awarded by the Court of first instance. *APEE v. HEERA NUND* . . . **2 N. W. 44**

33. ———— *Altering decree on appeal where respondent takes no objection—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348.* In a suit to establish title to three annas and a fraction of an estate, plaintiff, having obtained a decree for two annas, appealed, but the lower Appellate Court reduced the share allotted to the plaintiff. *Held*, that as no question of the share, to be awarded was raised before the lower Appellate Court by the defendant under s. 348, Code of Civil Procedure, that Court should not have interfered with the decision in the way it did. *RITOOBAJ v. OJAGUR SINGH* . . . **15 W. R. 227**

34. ———— *Objections by opposite parties in same interest—Appeal by defendant from dismissal of suit—Cross-objection by plaintiff.* Where a plaintiff's suit is dismissed and a defendant appeals, seeking no relief whatever, but acting in the same interest with the plaintiff, the latter is not entitled, by way of cross-appeal under s. 348, to argue that his suit was wrongly dismissed. *SABETOOLLAH MEAH v. ROHIM DEWAN* . . . **9 W. R. 273**

35. ———— *Objections by opposite parties in separate appeals.* Both parties appealed from the decree of the Court of first instance, and both the appeals were dismissed by the lower Appellate Court. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court from the decree of the lower Appellate

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Court dismissing his appeal, whereupon the defendant took objections to the decree of the lower Appellate Court dismissing his appeal. *Held*, that such objections could not be entertained. *GANGA PRASAD v. GAJAHDHAR PRASAD*. **I. L. R. 2 All. 651.**

36. ———— *Finding in favour of respondent who had not appealed or objected—Right of respondent to benefit by such finding.* *H* sued *B* for arrears of rent, alleging that the annual rent payable by the latter was R212-1-0. The Court of first instance gave *H* a decree based on the finding that the annual rent payable by *B* was R94. *H* appealed, and the lower Appellate Court gave him a decree based on the finding that the annual rent payable by *B* was R128-12-0. *B* appealed to the High Court from the lower Appellate Court's decree. *H* did not appeal from that decree, neither did he take any objections thereto under s. 561 of Act X of 1877. *STUART, C.J.*, and *OLDFIELD, J.*, before whom such appeal came for hearing, remanded the case to the lower Appellate Court for a fresh determination of the question as to the amount of annual rent payable by *B*. The lower Appellate Court then found that the annual rent payable by *B* was R212-1-0. *Held*, by *STUART, C.J.*, (*OLDFIELD, J.*, dissenting), that such second finding of the lower Appellate Court should be accepted and the amount awarded by its decree be enlarged accordingly, notwithstanding *H* had not appealed from that decree or preferred objections thereto. *BIKRAMJIT SINGH v. HUSAINI BERGAM*

I. L. R. 3 All. 648.

37. ———— *Objections which could not have been taken on appeal—Incidental decision of issue.* The plaintiff sued the defendants for compensation for the wrongful taking of the fruit on a tree which he alleged belonged to him. The defendants set up as a defence that the fruit on such tree had not been removed, and that such tree belonged to them. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit on the ground that the fruit on such tree had not been removed, but found incidentally that such tree belonged to the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed from the decree of the Court of first instance, and the defendants objected to the decree, contending that such tree belonged to them. *Held*, that inasmuch as the Court of first instance did not, in deciding that such tree belonged to the plaintiff, decide a question substantially in issue, it did not decide in this matter "against the defendants" within the meaning of s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code, and as the decree was limited to dismissing the suit, the defendants as respondents were not qualified to take an objection which they could not have taken by way of appeal, and therefore the Appellate Court was not warranted by law in entertaining the objection taken by the defendants. *BALAK TEWARI v. KAUSIL MISR*

I. L. R. 4 All. 491.

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contd.

38. ———— Objection by party improperly made respondent—*Extent of respondent's right.* A obtained a decree for possession of land against B and for costs against B, C, D, and others, defendants in the suit. C and other defendants appealed against this decree so far as it awarded costs against them, making A and D respondents to the appeal. Under s. 561, D objected to that part of the decree which awarded possession of the land to A. *Held*, on appeal, that it was open to D, although improperly made a party to the appeal by C against A, to take objection to the rest of the decree. *TIMMAYA MADA v. LAKSHMANA BHAKTA* . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 215

39. ———— Objections on appeal as to cost—*Procedure—Notice of objections.* The Court of first instance found for the defendants on the merits, and passed a decree in their favour without costs. The defendants appealed against that part of the decree which disallowed them their costs. The plaintiff filed a notice of objections to the decree on the merits as required by s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure (XIV of 1882). The lower Court of Appeal varied the decree by allowing the defendants their costs of suit, and held that the plaintiff was not entitled to file any objections. *Held*, that the Court of Appeal was in error in holding that the plaintiff's objections could not be entertained. S. 561 of the Code gives the respondent the power of taking any objection to the decree at the hearing of an appeal which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed a notice of his objections not less than seven days before the date fixed for the hearing of the appeal: and this power is independent of whether an appeal lies on a mere question of costs. *KAMAT v. KAMAT* . . . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 368

40. ———— Unsuccessful intervenors—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348.* Unsuccessful intervenors (defendants) who have not appealed cannot raise questions under s. 348, Act VIII of 1859. *BIPRO PERSHAD MYTEE v. KANYE DAYEE* . . . 1 W. R. 341

41. ———— Co-respondents. A defendant or respondent cannot be heard by way of cross-appeal under s. 348, Act VIII of 1859, as against a co-defendant or co-respondent. *TARUCK NATH ROY v. TABOORUNISSA CHOWDHRAIN* . . . 7 W. R. 39

42. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348.* A respondent, making a cross-appeal, can take objection to any part of the judgment of the first Court adverse to him to which the appellant can answer, and which affects the appellant's interests only; but the cross-appeal of a respondent does not open up any question between himself and his co-respondents, for they cannot be allowed to interplead. The law gives a respondent a right to raise objections at the hearing of the appeal; but under s. 348, Civil Procedure Code, reasonably construed, the contest is between two

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parties equally interested, and not with third parties. *MAHBOOB ALI v. ZUR BANOO BIBEE* . . . 9 W. R. 78

43. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348.* Plaintiff sued two tenants and his co-sharer for joint rents. His suit was dismissed, and the dakhilas produced by the tenant defendants were declared to be false. The latter appealed, making the former and his co-sharer respondents. Plaintiff then appeared and made a cross-appeal under s. 348, Act VIII of 1859. *Held*, that plaintiff had no *locus standi* to entitle him to make a cross-appeal against his co-sharer upon the appeal of the tenant defendants. *ANUNTO DOSS SEIN v. RAM JOY SEIN* . . . 11 W. R. 435

44. ———— *Whether a respondent can prefer a cross-objection against another respondent—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 561.* In a suit for possession of land the Court of first instance decreed the plaintiff's suit in part against the defendants. Some of the defendants appealed to the High Court without making the other defendants party-respondents. The plaintiffs preferred a cross-objection under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The non-appealing defendants were added as respondents by an order of the High Court to the effect that they might be made parties without prejudice to any objection that might be urged on their behalf at the hearing of the appeal. The non-appealing defendants at the hearing of the appeal contended that they were wrongly made parties, and that the plaintiffs could not urge their cross-objection as against them. *Held*, that, as a general rule, the right of a respondent to urge cross-objections should be limited to his urging them against the appellant, and it is only by way of exception to this general rule that one respondent may urge a cross-objection against another respondent, the exception holding good, among other cases in those in which the appeal of some of the parties opens out questions which cannot be disposed of completely without matters being allowed to be opened up as between co-respondents; but as there was nothing exceptional in this case, the plaintiffs were not allowed to urge their cross-objections against the non-appealing defendants. *BISHUN CHURN ROY CHOWDHRY v. JOGENDRA NATH ROY* . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 114

45. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348.* A plaintiff (respondent) may take an objection, under s. 348, against defendants who have not appealed, but who are *pro forma* brought in as co-respondents. *RAM LALL MOOKERJEE v. TARA SOONDUREE DEBIA* . . . W. R., 1864, 3

(*Contra*) *HOSSAIN BUKSH PUTOOAH v. BAROO BEPAREE* . . . 5 W. R. 49

——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348.* One defendant cannot

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—*contd.*

take an objection under s. 348 on the appeal of a co-defendant. *BURRODA SOONDUREE DOSSEE v. NO-BOGOPAL MULLICK* . . . **W. R., 1864, 294**

See *KHERMUKUREE DOSSEE v. NILAMBUR MUNDUL* . . . **2 W. R., 227**

GUDHADHUR BANERJEE v. MONMOHINEE DOSSEE . . . **7 W. R. 366**

KISHEN CHUNDER v. CHUNDRABOLLY DOSSEE . . . **2 Hay 180**

46. ———— *Absence of co-respondent—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348.* The lower Appellate Court was held to be justified in refusing to enter into an objection raised by the respondent under Act VIII of 1859, s. 348, in the absence as a party to the appeal of one of the parties interested in the decision of the first Court. *MOIZ-ZUNNISSA v. MOORAREE DHUR DEY* . . . **22 W. R. 314**

47. ———— *Absence of co-respondent—Cross-appeal by only some of the respondents.* A question having arisen in the execution of a decree as to assessing wasilat, the first Court held that the decree-holders were entitled to wasilat of a 2 anna 13 gundah share. The Judge held on the appeal of some of the judgment-debtors that the decree-holders were entitled to 1 anna 10 gundah share, and rejected the objections raised by the decree-holders under s. 348, Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that the Judge was wrong in amending the Munsif's decree as to the share, as the objection was not taken in the Court of first instance, and that he was bound to dispose of the objections taken by the decree-holders under s. 348; and if there was any difficulty arising from the absence of some of the judgment-debtors, he ought to have directed that they should be made respondents. *PRAN KISHORE DEB v. MAHOMED AMEER* . . . **21 W. R. 338**

48. ———— *Objection against absent co-respondent.* An objection by way of cross-appeal cannot be taken against a co-respondent who is not present in Court, and so unable to answer the objection of the cross-appellant. *LALL CHAND v. KUDMOO KOONWAR* . . . **7 W. R. 532**

49. ———— *Allowing objection not taken—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348—Court Fees Act, 1870, s. 16.* The principle that an Appellate Court should not go beyond the subject-matter of the appeal, applies to an objection, called a cross-appeal, under s. 348, which enables the respondent to take any objection to the decision of the lower Court which he might have taken if he had preferred a separate appeal. The joint effect of this section and of Act VII of 1870, s. 16, is to place the respondent in the position of a cross-appellant in so far that he must, before the hearing, specify his matter of objection, and must pay into Court the Court-fee attaching thereto. An Appellate Court was held to have acted without authority, and to have contravened the Court Fees Act, in having

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contd.

voluntarily suggested what it thought to be an error of the Court below, and allowed the respondent to take it as an objection giving effect to the objection subject to the payment of the Court-fee stamp. *SHARODA SOONDUREE DEBEE v. GOBIND-MONEE alias BROJO SOONDUREE DEBEE* . . . **24 W. R. 179**

50. ———— *Objections by pauper respondent—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 561.* Objections by a respondent to a decree under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be filed *in formâ pauperis*. *Babaji Hari v. Rajaram Ballal*, *I. L. R. 1 Bom. 75*, followed. *NARAYANA v. KRISHNA* . . . **I. L. R. 8 Mad. 214**

51. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 561.* A plaintiff who has obtained leave to sue *in formâ pauperis*, and has been successful in obtaining a decree for a portion of his claim, but has failed as to the other portion, is not entitled, on an appeal by the defendant, to be heard *in formâ pauperis* on cross-appeal as to the portion of his claim decided against him in the lower Court. *In the matter of BROJESHWARI DAS v. GUROO CHURN DAS* . . . **I. L. R. 11 Cal. 735**

52. ———— *Objections filed by respondent—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 561—Letters Patent—Appeal. Held*, that s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to appeals under s. 10 of the Letters Patent. *KAUSALIA v. GULAB KUAR* . . . **I. L. R. 21 All. 297**

53. ———— *Cross-objection—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 561—Cross-objection against co-respondents—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 5.* X brought a suit against A, B, C, D, E and others, to recover a sum of money and to enforce a security bond given by E. The suit was decreed against E alone. On appeal by E, X preferred a cross-objection, under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code, against A, B, C and D, without giving them notice. *Held*, that there was nothing in the suit which could be taken as an exception to the general rule that the right of a respondent to urge cross-objections under s. 561 of the Code should be limited to his urging them against the appellant only. *Anwar Jan Bibee v. Ajmut Ali*, **15 W. R. 26**, and *Bishun Churn Roy Chowdhry v. Jogendra Nath Roy*, **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 114**, followed. *Upendra Lal Mukerjee v. Girindra Nath Mukerjee*, **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 565**, referred to. *SHABIUDDIN v. DEEMOORAT KOER* (1903) **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 655**

54. ———— *Objections by appellant—Civil Procedure Code, s. 561—Procedure by way of objections not open to a party who has in fact appealed from the decree of the Court below. Held*, that objections under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure can only be filed by a party who might have appealed from the decree of the Court below, but has not done so. It is not open to a party who has appealed, and whose appeal has been dismissed, subsequently to such dismissal, to prefer

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objections under s. 561 to the decree of the Court below. *RAMJI DAS v. AJUDHIA PRASAD* (1903)

I. L. R. 25 All. 628

55. ———— Objections against persons not appealing—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 561—*Objections filed by respondents, against persons who did not appeal against them, inadmissible. The objections allowed to be urged by a respondent under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure are limited to the person who has appealed against him; and his (the respondent's) rights are not enlarged by the mere addition to the list of such persons of other persons who should not have been put on the list at all. *Babu Chote Lal v. Kishun Suhoy, S. D. A., N. W. P., 163, Vol. II, 360*, referred to. *Tim-mayya Mida v. Lakshmana Bhakti, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 215*, distinguished. *KALLU v. MANNI* (1900)

I. L. R. 23 All. 93

56. ———— Withdrawal of appeal—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 373, 561—*Right of appellant to withdraw his appeal at any time before judgment. Where no objections under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been filed by the respondent, an appellant has an absolute right to withdraw his appeal, at any time before judgment; but, where such objections have been filed, the appellant, if he wishes to withdraw his appeal, must do so before the hearing of the appeal has commenced. *Allah Baksh v. Niamat Ali, Weekly Notes, 1892, 58*, and *Jafar Husain v. Ranjit Singh, I. L. R. 17 All. 518*, referred to. *Venkataramanaia v. Kuppi, 3 Mad. H. C. Rep. 392*, and *Dhondi Jagannath v. The Collector of Salt Revenue, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 28*, distinguished. *KALYAN SINGH v. RAHMU* (1901)

I. L. R. 23 All. 130

57.—Stamp duty—*Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), ss. 4, 16—*Stamp duty on memorandum of objections filed by a respondent, in an appeal under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure, need not, under s. 16 of the Court-fees Act, be paid till the time of hearing. **REFERENCE UNDER COURT-FEES ACT, 1870, s. 5 (1901)** . **I. L. R. 25 Mad. 24**

58.—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 106, 109A—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 558, 561—*Appeal from Order under s. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, if lies to High Court. Section 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to orders under s. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Held*, further, that s. 109A, sub-s. (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act limits the power of the High Court to the hearing of second appeals and not appeals from orders either under s. 558 or s. 560 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Mothur Chandra Majumdar v. Tara Sunkar Ghose, 7 C. W. N. 440*, relied on. *MATHURA NATH ROY CHAUDHURI v. BASANTA KUMAR CHAKRAVARTI* (1908)

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 510

APPEAL—cont'd.**21. OMISSION TO APPEAL IN TIME AGAINST PRELIMINARY ORDER OR DECREE.**

1.—*Partition suit—Preliminary order or decree—*Whether omission to appeal against the preliminary order or decree within the period of limitation debars a party from questioning the preliminary order or decree in an appeal against the final decree—*Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 206. Held* by the Full Bench (MACLEAN, C.J., and RAMPINI, J., dissenting), that in an appeal against the final decree in a partition suit, it is open to the appellant to question the correctness of the preliminary order or decree for partition when no appeal was preferred against such order within the time allowed by law. *Boloram Dey v. Ram Chandra Dey, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 279*, overruled. *KHADEM HOSSAIN v. EMDAD HOSSAIN* (1901)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 758; 5 C. W. N. 617

22. ORDERS.

See **APPEAL—DECREES.**

1. ———— Interlocutory order—*Isolated issue of law.* An appeal will not lie from the separate determination of an isolated issue of law or fact before the taking of evidence on the remaining issues. *In the matter of the petition of the COURT OF WARDS* . **7 W. R. 222**

2. ———— Illegal order. The plaintiff obtained a decree in the Court of first instance. The defendant appealed. The lower Appellate Court improperly directed the Court of first instance to settle the matter in dispute in accordance with a decision of a former Judge in the matter, and allowed the parties ten days after the return of the case to file objections. *Held*, that the proceeding of the lower Appellate Court was unwarranted by law, and must be taken to be, if anything, an interlocutory order, and, as such, unappealable. *LUKH RAM v. BUNSEE DHUR* . **5 N. W. 180**

3. ———— Order dismissing part of claim before final decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 540.* Where a Judge, after the defendant's written statement was put in, framed certain preliminary issues and decided them, directing part of plaintiff's claim to be dismissed and part to be tried on the merits (which trial might necessitate the taking of an account from defendant): *Held*, that no appeal lies from such an order on the part of the plaintiff, because the Civil Procedure Code only allows an appeal against a portion of the decision when there has been a decision relating to the disposal of the entire suit, or on the part of the defendant, inasmuch as there had been no final order to take an account. *VENCATAGIRI RAJA v. MAHOMED RAHIMTULLA SAHIB*

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 13

4. ———— Order rejecting application for refund of stamp duty. An appeal does not lie from an order of the lower Court made

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on an application for refund of sufficient stamp duty and penalty, after a case remanded to it had been compromised. Redress should be sought by way of motion rather than as an appeal. *RAMANOOJ DOSSEE v. GOVERNMENT* . . . 2 W. R. Mis. 36

5. ——— Order of Munsif dismissing suit for under-valuation. An appeal will lie from an order of a Munsif dismissing a suit as beyond his jurisdiction because it was under-valued. *JOHAN BUKSH v. MEHER BIBEE alias MOHUR*

7 W. R. 183

6. ——— Order disallowing appointment of ministerial officer—*Act XVI of 1868, s. 9*. A party whose appointment by a Subordinate Judge or Munsif is disallowed by a Zillah Judge on the ground that he is not qualified for the appointment has no right of appeal to the High Court against the Judge's order. *In the matter of SHOSHEE KISHEN MOOKERJEE*

14 W. R. 328

7. ——— Order of Magistrate dismissing ministerial officer—*Commissioner of Revenue and Circuit*. The Commissioner is the proper authority to whom an appeal lies from the order of a Magistrate dismissing a ministerial officer from his post, and the order of the Commissioner passed in appeal is final. *In re PAREHU NARAYAN SINGH* 3 B. L. R. A. C. 370 : 12 W. R. 323

8. ——— Order giving possession to purchaser—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 264*. No appeal lay from an order of a Court giving possession under s. 264, Act VIII of 1859, to a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree. *OMIRTO MOYEE DOSS v. GOOROO DOSSEE ROY*

17 W. R. 395

9. ——— Order refusing to grant possession—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 259, 263*. No appeal lay from an order refusing to grant possession, under ss. 259 and 263, Act VIII of 1859. *GOPAL CHUNDER GHOSE v. RAJ CHUNDER DUTT*

2 W. R. Mis. 9

10. ——— Order admitting claim of dar-patnidar—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 269*. No appeal lay from an order admitting the claim of a dar-patnidar who has intervened under s. 269, Act VIII of 1859. *JADUB CHURN THAKOOR v. BHOLANATH SINGH ROY* . . . 5 W. R. Mis. 51

11. ——— Order on application to review—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 629—Appeal from decree as amended*. A second appeal lies against an order of a lower Appellate Court passed under s. 629 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) where the appeal to the lower Appellate Court has been, not from the order allowing a review, but from the original decretal order itself as amended by the original Court on the application for review. *Than Singh v. Chun-Tun Singh, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 296*, distinguished. *Semble*: The words of s. 629, "an order of the Court for rejecting the application shall be final," *prima facie* apply to

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

the Court which has passed the original decree, but in spirit they would seem properly to apply also to an order of an Appellate Court. *BALA NATHA v. BHIVA NATHA* . . . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 496

12. ——— Order rejecting review—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 378*. No appeal lies from the order of a Judge rejecting an application for a review of his order dismissing an appeal for default of prosecution. *CHOWDHRY RUTTUN PERSAD v. HUNOOMAN JAH*

W. R. 1864, Mis. 20

13. ——— Under s. 378, Act VIII of 1859, an order rejecting an application for review of judgment is final. *CALLY DASS SIRCAR v. JANOKKEENATH ROY* . . . 1 W. R. Mis. 7

14. ——— Order rejecting application for review of order dismissing execution proceedings for default in payment of process-fees—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 244 (c), 540, 623, and 629*. That an application for review of an order dismissing an execution case for non-payment of process-fees is not an application under s. 244, cl. (c), of the Code of Civil Procedure, but one for review, and no appeal lies therefrom. *PUDMANUND SINGH v. DOORGA PROSHAD DOOBEE* . . . 4 C. W. N. 39

15. ——— Order disposing of application for review on the merits. Where an application for review is disposed of as upon a rehearing on the merits, an appeal lies from the order so passed. *AMANTU ALI v. BINDHOO*

13 W. R. 138

16. ——— Order granting review—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 629*. No appeal lies from an order granting a review of judgment, except in the cases set forth in s. 629 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *BOMBAY AND PERSIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY v. S.S. "ZUARI"* . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 171

17. ——— *Letters Patent High Court, cl. 15—"Judgment"*—Order granting review of judgment—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 629*. A second appeal was decided on the 1st June 1888 in favour of the respondents by two Judges of the High Court. On the 24th July 1888, an application for review was filed with the Registrar. Various reasons prevented the two Judges from sitting together until the month of March 1889. On the 6th March the matter came up before them when a rule was issued, calling upon the respondents to show cause why a review should not be granted, and made returnable on the 28th March 1889. On that day one of the Judges had left India on furlough, and the rule was taken up, heard, and made absolute by the other of the two Judges sitting alone. *Held*, that the order was not a judgment within the meaning of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent; and that no appeal would lie therefrom, the order being final under s. 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Bombay and Persia Steam Navi-*

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

gation Company v. The "Zuari," I. L. R. 12 Bom. 171, and Achaya v. Rutnavehi, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 253, approved. AUBHOY CHURN MOHUNT v. SHAMANT LOCHUN MOHUNT

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 788

18. ———— *Order granting review of judgment—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 629.* No appeal lies from an order granting a review of judgment except as provided by s. 629 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Co. v. S.S. "Zuari," I. L. R. 12 Bom. 171, followed. HAR NANDAN SAHAI v. BEHARI SINGH*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 3

MAHABIR PRASAD v. NATHNI THAKUR

1 C.W. N. 338

19. ———— In general final appeal an order for review can only be challenged upon the grounds stated in s. 629 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Har Nandan Sahai v. Behari Singh, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 3, followed. BARODA CHURN GHOSE v. GOBIND PROSHAD TEWARY*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 984

20. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 626 and 629.* No appeal will lie from an order granting a review of judgment except under the conditions specified in s. 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Co. v. S.S. "Zuari," I. L. R. 12 Bom. 171, followed. DARYAI BIBI v. BADRI PRASAD*

I. L. R. 18 All. 44

See CHUNILAL HAJARIMAL v. SONIBAI

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 328

21. ———— *Grounds of appeal.* No appeal lies from an order granting a review of judgment except in cases specified in s. 629 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company v. S.S. "Zuari," I. L. R. 12 Bom. 171, followed. Har Nandan Sahai v. Behari Singh, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 3, and Baroda Churn Ghose v. Gobind Pershad Tewary, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 984, referred to.* That the Court which has granted the review has done so without sufficient reasons is not a valid ground of appeal under s. 629. *MUNNI RAM CHOWDHRY v. BISHEN PERKASH NARAIN SINGH*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 878

22. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 626, 629, 586, and 591—Order granting a review in a suit of Small Cause Court nature valued at less than Rs500.* In a suit of a nature cognizable by a Small Cause Court and valued at less than Rs500, an order granting a review was passed by the Appellate Court without recording any reason for it. An appeal was preferred against that order to the High Court under s. 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure:—*Held*, that the order was bad, being in contravention of the provisions of s. 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure:—*Held* also, upon the objection of the respondent, that no appeal lay against the above order, that the appeal

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

was permissible under s. 629, the provisions whereof are not controlled or superseded by s. 591 of the Code. Questions raised in an application for review are totally different from those raised in the suit; a review can only be granted on special grounds, and it may well be that, although an appeal is not allowed from the final decree in the suit, an appeal is allowable from an order granting a review, which could re-open the case after it had been disposed of. *GYANUND ASRAM v. BEPIN MOHUN SEN*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 734

See MANICKA MUDALIAR v. GURUSAMI MUDALIAR

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 496

23. ———— *Order amending decree—Correction of clerical mistake in original order.* Where the Court, on the application for a review of judgment, amends a clerical mistake in its original order, the decree drawn up in conformity to this order becomes the final decree, and an appeal will lie against it if brought within the time prescribed for bringing an appeal against any other similar decree. *JOYKISHEN MOOKERJEE v. ATAGOR ROHOMAN*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 22 : 6 C. L. R. 575

24. ———— *Order rejecting insufficiently-stamped document.* The question of the admissibility of an insufficiently-stamped document once admitted as evidence by a Court can form no valid ground of appeal. *KHOGB LALL v. JUNGLE SINGH*

**I. L. R. 3 Calc. 787
2 C. L. R. 439**

25. ———— *Order refusing to allow document to be filed.* No appeal lies from the refusal of the Judge of an Appellate Court to allow a fresh document to be filed. *BECKWITH v. KISHTO JEEBUN BUCKSHEE*

Marsh. 278 : 2 Hay 286

26. ———— *Order compensating defendant for loss of property attached.* *Held*, that no appeal lies to the District Court from an order made by a Munsif compensating a defendant for loss of property attached before judgment under s. 84 of Act VIII of 1859. *TRIKAM GOVARDHAN v. DULLAAB KUBER*

2 Bom. 389, 2nd Ed., 367

27. ———— *Order for compensation on release of attached property.* No appeal lies from an award of compensation on release of attached property. *HUROSOONDUREE DOSSET v. BUNGSEI MOHUN DASS*

3 W. R. Mis. 28

HURO SOONDERY CHOWDHRAIN v. BUNGSHEE MOHUN DASS

8 W. R. 332

28. ———— *Order releasing property from attachment—Claim to property attached—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 86, 246.* The plaintiff sued to recover a money-debt, and applied for attachment of certain property before judgment. The application was opposed by the wife of the defendant, who claimed an interest in the property. She was made a defendant by the Court of first

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

instance, which made a decree in favour of the plaintiff for the debt, but releasing the property from attachment, thus allowing the wife's objection. *Held*, that, notwithstanding the irregularity of thus disposing of the claim by an order contained in the decree, such irregularity did not affect the nature of the order releasing the property from attachment, and no appeal therefrom lay to the Judge. *GEORGE v. RAM RUTTUN* 3 *Agra* 272

29. ————— Certain property having been attached in execution as belonging to the judgment-debtor, a portion was claimed by a third party and released from attachment. *Held*, that no appeal by the judgment-debtor lay from the order of release. *SHAM SOONDER KOONWAR v. RUGHONATH SUHAYE* 11 *W. R.* 264

30. ————— No appeal lies from the order of a Court releasing a property from attachment on the ground that it is in the possession of the judgment-debtor, not on his own account, but on account of, or in trust for, some other person. *RADHA KISHEN v. AMERUDEEN* 11 *W. R.* 204

31. ————— Where property attached in execution is released at the instance of any intervenor, under s. 246, Civil Procedure Code, and retained in his possession, the decree-holder has no right of appeal. *In the matter of AJODHYA DASS* 12 *W. R.* 354

32. ————— Suit to establish right—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 278, 283. An objection was made to the attachment of certain property in the execution of a decree by the judgment-debtor on the ground that such property was in his possession, not as his own property, but on account of an endowment. This objection was one of the nature to be dealt with under s. 278 and following sections of Act X of 1877. The Court executing the decree made an order against the decree-holder releasing the property from attachment. *Held*, that such order was not appealable, the fact that the objection was made by the judgment-debtor notwithstanding, and the decree-holder's proper remedy was to institute a suit under the provisions of s. 283 of Act X of 1877. *SHANKAR DIAL v. AMIR HAIDER* 1 *L. R.* 2 *All.* 752

33. ————— Appeal by decree-holder. Where parties holding a decree which declares that they have a lien to be satisfied by the sale of certain property proceed to attach and sell the property, and in pursuing this course are met by an objection under Act VIII of 1859, s. 246, and that objection is adjudicated unfavourably to them, no appeal lies from such adjudication, though the parties are at liberty to bring a suit to establish their rights. *MITTOO LALL v. MAHTAB KOOREE* 19 *W. R.* 98

34. ————— Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246—Act X of 1859, s. 106. Where land is attached in execution of a rent-decree and on an application either under Act VIII of 1859,

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

s. 246, or under Act X of 1859, s. 106, it is released from attachments by order of a Court of competent jurisdiction, such order is not subject to appeal, and can only be impugned by a regular suit. *In the matter of the petition of URJOON SAHOY. URJOON SAHOY v. NILMONEE SINGH DEO* 20 *W. R.* 90

35. ————— Order dismissing claim to attached property—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 281, 283—Execution of decree—Objection to attachment. The heirs of the deceased obligor of a bond were sued thereon on the ground that they were in possession of the property of the deceased, and a decree was made in this suit for the recovery of the amount claimed "from the property of the deceased." In execution of this decree, the plaintiff caused certain property to be attached as belonging to the deceased. The defendants objected to the attachment on the ground that the property belonged to them. The Court executing the decree proceeded to investigate this objection, and finding that the property did not belong to the defendants, but to the deceased, disallowed it. *Held*, that the proceedings upon such objection were taken under s. 281 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the order disallowing it was, therefore, not appealable. *AWADH KUARI v. RAKTU TIWARI* 1 *L. R.* 6 *All.* 109

36. ————— Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 240. Where a claim under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859 is dismissed, there is no appeal from the order of dismissal. *BUKSHEE v. BUNGSEEDHUR* 6 *W. R.* *Mis.* 46

37. ————— Order on application to add party—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73. No appeal lies against an order passed on an application made before decree under s. 73 of the Civil Procedure Code, except in case of an appeal from the decree itself as provided for in s. 363. *Paravartani v. Ambalavana Pillai*, 1 *Mad.* 197, does not conflict with this ruling, as the petition there was presented in the course of a regular appeal then pending in the High Court. *MUTHAYAMMAL v. TIRUMALA GAUNDAN* 4 *Mad.* 22

38. ————— Civil Procedure Code, 1859. The action of the Court under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859, is a matter of discretion, and, upon a true construction of ss. 363 and 350, not a matter of appeal; but an appeal will lie after decree against interlocutory orders, if they affect the decision on the merits or the jurisdiction of the Court. *RIDHNATH SAHOY v. GOPEE SAHOY* 14 *W. R.* 90

See *UPENDRA KRISHNA DEB v. NOBIN KRISHNA BOSE* 17 *W. R.* 370 note 3 *B. L. R.* O. C. 113

39. ————— Order refusing application to add party—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 32. An order refusing an application under s. 32 of Act X of 1877 by a person to be added as a

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

defendant in a suit is not appealable. **KARMAN BIBI v. MISRI LAL** . . . **I. L. R. 2 All. 904**

40. ——— Order rejecting application to add party—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 32 and 588, cl. 2.* An order rejecting an application under s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code to be made a party to a suit is not appealable under cl. 2, s. 588. **ABIRUNNISSA KHATOON v. KOMURUNNISSA KHATOON** . . . **I. L. R. 13 Calc. 100**

41. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 32, 588 (2)*—Appeal against order that a plaintiff be made defendant. An appeal lies under Civil Procedure Code, s. 588 (2), against an order under s. 32 that a plaintiff be made defendant. **LAKSHMANA v. PARAMASIVA**
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 489

42. ——— Order dismissing petition for examination of witness—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 162, 163.* The order of a Court dismissing a petition under ss. 162 and 163, Act VIII of 1859, is final. But the Court is bound to show, on the face of its judgment, that judicial discretion has been used, and the limit of its powers not exceeded. **RAM SURUN SINGH v. GOOROO DYAL SINGH**
1 W. R. 83

HARO CHAND PORAMANICK v. KRISTO MOHUN GREE . . . **1 W. R. 297**

NEEM CHAND DEY v. ANUND COOMAR ROY CHOWDERY . . . **7 W. R. 147**

43. ——— Order as to expenses of witness—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 151.* An order was made directing the realization (under s. 151, Civil Procedure Code, 1859) by attachment and sale of the expenses of a witness after he was discharged without being required to give evidence. A miscellaneous appeal having been filed from the order, the High Court issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be allowed. On no cause being shown, the appeal was filed. **BIJOY KISHEN MOOKERJEE v. JOY KISHEN MOOKERJEE**
12 W. R. 430

44. ——— Order suspending execution for cross-decree. No appeal lies from the order of a lower Court suspending the execution of a decree pending the result of an enquiry in a cross-decree held by the judgment-debtor. **SMITH v. BULWANT SINGH** . . . **2 W. R. Mis. 24**

45. ——— Order staying execution of decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 209.* No appeal lies against an order, under the last clause of s. 209 of the Code of Civil Procedure, staying the execution of a decree. The High Court, however, in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, will examine the judicial propriety of such an order. **GAMBHIRMAL v. CHEJMAL JODEHMAL** **11 Bom. 151**

46. ——— *Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 243, 244, 588.* A decree-holder having attached the property of his

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

judgment-debtor in execution, the latter applied for a stay of execution until the decision of a pending suit brought by him against the judgment-creditor. The Court allowed the application, continuing the attachment on the property, and struck the execution-case off the file. The decree-holder appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that no appeal lay. **NIHAL CHAND alias CHUTTO LALL DASS v. RAMESHARI DASSEE** . **I. L. R. 9 Calc. 214 ; 12 C. L. R. 53**

47. ——— *Stay of execution pending suit between decree-holder and judgment-debtor—Appeal from order staying execution—Civil Procedure Code, s. 243.* An appeal lies from an order passed under s. 243 of the Civil Procedure Code, staying execution of a decree pending a suit between the decree-holder and judgment-debtor. The plaintiff instituted a suit against defendant for recovery of money and other relief, which was ultimately dismissed in appeal by the High Court, and he was ordered to pay defendant R1,000 as costs of the litigation. Plaintiff then brought this suit against defendant in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Farukhabad, and while it was pending, defendant applied to the Court to execute his decree for costs. Plaintiff then applied for stay of the execution, and his application was refused by the first Court, but granted by the District Court. On appeal by defendant to the High Court : *Held*, that an appeal lay from the order, and the Judge's order was correct. **Mithun Bibi v. Buzloor Khan**, 8 W. R. 392, disapproved. **KASSA MAL v. GOPI**
I. L. R. 10 All. 339

48. ——— *Security bond—Civil Procedure Code, Act XIV of 1882, ss. 545, 588.* The Court which passed a certain decree ordered execution thereof to be stayed pending appeal, on the debtor's furnishing security to the amount of R70,000, under the provisions of s. 545 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The debtor objected to the amount of security required, and appealed to the High Court on that ground. The decree-holder contended that no appeal lay. *Held*, that the order was appealable. *Held*, also, on the facts, that the security required was excessive. **UDEYADETA DEV v. GREGGSON**
I. L. R. 12 Calc. 624

49. ——— Order releasing surety for stay of execution. No appeal will lie from an order by a District Judge, releasing surety from security taken from him by the High Court, to enable a decree-holder to take out execution of his decree pending an appeal to the Privy Council, although it is an improper one. **ABEDOONISSA KHATOON v. AMEERONISSA KHATOON**
17 W. R. 464

50. ——— Order rejecting application to stay execution, etc., for want of sanction of Court under s. 462—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 462*—Decree by consent of guardian of minor defendant. An application to stay execution

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

of, and to set aside, a decree, passed with the consent of the guardian of a minor defendant, for want of sanction of the Court under s. 462, Civil Procedure Code, was rejected. *Held*, that no appeal lay against the order of rejection. *ARUNACHALLAM v. MURUGAPPA* . . . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 503

51. ——— Order rejecting petition for execution by transferee of decree—*Civil Procedure Code*, s. 232. A petition, by one claiming to be the purchaser at a Court-sale of the interest of a decree-holder under a decree, for execution of the decree was rejected. *Held*, that no appeal lay from the order rejecting the petition. *SAMBASIVA v. SRINIVASA* . . . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 511

52. ——— Order refusing stay of execution pending suit between decree-holder and judgment-debtor—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, ss. 243 and 588. An appeal lies from an order refusing stay of execution under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 243, pending suit between a decree-holder and his judgment-debtor. *LINGUM KRISHNA BHUPATI DEVU v. KANDULA SIVARAMAYYA* . . . I. L. R. 20 Mad. 366

53. ——— Order refusing application to be declared insolvent—*Insolvency—Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877)*, ss. 351, 588, cl. 17. An order refusing to grant an application to be made an insolvent is appealable under cl. 17, s. 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such an order must be considered to be one made under s. 351. *JUGGUTJEEBUN GOOPTOO v. HARACOOMAR PAL*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 719, dissented from. *NUBBI BUKSH v. CHASNI* . . . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 168 : 7 C. L. R. 282

54. ——— *Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877)*, ss. 351, 588, cl. 17. There is no appeal from an order made under s. 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure, refusing to grant an application to be made an insolvent. The appeal allowed under s. 588, cl. 17, so far as an order under s. 351 is concerned, is on behalf of the judgment-creditor only. *JUGGUTJEEBUN GOOPTOO v. HARACOOMAR PAL* . . . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 719

JUGGUBUN GOOPTA v. HURRO KOOMAR PAL

6 C. L. R. 135

55. ——— An appeal lies against an order passed under s. 351 of Act X of 1877, although it was an order refusing to declare petitioner an insolvent. *BAVACHI PACKI v. PIERCE LESLIE & Co.* . . . I. L. R. 2 Mad. 219

56. ——— *Civil Procedure Code*, 1877, s. 588 (n). An order dismissing an application to be declared an insolvent is appealable under s. 588 (n) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877. *MUMTAZ HOSSEIN v. BRIJ MOHUN THAKOOR* . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 888

57. ——— *Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, ss. 344, 588—*Insolvent judgment-debtor*. A debtor was arrested on civil process. He

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

presented a petition to the Court from which process issued, alleging that he was unable to pay the debt and praying to be declared insolvent and to be released. The Court passed an order on the same day, directing that he should be released, and that the creditor should proceed against his property. *Held*, that an appeal lay against the order. *KOMARASAMI v. GOVINDU* . . . I. L. R. 11 Mad. 136

58. ——— Order dismissing petition of insolvent debtor—*Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1877)*, s. 24—*Insolvency petition in execution of decree in Small Cause suit—Civil Procedure Code*, ss. 344, 588. In proceedings in execution of the decree passed in a Small Cause suit by a District Munsif who had been invested with insolvency jurisdiction, the judgment-debtors filed a petition under s. 344 of the Civil Procedure Code praying that they might be declared insolvents. Their petition was dismissed by the District Munsif. *Held*, that an appeal lay to the District Court against the order dismissing the petition. *VAIKUNTA PRABHU v. MOIDIN SAHIB* . . . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 89

59. ——— Appeal against order of a subordinate Court on a petition of insolvency—*Civil Procedure Code*, s. 589—*Civil Procedure Code Amendment Acts (VII of 1888, s. 56; Act X of 1888, s. 3)*. The judgment-debtor, having been arrested in execution of a decree passed by the Small Cause Court at Madras, which was transferred for execution to the subordinate Court of South Malabar, applied to the District Court to be declared an insolvent. The District Court transferred the application for disposal to the subordinate Court, and the application was granted on 25th July 1888. On 5th November 1888 one of the opposing creditors appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that the appeal did not lie. *SITHARANA v. VYTHILINGA*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 472

60. ——— Order refusing to discharge surety for insolvent—*Civil Procedure Code*, ss. 336, 344. An order refusing to discharge a surety under s. 336 of the Civil Procedure Code for an insolvent judgment-debtor filing his petition where the surety was entitled to his discharge, is not an appealable order. *BATMA MAL v. JAMNA DAS*

I. L. R. 15 All. 183

61. ——— Order releasing from attachment after acquired property of insolvent judgment-debtor—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, s. 357, and s. 588, cl. 17. Where some of the scheduled creditors of a judgment-debtor who had been declared an insolvent and in respect of whose property a receiver had been appointed, but who had not been discharged, presented an application to the Court purporting to be made under s. 357 of the Civil Procedure Code, praying for the sale of certain property which had come by inheritance to the judgment-debtor, and the Court, also purporting to act under s. 357 of the Code, made an order on such application allowing the property in question

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

to be released from attachment on deposit by the insolvent of one-third of the scheduled debts :—*Held*, that the order was appealable as an order under s. 357 by virtue of s. 588, cl. 17, of the Code of Civil Procedure. *GANESHI LAL v. MUSARRAT ALI. GIEWAR LAL v. MUSARRAT ALI*

I. L. R. 16 All. 234

62. ——— Order giving possession to mortgagor on payment after expiry of time—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 87*—*Decree for foreclosure*—*Mortgagor's application for extension of time*. In a suit on a mortgage, a decree for foreclosure was passed, a period of three months being fixed for the discharge of the mortgage-debt. The mortgagor having made default, the decree-holder applied for and was placed in possession of the property. The mortgagor, to whom no notice had been given of the decree-holder's application, then applied for and obtained an extension of time for payment, and he made the payment and recovered possession. *Held*, that the mortgagor was entitled to appeal against the order. *NARAYANA REDDI v. PAPAYYA*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 133

63. ——— Order on investigation of claim—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 229*—*Jurisdiction of District Judge*. The plaintiff obtained a decree against T, A, and J in a suit, the subject matter of which exceeded Rs. 5,000, and in part execution thereof attached property worth less than that amount, D having resisted the execution of the decree. The plaintiff's claim was numbered and registered as a suit under s. 229 of Act VIII of 1859. Upon investigation, the First Class Subordinate Judge made an order staying the execution of the decree. The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge who held that no appeal lay to him, as the subject matter of the original suit out of which the execution suit arose exceeded Rs. 5,000. The plaintiff appealed against this decision to the High Court. *Held*, that the investigation of the claim under s. 229 of Act VIII of 1859 was not to be regarded as a fresh suit, but was merely a continuation of the original suit, and that there was, therefore, no appeal against the order in question to the District Judge. *RAVLOJI TAMAJI v. DHOLAPA RAGU*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 123

64. ——— Proceedings in nature of fresh suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 331*—*Specific Relief Act (Act I of 1877), s. 9*—*Subordinate Judge, Jurisdiction of*. A obtained a decree for possession of certain land against B and others, under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. He was obstructed by the defendant, a third party, when he went to take possession. Thereupon he applied to the Munsif's Court for the removal of the obstruction, and his application was registered as a regular suit under s. 331 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Munsif gave the plaintiff a decree. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge reversed it. Against the order of the Subordinate Judge the plaintiff appealed to the High Court on the ground that the Proceedings under s. 331 were merely a continuation of the original suit under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, and as

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

no appeal lay against a decision passed under that section, no appeal lay to the Subordinate Judge. *Held*, that proceedings under s. 331 of the Code are in the nature of a fresh suit between the decree holder and a third party, and therefore an appeal lay to the Subordinate Judge. *Ravloji Tamaji v. Dholapa Raghu, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 123*, distinguished. *Muttammal v. Chinnana Gouden, I. L. R. 4 Mad. 220*, and *Kalima v. Nainan Kutti, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 520*, referred to. *NASIR ALI FAKIR v. MEHER ALI*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 330

65. ——— Order for delivery of land—*Obstruction by mortgagee in possession—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 229, 231*. On a complaint by a decree-holder, under s. 226 of the Civil Procedure Code, against a mortgagee in possession of the land, and two other persons who resisted the execution of the decree, the Munsif passed an order for delivery of possession, but without having numbered and registered the claim as a suit, as directed by s. 229 of the Code, which, in his opinion, did not apply to the claim of a mortgagee in possession; and the senior Assistant Judge, though of opinion that the Munsif was in error in not proceeding under s. 229, ruled that there was no appeal from his order, as the claim had not been numbered and registered, and investigated. *Held*, that the irregular procedure of the Munsif should not prevent the Court from correcting his error; and that his order, which could only have been made under s. 229, was subject to appeal under s. 231, and should therefore be reversed, and the case remanded, that the claim might be numbered and registered as a suit, and an order passed thereon after the investigation, as directed by s. 229 of the Code. *MUSABBI v. SHAUNUDDIN HISMUDDIN*

4 Bom. A. C. 35

66. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 328, 331*—*Obstruction to execution of decree—Dismissal of decree-holder's petition*. Obstruction was offered to the execution of a decree for partition of certain property, by one claiming to be entitled to occupy part of the land in question as a mulgeni tenant. The decree-holder presented petition to the Court under Civil Procedure Code, s. 328; this petition was rejected, and the claim was not numbered and registered as a suit. *Held*, that an appeal against the order rejecting the petition. *GOPALA v. FERNANDES*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 127

67. ——— Order numbering and registering as suit objection of obstruction to execution of decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 328 and 331*—*Complaint made more than a month from the time of the obstruction—Objection with respect to limitation in appeal*. Although no appeal lies against an order passed under s. 331 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) numbering and registering as a suit a complaint made at a time beyond a month from the time of the obstruction in an application under s. 328, such order can be objected to when the final order, which is appealable

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

as having the force of a decree under s. 331, is appealed against. The Judge in appeal is bound to entertain the objection that is then made, and to dismiss the application when he finds that it has been wrongly admitted. *LALA v. NARAYAN*

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 392

68. ——— Order rejecting claim to possession—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230*. No appeal lies against an order of the Court refusing to entertain an application under s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, by a party other than a defendant, who disputes the title of the decree-holder. *RASUL BIBI v. MOBARIK ALI*

2 B. L. R. A. C. 303 note : 11 W. R. 186

69. ——— *Person not party to suit*—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230*. There is no appeal from an order passed under s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, rejecting an application by a person, not a party to the suit, alleging that he is being dispossessed by the Court Ameen in execution of decree. *KHELLUT CHUNDER GHOSE v. PROSUNNO-MOYE DOSSEE*

W. R., 1864, Mis. 24

GOLUCK NARAIN DUTT v. BISTO PRA DOSSEE

1 W. R. 140

70. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230*. Where an application was made to the Civil Court, under s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code, by the petitioner disputing the right of a decree-holder to dispossess him of certain immovable property, and the Civil Judge rejected the application :—*Held*, that s. 231 of the Civil Procedure Code did not give the petitioner a right of appeal to the High Court. *STRINARASIMMA CHARIYAR v. NARASIMMA CHARIYAR*. 5 Mad. 183

71. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230*. Where an application for the remedy provided in Act VIII of 1859, s. 230, is refused by a Munsif in the exercise of his discretion, no appeal lies against the order of refusal. But where the application is admitted and filed, the opposite side called upon to meet it, and the claim subsequently rejected, the order of rejection is a decision between the parties on the merits of the application within the scope of s. 231 from which an appeal lies to the Judge. *MOOKANDEE MISRAIN v. SHEO LOCHUN PATUCK*

21 W. R. 39

72. ——— Order allowing claim to possession—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 230, 231*—*Suit under s. 15, Act XIV of 1859*. S brought a suit under s. 15, Act XIV of 1859, obtained a decree, and took possession. After this B applied under s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, alleging that he had been in possession and was dispossessed by S in execution of a decree against another party. The Munsif decreed the case in favour of B. *Held*, that the latter was not a proceeding under the former suit, and the decision upon it was appealable under s. 231, Act VIII of 1859. *BROHMO MOYEE DABEE v. BURKUT SIRDAR*

13 W. R. 264

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

73. ——— Order refusing to set aside an injunction—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 496, 588, cl. 24*. An appeal will lie under s. 588, cl. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure, from an order under s. 496 of the Code refusing to set aside an injunction. *Nubbi Buksh v. Chasni*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 168, referred to. *ZABADA JAN v. MUHAMMAD TALAB*

I. L. R. 15 All. 8

74. ——— Order for issue of notice made under s. 494—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 494, 588*. A petition praying for a temporary injunction in a suit was presented by the plaintiff in a subordinate Court. The Judge refused to pass orders on it without hearing the defendants, and ordered notice to issue to them. The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge, who granted the injunction prayed for :—*Held*, that no appeal lay from the subordinate Court, and that the District Judge had purported to exercise a jurisdiction not vested in him by law. *LUIS v. LUIS*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 186

75. ——— Order rejecting plaint as insufficiently stamped. A sued B and C (i) for a declaration of his title to certain property, and (ii) for an injunction restraining C from paying, and B from receiving, an allowance of Rs. 2,400 a year out of the income of the property in dispute. A valued each of the reliefs sought at Rs. 120, and affixed a Court-fee stamp of Rs. 20 to the plaint. The Court of first instance rejected the plaint as insufficiently stamped, holding that the claim for the injunction sought should be valued at ten times the annual allowance paid by C to B as provided by s. 7, cl. 2, of Act VII of 1870. On appeal to the High Court : *Held*, that the order rejecting the plaint as insufficiently stamped was appealable. *SARDARSINGJI v. GANPATISINGJI*

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 56

76. ——— Order rejecting plaint for want of jurisdiction—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 14*. Whether the Court acting under s. 14, Act VIII of 1859, enquires into and determines the preliminary question of jurisdiction or rejects the plaint, the proceeding is open to appeal ; and if it appears that jurisdiction has been unduly assumed, the subsequent enquiry of right must be set aside as carried on without jurisdiction. *MOHESHUR BUKSH SINGH v. COLLECTOR OF GHAZIPORE*

2 Agra 214

77. ——— Order returning plaint for presentation in proper Court—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 584*. A suit to redeem a usufructuary mortgage of certain lands was instituted in the Munsif's Court. After the suit had been admitted and the parties called on to produce evidence, the Munsif ordered the plaint in the suit to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation in the proper Court on the ground that the suit should have been instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, the value of the property in suit being beyond the jurisdiction of a Munsif. *Held*, that, under Act VII of 1859, the Munsif's order was appealable to the

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

lower Appellate Court, and, under Act X of 1877, the lower Appellate Court's order to the High Court. **KALIAN DAS v. NAWAL SINGH** I. L. R. 1 All. 620

78. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 588 and s. 57—Act XII of 1879, s. 2.* Where, after the issues in a suit were framed, the Court decided that it had no jurisdiction and returned the plaint to be presented in the proper Court:—*Held*, that in so doing the Court acted under s. 57 of Act X of 1877, and its decision, not coming within the definition of a "decree" in s. 2 of Act XII of 1879, was not appealable as such, but was appealable under s. 588 of Act X of 1877 as an order. **ABDUL SAMOD v. RAJENDRO KISHOR SINGH** I. L. R. 2 All. 357

79. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 540, 536 (b)—Second appeal.* The lower Appellate Court (Subordinate Judge) decided on appeal by the defendant from the decree of the Court of first instance (Munsif) that the Court of first instance had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, as the value of the subject-matter of the suit exceeded the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction, and ordered that the "appellant's appeal be decreed, the decision of the Munsif be reversed, and the record of the case be sent to the Munsif to return the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court." The plaintiff appealed to the High Court from such order as an order returning a plaint to be presented to the proper Court. *Held*, that such order could not be regarded as one to which Art. 6 of s. 588 of Act X of 1877 was applicable. That relates to orders returning plaints for amendment or to be presented to the proper Court passed by a Court of first instance, and not to an order by an Appellate Court upon an appeal to it from the decree of a Court of first instance on general grounds. The plaintiff's proper course was to have preferred a second appeal. **BINDESHRI CHAUBEY v. NANDU** I. L. R. 3 All. 456

(*Contra*) **CHINNASAMI PILLAI v. KARUPPA UDAYAN** I. L. R. 21 Mad. 234

80. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 57, 582, 588, 589—Returning plaint to be presented to the proper Court—Order under Civil Procedure Code, s. 528.* Where an order is made by the lower Court of Appeal, returning a plaint under s. 57 of the Civil Procedure Code, by virtue of the powers conferred on it by s. 582, an appeal lies to the High Court under s. 589. S. 588 does not prohibit such appeal. **Bindeshri Chaubey v. Nandu**, I. L. R. 3 All. 456, distinguished. **GOOR BUX SAHOO v. BIRJ LAL BENKA** I. L. R. 26 Calc. 275
3 C. W. N. 243

81. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 57 (a), 562, 588—Remand by Appellate Court—Second appeal.* The Court of first instance made an order returning the plaint in a suit to be presented to the proper Court on the

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

ground that it was not competent to try such suit. On appeal from such order, the Appellate Court, holding that the Court of first instance was competent to try such suit, made an order "decreeing the appeal." It subsequently made an additional order directing that the case "should be returned for re-trial." On appeal to the High Court from such additional order:—*Held*, that the appeal would not lie, as it was in reality one from an order passed in appeal from an order returning a plaint, which under the last clause of s. 588 of Act X of 1877 was final, and not an appeal from an order remanding a case under s. 562, the character of the original order of the Appellate Court not being altered by the passing of the additional order. **KISHNA RAM v. NARSING SEVAK SINGH** I. L. R. 3 All. 855

82. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 57, 588 (6)—Institution of suit in wrong Court—Transfer of suit—Power of the Court to which suit is transferred to return plaint to be presented to the proper Court—Jurisdiction.* A District Court transferred for trial a suit instituted in a Court subordinate to it to another Court subordinate to it. The Court in which the suit was instituted was not the one in which the suit should have been instituted, and consequently the Court to which it was transferred made an order dismissing it, and directing the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. *Held*, that such order must be taken to have been passed under s. 57 of the Civil Procedure Code, and was therefore appealable under s. 588 (6). **PACHAONI AWASTHI v. ILAHI BAKSHI** I. L. R. 4 All. 478

83. ————— *Order allowing amendment of plaint—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 53, 588 (6).* The plaintiff in a suit applied for the amendment of the plaint. The defendant objected to the amendment, and a day was fixed by the Court for the "admission or rejection of the petition of amendment and the determination of the defendant's objections thereto." The Court, after hearing the parties, made an order allowing the "petition of amendment," and rejecting the defendant's objections. The defendant appealed from such order to the High Court. *Held*, that, inasmuch as orders amending plaints then and there are not made appealable by Act X of 1877, and it was into this category, if into any at all, that such order must fall, such order was not appealable. **RAJINDRA KISHORE SINGH v. RADHA PRASAD SINGH** I. L. R. 3 All. 854

84. ————— *Order amending decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 206.* *Per* OLDFIELD, J. When an original decree is amended under s. 206 of the Civil Procedure Code, it, as amended, is the decree in the suit; and an appeal therefore lies from it under the provisions of s. 540, when the validity of the amendment can be questioned. *Per* MAHMOOD, J.—An order passed under s. 206 amending a decree is a separate adjudication, and is not merely a part of the original, decree and cannot alter its

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

date, and such an order is not appealable under s. 588 of the Code. *RAGHUNATH DAS v. RAJ KUMAR* I. L. R. 7 All. 276

SURTA v. GANGA . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 411

85. *Decree—Judgment—Objections by respondent to decree—Res judicata—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 13, 540, 561, 584.* In a suit to obtain possession of certain property, and to set aside a deed called a deed of endowment (*wakfnama*) on the ground that the defendant had fraudulently obtained its execution, the defendant pleaded (i) that the deed was a valid one, and (ii) that she was in possession of the property in satisfaction of a dower-debt, and her possession could not be disturbed so long as the debt remained unsatisfied. The Court of first instance held that the deed was invalid, but that the defendant was entitled to remain in possession of the property till her dower-debt was satisfied, and the Court passed a decree which merely dismissed the suit, without embodying the finding as to the deed. On appeal by the plaintiff to the District Judge, the defendant filed objections under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code in regard to the first Court's decision that the deed of endowment was invalid. The Judge dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, affirming the finding as to the dower, and, refusing to decide the question of the validity of the deed as being unnecessary for disposal of the claim, disallowed the defendant's objections. The defendant appealed to the High Court. *Held*, by the Full Bench (*OLDFIELD* and *MAHMOOD, JJ.*, dissenting), that if a decree is, upon the face of it, entirely in favour of a party to a suit, such decree being the thing which by law is made appealable, and nothing else, that party has no right of appeal therefrom. If, in the judgment of which such decree is the formal expression, findings have been recorded upon some issues against that party, and he desires to have formal effect given to them by the decree, so as to allow of his filing objections thereto under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code or of appealing therefrom under s. 540, he must take steps under s. 206 to have the decree properly brought into conformity with the judgment, so that there may be matter on the face of it to show that something has been decided against him; but if he fails to take this course, the decree, though in general terms, will stand good as finally deciding the issues raised by the pleadings upon which the ultimate determination of the cause and the decree itself rested. The findings in a judgment upon matters which subsequently turn out to be immaterial to the grounds upon which a suit is finally disposed of, as to the plaintiff's right to any portion of the relief sought by him as declared by the decree, amount to no more than *obiter dicta*, and do not constitute a final decision of the kind contemplated by s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, also, that in the present case the Judge was right in holding that the question as to the validity or otherwise of the deed of endowment was wholly immaterial. The judgment of *STRAIGHT, J.*, in *Lachman Singh v. Mohan, I. L.*

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R. 4 All. 497, approved and followed. *Per OLD-FIELD, J., contra*, that the decree, to agree with the judgment and fulfil the requirements of s. 206 of the Civil Procedure Code, should contain the material points for determination arising out of the claim and material for the decision thereon; that if this has not been done, the defect is a good ground of appeal, notwithstanding that the decree, on its face, may be altogether in favour of the appellant, and notwithstanding that he may not have applied for amendment of the decree under s. 206 or for review of judgment; and that, in the present case, the defect in the decree would afford a good ground of appeal. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*, that, inasmuch as the provisions of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code relate as well to the trial of issues as to the trial of suits, and in the present case the validity or otherwise of the deed was a matter directly and substantially in issue between the parties, and was adjudicated upon, the finding of the first Court upon that issue was not a mere *obiter dictum*, but would be binding upon the defendant as *res judicata* notwithstanding the fact that the suit against her was dismissed on the ground that she held possession of the property in lieu of dower; that whatever has the force of *res judicata* is necessarily appealable; that the word "from" as used in s. 540 or s. 584 and the expression "objection to the decree" in s. 561, refer not only to matters existing upon the face of the decree, but also to those which should have existed, but do not exist there; and that the defendant in the present case was aggrieved or injured by the omission in the decree of the first Court, and was therefore entitled to file objections to it, and, for the same reason, to appeal to the High Court from the decree of the lower Appellate Court. Also *per MAHMOOD, J.*, that it was doubtful whether the reliefs contemplated by ss. 206 and 623 were open to the defendant; but that, even conceding that she ought to have sought her remedy under either of those sections, her neglect to do so did not make her incapable of obtaining the same result by the exercise of her right of appeal. *Anusuyabai v. Sakkaram Pandurang, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 484, Man Singh v. Narayan Das, I. L. R. 1 All. 480, Mohan Lal v. Ram Dayal, I. L. R. 2 All. 843, Niamat Khan v. Phadu Buldia, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 319, and Pan Kooer v. Bhagwant Kooer, 6 N. W. 19*, referred to. *JAMAITUNNISSA v. LUT-FUNNISSA* . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 606

86. *Decree affirmed on appeal—Amendment of decree by first Court after affirmance—Objection by judgment-debtor to execution of amended decree—Appeal from order disallowing objection—Objection allowed on appeal.* The decree of a Court of first instance having on appeal been affirmed by the High Court, the first Court altered the decree which had been affirmed, intending to bring it into accordance with the judgment of the High Court. After the decree had been altered, application was made to execute it as altered, but this was opposed by the judgment-debtor on the ground that that was not the decree which could

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be executed. *Held*, by the Division Bench that the order of the first Court disallowing the objection and directing that execution of the decree as altered should proceed could not be regarded as passed under s. 206 of the Civil Procedure Code, but was an order passed in execution of decree, and as such was appealable. **MUHAMMAD SULATMAN KHAN v. FATIMA** **I. L. R. 11 All. 314**

87. ——— Order of remand after former remand. There is no appeal from the order of a lower Appellate Court remanding a case a second time on the ground that the former order of remand had not been carried out. **RADHABUL-LUB SURMA v. ANUNDMOYER DERIA** **W. R., 1864, Mis. 39**

88. ——— Order of remand. *Quære*: Whether, when a lower Appellate Court reverses a decree of a lower Court on the plea of limitation, and remands the case to be tried upon the merits, such decision is an order prior to decree from which no appeal will lie. **MAHOMED ANJOR v. GOURREE PERSHAD SHA** **6 W. R. 61**

89. ——— Order of remand on special point.—*Reversal of decree on appeal.* In a suit for the enhancement of rent, the Collector dismissed the suit. On appeal the Judge held that the rent was liable to enhancement, and remanded the case to the Collector to find what rate was equitable. *Held*, that an appeal lay from the decision of the Judge, notwithstanding the remand to find the rates. **NEELMONEY SINGH DEO v. SHOBHUN BIBEE** **Marsh. 600**

90. ——— Order of remand. Where the first Court held a suit barred by limitation and on the ground of *res judicata*, and the lower Appellate Court (in reversal of that Court's judgment) remanded the case for trial on its merits: *Held*, that an appeal lay from the lower Appellate Court's order of remand. **KURUMOONISSA BIBEE v. GOOROO PERSHAD SHAH** **7 W. R. 331**

91. ——— *Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 562*—"Preliminary point"—*Decree in accordance with an award.* Objection was unsuccessfully taken before a District Munsif to the validity of an award on the ground of the arbitrator being interested, and a decree was passed in accordance with the award. The defendant appealed and the Subordinate Judge held that the objection was well founded, and should prevail; and, setting aside the award, he remanded the case for trial. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that the appeal to the High Court was maintainable, the decision being one on a "preliminary point" under s. 562, and not a disposal of the case in accordance with the award. **KRISHNAN CHETTI v. MUTHU-PALANDI VACHA MAKALI TEVAR** **I. L. R. 22 Mad. 172**

92. ——— Order of remand made without jurisdiction.—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) ss. 562, 588*—*Proceedings taken*

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

by first Court pending appeal from order. In a case where neither of the parties desired to have a local investigation, though suggested by the Courts, the lower Court dealt with the case on the material before it, and made a decree. On appeal, the Appellate Court remanded the case for the purpose of a local investigation being held at the cost, in the first instance, of the plaintiff. The lower Court thereupon made an order that the plaintiff should deposit the costs of the local investigation, and, on default being made by the plaintiff, it dismissed the suit. The order of remand was found to be invalid as made without jurisdiction. *Held*, that all proceedings taken by the Court of first instance alter the remand and pending the hearing of the appeal against the remand order were null and void, inasmuch as the jurisdiction of that Court to hear the case upon remand depended upon the validity of the remand order. An appeal, therefore, lay from the order of remand, notwithstanding the Court of first instance had subsequently made what purported to be a final decree in the case. **JATINGA VALLEY TEA COMPANY v. CHERA TEA COMPANY** **I. L. R. 12 Calc. 45**

93. ——— Order remanding case.—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 588, cls. 16 and 18 and s. 622*—*Superintendence of High Court.* Land having been sold in execution of decree, one claiming that it had been held by the judgment-debtor benami for him applied that the sale be cancelled. He was not a party to the decree, and on that ground his petition was dismissed. The Appellate Court was of opinion that it had been wrongly dismissed, and remanded the case to be disposed of on the merits. *Held*, on revision, that the order remanding the case was not appealable, and consequently that the petition for revision was maintainable. **TIMMANNA BANTA v. MAHABALA BHATTA** **I. L. R. 19 Mad. 167**

94. ——— *N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), s. 190*—*Appeal from Court of Revenue to District Judge*—*Order of remand by District Judge under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure*—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 588, cl. 28.* S. 190 of Act XII of 1881 makes s. 562 of Act XIV of 1882 applicable to appeals from a Court of Revenue to a District Judge, and where in such a case a District Judge has made an order of remand under s. 562, an appeal will lie from such order to the High Court under s. 588, cl. 28, of Act XIV of 1882. **PARTAP SINGH v. NARAIN DAS** **I. L. R. 16 All. 375**

95. ——— *Order of remand*—*Rule 17 of the Kumaun Rules, 1894, made under Scheduled Districts Act (XIV of 1874), s. 6*—*Code of Civil Procedure, ss. 562, 564*—*Right of appeal against order under s. 562.* Where the Deputy Commissioner of Naini Tal decided that a suit was barred by limitation, but at the same time also came to a definite decision on each of the other issues, and the Commissioner in appeal, setting aside the finding as to limitation, remanded the case under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure:—*Held*, that

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

under Government Notification No. ⁶²⁸ VII-569B, dated 27th June 1894, rule 17, an appeal lies from such an order of remand. *Muzhar Hossein v. Bodha Bibi*, I. L. R. 17 All. 112 : L. R. 22 : I. A. 1, referred to. *HAFIZ ABDUL RAHIM KHAN v. HARI RAJ SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 405

96. ——— Order remanding appeal case for investigation—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1859, s. 363. No appeal lies from an order of the Judge remanding an appeal case to the Court below for further investigation as to the facts. *HAROMOHUN MOOKERJEE v. SHOONAYANEE MOHUNT THAKOORANEY* . . . Marsh. 469 ; 2 Hay 591

97. ——— Order remanding case after local investigation—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1859, s. 363. An appeal lies from an order remanding a case for re-trial after local investigation, such order not being one under s. 363. *JEEBUN KISSAN ROY v. DWARKANATH ROY CHOWDHRY* . . . W. R., 1864, 363

98. ——— Order directing a local investigation. No appeal lies from the order of a Judge directing a local investigation by an ameen. *BAHADUR ALI v. BHABO SOONDUREE DEBIA CHOWDHRAIN* . . . 7 W. R. 425

99. ——— Order in case on appeal after compromise reported—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1859, s. 363. An appeal having gone down on remand from the High Court, the Zillah Judge considered he was bound to proceed with it, notwithstanding a representation made to him by petition that a compromise had been entered into between the parties. *Held*, that, by s. 363 of the *Civil Procedure Code*, an appeal could not be preferred against this order of the Judge. *SOROOP NARAIN PANDAH v. SOONDUR PORIA* . . . 11 W. R. 505

100. ——— Order of remand—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1877, ss. 562, 586—*Suit of the nature cognizable in Small Cause Court*. An order on appeal from a decree in an original suit of the nature cognizable in Mufassal Courts of Small Causes under s. 562 of Act X of 1877, remanding the suit for re-trial, is appealable, s. 586 of Act X of 1877 notwithstanding, as that section applies to appeals from appellate decrees, and not to appeals from orders. *COLLECTOR OF BIJNOR v. JAFAR ALI KHAN* . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 18

101. ——— Right of second appeal—*Suits cognizable by Courts of Small Causes—Act X of 1877*, ss. 562, 586, 588, 589. The right of appeal given by ss. 588 and 589 of Act X of 1877 from an order of remand, as contemplated by s. 562, is not taken away by s. 586. *Collector of Bijnor v. Jafar Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 3 All. 18, followed. *MAHADEV NARSINGH v. RAGHO KESHAV* . . . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 292

102. ——— Order of remand in suit cognizable by Small Cause Court—*Civil Procedure Code*, ss 588 (28) and 586. In a suit

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

to recover Rs238 (being the purchase-money for certain land) on failure to perform the contract to sell the plaintiff the land, the Munsif decided the case on the issue of limitation only, and *held* the suit was barred. The Judge held it was not barred, and made an order remanding the case for trial on the other issues. It was objected that, the suit being for a sum less than Rs500 and of a nature cognizable by a Small Cause Court, no appeal lay against the order of remand. *Held*, following *Collector of Bijnor v. Jafar Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 3 All. 18, and *Mahadev Narsingh v. Ragho Keshav*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 292, that the right of appeal conferred by s. 588, *Civil Procedure Code*, is not controlled by s. 586, and therefore an appeal lay. *CHINNATAMBI GOUNDEN v. CHINNANA GOUNDEN* . . . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 391

103. ——— Order in Small Cause Court suit by Judge without jurisdiction.—*Institution in Court of Subordinate Judge invested with powers of a Court of Small Causes—Trial by Subordinate Judge not so invested—Transfer of suit—Jurisdiction—Civil Procedure Code*, s. 25. A suit of the nature cognizable in a Court of Small Causes was instituted in the Court of a Subordinate Judge, the Judge of which at the time of the institution of the suit was personally invested with Small Cause Court jurisdiction. That Judge retired from office without trying the suit, and the District Judge directed his successor, who was not invested with Small Cause Court jurisdiction, to try it, and he did so. *Held*, that it must be taken that the suit was transferred under s. 25 of the *Civil Procedure Code* to the Court of the Subordinate Judge; and that, therefore, regard being had to the provisions of that section that the Court trying any suit withdrawn thereunder from a Court of Small Causes shall, for the purposes of such suit, be deemed a Court of Small Causes, no appeal would lie in the case to the District Judge. *KAULESHAR RAI v. DOST MUHAMMAD KHAN* . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 274

104. ——— Interlocutory order in Small Cause Court suit. Although no appeal lies to the High Court from the final decree made in a suit cognizable by a Small Cause Court, an appeal lies from an interlocutory order made in such a suit by a District Court. *GOLAM HUSEN v. MUSA MIYA HAMAD ALI* . . . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 260

105. ——— Order of remand in Small Cause Court suit—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)*, ss. 562, 586, 588 (cl. 28), and 589. A Court, in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, passed an order under s. 562 of the *Civil Procedure Code*, remanding a case of the Small Cause Court class as described in s. 586. *Held*, that, under the express words of the second portion of s. 589 of the Code, an appeal does lie to the High Court from such an order. *KIRTE MOHALDAR v. RAMJAN MOHALDAR* . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 523

106. ——— Order of Small Cause Court in execution. No appeal lies to the High

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

Court from the order of a Small Cause Court in execution. **MUTTEE LALL v. RAM DAS**

W. R., 1864, Mis. 38

107. ——— Order of Judge refusing to execute Small Cause Court decree. An appeal lies from the order of a Judge refusing to execute a decree of a Small Cause Court. **DELLAWAR ALI v. DABEE PERSHAD** . . . **11 W. R. 203**

108. ——— Order refusing to execute Small Cause Court decree transferred for execution to Munsif—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 223, 228, 249, 622—Mofussil Small Cause Court Act (XI of 1865), ss. 20, 21—Execution-proceedings.* The plaintiff obtained a decree in a Small Cause suit in a subordinate Court in the Mofussil, and a certificate was granted to him under s. 20 of the Mofussil Small Cause Court Act for the execution of the decree against immoveable property of the judgment-debtor in the jurisdiction of a District Munsif. He accordingly presented a petition to the District Munsif under s. 247 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but his petition was dismissed. *Held*, that an appeal lay to the District Court. **PERUMAL v. VENKATARAMA** . . . **I. L. R. 11 Mad. 130**

109. ——— Order of Subordinate Judge in overvalued Small Cause Court suit—*Valuation of suit—Act XI of 1865, ss. 5, 21—Subordinate Judge invested with the jurisdiction of a Small Cause Court.* A suit was filed in the Court of a First Class Subordinate Judge invested with the powers of a Small Cause Court up to Rs. 500. The claim was for Rs. 530-7-3, as money had and received by the defendant to the plaintiff's use. The Subordinate Judge did not deal with the case under his Small Cause Court jurisdiction, but tried it as an ordinary suit, and gave the plaintiff a decree for Rs. 441-0-7. On appeal, the District Judge was of opinion that the claim had been recklessly overvalued, and he held, therefore, that the suit was one cognizable by a Small Cause Court, and that the appeal was barred. *Held*, reversing the decision of the lower Appellate Court, that as the claim or "demand" exceeded Rs. 500—the pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes under s. 5 of Act XI of 1865—and as the case was not "tried under" the Act, s. 21 gave no finality to the decree of the Subordinate Judge, which was, therefore, appealable. **DAMODHAR TIMAJI GOSAVI v. TRIMBAK SAKHARAM** . . . **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 370**

110. ——— Order declining jurisdiction. An appeal lies from the decision of a Court upon the hearing of a cause that it has no jurisdiction on the ground that the suit has been instituted in the wrong district. **DHERAJ MAHATAB v. MUDGOOSOODUN MOOKERJEE** . . . **Marsh. 572**

111. ——— Order of Mamlatdar in boundary dispute. In a case where boundaries of land are disputed, an appeal from the mamlatdar lies to the Collector. A District Judge has no power to entertain such an appeal. **NARAYAN VAYANKATESH v. DHANDU DAMODHAR** . . . **4 Bom. A. C. 167**

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

112. ——— Order allowing decree-holder to take credit for his decree as purchaser—*Civil Procedure Code, 1:59, s. 270.* Where a second decree-holder is himself purchaser of a property sold in execution of his own decree, and, instead of the money being deposited in Court, an order is obtained allowing the decree-holder as purchaser to pay the purchase-money by his decree being taken as a credit on account of the purchase, such order is not open to appeal under s. 270, Act VIII of 1859. **RAJARAM CHOWDHRY v. SEETOLA BUKSH MISSEER** . . . **7 W. R. 113**

113. ——— Order directing prosecution for forgery. No appeal lies from an order of a Civil Court directing a criminal prosecution for forgery committed before it. **GUNGA NARAIN SIRCAR v. AZEEZUNISSA BEEBEE**

5 W. R. Mis. 18

ESHAN CHUNDER DUTT v. PRANNATH CHOWDHRY
Marsh. 270: 2 Hay 236

114. ——— Order in execution of decree—*Power of Senior Assistant Judge. Held*, that a Senior Assistant Judge is not competent to hear an appeal from an order made in the execution of a decree in a case in which he is not competent to hear an appeal from the decree itself. **NARBHERAM KISANDAS v. NAVNIDRAM KUSHIRAM**

5 Bom. A. C. 46

115. ——— Order making over proceeds of sale to Official Assignee. No appeal lies from the order of a Judge making over to the official assignee the proceeds of property sold in execution. **INDUR CHUNDER DOOGAR v. THE OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE** . . . **W. R. 100**

NEET LALL v. MILLER . . . **W. R. 420**

116. ——— Order rejecting appeal—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 336.* An appeal is not admissible against an order passed under s. 336, Act VIII of 1859. *In the matter of* **GOUREE SUNKUR** . . . **11 W. R. 556**

117. ——— Order rejecting application to sue as pauper—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 588.* No appeal lies under Act X of 1877 from an order made under that Act rejecting an application for permission to sue as a pauper. **COLLIS v. MANOHAR DAS** . . . **I. L. R. 1 All. 745**

118. ——— Order allowing withdrawal of suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 373—Withdrawal of suit—Appeal from order permitting withdrawal.* An order under s. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code permitting the withdrawal of a suit with liberty to bring a fresh one, not being made appealable by s. 588, or being a "decree" within the meaning of s. 2, is not appealable. **KALIAN SINGH v. LEKHRAJ SINGH** . . . **I. L. R. 6 All. 211**

119. ——— Order directing suit to be re-admitted and registered. An order made by a lower Court, directing a suit to be re-admitted and

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registered on the file of the Court, is not appealable. *HIRDHAMUN JHA v. JINGHOOR JHA*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 711

120.———Order of Civil Court on conviction of escape from custody—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 651. Quære: Whether a person convicted, under s. 651 of the Civil Procedure Code, of escaping from lawful custody, who is sentenced to one month's imprisonment only, can under s. 588 (29) of that Code appeal.* *EMPRESS v. AMAR NATH*

I. L. R. 5 All. 318

121.———Order of Collector in execution of decree—*Transfer to Collector—Appeal to High Court from orders of Collector—Jurisdiction—Civil Procedure Code, s. 320.* Orders passed by a Collector in the exercise of the powers conferred on him under s. 320 and the following sections of the Civil Procedure Code, relating to the execution of a decree of a Civil Court, after transfer of the decree to him under s. 320, are not appealable to the High Court. *Held, therefore, that the order of a Collector disallowing an application by the judgment-debtor that the amount of the decree might be satisfied by the temporary transfer of his immoveable property, and ordering the sale of such property, and the order of a Collector confirming a sale, were not appealable to the High Court.* *MADHO PRASAD v. HANSA KUAR. MAN KUAR v. RAM KISHORE.*

I. L. R. 5 All. 314

122.———Order disallowing claim—*S. 322B of Civil Procedure Code, Act X of 1877—Miscellaneous appeal.* An appeal from the decision by which a disputed claim is settled under s. 322B of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act X of 1877, is cognizable as a miscellaneous appeal, i.e., an appeal from a decree not passed in a regular suit. *Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Peria Tambi Nayakar.*

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 420

123.———Order directing penalty to be enforced under Stamp Act—*Decision as to penalty not appealable as a decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), s. 365—Civil Procedure Code, Act X of 1877, s. 588.* A decision of a Judge directing a penalty to be enforced under the Stamp Act, the case being afterwards proceeded with, is not appealable as a decree, as it cannot be said to be a decree affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. Nor can such a decision be said to be "an order as to a fine" within the meaning of s. 365 of Act VIII of 1859 (with which s. 588 of Act X of 1877, cl. 29, corresponds). *SONAKA CHOWDRAIN v. BHOJBUNJOY SHAHA*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 311

124.———Order dismissing suit on failure to serve summons—*Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 97, 588.* An order under s. 97 of the Civil Procedure Code dismissing a suit on it being found that the summons has not been served on the defendant, in consequence of the failure of the plaintiff to pay the Court-fee leviable for

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such service, is not appealable. *LUCKY CHURN CHOWDHRY v. BUDURRUNNISA*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 617
12 C. L. R. 484

125.———Order dismissing suit on failure to give security for costs—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 381—Decree.* *Held* by the Full Bench, that an appeal lies from an order passed under s. 381 of the Civil Procedure Code, dismissing a suit for failure by the plaintiff to furnish security for costs as ordered, such order being the "decree" in the suit. *WILLIAMS v. BROWN*

I. L. R. 8 All. 108

126.———Order of single Judge of High Court—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 588. S. 588, Act X of 1877, restricting appeals against orders, does not apply to prevent an appeal to the High Court from the order of a Judge of that Court.* *HURRISH CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. KALISUNDARI DEBI*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 482: 12 C. L. R. 511

127.———Order setting aside sale in execution of decree for rent—*Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 173.* No appeal lies from an order setting aside a sale under s. 173 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *ROGHU SINGH v. MISRI SINGH.*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 825

HARABANDHU ADHIKARI v. HARISH CHANDRA DEY PAL

3 C. W. N. 184

128.———Order on further directions varying report of Commissioners under decree for account in partnership suit—*Time for appeal—Letters Patent, cl. 15—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 588, 591.* A decree was passed in a partnership suit directing (*inter alia*) the taking of an account. The Commissioner having taken the account and made his report, an order was made, on further directions, varying it in certain respects. Subsequently a final decree was passed, founded in part on the order on further directions. An appeal was filed against the final decree, in which objection was taken to the order on further directions. It was contended that no appeal having been filed against the order on further directions, as might have been done under s. 15 of the Letters Patent, so much of the appeal as arose out of that order had been barred by lapse of time. *Held*, that the order passed on further directions was not appealable under Chapter XLI of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), and that it fell, therefore, under the concluding portion of s. 591 of the Civil Procedure Code, and any error in it might subsequently be set forth as a ground of appeal against the final decree. *Per JENKINS, C.J.*—Assuming that the order on further directions was a judgment within the meaning of s. 15 of the Letters Patent, and as such appealable, the contention of the respondent cannot prevail, as that would not deprive the appellants of their right to appeal under the Code. *JAMSETJI DADABHOY BARIA v. DADABHOY DAJIBHOY BARIA.*

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 302

APPEAL—*contd.*22. ORDERS—*contd.*

129. ——— Order made in the course of execution proceedings and not appealed against—*Right to raise the question as to its propriety in the appeal against the final order.* A decree having in 1894 been passed in favour of the plaintiff in a suit against a number of defendants for the recovery of land with mesne profits, the amount of such mesne profits was ordered to be fixed in execution. In 1897, an order was passed declaring that all the defendants were liable jointly and severally for such mesne profits, which order was not appealed against. Later in the same year a Commissioner was appointed to ascertain the amount of the said mesne profits, and in due course a final order in execution was passed by the District Court. At the time when the last-mentioned order was passed, certain of the defendants desired to re-open the question of their joint liability, but were not permitted to do so. *Held*, that, even assuming that the order declaring the defendants to be jointly and severally liable was one from which an appeal could have been preferred,—as to which there might be some doubt,—it was a determination of one of the questions which had to be determined before the particular application for execution could be finally disposed of; and the question of the propriety of the order was one that need not be at once raised by appeal, but could be raised in the appeal against the final order. *Caussanel v. Soures*, *I. L. R. 23 Mad. 260*, referred to. *GODAVARI SAMULO v. GAJAPATI NARAYAN DEO*
I. L. R. 23 Mad. 494

130. ——— Order confirming appointment of head of muths—*Nomination by a pandaram under a decree—Revocation of such nomination by the pandaram's successor.* The pandaram of a muth, being empowered under a decree to nominate a person to be the head of a subordinate muth, subject to the approval of the subordinate Court, made a nomination, and died before the subordinate Court had come to a determination as to the fitness of his nominee. His successor in office was brought on to the record, and revoked his nomination and made a fresh nomination. The subordinate Court treated the fresh nomination as a nullity, and made an order confirming the first. The pandaram appealed against this order. *Held*, (i) that an appeal lay against the order complained of; (ii) that the person whose nomination had been confirmed was a necessary party to the appeal. *GNANASAMBANDA v. VISVALINGA* . . . *I. L. R. 13 Mad. 338*

131. ——— Order in execution of decree of Privy Council—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 610.* Land was put up and purchased in execution of a decree, and the sale was confirmed, and the purchaser put into possession. On appeal against the order confirming the sale, the High Court set the sale aside. The purchaser preferred an appeal to the Privy Council, pending which he had to give up possession of the land, but security was furnished under an order of the Court by persons not parties to the suit for its re-delivery to him and for payment of

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mesne profits in case of his appeal being successful. On appeal, the Privy Council reversed the order of the High Court. The purchaser was accordingly replaced in possession of the land, and he applied for execution in respect of the mesne profits against the respondents in the Privy Council and the sureties. The Court of first instance dismissed the application as against the sureties, and limited the applicant's claim against the others to the net income of the land, less the cost of management, and allowed him no interest. *Held*, that the order must be taken to have been made under Civil Procedure Code, s. 610, and an appeal lay therefrom. *ARUNACHELLAM v. ARUNACHELLAM* . . . *I. L. R. 15 Mad. 203*

132. ——— Order for pre-emption—*Decree conditional on payment of price stated within a fixed period, otherwise suit to stand dismissed—Non-payment of pre-emptive price—Appeal after expiration of period fixed by decree.* The plaintiff in a pre-emption suit obtained a decree in his favour for pre-emption of the share in suit on payment of a fixed sum within a period specified in the decree, otherwise his suit was to stand dismissed:—*Held*, that the plaintiff could appeal from such decree after the period prescribed therein had elapsed without his paying in the pre-emptive price fixed thereby, both as to the correctness of the pre-emptive price and as to the reasonableness of the time allowed for payment. *KODAI SINGH v. JAISRI SINGH*
I. L. R. 13 All. 189, 376

133. ——— Decree conditional on payment of pre-emptive price within a fixed period—*Appeal after expiry of such period.* *Held*, that plaintiffs in a pre-emption suit, who had obtained a decree conditional on payment by them of the pre-emptive price within a certain fixed period could, after the expiration of such period, appeal against such decree on the ground that a condition of the contract out of which their right to pre-empt arose had not been embodied in the decree. *Kodai Singh v. Jaisri Singh*, *I. L. R. 13 All. 376*, referred to. *WAZIR KHAN v. KALE KHAN*
I. L. R. 16 All. 126

134. ——— Order of Collector confirming sale for arrears of dak cess under Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act VII of 1880). A revenue-paying talukh was sold for arrears of dak cess under the Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act VII of 1880). Application was made to the Collector to set aside the sale, but the application was refused. *Held*, following the ruling in *Sadhu Saran Singh v. Panchdeo Lal*, *I. L. R. 14 Calc. 1*, that an appeal lay to the Revenue Commissioner against the Collector's order affirming the sale. *LALA PRYAG LAL v. JAI NARAYAN SINGH* . . . *I. L. R. 22 Calc. 419*

135. ——— Order setting aside ex-parte decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 108 and 591.* The words "affecting the decision of the case" in s. 591 of the Civil Procedure Code mean "affecting the decision of the case with refer-

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ence to the merits of it." Where an *ex-parte* decree was set aside by an order under s. 108 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the suit heard upon the merits and dismissed:—*Held*, that such order was not an order affecting the decision of the case under s. 591, and was not appealable under that section. *CHINTAMONY DASSI v. RAGHOONATH SAHOO*
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 981

136. ——— Order striking off application for execution, but maintaining attachment—Order not disposing of or affecting execution of decree. A decree-holder, in execution of his decree, attached certain immoveable property of his judgment-debtor; but on his taking no other steps to complete the execution of the decree, the Court struck off the execution-proceedings maintaining the attachment. Against this order the decree-holder appealed. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the order in question was not a judicial disposal of the application for sale, and would not preclude the decree-holder from continuing the execution of his decree, an appeal from such order was superfluous, and must be dismissed. *RATTANJI v. HARI HAR DAT DUBE*
I. L. R. 17 All. 243

137. ——— Order refusing to accept deposit on account of sale in execution of decree—Civil Procedure Code, s. 310A. No appeal will lie from an order passed under s. 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure refusing to accept a deposit tendered under that section on the ground that it was too late. *BASHIR-UD-DIN v. JHORI SINGH*
I. L. R. 19 All. 140

138. ——— Order amending sale-certificate—Order granting application for review of order—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244—Question relating to execution of decree. No appeal lies from an order granting an application for the amendment of a sale-certificate. *Bhimlal Das v. Ganesha Koer*, 1 C. W. N. 658, approved. *BUJHA ROY v. RAM KUMAR PERSHAD*
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 529
3 C. W. N. 374

139. ——— Order rejecting claim of alleged representative of deceased plaintiff, and for abatement of suit—Civil Procedure Code (1882), ss. 366 and 367—Dispute as to right to represent a deceased plaintiff—Right of his adopted son to continue the suit. The plaintiff in a partition suit in which his brother was defendant died, and an application was made on behalf of a boy alleged to have been adopted by the widow of the deceased under his authority that his name be brought on to the record as plaintiff. This application was made within six months of the death of the original plaintiff. The Court of first instance rejected the application, which the defendant opposed on the ground that the boy had not been adopted, and dismissed the suit on the ground that it had abated. *Held*, that appeals lay against the rejection of the above application, and also against the dismissal of the suit. *Per Curiam*: A dispute

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within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code, s. 367, need not be between persons claiming to represent the deceased plaintiff. *SUBBAYYA v. SAMINADIVAR*
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 498

See *HAMIDA BIBI v. ALI HUSEN KHAN*
I. L. R. 17 All. 172

140. ——— Order rejecting application for suit to abate—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 366. *Held*, that an order rejecting an application that a suit might be declared to have abated by reason of the death of the plaintiff and the invalidity of an application to the Court to bring legal representative on to the record was not one of the orders contemplated by s. 366 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that no appeal would lie therefrom. *BHAGWAN DAS v. MAHARAJA OF BHARTPUR*
I. L. R. 17 All. 286

141.—Order admitting review. The admission of a review presented out of time without any sufficient cause is a good ground of appeal under s. 629, cl. (c), of the Code of Civil Procedure. *PURNA CHANDRA SARKAR v. NIL MADHUB NANDI* (1901)
5 C. W. N. 485

142.—Order amending decree—Order amending a decree not in conformity with the judgment—Appeal from such an order—Decree—Review of judgment—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 206, 588, 622, 624. There is no appeal from an order, under s. 206 of the Code of Civil Procedure, amending a decree not in conformity with the judgment. The remedy, if any, in such a case would be by an application under s. 622 of the Code. *Kali Prosunno Basu v. Lal Mohan Guha*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 253, discussed. *Joy Kishen Mookerjee v. Ataoor Rohoman*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 22; *Surta v. Ganga*, I. L. R. 7 All. 875; *Abdul Hayai Khan v. Chunia Kuar*, I. L. R. 8 All. 377; and *Muhammad Sulaiman Khan v. Fatima*, I. L. R. 11 All. 314, referred to. *NALINAKSHYA GHOSAL v. MAFAKSHAR HOSSAIN* (1900)
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 177

143.—Order awarding compensation—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 491, 588—Attachment before judgment. There is no appeal from an order awarding compensation under s. 491 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *NARASINGA BHAKSHI v. GOVINDA BHAKSHI* (1900)
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 62

144.—Order declaring suit to have abated—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 368, 588 (18). *Held*, that an order made under the penultimate clause of s. 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure, declaring a suit to have abated, is appealable, not as a decree, but as an order under s. 588 (18) of the Code. *MEHDI HUSAIN v. SUGHRA BEGAM* (1902)
I. L. R. 25 All. 206

145.—Order in insolvency—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 2, 351, 589—Order in insolvency made by Subordinate Judge. An appeal against an order in insolvency, passed under s. 351 of the

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Code of Civil Procedure by a Court of Small Causes exercising the powers of a Subordinate Judge, will lie to the District Judge, and not to the High Court, and this appellate jurisdiction is not dependent upon either the value of the decree in respect of which the order in insolvency was obtained or the amount of the debts entered in the schedule of debts filed by the applicant for a declaration of insolvency. *Venkatrayar v. Jambooy Ayyan*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 377, dissented from. *Sitharama v. Vythilinga*, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 472; *Vaikunt Prabhu v. Moidin Saheb*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 89; and *Shankar v. Vilhal*, I. L. R. 21 Bom. 45, referred to. *DEBI PRASAD v. JAMNA DAS* (1900) . . . I. L. R. 23 All. 56

146.—Order in Small Cause suit—*Subordinate Judge invested with Small Cause jurisdiction—Small Cause suit tried by a Subordinate Judge under his ordinary jurisdiction—Appeal—Jurisdiction.* Where a Subordinate Judge invested with Small Cause jurisdiction tried a small cause suit under his ordinary jurisdiction. *Held*, that the character of the suit was not altered by the mode in which the Subordinate Judge had exercised his jurisdiction, and that his decree, being final, was not appealable to the District Court. *SHANKAR BHAI v. SOMABHAI* (1900) . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 417

147.—Order refusing application to be declared insolvent—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 344, 345, 588 (17) and 589—Application to be declared an insolvent—Subject-matter of the suit over Rs. 5,000 in value—First Class Subordinate Judge—Rejection of the application—Appeal—District Court.* In a suit, the subject-matter of which was over Rs. 5,000 in value, the plaintiff applied for execution. The defendant applied to be declared an insolvent under ss. 344 and 345 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). The First Class Subordinate Judge rejected the application. An appeal was preferred to the High Court. *Held*, dismissing the appeal and returning the memo. of appeal for presentation to the proper Court, that the appeal lay to the District Court under ss. 588, cl. (17) and 589 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Venkatrayar v. Jambooy Ayyan*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 377, not followed. *MANEKSHAH SORABJI GANDHI v. DADABHAI JAMSHETJI* (1903)

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 604

148.—Order rejecting a plaint—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 562, 588.* Where the first Court rejected the plaint on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action and of defendants, and the lower Appellate Court upon appeal set aside the order and remanded the case for decision on the merits: *Held*, that an appeal lies to the High Court under s. 588 against that order, as an order under s. 562, Civil Procedure Code. *RAM PRASAD v. SACHI DASSI* (1902) . . . 6 C. W. N. 585

149.—Order returning plaint—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 582, 588 (6), 589—Order of Appellate Court returning plaint for presentation to*

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proper Court—Act VII of 1887 (Suits Valuation Act), s. 11. S. 588 (6) of the Code of Civil Procedure refers, not only to orders passed by a Court of first instance, but to similar orders which an appellate Court may pass by virtue of s. 582 of the Code. Where an order returning a plaint for amendment, or to be presented to the proper Court, is passed by a Court of Appeal, an appeal will lie from such order, in the manner provided by s. 589 of the Code. *Bindeshri Chaubey v. Nandu*, I. L. R. 3 All. 456, overruled. *Chinnasami Pillai v. Karuppa Udayan*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 234, and *Goor Bux Sahoo v. Bir Lal Benka*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 275, followed. Where, however, an Appellate Court makes an order returning a plaint for presentation to the proper Court, the Court of first instance having heard and decided the suit, it is the duty of the Appellate Court, under s. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, first to find, and to record its reasons for so finding, whether the error in valuation complained of has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit on the merits. *WAHID-ULLAH v. KANHAYA LAL* (1902)

I. L. R. 25 All. 174

150.—Order of remand—*Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 109A—Appeal from an order of remand passed by a Special Judge—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 588.* An appeal does not lie from an order of remand passed by a Special Judge under the Bengal Tenancy Act. *MOTHUR CHANDRA MAJUMDAR v. TARA SUNKAR GHOSE* (1903) . . . 7 C. W. N. 440

151.—Order under Mad. Act VIII of 1865 (Rent Recovery), ss. 10, 69—*Adjudication that plaintiff has failed to prove default by defendant—"Judgment."* An order passed under s. 10 of the Rent Recovery Act, which amounts to an adjudication that the plaintiff has failed to prove default on behalf of the defendant, is a judgment within the meaning of s. 69 of the Act; and an appeal lies therefrom. *Narasimhaswami v. Lakshamma*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 436, followed. *VENKATA PAPAYYA RAO v. VENKATA SUBBAYYA* (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 453

152.—Order under Mad. Reg. III of 1802, s. 16, cl. 7—*Claim for property of an intestate—Order dismissing petition.* No appeal lies against an order of a District Judge passed under s. 16, cl. 7, of Madras Regulation III of 1802. *NARASAYYA v. COLLECTOR OF ANANTAPUR* (1900)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 95

153.—Order under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 232—Order refusing to recognise transferee of decree—Appeal.* An order passed under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code, refusing to recognise the transferee of a decree, may, for purposes of appeal, be regarded as an order passed under s. 244, and is therefore appealable. *Virasami Rowth v. Bodi Naikan* (Appeal against Appellate Order No. 60

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of 1899—unreported), followed. SUBBUTHAYAMMAL v. CHIDAMBARAM ASARI (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 383

154. — *Purchase of mortgaged property by mortgagee—Application by purchaser to recover possession as against defendants who held possession under prior sale based on prior mortgage—Question raised whether purchaser could recover possession without first paying defendants amount of prior mortgage—“Execution and enforcement of decree”—Appeal.* A mortgagee obtained a decree directing the sale of property in the possession of certain defendants, subject to a prior charge thereon. At the sale in execution of that decree, the mortgagee purchased the property. He now sought to recover possession of it from the defendants, the question raised being whether, under the terms of the decree, he was entitled to be put into possession without paying the amount of the prior charge, the defendants so dispossessed being at liberty to bring a separate suit to enforce the charge. *Held*, that the question thus raised between the decree-holder (purchaser) and the defendants related, within the meaning of s. 244 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code, to the execution or enforcement of the decree against these defendants, and an appeal lay from an order passed thereon. *Per* MOORE, J.—Even if the purchaser had not been also the decree-holder, he would have been a representative of a judgment-creditor. *Per* BHASHYAM AYYANGAR, J.—The order was not the less an order under s. 244 because it was also passed under ss. 318 and 334 of the Code. KASINATHA AYYAR v. UTHUMANSA ROWTHAN (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 529

155. — *Determination of question whether party applying for execution is representative of decree-holder.* The effect of the last clause of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to give the right of appeal against an order determining whether a party applying for execution is or is not the representative of the decree-holder. KRISHNAMA CHARIAR v. APPASAMI MUDALIAR (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 545

156. — *Order under s. 372, Civil Procedure Code—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 2, 372, 588 (21)—Order allowing objection under s. 372—Order decree.* A suit was brought by one Mewa Ram against Tej Singh and others. That suit was decreed *ex parte*. An application was, however, made by the defendants under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the result of which the *ex parte* decree was set aside and the suit reinstated. Upon the restoration of the suit, one Chabeli Ram, claiming to be an assignee of the rights of the original plaintiff, applied under s. 372 of the Code that his own name might be substituted as plaintiff for that of Mewa Ram. The plaintiff did not oppose this application. But the defendants objected, and the application was rejected. Subsequently, on the same day, the suit was dismissed. Chabeli Ram appealed against

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the Court's order rejecting his application under s. 372 of the Code. His appeal was allowed, and his name was brought on the record. This appeal seems to have been treated as also an appeal from the decree in the suit, and the Court made an order under s. 562 of the Code, remanding the suit for trial on the merits. *Held*, on appeal from this order, that no appeal lay to the lower Appellate Court from the order of the Court of first instance allowing the defendant's objection to Chabeli Ram's application under s. 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure; neither was such order a decree within the meaning of s. 2. *Moti Ram v. Kundan Lal*, I. L. R. 22 All. 380, and *Indo Mati v. Gaya Prasad*, I. L. R. 19 All. 142, distinguished. *Lalit Mohan Roy v. Shebock Chand Chowdhry*, 4 C. W. N. 403, referred to. TEJ SINGH v. CHABELI RAM (1902)

I. L. R. 24 All. 342

157. — *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 372, 588 (21)—Application to be brought on to record of appeal as assignee of deceased appellant—Application rejected—No appeal from order rejecting application.* *Held*, that no appeal would lie from an order rejecting the application of a person who claimed to be brought on to the record of an appeal as being the assignee of the deceased sole appellant. *Lalit Mohan Roy v. Shebock Chand Chowdhry*, 4 C. W. N. 403, followed. *Moti Ram v. Kundan Lal*, I. L. R. 22 All. 380, overruled. *Indo Mati v. Gaya Prasad*, I. L. R. 19 All. 142, explained and distinguished. JAMNA BIBI v. SHEIKH JHAN (1902)

I. L. R. 24 All. 532

23. PROBATE.

1. — *Order to suspend probate—Succession Act, s. 265—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 363.* Where an application for probate has been granted, and, an objection being made, a subsequent order is passed directing that the case be re-opened, that probate be suspended for a time certain, and that executor bring in his evidence to prove his right to obtain probate:—*Held*, that no appeal lies from such an order. Act X of 1865, s. 263, and Act VIII of 1859, s. 363, discussed. BROJO NATH PAL v. DASMONY DASSEE . 2 C. L. R. 589

2. — *Order of District Judge admitting person as caveator—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 86—Civil Procedure Code, s. 588, cl. 2.* S. 86 of the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881) makes the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to orders passed under that Act. An appeal therefore lies to the High Court from the order of a District Judge admitting a person as a caveator under s. 69 of the Act; such an order is appealable under s. 588, cl. 2, of the Code. ABHIRAM DASS v. GOPAL DASS

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 48

3. — *Order refusing to make person party defendant to an application for probate—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 53 and 86.* S. 86, read with s. 53 of

APPEAL—*contd.*23. PROBATE—*concl'd.*

the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), only allows an appeal to the High Court in cases in which an appeal is allowable under the Code of Civil Procedure. No appeal therefore lies against an order refusing to make a person opposing probate a party defendant to an application for probate. *Abirunnissa Khatoon v. Komurunnissa Khatoon*, I. L. R. 13 Cal. 100, and *Karman Bibi v. Misri Lal*, I. L. R. 2 All. 904, followed. *Khettramani Dasi v. Shyama Churn Kundu*

I. L. R. 21 Cal. 539

4. ——— Order refusing to amend probate—*Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 86—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 263.* No appeal lies from an order refusing to amend a clerical error in a grant of probate either under s. 86 of the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881) or s. 263 of the Succession Act (X of 1865). *Khettramani Dasi v. Shyama Churn Kundu*, I. L. R. 21 Cal. 539, referred to. *GERINDRA KUMAR DASS GUPTA v. RAJESWARI ROY*, I. L. R. 27 Cal. 5

24. RECEIVERS.

1. ——— Order refusing to remove a receiver—*Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 2, 244, 503, 540, 588—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11.* By a decree in an administration-suit, A was appointed receiver "to manage the estate." A died, and by a subsequent order B was appointed receiver. One of the defendants in the suit applied to have B removed from the office of receiver on the ground of his alleged mismanagement of the estate. The application was refused. *Held*, that the order of refusal was appealable, whether the former Code or the present Code of Civil Procedure was deemed to be applicable, being an order made in respect of a question arising between the parties to a suit relating to the execution of the decree. *MITHIBAI v. LIMJI NOWROJI BANAJI*, I. L. R. 5 Bom. 45

2. ——— Orders submitting person for and confirming nomination as receiver—*Reference to the District Court—Appealable order—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 503, 504, and 505.* No appeal lies from an order passed under s. 505 of the Civil Procedure Code by Court subordinate to a District Court, submitting the name of a person sought to be appointed a receiver together with the grounds for the nomination, such order being only a preliminary order or expression of opinion, and not an order under s. 503. Nor does an appeal lie from the order of the District Court confirming such nomination, but the District Court ought, when the question is raised, to decide on the necessity for the appointment of a receiver, the words "or pass such other order as it thinks fit" in s. 505 being sufficient to include that question, and not merely to decide the fitness or otherwise of the person nominated to the office of receiver. *BIRAJAN KOORE v. RAM CHURN LALL MAHATA*

I. L. R. 7 Cal. 719 : 9 C. L. R. 203

APPEAL—*contd.*24. RECEIVERS—*contd.*

3. ——— Order refusing to appoint receiver—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 503, 588 (24).* An order refusing to appoint a receiver under s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not appealable. *SUBRAMANYA v. APPASAMI*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 355

4. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 92.* An appeal did not lie against an order refusing to appoint a receiver under Act VIII of 1859, s. 92. *Ex parte IMEICHI PATAMA*

1 Mad. 129

5. ——— Order refusing to appoint a receiver—*Subordinate Judge, power of, to appoint—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 503, 505.* A Subordinate Judge, when considering the expediency of the appointment of a receiver, is acting under s. 503 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) as explained by s. 505. When he does appoint, his order is passed under s. 503, and when he refuses to take the necessary step preliminary to appointment his order is also made under that section. An appeal lies from such an order made by a Subordinate Judge. Circumstances under which a receiver is appointed, considered. *John v. John*, L. R. 2 Ch. 578, referred to. *SANGAPPA v. SHIVBASAWA*

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 38

6. ——— Order dismissing application for appointment of receiver—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 503.* An order made by a Subordinate Judge, dismissing an application under s. 503 for the appointment of a receiver in a suit pending before him, or declining to nominate a receiver, is an order under that section and not under s. 505, and is, therefore, appealable under s. 588 of the Civil Procedure Code as amended by Act XII of 1879. *Gossain Dulmir Puri v. Tekait Hetnarain*

6 C. L. R. 467

7. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 503, 505, 588—Order rejecting application to appoint receiver—Appealable order.* An order rejecting an application to appoint a receiver is an order passed under s. 503, and is, therefore, appealable under s. 588, cl. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Subramanya v. Appasami*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 355, overruled. *VENKATASAMI v. STRIDAVAMMA*

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 179

See ANONYMOUS CASE

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 180, note

8. ——— Order rejecting application for receiver—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1892), ss. 503, 505, 588 (24), and 589—Bengal, North-Western Provinces, and Assam Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887), s. 21.* An appeal lies from an order rejecting an application for a receiver under s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the order on appeal is final under s. 588. *Gossain Dulmir Puri v. Tekait Hetnarain*, 6 C. L. R. 467, followed. The Court to which such an appeal lies from the order of a Subordinate Judge is, under s. 21 of Act XII of 1887, the High Court where the value of the suit is above Rs. 5,000, and the District Judge's

APPEAL—*contd.*24. RECEIVERS—*concl.*

Court in other cases. *BOIDYA NATH ADYA v. MAKHAN LAL ADYA*. I. L. R. 17 Calc. 680

9. ———— *Order refusing to accept nomination of appointment of Receiver—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 503.* Where a District Judge receives a report from the Subordinate Court recommending the appointment of a Receiver, and on that report and recommendation he refuses to make the appointment, his order must be taken as an order made under s. 503 of the Civil Procedure Code, and is appealable under cl. 24 of s. 588 of the Code. *KHAGENDRA NARAIN SING v. SHASHADHAR JHA* (1904). I. L. R. 31 Calc. 495

10. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 503, 535 and 588—Recommendation by Subordinate Judge of a person to be appointed receiver—Refusal by District Judge.* A Subordinate Judge recommended to the District Judge that a certain person be appointed receiver and in case of the recommendation not being accepted, the Nazir of his Court should be appointed. The District Judge refused to authorize the Subordinate Judge to appoint either of the persons so recommended. Against the order of the District Judge an appeal was preferred to the High Court. *Held*, that no appeal lay. The District Judge's order was passed under s. 505 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) and not under s. 503. It was therefore an order which was not appealable not being specified in the list of orders in s. 588. *Birajan Koor v. Ram Churn Lall Mahata*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 719, followed. *BAI MANI v. KHIMCHAND* (1908). I. L. R. 33 Bom. 104

25. REGULATIONS.

1. ———— *Beng. Reg. XV of 1793—Order refusing application by mortgagee for return of excess payment under Reg. XV of 1793.* No appeal lies from an order refusing an application by a mortgagor for the return of excess payment alleged to have been made by him in a proceeding under Regulation XV of 1793 by which he redeemed his mortgage. *SREEMAN CHUNDER BANERJEE v. MODHOO SOODUN ROY*. 24 W. R. 17

2. ———— *Beng. Reg. I of 1798—Order of District Judge—Act XXIII of 1881, s. 38.* No appeal was provided from a summary order made by a District Judge under Regulation I of 1798; but such order was open to question in a regular suit. Act XXIII of 1861, s. 38, gave no right of appeal in such cases, but provided merely that the mode of trial and the procedure incidental and ancillary thereto, laid down in the Civil Procedure Code, should be applied throughout in miscellaneous cases and proceedings. *HUREENATH KOONDoo v. MODHOO SOODUN SAHA*. 19 W. R. 122

3. ———— *Beng. Regs. V of 1812, s. 26, and V of 1827, s. 3—Order for attachment and managers.* No appeal lay to the High Court

APPEAL—*contd.*25. REGULATIONS—*concl.*

from an order passed by a District Judge, issuing a precept to the Collector to hold an estate in attachment and to appoint a manager under s. 26, Regulation V of 1812, and s. 3, Regulation V of 1827. *In the matter of the petition of the COLLECTOR OF FURREEDPORE*. 12 B. L. R. F. B. 366

GOOROO DASS ROY v. COLLECTOR OF FURREEDPORE 19 W. R. 170 and 20 W. R. 262

4. ———— *Beng. Reg. V of 1812—Order of Collector refusing to make distribution among shareholders.* An appeal did not lie to the High Court from the order of a Collector refusing to distribute amongst the shareholders the amount of their shares of the surplus proceeds of a joint undivided estate attached and administered under Regulation V of 1812. *JOGO MOYEE CHOWDHRAIN v. THE GOVERNMENT*. 3 W. R. Mis. 17

5. ———— *Beng. Reg. VIII of 1819, s. 6—Order of Civil Court.* There is no appeal from an order made by the Civil Court under s. 6 of Regulation VIII of 1819. *In the matter of the petition of SOORJA KANT ACHARJ CHOWDHRY* I. L. R. 1 Calc. 383 25 W. R. 222

6. ———— *Beng. Reg. III of 1872, s. 5—Suit referred to Civil Court in Sonthal Pergunnahs, order in.* A decision on an issue or in a suit properly referred to a Civil Court in the Sonthal Pergunnahs, under s. 5, Regulation III of 1872, was appealable to the High Court under Act VIII of 1859, which was applicable to the Sonthal Pergunnahs. *TARINI PROSAD MISSEER v. MAHAMMAD CHODWHRY*. 6 C. L. R. 555

26. REMAND.

1.—*Order of remand—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 586, 588.* An appeal from an order of remand passed by the Appellate Court is specifically given by cl. (28) of s. 588, Civil Procedure Code, and s. 586, Civil Procedure Code, which bars a second appeal to suits of a Small Cause Court nature of below Rs500 in value, does not exclude an appeal from an order of remand passed in such a suit. *AGANDH MAHTO v. KHAGAL ALIULLAH* (1907)

11 C. W. N. 862

2.—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 562—Remand, order of—Appeal from order of remand after decision of the suit in accordance therewith.* *Held*, that no appeal will lie from an order of remand passed under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure if such appeal is filed after the suit has in compliance with the order of remand been decided and no appeal is preferred from the decree in the suit. *Madhusudan Sen v. Kamini Kanta Sen*, 9 C. W. N. 895, followed. *Rameswar Singh v. Sheodin Singh*, I. L. R. 12 All. 510, distinguished. *SALIG RAM v. BRIJ BILAS* (1907). I. L. R. 29 All. 659

APPEAL—*contd.*26. REMAND—*concl.*

3.— *Remand, order of—Erroneous order made with consent—Appeal—Appeal after taking full benefit of order—Election of remedies—Bar—“Final disposal of suit,” when.* An order of remand made with consent will bind the parties though made contrary to the provisions of s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Madhu Sudan Sen v. Kamini Kanta Sen*, 9 C. W. N. 895; s.c. I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1923, referred to. *Per Mukherjee, J.* An Appellate Court does not act without jurisdiction when it makes an erroneous order of remand, but merely commits an error of law, in making an order of a particular description in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation. Such error may be cured by consent. It cannot be laid down as an inflexible rule of law that under all circumstances the final disposal of a suit must be taken to be the delivery of the judgment. When a litigant has the right to choose between two remedies, which are not co-existent, but alternative, and adopts one of those remedies, his act at once operates as a bar as regards the other and the bar is final and absolute. After having taken the full benefit of an order of remand, it is not open to a party to turn round and appeal against it. *BAIKUNTHA NATH DEV v. SALIMULLA BAHADUR* (1907) 12. C. W. N. 590

4.— *Judgment of lower Appellate Court not complying with the requirements of section—Order to be made on second appeal.* Where, on second appeal, it is found that the judgment of the lower Appellate Court does not fulfil the requirements of s. 574 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the proper order to be made on second appeal is one setting aside the decree, and remanding the case to the Appellate Court to be disposed of according to law. *Krishna Reddi v. Srinivasa Reddi*, 4 M. H. C. 174, not followed. If the Judge of the Court to which the case remanded is the Judge who heard the appeal in the first instance he is not bound to re-hear the appeal if he considers that the case might be properly disposed of without so doing. In such a case his writing a judgment satisfying the requirements of s. 574 will be a sufficient compliance with the order to dispose of the case according to law. But where the Judge of the Court to which the case is remanded is not the Judge who heard the appeal in the first instance, as also in cases where the Judge, though the same, considers such a course necessary for a proper disposal of the case, a re-hearing is necessary for a disposal of the case according to law. *SARAVANA PILLAI v. SESA REDDI* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 469

27. RIGHT OF APPEAL, EFFECT OF REPEAL ON.

1.— *Civil Procedure Code (X of 1877)—Civil Procedure Code, 1859.* In all suits instituted before Act X of 1877 came into force, in which an appeal lay to the High Court under Act

APPEAL—*contd.*27. RIGHT OF APPEAL, EFFECT OF REPEAL ON—*contd.*

VIII of 1859, an appeal still lies notwithstanding the repeal of that Act by Act X of 1877. *RUNJIT SINGH v. MEHERBAN KOER*

I. L. R. 3 Cal. 662

2.— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859—Repeal by Civil Procedure Code, 1877.* A decree was obtained *ex-parte* before October 1st, 1877, and an application was made by the defendant for the first time in May 1878 to have the case reopened. This application was refused and an appeal was thereupon preferred against the order of refusal. *Held*, that no appeal would lie under Act X of 1877, and that, as there was at the time of that Act coming into operation, no proceeding on foot on the part of the appellant which could be saved by the operation of s. 6 of Act I of 1868, there was no remedy by way of appeal from the order under Act VIII of 1859. *Runjit Singh v. Meherban Kcer*, I. L. R. 3 Cal. 662; 2 C. L. R. 391, distinguished. *In the matter of APACH OJHA v. RAM DULARI KOER* 4 C. L. R. 18

3.— *General Clauses Consolidation Act, I of 1868, s. 6—Order refusing attachment in execution of decree—Repeal by Civil Procedure Code, X of 1877.* The holder of a decree for money applied for the attachment in the execution of the decree of certain moneys deposited in Court to the credit of the judgment-debtor. On the 4th June 1877, the Court of first instance refused the attachment on the ground that the decree directed the sale of certain immoveable property for its satisfaction, and awarded no other relief. The order of the Court of first instance was affirmed by the lower Appellate Court on the 4th August 1877. Act X of 1877, repealing Act VIII of 1859 and Act XXIII of 1861, came into force on the 1st October 1877. On the 13th November 1877, the decree-holder applied to the High Court for the admission of a second appeal from the order of the lower Appellate Court, on the ground that the decree had been misconstrued. *Held*, that an appeal was admissible under the repealed Act VIII of 1859, under the provisions of s. 6 of Act I of 1868. *Held*, also, that the order of the lower Appellate Court was also appealable under Act X of 1877. *THAKUR PRASAD v. AHSAN ALI*

I. L. R. 1 All. 668

4.— *Change of procedure—Right of appeal—Order under Civil Procedure Code, 1877, setting aside sale under Act VIII of 1859.* Where a decree for sale of certain property was obtained under Act VIII of 1859, and the property was sold, but an order was passed after the new Code of Procedure, Act X of 1877, had come into force, setting aside such sale: *Held*, that an appeal would lie from such an order under Act X of 1877. *HARBUNS SAHAJ v. BHAIRO PERSHAD SINGH* I. L. R. 5 Cal. 259

4 C. L. R. 23

5.— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877—Act XII of 1879, s. 102—General Clauses*

APPEAL—contd.**27. RIGHT OF APPEAL, EFFECT OF REPEAL ON—contd.**

Consolidation Act (I of 1868), s. 6. On the 25th June 1879, a Subordinate Judge made an order setting aside the sale of immoveable property in the execution of a decree from which an appeal was preferred, under Act X of 1877, to the District Court, on the 25th July 1879, before Act XII of 1879 came into force. *Held*, that, as the appeal would not have lain at all had Act XII of 1879 been in force on the date of its institution, s. 102 of that Act did not apply; but as the appeal lay to the District Court under the law in force on that date, it was competent to dispose of it under the provision of s. 6 of Act I of 1868. *DURGA PRASAD v. RAM CHARAN* . . . **I. L. R. 2 All. 785**

6. — Registration Act, 1871—
General Clauses Consolidation Act, I of 1868—
Repeal by Registration Act, III of 1877. An order refusing registration of a deed was passed on 23rd August 1872; and when Act VIII of 1871 was in force, an application for review was presented, and finally rejected on 20th December 1877, after the repeal of Act VIII of 1871 by Act III of 1877. *Held*, that under the provisions of s. 6 of Act I of 1868 (the General Clauses Act), the proceedings must be governed by the Act in force at the time when they were instituted, namely, by Act VIII of 1871, and therefore no appeal would lie. *MAHOMED HOSSEIN v. HADZI ABDULLAH*
I. L. R. 3 Calc. 727

7. — Collector's action—Appeal to Commissioner—Civil Court—Bhagdari and Narwadari Act (Bombay Act V of 1862), ss. 3, 5. *Held*, that an appeal from an order passed by the Collector under s. 3 of the Bhagdari and Narwadari Act (Bombay Act V of 1862) lies to the Commissioner. *JETHABHAI v. NATHABHAI* (1904)
I. L. R. 28 Bom. 399

8. — Appeal, right of—Appeal by defendant against whom suit dismissed—Party whether aggrieved by decree, a question of fact—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 108, 591—Orders setting aside ex parte decree, whether one affecting decision of the case. *Held*, on a review of authorities, that a defendant has the right to appeal notwithstanding that the suit has been dismissed as against him, if he is aggrieved by the decree. *Mussumut Oognee Choudhrai v. Shaikh Keramutoollah*, 17 W. R. 219, distinguished. The question whether a party is aggrieved by a decree is a question of fact to be determined in each case according to its peculiar circumstances. *KRISHNA CHANDRA GOLDAR v. MAHESH CHANDRA SAHA* (1905)
9 C. W. N. 584

9. — Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 153—Order setting aside sale—High Court—Revision, power of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622. An order setting aside a sale in execution of a decree decides a question relating to the title to the land or to some interest in the

APPEAL—contd.**27. RIGHT OF APPEAL, EFFECT OF REPEAL ON—contd.**

land as between parties having conflicting claims thereto, and is therefore appealable under s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), although it was made by an officer specially authorized under the section in a suit for rent valued at less than fifty rupees. In deciding whether an order is appealable under that section the point for consideration is not what that decree in the suit decided, but what the order decided. *Monmohini Dasi v. Lakhinarain Chandra*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 116, distinguished. Where a Court rejects an application under ss. 244 and 311 of the Civil Procedure Code on the ground that the applicant had no *locus standi*, the case would not fall within s. 622 of the Code. *GANGA CHARAN BHATTACHARJEE v. SHOSHI BHUSAN ROY* (1905) . . . **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 572**

10. — City of Bombay Improvement Act (Bombay Act IV of 1898), s. 48 (11)—Award by Tribunal of Appeal—Cross objections—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 561. S. 48 (11) of the City of Bombay Improvement Act (Bombay Act IV of 1898) does not provide for leave to appeal being granted to any individual, but for a certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal, that is the whole case and not any particular part of it. The consequence of the grant of the certificate is that there shall be an appeal to the High Court from the award, or any part of the award, and this must mean that there shall be a right to appeal or, to use the language of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), that an appeal will lie to the High Court and the respondents will be entitled to object in the manner provided by s. 561 of the Code. *RAGHUNATHDAS v. SECRETARY OF STATE* (1905)
I. L. R. 29 Bom. 514

11. — Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 521, 522—Award—Allegations of arbitrator's misconduct—decree following award. *Held*, unless it is shown that the award is illegal *ab initio*, or in other words where there is no award in law, that no appeal lies from a decree following a judgment given according to an award. *Nandram Daluram v. Nemchand Jadavchand*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 375, approved; *Kali Prasanno Ghose v. Rajani Kant Chatterjee*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 141, referred to. *WALJI MATHURA DAS v. EBJI UMERSEY* (1905) . . . **I. L. R. 29 Bom. 285**

12. — Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 7. A preliminary objection was taken that no appeal lay to the High Court on the ground that the suit had been valued at Rs. 640 and was one for a declaration, the prayer for possession being merely consequential. *Held*, overruling the objection, that the suit fell within the scope of s. 7, cl. (v), of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), and that the real value of the property being more than Rs. 5,000, an appeal lay to the High Court. *RAI MEHERBAI v. MAGANCHAND* (1905) . . . **I. L. R. 29 Bom. 96**

13. — Execution of decree—Order refusing stay—Appeal—Deliberate exercise of dis-

APPEAL—*contd.*27. RIGHT OF APPEAL, EFFECT OF REPEAL ON—*contd.*

cretion by lower Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 545. An order refusing to stay execution of a decree under s. 545 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) is not appealable. *Musaji Abdulla v. Damodardas*, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 279, doubted. *RAMCHANDRA v. BALMUKUND* (1905) . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 71

14. ——— Letters Patent, Art. 12—Suit for land—Jurisdiction—Leave of Court—Cause of action—Title—Appeal from order discharging summons. Held, that an appeal lies from an order dismissing a Judge's summons to show cause why leave granted under cl. 12 of the Letters Patent should not be rescinded and the plaint taken off the file. *VAGHOJI KUDVERJI v. CAMAJI BOMANJI* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 249

15. ——— Partition suit—Decree based on an agreement—Appeal by plaintiff—Application for withdrawal of suit—Decree dismissing appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 373 and 582. A question having arisen as to whether or not the decree of the lower Appellate Court was appealable under ss. 373 and 582 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882): Held, that ss. 373 and 582 of the Civil Procedure Code do not support the conclusion that rights actually vested by the decree of the first Court can afterwards be annulled by the plaintiff withdrawing of his own free will and without permission of the Court. The result of the adjudication was that there was a formal expression of an adjudication by the lower Appellate Court upon a right claimed by the defendants (appellants in second appeal) and thus there was a decree within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code from which an appeal would lie. *SATYABHAMBAY v. GANESH BALKRISHNA* (1905) . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 13

16. ——— Appeal from order—Appeal presented after final disposal of suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 588—Landlord and tenant—Transfer by tenant—Yearly tenancy—Transfer of tenancy. The right of appeal from interlocutory orders ceases with the disposal of the suit. Where on the plaintiff's appeal a suit was remanded under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code and on remand the Court of first instance decided the case in the plaintiff's favour and there was no appeal from that decision, but the defendant afterwards appealed to the High Court against the order of remand. Held, that the appeal was not maintainable. *Jatinga Valley Tea Company, Limited v. Chera Tea Company, Limited*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 45, distinguished. The incident of non-transferability is common to tenancies from year to year of homestead lands created before the passing of the Transfer of Property Act in the absence of custom to the contrary. *Hari Nath Karmakar v. Raj Chandra Karmakar*, 2 C. W. N. 122, followed. *Banee Madhab Bonerjee v. Joy Kishen Mookerjee*, 12 W. R. 495 : 7 B. L. R. 152, distinguished. *MADHU SUDAN SEN v. KAMINI KANTA SEN* (1905) . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1023

APPEAL—*contd.*27. RIGHT OF APPEAL, EFFECT OF REPEAL ON—*contd.*

17. ——— Order—Order directing refund of compensation money paid—Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), ss. 32, 33, 54—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 254, 588, 649—Execution, mode of—Order directing payment of money. An order made by a Court in a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, directing a party, to whom a sum of money awarded as compensation under the Act had been paid under a previous order, to refund the money, is not an award or a portion of an award within the meaning of s. 54 of the Act, nor does it come under any of the orders mentioned in s. 588 of the Civil Procedure Code. No appeal, therefore, lies from such order. *Sheo Rattan Roy v. Mohri*, I. L. R. 21 All. 354; *Mahammad Ali Raja Avergal v. Mahammed Ali Raja Avergal*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 287, distinguished. The order directing a refund may be enforced by the imprisonment of the party against whom it is made or by the attachment and sale of his property under ss. 254 and 649 of the Civil Procedure Code. *NOBIN KALI DEBI v. BANALATA DEBI* (1905) . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 92

18. ——— Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 153—Appeal from order. Held by the Full Bench (*RAMPINI, J.*, dissenting), that an order setting aside or declining to set aside a sale in execution of a decree for rent, the decree-holder being the purchaser, falls within the proviso to s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and is appealable, although there could be no appeal from the decree in the suit on account of the prohibition contained in that section. *KALI MANDAL v. REMSARBASWA CHAKRAVARTI* (1905) . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 957
9 C. W. N. 721

19.—Companies Act (VI of 1882), ss. 169, 177, 185, 189, 191—Order refusing supervision order under s. 191 appealable under s. 169—Liquidator, duties of—Where liquidators appointed under s. 185, misbehave, supervision order must be made by Court on the motion of creditors. The right of appeal conferred by s. 169 of the Indian Companies Act extends to all orders or decisions made or given in the matter of the winding up of a company whether the winding up be compulsory voluntary, or under supervision. An order refusing to make a supervision order under s. 191 is appealable under s. 169. The duties imposed upon liquidators by s. 177 of the Act cannot be delegated by them to others. Liquidators appointed by the Company under s. 177 can be removed only by the Court under s. 185 and are not subject to the control of the company in the performance of their duties. Where the liquidators on insufficient grounds refuse to deal with the claim of a creditor on its legal merits, the Court is bound to grant a supervision order on the application of such creditor. *KESAVAIA LOO NAIDU v. MURUGAPPA MUDALI* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 22.

20.—Account—Endowment—Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863), s. 18—Order granting

APPEAL—*contd.*27. RIGHT OF APPEAL, EFFECT OF REPEAL ON—*concl'd.*

leave to sue—"Decree"—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 2.* No appeal lies from an order made by the District Judge under s. 18 of Act XX of 1863 granting leave to bring a suit for the purpose of having the accounts taken of a religious endowment. Such an order is not a "decree" within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Kazem Ali v. Azim Ali Khan, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 382*, referred to. *MOZAFFER ALI v. HEDAYET HOSAIN (1907)*. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 584

21.—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 310, 588 (8)*—Order refusing to restore an application under s. 310 which had been dismissed for default of appearance. Held, that no appeal lies from an order refusing to restore to the file of pending applications an application under s. 310 of the Code of Civil Procedure which has been dismissed for default of appearance. The principle applied in *Jung Bahadur v. Mahadeo Prosad, I. L. R. 31 Calc. 207*; *Ningappa v. Gangawa, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 433*; and *Raja Srinivasa, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 319*, followed. *GHASITI BIBI v. ABDUL SAMAD (1907)*. I. L. R. 29 All. 596

28. SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE.

1. ——— Order refusing interest in execution of decree. When a sale in execution was set aside, and the order directing the return of the purchase-money did not also direct the payment of interest thereon:—Held, that there was no appeal from the order of the lower Court refusing to give interest. *BISHONATH DOSS v. AHMED ALI W. R., 1864, Mis. 19*

2. ——— Order absolving purchaser from liability for damages on re-sale.—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 254.* A purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree is liable for damages caused by re-sale consequent on his not making the required deposit. An appeal lay from the order of the lower Courts absolving the purchaser from liability. *SREE NARAIN MITTER v. MAHATAB CHAND*. 3 W. R. 3

SOORUJ BUKSH SINGH v. SREE KISHEN DOSS. 6 W. R. Mis. 126

3. ——— Order making defaulting purchaser liable for difference on re-sale. An appeal lay from an order holding the first defaulting purchaser liable for the difference arising from re-sale in execution of decree under s. 254, Act VIII of 1859. *JOOBRAJ SINGH v. GOUR BUKSH LALL*. 7 W. R. 110

4. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 254*—Sale in execution. An appeal lay from an order passed on an application under s. 254, Act VIII of 1859, to make a defaulting purchaser liable for the loss occasioned by a re-sale. *RAM DIAL v. RAM DAS*. I. L. R. 1 All. 161

APPEAL—*contd.*28. SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*

5. ——— Order under s. 254, *Civil Procedure Code, 1859.* No appeal lay to the Judge from an order passed by a subordinate Court under s. 254, Act VIII of 1859. *BINDA DABEE DOSSEE v. GOPEE SOONDEREE DOSSIA*

6 W. R. Mis. 82

6. ——— Order refusing refund of price to purchaser—Sale of immoveable property set aside.—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 315.* No appeal lies from an order refusing a refund of price to a purchaser, the sale to whom has been set aside under s. 315 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Soudagar Mal v. Abdul Rahman Khan, Weekly Notes, 1890, 85, Tapesri Lal v. Reeki Nandan Rai, Weekly Notes, 1890, 89, and Ral Dial v. Ram Das, I. L. R. 1 All. 181*, referred to. *Baijnath Sahai v. Moheep Narain Singh, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 535*, dissented from. *RAHIM BAKSH v. DHURI*

I. L. R. 12 All. 397

7. ——— Order on defaulting purchaser to make good such deficiency.—Default of purchaser at sale in execution—Deficiency in price arising on re-sale.—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 293, 540, 588.* No appeal lies from an order under s. 293 of the Code of Civil Procedure directing a defaulting purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree to make good the loss happening on a re-sale occasioned by his default. *Ram Dayal v. Ram Das, I. L. R. 1 All. 181*, and *Baijnath Sahai v. Moheep Narain Singh, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 535*, dissented from. *Soudagar Mal v. Abdul Rahman Khan, Weekly Notes, 1890, 85, Rahim Bakhsh v. Dhuri, I. L. R. 12 All. 397*, followed. So held by *EDGE, C.J., MAHMOOD and KNOX, JJ., STRAIGHT, J.*, dissenting. *DEOKI NANDAN RAI v. TAPESRI LAL*. I. L. R. 14 All. 201

ILAH BAKSH v. BAIJ NATH

I. L. R. 13 All. 569

8. ——— Order under *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 293*, on defaulting purchaser to make good deficiency on re-sale—Second appeal—Sale in execution of decree.—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 313*—Misdescription of property in proclamation of sale. Both an appeal and a second appeal lie from an order under s. 293 of the Civil Procedure Code, directing a defaulting purchaser at an execution sale to make good the deficiency of price happening on a re-sale owing to his default. *Sree Narain Mitter v. Mahatab Chand, 3 W. R. 3, Sooruj Buksh Singh v. Sree Kishen Doss, 6 W. R. Mis. 126, Joobraj Singh v. Gour Buksh Lall, 7 W. R. 110, Baijnath Sahai v. Moheep Narain Singh, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 535, and Amir Baksha Sahib v. Venkatachala Wudali, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 439*, followed. *Deoki Nandan Rai v. Tapesri Lal, I. L. R. 14 All. 201*, referred to and discussed. In this case it was held an appeal, reversing the decision of the lower Courts, that under the circumstances the

APPEAL—contd.

28. SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—contd.

purchaser was not liable for the deficiency. *KALI KISHORE DEB SARKAR v. GURU PRASAD SUKUL*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 99
2 C. W. N. 408

RAJENDRA NATH ROY v. RAM CHARAN SINHA
2 C. W. N. 411

9. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 311*—*Rejection of application to restore to file petition to set aside sale dismissed for default.* An application under s. 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside a sale in execution of a decree having been dismissed for default, the petitioner applied to the Court to restore the application to the file. The Court having rejected this application, the petitioner appealed against this order. *Held*, that no appeal lay. *Ningappa v. Gangawa, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 433*, followed. *RAJA v. STRINIVASA*
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 319

10. ———— *Order rejecting an application for restoring to the file an application to set aside a sale in execution of a decree—Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), ss. 311, 588 (8).* No appeal lies from an order rejecting an application to restore to the file an application to set aside a sale under s. 311 of the Civil Procedure Code, which has been dismissed for default. *SUJA UDDIN v. REAZUDDIN*
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 414

11. ———— *Order refusing to admit petition to set aside a sale—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 256.* Under s. 256 of Act VIII of 1859, the order of a Civil Court refusing to admit a petition against a sale was final. *LALL GOBINDYAL v. BURZIN*
2 Hay 111

12. ———— *Order affirming rejection of petition for reversal of sale in execution of decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 257.* Under s. 257, Act VIII of 1859, no appeal lay from the order of a lower Appellate Court, affirming the order of the lower Court, rejecting a petition for the reversal of a sale in execution on the ground of irregularity. *RAJ NARAIN KOER v. INDER CHUNDER BABU*
W. R., 1864, Mis. 439

MUDDUN MOHUN ROY CHOWDHRY v. RAM CHUNDER GOOPTO
2 W. R. Mis. 41

13. ———— *Order setting aside sale for irregularity.* Under s. 257, Act VIII of 1859, the order of a Judge on appeal setting aside a sale of immoveable property on the ground of irregularity was final, unless, under s. 35, Act XXIII of 1861, the Judge was shown to have acted without jurisdiction. *KOOLDEB SINGH v. JUGGUNATH SINGH*
2 W. R. Mis. 19

BHUVAN RAM TEWAREE v. LALLA AJOODHYA PERSAD
2 W. R. Mis. 29

MUDDUN MOHUN ROY CHOWDHRY v. RAM CHUNDER GOOPTO
2 W. R. Mis. 41

MAHOMED HOSSEIN v. AFZUL ALI
B. L. R. Sup. Vol., Ap. 1
W. R. F. B. 83: Marsh. 296

APPEAL—contd.

28. SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—contd.

ABDOOL KUREEM v. OOGHAN LAL
6 W. R. Mis. 119

14. ———— An order setting aside a sale on the ground of irregularity where an order has been passed by the Court executing the decree postponing the sale, but the sale has taken place in consequence of the order arriving too late, is not appealable. *MAIHA SINGH v. JHOW LAL*
6 N. W. 354

15. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 257.* Where the lower Court allowed an objection and makes an order setting aside the sale, such order, according to s. 257, Act VIII of 1859, was final. *In the matter of the petition of OODIUT ZUMAN*
8 W. R. 109

16. ———— *Order setting aside sale—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 588 (m)—Execution of decree—Application to set aside sale of immoveable property—Auction-purchaser.* *Held*, that although the auction-purchaser may not apply under s. 311 of Act X of 1877 to have a sale set aside, he yet may be a party to the proceedings after an application has been made under that section, and then, if an order is made against him, he can appeal from such order under s. 588 (m) of Act X of 1877. *KANTHI RAM v. BANKEY LAL*
I. L. R. 2 All. 396

17. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 588 (m)—Execution of decree—Auction-purchaser.* Where after a judgment-debtor has applied, under s. 311 of Act X of 1877, to have a sale set aside, the auction-purchaser is made a party to the proceedings, and the sale is set aside, the auction-purchaser can appeal against the order setting aside the sale. *Kanthi Ram v. Bankey Lal, I. L. R. 2 All. 396*, followed. *GOPAL SINGH v. DULAR KUAR*
I. L. R. 2 All. 352

18. ———— *Review of judgment.* An application under s. 311 of Act X of 1877 to set aside a sale in execution of a decree having been made by the judgment-debtor, the Court executing the decree (Subordinate Judge) disallowed the objections, and passed an order confirming such sale. The judgment-debtor subsequently applied to the Subordinate Judge for a review of judgment. The Subordinate Judge, without recording his reasons for granting such application, and without recording an order granting such application, irregularly proceeded at once to pass an order setting aside such sale, without cancelling the previous order confirming it. The auction-purchaser appealed to the District Judge. That officer, treating the appeal as one from an order granting an application for review of judgment, entertained it, and set aside the Subordinate Judge's second order. *Held*, that the District Judge was not justified in entertaining such appeal, such order not being one granting an application for review, but one setting aside a sale, and, as such, not appealable. *BHATRON DIT SINGH v. RAM SAHAI*
I. L. R. 3 All. 316

APPEAL—contd.**28. SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—contd.**

19. ——— Order setting aside a sale, appeal from—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 312 and 588, cl. 16.* An appeal does not lie from an order setting aside a sale passed under s. 312, para. 2, of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *SAKHARAM VITHAL v. BHIKU DAYRAM*
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 603

20. ——— Order confirming sale—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 310—Sale in execution of decree of share of undivided estate—Confirmation of sale in favour of co-sharer—Appeal by auction-purchaser.* A share of undivided immoveable property was put up for sale in execution of a decree, and was knocked down to *M.* Before it was knocked down to him, *A.*, the decree-holder, who had obtained permission to bid for and purchase such share, and who was a co-sharer of such share, bid the same sum as that for which it was knocked down to *M.*, claiming the right of pre-emption. The Court executing such decree subsequently made an order confirming the sale of such share in favour of *A.* *M.* appealed, impugning the propriety of the confirmation of the sale in favour of *A.* *Held*, that such appeal would not lie. *MUNIR-UD-DIN KHAN v. ABDUL RAHIM KHAN*
I. L. R. 3 All. 674

21. ——— Order confirming sale before time for filing objections has expired—*Appeal from order—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 311, 312—Objection to sale—Legal disability.* Although s. 312 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates that objections to a sale under s. 311 shall be filed before an order for confirmation is passed, if the precipitate action of the Court has led to the confirmation of a sale before the time allowed for filing objection to the sale has expired, whether or not that Court could entertain such objections after confirming the sale, the High Court on appeal is bound to interfere, and to see that objections which by law the appellant is empowered to make are heard and determined before a sale of his property is confirmed or becomes absolute. An application under s. 311 of the Civil Procedure Code, on behalf of a judgment-debtor who was a minor, was rejected on the ground that the applicant did not legally represent the minor, and the Court thereupon confirmed the sale. A second application to the same effect was then filed on behalf of the minor by his guardian, and was rejected on the ground that the Court had already confirmed the sale, and was precluded from entertaining objections after such confirmation, prior to which no proper application had been filed. From this order the judgment-debtor appealed. *Held*, that the appeal must be considered to be one from an order under the first paragraph of s. 312 of the Civil Procedure Code, confirming the sale after disallowing the appellant's objection, and that it would, therefore, lie. The order disallowing the application and the order confirming the sale were set aside and the case remanded for disposal of the appellant's objections. *BALDEO SINGH v. KISHAN LAL*
I. L. R. 9 All. 411

APPEAL—contd.**28. SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—concl'd.**

22. ——— Order disallowing objections to sale—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 311, 312, 588 (cl. 16)—Execution of decree—Sale in execution—Appeal.* *Per PETHERAM, C.J., and OLDFIELD, BRODHURST, and DUTHOIT, JJ.* An order passed under the first clause of s. 312 of the Civil Procedure Code, after an objection made under the provisions of s. 311 has been disallowed, is appealable under Art. 16 of s. 588. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*—An application made under s. 311 can be disposed of only under s. 312, and if the Court rejects the objection to the sale, the order must be regarded as an order "refusing to set aside a sale of immoveable property" under the first paragraph of s. 312 and therefore appealable as falling under the purview of Art. 16 of s. 588. *Lalman v. Rassu Lal, Weekly Notes, All. 1882, 117, and Rajan Kuar v. Latta Prasad, Weekly Notes, All., 1883, 178, dissented from by MAHMOOD, J. TOTA RAM v. KHUB CHAND*
I. L. R. 7 All. 253

23. ——— Order refusing to set aside sale—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 294, 312, 313.* There is no appeal to the High Court from an order refusing to set aside a sale, unless such order is made under s. 294, 312, or 313 of the Civil Procedure Code. *DURGA SUNDARI DEVI v. GOVINDA CHANDRA ADDY*
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 368

24. ——— Order refusing permission to bid—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 294—Decree-holder.* No appeal lies from an order passed under s. 294 of the Civil Procedure Code refusing permission to a decree-holder to bid at a sale in execution of his decree. *JODOONATH MUNDUL v. BROJO MOHUN GHOSE*
I. L. R. 13 Calc. 174

25. ——— Order refusing to set aside dismissal of application to set aside sale—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 102, 103, 588, 647—Appeal from an order refusing to set aside an order under s. 102, dismissing an application under s. 311.* S. 647 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), when read with cl. 8 of s. 588, does not give a right of appeal to a judgment-debtor whose application to set aside a sale of his property has been dismissed under s. 102, and whose application to set the dismissal aside has been refused under s. 103. S. 647 is not intended to confer any rights of appeal not expressly given elsewhere by the Code. *NINGAPPA v. GANGAWA*
I. L. R. 10 Bom. 433

26. ——— Order setting aside sale—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244 (c), 310 A—Order setting aside sale in execution of decree.* An order under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code is one under s. 244, cl. (c), of that Code, and therefore an appeal lies from that order at the instance of the decree-holder who is also the auction purchaser. *Kripa Nath Pal v. Ram Lakshmi Dasg, I C. W. N. 703, followed. PHUL CHAND RAM v. NURSINGH PERSHAD MISSER (1899)*
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 73

APPEAL—*contd.*

29. STAYING PROCEEDINGS.

1. ———— *Order for stay of sale—Mortgage decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 291 and 588—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 17 and 89—Order absolute for sale—Court's power to adjourn sale of mortgaged property.* An appeal lies against an order for stay of sale of property directed to be sold, in execution of a mortgage decree, notwithstanding that the said order is in terms one under s. 291 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After an order absolute for sale had been made under s. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Court has power to adjourn the sale of the mortgaged property with a view to give time to the mortgagor to raise money to pay off the decree. It could adjourn the sale to a future date in order to have a better sale in the event of want of bidders or for other similar reason. *Kedar Nath Raut v. Kali Churn Ram*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 703, distinguished. *Taniram v. Gajanan*, I. L. R. 24 Bom. 300, dissented from. *SHYAMKISHEN v. SUNDAR KOER* (1904). I. L. R. 31 Calc. 373

2. ———— *Order staying proceedings—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 215A, and s. 545—Preliminary order—Appellate Court, power of, to stay proceedings.* When an appeal is pending in the High Court against a preliminary order made by a Subordinate Court under s. 215A of the Civil Procedure Code, the High Court having seisin of the appeal can, apart from the question whether the case falls within s. 545 of the Code, make an order staying the carrying out of such order pending the hearing of the appeal. *BALKISHEN SAHU v. KHUGNU* (1904). I. L. R. 31 Calc. 722

30. MISCELLANEOUS.

1. ———— *Appeal—Decree—Defendants—Appellate Court, power of, to make another defendant liable, where no appeal by plaintiff.* In a suit for contribution, in which the plaintiff asked for relief against several defendants separately and the first Court gave a decree against defendant No. 1 and dismissed the suit against defendant No. 2: *Held*, that in an appeal by the defendant No. 1, in which the defendant No. 2 was made a party respondent, the Appellate Court had power to alter the decree so as to make defendant No. 2 liable, as the real contest in the case was between the defendants. *Upendra Lal Mukerjee v. Girindra Nath Mukerjee*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 563, upheld. *Hudson v. Basdeo Bajpye*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 109, referred to. *RUP JAN BIBEE v. ABDUL KADIR BHUYAN* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 643

2. ———— *Practice—Suit for partition—Plaintiffs not allowed to set up in appeal a case inconsistent with that upon which they came into Court.* Two sets of plaintiffs brought a suit for partition of certain houses, each claiming under a similar title a 5-anna 4-pie share. It was found by the Court of first appeal that each set of plaintiffs was *prima facie* entitled to a 4-anna share. But it was

APPEAL—*contd.*30. MISCELLANEOUS—*contd.*

found further that one of the two sets of plaintiffs had never been in possession within twelve years from the date of the institution of the suit, and that the same was the case which one of the defendants, whose share otherwise in the property in suit was two annas. In appeal to the High Court a case was set up that the plaintiffs, who had remained in possession, were, on the findings of the lower Appellate Court, entitled to a decree for partition not only in respect of their own 4-anna share, but also in respect of the shares of their co-plaintiffs and of the defendant, who had been found to be out of possession. *Held*, that this was not a case which could be set up in appeal on the findings of the Court below, inasmuch as it was inconsistent with the case originally brought into Court by the plaintiff. *Balmakund v. Dalu*, I. L. R. 25 All. 498, distinguished. *ILAH KHAN v. SHER ALI KHAN*

I. L. R. 26 All. 331

3. ———— *Suit of the nature cognisable by a Court of Small Causes—Appeal.* The plaintiff sued as widow of a deceased Brahman priest to recover from the defendant certain books containing lists of the clients of her late husband and also a sum of Rs. 60, on the allegation that the defendant had been entrusted with the books and had realized the money as her agent for the purpose of carrying on the business of her deceased husband, and contrary to the terms of the agency, had not handed over the money, which he had obtained from the clients to her. *Held*, that this was a suit of the nature cognizable by a Court of Small Causes within the meaning of s. 536 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *HANS RAJ v. RATNI* (1905) I. L. R. 27 All. 200

4. ———— *Defect of Parties.* When during the pendency of an appeal against a decree for rent one of the plaintiffs respondents died and his heirs were not brought on the record. *Held*, that the appeal ought to be dismissed. *Bejoy Gopal Bose v. Umesh Chandra Bose*, 6 C. W. N. 196, followed. *TARIP DAFADAR v. KHOTEJANNESHA BIBI* (1906)

10 C. W. N. 981

5. ———— *"Judgment," meaning of—Letters Patent, cl. 15—Jurisdiction.* An order refusing to enlarge the time for preferring an appeal which is already time barred, is not a "judgment" within the meaning of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, and is not, therefore, appealable under that clause. *Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Company*, 8 B. L. R. 433; *Kishen Pershad Panday v. Tiluckdhari Lall*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 182; *Mahabir Prasad Singh v. Adhikary Kunwar*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 473; *Malji Virji v. Bangabashi Saha*, 9 C. W. N. 502, referred to. *Luchminarain Bogla v. Brij Coomaree*, 5 C. W. N. 781, distinguished. *GOVINDA LAL DAS v. SHIBA DAS CHATTERJEE* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1323
s. c. 10 C. W. N. 986

6. ———— *Delay in filing appeal—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), ss. 5, 14—Delay due to appellant bona fide accepting erroneous legal advice.* Where

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30. MISCELLANEOUS—contd.

a client *bona fide* accepts the advice of counsel as to the proper procedure to adopt in the course of litigation, and misled by that advice fails to file an appeal within time, he is entitled to the benefit of s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877. *Balwant Singh v. Gumani Ram*, I. L. R. 5 All. 591; *Brij Mohan Das v. Mannu Bibi*, I. L. R. 19 All. 348; and *Kura Mal v. Ram Nath*, I. L. R. 28 All. 414, followed. *In re Coles and Ravenshaw*, [1907] I K. B. 1, referred to. *ANJORA KUNWAR v. BABU* (1907) I. L. R. 29 All. 638

7.—Appeal in forma pauperis—*Civil Procedure Code* (XIV of 1882), ss. 407, 592—*Applications under s. 592 to be decided under the rules in Chapter XXVI—No leave to appeal in forma pauperis when at date of suit there is subsisting an agreement falling under s. 407 (d)*. Although the question of the representation of an appeal in forma pauperis is not subject to the rules contained in Chapter XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure, the question of the right to appeal under s. 592 of the Code of Civil Procedure is subject to such rules. *Mailthi v. Somappa Banta*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 369, distinguished. When, at the time of the institution of the suit, there was subsisting an agreement falling within the terms of s. 407 (d), no leave to appeal under s. 592 can be given to the plaintiff who, by such agreement, had allowed other persons to obtain an interest in the subject-matter of the suit. *HANIFA BAI v. HAJI SIDDIQ BUI MEANJI SAIT* (1907) I. L. R. 30 Mad. 547

8.—Suit for adjustment of accounts—*Two appellate decrees in similar terms—Appeal from one of such decrees only—Res judicata*. From the decree in a suit for adjustment of accounts both parties appealed. Both appeals were decided by one and the same judgment. Two decrees were framed; but these were in substance identical. The plaintiff appealed from the decree in one appeal only. Held, that his appeal was not barred by reason of his not having appealed also from the decree in the other appeal. *Mariam-nissa Bibi v. Joymab Bibi*, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1101, and *Panchanada Velan v. Vaithinatha Sastrial*, I. L. R. 29 Mad. 333, followed. *DAMODAR DAS v. SHEORAM DAS* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 730

9.—*Procedure—Irregularity—Disposal of a suit on a Sunday*. Held, that the fact that a suit was decided on a Sunday did not vitiate the decree. *Semle*: that the Lord's Day Act (21 Geo. III, Cap. XLIX) does not apply to India. *Param Shook Doss v. Rasheed Ood Dowlah*, 7 Mad. H. C. 285, referred to. *SHEORAM TIWARI v. THAKUR PRASAD* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 136

10.—*Appellate Court—Power to make co-defendants liable upon appeal by a defendant—Mortgage-suit*. In an appeal by defendants Nos. 2 to 8 against the decision of the 1st Court in which the real contest was whether defendant No. 1, who was joined as a respondent with the plaintiffs or defendants Nos. 2 to 8, was liable for the mortgage

APPEAL—concl'd.

30. MISCELLANEOUS—concl'd.

debt, the Appellate Court has power to alter the decree of the 1st Court so as to make defendant No. 1 liable and to direct that a decree to recover the mortgage debt against defendant No. 1 be made in favour of the plaintiff. *ISHWARDHARY SINGH v. SAHEBZADI* (1908) 12 C. W. N. 720 s. c. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 538

11.—*Parties—Estoppel—Procedure*. The plaintiff having obtained a decree against one of two defendants acquiesced in that decree, but the defendant judgment-debtor appealed, making the other defendant also a party to his appeal with the result that the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. Held, that it was not open to the plaintiff in second appeal to contend that the Court below should have made a decree against that defendant with regard to whom he had acquiesced in the dismissal of his suit. *Farzand Ali Khan v. Bismillah Begam*, I. L. R. 27 All. 23, followed. *LOHRE v. DEO HANS* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 48

12.—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 380—Appeal lies from order under s. 380, directing a woman to deposit security for costs—Such order is a judgment under Letters Patent, clause 15—"Suit for money," what is*. An appeal lies against an order passed by a Judge sitting on the original side of the High Court requiring security from a woman under s. 380 of the Civil Procedure Code. Such an order is a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. *Seshagiri Row v. Nawab Askur Jung Aftab Dowla*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 502, followed. Suits, which are not exclusively for money, but which will result in a decree for money on the relief sought, come within the purview of s. 380 of the Civil Procedure Code. *SONABAI v. TRIBHOWANDAS* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 602

13.—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 536—Suit by Advocate General at instance of relators dismissed—No appeal by Advocate General—Appeal by relators—Maintainability*. A suit having been brought by the Advocate General he is the proper party to appeal and not the relators. The relators are not parties to the suit and as relators they have no right to step in when the Advocate General, who was plaintiff, has not thought fit to appeal against the dismissal of the suit. *JAN MAHOMED v. NURUDIN* (1907)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 155

14.—*Landlord and tenant—Kabriliyat executed by tenant in favour of landlord—Undue influence, if to be presumed against landlord—Onus—Appeal—Omission to join parties through mistake—Limitation*. When owing to the mistake of the clerk of the appellant's pleader, certain persons were not added as respondents till after the period allowed for preferring the appeal had expired:—Held, that as the omission was not intentional the appeal should be heard as duly filed. *PROMODA NATH ROY v. KINOO MOLLAH* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 167

APPEAL COURT.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.
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1. ACQUITTALS, APPEALS FROM.

1. ——— Appellate judgment of acquit-
tal—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 272.*
The words "appellate judgment of acquittal" in
Act X of 1872, s. 272, were meant to include all
judgments of an Appellate Court by which a con-
viction is set aside. *GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL v.*
GOOKUL CHUNDER CHOWDHRY. 24 W. R. Cr. 41

APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—contd.

1. ACQUITTALS, APPEALS FROM—contd.

2. ——— Time for appealing—*Criminal
Procedure Code, 1872, s. 272—Act XI of 1874,*
s. 23—Limitation. Under s. 272 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, as amended by s. 23 of Act XI
of 1874, an appeal against an acquittal presented
by the Government six months after the date of the
judgment complained of was barred by lapse of
time, even though the six months expired on the day
the amending Act became law. The amended s. 272
should be read by itself, and not as a clause of the
ordinary Statute of Limitations. *Ex parte the*
GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY. In the matter of REG.
v. DORABJI BALABHAI . . . 11 Bom. 117

3. ——— *Criminal Procedure
Code (Act X of 1872), s. 272—Limitation Act,*
X of 1871, s. 5, cl. b, and Sch. II, Art. 153. An
appeal by the Local Government under s. 272,
Criminal Procedure Code, was within time if pre-
sented within six months from the date of acquittal.
The sixty days' rule did not apply. *EMPRESS v.*
JYADULLA . . . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 436

4. ——— Appeal by Local Govern-
ment from judgment of acquittal—*Criminal
Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 417.* Under
the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), the
Local Government have the same right of appeal
against an acquittal as a person convicted has of
appealing against his conviction and sentence, and
there is no distinction between the mode of procedure
and the principles upon which both classes of appeals
are to be decided. *In the matter of the petition of the*
DEPUTY LEGAL REMEMBRANCER. QUEEN EMPRESS
v. BIBHUTI BHUSAN BIT . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 485

5. ——— Officer appointed to prefer
appeal—*Judgment of acquittal—Conviction of*
culpable homicide on charge of murder. On the
trial by a jury of a person on a charge of murder,
the jury found the accused not guilty of the offence
of murder, but convicted him of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder. The Sessions Judge,
although he disagreed with the verdict, declined to
submit the case to the High Court under s. 263 of
the Criminal Procedure Code. The Local Govern-
ment thereupon directed the Legal Remembrancer
to appeal under s. 272 of the Code, and in pursuance
of this direction an appeal was preferred by the
Junior Government Pleader. *Held*, that the appeal
was duly made. *Held*, further, that the judgment
passed by the Court of Session, following the verdict
of a jury acquitting the prisoner, was a judgment of
acquittal within the meaning of s. 272. *Held*,
also, that there being an acquittal on the charge of
murder, the appeal lay. *EMPRESS v. JUDDOONATH*
GANGOOLY . . . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 273

6. ——— Appeal upon facts from ver-
dict of a jury—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of*
1882), ss. 417, 418, 423. Under the provisions of
Act X of 1882, no appeal at the instance of the Local
Government lies from an order of acquittal in a case
which has been tried by a jury, when the questions
involved are purely questions of fact : for such an

APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*1. ACQUITTALS, APPEALS FROM—*contd.*

appeal to lie, it must be supported upon a ground which is covered by s. 418. *GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL v. PARMESHUR MULLICK*

I. L. R. 10 Cal. 1029

7. ——— Ground for setting aside acquittal on appeal—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 272*. It is not because a Judge or a Magistrate has taken a view of a case in which the Local Government does not coincide, and has acquitted accused persons, that an appeal by the Local Government must necessarily prevail, or that the High Court should be called upon to disturb the ordinary course of justice, by putting in force the arbitrary powers conferred on it by s. 272 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The doing so should be limited to those instances in which the lower Court has so obstinately blundered and gone wrong as to produce a result mischievous at once to the administration of justice and the interests of the public: *Held*, therefore, the Local Government having appealed from an original judgment of acquittal of a Sessions Judge, that, as such judgment was an honest and not unreasonable one, of which the facts of the case were susceptible, such appeal should be dismissed. *EMPERESS OF INDIA v. GAYADIN*

I. L. R. 4 All. 148

8. ——— Appeal by Local Government from judgment of acquittal. *Queen-Empress v. Gayadin, I. L. R. 4 All. 148*, followed by *BRODHURST, J.*, as to the principle applicable to the determination of appeals preferred by the Local Government from judgments of acquittal. *PER EDGE, C.J.* In capital cases, where the Local Government appeals, under s. 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, from an order of acquittal, it is, generally speaking, undesirable that the prisoner's fate should be discussed while he remains at large; and the Government should, in such cases, apply for the arrest of the accused under s. 427 of the Code. *PER EDGE, C.J.*, and *STRAIGHT, J.*—Every case as it arises must be decided on its own facts, and not on supposed analogies to other cases. *Queen-Empress v. Gayadin, I. L. R. 4 All. 148*, distinguished. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GOBARDHAN*

I. L. R. 9 All. 528

9. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 417—Appeal by Government*. An appeal on behalf of Government in the exercise of the powers conferred by s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should not be entertained when the judgment appealed from is based upon facts, and the conclusions of the Court are such as may reasonably be arrived at upon the facts found. *Empress of India v. Gayadin, I. L. R. 4 All. 148*, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ROBINSON*

I. L. R. 16 All. 212

10. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 417—Appeal by Government from an acquittal on the same footing as an appeal from a conviction*. In the Code of Criminal Procedure there is no apparent distinction between

APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*1. ACQUITTALS, APPEALS FROM—*contd.*

the right of appeal against an acquittal and a right of appeal against a conviction so far as the power of the Court to deal with the facts is concerned. In both cases the appellant has to satisfy the Court that there exists some good and strong ground apparent on the record for interfering with the deliberate determination of a Judge who has had all the evidence taken before him, and has arrived at that determination with that great advantage in his favour. *Queen-Empress v. Gayadin, I. L. R. 4 All. 148*, and *Queen-Empress v. Gobardhan, I. L. R. 9 All. 528*, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PRAG DAT*

I. L. R. 20 All. 459

11. ——— *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 96 et seq.—Right of private defence—Presumption—Pleadings*. *Held*, that an accused person who at his trial has not pleaded the right of private defence, but has raised other pleas inconsistent with such a defence, cannot in appeal set up a case, founded upon the evidence taken at his trial, that he acted in the exercise of the right of private defence; neither is the Court competent to raise such a plea on behalf of the appellant. *Queen-Empress v. Prag Dat, I. L. R. 20 All. 459*, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. TIMMAL*

I. L. R. 21 All. 121

12. ——— Acquittal by Sessions Judge where he might have convicted under different section of Penal Code—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 272*. Where the Sessions Judge might upon appeal have convicted the defendants under a different section of an Act from that under which they were convicted by the Magistrate, but instead of doing so he acquitted them:—*Held*, upon appeal by the Local Government, that it was not a case which called for the interference of the High Court. *ANONYMOUS CASE. In the matter of the petition of the GOVERNMENT PLEADER*

7 Mad. 339

13. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 272*. Where a person was convicted by a Magistrate under s. 409 of the Penal Code, for committing criminal breach of trust in the capacity of a public servant, and was acquitted by the Sessions Court on appeal on the ground that the breach of trust was not committed in such capacity, and the facts proved constituted the offence of criminal breach of trust, the High Court, on the appeal of Government, directed a new trial by the Magistrate on charges under s. 406 of the Penal Code, under the provisions of s. 272 of Act X of 1872. The Court concurred in the view taken by the High Court in an *Anonymous case, 7 Mad. 339*, that the powers under s. 272 should be exceptionally exercised. *QUEEN v. DUKARAN*

7 N. W. 186

14. ——— Difference of opinion between assessors—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 272—Setting aside order of acquittal*. In a case tried by assessors in which the accused was charged with culpable homicide not amounting to

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murder, he was acquitted by the Sessions Judge and one of the assessors, while the other assessor was for a conviction. The Government of Bengal having appealed under s. 272, Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court, on a consideration of the evidence, set aside the order of acquittal, and convicted the accused of the offence charged. **GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL v. HANEEF FAKEER**. 23 W. R. Cr. 50

15. ——— Conviction by assessors, but acquittal by Judge—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 272—Conviction and sentence to death by High Court.* Where the assessors found a prisoner guilty, but the Judge acquitted him, the High Court on an appeal under s. 272, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, reversed the Judge's decision of acquittal, and sentenced the prisoner to death. **QUEEN v. RHIDAY PATRO**. 26 W. R. Cr. 1

16. ——— Appeal from refusal of judge to add new charges—*Appeal from interlocutory order—Framing additional charges—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 417—Penal Code, ss. 206, 423, 424.* At the commencement of a trial before a Court of Session on a charge under s. 206 of the Penal Code, the Public Prosecutor applied to the Court to frame new heads of charge under ss. 423 and 424 of the Code. The Sessions Judge postponed passing any final decision upon this application, until it became apparent that the charge under s. 206 was not sustainable on the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution. After hearing the evidence for the prosecution on this charge, the Sessions Judge, without going into the defence or recording the opinions of the assessors, passed an order of acquittal. At the same time, he rejected the application for framing new heads of charge, holding, on the authority of *Queen-Empress v. Appa*, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 200, that he had no power to frame any new charges in addition to the original charge. He was also of opinion that the dismissal of a complaint, which the prosecutor had previously filed against the accused on the very charges which were sought to be added, was also a sufficient ground for rejecting the application. The Local Government appealed to the High Court against the order of acquittal. At the hearing of the appeal it was contended on behalf of the Crown that the Sessions Judge was wrong in refusing to frame additional charges as sought by the Public Prosecutor. The accused's counsel objected to this point being raised by Government in an appeal against an order of acquittal. *Held, per TELANG, J.*, (1) that under s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882) it was not open to Government to appeal to the High Court on the ground of the Sessions Judge's refusal to add new charges, or against any other interlocutory order made during the trial. (2) That the Sessions Judge ought to have finally disposed of the application for framing additional charges at the very commencement of the trial when it was made, especially because it did not purport to be based on any facts other than those contained in the deposi-

APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*1. ACQUITTALS, APPEALS FROM—*contd.*

tions recorded by the committing Magistrate. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. VAJIRAM**

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 414

17. ——— Power of Court to order arrest pending appeal—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 272 (1882, s. 427).* In an appeal under s. 272 of Act X of 1872, the High Court has power to order the accused to be arrested pending the appeal. **THE QUEEN v. GOBIN TEWARI**

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 281

EMPRESS v. MANGA. I. L. R. 2 All. 340

EMPRESS v. KARIM BAKSH

I. L. R. 2 All. 386

18. ——— Exercise of jurisdiction on appeal by Government—*Grounds of objection—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 477—Practice.* Per RANADE, J. The High Court, in exercising jurisdiction in the matter of appeals against acquittals, should confine its exercise to the particular grounds of objection which are raised by Government against the acquittal complained of. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KARIGOWDA**

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 51

19. ——— Misdirection—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 423 (2), 537—Trial by jury—Verdict and order of acquittal—Appeal against acquittal—Jurisdiction of High Court to consider the evidence—Evidence of accomplices.* In a charge, against an Inspector of Salt and Abkari, of extortion and bribery, in a Court of Session, the first witness for the prosecution deposed that, when he complained to the accused of delays which were taking place in weighing salt, the accused told him he ought to make the customary present of Rs100 or Rs50, according to the amount of salt to be weighed. The witness stated that he had refused to pay the bribe at that time, but that on the following day, when the accused stated that the weighing would only be properly proceeded with if the present were made, he consented, and the accused agreed to send his peon (who was charged with abetment) for the money. According to the witness, the peon came to his shop, and was paid Rs50 by his accountant by his order, and in his presence, and in the presence of two other persons who were in the employment of the witness. The prosecution evidence, if true, only showed that these two other persons had witnessed the transaction without taking any part in it. The accountant and the other two persons were called and gave evidence, as second, third and fourth witnesses respectively, for the prosecution. Some entries in account books were relied on in support of the oral evidence of the witnesses, but they were challenged by the accused as false entries, and they were, in fact, discredited by the High Court. The writer of them was called as the fifth prosecution witness, and they had been made after the alleged transaction was over. The Sessions Judge, in his charge to the jury, warned them against accepting the evidence of accomplices without corroboration

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in material particulars. He said that the first and second witnesses were certainly accomplices, and that the third, fourth and fifth witnesses had put themselves practically in the same position as accomplices and that their evidence also required corroboration before the jury could act on it. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty, and the Sessions Judge acquitted the accused. Upon an appeal being preferred by the Public Prosecutor against the acquittal, on the ground of misdirection : *Held*, that, as regards the first and second witnesses, the charge was accurate ; but that the description of the third, fourth and fifth witnesses was a misdirection. *Held*, further, that it was not obligatory on the High Court, in such circumstances, to order further inquiry or a retrial, and that the High Court could consider the evidence, and if, after so doing, it formed the opinion that the evidence could not in any proper view of the case, support a conviction, it would not alter or reverse the order of acquittal. *Queen-Empress v. Magan Lal*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 115, approved. *Elahee Buksh's Case*, 5 W. R. (Cr.) 80, followed. *Wajadar Khan v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 955, and *Ali Fakir v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 230, commented on. *EMPEROR v. SMITHER* (1902) I. L. R. 26 Mad. 1

20. ————— **Reversal of order—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 423—Power to "reverse the finding and sentence"—Reversal by Deputy Magistrate of an order acquitting accused on a charge of theft—Validity.** A Deputy Magistrate has no power, under s. 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to reverse an order acquitting an accused person of a charge of theft. The words "reverse the finding and sentence," in cl. 1 (b) of that section mean reverse the finding upon which a conviction is based, and do not empower the Appellate tribunal (or, at any rate, an Appellate tribunal other than the High Court) to reverse or set aside an acquittal. *Queen-Empress v. Jahanulla*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 975, explained. *SAMI AYYA v. EMPEROR* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 478

2. ACTS.

1. ————— **Act XI of 1846—Appeal to the High Court—Scheduled Districts Act (XIV of 1874)—Rule 44 of rules framed under s. 3 of Act XI of 1846—Agent to Governor in Khandesh District.** The accused were convicted, under s. 201 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), of an offence committed in the village of Gulamba, in the Mehwas Estate of Nal, in the Khandesh District, and sentenced by the Agent to the Governor each to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years. The Agent tried the case under the rules framed under Act XI of 1846. The accused appealed to the High Court under rule 44 of the rules framed under s. 3 of Act XI of 1846. *Held*, that the appeal did not lie to the High Court. Rule 44 was *ultra vires*, as no power was given by Act XI of 1846 to Government to confer appellate powers on the Sadar Foujdari

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Adalat, as was practically done by the rule. Act XI of 1846 being repealed in the Mehwas villages by Act XIV of 1874, rule 44 could not be continued either by the notification published in the *Bombay Government Gazette* for 1879, Part I, p. 115, or by the notification published in the *Bombay Government Gazette* for 1887, Part I, p. 19. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SARYA* . . . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 505

2. ————— **Act XXXVII of 1855—Conviction by Commissioner of Sonthal Pergunnahs.** No appeal lies to the High Court, under Act XXXVII of 1855, from a conviction by the Deputy Commissioner of the Sonthal Pergunnahs. *QUEEN v. BOYDONAETH MOOKERJEE* 17 W. R. Cr. 11

3. ————— s. 4, cl. 1—**Sonthal Pergunnahs—Scheduled Districts Act, XIV of 1874.** Under s. 4 (cl. 1) of Act XXXVII of 1855 (which is still in force in the Sonthal Pergunnahs), all sentences passed in criminal cases are final. *DULAR DAT RAI v. NIJABAT HOSEIN* I. L. R. 12 Calc. 536

4. ————— **Act II of 1864, s. 29—Appeal from sentence of Political Resident at Aden to High Court, Bombay, in criminal case arising in Perim.** A prisoner charged with having committed murder in the island of Perim was committed by the Magistrate at Perim to be tried before the Political Resident at Aden. Having been found guilty and sentenced to death, he appealed to the High Court of Bombay. By the Aden Act II of 1864, s. 29, it is provided that "no appeal shall lie from an order or sentence passed by the Resident in any criminal case." The High Court, however, admitted the appeal, being doubtful as to whether the above provision applied to cases arising in the island of Perim. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MANGAL TERCHAND* . . . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 258

5. ————— **Act XIV of 1868, s. 11, Order of conviction under.** There is no appeal from a conviction under s. 11, Act XIV of 1868, for a registered prostitute neglecting to appear for examination. *In re MUKTA BIBEE*, 17 W. R. Cr. 11

6. ————— **Bombay Cotton Frauds Act (IX of 1863), order under.** *Quære* : Whether an appeal lay, notwithstanding s. 411 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, in a case of conviction under s. 2 of the Bombay Cotton Frauds Act (IX of 1863) and sentence of one month's rigorous imprisonment with an order for confiscation of the cotton. *REG. v. JIVAN USMAN* . . . 3 Bom. Cr. 12

7. ————— **Bombay Ferries Act (XXXV of 1850), order of Magistrate under—Bom. Reg. XIX of 1827, s. 14.** An appeal lay from the summary determination of the Magistrate of a zillah, under s. 16 of Act XXXV of 1850 (an Act for regulating the Bombay Ferries, to the Sessions Judge. Such appeal need not be preferred within eight days, under s. 14 of Regulation XIX of 1827. *REG. v. MALHARI LAUJI* . . . 6 Bom. Cr. 45

APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*2. ACTS—*contd.*

8. ——— **Burma Courts Act (XVII of 1875), s. 35**—*Transfer of case from Sessions Judge—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 64—Power of Special Court at Rangoon—Burma Courts Act, XVII of 1875, s. 35.* The Special Court of British Burma has power to entertain an appeal from a sentence of death or other sentence passed by the Judicial Commissioner, in a case transferred by him to his own Court from that of the Sessions Judge, under the powers conferred by s. 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and s. 35 of Act XVII of 1875 (the Burma Courts Act), the hearing subsequent to the transfer being an exercise of original jurisdiction on the part of the Judicial Commissioner. *EMPRESS v. TSIT OOE*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 667

9. ——— **Cattle Trespass Act (I of 1871)**—*Award of compensation under Cattle Trespass Act, I of 1871, s. 22.* No appeal lies from an award of compensation passed under s. 22, Act I of 1871. *In re GUNESH PERSHAD* . 3 N. W. 200

10. ——— s. 22—*Appeal from an order awarding compensation for illegal seizure of cattle—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), ss. 404, 407.* No appeal lies from an order passed under s. 22 of the Cattle Trespass Act (I of 1871), awarding compensation for illegal seizure of cattle. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAYA LAKHMA*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 230

DHUKU v. DENONATH DEE alias DINU

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 712

In re KHADAR KHAN

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 559

QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LAKSHMI NARAYAN

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 238

11. ——— **Income Tax Act (IX of 1869), s. 25.** No appeal lay to a Sessions Judge from the order of a Magistrate fining a defaulter under s. 25 of the Income Tax Act, IX of 1869. *QUEEN v. MUDHOO DUTT* . 14 W. R. Cr. 71

12. ——— **Police Act (V of 1861), convictions under.** Convictions under the Police Act (V of 1861), are appealable like other convictions. When the appellants are convicted by an officer exercising the powers of a Magistrate and sentenced to imprisonment exceeding the limit prescribed by s. 411 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appeal lies to the Sessions Court. *QUEEN v. THAKOOR DOSS*

5 W. R. Cr. 21

13. ——— **Presidency Magistrates Act (IV of 1877), s. 41**—*Prosecution, sanction of Judge to.* No appeal lay from the order of a Judge directing a prosecution under s. 41 of the Presidency Magistrates Act. *In the matter of the petition of JANOKEY NATH ROY* . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 466

14. ——— s. 167. Where person has, on his own plea, been convicted on a trial held by a Presidency Magistrate, an appeal to the High Court on the ground that the conviction was illegal, and therefore also the sentence, does not

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lie according to the provisions of s. 167 of the Presidency Magistrates Act, No. IV of 1877, albeit that the Magistrate has sentenced the person to imprisonment for a term exceeding six months, or to a fine exceeding two hundred rupees. *EMPRESS v. JAFAR M. TALAB* . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 85

3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODES, 1861, 1872, 1882, 1898.

1. ——— **Effect of repeal of Act—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 36—Act X of 1882, s. 408.** On the 9th of December 1882, a person was convicted under ss. 457 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment by a Deputy Magistrate in Assam, exercising special powers under s. 36 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872). The new Code of Criminal Procedure came into force on the 1st of January 1883. The prisoner presented an appeal to the High Court from the conviction and sentence above mentioned on the 23rd of January 1883. *Held* by FIELD, J. (MITTER, J., expressing no decided opinion), that the case was governed by s. 408 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, and that no appeal lay to the High Court. *RONGAI v. THE EMPRESS* . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 513

12 C. L. R. 500

2. ——— **Order of Deputy Commissioner—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 36 and s. 270—Omission to get sanction of Sessions Judge.** Where a Deputy Commissioner's order required, under Act X of 1872, s. 36, the sanction of the Sessions Judge, the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from it until so sanctioned. *QUEEN v. SHAM SOONDER DAS*

25 W. R. Cr. 18

3. ——— **Conviction by Deputy Commissioner under Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 36.** *Quere:* Whether, where a person had been convicted by a Deputy Commissioner invested under s. 36 of Act X of 1872, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment requiring under that section to be confirmed by the Sessions Judge to which such Deputy Commissioner was subordinate, and such sentence had been confirmed accordingly, an appeal lay to the High Court against such conviction and sentence. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. NADUA* . I. L. R. 2 All. 53

4. ——— **Order sanctioning entertainment of complaint—Case under ss. 468, 469, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872.** No appeal lay to the District Judge from an order of a subordinate Court according sanction to the entertainment of a complaint in cases in which such sanction was required by ss. 468 and 469 of Act X of 1872. *In the matter of the petition of BULWUNT RAI*

6 N. W. 142

5. ——— **Order sanctioning prosecution—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 195—Revi-**

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sion. No appeal lies from an order granting or refusing to grant sanction to prosecute under s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The proceeding under s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by which such an order may be set aside, is a proceeding in revision, and not by way of appeal. *MEHDI HASAN v. TOTA RAM* . . . **I. L. R. 15 All. 61**

See *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GANESH RAMKRISHNA*
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 50

6. ——— Sentence by officer in Non-Regulation District—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1869, ss. 445A, 445C.* An appeal from a sentence passed by an officer in a Non-Regulation district invested with the powers mentioned in s. 445A, Act VIII of 1869, lay under s. 445C to the High Court only. *QUEEN v. LUNTRO SINGH*
14 W. R. Cr. 18

7. ——— Trial held by officer with special powers—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1869), ss. 445A and 445C—Deputy Commissioner—Act X of 1872, ss. 36 and 270.* The right of appeal to the High Court given by s. 445C of the Criminal Procedure Code to persons convicted on a trial held by an officer invested with the power described in s. 445A was confined to cases in which the officer has exercised that power. *QUEEN v. DHONA BHOOYA* . . . **5 B. L. R. F. B. 658**
14 W. R. Cr. 33

8. ——— Right of appeal to the High Court by a person other than a European British subject jointly tried with such subject—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 404, 452.* A person, not being a European British subject, who is tried before a District Magistrate jointly with a European British subject, cannot claim, under s. 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), the right of appeal to the High Court which is exclusively reserved to such European British subject. *In re SOLOMON*
I. L. R. 14 Bom. 160

9. ——— Illegal conviction—*Appeal on the merits.* No appeal upon the merits can be entertained from a conviction which was based on no legal evidence, and which was absolutely bad in law. *Queen v. Mohesh Chunder Chuttopadhyia*, **2 W. R. Cr. 13**, distinguished. *QUEEN v. POORNO CHUNDER DOSS* . . . **8 W. R. Cr. 59**

10. ——— Order for additional evidence by Appellate Court—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 422.* When an Appellate Court under s. 422 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directed a Court of first instance to take additional evidence, an appeal on the merits to the High Court was not thereby given. *REG. v. NANTAMRAM UTTAMRAM* . . . **6 Bom. Cr. 64**

11. ——— Order for additional evidence by Sessions Judge—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1869), s. 422—Act X of 1872, s. 282.* Upon an appeal from a sentence passed by a Magis-

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trate, the Sessions Judge remanded the case for the purpose of additional evidence being taken by the lower Court. Such evidence having been taken by the Magistrate, the case was returned to the Appellate Court. The Sessions Judge then disposed of the case in the manner prescribed by s. 419 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On an application by the prisoner to the High Court to be allowed to appeal on the merits of the case under s. 408, Act XXV of 1861:—*Held*, that no appeal lay to the High Court on the merits. *In the matter of the petition of DHANOBAR GHOSE* . . . **6 B. L. R. 463**
15 W. R. Cr. 33

12. ——— Judgment of Sessions Judge confirming illegal sentence of Magistrate. The Assistant Magistrate having decided a case without examining the witnesses for the defence named by the prisoners, the Sessions Judge on appeal ordered the evidence of those witnesses to be taken by the Assistant Magistrate. Their depositions having been returned to him, the Sessions Judge proceeded to deal with the case under s. 422 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and, convicting all the prisoners, confirmed the judgment and sentence passed by the Assistant Magistrate. *Held*, that the judgment of the Sessions Judge (though in form confirming the Assistant Magistrate's judgment and sentence) was in substance an original judgment, and that under s. 408 an appeal lay from it to the High Court upon the merits. *QUEEN v. MOHESH CHUNDER CHUTTOPADHYIA* . . . **2 W. R. Cr. 13**

13. ——— Taking of additional evidence by Appellate Court—*Dismissal of Appeal—Accused's right of appeal from such dismissal—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 428.* Where an Appellate Court has, under s. 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, taken additional evidence, the accused whose appeal has been dismissed by such Court has no right of appeal to the High Court. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ISAHAK*
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 372
4 C. W. N. 497

14. ——— Order for fine and imprisonment not in alternative—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1869, s. 411.* S. 411 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1869, must be construed strictly, and will only apply to cases in which either imprisonment or fine has been awarded by the sentence, and not to cases in which both punishments are awarded by one sentence. In the latter case, therefore, there was a right of appeal. *ANONYMOUS CASE*
1 N. W., Ed. 1873, 302

15. ——— Decision of jury as to nuisance. There was no right to appeal from the decision of a jury appointed to try whether the order of a Magistrate for the removal of a nuisance under s. 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was reasonable and proper. *SHTARAM v. RAMANAND*
16 W. R. Cr. 66

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16. ——— Order of Sessions Judge fining assessor under Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 354. The order of a Sessions Judge under s. 354 of the Code of Criminal Procedure fining an assessor was not appealable. *In the matter of the petition of GOUR SURUN DASS*

8 W. R. Cr. 83

17. ——— Order of Sessions Court for detention on refusal to give security—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 508*. No appeal lay from the order of a Sessions Court fixing a period of detention under Act X of 1872, s. 508, for an accused party refusing to furnish security. *QUEEN v. ROGHOO DOME*

24 W. R. Cr. 12

18. ——— Order for detention on refusal to give security for good behaviour—*Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), s. 123*. No appeal lies to the High Court from an order passed by a District Magistrate under the provisions of s. 123 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and on reference by the Magistrate confirmed by the Sessions Judge under the same section, requiring a person to be detained in prison until he should provide security for his good behaviour. *CHAND KHAN v. THE EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 878

19. ——— Order requiring security for good behaviour—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 267 and 286, illus. (d)*. Under ss. 267 and 286, *illus. (d)*, Act X of 1872, there was no appeal to the High Court from an order passed by a Magistrate of the district requiring a person to give security for good behaviour. *QUEEN v. NEJUAH*

22 W. R. 68

20. ——— Decision of Bench of Magistrates—*Summary Procedure—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), Chap. XVIII*. No appeal lay to a District Magistrate from the decision of a Bench of Magistrates composed of an Assistant Magistrate with second class powers and two or more Honorary Magistrates, in a case tried under Chap. XVIII of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872. *In the matter of the petition of HAVILDAR ROY. HAVILDAR ROY v. JAGU MEAN*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 96 : 11 C. L. R. 423

21. ——— Decision of Bench of Magistrates with second class powers—*Conviction*. An appeal lies under s. 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from a conviction by a Bench of Magistrates invested with second or third class powers. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NARAYANASAMI*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 38

22. ——— Order for maintenance of illegitimate child—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 316*. *Held* (MARKBY, J., dissenting), that no appeal lay from the order of a Magistrate under s. 316 of Act XXV of 1861, directing a man to pay a monthly allowance for the support of his illegitimate child. *QUEEN v. GOLAM HOSSEIN CHOWDHRY*

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 88 : 7 W. R. Cr. 10

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23. ——— Order for recognizance to keep peace—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 209, 280, 424*. There was no appeal to the Sessions Court from an order made by a Magistrate under s. 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, requiring a penal recognizance to keep the peace under s. 280. The Court of Session may, however, in such a case, under s. 434 of the Code, call for and examine the record of the Court below ; and if it shall be of opinion that the order of the Magistrate is contrary to law, refer the proceedings for the orders of the High Court. *REG. v. BHASKAR K. KHARKAR*

3 Bom. Cr. 1

24. ——— Order of Magistrate levying penalty for forfeiture of recognizances to keep the peace—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 502*. A first class Deputy Magistrate decided that a bond for keeping the peace had been forfeited, and, proceeding under s. 502 of the Criminal Procedure Code, levied the penalty. An appeal was entertained from this order by the Sessions Judge of South Arcot, and the order was reversed. A petition was then presented, under s. 294 of the Criminal Procedure Code, praying the High Court to reverse the order of the Sessions Judge. *Held*, that the order of the first class Deputy Magistrate was not open to appeal. The effect of the penultimate clause of s. 502 considered. *ANANTHACHARRI v. ANANTHACHARRI*

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 169

25. ——— Order dismissing complaint—*Appeal by prosecutor from order of dismissal*. In a case of dismissal of complaint by a Deputy Magistrate it was *held* that a prosecutor had no right of appeal, but ought to have moved the Magistrate to procure, under s. 434 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a reversal by the High Court of the order of dismissal. *LYALL & Co. v. SAM MUNDLE*

W. R., 1864, Cr. 23

26. ——— Order of Magistrate refusing to recall witness for prosecution. No appeal lies to the Sessions Court from the order of the Deputy Magistrate refusing to recall the witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of cross-examination. *In the matter of the petition of BELILIOS BELILIOS v. QUEEN*

19 W. R. Cr. 53

27. ——— Order of Sessions Judge imposing fine on witness under s. 228, Penal Code—*Insult to Judge*. An appeal lay against an order of the Sessions Court imposing a fine upon a witness under s. 228 of the Penal Code for intentional insult to the Sessions Judge sitting in a stage of a judicial proceeding. Where the High Court on appeal was satisfied that the witness did not intend to insult the Judge, the order was set aside. *QUEEN v. CHAPPU MENON*

4 Mad. 146

28. ——— Order for imprisonment—*Consolidation of separate sentences—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 411 (Act X of 1872, s. 273)*. A was convicted of offences under

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ss. 143, 447, and 211 of the Penal Code, and sentenced by the Magistrate to one month's imprisonment for each offence. *Held*, that, under s. 411 of Act XXV of 1861, there was no appeal. The separate sentences could not be taken together and combined into one sentence, so as to give a right of appeal. *QUEEN v. NAGARDI PARAMANIK*

1 B. L. R. A. Cr. 3 : 10 W. R. Cr. 3

QUEEN v. MORLY SHEIKH . 6 W. R. Cr. 51

29. ——— Sentence of fine and imprisonment—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 411. Held*, that no appeal lay where the sentence of imprisonment, and of further imprisonment in default of payment of a fine, does not in the aggregate exceed the term of one month. *REG v. SHANKAR VENKAJI* . . . 3 Bom. Cr. 15

30. ——— Appeal from sentence of Presidency Magistrate—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 411*. No appeal lies from a sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs200 or a further period of three months' simple imprisonment passed by a Presidency Magistrate. *SCHIEIN v. THE QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 799

31. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 411—Appeal from a conviction by a Presidency Magistrate—Sentence*. S. 411 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882) does not allow an appeal in the case of a conviction by a Presidency Magistrate where the sentence inflicted is six months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs125, or in default a further period of three months' rigorous imprisonment. *Schein v. Queen-Empress, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 799*, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HARI SAYBA* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 145

32. ——— Appealable sentence—Costs of complaint in Criminal Court, order on accused to pay—*Criminal Procedure Code, s. 413—Fine—Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 31*. An order passed by a Magistrate under s. 31 of the Court Fees Act, directing an accused person to pay to the complainant the Court-fee paid on the petition of complaint, is no part of the sentence so as to make it a sentence of fine within the terms of s. 413 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and an order, therefore, sentencing an accused person to 14 days' rigorous imprisonment and to pay the costs, is not appealable. *MADAN MANDUL v. HARAN GHOSE*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 687

33. ——— Order as to restoration of immoveable property—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 404, 520, 522—Jurisdiction of Appellate Court to reverse such an order*. There is no appeal from an order restoring possession of immoveable property under s. 522 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), nor can such an order be regarded as an integral part of the judgment appealed from, so as to stand or fall according as the judgment is upheld or reversed.

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1872, 1882, 1898—*contd.*

Basudeb Surma Gossain v. 'Naziruddin, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 834, Queen-Empress v. Fattah Chand, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 499, In re Annapurna Bai, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 630, and Rodger v. Comptoir D'Escompte de Paris, L. R. 3 P. C. 465, referred to. RAM CHANDRA MISTRY v. NOBIN MIRDHA

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 630
2 C. W. N. 225

34. ——— Order for punishment for separate offences—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 273—Addition of sentences*. Where a person is charged with two separate offences in one trial, the amount of the whole punishment awarded for the two offences must be regarded as one sentence for the purpose of determining whether an appeal lies under s. 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or not. *In the matter of the EMPRESS v. HARADHAN TAMULI* . . . 3 C. L. R. 511

35. ——— Cases tried together of which some are appealable and some not—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 411*. Where several persons were tried together and convicted under s. 147 of the Penal Code of rioting, and two of them were sentenced to pay each a fine of Rs50, or in default of payment to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a month, and the others were sentenced to a severer punishment, the Sessions Judge entertained an appeal by all the prisoners, being of opinion that the test, under s. 411 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as to whether a case is appealable, is the maximum sentence passed in it. *Held*, that an appeal only lay in the cases of those who had been more severely sentenced, and the High Court annulled the order of the Sessions Judge passed with reference to those of the accused who had been only fined Rs50, and restored the original sentences passed upon them. *REG. v. KALUBHAI MEGHABHAI* . . . 7 Bom. Cr. 35

36. ——— Transfer of territory from one Presidency to another, effect of, on right of appeal—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 408—24 & 25 Vict., c. 104—Letters Patent, 1862, cl. 26—Bom. Reg. II of 1827, s. 16, cl. 2. Held*, that there was nothing in the manner in which the district of North Canara was detached from the Madras Presidency and annexed to the Presidency of Bombay, to prevent the Code of Criminal Procedure from operation therein as if it had always formed a part of the Presidency of Bombay, or to deprive a convict, found guilty by the Sessions Judge of the district on the 18th September 1862, of the right of appeal which he then would have had to the High Court by virtue of s. 408 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and of 24 & 25 Vict., c. 104, and the Letters Patent (1862), cl. 26. Giving an appeal to the High Court from a district is not subjecting that district to the Regulations within the meaning of Regulation II of 1827 (Bom.), s. 16, cl. 2. *REG. v. VYANKATSVAMI* . 2 Bom. 112, 2nd Ed., 106

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37. ———— *Alteration of finding—Act V of 1898, ss. 195, 198 and 413—Powers of Appellate Court—Alteration of finding—Question whether accused is prejudiced by alteration—Penal Code, ss. 182 and 500.* *Held*, that an Appellate Court, when it acts under s. 423 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and “alters the finding, maintaining the sentence,” is not bound in respect of such altered finding by such conditions precedent as, for example, sanction or complaint by the person aggrieved, as would be binding on a Court of first instance. Hence, when, in appeal from a conviction under s. 182, the Appellate Court altered the conviction to one under s. 500 of the Indian Penal Code, it was *held* that this was within the competence of the Appellate Court, notwithstanding that there was in existence no complaint by the person aggrieved. *Held*, also, that under the circumstances of the case, there was not so material a difference between the two offences, both arising out of the same facts, as would necessarily lead to the conclusion that the accused had been prejudiced by the alteration of the finding by the Appellate Court. *EMPEROR v. GUR NARAIN PRASAD* (1903) I. L. R. 25 All. 534

38. ———— *Enhancement—Act XLV of 1860 (Indian Penal Code), s. 70—Act V of 1898, s. 423—Alteration of sentence in appeal—Enhancement.* A Magistrate, on a conviction under s. 420 of the Indian Penal Code, sentenced the accused to six months’ rigorous imprisonment. On appeal, the Sessions Judge reduced the substantive term of imprisonment to four months, but imposed a fine of one hundred rupees, or in default two months’ further rigorous imprisonment. *Held*, that, inasmuch as, even after the two months’ imprisonment imposed in default of payment of the fine had been served, the fine could still be exacted, the latter sentence amounted to an enhancement of the former. *Queen v. Madoosoodun Dey*, 3 W. R. Cr. 61; *Rakhal Raja v. Khirud Prosad Dutt*, I. L. R. 27 Cal. 175; and *Empress v. Meda*, Weekly Notes, 1887, 100, referred to. *Queen-Empress v. Chagan Jagannath*, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 439, dissented from. *KING-EMPEROR v. SAGWA* (1901)

I. L. R. 23 All. 497

39. ———— *Act V of 1898, s. 423 (b)—Conviction of two accused, and order against both accused to pay Court and process fees in equal shares—Acquittal of one accused on appeal—Order by Appellate Court for entire Court and process fees—Legality—“Enhancement of sentence.”* A Magistrate convicted two accused, and, in addition to the sentences which he passed on them, ordered them to pay the Court and process fees in equal shares. The Appellate Court acquitted one of the accused and ordered the other accused (whose conviction was affirmed) to pay the whole amount of the Court and process fees. *Held*, that the order of the Appellate Court was legal under s. 423 (d) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and did not amount to an enhance-

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ment of sentence within the meaning of s. 423 (b). Fees ordered to be paid under s. 31 (iv) of the Court-fees Act are recoverable as if they were fines imposed by the Court, but they are not part of the fine imposed as a punishment for the offence. *Queen-Empress v. Tangavulu Chetti*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 153, and the *High Court Ruling*, 20th July 1870; 5 M. H. C. R. App. 28, distinguished. *VEMURI SESHANNA* (1902) I. L. R. 26 Mad. 421

40. ———— *Restoration of property—Immovable property—Possession, order by Subordinate Magistrate restoring—Appeal—Jurisdiction—Magistrate of first class specially empowered to hear appeals—Consequential or incidental order—Act V of 1898, ss. 423, cl. (d), and 522, and Act X of 1882, s. 423.* *Held*, that a Magistrate of the first class specially empowered to hear appeals from Subordinate Magistrates has jurisdiction under s. 423, cl. (d), of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, to hear an appeal with reference to an order passed by a Subordinate Magistrate under s. 522 of that Code. *Ram Chandra Mistry v. Nobin Mirdha*, I. L. R. 25 Cal. 630, declared obsolete. *GOURHARI GOPE v. ALAY GOPINI* (1902)

I. L. R. 29 Cal. 724 : s.c. 6 C. W. N. 713

41. ———— *Restoration of property order for—Act V of 1898, ss. 517, 520.* An order by a Magistrate directing the restoration of property in respect of which no offence has been found to have been committed, to the person in whose possession that property was found, is not an order under s. 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is therefore not open to appeal. *Basudeb Surma Gossain v. Naziruddin*, I. L. R. 14 Cal. 834; *In re Annapurnabai*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 630; and *In re Decidin Durgaprasad*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 844, referred to. *SURENDRA NATH SARMA v. RAI MOHAN DAS* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Cal. 690 : s.c. 7 C.W. N. 634

42. ———— *Right of way—Act V of 1898, s. 423—Right of way, interference with—Order for preserving status quo ante on conviction, if proper—Appellate Court, power of, to set aside such order—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 341—Wrongful restraint.* Where a person blocked up a private way, along which the complainant had a right to go, by raising a wall, and was convicted of the offence of wrongful restraint under s. 341 of the Penal Code, and an order was passed by the trying Magistrate, directing the accused to remove the obstruction and not to interfere with the complainant’s right of way, and on appeal the Appellate Court set aside the order directing the removal of the obstruction and preventing the accused from interfering with the complainant’s right : *Held*, that the order of removal of the obstruction was a necessary corollary to the previous conviction of the accused, and was a proper order. That, although an Appellate Court has, under s. 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the power of making any amendment or any con-

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sequential or incidental order that may be just and proper, such Court cannot make an order which would make the entire proceeding infructuous and absurd. That the order of the Appellate Court, setting aside the order for removal of the obstruction, was neither proper nor just. *DEBENDRA CHANDRA CHOWDHURY v. MOHINI MOHAN CHOWDHURY* (1901) . . . **5 C. W. N. 432**

43. ———— *Whipping—Act V of 1898, ss. 391, 407—Sentence of whipping by second-class Magistrate—Appeal—Application for postponement of sentence till hearing of appeal—Refusal—Validity.* When a second-class Magistrate passes a sentence of whipping only, without imprisonment, he has no power to postpone the execution of the sentence pending an appeal by the accused. It is only when whipping is added to imprisonment in an appealable case that the whipping may and ought to be postponed under s. 391 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *MEYYAN v. EMPEROR* (1902) . . . **I. L. R. 26 Mad. 465**

44. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 195 (6)—Appeal lies to High Court against an appellate order revoking sanction granted by Court of first instance.* The right of appeal conferred by s. 195 (6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as read with sub-s. (7) of the same section is not restricted to a right of appeal to the Appellate Court to which the Court of first instance is immediately subordinate. The revocation by the Appellate Court of a sanction given by the Court of first instance is a refusal of sanction within the meaning of sub-s. (6) and an appeal lies therefrom to the High Court, as well as in cases where the sanction refused by the Court of first instance is granted by the Appellate Court. *Palaniappa Chetti v. Annamalai Chetti*, **I. L. R. 27 Mad. 223**, approved. An order revoking a sanction is a refusal of a sanction just as an order confirming a sanction is an order giving a sanction. *MUTHUSWAMI MUDALI v. VEENI CHETTI* (1907) . . . **I. L. R. 30 Mad. 382**

4. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

1. ———— *Appeal preferred after time—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 415.* An appeal preferred out of time, and without any explanation of the delay, may be rejected at once, under s. 415 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *QUEEN v. HULLODHUR GHOSE* **5 W. R. Cr. 40**

2. ———— *Computation of time for appeal—Time for obtaining copy of sentence or judgment, deduction of.* In computing time within which it is competent to a defendant to appeal against the sentence of a Magistrate, the number of days taken by the Court to prepare a copy of the sentence should be omitted. *QUEEN v. TOTI CHENGAN* . . . **6 Mad. 349**

3. ———— *Right to appear by mook-tear—Criminal Procedure Code, Act X of 1872,*

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s. 278. An appellant in a criminal case has a right to appear and be heard by a mook-tear. *EMPRESS v. SHIVRAM GUNDO* . . . **I. L. R. 6 Bom. 14**

4. ———— *Presentation of petition of appeal.* A petition of appeal in a criminal case may be presented to the Appellate Court by any person authorized by the appellant to present it. *In the matter of SUBBA AITALA* . . . **I. L. R. 1 Mad. 304**

5. ———— *Presentation of appeal—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 419.* The Criminal Procedure Code, s. 419, requires that a criminal appeal shall be delivered to the proper officer of the Court, either by the appellant or his pleader. Where a petition of appeal was not presented to the Court, but was deposited in a petition box kept for the convenience of parties within the Court precincts and intended for the deposit of papers for the Court:—*Held*, that it had not been presented, and was rightly returned for legal presentation. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. VASUDEVAIYYA* . . . **I. L. R. 19 Mad. 354**

6. ———— *Presentation of appeal petition by the clerk of the appellant's pleader—Criminal Procedure Code 1882, s. 419.* Presentation of an appeal petition by the clerk of the appellant's pleader is equivalent to a presentation by the pleader himself when it is signed by him and he is duly authorized. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KARUPPA UDAYAN* . . . **I. L. R. 20 Mad. 87**

7. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 419—Presentation of criminal appeal.* A petition of appeal under the Criminal Procedure Code is not duly presented when, having been signed by a pleader, it is handed in by a person who is not his clerk and over whose conduct and actions he has no control. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMASAMI* . . . **I. L. R. 21 Mad. 114**

8. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 419—Petition of appeal, presentation of.* A petition of appeal sent by post is not presented to the Court within the meaning of Criminal Procedure Code, s. 419. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ARLAPPA* . . . **I. L. R. 15 Mad. 137**

9. ———— *Notice of appeal—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 278, 279—Pleader, notice to.* The fact that the pleader of the accused is present in Court when an order is made admitting an appeal does not relieve the Court from the necessity of giving notice to the appellant of the day fixed for the hearing of the appeal. *In the matter of GOPAL CHUNDER MUNDLE* . . . **10 C. L. R. 57**

10. ———— *Power of Appellate Court to dispose of appeal in absence of the appellant—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 420, 421, 422, and 423—Appeal preferred by appellant in jail.* Where an appeal, preferred under s. 420 of the Criminal Procedure Code, has been admitted by the Appellate Court, and notice has been properly given under s. 422, and the record of the case

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has been sent for and perused under s. 423, the Appellate Court is competent, under the last-mentioned section, to dispose of the appeal, though the appellant is not present and is not represented by a pleader. The only limitation placed by s. 423 on the powers of the Appellate Court is that the Court, before disposing of the appeal, must peruse the record, and, if the appellant is present or is represented by a pleader, the appellant in person must be heard, or the pleader must be heard: so held by the Full Bench (MAHMOOD, J., dissenting). Held by MAHMOOD, J. (*contra*), that the principles of *audi alteram partem* and *ubi jus ibi remedium*, and the provisions of s. 422 of the Code, as to notice of appeal, imply that, where an appeal is admitted and not summarily rejected under s. 421, the appellant must have a real opportunity of being heard; that in the passage in s. 423, "after perusing the record and hearing the appellant or his pleader if he appears," the word "he" refers to the pleader, and must not be read as "either of them"; that, in any case, the words "if he appears" make it a condition precedent to the disposal of an appeal under the section that the appellant is heard, or at least has the choice of appearing; that the word "appears" refers to the *personal* appearance of the appellant; and that an appeal which has been admitted cannot be disposed of unless the appellant is before the Appellate Court, or can be heard within the meaning of s. 423. *Semble*: per MAHMOOD, J., but the High Court in appeal is competent to send for a criminal to appear before it to explain a difficulty in his case. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PORPI I. L. R. 13 All. 171

11. ——— Duty of Court to fix date of hearing—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 278*. A general notice posted in a Sessions Court-house that appeals will be heard for admission only on the first Court-day after the date of presentation of the appeal is not a compliance with the requirement of s. 278 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, *viz.*, that a reasonable time shall be fixed, within which the appellant, his counsel or agent may appear and be heard in support of the appeal. MALAN v. THE QUEEN . . . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 11

12. ——— Rejection of appeal for non-appearance—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 278*. When a criminal appeal has been rejected without hearing the appellant's pleader, and it is afterwards proved to the satisfaction of the Appellate Court that an adequate excuse has been made for the pleader's non-appearance, it is open to the Appellate Court to re-hear the appeal on its merits. ANONYMOUS . . . 7 Mad. Ap. 29

13. ——— Omission to fix time for hearing—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 278*. When the Appellate Court did not fix a reasonable time for the appearance of the appellant or his counsel as required by s. 278, Act X of 1872, the error was held to invalidate the proceedings. *In the matter of the petition of HURI PERSHAD* 24 W. R. Cr. 60

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14. ——— Power of Court on appeal—*Stolen property—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 517, 520*. An order passed under s. 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be revised by a Court of Appeal, although no appeal has been preferred in the case in which such order was passed. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. AHMED

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 448

15. ——— Powers of Appellate Court to alter finding of Court of first instance—*Criminal Procedure Code, s. 423*. Where the Court of Session had tried, convicted, and sentenced an accused person under s. 409 of the Penal Code, and the High Court was of opinion that the conviction was not sustainable under that section, the Court refused to alter the finding, under s. 423 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to a conviction for some other offence for which the accused had not been charged or tried. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. IMDAD KHAN

I. L. R. 8 All. 120

16. ——— Alteration of conviction on appeal. When on appeal against a conviction for one offence, it became apparent that, although there was not sufficient evidence to support the conviction, there was evidence which might have led to the conviction of the appellants for an essentially different offence, with which they had not been charged, the Court declined to consider that evidence with a view to altering the conviction of the appellants. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PARTATI, *Weekly Notes, 1887, 130*, referred to. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. YUSUF . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 107

17. ——— Power of single Judge on Appellate side—*Rule 30, Jan. 1865*. A Judge of the High Court, sitting alone on the Appellate Side, has the power to hear and dispose of appeals in criminal cases. QUEEN v. CHANDRA JUGI

9 B. L. R. 6:17 W. R. Cr. 47

18. ——— Power to hear appeals—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 14 and 412—Officer to hear criminal matters—Magistrate of District*. Government may by proclamation declare and direct that an Assistant Collector in charge of the Collectorate during the absence of the Collector shall be, during that period, "the officer in charge with the executive administration of the district in criminal matters;" and such officer, being, within the meaning of s. 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate of the district, may hear appeals from subordinate Magistrates under s. 412 of the Code. REG. v. BHATSHANKAR HARRAM . . . 3 Bom. Cr. 18

19. ——— Concurrent jurisdiction of Magistrate. Held, that the power conferred upon the Magistrate, F. P., at Broach to hear appeals did not exclude the jurisdiction which the Magistrate of the district had by law, and that the proceedings in any case in which a prisoner has appealed from the decision of a subordinate Magistrate to the District Magistrate must be forwarded to the latter. REG. v. UMTHA RUGNATH

5 Bom. Cr. 8

APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*4. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—*contd.*

20. — Powers of Appellate Court in disposing of appeal—Appellant bound to show ground for interference—*Criminal Procedure Code*, ss. 421, 423. A convicted person appealing is not in the same position before the Appellate Court as he is before the Court trying him : he must satisfy the Appellate Court that there is sufficient ground for interfering with the order of conviction ; and if no such ground is shown, it is the duty of the Appellate Court not to interfere. *EMPERESS v. SAJIWAN LAL* . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 386

21. — Powers of Appellate Court in cases of trial by jury when there has been misdirection—*Criminal Procedure Code*, 1882, ss. 138, 423, and 137. An accused in a trial by jury is entitled to the verdict of the jury on questions of fact, and where a verdict is vitiated owing to misdirection by the Judge, the Appeal Court has no option but to set aside the verdict and direct a re-trial. Were the Appeal Court to go into the facts in such a case, it would be substituting the decision of the Judges of that Court for the verdict of the jury, who have the opportunity of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses and weighing the evidence with the assistance which this affords, whereas the Judges of the Appeal Court can only arrive at a decision on the perusal of the evidence. *Makin v. Attorney-General of New South Wales*, [1894] A. C. 57, referred to. S. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not warrant an Appeal Court, in a case where there has been misdirection in a charge to a jury, going into the evidence with a view to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a conviction. Under s. 418, an appeal in a case tried by a jury lies on matters of law only, and the Appeal Court has no power to try the accused on matters of fact. The word "erroneous" in cl. (d) of s. 423 must not be read as "wrong on the facts," but must be read in connection with the words that follow as meaning that the verdict has been vitiated and rendered bad or defective by reason of a misdirection or a misunderstanding of the law. *WAFADAR KHAN v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . I. L. R. 21 Cal. 955

22. — Power of the Appellate Court to alter a finding of acquittal into one of conviction—*Criminal Procedure Code*, 1882, s. 423. The Appellate Court can, under the provisions of s. 423 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in an appeal from a conviction, alter the finding of the lower Court and find the appellant guilty of an offence of which he was acquitted by that Court. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JABANULLA* . . . I. L. R. 23 Cal. 975

23. — Powers of Appellate Court—Enhancement of sentence—*Criminal Procedure Code*, 1882, s. 420 (b) (3)—Alteration from fine to imprisonment. *Held*, that the alteration by an Appellate Court of a sentence of a fine of ₹50 or in default two months' simple imprisonment to a sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment was

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an enhancement of the sentence, and, as such, prohibited by s. 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Queen-Empress v. Dansang Dada*, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 751, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LACHMI KANT* . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 301

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24. — *Criminal Procedure Code* (1882), s. 423 (b) (3)—*Penal Code* (*Act XLV of 1860*), ss. 147 and 379—*Jurisdiction of Magistrate*. In a case where the accused were convicted by a Deputy Magistrate of the offence of rioting under s. 147, and theft under s. 379 of the Penal Code, and sentenced to four months for the first and two months for the latter offence, but on appeal the District Magistrate, considering the case to be one of theft rather than rioting, abandoned the sentence under s. 147, but upheld the conviction under s. 379 of the Penal Code, and sentenced them to six months' rigorous imprisonment :—*Held*, that what the District Magistrate had in effect done was to enhance the sentence under s. 379 of the Penal Code, which he had no power to do under s. 423, cl. (b), sub-s. (3), of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *RAMZAN KUNTRA v. RAMKHELAWAN CHOWBE* . . . I. L. R. 24 Cal. 316

ARPIN SHEIKH v. AROBDI DATIA . . . I. L. R. 24 Cal. 317, note

25. — *Criminal Procedure Code* 1882, s. 423—*Conviction and sentence on two separate charges—Retention of sentence where conviction on one of the charges is reversed*. Where an accused person is convicted and sentenced on two separate charges, the Appellate Court has no power, in appeal, to maintain the whole sentence when it reverses the conviction on one of the charges as to do so is in effect to enhance the sentence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HANMA* . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 760

26. — Power of Appellate Court to order a re-trial—*Criminal Procedure Code* (*V of 1898*), s. 423, cl. (b). A conviction and sentence under s. 211 of the Penal Code by a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case was on appeal set aside, and a new trial under the same section was directed by the Sessions Judge. It was contended that the power to order a new trial under s. 423, cl. (b), of the Criminal Procedure Code could only be exercised when the conviction and sentence were set aside for want of jurisdiction in the trying Magistrate. *Held*, that there is nothing in s. 423, cl. (b), of the Code to limit the power of an Appellate Court to order a re-trial. *Queen-Empress v. Maula Buksh*, I. L. R. 15 All. 205, and *Queen-Empress v. Jabanulla*, I. L. R. 23 Cal. 975, followed. *Queen-Empress v. Sukka*, I. L. R. 8 All. 14, disapproved of. *SATIS CHANDRA DAS BOSE v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . I. L. R. 27 Cal. 172
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27. ——— Appellate Court, duty of—*Presumption.* *Per* WHITE, J. The sound rule to apply in trying a criminal appeal where questions of fact are in issue is to consider whether the conviction is right, and in this respect a criminal appeal differs from a civil one. In the latter case the Court must be convinced before reversing a finding of fact by a lower Court that the finding is wrong. *PROTAB CHUNDER MUKERJEE v EMPRESS* 11 C. L. R. 25

28. ——— Duty of Appellate Court trying criminal appeal. If the Judge of the Appellate Court has any doubt that the conviction is a right one, whatever the original Court has done, the Judge of the Appellate Court should discharge the accused. In this respect the duty of an Appellate Court in criminal cases is not similar to that of an Appellate Court in civil cases. In the latter case the Court must be satisfied before setting aside an order of the lower Court that the order is wrong. *Protab Chunder Mukerjee v. Empress*, 11 C. L. R. 25, followed. *MILAN KHAN v. SAGAI BEPARI* . . . I. L. R. 23 Cal. 347

29. ——— Evidence not given in lower Court—Opinion of Judge as to credibility of witnesses. The High Court declined on appeal to receive evidence which was available on the trial below when the prisoner deliberately elected not to give evidence in reply to the case made against him. *Per* MARKBY, J.—It is not the duty of the High Court in appeal to try a prisoner *de novo* upon the recorded depositions. The Court is bound, in forming its conclusions as to the credibility of the witnesses, to attach great weight to the opinion which the Judge who heard them has expressed upon that matter. *QUEEN v. MADHUB CHUNDER GIRI* . . . 21 W. R. Cr. 13

30. ——— Jurisdiction of High Court to dispose of cases after holding jury have been misdirected—*Criminal Procedure Code* (Act V of 1898), ss. 298, 299, 423—*Re-trial.* *Quære:* Whether in setting aside a conviction on the ground of misdirection to the jury, the High Court has any power to re-try the case having regard to s. 423, Criminal Procedure Code. *SADHU SHEIKH v. EMPRESS* . . . 4 C. W. N. 576

31. ——— Appeals from conviction on trials by jury. Appeals from convictions on trials by jury, where illegal evidence has been admitted, should be dealt with on the same principles as appeals in which there has been a misdirection by the Judge, or an omission on his part to give the jury proper directions. *REG. v. RAMASWAMI MUDALIAR* . . . 6 Bom. Cr. 47

32. ——— Improper admission of evidence—*Discharge of prisoner on appeal—Conviction set aside.* Where the High Court on appeal found the evidence against a prisoner insufficient to support the conviction, and would, if the case had been before them on the facts, have reversed the conviction if the case had been tried

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without a jury, they ordered the verdict to be set aside, and the prisoner to be discharged, though where a verdict is set aside on appeal they can order a new trial. *QUEEN v. MAHIMA CHANDRA DAS* 6 B. L. R. Ap. 108; 15 W. R. Cr. 37

33. ——— Evidence—*Procedure on appeal.* Evidence taken before the Magistrate, but not used at the trial, cannot be referred to on appeal. *QUEEN v. WAZIRA* 8 B. L. R. Ap. 63; 17 W. R. Cr. 5

34. ——— Right of complainant to be heard as respondent on appeal. In criminal cases a complainant cannot claim as of right to be heard as a respondent in appeal. The matter is in each case in the discretion of the Court. *ANONYMOUS* . . . 7 Mad. Ap. 42

35. ——— Difference of opinion between Judges of Division Bench—*Letters Patent, cl. 36—Criminal Procedure Code* (Act XXV of 1861), s. 420. When a criminal appeal is heard by two Judges, sitting as a Division Court, and they differ in opinion, the opinion of the senior Judge must prevail under s. 36 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of 1865, notwithstanding s. 420 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *QUEEN v. KAZIM THAKOOR* 2 B. L. R. F. B. 25; 10 W. R. Cr. 45

36. ——— Alteration of charge and conviction of graver offence. It is not competent to an Appellate Court to find a prisoner on appeal guilty of a graver offence than that with which he was charged at his trial, unless an opportunity is afforded to the accused of defending himself against the charge so altered. *In the matter of DWARKA MANJHEE* . . . 6 C. L. R. 427

37. ——— Stay of proceedings—*Power of High Court—Stay of criminal proceedings—Perjury—Forgery.* When a Civil Court directs that criminal proceedings be taken against a party to a suit before it for perjury or forgery, the High Court has no power, on an appeal being preferred against the decision of that Court, to direct that such proceedings be stayed until the appeal shall have been heard and determined. *In the matter of the petition of RAMPRASED HAZRA* . . . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 426

RAM PARSHAD HAZAREE v. SOOMATHRA DABEA 5 W. R. Mis. 24

38. ——— Death of Appellant—*Abatement of appeal—High Court, power of revision of.* The Code of Criminal Procedure gives no right to the heir, devisee, executor, or any other representative of a deceased convict, to lodge an appeal, or continue and prosecute an appeal already lodged. (*KEMBALL, J., dissenting.*)—The appeal lodged by a convict abates on his death. The High Court, nevertheless, may call for and examine the record of the case with a view to revision and rectification, and may make such order thereon as it may consider just. *EMPRESS v. DONGAJI ANDAJI* I. L. R. 2 Bom. 564

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39. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 431—Appeal by accused against conviction—Power of revision by High Court.* Two persons M and N were convicted of criminal breach of trust, and each was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs1,000. Both prisoners filed an appeal to the High Court. N died pending his appeal. On M's appeal the High Court passed an order acquitting him and reversing his conviction and sentence. Thereupon one of the relatives of the deceased N applied to the High Court to set aside the conviction and sentence passed in his case and order the fine to be refunded. *Held*, that on N's death his appeal abated under s. 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882). As the case turned on the appreciation of evidence, the High Court declined to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, referring the legal representatives of the deceased to the Governor in Council for redress. *In re NABI SHAH* . . . **I. L. R. 19 Bom. 714**

40. ————— *Rejection of appeal—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 278—Act XI of 1874, s. 26.* When the Appellate Court rejects an appeal under Act X of 1872, s. 278, it is prohibited by Act XI of 1874, s. 26, from enhancing the sentence. *AKOOL SIRCAR v. PARTAMA* . . . **24 W. R. Cr. 29**

41. ————— *Right to withdraw appeal.* A petition of appeal presented for admission may be withdrawn. *In the matter of CHUNDER NATH DEB* . . . **5 C. L. R. 372**

42. ————— *Quære: Whether a petition of appeal against a conviction can be withdrawn after the Appellate Court has perused the evidence.* *In the matter of DWARKA MANJHEE* **6 C. L. R. 427**

43. ————— *Alteration of charge, and conviction of another offence—Rioting, charge of—Conviction—Appeal—Acquittal—Conviction of house-trespass and hurt, legality of—Act V of 1898, ss. 232 and 423—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 147, 323 and 448.* The accused were convicted of rioting. That was the only charge before the Magistrate. On appeal, the Sessions Judge acquitted them of rioting, but convicted them under ss. 448 and 323 of the Penal Code of house-trespass and hurt. *Held*, that the convictions by the Sessions Judge should be set aside; that the offences were distinct and separate offences, which should have formed the subject of separate charges, and that the accused had been prejudiced by the omission of those charges. *YAKUB ALI v. LETHU THAKUR* (1903) . . . **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 283**

44. ————— *Assessors and Jury—Act V of 1898, ss. 269 and 418—Offence triable with the aid of assessors tried in fact by a jury—Trial by jury—Appeal on a matter of fact.* Under s. 418 of the Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), no appeal lies on matters of fact, where an accused person is convicted by a jury on a charge which ought to have been tried with the aid of assessors. An accused person was charged with and tried for offences

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under ss. 302, 304 and 325 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860). Under the first of these charges he was triable by a jury. Under the latter two he was triable with the aid of assessors. He was, however, tried for all three offences by a jury, who found him guilty on the third charge. The Judge accepted the verdict, and sentenced the accused to four years' rigorous imprisonment. The accused appealed. *Held* by a Full Bench, that under s. 418 an appeal lay in this case on matters of law only, and not on matters of fact. *Per JENKINS, C.J.* The words in s. 418 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, "where the trial was by jury" mean "where the trial in fact was by jury" and not "when the trial should have been by jury." *KING-EMPEROR v. PARBHUSHANKAR* (1901) . . . **I. L. R. 25 Bom. 680**

45. ————— *Dismissal of appeal—Act V of 1898, s. 421—Summary dismissal of appeal of accused, legality of, on admission of appeal of co-accused.* The law gives to the Appellate Court the power of dismissing summarily an appeal upon going through the judgment, if the Court is satisfied that there is no sufficient reason shown for the interference of the Appellate Court; and the fact that the Appellate Court admitted one appellant's appeal does not affect the order summarily dismissing another appellant's appeal. *JAGAT CHANDRA SARMA v. LAL CHAND DAS* (1901) . . . **5 C. W. N. 332**

46. ————— *Question of law raised for the first time in appeal—Practice—Objection to prosecution, on a question of law raised for the first time in appeal, given effect to.* Objection to the prosecution of an accused, grounded on a question of law, allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal, and given effect to. *BIJOYENDRA LAL MITTER v. EMPEROR* (1903) . . . **7 C. W. N. 883**

47. ————— *Hearing on date of filing—Pleader—Right to be heard—Practice in the mofussil—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) s. 421.* A pleader for an appellant should not be called upon immediately on the filing of an appeal, to support it, but should be afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard. If the appeal is not admitted at once, and the Court desires to hear the appellant, before admitting it under s. 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he should be given the same notice, as is given to the Crown. *Semble*: The practice in the mofussil is to admit appeals, which are supported by pleaders, without any hearing, except on a question of bail; the only cases, which are dealt with under section 421 of the Code, being jail appeals. *RAMTOHAL DUSADH v. EMPEROR* (1909) . . . **I. L. R. 36 Calc. 385**

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1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT.

(a) APPEALABLE ORDERS.

1. ——— Order of High Court dismissing Munsif—*Beng. Reg. V of 1831, s. 26, cl. 2.* An order of the High Court at Calcutta, under s. 26, cl. 2, of Bengal Regulation V of 1831, dismissing a Munsif for corruption in the exercise of his functions as Judge, is final, and there is no jurisdiction in the Judicial Committee to admit a special appeal therefrom. *In the matter of SREE MOHUN GHUTTUCK* . . . 13 Moo. I. A. 343

2. ——— Decision as to admissibility of special appeal—*Act III of 1843.* By Act III of 1843, the decision of a single Judge of the Sudder Court of Bombay as to the admissibility of a special appeal was final so far as the Sudder Court was concerned; but the Act did not extend to take away the right of appeal to the Privy Council. *MODEE KAIKHOOSROW HORMUZJEE v. COOVERBAEE* 4 W. R. P. C. 94; 6 Moo. I. A. 448

3. ——— Award under Act XVIII of 1848—*Administration of private estate of Nawab of Surat—Statutes 7 and 8 Vict., c. 69; 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 41.* An act of the Legislature of India—(XVIII of 1848)—empowered the Governor in Council of Bombay to administer the private estate of the late Nawab of Surat, and it was by s. 2 enacted "that no Act of the said Governor of Bombay in Council in respect of the administration to, and distribution of, such property, from the date of the death of the said Nawab, should be liable to be questioned in any Court of law or equity." No provision was made for an appeal from the Governor's decision. In pursuance of the power conferred by this Act, the Government Agent at Surat, to whom the matter was referred, made an award distributing the estate in certain shares among the heirs of the deceased, which award was confirmed by the Governor in Council. On an application by a claimant dissatisfied with the award to the Judicial Committee, for leave to appeal from the Governor in Council's confirmation of the award:—*Held*, that the award was not such a judicial act as to come within the operation of s. 3 of the Statute 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 41, or the 7 & 8 Vict., c. 69, and could not be entertained by the Judicial Committee without a special reference to them by the Crown under s. 4 of the Statute 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 41. *In re NAWAB OF SURAT* . . . 5 Moo. I. A. 499

4. ——— Order under Act XL of 1858. An Appeal from an order under Act XL of 1858, appointing a person to be guardian of a minor and manager of his property, bears no value and cannot be carried to Her Majesty in Council. *PEARREE DAYE v. HURBUNS KOER*. 14 W. R. 299

5. ——— Order rejecting application for review. An appeal lies to the Privy Council, under s. 39 of the Charter of the High Court, from an order rejecting an application for a review of judgment. The petition of appeal must be pre-

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT
—*contd.*(a) APPEALABLE ORDERS—*contd.*

sent within six months from the date of the said order. *NAZUR ALI KHAN v. OJODHYARAM KHAN*
1 W. R. Mis. 13

AMEERONISSA BEGUM v. INDERJEET KOONWAR
5 W. R. Mis. 17

6. ——— Order confirming sale in execution—*Order made on appeal—Letters Patent, cl. 39—24 & 25 Vict., c. 104, s. 15.* Certain property having been sold in execution of a decree, the judgment-debtor applied to have the sale set aside. This application was rejected; but a review of the order rejecting it was subsequently granted, and the sale set aside, and an application by the auction-purchaser for the cancellation of the order setting aside the sale was refused. Thereupon the purchaser applied by petition to the High Court, praying that the order made on review might be reversed. In his petition he submitted that "the sale ought to have been confirmed" when the application of the judgment-debtor to have it set aside was first rejected, but the petition did not contain a formal prayer for confirmation of the sale. A rule, however, was granted, calling on the judgment-debtor to show cause why the order reversing the sale should not be set aside and the sale confirmed, which rule, after argument, was made absolute. The judgment-debtor having obtained leave to appeal to the Privy Council from the order making the rule absolute, the purchaser objected that such order was not appealable under cl. 39 of the Letters Patent, 1865, on the ground that it was not an order "made on appeal." *Held*, that as the purchaser had obtained a rule calling on the judgment-debtor to show cause why the sale should not be confirmed, and had allowed that rule to be made absolute, he could not contend that the order making the rule absolute was not an order made on appeal. *Semble*: Orders made by the High Court under s. 15 of 24 & 25 Vict., c. 104, are subject to appeal to the Privy Council. *HURDEO NARAIN SAHU v. GRIDHARI SINGH*
13 B. L. R. 103

GRIDHARI SINGH v. HURDEO NARAIN SAHU
21 W. R. 263

7. ——— Order rejecting review—*Order made on appeal—Letters Patent, cls. 39 and 42.* An order rejecting a review of judgment is not an "order made on appeal" within the meaning of cl. 39 of the Letters Patent of the High Court. In cases of appeal made under cl. 42 of the Letters Patent, the Court ought not, in transmitting the proceedings connected therewith, also to send such proceedings as applications for review of the judgment of the High Court and the orders of the Court thereupon. *ENAYAT HOSSEIN v. ROUSHAN JEHAN* . I. B. L. R. F. B. 1: 10 W. R. F. B. 1

8. ——— Difference of opinion between Judges of Division Bench of High

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT
—*contd.*(a) APPEALABLE ORDERS—*contd.*

Court—Letters Patent, 1865, ss. 15 and 39. An appeal lies directly to the Privy Council from the decree of a Division Bench of the High Court on an appeal from the *mofussil*, although the Judges differed, and upon the points of difference a further appeal to the High Court is given under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. *In the matter of the petition of the COURT OF WARDS ON BEHALF OF THE RAJA OF DARBANGA* . 7 B. L. R. 730: 18 W. R. 191

9. ——— Letters Patent, cl. 39—*Appeal from decision of High Court, Appellate Side.* Cl. 39 of the Letters Patent of 1865 does not rest for its authority on the 24 & 25 Vict., c. 104, and was not inserted in pursuance of that Act; consequently any power which it gives to admit an appeal to the Privy Council from a decision of the High Court on its Appellate Side, is not one of the powers which the High Court is, by the first part of s. 9 of 24 & 25 Vict., c. 104, commanded to exercise. *In the matter of the petition of FEDA HOSSEIN*
I. L. R. 1 Cal. 431

10. ——— Interlocutory judgment—*Letters Patent, cl. 40—Question of practice—Order for inspection of documents.* No appeal lies, under s. 40 of the amended Letters Patent of the High Court, to the Privy Council from an interlocutory judgment or order of a Judge of the High Court, until such judgment or order has been subjected to an appeal to the High Court under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, except in those cases in which, by reason of the number of the Judges who have made such order, an appeal under cl. 15 is given directly to the Privy Council. *Semble*: The High Court will not, in the exercise of its discretion, allow an appeal to the Privy Council upon a mere question of practice, such as an order for the inspection of documents. *SONBAI v. AHMEDBHAI HABIBHAI*
9 Bom. 398

11. ——— Interlocutory decree—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 595—Final decree—Practice.* Where the High Court reverses the decree of the Court below, and remands the case for re-trial on the merits, and for a new decree to be passed by the Court below, no appeal lies as a matter of right, under s. 595 of the Code of Civil Procedure (XIV of 1882), to the Privy Council, albeit the value of the subject-matter admittedly exceeds Rs. 10,000, as such a decree of the High Court is not a final, but an interlocutory decree. In such a case a certificate should first be obtained under cl. (c) of the section that the case is a fit one for appeal to Her Majesty in Council. *ISHVARGAR BUDHGAR v. CAUDASAMA AMARSANG* . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 548

12. ——— Interlocutory order—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 595, cl. (a)—Final order.* An order of the High Court, directing execution to proceed, is not a "final" decree, judgment, or order within the meaning of cl. (a), s. 595 of the

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—contd.**1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—contd.****(a) APPEALABLE ORDERS—contd.**

Code of Civil Procedure, Act X of 1877, and therefore no appeal lies from it to the Privy Council. *JOGESSUR SAHAI v. MURACHO KOORER*.

1 C. L. R. 354

13. *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 594, 596.* The District Judge of Ghazipur recalled to his own file the proceedings in the execution of a decree which were pending in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Shahabad, and disallowed an application for the execution of the decree which had been preferred to that Judge. The High Court, on appeal from an order of the District Judge, annulled his order as void for want of jurisdiction, and remitted the case in order that the application might be disposed of on its merits, directing that the record of the case should be returned to the Subordinate Judge of Shahabad. On an application for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council from the order of the High Court:—*Held*, that such order was in the nature of an interlocutory order, and was not one from which the High Court could or ought to grant leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council. *PALAK DHARI RAI v. RADHA PERSAD SINGH*. **I. L. R. 2 All. 65**

14. *Final decree or Order—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 595, 600.* An order in a partnership suit for account refusing to allow the plaintiffs to have their accounts taken in a particular manner suggested by themselves, unless they would consent to give certain credits in their accounts to the defendants, is not a final decree within the meaning of cl. (b) of s. 595 of the Civil Procedure Code, although the effect of such order may be to make it impossible for the plaintiffs to proceed further in the case, and consequently an appeal from such an order of the High Court to the Queen in Council does not lie. *ABEN SHA v. CASSIRAO BABA SAHEB*. **I. L. R. 6 Bom. 260**

15. *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 595 (a)—“Final decree.”* Certain persons interested in an award applied under s. 525 of the Civil Procedure Code to have it filed in Court. The Court made an order under s. 526 “that the claim of the plaintiffs be decreed.” The defendants appealed to the High Court from this “decree.” The High Court held that the appeal would not lie, and suggested to the plaintiffs to apply to the lower Court to give judgment according to the award, and a decree to follow it. Thereupon the plaintiffs made an application to the lower Court of the nature suggested, but styled it one for review of judgment. The lower Court granted the so-called review of judgment. The defendants appealed from the order of the lower Court contending that the “review of judgment” had been improperly granted. On the 23rd June 1880 the High Court held that the order of the lower Court was not appealable, not being one passed on review of judgment, but on an application to

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—contd.**1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—contd.****(a) APPEALABLE ORDERS—contd.**

give judgment and decree in accordance with an award which had been filed in Court. The defendants applied for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council from the order of the High Court of the 23rd June 1880. *Held*, that such order was not a “final decree” within the meaning of s. 595 (a) of the Civil Procedure Code, and therefore it was not appealable to Her Majesty in Council. *RAMADHIN MAHTON v. GANESH*. **I. L. R. 4 All. 238**

16. *Civil Procedure Code, s. 595—Application for leave to appeal to Privy Council—Order dismissing suit on preliminary issue.* The plaintiff in a suit to recover certain property set up an adoption. The Court of first instance held that the adoption was not proved, and dismissed the suit without trying the issues framed with reference to other allegations in the pleadings. On appeal by the plaintiff, the High Court passed a decree setting aside the decree of the Court of first instance, declaring the alleged adoption to be established, and remanding the suit for the trial of the remaining issues. The defendants sought to appeal to Her Majesty in Council against the decree of the High Court. The defendants’ application was refused on the ground that that decree was not a final decree, and no appeal lay. *TIRUNARAYANA v. GOPALASAMI*. **I. L. R. 13 Mad. 349**

17. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 595—Order directing accounts to be taken—Decree not final—Application for leave to appeal.* Where a decree has been made directing accounts to be taken, but there is nothing so special in the case as to bring it under cl. (c) of s. 595 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), leave to appeal to the Privy Council will not be given. *RAHIMBOHY HUBIBBOHY v. TURNER*. **I. L. R. 14 Bom. 428**

18. *Prerogative right of Crown to admit appeal where leave to appeal refused by High Court—Final decree—Meaning of “final” in s. 595 of Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882)—Civil Procedure Code, s. 601—Procedure.* Where a decree directing the taking of accounts which the defendant contends ought not to be taken at all decides, in effect, that, if the result should be found to be against the defendant, he is liable to pay the amount, the decree is final within the meaning of s. 595 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882) for the purpose of appeal. On the ground that a decree for an account was not final within that section, the High Court refused, under s. 601, to grant the defendant a certificate. On his application for special leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council, not by way of an appeal from the local Court’s refusal, but asking for the exercise of the prerogative right to admit an appeal:—*Held*, that as leave could be granted on any other ground, should any appear, besides the ground

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—*contd.*(a) APPEALABLE ORDERS—*contd.*

that the Court had refused the certificate without good cause, while leave could also be granted on the latter ground, if established, to make this application was, perhaps, more convenient than to appeal from the order of refusal. *Held*, also, that the real question in this suit having been the liability of the defendant to account to the plaintiff upon several claims, the decree had decided this against the defendant in such a way that, although the account had not been taken, the decree was final within s. 495. *RAHIMBHAY HABIBBHAY v. TURNER*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 155
I. L. R. 18 I. A. 6

19. ———— *Order refusing to appoint receiver in a suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 595—Letters Patent of the High Court, ss. 39 and 40.* There is no appeal to Her Majesty in Council against an order refusing the appointment of a receiver in a suit. Such order does not finally decide any matter which is directly in issue in the cause in respect to the right of the parties, and is not "final" within the meaning of cls. (a) and (b) of s. 595 of the Civil Procedure Code and s. 39 of the Letters Patent; nor is the matter a special case falling within the terms of cl. (c) of s. 59 of the Code or s. 40 of the Letters Patent. *Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. Oriental Gas Company*, 8 B. L. R. 433, *Lutf Ali Khan v. Asgur Reza*, I. L. R. 17 Cal. 455, *Kishen Persad Pandey v. Tiluckdhari Lall*, I. L. R. 18 Cal. 182, and *Rahimbhoy Habibbhoy v. Turner*, I. L. R. 15 Bom., 155: I. L. R. 18 I. A. 6, referred to. *CHUNDI DUTT JHA v. PUDMANUND SINGH BAHADUR* **I. L. R. 22 Cal. 928**

20. ———— *Order of remand on issue finally deciding whole case—Refusal of certificate of leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 562, 565, 595, 600, and 601.* An order comprising the decision of the Appellate High Court upon a cardinal issue in a suit, that issue being one that goes to the foundation of the suit, and that can never, while this decision stands, be disputed again, is a final decree for the purposes of appeal to the Queen in Council notwithstanding that there may be subordinate inquiries yet to be made in disposing of the suit. *Rahimbhoy Habibbhoy v. Turner*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 155: I. L. R. 18 I. A. 6, referred to and followed. The certificate of which the grant was part of the procedure in the admission of such an appeal was refused by the High Court on the ground that the proposed appeal was from an order remanding a suit under s. 562, Civil Procedure Code; and that orders of remand under that section were, by the practice of the Court, treated as not final within s. 595, cl. (a). That practice is probably correct; but here the order only purported to be under s. 562, which was not applicable. The first Court had not disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point, so as to have excluded evidence of facts appearing

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT
—*contd.*(a) APPEALABLE ORDERS—*contd.*

to the Appellate Court essential; and s. 565 appeared to be applicable rather than s. 562. The Appellate Court had reversed once for all the decision of the first Court upon an issue as to the making and validity of a will, which issue governed the whole case. *MUZHAR HOSSEIN v. BODHA BIBI*

I. L. R. 17 All. 112
I. L. R. 22 I. A. 1

21. ———— *Decree affirming the decision of the Court immediately below—Decree dismissing an appeal to the High Court for default of prosecution—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 556.* *Held*, that a decree of the High Court dismissing an appeal for want of prosecution—the appellants not having supplied their counsel with materials upon which to argue the appeal when it was called on for hearing—was a decree affirming the decision of the Court immediately below, within the meaning of s. 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *BENI RAI v. RAM LAKHAN RAI*

I. L. R. 20 All. 367

22. ———— *Cancellation of notification on the ground of error—Pledership examination—Notification of a candidate having qualified—Civil Procedure Code, chap. XLV.* A candidate at an examination for pleadership, a mistake in the computation of his marks having been made, was erroneously declared qualified for admission as a vakil of the High Court by a Government notification. The mistake having been discovered, such notification was, so far as he was concerned, cancelled. He then petitioned the High Court in the matter, and was informed by it that his name must be excluded from such notification, as he had not qualified by obtaining the requisite number of marks. The candidate having applied for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council. *Held*, that Chap. XLV of the Civil Procedure Code had no application, and the matter was not one in which the High Court was concerned to grant or refuse leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council. *In the matter of the petition of SUKH NANDAN LAL*

I. L. R. 6 All. 163

23. ———— *Order remanding suit for re-trial—Privy Council's Appeals Act, VI of 1874—Letters Patent, N.-W. P., s. 31—Interlocutory order—Order remanding case for re-trial.* *Held*, that the High Court has not any power under Act X of 1877 or cl. 31 of the Letters Patent, N.-W. P., to grant leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council from an order of the Court remanding a suit for re-trial. The provisions of cl. 31 of the Letters Patent are repealed by the Code and Act VI of 1874 which preceded it. *TETLEY v. JAI SHANKAR*

I. L. R. 1 All. 726

24. ———— *Power to admit appeal—Privy Council's Appeals Act (II of 1863), s. 1—Act XXXII of 1871, s. 18—Subordinate Court.*

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—contd.**1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—contd.****(a) APPEALABLE ORDERS—contd.**

The words "Court of highest civil jurisdiction in any Province" in Act II of 1863 have reference to the general jurisdiction of the Courts, and not to the finality of their decisions in particular cases. A Court which, under the provisions of Act XXXII of 1871, is a subordinate Court, has no authority, under Act II of 1863, to admit an appeal to Her Majesty in Council even where its decision is final. **HARDOE BUX v. JAWAHIR SINGH**. I. L. R. 3 Calc. 522

25. ——— Order under s. 206, Civil Procedure Code—Leave to appeal to Privy Council—Letters Patent, 1865, cl. 39—"Order made on appeal"—Amendment of decree, application for—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 206, 595 and 596. An order passed by the High Court, rejecting an application under s. 206 of the Civil Procedure Code to amend a certain decree of the Court, is not an order "made on appeal," and is therefore not appealable to His Majesty in Council. **Soudamoney Dossee v. Maharaj Dheraj Mahatab Chand Bahadoor**, 6 W. R. (Misc.) 102, and **Rajah Enact Hossein v. Rance Rowshan Jahan**, 10 W. R. (F. B.) 1, referred to. **SUNDER KOER v. CHANDISHWAR PROSAD SINGH** (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 679

26. ——— Order under s. 562, Civil Procedure Code—Civil Procedure Code, s. 595—Appeal to His Majesty in Council—Appeal from an order under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Held, that an order under s. 562 is not ordinarily capable of being the subject of an appeal to His Majesty in Council, though it may possibly be so if the order in question has the effect of deciding finally the cardinal point in the suit. **Saigid Muzhar Husain v. Musannat Bodha Bibi**, I. L. R. 17 All. 112; **Mahant Ishwargar Budhgar v. Caudasama Amarsang**, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 548; and **Forbes v. Amecroonissa Begum**, 10 Moo. I. A. 349, referred to. **HABIB-UN-NISSA v. MUNAWAR-UN-NISSA** (1903)

I. L. R. 25 All. 629

27. ——— Panna, Maharajah of—Order of Viceroy and Governor General of India deposing Ruler of Native State—Report of Commissioners appointed to enquire into imputation against Native Ruler—"Court." No appeal lies to His Majesty the King in Council from an order of the Viceroy and Governor General of India in Council deposing the Maharajah of the Native State of Panna, such order being an act of State. An order was made on the report of the Commissioners appointed by the Viceroy and Governor General of India in Council, "for the purpose of inquiring into the truth of an imputation against the Maharajah that he had instigated the death of his uncle, and of reporting to the Viceroy and Governor General in Council how far the same is true to the best of their judgment and belief." Held, that such a tribunal was not a

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—contd.**1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—contd.****(a) APPEALABLE ORDERS—concl'd.**

"Court" from which an appeal lay to His Majesty in Council. **MADHAVA SINGH, In re** (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1
s. c. I. L. R. 31 I. A. 239

28. ——— Letters Patent, cl. 39—Division Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 595 and 596. Where on an appeal to His Majesty in Council the case was sent back to the High Court with a direction that certain accounts might be taken on a certain footing and a Division Bench of the High Court took those accounts and made a final decree: Held, that an appeal would lie to His Majesty in Council from such decree under cl. 39 of the Letters Patent, the amount in dispute being over Rs. 10,000. The expression "Division Court" in that section is not restricted to a Division Court sitting on the Original Side. Ss. 595 and 596 of the Civil Procedure Code do not apparently apply to such a case. **GURU PROSUNNO LAHIRI v. JOTINDRA MOHUN LAHIRI** (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 963

(b) SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW.

29. ——— Power of Indian Legislature—Act VI of 1874, s. 5—Letters Patent, 1865, cl. 39—24 & 25 Vict., c. 104, s. 9—24 & 25 Vict., c. 67 (Indian Councils Act), s. 22. The provision in s. 5 of Act VI of 1874, that where there are concurrent decisions on facts, the case must, in order to give a right of appeal to the Privy Council, involve some substantial question of law, is not *ultra vires* of the power of the Indian Legislature as being a curtailment of the jurisdiction given to the High Courts by the Letters Patent, 1865, cl. 39. S. 22 of 24 & 25 Vict., c. 67, must be read with ss. 9 and 11 of 24 & 25 Vict., c. 104. By the express words of s. 9 all previously existing powers were reserved to the High Court, provided the Letters Patent did not interfere with them and as to these powers the Governor General in Council is expressly empowered to legislate. Even if, therefore, the power to admit an appeal to the Privy Council were conferred by the Letters Patent under the authority of 24 & 25 Vict., c. 104, it was, not being a new power, subject to the legislative control of the Governor General in Council. The *ratio decidendi* in **The Queen v. Meares**, 24 B. L. R. 106, dissented from. *In the matter of the petition of FEDA HOSSEIN*

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 431

30. ——— Question of law arising on evidence—Act VI of 1874, s. 5—Substantial question of law. The substantial question of law which, by s. 5, Act VI of 1874, the appeal to the Privy Council must involve, in order to give an appeal in a case where the decree appealed from affirms the decision of the Court below, is not limited to a question of law arising out of the facts as found by the Courts from whose decision it is

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT
—*contd.*(b) SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW—*contd.*

desired to appeal. A question of law arising on the evidence taken in the case is, without reference to the findings of the lower Courts, sufficient to found an appeal. *MORAN v. MITTU BIBEE*

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 228

31. ——— Form of judgment—*Substantial question of law—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 574.* The judgment of the High Court in a first appeal was as follows :—“This appeal must, in my opinion, be dismissed with costs and the judgment of the first Court affirmed : and I do not think it necessary to say more than that we agree with the Judge’s reasons.” The appellant applied for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council on the ground that the requirements of s. 574 of the Civil Procedure Code had not been complied with :—*Held* by the Full Bench, that the objection involved no substantial question of law, and that the application for leave to appeal must, therefore, be rejected. *SUNDAR BIBI v. BISHESHAR NATH* I. L. R. 9 All. 93

32. ——— Concurrence of two Courts on facts—“*Affirming*” judgment of lower Court—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 596*—*Substantial question of law—Case disposed of on facts.* Where the issues in a case involved questions both of law and fact, and the Subordinate Judge had decided against the plaintiff on two issues of fact sufficient for the disposal of the case, without trying the other issues, the High Court found on those two issues substantially in favour of the plaintiff, but raised a further question of fact on the evidence and decided that against him, coming finally to the same conclusion on the facts as the Subordinate Judge, though not agreeing with him in all his findings or in the reasons on which they were based :—*Held*, on an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, that the High Court did not “affirm” the judgment of the lower Court within the meaning of s. 596 of the Civil Procedure Code : *Held*, also, even assuming the judgment of the lower Court was affirmed by the High Court, that there were substantial questions of law in the case which entitled the plaintiff to appeal, notwithstanding that such questions might be immaterial to the decision of the case. *In the matter of the petition of ASHGHAH REZA.* *ASHGHAH REZA v. HYDER REZA* I. L. R. 16 Calc. 287

GOPINATH BIRBAR v. GOLUCK CHUNDER BOSE
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 292, note

33. ——— Confirmation of decree of lower Court—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 596*—*Substantial question of law.* *Per JARDINE, J.* Where the High Court in appeal has confirmed the decree of the lower Court and has taken substantially the same view of the facts, and where, upon the facts as found by both Courts, no question of law arises, leave to appeal to the Privy Council should be refused. *Per RANADE, J.*

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT
—*contd.*(b) SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW—*contd.*

There is a distinction between the confirmation of a decree and the affirmation of the decision and findings of the Courts of first instance by the High Court. The substantial question of law referred to in s. 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) need not directly arise out of the concurrent findings of fact, but it is enough if it is involved in those findings, and can, if the appeal is allowed, be raised in the course of the argument. *In re VISHWAMBHAR PANDIT* I. L. R. 20 Bom. 699

34. ——— Rejection of application to take additional evidence on appeal—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 569, 596.* The rejection of an application under s. 568 to an Appellate Court to take additional evidence on appeal cannot be said to involve any “substantial question of law” within the meaning of s. 596 of the Code so as to give the right to an appeal to the Privy Council. *In the goods of PREM CHAND MOONSHEE.* *UPENDRA MOHAN GHOSE v. GOPAL CHANDRA GHOSE*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 484

35. ——— Non-production of succession certificate at the proper time—*Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 4—Order granting application for execution of decree.* The representative of a decree-holder applied for execution of a decree without producing before the Court a certificate of succession as required by Act No. VII of 1889, s. 4. The Court to which the application was made granted execution. The judgment-debtor appealed to the High Court, by which the order of the lower Court was sustained upon production before it (the High Court) of the necessary certificate of succession. *Held*, that an objection, that the said application for execution was improperly granted by reason of the non-production of the succession certificate before the lower Court, did not raise a “substantial question of law” within the meaning of s. 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, so as to warn the High Court in granting leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council. *SHUJA ALI KHAN v. RAM KUR* I. L. R. 20 All. 118

36. ——— Malicious prosecution, suit for—*Difference between trial in England by jury and in India without one—Concurrent judgments on facts.* The only question involved in a case for malicious prosecution is a question of fact. In England the jury would find the facts and the Judge would draw the inference from the findings of the jury, but where, as in India, the case is tried without a jury, there is only a question of fact to be determined by one and the same person. There was accordingly no substantial question of law in the case, and the High Court granted the certificate allowing the appeal under a misapprehension. *MODY v. QUEEN INSURANCE CO.* 4 C. W. N. 781

37. ——— Affirmance of decision of lower Court—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of*

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—contd.**1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—contd.****(b) SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW—contd.**

1882), s. 596—Decree of Appellate Court that "appeal be dismissed" where decision on questions of fact is not the same. The word "decision," in s. 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, means merely the decision of the suit by the Court, and cannot, like the word "judgment," be defined as meaning the statement of the grounds on which the Court proceeds to make the decree. In order to "affirm the decision of the Court below," within the meaning of that section, it is sufficient for the Appellate Court to affirm the decree: it need not also affirm the grounds of fact on which the judgment was passed. Where the decree of the Appellate Court was that "the appeal be dismissed," but the reasons given were not the same as those of the lower Court in respect of some matters of fact: *Held*, that the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower Court, within the meaning of s. 596; and a certificate, which granted leave to appeal to the Privy Council on the ground that by its decree the Appellate Court did not affirm the Court below, and which did not find that the appeal involved a substantial question of law, was held not to comply with that section. *TASSADUQ RASUL KHAN v. KASHI RAM* (1902). **I. L. R. 25 All. 109**
s. c. L. R. 30 I. A. 35;
7 C. W. N. 177

38. —Assent of respondent—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 595, 596 and 600—Substantial point of law—Certificate of High Court—Assent of respondent to the appeal. Under s. 596, Civil Procedure Code, there is no right of appeal to the Privy Council simply on the ground that a substantial point of law is involved. The presence of such a question does not give a right of appeal when the value is below the mark; the Code restricts the right of appeal when the higher Court affirms the decision of the lower and the dispute either directly or indirectly relates to an amount of Rs. 10,000. Under ss. 595 and 600, Civil Procedure Code, there is a right of appeal if the High Court certifies that the case is "otherwise" a fit one for appeal. The word "otherwise" refers to special cases, such as, where the point in dispute is not measurable by money, though it may be of great public or private importance. But in all such cases a special certificate to that effect must be granted by the High Court. The mere assent of the respondent to an appeal does not give the appellant a right of appeal which the Code does not allow, or sustain a certificate which is obviously erroneous. *BANARASI PERSHAD v. KASHI KRISHN NARAIN* (1900). **5 C. W. N. 193**
s. c. L. R. 28 I. A. 11;
I. L. R. 23 All. 227

39. —Concurrent judgments on facts—Civil Procedure Code, s. 596—Application for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council. The expression "involve some substantial question of

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—contd.**1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—contd.****(b) SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW—contd.**

law," as used in s. 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, must be construed with reference to the practice of the Privy Council not to interfere with concurrent findings of fact of the Courts below; and this being so, it cannot be said that a question which only arises if the concurrent findings of fact of the Courts in India are disregarded—a question which can never arise so long as the Privy Council maintains those concurrent findings of fact—is a "substantial question of law" which the appeal to the Privy Council "involves." *Moran v. Mittu Bibee*, **I. L. R. 2 Calc. 228**; *Gopi Nati Birbar v. Goluk Chunder Bose*, **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 292, note**; and *In re Vishwambhar Pandit*, **I. L. R. 20 Bom. 699**, referred to. *BANKE LAL v. JAGAT NARAIN* (1900). **I. L. R. 23 All. 94**

40. —Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 596—Concurrent decisions on facts—Leave granted where no substantial question of law was involved. Where, on an appeal to the Privy Council, there were two concurrent decisions of the Courts below, on facts sufficient to dispose of the suit, but the High Court had granted leave to appeal, stating that "there seems to be a point of law which however has not been argued here, and it is therefore hereby certified that as regards the subject-matter and the nature of the questions involved, the case fulfils the requirements of s. 596 of the Civil Procedure Code," the Judicial Committee held, it appearing that there was no substantial question of law involved, that there was no sufficient ground for the leave to appeal, which ought not to have been granted. *KARUPANAN SEWAI v. SRINIVASAN CHETTI* (1901). **I. L. R. 25 Mad. 215**
s. c. L. R. 29 I. A. 38; 6 C. W. N. 241

41. —Malicious prosecution—Practice—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 600—Certificate that appeal to the Privy Council involves a question of law. In an action for malicious prosecution in which the plaintiff claimed Rs. 3,00,000 as damages, the Court of first instance dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff had not proved either the existence of malice or the absence of reasonable and probable cause. The plaintiff appealed, and the Appeal Court dismissed the appeal on the same grounds; and, on appeal to the Privy Council, their Lordships also held that, both as regards malice and the absence of reasonable and probable cause, the plaintiff had failed to discharge the burden of proof which lay upon him. The case came before the Privy Council on a certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay that the appeal involved a substantial question of law. It appeared to their Lordships of the Privy Council that this certificate must have been granted under a misapprehension. The only question involved was a question of fact on which there were concurrent findings. According to

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT
—*contd.*(b) SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW—*concl'd.*

English Law, it is for the Judge and not for the jury to determine what is reasonable and probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution. The jury finds the facts. The Judge draws the proper inference from the findings of the jury. In that sense the question is a question of law. But, where the case is tried without a jury, there is really nothing but a question of fact, and a question of fact to be determined by one and the same person. *PESTONJI MUNCHERJI MODY v. QUEEN INSURANCE CO. (1900)* . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 332

42. ——— Registrar's report—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 595—Privy Council, leave to appeal to—Order refusing to vary or discharge report of Registrar—Belchambers' Rules and Orders, rule 617—Substantial question of law.* Where a Court, under rules 615 and 617 of Belchambers' Rules and Orders (2nd Ed.), merely refused to reopen a Registrar's report: *Held*, that such decision is a final decree within the meaning of s. 595, Civil Procedure Code, and that it does not impose any pecuniary liability on applicant. *ROYAL INSURANCE CO. v. AKHOY COOMAR DUTT (1901)*

6 C. W. N. 41

(c) CONCURRENT JUDGMENTS ON FACTS.

43. ——— Finding of facts not concurrent but in effect the same—*Case in which no question of law is involved—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 596, 600.* Where there is no point of law involved in a case, the mere fact that the finding of the Appellate Court does not in terms coincide with the finding of the Original Court is not sufficient, where the findings of fact of the two Courts are in effect the same, to give a right of appeal to the Privy Council, notwithstanding that the value of the suit is more than Rs. 10,000. *In the matter of the petition of Ashghar Reza, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 287, distinguished. THOMPSON v. CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS COMPANY* . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 523

44. ——— Concurrence of two Courts in deciding fact—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 596—Restriction of power in India to grant leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council.* Where the decree of an Appellate Court has affirmed the decision of the Court immediately below it upon an issue of fact, and no substantial question of law is involved, no appeal is open under s. 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and leave to appeal should not be granted by the High Court in such a case. *NIRBHAI DAS v. RANI KUAR*

I. L. R. 16 All. 274

45. ——— Original Court's decision on fact, affirmed by the first Appellate Court—*Question of fact—Question of law not arising—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 596.* The Appellate High Court had, by the decree now appealed from,

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT
—*contd.*(c) CONCURRENT JUDGMENTS ON FACTS—*concl'd.*

affirmed upon the evidence the decision of the High Court in the original jurisdiction as to the fact on which the judgment depended, *viz.*, whether the defendant had attained full age at the time when he had executed the first of two mortgages, for the foreclosure whereof the suit was brought. No question of law, either as to the construction of documents or any other point, was raised. *Held*, that the present appeal could not be entertained. See *Nirbhai Das v. Rani Kuar, I. L. R. 16 All. 274. TULSI PERSHAD BHAKT v. BENAYEK MISSEER*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 918

L. R. 23 I. A. 102

46. ——— Certificate as to fitness for appeal—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 596—Concurrent findings of two Courts on questions of fact—Substantial question of law—Question of law not necessarily arising.* No appeal lies to the Privy Council from an appellate decree of the High Court, when there are concurrent findings of the High Court and of the lower Court upon questions of fact, and when upon such findings no question of law arises. *Tulsi Persad Bhakt v. Benayek Misser, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 918: L. R. 23 I. A. 102, followed. SAKALBOTI MANDARAIN v. BABULAL MUNDAR (1901)*

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 190

5 C. W. N. 455

47. ——— Appeal—Privy Council—Appeal—Practice—Concurrent findings of fact—Mis-carriage of justice or violation of law, not proved—Evidence—Admissibility of documents—*Res inter alios acta.* Where the appellants before the Judicial Committee failed to show any mis-carriage of justice or the violation of any principle of law or procedure, their Lordships refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of two Courts on pure questions of fact, although they thought the case to be one of great difficulty. *RANI SRIMATI v. KHAJENDRA NARAIN SINGH (1905)* . 9 C. W. N. 74

s.c. L. R. 31 I. A. 127

(d) VALUATION OF APPEAL.

48. ——— Suit for possession and mesne profits. Where a plaintiff sued for possession of property with wasilat, and did not (it being under the rules unnecessary for him to do so) include the wasilat in the valuation of the suit; and the suit was valued at Rs. 5,815, but with the wasilat would have been valued at over Rs. 10,000,—*Held*, that, on appeal from a decree in favour of the plaintiff, there was matter in dispute in excess of Rs. 10,000. *ANONYMOUS* . Ind. Jur. O. S. 58

GOOROO DASS ROY v. GHOLAM MOWLAH

Marsh. 24:1 Hay 103

49. ——— Appeal as to portion of property—*Portion under Rs. 10,000.* An appeal to

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT
—*contd.*(d) VALUATION OF APPEAL—*contd.*

the Privy Council involving a question of demand respecting property which on the whole is of the value of more than R10,000 is admissible, although the portion of the property to which the appeal relates is below that value. *ONORROOP CHUNDER MUKERJEE v. PERTAB CHUNDER PAUL*

8 W. R. Mis. 4

50. ——— Undervaluation of suit, omission to object to. Where a defendant, having the means of proving the real value of property, made no objection to the plaintiff's undervaluation, and also herself in special appeal knowingly undervalued the property by valuing the subject-matter at R575:—*Held*, that she could not be heard to represent the real value of the property to be over R10,000 for the purpose of securing admission for an appeal to Her Majesty in Council. *In the matter of BHUGGOBETTY DEBIA*

14 W. R. 62

51. ——— Decision to govern other similar suits by same party—*Subject-matter of suit below appealable value—Practice—Leave to appeal.* Leave to appeal to the Privy Council granted where the appeal, though valued at less than R10,000, involved indirectly questions respecting property of the value of R10,000, inasmuch as the judgment of the High Court would govern the decision in other suits which the plaintiff intended to bring on precisely the same grounds, and in respect of which precisely the same questions would arise as had arisen in the suit sought to be appealed. *ANANDA CHANDRA BOSE v. BROUGHTON*

9 B. L. R. 423

52. ——— Conflicting claims to waters of flowing stream—*Court Fees Act, 1870, s. 7.* In ascertaining whether or not there ought to be an appeal to the Privy Council, the High Court has only to look at the value of the question at issue in the litigation. In a case of conflicting claims with regard to the waters of a flowing stream, the matter at issue, so far as regarded the applicant, having been to have her lands irrigated in the way she claimed, the value of that matter, according to s. 7 of the Court Fees Act, VII of 1871, was held to be the extent to which her interests would be deteriorated if that right could not be established. *AJNAS KOOR v. LUTEEFA*

18 W. R. 21

53. ——— Appeal as to portion of property—*Letters Patent, cl. 39.* The High Court refused, under s. 39 of the Charter, to open so wide a door to appeal as to allow it in a case involving less than R10,000, only because the whole property which would be reduced in value in the event of the appeal proving successful was worth not less than R10,000. *In the matter of the petition of REEDNATH SAHOO. REEDNATH SAHOO v. GOPTEE SAHOO*

19 W. R. 191

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT
—*contd.*(d) VALUATION OF APPEAL—*contd.*

54. ——— Proof of real value of property in suit where stamp duty has been paid on a less amount.—Where the suit was one in which the stamp originally paid was upon an amount very much less than R10,000, and the whole course of the litigation and the stamps paid throughout had reference to that valuation, though the property was really of the value of R10,000, the Court, upon the strength of a former decision in the Privy Council Department, refused the application for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council. *Quære*: Can the mere payment of a stamp calculated on an undervaluation with reference to the rule in Act XXVI of 1867, Schedule, Art. 11, note (a), be treated as of itself a fraud which, *in fact*, deprives a party of his right of appeal? *LEKHRAJ ROY v. KANHYA SINGH*

18 W. R. 494

On a petition to the Privy Council in the same case for leave to appeal, it was held that a party who, in observance of the rules of valuation prescribed by the stamp law of the country in which he sues, has paid stamp duty upon a sum lower than the appealable amount, is not thereby precluded from obtaining leave from the Courts of that country to appeal to Her Majesty in Council, if he can show that the value of the property in dispute does reach the appealable amount. *LEKHRAJ ROY v. KANHYA SINGH*

L. R. 1 I. A. 317

55. ——— Decree indirectly involving question of title to property over R10,000. Three different plaintiffs, claiming through the same original title to be the owners of a certain mehal, sued the same defendant in separate suits for possession, and for the mesne profits of their respective shares. The defence raised being the same in each case, the suits were heard together, the result being that in both the lower Courts and in the High Court the plaintiffs obtained a decree for their claims. The aggregate value of the three suits amounted to more than R10,000, though the value of each suit was under that sum. The defendant applied to be allowed to appeal in each case to Her Majesty in Council. *Held*, that he was entitled to have each of the three cases admitted under the second clause of s. 596 of Act X of 1877, as the decree in each case involved indirectly a question of title to property of the amount or value of R10,000. *ASHANULLA v. KAROONAMOYI CHOWDHRY. ROHINI CHOWDHRY v. KISHEN GOBIND DAS*

4 C. L. R. 125

56. ——— Concurrent decision on facts—*Grounds of appeal—Act VI of 1874, s. 5.* Where there were two concurrent decisions on facts, an application to appeal to the Privy Council was refused; the right of appeal from a decision of the High Court on its Appellate Side, simply on the ground that the subject-matter of the suit was above R10,000, having been taken away by Act VI

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT
—*contd.*(d) VALUATION OF APPEAL—*contd.*

of 1874, s. 5. *In the matter of the petition of FEDA HOSSEIN*. I. L. R. 1 Calc. 431

57. ——— Appeal in two suits together over appealable value—*Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 596*. A and B purchased the same properties deriving title through different persons. The value of the properties with mesne profits was over R10,000. B granted two patni leases of the properties to different persons. A was therefore obliged to bring two suits for the recovery of the properties, and the value of the subject-matter in each suit was less than R10,000. *Held*, that an appeal would lie to the Privy Council. *JOOGULKISHORE v. JOTENDRO MOUN TAGORE*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 210

58. ——— Question of law in suit under appealable value—*Amount under R10,000—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 595, 596, 600*. Leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council granted in one of six suits directed to be heard together, although the amount involved in such suit was under the appealable value; there being an important question of law, which did not arise in the five other suits, the suit, however, involving other questions of law common to all the six suits; such suits having been, by agreement of counsel, heard upon the same evidence, and concluded by the same judgment; five of such suits being appealable as of right, and the aggregate amount in the six suits being considerably more than the appealable value. *BYJNATH v. GRAHAM*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 740

59. ——— Appealable value—Suit for restitution of conjugal rights—*Valuation of Suit—Suit conducted up to appeal as if properly valued—Jurisdiction—Consent of parties*. A suit for restitution of conjugal rights is not one to which any special money-value can be attached for the purposes of jurisdiction. *Golam Rahman v. Fatima Bibi*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 232, followed. *Held*, therefore, that no appeal lay as of right to Her Majesty in Council in such a suit, although the suit had been valued at R25,000, and that valuation had been relied on by the defendant, who had appealed to the High Court from the decision of the first Court which had gone against him. *MOWLA NEWAZ v. SAJIDUNNISSA BIBI*

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 378

60. ——— Value of the subject-matter of the suit—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 559—Madras Civil Courts Act (Madras Act III of 1873), s. 14*. The Civil Courts Act (Madras Act III of 1873) does not control the construction of Civil Procedure Code, s. 596, and under that section the real market-value of the matter in dispute is the test as to whether or not an appeal lies to the Privy Council. *PICHAYEE v. SRIVAGAMI*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 237

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT
—*contd.*(d) VALUATION OF APPEAL—*contd.*

61. ——— Value of property affected by decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 596*. In an application for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council the value of the property ostensibly affected by the decree sought to be appealed, was below R10,000; but it appeared that the suit in appeal in which the said decree had been passed was connected with another suit relating to the same property in which a decree had been passed which was the subject of another similar application, and that the aggregate value of the two decrees was much above R10,000, and that it could not be known which of such decrees would affect which specific portion of the property in question. *Held*, that under the above circumstances the application under consideration should be granted under the last paragraph of s. 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *In the matter of the petition of KHAWAJA MUHAMMAD YUSUF*

I. L. R. 18 All. 196

62. ——— Burma Courts Act (XI of 1889), s. 40—*Burma Civil Courts Act (XVII of 1875), s. 49—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 3 and 86—Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, ss. 595 and 614*. No appeal lies to the High Court from a final decree passed by the Recorder of Rangoon in the exercise of Original Civil Jurisdiction, where the value of the subject-matter of the suit is above ten thousand rupees, but an appeal lies to Her Majesty in Council. A decree passed by the Recorder of Rangoon, in a suit for grant of probate of a will, is a final decree passed by him in the exercise of Original Civil Jurisdiction. *ESSOF HASSIM DOOLY v. FATIMA BIBI alias MAH POH*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 30

1 C. W. N. 8

63. ——— Order in execution of decree. An appeal lies to Her Majesty in Council from an order passed by the High Court in a case of execution of decree in which the amount involved exceeds R10,000. *VELAITY BEGUM v. RUGHONATH PERSAD*

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2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 263; 8 W. R. 147

64. ——— Execution of decree of Privy Council. An appeal will lie as of right from the order of a single Judge of the High Court as to execution of a decree of the Privy Council, where the property is over R10,000. *LEELANAND SINGH v. LUCKIMPUR SINGH BAHADUR*

5 B. L. R. 605

LEELANAND SINGH v. LUCKMESSUR SINGH

14 W. R. P. C. 23

65. ——— Final order passed on appeal by the High Court—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 244, 595*. An order passed on appeal by the High Court determining a question mentioned in s. 244 of Act X of 1887 is a final "decree" within the meaning of s. 595 of that Act. *Held*, therefore, where such an order involved a

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT
—*contd.*(d) VALUATION OF APPEAL—*contd.*

claim or question relating to property of the value of upwards of ten thousand rupees, and reversed the decisions of the lower Courts, that, notwithstanding the value of the subject-matter of the suit in which the decree was made in the Court of first instance was less than that amount, such order was appealable to Her Majesty in Council. *RAM KIRPAL SHUKUL v. RUP KUAR* . I. L. R. 3 All. 633

66. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 596—Appeal to His Majesty in Council—Decree involving indirectly some question respecting property of the value of ten thousand rupees or upwards.* When, as in s. 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is laid down that, in order that an appeal may lie to His Majesty in Council, the decree to be appealed from must involve, directly or indirectly, some claim or question to or respecting property of ten thousand rupees in value or upwards, the reference is to suits in existence. It is not enough that the question decided by such decree is a question of title which may possibly affect the title of persons, who are not parties to the decree, to property not the subject-matter of the suit in which the decree was passed, and concerning the title to which property there is no litigation pending. *Radha Krishen Das v. Rai Krishna Chand*, I. L. R. 23 All. 415; *Banarsi Prasad v. Kashi Krishna Narain*, I. L. R. 23 All. 227; *Moofli Mahummad Uddolla v. Baboo Moolchand*, 1 Moo. I. A. 363; and *Baboo Gopal Lal Thakoor v. Teluk Chunder Rai*, 7 Moo. I. A. 548, referred to. *HANUMAN PRASAD v. BHAGWATI PRASAD* (1902) . I. L. R. 24 All. 236

67. ———— *Valuation of suit—"Value of subject-matter of suit"—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 596—Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 7, cl. VI (d)—Value of the relief sought.* In a suit for an injunction it is open to the applicant for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council to show what the real value of the subject-matter of the suit is, notwithstanding the fact that for the purposes of the Court-fees Act (VII of 1870) the value of the suit was fixed at a sum less than the appealable amount. *HARI MOHAN MISSEER v. SURENDRA NARAIN SINGH* (1904) . I. L. R. 31 Cal. 301

68. ———— *Cases in which appeal lies or not—Valuation of appeal—Value of the subject-matter of the suit—Decree involving question to property of appealable value—Claim for future mesne profits—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 596.* In a suit for possession of land and for mesne profits the plaintiffs obtained a decree in the first Court. They valued the land at Rs. 460 and in the proceedings in execution of the decree they put in a claim for mesne profits for over Rs. 30,000. The amount of the profits was not ascertained as the proceedings were stayed pending an appeal to the

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*1. CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT
—*contd.*(d) VALUATION OF APPEAL—*contd.*

High Court, which was ultimately successful. The plaintiffs applied for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council and swore that the mesne profits would amount to a sum exceeding Rs. 10,000. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to take into account their claim for mesne profits with a view to ascertaining whether the value of the matter in dispute reached the statutory amount of Rs. 10,000, and that any way the decree involved, directly or indirectly, some claim or question to or respecting property of the value of Rs. 10,000, within the meaning of s. 596 of the Code, and that in either view the plaintiffs were entitled to a certificate. *Mohideen Hadjiar v. Pitchay*, [1893] A. C. 193, referred to. *DALGLEISH v. DAMODAR NARAYEN CHOWDHRY* (1906) . I. L. R. 33 Cal. 1286

2. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

(a) LEAVE TO APPEAL.

1. ———— *Petition of appeal—Act VI of 1874, ss. 5, 7, and 9—Practice.* The petition of appeal to the Privy Council should distinctly state what the substantial question of law is that it is proposed to submit to the Privy Council. Petitions on the Original Side should be signed by counsel and on the Appellate Side by counsel or a pleader. *ALI ABKAR v. ABDUL LATIF SHUSBU* 12 Bom. 8

2. ———— *Appeal presented without security bond—Rule of 7th December 1858.* The High Court has no authority to receive a petition of appeal to England tendered without the usual security bond duly registered, as provided by the 8th Rule of the 7th December 1858. *PERSHAD SEIN v. RAJENDRA KISHORE* . 7 W. R. 338

3. ———— *Appeal in formâ pauperis.* An application to appeal to the Privy Council in formâ pauperis may be made to the High Court on unstamped paper, and accompanied by a certificate of counsel that there is a reasonable ground of appeal; the usual security for costs being given, and the costs of translation deposited. *In the matter of the petition of JOWAD ALI* . 8 W. R. 4

4. ———— *Effect of, on right to appeal to Privy Council without leave. Quære: Whether the leave given by the Courts in India to a party to sue in formâ pauperis would enable him to prosecute the appeal to the Privy Council without obtaining the leave of the Privy Council.* *MUNNI RAM AWASTY v. SHEO CHURN AWASTY* 7 W. R. P. C. 29; 4 Moo. I. A. 114

5. ———— *Ground for delay in applying—Ground for refusing to admit petition of appeal.* An application for permission to appeal to the Privy Council was presented on the last day of the six months allowed for such appeals, and with

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*2. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—*contd.*(a) LEAVE TO APPEAL—*contd.*

it was deposited, not the sum which had been estimated as the cost of translating, printing, and transmitting the record, but the estimate less the charges of printing; nothing being deposited as the cost of transcription. The petition was accordingly refused. *Held*, that the petitioner had no right to amend the estimate made by the clerk of the Privy Council Department, still less to amend it in the way he did; and that the plea of oversight was not sufficient to excuse him for non-compliance with the rules of Court or to admit his application beyond the prescribed time. *In the matter of the petition of GOUR SURN DASS*. 19 W. R. 305

6. ———— **Certificate—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 595, 596 and 600—Certificate where case is "otherwise" fit for appeal.** In considering under what section of the Civil Procedure Code the certificate of fitness was given by the Court, it is the certificate itself which has to be looked at, and not the order for the certificate. In granting a certificate under s. 600, Civil Procedure Code, the Court must exercise its judicial discretion upon the matter. Unless the certificate upon which the leave to appeal is based is in such a form as to justify that leave, the Court must find that leave was not properly given, and the appeal must be dismissed. *Banarsi Parshad v. Kashi Krishna Narain*, 5 C. W. N. 193, referred to. *RADHA KRISHN DAS v. RAI KRISHN CHAND* (1901)

5 C. W. N. 689
s.c. I. L. R. 23 All. 415;
L. R. 28 I. A. 182

7. ———— **Separate Suits—Valuation of appeal in three similar but unconsolidated suits.** Where an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council is made in three separate suits, which are not consolidated, though the questions to be decided are the same in all of them, it is necessary to show that, in each of the suits, the amount or value of the matter in dispute in the appeal to the Privy Council is R10,000 or upwards. *ROYAL INSURANCE CO. v. AKHOY COOMAR DUTT* (1901)

6 C. W. N. 41

8. ———— **Test—Application for leave to appeal—Companies Memorandum of Association Act (XII of 1895), ss. 9 and 12—Appeal against order passed under the Act—Test of pecuniary sufficiency or substantial question of law—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 594, 595 and 647—Case otherwise fit for appeal.** A petition by a Company for the confirmation of a special resolution altering the Memorandum of Association was dismissed by the High Court. The Company desired to appeal to His Majesty in Council. Leave to appeal was opposed on three grounds: (1) that no appeal lay under the Memorandum of Association Act or Companies Act; (2) that the pecuniary test was not satisfied; (3) that there was no substantial question of law. *Held*, that the order dismissing the petition was a "decree" within the

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*2. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—*contd.*(a) LEAVE TO APPEAL—*contd.*

definition of that term contained in s. 594 of the Code. *Held*, as to objections (2) and (3), that the only question was whether the case was a fit one for appeal to the King in Council, within the meaning of cl. (b) of s. 595. *Held*, further, that having regard to the fact that the commercial and financial position of the Company might be seriously affected by the questions at issue, and to the importance to Indian Companies generally of having such rights precisely defined, the case ought to be certified as a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council. *Held*, further, that the proceedings fell within Ch. XLV of the Civil Procedure Code. *BOMBAY BURMA TRADING CORPORATION, LD. v. DORABJI CURSETJI SHROFF* (1903)

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 415

9. ———— **Postponement of legacy—Direction in will for postponement of payment until a later period than majority, effect of—Privy Council, leave to appeal to—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 596—Value of subject-matter.** A question arose between an executor and a residuary legatee as to whether, under a will, the legatee was entitled to have the residue handed over to him on his attaining majority, or whether such payment was not to be postponed until he reached the age of twenty-five, the executor in the meantime having a right to the income. The Court held that payment should be made to the legatee on his attaining majority, and that the will conferred on the executor no right to the income. The executor applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, and contended that the matter in dispute was of the value of R10,000, as required by s. 596 of the Civil Procedure Code, inasmuch as it involved the right to the whole fund. *Held*, refusing leave, that the subject-matter of the dispute was only the income and was not of the requisite value. The case had proceeded on the hypothesis that the executor held the corpus of the estate as a trustee, and the only question was as to the income. *HUSENBHOY AHMEDBHOY v. AHMEDBHOY HABIBBHOY* (1901)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 319

10. ———— **Practice—Application to High Court for certificate for leave to appeal to Privy Council—Grounds for refusal of leave.** It is desirable that the High Court, in refusing a certificate for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, should state their reasons for refusing it. *VENGANATH SWAROOPATHIL VALIA NAMBIDI v. CHERAKUNNATH NAMBIYATHAN NAMBUDRIS KRISHNAN NAMBUDRIPAD* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 194

s.c. I. L. R. 33 I. A. 67
10 C. W. N. 545

11. ———— **Extension of time—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 602—Appeal by special leave—Time for depositing estimated cost.** Although s. 602 of

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*2. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—*contd.*(a) LEAVE TO APPEAL—*concl.*

the Civil Procedure Code only applies to a case where a certificate of leave to appeal to the Privy Council has been granted by the High Court, it has been the invariable practice of the Calcutta High Court to treat that section as applying to cases where special leave has been granted by the Privy Council. The High Court has power to extend the time as provided by s. 602 of the Civil Procedure Code for depositing the estimated cost of translating, transcribing, indexing and transmitting to the Privy Council the record of a case under appeal, but it ought not to do so without some cogent reason. *Burjore and Bhawani Parshad v. Bhagana*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 557, followed. *JOTINDRA NATH CHOWDHURY v. PRASANNA KUMAR BANNERJEE BAHADUR* (1907)

11 C. W. N. 1104

12. ———— *Value of subject-matter of suit—Several suits tried together and dealt with on one judgment—Aggregate value—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 596.* A large number of suits were tried together and dealt with in the judgment both in the first Court and in the High Court, and leave to appeal to the Privy Council was granted in the cases where the amounts in dispute were over R10,000; on application for leave to appeal in the remaining cases: *Held*, that inasmuch as, although if each case were taken separately, the value was below R10,000, yet, if taken collectively, the aggregate reached that amount and the cases were all dependent upon the same judgment, and the case fell within s. 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, leave to appeal should be granted in each of the cases. *Khajah Ashanulla v. Karoonamoyi Chowdhry*, 4 C. L. R. 125; *Jogulkishore v. Jotindro Mohun Tagore*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 210; and *Byjnath v. Graham*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 740, referred to. *DEO-NARAIN SINGH v. GUNI SINGH* (1907)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 400

13. ———— *Leave to appeal—Final decree—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 167—Remand order, when can be regarded a final decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 595.* Where the cardinal point in a suit was, whether notice under s. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to annul certain incumbrances was properly served or not, an order of the High Court holding that the notice had been properly served and remanding the case to be tried out on the other issues, is a final decree and an appeal from the decree to the Privy Council would lie. *Rahimbhoy Habibhoy v. Turner*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 155, and *Muzhar Hossein v. Bodha Bibi*, I. L. R. 17 All. 112, referred to. *ANANDA GOPAL GOSSAIN v. NAFAR CHANDRA PAL CHOWDHURY* (1908).

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 618
s.c. 12 C. W. N. 545APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*2. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—*contd.*

(b) TIME FOR APPEALING.

14. ———— *Calculation of period of limitation.* In calculating the period of six months allowed for appealing to the Privy Council, the date on which the decree was pronounced or dated should be excluded. *In the matter of the petition of RAMANOOGRA NARAIN* . 13 W. R. P. C. 17

15. ———— *Power of Supreme Court to grant leave after expiration of time.* The Supreme Court at Madras admitted an appeal to the Privy Council after the expiration of six months from an original decree. *Held*, that the Court was not authorized to grant such leave to appeal by the Madras Charter of 1800. *EAST INDIA COMPANY v. SYED ALLY* . 7 Moo. I. A. 555

16. ———— *Closing of Court for vacation—Privy Council Rules.* The High Court has no power to allow an appeal to Her Majesty in Council when the petition is not presented within six calendar months from the date of the decree complained of. When the six months expired during the Durga Pooja vacation, and the petition of appeal was presented on the first day the Court resumed its sittings:—*Held*, that the petition was too late, and leave could not be given to appeal. *TAMVACO v. SKINNER* . 1 B. L. R. O. C. 39

17. ———— *If the period within which an appeal is required by law to be filed expires while the High Court is closed for the vacation, parties are allowed to file their petitions of appeal on the first open day after the vacation.* *LUCHMUN CHUNDER SINGH v. KALEECHURN SINGH* 12 W. R. 293

18. ———— *Time for appealing—Civil Procedure Code, s. 599—Limitation Act, s. 12, Sch. II, Art. 177—Period of limitation for admission of an appeal to Privy Council.* On a petition for leave to appeal to the Privy Council presented on the 8th April, it appeared that the period of six months from the date of the decree to be appealed against had expired on the 23rd of March, if the time occupied by the petitioner in getting a copy of the decree was to be computed in that period. *Held*, that the petition was barred by limitation. *Per Curiam.* It is not at all clear that the word "ordinarily" in s. 599 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not refer to the circumstances referred to in the second paragraph of that section, *viz.*, when the last day happens to be one on which the Court is closed. *LAKSHMANAN v. PER-YASAMI* . I. L. R. 10 Mad. 373

19. ———— *Review, pendency of application for.* When an application to review a judgment is rejected by the High Court, the six months allowed for appeal to Her Majesty in Council run from the date of the judgment and not from that of the order rejecting the review. *SOUDAMINEE DOSSEE v. DHERAJ MAHATAB CHAND* B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 585: 6 W. R. Mis. 102

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20. ———— Date of decree—*Appeal from Vice-Admiralty Court of Bengal—Rule 35 of Vice-Admiralty Rules.* By rule 35 of the rules respecting appeals from the Vice-Admiralty Courts abroad, made and ordained by King William IV in Council, in pursuance of the Statute 2 Will. IV, in c. 51, all appeals from the decrees of Vice-Admiralty Courts are to be asserted within fifteen days after the date of the decree. *Held*, that the words "after the date of the decree" mean after the date when the decree is pronounced by the Admiralty or Vice-Admiralty Court, as the case may be, not the date when the decree is reduced to writing and signed. On the 23rd July 1880, the High Court in its Appellate Jurisdiction, modifying a decree of the High Court as a Court of Vice-Admiralty in a cause of damage by collision, referred it to the Registrar to assess the damages that had been incurred in reference to one of the ships, both of which were held to be in fault. The parties went, without protest, before the Registrar for that purpose, the impugnants also having taken out process to compel the appearance of the promovents before him, and the damages were assessed with the consent of both parties at a certain amount. On the 2nd September 1880, a notice of appeal was given on behalf of the impugnants, and was recorded as asserted pursuant to rule 35 above referred to. *Held*, that the appeal was not within time, more than fifteen days having elapsed after the decree before the appeal was asserted. According to the law laid down in the Vice-Admiralty Courts, the proceedings taken before the Registrar were themselves sufficient also to prevent an appeal as of right. *The owners of the ship "BRENNILDA" v. THE BRITISH INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 547

21. ———— Deposit of costs of appeal—*Act VI of 1874, ss. 8 and 11, cl. b—Limitation Act, 1871, s. 5—Closing of the Court—Deposit of money for expenses of appeal—Power of High Court to enlarge time.* The petitioners had obtained a certificate on the 1st of September to appeal to Her Majesty in Council from a decision passed against them by the High Court on the 4th of May. Accordingly the period during which they were required to deposit the amount for the translation of the record, under s. 11, cl. (b), of Act VI of 1874, expired on the 4th of November. The offices of the Court re-opened after the vacation on the 23rd October, but the Benches did not begin to sit till the 16th November. On the last-mentioned date the petitioner brought in the money, and it was refused by the officer of the Court as being too late. *Held*, that it was rightly refused, and that the Court had no power to grant permission to deposit it after the prescribed time. *In the matter of the petition of LALLA GOPPEE CHUND*

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 128

22. ———— *Act VI of 1874, s. 11—Power to enlarge time—Practice.* The re-

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quirements of s. 11, Act VI of 1874, as to the deposit of costs, are not absolutely imperative. The Court has power in its discretion to modify them, and when the period for making the deposit expires on a day when the offices of the Court are closed, it is a reasonable exercise of that discretion to allow the deposit to be made on the day they re-open. *In the matter of the petition of SOORJMUKEE KOER*

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 272

23. ———— Dismissal of appeal for default in deposit of security and in transcribing record—*Act VI of 1874, ss. 11, 14, and 15.* On an application to stay proceedings in an appeal to the Privy Council, which had been presented on 2nd July 1874 from a decision of the High Court on its Original Side, it appeared that no deposit had been made by the appellant to defray the costs of transcribing, etc., as provided by s. 11, Act VI of 1874; that no steps had been taken to prosecute the appeal; and that no security had been deposited for the costs of the respondent since the petition of appeal was presented. The Court granted a rule calling on the appellant to show cause why the proceedings on appeal should not be stayed, and, on his not appearing to show cause, ordered that the appeal should be struck off the file. *THAKOOR KAPILNATH SAHAI v. THE GOVERNMENT*

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 142

24. ———— *Failure to give security—Power to enlarge time—Act VI of 1874, ss. 5 and 11.* An intending appellant to the Privy Council, who held a certificate under Act VI of 1874, s. 5, having failed to give the requisite security and deposit within the six weeks prescribed by s. 11, an order was passed to strike off his application to appeal. As, however, the defendant in the Court below who would have been respondent in the appeal, had filed an appeal under the Letters Patent, s. 15, against the grant of the certificate, the applicant contended that the six weeks would not begin to run until such appeal was finally disposed of. *Held*, that there was no ground for this contention, as the appeal did not operate as a stay of proceedings, nor remove the record to any other Court. *Held*, that the Court had no jurisdiction to enlarge the time specified in s. 11. *FUNEENDRO DEB ROY KUT v. JOGENDRO DEB*

23 W. R. 220

25. ———— Deposit of security—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 602—Extension of time for giving security.* The time allowed by s. 602 of the Civil Procedure Code for giving the security and making the deposit required by that section may be extended. *FAZUL-UN-NISSA BEGUM v. MULO*

I. L. R. 6 All. 250

26. ———— *Extension of time for security in appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 602.* The words in s. 602 of Act X of 1877, relating to the time within which security is to be given, are directory only; and

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although they are not to be departed from without cogent reason, the Court from which the appeal is preferred has the right of extending the time. In this case, a satisfactory explanation having been given of delay in giving security until after the time limited by the above section had expired:—*Held*, that the Court had rightly exercised discretion in extending the time. *In the matter of the petition of Soorj Mukhi Koer*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 272, approved. *BURJORE v. BHAGANA*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 557: L. R. 11 I. A. 7

27. ——— Enlargement of time for making deposit of costs of appeal—*Time for appealing—Civil Procedure Code*, ss. 600, 602. The Court may enlarge the time for making the deposit required by Civil Procedure Code, s. 602, for cogent reasons under the rule in *Burjore v. Bhagana*, L. R. 11 I. A. 7: I. L. R. 10 Calc. 557; but those reasons must be such as would lead the Court to believe that the party was diligent in due time to be prepared to lodge the deposit within the limited period, and that he was prevented from doing so not owing to absence and the difficulty of getting funds, but owing to some circumstances accidental or otherwise over which he had no control, or owing to mistake which the Court would consider not unreasonable or caused by negligence. *RANGASAYI v. MAHALAKSHMANNA* . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 391

VENKATACHALAM v. MAHALAKSHMANNA

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 392, note

28. ——— Security for costs of respondent—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)*, ss. 603 and 610—*Right of surety to dispute validity of security bond notwithstanding admission of appeal*. Notwithstanding the admission of an appeal to Her Majesty in Council under s. 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a surety is not precluded from questioning the validity of the security bond in execution proceedings, inasmuch as he was not a party to the order of the High Court. *GIRINDRA NATH MUKERJEE v. BEJOY GOPAL MUKERJEE*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 246
3 C. W. N. 84

79. ——— Appeal struck off for want of prosecution—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)*, ss. 598, 599, 600. A on the 8th September 1885 filed his petition of appeal to Her Majesty in Council against a decree obtained against him by B on the 19th May 1885. On the 11th September 1885, A's attorney received for approval from the Registrar the usual draft notice calling upon B to show cause why the case was not a fit and proper one for appeal to Her Majesty in Council; this draft notice was never returned as approved or otherwise to the Registrar, and no further steps were taken to prosecute the appeal. On the 1st April 1886, B applied to have the appeal struck off for want of prosecution. *Held*, that he was entitled to the order. *MOORAJEE POONJA v. VISRANJEE VISENJEE*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 658

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30. ——— Delay in transmission of appeal—*Power of High Court*. Until a petition of appeal to the Privy Council presented to the High Court has been admitted and allowed, a party has no right of appeal to the Privy Council. If the petition is allowed to remain on the file of the Court, and is not prosecuted within a reasonable time, the Court has power to order its removal from the file. *GOBARDHAN BARMONO v. MANO BIBI*

3 B. L. R. O. C. 128: S. C. on appeal
5 B. L. R. 76: 14 W. R. O. C. 34

31. ——— Appeal admitted after time—*Power to reject appeal*. In a case where the period within which an application for leave to appeal to England expired during the Dusserah vacation, and the application was presented on the first day of the Court sitting after the vacation, when, though notice was served under the rules,—no cause being shown to the contrary,—the appeal was admitted and the applicant allowed to incur large costs for translation and transcription, and the record was nearly ready for transmission:—*Held*, that the plea of limitation could not at this stage be heard in bar to the admission of the appeal, and that the High Court was bound to allow it to go on, subject to the orders of the Privy Council. *RAJ KISHEN SINGH v. HURO SOONDUREE DASSEE*

15 W. R. 255

32. ——— Power of High Court to consolidate appeals or admit time-expired appeals. The High Court has no power to consolidate appeals to the Privy Council or to admit appeals to the Privy Council in cases in which the time for filing an appeal has expired; such consolidation or admission cannot be made without the permission of the Privy Council. *PRAN NATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. KASHEENATH CHOWDHRY*

2 W. R. Mis. 26

See MAHOMED MUHSUR v. RAM LAL ROY

6 W. R. Mis. 50

33. ——— Power of High Court to restore appeal. After an appeal to Her Majesty in Council has been dismissed for default, or for any reason removed from the file of the High Court, under the law or under the rules of the Court, it is in the discretion of the High Court to restore the appeal after the period of six months allowed for preferring such appeals has expired. *In the matter of the petition of RADHA BINODE MISSE*

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RADHA BINODE MISSE v. KRIPAMOYEE DEBIA

7 W. R. 531

(*Contra*) *BOLAKUN, In re* . 6 W. R. Mis. 121

34. ——— Appeals struck off for default in making deposit. The High Court has no authority to restore appeals to Her Majesty in Council, dismissed or struck off the file for default in making deposit. *In the matter of the petition of SREEKANT ROY*

7 W. R. 74

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*2. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—*contd.*

(c) MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

35.———Papers forwarded with record—*Review*. Where an application for review was rejected and no appeal to the Privy Council was filed against the order of rejection, papers filed with the application for review will not be forwarded with the record to the Privy Council on the appeal of the case. *FUKEERUDEEN MAHOMED AHSAN CHOWDHRY v. NAJUMUNISSA CHOWDHRAIN*

2 B. L. R. A. C. 264 : 11 W. R. 145

36.———Translation of account-books and papers—*Costs*. Where it was impossible to say whether certain account-books and papers were material or relevant, or even were part of the evidence in the case, the High Court declined to put the appellant in an appeal to England to the expense of translating and transcribing them, but gave the respondent the option of translating them at his own expense, with a view to their being sent to England as an appendix to the record, leaving it to the Privy Council, in the event of the respondent being successful, to make any order they pleased as to the costs of translation. *In the matter of the petition of RAJ COOMAR BABOO DEO NUND SINGH*

7 W. R. 90

37.———Evidence—*Exhibits marked for identification afterwards marked as "admitted on both sides" by Bench-Clerk—Certificate by Court as to the endorsement on exhibits—Record of appeal to the Privy Council*. In an application for a certificate that a limited meaning should be placed upon endorsements made by the Bench Clerk or certain exhibits printed in the paper-book in a suit, which had gone on appeal to the Privy Council, the Court considering the reasons for the application to have arisen from the nature of the case and from the contentions on either side, left the matter to be dealt with by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, at the same time directing its order to be forwarded to the Privy Council. *RATAN KOER v. CHOTAY NARAIN SINGH*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 476

38.———Translation of deeds. *Razee-namas and safeenamas*, as well as security bonds, connected with appeals to England, need not be in English. *MAHOMED TUKEE CHOWDHRY v. LUCHMEPUT SINGH DOOGUR*

7 W. R. 291

39.———Appeal, pendency of effect of—*Legal disability—Right to sue*. The pendency of an appeal to England does not put the party who, subject to that appeal, is the owner of an estate under a legal disability to bring a suit in that character against third parties. *PRAHLAD SEN v. RAJENDRA KISHORE SINGH*

2 B. L. R. P. C. 111 : 12 W. R. P. C. 6

40.———Agreement not to appeal—*Application to stay proceedings*. Where an appeal is preferred contrary to an agreement not to appeal, application to stay the proceedings should be made before the case is prepared for hearing. *AMIR ALI v. INDERJIT KOER*

9 B. L. R. 460

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*2. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—*contd.*(c) MISCELLANEOUS CASES—*contd.*

41.—Certificate of appeal. A certificate of appeal, given pursuant to ss. 595 (c) and 600 of the Civil Procedure Code, that the case is a fit one for appeal, is valid. *Rajah Tasadduk Rasul Khan v. Manik Chand, L. R. 30 I. A. 35*, distinguished. *WEBB v. MACPHERSON* (1903) L. R. 30 I. A. 238

42.—Limitation—Practice—Order refusing to admit an appeal—Act XV of 1877 (Limitation), s. 5—"Sufficient cause." On January 19, 1897, the High Court refused to admit an appeal from a decree of a Subordinate Judge, dated June 25, 1894, on the ground that delay mainly attributed to filing an appeal in the wrong Court through an alleged error, in its valuation was not, under all the circumstances "sufficient cause" for not appealing in due time within the meaning of s. 5 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). *Held*, that this order could not be set aside unless shown to be wrong, however serious the consequences may have been. *RAM NARAIN JOSHI v. PARNESWAR NARAIN MAHTA* (1902)

L. R. 30 I. A. 20 :
s.c. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 309

43.———Application on fresh material—*Revenue Sale Law (Act XI of 1859), s. 53—Purchase at execution sale—Purchase at revenue sale—Incumbrances—Debtor and Creditor—Practice*. An estate was purchased at a revenue sale by a person who had purchased the same at an execution sale before the revenue sale took place, but after default occurred in the payment of revenue. *Held*, that the purchase was a purchase by a proprietor within the meaning of s. 53 of the Revenue Sale Law, and the purchaser took subject to incumbrances. *Abdool Bari v. Ramdas Coondoo, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 707*, referred to. Where a debtor assigned to his creditor a debt due to him by a third person and the latter made no attempt to recover any portion of it : *Held*, upon accounts taken between them, that the creditor was rightly debited with the amount of the debt. In this case the Judicial Committee had, upon the application of the respondent, deferred giving judgment in order that the parties might have an opportunity of further considering and arguing (and upon fresh materials, if available) a point which was raised by the appellant for the first time before the Judicial Committee. There was a fresh hearing on that point in consequence. *SYAMA KUMARI v. RAMESWAR SINGH* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 786

44.———Review of judgment—Appeal from order granting review—Grounds of appeal. When an application for review of judgment has been granted for "any other sufficient reason," the sufficiency or otherwise of the reason for granting it is not a ground of appeal within the meaning of s. 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Per RICHARD, J.*—But the fact that the Court-fee on the plaint, at first held to be inadequate, is afterwards found to be

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*2. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—*concl.*(c) MISCELLANEOUS CASES—*concl.*

sufficient is a good ground for granting a review of judgment. *ALI AKBAR v. KHURSHED ALI* (1905) I. L. R. 27 All. 695

45. ———— *Competency—Power of Local Court to admit appeal—Question of competency left open by local Court—Objection at hearing—Dismissal of appeal—Value of appeal—Action for injunction against infringement of trade mark.* Where the Local Statutes contemplate that appeals to the Privy Council shall be allowed to lie on the local Court satisfying itself as to its competency and the local Court in its order in one case expressly left the question of competency open: *Held*, by the Judicial Committee, that the appeal was not competent. *GILLET COMPANY v. LUMSDEN* (1905)

10 C. W. N. 7

46. ———— *“Interested in the result of appeal”* —Where defendants have been exonerated and there is no appeal against that portion of the decree, they cannot be brought on the record under s. 559. A party, who is not made a respondent in an appeal, is not “interested in the result of the appeal” within the meaning of s. 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless the decrees sought to be obtained against the respondents in the appeal would have the effect of prejudicing him in some way or other. The party sought to be made a respondent in the appeal under s. 559 must be shown to be interested in the result of the appeal before he is brought on the record, and the interest he may acquire as a result of being added as a respondent, will not suffice. Where a defendant has been exonerated and there is no appeal against so much of the decree as exonerates him, no decree can be passed against him in an appeal by any other party as he is not a party to the appeal and cannot be said to be interested in the result of such appeal. *Atma Ram v. Balkishen*, I. L. R. 5 All. 267, followed. *Upendra Lal Mukerjee v. Girindra Nath Mukerjee*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 586, not followed. *SUBRAMANIAN CHETTY v. VEERABADRAN CHETTY* (1908) I. L. R. 31 Mad. 442

3. STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.

1. ———— *Stay of execution before appeal admitted—Practice—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 603 and 608.* Where a petition for leave to appeal to the Privy Council from a decree of the High Court has been presented, the High Court may grant a stay of execution of its decree, although the appeal has not yet been admitted under s. 603 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *JANBAI v. SALE MAHOMED JAFFERBHAY* I. L. R. 19 Bom. 10

2. ———— *Security against party in possession—Beng. Reg. XVI of 1797, s. 4.* Within six months after decree and prior to the admission of an appeal therefrom to England, the

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*3. STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL—*contd.*

Sudder Court, on an *ex-parte* application without notice, issued an execution order putting the decree-holder in possession. This was done without calling for security as provided by s. 4, Bengal Regulation XVI of 1797. The appellant, on the admission of the appeal, applied to the Sudder Court for security from the party in possession pending the appeal, but that Court held that, as the decree-holder was in possession under an execution order which could not be appealed from, they had no power to interfere. On petition the Judicial Committee, under the circumstances and on affidavit of waste, made an order declaring that it was competent to the Sudder Court to require security to be given for protection of the property pending the appeal, notwithstanding execution of the decree had issued, and gave permission to the appellant to apply to the Sudder Court with an intimation of that opinion. *JARIUTOOL BUTOOL v. HOSEINEE BEGUM* 10 Moo. I. A. 196

3. ———— *Beng. Reg. XVI of 1797, s. 4.* The plaintiff obtained a decree for possession of a zamindari, which was reversed on appeal by the High Court. The plaintiff then appealed to the Privy Council. Under such circumstances, the High Court has no power, under s. 4, Regulation XVI of 1897, to order security to be taken from the defendant (respondent) in the appeal to the Privy Council for the due performance of such orders as the Privy Council may pass in the appeal, or to suspend the decree reversing the decision of the first Court. *NILKISEN THAKOOR v. BEERCHUNDER THAKOOR GOSSAIN*

2 W. R. Mis. 23

4. ———— The High Court cannot interfere to require security from a party who has formally been put in possession of the property in dispute in execution of a decree, where execution was taken out before an appeal to the Privy Council was preferred and admitted. *HURO SOONDUREE DEBIA v. STEVENSON*

5 W. R. Mis. 13

5. ———— *Security—Failure to furnish security—Ben. Reg. XVI of 1797, s. 4.* In the case of an appeal to the Privy Council, the Court has no power, on failure of both parties to furnish security as required by s. 4, Regulation XVI of 1797, to attach any property held by the appellant beyond that decree. *KHOROO LALL v. KANT LALL*

5 W. R. Mis. 37

6. ———— *Beng. Reg. XVI of 1797, s. 4.* When an appeal to the Privy Council has been admitted, all that the High Court can do is to proceed, under s. 4, Regulation XVI of 1797, to stay the execution of the decree, on the appellant giving security for the due performance of the decree of the Privy Council. But the Court cannot continue an attachment of money made under Regulation II of 1806 during the pendency

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*3. STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
—*contd.*

of the suit in the Zillah Court, after the decree of the Zillah Court has been reversed by the High Court on appeal. *In re petition of RAMNATH CHOWDHRY* . . . 6 W. R. Mis. 17

7. ——— In the case of an appeal to the Privy Council, security to the extent of the whole sum decreed need not always be taken from the decree-holder. When security is taken for less than the full amount decreed, the decree-holder should be restrained from issuing process of execution with a view to realizing any sum in excess of the amount for which security is given. *MOLKA v. SUMPUT KOONWAR* . . . 6 W. R. Mis. 62

8. ——— The Zillah Court decreed a suit in plaintiff's favour. On appeal the High Court reversed the judgment, and remanded the case, making no order as to the costs of the appeal. Against such remand an appeal was preferred to Her Majesty in Council. The Zillah Court, however, proceeded with the case, and eventually dismissed the whole suit, and the defendant applied to execute the decree for his costs. *Held*, that, in such circumstances, the High Court was not competent, under s. 4, Regulation XVI of 1797 (the last-mentioned decree not having been appealed to it), to suspend execution of decree, or to direct the taking of security. *In the matter of the petition of ONOOROP CHUNDER MOOKERJEE* . . . 6 W. R. Mis. 45

9. ——— When an appellant to the Privy Council applies to the High Court to stay execution of the decree on giving security, and action is taken by the Court on such application, a Principal Sudder Ameen has no authority, without the direction of the High Court to make an order on an application to execute the decree, though the judgment-debtor should have failed to give security. *DEBEE PERSHAD v. UMURTH NATH CHOWDHRY* . . . 8 W. R. 275

10. ——— *Power of High Court.* The High Court can, on cause shewn, require security from a decree-holder who has been put in possession in execution of decree against which an appeal has been preferred to the Privy Council, and is still pending. It is not imperative on the High Court, under such circumstances, to take security from the decree-holder in possession, unless it be shewn that the party in possession is making waste, or is so embarrassed by debt that the estates are likely to be seized by creditors in satisfaction of their claims, or unless some other good cause be given. *SOORAJ MONEE DAYEE v. SUDDANUND MOHAPATTUR* . . . 12 W. R. 296

11. ——— *Widow's interest.* A judgment-debtor who had been permitted to retain possession of disputed property pending an appeal to England, on furnishing security for mesne profits and costs, deceased, and the widow offered

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*3. STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
—*contd.*

her life-interest in his estate as security. *Held*, that, as her interest was only temporary, it could not be accepted as competent security. *PHOOL KOER alias KANAYA KOER v. DABEE PERSAUD* . . . 12 W. R. 187

12. ——— *Beng. Reg. XVI of 1797, s. 4.* When an appeal is preferred to Her Majesty in Council from a decree of the High Court, the security to be taken from the decree-holder must be regulated by s. 4, Regulation XVI of 1797; the practice being to calculate for an amount sufficient to meet the mesne profits which are to go to his hands from the date of his obtaining possession to the probable date of the eventual execution of the decree of the Privy Council, which period is generally taken to be three years. *AMEEROONISSA KHATOON v. DUNNE* . . . 14 W. R. 361

13. ——— *Beng. Reg. XVI of 1797, s. 4.* Application for decree-holder pending decision of appeal to the Privy Council to give security refused; *AINSLIE, J.*, following the Full Bench ruling in the case of *Rajkissen Singh, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 605*; 6 W. R. Mis. 111; and *PAUL, J.* (whilst declining to follow that ruling), considering the application premature, because merely put on the file of the High Court without the appeal being submitted. *BURRA LALL v. THE COURT OF WARDS* . . . 16 W. R. 289

14. ——— *Sufficiency of security.* The High Court having ordered a judgment-debtor, pending an appeal to the Privy Council, to furnish security within two months, he put in a petition in the Zillah Court on the last day allowed by the order, tendering a darpatni mehal as security, and on the day following gave an unregistered security bond. The Judge rejected the bond. *Held*, that the bond was not required to be registered until the security had been accepted; and that the Judge should have directed an investigation into the goodness and sufficiency or otherwise of the property tendered. *DUNNE v. AMEEROONISSA KHATOON* . . . 13 W. R. 41

15. ——— The decree-holder (respondent to England) was required immediately to elect between furnishing security and drawing the sum deposited by the appellant on account of wasilat and costs, and (upon her failure to do so) allowing the appellant to obtain a refund of the deposit upon giving the like security. A party, who seeks to obtain security after the decree has been executed, must shew special circumstances (*e.g.*, waste or improper dealing with the property) before the Court can grant such an order. *JUGGOO LALL OOPADHYA v. JANKEE BIBEE* . . . 17 W. R. 521

16. ——— *Beng. Reg. XVI of 1797, s. 4.* In a suit in which an appeal to the Privy Council from a decree of the High Court has been admitted and is still pending, the Court of original jurisdiction which made the decree first ap-

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*3. STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
—*contd.*

pealed from has jurisdiction to issue execution. Although, as a general rule, the High Court will take security under s. 4, Regulation XVI of 1797, before allowing execution of a decree while there is an appeal to the Privy Council pending, yet the Court may, under certain circumstances, allow execution without taking security. Where the lower Court is informed that there has been an appeal to Her Majesty in Council from the decree which it is asked to execute, the lower Court should, in the exercise of its discretion, allow time to the parties to apply to the High Court to stay execution or to require security from the party left in possession, before issuing execution, unless it should see danger of the property being made away with in the interval. *LOCH, J.*, differed. *WISE v. RAJKRISHNA ROY*. B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 541 6 W. R. Mis. 84

17. ———— *Beng. Reg. XVI of 1797, s. 4.* The plaintiff obtained a decree for possession of part of a zamindari in the Court below, and in execution obtained possession on giving security. On appeal by the defendants to the High Court, the decree was reversed and restitution ordered. Plaintiff then appealed to the Privy Council, and applied to the High Court to be left in possession upon his former security. *Held*, that s. 4, Regulation XVI of 1797, did not apply, and the plaintiff was not entitled either to keep possession or to require the defendants to give security; but the defendants were entitled to restitution of the property without security, whether the judgment of the High Court ordered restitution or not: but that it was within the discretion of the Court to call upon the defendants to give security for costs, if any, awarded by the decree of reversal. *In the matter of the petition of RAJKRISHNA SINGH*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 605: 6 W. R. Mis. 111

18. ———— *Beng. Reg. XVI of 1797, s. 4.* The plaintiffs, in execution of a decree, which had been affirmed by the High Court on appeal, obtained possession of the land decreed, and realized their costs. The defendant afterwards filed an appeal to the Privy Council against the decree of the High Court. After admission of the appeal, he applied that the plaintiffs might be called upon to furnish security. *Held*, that under s. 4, Regulation XVI of 1797, the application could not be entertained. *JOYNARAIN PATTUR v. RUS-SICK MOHUN BANERJEE*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 744: 8 W. R. 144

19. ———— Order for security to be furnished by respondent in Privy Council —*Order made after decree appealed against—Liability for mesne profits of persons giving security—Civil Procedure Code, s. 608—Revocation of surety—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 103—Construction of security bond.* The present plaintiff purchased land brought to sale in execution of a decree, and was put in possession. The sale was

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*3. STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
—*contd.*

set aside by the High Court, and the purchaser was ousted. He preferred an appeal to the Privy Council, and the High Court directed that security be given for the mesne profits and the due delivery of the property without waste in the event of the appeal being successful. The present defendants furnished security, and executed a document under which the plaintiff, who had succeeded in the Privy Council, now sued to enforce his rights. It appeared that after the date of the instrument abovementioned a payment was made from the income of the property in satisfaction of a decree obtained by the zamindar against the present plaintiff for arrears of *poruppu* previously accrued due. *Held*, (i) that the order of the High Court requiring security to be furnished was not *ultra vires*, and that the instrument abovementioned was enforceable; (ii) that the defendants, who had given no personal guarantee, were not competent to put an end to the security under the provisions of the Contract Act relating to revocation of a surety; (iii) that on the right construction of the instrument the period for the profits of which the defendants were chargeable was that between the date of the instrument and the date of the decision of the Privy Council; (iv) that the defendants should be credited with the amount paid in satisfaction of the decree for *poruppu*. *NARAYANAN CHETTI v. ARUNACHELLAM CHETTI*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 140

20. ———— Security by party in possession—*Mad. Reg. VIII of 1818.* After an appeal had been asserted from a decree of the Sudder Court at Madras, the appellant applied to that Court under s. 4, Regulation VIII of 1818, and the Circular Order of the 21st September 1826, for an order calling on the respondents, who had been in possession of the estates in dispute before the institution of the suit, to give security as prescribed by that Regulation. The Sudder Court refused the application as not being within the provisions of the Regulation. On petition the Judicial Committee declined to interfere, as there was no allegation of waste by the respondents in the petition. *Quære*: Whether there was any jurisdiction in the Judicial Committee, under s. 4 of Madras Regulation VIII of 1818, to call for security from the respondent when put in possession. *NAGALUTCHMEE UMMAL v. GOPPOO NADARAJA CHETTY*

6 Moo. I. A. 309

21. ———— Procedure where decree-holder attempts to execute it. Procedure where there is an order of Court to stay the execution of a decree obtained by a party who has appealed to the Privy Council from another decree against himself, if the holder of the decree which is appealed against attempts to execute it. *DWARKANATH ROY v. WOOMASOONDUREE DASSEE*

14 W. R. 329

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*3. STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
—*concl'd.*

22. ——— Power of Civil Court in mofussil. A Civil Court in the mofussil has no power to stay execution in cases where an appeal has been made to the Privy Council against a decree of the High Court. *MUTTEALAUMMAL v. CHELLAYAMMAL* 5 Mad. 98

23. ——— Restoration of property pending appeal. The Court has power, under s. 608, Civil Procedure Code, to stay execution of a decree of the High Court in a suit subsequently appealed to Her Majesty in Council. *Quære*: Where the Court has power to order restitution of possession of property already taken in execution of its own decree pending an appeal to the Privy Council. *ASHANULLA v. KAROONAMOYI CHOWDHRY*; *ROHINI CHOWDHURANI v. KISHEN GOBIND DASS* 4 C. L. R. 125

24. ——— Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 603, 608. An application for stay of execution under s. 608, Civil Procedure Code, cannot be granted before an appeal to the Privy Council is finally admitted under s. 603, Civil Procedure Code. *JARAO KUMARI v. GOPI CHAND BOTHRA* (1900) 5 C. W. N. 562

25. ——— Stay of execution of decree pending appeal—To what Court application should be made—Power of High Court to grant stay of execution up to determination of Privy Council appeal—Order of Judicial Committee granting stay of execution where High Court had not done so. Application for stay of execution of a decree pending an appeal to His Majesty in Council should always be made, in the first instance at any rate, to the Court in India which has ample power to deal with the matter according to the circumstances of the particular case, and has knowledge of details, which the Judicial Committee cannot possess on an interlocutory application. In this case the High Court were of opinion that they had no power to grant a stay of execution up to the determination of the appeal by the Privy Council, but their judgment showed that they thought it ought to be granted; and the Judicial Committee allowed such a stay of execution upon terms. *VASUDEVA MODELAR v. SADAGOPA MODELAR* (1906) I. L. R. 29 Mad. 379
s.c. L. R. 33 I. A. 132

4. EFFECT OF PRIVY COUNCIL DECREE OR ORDER.

1. ——— Effect of order of Privy Council dismissing suit on power of High Court to make orders in suit—Petition for the amendment of an order in Council dismissing a suit—Receiver's liability to account—Rights as between the Administrator-General and executors transferring estate to him, and the petitioner interested in the estate—Act II of 1874, s. 31. A Court having appointed a receiver in a suit has authority, incidental to its jurisdiction, to

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—*contd.*4. EFFECT OF PRIVY COUNCIL DECREE OR ORDER—*concl'd.*

order him to account, although the suit may be no longer pending. The estate is in its hands, and the receiver is its officer, and the dismissal of the suit by an Appellate Court does not alter that state of things. The original Court in such a case may permit parties interested to intervene on questions as to the accounts, and may deal with costs and other matters. In a suit by a plaintiff interested in the estate, wholly based on the alleged illegality of its transfer by the executors named in the will of a Hindu, to the Administrator-General (Act II of 1874, s. 31), decrees were made by the High Court, Original and Appellate, in the plaintiff's favour. The Judicial Committee, however, held the transfer legal; and the suit, brought against the Administrator-General and the executors as co-defendants, was dismissed. *Held*, on the plaintiff's petition for such modification of the order dismissing the suit as would maintain what had been ordered below relating to the accounts, thereby enabling the High Court to bring matters in dispute to an end, that there were no grounds for the amendment. Their Lordships' opinion was that the High Court would not be deprived of any jurisdiction in that respect by the dismissal of the suit. If it should be necessary to the carrying out of the transfer that the Administrator-General should take proceedings, he could do so. To make orders upon the Court's receiver was within its powers; and either the receiver or the executors could be called to further account without the petitioner being met by the defence of prior adjudication of the matter (s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure). *In the matter of the petition of PREM LALL MULLICK, ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL v. PREM LALL MULLICK*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 1011
L. R. 22 I. A. 203

5. CRIMINAL CASES.

1. ——— Right of appeal. No right of appeal to the Privy Council exists in any matter of criminal jurisdiction, and the High Court has no power to grant leave in such a case. *In the matter of GOOROO DASS ROY* 18 W. R. 407

In the matter of AMEER KHAN
13 W. R. 407, note

2. ——— Case referred under s. 404, Criminal Procedure Code, 1869—Letters Patent, 1865, s. 41. The High Court has no power, under cl. 41 of the amended Letters Patent of 1865, to grant leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council from an order made or decision given in a criminal case referred by a Magistrate under s. 404 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *REG. v. REAY*
7 Bom. Cr. 77

3. ——— Question of law or practice—Ground for leave to appeal. In criminal cases the High Court will not, in general, grant leave to ap-

APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—concl'd.

5. CRIMINAL CASES—concl'd.

peal to the Privy Council, unless some important question of law or practice or jurisdiction is involved. Considerations that guide the Court in granting leave to appeal in such cases, stated; and instances in which such leave has been granted, mentioned. *REG. v. PESTANJI DINSHA*

10 Bom. 75

4. ————— *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 124A.* The accused, who was the editor, proprietor, and publisher of the *Kesari* newspaper, was charged under s. 124A of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) with exciting and attempting to excite feelings of disaffection to Government by the publication of certain articles, etc., in the *Kesari* in its issue of the 15th June 1897. At the close of the Judge's charge to the jury counsel for the first accused asked that the following points might be reserved for the decision of the Court under s. 434 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), viz.:—(i) Whether the order for the prosecution was sufficient under s. 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code. (ii) Whether the High Court had power, in the absence of a sufficient order, to accept the commitment of the accused under s. 532 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to proceed with the trial. (iii) Whether the meaning given to the term "disaffection" by the Judge in his charge to the jury was correct. The Judge declined to reserve the above points. The first accused, having been convicted, applied to a Full Bench, under cl. 41 of the Letters Patent, 1865, for a certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal to the Privy Council. The points upon which he desired to appeal were those which his counsel at the close of the trial asked the Judge to reserve as above stated. The Full Bench refused to grant the certificate. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BAL GANGADHAR TILAK* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 112

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See APPEAL—DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 98, 99 (1859, s. 110).

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 99.

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See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 102 AND 103.

See RECOGNIZANCE TO APPEAR.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 107

See RES JUDICATA—JUDGMENTS ON PRELIMINARY POINTS.

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY TOWNS—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 476

————— sufficient to prevent ex-parte decree.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 108 (1859, s. 119).

APPEARANCE—concl'd.

————— *Default in—Appeal—Adjournment, application for—Dismissal for default—Re-admission—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 556, 558.* An application by a counsel or pleader, who is instructed only to apply for an adjournment, which is refused is not an "appearance" within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. When in such circumstances an appeal is dismissed, the dismissal is one for default under s. 556 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitling the appellant to apply for re-admission under s. 558 of the Code. *Cooke v. The Equitable Coal Company*, 8 C. W. N. 621, approved. *Watson & Co. v. Ambika Dasi*, 4 C. W. N. 237, overruled. *SATISH CHANDRA MUKERJEE v. AHARA PRASHAD MUKERJEE* (1907)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 403

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6 C. W. N. 518

1. GENERAL DUTY OF APPELLATE COURTS.

1. _____ High Court, practice of—
Appeal on questions of fact—Credibility of witnesses. The High Court, sitting in appeal on questions of fact, was guided by the same rules as those of the Privy Council when they sat upon motions for a rule for new trials from the old Supreme Court. The High Court, sitting in appeal, will not disturb a judgment upon a question as to the credibility of witnesses, unless it be manifestly clear, from the probabilities attached to certain circumstances in the case, that the Court was wrong in the conclusion drawn from such evidence. The High Court, sitting in appeal, will look upon the decree of a Judge

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*1. GENERAL DUTY OF APPELLATE COURTS
—*contd.*

as to facts in the same light as the verdict of a jury, and, though some of the reasons given for the conclusion arrived at be erroneous, the High Court in appeal will not say that the decree is against the weight of evidence, if sufficient reason for such decree still remain. *HEERALALL CHUCKERBUTTY v. MOHESH CHUNDER GHOSAL* . . . 1 Hyde 105

2. ———— **Privy Council, practice of**—*Appeal on questions of fact.* The rule of the Privy Council not to disturb a judgment of a Court in India upon a question of fact, unless it is clear from the probabilities of the case that the judgment is wrong, however necessary as regards a Court of Appeal far removed from India, would hardly be extended as one equally necessary and applicable with the same strictness to a Court of Appeal in India. *SARODA SOONDERY v. TINCOWRY NUNDY* . . . 1 Hyde 223

3. ———— **Question of fact, ground for disturbing finding on.** *Held*, on examination of the evidence, that the lower Appellate Court ought not to have disturbed the distinct finding of the lower Court, as it had, upon what appeared to be mere conjecture. *LAL MAHOMED BIPARI v. SHOILA BEWA* . . . 11 C. L. R. 104

4. ———— **Jurisdiction where appeal is barred.** When an appeal is barred by law, an Appellate Court cannot interfere in any matter legitimately arising out of the case, unless there is want of jurisdiction. *KURUM CHAND KOLBEAH v. HUREE MOHUN GHOSE* . . . 2 W. R. Mis. 45

5. ———— **Presumption of correctness of judgment appealed from**—*Duty of Judge.* A Judge of appeal is not in the position of an arbitrator who has to look at the evidence on both sides and determine which is preferable. He has to deal with the decision of a properly constituted Court, which, if not shown to be erroneous, ought to be affirmed. *SHETABDEE BISWAS v. MOLANDEE MUNDUL* . . . 25 W. R. 30

6. ———— **Presumption as to facts found by lower Court**—*Omission to file objections under Civil Procedure Code, s. 561.* Where a decree is in favour of the respondent, the Appellate Court is not entitled to accept the facts found by the Court of first instance as incontestably proved, merely because the respondent has not filed any cross-objections to the decree under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). *BHAGOSI v. BAPUJI* . . . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 75

7. ———— **Credibility of witnesses.** In cases turning on the credibility of witnesses, the Appellate Court gives great weight to the decision of the Court below. *WOMESH CHUNDER ROY v. DEENDAYAL PORAMANTICK* . . . 2 Hay 12

8. ———— **Where credit has been given to witnesses by the Court of first instance before which they have been examined, the**

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*1. GENERAL DUTY OF APPELLATE COURTS
—*contd.*

Appellate Court is not at liberty to say that it disbelieves them without stating reasons. *HOYMO DASSEE v. SREEKISSEN NUNDY* . . . 14 W. R. 58

9. ———— **Dealing with documentary evidence.** Where a Munsif pronounces an opinion as to the authenticity of certain documents, the lower Appellate Court must assume that he did his duty and looked into each and every one of them before pronouncing such opinion. On a question of simple credit to be given to a witness, an Appellate Court, having before it merely written depositions, is not authorized to set aside the opinion of the Court of first instance which heard the witness and recorded that his demeanour was not satisfactory. *GOPEE NATH MOOKERJEE v. BODDHUMUNT MAL* . . . 25 W. R. 26

See NOBIN CHUNDER POOSHALEE v. RUNGO CHUNDER CHATTERJEE . . . 25 W. R. 363

10. ———— **Method of dealing with questions of fact in appeal.** In dealing with questions of fact which turn entirely upon evidence given on the trial, the High Court ought not merely to consider whether the lower Court has come to the same conclusion as that to which it should have come if it had originally heard the witnesses, but, before reversing the decision, it ought to be satisfied that the Court was clearly wrong. *OOTUM v. MULLICK GHOLAM HOSSEIN* . . . 2 Hay 359

11. ———— **Point taken in appeal, but not argued by pleader.** Where a point is taken on appeal, the Appellate Court should consider and decide it, although the vakil may omit to argue it. *DADA VALAD VALLI v. BAVASHA VALAD KASAM* . . . 6 Bom. A. C. 9

12. ———— **Duty of Judge to hear comments on evidence.** It is the duty of the Judge of an Appellate Court to allow the parties or their pleaders to submit the evidence to him at the hearing in open Court, and to make upon the evidence so submitted every comment, and found upon it every argument they may think necessary. *LALLA JUGGESHUR SAHOY v. GOPAL LALL* . . . 15 W. R. 54

13. ———— **Duty of Appellate Court to direct examination of witnesses before reversing decree**—*Dismissal of suit by first Court without examining defendant's witnesses*—*Reversal of decree on appeal.* Where a Court of first instance, considering it unnecessary to examine certain witnesses for the defence, dismissed the suit, and the lower Appellate Court, disbelieving the evidence of those witnesses for the defence who were examined, allowed the plaintiff's appeal:—*Held*, that before doing so the lower Appellate Court should have afforded the defendants an opportunity of supplementing the evidence which they had given in the first Court by the testimony of those witnesses whom that Court had declared it unnecessary to hear, and that the case must be regarded as one in which the first Court had refused to examine the

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*1. GENERAL DUTY OF APPELLATE COURTS
—*concl.*

witnesses tendered by the defendants. The Court directed the first Court to examine the defendants' witnesses, and having done so, to return their depositions to the lower Appellate Court, which was to replace the appeal upon its file and dispose of it. *KHUDA BAKHSH v. IMAM ALI SHAH*

I. L. R. 9 All. 339

14. ——— Duty of Appellate Court to call the remaining witnesses before reversing the decree of first court—*Dismissal of case in first Court without hearing all the witnesses.* The Subordinate Judge, having heard all the witnesses for the plaintiff and some of the witnesses for the defendant, intimated that he did not consider it necessary for the defendant to call any more evidence. He then dismissed the suit. On appeal by the plaintiff, the Judge, upon the recorded evidence, reversed the decree, and allowed the plaintiff's claim. The defendant appealed to the High Court, contending that the lower Court ought not to have found against him without allowing him an opportunity to call the witnesses whose evidence had been dispensed with by the Subordinate Judge. *Held* (reversing the decree of the lower Appellate Court and remanding the case), that the lower Appellate Court ought not to have reversed the decree of the first Court without allowing the defendant to give the evidence which the first Court declined to take. *ARJUN RAMCHANDRA SHETKARPE v. SHANKAR VISHRAM SHENVI GHURAYE*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 253

15.—*Order of Appellate Court returning plaint for presentation to proper Court—Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), s. 11.* Where an Appellate Court makes an order returning a plaint for presentation to the proper Court, the Court of first instance having heard and decided the suit, it is the duty of the Appellate Court, under s. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, first to find, and to record its reasons for so finding, whether the error in valuation complained of has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit on the merits. *WAHID-ULLAH v. KANHAYA LAL* (1902) . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 174

16.—*Practice—Power to take notice of facts transpiring during pendency of appeal—Discretion.* As a general rule a Court of Appeal in considering the correctness of the judgment of the Court below will confine itself to the state of the case at the time such judgment was rendered, and will not take notice of any facts which may have arisen subsequently. But the Court will in exceptional cases depart from this rule, specially where by so doing it can shorten litigation and best attain the ends of justice. Plaintiff was given leave to amend his plaint so as to adapt his case and prayers for relief to the new facts, the amendment not altering the nature of the case. *RAM RATAN SAHU v. BISHUN CHAND* (1907) . . . 11 C. W. N. 732

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*

2. EXERCISE OF POWERS IN VARIOUS CASES.

(a) GENERAL CASES.

1. ——— Discretion, exercise of—*Discretion capriciously exercised—Error of Law.* The discretion vested in a Court of Justice must be exercised in a sound and reasonable manner, and a capricious and unreasonable exercise of discretion on the part of a Court of first instance is an error in law which it is the duty of an Appellate Court to correct. *PENDSE v. MALSE* . . . 3 Bom. A. C. 94

2. ——— Appellate Court's power to interfere with exercise of discretion. When an appeal against an order based on facts is given from a subordinate to a superior Court, the discretion vested in the former is absorbed in the latter, and it is the duty of the superior Court to weigh the facts which form the basis upon which the subordinate Court proceeds and arrive at its own independent conclusion: and this is so notwithstanding that the subordinate Court exercised its discretion after a proper enquiry and due consideration of the facts put before it, and not capriciously or with prejudice. *KIRANI AHMEDULA v. SUBABHAT*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 28

3. ——— Costs—miscarriage or mistake. An Appellate Court will not interfere with the discretion of a lower Court as to costs, unless satisfied that there has been some miscarriage or mistake. *LUHMUN RAM UNOOJ v. WATSON* . . . W. R., 1864, 146

DESAJI LAKHMAJI v. BHAVANIDAS NOROTAMDAS
8 Bom. A. C. 100

KESHAVRAM KRISHNA JOSHI v. BHAVANJI BIN BABAJI . . . 8 Bom. A. C. 142

KAPPUSVAMIAYAN v. NANNUVAYYUN
1 Mad. 74

4. ——— Costs—Action on contract—*Verdict for less than ₹1,000—Certificate under Act XXVI of 1864, s. 9.* Where, in an action in the High Court founded on contract, a verdict was found for the plaintiff for a sum less than ₹1,000, and the Judge who tried the case awarded costs without certifying under s. 9, Act XXVI of 1864, that the action was fit to be brought in the High Court:—*Held*, that the Court might supply the omission on appeal. *NOBOCCOMAR DASS v. KEWATA MUG* . . . 10 B. L. R. 358

KEWATA MUG v. NOBOCCOMAR DASS
19 W. R. 207

5. ——— Discretion of Judge—*Refusal to admit appeal—Limitation.* Where the law leaves a matter within the discretion of a Court, and the Court, after proper enquiry and due consideration, has exercised the discretion in a sound and reasonable manner, the High Court will not interfere with the conclusion arrived at, even though it would itself have arrived at a different conclusion. Consequently, where a District Judge

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*2. EXERCISE OF POWERS IN VARIOUS CASES—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*concl'd.*

after due enquiry, refused to admit an appeal presented after the time prescribed by the Statute of Limitations, the High Court would not interfere with his order. *RANCHODJI v. LALLU*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 304

6. ——— Question of limitation—*Appeal.* *B* sued *M* and *T* for money due on a bond, and on the 27th April 1877 obtained a decree against *T*, the suit against *M* being dismissed. *T* applied for a review of judgment, and *B* also made a similar application. On the 25th May 1877 *T*'s application was granted, and on the 16th July 1877 *B*'s was rejected. On the 29th June 1878, the Court re-heard the suit against *T*, and dismissed it. *B* appealed, making *T* and *M* respondents, and imputing in his memorandum of appeal the decree of the 27th April 1877 as well as that of the 29th June 1878. The Appellate Court, assuming that the appeal was one from the decree of the 27th April 1877, preferred beyond time, admitted it after time, and after hearing the case on its merits, gave a decree against *M*, and dismissed the suit as regards *T*. *Held*, that the Appellate Court erred in assuming that the appeal was from the decree of the 27th April 1877, and that it was at liberty to admit it beyond time, the appeal being from the decree of the 29th June 1878, that decree being the one which had brought *B* before that Court as an appellant; and that the Appellate Court was not competent, on an appeal from the decree of the 29th June 1878, to reconsider the merits of the case against *M*, the appeal from the decree of the 27th April 1877 being barred by limitation, and that decree and the decree of the 29th June 1878 being separate and distinct, and not appealable in one memorandum of appeal from the latter decree. *MOTI BIBI v. BIKANU* . I. L. R. 2 All. 772

7. ——— An Appellate Court can *ipso motu* raise the question of limitation for the first time, where it appears on the face of the plaint that the suit is barred. *MOZAFFUR ALLY v. GIRISH CHANDRA DAS*

I. B. L. R. A. C. 25 : 10 W. R. 71

8.—Plaint, amendment of—*Appellate Court, power of, to allow amendment—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 53, 582.* An Appellate Court has power, under s. 582 read with s. 53 of the Civil Procedure Code, to allow an amendment of the plaint. Where the object of an amendment of a plaint is merely to seek relief ancillary to the principal prayer of the plaint, such amendment does not alter the character of the suit. *Shyam Chand Koondoo v. The Land Mortgage Bank of India*, I. L. R. 9 Cal. 695; *Dhani Ram Shaha v. Bhagirath Shaha*, I. L. R. 22 Cal. 692; and *Sieshamma v. Chenappa*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 467, referred to. *PEARY MOHAN MUKHERJEE v. NARENDRA KRISHNA MUKHERJEE* (1900) . 5 C. W. N. 273

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*2. EXERCISE OF POWERS IN VARIOUS CASES—*contd.*

(b) SPECIAL CASES.

9. ——— Analogous cases—*Joinder of causes—Cases in which evidence is similar.* A number of cases having been instituted against the same defendant, and relating to the same matter, the plaintiff in one of them applied to both the lower Courts to have them all tried together, pointing out particularly that the documentary evidence in one of the other cases was necessary and should be made use of in the trial of his case. This application was refused by the first Court, and the lower Appellate Court decided the case of the applicant upon evidence recorded with it, and disposed of the others as governed by that judgment. *Held*, that all the cases should have been tried together; but as the Judge failed to comply with the application to do so, he should have tried each case separately on its merits. *NEHAL SINGH v. ALI AHMED* 15 W. R. 110

10. ——— Cases in which evidence is similar. A Judge should not, without the consent of the parties, allow his judgment in one case to govern his decision in another even if the subject of dispute is of a similar nature and the evidence similar in character, when the parties are not the same and the subject-matter of the suit is different. *SOORENDRANATH ROY v. PURMANUND GHOSE* . . . 15 W. R. 342

11. ——— Appeal—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877-1882, s. 582 (Act XXIII of 1861, s. 37)—“Powers” —“Jurisdiction.”* S. 37 of Act XXIII of 1861 did not apply to cases where the subject which was being dealt with by the Court was not the actual appeal itself, and could not, therefore, be rightly treated as standing in an analogous position to that of the original suit itself; and, further, that the same section had not the effect of making s. 7 of the same Act applicable to cases where the Appellate Court had passed an order under ss. 5 and 6 dismissing the appeal. *Semble*: The word “powers” in s. 37 of Act XXIII of 1861 was not synonymous with, and did not comprehend, “jurisdiction.” *KALIKRISHNA CHANDRA v. HARIHAR CHUCKERBUTTY*

I. B. L. R. A. C. 155 : 10 W. R. 160

12. ——— Memorandum of appeal—*Memorandum of appeal insufficiently stamped—Court Fees Act, ss. 6, 28—Levy of stamp-duty.* When a memorandum of appeal is insufficiently stamped, the deficient stamp-duty should be levied by the Appellate Court. *CHENNAPPA v. RAGHUNATHA* . . . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 24

13. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 543—*Memorandum of appeal containing scandalous matter—Duty of the Appellate Court.* A memorandum of appeal presented to a District Court alleged, *inter alia*, actual partiality against the Judge whose decree was in question. The memorandum was returned for amendment on the ground that it contained language disrespectful

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*2. EXERCISE OF POWERS IN VARIOUS CASES—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

to the Court of first instance. The appellant's pleader presented the appeal memorandum unamended stating that he wished to rely in the appeal on the passages objected to, and asking that the Court would, if necessary, strike them out. The District Judge thereupon rejected the memorandum of appeal under Civil Procedure Code, s. 543. It appeared that the objectionable portions of the memorandum were separable from the rest :—*Held*, on appeal to the High Court against the order rejecting the appeal to the District Court, *Per* SUBRAMANIA AYYAR, J., that the District Judge should have ordered the objectionable matter to be expunged and then to have admitted the appeal. *Per* MOORE, J.—(Holding that the statement which accompanied the memorandum of appeal on its representation contained expressions amounting to contempt of Court), the District Judge should have returned the appeal memorandum and have refused to receive it until the objectionable remarks have been expunged. *ZAMINDAR OF TUNI v. BENNAYYA*. I. L. R. 22 Mad. 155

14. ——— Power to separate suits misjoined. An Appellate Court has jurisdiction under s. 37, Act XXIII of 1861, to separate misjoined suits, and to try them separately. *SHORROOP CHUNDAR PAUL v. MOTHOR MOHUN PAUL CHOWDHRY*. 4 W. R. 109

15. ——— Withdrawal of suit on appeal. An Appellate Court has under this section power to allow a suit to be withdrawn. *GREGORY v. DOOLEY CHAND*. 14 W. R. O. C. 17

16. ——— Arbitration, reference to—*Act VIII of 1859, ss. 312 and 313—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 37*. An Appellate Court has no power, even by consent of parties, to refer a case to arbitration under the arbitration sections of Act VIII of 1859, which apply only to Courts of original jurisdiction; nor is such power conferred on an Appellate Court by s. 37, Act XXIII of 1861. *JUGGESSUR DEY v. KRITARTHOMOYEE DOSSEE*. 12 B. L. R. F. B. 266

21 W. R. 210

(*Contra*) *RUSSOOL BIBEE v. JAN ALI CHOWDHRY*. 12 B. L. R. 267, note

17 W. R. 31

CHIRANJI LAL v. JAMNA DAS. 7 N. W. 243

Quære: Whether it can. *HACHUN BANOO v. ABDUL HAKIM*. 19 W. R. 321

17. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 582*. Under s. 582 of the Civil Procedure Code, a Court of Appeal has the power, with the consent of the parties, of referring to arbitration matters in dispute in an appeal. *JUGGESSUR DEY v. KRITARTHOMOYEE DOSSEE*, 12 B. L. R. F. B. 266: 21 W. R. 210, dissented from. *In the matter of SANGARALINGAM PILLAI*. I. L. R. 3 Mad. 78

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*2. EXERCISE OF POWERS IN VARIOUS CASES—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

18. ——— *Semble*: An Appellate Court has the power to refer a case to arbitration at the instance of the parties under s. 582 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. *In re Sangaralingam Pillai*, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 78, cited. *Juggessur Dey v. Kritarthomoyee Dossee*, 12 B. L. R. 266, cited and distinguished. *BHUGWAN DASS MARWARI v. NUND LALL SEIN*. I. L. R. 12 Calc. 173

19. ——— *Power to refer to arbitration a case on appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 582*. Under s. 582 of the Civil Procedure Code, an Appellate Court has power to refer a case before it to arbitration if the parties wish it to be referred. *In re the petition of Sangaralingam Pillai*, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 78, and *Bhugwan Dass Marwari v. Nund Lal Sein*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 173, followed. *SURESH CHUNDER BANERJEE v. AMBICA CHURN MOOKERJEE*. I. L. R. 18 Calc. 507

20. ——— Attachment, order of—*Setting aside order of attachment made by another Court*. No Court other than a Court of Appeal or a High Court acting under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code can discharge an order of attachment issued by another Court. *KOLASHERRI ILLATH NARAINAN v. KOLASHERRI ILLATH NILAKANDAN NAMBUDERI*. I. L. R. 4 Mad. 181

21. ——— Award of Ameen—*Power of Appellate Court as to Ameen's award of wasilat where it has been confirmed by lower Court*. After obtaining a judgment for possession, the judgment-creditor sued for wasilat. After decree, an enquiry was made into the amount of wasilat, and on the report of an Ameen, the decree-holder being present and the opposite party not appearing, the Court made an order for the payment of the sum therein mentioned. Subsequently the judgment-debtor appeared and petitioned that the award might be corrected by deductions to which he was entitled. On his application being refused, he appealed to the Judge, who remanded the case with a view to its being ascertained whether any and what amount should be deducted. *Held*, that the Judge should not have interfered with the award of wasilat, which was a final award so far as the Appellate Court was concerned. *PUNCHANUN BOSE v. OOMANATH ROY CHOWDHY*. 14 W. R. 160

22. ——— Caste, question of, evidence on. On questions of caste a lower Appellate Court has a right to come to a finding based on history or the custom of the country. *ROGHONATH DASS MOHAPATTUR v. BYDONATH DASS MAHARATHA*. 14 W. R. 364

23. ——— Decree—*Error in decree of lower Court—Power to make decree which lower Court ought to have made—Madras Rent Recovery Act, ss. 9, 10, 11*. A summary suit by a landlord to enforce the acceptance of a pottah under the

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*2. EXERCISE OF POWERS IN VARIOUS CASES—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

Madras Rent Recovery Act should not be dismissed on a finding by the Appellate Court that the pottah tendered was not a proper pottah. The Appellate Court ought to pass the decree which the Court of first instance should have passed. *NAGARAJA v. KASIMSA* . . . I. L. R. 11 Mad. 23

24. ——— Issues—Reference of issues for determination—*Civil Procedure Code*, ss. 566, 567—Transfer of case to another Court. Where an Appellate Court has made an order of reference under s. 566 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the return to such order must be made to the same Court, and such Court is not competent to transfer the appeal for disposal elsewhere. *UDIT NARAIN SINGH v. JHANDA* . . . I. L. R. 15 All. 315

25. ——— Jurisdiction—Subordinate Court acting without jurisdiction—Erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by subordinate Court—Appeal, ground of. Where the High Court is the Court of Appeal from any particular subordinate Court, and that Court acts without jurisdiction in the trial of a suit or an appeal before it, the High Court has power as an Appellate Court to set right the proceedings of such subordinate Court. *Kishna Ram v. Hingu Lal*, I. L. R. 4 All. 237, and *Tota Ram v. Issur Das*, *Weekly Notes*, 1887, 76, overruled. *JWALA PRASAD v. SALIG RAM* . . . I. L. R. 13 All. 575

26. ——— Local investigation, interference with result of. An Appellate Court should not interfere with the result of a local investigation or enquiry except upon very clearly defined and sufficient grounds. *SARAT SUNDARI DEBI v. PROSONNO COOMAR TAGORE* . . . 6 B. L. R. 677
15 W. R. P. C. 20

MONKEE DUMBER SAHEE v. MONKEE BHULLUNDER SAHEE . . . 15 W. R. 423

27. ——— Decree after—Ground for reversal by Appeal Court. An Appellate Court ought not to reverse the decision of a first Court based upon very careful inspection of the land in dispute, except upon a very clear and strong opinion upon the evidence, and upon recording sufficient and satisfactory reasons for such opinion. *BRINDABUN BEAROTEE v. DHUNUNJOY NARAIN BHUNJO DEO* . . . 18 W. R. 452

28. ——— Plaintiff—Order to file new plaintiff—Withdrawal of suit. An Appellate Court, having set aside the whole of the proceedings, including the plaintiff, directed that a new plaintiff be presented in a proper Court. *Held*, that this order, equivalent to directing the plaintiff to institute a new suit, was wrong; and that with only the alternative of having leave to withdraw the suit and bring a new one, his suit should have been dismissed. *LEDGARD v. BULL*

I. L. R. 9 All. 191 : I. L. R. 13 I. A. 134

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*2. EXERCISE OF POWERS IN VARIOUS CASES—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

29. ——— *Civil Procedure Code*, s. 57—Return of plaintiff when Court has no jurisdiction. An Appellate Court is not bound to return the plaintiff under all circumstances where defect of jurisdiction appears. *YACOOB v. MOHAN SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 11 Mad. 482

30. ——— Plaintiff, amendment of. *Semble*: A plaintiff cannot be amended in an Appellate Court. *ABDUL GAFOOR v. NUR BANU*
1 B. L. R. A. C. 78 : 10 W. R. 111

31. ——— Appellate Court's power to amend plaintiff—Suit for rent converted into one for ejectment—Variance between pleading and proof—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, ss. 53 and 582. An amendment of a plaintiff, which materially transforms the nature of the claim, cannot be made under s. 53 of the Code, and certainly not in appeal. S. 53 permits amendment of the plaintiff before judgment and not after. The larger powers conferred on Appellate Courts by s. 582 do not authorize such a material transformation of a suit in appeal. *BAI SHRI MAJIRAJBA v. MAGANLAL BHAISHANKAR* . . . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 303

32. ——— Objection for defect in plaintiff. An Appellate Court is competent at any stage to allow objections to be taken to an apparent defect in the plaintiff. *COLVIN COWIE v. ELIAS*
2 B. L. R. A. C. 212 : 11 W. R. 40

33. ——— Striking names out of plaintiff and amending issues—Merits of case, error not affecting—*Act VIII of 1859*, s. 350. Four plaintiffs sued as partners, but it was found during the trial that they were not all partners at the time the cause of action accrued; and the Judge thereupon amended the issue which had been raised on that point, and raised the question whether the plaintiffs were or were not partners; and it being decided in the negative, the Judge ordered two of the plaintiffs' names to be struck out of the plaintiff, and he gave a decree in favour of the other plaintiffs. *Held*, that the Judge acted rightly in amending the issue, but that he should have done so without striking the names of the plaintiffs out of the plaintiff. Such an error is "an error in an interlocutory order not affecting the merits of the case," and therefore, under s. 350, *Act VIII of 1859*, not a ground for reversing the decree on appeal. *EAST INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY v. JORDAN*

4 B. L. R. O. C. 97 : 14 W. R. O. C. 11

34. ——— Remand—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1877, s. 562. An Appellate Court is not empowered by *Act X of 1877* to order or allow a plaintiff to be amended, or to remand a case under s. 562 of that Act for the purpose of such amendment. *FARZAND ALI v. YUSUF ALI*

I. L. R. 2 All. 689

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*2. EXERCISE OF POWERS IN VARIOUS CASES—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

35. ————— *Waiver of defect in plaint in Court below—Ground for dismissal.* In a case in which, although the plaintiff mentioned no overt act justifying the plaintiff's request for a declaration of title, and still it appeared on the admitted facts of the case that there was a cause of action, and the Court of first instance adjudicated on the merits and passed a decree in favour of plaintiffs. *Held*, that it was too late for the lower Appellate Court to dismiss the claim on the ground of the above defect in the plaint. *SHOME DUTT CHOWDHRY v. SUBB NARAIN CHOWDHRY*

24 W. R. 242

36. ————— *Amendment of record on appeal.* A second plaintiff was added in the Court below, but no amendment was made in the record, and the suit was dismissed with costs. An appeal being brought, the original plaintiff failed to pay the costs, was made insolvent, and the Official Assignee declined to proceed with the appeal. It was objected that the appeal ought to be dismissed, there being no appellant on the record; but the Court allowed the appeal to proceed, and the amendment order by the Court below to be effected. *KEARNATH DOSS v. PROTAB CHUNDER DOSS.*

I. L. R. 6 Cal. 626; 8 C. L. R. 238

37. ————— *Dismissal or withdrawal of case.* Where the Court of Appeal sets aside the whole of the previous proceedings in a suit, it cannot direct a new and amended plaint to be filed, but must give the plaintiff the alternative of having his suit dismissed or of withdrawing it with leave to bring a new action. *LEDGARD v. BULL*

L. R. 13 I. A. 184
I. L. R. 9 All. 191

38. ————— *An amendment of a plaint ought not to be allowed on appeal, if by so doing the defendant is likely to be precluded from pleading limitation, and where no leave to amend was asked for in the Court of first instance.* *MALLIKARJUNA v. PALLAYA*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 319

39. ————— *Objection not taken to plaint—Ground for dismissal of suit—Suit for declaratory decree without asking consequential relief.* A suit should not be dismissed by an Appellate Court on the ground of its being one asking merely for a declaratory decree, and no consequential relief, where that objection has never been taken by the defendants to the suit. The plaintiffs should in such a case be allowed an opportunity of amending their plaint. *LIMBA BIN KRISHNA v. RAMA BIN PIMPLU*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 548

40. ————— *Suit for declaration of title without asking for possession.* Where a person brings a suit merely for declaration of his title without seeking to recover possession, although he may be in physical possession, the Appellate Court will not grant an opportunity to amend the

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*2. EXERCISE OF POWERS IN VARIOUS CASES—*concl'd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*concl'd.*

plaint if the plaintiff had already such an opportunity and did not avail himself of it. *Limba bin Krishna v. Rama bin Pimplu*, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 548, distinguished. *RAJ NARAIN DAS v. SHAMA NANDO DAS CHOWDHRY*. I. L. R. 26 Cal. 845
4 C. W. N. 162

41. ————— *Appellate Court can itself try the offender—Cognizance in such cases under s. 190 (b) and not 190 (c)—S. 423 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ought to be read with s. 528 of the Code.* The provisions of s. 423 (1) (b) do not preclude an Appellate Court, when it reverses the finding and sentence under appeal, from trying the offender itself, if the offence is one ordinarily triable by it. In such cases, the Appellate Court takes cognizance under s. 190 (b) and not s. 190 (c). *EMPEROR v. MANIKKA GRAMANI* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 228

3. EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL.

1. ————— *Evidence Act, 1855, s. 57—Re-hearing of ex-parte case on fresh evidence.* Where a Court of first instance sets aside its own ex-parte judgment, and after a new trial, in which it takes fresh evidence, as well as admits that originally recorded, again gives plaintiffs a decree, it is the duty of the lower Appellate Court to enquire, under s. 57 of Act II of 1857, whether, independently of the evidence originally recorded, there was sufficient to justify the decree. *ROSUL SINGH v. KISHOREE LALL*

8 W. R. 499

2. ————— *Evidence sufficient for judgment—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 353.* When parties have had an opportunity of putting in such evidence as they consider sufficient to entitle them to a judgment upon the material issues of the case, the evidence ought to be held sufficient under s. 353, Civil Procedure Code, to enable the Appellate Court to pronounce a satisfactory judgment. *ZAHRAH v. BHUGWAN DASS*

16 W. R. 211

3. ————— *Consideration of evidence in ex-parte case.* Where a party fails to file a memorandum of objections under s. 354, Act VIII of 1859, the Appellate Court is not at liberty to decide the case ex-parte without considering the evidence. *WOOMESH CHUNDER ROY v. JONARDUN HAJRA*

15 W. R. 235

4. ————— *Appeal against part of decree—Duty of Judge.* Where a plaintiff, dissatisfied with so much of the decision of the first Court as is adverse to him, appeals, making the party in whose favour the decree is made the sole respondent, the Judge of the Appellate Court has only to determine whether, as between the appellant and

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*3. EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
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respondent the order of the first Court is correct.
KISHORE SINGH v. POOKHUN SINGH

10 W. R. 432

5. ———— **Adjudication on Evidence**
—*Suit for contribution where shares were not specified.* In a suit for contribution on account of Government revenue, which was decreed by the first Court, but dismissed by the lower Appellate Court, because the plaintiff did not specify the shares of the different shareholders:—*Held*, that the lower Appellate Court was bound to adjudicate upon the evidence. BHONO BIBEE v. PALLAN GAZEE

11 W. R. 131

6. ———— **Evidence improperly admitted in Lower Court.** The lower Appellate Court was not competent to reject the documentary evidence which had been admitted by the Court of first instance merely because it had been admitted after the first hearing of the case, or after the date on which it had been ordered to be produced. HONOOMAN SINGH v. FELL

3 Agra 148

7. ———— **Decision in lower Court on merits.**—*N.-W. P. Rent Act, 1881, s. 207.* In a suit instituted in the Court of an Assistant Collector under cl. (h) s. 93 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, an objection was taken that, the plaintiffs not being recorded shareholders, the suit was not maintainable in the Revenue Court. The objection was allowed, but the Court, at the same time, disposed of the case on the merits, and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the lower Appellate Court affirmed the decree on the ground that the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. *Held*, that as there were materials on the record for the determination of the suit, the Judge should, with reference to s. 207 of the Rent Act, have disposed of the appeal on the merits. *Debi Saran Lal v. Debi Saran Upadhyia, I. L. R. 6 All. 278*, referred to. SHEO PRASAD v. ANRUDH SINGH I. L. R. 6 All. 440

8. ———— **Additional evidence on appeal.**—*Evidence excluded by lower Court because it had sufficient evidence.* A Court of first instance ought not, because it is satisfied upon the evidence which one of the parties has given, to prevent him from putting upon the proceedings all the evidence that he wishes to give, so that he may have his case brought fairly before the Appellate Court. Where a party has thus been prevented in the first Court, and the evidence on the record is not deemed sufficient by the Appellate Court, the latter Court does wrong if it refuses to receive the evidence which has been excluded in the way indicated. BRIJ SOONDAR ROY v. KAIMOONNISA

23 W. R. 63

9. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 355, Court taking evidence under.** A lower Court, in taking evidence ordered under s. 355, Act VIII of 1859, acts in a ministerial capacity. RAM JOY SURMAH v. PRANKISHEN SINGH, BURODA DEBIA v. PRANKISHEN SINGH, IRON-NODA DEBIA v. PRANKISHEN SINGH 2 W. R. 80

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*3. EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
ON APPEAL—*contd.*

10. ———— **Time for making application.** An application to give additional evidence should be made when the case first comes before the Appellate Court. It is too late to make such an application when the case has been remanded and has come back for final disposal—*per* ARNOULD, C.J. ARDESHIR DHANJIBHAI v. COLLECTOR OF SURAT 3 Bom. A. C. 116, 123

11. ———— **Power of Appellate Court—Discretion of Court.** It is within the discretion of a lower Appellate Court to allow the parties an opportunity to adduce fresh evidence, if it is satisfied that the interests of justice require that course. DAMOODUR DASS v. RITOO SINGH

24 W. R. 325

12. ———— **Evidence insufficient.** Where the evidence upon the record is not sufficient to enable the Appellate Court to pronounce a judgment upon regular appeal, it may require the Court against whose decree the appeal is made to take additional evidence, defining the points to which such evidence is to be confined, in order to enable the Appellate Court finally to determine the case. NARASIMHARAV KRISHNARAV v. ANTAJI VIRUPAKSH 2 Bom. 64, 2nd Ed., 61

13. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, s. 355—Evidence taken in lower Court insufficient.** Where a Munsif, without framing issues or examining the plaintiff, passed a decree in his favour upon an admission made by the defendant, and upon inspection of a document that was upon the record of a former suit; but the Judge, on appeal, reversed the decree of the Munsif on account of the insufficiency of evidence, the document, in his opinion, not being admissible:—It was *held* that the Judge ought not to have reversed the Munsif's decree without first exercising his power of taking fresh evidence under s. 355 of the Code of Civil Procedure. APPA VALAD KASHINATH v. VITHOBA VALAD TUKARAM

6 Bom. A. C. 88

14. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 356, 357.** Where defendant appealed in a suit to recover arrears of rent in which the genuineness of the kabuliya was in issue, and the defendant asked the Deputy Collector to summon certain witnesses to prove that he had been paying at a particular rate, the Judge ought, under s. 356, Act VIII of 1859, to have directed the Deputy Collector to send up either the witnesses or their evidence, and under s. 357, to have directed the evidence to be confined to the rate and time of payment, and the rent to which the payment had been appropriated. MOHUN MUNDUR v. BRIJ BHOOKUN SINGH

9 W. R. 127

15. ———— **Omission to call evidence in lower Court.** A suit to recover money having been commenced against P and others, an attachment was applied for, and certain goods, supposed to be the defendants', were attached by order

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*3. EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL—*contd.*

of the Court. Two other persons coming forward and claiming the attached goods as their property, plaintiffs concluded them to be partners with the original defendants, and made them also defendants. The lower Court at the trial held that the proof of partnership failed. *Held*, on appeal, that the plaintiffs' case could not at this stage be supplemented by examining parties whom the plaintiffs did not think fit to call, or by books which they did not produce, in the Court below. *VELAET ALI KHAN v. MATADEEN* 10 W. R. 402

16. ————— *Fresh evidence—*
Civil Procedure Code, s. 568. An appellant who had ample opportunity of giving evidence in the Court below and elected not to do so, but to rest his case on the evidence as it stood, ought not to be allowed at the stage of appeal to give evidence which he could have given below. *RAM DAS CHAKRABATI v. OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR OF THE COTTON GINNING COMPANY* I. L. R. 9 All. 366

17. ————— *Application to put in evidence on appeal which applicant refused to produce in lower Court.* The plaintiffs had applied during the hearing of the case in the Court of first instance, for the production of certain books of account of the defendants. The defendants resisted the application, and the Court refused to order the books to be produced. The suit having been dismissed, the plaintiffs appealed, and in the Court of Appeal the defendants applied to be permitted to put in evidence the books which they had refused to produce:—*Held*, that the evidence could not be admitted. *MONOHUR GANESH TAMBEKAR v. LAKHMIRAM GOVINDARAM* . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 247

18. ————— *Reversing decision without fresh evidence.* Defendant, having purchased a decree, caused the judgment-debtor's (B's) rights and interest in certain property to be sold in execution, and bought them himself. Plaintiff, who had purchased one B's rights and interest in a 4-annas share of the property intervened; but his intervention having been rejected in the summary department, he sued to set aside the summary order, and to establish his vendor's right in the property. The vendor having admitted the sale to the plaintiff, the first Court thought it unnecessary to examine the witnesses to, and the writer of, the deed of sale, and finding the plaintiff in possession, decreed the suit. This decision was reversed on appeal. *Held*, that the lower Appellate Court did wrong in presuming collusion between B and his vendee (the plaintiff), and ought not to have rejected the deed without examining the writer and witnesses; and that it should have decided whether plaintiff was in possession at any time under the deed of sale. *RAM LALL JHA v. ISSUR CHUNDER DEY* 10 W. R. 451

19. ————— *Admission of fresh documentary evidence.* The Appellate Court

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*3. EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL—*contd.*

should not send for and admit fresh documentary evidence which has not been put in by either party in the lower Court. *DWARKANATH SHAHA v. RAM LOCHUN BISWAS* 10 W. R. 92

20. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 355—Additional evidence after review.* Where a lower Appellate Court admitted a review with the object of taking into consideration a material issue which it had omitted to consider at the trial:—*Held*, that, having admitted the review on grounds independent of fresh evidence, it was competent for the Court, under s. 355, Act VIII of 1859, to admit fresh evidence, if required to enable it to pronounce a satisfactory judgment or for any substantial cause. *BEHAREE LALL NUNDEE v. TROYLUCKHO MOYEE BURMONEE* 12 W. R. 223

21. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 355.* The true interpretation of s. 355, Act VIII of 1859, is that, when a Court sees that by some inadvertence or mistake a party has not produced some evidence which he was capable of adducing, and that he is likely to be prejudiced by that omission or mistake, which was simply unintentional, undesigned, and accidental, the Court will allow such further evidence to be taken. *GOWHUR ALI KHAN v. SAKHEENA KHANUM* 15 W. R. 507

22. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 355—Appeal from ex-parte decree.* The Court declined on appeal from an order rejecting an application under s. 119, Act VIII of 1859, to set aside an *ex-parte* decree, to receive an affidavit which had not been previously tendered, and held that s. 355 was not meant to have application to such a case as this, but to empower the Court of Appeal, at its discretion, to receive evidence upon issues of facts which had been tried in the Court of first instance. *LESLIE v. ALLENDER* 17 W. R. 390

23. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 355—Error in law.* In a suit for ejectment on the ground that defendant was holding over after the expiration of his lease, the defendant's vakil deposed on oath in the first Court that the defendant had no documents whatever, and that those he once had were burnt. When the case came before the Subordinate Judge on appeal, he permitted the defendant to file a new piece of evidence, *viz.*, a pottah which was alleged to have escaped the general destruction. *Held*, that the admission of the pottah on the mere *ipsi dixit* of the defendant was a substantial error in law, even though plaintiff neither admitted nor denied the document; that the Subordinate Judge had no right to admit the pottah under the circumstances; and that, if he had, he was wrong in deciding the case upon it without taking evidence as to its genuineness. *SERAJOOL HUQ v. KERAMAT-OLLAH* 19 W. R. 88

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*3. EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
ON APPEAL—*contd.*

24. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 355—Evidence excluded by first Court.* When the first Court was satisfied with the evidence produced, and therefore did not allow the plaintiff to produce all his evidence, and the Appellate Court does not think the evidence sufficient, it ought to allow the plaintiff on appeal to call the evidence excluded by the first Court. *BRITO SOONDAR ROY v. KAMROONNISSA* 23 W. R. 63

25. ————— *Improper reception of evidence—Remand.* When a lower Court disposes of a case upon the merits as proved by evidence not legally admissible against the defendants, and the Appellate Court considers it proper to allow the plaintiff to adduce further evidence, it may either take such further evidence itself or send the case back to the lower Court to take such evidence. *RAMJOY SURMAH MOJOOMDAR v. PURAN KISHEN SINGH* W. R. F. B. 124

26. ————— *Discovery of fresh evidence—Application for review.* The High Court decided a case irrespective of certain documents brought forward by a party at the hearing of the appeal, and afterwards rejected an application for a review of that judgment. In an application to the Privy Council for special leave to bring in those documents :—*Held*, that further evidence ought not to be admitted under s. 355, Act VIII of 1859; that there was great danger in the Court of ultimate appeal lightly introducing evidence which had not been under the consideration of the Courts below, and which the parties had had no means of testing. *GOBIND SUNDARI DEBIA v. JAGADAMBA DEBIA* 3 B. L. R. P. C. 25

27. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 568.* The test as to whether additional evidence should be received in an Appellate Court under s. 568 of the Code of Civil Procedure depends upon the question whether or no the Appellate Court requires the evidence "to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause"; as to this, the Appellate Court is to be the sole judge. *In the goods of PERM CHAND MOON-SHEE. UPENDRA MOHAN GHOSE v. GOPAL CHUNDRA GHOSE* I. I. R. 21 Cal. 484

28. ————— *Reasons, record of—Power to take fresh evidence—Discretion of Court.* The power given to the High Court by the Code of Civil Procedure of taking, of its own motion, original evidence anew, should be exercised very sparingly; and when exercised, it is desirable that the reasons for exercising it should always be recorded or minuted by the Court in the proceedings. *SREEMANCHUNDER DEY v. GOPAL CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY* 7 W. R. P. C. 10 : 11 Moo. I. A. 29

GUNGA GOBIND MUNDUL v. COLLECTOR OF 24-PERGUNNAHS 7 W. R. P. C. 21
11 Moo. I. A. 345

JUGGUBUNDHOO DEB v. GOLUCK CHUNDER HALDAR 10 W. R. 228

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*3. EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
ON APPEAL—*contd.*

JOOG MAYA DEBIA v. RAM CHUNDER CHATTERJEE 10 W. R. 378

29. ————— *Reasons for taking fresh evidence.* *Held*, that the lower Appellate Court should state most fully and clearly its reasons for calling for fresh evidence, but that in point of law it was sufficient if that Court considered the matter and stated that such reasons existed without mentioning what they were. *SHIB CHUNDER MAHTOON v. KASHEENATH KURMOKAR* 12 W. R. 245

30. ————— *Sufficiency of reasons for taking fresh evidence.* Where an Appellate Court received additional evidence, recording only that the papers were material and important, there was held to be no sufficient compliance with the proviso of s. 355, Civil Procedure Code, which requires the reasons for admitting additional evidence to be stated. *JUGGUT INDUR BUNWARREE v. BHUBO TARINEE DASSEE* 14 W. R. 19

31. ————— *Reasons for taking fresh evidence.* Additional evidence cannot be admitted in appeal without some substantial reason being recorded in the proceedings. *SNADDEN v. TODD, FINLAY & Co.* 7 W. R. 313

32. ————— *Reasons for taking fresh evidence.* The provision in the Code of Civil Procedure which requires Judges who admit fresh evidence on an appeal to record their reasons, though not a condition precedent to the reception of the evidence, is yet one that ought at all times to be strictly complied with. *GUNGA GOBIND MUNDUL v. THE COLLECTOR OF THE 24-PERGUNNAHS* 7 W. R. P. C. 21 : 11 Moo. I. A. 345

SREEMAN CHUNDER DEY v. GOPAL CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY 7 W. R. P. C. 10 : 11 Moo. I. A. 28

HURPERSHAD v. SHEO DYAL L. R. 3 I. A. 259 : 26 W. R. 55

LOWA JHA v. BISSESHUR SINGH. 11 W. R. 6

CHARDON v. AJEET SINGH 12 W. R. 52

BANEE PERSHAD v. LALLA JOGGESSUR DASS 11 W. R. 47

33. ————— Where the evidence of a defendant has been taken by the Court of first instance so imperfectly that the lower Appellate Court cannot pass a satisfactory judgment between the parties, it is competent to the Judge of that Court, under the provisions of s. 355, Civil Procedure Code, to have the defendant fully examined before himself, but not to remand the case for rehearing and re-trial. If he examines the defendant, he is bound to record his reasons for so doing, in order that the High Court may be enabled on appeal to decide whether or not the new evidence has been rightly admitted. *MOHESH CHUNDER DASS v. MADHUB CHUNDER SIRDAR* 13 W. R. 85

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*3. EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL—*contd.*

34. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 355—Reasons for sending for document on appeal.* Where a Judge sends for a map or other document, he is bound to record his reasons for doing so, according to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, and the evidence so obtained must be taken and received by him in the presence of the parties in open Court and afterwards kept on the record. It is not competent to him under s. 355 merely of his own discretion to send for a document for personal inspection irrespective of the parties to the suit. *GUNPUT ROY v. RAM DEOUR ROY*

21 W. R. 416

35. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 355—Suit for arrears of rent.* Where, in a suit for arrears of rent, tenancy was acknowledged, but the rate of rent questioned by tenant, and the Subordinate Judge, not feeling satisfied with the documents purporting to show the rents during three years, called for the documents relating to payment of rent during three earlier years:—*Held*, that the Subordinate Judge was justified in requiring this further evidence, because, though such evidence should rarely be called, it was within the discretion of an Appellate Court to do so, giving its reasons for the course which it pursued. *SHOOKRAH SKAIKH v. NUND COOMAR BANERJEE*

25 W. R. 246

36. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 568.* Where the lower Appellate Court allows additional evidence to be taken, though it is not satisfied that the evidence is necessary under cl. (a) or cl. (b) of s. 568 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court will interfere; but where this does not appear to be the case, and there is simply an omission on the part of the Appellate Court to record its reasons for allowing additional evidence to be taken, the High Court will not interfere. *HAFIZ ABDUL KURIM v. SRI KISSEN RAI*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 139

37. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 568.* The provision in s. 568 of Act XIV of 1882 as to an Appellate Court recording its reasons for admitting additional evidence is directory mere y, and not imperative. *GOPAL SINGH v. JHAKRI RAI*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 37

38. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 355—Reasons for taking fresh evidence.* Where the first Court refused the plaintiff's application to summon five of his witnesses, notwithstanding that it postponed the case for ten days, although fifteen other of the witnesses were present, the High Court held that the first Court's omission to summon the witnesses was, under the circumstances, a sufficient reason within Act VIII of 1859, s. 355, for the lower Appellate Court to send for them, and take their evidence. *ABELAKH ROY v. GUGGUN BHUGUT*

22 W. R. 269

39. ————— *Record of reasons.* In a suit for possession of certain lands under

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*3. EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL—*contd.*

a howla tenure, khaspossession of which for some generations was alleged, no special documentary title was set up in the plaint; but one the plaintiffs in his deposition referred the title to a particular pottah, which he said had existed, and had been lost in the time of his grandfather. Two of the defendants were the zamindars of the talukh in which the howla tenure was said to exist, and had transferred their proprietary right to the other two defendants. The zamindars did not defend the suit, and were not examined in the Court of first instance. The lower Appellate Court "considered it necessary, for the proper decision of the case," to examine the zamindars, and, relying mainly on their evidence, reversed the decision of the Munsif, and gave a decree in favour of the plaintiff. *Held*, on appeal, that the lower Appellate Court had sufficiently recorded its reasons within the meaning of s. 355 of Act VIII of 1859 for requiring the additional evidence; that it was right in so doing; and that, although no special title had been set up in the plaint, the decree which was given on the evidence in favour of the plaintiffs could not be reversed in special appeal. *RADHANATH DHUBI v. RAMGOBIND PAL*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 218

RADHANATH DHOOPTEE v. LUCKHEE KANT PAL.
12 W. R. 224, note

40. ————— *Reasons for taking fresh evidence.* Where the plaintiff himself is present, the lower Appellate Court may in its discretion examine him if it considers his evidence material. The requirements of the law are sufficiently fulfilled if the Court records that it considers his examination necessary. *HAFIZA v. AZHUR HOSSEIN*

13 W. R. 328

41. ————— *Improper admission of evidence—Evidence Act (II of 1855), s. 57.* An Appellate Court should not receive evidence, though alleged to be material and important, which has not been produced in the lower Court, without substantial reason for its non-production. The High Court refused to reverse a decision on the ground of the improper admission of evidence. *JOGADINDRA BANWARI GOBIND v. BHOBOTARINI DASI*

5 B. L. R. Ap. 54

42. ————— *Omission to give reasons for admitting it.* Where evidence has been taken by an Appellate Court in the presence of parties or their agents, it should not be rejected on appeal merely because the Court omitted to record its reason for admitting it. *BHUGWAN CHUNDER GHOSE v. RAJCOOMAR GOHO*

13 W. R. 303

43. ————— *Rejection of documents in first Court on the ground of want of registration—Subsequent registration and presentation to Appellate Court.* The plaintiff, as purchaser at a Court's sale, sued in 1871 for possession of certain immoveable property, and tendered in evidence a

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*3. EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL—*contd.*

sale certificate, dated 20th September 1865. The first Court decided against the plaintiff on the ground among others, that the certificate was not registered, though registration of it was compulsory. On the 9th February 1875 the plaintiff filed an appeal in the High Court against that decree, and on the 26th July 1875 applied to that Court for permission to give in evidence a new certificate of sale, issued on the 1st February 1875, regarding the same property as that to which the certificate of the 20th September 1865 related. *Held* by the High Court, that, as the new certificate was issued after the first Court had made its decree, the High Court ought not to receive it or to suggest or facilitate any application to the lower Court for a review of its decree on documentary evidence which had no existence when that Court made such decree. **LALBHAI LAKHMIDAS v. KAMALUDIN HUSEN KHAN**

12 Bom. 247

44. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 568—Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.* Circumstances under which an Appellate Court will not allow additional evidence to be produced at the hearing of an appeal under s. 568 of the Civil Procedure Code. **NADIAR CHAND SINGH v. CHUNDER SIKHUR SADHU** **I. L. R. 15 Calc. 765**

45. ————— *Evidence on appeal—Civil Procedure Code, s. 142A—Document rejected as inadmissible, but allowed to remain on the record.* Where a document tendered in evidence in a Court of first instance was rejected as inadmissible, but was nevertheless allowed to remain on the record of the case:—*Held*, that the mere fact of the document remaining on the record did not make it evidence in the Appellate Court, but it must be tendered as evidence in the Appellate Court and accepted thereby. **HAR GOBIND v. NONI BAHU**

I. L. R. 14 All. 356

46. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 568.* The test as to whether additional evidence should be received in an Appellate Court under s. 568 of the Code of Civil Procedure depends upon the question whether or not the Appellate Court requires the evidence "to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause"; as to this, the Appellate Court is to be the sole judge. *In the goods of* **PREM CHAND MOONSHEE. UPENDRA MOHAN GHOSE v. GOPAL CHANDRA GHOSE** **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 484**

47. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 568—Remand—Direction by Appellate Court to take further evidence.* In a suit on a hypothecation bond the plaintiff relied in bar of limitation on endorsements of part-payments appearing on the bond. The Court of first instance held that the endorsements were genuine. The Court of first appeal remanded the suit for further evidence to be taken with regard to the endorsements, and

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*3. EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL—*contd.*

directed the Court to record an opinion on the question of the handwriting of the endorsements, and held upon the return of the evidence that the endorsements were forgeries, and dismissed the suit. *Held*, that the additional evidence was legally taken and admitted under s. 568. **SHRINIVASACHARIAR v. RANGAMMAL** **I. L. R. 18 Mad. 94**

48. ————— *Remand to the Appellate Court—Additional evidence in Appellate Court—Finding of fact upon evidence taken after remand—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 568.* In a second appeal, the High Court set aside the decrees of the lower Court on the ground that certain issues raised in the suit were not considered by those Courts, and remanded the case to the lower Appellate Court for a proper decision of the case. The lower Appellate Court took evidence on the issues not tried before, and came to findings of fact on that evidence. *Held*, that the lower Appellate Court tried the case, not as an original case, but as an appeal, and acting under the powers given to it took fresh evidence. **BENI FERESHAD KUARI v. NAND LAL SAHU** **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 98**

49. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 562, 568, 569—Additional evidence by Appellate Court—Invalidity of order reversing decree of lower Court on account of exclusion of evidence.* A trial took place in the Court of a District Munsif, who heard evidence, decided issues, and passed a decree. On an appeal being preferred, the Subordinate Judge reversed the decree, and remanded the suit for re-trial on the ground that certain documentary evidence which had been tendered by a defendant had been excluded, and plaintiffs' witnesses, who had been cited in the list, had not been wholly examined. On an appeal being preferred against that order:—*Held*, that s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure was inapplicable to such a case; and that the proper and only legal course for the Subordinate Judge to take under the Code of Civil Procedure was to act either under s. 568 or s. 569, by himself taking the evidence which he considered to have been wrongly excluded, or to direct the District Munsif to take it. *Per* **umbra Nayar v. Subrahmanian Pattar, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 445**, distinguished. **SESHAN PATTAR v. SESHAN PATTAR** **I. L. R. 23 Mad. 447**

50.—*Additional evidence—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 584, 568—Appeal—Admission of additional evidence—Discretion of Court.* The refusal by an Appellate Court to exercise the discretion vested in it by s. 568 of the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to the admission of additional evidence would be an error or defect in procedure, within the meaning of s. 584 of the Code, because s. 568 distinctly implies that discretion must be exercised. But a refusal, in the exercise of discretion, to admit additional evidence is undoubtedly not such an error or defect. **RAM PIARI v. KALU (1900)**

I. L. R. 23 All. 121

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*3. EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
ON APPEAL—*concl'd.*

51.—Evidence of application before Criminal Court—*Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 26—Right of way—Application before a Criminal Court, admissibility in evidence of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 568—Additional evidence.* In a suit for declaration of right of way, the plaintiff, in order to show that the period of 20 years ended within two years before the institution of the suit, as required by s. 26 of the Limitation Act, produced before the first Appellate Court a petition, filed by the plaintiff before the Criminal Court, complaining of the obstruction in question; and the first Appellate Court relied on the petition, although it was not produced before the first Court and was not marked as an exhibit by the Appellate Court, which also did not comply with the requirements of s. 568 of the Civil Procedure Code for admitting additional evidence. *Held*, that the petition was inadmissible, and the first Appellate Court was wrong in relying upon it. *JUGGERNATH BARJ v. KANAI DAS BYRAGI (1901)*

6 C. W. N. 31

52.—Taking additional Evidence on Appeal—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 568—Witnesses—Application for Probate—Examination of only some of the Witnesses in support of Will—Tender of others for cross-examination—Courts differing on question of fact on different Evidence—Presumption of Correctness of Appellate Court.* On an application to a District Judge for probate of a will, the evidence of three out of the six witnesses in support of it was taken, and then the applicant and two other witnesses were tendered for cross-examination, and the caveators, on the ground that such a course was not in accordance with the practice of the Civil Courts, declined to cross-examine them and their evidence was not given. The District Judge came to the conclusion on the evidence that the will was genuine and granted probate of it. On appeal the High Court, the parties consenting, took the additional evidence of the three witnesses under s. 568 of the Civil Procedure Code and on a consideration of the whole of the evidence came to an opposite conclusion from that of the District Judge and dismissed the application for probate:—*Held*, that on a pure question of fact, the Courts having differed on what were not the same materials for decision, the Judicial Committee would not reverse the decree of the High Court unless they were satisfied it was wrong, and they were not so satisfied. An objection by the appellants that in taking additional evidence the High Court had not acted in accordance with the provisions of s. 568 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was disallowed as the appellants had without raising any objection at the time consented to the additional evidence being taken. *JAGARNATH PERSHAD v. HANUMAN PERSHAD (1909)* . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 833

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*4. REJECTION OR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
ADMITTED OR REJECTED BY COURT BELOW.

(a) UNSTAMPED DOCUMENTS.

1. — Unstamped documents—*Admission of unstamped document in evidence—Act X of 1862, ss. 15 and 17—Objection made on appeal—Act VIII of 1859, s. 350.* When the Court of first instance admitted, without objection, unstamped receipts in evidence, but the Judge on appeal rejected the documents, and reversed the decision of the lower Court:—*Held*, that the documents, once received without objection, were wrongly rejected and the decision below wrongly reversed on appeal, as the irregularity was not one affecting the merits of the case under s. 350, Act VIII of 1859; and that the Court had no power to receive the documents on payment of the stamp duty and penalty under s. 17, Act X of 1862. *LALJI SINGH v. AKRAM SEN*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 235 : 12 W. R. 47

CURNESSE v. SHEOCHURN SAHOO

W. R., 1864, 184

2. — Document admitted in Court below. An Appellate Court has no right to refuse to admit on technical grounds a document which has been received and read in the Court below without objection. *AKBAR ALI v. BHYEA LAL JHA*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 66 : 7 C. L. R. 497

MOHABEER DOSS v. LALLA ROY 1 W. R. 12

GOUR SURN DAS v. KANHAY SINGH 12 W. R. 237

CRAWLEY v. MALING . . . 1 Agra 63

HUR CHUNDER GHOSE, v. WOOMA SOONDUREE
DOSSEE . . . 23 W. R. 170ROY LUCHMEEPUT SINGH v. MOSHURUFF ALI
25 W. R. 80KASHEE NATH MOOKREJEE v. MOHESH CHUNDER
GOOPTO . . . 25 W. R. 168

NEM ROY v. LALMUN ROY 25 W. R. 376

3. — Document admitted in Court below. Where a document was admitted in evidence by the Court of first instance without any objection by the parties, but the Assistant Judge on appeal held it inadmissible, because it was insufficiently stamped, although no objection was made to it in the memorandum of appeal:—*Held*, that the Assistant Judge ought not to have excluded it from his consideration. *KASTUR BHAVANI v. APPA* . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 621

4. — Document admitted or rejected in Court below. The decision of the Court of first instance as to the admissibility of a document, subject to the payment of stamp duty, is final, and cannot be reviewed by the Appellate Court. *LAKSHMI NARAYANA AIYAR v. SUPPARA GAUNDAN* . . . 2 Mad. 321.

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*4. REJECTION OR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED OR REJECTED BY COURT BELOW—*contd.*(a) UNSTAMPED DOCUMENTS—*contd.*

5. ———— Document not sufficiently stamped admitted in evidence by lower Court. A Court of first instance having admitted in evidence a document improperly stamped, the Appellate Court cannot question its admissibility. *SHIDDAPA v. IRAVA* . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 737

6. ———— Question of liability to stamp. It is open to an Appellate Court to consider the question whether a document which the Court of first instance has declared liable to be stamped under Act X of 1862 is properly so liable. *SUBRAYA PILLAI v. SRINIVASA PILLAI, DURGA PILLAI v. SRINIVASA PILLAI, CHELLA PILLAI v. SRINIVASA PILLAI* . . . 3 Mad. 71

7. ———— The fact that the document was received in evidence without a stamp is no reason for reversing the decision in appeal. *CURRIE v. MUTU RAMEN CHETTY* 3 B. L. R. A. C. 126 : 11 W. R. 520

8. ———— Where title-deeds of land had been deposited by a debtor with the Bank of Bengal, and a letter was given authorizing the Bank to sell the land and apply the proceeds in liquidation of a debt then existing and due to the Bank, the Court declined to entertain the question whether the document relied on was one requiring a stamp as being a matter not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. *IBRAHIM AZIM v. CRUICKSHANK* 7 B. L. R. 653 : 16 W. R. 203

9. ———— Ground for reversal of decision. An Appellate Court has no power to reverse the judgment of a Court of first instance, merely on the ground that the document on which the suit was based did not bear a stamp at all. *SRINATH SAHA v. SARODA GOBINDO CHOWDRY* 5 B. L. R. Ap. 10

10. ———— Improper admission in evidence of unstamped document—Irregularity not affecting the merits of the case—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 350*. Where a Court of first instance, treating an unstamped promissory note, the after-stamping of which was inadmissible, as a bond, received such instrument in evidence, on payment of the stamp-duty chargeable on it as a bond and of the penalty :—*Held*, that the reception of such instrument by such Court, being an irregularity not affecting the merits of the case, was no ground for reversing the decree of such Court when the same was appealed from. *AFZAL-UN-NISSA v. LEJ BAN* . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 725

11. ———— Admission by first Court of document unstamped. The provisions of the Stamp Law, by which unstamped or insufficiently stamped documents are excluded, were framed primarily in the interests of the Government revenue, but were never intended to create or put

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*4. REJECTION OR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED OR REJECTED BY COURT BELOW—*contd.*(a) UNSTAMPED DOCUMENTS—*contd.*

an end to the rights of the parties. Where a document is admitted by the first Court as not requiring a stamp, its admissibility cannot be questioned in appeal. *ENAYETOOLLAH v. MEAJAN* 16 W. R. 6

12. ———— Admission of unstamped document on payment of penalty. A plea that a deed of sale filed had been originally unstamped, and that the lower Court was incompetent to supply the deficiency of the stamp by paying the penalty in the appellate stage of the case, was overruled. *RAM SARUN SAHOO v. VERYAG MAHTON* 25 W. R. 554

13. ———— Stamp Act, s. 50—Document admitted as duly stamped. Where a document has been admitted in evidence as duly stamped, such admission can only be called in question by the Appellate Court under s. 50 of the Indian Stamp Act. *REFERENCE UNDER STAMP ACT, 1879* I. L. R. 8 Mad. 564

14. ———— Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 578—Unstamped hundi admitted in lower Court. Suit by payee against drawer upon a hundi drawn in British India upon a person at Colombo. The hundi was not stamped when drawn. Objection taken to its admission in evidence by defendant was allowed by the Munsif, but plaintiff was permitted to sue for the amount due upon the original consideration. The suit was dismissed on the ground that no consideration was proved. Upon appeal, the District Judge held that the hundi did not require a stamp, as it was not intended to operate in British India, and admitted the hundi in evidence as a business letter admitting responsibility, and found that there was consideration. *Held*, upon second appeal, that the hundi having been admitted in evidence, though contrary to law, by the District Judge, no objection could be taken to the decree in second appeal upon that account. *RAMASAMI v. RAMASAMI* I. L. R. 5 Mad. 220

15. ———— Question of stamp duty. Where the objection is taken for the first time in special appeal that a document which, according to Act X of 1862, ought to have been stamped has been admitted by both the lower Courts unstamped, the High Court is bound to take notice of the objection (although not one of the grounds set forth in the petition of appeal) and to require payment of the stamp duty and penalty, or to reject the document. *ADINARAYANA SETTI v. MINCHIN* 3 Mad. 297

16. ———— Court Fees Act, s. 23. If a document which ought to bear a stamp under the Court Fees Act has been used in the High Court, and the mistake or inadvertence which permitted its reception in a lower Court, without being properly stamped, comes to light in the High Court,

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*4. REJECTION OR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED OR REJECTED BY COURT BELOW—*contd.*(a) UNSTAMPED DOCUMENTS—*contd.*

any Judge of that Court may, under s. 28 of the Court Fees Act, direct that it should be properly stamped. *CHEDI LAL v. KIRATH CHAND*

I. L. R. 2 All. 682

17. ———— *Application insufficiently stamped—Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), ss. 6, 28—Application for review.* On the 26th January 1889, an application was presented to the Munsarim of the District Judge's Court for review of a judgment passed on the 19th December 1888. The application was insufficiently stamped, and the Munsarim endorsed on it "stamp insufficient." On this a dispute ensued between the pleader for the applicant and the Munsarim as to the sufficiency of the stamp. On the 25th April 1889, the deficiency pointed out by the Munsarim was made good. On the 26th May the Judge admitted the application on the applicant paying the Court-fee payable on an application presented on or after ninety days from the date of the decree. *Held*, that s. 6 and the first paragraph of s. 28 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) were applicable; that there was no mistake or inadvertence within the meaning of the second paragraph of s. 28; that the Judge had no power under the circumstances to admit the application as one presented after ninety days from the date of the decree; and that there was no presentation within ninety days of an application which could have been received. *MUNRO v. CAWNPORE MUNICIPAL BOARD*

I. L. R. 12 All. 57

18. ———— *Penalty. Held*, that an objection may properly be taken in a Court of first appeal to an unstamped document, and such Court is bound to entertain the objection and may direct that the document be stamped and the penalty imposed. *SAFDAR ALI KHAN v. LACHMAN DASS*

I. L. R. 2 All. 554

19. ———— *Stamp Act, 1869, s. 20, and Sch. II, Arts. 5 and 11—Stamp duty—Penalty, tender of.* An Appellate Court has no authority to direct the reception of an unstamped document to which the provisions of s. 20 of the Stamp Act (XVIII of 1869) apply, unless the amount of stamp duty and prescribed penalty was tendered when the document was first offered in evidence and rejected. *CHAMPABATY v. BIBI JIBUN*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 213

GOUR PERSHAD LAL v. LALLA NUND LAL

7 W. R. 439

20. ———— *Stamp Act, 1879, s. 34, proviso III—Admission of documents in evidence—Unstamped promissory note admitted as a bond on payment of stamp duty and penalty.* The plaintiff sued to recover the amount due on three khatas. The defendant objected that the khatas were not duly stamped. The Subordinate Judge held that the instruments were bonds, and as such admitted

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*4. REJECTION OR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED OR REJECTED BY COURT BELOW—*contd.*(a) UNSTAMPED DOCUMENTS—*conclld.*

them in evidence on payment of the proper stamp duty and penalty under s. 34, proviso I, of the Stamp Act (I of 1879). At a subsequent stage of the same suit, his successor in office was of opinion that the khatas in question were promissory notes; that as such they could be stamped only at the date of their execution, and that they had been illegally admitted in evidence under s. 34, proviso I. He accordingly dismissed the suit. On appeal, the District Judge agreed with the Subordinate Judge that the instruments sued on were promissory notes, but held that, after they had once been admitted in evidence on payment of the stamp duty and penalty the question of their admissibility could not be subsequently raised in the suit under proviso III to s. 34 of the Stamp Act (I of 1879). He therefore reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge, and remanded the case for trial on the merits. Against this order of remand defendants appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that the promissory notes, having been once admitted in evidence, could not afterwards be rejected on the ground of their not being duly stamped. *DEVA CHAND v. HIRA CHAND KAMARAJ*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 449

21. ———— *Stamp Act, 1879, s. 34—Instrument admitted as duly stamped—Appellate Court's power to question the admission.* Where a Court of first instance has admitted a document in evidence as duly stamped, s. 34, cl. 3, of the Stamp Act (I of 1879) precludes the Appellate Court from questioning the admission of such document. If the Appellate Court considers the document to be insufficiently stamped, it can only proceed under s. 50 of the Act. *GURUPADAPA BIN IRAPA v. NARO VITHAL KULKARNI*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 493

(b) VALUATION OF SUIT, ERROR IN.

22. ———— *Valuation of suit—Error in valuation of suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 350.* An error in the valuation of a claim is not an error, defect, or irregularity which affects the merits of the case, and an Appellate Court is restrained by s. 350 of the Code of Civil Procedure from ordering the reversal of a decree on account of any such error, which does not also affect the jurisdiction of the Court which originally tried the suit. *NANSA BIN BIBA v. BABA BIN BAHIRU*

1 Bom. 163

SUBAH ROY v. BALDEO SINGH

24 W. R. 225

23. ———— *Error in valuation.* An error in a matter of stamp is no ground for appeal, and is no reason for interfering with the decision of the Court below, under s. 350 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *SHOWDAMINTE DOSSEE v. RAM ROODRO GANGOOLY*

8 W. R. 367

MAHOMED SHAHA v. LALL MAHOMED

15 W. R. 179

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*4. REJECTION OR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED OR REJECTED BY COURT BELOW—*contd.*(b) VALUATION OF SUIT, ERROR IN—*contd.*

24. *Undervaluation—Dismissal—Remand.* If a lower Appellate Court finds a suit to have been undervalued, when its proper value would have placed it beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of first instance where it was instituted, it should dismiss the case, and not remand it with a view to the deficient stamp duty being made up. *AUGUPURA CHOWDHRY v. MEAH BIBE*

10 W. R. 207

25. *Supplemental*
plaint where suit was undervalued.—Irregularity. Where a suit was remanded to a Munsif's Court, and, on the defendants objecting that the plaintiff had been undervalued, an order was made by the Court that the plaintiff should, in some shape or other, put in the additional amount of stamp duty, and a supplemental plaintiff with the required stamp was accordingly put in and received, the irregularity was not considered to have affected the merits of the case or to call for a reversal of the Munsif's decision. *GUDDADHUR BANERJEE v. PREMOMOYEE DEBIA*

10 W. R. 286

26. *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 350.* In a suit in a Munsif's Court it was found, after issues had been fixed and some evidence recorded, that the claim had been undervalued, and that the proper valuation would carry it beyond the jurisdiction of the Munsif. The plaintiff was accordingly returned; and additional stamps having been filed, the case was tried by the Principal Sudder Ameen. The Judge, on appeal, held that the plaintiff had been illegally returned by the Munsif, and that the act of the Principal Sudder Ameen in proceeding to try the case was illegal. He accordingly dismissed the suit. *Held*, with reference to s. 350, Act VIII of 1859, that the Judge was wrong in reversing the decree of the Principal Sudder Ameen. *RAM GUTTY v. GOONO MONEE DEBIA*

11 W. R. 177

27. *A lower Appellate Court was held to have done right in dismissing a suit on the ground of undervaluation, although the plaintiff had been admitted and acted on by the first Court without objection by the parties.* *MEWA LALL v. BEHAREE LALL*

14 W. R. 195

28. *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 350.* S. 350, Act VIII of 1859, did not prohibit a Court of Appeal from modifying or reversing a decision of a lower Court, on the ground of undervaluation of the suit, if the proper valuation would have taken it beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. *HURER PANDEY v. BASSOO*

11 W. R. 257

29. *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 350.* An Appellate Court is restrained under s. 350, Act VIII of 1859, from reversing a decree on account of any error in the valuation

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*4. REJECTION OR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED OR REJECTED BY COURT BELOW—*contd.*(b) VALUATION OF SUIT, ERROR IN—*contd.*

of a claim which does not also affect the jurisdiction of the Court which originally tried the suit. *RAMES-SUR DYAL SING v. RAJ KISHORE SINGH*

13 W. R. 325

30. *Dismissal of suit for insufficient stamp—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 31 and 350.* Where a defendant, after the case had been gone into on the merits, set up that the suit had been undervalued, and the Court of first instance found in favour of the plaintiff on that issue, but the lower Appellate Court was of a contrary opinion, and dismissed the suit:—*Held*, that the lower Appellate Court should, before dismissing the suit on that ground, have allowed the plaintiff the option of supplying the necessary stamps, as the first Court would have done, under s. 31, Act VIII of 1859. In any case, the order of the first Court was not one affecting the merits of the case or jurisdiction of the Court; and therefore, under s. 350, Act VIII of 1859, the suit could not be dismissed on appeal upon that ground. *WAJID ALI KHAN v. LALA HANUMAN PRASAD*

4 B. L. R. A. C. 139
12 W. R. 484

31. *Insufficient stamp—Return of plaintiff—Act VIII of 1859, s. 30—Jurisdiction.* *Held*, on special appeal, that the lower Appellate Court was right in setting aside the proceedings of the Munsif on the ground that the property in suit was valued at an amount beyond his jurisdiction; but the plaintiff was entitled to have the plaintiff returned to him, that he might present it with the proper additional stamp before the proper Court. *JADU v. HIFAZAT HOSSEIN*

5 B. L. R. Ap. 15
13 W. R. 358

32. *Undervaluation—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 31.* Where a petition of appeal had been filed, time allowed for the issue of notice, and a day fixed for hearing, it was held to be the duty of the Judge, under s. 31, Act VIII of 1859, on finding that the petition was inadequately stamped, to give the appellant an opportunity of filing the proper stamp. *NUS-SERUT ALY CHOWDHRY v. MAHOMED KANOO SIRDAR*

11 W. R. 145

33. *Court Fees Act, 1870, s. 12—Erroneous decision of Munsif as to valuation of suit.* Where a Munsif ruled erroneously that a suit instituted in his Court had been correctly valued, and it appeared that, if the suit had been correctly valued, the Munsif would not have had jurisdiction to entertain it, the lower Appellate Court, having regard to cl. 2, s. 12 of the Court Fees Act, VII of 1870, ordered that the appeal should be decreed and the plaintiff retained until the plaintiff should pay the additional stamp duty, when the suit would be made over to the Subordinate Judge

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*4. REJECTION OR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED OR REJECTED BY COURT BELOW—*contd.*(b) VALUATION OF SUIT, ERROR IN—*contd.*

for re-trial. *Held*, that the order was a proper one.
BROJO COOMAR SEN v. ESHAN CHUNDER DAS

3 C. L. R. 79

34. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 578—Error or irregularity—Court-fees—Appeal.* The refusal of a plaintiff-respondent to make good a deficiency in Court-fees in respect of his plaint when called upon to do so by the Appellate Court, is not a ground upon which the Appellate Court should reverse the decree of the Court of first instance and dismiss the suit. **MEHDI HUSAIN v. MADAR BAKHS**

I. L. R. 2 All. 889

35. ————— *Plaint insufficiently stamped—Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 12—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 578.* A suit was instituted and tried on the merits in the Court of a Subordinate Judge without any objection being taken, either by the defendants or by the Court, that the plaint was insufficiently stamped. The defendants appealed on the merits, and the District Judge, being of opinion that the stamp on the plaint was inadequate, called upon the plaintiff to pay the additional fee which would have been payable had the objection been taken and the question rightly decided in the Court of first instance. *Held*, on second appeal, that the order of the Judge was properly made under s. 12, cl. 2, of the Court Fees Act, VII of 1870. **Kala Chand Sen v. Anundkrishno Bose**, 22 W. R. 433, dissented from. S. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code explained. **SHAMA SOONDARY v. HURRO SOONDARY**

I. L. R. 7 Cal. 348

8 C. L. R. 528

36. ————— *Court Fees Act, 1870, s. 12—Memorandum of appeal—Stamp—Suit for recovery of land and money.* In deciding the amount of stamp to be borne by the memorandum of appeal, the High Court is not bound by the decision of the Court of first instance as to the stamp on the plaint. **MOTIGAVRI v. PRANJIVANDAS**

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 302

37. ————— *Court Fees Act, VII of 1870, s. 12—Stamp—Plaint—Undervaluation—Rejection—Finality of decision.* The decision of the Court of first instance, that a plaint is undervalued, is binding upon the Court of appeal, reference, or revision; but the Court of first instance is not justified in rejecting the plaint without giving to the plaintiff an opportunity of affixing the proper stamp. **BAI ANOPE v. MULCHAND GIRDHAR**

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 355

38. ————— *ss. 10, 12, 28—Order requiring additional Court-fee on claim, passed subsequent to decree—Decree prepared so as to give effect to subsequent order—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 54, 55, 584.* A Judge, after disposing of an appeal on the 1st March 1883, again took it up,

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*4. REJECTION OR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED OR REJECTED BY COURT BELOW—*concl.*(b) VALUATION OF SUIT, ERROR IN—*concl.*

— **ss. 10, 12, 28—concl.**

and on the 21st March 1883 directed the appellant to pay additional Court-fees on her memorandum of appeal. On the 2nd May 1883 the appellant paid the additional Court-fees under protest, and a decree was then prepared, bearing date the 1st March 1883, but it referred to and carried into effect the subsequent order of the 21st March and the 2nd May. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*—That as soon as the Judge had passed the decree of the 1st March 1883, he ceased to have any power over it, and was not competent to introduce new matters not dealt with by the judgment; that the order of the 21st March and the deposit of the 2nd May, whether right or wrong, were not proceedings to which effect could be given in the antecedent decree of the 1st March 1883; and that the decree was *ultra vires* to that extent, and was therefore liable to correction in second appeal under s. 584 of the Civil Procedure Code. The powers conferred by ss. 54 (a) and (c) and 55, read with s. 582 of the Civil Procedure Code, or by s. 12 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), read with cl. (ii) of s. 10, are intended to be exercised before the disposal of the case, and not after it has been decided finally so far as the Court is concerned. The powers conferred by s. 28 of the Court Fees Act cannot be exercised by an order passed after the decision of the case to which the question of the payment of Court-fees relates, and, even assuming that they can be so exercised, such an order, though it may be subject to such rules as to appeal or revision as the law may provide, cannot be given effect to by making insertions in an antecedent decree. *Per OLDFIELD, J.*—That the Court had power to make the order it did, inasmuch as the collection of Court-fees was no part of a Judge's functions in the trial of a suit which could be said to have ceased with its determination; and the provisions of the Court Fees Act fixed no time within which the presiding Judge could exercise his power of ordering documents to be stamped, and seemed, on the other hand, to contemplate the exercise of that power at any time subsequent to the receipt, filing, or use of a document, and to make the validity of the document and the proceedings relative thereto dependent on the document being properly stamped. **MAHADEI v. RAM KISHEN DAS**

I. L. R. 7 All. 528

5. ERRORS AFFECTING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE.

1. ————— *Delivery of judgment out of Court—Error in procedure—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 350.* In a suit for possession of land, the Judge, after hearing the evidence and admitting the documents on both sides, intimated that he should examine the place to satisfy himself with respect to the boundaries. He did make such examination, the defendant attending, but the plaintiff

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*5. ERRORS AFFECTING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE—*contd.*

being absent; and he afterwards delivered his judgment in favour of the defendant out of Court. *Held*, that the mere circumstance that the judgment was delivered out of Court did not constitute error under s. 350, Act VIII of 1859. and was no ground of appeal. *NILMONEY SINGH DEO v. BHOJANY CHURN PANDA* . . . **Marsh. 327 : 2 Hay 305**

2. ——— Omission to decide limitation—*Error or defect in decision of case.* An omission to decide a question of limitation, though not raised in the grounds of appeal, is an error or defect in the decision of the case on the merits. *SABUJI KESRAJI v. RAJSANGJI JALMSANGJI* . . . **2 Bom. 169 : 2nd Ed. 162**

3. ——— Admission of invalid document—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 350—Bom. Reg. XVIII of 1827, s. 10—Objection to validity of document unstamped.* An objection to the validity of a document under Bombay Regulation XVIII of 1827, s. 10, as distinguished from its inadmissibility in evidence, or from a prohibition to Courts of Justice or public officers to act upon it, is an objection on the merits under Act VIII of 1859. *GIRDHAR NAGJISHET v. GANPAT MORORA* . . . **11 Bom. 129**

4. ——— Order without jurisdiction—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 350, 351, 355.* Every order passed by a Court is not void for want of jurisdiction simply because it is illegal,—*e.g.*, where a Court remands a case under s. 351, Act VIII of 1859, instead of following the provisions of s. 355. Such an order is not necessarily an error affecting the decision on the merits. *JOWAD ALI v. HOSSEIN BIBEE* . . . **8 W. R. 207**

5. ——— Decree passed without jurisdiction—*Reversal or modification of decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 350.* Where the proceedings and the decree passed by a lower Court were without jurisdiction. *Held* (SPANKIE, J., dissenting), that s. 350 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply, as the judgment of the High Court could not be for reversing or modifying the decree of the lower Court, there being no decree to reverse or modify. *BIJEE KOOR v. DAMODHUR DAS* . . . **5 N. W. 55**

6. ——— Trial on different issue and reversal in Appellate Court. A suit having been decreed in favour of plaintiff in the Court of first instance, where it was tried on a certain issue, the decree was reversed in the Appellate Court, where it was tried on a different issue. Plaintiff upon this objected in special appeal that he had been misled by the issue framed in the first Court, and, but for it, would have adduced evidence to prove his case. *Held*, that, if plaintiff had any evidence to offer upon the issue tried in the Appellate Court, he should have moved the Judge to allow him the opportunity of offering it, and that there was no error of law in the proceedings of the lower

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*5. ERRORS AFFECTING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE—*contd.*

Appellate Court. *ESHAN CHUNDA SEIN v. DHONAYE* . . . **11 W. R. 61**

7. ——— Irregular verification of plaint—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 51, 578.* A defect in signature of the plaint, or the absence of signature where it appears that the suit was in fact filed with the knowledge and by the authority of the plaintiff named therein, may be waived by the defendant, or, if necessary, cured by amendment at any stage of the suit, and, having regard to s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code, is not a ground for interference in appeal. *BASDEO v. SMIDT* . . . **I. L. R. 22 All. 55**

8. ——— Admission of illegal evidence—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 350.* The objection that papers were admitted as evidence which were not legally admissible, is not ground sufficient, under s. 350 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to warrant a decree being reversed or modified, or a case being remanded, when it is admitted that there was other evidence to support the lower Court's finding, and the insufficiency of such other evidence is not alleged in the grounds of appeal. *KENARAM SHAMUNT v. GOPEENATH GEEREE* . . . **10 W. R. 180**

9. ——— Splitting cause of action. Where the lower Courts allowed a plaintiff erroneously to bring separate suits where he ought to have brought only one :—*Held*, that, as the separate suits against the co-proprietor were instituted simultaneously, the error in splitting up the claim against him did not affect the merits; and accordingly the decree was affirmed. *VITHU v. NARAYAN DABHUL RAR* . . . **5 Bom. A. C. 30**

10. ——— Multifariousness—*Causes of action over some of which lower Court had jurisdiction—Duty of Judge to try these.* A suit was brought against six defendants, the cause of action against five of them being unconnected with the cause of action against the sixth. The Assistant Judge, in whose Court the suit was brought, tried one of the causes of action, over which he had jurisdiction, but refused to try the other, over which he had no jurisdiction. In appeal, the District Judge refused to enter into the merits of either on the ground of the misjoinder of the causes of action. *Held*, that the District Judge was bound to enter into the merits of the claim over which the Court of first instance had jurisdiction, it not being affected by the error in the misjoinder of the two claims. *SAMSUDDIN PIRJADE v. GUNPATRA JAGANNATH* . . . **7 Bom. A. C. 19**

See RUKMINI BURMONIA v. FOODEN KOOMAREE BURMONIA . . . **23 W. R. 408**

11. ——— Misjoinder of causes of action—*Property wrongly attached—Joint suit by holders of two shares to have their shares declared not liable to attachment—Civil Procedure Code, s. 578—Amendment of plaint.* A decree-holder, in

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*5. ERRORS AFFECTING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE—*contd.*

execution of a decree against one G L, attached a house as belonging to G L and his two sons forming a joint Hindu family. The sons objected that the house had previously been partitioned, and was held by them and their father in separate shares, but their objection was disallowed. They then brought a joint suit for a declaration that their respective portions of the house were not liable to attachment in execution of a decree against their father. No objection was taken to the frame of that suit, and the Court of first instance gave the plaintiffs a decree on the finding that partition had in fact taken place prior to the suit in which the defendant, judgment-creditor, had obtained his decree. On appeal by the judgment-creditor, the lower Appellate Court dismissed the suit entirely on the grounds of misjoinder of causes of action. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court. *Held*, on these facts, that the plaintiffs should have been allowed to amend their plaint by striking out the name of one of them, and that, though there was irregularity in the procedure, such irregularity did not affect the merits of the case of the jurisdiction of the Court within the meaning of s. 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *BEHARI LAL v. KODU RAM*

I. L. R. 15 All. 380

12. — Misjoinder of parties and causes of action—Error not affecting merits—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 578. Held, per MITTER, J. (PIGOT, J., dissenting), that, as regards the objection to the suit for misjoinder and under s. 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Appeal Court was precluded by s. 578 of the Code from reversing the decree of the lower Court, as the error (if an error at all) could not affect the merits of the decision. MOKUND LALL v. CHOBAY LALL*

I. L. R. 10 Cal. 1061

13. — Misjoinder of parties—Irregularity affecting merits—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 578. In appeal it was contended by the respondents, in support of the decree made by the Court below, dismissing the claim of the plaintiff No. 2, that the claim was liable to dismissal by reason of its involving the misjoinder of plaintiffs with different causes of action. This objection had been raised in the written statement, and the Court was asked to raise an issue on the point. In answer to this contention, it was urged by the appellants that, as the respondents went to trial upon the merits, it was not open to them to urge any objection like this to the frame of the suit on appeal. Held, that it was open to the respondents to raise the objection as to misjoinder in appeal. Tarinee Churan Ghose v. Hunsman Jha, 20 W. R. 240, distinguished. Smurthwaite v. Hannay [1894], A. C. 494, referred to. MOHIMA CHANDRA ROY CHOWDHRY v. ATUL CHANDRA CHAKRAVARTI CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 24 Cal. 540

14. — Misjoinder of plaintiffs—Error of procedure. The misjoinder of

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*5. ERRORS AFFECTING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE—*contd.*

plaintiffs which does not produce error in the decision of the case on its merits is not a ground for the reversal of a decree on special appeal. *Semble*: That such misjoinder is not a ground for the reversal of a decree in regular appeal. Where the widow of H, a Mahomedan, and his two daughters brought a joint suit for their respective shares of the estate of H, which were awarded to them jointly,—*Held*, that this was an error of procedure which did not affect the merits of the case. MIYA GULAM NABI v. KHARANBIBI . . . 6 Bom. A. C. 177

15. — Misjoinder—Objection to declaratory decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 350. A lower Appellate Court has no power to reverse the decree of a Court of first instance on the ground of misjoinder of parties. After a Court of competent jurisdiction has exercised its discretion under s. 15, Act VIII of 1859, and passed a declaratory decree, it does not lie within the power of a Court of Appeal, under s. 350 of that Act, to set aside the decree upon an objection which does not affect the merits, and which was not taken at the time when the decree of the first Court was passed. RAM KANAYE CHUCKERBUTTY v. PROSSUNO COOMAR SEIN . . . 13 W. R. 176*

16. — Non-joinder of plaintiff's undivided brother—Suit by mortgagee against sons of a deceased judgment-debtor—Decree against members of joint family—Parties, non-joinder of—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 578. A personal decree on a mortgage was passed against a Hindu (the mortgagor) and his two sons on 19th October 1877. The decree provided for payment of the secured debt in various instalments by May 1895. The mortgagor died in 1883, having discharged part of the debt. The decree-holder having attached certain family property in execution, the mortgagor's two younger sons, who had not been born at the date of the above decree, objected that their shares were not liable to attachment. This objection prevailed, the Court expressing the opinion that the matter in controversy should be determined in a regular suit. The other defendants in the suit of 1877 had both died in the interval, one of them leaving infant sons. The decree-holder (in whose sole name the mortgage stood) now sued the sons of the mortgagor and their infant nephews in 1891, describing himself, being allowed to amend his plaint, as managing coparcener and representative of the joint family. A plea of non-joinder was raised, *inter alia*, on the ground that the plaintiff had an undivided brother:—*Held*, that since the plaint (as amended) showed that the plaintiff sued as managing member of his undivided family, the omission to join his brother was a merely formal error, and was not fatal to the suit. RAM-AYYA v. VENKATARATNAM . . . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 122*

17. — Order adding party to suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 363. An order adding a party to a case is not one affecting the*

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*5. ERRORS AFFECTING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE—*contd.*

merits in the sense of s. 363 ; but where such order is made without postponing the case (s. 73) for a reasonable time, it is a very important matter. *KOOMARA OOPENDRA KRISHNA DEB v. NOBIN KRISHNA BOSE* . . . 17 W. R. 370 note

UPENDRA KRISHNA DEB v. NOBIN KRISHNA BOSE . . . 3 B. L. R. O. C. 113

18. ——— Rescission of order on same day as made without notice to one of the parties—*Adjournment—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 146.* Where an order was regularly made by a Munsif under Act VIII of 1859, s. 146, granting time to the parties, adjourning the hearing, and fixing a day for the further hearing, but was rescinded on the same day on the application of the defendant, and the case tried on the following day, when all the evidence which the plaintiffs was entitled to produce was not before the Court :—*Held*, that, as it was not shown that the rescinding order was regularly and properly made, there was a defect in the procedure and a defect in law, which might most materially have affected the decision on the merits. *BISHEN PERKASH SINGH v. RUTTUN GEER CHELA* . . . 20 W. R. 3

19. ——— Decree against agent instead of principal—*Suit brought in name of agent instead of corporate body—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 350.* Where a decree makes a party liable who is not liable (e.g., an agent instead of the corporate body whose agent he is), the error is one affecting the merits within the meaning of s. 350, Civil Procedure Code. *NUBEEN CHUNDER PAUL v. STEPHENSON* . . . 15 W. R. 534

20. ——— Technical error—*Ground for reversing judgment.* The lower Appellate Court is not justified in reversing a decision of the Court of first instance for a technical error, unless that error has affected the decision of the case on the merits. The best test to ascertain whether an erroneous interlocutory order has affected the ultimate decision on the merits is to see whether the Court would have come to the same decision had the erroneous order not been passed. *PRAN NATH BHADOORY v. SREE KANT LAHOREE* . . . 2 C. L. R. 257

21. ——— Filing appeal without copy of decree—*Cure of irregularity.* The appellant filed an appeal against the judgment of the Court of first instance without a copy of the decree. Subsequently the decree of the Court of first instance was filed within the time allowed for appeal and accepted by the Judge. *Held*, that the irregularity was cured, and the appeal should not have been dismissed on the ground of such irregularity. *LULLEE v. RAM PERSHAD* . . . 2 Agra 34

22. ——— Improper exercise of discretion in granting declaratory decrees—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 578.* The awarding of declaratory relief as regulated by s. 42 of the

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*5. ERRORS AFFECTING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE—*contd.*

Specific Relief Act is a discretionary power which Courts of equity are empowered to exercise with reference to the circumstances of each case and the nature of the facts stated in the plaint, and the prayer of the plaintiff ; that so long as a Court of first instance possesses jurisdiction to entertain a declaratory suit, and, entering into the merits of the case, arrives at right conclusions and awards a declaratory decree, such a decree cannot be reversed in appeal simply because the discretion has been improperly exercised ; and that such improper exercise of discretion under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act has no higher footing than that of an error, defect, or irregularity, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court, within the meaning of s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code. This does not imply that, even in cases where the discretionary power to award declaratory relief has been exercised wholly arbitrarily, and in a manner grossly inconsistent with judicial principles, the Court of Appeal would have no power to interfere. *Ram Kanaye Chuckerbutty v. Prosunno Coomarr Sein*, 13 W. R. 175, *Sadut Ali Khan v. Khajeh Abdool Gunnee*, 11 B. L. R. 203, *Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho*, I. L. R. 1 All. 688, and *Damoodar Surmah v. Mohee Kant Surmah*, 21 W. R. 54, referred to. *SANT KUMAR v. DEO SARAN* . . . I. L. R. 8 All. 365

23. ——— Error in allowing wrong party to begin—*Suit on bond—Right to begin—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 578.* The defendants in a suit on a bond admitted the execution of the bond, but denied that they had received, as the bond recited they had done at the time of execution, the consideration for it. The Court of first instance irregularly allowed the plaintiff to call witnesses to prove that the consideration had been paid at the time of the execution of the bond. They proved, however, that it had not been paid at the time of the execution, but, if paid at all, at some subsequent time. The plaintiff gave no further evidence of payment, and the Court of first instance, without calling on the defendants, dismissed the suit. The lower Appellate Court held that the defendants should have been required to begin under the circumstances, and reversed the decree of the Court of first instance, and gave the plaintiff a decree : *Held*, that it was doubtful, having regard to the provisions of s. 578 of Act X of 1877, whether it was competent for the lower Appellate Court to reverse the decision of the Court of first instance ; but even if it were, the lower Appellate Court should have not ignored what had taken place, but should have dealt with the case on appeal in the shape it came before it. *MAKUND v. BAHORI LAL* . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 824

24. ——— Omission to state reasons for decision—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 578.* In a suit to recover possession of certain immoveable property alleged to have been purchased by the

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*5. ERRORS AFFECTING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE—*contd.*

plaintiff from a Hindu widow who claimed to have held the same as heir of her husband, the defendant, who was the mother of the husband, contended, *inter alia*, that the alleged purchase and sale were invalid by reason that she herself was entitled to maintenance out of the property. The first Court gave the plaintiff a decree, and this decree was affirmed on appeal by the District Judge, who, however, gave no reasons of his own for his judgment, but merely adopted those of the lower Court. *Held*, that, having regard to the nature of the case and the simplicity of the point for determination, the fact of the District Judge having omitted to state his reasons did not amount to such an error of law within the meaning of s. 857 of the Code of Civil Procedure as affected the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. *ROHIMONI DABI v. ZAMIR-UDDIN* 8 C. L. R. 597

25. ——— Objection by one of several parties—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 578—Irregularity not affecting the merits or jurisdiction—Misjoinder*. Where one party alone objected to the frame of the suit and the defect (of misjoinder and multifariousness) did not affect the merits of the case of the jurisdiction of the Court, the lower Appellate Court ought not, regard being had to s. 578 of Act X of 1877, to have reversed the decree of the Court of first instance by reason of such defect. *KALIAN SINGH v. GUR DAYAL* I. L. R. 4 All. 163

26. ——— Error in frame and valuation of suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 578—Co-sharers, suit by some of several—Error not affecting jurisdiction or merits*. The plaintiffs in this suit, alleging that they were co-sharers of a certain village, that certain land situate in such village was the property of the co-sharers, and that such land had been improperly sold by the persons occupying it to one of the co-sharers, sued the vendors and the purchaser and the other co-sharers for possession of their share of such land and the setting aside of the sale so far as their share was concerned, and valued the suit according to their share. *Held*, that the error in the frame and valuation of the suit, inasmuch as it did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit was instituted or the merits of the case, was not, under s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code, a ground on which the Appellate Court should have reversed the decree of the Court of first instance. *Unnoda Persad Roy v. Erskine, 12 B. L. R. 370*, distinguished. *PARAM v. ACHAL* I. L. R. 4 All. 289

27. ——— Dismissal of suit for undervaluation—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 578—Irregularity affecting merits*. A Munsif, after hearing the evidence on both sides, found that the suit had been undervalued, but, instead of returning the plaint under s. 57, he dismissed the suit. *Held*, that such dismissal was a matter affecting the merits of the case and which the Appellate Court

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could deal with under s. 578. *BHODESWAR CHOWDHRY v. GAURI KANT NATH*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 834

28. ——— Institution of suit in wrong Court—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 578. Per MAHMOOD, J.* The institution of a suit in a Court of higher grade than the Court which is competent to try it is not a question either as to the jurisdiction or affecting the merits of the case. It is a question of the kind provided for by s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the irregularity is not one which affects "the merits of the case of the jurisdiction of the Court" within the meaning of that section. *NIDHI LAL v. MAZHAAR HUSAIN*

I. L. R. 7 All. 280

29. ——— Institution of suit in Subordinate Judge's Court instead of Munsif's Court—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 578*. The words "not affecting the jurisdiction of the Court" in s. 578 of the same Code mean "not affecting the competency of the Court to try." The error in instituting a suit in a Subordinate Judge's Court instead of in that of the Munsif is not an error which affects the jurisdiction of the former Court within the meaning of s. 578. *MATRA MONDAL v. HARI MOHUN MULLICK alias MOTHURA MOHAN MULLICK* I. L. R. 17 Calc. 155

30. ——— Suit brought on behalf of minor without authority—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 37—Minors Act, Bombay (Act XX of 1864)*. In a suit brought by the Political Agent, Southern Mahratta country, as administrator of the estate of the Chief of Madhol, who was described in the plaint as being 19 years of age, to eject the defendants from certain lands belonging to the Chief situated in the Satra District, it was found, on preliminary objections taken by the defendants, that the Political Agent had no authority to institute the suit, he being neither a certificated guardian of the Chief under the Bombay Minors Act XX of 1864 nor a "recognized agent" under s. 37 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, also, that the irregularity of the Political Agent's suing for the Chief without authority was one affecting the merits of the case, though not the jurisdiction of the Court. If the Political Agent was not properly representing the Chief, he had no merits, no rights as against the defendants. The District Judge was, therefore, right in reversing the decree of the first Court, s. 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure having no application to the present case. *VENKATRAV RAJE GHORPADE v. MADHAVARAV RAMCHANDRA* . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 53

31. ——— Omission to appeal from order—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 591*. S. 591 of the Code enables the Court, when dealing with an appeal from a decree, to deal with any question which may arise as to any error, defect, or irregularity in any order affecting the decision of the case, though an appeal from such order

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might have been and has not been preferred. *Googlee Sahoo v. Premall Sahoo*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 148, referred to. *HAR NABAIN SING v. KHARAG SING* I. L. R. 9 All. 447

32. ———— Permission to relative to sue, proof of—*Act XL of 1858, s. 3—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 440, 578*. In a suit conducted on behalf of a minor by a relative, the absence of the certificate of guardianship required by s. 3 of the Bengal Minors Act (XL of 1858) is not a fatal defect; and the fact of the Court allowing such a suit to proceed must be taken as implying that the necessary permission has been given. Even if such permission has not in fact been given, the irregularity is covered by s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Bhaba Pershad Khan v. The Secretary of State for India in Council*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 159, followed. *PARMESHAR DAS v. BELA* I. L. R. 39 All. 503

33. ———— Declaratory decree—*Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 42—Civil Procedure Code, s. 578*. An improper or irregular exercise of the discretionary power conferred by s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) does not in itself constitute sufficient ground for the reversal of a decree which is not open to objection on the ground of jurisdiction, or of the merits of the case, being covered by s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Sant Kumar v. Deno Saran*, I. L. R. 8 All. 365, referred to. *MUHAMMAD MASHUK ALI KHAN v. KHUDA BAKSH* I. L. R. 9 All. 622

34. ———— Allowing assignee of decree to go on with execution, though he has made no formal application for execution. Where the Court allows the assignee of a decree to proceed with the execution even if he has omitted to make a formal application for execution, it is an error of procedure and not one affecting the merits of the case. *DWAR BUKSH SIKKAR v. FATIK JALI* I. L. R. 26 Calc. 250
3 C. W. N. 222

35. ———— Exclusion of evidence—*Ground for reversal of decision—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 578*. The exclusion of evidence in the lower Court is not sufficient ground for reversing that Court's decree, unless the Appeal Court comes to the conclusion that the evidence refused, if it had been received, ought to have varied the decision. *DESOUZA v. PESTANJI DHANJIBHAY*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 408

36. ———— Error in rejecting documents already admitted—*Order of remand—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 578*. Where in a suit to recover the amount due on three khatas the first Court found they were bonds and admitted them on payment of stamp duty and penalty under s. 34 of the Stamp Act, but at a subsequent stage of the suit his successor in office was of opinion that they were promissory notes, and that, therefore, they, not being stamped, could not have been legally admitted in evidence, and accordingly dismissed the

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suit; and the District Judge held that, after they had once been admitted in evidence on payment of the penalty, the question of their admissibility could not be raised, and remanded the suit for trial on the merits:—*Held*, that, under s. 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), the High Court could not interfere with the order of remand, as it was not one which affected the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. *DEVACHAND v. HIRACHAND KAMARAJ* I. L. R. 13 Bom. 449

37. ———— Execution of document by a pardanashin lady—*Refusal of her application as defendant for the issue of a commission to take her evidence—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 333, 390, 578—Irregularity not affecting merits of case*. The Court of first instance rejected an application made under Chap. XXV of the Civil Procedure Code for the issue of a commission to take the evidence of a Mahomedan pardanashin lady, the defendant in the suit, which was brought against her on a mortgage bond, the execution of which she had denied in her written statement. The Courts below concurred in finding that there was sufficient evidence of the execution of the document by the pardanashin lady with full knowledge of its contents. From their judgments it appeared that, if the defendant had been examined on commission and had given her testimony in support of her written statement, it would not have been believed, and in their Lordship's opinion it could not reasonably have prevailed. *Held*, that the error alleged by the appellant to have occurred in the refusal of the Court to issue the commission (whether or not it would have been better to have issued it) was, at all events, no valid ground of appeal. The evidence taken on the commission could not have affected the merits of the case within s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code. *AKIKUNNISSA BIBI v. RUP LAL DAS*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 807
2 C. W. N. 566

38. ———— Refusal of Court to summons witnesses—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 159 and 578*. Where an application to a Civil Court for witnesses to be summoned has been refused on the ground that the applicant had negligently or with intention to delay the hearing postponed the making of his application for a summons until a time when it would be impossible to obtain the attendance of the witnesses at the hearing, and the refusal is made one of the grounds of appeal against the decree in the suit:—*Held*, that s. 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply if the irregularity in refusing the application did not affect the merits of the case. If it did affect the merits of the case, the ground of appeal would be a good one. *BHAGWAT DAS v. DEBI DIN*

I. L. R. 16 All. 218

39. ———— Execution of decree against representative of debtor—*Civil Procedure*

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*5. ERRORS AFFECTING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE—*contd.*

Code, 1882, ss. 234, 248, and 578—Application by decree-holder for execution of decree by substitution on death of the judgment-debtor to the Court where the decree has been transferred. A decree was transferred to another Court for execution. Pending the proceedings, one of the judgment-debtors died. On an application to that Court by the judgment-creditor to execute the decree against the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor, a notice was issued under s. 248 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The legal representative objected that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application, and that the application should have been made under s. 234 of the Code to the Court that passed the decree. *Held*, that, even assuming that an application under s. 234 to the Court which passed the decree was a necessary preliminary to proceedings under s. 248 by the Court executing the decree, the omission to make it was only an irregularity which did not affect the merits of the case, and, under s. 578, the order of the Court of first instance should not have been reversed on account of such irregularity. *SHAM LAL PAL v. MODHU SUDAN SIRCAR* I. L. R. 22 Calc. 558

40. ———— *Illegal order of remand—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 578—Irregularity affecting the merits.* Where a District Court reversed the District Munsif's decree and remanded the case for a revised finding on the merits:—*Held*, that this procedure was *ultra vires* and illegal, and that, as the irregularity might have affected the merits of the case, s. 578, Civil Procedure Code, was inapplicable. *MALLIKARJUNA v. PATHANENJ* I. L. R. 19 Mad. 479

41. ———— *Jurisdiction of a Court where a decree has been transferred for execution to substitute the name of the transferee of the decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 232 and 578—Whether an order passed without jurisdiction can be cured by the provisions of s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code.* An application by the transferee of a decree for execution after substitution of his name can be entertained only by the Court which passed the decree, and the Court to which the decree has been transferred has no jurisdiction to entertain it. *Sheo Narain Singh v. Hurbuns Lall*, 14 W. R. 65, *Nakoda Ismail v. Kassam*, 9 Bom. H. C. 46, and *Kadir Bakhsh v. Ilahi Bakhsh*, I. L. R. 2 All. 283, referred to. In a case where a decree has been transferred to another Court for execution, and that Court orders the execution to proceed after substitution of the name of the transferee of the decree, the said order is one passed without jurisdiction, and can be set aside on appeal, notwithstanding the provisions of s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Sham Lal Pal v. Modhu Sudan Sircar*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 558, distinguished. *AMAR CHUNDRA BANERJEE v. GURU PRSUNNO MUKERJEE* I. L. R. 27 Calc. 488

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*5. ERRORS AFFECTING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE—*concl.*

42. ———— *Misjoinder—Misjoinder of parties—Misjoinder of causes of action—Assault by two persons, on the same occasion, on two other persons—Joint plaintiffs—Joint defendants.* *Held*, that, although the defendants had not really been prejudiced by the misjoinder, it was impossible to hold that the case fell within s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). That section only applies to mistakes and irregularities subsequently committed in a suit which has been instituted in such a way as to give the Court jurisdiction to try it. The suit must first be instituted in the manner allowed by law. But the law, as it stands at present, does not authorise a suit, which is really two separate suits in which separate plaintiffs are concerned, to be instituted, nor does it give the Court jurisdiction to entertain a suit thus instituted. *VARAJLAL BHAISHANKER v. RANDAT HARIKRISHNA* (1901) I. L. R. 26 Bom. 259

6. INTERFERENCE WITH, AND POWER TO VARY, ORDER OF LOWER COURT.

1. ———— *Power of, on appeal ex parte—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 37—Power to remand.* An Appellate Court, hearing an appeal *ex parte* in the absence of the respondent, cannot *suo motu* raise points in favour of the respondent, but must confine its decision to the question raised by the appellant. *DURGA PRASAD v. KHAIRATI* I. L. R. 1 All. 545

2. ———— *Making different case for appellant from that which he makes for himself in first Court—Practice.* A Judge is not permitted to make, on appeal, a different case for the appellant from that which he alleged for himself in the Court of first instance. *KACHUBHAI v. KRISHNABAI* I. L. R. 2 Bom. 635

3. ———— *Travelling beyond record.* An Appellate Court should not ordinarily travel beyond the record, or take up points which are not the subject of appeal before it. *KASHINATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. ROY DWARKANATH CHUCKERBUTTY* 7 W. R. 61

4. ———— *Decision of case on issue not raised in Court below.* A lower Appellate Court is not justified in determining an appeal on an issue which was not raised between the parties in the Court of first instance. *USTOORUN v. MOHUN LALL* 21 W. R. 333

PRANKISHORE DEB v. MAHOMED AMEER 21 W. R. 338

RUKMINI BURMONIA v. FOODUN KOOMAREE BURMONIA 23 W. R. 408

5. ———— *Decision on issue not taken in Court below—Want of evidence for decision.* No issue was taken in the Court of first instance on the question whether an agreement was void for champerty. An issue was raised on this

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question by the Appellate Court, and (no evidence being taken) was decided in favour of the defendant. *Held*, on special appeal, that unless it was manifestly apparent on the face of the proceedings that the agreement was against morality or public policy, the Appellate Court ought not to have held it void. *RAMRAV KHANDERAV v. GOVIND PANDSHET*

6 Bom. A. C. 63

6. ——— Raising issue without cross-appeal—*Appeal from decree partly in favour of appellant.* When a decree gives title to land to defendant and right of way to plaintiff, and plaintiff alone appeals, the Appellate Court must not raise an issue as to right of way without cross-appeal from defendant. *SOOKHANUNDAMOYEE DEBIA v. BANAY MADHUB MOOKERJEE*

1 W. R. 73

7. ——— Giving relief not asked for—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 334.* An Appellate Court exceeds its authority in giving a plaintiff relief for which he does not ask although, under Act VIII of 1859, s. 334, the Court may decide an appeal before it on other grounds than those stated in the memorandum of appeal. That section does not entitle the Court to go beyond the subject-matter of appeal. *SHARODA SOONDUREE DABEE v. GOBIND MONEE alias BROJO SOONDUREE DABEE*

24 W. R. 179

8. ——— Alteration of decree on appeal—*Defendant not objecting to decree on appeal.* Where the defendant does not appeal against or object to the amount awarded by the first Court to the plaintiff, it is not open to the Appellate Court to reduce it. *NAYANCHANDRA v. NARAYAN*

1 L. R. 4 Bom. 293

9. ——— Improper procedure—*Suit by raiyat for rent.* In a suit by a raiyat against a zamindar for rent, the Court of first instance gave the plaintiff a decree for a part of his claim. The plaintiff appealed against the disallowance of the residue. The Judge on appeal reversed the decree and dismissed the suit, although no objection was made by the defendant to the judgment of the Court below, merely saying that a claim for rent by a raiyat against a zamindar was absurd. On appeal to the High Court, the decree of the Judge was reversed, and the original decree established. *HEM CHUNDER v. AHMED REZA*

Marsh. 332 : 2 Hay 429

10. ——— Rejection of appeal. *Quare.* Whether, after registering and admitting an appeal, and causing notice to be served, an Appellate Court can reject the appeal as not being filed within the prescribed time. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL v. MUTU SWAMY*

4 B. L. R. Ap. 84 : 13 W. R. 245

11. ——— Raising questions on second appeal. The question of due diligence on the part of a judgment-creditor can be gone into

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*6. INTERFERENCE WITH, AND POWER TO VARY, ORDER OF LOWER COURT—*contd.*

on a second appeal. *KADUMBINI DABYA v. KOYLASH CHUNDER PAL CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 554 : 8 C. L. R. 19

12. ——— *Ex-parte* decree passed when summons had not been served in sufficient time. Where an *ex-parte* decree was passed against the defendant, and it appeared that the writ of summons had not been served upon him in sufficient time to enable him to appear and answer, the Appellate Court, reversing the order of the Court of first instance, directed the *ex-parte* decree to be set aside and ordered a new trial. *CHANDRASAPPA BIN SANGAPPA v. MAINBA BIN MAHADSHET*

7 Bom. A. C. 138

13. ——— Grounds of appeal—*Contention abandoned in lower Court.* An appellant in regular appeal may not, at the hearing, raise a contention of law expressly abandoned by him in the Court below, and not contained in the memorandum of appeal. *PABITRA DAS v. DAMUDAR JANA*

7 B. L. R. 697 : 24 W. R. 397 note

14. ——— Finding of Court not appealed against. A finding of the first Court not appealed against cannot be interfered with by the Appellate Court. *KALEE DAS ROY v. KHIRODA SOONDUREE DEBIA*

16 W. R. 300

15. ——— Presumption of correctness of judgment of lower Court—*Grounds for interference with.* An Appellate Court ought not to interfere with the judgment of the lower Court until perfectly satisfied that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is erroneous. It is a presumption of law that the judgment appealed against is right until the contrary is shown; and when there is a doubt about it, the benefit of that doubt should be given by the Appellate Court to the respondent. *TAYUBUNNISSA BIBI v. KUWAR SHAM KISHORE ROY*

7 B. L. R. 621 : 15 W. R. 228

16. ——— Judgment of lower Court—*Grounds for reversal of—Defect in investigation. —Insufficient finding.* An Appellate Court should find some sufficient and significant facts before it reverses a judgment of the lower Court, and should show a proper basis for its conclusions. *ANISUL FUTWA v. CHANDO*

8 B. L. R. Ap. 3

17. ——— Grounds for reversal. An Appellate Court is bound to state its reasons for reversing the decision of a lower Court. *MAHADEO OJHA v. PARMESWAR PANDAY*

2 B. L. R. Ap. 20

LALLA SOOKLALL SING v. BUSOODHUN. NOOR ALLY v. LALLA SOOKLALL SING

W. R. 1864, 347

18. ——— Appeal on full Court-fee from decree dismissing suit in part—*Remand of whole case, though no cross-appeal or objections preferred—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 562, 578—Practice—Dismissal of whole suit on.*

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*6. INTERFERENCE WITH, AND POWER TO VARY, ORDER OF LOWER COURT—*contd.*

remand—High Court competent in second appeal to consider validity of remand order not specifically appealed—*Civil Procedure Code*, ss. 544, 561. A plaintiff whose suit had been decreed in part appealed from so much of the first Court's decree as was adverse to him, and stamped his memorandum of appeal with a stamp which would have covered an appeal from the whole decree. The defendant did not appeal or file cross-objections. The lower Appellate Court remanded the whole case to the first Court under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiff not appealing under s. 588 (28) from the order of remand. The first Court then dismissed the whole suit, and, on appeal by the plaintiff, the lower Appellate Court confirmed the decree. On a second appeal to the High Court, *held*, (i) that the High Court was competent to consider the validity or propriety of the order of remand, though it had not been specially appealed against; (ii) that the order of remand was *ultra vires*, so far as it related to that part of the first Court's decree which was favourable to the plaintiff, the lower Appellate Court not having jurisdiction, in the absence of any appeal or objections by the defendant, to disturb that part of the decree; (iii) that the order of remand was not made valid by the subsequent appearance of the plaintiff before the first Court or by the appeal from the first Court's decree on the remand; and (iv) that the case was not covered by s. 578 of the Code. *Per MAHMOOD, J.* S. 544 had no application to the case, that section relating only to cases where one or more of the parties arrayed on the same side appealed against a decree passed on ground common to all, and not cases where either of two opposite parties appealed from a part of the decree upon a Court-fee sufficient for an appeal from the whole. *Moheshur Sing v. Bengal Government*, 7 Moo. I. A. 283, *Forbes v. Ameroonissa Begum*, 19 Moo. I. A. 340, and *Mukhun Lal v. Sree Kishen Sing*, 12 Moo. I. A. 157, referred to. *CHEDA LAL v. BADULLAH*

I. L. R. 11 All. 35

19. ——— Application to set aside sale in execution of decree—Court reversing lower Court on evidence taken before necessary party was added—*Superintendence of High Court*—*Civil Procedure Code*, s. 622. A person, alleging himself to be the undivided brother and as such the legal representative of a deceased judgment-debtor, applied to have set aside a sale of certain property alleged by him to be joint family property, which had taken place in execution of the decree. He did not make the purchaser a party to such application. The Court of first instance dismissed the application. On appeal, the Appellate Court made the purchaser a party to the proceedings, and, holding that there was irregularity in conducting the sale, reversed the order of the Court of first instance. *Held*, that the Appellate Court was wrong in so holding upon evidence recorded by the Court of first instance when the purchaser was not

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*6. INTERFERENCE WITH, AND POWER TO VARY, ORDER OF LOWER COURT—*contd.*

a party to the proceedings, and the order of the Appellate Court was set aside under s. 622 of the Code. *SUBBARAYADU v. PEDDA SUBBARAZU*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 476

20. ——— Want of cause of action—*Grounds for rejecting claim*—*Civil Procedure Code* (Act X of 1877), s. 53. In a suit for confirmation of possession and declaration of title in respect of land, where the plaintiff did not disclose any facts from which it could be said that the defendants denied the plaintiff's title, but from the proceedings in the original cause it was established that, before the suit was brought, there was a dispute existing between the parties as regards the title, and that a decree in favour of the plaintiffs had been passed by the original Court on the merits of the case:—*Held*, that, though the plaintiff might have been rejected in the first instance under s. 53 of the Civil Procedure Code, on the ground that it did not disclose any cause of action, it was too late for an Appellate Court to reverse the decree solely on that ground, without being satisfied that no such cause of action was established on the evidence. *SHAH AHMED SUJAD v. TAREE RAI* . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 343

21. ——— Power of the Court of appeal to vary decrees appealed from in consequence of circumstances occurring subsequently to the date of such decrees—*Partition suit*—*Death of a co-parcener pendente lite*. When the decree of a subordinate Court is under appeal to the High Court, it is open to the High Court to vary it either in points in which it is erroneous or in respect of matters occurring subsequently to the date of such decree which are admitted. The plaintiff obtained a decree in a partition suit in the Subordinate Judge's Court for his share in certain joint family property in the possession of the defendants (his co-parceners). The decree was affirmed on appeal. The defendants filed a second appeal in the High Court, but, before it was decided, one of the defendants died. The plaintiff at the hearing of the second appeal claimed a larger share in the family property than he had been awarded by the decree of the Courts below. *Held*, that he (plaintiff) was entitled to a share in that of the co-parcener who died *pendente lite*, and that the decree appealed from ought to be varied accordingly. *SAKHARAM MAHADEV DANGE v. HARI KRISHNA DANGE* . . . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 113

22. ——— Power to vary decree as made in the lower Court—*Decree confined to rights in issue between parties*—S. 565 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877. After the trial of issues raising the question whether the plaintiff was, or the defendants were, entitled to zamindari rights in certain mehals, a decree was made affirming the title of the plaintiff, the evidence in support of the defendant's case being discredited, and the latter were declared by the decree to be the "plaintiff's under-tenure-holders of the said mehals." This was

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*6. INTERFERENCE WITH, AND POWER TO VARY, ORDER OF LOWER COURT—*contd.*

modified on appeal by the declaration that "the defendants are patnidars of the same mouzahs." *Held*, that it was unnecessary on this appeal to consider whether the Appellate Court was right in its conclusion that the defendants were patnidars; because, upon the case which had been set up for the defendants, and upon the issues framed and tried in the lower Court, the Appellate Court could not properly make such a declaration; the defendants could not be in a better position than they would have been in had they claimed to be patnidars, in which case an issue as to that title would have been framed and tried. S. 565 of Act X of 1877 does not enable an Appellate Court to declare a right in favour of one of the parties, where no issue has been fixed on the point, and the right has not been set up in the lower Court. *OFFICIAL TRUSTEE OF BENGAL v. KRISHNA CHANDRA MOZUMDAR*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 239 : L. R. 12 I. A. 166

23.—*Court-fee—Decree—Memorandum of appeal, amendment of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 53, 582—Court-fees Act (VII of 1870).* In the generality of cases, an Appellate Court cannot pass a decree for a larger amount than that claimed in the memorandum of appeal, unless, before the judgment is pronounced, an amendment of the memorandum of appeal is allowed and the additional court-fee paid in. *PERCIVAL v. COLLECTOR OF CHITTAGONG* (1900)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 518

24.—*Decree—Memorandum of appeal, valuation of—Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), suit under—Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), ss. 8, 11.* In cases under the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), the decree awarded in appeal must be limited to the amount for which court-fee has been paid on the memorandum of appeal. *MAHOMED ALI AMJAD KHAN v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 501

25.—*Grounds arising after decree—Power of Court of Appeal to vary decree on grounds arising subsequently to decree.* It is open to the Court of Appeal to vary a decree under appeal, not only for error, but also on grounds which have come into existence since it was passed. *Sakharam v. Hari*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 113, referred to. *RUSTOMJI ASPANDYARJI SETHNA v. SHETH PURSHOTAMDAS CHATURDAS* (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 606

26.—*Alternative relief—Contending defendants—Practice.* If in a mortgage-suit, in which the plaintiffs ask for relief against two sets of defendants in the alternative, the first Court gives a decree against one set of defendants and dismisses the suit against the other, the Appellate Court has, on appeal by one set of defendants, in which the other set of defendants is made a party respondent, power to alter the decree, so as to make the latter liable, the real contest in the case being between the defendants. *Upendra Lal Mukerjee*

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*6. INTERFERENCE WITH, AND POWER TO VARY, ORDER OF LOWER COURT—*contd.*

v. Girindra Nath Mukerjee, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 565, *Hudson v. Basdeo Bajpye*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 109, and *Rupjaon Bibee v. Abdul Kadir Bhuyan*, I. L. R. 31 Calc. 643, followed. *ISWARDHARI v. SAHEBZADI* (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 538
s.c. 12 C. W. N. 720

7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

(a) GENERAL CASES.

1. ———— Objection allowed to be raised and overruled. As a general rule, objections not taken in the lower Court ought not to be allowed to be set up in the Appellate Court; but where the Judge in appeal had allowed such an objection to be taken and had overruled it, the High Court allowed it to be raised in special appeal, and, being of opinion that it was a valid objection, reversed the decision of the Court below. *DINDAYAL PARAMANIK v. SURENDRANATH ROY*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 78, note : 10 W. R. 77

2. ———— Plea sought to be raised that was not taken in the memorandum of appeal—*Civil Procedure Code*, s. 542. S. 542 of the Code of Civil Procedure was intended to confer upon the Court a power exercisable by it alone; it was not intended to enable an appellant to take the respondent by surprise by urging matter of which he had no notice. *BANSIDHAR v. SITA RAM*

I. L. R. 13 All. 381

3. ———— Objection to procedure. The errors of procedure of the Court of first instance are not to be remedied when they have not been made a ground of complaint before the lower Appellate Court. *ANURUP CHANDRA MUKHOPADHYA v. HIRAMANI DAS*

3 B. L. R. Ap. 38

ONOROOP CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. HEERA MONEE DOSSEE

11 W. R. 418

4. ———— Objection based on Full Bench ruling. An objection that the judgment of the Court of first instance is erroneous under a ruling of the Full Bench of the High Court not taken before the lower Appellate Court will not be allowed to be taken in special appeal. *NARATTAM DASS CHOWDHRY v. ROSOPYARI CHOWDHRAIN*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 271

5. ———— *Held*, that a fresh ground could not be taken in appeal which had not been taken below, though based upon a Full Bench ruling. *KASIMUDDI KHANDKAR v. NADIR ALI*

2 B. L. R. A. C. 265 : 11 W. R. 164

But see *HYES v. MONEROODDEEN AHUNG*

24 W. R. 6

BONOMALEE BAGADAR v. KYLASH CHUNDER MOJOMDAR

24 W. R. 72

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

6. ——— Objection based on point of law—*Second appeal*. An objection based upon a point of law may be made in second appeal, provided it does not involve the taking of any additional evidence on matters of disputed facts. *GAVDAPPA v. GIRIMALLAPPA*. I. L. R. 19 Bom. 331

7. ——— New point—*Discretion of Court*. On second appeal the appellant should not be allowed to raise an entirely new point, if it is one for the right determination of which it is necessary to go into evidence which has not been produced in the lower Courts, or unless it is a pure point of law going into the question of the jurisdiction of the lower Courts and capable of being determined without the consideration of any evidence other than that on the record; and even if it fall within the above exception, it is purely discretionary with the Court whether to consider it or not. *FAKIR CHAND AUDHIKARI v. ANUNDA CHUNDER BHUTACHARJI*. I. L. R. 14 Calc. 586

8. ——— Objection which, if taken, might have been cured. An objection which, if taken, might have been cured, and which has not been taken in the Court below, cannot be taken in the Court of appeal. *DHURM DASS PANDEY v. SHAMA SOONDERY DEBIA*. 6 W. R. P. C. 43: 3 Moo. I. A. 229

9. ——— Objection taken too late. A point not taken in either of the lower Courts was disallowed as being too late when taken for the first time at the hearing of the special appeal. *MAHA-DAJI v. VYANKAJI GOVIND*. I. L. R. 1 Bom. 197

RAMABAI SAHEB PATVARDHAN v. APPA. 12 Bom. 13

CHUNDEE CHURN ROY v. RAM COOMAR DUTT. 7 W. R. 413

BUNSEE LALL v. AOLADH AHSAN. 22 W. R. 552

10. ——— Allowing objections. The High Court allowed objections to be taken by a defendant which had not been taken in either of the lower Courts. *BHUBAN CHANDRA SHOME v. RAMDAYAL SHAMANTA*. 5 B. L. R. Ap. 62: 14 W. R. 55

RAMTARAK KARATI v. DINANATH MANDAL. 7 B. L. R. 184
24 W. R. 414 note

11. ——— Objection apparent on pleadings. The High Court can raise and adjudicate upon certain points in special appeal, when they are apparent on the face of the pleadings, even though the parties to the suit are silent. *ENAFET HOSSEIN v. KUREEMOONISSA*. 3 W. R. 40

12. ——— Objection involving point of mixed law and fact—*Second appeal*. An objection involving a point of law as well as of fact,

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

if not taken in the Court below, cannot be entertained in second appeal. *VASANJIT HARIBHAI v. LALLU AKHU*. I. L. R. 9 Bom. 285

13. ——— Question of mixed law and fact raised for first time in Appellate Court—*Objection taken for first time on appeal*. *Semble*: When a question raised before the Appellate Court is a mixed one of law and fact, and one which was not raised before the Court of first instance, it is doubtful whether the Appellate Court should allow it to be raised. *UMRAO BIBI v. MAHOMED ROJABI*. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 205
4 C. W. N. 76

14. ——— Objection not taken on cross-appeal—*Remand*. An objection not taken in cross-appeal before the lower Appellate Court cannot be taken in special appeal; but if the case be remanded for new trial, such objection may then be taken before the Court of first instance. *DURGARAM ROY v. NARSING DEB*. 2 B. L. R. A. C. 254

DOORGARAM ROY v. NUROSINGH DEB. 11 W. R. 134

15. ——— Omission to prefer appeal against remand order—*Objection to its legality on special appeal*. The omission of a party to prefer an appeal against an order of remand does not preclude him from questioning its legality when it comes up in special appeal from the subsequent decision passed after remand. *MAGARAM OJHA v. NILMONEE SINGH DEO*. 13 B. L. R. 198
21 W. R. 326

16. ——— Objection taken but not pressed. Where an objection taken in the grounds of appeal is not pressed at the hearing of the case, it cannot be raised again in special appeal. *NOBOKRISTO SIRCAR v. KALACHAND DOSS*. 12 W. R. 470

SOORJO KANT BANERJEE v. KRISTO KISHORE PODDAR. 14 W. R. 423

17. ——— Want of opportunity to raise objection. A defendant is entitled to take in the Appellate Court an objection which he had no opportunity of taking until the case was heard in appeal. *LOWA JHA v. BISSESHUR SINGH*. 11 W. R. 6

18. ——— Objection by pro formâ defendant. A pro formâ defendant cannot be allowed to raise in appeal objections which he neglected to raise in the suit. *DEOKEENUNDUN ROY v. KALEE PERSHAD*. W. R. 1864, Mis. 34

As to taking objections for the first time, see also *MANIRUDDEEN AHMED v. RAM CHAND*. 2 B. L. R. A. C. 341

NAIMUDDA JOWARDAR v. SCOTT MONCRIEFF. 3 B. L. R. A. C. 283

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*conclld.*

- NYEMODDEE JOWARDAR v. MONCRIEFF
12 W. R. 140
- NANOO ROY v. JHOOMUCK LALL DASS
12 B. L. R. 292 note : 18 W. R. 376
- GOUR KISHORE DUTT v. AKBUR
22 W. R. 489
- SHEO GOBIND RAWUT v. ABHAY NARAIN SINGH
5 B. L. R. Ap. 17

(b) SPECIAL CASES.

19. ——— Adoption—*Objection to invalid adoption.* An objection (that an adoption was invalid, because the party adopted was the eldest son of his natural father) was rejected in special appeal, because not urged in the lower Courts at any stage of the trial, and not specifically taken in the petition of special appeal. JOY TARA DOSSEE CHOWDHRAIN v. ROY CHUNDER GHOSE

1 W. R. 136

20. ——— Omission of performance of ceremonies. *Held*, that, as no objection to the omission of any of the usual ceremonies of adoption or to the age of the adopted son was taken before the lower Court, its decision was not open to those objections when taken on appeal. DURYAO SINGH v. KARTUN SINGH

1 Agra 31

21. ——— Objection to share taken on adoption—*Objection on appeal to extent of share awarded to adopted son.* In a suit by an adopted son to recover his share in his adoptive father's estate, a son having been born to the adoptive father, subsequently to the plaintiff's adoption, the Court of first instance awarded the plaintiff a fourth share of the property in dispute. The defendant appealed to the District Court, but in appeal raised no question as to the extent of the share awarded to the plaintiff. On second appeal to the High Court, it was contended that, in any event, the plaintiff was only entitled to a fifth share. *Held*, that, under the circumstances and having regard to the nature of the question, the point might be taken in second appeal on behalf of the defendant, and the High Court varied the decree by awarding the plaintiff a fifth share instead of a fourth share, but ordered the appellant (defendant) to bear his own costs of the appeal. GIRIAPA v. NINGAPA

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 100

22. ——— Alienation—*Alienation by member of Mitakshara family—Invalidity of alienation—Proof of consideration.* A father having executed a deed conveying certain ancestral property to two persons (*D* and *B*), who alienated it to several others, his son sued to have the conveyances by *D* and *B* set aside on the ground that the deed given by the father was benami, and that *D* and *B* never had possession. The suit was dis-

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

missed by both the lower Courts. *Held*, that, as plaintiff went to trial in the Courts below upon one issue only, *viz.*, whether *D* and *B* were ever really in occupation, he was not entitled in special appeal to complain that evidence had not been taken as to the passing of consideration-money. *Held*, that, as no issue was raised in the lower Courts which could have been the foundation for a declaration of right, the non-decision of a claim to such a declaration could not be made a ground of special appeal. *Held*, that where the question whether the alienation of certain property by the father without the son's consent was valid under the Mitakshara law was not raised in the lower Courts, such invalidity could not be admitted as a ground of objection in special appeal, for it necessarily involved an issue of fact. PURIAG DUTT v. BROJO KOONWAR

9 W. R. 503

BENODE PATNAIK v. DOYANIDHEE BULLIOR SINGH

9 W. R. 493

23. ——— Appeal—*Objection that no appeal lies.* The High Court refused to entertain an objection (not taken till the close of the appellant's argument) that, the amount in appeal being less than Rs. 5,000, no appeal would lie. CHUNDER NATH MISSEER v. SIRDAR KHAN

18 W. R. 218

24. ——— Attachment—*Invalidity of attachment.* An objection that an attachment under s. 240 of Act VIII of 1859 was invalid, because the formalities required by s. 239 had not been complied with, was not allowed to be taken on appeal, it not having been raised in the Courts below. RAMKRISHNA DAS SUDROWJI v. SURFUNDISSA BEGUM

I. L. R. 6 Cal. 129

25. ——— Award—*Objection that arbitrators had no power to administer other than usual oath.* Where on a reference to arbitration the arbitrators had made an award founded on the evidence of the defendant after he had by agreement been sworn on the Koran, and an objection was taken that the arbitrators had no power to administer such oath, and that the award was invalid: *Held per* PEARSON, J. (SPANKIE, J., doubting), that, as the objection was one which vitally affected the procedure of the arbitrators, it could not be ignored, although it was not preferred in the lower Courts, and was not to be found in the memorandum of special appeal. WALIULLA v. GHULAM ALI

I. L. R. 1 All. 535

26. ——— Objection to validity of award. Where objection to the validity of the award on the ground that it was made beyond the time allowed was not taken by the defendant in the first Court:—*Held*, that he was not thereby estopped from raising the objection for the first time in appeal, inasmuch as it was not shown that in the first Court he was aware of the defect, or had

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

done anything to imply consent to extension of the time. *CHUHA MAL HARI RAM*

I. L. R. 8 All. 548

27. ———— *Coverture—Plea of coverture—Execution of decree.* The plea of coverture not allowed to be raised against a decree-holder, because not taken when she first sought to execute the decree. *KIRKBY v. DILLONS*

1 N. W., Ed. 1873, 243

28. ———— *Custom—Objection as to custom against inheritance.* In a suit by a Hindu widow for possession and declaration of title:—*Held*, that defendant could not be allowed to come in and urge for the first time on appeal that, by a family custom or koolachar, females were excluded from inheriting. *DOORGA PERSHAD SINGH v. DOORGA KOONWAREE* 13 W. R. 10 : 9 B. L. R. 306, note

29. ———— *Damages, measure of—Mode of calculation of damages.* *Held*, that, as the defendant had made no objection to the manner in which the plaintiff had calculated damages in the Courts below, the question could not be gone into on special appeal. *MCDONALD v. RAJARAM ROY*

3 B. L. R. Ap. 28 : 11 W. R. 371

30. ———— *Decree, form of.* An objection as to the form of a decree not allowed to be taken in the first time on special appeal. *MOHESUR BUKSH SINGH v. MUTHOORAPERSHAD*

8 W. R. 515

31. ———— *Defence not raised in the lower Court—Declaratory decree, suit for—Objection to declaratory decree.* *B J*, a Hindu widow, made a will disposing of property, of which under an award she had only the use during her life, and to which the plaintiff, her son, was entitled after her death. While she was still living, the plaintiff filed this suit, praying that the will might be declared invalid. The defendants were the testatrix and those who took under the will. While the suit was pending, the testatrix died. The Subordinate Judge passed a decree in plaintiff's favour, and declared the will invalid. The defendants appealed, and contended for the first time in appeal that the allegations in the plaint, *viz.*, that the will was in their favour, and that they (the defendants) were interested in denying the plaintiff's title as reversioner, did not constitute a case in which, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, a declaratory decree ought to be made. *Held*, that, as the objection was taken for the first time in appeal, it would be unjust to allow the defendants to benefit after they had failed to resist *G's* claim on the merits. *MAGANLAL PURUSHOTTAM v. GOVINDAL NAGINDAS*

[I. L. R. 15 Bom. 697

See *BOMBAY-BURMAH TRADING CORPORATION v. SMITH* I. L. R. 17 Bom. 197

32. ———— *Enhancement—Waiver of objection.* In a suit for enhancement of rent, where

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

defendant pleaded Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 4, plaintiff referred in both the lower Courts to a chittee to prove variation of rent; but it was found that the terms of the chittee barred enhancement. *Held*, that it was not open to plaintiff in special appeal to object that the chittee had not been proved. *LALLA BANEE PERSHAD v. LALLA DABEE PERSHAD*

24 W. R. 435

33. ———— *Service of notice.* In a suit for enhancement of rent it was objected on behalf of the defendant in special appeal that service of notice had not been proved. *Held*, that the question was one of fact, and the objection ought, therefore, to have been taken in the Court of first instance. *DUMAINE v. UTTAM SINGH*

5 B. L. R. Ap. 44

13 W. R. 462

34. ———— *Objection to want of notice of enhancement.* An objection that no notice of enhancement had been served, though not taken in the Court below, was allowed to be taken on appeal. *THEKMEE BELDAR v. RAM KISHEN LALL* 15 W. R. 71

But not a technical objection to the form of notice. *SHREE GOPAUL MULLICK v. DWARKANATH SEIN* 15 W. R. 520

SHAMA SOONDUREE DEBIA v. DEGUMBUREE DEBIA 21 W. R. 368

Ssee WOOMA CHURN DUTT v. GRISH CHUNDER BOSE 17 W. R. 32

RAM RUTTUN GHOSE v. PROSUNNO NATH BHUTACHARJEE 20 W. R. 203

35. ———— *Informality of notice of enhancement.* Where a notice of enhancement, though informal, was sufficient to inform the raiyat of the landlord's intention to increase the rent to the rates paid for similar lands in places adjacent, and the notice was accepted by the raiyat, and treated by him in the lower Court as a notice under cl. 1, s. 17, Act X of 1859, it was held that the informality could not be objected to for the first time in the High Court in special appeal. *KASHEENATH DEB v. SHIBESSUREE DEBIA* 8 W. R. 503

36. ———— *Suit to contest enhancement—Irrigation expenses.* *Held*, that in a suit for enhancement the plea of increased expense on account of irrigation cannot be admitted for the first time in special appeal. *KUNCHUN SINGH v. SHEORAJ* 1 Agra Rev. 7

37. ———— *Objection not taken before as being unnecessary.* A suit for enhancement of rent was defended on two grounds, the first of which was overruled, but the second succeeded, and the suit was dismissed. Plaintiff appealed, and the second ground having been overruled in appeal, the respondent (defendant) again put forward the objection which had been over-

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

ruled by the first Court. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, it was not too late for him to take that objection. *TAREE MAHTOON v. RAM SAHOY SINGH*
25 W. R. 110

38. ———— *Evidence—Time for objection to evidence.* It is the duty of the party who wishes to object to evidence to object in the first instance, and not to delay doing so until the case is before the High Court in special appeal. *SEETUL PERSHAD MITTER v. JUNMEJOY MULLICK*
12 W. R. 244

39. ———— *Objections to evidence as not being the best.* Objections to evidence as not being the best evidence should not be allowed to be taken on special appeal. *AVUDH BEHAREE SINGH v. RAM RAJ TEWAREE*
18 W. R. 105

LOCHUN SINGH v. HET NARAIN SINGH
24 W. R. 232

40. ———— *Objection to mode of recording evidence.* The objection that the depositions of the witnesses were not taken in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, but only notes of the evidence, is not one which can be taken in special appeal. *LALL MAHOMED v. PEER NUZUR*
18 W. R. 112

41. ———— *Documents, though inadmissible, admitted in first Court by consent—Documents not objected to in first Court—Appeal.* Judgments not *inter partes*, though not conclusive as *res judicata*, are admissible in evidence under s. 13 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) to show the conduct of the parties, or particular instances of the exercise of a right, or admissions made by the parties or their predecessors in title, or to identify property, or to show how it has been previously dealt with. Where parties to a suit, in order to save delay or expense or for any other reason, have agreed or not objected to the admission of certain evidence given in some former proceedings, although it is not strictly admissible, and the first Court has allowed this to be done, it is not open to the Appellate Court to take objection to such a procedure and exclude the evidence. *LAKSHMAN GOVIND v. AMRIT GOPAL*
I. L. R. 24 Bom. 591

42. ———— *Objection as to admissibility of evidence.* It being objected in special appeal that the decision of the lower Appellate Court was based on documents which were neither admissible as legal evidence nor had any bearing on the point to be decided:—*Held*, that, though the objection to the admissibility of the evidence ought to have been taken in the Court in which the evidence was tendered, yet coming in such a shape as it did, it could not be got over. *Held*, also, (*MITTER, J., dissentiente*), that as defendant has succeeded in special appeal on an objec-

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

tion which he should have taken before, he ought to pay his own costs in this appeal, even should he succeed ultimately (the case being remanded); and that it is not the exclusive duty of a Court, but that of pleaders also, to see whether evidence tendered is legally admissible. *MUNRAKHUN ROY v. JUGGUT DOSS*
10 W. R. 124

43. ———— *Objection as to admissibility of evidence.* The reception of papers and documents by the lower Appellate Court, unless objected to at the time, cannot be made a ground of special appeal. *RASH BEHARI SINGH v. NABAYI PODDAR*
3 B. L. R. A. C. 99
11 W. R. 465

44. ———— *Objection as to admissibility of evidence.* Where no objection has been taken as to the admissibility of documentary evidence,—*viz.*, a decree and other proceedings in regard to that decree, which had been made use of by the opposite party,—an Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to exclude it. Where defendant allows, without objection, a purchaser of a plaintiff's interest in the suit to substitute his name on the record under an order of Court, he cannot afterwards contend that the suit is thereby abated. *BIR CHANDRA ROY MAHAPATTER v. BANSI DHAR ROY MAHAPATTER*
3 B. L. R. A. C. 214

45. ———— *Evidence received without objection.* Where a deposition made in another suit, to which special appellant was not a party, was admitted and used by the first Court without any objection on the part of the special appellant, it was held that he could not be allowed to object it in special appeal. Where the lower Appellate Court's judgment is good, and its adjudication of a plaintiff's right has been based on a sound principle, the High Court will not allow a new point to be taken in special appeal which was not taken in either of the Courts below. *WAZEER JEMADAR v. NOOR ALI*
12 W. R. 33

46. ———— *Objection to validity of document.* Before an objection to the validity of a document filed as evidence in a case can be admitted as a ground of special appeal, it must be shown to have been made at every stage in the Courts below. *JOYKISHEN MOOKERJEE v. RAJKISHEN MOOKERJEE*
12 W. R. 315

47. ———— *Where a party in the first Court raises the question that a document is not genuine, it is open to him to take in the Appellate Court any ground in support thereof, although the same may not have been taken in the first Court.* *HATMABATI DAS v. GOVINDA CHANDRA GHOSH*
2 C. W. N. 695

48. ———— *Objection to evidence wrongly received.* An objection to the effect that the Court of first instance had given judgment

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

on the strength of a document which ought to have been registered, was not admitted in special appeal, as it had not been raised either in the first Court or in the lower Appellate Court. JOYGOPAL MOZOOMDAR v. THAKOMONEE DABEE . . . 11 W. R. 381

49. ———— *Evidence wrongly received without objection.* Objection as to reception of evidence not before objected to disallowed on special appeal. GODAYI JOARDAR v. MEARS . . . 10 W. R. 50

RUGHONATH PERSHAD v. HUREE MOHUNT . . . 10 W. R. 37

CHADEE SINGH v. BEHAREE TEWAREE . . . 10 W. R. 91

MUKDOOMUNNISSA v. NOKHY SINGH . . . 24 W. R. 296

ANAR MOLLAH v. HILLS . . . 10 W. R. 139

KUSSEN KAMINEE DOSSEE v. RAM CHUNDER MITTER . . . 12 W. R. 13

PROTAP CHUNDER BOROOAH v. COLLECTOR OF GOWALPARA . . . 22 W. R. 216

50. ———— *Objection to unregistered document—Regular appeal.* Held, that the Court is bound in regular appeal to entertain an objection that a document is invalid for want of registration, even though no objection may have been raised to its admissibility in the Court below. BASAWA GURBASAWA v. KALKAPA . . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 489

51. ———— *Held*, that, as the plea as to the inadmissibility of a document as evidence for want of registration was not specially taken in the Court below, it could not be allowed in a special appeal. GRISH CHANDRA ROY CHOWDHRY v. AMINA KHATUN . . . 3 B. L. R. Ap. 121

52. ———— *Costs.* Whether the lower Appellate Court wrongly gave effect to an unregistered bond which, by reason of its being unregistered, was not admissible in evidence, no objection being taken by the parties to its being admitted: *Held*, that the objection must prevail when taken for the first time in special appeal, but the party taking it was not entitled to the costs of the appeal. OOMATOOL FATIMA v. GHUNNOO SINGH . . . 19 W. R. 22

53. ———— *Objection that document is improperly stamped.* The plaintiff appealed to the Judge against a dismissal of his suit, who reversed the decision of the Court below, and gave the plaintiff a decree. The defendant thereupon appealed to the High Court on the ground that a document had been admitted in evidence in support of the plaintiff's case, which did not bear a proper stamp. *Held*, that the defendant, having omitted to take the objection before the Judge, could not appeal on this ground. RAMBREM LAL v. ABLUCKH SINGH . . . Marsh. 267: 2 Hay 148

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

54. ———— *Objection to document as evidence not raised in lower Court.* If no objection is taken in the Court of first instance to the reception of a document in evidence, it is not within the province of the Appellate Court to raise or recognize it in appeal. CHIMNAJI GOVIND GODBOLE v. DINKAR DHONDEV GODBOLE . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 320

55. ———— *Refusal to examine witnesses.* A Court of first instance, being satisfied that plaintiff's case could not be established, refused to examine defendant's witnesses. The lower Appellate Court, differing from the Munsiff, gave plaintiff a decree. *Held*, that, although the Munsiff had committed a great irregularity, still, as that point was not raised in the lower Appellate Court, it could not be taken in special appeal. GOOROO DASS AKHOOLEE v. PORAN MUNDLE . . . 12 W. R. 363

56. ———— *An objection that the Court had refused to examine witnesses, if not brought before the Appeal Court, cannot be raised on special appeal.* OSMAN SINGH v. CHUMMUN MAHTOO . . . 15 W. R. 87

57. ———— *It is too late to make an objection, for the first time in second appeal, that a certain witness, for whose evidence no application had been made in the Courts below, ought to have been examined by the Appellate Court.* SOMASHEKHARA v. SUBHADRAMAJI . . . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 524

58. ———— *Refusal to take evidence.* Where the Court refuses to take evidence offered that fact should be made the ground of regular appeal, and not first set up in special appeal. LALLA DEBEEDEN v. SHEO GHOOOLAM SINGH . . . 2 N. W. 206

59. ———— *Execution of decree—Mode of execution—Discretion of Court.* When the mode of execution has not been specifically objected to in the Court below, the High Court will not interfere. DWARKANATH DASS BISWAS v. UNNODA CHURN DASS . . . 8 W. R. 318

60. ———— *Objection that decree cannot be executed in portions.* A decree cannot be executed in aliquot parts, but where it was objected for the first time in second appeal that a person seeking execution of a portion of decree was not entitled to execution, the High Court refused to allow the objection. GOODUR SAROY v. DHUNNESHUR KOBR . . . 7 C. L. R. 117

61. ———— *Form of suit—Madras Local Boards Act (Madras Act V of 1884), s. 27.* An objection that the suit was not properly framed was not allowed to be taken for the first time on second appeal in a suit brought under the Madras Local

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

Boards Act. PRESIDENT OF THE TALUK BOARD *v.*
NARAYANAN . . . I. L. R. 16 Mad. 317

62. ———— **Fraud—Omission to allege fraud.** *Held*, that defendant could not be allowed in special appeal to object that the lower Court had not determined the *bona fides* of plaintiff's purchase, unless he (defendant) had not only alleged fraud, but shown the way in which the fraud was intended to be carried out. *BOIKUNTO NATH SETT v. RUSSICK LALL BURMONO* . . . 10 W. R. 231

63. ———— **Guardian—Objection as to due appointment of guardian.** Where plaintiff claimed as his inheritance what had been sold to defendants by his mother to liquidate debts due by his late father, it was held, first, that it was too late in special appeal to raise doubts as to his mother having been plaintiff's guardian when the objection had not been taken below at any stage of the proceedings. *KOOL CHUNDER SURMAH v. RAMJOY SURMONA* . . . 10 W. R. 8

64. ———— **Want of certificate—Maxim "Omnia præsuntur rite esse acta."** On a suggestion taken for the first time in special appeal that a guardian has not obtained a certificate, it will not be assumed for the purpose of reversing the decree that such is the case. It will be presumed rather that the proceedings in the Court below have been regularly conducted until irregularity be shown. *THUMMUN v. GOLAB RAE* . . . 2 N. W. 89

65. ———— **Issues—Omission to raise issues.** Where appellant satisfies the Court that he has been substantially injured by no issues being framed by the Judge previous to his decision, effect will be given to such objection. *SAH KOONDUN LALL v. MAKHUN LALL* . . . 1 N. W. 168, Ed. 1873, 247

66. ———— **Jurisdiction.** The defendant objected to the jurisdiction of the first Court, but took no objection to the jurisdiction before the lower Appellate Court. *Held*, that objection to the jurisdiction was waived. *MAHOMED HOSSEIN v. AKAYA NARAYAN PAL* . . . 2 B. L. R. Ap. 42: 18 W. R. 37 note

HURISH CHUNDER ROY v. POORNA SOONDUREE DEBEE . . . 1 E. V. 35

67. ———— **Suit brought in Court without jurisdiction—N.-W. P. Rent Act, XVIII of 1873, s. 206.** As the plaintiff's claim, instituted in the Civil Court to eject the defendant, a quondam tenant, and to recover mesne profits, could not be entertained in any suit in any Court, the provisions of s. 206 of Act XVIII of 1873, that the objection that a suit was instituted in the wrong Court shall not be entertained by the Appellate Court, unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance, were not applicable. *RAM ATTAR RAI v. TALIMUNDI KUAR* . . . 7 N. W. 49

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

68. ———— **Summary suit for possession.** A and B obtained a decree for possession of land against C. On their proceeding to execute their decree, D, who was in possession, presented a petition to the Munsif, complaining that they were thereby attempting unlawfully to interfere with his possession. The case was tried, on remand from the Judge, as a suit under the provisions of s. 229 of Act VIII of 1859. *Held, per JACKSON, J.*, that, as the decree-holder had not complained that the officer of the Court had been obstructed or resisted by the claimant, the case did not fall within s. 229 of Act VIII of 1859; and, therefore, the Court had not jurisdiction to take summary cognizance of the case. *Per MITTER, J.* This objection, taken for the first time on special appeal, did not affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. *BUHAL SINGH CHOWDHRY v. BEHARI LALL* . . . 1 B. L. R. A. C. 206: 10 W. R. 318

69. ———— **Objection to suit for mesne profits as being matter for execution—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244.** A landlord sued his tenant for arrears of rent, and obtained a decree for a certain amount and a declaration that, if the amount were not paid within fifteen days, the tenant should be ejected under s. 52, Act VIII of 1869. The amount was not paid and the landlord executed the decree and obtained possession. The tenant appealed, and succeeded in getting the decree set aside, and the amount found due from him for arrears by the first Court was reduced and a decree made, directing that, if the reduced amount were not paid within fifteen days, he should be ejected. He paid the amount found due by the Appellate Court within the fifteen days, and recovered possession of his holding. He then brought a suit in the Munsif's Court to recover mesne profits from his landlord for the time he was in possession after the execution of the first Court's decree. It was contended on second appeal that the suit would not lie, as the matter might and should have been determined in the execution department under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that, as the suit was instituted in the Munsif's Court and the Munsif, under the circumstances of the case, was the officer who, in the first instance, would have had to determine the matter in the execution department, there was at most only an error of procedure and no exercise of jurisdiction by the Munsif which he did not possess, and that upon the authority of the decision in *Purmessurree Pershad Narain Singh v. Jankee Kooer*, 19 W. R. 90, this could not be made a ground of objection on appeal. *Held*, also that, the point being one that was not raised in the pleadings or before either of the lower Courts, and being a point which went exclusively to the jurisdiction of the Court, it

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

could not be raised on second appeal. *AZIZUDDIN HOSSEIN v. RAMANUGRA ROY*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 605

70. ———— Objection affecting jurisdiction—*Want of proper certificate—Suits under Dekkan Agriculturists Relief Act. Held*, that an objection taken to a suit under the Dekkan Agriculturists Relief Act on the ground that a proper certificate had not been obtained could be taken for the first time on second appeal, as it was an objection affecting the jurisdiction of the Courts below. *NYAMATULA v. NANA VALAD FARIDSHA*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 424

71. ———— Jurisdiction, objection to—*Objection apparent on face of plaint.* Where the objection was not taken in the Court below, but was apparent on the face of the plaint and had reference to the jurisdiction of the Court: the Court held they must consider it. *RAMAYYA v. SUBBARAYUDU*

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 25

72. ———— *N.-W.-P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), s. 206.* Under s. 206 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, when no objection to the jurisdiction was taken in the first Court, an objection to the jurisdiction is not to be entertained in the Appellate Court, but the Judge must try the case upon the facts, and apply the law applicable to those facts. *Debi Saran Lal v. Debi Saran Upadhia*, I. L. R. 6 All. 378, approved. *MADHO LAL v. SHEO PRASAD MISR*

I. L. R. 12 All. 419

73. ———— Question of jurisdiction taken for first time on appeal. An objection to the jurisdiction of the Court may be taken at any stage of the suit, and the Court is not only competent, but bound to take notice of it. In this case it was taken and allowed on appeal. *RANCHOD MORAR v. BEZANJI EDULJI*

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 86

74. ———— Jurisdiction—*Suit for property wrongly taken in execution of decree—Separate suit brought where proceeding should have been in execution.* Where a suit for the recovery of lands taken by the decree-holder in excess of his decree has been held not to lie under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, but the suit had been instituted in the Court which had jurisdiction to execute the decree, the plaint may be regarded as an application to that Court for determining the question whether the lands are covered by the decree, and the suit does not therefore fail for want of jurisdiction. *Purmessurree Pershad Narain Singh v. Jankee Koo r*, 19 W. R. 90, and *Azizuddin Hossein v. Ramanugra Roy*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 605, referred to and followed. *Held*, also, that in such a case it is incumbent upon the defendant to raise the plea of jurisdiction in the Court of first instance, the question being not a pure question of law, but a question which would depend upon facts. *BIRU MAHATA v. SHYAMA CHURN KHAWAS*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 483

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

75. ———— Objection to jurisdiction on the ground of wrong valuation of suit—*Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1889), s. 11.* The High Court held that it was not at liberty to entertain an objection that the suit was not within the pecuniary limits of the District Munsif's jurisdiction, as it appeared that the appellant had not been prejudiced on the merits. *MUTHUSAMI MUDALIAR v. NALLAKULANTHA MUDALIAR*

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 418

76. ———— Objection taken for first time in second appeal that preliminaries to suit have not been taken—*Question of jurisdiction.* In a suit for declaration of the plaintiff's right to have their names registered as purchasers of a tenure, an objection having been raised in second appeal that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, as the plaintiffs had not previously asked the Collector to place them on the register:—*Held*, that this circumstance was not necessary to give jurisdiction, although it might be a reason for treating the suit as premature. That objection, however, being taken for the first time in second appeal was disallowed. *BHUKAJI BAJI v. PANDU*

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 43

77. ———— *Kabuliat, suit for—Failure to prove case.* Where, in answer to a suit for a *kabuliat* at a specified rent, defendant pleaded in the Court below, not that plaintiff was not entitled to any *kabuliat* at all, but that he was not entitled to a *kabuliat* at the rates he claimed:—*Held*, that defendant could not be allowed in special appeal to take advantage of the Full Bench ruling in *Gholam Mahomed v. Asmut Ali Khan*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 974 : 10 W. R., F. B., 14, and ask for the suit to be dismissed. *GHOLAM ALI v. ADGUR ALI*

11 W. R. 105

78. ———— *Failure to prove case.* In a suit for a *kabuliat* at an enhanced rate, the Court of first instance gave a decree for an amount less than that of the claim. No objection was taken before the lower Appellate Court, that, under the Full Bench ruling in *Gholam Mahomed v. Asmut Ali Khan Chowdhry*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 974 : 10 W. R., F. B., 14, the suit was liable to be dismissed. This objection was taken for the first time in special appeal. *Held*, that the objection could not be entertained. *NIZANUT ALI v. ROMESH CHANDRA ROY*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 78 : 11 W. R. 430

But see *HAMED ALI v. AFFEEOODDEN*

1 B. L. R. S. N. 14 : 10 W. R. 213

79. ———— *Omission to tender pottah.* The lower Appellate Court ought not to have entertained the objection of the defendant that no *pottah* had been tendered before the institution of the suit, as the objection had not been taken before the first Court. That issue was not essential to the right determination of the suit upon

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

the merits. RAMANATH RAKHIT v. CHAND HARRI
BEUVA 6 B. L. R. 356

80. ———— *Omission to tender pottah.* In a suit for a kabuliat an objection cannot be raised on appeal for the first time that a pottah had not been tendered. DOORGA KANT MOZOOMDAR v. BISHESHUR DUTT CHOWDHURY
W. R., 1884, Act X, 44

81. ———— *Landlord and tenant—Suit to have pottah cancelled.* Where a plaintiff sued to have the defendants' pottah cancelled on the ground of fraud, to restrain them from felling trees, and for a declaration that a certain shola was Government property:—*Held*, that, having failed to establish the grounds upon which relief was claimed, the plaintiff was not entitled to object on appeal, for the first time, that the defendants were merely tenants from year to year. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. NUNJA I. L. R. 5 Mad. 163

82. ———— *Limitation—Possession.* Where a defendant in the lower Court pleaded limitation, but placed that issue upon the simple fact that he himself had possession for twelve years and upwards, which issue was found against him:—*Held*, that it was too late for the defendant in special appeal to object that that finding did not dispose of the issue of limitation. KISTO MOHUN KURMOKAR v. NOYAN TARA DOSSEE 10 W. R. 389

83. ———— *Minority—Right of member of family to alienate.* A plaintiff obtained a decree to set aside an alienation of ancestral property effected by his father during his minority. Defendant objected in special appeal, first, that the suit was barred by lapse of time since plaintiff attained his majority; and, secondly, that, under the Mitakshara law, the father had a right to alienate a share of the property. *Held*, that, as the first of these objections was entirely a matter of fact, and as the second, though essentially a matter of law, went to the substance of the plaintiff's claim, they should have been urged in the lower Courts, and could not be admitted for the first time in special appeal. BENODE PUTNAIK v. DOYANIDHREE BULLIOR SINGH 9 W. R. 493

84. ———— *Settlement.* In the first Court an issue was raised whether or not the hearing of this suit was barred by the law of limitation. One of the grounds of appeal to the Judge was, that the Principal Sudder Ameen ought to have held the suit barred as regards the *diaras* under the special limitation of three years from the date of the Collector's settlement. The Judge did not notice this ground in his judgment. The same ground of appeal was repeated in the special appeal to the High Court, but that Court refused to entertain it, for the reason that it did not appear to have been raised in argument before the Judge or in the

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

first Court. RAJ KUNWAR *alias* SHEOMURAT KUNWAR v. INDERJIT KUNWAR
5 B. L. R. 585 : 13 W. R. 52

85. ———— *Guardian and Ward—Minority.* A sued B to recover possession of a hereditary jote, of which he alleged he had been dispossessed by B during his minority. B raised the defence of limitation and relinquishment by A's grandmother and guardian. The Munsif held that the suit was not barred on the ground that it had been brought within three years from the date on which A had attained his majority, but decided against A on the merits. On appeal the question of limitation was not raised, but on the merits the Judge also found against A. On special appeal by A, B took an objection under s. 348 of Act VIII of 1859 that A's suit was barred. *Held*, that B could not take the objection at that stage. KEDERNATH MOOKERJEE v. MATHURANATH DUTT
1 B. L. R. A. C. 17 : 10 W. R. 59

86. ———— Where an objection that the suit was barred by limitation was not taken into consideration by the lower Appellate Court, and in special appeal the facts necessary to support the plea of limitation were stated in the ground of appeal, but for another reason and in another form than those for which it was raised before, the High Court allowed the objection to be taken and to prevail, and dismissed the suit. BISSONATH SURMA v. SHOODAMOKEE
11 B. L. R. Ap. 1 : 20 W. R. 1

87. ———— *Setting aside ex-parte case.* A Munsif entertained a petition by a defendant under s. 119 of the Civil Procedure Code, and set aside his former judgment given *ex-parte* in favour of the plaintiff, and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff, on appeal before the Judge, did not raise the objection that the Munsif ought not to have entertained the petition of the defendant, as it had not been presented in due time. It was held to be too late to raise the objection on special appeal. BORO KHASIA v. JATA SIRDAR
8 B. L. R. 78 : 15 W. R. 315

88. ———— *Limitation.* Where the question of limitation was raised for the first time on second appeal: *Held*, that it could not be decided against the plaintiff. SHIVAPA v. DOD NAGAYA I. L. R. 11 Bom. 114

89. ———— *Merger—Plea of merger.* A plea of merger cannot be raised for the first time in special appeal. RUSTON v. ATKINSON
11 W. R. 485

90. ———— *Misjoinder—Misjoinder of causes of action—Suit for arrears of rent—Separate leases.* The Court refused to admit in special appeal the plea that the lessor should have instituted separate suits to recover the arrears of rent due on each lease, as it allowed the objection that the leases

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

could not be declared forfeited for the aggregate of the arrears of rent and cesses due on both leases, but that the forfeiture of each lease was incurred in respect of the arrears due on it, and that the lower Courts should have therefore determined and declared in their decrees what was the amount of arrear due in respect of rent and cesses on each lease separately. *GOLABI SINGH v. RAI NORMAL CHAND* 6 N. W. 342

91. ————— *Misjoinder of causes of action.* An objection that the plaintiff has joined together causes of action which, by s. 44 of the Civil Procedure Code, may not be joined together without leave first obtained, is taken too late for the first time in the Court of Appeal after the case has been already heard on its merits. *DHONDIBA KRISHNAJI PATEL v. RAMCHANDRA BHAGVAT* I. L. R. 5 Bom. 554

GUNESH PERSAD v. WILSON W. R., 1864, Act X, 86

92. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 44—Misjoinder of causes of action—Objection not taken in Court of first instance.* An objection under s. 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to misjoinder of causes of action should be taken in the Court of first instance, and not for the first time on appeal. Where such an objection had been raised for the first time in appeal, the High Court in second appeal declined to entertain it. *Dondiba Krishnaji Patel v. Ramchandra Bhagvat*, I. L. R. 5 Bom. 554, followed. *MAULA v. GULZARI SINGH* I. L. R. 16 All. 130

93. ————— *Misjoinder of parties.* Misjoinder of parties is not an objection which can be allowed to be taken in special appeal. *TILUCK CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. MUDDUN MOHUN JOOGEE* 12 W. R. 504

LALL MAHOMED v. PEER NUZUR 18 W. R. 112

LUCHMEE DHUR PATTUCK v. RUGHOOBUR SINGH 24 W. R. 286

94. ————— *Held, that, even if there had been a misjoinder, the plea could not be allowed in second appeal, as the defendants had not been prejudiced.* *MALAGURI GARUDIAH v. NARAYANA RUNGIAH* I. L. R. 3 Mad. 359

NUJMOODDEEN AHMED v. ZUHOORUN 10 W. R. 45

RAM DOYAL DUTT v. RAM DOOLAL DEB 11 W. R. 273

TULSHA v. GOPAL RAI I. L. R. 6 All. 632

(*Contra.*) *SREEKANT ROY CHOWDHRY v. KITABOODDEEN SIRDAR* 10 W. R. 49

95. ————— *Misjoinder of causes of action.* As a general rule, if an objection on the ground of misjoinder of causes is pressed and carried to a decision in the first Court, the High

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME
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Court will, even upon special appeal, upon its being shown to be well founded, give the objector the benefit of it; but if it is not pressed and carried to a decision in the first Court, and if the parties go to trial as if the objection had not been made, then the objection will not be given effect to at a later stage, unless it appears clearly that there was a defect in the original trial in consequence of the misjoinder. *TARINEE CHURN GHOSE v. HUNSMAN JHA* 20 W. R. 420

96. ————— *Objection to defendant being made plaintiff.* Where a defendant was made one of the plaintiffs by the consent of the first Court and appealed as one of the plaintiffs, and took no objection until the case came up on special appeal, the objection was not allowed to be taken. *RAKHAI DOSS MUNDLE v. PROTAP CHUNDER HAZRAH* 12 W. R. 455

97. ————— *Notice of enquiry—Want of notice of enquiry by Ameen.* A judgment-debtor, who, while objecting before the Judge as to what had been done by the Ameen in the enquiry as to the mesne profits, raised no objection as to the want of notice of the Ameen's enquiry, was not allowed to raise the latter objection on appeal. *SHARODA MOYEE BURMONEE v. WOOMA MOYEE BURMONEE* 8 W. R. 9

98. ————— *Notice of sale—Objection to form of notice of sale for arrears of rent under Bengal Regulation VIII of 1819, s. 8.* An objection to the form of the notice of sale under s. 8 of Bengal Regulation VIII of 1819 was taken for the first time in the Appellate Court. *Held, that, as a defect fatal to the whole proceeding appeared in the notice, the objection was competently taken in that Court.* *Macnaghten v. Mahabir Pershad Singh*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 656 : L. R. 10 I. A. 25, distinguished. *AHSANULLA KHAN BAHADUR v. HARI-CHARN MOZUMDAR* I. L. R. 20 Calc. 86
L. R. 19 I. A. 191

99. ————— *Notice of suit—Omission to give notice of action under s. 42, Police Act, V of 1861.* In a suit against a police officer, the objection under s. 42, Act V of 1861, that one month's notice has not been given, must be taken in the lower Court: if not taken then, it cannot be made a ground of appeal. *NARAIN DEEN TEWAREE v. RAM DASS* 8 W. R. 425

100. ————— *Notice of suit against Municipal Commissioners—Non-joinder of party—Special appeal—Act XV of 1873, ss. 28, 43.* The plea that no notice was given as required by s. 43 cannot be taken for the first time in special appeal. *Quære:* Whether a plea that the Local Government had not been made a party to a suit against a Municipal Committee in accordance with s. 28 can be taken for the first time in special

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

appeal. MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE OF MORADABAD v. CHATRI SINGH . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 269

101. ——— Notice to quit. An objection as to the necessity of notice to quit is one which may be taken on special appeal. DODHU v. MADHAVRAO NARAYAN GADRE

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 110

102. ——— *Suit for ejectment.* Where notice to quit is a necessary part of plaintiff's title to eject, and when the issues raised the question of plaintiff's right to eject, and no proof was given of notice by plaintiffs, but no objection was taken to the want of notice by the defendant until second appeal:—*Held*, that it was competent to the Court to entertain the objection in second appeal, but that the plaintiff should have liberty to meet the objection upon the trial of an issue referred to the lower Court upon that point. ABDULLA RAWUTAN v. SUBBARAYAR

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 346

103. ——— *Denial of landlord's title throughout case—Objection on special appeal that no notice to quit has been given.* Where a tenant denies his landlord's title and persists throughout in a vexatious and aggressive course of conduct towards him, he will not, in a suit for ejectment, be allowed in special appeal to assert that he has not been served with a notice to quit, that objection not having been taken in the Courts below. RAM NUFFER BHATTACHARJEA v. DHOL GOBIND THAKOOR

I. C. L. R. 421

104. ——— *Parties—Suit by receiver in his own name—Error in frame of suit.* Where the receiver of an estate, appointed by the High Court on its Original Side, received permission to bring a suit on behalf of the parties interested in the estate, and brought the suit in his own name, it was held that, though the frame of the suit was erroneous, yet the error being one of form only, and no objection on the ground of that error having been taken in the Court below, such objection could not be allowed to prevail in the Court of Appeal, which might amend the proceedings without consent of the parties interested, or further notice of appeal. JUGUNNATH PERSHAD DUTT v. HOGG

12 W. R. 117

105. ——— *Defect of parties, objection as to.* Where a decree for *wasilat* was given against the manager of an unregistered trading company, and the plea that the company was not a corporate body, and therefore not liable without a disclosure of the names of the parties constituting the company, was not taken until the execution stage:—*Held*, that the plea was a technical one, and taken too late to be of any weight in a Court of equity. TRIPP v. NURSING CHUNDER MITTER

W. R. 1864, Mis. 7

106. ——— *Defect of parties, objection as to.* *Per* PRINSEP, J. The objection

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

as to defect of parties after the case had passed through two Courts is not one affecting the merits of the case so as to be a ground of special appeal. BOYDONATH BAG v. GRISH CHUNDER ROY

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 26

107. ——— *Non-joinder of parties—Misjoinder.* *Held* by MUTTUSAMI AYYAR and BRANDT, JJ. (KERNAN, J., dissenting), that the objection as to non-joinder of parties is not essential, but merely formal, and weight should not be attached to it when it is first taken on second appeal. MOIDIN KUTTI v. KRISHNAN

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 322

108. ——— *Defect of parties.* Where a suit is brought by one member of an undivided Hindu family to recover land, the property of the family, and no objection is taken at the hearing on the ground of the non-joinder of the plaintiff's coparceners, it is not open to an unsuccessful defendant to raise such objection on appeal. The objection should be taken at the first hearing at as early a stage as possible. PARAMASIVA v. KRISHNA

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 498

See RAJNARAIN BOSE v. UNIVERSAL LIFE ASSURANCE Co. . . . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 594, 603

109. ——— *Suit for specific performance—Practice.* An objection that certain of the defendants should not have been made parties to a suit for specific performance of an agreement because they were not parties to the agreement cannot be taken in second appeal for the first time, as it only involves a question of practice. DODHU v. MADHAVRAO NARAYAN GADRE

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 110

110. ——— *Suit for payment of mortgage money or foreclosure—Non-joinder of person interested in the mortgaged property, effect of—Transfer of Property Act, s. 85—Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 32.* The non-joinder in a suit to which Chap. IV of Act IV of 1882 applies of a person interested in the mortgaged property within the meaning of s. 85 of that Act, and of whose interest the plaintiff has notice, is a fatal defect in the suit, unless cured by the action of the Court under s. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and where such non-joinder is brought to the notice of the Court, the Court will give effect to the objection and dismiss the suit, even though such objection be raised for the first time in appeal. *Mata Din Kashodan v. Kazim Hussain*, I. L. R. 13 All. 432, *Janki Prasad v. Kishen Das*, I. L. R. 16 All. 478, and *Bhawani Prasad v. Kallu*, I. L. R. 17 All. 537, referred to. GHULAM KADIR KHAN v. MUSTAKIM KHAN

I. L. R. 18 All. 109

111. ——— *Technical objection.* In suit for possession by right of foreclosed mortgage, plaintiff having obtained a decree which was *ex-parte* against one of the defendants, the lower

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

Appellate Court found as a fact, on the appeal of the defendants, that the mortgage transaction was benami and collusive (the defendant A having been a sharer in the fraud), and dismissed the claim. *Held*, that plaintiff could not in special appeal be allowed, under the finding of the lower Appellate Court, to urge that his suit should not have been dismissed as against the share of A on the technical ground that A had not appealed. *RAMLOCHAN SOOR v. NITYA KALLEE DEBI* . . . 12 W. R. 210

112. ———— *Partition—Objection to report of Ameen as to partition—Waiver of objection.* In a suit for partition, the Subordinate Judge appointed an Ameen, under s. 396 of the Civil Procedure Code, to effect a partition. The Ameen made his report, which was objected to on the merits by the defendant, but ultimately the report was confirmed, the defendant having acquiesced in the proceedings. On appeal to the District Judge, the defendant took an objection that the appointment of the Ameen was irregular. *Held*, that, having acquiesced in the proceedings so far, it was too late for the defendant to take the objection. *GYAN CHUNDER SEN v. DURGA CHURN SEN* . . . I. L. R. 7 Cal. 318
8 C. L. R. 415

113. ———— *Policy of Insurance—Jettison.* Where the plaintiffs could not recover on a policy for a partial loss except as for jettison, and that point was not taken in the Court below, the point could not be raised in appeal. *MACKINNON v. DUNDAS* . . . Bourke A. O. C. 155

114. ———— *Purchase—Suit to enforce sale of religious office.* In a suit to enforce a right by purchase of a priest's office, no objection was taken to the legality of the transaction until second appeal. *Held*, that the objection must be allowed. *KUPPA v. DORASAMI* . . . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 76

115. ———— *Suit on bond as asset purchased.* A plaintiff who had purchased a factory from the Official Assignee sued for the recovery of money on a bond alleged to have been an asset of his purchase, and obtained a decree. In appeal it was objected for the first time that plaintiff had not filed any evidence to prove that the bond formed part of the assets of the factory, and his suit was dismissed. *Held*, that the objection ought not to have been allowed to prevail so far as to dismiss the suit, but the plaintiff ought to have an opportunity given him of adducing the requisite proof. *CHUNDER COOMAR ROY v. KUBEROODEEN* . . . 10 W. R. 332

116. ———— *Rent, suit for—Rate of arrears of rent.* Where a landlord's claim for arrears of rent at enhanced rates was dismissed *in toto* by the first Court, and in his appeal to the Judge he advanced no claim for arrears at the old rates, he cannot in special appeal object to the Judge's decision on the ground that such arrears were not

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

decreed to him. *BEEJOY GOBIND BURAL v. JANNOBEE BURMONYA* . . . 8 W. R. 252

117. ———— *Raising new plea on special appeal.* In a suit for enhancement of rent which was dismissed in the lower Court, where the sole issue raised was the genuineness of a pottah pleaded by the defendant:—*Held*, that an entirely new plea of misconstruction of the terms of the lease could not be admitted in special appeal, when the facts on which alone it could be supported had not been found in the lower Court. *SATOORAM MAJOOMDAR v. PREONATH BANERJEE* . . . 10 W. R. 424

118. ———— *Res judicata—Act X of 1877 (Civil Procedure Code), s. 542—Raising new plea in special appeal.* *Held*, that not only may the plea of *res judicata*, though not taken in the memorandum of appeal, be entertained in second appeal, under the provisions of s. 542 of Act X of 1877, but that, even when such plea has not been urged in either of the lower Courts, or in the memorandum of appeal, if raised in the second appeal, it must be considered and determined either upon the record as it stands or after a remand for findings of fact. *MUHAMMAD ISMAIL v. CHATTAR SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 4 All. 69

KOYLASHNATH CHUND v. MONMOHINEY DOSSEE
Marsh. 276

MONMOHINEY DOSSEE v. KOYLASHNATH CHUND
2 Hay. 154

See MUGNO MOYE DEBIA v. HUR CHUNDER RAOOT . . . 3 W. R., Act X, 146

119. ———— *Plea of res judicata taken for the first time in Appeal—Power of Court to entertain it.* Although the plea *res judicata* may be taken at any stage of a suit, including first or second appeal, an Appellate Court is not bound to entertain the plea if it cannot be decided upon the record before that Court, and if its consideration involves the reference of fresh issues for determination by the lower Court. *Muhammad Ismail v. Chattar Singh*, I. L. R. 4 All. 69, and *Tek Narain Rai v. Dhondh Bahadur Rai*, *Weekly Notes*, All. 1898, 104, referred to. *KANAHAI LAL v. SURAJ KUNWAR* . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 446

120. ———— *Right of suit.* An appellant cannot defeat the suit by an objection to the plaintiff's right to sue brought forward for the first time on appeal. *PAREYASAMI alias KOTTAI TEVAR v. SALUCKAI TEVAR alias OYYA TEVAR* . . . 8 Mad. 157

121. ———— *Objection to competency to sue.* Incompetency to sue is a defect not admitting of cure or palliation, but that plea being of a material preliminary nature, and involving the plaintiff's *locus standi* in Court, was held to be admissible, though pleaded orally for the first time on appeal. *RADHA KISHEN v. BUKHTAWUR LALL* . . . 1 Agra 1

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

122. ————— *Absence of tender before suit.* Where a party has a good objection, such as an absence of tender before suit, to urge to the prosecution of a suit, his omission to do so in the first instance is fatal to his availing himself of it as an objection on appeal. *MAHOMED AMEEN-ODDEEN KHAN v. MOZUFFUR HOSSEIN KHAN*
5 B. L. R. 570 : 14 W. R. P. C. 5

123. ————— *Suit not brought on agreement.* In a suit for maintenance, the amount of which had been fixed by agreement, an objection taken on appeal that the suit should have been brought on that agreement, *held*, taken too late, the defendant having been made aware of the agreement at the hearing, and not having objected on this ground in the first Appellate Court. *AHMAD HOSSEIN KHAN v. NIHAL-UD-DIN KHAN*
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 945 : 13 C. L. R. 330

124. ————— *Partnership—Contract Act, s. 342.* An objection taken for the first time in special appeal that the plaintiff had no right as a partner and no right to sue, under s. 342 of the Contract Act, was not allowed. *BUDDUN SAHU v. RAMPERTAB SAHU*
25 W. R. 511

125. ————— *Jurisdiction of Civil Court.* A party who applied to a Magistrate for the removal of an obstruction, having been referred to the Civil Court, brought a suit there and obtained a decree declaratory of his right of way. In special appeal it was objected that the suit was not cognizable in the Civil Court. *Held*, that after decree it ought to be presumed that plaintiff had a right to bring the suit in the Civil Court, and the objection was not allowed to prevail. *TRILUCHUN DOSS v. GUGUN CHUNDER DEY*
24 W. R. 413

126. ————— *Competency of agent to sue.* The question of competency of an agent to sue, if not raised in the initial stage of a suit, cannot be permitted to be raised in special appeal. *SOORENDRONATH ROY v. RUGHOOBUR DYAL AWUSTEE*
15 W. R. 392

127. ————— *Insolvency.* Where the defendants for the first time in second appeal objected to the plaintiff's right to sue on the ground of his having taken the benefit of the Insolvency Act, the objection was entertained by the High Court upon admission, by the plaintiff, of the fact of his insolvency. *SADODIN v. SPIERS*
I. L. R. 3 Bom. 437

128. ————— *Suit for declaratory decree.* An objection urged by the respondents for the first time in special appeal, that inasmuch as it was the plaintiff's own fault that he did not appear before the Collector and make his objection in time, his suit, which was one merely for declaration of title, and therefore was in the discretion vested in the Court by the 15th section of Act VIII of 1859, ought not to be entertained, was not

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

allowed. *SPENCER v. PUHUL CHOWDRY. SPENCER v. KADIR BUKSH*

6 B. L. R. 658 : 15 W. R. 471

(*Contra*) *SOODHUKHINA CHOWDHURANI v. ISSUR CHUNDER MOJOOMDAR*
12 W. R. 24

129. ————— *Suit for declaratory decree—Wrongful distraint.* A suit was brought against the plaintiff by his tenants for an illegal distress in attaching crops raised by them on the land let to them by him. The present defendant, in the course of that suit, presented a petition to the Court, in which he stated that he was the owner of the land on which the crops attached had been raised. The plaintiff brought the present suit for a declaration of his title and confirmation of possession, alleging that the defendant's statement affected his (plaintiff's) title by throwing a cloud over it. On special appeal it was objected for the first time that the plaint disclosed no cause of action, and the objection was admitted and prevailed. *JAN ALI v. KHONKAR ABDUR KUHMA*
6 B. L. R. 154 : 14 W. R. 420

130. ————— *Suit for declaratory decree—Possession.* In a suit merely for a declaration of right in respect of certain property, the lower Appellate Court, considering that the suit was really one for the possession of such property, allowed the plaintiff to make up the full amount of Court-fees required for a suit for possession. The plaint in the suit was not amended, and the lower Appellate Court eventually gave the plaintiff a declaratory decree. *Held*, on second appeal by the defendant who objected that a suit merely for a declaratory decree could not be maintained, that such objection ought not to be allowed under the circumstances. *SARASUTI v. MANNU*
I. L. R. 2 All. 134

131. ————— *Cause of action.* An objection as to the plaintiff having no cause of action may be taken at any stage of the suit. *PARBATI CHARAN MUKHOPADHYA v. KALI NATH MUKHOPADHYA*
6 B. L. R. Ap. 73

(*Contra*) *KALICOOMAR SIRCAR v. BROMOMOYEE DOSSEE*
1 W. R. 23

SUDAKHINA CHOWDHURANI v. RAJMOHAN BOSE
11 W. R. 350

132. ————— *Plaint disclosing no cause of action—Discovery at the stage of an appeal under the Letters Patent of defect in the plaint.* Where in an appeal under s. 10 of the Letters Patent it was brought to the notice of the Court that the plaint in the suit disclosed no cause of action against the defendant named therein, the Court entertained the plea and dismissed the suit. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. SUKHDEO*
I. L. R. 21 All. 341

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

133. ————— *Dismissal of suit on the ground that the plaint disclosed no cause of action, although no such ground taken in the written statement.* It is competent to the defendant at the earliest possible stage of the hearing to obtain the declaration of the Court upon the question whether the plaint does or does not disclose a cause of action, even if that question is not expressly raised in the written statement. *UMAMOYE DASSEE v. RAJKRISTO NUNDUN* . . . 3 C. W. N. 220

134. ————— *Cause of action.* In a suit by a purchaser of an estate to have his name registered in the Collectorate and his possession confirmed, which failed in the Court of first instance, but was decreed in the lower Appellate Court, it was held to be too late for the defendant, after contesting the suit in two Courts, to urge in special appeal that the plaint disclosed no cause of action. *BUKSH ALY SOWDAGUR v. JOYANUT KHAN* 11 W. R. 248

SOODUKHINA CHOWDHARNI v. RAJ MOHAN BOSE 11 W. R. 350

135. ————— *Cause of action*—*Per PEARSON, J., and STRAIGHT, J. (SPANKIE, J., dissenting)*—That in disposing of a second appeal the High Court is competent, under s. 542 of Act X of 1877, to consider the question whether the plaintiff has any cause of action or not, although such question has not been raised by the defendant appellant in the Courts below or in his memorandum of second appeal, but is raised for the first time at the hearing of such appeal. *LACHMAN PRASAD v. BAHADUR SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 884

136. ————— *Cause of action*—*Premature suit.* *K* sued *N* (his uncle) for partition of the estate of *V* (the father of *N*) in the lifetime of *V*, who was alleged to be of unsound mind. *N* objected to the suit being entertained on the ground that *V* was alive. Before issues were settled, *V* died, and the suit was tried and *K* obtained a decree. On appeal by *N* on the ground that, when the plaint was filed, *K* had no cause of action:—*Held*, that the decree could not on this ground be set aside. *NARAYNA v. KRISHNA* I. L. R. 8 Mad. 214

137. ————— *Suit for partition of portion of property.* A case is not to be decided in special appeal upon a question which was not raised or tried or considered by the lower Courts. The objection that a suit for a partition of portion of joint property will not be taken for the first time on special appeal was therefore not allowed to prevail. *SHIB SAHAYE SINGH v. NURSHING LALL* 22 W. R. 352

138. ————— *Separate suit for question determinable in execution of decree.* Where a question such as is provided for by Act

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

XXIII of 1861, s. 11, instead of being determined by order of the Court executing the decree, was made the subject of a separate suit in that Court, it was held that, though the form of procedure was wrong, there was not a want of jurisdiction which could be made a ground of objection in appeal. *PURNESUREE PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH v. JANKEE KOER* 19 W. R. 90

139. ————— *Delay in bringing suit.* An objection that there had been such delay that the Court in its discretion under s. 27 of the Specific Relief Act would not give relief in a suit for specific performance not allowed to prevail in second appeal. *MOKUND LALL v. CHOTAY LALL* I. L. R. 10 Cal. 1081

140. ————— *Sale, setting aside—Setting up new case on appeal—Suit to set aside sale on ground of fraud, misrepresentation, etc., by vendor—Raising issue as to breach of covenant for title.* When a vendee who sues to cancel a sale on the ground of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment by his vendor fails to establish those grounds of relief, he is not entitled to set up in second appeal a case founded on the implied covenant for title under the Transfer of Property Act, s. 55. *MAHOMED v. SITARAMAYYAR* . . . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 50

141. ————— *Service of summons—Objection that suit ought to have been dismissed for non-service of summons on non-payment of costs.* Where the Court did not dismiss the suit under s. 5 of Act XXIII of 1861 as it should have done, but proceeded with the suit and passed a decree from which the original defendant appealed on the merits to the Assistant Judge, without taking the objection that the suit ought to have been dismissed, it was held that he could not raise the objection for the first time in special appeal. *ABAS v. IBRAHIMJI* 5 Bom. A. C. 119

142. ————— *Settlement—Suit for possession.* In a suit to recover possession, the plaintiff alleging that the land in dispute from which he had been ousted had been settled with him by Government in 1833 as part of his zamindari, and the defendant alleging that the land was part of his lakhiraj garden land, which had been released by Government from assessment, the Courts below found that the lands in dispute were part of those which had been settled with the plaintiff. On appeal to the Privy Council, the defendant attempted to show that, assuming the lands in question to have been part of those settled with the plaintiff, that settlement had been improperly made. *Held*, that this contention was not open to the defendant upon the record, never having been taken in the Courts below. *SRIMATI DASI v. LALANMANI* 2 B. L. R. P. C. 64 : 11 W. R. P. C. 27

143. ————— *Transfer of case—Objection to transfer of case for execution of decree.* An

APPELLATE COURT—*contd.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL—*contd.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

objection on special appeal that the transfer of the suit for execution had been made without jurisdiction was allowed to be taken in special appeal.
HAMIDOODDEEN v. BHADOO SAHAE

18 W. R. 345

144. ———— *Objection to transfer from Munsif to Judge.* Although the transfer by the Judge of a case from the file of the Munsif to that of his own Court, and the decision of it upon issues framed by and evidence taken before the Munsif, is improper, yet, if no objection be taken to it at the time, it must be presumed that the parties consented to the action of the superior Court, and they are not at liberty to await its decision and on finding it adverse to them to take exception for the first time to the Court's proceedings on appeal.
YAKOUB ALI v. LUCHMUN DASS . . . 6 N. W. 80

145. ———— *Valuation of suit—Objection as to valuation of suit.* An objection to the decree of a subordinate Court, founded on the improper valuation of the suit, is not such an objection as may be entertained when raised for the first time in special appeal. **KALADDIN GURU BAKUS v. RAGHOORI** . . . 1 Bom. 62

KALEE COOMAR CHATTERJEE v. KRISTO KISHORE PODDAR . . . 14 W. R. 196

146. ———— *Objection to valuation of suit.* Where no question of valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of institution-fee payable on a suit has been raised, either in the Court of first instance or in the grounds of appeal, the Appellate Court is not competent to raise such question. **KALA CHAND SEN v. ANUND KRISTO BOSE** . . . 22 W. R. 433

147. ———— *Question of deficiency of Court-fee not raised in the Court of first instance—Court Fees Act, s. 12—Estoppel.* The plaintiffs, suing in respect of certain plots of land, by mistake undervalued their claim with regard to the said land, and in consequence paid an insufficient Court-fee on their plaint. This mistake was not discovered until the case had come in appeal before the High Court, and, when discovered, the deficiency was at once made good. *Held*, that no plea as to the deficiency in the Court-fee having been raised, as it might have been by the defendant before the decision of the suit in the Court of first instance, such plea could not be raised for the first time in appeal. **WILAYAT ALI KHAN v. UMARDARAZ ALI KHAN** . . . I. L. R. 19 All. 165

148. ———— *Will—Transaction treated as gift—Objection to it as an invalid will.* In a suit to recover certain property left by one R, both the lower Courts found that it had been left by R before his death to defendants by way of gift. In special appeal the plaintiffs raised the objection that under the Hindu Wills Act a verbal will of this kind was not legal. *Held*, that, after two Courts had decided

APPELLATE COURT—*concld.*7. OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL—*concld.*(b) SPECIAL CASES—*concld.*

unfavourably to plaintiff the only case raised by him there, he could not now turn round and throw out the defendant's case on a technical ground that the alleged gift was really a will. **RADHA BULLUBH CHUCKERBUTTY v. BANEE MADHUB CHUCKERBUTTY**
23 W. R. 230

149. ———— *Withdrawal of suit—Plea taken for the first time at the hearing of second appeal.* The plea that the plaintiff had improperly been permitted to withdraw from a former suit with liberty to bring the present one, which had not been taken in the lower Courts, and was not taken in the memorandum of second appeal, was not permitted to be urged at the hearing of the second appeal.
AHURUNNISSA v. KHUDA YAR KHAN

I. L. R. 3 All. 528

150. ———— *Evidence—Judgment not inter partes—Objection to its admissibility not taken in the first Court—Whether such an objection is allowable at a later stage of the case.* Where no objection was taken in the Court of first instance as to the admissibility in evidence of a document, but on the contrary reference was made to it by the defendant in the written statement as affording a basis to some of the objections raised by him: *Held*, that an objection as to the admissibility or otherwise of the document in evidence in such a case should not be allowed to be taken by the defendant (appellant) on appeal. **MILLER v. MADHO DAS**, I. L. R. 19 All. 76; **L. R. 23 I. A. 106**, distinguished. **HRIDOY KRISHNA DAS v. PRASANNA KUMARI CHOWDHURANI** (1900) . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 142

151. ———— *Limitation.* The lower Appellate Court was empowered to take cognizance of the question of limitation, though it had not been raised as a defence in the Court of first instance. **DEO NARAIN CHOWDHURY v. WEBB** (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 86; s. c. 5 C. W. N. 160

152. ———— *Notice of sale—Practice—Point not taken in plaint or at settlement of issues—Right to raise it on appeal.* Where a plaintiff, in a suit to set aside a sale of land, fails to take the objection either in his plaint or at settlement of issues, that the notice of sale prescribed by s. 39 of the Madras Rent Recovery Act (Madras Act VIII of 1865) had not been served upon him, he should not be allowed to raise it on appeal. **SUBBIEN v. RAMASAMI CHETTY** (1902). I. L. R. 26 Mad. 363

APPLICATION.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 4.

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 230

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13 C. W. N. 702

—*Landlord and tenant—Basis of apportionment of rent—Assets.* An apportionment of rent should not be on the basis of the assets of the different villages at the time of the creation of the original tenure, but on the basis of the present assets of the different portions of the tenure which by division have passed into different hands. HARI KISHEN BHAGAT TILUKDHAKI v. LAL (1903)

7 C. W. N. 453

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I. L. R. 4 Calc. 560 : 3 C. L. R. 361

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1. ——— Payment of rent. A general payment made in one year, without proof that it was in satisfaction of the rents of that year, may be applied in satisfaction of the arrears of the previous years. AHMUTY v. BRODIE

W. R. 1864, Act X, 15

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concl'd.**

2. ——— The payments in each year must be presumed to be for the current year, and surplus payments to be for the past, not subsequent years. TARAMONEE DOSSEE v. KALLY CHURN SURMAH . W. R. 1864, Act X, 14

3. ——— Where a tenant pays money to his landlord on account of rent, without any specification whether the payment was for old or enhanced rent, the landlord is at liberty to credit the payment as he thinks fit. SHURNO MOYEE v. KASHEE KANT BHUTTACHARJEE

7 W. R. 511

4. ——— Payment of debts—*Debt barred by limitation.* An unappropriated payment is to be applied to the earliest debt, although the debt is barred by the Act of Limitation, where the facts do not raise any question which might affect such priority. MOONEAPPAN v. VENCATARAYADOO

6 Mad. 32

MULCHAND GULABCHAND v. GIRDHAR MADHAV . 8 Bom. A. C. 6

5. ——— Payments unapplied by either the debtor or the creditor should be appropriated to the earlier items making up the debt due. This rule is not impaired by the decisions in the cases of *Mills v. Pawkes*, 5 Bing. N. C. 455, and *Nash v. Hodgson*, 6 De G. M. & G. 474. HIRADA KARIBASAPPAH v. GADIGI MUDDAPPA

6 Mad. 197

6. ——— *Contract Act, ss. 60, 74.* In consideration of an advance of Rs 118, the defendant executed, in favour of the plaintiff, a mortgage-bond, dated 3rd November 1879, by which it was stipulated that the amount should be repaid "in kind by delivery of half the amount of the rubbi crops of every description produced at the first-class rates; and in case the same is not paid in kind, it will be paid principal with interest from the date of execution at one anna per cent. per mensem in cash in the month of Baisakh 1287 F. S. (April 1880). The defendants admitted execution of the bond, and pleaded payments in grain to the amount of Rs 136, which they failed to prove. It was found that the plaintiff had received payments in grain to the extent of Rs 71, more than half of which, however, he claimed to be entitled to appropriate to the payment of other antecedent debts which were due to him by the defendants. It was not stated at the time of payment towards which debt the payments were to be applied, but all the payments were admittedly made in kind. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to appropriate the payments to the antecedent debts, inasmuch as, within the meaning of s. 60 of the Contract Act, there were "other circumstances" indicating that the payments were made in liquidation of the amount of the bond. SUNCUT LAL v. BAIJNATH ROY . I. L. R. 13 Calc. 164

7. ——— *Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 69—Creditor's appropriation of payments to one or other of debts.* One of two

APPROPRIATION OF PAYMENTS— concl'd.

mortgages bore interest at 12 per cent. on the mortgage debt payable with costs, and the other carried simple interest. Payments made by the debtor had been appropriated by the creditor to payment of the interest on the bond bearing simple interest, while the compound interest, on the other hand, had been left to accumulate. In a suit, brought against the representative of the debtor after his decease, to enforce the mortgage bearing compound interest, the objection was taken to the appropriation by the creditor. *Held*, that the rule in s. 60 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, follows the ordinary law in prescribing a rule as to the case in which the creditor may, at his discretion, apply, to one or other of the debts due to him, payments made by the debtor. A reluctance shown by the debtor to agree to pay compound interest, before he executed the mortgage bond at such interest, was not an indication, within that section, that he intended that application of his payments should be made first to that bond. *RAMESWAR KOER v. MAHOMED MEHDI HOSSEIN KHAN* . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 39
2 C. W. N. 633

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See ACCOMPLICE.

See CHARGE TO JURY—MISDIRECTION.
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See PRACTICE—CRIMINAL CASES—APPROVERS . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 492

1. ——— Mode of dealing with evidence of approvers. The evidence of persons who are themselves liable to punishment should be carefully sifted and tested before they can be relied on in a Court of law. *QUEEN v. REAJ ALI alias DULLOO KHAN* . . . 6 W. R. Cr. 77

2. ——— Uncorroborated evidence. The evidence of an approver is not sufficient to convict a person charged with an offence. *QUEEN v. TULSI DOSAD* . . . 3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 66

QUEEN v. ISSEN MUNDLE . . . 3 W. R. Cr. 8

QUEEN v. NAWAB JAN . . . 8 W. R. Cr. 19

QUEEN v. RAM SAGOR . . . 8 W. R. Cr. 57

QUEEN v. CHIRAG ALI . . . 12 W. R. Cr. 5

3. ——— Where a prisoner had been found guilty by the jury on the uncorroborated evidence of an approver, after the Judge in his summing up had pointed out to them the desirability, under the circumstances, of such corroboration, the High Court on appeal refused to set aside the conviction. *QUEEN v. MAHIMA CHANDRA DAS*
6 B. L. R. Ap. 108 : 15 W. R. Cr. 37

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See *QUEEN v. ELAHI BUKSH*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 459 : 5 W. R. Cr. 80

4. ——— *Illegal conviction.* A conviction based on the testimony of approvers, uncorroborated as to the identity of the accused person, cannot be sustained, and confessions of co-prisoners, implicating him, cannot be accepted as sufficient corroboration of such testimony. *REG. v. BUDHU NANKU* . . . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 475

5. ——— When evidence is given by an approver, it is not important to consider whether a story told by the accused to him tallies with that made to another person. *QUEEN v. NYTARAM MYTTEE* . . . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 171

6. ——— *Direction to Jury.* A Sessions Judge should not permit the evidence of an approver who was examined as a witness before the committing Magistrate to be laid before the jury by whom the prisoners were tried. *ANONYMOUS*
4 Mad. Ap. 22

7. ——— In a case in which the principal evidence against an accused is the evidence of an approver, a Sessions Judge should carefully warn the jury of the infirmity which attaches to that evidence, and he should also tell them (if the fact be so) that the approver is speaking under the influence of an offer of conditional pardon.
28 W. R. Cr. 19

8. ——— *Corroboration—Dacoity.* Rule as to corroboration of the evidence of an approver laid down in case of dacoity under s. 400, Penal Code. *QUEEN v. KALLA CHAND DOSS*
11 W. R. Cr. 21

9. ——— The corroboration of the evidence of an approver should arise from other evidence relative to facts which implicate the prisoner in the same way as the story of the approver does. *QUEEN v. BYKUNT NATH BANERJEE*
10 W. R. Cr. 17

10. ——— *Accomplice of accused person.* There is no rule of law which prevents the admission without corroboration of the evidence of a witness who says he committed breaches of the law with the accused, if the witness is not open to the same charge as the accused. *In the matter of ROJONI KANT PORAMANICK*
13 W. R. Cr. 24

11. ——— *Confessions of co-prisoners when others were absent.* Exact correspondence in details of several statements made by an approver in the course of a trial is not corroborative evidence such as is ordinarily required to make it safe to convict a particular prisoner. Confessions of prisoners are not, as against their fellow prisoners who were not present when the confessions were made, such corroborative evidence of the statement of an approver as would justify the conviction of the other prisoners thereon. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BEPIN BISWAS* I. L. R. 10 Calc. 970

12. ——— *Dacoity—Possession of stolen property.* Criminal Courts dealing

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with an approver's evidence in a case where several persons are charged should require corroboration of his statements in respect of the identity of each of the individuals accused. *Queen-Empress v. Ram Saran*, I. L. R. 8 All. 306, *Queen-Empress v. Kure*, Weekly Notes, All. (1886) 65, and *Reg. v. Mullins*, 3 Cox C. C. 526, referred to. *A*, *B*, *M*, *R*, and *N* were tried together on a charge under s. 460 of the Penal Code. The principal evidence against all of them was that of an approver. Against *A*, *B*, and *M* there was the further evidence that they produced certain portions of the property stolen on the night of the crime from the house where the crime was committed. With regard to *R*, it was proved that he was present when *B* pointed out the place where some of the property was dug up, but he did not appear to have said anything or given any directions about it. *Held*, with reference to *A*, *B* and *M*, that it could not be said that their recent possession of part of the stolen property so soon after it had been stolen, was not such corroboration of the approver's evidence of their participation in the crime as entitled the Court to act upon his story in regard to those particular persons. *Held*, that, inasmuch as there was no sufficient material to warrant the inference of guilty knowledge on *R*'s part, and with regard to *N* no property was found with him or produced through his instrumentality, both *R* and *N* ought to have been acquitted. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BALDEO*

I. L. R. 8 All. 509

13. ———— *Conditional pardon—Withdrawal of pardon—Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 349.* A party charged along with others with murder, having had a conditional pardon granted to him by the Deputy Magistrate, retracted before the Sessions Judge the statements he had made before the Deputy Magistrate. On being sent back to the Deputy Magistrate, that officer committed him for trial on a charge of giving false evidence. The Sessions Judge considered that the Deputy Magistrate was bound, under s. 349, Code of Criminal Procedure, to commit on the original charge of murder, and not on that of giving false evidence, and he recommended that the order of commitment should be quashed and the Deputy Magistrate directed to commit on the charge of murder. The High Court declined to interfere, as there was evidence on the record tending to support the charge for giving false evidence, and as s. 349 did not have the effect of taking away from Magistrates the power to entertain a charge of this kind. *QUEEN v. MULLICK JEECHOO*

23 W. R. Cr. 12

14. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 349—Withdrawal of pardon—Procedure.* Per FIELD, J. There is a grave doubt whether the deposition of an approver, taken before the committing Magistrate, may be used as evidence against his accomplices on their trial before the Sessions Court, the conditional pardon of the approver having been withdrawn. Where a conditional pardon granted to an approver is withdrawn

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under s. 349 of the Criminal Procedure Code by the Sessions Court, the Judge ought to wait till the conclusion of the trial of the accomplices, and then, before passing judgment on them, if found guilty, proceed against the approver. *In the matter of JOYUDEE PARAMANICK*

7 C. L. R. 66

15. ———— *Admissibility of, after withdrawal of pardon.* Whether the depositions of an approver taken before the committing Magistrate may be used in the Sessions Court as evidence against accomplices, the approver having retracted his former statement and the conditional pardon having in consequence been withdrawn. See *Joyudee Paramanick*, 7 C. L. R. 66. *NANHA MALLA v. EMPRESS*

13 C. L. R. 326

16. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 349—Acquittal of prisoner—Withdrawal of pardon granted to approver after judgment of acquittal—Conviction on trial improperly originated, power of High Court to set aside.* At a Sessions trial the Judge, after acquitting the prisoner, passed an order withdrawing a pardon already granted to an approver, who had given his evidence as such an approver before the Sessions Court, and ordered his commitment. The approver was charged, tried, and found guilty. *Held*, by MITTER, J., that the order withdrawing the pardon and committing the approver was contrary to the provisions of s. 349 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the words "before judgment has been passed" being words inserted in the section to put a limit to the time within which the power of withdrawal of the pardon conferred in the Court of Sessions may be actually exercised; and that therefore the trial of the approver was illegal. The power of directing commitments conferred upon the Sessions Court by s. 349 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised only before judgment has been passed. *Held*, by MACLEAN, J., that it is not necessary that the order should be made before judgment is passed, but that it must appear to the Judge before he passes judgment that the conditions of the pardon have not been complied with; and that in the present case it was impossible to hold that, because the actual order of commitment of the accused was written (although in the judgment) after the acquittal, therefore it did not appear to the Judge before passing judgment that there were grounds for his order. *In the matter of the petition of NOBIN CHUNDER BANIKYA. EMPRESS v. NOBIN CHUNDER BANIKYA*

I. L. R. 8 Cal. 560: 10 C. L. R. 369

17. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 338—Tender of pardon to accomplice who has pleaded guilty—Accomplice—Evidence—Corroboration.* A Court of Session, under s. 338 of the Criminal Procedure Code, tendered a pardon to an accused person charged jointly with two others for the same offence, who had pleaded guilty. The tender was accepted, and such person was examined as a witness against the other accused. *Held*, that the tender of pardon was not improperly made, and the evidence of the

APPROVERS—contd.

approver was admissible. *Per DUTHOIT, J.* The word "supposed" in s. 338 must be taken merely as intended to exclude the case of a man who has actually been convicted of the crime, and not the case of a man who, although admitted to be a party to the crime, is unconvicted. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KALLU* . . . **I. L. R. 7 All. 160**

18. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 349—Withdrawal of pardon granted under s. 349.* A pardon granted under s. 349 of Act X of 1872 was withdrawn by the Sessions Judge before the hearing of the whole of the evidence, without proof that the statement made by the person pardoned was inconsistent except upon most immaterial points, with previous statements by him or contradicted by the evidence, and before any evidence affecting his veracity had been given. *Held*, that the pardon had been improperly withdrawn. *SRINOP v. EMPRESS*

12 C. L. R. 226

19. ————— *Tender of pardon, effect of—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 337, 339—Accomplice—Subsequent trial of accomplice for connected offences.* A prisoner charged before a Magistrate at Benares with offences punishable under ss. 471, 472, and 474 of the Penal Code made a confession to the Magistrate in respect of those offences. He was then sent in custody to Calcutta, and was there, together with other persons, charged before a Magistrate with offences punishable under ss. 467, 473, and 475. The conduct to which these charges related was closely connected and mixed up with that to which the charges first-mentioned had reference. Under s. 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate at Calcutta tendered a pardon to the prisoner upon the conditions specified in that section, and the prisoner accepted the pardon, and gave evidence for the prosecution. The Magistrate held that this evidence was not sufficiently corroborated, and accordingly discharged all the accused, but the pardon was not withdrawn, and there was nothing to show that the Magistrate was dissatisfied with the prisoner's statements or considered that he had not complied with the conditions on which the pardon was tendered. Subsequently the prisoner was committed by the Magistrate of Benares for trial before the Court of Sessions upon the charges under ss. 471, 472, and 474 of the Penal Code. He pleaded not guilty, but did not in terms plead the pardon as a bar to the trial, though he made some reference to the subject; and the Sessions Judge having made a brief inquiry as to the proceedings at Calcutta, came to the conclusion that there was no sufficient proof of any conditional pardon, and convicted and sentenced the accused. *Held*, that by the terms of the conditional pardon granted to the accused by the Calcutta Magistrate, the conditions of which were satisfied, as was shown by its never having been withdrawn, the accused was protected from trial at Benares in respect of the offences under ss. 471, 472, and 474, and was not liable to be proceeded against in respect of them, and that the trial and conviction were, therefore, illegal. Although

APPROVERS—contd.

s. 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not in terms cover a case where a Magistrate holding a preliminary inquiry for committal against several persons tenders a conditional pardon to one of them, examines him as a witness, and subsequently discharges all the accused for want of a *prima facie* case against them, the words "every person accepting a tender under this section shall be examined as a witness in the case" mean that for all purposes (subject to failure to satisfy the conditions of the pardon as provided for by s. 339) such a person ceases to be triable for the offence or offences under inquiry or (with reference to s. 339) for "any other offence of which he appears to have been guilty in connection with the same matter," while making "a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offences" directly under inquiry. The words last quoted refer to the importance, when a pardon is tendered, of encouraging the approver to give the fullest details, so that points may be found in his evidence which may be capable of corroboration. The question of how far the pardon protects him, and what portion of it should not protect him, ought not to be treated in a narrow spirit. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GANGA CHARAN* . **I. L. R. 11 All. 79**

20. ————— *Trial of persons whose pardon has been cancelled—Conditional pardon granted and afterwards cancelled—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 339.* It is unfair to put an approver, whose conditional pardon has been cancelled on trial, along with other prisoners, in the course of whose trial such approver has given evidence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMA TEVAN*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 352.

21. ————— *Pardon tendered and afterwards withdrawn—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 338, 339.* An accused person to whom a tender of pardon has been made, and who has given evidence under that pardon against persons who were co-accused with him, should not, if such pardon is withdrawn, be put back into the dock and tried as if he had never received a tender of pardon, but his trial should be separate from, and subsequent to, that of the persons co-accused with him. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MULUA* . . . **I. L. R. 14 All. 502**
QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SUDRA . **I. L. R. 14 All. 336**

22. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 337—Pardon tendered to one of the accused—Approver—Trial of approver for non-fulfilment of the condition on which pardon was offered.* No action can be taken against a person who has accepted a pardon for breach of the condition on which the pardon was tendered until after the case in the Court of Session has been finished, and then his trial should be commenced *de novo*. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BHAI*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 493

23. ————— *Evidence of.* The evidence of an accused person who has confessed, and has been admitted or is likely to be admitted as an approver and who has been detained in police-custody up till the

APPROVERS—concl'd.

time of trial, is open to the greatest suspicion that the police have arranged his statements so as to fit in which any evidence that they may have obtained elsewhere. Case in which the High Court acquitted a person who had been convicted by the lower Court of dacoity on the evidence of an approver who had been in police-custody up till the time of trial, and where other evidence corroborating the same was found to be too weak to support a conviction. *AMIR KHAN v. KING-EMPEROR* (1902) 7 C. W. N. 457

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— agreement to refer to—

See SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, s. 21.

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 199

I. L. R. 9 All. 188

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 956

— construction of award—

See LIFE ESTATE . . . 5 C. W. N. 569

— Court acting as arbitrator—

See AGREEMENT . . . 10 C. W. N. 835

ARBITRATION—contd.

— destruction of landmarks erected by—
See LANDMARKS.
 I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1084

— enhancement of rent by—
See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 30.
 6 C. W. N. 614

— reference to—
See COMPROMISE—COMPROMISE OF SUITS
 UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.
 I. L. R. 20 Bom. 304

See CONTRACT . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 736

See EVIDENCE—PAROL EVIDENCE—VARY-
 ING OR CONTRADICTING WRITTEN IN-
 STRUMENTS . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 335

See GUARDIAN—DUTIES AND POWERS OF
 GUARDIANS . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 334

— revocation of agreement to refer to—
See CONTRACT ACT, s. 28.
 I. L. R. 1 Calc. 42, 466

See SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, s. 21.
 I. L. R. 9 All. 168

— withdrawal of suit after—
See WITHDRAWAL OF SUIT.
 7 C. W. N. 186

1. ARBITRATION UNDER SPECIAL ACTS AND REGULATIONS.

(a) ACT VI OF 1857.

1. ——— Act VI of 1857—*Land acquisition—Appointment of third arbitrator—Non-attendance of umpire—Waiver.* Where one of two arbitrators, appointed under s. 10 of Act VI of 1857, by letter and also verbally authorized his co-arbitrator to appoint a certain person as third arbitrator, and the co-arbitrator wrote to the proposed third arbitrator informing him that he had been so appointed. *Semle:* That there was a good appointment "by writing" of the third arbitrator within the meaning of s. 12 of Act VI of 1857. Where a third arbitrator appointed under s. 12 of Act VI of 1857, considering that his services were required merely as an umpire, though he had due notice of the first meeting, neglected to attend that or any subsequent meetings of the arbitrators and took no part in the making of the award: *Held,* that such non-attendance of the third arbitrator did not render the award a nullity, but was only a ground for setting it aside on the ground of irregularity. Where an officer, appointed under Act VI of 1857 to conduct arbitration proceedings on behalf of Government, attended the first two meetings of the arbitrators and did not object to two of the arbitrators proceeding with the reference in the absence of the third arbitrator, and did not attend the subsequent meetings of the arbitrators: It was *held* that the Government had thereby waived their right to insist on the non-attendance of the

ARBITRATION—contd.**1. ARBITRATION UNDER SPECIAL ACTS AND REGULATIONS—contd.**

(a) ACT VI OF 1857—*contd.*

third arbitrator as a ground for setting aside the award. *ARDESAR HORMASJI WADIA v. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . 9 Bom. 177

2. ——— Land acquisition—

Judgments of arbitrators separately given. The separately recorded opinions, on different dates, of arbitrators (appointed, under Act VI of 1857, to assess the value of land taken for a public purpose) who have never met or consulted together do not constitute an award under the Act. An award, to be good, must contain the joint judgment of the arbitrators up to the latest period previous to the execution of the award. *FATMA BIBEE v. COLLECTOR OF SURAT* . 8 Bom. A. C. 79

3. ——— s. 32—Waiver of

irregularity—Well in mill compound—Manufactory. By a Government notification of the 3rd of June 1863, published in the Gazette, it was declared, under the provisions of Act VI of 1857, that a certain strip of land passing by the mill of the defendants was required for a public purpose,—the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway,—a plan of which land was to be seen in the Collector's office. On the 4th of November following, the secretary of the defendants' company received a notice signed by the Collector, requiring the owner of the mill to call at the Collector's office to signify his acceptance or otherwise of the compensation for the land required. The secretary went to the Collector's office, and there saw a plan, from which it appeared that an adjoining well from which the engine of the mill was supplied with water was intended to be taken, but no compensation for the well or land required was then agreed upon. On the 28th November a notice signed by the Collector was served on the defendants, stating that he had appointed an arbitrator on behalf of Government, and requiring the defendants to appoint an arbitrator also; the defendants in reply stated that they had already appointed an arbitrator. *Held,* that the defendants had, by appointing their arbitrator to determine the compensation for the land required, waived any irregularity in the previous proceedings, and precluded themselves from claiming to have the whole manufactory taken under s. 32, Act VI of 1857, though no proceedings were taken in the arbitration for nearly twelve months subsequently, and the defendants had shortly before such proceedings made such a claim. *KHARSHEDJI NASARVANJI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . 5 Bom. O. C. 97

(b) ACT X OF 1859 AND 1877.

4. ——— Act X of 1859, suit under.

Quare: Whether Act X of 1859 empowered a Judge to refer a case to arbitration. *GAZEE v. HAMEED BUKSH* . 16 W. R. 163

ARBITRATION—*contd.*1. ARBITRATION UNDER SPECIAL ACTS AND REGULATIONS—*contd.*(b) ACT X OF 1859 AND 1877—*concl'd.*

5. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), Chap. XXXVII—Kabuliat, suit for.* Notwithstanding that Chapter XXXVII of Act X of 1877 in reference to arbitration does not refer specially to suits brought under Act X of 1859, yet if both parties to a suit for a kabuliat brought under the latter Act agree to refer the matters in dispute between them to certain arbitrators named by them, and file a joint petition in the Court of the Deputy Collector, stating that they had so agreed, and praying that the case may be referred to such arbitrators, neither of them will be afterwards at liberty to object to a decree made, embodying the award of the arbitrators on the ground that the reference to arbitration was irregular, and not warranted by any of the provisions of Act X of 1877. When a case has been so referred, the arbitrators are at liberty to determine what appears to them to be a fair and equitable rate of rent, and, notwithstanding the amount so found is less than that demanded by the plaintiff in his plaint, the Court out of which the reference issued is not at liberty on that ground to dismiss the suit, but is bound to order the defendant (with the alternative of eviction) to execute a kabuliat in favour of the plaintiff, engaging himself to pay rent to the plaintiff at the rate determined by the arbitrators to be fair and equitable. *KHEMNA GOWALA v. BUDOLOO KHAN* . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 251 : 7 C. L. R. 92

(c) ACT XX OF 1863.

6. ————— *Act XX of 1863, s. 16—Power to refer suit to arbitration—Suit for dismissal of members of Devastanam committee—Validity of award.* Where a suit for dismissal of the members of a devastanam committee and damages was referred under Act XX of 1863, s. 16, to arbitrators who passed an award dismissing them as prayed and decreeing a portion of the damages claimed with interest :—*Held*, that the Court had power to refer the matter to the arbitrators, and the arbitrators had power to decide it and to award damages with interest, provided the amount, inclusive of interest, did not exceed the amount claimed in the plaint. *PERUMAL NAIK v. SAMINATHA PILLAI*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 498

7. ————— *Award—Decision by majority without such provision in the award.* Plaintiff brought this suit to obtain a decree dismissing defendants, committee and manager of a certain pagoda, from their offices on the ground of malversation. The Court made an order expressed to be by consent of the parties concerned, and in exercise of the Court's discretionary power under s. 16 of Act XX of 1863, referring the matters in difference to three arbitrators for final determination, the said arbitrators "to make their award in writing and submit the same" within a certain

ARBITRATION—*contd.*1. ARBITRATION UNDER SPECIAL ACTS AND REGULATIONS—*contd.*(c) ACT XX OF 1863—*concl'd.*s. 16—*concl'd.*

period. Each arbitrator delivered a separate award in writing, two arbitrators finding for the plaintiff. The Civil Judge made a decree in accordance with the award of the majority of the arbitrators. The first defendant appealed on the grounds (i) that he had not consented to the arbitration, and (ii) that there being no provision in the order of reference to the effect that the finding of a majority of the arbitrators should prevail, there was no valid award. *Held*, that in this case the order of the Judge was valid without the assent of the persons to be bound; that he might, when he made the order, have inserted as a provision that the decision of the majority should be that of the body; and that there was no reason why his ratification of that mode of decision, wholly within his discretion, should not be equivalent to a previous command. *IMMEDY KANUGA RAMAYA GAUNDAN v. RAMASWAMI AMBALAM* . 7 Mad. 173

8. ————— *Case referred to arbitration under s. 16 of Act XX of 1863 in which it was held that that Act did not apply, and that the award and decree made thereon were illegal and void.* *PROTAP CHANDRA MISSEER v. BROJONATH MISSEER* . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 275

(d) BOMBAY REGULATION VII OF 1827.

9. ————— *Bom. Reg. VII of 1827—Award, validity of.* Where an award was held to be bad on the ground that the deed of submission to arbitration did not contain all the conditions required by the law (Bombay Regulation VII of 1827), as it made no provision as to the "time within which the award was to be given:" *Held*, that the parol consent of the parties to the deed of submission before the arbitrator to waive such omission will not cure the defect. *NUSSERWANJEE PESTONJEE v. MYNOODEEN KHAN*

6 Moo. I. A. 134

(e) DEKKHAN AGRICULTURISTS' RELIEF ACT, 1879.

10. ————— *Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879), s. 47—Code of Civil Procedure (XIV of 1882), s. 525—Construction—Conciliator's certificate.* Where a matter has been referred to arbitration, without the intervention of a Court of Justice, by parties one of whom is an agriculturist, and an award has been made thereon, any person interested in the award may, without obtaining the conciliator's certificate, apply for the filing of the award under s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which are not superseded by s. 47 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1879. *GANGADHAR SAKHARAM v. MAHADU SANTAJI* . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 20

ARBITRATION—*contd.*1. ARBITRATION UNDER SPECIAL ACTS AND REGULATIONS—*contd.*(e) DEKKHAN AGRICULTURISTS' RELIEF ACT, 1879—*concl'd.*

11. ———— ss. 47 and 74—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 518-521 and 522*—Power to file private award to which agriculturist debtors are parties. A Civil Court can file a private award to which agriculturist debtors are parties without adjusting the accounts under the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act. *Gangadhar v. Mahadu, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 20*, followed. *MOHAN v. TUKARAM I. L. R. 21 Bom. 63*

(f) N.-W. P. RENT ACT, 1873.

12. ———— N.-W. P. Rent Act (XVIII of 1873). Under the general law, parties to suits may, if they are so minded, before issue joined, refer the matters in dispute between them to arbitration and, after issue joined, with the leave of the Court. Act XVIII of 1873 does not prohibit the parties to the suits mentioned therein from referring the matters in dispute between them in such suits to arbitration. Where, therefore, the parties to a suit under that Act agreed to refer the matters in dispute between them to arbitration, after issues had been framed and evidence recorded, and applied to the Court to sanction such reference:—*Held* (STUART, C. J., dissenting), that the Court was competent to grant such sanction, and on receiving the award to act on it. *GOSHAIN GIRDHARIJI v. DURGA DEVI I. L. R. 2 All. 119*

(g) N.-W. P. LAND REVENUE ACT, 1873.

13. ———— N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 221—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 521*—Award delivered after expiration of time allowed by Court. The principle of the ruling of the Privy Council in *Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar, I. L. R. 13 All. 300: L. R. 18 I. A. 51*, is applicable also to arbitrations under s. 221 of Act XIX of 1873. *GAURI SHANKAR v. BABBAN LAL I. L. R. 14 All. 347*

14. ———— ss. 222 to 231—Award by one arbitrator only—Effect of such award and of the decision of the Settlement Officer thereon. The provisions of ss. 222 to 231 of Act XIX of 1873 contemplate that the award therein dealt with should be an award made by more arbitrators than one. Where, therefore, a Settlement Officer had delivered a decision under s. 230 upon what purported to be an award by one arbitrator only, it was held that such so-called award and the decision thereon of the Settlement Officer would not prevent the matters dealt with therein being reopened in a civil suit. *Jatan Singh v. Mahadeo Singh, Weekly Notes, All. (1886) 180*, distinguished. *PARSIDIH RAI v. RAJI NAIN RAI I. L. R. 18 All. 172*

ARBITRATION—*contd.*1. ARBITRATION UNDER SPECIAL ACTS AND REGULATIONS—*concl'd.*(g) N. W. P. LAND REVENUE ACT, 1873—*concl'd.*

15.—*Religious Endowment Act (XX of 1863), s. 16*—Suit for the removal of trustee—Reference of entire suit to arbitrator—*Legality*. Under s. 16 of the Religious Endowments Act, a Court may refer any matter in difference in the suit for decision by an arbitrator, but it is not open to the Court to refer the whole suit. *KAREDLA VIJAYARAGHAVA PERUMALAYYA NAIDU v. VEMAVARAPU SITARAM-AYYA (1902) I. L. R. 26 Mad. 361*

2. REFERENCE OR SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION.

1. ———— Power of Court to refer—*Remand under Civil Procedure Code, s. 566, for trial of issues*—Reference by first Court of whole case to arbitration—*Refusal of arbitrator to act*—Award by remaining arbitrators—*Illegality of award*—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 510*. A Court of first instance to which issues have been remitted under s. 566 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Appellate Court, has only jurisdiction to try the issues remitted and is *functus officio* in other respects, and cannot make a reference of the case to arbitration, which is only within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court. *Gossain Dowlat Geer v. Bissessur Geer, 22 W. R. 207*, referred to. *NAND RAM v. FAKIR CHAND I. L. R. 7 All. 523*

2. ———— Power of parties to refer—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 312, 325*—*Mode of reference to arbitration*. Ss. 312 and 325 of the Code of Civil Procedure (VIII of 1859) were enabling, and were not intended to be restrictive or exclusive. Parties who are *sui juris* are competent, before decree, to make any agreement as to the settlement of the suit. *JOGESSUR BANERJEE v. KULYANEE CHURN DEO 24 W. R. 41*

3. ———— Matters for arbitration. Whatever matters parties to a suit may agree to refer to arbitration, they can refer such matters or any of such matters as are in difference between them in the suit. *TRUNATH CHOWDHURY v. MANICK CHUNDER DOSS 14 W. R. 469*

4. ———— Agreement to refer future differences to arbitration—*Naming of arbitrators*—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 523*. A general agreement to refer future differences to arbitration comes within s. 523 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), and may be filed under that section. The section is not confined to cases in which a dispute actually existing at date of agreement is agreed to be referred to arbitration. But the agreement must name the arbitrator or arbitrators, and an agreement which provides for the future appointment or election of arbitrators does not fall within the section. The effect of the last clause of s. 523 is to give the parties to such an agreement power to nominate the arbitrator, even when they have agreed that he shall be appointed by the Court. In such cases the Court must

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appoint their nominee. FAZULBHOY MEHRAJI CHINYOY v. BOMBAY AND PERSIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY I. L. R. 20 Bom. 232

5. ———— Reference by executor to arbitration—*Application for probate—Opposition by caveator—Effect of award—Jurisdiction of Testamentary Court to decide question of award—Power of executor to refer question of execution of will to arbitration.* Any dispute (for instance, as to the due execution of a will) in a suit on the testamentary side of the High Court can be referred to arbitration, and the Court will recognize such reference and the award made in it. An executor having propounded a will applied for probate, a caveat was filed denying the execution of the alleged will, and the matter was duly registered as a suit. The executor and the caveatrix subsequently referred "the dispute" to arbitration, and an award was made that the alleged will had not been executed. The executor nevertheless subsequently continued the suit. At the hearing the caveatrix pleaded the award, and contended that it was binding on the plaintiff (executor). The plaintiff (executor) contended that the Court as a Court of Probate had no jurisdiction to try any question as to the award, but was limited only to the question of the execution of the will. *Held, per CANDY, J.,* that the Court had jurisdiction to determine the question as to the award. *Held, also,* that the award was binding on the executor. GHELLABHAI ATMARAM v. NANDUBAI

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 238

In the same case on appeal. *Scmble:* (FARRAN, C.J., and STRACHEY, J.) An executor, against whose application for probate a caveat has been entered, cannot submit to arbitration the question whether the will propounded by him was duly executed by the deceased. GHELLABHAI ATMARAM v. NANDUBAI I. L. R. 21 Bom. 335

6. ———— Application for reference—*Parties to application—Act VIII of 1855, s. 313.* An application for arbitration, as provided by s. 313 of Act VIII of 1859, must be made by all the parties who are materially interested, otherwise it is liable to be declared invalid by the Court and to be set aside. BAIKANTHANATH CHATTERJEE v. NAZIRUDDIN

1 B. L. R. S. N. 11: 10 W. R. 171

7. ———— Mode of application. The application for a reference to arbitration must be made in Court by an instrument in writing by the parties in person, or their pleaders specially authorized in that behalf. BHIRGOO ROY v. BHAGRUTH UPADHYA W. R. 1864, Act X, 41

GAZEE v. HAMID BUKSH . . . 16 W. R. 160

8. ———— Power of partner to bind the firm by reference to arbitration in absence of special authority—*Specific Relief Act, s. 21.* One partner, though entitled to bring a suit

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on behalf of the firm of which he is a member to recover a debt due to the firm, has no power, in the absence of special authority, to bind the firm by submission to arbitration of the claim so brought. *Stead v. Salt, 3 Bing. 101, and Strangford v. Green, 2 Mad. 228, referred to.* RAM BHAROSE v. KALLU MAL I. L. R. 22 All. 135

9. ———— Absent plaintiff—*Special authority.* An application for arbitration on behalf of an absent plaintiff is not allowable without special authority. GOOR CHUNDER PUTEETUNDO v. JOOGUL CHUNDER alias SHAMA CHURN GHOSE

1 W. R. 80

10. ———— Unauthorised reference—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 313—Mooktears without special authority.* Where reference to arbitration was made by mooktears of the parties without holding special authority for that purpose as provided by law (s. 313, Act VIII of 1859) from their clients respectively: *Held,* that such reference to arbitration was unauthorized and illegal, and not sufficient to remove the bar of limitation. SHUNKER v. HUR NARAIN . . . 1 Agra Rev. 49

RAM PERSHAD v. NAZEER HOSSEIN

1 Agra Rev. 63

11. ———— Application made during hearing—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 313.* When an application for reference to arbitration is made in open Court at or during the final hearing of a suit, in the presence of all parties, and they consent thereto, a written authority, such as that referred to in s. 313 of Act VIII of 1859, seems not to be required. AKBER BEG v. BUNDA ALI

2 N. W. 419

JEYASANKIRA DEVI v. NAGANNADA DEVI

1 Mad. 106: 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 136

12. ———— Submission in writing—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859 s. 326.* S. 326 of the Civil Procedure Code made all submission to arbitration by an instrument in writing practically a rule of Court. PESTONJEE NUSERWANJEE v. MANOCKJEE & Co. . . . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 69

13. ———— Order of reference to arbitration—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 506—Jurisdiction—Absence of written authority to refer practice.* By a Judge's order consented to by the plaintiff and defendant, this suit was referred to arbitration on the 13th December 1898. In the following January and February two meetings were held before the arbitrator which were attended by the defendant and the managing clerk of his then attorney, and he took an active part in the proceedings. Subsequently the defendant changed his attorney, and declined to proceed with the arbitration, contending that the order of reference was illegal, inasmuch as no special authority in writing was given by the parties to their attorneys to obtain the order, as required by s. 506 of the Civil Procedure Code.

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He took out a summons to set aside the order. *Held* (dismissing the summons), that the absence of a written authority did not invalidate the order of reference. *LUXUMBAI v. WIDINA CASSUM*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 629

14. ————— *Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 506 and 578—Reference to arbitration, not by a written petition, but by consent of parties—Whether an award passed on such reference ab initio void—Irregularity not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.* The second paragraph of s. 506 of the Civil Procedure Code, which says that every application for an order of reference shall be made in writing, is directory only; therefore in a case where both parties consented to a reference to arbitration and where the order of reference was made by the Court in the presence of their counsel or advocates, but not upon a written application, such a reference is not a nullity, as it is merely an irregularity not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. *SHAMA SUNDRAM IYER v. ABDUL LATIF* . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 61

4 C. W. N. 92

15. ————— *Ineffectual reference—Refusal of arbitrator to act—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 319 and 326.* Where parties had executed a deed agreeing to refer all matters in dispute to the arbitration of three persons, and one of the arbitrators refused to continue to act, and the other two consequently refused to proceed with the reference, the Court refused to order the agreement to be filed in Court. *BROOKE v. SURDIAL* 12 B. L. R. Ap. 13

16. ————— *Want of express consent.* The Judge intimated that he should refer the suit to arbitration, and allowed a certain time to the parties to object to that course. No objection was made within such time, and thereupon the Judge referred the cause to arbitrators named by him. After the day fixed, the defendants objected. *Held*, that the reference was not warranted, there having been no express consent by the parties. *DEGUMBUR CHATTERJEE v. RAM PREA DEBEA*

Marsh. 517; 2 Hay 583

17. ————— *Refusal to consent to arbitration—Presumption.* Nothing which passes between the parties to a suit in any attempt at arbitration or compromise should be allowed to effect the slightest prejudice to the merits of their case as it eventually comes to be tried before the Court. No presumption can be raised against a party to a suit from his refusal to withdraw from the determination and submit to arbitration. *MOHABEER SINGH v. DHUJJOO SINGH* . . . 20 W. R. 172

18. ————— *Jurisdiction of Court over arbitrators—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 508, 516.* When a Court has referred a suit to arbitration, it has jurisdiction over the arbitrators to compel them to give up documents filed before them as exhibits during the course of

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the arbitration, and to return the original records of the suit which may have been handed to them. Such jurisdiction can be exercised by an application made in the suit on notice to the arbitrators. *NURSING CHUNDER DAWN v. NUFFUR CHUNDER DUTT* I. L. R. 17 Calc. 832

19.—*Agreement to refer—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 375, 462, 525—Agreement to refer to arbitration during pendency of suit—No order of reference made by Court—Power to give effect to agreement in the suit.* During the pendency of a suit for partition between members of an undivided Hindu family, the division of the properties was referred by the parties to arbitrators, and an adjournment was granted by the Court to enable an award to be made. An order of reference was not, however, asked for, or made by the Court. An award was made, whereupon plaintiffs requested that it should be filed and that a decree might be passed in its terms. Defendants objected to the filing of the award. On the question whether the award could be given effect to in the suit: *Held*, that the agreement to refer to arbitration had not been lawfully entered into, as the submission related to the rights of minors, who were parties to the suit, and leave of the Court had not been obtained under s. 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure, either before the submission to arbitration or after the award; and that the adjustment was in consequence not binding on the minors, nor (regard being had to the nature of the suit) on the major members of the family. The effect of the submission was to take away from the Court the power of adjudicating upon the rights of the minors, and to leave such adjudication to a private tribunal. Such an agreement fell within s. 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Semble*: that assuming the award to be but the completion of an agreement lawfully entered into by the parties, and that such agreement, plus the award, affected the rights of the parties in the pending suit, it could only do so as an agreement, adjusting the suit; and as such could be recorded and acted upon under s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Quære*: Whether an award filed under s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and obtained under similar circumstances, would be invalid? *LAKSHMANA CHETTI v. CHINNATHAMBI CHETTI* (1900) . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 326

20. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 375, Ch. XXXVII, ss. 506 and 523—Agreement to refer to arbitration—"Adjustment of suit" within the meaning of s. 375—Agreement not in writing—Agreement to refer pending suit.* Upon the petition of a party to an agreement to refer to arbitration matter in dispute in the suit, it is not competent for the Court to decree under s. 375 "that the said agreement to refer to arbitration be recorded, and that, in terms of the said agreement, the suit be referred to the arbitrator, with all such powers and authorities as are vested in arbitrators under the provisions of the Code

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of Civil Procedure, and the said arbitration be finished within six months from the date of the completion and filing of the decree." This order is of the nature of an order under Ch. XXXVII of the Civil Procedure Code, but, where such agreement to refer to arbitration is not in writing, neither s. 506 nor s. 523 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies. Further, s. 523 does not apply to an agreement to refer where there is a pending suit. *Ghulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan*, 6 C. W. N. 226, referred to. *Harivalab Das Kallindas v. Uttam Chand Manick Chand*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 1, dissented from. *Per* MACLEAN, C. J. Merely an agreement to refer to arbitration is not an adjustment of the suit within the meaning of s. 375 of the Code. *Pragdas Sagarmall v. Girdhardas Mathuradas*, I. L. R. 26 Bom. 76, distinguished. *Per* HILL and STEVENS, JJ. *Query*: whether an agreement to refer to arbitration would under no circumstances be an adjustment of a suit such as is contemplated by s. 375, Civil Procedure Code. *FAKIR CHAND DEY v. TINCOWRI DEY* (1912)

7 C. W. N. 180

21. Appeal—Award—Appeal from decree based on an award—Civil Procedure Code, s. 506—"All the parties to the suit." *Held*, that the words "all the parties to a suit," in s. 506 of the Code of Civil Procedure, refer to the succeeding words of the same section "any matter in difference between them in the suit," and would not necessarily include parties who never put in any appearance in the Court, and between whom and any of the parties to the submission there was not in fact any matter in difference in the suit. *Deo Nandan v. Bhirgu Rai*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1887), 215, referred to. *PITAM MAL v. SADIQ ALI* (1898)

I. L. R. 24 All. 229

22. Application—Award—Acquiescence—How far a defendant, not a party to an application for reference to arbitration, is bound by his conduct. In a suit brought by the plaintiffs for recovery of possession of certain immovable property on a declaration of title thereto, a reference was made to arbitration. One of the defendants (defendant No. 2) did not join in the reference, and did not take any part in the proceedings before the arbitrators, although it appeared that he, in obedience to a summons which was issued at the instance of another defendant, sent his servant to produce a document before the arbitrators. An objection was now taken by defendant No. 2 that he was not bound by the award. *Held*, that it was so, and that the conduct of defendant No. 2 was not such that it could be said that he was bound by the award by reason of acquiescence. *BENI MADHUB MITTER v. PREONATH MANDAL* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 303: s. c. 5 C. W. N. 268

23. ——— Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 506—Reference to arbitration—Application by pleader not specially authorised.

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Where a pleader, who made the application for reference to arbitration, was not specially authorized to make such application as is required by s. 506, Civil Procedure Code, and there was nothing to show that the reference to arbitration was acquiesced in by the subsequent conduct of the party: *Held*, that the reference to arbitration was not valid. *Saturjit Perlup Bahadoor Sahi v. Duhin Golab Koer*, I. L. R. 24 Calc., 469 distinguished. *SHEO DAS MISSEER v. BIRJ NANDON PERSHAD* (1902)

7 C. W. N. 343

24.—Reference by manager of joint Hindu family—Hindu law—Joint Hindu family—Power of manager to refer a dispute to arbitration—Award—Minors bound by the award. A manager of a joint Hindu family, even when he is not the father, has the power to bind the family by a reference of a dispute, with any outsider, regarding any family property, to arbitration, provided such reference be for the benefit of the family. Minors in the family are bound by the reference, and consequently by the award made upon it. *BALAJI NARAYAN GOKHALE v. NANA BIN BABAJI GHATGE* (1903)

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 287

25.—Civil Procedure Code, s. 506—Arbitration—Application for reference signed by pleader holding a defective vakalatnamah. An application under s. 506 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a reference to arbitration was made by the parties to a pending suit. This application was signed on behalf of the defendants by some of the defendants personally, and on behalf of the others by a pleader. It appeared, however, that the pleader's vakalatnamah has not been signed by one of the defendants on whose behalf the pleader had signed. *Held*, that in the absence of any circumstance to estop the defendant who had not signed from objecting to the reference, the reference to arbitration and all subsequent proceedings founded thereupon were invalid. *Pitam Mal v. Sadiq Ali*, I. L. R. 24 All. 229, distinguished. *KADHU SINGH v. BALJIT SINGH* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 423

26.—Arbitration—Authority of pleader to agree to reference. A vakalatnamah in general terms is wholly insufficient to enable a pleader to apply for an order of reference to arbitration on behalf of his client under s. 506 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where, however, a reference was made on such authority and an award followed and a decree based on such award without any objection taken to the authority of the pleader to apply for a reference, the High Court refused to set aside such decree in revision. *RAMJIWAN v. KALI CHARAN SINGH* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 429

27. ——— Arbitration—Reference made orally, but reduced to writing by the Court—Irregularity. Where both parties to a pending suit consented to a reference to arbitration and an order of reference was then and there made by the Court in the presence of the parties, though not upon a

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written application, it was *held*, that it was not open to the Court, having regard to the provisions of s. 510 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to supersede that reference, the arbitrator not having declined to act. *Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynodeen Khan*, 6 *Moc. I. A.* 134, distinguished. *Shama Sundram Iyer v. Abdul Latif*, *I. L. R.* 27 *Calc.* 61, and *Luxumbai v. Hajee Widina Cassum*, *I. L. R.* 23 *Bom.* 629, followed. *ABDUL HAMID v. RAIZ-UD-DIN* (1907) . . . *I. L. R.* 30 *All.* 32

3. APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS AND UMPIRES.

1. ——— Power of Judge to appoint—*Consent of nominees—Fresh appointment after refusal to act.* Before a Judge refers a case for arbitration, he should ascertain whether the persons nominated are willing to accept the office, and till he has done so, any nomination of an arbitrator by him, without the application or consent of the parties, is illegal. But when a case has once been referred to arbitration, after the preliminary steps have been properly taken, the Judge has the sole power of appointing fresh arbitrators in the room of such as refuse to act. *TROYLUCKHONATH ROY v. COLLECTOR OF BEERBHOOH. LOCKENATH ROY v. COLLECTOR OF BEERBHOOH. HIRONATH ROY v. KASHEENATH ROY* *W. R.* 1864, 338

2. ——— Nomination by Judge—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 314—Validity of appointment of arbitrator.* Where both parties could not agree in nominating an arbitrator, and the Judge nominated one under s. 314, Act VIII of 1859, and one of the parties, six weeks after the nomination, objected to the Judge's nominee, but could not show on appeal that he did not request the Judge to nominate some one, the appointment was held good and binding upon both parties. *SUROOP RAM DEB v. GOBIND RAM DEB* *7 W. R.* 13

3. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 510 and 524—Refusal of person appointed arbitrator to act—Appointment of arbitrator by Judge—Effect of s. 524 on such appointment.* The words "so far as they are consistent with any agreement so filed" in s. 524 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not mean that the agreement must contain in every case an express provision as to what ought to be done if any arbitrator is unwilling to act, in order that a Judge may act in conformity to it, and that s. 510 has otherwise no application. The reasonable construction is that the action of the Judge under s. 510 should not be inconsistent with the agreement, if it contains any special provision on the subject. *BALA PATTABHARAMA CHETTI v. SEETHARAMA CHETTI* . . . *I. L. R.* 17 *Mad.* 498

4. ——— Arbitrators not consented to by parties—*Invalid award.* The Code gives no power to a Court to enforce arbitrators on an unwilling suitor. The award of arbitrators so appointed

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will not be enforced. *SHEONATH alias BURRAY KAKA v. RAMNATH alias CHOTAY KAKA*

1 *Ind. Jur. N. S.* 161 : 5 *W. R. P. C.* 21
10 *Moo. I. A.* 413

5. ——— Appointment of sole arbitrator in place of four—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 315, 318, 319—Recall of reference—Consent—Appointment of substitute for arbitrator.* In a suit for a partnership account, the matters in dispute were, by an order dated the 19th April 1877, referred by consent to four persons and an umpire, the award to be made within five months. Some steps were taken in the reference, but the arbitrators failed to make their award within the time limited, and meanwhile the umpire died. After negotiations for appointment of a fresh arbitrator and enlargement of the time had failed, the plaintiff moved that "the order of the 9th April 1877" might be recalled, and that the matters in dispute might be referred to the arbitration of such person or persons as the Court might be pleased to admit, or be tried and determined by the Court. The defendant opposed the application. An order was, however, made on the 29th May 1878 that the order of the 19th April 1877 should be recalled, and that all matters in difference between the parties should be referred to *C D*, who should make his award in writing within three months, or within such further time as the said *C D* might think necessary. Certain provisions as to the payment of costs were also made. *Held*, that the order of the 19th May was not an order recalling the reference under s. 318, and then referring it afresh under s. 315 of Act VIII of 1859, but an order under s. 319 appointing a new arbitrator in the place of the old ones, for which the consent of all parties was not necessary. Under s. 319 of Act VIII of 1859, the Court has power to appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators either in the place of an arbitrator or in the place of arbitrators. *RAMPERSAD v. JUGGERNAUTH* . . . *6 C. L. R.* 1

6. ——— Umpire, appointment of—*Act VIII of 1859, s. 316—Difference of opinion.* Where a case has been referred to arbitration, but no provision has been made in the reference for any difference of opinion among them as directed by s. 316, Act VIII of 1859 : *Held*, that the Court, on the case coming before it, and objection being taken to the award, should have ordered that the arbitrator should appoint an umpire ; or should have declared that the decision of the majority should prevail ; or should have appointed an umpire ; or should have made such arrangement as the parties would have consented to ; or if they could not agree, such arrangement as it thought fit. Where this was not done, and the case came up in special appeal to the High Court, the case was sent down that it might be submitted to arbitrators again with a distinct order under s. 316. *HARADHAN DATT v. RADHANATH SHAHA* . . . *2 B. L. R. S. N.* 14 : 10 *W. R.* 398

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7. ——— Appointment of Arbitrator by Court. *Semble*: Where no arbitrator has been named in an agreement, and the aid of the Court in the appointment of an arbitrator is invoked, the parties ought to have an opportunity of being heard upon the selection to be made. *Pestonjee Nusservanjee v. Manockjee*, 12 Moo. I. A. 112, referred to. *COLEY v. DACOSTA*
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 200

8. ——— Power of Court to appoint new arbitrators—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 510*. The Court has power under s. 510 of the Code of Civil Procedure to appoint a new arbitrator in the place of another, only when the latter had consented to act as arbitrator. *Pugardin Ravulan v. Moidinsa Ravulan*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 414, approved of. *BEPIN BEHARI CHOWDHRY v. ANNODA PRASAD MULLICK*
I. L. R. 18 Calc. 324

9. ——— Appointment of umpire by arbitrators—*Umpires—Mode of appointment prescribed by contract—Delegation by arbitrators of their right to appoint umpire*. A contract provided that disputes between the parties were to be referred to the arbitration of two merchants, and that, should the arbitrators be unable to agree, they should appoint an umpire. The plaintiffs and defendant referred their dispute to two arbitrators. These arbitrators disagreed in their report, and referred the case to the Bombay Chamber of Commerce for the appointment of an umpire. The Chamber of Commerce appointed an umpire, who made his award. *Held*, that the appointment of the umpire was invalid. The arbitrators could not delegate the power of appointment conferred on them by the contract. *SMITH v. LUDHA GHILLA DAMODAR*
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 129

10. ——— Incapacity to act—*Act VIII of 1859, s. 319—Absence from the country*. When a person goes away from the country and remains away, and there is no evidence to show an intention to return, that person becomes incapable of acting as umpire within the meaning of s. 319 of Act VIII of 1859. *GADADHAR MOITRY v. GANGA PRASAD MOITRY*
4 B. L. R. O. C. 89

11. ——— *Bengal Chamber of Commerce, arbitration by—Rules—Umpire, appointment of—Effect of failure to appoint*. The rules relating to arbitration under the Bengal Chamber of Commerce contemplate the appointment of an Umpire before the Arbitrators enter upon the reference and not upon a disagreement between them. Where the terms of a reference provide for the appointment of an Umpire before the Arbitrators enter upon the reference, until the Umpire is appointed, the reference cannot proceed. *Bright v. Durnell*, 4 Dow. 756; *Bates v. Townley*, 1 Ex. 572, followed. *CHOONI LAL v. MADHURAM* (1908) I. L. R. 36 Calc. 388

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4. DUTIES AND POWERS OF ARBITRATORS.

1. ——— Ascertainment of points at issue—*Decision on issue*. "All matters in difference in the suit, including all dealings and transactions between the parties," having been referred to the arbitration and award of certain persons, the arbitrators should ascertain upon what points the parties are at issue, and upon each of these points come to a finding. *LUCHMEE NARAIN v. PYLE*
2 N. W. 150

2. ——— Delegation of authority—*Absent arbitrators*. Arbitrators have no power to delegate their authority to others. Thus, if some of the arbitrators are absent, those present cannot appoint others in their stead. *SURUBJEET NARAIN SINGH v. GOURREE PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH*
7 W. R. 269

3. ——— Procedure of arbitrators—*Technical rules*. Arbitrators are not bound by the technical rules of Court. *REEDDY KRISHNA MOZOONDAR v. PUDDO LUCHON MOZOONDAR*
1 W. R. 12

4. ——— Evidence. Arbitrators ought only to take such evidence as is required by the terms of the agreement referring the question in dispute to arbitration. *KRISHNAKANTA PARAMANIK v. BIDYA SUNDAREE DAS*
2 B. L. R. Ap. 25

5. ——— Matters referred by Court, also by parties—*Separate awards*. Arbitrators should give separate awards in a case referred to them by the Judge, and on other matters referred to them by the parties, instead of mixing them all up and giving a general award. *ROCHOO NUNDEN LALL SAHOO v. BUNWARRE LALL SAHOO*
3 W. R. Mis. 27

6. ——— Decision on matters not referred. The decision of arbitrators in a matter not in difference between the parties, nor referred to them, is null and void for want of jurisdiction. *MOSHABEL SINGH v. KOSOMETTY BEWA*
15 W. R. 172

7. ——— Power to order payment of fees to be condition precedent to hearing of reference. There is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code which authorizes arbitrators to apply to the Court for confirmation of an order passed by them making payment of their fees a condition precedent to the hearing of a reference. *STEEL v. ROBERTS* I. L. R. 6 Calc. 809; 8 C. L. R. 439

8. ——— Interest after date of submission—*Costs of reference—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 312-322*. Where all matters in difference between the parties in the suit were referred to arbitration under an order of Court:—*Held*, that the arbitrators had power to award interest after the date of the submission, and to deal with the costs of the reference and award. *MOHAN LALL v. NATHU RAM*
1 B. L. R. O. C. 144

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9. ——— Costs—*Omission to fix scale of costs.* An award directed that the defendant should pay the costs of the suit, and of the reference, and of the award, without fixing the scale. On application to the Court to do so, the case was sent back to the arbitrator for that purpose. *Held*, that, when the order of reference gives the arbitrator full discretion over costs, he alone can fix the scale. *BARRUT CHUNDER DOSS v. DAMJEE PITTUMBER* Bourke O. C. 7: Cor. 150

10. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 317 *et seq.* Where by an order of reference made pending a suit, all matters in difference between the parties are referred to an arbitrator by the Court under Act VIII of 1859, s. 317 *et seq.*, the arbitrator has power to deal with the costs of the suit. *MUDDOOSOODUN CHOWDHRY v. KOYLAS CHUNDER SHAW. KOYLAS CHUNDER SHAW v. MUDDOOSOODUN CHOWDHRY*

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 12

11. ——— Power of arbitrators to deal with question of costs—*Excess in award.* The parties to a suit having referred the matters in dispute between them to arbitration, the arbitrators, without being specially authorized to decide the question of costs, included in the award a direction that the defendant should pay the costs of the plaintiff. On the application of the plaintiff the Subordinate Judge, under s. 526 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ordered the award to be filed, holding that the arbitrators had as such an implied power to deal with the costs. The defendant applied to the High Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction, praying that the record of the case might be sent for, and the order of the Subordinate Judge set aside. *Held*, that the arbitrators had no implied power to deal with the question of costs, and that on the defendant's objection the Subordinate Judge should have refused to file the award. Under the circumstances, the High Court, instead of setting aside the order to file the award, directed the award to stand good, except so far as it awarded costs, and that the decree should be drawn in accordance with it, as it would be if it contained no direction as to costs. *DAGDUSA TILAKCHAND v. BHUKAN GOVIND SHET* I. L. R. 9 Bom. 82

12. ——— Action after award—*Award—Arbitrator, powers of—Entry by arbitrator after award made—Devolution of property, alteration of, by arbitrator.* Where a plaintiff seeks to enforce an award so far as it is operative in law, but disputes the legal effect of a particular clause, and contends that an unauthorized addition to the award by the arbitrator after the award had been made is *ultra vires*: *Held*, that it is not a suit to cancel or set aside an award, and that Art. 91, Sch. II, of the Limitation Act does not apply. An entry made by an arbitrator in the schedule of the property, after he had made his award, to the effect that a particular portion had been given to the defendant as dower

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and was her separate property, is no part of his award, and confers no title on the defendant. An arbitrator has no power to alter the devolution of property in a mode at variance with the ordinary principles of the law governing the parties, in the absence of a special custom prevailing in the family. He has no power to make property which is divisible by law indivisible for ever. *JAFRI BEGUM v. SYED ALI REZA* (1901) 5 C. W. N. 585 s.c. I. L. R. 23 All. 382; L. R. 28 I. A. 111

13. ——— Irregularity—*Irregularity not misconduct—Right of arbitrator to delegate his ministerial duties—Invalid portion of award rejected if separable.* Where a reference to arbitration included primarily certain specific points, as to measurements of work done and rates of payment in difference between the parties, and also all other matters in difference now subsisting between them "or in anywise incident or relating thereto," and the arbitrators were informed in writing, without the plaintiff's knowledge, by the draftsman, of the reference that only incidental or minor matters arising out of the specific points referred were intended to be dealt with: *Held*, that the omission to bring this information to the knowledge of the plaintiff was not misconduct, for there was no ground for impeaching the good faith of any of the parties concerned or the correctness of the opinion given. *Rolland v. Cassidy*, 13 App. Cas. 776, followed. An arbitrator may delegate to a third party the performance of acts of a ministerial character, so long as he exercises his own judgment on the matters referred. Where an award in respect of matters referred is clearly separable from that portion of it which goes beyond the strict terms of the reference, the former will be upheld and the latter rejected. *BUTA v. MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE OF LAHORE* (1902) I. L. R. 29 I. A. 168 s.c. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 854; 7 C. W. N. 82

14. ——— Guardian and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), s. 46—*Guardian, removal of—Consent of the guardian—Arbitrator's power—District Judge's jurisdiction, extra cursum curiae—Appeal.* An arbitrator has no power to take property out of the custody of a guardian appointed by Court and place it in charge of another, or to declare a legally appointed guardian a nominal one. Nor has a District Judge, as such, jurisdiction to remove a guardian under circumstances which would not enable him to remove him under the Guardian and Wards Act. The consent of the guardian cannot enable the Judge or the arbitrator to exercise such powers. A Court cannot, whilst acting *extra cursum curiae*, do that which the parties cannot legally authorize an arbitrator to do. If it does, such acts or orders would not be regarded as those of an arbitrator merely because the parties had consented. Such orders would therefore be appealable. *Bickett v. Morris*, L.R. 1 H. L. Sc. 47; *White v. The Duke of Buccleuch*,

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L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 70 : In re Durham County Permanent Benefit Building Society, L. R. 7 Ch. 45, and Burgess v. Morton, [1896] A. C. 136, referred to.
INDER NARAIN SINGH v. E. E. ADLAM (1904)
 8 C. W. N. 37

5. SUBMISSION OF AWARD.

1. ——— Extension of period for submission of award—*Practice*. Applications for the extension of the period for the submission of an award and orders thereon should be made in writing and recorded. *MONJI PREMJI SETT v. MALIYAKEL KOYASSAN KOYA HAJI*
 I. L. R. 3 Mad. 59

2. ——— *Umpire—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 509*. As in the case of an arbitrator, so in the case of an umpire, a Court has power to extend the period within which the award is to be submitted. The Court can extend the time allowed to an umpire under s. 509 of the Code. *KUPU RAU v. VENKATARAMAYYAR*
 I. L. R. 4 Mad. 311

3. ——— *Order extending time for presentation of award*. An order extending the time for the presentation of an award upon application presented within time is not bad in law by reason of its having been made after the expiry of the term which it purports to extend. *SUPPU v. GOVINDACHARYAR*
 I. L. R. 11 Mad. 85

4. ——— *Omission to fix time for delivery of award—Extension of time after expiration of period fixed—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 35, 508, 514*. The provision contained in s. 508 of the Civil Procedure Code, requiring the Court to fix a reasonable time for the delivery of the award, is not imperative, but directory, and non-compliance with it does not make the order of reference abortive and any subsequent arbitration proceedings ineffectual and bad. Under s. 514 of the Code, the Court may extend the time for making the award after the time fixed therefor has expired. *HAR NARAIN SINGH v. BHAGWANT KUAR*
 I. L. R. 10 All. 137

5. ——— *Making and filing award—Award made, but not filed within time specified by order of Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1932), ss. 508, 514, 521*. The present suit for dissolution of partnership and all matters in dispute between the parties thereto were by Judge's order, dated 18th July 1887, referred to the arbitration of A and B. The time for making and filing the award was by subsequent orders extended to the 18th May 1888. The award was made on that day, but was not filed until the 18th June 1888. The second defendant obtained a rule calling on the other parties to show cause (*inter alia*) why the award should not be set aside by reason of its not having been filed in time. *Held*, that the omission to file the award on or before the 18th May 1888 did not render it invalid.

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The word "made" in ss. 514 and 521 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) does not include the filing of the award. *UMERSEY PREMJI v. SHAMJI KANJI*
 I. L. R. 18 Bom. 119

6. ——— *Award leaving point at issue undecided—Omission from reference of a point in dispute—Decision by Court after submission*. Where matters in dispute are referred to arbitration, and it is found that one question at issue is omitted from the reference, and that the award returned by the arbitrators contains no decision thereon, the party interested should bring the omission to the notice of the Court. If he fails to do so, the Court is not wrong in not passing any order or coming to any decision on that point. *RAJ NARAIN ROY v. JUGGESSUR MOOKERJEE*
 14 W. R. 247

7. ——— *Delivery of award to party—Completion of arbitration—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 315, 318, and 320—Record of proceedings*. By an order of Court of January 17th, 1867, a suit was referred to two arbitrators, under s. 312, Act VIII of 1859, who were to make their award in writing, and submit the same to the Court within three months. No order for enlarging that time was made. The first meeting of the arbitrators was held on May 22nd, 1867, and four subsequent meetings were held, at which all the parties attended, and evidence was taken; at the last of which meetings, namely, on 27th July, an objection for the first time was taken on behalf of the defendant that the time limited by the order of reference had expired, but the arbitrators proceeded with the reference. The award was made on 12th August 1867, and remained with one of the arbitrators until his death in August 1868. Subsequently it was produced by the other arbitrator, on the application of the parties to the suit, and delivered to the successful party, by whom it was brought into Court on the 10th May 1870, and judgment was moved for in accordance therewith. *Held*, that the arbitrators had authority to make the award. The award was properly submitted to the Court. S. 320, Act VIII of 1859, does not make it necessary for the arbitrators to submit the award to the Court personally. Submission to the Court under s. 320 is not necessary to the completion of an award under ss. 315 and 318. Although an arbitrator may deliver his award to one of the parties, he ought not to hand over with it the proceedings, depositions, and exhibits. *JAGAT SUNDERI DAS v. SANATAN BYSAK*
 5 B. L. R. 357

6. REMISSION TO ARBITRATORS.

1. ——— *Defective and illegal award*. An award, defective and illegal on the face of it should be at once remitted to the arbitrators. *LUCHMEE NARAIN v. PYLE*
 2 N. W. 150

2. ——— *Award containing mistakes, omissions, or defects—Civil Procedure Code,*

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1859, ss. 322, 323, 324. S. 323, Act VIII of 1859, authorizes a Court which refers a case to arbitrators, to remand it to them for reconsideration when their award contains mistakes, omissions, or defects which cannot be amended by the Court under s. 322. Such award, on the refusal of the arbitrators to reconsider it, becomes null and void, without proof of corruption or misconduct under s. 324. *MOHUN KISHEN v BHOOBUN SHYAM* . 7 W. R. 406

3. ——— Application to remit award to arbitrators—*Time for remission—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 320.* An application that an award be remitted to the arbitrators, in order that the proceedings, depositions, and exhibits in the suit which had not been submitted with it to the Court under Act VIII of 1859, s. 320, should be so submitted, ought to be made within ten days after the award has been originally submitted; otherwise, if the award be good on the face of it, the Court will give judgment upon it. *BANEY MADHAR ROY v. HURRY MOHUN ROY* . 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 16

4. ——— Judgment passed on award within time allowed for remission—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 324, 325—Remission after judgment.* A judgment give according to an award under s. 325 of Act VIII of 1859, without waiting the ten days prescribed by s. 324 of that Act, is illegal, and will be set aside. After passing judgment according to an award, such award cannot be resubmitted to the arbitrator for reconsideration and correction. *POHKAR PERSHAD v. PUNCHUM RAE* . 2 N. W. 235

5. ——— Remission to arbitrators after decision on special appeal. A case having been referred to arbitration without provision being made for a difference of opinion, and the arbitrators having given in differing awards, the Court of first instance tried the case anew, and dismissed the suit. This decision was confirmed on appeal. In special appeal the plaintiff asked that the case might be sent back to the arbitrators with a provision for difference of opinion, and that they might submit their award a second time. *Held*, that it was too late at this stage to allow such a course. *THAKOOR DASS CHUCKERBUTTY v. RAM JEEBUN CHUCKERBUTTY* . 14 W. R. 150

6. ——— Refusal of arbitrator to reconsider award. The plaintiff in this suit sued the defendants to recover certain moneys presented to him on his marriage, which he alleged the defendants had received and appropriated to their own use. The defendants denied that they had received such moneys, but admitted that such moneys had been credited by the plaintiff's father to the firm in which they, the plaintiff and the plaintiff's father, were jointly interested, against a larger amount of moneys belonging to the firm which had been expended on the plaintiff's marriage. The parties agreed to refer the matter in dispute between them to arbitration, and to abide by the decision of the arbitrator. The arbitrator decided that the

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plaintiff could not recover the money he sued for and which had been credited to the firm of which he was a partner, as a larger sum had been expended on his marriage out of the funds of the firm. The plaintiff obtained the opinions of certain pandits to the effect that, under Hindu law, gifts on marriage are regarded as separate acquisitions, and prayed that the Munsif would remit the award with these opinions to the arbitrator. The Munsif remitted the award with the opinions, requesting the arbitrator to consider them, and to return his opinion in writing within a certain period. The arbitrator having refused to act further, the Munsif proceeded to determine the suit, and gave the plaintiff a decree on the ground that, in a joint Hindu family, presents received on marriage do not fall into the common fund. *Held* (PEARSON, J., dissenting), that, there being no illegality apparent on the face of the award the Munsif was not justified in remitting the award, or in setting the award aside and proceeding to determine the suit himself, but that he should have passed judgment in accordance with the award. *NANAK CHAND v. RAM NARAIN*

I. L. R. 2 All. 181

7. ——— Refusal by arbitrator to act—*Award on one point only—Remission to arbitrator—Limitation—Adverse possession.* A case was referred for decision to an arbitrator. The arbitrator made his return, deciding by the award only one of the issues raised in the case, *viz.*, that the defendants had been in possession of the land in suit for more than twelve years. The plaintiffs and the defendants claimed under the same landlord. The Munsif remitted the award to the arbitrator for determination of the other matters arising in the case; the arbitrator, however, refused to act further in the matter, and the Munsif himself took up the case and decided it in favour of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge held that the award made by the arbitrator was sufficient for the determination of the case, and reversed the decision of the Munsif and gave the defendants a decree in terms of the award. *Held*, that, as the plaintiffs and the defendants claimed under one and the same landlord, and the question between them being which of the two had the better title to the land in dispute, the case could not have been concluded by the finding of the arbitrator upon the question of possession, and that the Munsif had acted rightly, on the arbitrator declining to complete the award, in deciding the case himself. *JONARDON MUNDUL DAKNA v. SAMBHU NATH MUNDUL*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 806

8. ——— Appeal impugning propriety of order of remission—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s 520.* An award was remitted under s. 520 of Act X of 1877. The arbitrators refused to reconsider it, and the Court thereupon proceeded with the suit, and gave the plaintiffs a decree. The defendants appealed from such decree on the ground amongst others that the award had been improperly

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remitted under s. 520. *Held*, that the question whether the award had been properly remitted under s. 520 or not could be entertained in such appeal.

ABDUL RAHAMAN v. YAR MOHAMMAD.

I. L. R. 3 All. 636

But see *GEORGE v. VASTIAN SOURY*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 204

and cases cited in the judgment in that case.

9. ——— Omission of arbitrator to carry out terms of reference—*Suit for partition and to take accounts—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 2, 520, 522, 523—Filing agreement to refer to arbitration in Court—“Decree”*. The sharers of a joint undivided estate agreed in writing that such estate should be partitioned, and the accounts thereof settled by arbitration, and named one of such sharers as arbitrator, and agreed that he should settle all the accounts, show the surplus at each sharer's credit, and prepare lots, after partition of the lands and houses comprehended in such estate, and have them drawn within one year from the completion of the partition. Subsequently one of such sharers applied, under s. 523 of Act X of 1877, to have such agreement filed in Court. The other sharers not objecting to this course, such agreement was filed accordingly, and the case was referred to such arbitrator. The arbitrator made an award whereby he partitioned such estate into lots, assigning some only of such lots by name, and wherein he stated that he had not been able to settle the accounts owing to the default of the parties; and that, considering that the partition should take effect without any delay, he did not ask for further time. He further stated that “all the parties state that they will adjust the accounts after renewing the agreement,” and he requested that the unassigned lots might be drawn in Court. The Court made an order confirming the award, and, it being objected that the settlement of the accounts should not be postponed, but that they should be settled as agreed directed that the arbitrator should settle the accounts, and gave him a year's time for that purpose, and, some of the parties not being willing to draw the unassigned lots, directed the distribution of such lots “in reference to the age and number” of the sharers. *Held*, that such order was a “decree” within the meaning of ss. 2 and 522 of Act X of 1877, that the arbitrator should himself have drawn such lots, or he should have made the parties draw them; but, inasmuch as it would not have strained the agreement to have had such lots drawn in Court and no objection had been taken to the arbitrator not having himself drawn them, it was not incumbent on the Court to have remitted the award in order that the arbitrator might have drawn them, that the Court, however, should not have distributed such lots in the manner it had done, but should have drawn a lot for each person; and in acting as it had done it had acted contrary to the award, and for that reason its decree could not be maintained, and that, in con-

ARBITRATION—*contd.*6. REMISSION TO ARBITRATORS—*contd.*

firming the award before the accounts had been settled and an award made in respect thereof, the Court had acted erroneously, inasmuch as the award had left undetermined a very important matter, *viz.*, the settlement of the accounts; and the Court should, under s. 520 of Act X of 1877, have remitted the award for the reconsideration of the arbitrator; and, as it had the power to remit it upon such terms as it thought fit, the Court could have allowed one year, if necessary, for the settlement of the accounts; and on this account, and also because the Court had made an order postponing the settlement of the accounts, and thereby made an order contrary to, and in excess of, the award, its decree must be reversed. SADIK ALI v. IMDAD ALI KHAN

I. L. R. 3 All. 286

10. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 521—Legality of order remitting award for reconsideration—Appeal*. An award, submitted by arbitrators, to whom all matters in dispute had been referred, stated that “defendant has not produced any witness in support of his contention raised in issues Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 6, hence we have only to deal with issues Nos. 3, 4, and 7,” and, dealing with those issues, the arbitrators gave their finding. The award was remitted on the ground that the arbitrators had not determined the issues Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 6. *Held*, (1) the legality of an order remitting an award for the reconsideration of the arbitrators may be challenged on appeal against the decree ultimately passed; and (2) that the award ought not to have been remitted: there was no illegality on the face of it, and there was a decision on the whole matter in issue between the parties. *Molhooranaith Tewaree v. Brindabun Tewaree, 14 W. R. 327, Ambica Dasi v. Nadyar Chand Pal, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 172, Nanak Chand v. Ram Narayan, I. L. R. 2 All. 181, and Bikramjit Singh v. Husaini Begam, I. L. R. 3 All. 643*, referred to. *GEORGE v. VASTIAN SOURY* . . . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 202

7. REVOCATION OF, OR WITHDRAWAL FROM, ARBITRATION.

1. ——— *Revocation of agreement to refer*. It is almost a universal rule that a submission to arbitration is revocable before award made. *SURUBJEET NARAIN SINGH v. GOURIE PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH* . . . 7 W. R. 269

2. ——— *Mode of revocation*. A revocation by deed can set aside a deed by which a person binds himself to abide by the decision of arbitrators. Revocation by parol may set aside a parol agreement. Notice is not necessary. *ALLA AYAPPA v. NUNDULA PERAIYA alias PERAMBOTLU*

3 Mad. 82

But see *NAGASAWMY NAIK v. RUNGAVAMY NAIK*

8 Mad. 46

3. ——— *Telegram staying proceedings*. In the course of arbitration proceedings in Calcutta one of the arbitrators received two

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telegrams purporting to be sent by the plaintiff and defendant in Darjeeling to the arbitrators, the terms of which were: "Stay further proceedings; arrange matters here." *Held*, that the telegrams sent to the arbitrators did not amount to a revocation of their authority. *KELLIE v. FRASER*

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 445

4. ———— *Lapse of time.*

Presumption of revocation from—Suit to enforce agreement to refer. Where some months had elapsed without either party taking action to carry out an agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration, the plaintiff was held not to be debarred from considering the agreement revoked and prosecuting his suit. *JEORAKHUN LOH v. MUTTRA PERSHAD*

1 N. W., Ed. 1873, 252

5. ———— *Ground for revocation—*

Sufficient cause. An agreement to refer an existing dispute to arbitration is as binding and capable of enforcement as any other lawful contract; and a submission of such a dispute to arbitration once made is not, without just and sufficient cause, revocable. *Alla Ayappa v. Nundala Peraiya*, 3 Mad. 32, overruled. *Pestonjee Nusserwanjee v. Maneckjee*, 3 Mad. 133, and *Santanja v. Ramaraya*, 7 Mad. 257, followed. *NAGASAWMY NAIK v. RUNGAVAMY NAIK*

8 Mad. 46

6. ———— *Long and un-*

reasonable delay in the conduct of the proceedings—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 523. A submission to arbitration can only be revoked on good grounds. The claimant, in a reference to arbitration, is the person on whom, *ceteris paribus*, it is incumbent to promote the conduct of the proceedings; and when, therefore, there is a long and unreasonable delay unexplained by any act of the other party, either conducting to it or consenting to it or waiving it, the latter is, *prima facie*, entitled to decline to go on with the reference, and to revoke the agreement for submission. Where an agreement to refer has been duly revoked, the Court is incompetent to order it to be filed under s. 523 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *COLEY v. DACOSTA*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 200

7. ———— *Omission to fix time within which award should be made—Notice.*

According to the proper construction of the Code of Civil Procedure (that is to say, construing it with reference to the constitution of the Civil Courts of India and the abiding direction to them to proceed in all cases according to equity and good conscience), when persons have agreed to submit the matter in difference between them to the arbitration of one or more specified persons, no party to the agreement can revoke the submission to arbitration, unless for good cause and a mere arbitrary revocation of the authority is not permitted. Where no time was originally fixed within which the award was to be made, it is open to either party to hasten the proceedings by giving notice to the arbitrators that the

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award must be made, and an umpire appointed, within a reasonable time; but where the time elapsing after the notice has been actively employed by the arbitrators, and the delay has been owing to necessity which they could not control, the parties cannot recede from their submission by reason of the notice. *PESTONJEE NUSSERWANJEE v. MANOCKJEE & Co.* 10 W. R. P. C. 51: 12 Moo. I. A. 112

ABLAKEE KOOR v. OODUN SINGH

15 W. R. 331

8. ———— *After the parties*

to a suit have agreed to refer it to arbitration and the order of reference has been made by the Court under s. 508 of the Civil Procedure Code, neither of them can arbitrarily and on no sufficient ground withdraw from the agreement. *Pestonjee Nusserwanjee v. Manockjee & Co.*, 12 Moo. I. A. 112, followed. *NAINSUKH RAI v. UMADAI*

I. L. R. 7 All. 273

9. ———— *Revocation of submission.*

A submission to arbitration once made cannot be revoked except for good cause. It cannot be revoked at the mere will of one of the parties to it. *Pestonjee Nusserwanjee v. Manockjee & Co.*, 12 Moo. I. A. 112, referred to. *SULTAN MUHAMMAD KHAN v. SHEO PRASAD*

I. L. R. 20 All. 145

10. ———— *Appointment of new arbitra-*

tor, Power of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 506, 508, 510, 521. On 19th June 1884, an application for an order of reference was made, under s. 506 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), by both parties to a suit. It was signed by both defendants and by the plaintiffs' pleader. As the plaintiffs' pleader had not been "specially authorized in writing" to join in the application, the Court postponed making any order on the application till the 23rd idem. On that day the first defendant did not attend the Court, but the plaintiffs' pleader produced the requisite authority, and the Court made an order referring the suit to the decision of the arbitrator nominated in the application of the 19th. On 27th June the first defendant made an application to the Court to revoke the authority of the arbitrator and appoint a new arbitrator in his place, on the ground that, after signing the application of the 19th, he had become aware of certain circumstances connected with the arbitrator which showed that he was not worthy of the confidence reposed in him. No final order was made upon this application till after the submission of the award, when it was rejected on the ground that the charges of misconduct and partiality imputed to the arbitrator were not made out. *Held*, first, that the first defendant not having objected to the appointment of the arbitrator on or before the 23rd June 1884, when the order of reference was made, must be taken to have tacitly acquiesced in the course adopted by the Court, and that such

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acquiescence amounted to a fresh submission. *Ardesar Hormosji Wadia v. Secretary of State for India*, 9 Bom. 177, and *Sreenath Ghose v. Raj Chunder Paul*, 8 W. R. 171, followed. The objections raised by the first defendant could only be considered after the submission of the award, and then only to the extent permitted by s. 521 of the Code of Civil Procedure (XIV of 1882). When once a matter is referred to arbitration, it is not competent to the Court, under the second paragraph of s. 508 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), to "deal with" the matter in difference between the parties, except as provided in Ch. XXXVII of the Code. There is no section of that Chapter which authorizes the Court to revoke the authority conferred on an arbitrator and to appoint a new one except in cases falling strictly within the purview of s. 510 of the Code, where "the scope and object of the reference cannot be executed." It is only in those cases, apparently, that the authority conferred on arbitrators can be revoked "for good cause," the cause being such as is contemplated in that section, as where "an arbitrator refuses, or neglects, or becomes incapable to act, or leaves British India under circumstances showing that he will probably not return to India at an early date." The enactment of the second paragraph of s. 508 of the Code of 1882, which does not occur in the corresponding section (315) of Act VIII of 1859, has the effect of rigidly restricting the Courts to the exact procedure laid down when dealing with cases in which the appointment of a new arbitrator becomes necessary. *HALIMBHAI KARIMBHAI v. SHANKAR SAI*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 381

11. ———— **Revocation by one party—**
"Sufficient cause"—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859*, s. 326. The fact of one of the parties to the agreement revoking his submission is not a sufficient "cause" within the meaning of s. 326 of Act VIII of 1859. The English cases on the subject considered. *PESTONJEE NUSSERWANJEE v. MANECKJEE*

3 Mad. 183

s.c. on appeal

12 Moo. I. A. 112 :
10 W. R. P. C. 51*SANTANJA v. RAMARAYA* . . . 7 Mad. 257

12. ———— **Examination of arbitrator as a witness.** A reference to arbitration made under an order of Court cannot be revoked at the instance of a party. If an arbitration award is set aside and the matter is tried as a suit before the Court, the arbitrator cannot be examined as a witness as to the grounds of his decision, but only to prove any admission which may have been made before him in the course of arbitration, and which might be material evidence. *NILMONEE BOSE v. MOHIMA CHUNDER DUTT* . . . 17 W. R. 516

13. ———— **Revocation of agreement to have case decided on the evidence of third person**—*Oaths Act (X of 1873)*, ss. 8-12—*Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877)*, Ch. XXXVII.

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The plaintiffs and some of the defendants in a suit agreed that the matters in difference between them in the suit should be decided in accordance with the statement made on oath by one J after he had made a local enquiry into such matters. The Court trying the suit accordingly directed that J should be examined on a certain day. Before J was examined, the defendants objected to the case being decided in accordance with J's evidence, but the Court disallowed the objection, and, having taken J's statement on oath, decided the case in accordance therewith. *Held*, by STUART, C.J., that the provisions of ss. 8 to 12 of Act X of 1873 were not applicable to the reference of the case to J; that such reference was in the nature of a reference to arbitration under the Code of Civil Procedure; that it would have been valid and binding on the parties had all the defendants joined in it; but that, as all the defendants did not do so, the proceedings were illegal, and they should be set aside and the suit be decided on the merits. *Held*, by OLDFIELD, J., that the reference of the case to J was not made under or governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to arbitration, and therefore the defendants were competent to revoke the agreement; and that, assuming the reference was made under the provisions of the Oaths Act, there was no rule of law prohibiting the revocation of such a reference, and therefore the defendants were competent to revoke the same. *LEKHRAJ SINGH v. DULHMA KUAR*

I. L. R. 4 All. 302

14. ———— **Revocation by Court—Illness of arbitrators**—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859*, s. 318. Where one of the arbitrators had been ill and the time for sending it in elapsed before they could make their award, the Court superseded the arbitration and recalled the suit. *JOSEPH v. SREERKER* . . . Bourke O. C. 359

15. ———— **Withdrawal from arbitration**—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859*, s. 326. Either of the parties in a reference to arbitration may withdraw from the proceedings at any time previous to the making of the award, unless the submission to arbitration has been made a rule of Court under s. 326 of the Civil Procedure Code. *ALLA AYAPPA v. NUNDALA PERAIYA alias PERAMBHOTLU*

3 Mad. 82

But see *NAGASAWMY NAIK v. RUNGASAMY NAIK*
 8 Mad. 46

16. ———— **Refusal of some arbitrators to act**—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859*, s. 319—**Refusal to nominate other arbitrators—Withdrawal from arbitration.** Where some of the arbitrators named in an arbitration agreement refuse to act and the parties do not agree to appoint others instead of them, it is not incumbent upon the Court to appoint other arbitrators, unless both parties agree, the provision of s. 319 being not obligatory, but simply permissive. *Held*, further, that under such circumstances, the refusal on the part of one

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party to nominate other arbitrators does not amount to a withdrawal from the agreement to proceed to arbitration. *SADA SOOKE v. SHIVA DYAL*

1 Agra 109

17. ———— **Withdrawal from arbitration—Ground for withdrawal.** A party is not entitled to withdraw without good cause shown from a submission to arbitration. Where an award was about to be pronounced and a party withdrew on the grounds, first, that the arbitrator was entering into foreign matters; and, second, that a minor was likely to be interested who would not be bound, the grounds were held not to constitute a good ground for withdrawal. *RAM COOMAR SHAHA v. KALA CHAND SHAHA*

21 W. R. 395

18. ———— **Agreement not fully carried out as to number of arbitrators.** The parties to the suit agreed to refer the disputes between them in another suit to the arbitration of five persons named by them, and did not agree to accept the decision of any less number of persons so nominated. Three only of the arbitrators nominated were proceeding with the arbitration, and one had declined to act. *Held*, that the suit, which was one to put an end to the arbitration, was maintainable. *PARMESHA DAT v. HARI NAIK*

7 N. W. 357

19. ———— **Agreement to withdraw suit—Failure to make award—Application for restoration to file of Court.** A suit was, by order of Court, referred to three specified arbitrators, who were to make an award within six months, and in case of difference of opinion all matters in dispute were to be referred to the decision of an umpire. The arbitrators had only one meeting, at which an agreement was come to by the parties to settle all matters in dispute among themselves and withdraw the matters from arbitration, which was accordingly done, but nothing appeared to have been afterwards done. No award was made by the original arbitrators within six months from the reference. On application by the plaintiff to have the suit restored to the file of the Court: *Held*, that the suit was still pending, the arbitrators not having determined it while they had jurisdiction to do so, and it was ordered that it should be brought again before the Court. *GAPI NATH NANDI v. SHIB CHANDRA NANDI*

6 B. L. R. Ap. 74

20.—**Civil Procedure Code, ss. 510, 514—Delegation of their duties by arbitrators—Award not submitted by the arbitrators within the time limited by the Court.** The parties to a suit for winding up a partnership agreed to refer the suit to arbitration, and two arbitrators were appointed by the Court. The parties subsequently agreed that the matters in dispute should be settled by one Saif Ali, who was within a certain time to send in his opinion to the arbitrators in order that they might submit to the Court an award in accordance therewith. Saif Ali

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sent in his opinion to the arbitrators, some days before the time fixed by the Court for the submission of the award; but the arbitrators did not submit their award within time. *Held*, that the agreement of the parties to let the matters in dispute be settled actually by Saif Ali could not possibly have the effect of superseding the appointment of arbitrators by the Court. Before the Court could proceed to hear the suit, it was necessary that it should itself make, under either s. 510 or s. 514, an order superseding the reference to arbitration. *JAMNA KUNWAR v. NASIB ALI* (1902)

I. L. R. 24 All. 312

21.—**Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 21—Alleged revocation of submission—For what cause submission may be revoked.** Although no party to an agreement of reference can revoke the submission to arbitration, unless for good cause, and a mere arbitrary revocation of the authority is not permitted, the fact, if proved, that the arbitrator was in fraudulent collusion with one of the opposite side might be a good ground for revocation of the submission. *Pestonjee Nussurwanjee v. Manockjee & Co.*, 12 Moo I. A. 112; *Tahal v. Bisheshwar*, I. L. R. 8 All. 57, referred to. *BANSIDHAR v. SITAL PRASAD* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All. 13

8. AWARDS.

(a) CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF.

1. ———— **Rule of construction.** An award should be construed, not by oral evidence given by the arbitrators, but by looking at the language of the award itself. *GUNESHEE v. CHOTAY LALL*

3 N. W. 117

2. ———— **Award of the nature of a family settlement directing an annuity to be paid "ta haiyat walidain."** An award drawn by an unprofessional arbitrator in India is not to be construed according to the same principles as an award settled by counsel or a solicitor in England, but in accordance with what may reasonably be supposed under the circumstances of the case to have been the intentions of the arbitrator. Where an award, which was of the nature of a family settlement between a father, mother, and son of certain property which had been given by the father to the mother in lieu of dower and then by the mother to the son, directed that a certain annuity should be paid out of the property to the father and mother "ta haiyat walidain," it was *held* that the annuity was to be paid during the joint lives of the father and mother and also during the life of the survivor. *ABDUL MAJID KHAN v. KADIR BEGAM*

I. L. R. 20 All. 245

3. ———— **Effect of award—Signature of award by parties.** *Held*, that the parties, having signed the award of arbitration, must be bound by that until it is legally set aside, and, until it is set aside, a suit to enforce rights irrespective of the

ARBITRATION—*contd.*8. AWARDS—*contd.*(a) CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF—*contd.*

award is not maintainable. *GOLAM ALI KHAN v. IMAM ALI KHAN* 2 Agra 224

4. ———— *Party added during arbitration.* In a suit pending before arbitrators, a person who is made a co-plaintiff on application, and makes no objection to the arbitration, is bound by the award. *SHITANATH BISWAS v. KISHEN MOHUN MOKERJEE* 5 W. R. 130

5. ———— *Defence of submission to arbitration and award upon the matter in suit before suit brought.* An award upon a question referred to arbitrators, on whose part no misconduct or mistake appears, concludes the parties who have submitted to the reference from afterwards contesting in a suit the question so referred and disposed of by the award. Two widows of a deceased Hindu referred generally to arbitrators the question of their rights, respectively, in the estate of their deceased husband, including the matter whether there was, or was not, any cause disentitling the widow who afterwards brought this suit for her share in the estate against the other who had obtained possession of the whole. The arbitrators declared her to be disentitled to succeed to any portion of the estate, and awarded her maintenance only. *Held*, that, in the absence of mistake or misconduct on the part of the arbitrators, the award was binding on the parties. *BHAGOTI v. CHANDAN*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 383 : L. R. 12 I. A. 67

6. ———— *Person not party to award—Reciprocity—Estoppel of objection of parties—Exclusion from inheritance—Evidence Act, s. 115.* An arbitrator's award declared the right of a member of a Hindu family jointly possessed of village houses and property, such member being deaf and dumb, and not a party to the arbitration and award. He afterwards sued for separate possession against the others, who in their defence denied his title to inherit by Hindu law, on account of his physical infirmity, which was from birth. The award having been produced at the hearing: *Held*, that this member of the family, being a stranger to the submission to arbitration, was under no obligation to abide by the award, and that he consequently could not avail himself of what the award contained in his favour. *HIRA SINGH v. GANGA SAHAI*

I. L. R. 6 All. 322 : L. R. 11 I. A. 20

Affirming decision of High Court in *GANGA SAHAI v. HIRA SINGH* I. L. R. 2 All. 809

7. ———— *Award not made on reference by all parties.* An arbitration award, not being one which has been made upon a reference by all the parties to the suit, is not capable of being converted into a final decree under the provisions of Ch. VI, Act VIII of 1859, though it is evidence against any party who agreed to the reference. *BEEJOY CHUNDER BANERJEE v. BHYRUB CHUNDER BANERJEE* 15 W. R. 427

ARBITRATION—*contd.*8. AWARDS—*contd.*(a) CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF—*contd.*

8. ———— *Consent to arbitration—Ambiguity in award.* A dispute having arisen as to the boundary of two estates, the parties joined in a petition to the Settlement Officer of the district to appoint arbitrators for the purpose of settling the boundary. That officer appointed arbitrators who subsequently made the following award: "Having in the presence of the karpurdazes of both parties taken down the depositions of the witnesses of both parties on the disputed locality and made investigation and enquiry on the spot, and having observed the aspect of the place, we have ascertained as follows." They then proceeded to state the boundary. "Going along west from the high peak of Sathoo Pahar, which is on the south of Luphapara one comes to a gurb called Rajgurb; on the south of it is Doobhiadidi in Mahomedabad; on the north of that gurb is Kolarkoonda in Belputta; on the west of it is Perma hill; on the east, south, and west is Mahomedabad; on the north is Belputta." At the foot of the award were the words, "Decision of the arbitrators confirmed," dated and signed by the Deputy Collector. The parties to the award afterwards petitioned the Settlement Officer to lay pillars along the line settled by the arbitrators, but he refused the application, but made an order that, "if the petitioners construct the pillars themselves, there will be no likelihood of objection hereafter. It is not necessary for the Court to pass any order in this matter." *Held*, (1) that both parties had accepted the award; (2) that the award was not ambiguous; (3) that the effect of the award was not merely to determine possession at the time, but to determine the right to the land itself. *RAMRUNJUN CHUCKERBUTTY v. RAM PROSAD DASS*

13 C. L. R. 26

9. ———— *Refusal to award interest to Mahomedan—Suit on mortgage.* Plaintiff, who was a Mahomedan, sued upon a mortgage executed by the defendants, who were also Mahomedans, to secure certain sums advanced by him, with interest at 24 per cent. The defendants pleaded an award by which the arbitrator, to whom the question of the defendants' liability under the mortgage and certain cross-claims which the defendants urged against the plaintiff had been referred, had found that the plaintiff was entitled to a particular sum under the mortgage for principal, but that, as a Mahomedan, he was not entitled to any sum for interest. The plaintiff contended that the award was bad. *Held*, on appeal, that the plaintiff was not entitled, by reason of interest having been disallowed, to treat the award as a nullity, that the omission by the arbitrator to allow interest was a mistake which might be rectified by the Court, and that the award must be taken to be binding on the plaintiff. *Held*, further, that the plaintiff was entitled to proceed on the mortgage, and that the sum found due by the award having been a portion of the mortgage debt, the plaintiff was entitled to

ARBITRATION—*contd.*8. AWARDS—*contd.*(a) CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF—*contd.*

the usual mortgage decree for the sum found due with interest at 24 per cent. from the date of the award. *MOONZORAD DOWLAH v. MEHIDI BEGUM*
7 C. L. R. 206

10. ———— *Maintenance, Grant of villages for—Nature of grant, whether absolute or resumable.* A grant of villages was made by a talukhdar to his younger son for maintenance. The elder son inherited the family talukh. In the next generation, in 1869, an award was made by a body of Oudh talukhdars as arbitrators on the submission of the disputants, who directed that the village "given as maintenance be decreed in favour of the grantee to continue as heretofore." The questions raised in that award were whether the villages had been granted only for life or were inheritable by the descendants of the grantee, and whether the talukhdar, or the holder of the grant for the time being, was liable for the revenue on the villages. The same questions were now raised by the third generation, who were the great-grandsons of the grantor, on the construction of the award. There was no limitation in the original grant of the villages to the grantee personally, nor was the grant expressly declared to be to him and his lineal descendants through males. But possession had followed in that order, and the talukhdar had always paid the revenue. The award, not having been filed within six months after the passing of the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, did not come within s. 33 of that Act. *Held*, (i) that the award was not on that account invalid. It was obligatory upon both parties to the submission and upon those whose interests they represented. (ii) That evidence of the antecedent possession of the villages, as well as of the quasi-judicial acts of the arbitrators, was admissible. (iii) That the terms of the award conferred upon the grantee and his descendants the right to possess the villages free of rent to the talukhdar, who remained responsible for the revenue. (iv) That the villages would not revert to the talukhdar's line until the line of the grantee's descendants should have become extinct. *BHAIYA ARDAWAN SINGH v. UDEY PRATAB SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 838
L. R. 23 I. A. 64

11. ———— *Reference to arbitration by the parties—Award—Leave to file by plaintiff, application for—Title-deeds—Discretionary power of Court to remit award for re-consideration to arbitrators—Arbitration Act (IX of 1899), s. 13—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 506 to 526.* A and B referred certain matters in dispute between them to arbitrators, under the Arbitration Act (IX of 1899), and an award was made by which A was ordered to pay a sum of money to B upon B delivering up certain title-deeds. A thereafter applied to the Court to have the award filed. B objected upon the ground that there was no finding that he was in possession of the title-deeds, and asked to have the award remitted. *Held*, that an order in the award

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on A to pay a sum of money to B, on the latter giving up certain title-deeds (possession of which was denied by him), could not amount to a finding that B was in possession of the title-deeds. *Held*, further, that ss. 506 to 522 of the Civil Procedure Code apply to arbitrations in a suit. *PROTAP CHUNDER DEY, v. TOOLSEY DASS DEY* (1902) I. L. R. 29 Calc. 793

12. ———— *[Construction of award—Suit to recover money due on an award—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), ss. 21 and 30—Specific performance—Damages.* In a suit for the recovery of a certain sum of money with interest due on an award and on the failure of the defendant to pay for the recovery of the same from the defendant's property, it was contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought, having regard to ss. 21 and 30 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877). *Held*, disallowing the contention, that the suit was not for specific performance. It was a suit for the recovery of money and for relief incidental thereto. *FARDUNJI EDALJI v. JAMSETJI EDULJI* (1904)
I. L. R. 28 Bom. 1

13. ———— *English Arbitration Act (53 & 54 Vict., c. 49), s. 32—Award of Arbitrators—Order in High Court, England, that the award be enforced as judgment, if amounting to foreign judgment—Suit in High Court, Original Side, to recover amount directed in award—Defendant not resident nor carrying on business in Calcutta—Letters Patent (25 & 25 Vict., c. 104), cl. 12—Defendant's undertaking to pay to plaintiffs' attorney in Calcutta if latter forbore from suit if amounting to "cause of action" within the meaning of cl. 12 of the Letters Patent—Jurisdiction.* An award was made by arbitrators in England directing defendant to pay plaintiffs a certain sum. The award was by an order of the 1st March 1902 of the High Court Q. B. D., England, directed to be enforced in the same manner as a judgment. Defendant left England and left the sum unpaid. Plaintiff instituted a suit on the Original Side of the High Court of Calcutta to recover the said sum, but at the time of the institution of the suit defendant neither dwelt nor carried on business nor personally worked for gain within the limits of its original jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' solicitor, however, at an interview in Calcutta with defendants had given an undertaking to defendant not to sue him, until he heard from plaintiffs, in consideration of defendant's undertaking to pay £500 immediately in part payment. *Held*, that the defendants undertaking in consideration of plaintiffs' attorney forbearing to sue was not a "cause of action" within the meaning of cl. 12 of the Charter, and the High Court had not jurisdiction to entertain the suit. *Read v. Brown*, 22 Q. B. D. 128, and *Cooke v. Gill*, L. R. 8 C. P. 107, referred to. *Obiter*: per MACLEAN, C. J. That the order of the 1st of March 1900 is not such a judgment as to entitle the plaintiffs to

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sue upon it. *DEEP NARAIN SINGH v. MINNIE DIETERT* (1904) . . . **8 C. W. N. 207**
S. C. I. L. R. 31 Calc. 274

14. *Instrument of partition—Award—An award by an arbitrator directing a partition.* An award began by saying, "We decide as below. The parties should act accordingly." It went on, the defendant "should take into his possession as below after passing a legal release." It added other directions with regard to the action of the defendant, and provided "in connection with whatever is settled to be given to the 'defendant' and to be taken by him, we direct that the 'defendant' should take into his possession the properties and receive and pay money stated above after passing a release on sufficient stamp and getting it registered." *Held*, that the award came within the meaning of the words "an award by an arbitrator directing a partition" within the meaning of s. 2, clause 15, of the Indian Stamp Act (II of 1899). *Per BEAMAN, J.* The terms of s. 2, clause 15, of the Indian Stamp Act (II of 1899) provide for all the cases, for parties having divided or agreed to divide, for arbitrators, to whom reference has been made, directing a partition and last for the Courts effecting a partition. *KALI DASS v. TRIBHUVANDASS* (1906) . . . **I. L. R. 31 Bom. 68**

(b) ENFORCING AWARDS.

15. ——— *Requisites for enforcing award—Judgment and decree on award.* *Per MELVILL and PRINCEY, JJ.* Before effect can be given to an award by execution proceedings, there must be a judgment according to the award and a decree following thereon. *ISHWARDAS JAGJIVAN-DAS v. DOSIBAI* . . . **I. L. R. 7 Bom. 316**

16. ——— *Award allowing maintenance in perpetuity—Enforcing an award beyond lifetime of parties.* The plaintiff and the defendant were members of a Deshpande family in Khandesh. An arbitration award, dated 1838, which was assented to by the ancestors of the parties, provided that the defendant's father should continue to hold the Deshpande vatan, and pay a certain allowance to the plaintiff's father and two uncles, unless they should see fit to make a partition. The plaintiff alleged that the allowance as fixed was payable in perpetuity, and was paid till 1864-65 when it was stopped, and prayed for a decree declaring him entitled to it and arrears for eleven years. *Held*, that effect could not be given to the award as a decree, as no Court would pass a decree fixing a grant of maintenance in perpetuity; that an allowance fixed by a decree as maintenance was ordinarily liable to be varied, on the party ordered to pay it showing circumstances rendering it equitable to make the variation; and that, there being no reason to suppose that the arbitrators had any idea of fixing the allowance for a longer period than the

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lifetime of the parties, and all those parties being dead, no effect could any longer be given to the award. *MADHAVRAV DESHPANDE v. RAMRAY DESHPANDE* . . . **I. L. R. 7 Bom. 151**

17. ——— *Agreement to be bound by majority—Refusal of arbitrator to act.* Where a case was referred by a Court to the arbitration of three persons, and the parties to the reference agreed to be bound as to the matters in dispute by the decision of a majority of the arbitrators, and one of the arbitrators subsequently refused to act and withdrew from the arbitration: *Held*, that the Court could not pass a decree on the award of the remaining arbitrators, and could only, under s. 510 of the Civil Procedure Code, appoint a new arbitrator or supersede the arbitration and proceed with the suit. *Nasir Ali v. Tinoo Dossia*, 6 W. R. 95, and *Rohilkhand and Kumaun Bank v. Row*, I. L. R. 6 All. 468, referred to. *NAND RAM v. FAKIR CHAND* . . . **I. L. R. 7 All. 523**

18. *Specific enforcement—Specific performance—Suit on an award not a suit for specific performance of a contract—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 113.* *Held*, that a suit to enforce an award cannot be treated as a suit for specific performance of a contract within the meaning of Art. 113 of the second Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1877. *Sornavalli Ammal v. Muthayya Sastrigal*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 593, followed. *Sukho Bibi v. Ram Sukh Das*, I. L. R. 5 All. 263, and *Raghubar Dial v. Madan Mohan Lal*, I. L. R. 16 All. 3, distinguished. *SHEO NARAIN v. BENI MADHOB* (1901)

I. L. R. 23 All. 285

19. ——— *Suit for specific enforcement of award—Case in which compensation in money considered impossible to assess.* The defendant leased a village to the plaintiff for a term of five years. In the second year of the lease disputes arose between the parties, which they agreed to submit to arbitration. On the questions submitted to him, the arbitrator delivered an award, which was to the effect—(1) that the lessee should surrender possession at a fixed time within the term of the lease, (2) that the lessee should pay the sum of Rs800 to the lessor, and (3) that, as to arrears of rent due from the tenants, the lessee should obtain decrees and execute a conveyance of them to the lessor, who was to pay to the lessee the aggregate amount of the decrees. The other terms of the award having been performed, the lessee sued for specific performance of the remainder. He filed with his plaint a number of decrees obtained by him against the tenants, together with a sale-deed conveying those decrees to the defendant, and prayed that the defendant might be ordered to accept the conveyance and pay the amounts of the decrees. *Held*, that, even if the award were bad, the defendant having acted on it and accepted the benefits it

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gave him, had precluded himself from impeaching it; also that the case was not one in which it was possible to assess compensation in money for the breach of the particular condition in the award, and that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the award, and this was directed in terms of the order made in the case of *Bell v. Denver*, 54 *Law Times Reports* 729. *BRIJ MOHAN LAL v. SHIAM SINGH* (1901) **1 L. R. 24 All. 164**

20. ———— *Award—Suit to file an award—Want of jurisdiction in the arbitrators can be pleaded—Award is equivalent to a judgment even before a decree is passed upon the award—Partition is effected by the award itself.* When a suit is brought to enforce an award a party to it can urge and show that it is not binding upon him on the ground of want of jurisdiction in the arbitrators. An award is equivalent to a judgment whether it has passed into a decree or not. It is binding upon the parties. In cases where it directs partition to be effected, it dissolves the joint family and from the moment of its date it severs their joint interests. *Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Alam Khan*, **1 L. R. 18 Cal. 414**, and *Laldas v. Bai Lala*, **11 Bom. L. R. 20**, followed. *BHAURAO v. RADHABAI* (1909)

1 L. R. 33 Bom. 401

(c) POWER OF COURT AS TO AWARDS.

21. ———— *Confirmation of award—Duty of Court.* The Court, in passing judgment on the arbitration award, must confine itself to the plaintiff's claim and give a decision thereon. *TRUNATH CHOWDRY v. MANICK CHUNDER DASS*

14 W. R. 466

22. ———— *Duty of Court.* If a Court regards an award as not open to objection, such Court must deliver judgment in accordance with the terms of such award, and not modify the same. *LUCHMEE NARAIN v. PYLE*

2 N. W. 150

23. ———— *Adding to award on confirmation.* The Court can only give judgment in accordance with the award, and cannot add an order for interest to it, if interest has not been given. *MOHUN LALL SHAHA v. JOYNARAIN SHAHA CHOWDHRY*

23 W. R. 105

24. ———— *Plea of jurisdiction on limitation.* When an award has been made, no plea of jurisdiction or limitation can be raised before the Court, which is to pass its decree according to the award. *AMEEN CHUND v. MENDHOO KHAN*

1 Agra Rev. 53

25. ———— *Reduction of number of instalments where payment by instalment is ordered—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 518, 522.* The arbitrators, to whom the matters in difference in two suits for money were referred to arbitration, made an award for payment to the plaintiff of

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certain sums by the defendant, and further directed that these sums should be paid by certain instalments. The plaintiff preferred objections to the award in so far as it directed payment by instalments, and the Court, holding that the arbitrators had no power to make such a direction, modified the award to that extent, under s. 518 of the Civil Procedure Code. On appeal, the District Judge, while allowing the power of the arbitrators to direct payment by instalments, reduced the number of instalments which had been fixed. *Held*, that, as it was clear that the reference to arbitration gave the arbitrators full powers, not only as to the amount to be paid, but also as to the manner of payment, the lower Appellate Court was wrong in reducing the number of instalments which had been fixed. *Per MAHMOOD, J.* The word "award" used in the last sentence of s. 522 of the Code must be understood to mean an award as given by the arbitrators, and not as amended by the Court under s. 518. The words "in excess of, or not in accordance with the award," used in s. 522, were intended to enable the Court of Appeal to check the improper use of the power conferred by s. 518. *JAWAHAR SINGH v. MUL RAJ*

1 L. R. 8 All. 449

26. ———— *Power of Court to order sale—Award without power to sell—Power of Court to go beyond award when made a decree of Court.* Where the partners of a firm in their partnership deed agreed to refer their disputes to arbitration, and the reference made in pursuance of this agreement gave the arbitrators a power to make partition, but omitted a power to sell: *Held*, on the award being made a rule of Court, that the Court had no power, under s. 326, Act VIII of 1859, to order the sale of certain property of which the arbitrators were unable to make partition, and the sale of which they recommended on that ground. *CHUNIMONY DASSEE v. NISTARINEE DASSEE*

3 C. L. R. 357

27. ———— *Grant of right of way not given by award—Award for partition—Subsequent suit for right of way not of necessity.* Where the house and lands of a joint Hindu family were partitioned by the Court according to an award made by an arbitrator to whom the parties had agreed to refer the matter:—*Held*, in a subsequent suit, that the Court could not go behind the award and allow one of the members of the family to claim a right of way from the family house to a public road, through the lands allotted by the award to another member, such right of way not having been granted by the award, and there being no such right of way of necessity. *GOPAL CHUNDER ROY v. BROJENDRO COOMAR ROY*

5 C. L. R. 338

28. ———— *Arbitration—Award—Award set aside—Court not empowered to make a second reference on the same submission.* The parties to a suit pending in the Court of a Munsif referred the matters in

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dispute between them to arbitration. An award was made and delivered: but it was afterwards discovered that one of the plaintiffs had died before the termination of the arbitration proceedings, and the Munsif accordingly set aside the award. *Held*, that the Munsif had no power to make a second order on the same agreement of the parties again referring to arbitration the matters in dispute between them. *PACHKAURI RAM v. NAND RAI* (1908) **I. L. R. 30 All. 505**

(d) VALIDITY OF AWARDS, AND GROUND FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE.

29. ———— *Reversal of award—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 324.* An award is not reversible, unless the provisions of s. 324, Act VIII of 1859, apply. *REEDOY KISHTO MUZOOMDAR v. PUDDO LOCHUN MUZOOMDAR* . . . **1 W. R. 12**

30. ———— *Application to set aside award—Extension of time for applying to set aside award—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 324.* In an application to set aside an order made by a Judge in chambers, extending the time (of ten days) for making an application under s. 324 of Act VIII of 1859 to set aside an award on the ground of misconduct of one of the arbitrators and of the umpire:—*Held*, that the words of the section being in their ordinary import obligatory, and there being nothing in the other parts of the Code to show that such construction was at variance with the intention of the Legislature, and a similar provision having been held by the Courts in England to be imperative that the application to set aside the award must be made within the ten days, provided the Court be then sitting, and, if not, on the first day of its sitting after that time, and that there is no power to enlarge the time to make such application. *EDULJI SHAPURJI v. TALSI DAS SUNDARDAS*

2 Bom. 285: 2nd Ed. 270

EDULJI SHAPURJI v. TULSIDAS SUNDERDAS.
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 234

31. ———— *Ground for setting aside award—Delay in returning.* An award made by the consent of the parties cannot be set aside merely by reason of its having been sent in a week later than the date appointed, when such delay is not owing to misconduct or corruption. *AMEEN CHUND v. MENDHOO KHAN* **1 Agra Rev. 53**

32. ———— *Fraud.* To set aside an award, there must have been some fraudulent suppression of evidence or other malpractice of the successful party, which should be definitely stated in the plaint. *HUB CHURN DASS v. HAZARE MULL* **1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 12**

33. ———— *Inconsistency in award.* An award of arbitrators cannot be set aside on the ground of its being inconsistent, because the

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plea of the defendant was proved as to part of the case, and not as to the other. *DEBRAJ ROY v. KARTICK CHUNDER SIRCAR* . . . **W. R. 1864, 153**

34. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 322, 323, 324.* Where by the terms of a reference to arbitration all matters in difference are referred to the arbitrator, the Court will not modify (s. 322), remit (s. 323), or set aside (s. 324) the award, on the ground that the arbitrator in his discretion has awarded damages to the plaintiff, and at the same time make him pay all the costs, when it is not shown that he exercised the discretion given him improperly. *MOHENDROHATH BOSE v. NUSSEE MANGEE* . . . **1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 224**

35. ———— *Document wrongly admitted in evidence—Privileged communication—Refusal to confirm award.* In a case referred to arbitration the defendant contended that, as he had tendered the amount awarded to plaintiff before suit, he ought not to pay costs, and in support of his contention produced a letter written by the plaintiff's attorneys to his attorneys, which was stated to be without prejudice, and on that the arbitrator refused plaintiff costs. An application to confirm the award was refused, on the ground that the letter had been improperly used as evidence. *Held*, on appeal, that though the arbitrator was wrong in receiving and using a document which ought not to have been received, yet that this was not a sufficient ground to justify the Judge in refusing to confirm the award. *HOWARD v. WILSON*
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 231: 2 C. L. R. 488

36. ———— *Arbitrator having interest in the matter at issue—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 324.* A Court should make full enquiry into the objections made to an award before setting it aside, and should not hastily assume that the mere circumstance of the arbitrator having some interest in the matter at issue would necessarily bring the award within the provisions of s. 324 of Act VIII of 1859 and render it liable to be set aside. *SENK KACHEE v. OREE DOBBY* . . . **2 N. W. 241**

37. ———— *Interested arbitrator—Pleader of one of the parties.* A Court is justified in holding that an award is not valid and binding upon that defendant, when the arbitrator was the retained pleader of the plaintiff, and no disclosure of this fact was made, before the arbitrator was appointed, to the defendant who was consequently unaware of it. *KALI PROSANN GHOSE v. RAJANI KANT CHATTERJI* **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 141**

38. ———— *Award purporting to be considered award of arbitrators, but really adoption by arbitrators of an agreement between parties.* Where an award which purported to be a considered award of the arbitrators framed after consideration of the statements of the parties and the evidence of witnesses was found in reality to be merely the

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adoption by the arbitrators of an agreement arrived at and signed by the parties to the reference, it was held that this would not prevent the award being a valid and binding award between the parties.

GOBARDHAN DAS v. JAI KISHEN DAS

I. L. R. 22 All. 224

39. ———— *Arbitrary decision—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 324.* It is no ground to set aside an award of arbitrators, under s. 324, Act VIII of 1859, that the arbitrators decided the case against the written statement of the defendant.

GOOROO CHURN DEY v. RAMDHONE PAUL

7 W. R. 28

40. ———— *Misconduct of arbitrators—Refusal to amend award.* The refusal of arbitrators to amend a clearly bad award is misconduct under s. 324, Act VIII of 1859.

DEE NARAIN SINGH v. RAJMONEE KOONWAR

3 W. R. 168

41. ———— *Neglect of some arbitrators to attend—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 324.* The neglect of some of the arbitrators to attend meetings of the arbitrators is misconduct within the meaning of s. 324, justifying the setting aside of the award by the Court which appointed the arbitrators, but not by a Court of Appeal.

SREENATH GHOSE v. RAJCHUNDER PAUL

8 W. R. 171

42. ———— *Power of Court on appeal.* But where the decree is appealed from, the Appeal Court has power to take cognizance of the question of misconduct of arbitrators. See s. 363, Act VIII of 1859.

RAMYAD SINGH v. NIRUNJUN KOER

22 W. R. 420

RAM GUTTEE MUNDUL v. THAKOOR DASS MUNDUL

22 W. R. 418

43. ———— *Refusal to call witness.* Refusal by an arbitrator to call witnesses produced by either party amounts to judicial misconduct within the meaning of s. 521 of the Civil Procedure Code.

RUGHOOBUR DYAL v. MAINA KOER

12 C. L. R. 564

44. ———— *Suspicion of partiality.* An award cannot be set aside by the Court on the mere surmise that the arbitrator has been partial.

NAINSUKH RAI v. UMADAI

I. L. R. 7 All. 273

45. ———— *Power to set aside award after judgment given on it—Award—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 324, 325—Jurisdiction.* Two out of three arbitrators appointed in the case submitted their award before the Munsif. The defendant, against whom the award had been made, applied to the Munsif to set aside the award on the grounds of corruption and misconduct and that the award was a nullity, inasmuch as only two out of three arbitrators had made the award. The Munsif overruled the objections, and passed a decree in terms of the award. On appeal to the Judge, the order of the

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Munsif was set aside on the ground that the award was illegal, as two only of the three arbitrators originally appointed had made the award, and the evidence did not prove the plaintiff's case. On an application to the High Court to set aside the order of the Judge: Held, that, under s. 325, Act VIII of 1859, the Judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the award when the Court of first instance had passed judgment according to the award. In the matter of the petition of ILAHI BAX

5 B. L. R. Ap. 75

ELAHEE BUKSH v. HAJOO

14 W. R. 33

46. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 521, cl. (a)—“Misconduct” of arbitrator.* The word “misconduct,” as used in s. 521, cl. (a), of the Civil Procedure Code, should be interpreted in the sense in which it is used in English law with reference to arbitration proceedings. It does not necessarily imply moral turpitude, but it includes neglect of the duties and responsibilities of the arbitrators, and of what Courts of Justice expect from them before allowing finality to their awards. An arbitrator to whom the matters in difference in a suit were referred under s. 508 of the Civil Procedure Code, and who was directed by the order of reference to deliver his award by the 22nd September, applied on the 17th September for an extension of time on the ground that a very full investigation was necessary, which it was not possible to make within the prescribed period. On the 20th September, without waiting for the order of the Court, he notified to the parties that he proposed to hold an inquiry in the case on the 24th, and it appeared that he did not expect this intimation to reach them before the 21st or 22nd. On the 23rd he informed the plaintiff's pleader that a new date would be fixed for the inquiry, of which notice would be given to the parties. Notwithstanding this, on the 23rd the arbitrator took evidence for the defendant in the absence of the plaintiff and his pleader. All these proceedings were held before the arbitrator received an order of the Court extending the time for delivery of the award up to the 26th October. On the 27th September he directed the parties to be informed that the investigation would be held on the 5th October. On the 4th October the plaintiff presented a petition praying the arbitrator to summon witnesses and to take documentary evidence, and upon this nothing definite was settled at the time; but after the pleaders had left, the arbitrator passed an order rejecting the petition, on the ground that the evidence sought to be produced was unnecessary. On the same date and on the 5th and 6th October he took evidence for the defence in the absence of the plaintiff and his pleader. On the 10th he rejected a petition by the plaintiff praying for further time to produce evidence, and complaining of his having taken evidence in the plaintiff's absence and having received in evidence a fabricated,

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document. On the 25th October the arbitrator delivered his award in favour of the defendant. Subsequently, upon objections made by the plaintiff, the Court set aside the award, and directed that the trial of the suit should proceed:—*Held*, that, although no case of "corruption" within the meaning of s. 521, cl. (a) of the Civil Procedure Code had been made out against the arbitrator, the circumstances above stated amounted to "misconduct" and the award was, therefore, bad in law, and had rightly been set aside. *Soobal Thakur Opadeeah v. Punchanund Tikka*, S. D. A. Bengal, 1848, 115, *Reedoy Kriste Mozomdar v. Pudo Luchun Mujumdar*, 1 W. R. 12, *Sada Ram v. Beharee*, S. D. A. N. W., 1864, Vol. 2, 399, *Paru Dass v. Khoobee*, S. D. A. N. W., 1861, Vol. 2, 199, *Howard v. Wilson*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 231, *Bhagirath v. Ram Ghulam*, I. L. R. 4 All. 283, *Wazir Mahton v. Lulit Singh*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 166, *Nainsukh Rai v. Umadai*, I. L. R. 7 All. 273, and *Pestonjee Nusserwanjee v. Manockjee*, 12 Moo. I. A. 102, distinguished. *GUNGA SAHAR v. LEKHRAJ SINGH* . I. L. R. 9 All. 253

47. ———— *Omission of arbitrators to act in conformity with the rules of evidence.* It is not a valid objection to an award that the arbitrators have not acted in strict conformity with the rules of evidence. *GUPPU v. GOVINDACHARYAR* I. L. R. 11 Mad. 85

48. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 521—Misconduct of arbitrators—Ground for setting aside award.* Where a suit was referred to arbitration, and objection was taken to the award on the ground that one of the arbitrators had not attended a meeting when witnesses were examined by the other arbitrators:—*Held*, that the award was invalid by reason of misconduct on the part of the arbitrators within the meaning of s. 521 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure *THAMMIRAJU v. BAPIRAJU* I. L. R. 12 Mad. 113

49. ———— *Misconduct of arbitrators—Application to have award set aside—Ground for setting aside award.* On an application to have an award set aside by reason of misconduct on the part of the the arbitrators, their action alleged was held not to amount to misconduct, and, therefore, the defendants were not entitled to have the award set aside. *TOOLESE MONEY DASSEE v. SUDEVI DASSEE* . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 361 3 C. W. N. 347

50. ———— In another case, heard at the same time and between the same parties, the facts were these:—The first meeting of the arbitrators was held on the 9th January without any notice to the defendants. It was alleged that nothing was done at this meeting. On that day the arbitrators sent a notice to the appellants appointing the next day (10th) at 6-30 P.M. for the next meeting. The defendants' attorney thereupon

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wrote protesting, and asked the arbitrators not to proceed, as they intended to apply to the Court. No notice of this protest was taken by the arbitrators, and they proceeded with the arbitration on the 10th in the absence of the defendants. On the 11th the defendants' attorney received a notice that the arbitrators would hold a meeting on the 12th at 8 A.M. A meeting was held on that day in the absence of the defendants, and an award was made decreeing the suit. *Held*, that the arbitrators did not give the defendants a fair and reasonable opportunity of being heard, and were guilty of such misconduct as was sufficient to vitiate the award. *Semble*: The *ex-parte* meeting on the 10th was alone sufficient to warrant the Court in setting aside the award. *TOOLSEYMONY DASSEE v. SUDEVI DASSEE*

3. C. W. N. 361

51. ———— *Ground for setting aside award—Arbitrator receiving evidence from one side in absence of other side—Misconduct—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 521.* An arbitrator ought not to hear or receive evidence from one side in the absence of the other side, without (if he does) giving the other side affected by such evidence the opportunity of meeting and answering it. This proposition is, however, subject to the qualification that the parties may agree that a reference may be conducted in any particular way, and such an agreement may be either express or implied from their conduct during the arbitration, and they may also expressly or by their conduct waive their objection to an irregular course of conduct on the part of the arbitrator. Where an arbitrator received certain papers and documents from the defendants in a suit referred to his arbitration, together with a letter from the defendants containing certain documents sent to him and made his award without giving the plaintiffs an opportunity of seeing the said papers and documents, and of meeting the inferences deducible from them:—*Held*, that there was such a breach of duty on the part of the arbitrator as entitled the plaintiffs to have the award set aside. *CURSETJI JEHANGER KHAMBATTA v. CROWDER* I. L. R. 18 Bom. 299

52. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 508, 514, 521—Omission to fix time for delivery of award—Extension of time after expiration of period fixed—Invalidity of award when not made within time fixed by Court—Costs.* The provision contained in s. 508 of the Civil Procedure Code, requiring the Court to fix a reasonable time for the delivery of the award, is not imperative, but directory, and non-compliance with it does not make the order of reference abortive and any subsequent arbitration proceedings ineffectual and bad. Under s. 514 of the Code, the Court may extend the time for making the award after the time fixed therefor

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has expired. The last paragraph of s. 521 does not imply that an omission by the Court to fix a positive date within which the award is to be filed is fatal to the validity of the award. Where an order extending the time for delivery of an award was made after the time fixed therefor had expired, and did not fix any positive date for the filing of the award :—*Held*, that the adoption of the award by the Court amounted to an enlargement of the time for delivery of the award to the date on which it was in fact delivered, and to a ratification of what had been done by the arbitrators, and that the parties, having made no objection to the action of the Court, must be taken to have waived any objection to the award. The mere circumstance of an arbitrator having first tendered and then withdrawn his resignation does not formally divest him of his character as arbitrator. *Joymungul Singh v. Mohun Ram Marwaree*, 23 W. R. 429, referred to. *HAR NARAIN SINGH v. BHAGWANT KUAR*

I. L. R. 10 All. 187

Held, on appeal to the Privy Council (reversing the above decision):—When once an award has been delivered, it is no longer competent to the Court to grant further time, or to enlarge the period for the delivery of the award under s. 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where an award was not made within the period fixed by the Court's order, but was made after the date given in the last order extending the time for its delivery :—*Held*, that the award was invalid. The decree of the Court dealing with the award as if duly made within the time could not be treated as enlarging it. The judgment in *Chuha Mal. v. Hari Ram*, I. L. R. 8 All. 548, approved. Order to be that the suit should proceed. Neither party to be entitled to costs in either Court below after the first judgment with regard to the stage at which the objection was taken; and the costs prior to that to abide the issue. *HAR NARAIN SINGH v. CHAUDHRAN BHAGWANT KUAR*

I. L. R. 1 All. 300

L. R. 18 I. A. 355

The principle of this case is applicable also to arbitration under s. 221 of the N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873). *GOURI SHANKAR v. BABBAN LALL*

I. L. R. 14 All. 347

53. ——— *Omission to fix time for delivery of award—Award not signed by the arbitrators in the presence of each other—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 508 and 516.* An award is not invalid merely because no time has been fixed for the making of the award, s. 508 of the Code of Civil Procedure being directory and not mandatory. *Har Narain Singh v. Bhagwant Kuar*, I. L. R. 10 All. 137, followed. *MUTHUKUTTI NAYAKAN v. ACHA NAYAKAN*

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 22

54. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 514, 521—Enlargement of time for award,*

ARBITRATION—*contd.*8. AWARDS—*contd.*(d) VALIDITY OF AWARDS, AND GROUND FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE—*contd.*

after period fixed for making it had expired. A suit was referred to an arbitrator, who did not make his award within the period limited for that purpose. After that period had expired, an application was made for its extension, both parties consenting; the application was granted, and the award was made within the time so extended, and a decree was passed in its terms. *Held*, that the order extending the time was not illegal, and the party dissatisfied with the decree was not entitled to have the award and the decree made upon it set aside. *LAKSHMINARASIMHAM v. SOMASUNDARAM*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 384

55. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 514 and 521—Power of Court to extend time for making award.* A Court has power to act under s. 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure at any time before the award is actually made, whether the time previously limited for making the award has expired or not. *Har Narain Singh v. Chudhrain Bhagwant Kuar*, I. L. R. 13 All. 300, referred to. *RAM MANOHAR MISR v. LAL BEHARI MISR*

I. L. R. 14 All. 343

56. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 508, 521—Delivery of an award.* A suit was, at the instance of the plaintiff and defendants, referred to an arbitrator. The arbitrator made his award within the period fixed by the order of reference, but did not submit it to the Court until two days later. *Held*, that the award was valid under Civil Procedure Code, s. 508. *ARUMUGAM CHETTI v. ARUNACHALAM CHETTI*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 22

57. ——— *Validity of award—Omission to fix time for sending in—Act VIII of 1859, s. 318.* Where no time had been fixed in the order directing the award for sending in the award, the award is, under s. 318 Act VIII of 1859, invalid. *GANGA-GOBINDA v. KALIPRASANNA NAIK*

I B. L. R. S. N. 13: 10 W. R. 206

58. ——— *Omission to fix time for delivery of award—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 315.* Where the lower Appellate Court omitted in its order referring the case to arbitration to fix a time for the delivery of the award, as directed by s. 315 of Act VIII of 1859, but both the parties permitted the reference to proceed and took part in the proceedings, without making any objection until after the award was delivered, and when the omission in the order of reference could work no injury to either party, the High Court saw no reason why the omission should be held to avoid the award. *MUBARIK ALI v. KADIR BUKSH*

7 N. W. 351

59. ——— *Award made out of time—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 506, 514.* An appeal was preferred against a decree of an original Court dismissing a suit, and the Appellate Court sent the case back for the purpose of certain evidence being taken, and certified to it.

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Pending that being done, the parties applied to the Appellate Court to refer the case to arbitration, and that Court referred that application to the original Court for disposal, although the case was still pending on its own file for disposal. Subsequently another application was made to the original Court to refer the case to arbitration, and on the 10th May the record was sent to the arbitrator with directions to submit his award within seven days. On the 12th September, as the award had not been sent in, the original Court passed an order recalling the record, and subsequently the award of the arbitrator, dated the 12th September, was filed. The original Court thereupon forwarded the record to the Appellate Court for its decision. Objections were taken to the award, but overruled, and the Appellate Court passed an order directing the case to be sent back to the original Court, with orders to pass a formal decree in accordance with the award of the arbitrator. *Held*, that the award was bad in law, because the time within which it was directed to be made had never been enlarged, and the Court's order of the 12th September recalling the record could not be taken as an indication that the time was enlarged. *BHUGWAN DASS MARWARI v. NUND LALL SEIN*

I. L. R. 12 Cal. 173

60. ———— *Award made out of time—Civil Procedure Code, s. 521—Arbitration.* Under s. 521 of the Civil Procedure Code, the rule that no award shall be valid unless "made" within the period fixed by the Court, is equivalent to a rule that the award must be "delivered" within that period. Upon a reference to the arbitration of three persons, the Court ordered that the award made by them should be filed on the 19th September 1885. The award was not filed on that date, but was signed by two of the arbitrators on that date, and by the third arbitrator on the 20th September, on which day it was filed. It had been agreed that the opinion of the majority should carry the decision. *Held*, that the award was not "made" within the period fixed by the Court "within the meaning of s. 21 of the Civil Procedure Code. *BEHARI DASS v. KALIAN DAS*

I. L. R. 8 All. 543

61. ———— *Award made out of time—Civil Procedure Code, s. 521—Arbitration—Order fixing time, or enlarging time fixed, for the delivery of award requisite—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 508, 514, 522—Decree in accordance with award.* The law contained in ss. 508 and 514 of the Civil Procedure Code requires that there shall be an express order of the Court fixing the time for delivery of the award or for extending or enlarging such time; and the mere fact that the Court has passed a decree in accordance with the award cannot be taken as affording a presumption that an extension of time was given. An award which is

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invalid under s. 521 of the Civil Procedure Code because not made within the period allowed by the Court, is not an award upon which the Court can make a decree, and a decree passed in accordance with such an award is not a decree in accordance with an award from which no appeal lies with reference to the ruling of the Full Bench in *Luchman Das v. Brijpal, I. L. R. 6 All. 174*. *CHUBA MAL v. HARI RAM*

I. L. R. 8 All. 548

62. ———— *Award made out of time—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 508, 521, 522, 622—Act VIII of 1859, s. 318.* An order of reference to arbitration was made on 21st January. Six weeks' time was allowed for the return of the award. No application was made for extension of time. The award having been returned on 8th May, the Court refused to give judgment in accordance with it, under s. 522 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the ground that it was not valid. *Held*, on an application under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, that the award was invalid. *SMSON v. VEN-KATAGOPALAM*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 475

63. ———— *Making and filing award—Award made, but not filed within the time specified by order of Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 508, 514, 521.* A suit for dissolution of partnership and all matters in dispute between the parties thereto were, by Judge's order, dated 18th July 1887, referred to the arbitration of A and B. The time for making and filing the award was by subsequent order extended to the 18th May 1888. The award was made on that day, but was not filed until the 18th June 1888. The second defendant obtained a rule calling on the other parties to show cause (*inter alia*) why the award should not be set aside by reason of its not having been filed in time. *Held*, that the omission to file the award on or before the 18th May 1888 did not render it invalid. The word "made" in ss. 514 and 521 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), does not include the filing of the award. *UMERSEY PREMJI v. SHAMJI KANJI*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 119

64. ———— *Denial of genuineness—Want of consent.* The objections which can be raised against an award are such as at the outset are fatal to it, e.g., objections which deny its genuineness or deny that the objector was a consenting party to the arbitration. *PROTAP CHUNDER ROODRO v. HURO MONEE DOSIA*

24 W. R. 188

65. ———— *Parties not all joining in reference.* A plaintiff and some of the defendants to a suit applied to refer the suit to arbitration (certain other of the defendants not having joined in the application); and award was passed and a decree made in accordance with such award. The plaintiffs objected to the validity of the award on the ground that all the parties to the suit had not

ARBITRATION—*contd.*8. AWARDS—*contd.*(d) VALIDITY OF AWARDS, AND GROUND FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE—*contd.*

joined in referring the suit to arbitration; the objection was dismissed, and judgment given in accordance with the award. *Held*, that, under the special circumstances of the case, justice was so clearly in favour of the view that the award was good, that the Court, although not entirely approving of certain decisions of the High Court (*Shitanath Biswas v. Kishen Mohun Mookerjee*, 5 W. R. 130, *Ram Soonder Mookerjee v. Ram Shurun Mookerjee*, 6 W. R. 25, *Doorga Churn Thakoor v. Kally Doss Hazrah*, 10 W. R. 463, *Bishoka Dasia v. Anunto Lall Pain*, 4 C. L. R. 65, which laid down that such an award is good, notwithstanding that some of the parties to the suit may not have joined in the reference to arbitration), did not think fit to differ from those decisions on that occasion. *JOY PROKASH LALL v. SHEO GOLAM SINGH*

I. L. R. 11 Cal. 37

66. ——— *Parties not all joining in reference. Submission to arbitration by one of several defendants.* A having brought a suit against B and two of his tenants for possession of certain lands of which he alleged he had been dispossessed by the defendants in 1279, it was arranged between A and the defendant B that the matter should be referred to arbitration. Arbitrators were accordingly appointed, and their award having been given in favour of A, judgment for the plaintiff was recorded in terms of that award. B then appealed on the ground that the other defendants had not joined in the agreement to submit the matter to arbitration, and the judgment was set aside, and the case remanded for re-trial. On remand the plaintiff's suit was dismissed, and the order of dismissal was upheld by the lower Appellate Court. *Held*, on further appeal by the High Court, that the fact of the tenants not having joined in the submission to arbitration did not vitiate the award, and that, as between A and B, the original decision of the Court of first instance in terms of that award must be restored. *BISHOKA DASIA v. ANUNTO LALL PAIN*

4 C. L. R. 65

67. ——— *Parties not all joining in reference—Award made without all parties consenting to arbitration.* *Quare*: per JACKSON, J. What is the effect of an award arrived at in a pending suit which was referred to arbitration by an order of Court otherwise than by consent of all the parties? *DOORGA CHURN THAKOOR v. KALLY DOSS HAZRAH*

10 W. R. 463

68. ——— *Parties not all joining in reference—Award without consent—Some arbitrators only acting.* Where parties do not give their consent to the appointment of arbitrators and the judgment proceeds on the arbitration award, the decree is not binding on those parties. Where four arbitrators had been appointed and only two acted, the award was held to be invalid. *RASH BEHAREE ROY v. DOORGABUR ROY*

14 W. R. 211

ARBITRATION—*contd.*8. AWARDS—*contd.*(d) VALIDITY OF AWARDS, AND GROUND FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE—*contd.*

69. ——— *Award by three arbitrators where reference is to five—Illegal order.* The parties to the suit agreed to refer the disputes between them to the arbitration of five persons named by them, and did not agree to accept the decision of any less number of persons so nominated. Three only of the arbitrators nominated were proceeding with the arbitration, and one had declined to act. The Court which made the reference released, in favour of the plaintiffs in the suit in which the reference was made, the attachments existing on debts due to the defendant in that suit, at the instance of the three arbitrators, who proposed to authorize the plaintiffs to collect those debts, and directed the debtors to pay their debts to the plaintiffs. It was held that, assuming that the reference permitted the arbitrators nominated to authorize either of the parties to collect the debts attached, inasmuch as the agreement was unaccompanied by any stipulation that a less number than the whole of the arbitrators could determine whether such permission should be given, the act of the three arbitrators which led to the issue of the order could not be supported, and that the last portion of that order was *ultra vires*, and must be declared void. *PAR-MESHAH DAT v. HARI NAIK*

7 N. W. 357

70. ——— *Award made by more arbitrators than were appointed.* An award was held invalid, among other reasons, because it purported to be the award of four persons, whereas the order of reference was addressed only to three. *PHIRAN v. BAHARAN*

7 N. W. 367

71. ——— *Presence of arbitrators at meeting of award.* When a case has been referred to arbitration, the presence of all the arbitrators at all meetings, and above all at the last meeting when the final act of arbitration is done, is essential to the validity of the award. *NAND RAM v. FAKHER CHAND*

I. L. R. 7 All. 523

72. ——— *Omission of provision for difference of opinion and award by majority—Ground for setting aside award.* Where an order of reference to arbitration does not provide for difference of opinion among the arbitrators, and for authorizing a majority to decide the case, the award will, on objection taken, be set aside. *FUTEH SINGH v. GANGO*

4 W. R. 4

73. ——— *Omission of provision for difference of opinion.* The mere absence of a clause in the order of reference providing for a difference of opinion between the arbitrators cannot vitiate the award where there is no such difference of opinion. *GOUR CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE v. SODOY CHUNDER NUNDEE*

17 W. R. 30

74. ——— *Award by majority of arbitrators.* Where several arbitrators are appointed, and the parties do not agree to be bound by the act of the majority, the award, in order to be valid and binding, must be concurred in and executed by

ARBITRATION—*contd.*8. AWARDS—*contd.*(d) VALIDITY OF AWARDS, AND GROUND FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE—*contd.*

all the arbitrators. *SURUJEET NARAIN SINGH v. GOURFE PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH* 7 W. R. 260

75. ———— *Award made by majority of arbitrators.* Where the terms of a submission to arbitration give no authority for the majority of the arbitrators to make the award, it should be made by the whole of the arbitrators. An award made by the majority only would not be a valid award. *In the matter of the petition of JUNGLEE RAM. JUNGLEE RAM v. RAM HEET SAHOY* 19 W. R. 47

76. ———— *Award made by majority of arbitrators—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 506, 509, 510—Refusal of minority of arbitrators to act.* Where the parties agreed to refer a suit to arbitration, but no provision was made that a decision by the majority of arbitrators should be binding, and two of five arbitrators withdrew:—*Held*, that a decision by the majority was invalid. *GURUPATHAPPA v. NARASINGAPPA* . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 174

77. ———— *Award made by arbitrators unwilling to act—Refusal of arbitrators to act—Civil Procedure Code, s. 510.* It is an essential principle of the law of arbitration that the adjudication of disputes by arbitration should be the result of the free consent of the arbitrators to act; and the finality of the award is based entirely upon the principle that the arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties themselves, and that such judges are willing to settle the disputes referred to them. Where certain matters were referred to arbitrators who refused to act, and the Court of first instance passed an order directing them to proceed and to make an award, and they, on the passing of such order, made an award:—*Held*, that all proceedings taken by the arbitrators in obedience to the order of the Court directing them to arbitrate against their will were null and void. *SHTBCHARAN v. RATIRAM* I. L. R. 7 All. 20

78. ———— *Award partly by fresh arbitrators appointed against consent of parties—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 510.* Where two of five arbitrators nominated by the parties to a suit and appointed by the Court had not consented before, and after appointment declined to act, and the Court appointed two arbitrators in their place against the consent of one of the parties to the suit:—*Held*, that, under the circumstances, the appointment of the new arbitrators was not warranted by the provisions of s. 510 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the order of reference to such arbitrators, the award made by them, and the decree passed upon the award, were illegal. *PAGARDIN RAYUTAN v. MOIDINSA RAYUTAN* . . . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 414

79. ———— *Award made by some only of arbitrators—Death of one of several arbitrators.* Matters in dispute were referred to the arbitration of five persons, of whom four made their award on

ARBITRATION—*contd.*8. AWARDS—*contd.*(d) VALIDITY OF AWARDS, AND GROUNDS FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE—*contd.*

27th August 1875. On 3rd September, the same arbitrators granted an application for re-hearing. Before the matter was re-heard, one of the four died, and an order striking off the application was made by two of the surviving arbitrators. *Held*, that the award was not a valid and final award. *BOONJAD MATHOOR v. NATHOO SHAHOO*

I. L. R. 3 Cal. 375 : 1 C. L. R. 455

80. ———— *Award made by some only of arbitrators—Absence of some of arbitrators.* A case was referred to the arbitration of five persons with a proviso that in the event of any two of the arbitrators being absent, the arbitration should be continued by the other three. Two of the arbitrators named were the pleaders on either side, and these two, with the consent of the parties, ceased to act as arbitrators, but argued the matter before the other arbitrators. *Held*, that the award made by the other three arbitrators named was a valid award. *DEBENDRA NATH SHAW v. AUBHOY CHURN BAGCHI* I. L. R. 9 Cal. 905 : 12 C. L. R. 525

81. ———— *Award by umpire and one arbitrator without provision for appointment of umpire—Agreement to refer not providing for disagreement of arbitrators—Appointment of umpire by Court—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 508, 509, 523—Application to set aside award.* In an agreement to refer certain matters to arbitration, which was filed in Court under s. 523 of the Civil Procedure Code, and on which an order of reference was made by the Court, no provision was made for difference of opinion between the arbitrators, by appointing an umpire or otherwise. The arbitrators being unable to agree upon the matters referred, the Court, on the application of one of them, appointed an umpire and directed that the award should be submitted on a particular date. An award was made by the umpire and one arbitrator, without the concurrence of the other arbitrator, and submitted to the Court, which passed a decree in accordance with its terms. *Held*, that, in the present case, there had been no legal award such as the law contemplated, inasmuch as the agreement to refer gave the Court no power to appoint an umpire, and required that the award should be made by the arbitrators named by the parties. *Held*, that s. 509 and the other sections preceding s. 523 of the Civil Procedure Code, relating to the power of the Court to provide for difference of opinion among the arbitrators, were only made applicable to cases coming under s. 523, so far as their provisions were consistent with the agreement filed under that section. *MUHAMMAD ABID v. MUHAMMAD ASHGAR* I. L. R. 8. All. 64

82. ———— *Umpire appointed contrary to agreement—Decision by majority of arbitrators.* Submitted to arbitration the matters in dispute between himself and the other parties to a suit on the terms that an umpire should be selected from seven persons whom he named. Those terms

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were not objected to by the other side. Arbitrators were agreed upon, and *K*, one of the seven persons named in the submission, was appointed an umpire. But *K* and some of the arbitrators declined to act. Fresh arbitrators were then chosen, but no umpire; and the arbitrators being equally divided in their opinion on the case, the Court of its own motion appointed as umpire *L*, who was not one of the seven persons named in the submission. *B* objected to *L*'s appointment, but the Judge overruled the objection and passed judgment in accordance with the umpire's award. *Held*, on appeal that, as it was stipulated as an essential part of the submission that an umpire should be chosen from seven persons named, the power of the Court to appoint an umpire, under s. 319 of the Civil Procedure Code, was controlled and limited by that stipulation; and that the umpire not being one of the seven persons named in the submission, there was no valid award. *BAR-RACHO v. DESOUZA* . . . 7 Mad. 72

83. ———— *Award by umpire and one arbitrator—Refusal of arbitrator to attend.* *Held*, that an award made by one of the arbitrators and the umpire in the absence of second arbitrator, who declined to attend, was not a valid award. *BUSUNT RAI v. GRIDHAREE SINGH* . 3 Agra 93

84. ———— *Award by umpire where arbitrators cannot decide.* Where the parties prayed the Court to appoint two arbitrators and an umpire and to refer the case to them for decision, and undertook to abide by such decision as might be passed by them unanimously or by the majority of them:—*Held*, that an award by the umpire alone, the arbitrators being unable to decide, was valid. *KUPU RAO v. VENKATARMAYYAR* . I. L. R. 4 Mad. 311

85. ———— *Partial disagreement of arbitrators.* A partial disagreement of two arbitrators does not nullify their award as a whole. *PANAOLAH v. TUMEEZOODEEN* . 2 W. R. 32

86. ———— *Omission to sign award at same time—Procedure—Act VIII of 1859, s. 395.* An award of arbitrators, to be legal, must be completed and signed by each in the presence of the whole of them. *In the petition of JAY MANGAL SINGH*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 82 : 11 W. R. 433

87. ———— *Omission to sign award at same time—Act VIII of 1859, s. 327.* Where, on a reference to arbitration, the case had been regularly heard by all the arbitrators sitting together, and an award been drawn up and signed by them, the mere omission of the arbitrators to sign the award at the same time and in each other's presence does not invalidate the award. *BHOBO-SUNDARI DASI v. MAKHUN LAL DEY*

3 B. L. R. 128

ARBITRATION—*contd.*S. AWARDS—*contd.*(d) VALIDITY OF AWARDS, AND GROUND FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE—*contd.*

But see *per* NORMAN, J., in *JAY MANGAL SINGH v. MOHAN RAM MARWARI*

8 B. L. R. 130 note, and 319 note :
12 W. R. 397

88. ———— *It is necessary, as provided by s. 516 of the Code, that all the arbitrators agree to the terms of the award, but there is no provision of law requiring them to sign it in the presence of each other.* *Bhavasundari Dasi v. Makhanlal Dey*, 8 B. L. R. 125, followed. *MUT-HUKUTTI NAYAKAN v. ACHA NAYAKAN*
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 22

89. ———— *Omission of all the arbitrators to sign award—Draft of award signed by all the arbitrators—Fair copy signed by only four.* Where, in a suit to recover a sum of money on an award, the five arbitrators came to a decision, and made, dated, and signed a rough draft of their award, and the defendant then withdrew from the submission, and a fair copy was then made, bearing the same date as that of the rough draft, but signed by only four of the arbitrators:—*Held*, that the award was complete at the date of the rough draft, and that its validity was not affected by the subsequent occurrences. The validity of an award cannot be impeached because the arbitrators afterwards do an act required neither by the law nor by the terms of the submission. *KULA NAGABUSHANAM v. KULASESHACHALAM* . . . 1 Mad. 178

90. ———— *Award not signed by all the arbitrators—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 312—Division of award.* The parties to certain suits having agreed to submit to arbitration, the suits were so referred under Act VIII of 1859, s. 312. After this reference, the parties agreed by an *ikrarna* to submit the same suits, together with other matters, to the arbitration of five persons, the effect being to withdraw the first submission and substitute the new agreement. Before these arbitrators arrived at a final conclusion, the parties by a *solanamah* compromised the whole of the subjects of dispute, and afterwards an award was drawn up in the terms of the *solanamah* and signed by two of the arbitrators and the head arbitrator. When the award was brought before the Subordinate Judge, he considered it had been made *ultra vires* in respect of those matters which were not involved in the suits originally referred, and accordingly made a decree only in those suits corresponding with the terms of the award. Some of the defendants applied to the Subordinate Judge to have the effect of a decree given to that portion of the award which was left outstanding by the first decision. This application was decreed and the remainder of the award enforced. An appeal to the Judge was dismissed with costs. *Held*, that the award was illegal because it was not signed by all the arbitrators, and there had been no agreement to abide by the decision of the majority, or that the voice of the

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umpire should prevail. *Held*, however, that, as the parties concerned did not take steps to set the Subordinate Judge right, the High Court could not interfere, but that the effect of the decision was to dispose of the award altogether, and not to divide it into two parts, one of which might form the foundation of a future judgment. *Held*, that the application to give effect to the unenforced portion of the award ought to have been dismissed. *NEM ROY v. BHARUT ROY* . . . 22 W. R. 129

91. *Signing award after tender of resignation by one arbitrator.* Where one of the arbitrators, before duly signing the award, tendered his resignation in a letter to the Judge, but was induced to withdraw it, and afterwards signed the award :—*Held*, that the arbitrator who first tendered and then withdrew his resignation did not formally divest himself of his character of arbitrator, and was therefore not *functus officio* when he signed the award, which was consequently valid. *JOYMUNGAL SINGH BAHADOOR v. MOHUN RAM MARWAREE* . . . 23 W. R. 429

Affirming decision of High Court in

15 W. R. 38

92. *Resignation of arbitrator and subsequent withdrawal of resignation—Power to withdraw resignation.* An arbitrator has full power to retract his resignation of office before it is accepted. An award signed after the withdrawal of such resignation is a valid award. *JOYMUNGUL SINGH v. MOHUN RAM MARWAREE* . . . 15 W. R. 38

93. *Awardir regularly made.* Where an arbitrator imported into his proceedings a previous enquiry alleged to have been made by him, and relied upon admissions made in the former proceedings, his award was held to be bad, and the decision based upon it was set aside. *KANEYE CHAND GOSSAMEE v. RAM CHUNDER GOSSAMEE* . . . 24 W. R. 81

94. *Award made on special form of oath—Power of arbitrators to administer other than prescribed form of oath—Oaths Act (X of 1873), s. 13.* The matters in dispute in a suit were, by the desire of the parties to the suit, referred to arbitration. During the investigation of these matters by the arbitrators the plaintiff offered to be bound by the oath of the defendant administered on the Koran. The defendant agreed to take such oath and such was accordingly administered to him by the arbitrators, and his evidence taken, and an award made based on the evidence so taken. On special appeal to the High Court by the plaintiff, he objected for the first time, the objection not having been taken in his memorandum of special appeal, that the arbitrators were not legally competent to administer such oath, and the evidence so taken could not form a valid basis of an award,

ARBITRATION—*contd.*8. AWARDS—*contd.*(d) VALIDITY OF AWARDS, AND GROUND FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE—*contd.*

ad the award was therefore void. *Held, per PEARSON, J.*, (SPANKIE, J., dissenting), with reference to the legal competency of the arbitrators to administer the oath, that the objection was good, and that the arbitrators had no power to administer the oath. *Per PEARSON, J.*, that the statement of the defendant made on an oath illegally administered could not form a valid basis of an award, and the award was void and should be set aside. *Per SPANKIE, J.*, that the plaintiff having offered to be bound by the oath, and the defendant having agreed to take it, the plaintiff was bound by the evidence given on such oath; and that, as the arbitrators had by law and consent of parties authority to receive the evidence of the defendant, the substitution by them of an oath on the Koran for an affirmation did not, under the provisions of s. 13, Act X of 1873, invalidate such evidence, and consequently render the award based on such evidence void. *WALI-UL-LAH v. GHULAM ALI* . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 535

95. *Vague and indefinite award—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 520, 521, 525, 526.* Certain disputes between parties were referred under a written agreement to an arbitrator, who in due course made his award. The plaintiff then applied to the Subordinate Judge to have the award filed in Court under the provisions of s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The defendants came in and objected to the award on the following amongst other grounds: that the agreement of submission was vague and indefinite, and did not clearly set out the matters in dispute. The Subordinate Judge overruled the objection without taking any evidence and directed the award to be filed and a decree to be passed thereon. The plaintiff appealed. *Held*, on appeal that, as the objection was well-founded, inasmuch as the agreement to refer was vague and indefinite, and did not clearly lay down the power of the arbitrator in dealing with the subject-matter in dispute, and as it was not possible to make out what powers were intended to be conferred upon the arbitrator, the award should not be allowed to be enforced under the provisions of ss. 525 and 526. *BINDESSURI PERSHAD SINGH v. JANKEE PERSHAD SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 16 Cal. 482

96. *Award referring parties to separate suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 522.* After issues had been framed in a suit to wind up a partnership, the matter was referred to an arbitrator, who made his award, and with regard to certain property not part of the partnership property, he referred the parties to a separate suit. *Held*, that the award was not illegal by reason of its comprising the reference of the parties to a separate suit. *VENKAYYA v. VENKATAPPAYYA* . . . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 348

ARBITRATION—*contd.*8. AWARDS—*contd.*(d) VALIDITY OF AWARDS, AND GROUND FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE—*contd.*

97. ———— *Submission to arbitration—Award not disposing of all the matters referred—Finality of award—Validity of award—Waiver—Consent of parties—Partition.* The ground for holding an award to be invalid on account of its not disposing of all the matter referred appears to be that there is an implied condition in the submission of the parties to the arbitration that the award shall dispose of all. This condition may be waived by the consent of the parties before the arbitrators. The partition of joint estate, consisting of different properties, having been submitted to arbitration, and the parties agreeing to a division being made by steps, and that each division should be final without any condition that the award should not be final while part remained undivided:—*Held*, in a suit brought by one of the parties for partition of the whole estate, after such a division of part, that, although cases cited as to the invalidity of an incomplete award might have been applicable had the arbitrators awarded as to only part of the property of their own authority, and without that of the parties, it was competent to the latter to agree before the arbitrators to the division being made as it had been; and that here the partition, as to the property divided, was final. Only a decree for the partition of the undivided residue could be made. *MAKUND RAM SUKAL v. SALIQ RAM SUKAL*
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 590
L. R. 21 I. A. 47

98. ———— *Reference applied for by agent without authority—Knowledge and tacit ratification by principal—Estoppel.* In a suit which was defended by an agent (am-mokhtar) on behalf of the defendant, the agent applied for a reference to arbitration, although he had no power to do so under the am-mokhtar-namah. After the submission of the award, objection was made on behalf of the defendant that the agent had no authority to apply for or consent to the reference. The objection was overruled by the Court and a decree made in accordance with the award with one slight modification in the defendant's favour. *Held*, that, although the agent was authorized to apply for or consent to a reference, the defendant, having been aware of the proceedings and tacitly ratified the action of his agent, could not be allowed to question the legality of the award, and the award was not void *ab initio*. *Uniraman v. Chathan*, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 451, referred to. *SATURJIT PERTAB BAHADOOR SAHI v. DULHIN GULAB KOER*
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 459

99. ———— *Award made in reference to arbitration by one partner without authority—Specific Relief Act, s. 21.* A partner has no power, in the absence of special authority, to bind the firm by a submission to arbitration of a suit which has been brought, and an award was in such arbitration invalid. *Stead v. Salt*, 3 Bing. 101, and

ARBITRATION—*contd.*8. AWARDS—*contd.*(d) VALIDITY OF AWARDS, AND GROUND FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE—*contd.*

Sharigfood v. Green, 2 Mad. 228, referred to. *RAM BAROSE v. KALLU MAL*. I. L. R. 22 All. 135

100. ———— *Award, validity of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 506—Reference to arbitration not concurred in by all the parties—Ground for setting aside award.* When a reference to arbitration is made in the course of a suit, and an award made upon it, the award cannot be set aside on the ground that all the parties to the suit did not concur in the reference. *The Chairman of the Purnea Municipality v. Siva Sankar Ram*, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 899, followed. *LAL MOHAN PAL v. SURYA KUMAR DAS* (1906) 11 C. W. N. 1152

101. ———— *Award beyond the terms of reference—Ultra vires award.* An award that goes beyond the terms of reference to the arbitrators is to that extent *ultra vires*. *MOHAMMED MUMTAZ ALI KHAN v. SAKHAWAT ALI KHAN* (1901) 5 C. W. N. 881: s.c. I. L. R. 23 All. 394: L. R. 28 I. A. 190

102. ———— *Discretion of Court—Ground for setting aside an award—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ch. V, s. 39—Exercise of Court's discretion—Conduct of plaintiffs—Reasonable apprehension of injury—Coercion.* The plaintiffs and defendants, together with one Jaffer Gargji, who died before the date of this suit, entered into a partnership in February 1895, to do certain work for the Maharaja Holkar at Indore. The work was done and paid for, whereupon disputes arose among the partners as to the allocation of the payments. Criminal proceedings were instituted at Indore, by the first and the third defendants and the fourth plaintiff Cooverji, against the first and second plaintiffs, who were arrested under warrants on the 20th June 1895. They were subsequently released on bail; and, while the proceedings against them were still pending, the matters in dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants were referred to arbitration on the 9th September 1895, and an award made on the 17th September 1895. The submission paper and the award were signed by all the parties except the fourth plaintiff Cooverji. The criminal proceedings at Indore were then withdrawn. On the 21st June 1898, the first and second defendants filed a suit against the first three plaintiffs, in the Court at Indore, to recover from them the amount due under the award, but on the 7th July following, the plaintiffs (four in number) filed this suit to have the award declared null and void, and for an injunction against the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 restraining them from proceeding with their suit at Indore. The lower Court held that the allegations of collusion and fraud made by the plaintiffs were false, but held that the award was not binding on any of the parties, inasmuch as the fourth plaintiff (Cooverji) had not signed the submission paper. In appeal, the Court agreed with the lower Court as to

ARBITRATION—*contd.*8. AWARDS—*contd.*(d) VALIDITY OF AWARDS, AND GROUND FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE—*contd.*

the allegations of collusion and fraud, but without expressing any opinion on the question whether the award was rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the fourth plaintiff (Cooverji) had not signed the submission paper, their Lordships reversed the decree and dismissed the suit on the ground that no case had been made out by the plaintiffs for the special intervention of the Court under Ch. V of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877). The plaintiffs had no shown that they had reasonable apprehension that the award, if left outstanding, would cause them serious injury, nor had their conduct been such as to call for an exercise of the Court's discretion under s. 30 of the Act in their favour. *Per JENKINS, C. J.* In a suit of this nature, three points must be made good by the plaintiffs: (1) that the award is void or voidable; (2) that the plaintiffs have a reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause them serious injury; (3) that the Court ought, under the circumstances of the case, in the exercise of its discretion, to adjudge the award void or voidable and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. *Antram v. Chace, 15, East 209*, discussed and distinguished. *VULLEY MAHOMED v. DATTUBHOY HASSAM (1900)*. I. L. R. 25 Bom. 10

103. Misconduct of arbitrator—*Application to set aside award—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 158—Arbitrators, misconduct of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 521.* An application to set aside an award, on the ground that three out of five arbitrators were not present at the time the award was made and did not sign the award, although it purported to have been signed by all of them, is governed by Art. 158 of Sch. II to the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). There was misconduct on the part of the arbitrators within the meaning of s. 521 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Muhammad Abid v. Muhammad Asghar, I. L. R. 8 All. 64*, distinguished. *RAM NARAIN ROY v. BALJ NATH MALLA (1901)*

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 36

104. Arbitrator, *am-muktear* of one of the parties—*Indebtedness of arbitrator to a party—Judicial misconduct—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 525.* If, after a reference to arbitration, it transpires that the arbitrator has been acting as *am-muktear* of one of the parties, without any remuneration, the other party is entitled to withdraw from the reference, and the award made by the arbitrator after receipt of notice of revocation cannot be enforced by suit. If the arbitrator is indebted to one of the parties at the time of the reference, or becomes so indebted after the reference, and in either case does not disclose the fact to the other party, such party would be entitled to revoke the reference upon discovery of the fact, and any award made by such arbitrator would be invalid on the ground of judicial misconduct.

ARBITRATION—*contd.*8. AWARDS—*contd.*(d) VALIDITY OF AWARDS, AND GROUND FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE—*contd.*

O. R. Coley v. A. DaCosta, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 200; Toolsimoni Dasi v. Sudevi Dasi, 3 C. W. N. 361; and Kali Prosanno Ghose v. Rajani Kanto Chatterjee, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 141, referred to. *MAHOMED WAHIUDDIN v. HAKIMAN (1902)*
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 278 : s.c. 6 C. W. N. 235

105. Application to the Presidency Small Cause Court to set aside an award—*Small Cause Court, jurisdiction of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 521 and 622.* The Presidency Small Cause Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application under s. 521 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the High Court cannot interfere (under s. 622 of the Code) merely because such Court has taken, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, a mistaken view as to what does or does not constitute misconduct. Misconduct, in s. 521 of the Code, does not of necessity imply corruption. The High Court cannot interfere under s. 622 of the Code, unless it is satisfied that the lower Court has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally. *Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 6*, referred to. *KALI CHARAN SIRDAR v. SARAT CHUNDER CHOWDHURY (1903)*

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 397 : s.c. 7 C. W. N. 545

106.—Reference to District Munsif—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 521—Petition by both parties requesting the District Munsif to examine site and peruse documents, and agreeing to abide by his decision—Appeal.* In the course of a suit, in which plaintiff claimed an order directing defendant to close a doorway, and an injunction, plaintiff and defendant jointly presented a petition requesting the District Munsif to inspect the site and peruse the documents filed in the suit, and agreeing to abide by the decision which the Court might be pleased to pass, as the final decision. The District Munsif passed an order in terms of the petition and inspected the site and considered the documents, and ultimately passed a decree in plaintiff's favour. Against that decree, defendant appealed. *Held*, that the District Munsif had acted as an arbitrator by consent of the parties, and no appeal lay from his decision, which must be looked upon as an award. And, as no reasons had been shown for setting aside the award under s. 521 of the Code, the decree must be taken to have been passed in accordance with the award, and, as such, upheld. *NIDHAMARTHI MUKKANTI v. THAMMANA RAMAYYA (1902)*

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 76

107.—Arbitration—Award—*Validity of award made, but not reaching the Court within the time limited.* In the case of an arbitration made under the order of a Court it is sufficient, if the award be made, that it is completed and signed by the arbitrators, within the period limited under s. 508 of the Code of Civil Procedure; it is not necessary to the validity of such award that it should actually reach the hands of the Court within such period.

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Aramugam Chetti v. Arunachalam Chetti, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 22, and *Umersey Premji v. Shamji Kanji*, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 119, followed. *Raja Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar*, I. L. R. 13 All. 300, referred to. *Behari Das v. Kalian Das*, I. L. R. 8 All. 543, dissented from. ASAD-UL-LAH v. MUHAMMAD NUR (1905) I. L. R. 27 All. 459

108. ——— *Award to be filed in Court having jurisdiction over the matter submitted—Award not invalidated by want of notice nor by the arbitrator's accepting a fee—Jurisdiction.* The omission to give notice of the meeting of the arbitrators to a party who had, prior to such meeting, notified to the arbitrators his withdrawal from the submission, does not invalidate an award; nor does the fact that the arbitrators, at the suggestion and with the consent of all parties accepted remuneration for their trouble, make the award illegal. The Court having jurisdiction to file the award is determined by the value of the matter to which the arbitration related, and not by the amount actually allowed under the award. *Narsingh Das v. Ajodhya Prosad Sukul*, I. L. R. 31 Calc. 203, referred to. SUBRAYA PRABHU v. MANJUNATH BHAKTA (1906)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 44

109. ——— *Arbitration—Validity of reference disputed—Jurisdiction of Court to decide as to validity of reference—Civil Procedure Code, s. 622.* Held, that upon an application made to it under s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court has jurisdiction to and is bound to enquire into the question whether the parties had or had not referred the matter in question to arbitration. *Amrit Ram v. Dasrat Ram*, I. L. R. 17 All. 21, *Mahomed Wahid-ud-din v. Hakimian*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 757, and *Manilal Hargovandas v. Vanmalidas Amratlal*, I. L. R. 29 Bom. 621, referred to. GANESH SINGH v. KASHI SINGH (1906) I. L. R. 28 All. 621

110. ——— *Award, validity of—Decree in accordance with award—Irregularity—Appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 522—Practice.* Two out of three arbitrators agreed in making an award, but the third did not agree, and the award was filed in the Court of first instance without the signature of the dissentient arbitrator, who however subsequently came into Court and signed it. The Court thereupon made a decree in accordance with the award. On appeal to the Subordinate Judge, however, this decree was set aside on the ground that such an award was invalid and illegal. On second appeal to the High Court: Held, that after the award had been filed in Court it was not open to the dissentient arbitrator to come in and sign the award, nor had the Court any power to allow him to sign it; and that in this view of the matter, the award was invalid and illegal. An appeal under s. 522 of the Civil Procedure Code against a decree made in accordance with an award depends

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upon the validity or otherwise of the award itself that section presupposes a valid and legal award and not an award upon which no decree could be pronounced. *Raja Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar*, I. L. R. 13 All. 300; I. L. R. 18 I. A. 55; *Jafri Begum v. Syed Ali Raza*, I. L. R. 23 All. 383, and *Kali Prosanno Ghose v. Rajani Kant Chatterjee*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 141, referred to. RAMESH CHANDRA DHAR v. KARUNAMOYI DUTT (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 498

111. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 521 and 522—Arbitration—Award—Decree on judgment in accordance with award—Appeal.* During the pendency of a suit in the Court of a Subordinate Judge the matters in dispute between the parties were referred to arbitration. In due course a document purporting to be the arbitrator's award was received by the Court through the post. Objections were filed by one of the defendants to the suit but these objections were, after hearing, disallowed by the Court which proceeded to pass a decree in accordance with the award. Held, that an appeal would lie from such a decree upon the ground that the so-called award was never delivered by the arbitrator and was in fact and in law no award at all. SHAM LAL v. MISRI KUNWAR (1907) I. L. R. 29 All. 426

112. ——— *Arbitration—Order of reference not fixing a period within which the award is to be made—Appeal.* Where an order of reference to arbitration made by a Court omits to fix a date for the delivery of the award, such omission is not a mere irregularity, but is a defect fatal to the order and to all subsequent proceedings founded thereon. *Chuha Mal v. Hari Ram*, I. L. R. 8 All. 548, followed. *Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar*, I. L. R. 18 I. A. 55, referred to. LACHMAN DAS v. ABPAKASH (1908) I. L. R. 30 All. 169

(e) DELAY IN MAKING AWARD.

113. ——— *Oral award—Arbitrators, liability of, for delay in making award—Negligence—Fraud.* In 1889 defendant 5 executed a bond to the plaintiff, on which the latter brought a suit in 1893. This suit was referred to arbitration, and defendants 1, 2 and 3 and the husband of defendant 4 were appointed arbitrators. The plaintiff brought the present suit against the arbitrators and defendant 5, to recover damages, alleging that only an oral award had been given and that in collusion with defendant 5 the arbitrators had failed to give a written award, and that, not having obtained a written award, he had suffered loss by reason of the bonds having "gone out of time" (become barred by limitation). The lower Court held that inasmuch as the arbitrators had not shown that their delay in giving an award was caused by the negligence to the parties, the presumption was that they acted fraudulently in

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not doing their duty. It therefore awarded the plaintiff Rs. 1,000 damages against defendants 1 to 4. On appeal: *Held*, (i) (reversing the decree and dismissing the suit) that, if (as stated in the plaint) an oral award had been made, there was no cause of action, as there was no stipulation that the award should be in writing; (ii) that the fraud alleged, *viz.*, of collusion with the fifth defendant, was negated by the evidence, which showed that the arbitrators were not unanimous; (iii) that the fact that the arbitrators had failed to account for the delay in making the award did not justify the presumption of fraud. There was no more reason to presume fraud than to presume negligence; and, if there was only negligence, no suit would lie. *SAVLAPPA v. DEBCHAND VALCHAND* (1901)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 132

(f) FILING OF AWARDS.

114. ———— *Refusal to file award—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 520, 521 and 526—Arbitration—Award—Allegations against the award—Objections must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court.* It is not sufficient merely to allege a cause or ground against the filing of an award such as is indicated in ss. 520 and 521 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), but the cause or the ground must also be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. *Dandekar v. Dandekars*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 663, followed. *Venkatesh Khando v. Chanappargudi*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 674, and *Tejpur v. Mahomed Jamal*, I. L. R. 20 Bom. 596, distinguished. *DHANJIBHAI GIRDHARIBHAI v. MATHURBHAI GHELABHAI* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 287

115. ———— *Application to file an award—Arbitration without intervention of Court—Withdrawal of such application—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 373 and 525.* When an application has been made under s. 525 of the Civil Procedure Code to have a certain award filed in Court, which had been made without the intervention of the Court, the applicant is at liberty, at any stage of the hearing prior to the delivery of judgment and preparation of the decree, to withdraw the application under s. 373 of the Code. *GAURI SHANKER v. MAIDA KOER* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 516

116. ———— *Award—Order rejecting application to file award made out of Court—Appeal.* *Held*, that no appeal will lie from an order refusing to file an award made between the parties without the intervention of a Court. *Bhola v. Gobind Dyal*, I. L. R. 6 All. 186, and *Katik Ram v. Babu Lal*, *Weekly Notes* (1903), 234, followed. *Gholam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 167, distinguished. *Mahammad Newaz Khan v. Alam Khan*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 414, referred to. *BASANT LAL v. KUNJI LAL* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 21

ARBITRATION—*contd.*

9. PRIVATE ARBITRATION.

1. ———— *Mode of submission to arbitration—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 525 (1859, s. 327).* In arbitrations not started with the sanction of the Court, it is not necessary that the agreement should be reduced to writing before it can be binding. *MUDHOO MANJEE v. NILMONEE SINGH DEO*

18 W. R. 533

2. ———— *Oral submission.* A submission of private arbitration may be perfectly valid though not put in writing, and a private award made in pursuance of such submission will be respected and treated as valid by the Courts if duly performed and the possession of the contested property be held under them. The arbitrators may be competent to prove, as well the submission as the making of the award, though no *iktarnamah* was ever executed. *BAHAL SINGH v. SHIBO RAM SINGH*

W. R. 1864, 76

3. ———— *Matters for submission—Subject-matters of suit and other matters in dispute.* There is nothing in Act VIII of 1859 to prevent parties who have a suit pending in Court from submitting the subject-matter of that suit and other matters in dispute to arbitration under s. 327. *THAKOOR DOSS ROY v. HURRY DOSS ROY*

W. R. 1864, Mis. 21

4. ———— *Agreement to refer to private arbitration by parties engaged in litigation—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 523 and 525.* Under ss. 523 and 525 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), parties to a suit as well as persons not engaged in litigation may agree to refer matters in dispute between them to private arbitration without the intervention of the Court, and may apply to have the agreement filed; and the mere fact that a suit is pending with respect to the matters in dispute is not of itself a sufficient reason to induce the Court to refuse to file the agreement. *HARIVALABDAS KALLIANDAS v. UTTAMCHAND MANEKCHAND*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 1

5. ———— *Power of arbitrators after making and delivery of award—Review.* After an award has been made and handed to the parties, the functions of the arbitrators cease. They have no power afterwards to deal with an application for review of their decision. *In the matter of the petition of DUTTO SINGH*. *DUTTO SINGH v. DOSAD BAHADUR SINGH*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 575

6. ———— *Award signed by arbitrators at different times—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327—Award irregularly made.* In the case of a private award where the arbitrators granted a new trial, and eventually disposed of the case in the absence of the defendant, and after a year from the time of allowing a new trial one day verbally pronounced their judgment to one party, and on another day to the other party, and on a subsequent date wrote out the award which was signed on a particular date by one arbitrator, who sent it to

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others elsewhere for signature on a different date. —*Held*, that the award ought not to be enforced under Act VIII of 1859, s. 327. *NADER ALI v. MAJO* 21 W. R. 377

7. ———— *Award signed only by some of the arbitrators.* Matters in dispute between the parties were referred to seven arbitrators without the intervention of a Court. The arbitrators or so many of them as could be got together, held sittings extending over some months, and at each sitting they came to a decision, either unanimously or by a majority, on different questions submitted to them. These decisions were entered on the minutes of their proceedings, and at their last sitting the arbitrators all agreed, and informed the parties that the decisions so arrived at constituted the final award and gave directions for embodying those decisions in the shape of a formal document, which was drawn up on a subsequent day, but was signed by four only out of the seven arbitrators. The remaining arbitrators not being asked to sign it, they never did sign it. *Held*, that the actual award was an oral award made by all the arbitrators on the last day of their joint sitting, and the drawing up of the formal award was a purely ministerial act to give effect to the previously completed judicial act. The omission to take the signatures of the minority of the arbitrators to the document which formed the record of the award was not fatal to the award. *DANDEKAR v. DANDEKARS* I. L. R. 6 Bom. 663

8. ———— *Document recommending solution of disputed points—Act XIV of 1882, s. 525.* A document, although headed as an "award" and signed by the arbitrator, which merely recommends a solution of the questions referred to arbitration, will not be treated by the Court as an award on an application made under s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *NUNDOLOLL MOOKERJEE v. CHUNDER KANT MOOKERJEE* I. L. R. 11 Cal. 356

9. ———— *Application to enforce award—Time for filing award—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* An award of arbitration, whether private or not, cannot be enforced unless the application for enforcement is made within six months from the date of award. *BHYRUB JHA v. HUNOOMUN DUTT JHA* 5 W. R. 123

10. ———— *Time for filing award—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 176—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 525, 526.* Where an award was made and signed by the arbitrator on the 5th of August 1881, but was not delivered to the parties till the 13th of September following: *Seemle*, that an application to file the award made on the 25th of February 1882, under the provisions of s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was not barred by limitation. It is clearly the intention of the Legislature that a party to an arbitration should have six months to enforce the award, under s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, from the time

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when he is in a position to enforce it. *In the matter of the petition of DUTTO SINGH. DUTTO SINGH v. DOSAD BAHADUR SINGH* I. L. R. 9 Cal. 575

11. ———— *Filing award in Court—Effect of not filing—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* An arbitration award should be filed in Court. Effect of not filing as defined in s. 327, Act VIII of 1859. *SCOPHUL SINGH v. METHOO SINGH* 1 W. R. 163

12. ———— *Effect of not filing—Validity of award.* An award of arbitration may be valid without being enforced by the Courts, as, for instance, where possession under the award is shown. *MOHESH CHUNDER MOITER v. BULORAM MOITER* 6 W. R. 94

13. ———— *Effect of not filing—Validity of award.* An award made by private submission may be valid and binding, though no proceedings under s. 327, Act VIII of 1859, have been taken to enforce it. *SURUBJEET NARAIN SINGH v. GOUREE PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH* 7 W. R. 260

14. ———— *Effect of not filing—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327—Validity of award.* Arbitration awards not brought into Court under s. 327, Act VIII of 1859, are not on that account necessarily invalid. *RAMYAD SAHOO v. DOOLAR SAHOO* 9 W. R. 441
NURSINGH GARIWAN v. PUTTOO OSTAGUR 20 W. R. 420

15. ———— *Objection by creditor to filing award.* The plaintiff applied to file an award and for a decree in terms thereof, to which the defendant consented. *K*, a creditor of the defendant, thereupon applied to be made a party to the suit and objected to the filing of the award and to the decree, alleging that the award was fraudulent and fictitious, and had been made in order to save the defendant's property from his creditors. The Subordinate Judge made *K*, a party to the suit, and refused the plaintiff's application. On application to the High Court:—*Held*, that the Judge was bound to file the award, the defendant having raised no objection to it and no illegality appearing on the face of it. *DUNGARSI DIPCHAND v. UJAMSI VELSI* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 727

16. ———— *Obligation to file—Suit to enforce award not filed—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* A suit lies to enforce an award made without the intervention of a Court of Justice. The procedure provided in s. 327 of the Civil Procedure Code is not imperative upon a plaintiff who seeks to enforce an award so made. *PALANIAPPA CHETTI v. RAYAPPA CHETTI* 4 Mad. 119

KOTA SEETAMMA v. KOLLIPURLA SOORJIAH 8 Mad. 81

17. ———— *Objections to filing award—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss.*

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520, 521, 525, and 526—*Procedure where identity of award impeached—Power of Court to enquire into objection to file award—Jurisdiction.* Where an application was made to a Subordinate Judge to file an award, and an objection was taken that the arbitrators had made their award several months before the date of the one sought to be filed, thus impeaching the identity of the award, and the Subordinate Judge, after an enquiry with regard to the several objections, ordered the award to be filed:—*Held*, that the order of the Subordinate Judge should be set aside or the award be deemed not to have been filed. The only objections which the Court can enquire into under ss. 525 and 526 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) are those which are specified in ss. 520 and 521, and these relate to cases in which the reference and the award are accepted facts; but where the objection denies the *factum* of the particular awards ought to be filed, and the objection does not seem to be frivolous, but one giving rise to enquiry into difficult questions of law and fact, it is not competent for the Court to deal with that objection under ss. 525 and 526. In such a case the Court should leave the applicant to a regular suit on the award as the basis of his cause of action, wherein the party urging the objection will have the advantage of being a defendant rather than a plaintiff, and of having an appeal open to him in the event of an unfavourable decision. *SAMAL NATHU v. JAISHANKAR DALSUKRAM*. I. L. R. 9 Bom. 254

18. *Objections to filing award—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 520, 524, 525—Rejection of application to file award—Consent of parties to jurisdiction.* A dispute between the plaintiffs and defendant having been referred to arbitration and an award made, the plaintiffs applied under s. 525 of the Civil Procedure Code that the award should be filed in the Munsif's Court. It having been objected that the arbitrators had been guilty of impartiality and other misconduct, an issue was framed with the consent of both parties "whether the award could be filed and enforced" and the Munsif, after hearing evidence, dismissed the application. On appeal the Subordinate Judge decided that the award was valid. On second appeal:—*Held*, that, although where an application to file an award under s. 525 and objection is made upon any of the grounds mentioned in s. 520 or 521, the proper course for the Court is to dismiss the application, and leave the applicant to bring a regular suit to enforce the award; yet both parties having consented to the matter being tried upon the application as it in a regular suit, it could not, on second appeal, be objected that the lower Courts had acted without jurisdiction. *HURO NATH ROY v. NISHTABINI CHOWDHRAIN*. 13 C. L. R. 14

19. *Showing cause—Sufficient cause.* The term "to show cause," in ss. 525 and 526 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877) does not mean merely to allege cause, nor even to make out that there is room for argument, but both to allege cause and to prove it to the satis-

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faction of the Court. *DANDEKAR v. DANDEKARS*. I. L. R. 6 Bom. 663

20. *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 525, 526—Partnership—Agreement to refer disputes to arbitration.* The three parties to a deed of partnership agreed that in case of any dispute or difference the matter should be referred to the arbitration of persons chosen by each party to such dispute, and that in case any such party should refuse or fail to nominate an arbitrator, then the arbitrator named by the other party should nominate another arbitrator, and the two should nominate a third person as umpire. Certain differences having arisen among the three partners, two of them called upon the executors of the third to nominate an arbitrator under the terms of the deed, but they refused to do so. The first-mentioned partners then nominated an arbitrator, who in his turn nominated another, and, these having appointed an umpire, made an award. One of the partners at whose instance the matter in dispute had been referred to arbitration presented an application under s. 525 of the Civil Procedure Code, praying that the award might be filed in Court. This application was opposed by the executors of the third partner, who appeared and lodged verified petitions disclosing grounds of objection within the meaning of s. 520 or s. 521 of the Code. *Held*, that the word "parties," as used in s. 525, should not be confined to persons who are actually before the arbitrators; that if persons by an agreement have undertaken themselves that, in the event of a certain state of things happening, a particular procedure shall be followed, which under one state of circumstances, may be adopted *in invitum*, they should, for the purposes of s. 525, be regarded as parties to that arbitration; and that there was sufficient reason to show that the defendants in the present case were *prima facie* bound by the arbitration, so as to bring them within the terms of s. 525 as parties thereto, who should be called on to show cause why the award should not be filed. *Willcox v. Storkey*, L. R. 1 C. P. 671, and *Re Newton and Hetherington*, 19 C. B. N. S. 342, referred to. *Held*, also, that ss. 525 and 526 of the Code, read together, mean that the party coming forward to oppose the filing of the award must show cause, that is, must establish by argument, or proof, or both, reasonable grounds to warrant the Court in arriving at the conclusion that the award is open to any of the objections mentioned in s. 520 or s. 521, and it is not sufficient when it is sought to make the award a rule of Court for the defeated party to come and merely say upon a verified petition that this or that ground referred to in ss. 520 and 521 existed against the filing. *Sree Ram Chowdhry v. Denobundhoo Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 490, and *Ichamoyee Chowdhralee v. Prosunoo Nath Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 557, dissented from. *Dutto Singh v. Dosad Bhahadur Singh*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 575, *Dandekar v. Dandekars*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 663, and *Chowdhry Murtaza Hossein v. Bechun-*

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nissa, L. R. 3 I. A. 209 : 26 W. R. 10, referred to.
JONES v. LEDGARD I. L. R. 8 All. 340

21. ————— *Sufficient cause—*
Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327. *Per SPANKIE, J.*
 S. 327 intended to provide for those cases only in which the reference to arbitration is admitted and an award has been made. Where the defendant denies referring any dispute to arbitration, or that an award has been made between himself and the plaintiff, sufficient cause is shown why the award should not be filed. The plaintiff should be left to bring a regular suit for the enforcement of the award.
HUSSAINI BIBI v. MOHSIN KHAN

I. L. R. 1 All. 156

22. ————— *Sufficient cause—*
Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 525, 526. Under ss. 525 and 526 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court has full power to enter into the question of the sufficiency of the cause shown against the filing in Court of an award. *Dandekar v. Dandekars, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 663, followed.* *Ichamoyee Chowdhranee v. Prosunno Nath Chowdhry, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 557, dissented from.* *In the matter of the petition of DUTTO SINGH. DUTTO SINGH v. DOSAD BAHADUR SINGH I. L. R. 9 Calc. 575*

23. ————— *Sufficient cause—*
Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 525, 526. Where an application is made under s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure to have an award filed in Court, and it appears to the Court, on cause shown why the award should not be filed, that there is a reasonable dispute between the parties on any of the grounds mentioned in s. 520 or 521, the application should be dismissed. Under s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, sufficient cause may be shown, by affidavit or verified petition. *Sree Ram Chowdhry v. Denobundhoo Chowdhry, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 490, and Sashi Charan Chatterjee v. Tarak Chandra Chatterjee, 8 B. L. R. 315, referred to.* *ICHAMOYEE CHOWDHRAÑEE v. PROSUNNO NATH CHOWDHRY I. L. R. 9 Calc. 557*

24. ————— *Sufficient cause—*
Objections to filing award—Setting aside award—
Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327. In an application under s. 327 of Act VIII of 1859 to have an award filed in Court so as to be enforced as a decree, it was objected on behalf of the defendant, amongst other things, that the award which determined the succession to a talukhdari registered under Act I of 1869, having been based on a certain will produced, which in terms referred to another will of the same testator not produced, there was miscarriage on the part of the arbitrators in making their award; the whole of the will, in the absence of the last-mentioned document, not having been before them. It appeared that the defendant in the proceedings before the arbitrators, notwithstanding the knowledge that this document was withheld, submitted nevertheless to take his chances of the arbitration; suggesting in fact favourable presumptions to himself in construing the will produced, or that the whole

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will not having been produced, it should be declared not to be operative, and that consequently the dispute should be determined according to the British law of succession as laid down by Act I of 1869, or according to custom, or according to the Mahomedan law of succession. *Held*, that the award could not be set aside on the ground of the objection taken. According to the true construction thereof, the earlier sections are not incorporated into s. 327 of Act VIII of 1859, as they are into s. 326. The words "sufficient cause" in s. 327 should be taken to comprehend any substantial objection which appears on the face of the award, or is founded on the misconduct of the arbitrators, or on any miscarriage in the course of the proceedings, or upon any other ground which would be considered fatal to an award on an application to the Courts in England. *CHOWDHRI MURTAZA HOSSEIN v. BECHUNNISSA I. L. R. 3 I. A. 209 : 26 W. R. 10*

25. ————— *Application to file private award—Objection to award, effect of—*
Power of Court—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 520, 521, 525, 526. *Held*, by the Full Bench (PETHERAM, C.J., and PRINSEP, PIGOT, MACPHERSON, and GHOSE, JJ.). Where an application is made to a Court for filing a private award, and objections are raised in a verified written statement, and the objections are such as fall within s. 521 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court is not bound to hold its hand and reject the application, but it is the duty of the Court to enquire into the validity of the objections raised and thereupon determine whether the award should be filed or not. *Per PRINSEP, PIGOT, and MACPHERSON, JJ.* Where on such an application an objection is taken that the matters in dispute were never referred to arbitration, and is therefore not on the grounds mentioned in s. 521, the Court has no jurisdiction to deal with it, but should reject the application and refer the parties to a regular suit.
SURJAN RAOT v. BHIKARI RAOT

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 213

26. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (1882), ss. 520, 521, and 526—Refusal by Court to file award—"Grounds shown."* In s. 526 of the Code of Civil Procedure the word "shown" is not equivalent to "alleged," but it is necessary that one of the grounds mentioned in s. 520 or s. 521 should be proved to the satisfaction of the Court before the Court is justified in refusing to file the award. *Dutto Singh v. Dosad Bahadur Singh, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 575, and Dandekar v. Dandekars, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 663, followed.* *Hurronath Chowdhry v. Nistarini Chowdhrani, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 74, and Ichamoyee Chowdhranee v. Prosunno Nath Chowdhry, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 557, dissented from.* *JAGAN NATH v. MANU LAL I. L. R. 16 All. 281*

27. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 525 and 526—Objection to application to file an award in Court that one party had not agreed to refer any matter to arbitration—Jurisdiction of Court to determine whether the parties had or*

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had not referred the matter in question to arbitration. An objection to an application made under s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the parties had not agreed to refer to arbitration any matter, or had agreed to refer some only of the matters determined by the award, or that the document alleged to be an award was not an award of the arbitrators, is an objection which must be considered and determined under s. 526 upon evidence by the Court to which the application is made. *Chowdhri Murtaza Hossein v. Bechunnissa*, L. R. 3 I. A. 209, *Samal Nathu v. Jaishankar Dalsukram*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 254, *Venkatesh Khando v. Chanapavada*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 674, *Lala Iswari Prasad v. Bir Bhanjan Tewari*, 8 B. L. R. 315 : 15 W. R. F. B. 9, *Hussaini Bibi v. Mohsin Khan*, I. L. R. 1 All. 156, *Surjan Raot v. Bhikari Raot*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 213, and *Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Alam Khan*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 414 : L. R. 18 I. A. 73, referred to. *AMRIT RAM v. DASRAT RAM* I. L. R. 17 All. 21

28. ———— *Application to file award—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 521, 522, 525, and 526—Objections as to factum or validity of submission and award.* Where on an application to file an award ss. 525 and 526, Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), objections, which in the opinion of the Court are not merely frivolous or colourable, are raised to the factum or validity of the submission and award, the Court has no jurisdiction to deal with them, and must refer the parties to a regular suit. *Samal Nathu v. Jaishanker Dalsukram*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 254, and *Surjan Raot v. Bhikari Raot*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 213, followed. *Amrit Ram v. Dasrat Ram*, I. L. R. 17 All. 21, not followed. *TEJPUR DEWCHAND v. MAHOMED JAMAL* I. L. R. 20 Bom. 596

29. ———— *Application to file award—Objection that submission was revoked before award made—Jurisdiction of Court to determine objection—Subsequent suit to annul award—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 521, 522, and 526—Right of suit.* The plaintiff's case was that arbitrators, to whom differences between him and the defendant had been referred, had, out of enmity to him and at the defendant's instance, made a fraudulent award on 17th February after he had revoked his submission and had antedated it as on 1st February; that the defendant had instituted proceedings under Civil Procedure Code, Chap. XXXVII, and his objections to the above effect having been overruled, a decree was passed in terms of the award. He now sued to have it declared that neither the decree nor the award was binding. Held, that the Court had jurisdiction to determine the genuineness or validity of the award in the proceedings under Chap. XXXVII, and that the present suit was not maintainable. *CHINTAMALLAYYA v. THADI GANGIREDDI*

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 89

30. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 525 and 526—Arbitra-*

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tion award—Denial of reference to arbitration—Jurisdiction of Court to determine the factum of reference—Appeal. Held by a majority of the Full Bench (MACPHERSON, J., dissenting), that when an application has been made under s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure and notice has been given to the parties to the alleged arbitration, the jurisdiction of the Court to order the award to be filed and to allow proceedings to be taken under it is not taken away by a mere denial of the reference to arbitration on an objection to the validity of that reference. *Amrit Ram v. Dasrat Ram*, I. L. R. 17 All. 21, followed. *MAHOMED WAHIDUDDIN v. HAKIMAN*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 757
2 C. W. N. 529

31. ———— *Application to amend an award—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* Upon a motion to amend an award filed under s. 327 of the Civil Procedure Code, on the ground of obvious errors contained in it, it was held that the Court had no power, under s. 327, to amend an award or remit it for the reconsideration of the arbitrators, but had only the power to file and enforce the award or reject it. *ALLARAKHIA SHIVJI v. JEHANGIR HORMASJI* 10 Bom. 391

32. ———— *Award in criminal matter—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* When complaint has been preferred to a Criminal Court, and the Magistrate has directed that the subject-matter of the complaint be referred to arbitration, if the parties consent and proceed to such reference, the award may be enforced under the provision of s. 327, Act VIII of 1859. *SHEO NUND RAI v. MAHANUND RAM* 1 Agra 45

33. ———— *Award deciding matter not referred—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 525.* Held, where a private award determined a matter not referred to arbitration, that a claim under s. 525 of Act X of 1877 that such award should be filed in Court was properly dismissed. *JUALA SINGH v. NARAIN DAS* I. L. R. 3 All. 541

34. ———— *Award in excess of terms of submission—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 525, 526—Agreement as to management of devasam.* An award made under s. 525, which is partly within, and partly exceeds, the terms of the submission to arbitration, cannot be enforced by summary procedure under s. 526 as to such portion as does not exceed those terms. To refer to arbitration questions arising on the construction of the award and questions left undecided by is a matter beyond the scope of an agreement to submit to a scheme for the future management of a devasam. as regards conduct of suits, granting of demises, custody of property, collection of rents, appointment and removal of servants, and defrayment of current expenditure. *MANA VIKRAMA, MAHARAJA OF CALICUT, v. MALLICHERRY KRISTHAN NAMBUDDRI* I. L. R. 3 Mad. 68

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35. ———— *Award, dealing with—Matters referred piece by piece—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* Where an arbitration-bond provides that the matters in dispute referred to the arbitrators may be taken up and dealt with *seriatim*, and the award delivered bit by bit (khund-khund), it is not necessary, under s. 327 of Act VIII of 1859, that all the matters referred should have been decided before the first portion of the award, dealing with some only of the subjects in dispute, can be filed. *SHOSHIMUKHI DABIA v. NOBIN CHUNDER ROY* 4 C. L. R. 92

36. ———— *Private award, enforcement of—Procedure—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 327.* When a private award between parties is filed in a Court, the prescribed course is for the Court to give judgment upon it and pass a decree; not to order execution before such decree has been passed. *SAHEB RAM JHA v. KASHEENATH JHA* 21 W. R. 295

37. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 525—Loss of award, procedure on.* When an award has been lost, a Court acting under s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot take secondary evidence of its provisions and pass a decree accordingly. A suit to have a copy of such award filed cannot, therefore, be maintained. *GOPI REDDI v. MAHANANDI REDDI* I. L. R. 12 Mad. 331

38. ———— *Award not deciding chief subject of dispute—Order setting aside filing of award.* Amongst other matters, the arbitrators were asked to make a division of certain fields to which the parties were equally entitled. The arbitrators decided the other matters, but, as regards the fields, said that it was inconvenient to do so in consequence of the rains, and ordered the parties "to receive the profits half and half and to pay the assessment half and half." *Held*, that the award left undetermined one of the principal subjects of dispute; and as the Court had no power to remit the award to the arbitrators, the applicant was entitled to a judgment setting aside the order for filing the award. *DANDEKAR v. DANDEKARS* I. L. R. 8 Bom. 663

39. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 525—Suit on a private award—Alternative claim on original consideration—Withdrawal of claim on award.* The plaintiff lent money to two of the defendants, who were partners with the third defendant, for the purposes of the partnership and obtained promissory notes from them. Disputes which arose between them were referred to arbitrators, who made an award. An application by the plaintiff to have the award made a rule of Court was opposed by defendant No. 1, and the plaintiff was referred to a regular suit. He now brought his suit in the alternative on the award and on the promissory notes. The award was found to be unenforceable. The plaintiff then declared himself satisfied to withdraw his suit as far as the award was

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concerned, and the Court passed a decree for plaintiff on the merits. Defendant No. 3 alone having appealed, the Court of first appeal held that the plaintiff must succeed or fail on the award, and that the withdrawal of the prayer for a decree on the award altered the nature of the suit; and finding that there was no evidence of misconduct on the part of the arbitrators, he passed a decree in the terms of the award. On a second appeal preferred by defendant No. 1:—*Held*, that this procedure was right. *NARASAYYA v. RAMABADRA* I. L. R. 15 Mad. 474

40. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), s. 525—Application for filing an award registered as a suit—Grounds for not filing award.* An application for filing an award being registered as a suit, the defendant raised objections, and the following issues were framed:—(1) Whether a certain arbitrator was nominated or accepted as one of the arbitrators by the defendant? (2) Whether there was any and what illegality apparent on the face of the award? (3) Whether the proceedings conducted by the arbitrators were illegal? *Held*, that the objections taken by the defendant, which were the subject of the above issues, precluded the Court from filing the award. *VENKATESH KHANDO v. CHANAPGAUDA* I. L. R. 17 Bom. 674

41. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 525—Application to file an award—Award relating to partition of property, including immovable property partly outside jurisdiction—Jurisdiction to file award and pass decree.* Matters in dispute between certain parties were submitted to arbitration within the jurisdiction of the High Court, and an award was in due course made therein. The matter to which the award related was the partition of property, including immovable property, part of which was situated outside the jurisdiction of the High Court. Application was then made that the award might be filed and a decree passed in its terms, when it was objected that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. Leave to sue had not been obtained under s. 12 of the Letters Patent. *Held*, that the Court had jurisdiction, inasmuch as the right to have the award filed had originated within the jurisdiction. *Kellie v. Fraser*, I. L. R. 2 Cal. 445, referred to. *SESHAYA CHETTIAR v. CHENGAYYA CHETTIAR* (1900) I. L. R. 24 Mad. 31

42. ———— *Arbitration without the intervention of the Court—Order directing it to be filed—Judgment and decree thereon—Appealability of the order—Revision—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 522, 525, 526 and 622.* *Held* by the Full Bench (RAMPINI and PRATT, J.J., dissenting), that an appeal lies from an order under s. 526 of the Civil Procedure Code merely directing the award to be filed. *Per MACLEAN, C.J., and GHOSH, J.* When an award has been ordered to be filed under s. 526 of the Code, the party in whose favour it is passed must proceed

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to obtain a judgment and consequent decree under s. 522, and, if that decree is in accordance with the award, there is no appeal from it. *Per SALE, J.* No decree expressly incorporating the terms of the award is required to be drawn up in pursuance of the order under s. 526 to file the award. The award may be executed under the Code, as if it were a decree of the Court. *Per RAMPINI and PRATT, JJ.*—An appeal lies from an order under s. 526, refusing to file an award, but not from an order directing it to be filed, except in the cases specified in s. 522. When an order was passed by the Munsif that the award be filed in Court, and a formal decree was drawn in the following terms: "It is ordered that the arbitration award in this case be filed in Court." *Held, per GHOSH, RAMPINI and PRATT, JJ.,* that the decree was substantially such as was contemplated by s. 526 read with s. 522, and that no appeal lay from it. *Held, further,* by the Full Bench, that if no appeal lay from an order directing the award to be filed, and the lower Appellate Court entertained an appeal, the High Court has the power to interfere with the decree of the Court below either on second appeal or under s. 622 of the Code. *Mahomed Wakiuddin v. Hakimian, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 757; Punnusami Mudali v. Mandi Sundara Mudali, I. L. R. 27 Mad. 255; Ghulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan, I. L. R. 29 Cal. 167,* referred to. *Surjan Raot v. Bhikari Raot, I. L. R. 21 Cal. 213,* approved of. *Chintu Money Aditya v. Haladhur Maiti, 10 C. W. N. 601,* referred to. *JANOKEY NATH GUHA v. BROJO LAL GUHA (1906) I. L. R. 33 Cal. 757 s. c. 10 C. W. N. 609*

43. ———— *Private arbitration—Award made a rule of Court—Appeal.* When an award made in a private arbitration has been made a rule of Court and a decree passed thereon, no appeal will lie except so far as the decree is in excess of or not in accordance with the award. In this respect there is no difference between a decree based upon a private award and a decree based upon an award made through the intervention of the Court. *Mustafa Khan v. Bhulja Bibi, I. L. R. 27 All. 526,* distinguished. *BAHADUR SINGH v. NEGI PURAN SINGH (1908) I. L. R. 30 All. 151*

10. MISCONDUCT OF ARBITRATOR.

1. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 506, 521, 522—Arbitration—Reference during suit—Award, decree passed on—Appeal—Misconduct of arbitrator—Award made within time but not submitted—Validity.* There is no appeal from the award of an arbitrator (in accordance with which a decree has been made) on the ground of misconduct of the arbitrator. *Ghulam Khan v. Mohamed Hassan, 6 C. W. N. 226: s. c. I. L. R. 29 Cal. 167,* followed. An award made and signed, but not submitted to the Court within the time allowed for delivering the same in Court, is valid in law. *Umersy Premji v. Shamji Kanji, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 119,* and *Arunmugam Chetti v.*

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Arunachalam Chetti, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 22, relied on. *DEBENDRA NATH CHATTERJEE v. SARBAMANGOLA DEBI (1904) 8 C. W. N. 916*

2. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 521, 522—Allegations of arbitrator's misconduct—Decree following award—Appeal from the decree.* The plaintiff filed a suit for the dissolution and winding up of a partnership. The matters in dispute were referred to arbitration by an order of the Court; an award was made; an application was made by the appellant to set aside the award on the ground of alleged misconduct of the arbitrator; the application was refused; judgment was given according to the award; upon the judgment so given a decree was passed. From this decree the appellants preferred an appeal. *Held,* unless it is shown that the award is illegal *ab initio* or in other words where there is no award in law, no appeal lies from a decree following a judgment given according to an award. *Nandram Daluram v. Nemchand Jadavchand, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 357,* approved. *Kali Prosanno Ghose v. Rajani Kant Chatterjee, I. L. R. 25 Cal. 141,* referred to. *WALJI MATHURA DAS v. EBJI UMERSEY (1905)*

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 285

11. MISCELLANEOUS.

1. ———— *Arbitration—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 525—"The matter to which the award relates"—Jurisdiction.* The words "the matter to which the award relates" in s. 525 of the Civil Procedure Code were not intended by the Legislature to refer to the precise amount of the precise matter awarded to one party or the other by the arbitrator; they refer to the subject-matter of the arbitration, and not the matter actually awarded by the arbitrator. *NARSING DAS v. AJODHYA PROSAD SIKUL (1904) I. L. R. 31 Cal. 203*

2. ———— *Application to stay proceedings pending arbitration—Arbitration Act (XI of 1899), s. 19.* Section 19 of the Arbitration Act only applies where there has been a submission to arbitration before the commencement of legal proceedings. *RAMJIDAS PODDAR v. HOWSE (1907) I. L. R. 35 Cal. 199*

ARBITRATION ACT (IX OF 1899).

See ARBITRATION.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882), ss. 506 522.

1. ———— *ss. 4 and 5—Submission—Contract by bought and sold notes—Arbitration clause—Award ex parte—Rules of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.* A clause providing for the reference of any dispute to arbitration, contained in a contract effected by means of bought and sold notes, identical in their terms and signed by the respective parties or their agents, constitutes a "submission" within the meaning of s. 4 of the Arbitration Act. *Cuerleon*

ARBITRATION ACT (IX OF 1899)—*contd.*ss. 4 and 5—*conclld.*

Tinplate Company v. Hughes, 60 L. J. Q. B. 640, distinguished. A party to such a contract and the arbitrators are entitled to proceed in the absence of the other party, if the latter has had due notice to attend the reference, and, although the Court will not decree specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate, yet it will enforce an *ex parte* award made on such reference. *In re Smith and Service and Nelson and Sons*, 25 Q. B. D. 545, referred to. *RAM NARAIN GUNGA BISSEN v. LILADHUR LOWJEE* (1906) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1237 s. c. 10 C. W. N. 814

2. — ss. 4, 20—*Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 28—Arbitration clause in a contract, whether valid—Reference to an association—Power to delegate.* An arbitration clause in a contract amounts to a "submission" within the meaning of s. 4 of the Indian Arbitration Act, and is valid, being covered by exception (1) to s. 23 of the Contract Act. When reference is made to an association consisting of a large and fluctuating body of persons, who cannot sit as a tribunal, the association has power to appoint individuals to act as arbitrators, and the rules of the association will be binding on the parties, *GANGES MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. INDRA CHAND* (1906) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1169

s. 13—

See ARBITRATION—AWARDS—CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 793

s. 14—

Arbitration Act (IX of 1899), s. 14—Bengal Chamber of Commerce, arbitration by the—Rules of the—Indian Stamp Act (II of 1899), ss. 5, 6 and 35, Sch. I, Arts. 5 and 43—"Submission" required to be proved and stamped—Award made out of time—Enlargement of time after expiry of original time—Concealment of names and appointment of arbitrators—Notification of time and place of hearing—Evidence, refusal to hear, when misconduct—Award against a firm—Jurisdiction of Court to set aside award, if may be ousted. Contract-notes which contain a provision for the submission of disputes to arbitration ought each to bear eight-annas stamp under Art. 5, Sch. I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, as an agreement not otherwise provided for in the Schedule. Although the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, has made the procedure for the enforcement of an award simpler than the old practice of instituting suit for the purpose, it is still necessary to prove that the arbitrators acted under a valid submission before an award can be made a decree of Court under the Act. *Ferrer v. Owen*, 7 B. & C. 427, referred to. The Rules for the guidance of the arbitration "tribunal" of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce were construed to contemplate the parties being notified of the names and the fact of the appointment of the arbitrators. Where the arbitrators appointed by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce under its Rules did not appoint a time and place for the hearing of the reference: *Held*, that the arbitrators failed in their

ARBITRATION ACT (IX OF 1899)—*contd.*s. 14—*conclld.*

duty in not doing so. Whether the arbitrators should or should not hear evidence and the parties by counsel or otherwise must depend on the particular circumstances of every case, the arbitrators exercising, in a judicial manner, their discretion in the matter. The refusal to hear evidence in a case where the arbitrators cannot decide a matter in dispute without hearing evidence would amount to a misconduct on the part of the arbitrators. It is improper for the arbitrators not to hear evidence to ascertain as to who are the persons liable on a contract entered into in the name of a firm. An award made against a firm, without ascertaining as to who are the persons who constitute it, is, on the face of it, bad and no Court can make a decree, in such circumstances, upon the award against a firm. It is not competent for the parties by an agreement to oust the jurisdiction of the Court vested in it by s. 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, to set aside an award, if misconduct on the part of the arbitrators were shown or if it were shown that the award was improperly procured, when the parties desire that the award should be enforced under the provisions of the Act. *HURDWARY MULL v. AHMED MUSAJI SELAJI* 13 C. W. N. 63

s. 19—

1.—*Jurisdiction of High Court to stay proceedings in the Small Cause Court—Step in the proceedings.* *N* agreed to purchase from *R* 150 tons of sugar imported by *R*. A clause in the agreement provided for arbitration in the event of disputes arising in connection with the agreement. A dispute arose with regard to the condition of some of the bags of sugar, and *N* claimed damages from *R* which *R* refused to pay. *N* filed a suit in the Small Cause Court. The Judge before whom the suit was instituted on the petition of *R* stayed the proceedings. On appeal to the full Court the order staying the proceedings was set aside. *R* by a petition to the High Court prayed that the proceedings in the Small Cause Court should be stayed. *Held*, that under s. 19 of the Arbitration Act, the High Court has the power to stay proceedings in the Small Cause Court and the proceedings should under the circumstances be stayed. *Per* CURIAM:—The language of s. 19 of the Act is quite clear and it gives jurisdiction to the High Court to stay proceedings in any Court in the Presidency town subordinate to its jurisdiction. The section in the beginning refers to a party to a submission commencing any legal proceedings; then it goes on to refer to such legal proceedings, and then provides for staying the proceedings. Nowhere is there any indication in the section or the Act that the legal proceedings contemplated must be proceedings in that Court. Any proceedings taken by a party to a suit to stay legal proceedings under s. 19 of the Arbitration Act are not "steps in the proceedings." *RALLI v. NOOR MAHOMED* (1906)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 236

ARBITRATION ACT (IX OF 1899)—concl'd.

s. 19—concl'd.

2.—*Application for extension of time—Stay of proceedings—Step in proceedings.* The Calcutta Corporation applied for further time to file their written statement and obtained a fortnight's time. Subsequently they applied to the Court for a reference to arbitration and stay of proceedings. The plaintiffs objected on the ground that an application for further time amounted to a step in the action within s. 19 of the Indian Arbitration Act:—*Held*, that such an application was a step in the proceedings within s. 19 of the Arbitration Act and that the application for reference to arbitration could not be maintained. *Ford's Hotel Company, Limited v. Bartlett*, [1896] A. C. 1, followed. *SARAT KUMAR ROY v. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1907) I. L. R. 34 Cal. 443

ARBITRATOR.

See ARBITRATION.

failure of, to submit award—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 108.
13 C. W. N. 493**ARCHITECT.**

certificate of, in building contract.

See CONTRACT—BREACH OF CONTRACT.
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 178

area, increase of.

See LEASE . I. L. R. 36 Cal. 604

ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL.See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, CL. 15.
4 B. L. R. A. C. 86, 181
9 B. L. R. 274See REVIEW—QUESTIONS WHICH MAY BE
RAISED ON REVIEW.**"ARIAT".**

See MAHOMEDAN LAW.

I. L. R. 28 All. 264

ARMENIANS.

See ENGLISH LAW.

I. L. R. 24 Cal. 216

ARMS.

possession of, by servant—

See ARMS ACT, s. 19 (f).
13 C. W. N. 124**ARMS ACT (XXXI OF 1860).**

See ARMS ACT (XI OF 1878).

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 478

1.—s. 32—Carrying or being in possession of arms without a license. The mere possession of arms under Act XXXI of 1860 is not an offence in districts where s. 32 of the Act

ARMS ACT (XXXI OF 1860)—concl'd.

s. 32—concl'd.

is not in force. *In the matter of the petition of RAMESAR PERSHAD NARAYAN SING*

9 B. L. R. Ap. 34: 18 W. R. Cr. 1

In the matter of the petition of MODNARAIN PURI
18 W. R. Cr. 26

2.—Possession of arms—*Illegality in conduct of search.* The mere possession of arms in a certain district being an offence if there be satisfactory evidence that the prisoners were in the possession of arms, they would be punishable for such illegal possession, notwithstanding the police may have also committed an illegality in their procedure in conducting the search for the same. *QUEEN v. SHEOPERSHUN ROY* 2 N.W. 57

3.—cl. (6)—*Fine—Imprisonment—Sentence.* Under Act XXXI of 1860, s. 32, cl. 6, a sentence of fine only, or of imprisonment only, is a legal sentence. *QUEEN v. BHISTA BIN MADANNA* . . . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 308

4.—s. 44—*Fine—Manufacturing gunpowder without a license.* Certain persons were convicted, under s. 5 of Act XXXI of 1860, of manufacturing and selling gunpowder without a license, and sentenced to fine, or in default imprisonment. S. 44 of the Act provides a special procedure for levying the fine by distress. *Held*, that the sentence was legal, the Act giving power to imprison or fine upon conviction. ANONYMOUS

5 Mad. Ap. 24

ARMS ACT (XI OF 1878).

s. 1, cl. (b), and s. 5—*Attachment and sale of arms in execution of a decree by Nazir of the Court—Public servant, sale of arms by.* The sale of arms by the Nazir of the Court, in execution of a decree, is a sale by a public servant in discharge of his duty, and is, therefore, excluded by s. 1, cl. (b), from the operation of the Indian Arms Act, XI of 1878. It is expedient for the Court ordering such sale to give notice of the sale and of the purchaser's name and address, as contemplated by s. 5 of that Act, to the "Magistrate of the district or to the police officer in charge of the nearest police station." *WALA HIRAJI v. HIRA PATEL*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 518

1.—s. 4—*Possession of unserviceable firearms without license.* A gun rendered unserviceable by the loss of the trigger does not fall within the definition of "arms" in s. 4 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878. Possession of such a weapon without a license is no offence. *QUEEN v. SIDDAPPA*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 60

2.—A revolver with a broken trigger is within the definition of "arms" in Indian Arms Act, 1878, s. 4. Whether in any particular case an instrument is a firearm or not, is a question of fact to be determined according to circumstances, and the circumstance that it is in an unserviceable condition is not conclusive. *Queen v. Siddappa*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 60, dissented from. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JAYARAMI REDDI*

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 360

ARMS ACT (XI OF 1878)—contd.**s. 4—contd.**

3. ——— *Arms—Parts of arms—Serviceable gun-barrel.* As a gun-barrel and nipple in serviceable condition fall within the definition of "arms" in s. 4 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, the possession of such articles without a license is punishable under s. 19 (f) of the said Act. *QUEEN v. VYAPURI KANGANI*. I. L. R. 7 Mad. 70

4. ——— *Sword stick—"Arms," meaning of—License, necessity of.* A sword-stick is a "sword" within the meaning of the term in s. 4 of the Indian Arms Act. Neither the length, breadth or the form of the blade of a weapon, nor the handle, afford any certain test of its classification as "arms." Whatever can be used as an instrument of attack or defence, for cutting as well as for thrusting, and is not an ordinary implement for domestic purposes, falls within the purview of the Act. *EMPEROR v. SATISH CHANDRA ROY* (1907). I. L. R. 34 Calc. 749

5. ——— *ss. 4 and 5—Manufacture or possession of fireworks—Rockets.* The manufacture or possession of fireworks, including rockets which are mere fireworks, without a license, is not prohibited by s. 5 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878. The rockets referred to in s. 4 are war-rockets. *QUEEN v. SUPPY* I. L. R. 5 Mad. 159

——— *ss. 5 and 19.* A, having obtained a license under the Arms Act, 1878, for a match-lock, had the same converted into a percussion gun. He was convicted under s. 19 of the said Act on the ground that the license did not permit him to keep a percussion gun. *Held*, that the conviction was bad. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BODAPPA* I. L. R. 10 Mad. 131

——— *ss. 14 and 19 (f)—Temporary possession of a gun.* S. 19 (f) of the Arms Act does not make the mere possession of a gun punishable thereunder, but a possession contrary to s. 14 of the Act. The temporary possession of a gun by a man, who has snatched it up to fire at a mad dog, which had entered his premises, is not contemplated by s. 14. *PROBHAT CHANDRA CHOWDHRY v. EMPEROR* (1907). I. L. R. 35 Calc. 219

——— *ss. 15 and 19—Arms—Possession of arms—Badami Talukha—Act XXXI of 1860, s. 32, cls. 1 and 2.* Cl. 2, s. 32 of Act XXXI of 1860, relating to the manufacture, importation, and sale of arms, did not apply to the Badami Talukha of the Kaladgi Collectorate at the time when the Indian Arms Act, No. XI of 1878, came into force; and the notification of the Government of Bombay, No. 1112, of the 19th February 1878, which declares that the provisions of Act XXXI of 1860 as modified by Act VI of 1866 are in force in Badami amongst other places, is not an order of disarmament under cl. (1), s. 32 of Act XXXI of 1860. In the absence, therefore, of a notification, under s. 15 of Act XI of 1878, extending, with the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council, the provisions of the section to Badami, the possession of arms without a license in that talukha is not punishable under s. 19. *GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY v. DADYAMA BASAPA* I. L. R. 9 Bom. 478

ARMS ACT (XI OF 1878)—contd.

1. ——— *s. 19—Unlicensed possession of gunpowder used for making crackers.* The possession of gunpowder without a license, whether intended for the manufacture of fireworks or not, is an offence under s. 19 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878. *QUEEN v. SUPPY*, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 159, distinguished. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KHASIM*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 202

2. ——— *cl. (a)—Sale of sulphur and ammunition by agent of a license-holder.* Sale of sulphur and ammunition by the agent of one holding a license (in Form VI) under Act XI of 1878 is not illegal. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SITHARAMAYYA*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 474

3. ——— *Going armed without license—License to carry arms, production of—Retainer carrying arms.* A servant of a person who possessed a license for two swords and a gun, which license also covered one retainer, was stopped by the police on the road while carrying a sword. On being asked to produce his license, he was unable to do so, it not then being with him. No opportunity was afforded him of producing the license, but he was charged with an offence under s. 19 of Act XI of 1878, and on these materials convicted and fined. *Held*, that the conviction was wrong. The law does not require a licensee always to have his license with him. If under such circumstances, on being required to produce it, he is prepared to do so on a reasonable opportunity being given him to get it, and it exists, he should not be prosecuted; if prosecuted, the production of the license at the trial is a sufficient answer to the charge of infringing the Arms Act. *Held*, further, that a license granted to a person to carry arms and including a retainer authorizes any retainer to carry the arms specified with the permission of his master, and does not restrict him merely to carry them while in the actual presence of his master. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KISHUNWA* I. L. R. 20 Calc. 443

In the matter of the petition of KALI NATH SINGH
3 C. W. N. 394

4. ——— *cl. (c). "Going armed"—Presumption as to persons found carrying arms.* Where a person is found carrying arms apparently in contravention of the provisions of the Arms Act, it must be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that he is carrying such arms with the intention of using them should an opportunity of using them arise. *Queen-Empress v. Williams, Weekly Notes, 1891, 208*, explained and approved. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BHURE*. I. L. R. 15 All. 27

5. ——— *Unlawful possession of arms—Temporary custody of arms not for use as such.* The mere temporary possession without a license of arms for purposes other than their use as such, as, for instance, where a servant is carrying his master's gun to a blacksmith for repairs, or where a blacksmith has a gun left with him for repairs, is not an offence within the meaning of s. 19 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878. *Queen-Empress v. Williams, Weekly Notes, All. (1891), 208*, and *Queen-Empress*

ARMS ACT (XI OF 1878)—*contd.*s. 19—*contd.*

v. Bhure, I. L. R. 15 All. 27, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. TOTA RAM* . I. L. R. 16 All. 276

6.—“*Going armed*”—The [mere carrying of arms, for purposes other than their use as such, not an offence. One C. N., a person entitled to possess and use fire-arms, gave a pistol to an acquaintance, who was not entitled to possess and use fire-arms, asking him to take it and get it repaired in a neighbouring town. This acquaintance gave the pistol to his father, Harpal Rai, who was taking it into the town to get it repaired, when he was arrested and charged with an offence under s. 19 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878. *Held*, that Harpal Rai was, under the circumstances, guilty of no offence under the Arms Act. The mere temporary possession, without a license, of arms, for purposes other than their use as such, is not an offence within the meaning of s. 19 of the Arms Act. *Queen-Empress v. Alexander William, Weekly Notes (1891), 208*; *Queen-Empress v. Bhure, Weekly Notes (1892), 221*; and *Queen-Empress v. Tota Ram, Weekly Notes (1894), 32*, referred to. *EMPEROR v. HARPAL RAI (1902)*

I. L. R. 24 All. 454

7. ——— Order extending time for renewal of licenses—Conviction for offence during extended time. An order extending the time for renewal of licenses has the effect of keeping a license previously granted practically in force, and a person cannot be convicted of an offence under s. 19 (f) of the Arms Act for a breach of its provisions within the extended time. *In the matter of the petition of KALI NATH SINGH* . 3 C. W. N. 394

8. ——— s. 19, cl. (f)—Notification 458 of the 18th March 1898—Exemptions from the operation of the Arms Act—Volunteers. A volunteer, being a person exempted in virtue of Notification 458, dated 18th March 1898, of the Government of India, is not exempted merely with reference to his duties as a volunteer, but generally (subject to the exceptions mentioned in the said notification). It is therefore not unlawful for a volunteer to possess fire-arms and to use the same. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LUKE* . I. L. R. 22 All. 323

9.—S. 19 (f)—Possession and use of a gun by servant. Where the accused, a servant, was found using a gun which was lent to him by his master who held a license for the gun for his own purpose: *Held*,—That the act of the accused was an infringement of the provisions of s. 19, cl. (f) of the Arms Act. *In the matter of Kali Nath Singh, 3 C. W. N. 394*, *Prabhat Chandra Choudhry v. Emperor, 12 C. W. N. 272*; s. c. I. L. R. 35 Cal. 219, *Queen-Empress v. Gungadin, I. L. R. 22 All. 118*, referred to and distinguished. *MADHO LAL v. THE EMPEROR*

13 C. W. N. 124

10. ——— ss. 19 and 20—Definition—Concealment of arms on search being made by the Police—Mere denial of possession not concealment—Possession of unlicensed arms. *Held*, that the mere denial on the part of a person, whose house is being searched by the Police for unlicensed arms, that

ARMS ACT (XI OF 1878)—*contd.*s. 19—*contd.*

he has any such arms in his possession does not constitute a concealment or attempt to conceal arms on search being made by the police within the meaning of the second paragraph of s. 20 of Act XI of 1878. *Held*, also, that where unlicensed arms are found concealed upon premises which, though legally the joint property of a joint Hindu family, are in fact at the time of the finding in the exclusive possession and control of one member of the family, that member of the family can properly be held to be in possession of such arms. *Queen-Empress v. Sangam Lal, I. L. R. 15 All. 129*, distinguished. *EMPEROR v. RAM SARUP (1905)*

I. L. R. 28 All. 302

11. ——— ss. 19, 20, 29—Possession of or control over—Search, legality of—Sanction to prosecute—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 55, 103, and 165. The license of the accused for the possession of firearms and ammunition was cancelled in August 1897. He was suspected of being in possession of arms after the cancellation of his license. On the 23rd of April 1899, the Assistant Magistrate of Purneah, with a numbers of police, went to the house of the accused to search for arms. They surrounded it, arrested the accused, and then searched his house. The police had no search-warrants, nor was there anything to show upon what charge the accused was arrested. Two gun stocks, some ammunition, and implements for reloading were discovered in the house. There was nothing to show that the sanction required by s. 29 of the Arms Act was given before proceedings were instituted against the accused. Accused was convicted and sentenced under ss. 19 and 20 of the Arms Act. *Held*, that the conviction under s. 20 was not sustainable, but that the accused must be taken to have had arms and ammunition as defined by the Arms Act within the meaning of sub-s. (f) of s. 19 of that Act, and the conviction under that section must be confirmed. *Held*, further, that with respect to the question of whether or not any previous sanction had been given under s. 29 of the Arms Act, the Court was not unmindful of the suggestion that the charge in this case was, in the first instance, in respect of an alleged offence under s. 20 and not of one under s. 19; but that ss. 19 and 20 were so interwoven that it was difficult to see how an offence could be committed under the first paragraph of s. 20 unless an offence under one of the enumerated sub-sections in s. 19 had also been committed. It was not suggested that the charge here was an offence under the second paragraph of s. 20. *AHMED HOSSEIN v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . I. L. R. 27 Cal. 692

4 C. W. N. 750

12. ——— s. 19, cl. (f), and s. 25—Unlawful possession of arms—Search-warrant, contents of—“Possession,” What evidence of, necessary where arms are found in common room of joint family house. When a Magistrate issues a search-warrant under s. 25 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, it is necessary that he should record the grounds of his

ARMS ACT (XI OF 1878)—*contd.***s. 19—*contd.***

belief that the person against whom the warrant is issued has in his possession arms, ammunition, or military stores for an unlawful purpose. Where proceedings under the Indian Arms Act, 1878, in respect of the unlawful possession of arms are taken against a member of a joint Hindu family not being the head of such joint family, and arms are found in a common room of the joint family house, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to give good evidence that such arms are in the exclusive possession and control of the particular member of the joint family who is sought to be charged with their possession. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SANRGHAM LAL*

I. L. R. 15 All. 129

13. — s. 19, cl. (f) and ss. 25, 30—

Arms in a temple—Confiscation of arms used for purposes of worship—Police Inspector specially empowered—License to possess arms—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 579, and Sch. IV—"Offences against other laws." A collection of fire-arms, consisting of four small cannons, four pistols, and thirty-one muskets, had been kept as objects of worship in a Sikh temple in Patna for upwards of two centuries. The Mohunt of the temple neglected to take out a license in respect of these arms under Act XI of 1878. A Police Inspector, who was appointed to see that the provisions of the latter Act were obeyed, searched the temple on information received, and, having found the arms, prosecuted the persons who had charge of the temple. The latter was convicted by the Deputy Magistrate of Patna under s. 19, cl. (f), of Act XI of 1878, and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50, or to be rigorously imprisoned for two months. The Deputy Magistrate also ordered the arms to be confiscated, and directed that their value and the fine should be divided between the informer and the Police Inspector. On a reference from the Sessions Judge of Patna:—*Held*, with reference to Act X of 1872, s. 579, and the last heading to Sch. IV of the same Act, and to s. 19, cl. (f), of Act XI of 1878, that the proceedings of the Police Inspector and the conviction of the accused were not illegal. There is nothing in the Arms Act to exempt the custodians of a temple from complying with the requirements of the Arms Act, either by taking out a license or obtaining exemption under s. 27. S. 25 of the Arms Act appears to refer to cases in which the Magistrate considers that arms, whether under a license or not, are possessed for an illegal purpose, or under circumstances such as to endanger the public peace. S. 30 of the Arms Act appears to contemplate the presence of some specially empowered officer besides the officer conducting the search. *EMPRESS v. TEGHA SINGH*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 473

14. — ss. 19, 27—Exemptions from provision of Arms Act—Government Notification 518 of the 6th March 1879—Government Notification 458 of the 18th March 1898—"Personal use" of arms—Arms carried and used by servant of exempted person. By a notification under s. 27 of the Arms Act (XI of 1878) issued by the Government of India, certain persons, amongst them Rajas and

ARMS ACT (XI OF 1878)—*concl'd.***s. 19—*concl'd.***

members of the Legislative Council of the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, were exempted from the operation of ss. 13 and 16 of the said Act; but with this proviso, that, "except where otherwise expressly stated, the arms or ammunition carried or possessed by such persons shall be for their own personal use, etc., etc." *Held*, that the terms of this proviso would allow of a person exempted under the notification above alluded to sending a servant armed with a gun into a neighbouring district to shoot birds for him, and that a gun so carried and used by the servant of the exempted person was in the "personal use" of the exempted person within the meaning of the notification. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GANGA DIN*

I. L. R. 22 All. 118

s. 22—Master and servant—Master's liability for the criminal acts of his servant. Where the manager of a licensed vendor of arms, ammunition and military stores sold certain military stores without previously ascertaining that the buyer was legally authorized to possess the same:—*Held*, that the licensee was liable to punishment under s. 22 of the Indian Arms Act (XI of 1878), though the goods were not sold with his knowledge and consent. The principle—"whatever a servant does in the course of his employment with which he is entrusted and as a part of it, is his master's act"—is applicable to the present case. *Attorney General v. Siddon*, 1 Cr. & J. 220, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. TYAB ALI*

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 423

s. 25 : See TRESPASS.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 433

s. 29—Sporting License—Rules under Arms Act. In a district where bison are notoriously in the habit of injuring crops, a license under Form XI, rule 16 of the Indian Arms Act (1878) Rules (to kill wild beasts which injure crops), justifies the holder thereof in shooting bison for the sake of sport without taking out a sporting license under form VIII, rule 13 of the same rules. *QUEEN v. BOMMAYA*

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 26

ARMY (ANNUAL) ACT, 1895 (58 VICT., C. 7).**s. 4—**

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—SALARY.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 402

ARMY DISCIPLINE ACT, 1879 (42 & 43 VIC., c. 33).

See SOLDIER . I. L. R. 11 Mad. 475

s. 144—Decree against person subject to military law—Stoppage of pay, order for. Where a decree was made against the defendant, who was an officer in the Indian Army, the Court, under s. 144 of the Army Discipline Act, 42 & 43 Vic., c. 33, directed that the amount of the decree should be stopped and paid out of the pay of the defendant not exceeding one-half thereof. *RAMSAY v. ANDERSON*

7 C. L. R. 336

ARMY DISCIPLINE ACT, 1878 (42 & 43 Vic., c. 33)—concl'd.

—ss. 144, 151.

See SERVICE OF SUMMONS.

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 319

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 475

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—
JURISDICTION—ARMY ACT.

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 319

ARMY DISCIPLINE ACT, 1881 (44 & 45 Vic., c. 58).

—s. 145—Soldiers in Indian Forces.
S. 145 of the Army Act, 1881, is not applicable to soldiers of Her Majesty's Indian forces. *NATHU BI v. JAFAR HUSAIN* I. L. R. 8 Mad. 365

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—
JURISDICTION—ARMY ACT.

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 218

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 143

—ss. 148, 151.

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY
TOWNS—JURISDICTION—ARMY ACT.

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 37

—s. 151.

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECT OF ATTACH-
MENT—PENSION, SALARY, OR ANNUITY.

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 170

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 102

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY
TOWNS—JURISDICTION—ARMY ACT.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 144, 372

—s. 156—Taking in pawn medal or military decoration from a soldier. Under the Army Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vic., c. 58), s. 156, any person who takes in pawn a military decoration from a soldier is liable to punishment. *Held*, that this section of the Army Act, 1881, is applicable to a person who takes a medal in pawn from a sepoy in India. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NARAYANSAMI*

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 108

—ss. 136, 151—

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACH-
MENT—SALARY.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 402

ARMY DISCIPLINE ACT, 1888 (51 Vic., c. 4), s. 7.

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY
TOWNS—JURISDICTION—ARMY ACT.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 144, 372

ARREARS OF RENT.

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See INTEREST . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 34

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ARREARS OF RENT . 7 C. W. N. 203

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See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 253

6 C. W. N. 337

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 20

L. R. 24 I. A. 137

1. CIVIL ARREST.

1. —Arrest pending enquiry into insolvency—Application of judgment-debtor to be declared insolvent—Subsequent proceedings in execution against him—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 245B, 336, 337A, 344, and 349. *G* obtained a money-decree against *M*, and in execution applied for his arrest and imprisonment. Before the warrant of arrest was issued, but after *M* had appeared in Court in obedience to a notice under s. 245B of the Civil Procedure Code, another judgment-creditor applied for execution of another decree against him. Thereupon *M* applied, under s. 344 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), to be declared an insolvent, and in his application mentioned *G* as one of his creditors (s. 345). The Subordinate Judge referred to the High Court the question whether, pending the inquiry into *M*'s insolvency, he could be arrested in execution of *G*'s decree against him.

ARREST—contd.**1. CIVIL ARREST—contd.**

Held, that there was no provision in the Code to prevent the Court from issuing a warrant of arrest against him. Where, however, such a judgment-debtor is brought before the Court under a warrant of arrest, or comes before it upon notice under s. 245B, the Court has a discretionary power not to put the warrant in force under s. 349 or not to issue it under s. 336 (where the requisite notification has been published by the Local Government) if the applicant furnishes security for his appearance when called upon. In such cases the Court can also act under s. 337A of the Civil Procedure Code. *GANPAT BHAGVAT v. MAHADEV HARI*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 731

2. ——— Arrest of a lunatic in execution of a decree—Discretion of Court to order the arrest—Ground for disallowing application for arrest of judgment-debtor—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 337A. Under the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), a Court is not bound to order the arrest of a lunatic in execution of a decree passed against him. The power to order his arrest is discretionary. The lunacy of a judgment-debtor is good cause within the meaning of s. 337A of the Code for disallowing an application for his arrest. *BHANABHAI v. CHOTABHAI*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 961

3. ——— Arrest of debtor in execution of money decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 245B, 337A, 339—Subsistence allowance. A decree by consent was made on 6th May 1896, ordering the defendant within one year to pay to the plaintiff Rs. 4,842 with interest and costs. On 14th May 1898 a notice was issued to the judgment-debtor to show cause why this decree should not be executed by his arrest and imprisonment: he pleaded poverty and "other sufficient cause," and the matter was set down for inquiry under s. 337A. When it came on, the Court, after hearing the evidence of the judgment-debtor, held that no cause had been shown why he should not be arrested, and that it was bound to order his arrest at once under that section, and subsistence allowance was ordered under s. 339. *GUBBOY v. RAMDOYAL CHOWBAY*

2 C. W. N. 588

4. ——— Suit for damages for arrest in execution of decree—Malice—Reasonable and probable cause, want of. A suit to recover damages on account of injuries caused by an arrest in accordance with a decree of a competent Court can only be maintained under special circumstances,—*viz.*, the plaintiff must show (i) that the original action, out of which the alleged injury arose, was decided in his favour; (ii) that the arrest was procured without reasonable and probable cause; (iii) that the injury sustained was something other than an injury which has been or might have been compensated for by an award of the costs of the suit,—*e.g.*, that he has suffered "some collateral wrong." Where a plaintiff must show an absence of reasonable and probable cause, malice is not

ARREST—contd.**1. CIVIL ARREST—contd.**

alone sufficient to entitle him to a verdict. *RAJ CHUNDER ROY v. SHAMA SOONDARI DEBI*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 583

5. ——— Malice, proof of. To maintain such a suit, legal not actual malice is sufficient. *GOUTIERE v. CHARRIOL*

1 N. W. Part 2, 32 : Ed. 1873, 91

6. — Privilege from arrest—Privilege of party morando. Where a native of Patna came from Calcutta to Madras on 24th October on account of a suit pending, in which he was plaintiff, and, the case having been adjourned on 27th October for seven weeks, remained in Madras on account of the suit, and was arrested on 10th November,—*Held*, that he was privileged under s. 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *In re SIVA BUX SAVUNTHARAM*

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 317

7. ——— Party in contempt of Court. A party against whom a writ of attachment for contempt has been issued is not entitled to his right of privilege from arrest while proceeding to Court or leaving Court on the hearing of his suit. *JOHN v. CARTER*

4 B. L. R. O. C. 90

8. ——— Party to suit—Summary Procedure—Arrest under writ of Small Cause Court—Act X of 1877, s. 642. The general rule that a party to a suit is protected from arrest upon any civil process, while going to the place of trial, while attending there for the purpose of the cause, and while returning home, applies to a defendant to a suit under the summary procedure sections of the Civil Procedure Code, who has not obtained leave to appear and defend, and who, therefore, cannot be heard at the trial. Questions as to the privilege of exemption from arrest, in the case of persons arrested under writs issued from the Small Cause Courts in Calcutta, must be governed by the English law, and not by s. 642 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is not a deviation sufficient to forfeit privilege if the shortest road home is deviated from and a less crowded and more convenient road adopted. *In the matter of SURENDRO NATH ROY CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 106

9. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 642—Arrest in execution of process of Revenue Court. S. 642 of the Civil Procedure Code only protects an accused person while he is attending a Criminal Court from arrest "under that Code." *Held*, therefore, where a person, who had been convicted by a Magistrate and had been fined, was arrested in execution of the process of a Revenue Court while waiting in Court until the money to pay such fine was brought, that such person was not protected from such arrest by the provisions of that section, and that, having escaped from custody under such arrest, such person had properly been convicted under s. 651 for escaping from "lawful custody." *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. HARAKH NATH SINGH*

I. L. R. 4 All. 27

ARREST—*contd.*1. CIVIL ARREST—*contd.*

10. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 642—Insolvency Act (11 & 12 Vict., c. 21), s. 51—Exemption from arrest on civil process redeundo.* The Commissioner in Insolvency committed an insolvent to jail by an order under s. 51 of the Insolvency Act, and he was released by order of the Full Bench, who held that a Commissioner in Insolvency has no power under that section to commit an insolvent to jail, but must leave the excepted judgment-creditors (if any) to their ordinary remedies for the time mentioned in the order. The insolvent having been discharged from jail under the rule laid down by the Full Bench as above, was immediately arrested on a warrant obtained by a judgment-creditor. *Held, per SHEPARD, J.,* that the insolvent was not privileged from arrest as being on his way back from Court. *SAMARAPURI v. PARRY & Co.* . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 150

11. ————— *Protection of arresting officers—Penal Code, s. 78.* The arrest under civil process of a judgment-debtor going to a Court in obedience to a citation to give evidence, and made within the precincts of that Court, and with some show of violence and contempt of Court, does not entitle the officers making the arrest to protection under s. 78, Penal Code. *THACOODASS NUNDEE v. SHUNKUR ROY* . . . 3 W. R. Cr. 53

12. ————— *Defendant as witness for plaintiff.* A defendant in a suit summoned by, and examined as a witness for, the plaintiff, is entitled to protection from arrest on civil process during the time reasonably occupied in going to, attending at, and returning from, the place of trial. *APPASAMY PATTAR v. GOVINEEN NAMBIAR* . . . 4 Mad. 145

13. ————— *Summary execution—Small Cause Court, Mofussil—Act XI of 1865, s. 19.* In authorizing (s. 19, Act XI of 1865) immediate execution of a Small Cause Court decree, by the issue of a warrant, either against the person or against the moveable property of a judgment-debtor the Legislature never intended that the debtor should be protected from arrest until he had had a reasonable time for returning home. Where a judgment-debtor has paid the amount of a Small Cause Court decree, he is not entitled to a refund, merely because he was arrested before he reached home under an execution issued against his person by the Court, and paid the amount to obtain his discharge. *DEPENNING v. DEBENDRONATH MOITRO* . . . 9 W. R. 549

14. ————— *Power of High Court to release party arrested in execution of decree of Presidency Small Cause Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 642.* Where a defendant in a suit in the High Court was arrested in execution of a decree of the Calcutta Court of Small Causes, while attending before an arbitrator appointed by the High Court to take a reference in the suit, it was held that he was privileged from such arrest while so attending, and that the High Court had power to

ARREST *contd.*1. CIVIL ARREST—*contd.*

direct his release from custody. Small Cause Courts in the Presidency towns are subject to the order and control of the High Courts. *In the matter of Omrito Lall Dey, I. L. R. 1 Calc. 78, followed. In the matter of JUGGESSUR ROY 5 C. L. R. 170*

15. ————— *Witness—Bond fides.* Where a witness was arrested in execution of a decree, and the circumstances under which the arrest had taken place showed the absence of a *bond fide* belief on his part that his attendance at Court was required for the purpose of giving evidence in the case in which he had been subpoenaed, the Court refused to allow his claim to privilege from arrest. *WOOMA CHURN DHOLE v. TEL*

14 B. L. R. Ap. 13

See in the matter of OMIRITO LALL DEY

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 78

16. ————— *Witness. Held,* that on the facts shown in the affidavit the prisoner was privileged as a witness at the time of his arrest. *In the matter of OMIRITO LALL DEY*

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 78

17. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 349—Court, Power of, to release judgment-debtor after he is "imprisoned"—"Arrest" and "imprisonment."* "Arrest" as used in s. 349 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) does not include "imprisonment." Therefore the power conferred on the Court under that section to release a judgment-debtor arrested in execution of a decree on a security being given by him ceases after he has been imprisoned or put into jail. *In the matter of Hastie, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 451, dissented from. In re Quarme, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 503, followed. MAHOMED HUSEIN v. RADHI . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 46*

18. ————— *Arrest on a Sunday—Lords Day Act.* Arrest under civil process of a mofussil Court on Sunday is legal in this country. *ANONYMOUS* . . . 4 Mad. Ap. 62

See ABRAHAM v. QUEEN . 1 B. L. R. A. Cr. 17

See GRASEMAN v. GARDNER

3 W. R. Rez. Ref. 2

See PARAM SHOOK DOSS v. RASHEED OOD DOWLAH . . . 7 Mad. 285

19. ————— *Arrest of pilot brig—Privilege from arrest—Statute 21 & 22 Vic., c. 126.* A Government brig employed in supplying pilots to vessels at the Sandheads was arrested under proceeding *in rem*. *Held,* that the brig, by 21 & 22 Vic., c. 126, had become the property of the Crown, and as such was entitled to the same exemption from arrest as all other Queen's ships, and that the proceeding *in rem* was therefore illegal. *BROWN v. THE PILOT BRIG "KEDGEREE" . 1 Hyde 253*

20. ————— *Discharge from arrest—Undertaking by prisoner not to sue.* The prisoner was required before his discharge to give an undertaking that he would bring no action for damages.

ARREST—contd.**1. CIVIL ARREST—concl'd.**

for illegal arrest or false imprisonment against the Judges of the Small Cause Court, the bailiff, the Jailor, or the judgment-creditor. *In the matter of OMERTO LALL DEY*. I. L. R. 1 Calc. 78

21.—*Decree—Execution—Arrest of debtor in execution—Release of debtor from such arrest under interim protection order granted under s. 13 of Indian Insolvency Act (11 & 12 Vict., c. 21)—Re-arrest of debtor in execution of same decree—Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), s. 341.* A judgment-debtor who has been arrested and imprisoned in execution of a decree, and has obtained an interim protection order under s. 13 of the Indian Insolvency Act (11 & 12 Vict., c. 21), is liable to be re-arrested in execution of the same decree. *Secretary of State v. Judah*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 653, distinguished. *In re Bolye Chund*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 874, not followed. *SHAMJI DEOKARAN v. POONJA JAIRAM* (1902). I. L. R. 26 Bom. 652

2. CRIMINAL ARREST.

1. ———— *Arrest without warrant—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 54—Powers of the police to arrest without a warrant—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 220 and 342.* S. 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882) authorizes the arrest by the police, not only of persons against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or a reasonable suspicion exists of their having been concerned in a "cognizable offence," but also of persons against whom "credible information" to that effect has been received. *Semble*: Where the arrest is legal, there can be no guilty knowledge "super-added to an illegal act" such as it is necessary to establish against the accused to justify a conviction under s. 220 of the Penal Code. It is only where there has been an excess by a police officer of his legal powers of arrest that it becomes necessary to consider whether he has acted corruptly or maliciously, and with the knowledge that he was acting contrary to law. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. AMARSANG JETHA*. I. L. R. 10 Bom. 506

2. ———— *Offence against opium laws.* The arrest of a person accused of an offence against the opium laws without a warrant is generally illegal except under the circumstances specified in s. 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *REG v. NARAYAN GANGARAM*. 9 Bom. 343

3. ———— *Finding person with stolen property.* The police may, without any formal complaint, apprehend any person found with stolen property. *QUEEN v. GOWREE SINGH*. 8 W. R. Cr. 28

4. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 140.* S. 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not apply to a case of arrest for dacoity made without warrant by a subordinate police officer in the presence of a head constable who authorized him to make the arrest. *QUEEN v. EMOO*. *QUEEN v. SAGUE BEWAR* 11 W. R. Cr. 20

ARREST—contd.**2 CRIMINAL ARREST—contd.**

5. ———— *Re-arrest on same charge of prisoner who has been discharged.* A prisoner who had been sent up for trial and who was discharged by the Deputy Magistrate was subsequently re-arrested by a sub-inspector on the same charge and sent up for trial. The Deputy Magistrate considered the second arrest to be illegal, and prosecuted the sub-inspector for wrongful confinement, and fined him. *Held*, that the Deputy Magistrate was right, the discharge from custody having been a useless procedure if the accused immediately became liable to be rearrested without fresh material for prosecution of the charge. *RAMDAS SADHOO v. ANAND CHUNDER ROY*. 19 W. R. Cr. 27

6. ———— *Right to option of release on bail—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 55.* Where a person is arrested by the police under the provisions of s. 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he should always be given the option of release on reasonable bail being supplied. *In the matter of the petition of DOULAT SINGH*. I. L. R. 14 All. 45

7. ———— *Omission to notify substance of warrant—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1895), s. 80—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 225B.* An arrest by a police officer without notifying the substance of the warrant to the person against whom the warrant is issued as required by s. 80 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not a lawful arrest, and resistance to such an arrest is not an offence under s. 225B of the Penal Code. *SATISH CHANDRA RAI v. JODU NANDAN SING*. I. L. R. 26 Calc. 748

3 C. W. N. 741

8. ———— *Arrest by police on an order in writing—Whether police obliged to show authority under which they act to person arrested—Resistance to such arrest—Escape from custody—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1895), ss. 56 and 80—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 224.* There is nothing extending s. 80 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to an arrest made by the police on an order in writing under s. 56 of that Code, so as to require that any information as to the authority under which the police are acting must be given to the person arrested in order to make it an arrest warranted by law. It may be desirable or even obligatory that, if called upon, the police officer making such an arrest should show the person arrested the authority under which he is acting, but to hold that he is bound to do so before he can properly arrest and detain in custody such a person, so as to make the arrest and the detention lawful, would be to extend the law beyond what the Legislature has thought proper to declare it. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BASANT LALL*. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 320

4 C. W. N. 311

9. ———— *Warrant of arrest directed to police officer—Endorsement*

ARREST—contd.**2. CRIMINAL ARREST—contd.**

of warrant by another police officer to process-serving peons—*Legality of such endorsement—Peons not police officers—Arrest by peons—Rescue of persons arrested—Whether lawful arrest—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 68 and 79.* A warrant of arrest was endorsed over to a Court sub-inspector for execution. The Court sub-inspector being away, the Court head-constable, by an order in writing signed by himself, endorsed this warrant over to two process-serving peons for execution. The peons arrested a number of men under the warrant, some of whom were forcibly rescued by the accused and other persons. The accused were convicted under various sections of the Penal Code of rescuing the persons arrested and obstructing the execution of the warrant of arrest. *Held*, that the endorsement of the warrant by the Court head-constable to the peons did not make them competent to execute the warrant, that even if the peons had been legally appointed, they could not have made the arrest, inasmuch as they were not police officers within the terms of s. 79 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The terms of s. 79 are express in this respect, and no other person, except a police officer, is competent to execute a warrant of arrest under an endorsement from another police officer. *DURGA CHARAN JEMADAR v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* **I. L. R. 27 Calc. 457**

DURGA JEMADAR v. GUNA NATH

4 C. W. N. 822

10. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 79—Warrant, endorsement upon, without any name—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 224.* An endorsement upon a warrant under s. 79, Criminal Procedure Code, should be regularly made by name to a certain person in order to authorize him to make the arrest. Where the endorsement was made to the officer of a certain police station without the name of such officer being given:—*Held*, that the arrest by virtue of such a warrant was not legal so as to make any attempt or obstruction or escape an offence punishable within the terms of s. 224 of the Penal Code. *DURGA TEWARI v. RAHMAN BUKSH*

4 C. W. N. 85

11. *Arrest made by excise officer—Bengal Excise Act (Bengal Act VII of 1878), ss. 39, 40—Breach of excise rules—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 147, 225, 353—Rioting—Assaulting a public servant in execution of his duties—Forcibly rescuing persons from lawful custody.* Where an excise sub-inspector, on receiving information that some persons were illicitly distilling liquor in some jungles, proceeded thither unaccompanied by a police officer, and, finding his information correct, arrested some persons and took them to the neighbouring village and asked for the assistance of the punchayet, who, instead of giving assistance, collected men and rescued them from custody and assaulted the excise sub-inspector:—*Held*, that the arrest was a lawful one

ARREST—concl'd.**2. CRIMINAL ARREST—concl'd.**

under s. 39 of the Bengal Excise Act (Bengal Act VII of 1878). *HRIDOY MONDAL v. JAGANANDA DASS*

4 C. W. N. 245

12.—*Madras Abkari Act (Mad. Act I of 1886), s. 34—Power of officer in one Circle to arrest offenders in another.* An officer of the Salt and Abkari Department, belonging to Circle A, received certain information and entered Circle B, and, under s. 34 of the Madras Abkari Act, arrested an offender in the latter Circle. The Magistrate who, in due course, tried the offender, held that the officer's powers of arrest were restricted to his own Circle, and acquitted the accused, though he believed the prosecution evidence as to an offence having been committed. Upon an appeal being preferred against the acquittal: *Held*, that the order of acquittal was wrong, and must be set aside; also, that the question whether the officer who effected the arrest was acting within or beyond his powers in making the arrest did not affect the question whether the accused was or was not guilty of the offence with which he was charged. *EMPEROR v. RAVALU KESIGADU (1902)*

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 124

13. *Arrest without authority—Arrest by police in Calcutta—Legality—Security for good behaviour—Information—Duty of Magistrate to proceed with case—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 1 (2) (a), s. 4 (p) (s), s. 55 (b), s. 109 (b).* The accused was arrested in Calcutta by the Inspector in charge of the Colocotollah thana, under the provisions of s. 55 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and placed on his trial before a Bench of Honorary Magistrates on a charge under s. 109 (b) of the Code. The Magistrates discharged the accused on the ground that he was not properly before them, as the Inspector had no authority to arrest him. *Held*, that the order of discharge should be set aside and the case be proceeded with against the accused. That the arrest of the accused by the Inspector was quite legal. That the Magistrates were also empowered to put in force the provisions of s. 109 of the Code, whenever they had credible information that the accused had no ostensible means of livelihood or was unable to give a satisfactory account of himself and was within the limits of their jurisdiction. How he came before them was immaterial. *Emperor v. Ravalu Kesigadu, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 124, followed.* *EMPEROR v. MADHO DHOBI (1904)* . **I. L. R. 31 Calc. 557**

ARREST OF JUDGMENT.

1. *Act XVIII of 1862, s. 41—Act XIII of 1865—Charge.* It ought to appear upon the face of a charge that it had been delivered to the Clerk of the Crown by a Justice of the Peace or a Magistrate, but its not so appearing is a formal defect only, to which objection could only be taken under s. 41 of Act XVIII of 1862 before the jury has been sworn, and it was not ground for arrest of judgment. *QUEEN v. THOMPSON*

I. B. L. R. O. Cr. 1

ARREST OF JUDGMENT—concl'd.**2. —Caption of charge**

—*Act XIII of 1865.* Where the High Court could have directed the preliminary investigation of a charge against *N* by the Deputy Magistrate of Serampore, but it did not appear in the caption of the charge or in evidence that the Court had so directed it:—*Held*, that it was no ground for arrest of judgment, but the objection might have been raised before the jury was sworn under s. 41 of Act XVIII of 1862. *QUEEN v. NABADWIP GOSWAMI*

1 B. L. R. O. Cr. 15: 15 W. R. Cr. 71 note

ARTICLED CLERK.

See ATTORNEY . . . 13 C. W. N. 402

See PRACTICE . . . 13 C. W. N. 402

ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION.

See COMPANY—ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND LIABILITY OF SHARE-HOLDERS.

See COMPANY—MEETINGS AND VOTING.
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 164

See STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. I, ART. 8.
I. L. R. 22 All. 131

ARTIFICERS.

See ACT XIII OF 1859.

2 B. L. R. A. Cr. 32: 12 W. R. Cr. 26

ARTIZAN.

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See MADRAS TOWNS IMPROVEMENT ACT (III OF 1871) . . . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 174

ASCETICS.

— succession to property of—

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—RELIGIOUS PERSON . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 543
5 N. W. 50
I. L. R. 22 Mad. 302

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—RELIGIOUS PERSONS . . . 7 C. W. N. 145

See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 608

ASSAM.

— law as to pykes in—

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—PERSONS BY WHOM RIGHT MAY BE ACQUIRED.

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 100

ASSAM FOREST REGULATION (VII OF 1891).

— s. 40—*Rules—Onus of proof.* In order to support a conviction for breach of rules 1 and 2 framed under s. 40 of the Assam Forest Regulation, the onus is on the prosecution to prove that the forest produce was being removed along some route other than the two routes prescribed by rule 1. The mere fact of its being found concealed under suspicious circumstances is not sufficient to

ASSAM FOREST REGULATION (VII OF 1891)—concl'd.**s. 40—concl'd.**

remove that onus from the prosecution and to throw the burden on the accused of proving that it was on its way for conveyance by an authorized route. *MOTI THAKOOR v. DEPUTY CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 895

ASSAM FRONTIER TRACTS REGULATION (II OF 1880).**s. 2.**

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—
CALCUTTA—CRIMINAL.

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 874

ASSAM LAND AND REVENUE REGULATION (I OF 1886).

— ss. 2, prov. (b), 12, and ss. 39, 151 and 154—*Settlement-holder, his rights under a settlement—Nisf-kherajdar, his rights to a settlement.* The effect of ss. 39 and 151 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886, is that a settlement made by a Settlement Officer, unless interfered with by the Chief Commissioner, is final; but the settlement-holder does not thereby acquire any right to the land so settled as against any person claiming rights to it. The effect of an order by the Government of India before the passing of the Assam Regulation in regard to the right of a nisf-kherajdar to hold lands found upon survey to be in excess of his nisf-kheraj estate, and to obtain a settlement thereof, considered. In 1881 *S*, a nisf-kherajdar, obtained a settlement for a year of certain lands which were found upon survey to be in excess of his nisf-kheraj estate. Subsequently a pottah was granted to *S* for a portion of the excess lands, while the other portion was settled by the revenue authorities under a kobala pottah with *M*, who entered into possession under his settlement. In a suit by *S*, the nisf-kherajdar, for a declaration of his right to a settlement of the portion settled with *M* and for possession:—*Held*, that having regard to the provisions of s. 2, prov. (b), s. 12 of the Regulation, and the order of the Government of India, the nisf-kherajdar was entitled to a declaration of his right to a settlement, but in view of s. 154 he was not entitled to a decree for possession. *MADHUB NATH SURMA v. MYARANI MEDHI* . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 819

— s. 59—*Rent suit—Suit for arrears due before Regulation came into force.* In a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent accrued due before the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation of 1886 came into force, which was instituted on the 7th of July 1886, where it appeared that the plaintiff's name had been previously registered, but that the Chief Commissioner had issued no notification under s. 48 of the Regulation directing that the registers then in existence should be deemed to be registers prepared under s. 59 of the Regulation, and that the plaintiff's name had not been registered under the last-mentioned section:—*Held*, that s. 59 applies to rent accruing due after the Regulation came into

ASSAM LAND AND REVENUE REGULATION (I OF 1886)—concl'd.

— s. 59—concl'd.

force, and not to rent already due on the date on which it came into force and that, therefore, the suit was maintainable. *BROZO NATH CHOWDHRY v. BIRMONI SINGH MONIPURI*. I. L. R. 15 Calc. 227

— ss. 65, 68, 70 (sub-ss. 2 and 3), and 71—*Act XI of 1859, s. 37—"Estate"—"Property"—Shikmi haziram rights.* A purchaser of a part of a permanently-settled estate is entitled to the benefit of s. 71 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, inasmuch as in s. 71 the words used are "property sold under s. 70," and the property to which reference is made in s. 70 includes both an estate as well as a share in respect of which revenue has been separately apportioned. The object of s. 37, Act XI of 1859, is the same as that of s. 71, Regulation I of 1886. Those sections cannot be said to have different meanings, for, if it were to be held that the incumbrance which could be set aside under s. 71 of the Regulation I of 1886 must be an incumbrance actively created by the previous holder, it would amount to this, that any acquiescence or laches, either wilful or arising from pure negligence on the part of the holder, by which the talukh or estate becomes incapable in the hands of the purchaser of yielding the Government revenue, would be outside the scope of this section. *MAHOMED NASIM v. KASI NATH GHOSE*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 194
3. C. W. N. 108

— ss. 96 and 154—

See PARTITION—JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT IN SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION.
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 514
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 751

— s. 154—*Right to obtain a settlement—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.* The question as to the right of a party to obtain a settlement from the revenue authorities is not excluded from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by the provisions of s. 154 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. *PATAN MARIA v. BHABIRAM DUTT BARNA*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 239
1 C. W. N. 94

ASSASSINATION, INCITEMENT TO.

See NEWSPAPERS (INCITEMENTS TO OFFENCES) ACT I. L. R. 36 Calc. 405

ASSAULT.

See COMPOUNDING OFFENCE.

6 N. W. 302

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 664

See HURT—CAUSING HURT.

7 B. L. R. Ap. 25 : 16 W. R. Cr. 3

See JURISDICTION I. L. R. 36 Calc. 869

See MISJOINDER

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 259

See PENAL CODE, ss. 351 to 358.

ASSAULT—concl'd.

—by several but fatal blow by one—

See DYING DECLARATION

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 659

—suit for damages for—

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—CRIMINAL COURT, PROCEEDINGS IN.

2 B. L. R. A. C. 31 : 12 W. R. 477

See DAMAGES—SUITS FOR DAMAGES—TORT . . . 6 C. W. N. 915

See SPECIAL APPEAL—SMALL CAUSE COURT SUITS—DAMAGES.

4 B. L. R. A. C. 31 : 4 W. R. 7

I. L. R. 10 All. 49

1. ——— Criminal force—*Threatening gestures—Words.* Any gestures calculated to excite in the party threatened a reasonable apprehension that the party threatening intends immediately to offer violence, or, in the language of the Penal Code, is "about to use criminal force" to the persons threatened, constitute, if coupled with a present ability to carry such intent into execution, an assault in law. Mere words do not amount to an assault, but the words which the party threatening uses at the time may either give his gestures such a meaning as to make them amount to an assault, or, on the other hand, may prevent them from being held to amount to an assault. In order to have the latter effect, the words must be such as clearly to show the party threatened that the party threatening has no present intention to use immediate criminal force. *CAMA v. MORGAN* . 1 Bom. 205

2. ——— Joint Assault—*Cause of action.* An assault made by parties proceeding together and acting in conjunction as to time, place, and assault is a single act, and the cause of action is common to all parties. *RAMESSUR BHATTACHARJEE v. SHIBNARAIN CHUCKERBUTTY* . 14 W. R. 419

3.—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 352, 353—Assaulting a public officer in the discharge of his duties—Assault on a witness—Charge for the offence under s. 353—Conviction for assaulting a witness, when no complaint of such offence.* A person called upon to meet a charge that he had assaulted a public officer in the discharge of his duties cannot, on failure of that charge, be convicted of an offence of having assaulted a private individual, viz., a witness in the case, especially in the absence of a complaint by that private individual. *In the matter of AKBAR MOMIN (1901)* 6 C. W. N. 202

ASSAULT ON PUBLIC SERVANT.

See POLICE ACT (V OF 1861), ss. 17, 19.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 411

See THUMB IMPRESSIONS.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 97

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CIVIL CASES.

5 C. W. N. 843

ASSAULT ON PUBLIC SERVANT—*contd.*

1. ———— **Collectorate peadah—*Penal Code, s. 353.*** A collectorate peadah, who had been deputed to keep the peace during a dstraint, was assaulted by the prisoners while on his road to execute the order with which he had been entrusted, the prisoners attempting to deprive him of his purwanah. *Held*, that they were rightly convicted under s. 353 of assaulting a public servant while in the execution of his duty. **QUEEN v. MEIHI MULLAH 13 W. R. Cr. 49**

2. ———— **Sepoy in Revenue Department—*Penal Code, ss. 353 and 352—Rules or executive orders of Government published in Nairne's Revenue Handbook—Impressment of carts for the use of Government officers how far legal.*** The rules or executive orders of Government printed at pages 26 and 27 of Nairne's Revenue Handbook have not the force of law, and a public servant, acting in obedience thereto, cannot be considered as acting in execution of his duty as a public servant, if his act is otherwise illegal. Accordingly, where on a complaint by a sepoy in the Revenue Department deputed by a Forest Settlement Officer to impress some carts for the use of the latter, that the accused assaulted and prevented him from seizing his cart, a Magistrate of the first class convicted the accused, under s. 353 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), for assaulting and obstructing a public servant in the execution of his duty, and sentenced the accused to undergo twenty-one days' rigorous imprisonment :—*Held*, that the conviction under s. 353 of the Penal Code should be set aside. The only offence of which, upon the evidence, the accused was guilty, was that of simple assault under s. 352 of the Penal Code. *In re the petition of RAKHMAT*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 558

3. ———— **Public servant acting under warrant of attachment—*Deterring a public servant from discharge of his duty—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 353—Non-production of the warrant at the trial.*** One of the accused was convicted under s. 353 of the Penal Code (assaulting or using criminal force to a public servant in the execution of his duty) and two others of the abetment of an offence under that section. But the warrant of attachment under which the public servant was acting was not produced at the trial, nor was any secondary evidence given to show its contents. *Held*, in the absence of any evidence as to the terms of the warrant either by the production of the original or in the form of secondary evidence, it was impossible to hold that the conviction was good. **TAFAZZUL AHMED CHOWDHRY v. QUEEN-EMPRESS**

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 630

CHUNDER COOMAR SEN v. QUEEN-EMPRESS

3 C. W. N. 605

4. ———— **Licensed vaccinator attempting to take lymph from child—*Assaulting public servant in execution of duty or with intent to prevent him from discharging his duty—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 353—Right of private defence.*** Where a licensed vaccinator

ASSAULT ON PUBLIC SERVANT—*concl'd.*

attempted to take lymph from a child of one petitioner to vaccinate the child of the other, and was assaulted in consequence and received slight injuries :—*Held*, that the vaccinator was not entitled to take lymph from the arm of any person who objected, and his attempting to do so was unlawful, and that the petitioners were justified in assaulting him. *Held*, also, that the slight injuries received by the vaccinator did not prevent him from discharging his duty. **MANGOBINDA MUCHI v. EMPRESS**

3 C. W. N. 627

ASSENT, EVIDENCE OF.

See **CONTRACT . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 736**

ASSESSMENT.

See **BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (BENGAL ACT III OF 1884)**

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 859

See **CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882) 12 C. W. N. 904**

See **CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR.**

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 597

See **EXECUTION 12 C. W. N. 3**

See **GRANT . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 432**

See **MUNICIPAL ACT, BENGAL ACT III OF 1899, ss. 153, CL. (b), 159, 175 AND 225.**

————— **Arrears of assessment—Inamdar—Occupancy tenant—Purchase from the occupancy tenant—Decree for assessment—Money decree against the occupants—Charge on land.** The plaintiff, an inamdar, sued to recover assessment due for the years 1895-96 and 1896-97 from defendant 2, who came in as a purchaser from the original occupancy tenant on the 5th April 1899. The lower Court passed a personal decree against defendant 2 for the arrears of assessment. *Held*, that defendant 2 was not liable, since an inamdar suing for assessment was not entitled to a charge on the lands, but only to a money decree against the occupants. *Ratanji v. Sakharan, (1884) P. J. 68*, followed. **VINAYAK v. LAKSHMAN. LAKSHMAN v. VINAYAK (1904)**

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 92

ASSESSORS.

See **CONVICTION . 2 B. L. R. F. B. 23
10 W. R. Cr. 43**

See **CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.**

33 Bom. 423

————— **in Land Acquisition cases.**

See **LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1870, s. 19.**

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 553

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 299

See **LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1870, s. 22.**

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 380, 383

See **LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1870, s. 35.**

11 B. L. R. 230

13 B. L. R. 300

ASSESSORS—*contd.*

acquittal without consulting—

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 1 All. 610
I. L. R. 10 All. 414

disqualification of—

See LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1870, s. 19.

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 299

evidence not taken in presence of—

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 15 All. 136

1. ———— *Necessity of—Opinion on whole evidence.* No legal conviction can take place unless the opinion of the assessors is taken on the whole of the evidence in a case. *QUEEN v. BHUGWAN LALL*
15 W. R. Cr. 3

2. ———— *Opinions of assessors—Trial on two charges—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 255, 265.* The intention of the Legislature in ss. 255 and 265 of the Criminal Procedure Code in a case in which the accused was tried on two charges, was that the assessors should give a definite opinion whether the prisoner is guilty of either of the offences charged, and, if so, of which of the charges preferred against him; and that the Judge, on delivering judgment, should give it with advertence to the opinion of the assessors. *QUEEN v. MATAM MAL*
22 W. R. Cr. 34

3. ———— *Grounds of opinion—Assessors differing from Judge.* Assessors ought to give the grounds of their opinions, particularly when they differ in opinion from the Judge. *QUEEN v. BUSHMO ANENT*
3 W. R. Cr. 21

4. ———— *Grounds for opinion—One assessor concurring with other.* Where one of the two assessors says that he thinks it proved that a war was waged against the Queen, that there was a conspiracy to carry on that war, and that the prisoner is guilty of all the acts charged, and the other assessor concurs with him, it cannot be said that the assessors have given no reason for their opinion. *QUEEN v. AMIRUDDIN*
7 B. L. R. 63: 15 W. R. Cr. 25

5. ———— *Grounds of opinion—Recording opinions.* The grounds of each assessor's opinion should be distinctly recorded by the Judge. *QUEEN v. MINA NUGGERBHATIN*
3 W. R. Cr. 6

6. ———— *Recording opinions of assessors.* When a judgment of acquittal is recorded it is not necessary to record the opinions of the assessors. *REG. v. PARBAT*
7 Bom. Cr. 82

7. ———— *Omission of Judge to state grounds of decision—Material error.* In a trial conducted with the aid of assessors, the Judge's omission to state the ground of his decision is not an illegality which invalidates the conviction. *REG. v. KALA KARSAN*
6 Bom. Cr. 55

8. ———— *Summing up by Judge—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861),*

ASSESSORS—*contd.*

s. 379. Although the old Criminal Procedure Code did not expressly provide for summing up of the evidence in a trial with the aid of assessors, it was held that there was nothing in the Code to prevent a Judge from summing up the evidence to the assessors. *QUEEN v. AMIRUDDIN*
7 B. L. R. 63: 15 W. R. Cr. 25

(Contra) *QUEEN v. JOGE POLY*

7 B. L. R. 67 note: 11 W. R. Cr. 39

9. ———— *Summing up evidence—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 309—Delivery of opinions of assessors—Sessions Judge, duties of.* The power of summing up the evidence given by s. 309 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, Act X of 1882, is intended to be exercised in long or intricate cases, and the Sessions Judge should confine himself to summing up the evidence, and should not obtrude on the assessors his opinion of the worthlessness or otherwise of certain portions of the evidence. The Sessions Judge should also conform strictly to the words of s. 309, and require each assessor to state his opinion orally. The Sessions Judge should not utilize the services of the pleader for the prosecution for the purpose of recording his summing up to the assessors. If he is not capable of recording the substance of it himself, he should employ an independent person for that purpose. *SHADULLA HOWLADAR v. EMPRESS*
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 875: 12 C. L. R. 506

10. ———— *Trial with assessors where no evidence offered by prosecution.* In a trial before a Sessions Judge with assessors, when the prisoner pleads not guilty and the public prosecutor does not offer evidence in support of the charge, the Judge ought to instruct the assessors that they are bound to find the prisoner not guilty. *ANONYMOUS*
4 Mad. Ap. 39

11. ———— *Inspection of place of offence—Personal inspection by Judge, time for—Notice of intention to view.* If a Sessions Judge should think it necessary to visit the place of the alleged occurrence of an offence under trial, he should give notice to the parties and the assessors. He should not go without such notice and after the trial has been completed by delivery of the opinion of the assessors. *In re OUDH BEHARI NARAIN SINGH*
1 C. L. R. 143

12. ———— *Assessors viewing scene of offence—Power of Judge to delegate examination of witnesses.* In case of a view of the scene of an alleged offence, it is the duty of the officer conducting the jury or assessors to the spot not to suffer any other persons to speak to or hold any communication with any of the jury or assessors. The Judge therefore cannot delegate to the assessors his own function of examining witnesses on the spot. *QUEEN v. CHUTTERDHAREE SINGH*
5 W. R. Cr. 59

13. ———— *Trial without assessors—Prisoner admitting offence, but pleading insanity at time of committing it—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 324.* The prisoner having admitted before

ASSESSORS—contd.

the Court of Session that he had killed his wife, no assessors were empanelled. At the end, however, of his confession he pleaded that he was not in his right mind at the time. The Judge, therefore, proceeded to record medical and other evidence on the point, and having come to the conclusion that there was no reason to doubt from the prisoner's conduct, either prior or subsequent to the murder, that in committing the murder he knew that he was doing a wrongful act, convicted the prisoner. *Held*, that the plea was in effect one of not guilty, and that the trial should not have proceeded without assessors, and that it should be quashed. *QUEEN v. CHEIT RAM* 5 N. W. 110

14. ——— Trial by jury of a case properly triable by assessors—*Appeal on facts. Per MACLEAN, J. (MITTER, J., dubitante).* The trial by a jury of an offence triable with assessors is not invalid on that ground, but an accused who would have been entitled to an appeal on the facts, if the case had been tried with assessors, is not debarred from that right merely by the fact that the trial by jury is not invalid. *EMPRESS v. MOHIM CHUNDER RAI* I. L. R. 3 Calc. 765

15. ——— Trial with the aid of assessors—*Commencement of the trial—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 268, 272, 284, 285.* The accused was committed for trial to the Sessions Court on a charge of murder. He pleaded not guilty to the charge, and claimed to be tried. Thereupon the Sessions Judge chose two assessors; but as one of them was ill, his attendance was at once dispensed with, and the Sessions Judge proceeded with the trial with the aid of the other assessor only. *Held*, that this procedure was illegal and contrary to ss. 284 and 285 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882). The attendance of one of the assessors having been dispensed with before the commencement of the trial, the Sessions Judge ought to have chosen another assessor in his place. A trial in the Sessions Court, "with the aid of assessors," does not begin with the reading of the charge, as the assessors are chosen under s. 272 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), only if the accused does not plead to the charge or claims to be tried. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BASTIANO* I. L. R. 15 Bom. 514

16. ——— Assessors prevented by death or illness from attending a trial—*Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 268, 285.* During the course of a trial before a Sessions Court with three assessors, one assessor died at an early stage of the proceedings. Later on another assessor became too ill to take any further part in the trial, and the third assessor was obliged to retire at the beginning of the accused's pleader's address to the Court, and did not return until it was finished. *Held*, that the law contemplated the continuous attendance of at least one assessor throughout the trial. This condition not having been fulfilled, the proceedings before the Sessions Court must be set aside as having (with regard to the provisions of s. 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) been held before a

ASSESSORS—contd.

Court not having jurisdiction. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MUHAMMAD MAHMUD KHAN* I. L. R. 13 All. 337

17. ——— Effect of incapacity of assessors to understand the proceedings—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 285.* Three assessors were chosen to assist the Court at a trial. Before the case commenced, it was discovered that one of the assessors was deaf, and his presence was accordingly dispensed with. The trial proceeded with two assessors present; but after the Public Prosecutor had closed his case, it was discovered that one of the remaining assessors was so deaf as to be incapable of understanding the proceedings. Under these circumstances, it was held that the trial having been held with practically only one assessor, the proceedings ought to be set aside and a new trial ordered. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BABU LAL* I. L. R. 21 All. 106

18.—*Absence of assessor—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 284, 285 and 537—Trial with assessors—Trial with the aid of one assessor only—Legality of such trial.* In a case triable by a Court of Session with the aid of assessors, one of the assessors being ill, the trial commenced and ended with only one assessor. *Held*, that there was no legal trial, and that the proceedings must be set aside and a new trial directed. S. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) had no application to such a case, as the Court was not properly constituted. *KING-EMPEROR v. JAYRAM* (1901) I. L. R. 25 Bom. 694

19. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 285, 537—Commencement of trial, for murder, by Judge and two assessors—Absence of one assessor during portion of the trial—Resumption of his seat by assessor, and his opinion expressed and recorded by the Judge—Legality of trial.* A trial for murder, conspiracy to murder, and abetment of murder, duly commenced before a Sessions Judge and two assessors, and continued for about seven weeks. During that period one of the assessors was permitted to absent himself during two whole days and five half days, respectively; at first, so that he might visit his mother on her death-bed, and subsequently, to perform the daily obsequies rendered necessary by her decease. He then resumed his seat as an assessor, and continued so to act until the termination of the trial, all the depositions recorded in his absence having been read by him on his return. At the conclusion of the trial the Sessions Judge invited the opinion of each assessor, and recorded it. The opinion of each was that all the accused were guilty; and the Judge, concurring in that opinion, convicted the accused. The prisoners appealed to the High Court, where it was contended that the Judge had acted contrary to law in allowing the assessor who had been absent to resume his seat as an assessor, and in inviting and taking into consideration his opinion in deciding the case; and that the conviction ought to be quashed. *Held* (DAVIES, J., dissenting), that the finding and sentence appealed against had been passed by a

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Court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of s. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the defect in the trial did not affect its validity and was cured by that section if the irregularity had "not in fact occasioned a failure of justice"; and that no such failure of justice had been shown. *KING-EMPEROR v. TIRUMAL REDDI* (1901)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 523

20. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 268, 285—Assessor, trial with the aid of—Assessor, absence of, from trial.* The law requires that a Sessions trial should under exceptional circumstances be held by the Sessions Judge with the aid of at least one and the same assessor sitting all through the proceedings. When a trial is resumed by a Sessions Judge in the absence of one of the assessors, but still with the aid of the other assessor or assessors present, the absent assessor ceases to occupy the position of an assessor during the trial. *KING-EMPEROR v. MESSERUDDIN SHIKDAR* (1902)

6 C. W. N. 715

21. ——— *Jurors as assessors—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 26 (3), 309—Sessions Judge sitting with jury—Charges of theft and administering drug—Opinion of only two jurors taken as assessors on second charge—Validity.* At the trial of an accused, before a Sessions Judge and a jury, for theft in a building (an offence triable by a jury), and for administering a noxious substance (an offence triable by assessors), the Judge took the verdict of the jury on the former charge, and took the opinion of only two of them (as assessors) on the latter. *Held*, that, under ss. 269 (3) and 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judge should have taken the opinion of all the jury, as assessors, on the latter charge, and that his failure to do so was not an "omission" or "irregularity" to which s. 537 applied. *RAMAKRISHNA REDDI v. EMPEROR* (1903)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 598

ASSETS.

See ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL

2 Mad. 255

Cor. 67

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 428

See ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL'S ACT, 1867,

s. 33 . . . 6 Mad. 346

See ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL'S ACT, 1874,

s. 35 . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 54, 65

1 C. W. N. 500

See COMPANY—WINDING UP—COSTS AND CLAIMS ON ASSETS.

See COMPANY—WINDING UP—DUTIES AND POWERS OF LIQUIDATORS

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 31

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ARTS. 12 TO 145, 115.

See REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PERSON . . . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 792

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—DISTRIBUTION OF SALE-PROCEEDS.

ASSETS—concl'd.

—rateable distribution of—

See ATTACHMENT I. L. R. 33 Calc. 639

ASSIGNABILITY.

See ASSIGNMENT . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 702

See CONTRACT . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 702

ASSIGNEE FROM PURCHASER.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE.

12 C. W. N. 1029

ASSIGNEE OF TRADE MARK.

See TRADE MARK . . . 13 C. W. N. 82

ASSIGNEE, RIGHT OF, TO SUE.

See ASSIGNMENT

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 345

ASSIGNMENT.

See ADMINISTRATION BOND.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 713

See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 577

See EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT.

See INSOLVENCY—ASSIGNMENTS BY DEBTOR.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—PAYMENT OF RENT—GENERALLY

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 540

See LEASE . . . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 610

See LIMITATION . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 612

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 7, AND SCH. II, ART. 11.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 730

See PROMISSORY NOTES—ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS ON, PROMISSORY NOTES.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 654

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT.

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 96

—by debtor—

See INSOLVENCY ACT—

s. 9 . . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 476

ss. 9 AND 24. . . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 765

—of business by District Judge to Subordinate Judge—

See CIVIL COURTS ACT, s. 13.

13 C. W. N. 264

—of debt —

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 23.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 406

—of decrees—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 148, CL. (h)

6 C. W. N. 91

1. ——— *Assignment by debtor and creditor of debt due by third person—Revenue Sale Law (Act XI of 1859), s. 53—Purchase at execution sale—*

ASSIGNMENT—contd.

Purchase at Revenue Sale—Practice. Where a debtor assigned to his creditor a debt due to him by a third person and the latter made no attempt to recover any portion of it: *Held*, upon accounts taken between them, that the creditor was rightly debited with the amount of the debt. *SYAMA KUMARI v. RAMESWAR SINGH* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 786

2. ——— *Assignability of executory contract—Actionable claim—Fraudulent assignment—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 3 and 6, cl. (h)—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 23.* The rule in this country as to the assignability of an executory contract for the purchase and sale of goods is that the benefit of such a contract can be assigned; understanding by benefit the beneficial interest under the contract and the right to enforce it. This rule is subject to certain qualifications, viz., (1) that the benefit is not coupled with a liability and (2) that the nature of the contract has not been affected by personal considerations. Such a contract falls within the rule which is in existence and in force in this country as to assignment of contracts. Such a contract, though perhaps contingent in character, comes within the definition of *actionable claim* in the Transfer of Property Act, s. 3. An assignment made under such circumstances as to amount to a fraud of the Bankruptcy Law, falls clearly within s. 6, cl. (h) of the Transfer of Property Act and is void. The word "object" in s. 23 of the Contract Act is not used in the same sense as *consideration*. It means purpose or design. *JAFFER MEHER ALI v. BUDGE BUDGE JUTE MILLS CO., LD.* (1906)

10 C. W. N. 755

s. c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 702

3. ——— *Party—Unconscionable assignment.* An assignment cannot be questioned as unfair and unconscionable by a person, who was not a party to the assignment. *BHAGWAT DAYAL SINGH v. DEBI DAYAL SAHU* (1908)

12 C. W. N. 393

s. c. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 420

L. R. 35 I. A. 46

4. ——— *Decree—Record.* The validity of an assignment of a decree cannot be questioned after the assignee has been placed on the record as substituted decree-holder. *Gous Mahomed v. Kharwas Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 450, and *Bajinath Lohea, v. Benoyendra Nath Palit*, 6 C. W. N. 5, followed. *Koob Lal v. Nittyanund Singh*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 839, considered. *RAM RATAN CHUCKERBUTTY v. JOGESH CHANDRA BHATTACHARJYA* (1907)

12 C. W. N. 625

5. ——— *Claim for damages for breach of contract—Right of assignee to sue—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 3, 6 (e), 130—"Actionable claim"—"Mere right to sue."* A claim for damages for breach of contract, after breach, is not an "actionable claim" within the meaning of s. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, but a "mere right to sue" within the meaning of s. 6 (e) of the same Act, and therefore cannot be transferred. *Per*

ASSIGNMENT—concld.

MACLEAN C.J., and HARINGTON J. (FLETCHER J. dubitante). *ABU MAHOMED v. S. C. CHUNDER* (1909)
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 345

ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSE IN ACTION.

See CHAMPERTY . I. L. R. 3 Bom. 402

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23.

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 4

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 42

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDICTION—CAUSE OF ACTION.

See LIS PENDENS . I. L. R. 23 All. 331

See PROMISSORY NOTE.

3 B. L. R. O. C. 130

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 290

See PROMISSORY NOTES—ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS ON, PROMISSORY NOTES.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 654

1. ——— *Practice of Courts in India—Right of assignee to sue.* In the practice of the Courts of India, it is lawful to assign choses in action when there is neither fraud against individuals nor special violation of the rule of public policy. The assignee of a claim for rents can sue under Act X of 1859. *HURRINATH MUZOOMDAR v. MORAN & Co.*

W. R. 1864, Act X, 127

2. ——— *Rule in equity. Semble:* There is nothing in equity which prevents a suitor, pending a suit or any other legal proceedings, from assigning the whole or any part of the subject of litigation. *Per* PHEAR, J. *GROSE v. AMIRTAMAYI DAS* . 4 B. L. R. O. C. 1: 12 W. R. O. C. 13

See RAMLAL MOOKERJEE v. HARAN CHANDRA DHUR 3 B. L. R. O. C. 130: 12 W. R. O. C. 9

3. ——— *Right of assignee to sue—Suit in his own name.* Choses in action are assignable in this country, and they are also assignable in England, although at law the assignee cannot sue in his own name. *JUG MOHUN LALL v. BUDDUN KOER* 9 W. R. 243

4. ——— *Right of purchaser of decree to sue for possession.* Choses in action are assignable by Civil Courts in this country, which are not merely Courts of Law, but also Courts of Equity. The purchaser of a decree-holder's rights and interests in decreed land may sue to recover possession, even if the thing purchased have no actual existence, but rests on mere possibility; if legally saleable, it was equitably an assignable cause of action. *MUNRUNJUN SINGH v. LEEA NUND SINGH* 11 W. R. 5

5. ——— *Hindu Law—Promissory note—Small Cause Court, Madras.* According to Hindu law, not only is the beneficial interest in the subject-matter of the contract, but the contract itself, assignable; the assignee therefore may issue in his own name. This doctrine is applicable to suits brought in the Madras Small Cause

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—contd.

Court. VEMBAKUM SOMAYAJEE JANAKEE AMMAL
v. MOONESAWMY CHETTY . . . 4 Mad. 176

KADABBACHA SÁHUB v. RANGASVAMI NAYAK.
1 Mad. 150

6. ——— Assignment of bond—Obligor's consent. The obligor's consent is not necessary to the assignment of a common money-bond. KRISTA CHETTI v. BALARAMA CHETTI
1 Mad. 139

7. ——— Right of assignee to sue—Promissory notes not made negotiable—Assignee's right of suit. Held, where a promissory note made payable simply to the payee without the addition of the words "order" or "bearer," and therefore not negotiable, was assigned to a third person, that the assignee could sue upon such note, a chose in action being by the law of India assignable, and that the assignee could sue in the Courts of India in his own name. KANHAIYA LAL v. LOMINGO
I. L. R. 1 All. 732

8. ——— Purchaser of moiety of right to damages. Where the plaintiff purchased from a certain person a moiety of whatever the latter might obtain as damages from the defendants for the breach of a contract :—Held, that such a transfer did not confer on the plaintiff a right to sue the defendants for a moiety of the damages. BHEKAREE SINGH v. MUHOSSEIN ALLY . . . 1 Hay 482

9. ——— Amalgamation of joint debt and personal debt. A joint debt cannot be amalgamated by a colourable assignment with a personal debt, so as to give the assignee the right to sue in respect of both debts. SREEHERRY PAUL v. NILMONEY SEN . . . 1 Hyde 169

10. ——— Order directing servant to pay money on account of advance. An order directing a servant to pay at an uncertain time a certain sum of money to the payee on account of advance is not a cheque, and the payee cannot transfer the same to a third party so as to give such third party a right of action against the drawer of such order. Nor is such a document evidence of a debt, enabling the person to whom the same is transferred to contend that by the sale to him he acquired the interest in a debt due by the writer of the order to the payee. BULLOO v. DEBRETON
2 N. W. 335

11. ——— Suit to recover possession of land and for damages. In a solenamah between B, the assignee of the plaintiff, and the defendant and a third party, it was agreed that as B held less seer land than the other two, there should be an equal division between the shareholders within a certain time, and, in case no division took place, that B should be entitled to damages. In a suit by the plaintiff to recover possession of certain seer land and a certain sum as damages for breach of the contract :—Held, that, if it was a suit to enforce a contract made with B, which contract did not convey any right in specific lands, the cause of

ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSE IN ACTION

—contd.

action was one not legally assignable. JURBUNDHUN SINGH v. SHEORAJ SINGH . . . 5 N. W. 184

12. ——— Sale of patnidari rights. When a patnidar's rights and interests in a patni are sold during the pendency of a suit brought by him against his tenants, the purchaser acquires the patnidar's privilege to carry on the suit. WILSON v. THE GOVERNMENT . . . 12 W. R. 122

13. ——— Wrongful attachment of property—Assignment of right to sue for compensation. The mere right to sue for compensation for the wrongful attachment of moveable property in execution of a decree is not transferable by sale. PRAGI LALL v. FATEH CHAND
I. L. R. 5 All. 207

14. ——— Sale of decree. Where A has sold his decree to B, the purchaser, B can sue on it. SUNGOOBURNESA KHANUM v. MEHER CHUND . . . W. R. 1864, 313

But the decree-holder should apply to the Court to certify any transfer of his interest in the decree, otherwise the Court may take no notice of the transfer. KHETTER MOHUN CHUTTAPADHYA v. ISSAR CHUNDER SURMA . . . 11 W. R. 271

15. ——— Right of assignee to execute decree—Assignment of decree. When a decree is assigned to A for his benefit in the name of B, B, the ostensible decree-holder, may take out execution. PURNA CHANDRA ROY v. ABHAYA CHANDRA ROY
4 B. L. R. Ap. 40

16. ——— Assignment of decree. A Court is not bound to admit the assignee of a decree to execution thereof. If there is no dispute, it may admit him, or, if the dispute is one which it can decide, it may try the point in dispute, and upon the result of that trial admit the assignee to carry on the decree. BISHTOO CHURN BHOSUN v. KISHEN GOPAL MISSEER . . . 13 W. R. 207

17. ——— Assignment of ex-parte decree for rent. When an ex-parte decree for rent has been sold by the decree-holder, there is no rule of law in Bengal which forbids the assignee from carrying on the suit instead of the landlord. BINODE BEHAREE MOOKERJEE v. BEER NARAIN ROY . . . 5 W. R., Act X, 52

18. ——— Assignee of decree under Act X of 1859. The purchaser of a decree under Act X of 1859 is entitled to ask the holder for a power-of-attorney to proceed with the execution. BROJO COOMAR MULLICK v. MON MOHINEE DEBIA . . . 16 W. R. 55

19. ——— Assignment of Act X of 1859 decree. There is no prohibition or rule of law forbidding the assignment of a decree under Act X of 1859, any more than any other decree. In the matter of JUNMEJOY MOOKERJEE
14 W. R. 215

20. ——— Right of assignee to appeal—Assignment of interest in suit. Where the whole interest of a sole plaintiff had been transferred

ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSE IN ACTION —*contd.*

with his unqualified assent, and the transferee was substituted for the original plaintiff in the very inception of the case, the defendant's written defence being afterwards put in without demur, it was held not to be necessary for the original plaintiff to be associated with the transferee in an appeal by the latter. *MUNEEROODEEN MOJOOMDAR v. PARBUTTY CHURN GHOSE* 15 W. R. 121

21. ————— *Purchaser of rights and interests of plaintiff.* A party who purchases the rights and interests of the plaintiffs after a suit has been dismissed, is not entitled to appeal against the order of dismissal without joining the original plaintiffs in the suit as appellants. *DHUNNOO SOWDAGUR v. SUNNOO BIBEE* 15 W. R. 106

See *JUDOPATTEE CHATTERJEE v. CHUNDER KANT BHATTACHARJEE* 9 W. R. 311

22. ————— *Purchaser of right, title, and interest in suit.* The purchaser of the right, title, and interest of a defendant in a suit in and to the land the subject-matter of that suit, has no right as such to appeal from a decree passed against the defendant. *GAJADHAR PRASAD v. GANESH TEWARI* 7 B. L. R. 149; 15 W. R. 485

23. ————— *Right of purchaser on death of assignee.* A sued B in the Court of first instance, and obtained a decree declaring A's right to a house. The District Court on appeal reversed this decree, and rejected A's claim. The High Court reversed the decree of the District Court, and remanded the appeal. The District Court on remand made a decree confirming the original decree of the Court of first instance in A's favour. Subsequently to the last-mentioned decree of the District Court, B sold the house to C. B then preferred a special appeal to the High Court, but died before it was heard. *Held*, under Act VIII of 1859, that C could not carry on the special appeal after B's death. *MORESHVAR BAPUJI PHATAK v. KUSHABA SHANKROJI* I. R. L. 2 Bom. 248

24. ————— *Purchase of right of appeal—Effect of, as to liability for costs in lower Court—Speculative purchase, policy of.* Where the rights and interests of the plaintiff in a suit which was dismissed were purchased by third parties who filed an appeal in which they described themselves as plaintiffs-appellants, together with the original plaintiffs, and the original decree was confirmed with costs:—*Held*, that the purchasers took the position of plaintiffs, with all the risk and liabilities of plaintiffs from the commencement, including liability for all costs awarded against the plaintiffs generally without limitation. *Quere*: Ought the speculative purchase of a right of appeal to be recognized by a Court of Justice? *TROYLOCKHONATH BANERJEE v. BRINDABUN CHUNDER SIKKAR CHOWDHURY* 18 W. R. 438

25.—*Letters Patent, Art. 15—Refusal to order assignee of plaintiff to be brought on record—Appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 372—Application to be brought on record in substitution for*

ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSE IN ACTION —*concl.*

plaintiff, and for postponement of decree. An order dismissing on its merits an application by the assignee of a plaintiff in a suit, to be brought upon the record either in addition to or in substitution for the plaintiff, is a judgment within the meaning of Art. 15 of the Letters Patent, and an appeal lies therefrom. The plaintiff in a suit, after its institution, assigned to A the subject-matter of the suit and gave him power and authority to continue it either in addition to or in substitution for the plaintiff, and further constituted A his attorney. The suit was referred to a Judge in Chambers to take accounts, and a certificate was agreed to by the first defendant in it, which left certain matters undetermined. The case was set down for hearing in order that a decree might be passed in terms of the certificate. A thereupon applied to be brought on the record in addition to or in substitution for the plaintiff in the suit, and asked that the passing of a final decree therein might be postponed until the matters left undetermined by the certificate had been inquired into and determined. *Held*, that the application was a reasonable one and should be complied with, as A was directly interested in the matters to be settled by the decree. *COMMERCIAL BANK OF INDIA v. SABJU SAHEB* (1900)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 252

26.—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244—Suit by assignee of decree for declaration of validity of assignment—Maintainability.* A suit lies at the instance of the assignee of a decree for a declaration as to the validity of his assignment. The amendment of s. 244 by s. 26 of Act VII of 1888 has not taken away this right. *Raman v. Muppil Nayar*, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 478, referred to *BOMMANAPATI VEERAPA v. CHINTAKUNTA SRINIVASA RAU* (1902) I. L. R. 26 Mad. 264

ASSIGNMENT OF DEBT.

—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 130—Direction to pay, endorsed on instrument, amounts to assignment.* A direction in writing to pay the amount due on an instrument, endorsed on such instrument by the payee thereof, coupled with the delivery of the instrument so endorsed to the person to whom payment is directed, is an assignment of such document within the meaning of s. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act. *Brandts, Sons & Co. v. Dunlop Rubber Company, Limited* [1904] 1 K. B. 387, distinguished. *RAMA IYEN v. VENKATACHELLAM PATER* (1906) I. L. R. 30 Mad. 75

ASSIGNMENT OF EXECUTORY CONTRACT.

See ASSIGNMENT I. L. R. 33 Calc. 702

ASSOCIATION.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 110 (f)
13 C. W. N. 244

—illegal—

See COMPANY—FORMATION AND REGISTRATION . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 31, 200
I. L. R. 20 Mad. 68

ASSOCIATION—concl.

—registration of—

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See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—BREACH OF AGREEMENT

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 550

—with bad characters—

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13 C. W. N. 318

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I. L. R. 19 Mad. 85

ASURA MARRIAGE.

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23.
I. L. R. 32 Mad. 185

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See REPRESENTATIVE . 11 C. W. N. 438

ATTACHMENT.

Col.

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 - (b) BOOKS OF ACCOUNT . . . 754
 - (c) BUILDING AND HOUSE MATERIALS . . . 754
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See CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY BY SHEBAIT . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 364

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3 B. L. R. A. C. 413 : 12 W. R. 329
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I. L. R. 29 Bom. 259

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—alienation during attachment—

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PARTIES TO SUIT
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—effect of—

See HINDU LAW . I. L. R. 32 Mad. 429

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5 C. W. N. 391

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PROFITS . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 540

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9 C. W. N. 125

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—of property—

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6 C. W. N. 382

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13 C. W. N. 601

—warrant of—

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I. L. R. 29 All. 272

—whether subsisting—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 278
. . . I. L. R. 31 All. 367

I. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT.

(a) ANNUITY OR PENSION.

1. ——— Annuity charged on estate—
Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 265. An annuity,
the payment of which is a charge upon an estate, is
property which can be attached under the provisions
of s. 205, Act VIII of 1859, at the instance of the
person who has inherited the estate from the grantor
of the annuity and by whom the annuity is payable
DHERAJ MAHTAB CHAND v. DHUN COOMARU
BIBEE 17 W. R. 254

2. ——— Stipends allowed to Mysore
Princes. The stipends allowed by Government to
the members of the Mysore family cannot be
attached. MAHOMED KUZULBASH v. MAHOMED
BUSEEROODEEN 7 W. R. 169

3. ——— Pay of Carnatic Stipendiary
—*Mad. Reg. IV of 1831—Act XXIII of 1838.*
The stipend of a Carnatic stipendiary is not liable
to attachment in execution of a decree obtained
against the stipendiary, it being one of the descrip-
tions of personal grants expressly protected from at-
tachment in satisfaction of any decree or order of
a Court by s. 3, Regulation IV of 1831, extended by

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(a) ANNUITY OR PENSION—*contd.*

Act XXIII of 1838. These enactments were not impliedly repealed by ss. 205 and 237 of the Code of Civil Procedure. MAHOMED ABDUL VAKAB SAHIB v. COMANDUR RAMA SAMY AIYENGAR

4 Mad. 277

4. ——— Allowance charged on estate—*Annuity—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 205.* Where a deed is executed stipulating the grant of a regular maintenance payable from the grantor's estate, and recoverable, in the event of non-payment, from that estate, the allowance so granted is property which can be attached under the provisions of s. 205, Act VIII of 1859. ENAET HOSSEIN v. NUJEEBOONISSA BEGUM . . . 11 W. R. 138

5. ——— Political pension—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 266, sub-s. (g)—Payments due under the Oudh loans of 1838 and 1842—Exemption from liability to attachment for debt.* Although it is probable that the enactments of s. 266, Civil Procedure Code, 1882, were not meant to cover pensions payable by a foreign State when remitted for payment to their pensioners in India, they certainly include all pensions of a political nature payable directly by the Government of India. A pension guaranteed payable by the latter by a treaty obligation contracted with another sovereign power is in the strictest sense a political pension. An allowance, payable by the Government of India under an arrangement made between the King of Oudh and the Governor General in 1842 for the benefit of members of the King's family and household, and their respective heirs in perpetuity and payable to one of such heirs, who has inherited it, as his share in the interest in the Oudh loan of 1842, is a political pension within the meaning of s. 266, sub-s. (g), Civil Procedure Code, 1882. The arrangement of 1842 cannot be treated as merely a provision out of the King's private estate for the maintenance of members of his family, there having been in a State like that of Oudh no distinction between State property and private property vested in the sovereign. BISHAMBAR NATH v. IMDAD ALI KHAN

I. L. R. 18 Cal. 216

L. R. 17 I. A. 181

6. ——— Arrears of yeomiah pension—*Suit against representatives of yeomiahdar.* Arrears of yeomiah pension due to the estate of a deceased yeomiahdar, which have accidentally accumulated, are not subject to attachment in satisfaction of a decree of a Civil Court obtained against the representatives of the yeomiahdar. ANONYMOUS CASE . . . 5 Mad. 371

7. ——— Tora garas hak—*Pensions Act, s. 11.* A tora garas hak is not exempted from attachment under a decree of a Civil Court by s. 11 of the Pensions Act of 1871. SECRETARY OF STATE v. KHEMCHAND JEYCHAND I. L. R. 4 Bom. 432

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(a) ANNUITY OR PENSION—*contd.*

8. ——— Arrears of pension due—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 266—Saleable property.* In case of pensions not exempted from attachment under s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), it is only arrears in respect thereof actually accrued due that are attachable in execution of a decree. TUFFUZZOOL HOSSEIN v. RUGHONATH PERSHAD, 14 Moo. I. A. 49: 7 B. L. R. 186, cited and followed. BHOYRUB CHUNDER ROY v. MADHUB CHUNDER SEN . . . 6 C. L. R. 19

9. ——— Gratuity—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 266 (g)—Liability to attachment in execution of decree.* The bar in s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code to the attachment of gratuities allowed by Government to its ex-servants, military and civil, is not limited to such gratuities as are allowed to "pensioners," but applies to a gratuity granted in consideration of past services. BAWAN DAS v. MUL CHAND . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 173

10. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 266—*Liability to attachment—Gift—Delivery—Act IV of 1882 (Transfer of Property Act), s. 123—Act IX of 1872 (Contract Act), s. 90.* K, a servant in the employment of the East Indian Railway Company, was recommended, by the Traffic Manager, a bonus in consideration of long and good services. This recommendation was sanctioned, and the amount of the bonus was received by the District Paymaster. Before payment to K, the money was attached in execution of a decree obtained against him by J. Held, that, inasmuch as the bestowal of the money was a gift of moveable property of date subsequent to the 1st July 1882, and was not evidenced by a registered instrument, it could only be effected by actual delivery; that as there had been no such delivery as completed the transfer (s. 123 of the Transfer of Property Act and s. 90 of the Contract Act), the money was not at K's disposal, and he could not have enforced payment; and that the money was therefore not liable to attachment in execution of a decree against him. JANKI DAS v. EAST INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY.

I. L. R. 6 All. 634

11.—Annuity to vendor—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 266—Execution of decree—Annuity payable to vendor by vendee of immovable property.* Held, that, where a person made over property to the Court of Wards, partly in consideration of a present payment, and partly in consideration of an annuity payable to the vendor, such annuity was property of the vendor which was capable of being attached in execution of a decree against the vendor. HARI-DAS ACHARJIA v. BARODA KISHORE ACHARJIA, I. L. R. 27 Cal. 38, and MANISWAR DAS v. BABOO BIR PERTAB SAHU, 6 B. L. R. 646, referred to. SYUD TUFFUZZOOL HOSSEIN KHAN v. RUGHONATH PERSHAD, 14 Moo. I. A. 40, distinguished. HARSHANKAR PRASAD SINGH v. BAIJNATH DAS (1901) I. L. R. 23 All. 164

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(a) ANNUITY OR PENSION—*concl'd.*

12.—Political pension—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 266 (g)*—Fund representing political pension due at date of pensioner's death, but unpaid—*Liability to attachment.* A person to whom a political pension was being paid died; and at the date of his decease a sum of money was due to him in this respect, but remained, unpaid, in the hands of the Collector of the district. On an attempt being made to attach the fund in execution proceedings: *Held*, that the character of the fund remained unchanged so long as it remained unpaid in the hands of the Government, irrespective of whether the intended beneficiary were alive or dead; and that the fund was not liable to attachment. *VALIA THAMBURATTI v. ANUJANI KUNHUNNI (1902)* **I. L. R. 26 Mad. 69**

13.—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 266 (g)*—*Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871), s. 11*—Attachment of pension payable to descendants of reigning family in Ceylon—*Pensions payable in British India—Validity of attachment.* Certain descendants of the family which formerly reigned in Ceylon resided in British India, where the Collector of the district, on behalf of the Government of India, paid them pensions. Apparently, though this was not proved, the cost of these pensions was ultimately defrayed by the Government of Ceylon. These pensions were attached in execution of certain decrees. Upon application being made by the pensioners to have the attachments set aside: *Held*, that the pensions were exempt from attachment, as being "political pensions" within the meaning of s. 266 (g). *Per Sir ARNOLD WHITE, C.J.* If the Government of India were to be regarded as merely the agent of the Ceylon Government for the purpose of paying the pensions, the Courts of British India would have no jurisdiction to proceed by way of attachment, since the rights of the pensioners (assuming them to be enforceable at law) would only be enforceable in Ceylon. *Ghamsham Lal v. Bhansali, I. L. R. 5 Bom. 249*, and *Bishambar Nath v. Indad Ali Khan, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 216*, referred to. *MUTHUSAMI NAIDU v. ALAGIA MANAVALA SIMMALA RAJA (1902)*

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 423

14.—*Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871), ss. 4, 11*—Grant made to compensate for resumption of rent-free land—Attachment, liability to—Execution. A grant of an annual sum made by Government as a compensation for loss sustained by the grantee on account of improper resumption by Government of rent-free lands formerly belonging to the grantee is not a pension within the meaning of s. 11 of the Pensions Act and is liable to attachment. *The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hem Chand Jey Chand, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 432*, followed. *JIBAN KRISHNA GHOSH v. SRIPATI CHURN DEY (1904)*

3 C. W. N. 665

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

(b) BOOKS OF ACCOUNT.

15.—Account Books. Books of account cannot be attached in execution of a decree. *In re PESTANJI CURSETJI* **3 Bom. O. C. 42**

ADJODHYA PERSHAD v. MIDDLETON, COHEN & Co. **3 N. W. 334**

16.—*Order for production in Court by Court executing decree.* Although a Court will not allow account books to be attached and brought to sale as mere waste paper, yet to prevent a judgment-debtor from making away with his books and defeating a decree-holder, it will be competent to a Court executing a decree, if execution is applied for by attachment of debts, to require the judgment-debtor to produce his books in Court and leave them in the custody of the Court. *ADJODHYA PERSHAD v. MIDDLETON, COHEN & Co.*

3 N. W. 334

(c) BUILDING AND HOUSE MATERIALS.

17.—Materials of house—Property specifically mortgaged—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 266.* S. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), prov. (c), does not prohibit the sale of property specifically mortgaged, albeit that the property be materials of a house belonging to or occupied by an agriculturist. *BHAGVANDAS v. HATHIBHAI* **I. L. R. 4 Bom. 25**

18.—Building materials—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 266, cl. (c), and Explanation (a) and s. 295*—Attachment and sale of building materials—Rateable distribution of proceeds of sale. By cl. (c) of s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), an ordinary judgment creditor is precluded from attaching or selling the materials of house or other building belonging to his judgment-debtor, but by *Explan. (a)* of the same section, this prohibition does not extend to a creditor whose decree is for rent. *Held*, that ss. 266 and 295 must be read together, and that an ordinary judgment-creditor is not entitled, under s. 295, to a rateable proportion of the assets realized by the sale of such house or building, under a decree obtained by another creditor for rent due to him in respect of the said house or building. *MANIKLAL VENTILAL v. LAKHA*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 429

19.—Houses and buildings occupied by agriculturists—Representative of an agriculturist—Exemption from attachment and sale—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 266, cl. (c).* The expression "materials of houses and other buildings belonging to and occupied by agriculturists" used in s. 266, cl. (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, is intended to exempt from attachment and sale the house dwelt in by an agriculturist as such and the farm buildings appended to such dwelling. The exemption does not extend to other houses not in the physical occupation of an agriculturist owner as a dwelling appropriate or convenient for his calling. The

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(c) BUILDING¹ AND HOUSE² MATERIALS—*contd.*

exemption extends, after the death of an agriculturist debtor, to his representative, who occupies the house in good faith as an agriculturist, and who does not take it up merely with the view of defrauding his creditor. *RADHAKISAN HAKUMJI v. BALVANT RAMJI* . . . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 530

20. ——— Execution against bhag—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 266 (c)—Building site—Agriculturist bhagdar—Bhagdari Act (Bom. Act V of 1862)—Decree.* A, having obtained a decree against B, who was a bhagdar, attached his bhag in execution, including the gabhan or site upon which B's house was built. B applied to have the attachment removed from the gabhan on the ground that he was an agriculturist, and that, therefore, the gabhan of his house was protected from attachment by cl. (c) of s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Held*, that the gabhan was subject to attachment, and was not protected by the above clause. B did not hold as an agriculturist. He could not have occupied the house except as a bhagdar, and it was as part of a bhag that the site was attached. The protection of s. 266, cl. (c), was intended for agriculturists in the strictest sense, and for agriculturists in that sole character. *JIVAN BHAGA v. HIRA BHAIJI* . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 363

21. ——— *Bhagdari Act (Bombay Act V of 1862), ss. 1, 3, and 5—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 662 (c)—Bhagdari village—Bhag—"Homestead," meaning of.* *Per FARRAN, C.J., and JARDINE, PARSONS, and RANADE, JJ.* The superstructure of a house belonging to a bhag in a bhagdari village is exempt from attachment under the provisions of the Bhagdari Act (Bombay Act V of 1862). *Per CANDY, J.* Having regard to the decision in *Pranjivan v. Jaishankar*, 4 Bom. A. C. 46, and the object of the Bhagdari Act, it is doubtful whether the Legislature intended to exempt from attachment the materials of a house belonging to a bhag. *COLLECTOR OF BROACH v. VENILAL KESHAVBHAI* . . . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 588

(d) DEBTS.

22. ——— Proclamation as to nature and value of property—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 268, 278, 287.* A decree-holder, by a prohibitory order issued under s. 268 of the Civil Procedure Code, attached a debt due to his judgment-debtor. The person served with the order applied under s. 278 to have the attachment removed. *Held*, that the application could not be entertained under s. 278, that section having no application to the case; but that, before issuing a proclamation of sale in execution of a decree of the debt so attached, it is the duty of the Court, under s. 287 of the Code, to ascertain all that the Court considers it material for the intending purchaser to know in order to

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(d) DEBTS—*contd.*

judge of the nature and value of the property proclaimed for sale. If the property of which sale is sought is a debt, and the Court receives notice from the alleged debtor that no debt exists, the Court should satisfy itself as to the existence or otherwise of the debt, and, if it comes to the conclusion that no debt exists, should abstain from proceeding to sale. *HARILAL AMTHABHAI v. ABHESANG MERU* . . . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 323

23. ——— Right and interest of vendor in purchase-money—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 266—Vendor and purchaser.* The right or interest which the vendor of immoveable property has in the purchase-money, where it has been agreed that the same shall be paid on the execution of the conveyance, is not, so long as the conveyance has not been executed, a debt, but a merely possible right or interest, and as such, under s. 266 of Act X of 1877, is not liable to attachment and sale in the execution of a decree. The person who purchases such a right or interest at a sale in the execution of a decree takes nothing by his purchase. *AHMAD-UD-DIN KHAN v. MAJLIS RAI* . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 12

24. ——— Claims over which British Courts have no jurisdiction—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 266—Subject of the Gaikwar—Subject of a Kathiawar State—Rajkot.* Debts due to a British subject by the Gaikwar Government or by a subject of that Government or of a State in the province of Kathiawar are not debts which, under s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877), are liable to attachment in execution of a decree. Claims over which no Court in British India has jurisdiction are not debts liable to be attached under s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877). The mere circumstance that the garnishee is at the time of the application for attachment beyond the limits of British India would not of itself render the debts not liable to be attached. *GHANSHAMLAL v. BHANSALI* . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 249

25. ——— Debt secured by mortgage of immoveable property—*Civil Procedure Code (X of 1877), s. 266.* A debt secured by mortgage of immoveable property cannot be sold in execution of a decree under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code applicable to moveable property. *SRINATH DUTT v. GOPAL CHUNDER MITRA* . . . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 511 : 12 C. L. R. 445

26. ——— Debt creating charge on immoveable property—*Interest in immoveable property—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 266.* Where a judgment-debtor is entitled to a debt secured by a collateral hypothecation of land and the decree-holder attaches and sells the judgment-debtor's interest in the bond, such interest is immoveable property for the purpose of attachment and sale under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. *Per TURNER, C.J.—Quære:* Whether the decree-holder could not sell the debt apart from the

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(d) DEBTS—*contd.*

security as moveable property. *APPASAMI v. SCOTT* . . . I. L. R. 9 Mad. 5

27. — Attachment of debt—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 268*—Payment of debt attached out of Court. Where a debt, which had been attached under s. 268 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was paid out of Court to the only person who, had the money due been paid into Court as required by the terms of the said section, would have been entitled to withdraw the said money from Court, and such payment was certified to the Court, it was held that this amounted to a sufficient compliance with the requirements of s. 268. *FIDA HUSAIN v. MAULA BAKHSHE* . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 145

28. — Attachment of maintenance allowance—*Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), s. 266*—Meaning of the word "debt"—Attachment in execution of decree—Prohibitory order. The word "debt" in s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code means an actually existing debt, that is, a perfected and absolute debt, not merely a sum of money which may or may not become payable at some future time or the payment of which depends upon contingencies which may or may not happen. When, therefore, A is bound under a deed to pay to B a monthly maintenance allowance during the lifetime of the latter, there cannot be a valid attachment of any portion of the allowance by a prohibitory order issued to A of a date anterior to the time when the same falls due to B. *HARIDAS ACHARJIA CHOWDHRY v. BARODA KISHORE ACHARJIA CHOWDHRY* . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 38
4 C. W. N. 87

29. — Attachment of partnership debt—*Execution of decree*. An uncertain sum which may or may not be payable by one member to another of a partnership, not shown to have been wound up, cannot be attached or sold in execution of a decree. *DWARIKA MOHUN DAS v. LUKHIMONI DASI* . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 384

30. — Attachment of a debt due to a judgment-debtor—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 268, 284, 301*—Sale of debt—Payment into Court—Prohibitory order. A decree-holder by a prohibitory order made under s. 268 (a) of the Civil Procedure Code attached a debt due to his judgment-debtor. The debt was not paid into Court. Held, that the Court cannot, under s. 268 of the Code of Civil Procedure, call on a person subject to a prohibitory order to pay or show cause why he should not pay his debt into Court. The Court is bound to satisfy itself that a debt is due; the debt must then be sold and delivery made under ss. 284 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *SIRIAH v. MUCKANACHARY* . . . I. L. R. 10 Mad. 194

31. — Attachment by a judgment-creditor of a debt due to judgment-debtor by a third party—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 267, 268, and 503*—*Execution—Practice—Gar-*

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(d) DEBTS—*contd.*

nishee—Order upon third party to pay where debt admitted—*Procedure where existence of debt not admitted*. When a debt alleged to be due by a third party to a judgment-debtor has been attached by the judgment-creditor, the Court may, under s. 268 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), make an order upon the garnishee for the payment of such debt to the judgment-creditor in case the former admits it to be due to the judgment-debtor. Where, however, the garnishee denies the debt, there is no other course open to the judgment-creditor than to have it sold, or to have a receiver appointed under s. 503 of the Code. *TOOLSA GOOLAL v. ANTONE* . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 448

32. — Order prohibiting creditor from recovering debt—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 268 (a)*—*Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 15*—*Injunction or order staying a suit*. S. 268, cl. (a), of the Civil Procedure Code does not mean that while a debt is under attachment, the person to whom the debt was originally owing should be barred from bringing a suit in respect of it. What it prohibits is the recovery of the debt, and the payment of it by the debtor to the creditor. *Semble*: An order of attachment under s. 268 of the Civil Procedure Code is not an injunction or order staying a suit within the meaning of s. 15 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). *SHIB SINGH v. SITA RAM*
I. L. R. 13 All. 76

33. — Debt of which the amount is unascertained—*Principal and agent—Vendor and purchaser—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 266*. Where money is due by an agent or vendee to his principal or vendor, the principal's or vendor's claim against his agent or vendee may be attached and sold in execution of a decree against the principal or vendor as a debt under s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and it is not necessary that the exact amount due to the principal or vendor should be ascertained prior to attachment and sale. *Tuff-uzzool Hossain Khan v. Rughoonath Pershad*, 7 B. L. R. 186: 14 Moo. I. A. 40, *Tokai Sherob v. Davod Mullick Fureedoon Beglar*, 6 Moo. I. A. 510, *Abbott v. Abbott and Crump*, 5 B. L. R. 382 and *Hill v. Boyle*, L. R. 4 Ex. 260, considered. *MADHO DAS v. RAMJI PATAK*
I. L. R. 16 All. 286

34. — Money payable to auctioneer—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 266*—*Execution of decree—Attachment of money payable to an auctioneer by purchasers of goods sold by him at auction*. Held, that money payable to an auctioneer by purchasers of goods entrusted to him for auction could not be attached by the creditors of the auctioneer, except as to such an amount as the judgment-debtor had a disposing power over which he could exercise for his own benefit; and further, that, if such money was attached the auctioneer was a proper person to raise the objection that it was not attachable

ATTACHMENT—contd.**1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—contd.****(d) DEBTS—concl'd.**

under s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure. **SMITH v. ALLAHABAD BANK (1901) I. L. R. 23 All. 135**

35. ——— Mortgage-debt—Mortgage—Mortgage debt, nature of—Movable or immoveable property—Mode of attaching and selling a Mortgage-debt in execution—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 268, 274—Effect of sale of mortgage-debt in execution. A mortgage-debt is movable property within the meaning of s. 268 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), and its sale in execution by public auction carries with it the right to proceed against the mortgaged property, even though there may have been no attachment and sale under s. 274 of the Code. Where a mortgage-debt had been attached in execution under s. 268 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), and sold under s. 297: **Held**, that the Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the sale. **TARVADI BHOLANATH HARISHANKER v. BAI KASHI (1901) I. L. R. 26 Bom. 305**

(e) DECREES.

36. ——— “Other property”—Act VIII of 1859, s. 205—Decree. A decree of Court fell within the description of “other property” in s. 205 of the Civil Procedure Code, and was, therefore, liable to attachment, which should be made under s. 237. **GHOLAM MAHOMED v. INDRA CHAND JAHURI . 7 B. L. R. 318; 15 W. R. 34**

37. ——— Immoveable property—Execution of decree, sale in. A decree is held to be part of a judgment-debtor's effects, and not to fall under the head of immoveable property. **BUNSHEE-MOHUN DOSS v. HUROCHUNDER DOSS CHOWDHURY W. R. 1864, Mis. 28**

38. ——— Decree for mesne profits—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 233—Decree for money—Attachment pending ascertainment of mesne profits. A decree for mesne profits to be ascertained in execution is a decree for money within the meaning of s. 232, Act VIII of 1859; and there is no irregularity in the decree-holder applying for attachment of the judgment-debtor's property pending the ascertainment of the mesne profits. **SHARODA MOYEE BURMONEE v. WOOMA MOYEE BURMONEE 8 W. R. 9**

39. ——— Decree for money obtained by judgment-debtor—Debt—Civil Procedure Code (1877), (1882), ss. 266, 273. A decree for money obtained by a judgment-debtor is not a debt which by virtue of s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure, can be attached and sold. Where a decree-holder desires to render a decree obtained by his judgment-debtor available for the satisfaction of his own decree, the procedure laid down by s. 273 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be followed. **TIRUVENGADA CHARI v. VYTHILINGA PILLAI I. L. R. 6 Mad. 418**

ATTACHMENT—contd.**1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—contd.****(e) DECREES—contd.**

40. ——— Money-decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 273. **Held**, that Act X of 1877, does not contemplate the sale of a decree for money as the result of its attachment in the execution of a decree, and the attachment of a decree for money in the mode ordained in s. 273 cannot lead to its sale. **Held**, also, that the last clause but one of s. 273 applies to other than money-decrees. Where two decrees for money, although they were not passed by the same Court, were being executed by the same Court:—**Held**, that the provisions of the first clause of s. 273 of Act X of 1877 were applicable on principle. **SULTAN KUAR v. GULJARI LAL I. L. R. 2 All. 290**

41. ——— “Saleable property”—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 266 and 273—Adjustment of decree after attachment. The particular procedure prescribed by s. 273 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) is clearly confined to money-decrees, and therefore such decrees cannot be sold after being attached; all other decrees are both attachable and saleable as “saleable property” under s. 266 of the Code. A decree being attached as directed by s. 273 of the Civil Procedure Code, its adjustment subsequent to such attachment cannot be recognized by the Court. **GOPAL NANASHT v. JOHARIMAL DADA BALSHT v. JOHARIMAL. I. L. R. 16 Bom. 522**

42. ——— Sale of decree for money—Suit in forma pauperis—Court-fees recoverable by Government—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 273, 284, 411—Execution of decree, Mode of. Where a plaintiff suing in *forma pauperis* obtained a decree for money, and the Collector, in pursuance of an order made in his favour at the time when such decree was passed, attached it under s. 273 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and subsequently sold the same under s. 284: **Held**, upon the application of the decree-holder for execution of his decree, that the provisions of s. 273 did not contemplate the sale of a decree for money, but they showed in what manner the attachment of decrees should be made available on behalf of the attaching person. **Sultan Koer v. Gulzari Lal, I. L. R. 2 All. 290, and Tiruvengada Chari v. Vythilinga Pillai, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 418, followed. Semble:** The provisions of s. 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not justify the Court in selling a decree upon the application of the Collector, inasmuch as that section provides that persons who have been successful as paupers shall, so far as the subject-matter of their success is concerned, be liable to satisfy out of what they recover the amount of the fees which have been for a time, pending the decision of their suit, remitted to them. **JOTINDRO NATH CHOWDHURY v. DWARKA NATH DEY I. L. R. 20 Calc. 111**

43. ——— Decree for possession of land—Immoveable property. A decree for possession

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(e) DECREES—*contd.*

of land is of the nature of immoveable property, and a Judge has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of a lower Court setting aside the sale of such a decree. *MOBKONISSA v. DEWAN ALI*

4 W. R. Mis. 22

44. ———— Decree for redemption—*Mode of attachment—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 273, 274, 316—Sale of a decree for redemption. S. 273 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877) having expressly provided a mode for the attachment of decrees, the procedure laid down in s. 274 relating to immoveable property has no application to the attachment of a decree for redemption. NAIGAR TIMAPA v. BHASKAR PARMAYAI*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 444

45. ———— Attachment of decree of Revenue Court in execution of a Civil Court decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 266, 268, 273. Held, that though a decree of a Court of Revenue is not liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court under s. 273 of the Civil Procedure Code, such decree stands in the position of an ordinary debt, and may be dealt with under s. 268 of the Code. Onkar Singh v. Bhup Singh, I. L. R. 16 All. 496, and Gholam Mahomed v. Indra Chand Jahuri, 7 B. L. R. 318, referred to. Takiya Begam v. Siraj-ud-daula, Weekly Notes, All. (1885) 123, and Sultan Kuar v. Gulzari Lal, I. L. R. 2 All. 290, distinguished. AULIA BIBI v. ABU JAFAR I. L. R. 21 All. 405*

46. ———— Money-decree—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 273—Decree for dissolution of partnership—Money decree—Execution of money-decree—Attachment of decree for dissolution of partnership. Certain creditors of a partnership obtained a money-decree against the firm. In execution of their decree they sought to attach and sell a decree for the dissolution of the firm and for the taking of the accounts of the partners and for the incidental reliefs requisite in such decrees, including the appointment of a receiver and a direction to pay the debts of the firm. Held, that the decree for dissolution could so far be regarded as a money-decree, and could therefore be attached, but not sold. The proper remedy in such cases is by proceedings under s. 273 of the Civil Procedure Code. SIDLINGAPPA BIN IRAPPA v. SHANKARAPPA BIN KARIBASAPPA (1903) I. L. R. 27 Bom. 556*

47. ———— Civil Procedure Code, s. 23. A decree upon a mortgage is not a money-decree within the provisions of s. 273, Civil Procedure Code. *E. R. Macnaghten v. Surja Prasad Misra, 4 C. W. N. xxxv, followed. BAJI NATH LOHEA v. BINOYENDRA NATH PALIT (1901)*

6 C. W. N. 5

48. ———— Execution of decree—Attachment—Decree for money—Decree for sale of mortgaged property. A decree for

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(e) DECREES—*conclld.*

the sale of immoveable property under s. 88 of the Transfer of Property Act is not a decree for the payment of money or a decree for money, and is therefore liable to attachment and sale under the penultimate clause of s. 273 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Takiya Begam v. Siraj-ud-daula, Weekly Notes (1885) 123, overruled. Abdullah v. Doctor Oosman, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 244, dissented from. Sultan Kuar v. Gulzari Lal, I. L. R. 2 All. 290, Ram Charan Bhagat v. Sheobarat Rai, I. L. R. 16 All. 418, Barhma Din v. Baji Lal, I. L. R. 26 All. 91, Shyam Sundar v. Mahammad Ihtisham Ali, I. L. R. 27 All. 501, Jogul Kishore v. Cheda Lal, Weekly Notes (1893) 184, Gopal Nana Shet v. Johari Mal valad Jitaji, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 522, MacNaghten v. Surja Prasad Misra, 4 C. W. N. xxxv, and Baji Nath v. Binoyendra Nath, 6 C. W. N. 5, referred to. DELHI AND LONDON BANK v. PARTAB SINGH (1906) I. L. R. 28 All. 771*

49. ———— Existence of decree at time of attachment necessary to make it valid. An attachment in execution, whether made by the Court which passed the decree or by the Court to which such decree had been transferred for execution, is null and void, if at the time of attachment the decree had been set aside and was non-existent; and a renewed decree, in the same terms as the original decree, passed subsequently will not validate it. *CHETTIATIL MUHAMOD v. KUNHI KORU (1905)*

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 175

50. ———— Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 316—Attachment of decree after sale but before confirmation—Right of attaching creditor to have sale confirmed. When a person who had obtained a decree purchased immoveable property at an auction-sale held in execution of the same, but before the sale was confirmed and satisfaction of the decree entered in the record, the decree was attached by a judgment-creditor of the decree-holder. *Held, that the effect of the attachment was to place the attaching creditor in the position of the decree-holder so as to entitle him to have the sale confirmed under s. 316, Civil Procedure Code and to take out a certificate of sale. BOHARIA RUDRANI KOER v. RAM PERTAB MULL (1906)*

11 C. W. N. 158

(f) EQUITY OF REDEMPTION.

51. ———— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 266 and 274—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 60—Immoveable property. The equity of redemption of the mortgagor is in moveable property, and is, as such, liable to be attached and sold in execution of a decree under s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). Its attachment can be effected under s. 274 of the Code by an

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(f) EQUITY OF REDEMPTION—*concl'd.*

order prohibiting the judgment-debtor from dealing with it in any way and all persons from receiving it, such order being proclaimed and notified as therein directed. *PARASHRAM HARLAL v. GOVIND GANESH PORGAUMKAR*

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 226

(g) EXPECTANCY.

52. ————— *Quære*: Whether a mere expectancy is liable to attachment and sale in execution of decree. *DOOLI CHAND v. BRIJ BHUKAN LAL AWASTI* . . . 6 C. L. R. 528
10 C. L. R. 61

53. ————— Sum to be paid in future—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 205*. A sum receivable by way of assignment is not liable to be attached and sold in execution of decree. *SHAM CHUNDER BABOO v. TEELUCK CHUNDER BABOO*

2 Hay 142

54. ————— Claim under pending award—*Property, definition of*. Under s. 205 of the *Civil Procedure Code*, sums to be attached must not be inchoate, but existing and definite; and although liquidated demands in their nature definite and certain, though *sub lite* and unproved may be seized, a mere expectancy or a mere right of suit cannot be attached; the attachment must operate at the time of attachment, and not be anticipatory, so as to fasten on some future state of property in which the suit may result. A claim which may accrue under a pending award cannot be sold in execution. *TUFFAJAL HOSSEIN KHAN v. RAGHONATH PRASAD*

7 B. L. R. 186 : 14 Moo. I. A. 40

See *BHAICHAND BIN KHEMCHAND v. FULCHAND HARICHAND* . . . 8 Bom. A. C. 150

55. ————— Attachment of future estate—*Execution of decree—Civil Procedure Code, s. 266—Construction, according to Mahomedan law, of grant of such estate*. Previously to a mortgage, a fractional interest in certain property (which interest was purchased by the plaintiff, the mortgagee at a judicial sale) had been the subject of settlement by a Mahomedan on his wife, under the condition that, if he should have no child by her, his two sons by another wife should each have an estate therein. He died without other children. *Held*, that the two sons had taken definite interests capable of being attached within s. 226 of the *Civil Procedure Code*, not being mere expectancies. *UMES CHUNDER SIRCAR v. ZAHUR FATIMA*

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 164

L. R. 17 I. A. 201

56. ————— Expectancy of succession by survivorship—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 266 (k)—Spes successionis*. One S devised a house, which was his self-acquired pro-

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(g) EXPECTANCY—*concl'd.*

perty, to his widow (the defendant), and died leaving a son, V. The will did not give expressly the widow power to dispose of it. The plaintiff, in execution of a decree against V, sought to attach V's interest in the house. The lower Court held that, as the interest taken by the defendant in the house under her husband's will was only a widow's estate, V, as her husband's son, had an interest in the house which might be attached by the plaintiffs. *Held* (reversing the decree), that V had no interest in the house. He had only a *spes successionis*—an expectancy of succession by survivorship, and such a hope or expectancy is not attachable under s. 266 (k) of the *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)*. The entire estate was vested by the testator in the defendant. No doubt, her estate was a widow's estate. Her estate in it closely resembled that of a married woman in England, to whom property is given with a restraint against alienation. That being so, she was unable to dispose of it, but still she was its full owner. The whole property passed to her from the testator. Nothing was left in him. But until she died, it could not be known who would inherit the house. *Anandji Dattatraya v. Chandrabai, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 503*, distinguished. *ANANDIBAI v. RAJARAM CHINTAMAN PETHE* . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 984

57. ————— Future rents and profits of ghatwal—*Decree attachment in execution of—Ghatwali estate—Attachment of future rents and profits—Prohibitory order—Receiver*. Future rents and profits that may become due to a ghatwal cannot, as such, be attached in execution of a decree against him. *Haridas Acharjia Chowdhry v. Baroda Kishore Acharjia Chowdhry, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 38*, followed. *UDOY KUMARI GHATWALI v. HARI RAM SHAHA (1901)* . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 483

(h) IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY CHARGED WITH MAINTENANCE.

58. ————— Immoveable property as signed for maintenance with proviso against alienation—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 266, cl. (l)—Land assigned for maintenance of widow with proviso against alienation—Such land exempt from attachment*. By a deed of assignment the usufruct of certain land was given to a Hindu widow for her maintenance, the deed expressly stipulating that the same was not to be in any way alienated. A judgment-creditor of the widow caused the land to be attached in execution of a money-decree. The widow contended that the land was protected from attachment under s. 266 of the *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)*. Both the lower Courts disallowed the widow's contention. On appeal to the High Court: *Held*, reversing the orders of the lower Courts, that, having regard to the proviso against alienation contained in the deed

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(h) IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY CHARGED WITH MAINTENANCE—*concl'd.*

of assignment, the usufructuary interest in the land assigned to the widow was one over which she had no power of disposal, and, consequently, could not be attached and sold in execution of a money-decree against her. *DIWALI v. APAZI GANESH*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 342

59. ——— Property assigned to Hindu widow in lieu of maintenance—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 266, cl. 1. Held*, that an interest in the income of immoveable property assigned by way of maintenance to a Hindu widow by the members of her family is not capable of being attached and sold in execution of a decree against the widow. *Diwali v. Apaji Ganesh, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 342*, referred to. *GULAB KUAR v. BANSIDHAR*
I. L. R. 15 All. 371

(i) JOINT FAMILY AND REVERSIONARY INTERESTS.

60. ——— Interest of member of joint family—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 205. Quære*: May not the creditor of a member of a joint Hindu family have, under Act VIII of 1859, s. 205, some remedy against the property to which his debtor may be entitled? *KALI PUDO BANERJEE v. CHOITUN PANDAH* . . . 22 W. R. 214

61. ——— Reversionary interest—*Execution of decree. R C D*, a Hindu, died possessed of property, leaving as his heiress his widow, *R D*. He also left four daughters, two of whom died in the lifetime of their mother, each leaving a son. *R D* died, leaving her surviving two daughters, *P D* and *J D*, who succeeded to the estate of *R C D*. *Held*, that *J B*, one of the sons of *J D*, had no such interest in the property as could be attached and sold in execution of a decree against him. *BHOONMOHUN BANERJEE v. THAKOOR DOSS BISWAS* . . . 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 277
15 W. R. F. B. 18 note

62. ——— *Act, VIII of 1859, s. 205—Property, Right of—Interest of Hindu heir expectant on death of widow.* The interest of an heir according to the Hindu law, expectant on the death of a widow in possession, is not property and, therefore, not liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree under s. 205 of Act VIII of 1859. *RAM CHANDRA TANTRA DAS v. DHARMO NARAYAN CHUCKERBUTTY* . . . 7 B. L. R. 341: 15 W. R. F. B. 17

KORAZ KOONWAR v. KOMAL KOONWAR

6 W. R. 34

But see *GAUR HARI DUTT v. RADHA GOBIND SHAHA* . . . 7 B. L. R. 343 note: 12 W. R. 54

63. ——— Interest of grandson in Mitakshara family—*Sale in execution of decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 266—Interest of grandson in ancestral property.* The interest of a grandson in the ancestral property of a joint Hindu

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(i) JOINT FAMILY AND REVERSIONARY INTERESTS—*contd.*

family governed by the Mitakshara law can be attached and sold in execution of a decree. *JOGUL KISHORE v. SHIB SAHAI* . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 430

64. ——— Interest of undivided member of joint family—*Death of judgment-debtor—Avoidance of right of survivorship by the attachment.* In the Madras Presidency, where the interest of an undivided member in the joint property of a Hindu family has been attached in execution of a decree for the personal debt of such member, and the judgment-debtor dies pending attachment, a valid charge is constituted in favour of the judgment-creditor which will prevent the accrual to the other co-parceners of the right of survivorship. *BAILUR KRISHNA RAU v. LAKSHMANA SHANBHOGUE*
I. L. R. 4 Mad. 302

65. ——— Right of son to succeed by survivorship—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 205.* The right of a son to succeed by survivorship to his father's specific share of property cannot be sold in execution of decree, such right being too remote. S. 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which specifies the kinds of property which are liable to attachment and sale in execution of decree, makes no mention of contingent interests. The property must belong at the time to the defendants. *GOOR SURUN DOSS v. RAM SURUN BHUKUT*
8 W. R. 253

66. ——— Son's interest in ancestral estate—*Reversionary rights—Death of son between attachment and sale.* The rights of a Hindu son during his father's lifetime in ancestral property, viz., a right of joint enjoyment thereof under the father's management, and a right of partition under certain circumstances, together with the right of succeeding the father in the management after his death, may be vested rights, and are undoubtedly rights of an incipient proprietary character, but they do not constitute a transferable or inheritable property, and they cannot survive the person in whom they are vested. *GOOR PERSHAD v. SHEODEEN* . . . 4 N. W. 137

67. ——— Property liable to attachment and sale—*Grant to Hindu widow for maintenance for life—Reversionary right of grantor—Act VIII of 1859, s. 205—Civil Procedure Code, s. 266 (k).* One *N*, the sole owner of a certain village, had a son *J*, and *J* had two wives. By his first wife he had a son *U*. *J*'s second wife was *G*, by whom he had a son, whose widow was *K*, the defendant in the suit. *J* died, leaving *U* his son. *G* his widow, and *K* his son's widow, and on his death *U* inherited the village. Prior to the year 1874 *U* had made a gift to *G* of 105 bighas situate in the village. In 1874 the rights and interests of *U* in the village were sold by auction and purchased by *T*, the ancestor of the plaintiffs. *G*, by a deed of gift,

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(i) JOINT FAMILY AND REVERSIONARY INTERESTS
—*concl'd.*

conveyed the 105 bighas to *K*, and ultimately died on 26th January 1883. Plaintiffs then sued to set aside the gift and for possession of the land. The learned Judge found that the land was given to *G* in lieu of her maintenance, which she was to hold rent free for her life, and that she had been in possession thereof for twenty years. Further, that *U* had the right to resume the land and assess it to rent on the death of *G*, and that all the rights and interests of *U* in the land were attached and sold in 1874. On second appeal it was contended that the interest of *U* in the land at the time of the sale of the village by auction was in the nature of a mere expectancy, and therefore could not be sold and was not sold. *Held*, that *U* gave to *G* the usufruct of the land for her life in lieu of her maintenance; that after the gift the interest of *U* in the land was of the same character and carried with it the same consequences as the reversion which the lessor would have for land leased for life or years, and analogous to the right which a mortgagor who had granted a usufructuary mortgage would have; that *U* had a vested right in the land which was capable of being sold, and that right passed to the auction-purchaser at the sale of 1874. *Koraj Koonwar v. Komul Koonwar*, 6 W. R. 34, *Ram Chunder Tanta Doss v. Dhurmo Narain Chukarbally*, 7 B. L. R. 341: 15 W. R. F. B. 17, and *Tuffuzzool Hussain Khan v. Raghu-nath Pershad*, 7 B. L. R. 186: 14 Moo. I. A., 40, distinguished. *KACHWAIN v. SARUP CHAND*
I. L. R. 10 All. 462

68. — *Vested remainder*
— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 266—Attachable interest.* The plaintiff sued to have it declared that a certain house was liable to be attached and sold in execution of a decree obtained by him against the defendant's son. The defendant, who was 80 years of age, claimed the house as her absolute property alleging that her son by a deed had given it to her as a provision for her maintenance. The deed stated that she had been made the owner of the house, that the donor had no right to it, and that it wholly belonged to her. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration prayed for. The surrounding circumstances showed that the house was revertible to the donor on the defendant's death. He had what in English law would be termed a vested remainder on her death, and he had, therefore, a saleable interest during her life. He had an interest which could be attached and sold under s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *ANNAZI DATTATRAYA v. CHANDRABAI*
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 503

69.—The effect of s. 30 of the Insolvent Debtors Act and the analogous provision contained in s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure considered. *NUNNA BRAHMAYYA SETTI v. CHAIDARABOYINA VENKITA-SWAMY* (1902) . . . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 214

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

(j) LETTERS IN POST OFFICE.

70. — *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 272—Post Office Act (XIV of 1866), s. 5—Letters held in trust for judgment-debtor.* An attachment was placed under Civil Procedure Code, s. 272, on letters in the post office addressed to certain judgment-debtors. The day before the attachment the senders of the letters had applied to have the letters returned to them. *Held*, that the post master held the letters in trust for, or on behalf of, the judgment-debtors, and they were accordingly liable to attachment on the application of the decree-holder. *NARASIMHULU v. ADIAPPA*
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 242

(k) MAINTENANCE.

71. — *Right of future maintenance—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 205.* A prospective right of maintenance cannot be attached and a contingency of this kind is not included in Act VIII of 1859, s. 205, as something capable of attachment. *MONESSUR DOSS v. KISHEN PROTAP SHAHEE* . . . 23 W. R. 427

72. — *Act VIII of 1859, ss. 205, 243—Attachment of future maintenance, or "Babooana"—Procedure.* Where a judgment debtor was possessed of a decree entitling him to maintenance from a third party: *Held*, that his judgment-creditor could attach the amount before it accrued due, by prohibitory order forbidding such third party to pay the judgment-debtor, and directing him to pay to such person only as the Court might direct, or an arrangement might be made for the collection or administration, if necessary, of the amount of maintenance. *MANISWAR DAS v. BIR PARTAB SAHU* . . . 6 B. L. R. 646: 15 W. R. 188

73. — *Right to appeal.* A decree-holder cannot attach his judgment-debtor's right to appeal, or his right to future maintenance, nor can the Court prescribe to the decree-holder what course he is to take for the realization of his claim, or what property he is to attach. *BIPRO PROTAP SAHU v. DEO NARAIN ROY*
3 W. R. Mis. 16

KASHESHUREE DEBIA v. GREESH CHUNDER LAHOOREE . . . 6 W. R. Mis. 64

DULOON KOONWAR v. SUNGUM SINGH

7 W. R. 311

CHUKOWREE MISSER v. NUMOODAH KOORER

24 W. R. 5

74. — *Money allowance for maintenance.* *A* was liable to pay *B*, a widow, a monthly allowance for maintenance. *B* obtained a decree against *A* as heir of her husband for a debt of her husband. *Held*, without deciding as to whether a money allowance for maintenance can be attached in execution of a decree, that under the circum-

ATTACHMENT—contd.**1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—contd.****(k) MAINTENANCE—concl'd.**

stances of this case he was not entitled to attach maintenance under the decree. **KOMAREE DABEE v. GREESH CHUNDER LAHOORY**

Marsh. 200 : 1 Hay 583

But arrears of maintenance are capable of being attached as a debt due to a widow in execution of the decree against her. **HOYMOBUTTY DEBIA CHOWDHRAIN v. KOROONA MOYEE DEBIA CHOWDHRAIN**

8 W. R. 41

75. ——— Money allowance charged on land. A Hindu widow's right to maintenance out of lands which belonged to her husband and have devolved on her son is a purely personal right which cannot be sold in execution of a decree or otherwise transferred. **BHOYRUB CHUNDER GHOSE v. NUBO CHUNDER GOHO**

5 W. R. 111

76. ——— Right to monthly allowance in lieu of share of land—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 266, proviso, cl. (i)—Attachment of monthly allowance. A heritable right to receive a certain monthly allowance originally assigned in lieu of a share of landed property is not a mere right to maintenance or anything else exempted by the proviso to s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code, and is saleable in execution of a decree. **SALAMAT HOSSEIN v. LUCKHI RAM**

77. ——— Attachment of maintenance allowance—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 266—Meaning of word "debt". The word "debt" in s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code means an actually existing debt, that is, a perfected and absolute debt, not merely a sum of money which may or may not become payable at some future time or the payment of which depends upon contingencies which may or may not happen. When, therefore, A is bound to pay to B a monthly maintenance allowance during the lifetime of the latter, there cannot be a valid attachment of any portion of the allowance by a prohibitory order issued to A of a date anterior to the time when the same falls due to B. **HARIDAS ACHARJIA CHOWDHRY v. BARODA KISHORE ACHARJIA CHOWDHRY.**

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 38

(l) MESNE PROFITS.

78.—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 235, 273, 583—Execution—Decree for money—Attachment of a right to recover mesne profits by way of restitution. A judgment-debtor was compelled by a decree obtained against him to deliver up possession of certain land. On appeal, the High Court reversed the decree under which he had been dispossessed, and declared him to be entitled to recover possession, with mesne profits. The holder of another decree against the same judgment-debtor attached, in execution of his decree,

ATTACHMENT—contd.**1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—contd.****(l) MESNE PROFITS—concl'd.**

the judgment-debtor's right to recover the mesne profits. The decree-holder then applied under s. 273 of the Code of Civil Procedure to recover the mesne profits by way of execution. *Held*, that he was not entitled to do so. The right of the judgment-debtor to recover the mesne profits by way of restitution was not a decree for money within the meaning of s. 273 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such a right might be enforced by suit or by summary process in execution under s. 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but was not a decree within the meaning of s. 273. S. 273 applies only to cases in which the right attached is one expressly settled by the decree. *Semble*: That if a summary order under s. 583 awarding mesne profits had been made prior to the decree-holder's attachment, it might have amounted to a decree within the meaning of s. 273. **VASUDEVA RAO VARMAN v. NARAYAN PATTAR (1910)**

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 341

(m) OFFERING TO HINDU DEITY.

79.—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 266—"Saleable property"—Right to receive offerings to an idol—"Disposing power" over such offerings—Decree, execution of. Offerings which may in future be made to a Hindu idol cannot be attached in execution of a decree against the idol, the right to receive such offerings not being "saleable property" within the meaning of s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code. **SHOLOJANUND OJHA v. PEARY CHARAN DEY (1902)**

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 470

S.C. ISVAR BOIDYANATH JEO v. PEARY CHURN DEY

6 C. W. N. 728

(n) PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.

80. ——— Share in partnership assets—Act VIII of 1859, s. 205, and ss. 233, 234. A decree-holder, who was also a partner of the judgment-debtor, sought to attach, in execution of his decree, the share of the judgment-debtor in the assets of the partnership business, the business then being in the hands of the Receiver of the Court under a decree for dissolution and winding up. *Held*, that such share of the judgment-debtor was not "property" within the meaning of s. 205 of Act VIII of 1859, and, therefore, not liable to attachment in execution. **ABBOTT v. ABBOTT AND CRUMP**

5 B. L. R. 382

81. ——— Property of partnership. Attachment limited to share of partner—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 233, 234. A decree-holder in execution attached and seized certain property which belonged to the judgment-debtor in partnership with another person, who alone, at the time of attachment, was in actual possession. *Held*, that such property was the subject of attachment in execution of the

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(n) PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY—*concl'd.*

decree against the one partner, but such attachment must be limited to his share, and the attachment should be by prohibitory order, not by actual manual seizure. *THAMA SING v. KALIDAS ROY*
5 B. L. R. 386

82. ———— *Attachment limited to share of partner.* Property belonging to a partnership cannot be seized in execution of a decree against one partner only. Accordingly, where a suit was brought against one partner only and the decree made him alone liable: *Held*, that only his property could be attached in execution of that decree. *KALIMBHAI v. CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS*
I. L. R. 4 Bom. 222

SITARAM v. ATMARAM BAZI
I. L. R. 4 Bom. 227 note

HARIBHAI v. ARDESIR UKADJI
I. L. R. 4 Bom. 229 note

83. ———— *Unascertained interest in a partnership—Right of suit—Civil Procedure Code, s. 266.* In a suit by the purchaser at an execution-sale of the interest of the judgment-debtor in a partnership of which the undivided father (deceased) of the judgment-debtor had been a member against the other partners praying that an account be taken and that the share of the judgment-debtor be paid to him, it was contended that the share in the partnership was not liable to be attached and sold in execution: *Held*, that a share in a partnership could be the subject of attachment under s. 626 of the Civil Procedure Code; that the execution-sale was not bad in law; and that the present suit was accordingly maintainable. *Dwarika Mohun Das v. Luckhmoni Dasi*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 384, dissented from. *PARVATHEESAM v. BAPANNA*.
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 447

84. ———— *Share of partner in partnership business—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 266—Saleable property.* The share of a partner in a partnership business is "saleable property" within the meaning of those words in s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and can therefore be attached and sold by an execution-creditor in execution of a decree against that partner. *Dwarika Mohun Das v. Luckhmoni Dasi*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 384, *Tuffuzzul Hossein Khan v. Raghu Nath Pershad*, 7 B. L. R. 186: 14 Moo. I. A. 40, *Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 198: L. R. 4 I. A. 247, and *Parvatheesam v. Bapanna*, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 447, referred to. *JAGAT CHUNDER ROY v. ISWAR CHUNDER ROY*
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 693

(o) PERISHABLE ARTICLES.

85. ———— *Articles of perishable nature.* Articles of such a perishable nature that they cannot be kept for fifteen days and sold, according

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(o) PERISHABLE ARTICLES—*concl'd.*

to the Civil Procedure Code, ought not to be taken in execution. *SADASHIV MORSEHVAR v. HANSO BIN SHRAVAN*
5 Bom. A. C. 156

(p) PROPERTY AND INTEREST IN PROPERTY OF VARIOUS KINDS.

86. ———— *Service tenure—Interest in property—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 205.* Where a tenant had an hereditary interest in property, paying a small quit-rent for it, and holding it subject only to the duty to the zamindar of furnishing a few men in aid of the regular police:—*Held*, that the interest was a beneficial one, which could be attached and sold by the tenant's creditor. *RAMESSUR NATH SINGH v. GOLAMEE SAHOO*
24 W. R. 309

87. ———— *Ship-owner, interest of, in mortgaged ship—Sale under prior mortgage.* A ship-owner having mortgaged his ship has still an interest in her seizable in attachment under the Civil Procedure Code. An attachment on a vessel in respect of the mortgagor's right and interest does not affect the validity of a sale under a prior mortgage. *AUHN v. AHMED MAHOMED*
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 241

88. ———— *Profits of property.* When a party attaches property, he also attaches the profits thereof. *RAM COOMAR GHOSE v. GOBIND CHUNDER SANDYAL*
12 W. R. 391
RAM COOMAR GHOSE v. GOBIND NATH SANDYAL
9 W. R. 450

89. ———— *Profits already realized.* But if, when attaching the property, he allows the original owner to remain in possession and enjoy the profits, those profits cease, from the moment they find their way into the pockets of the owner, to be specifically liable for the judgment-debt under the attachment. *RAM COOMAR GHOSE v. GOBIND CHUNDER SANDYAL*
12 W. R. 391

90. ———— *Attachment of property of tenant for rent.* A landlord may have a right to receive a share of the produce as rent; and if the share is not made over, to compel it to be done or to recover damages; but the property in the crops is in the raiyat until transferred by some act of his own. It is illegal for the landlord to attach everything in the possession of the raiyat which he considers may be liable to satisfy the rent: all that he can do by way of attachment is to treat the rent as a debt due from the raiyat to the landlord and to attach it as such. *PRITUN KOORMEE v. EDIL SINGH*
18 W. R. 464

91. ———— *Doors and window-shutters—Execution of decree—Attachable property—Doors and windows—Immoveable property.* The doors and window-shutters of a pucca building cannot be separately attached in execution of decree,

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(p) PROPERTY AND INTEREST IN PROPERTY OF VARIOUS KINDS—*contd.*

forming as they do part of an immoveable property and having no separate existence. *PERU BEPARI v. RONUO MAIFARASH*. I. L. R. 11 Calc. 164

92. ———— Property which is the subject of a suit—*Interest in property contingent on suit*. The fact of a judgment-debtor's property being the subject of an existing suit is no hindrance to its being attached in execution, but it is in the discretion of the Court to order its sale at the fittest and most proper time. *RAM CHUNDER v. NUND LALL BOSE*. 19 W. R. 132

93. ———— Actionable claim—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 6, cl. (d)—Transferable claim—Civil Procedure Code, s. 266—Execution of decree*. Under the Transfer of Property Act, property includes an actionable claim. There was sold in execution of a decree the judgment-debtor's right to get by division a quantity of land which had been reserved by him for his own use in a deed of gift, but which, at the time of the execution-sale, was in the possession of the donee of the estate, the land never having been appropriated by measurement as provided in the deed. In a suit brought by the auction-purchaser (decree-holder) for the area of the land reserved by measurement and division: *Held*, that the claim of the judgment-debtor to the land was a transferable claim, and therefore capable of being attached and sold in execution under s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code. *RUDRA PERKASH MISSER v. KRISHNA MOHUN GHATUCK*. I. L. R. 14 Calc. 241

94. ———— Property in zenana. There is nothing in Act VIII of 1859 which exempts from attachment property to be found in the zenana of a judgment-debtor. *DOORGA CHURN MITTER v. HUREE MOHUN GOOHO*. 17 W. R. 86

95. ———— Property necessary for livelihood—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 266—Property exempted from attachment—Execution of decree—Rules of High Court*. Before property of a judgment-debtor can be exempted from execution as falling under the head of the property described in s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is necessary that the Court should first express its opinion that such property is necessary to enable the execution-debtor to earn his livelihood, and the Court which must decide this point is the Court which issues the execution. S. 14 (a), Part II, Chapter V, of the General Rules and Circular Orders of the High Court commented on. *BAKHIR MOHAMMED v. DOORGA CHURN SHAHA*. I. L. R. 10 Calc. 39 : 13 C. L. R. 200

96. ———— Property in hands of the Receiver—*Order on Receiver to sell—Attachment in mofussil—Execution of decree*. By a decree of the High Court obtained by *D M* in November 1871 in a suit on a mortgage brought by him against *B C* and *P C*, it was ordered that the suit should be dis-

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(p) PROPERTY AND INTEREST IN PROPERTY OF VARIOUS KINDS—*contd.*

missed against *P C*; that the amount found due on the mortgage should be paid to *D M* by *B C*; that the mortgaged property, some of which was in Calcutta and some in the mofussil, should be sold in default of payment, and any deficiency should be made good by *B C*. The property in Calcutta was sold under the decree and did not realize sufficient to satisfy the decree. *D M* thereupon, in August 1873, obtained an order for the transfer of the decree to the mofussil Court for execution. After the transfer *B C* died, in December 1874, leaving a widow and an adopted son his representatives, against whom the suit was revived. The decree, however, was returned to the High Court unexecuted. In a suit for partition of the estate of *R C*, deceased, brought by *P C* against *B C* in the High Court, a decree was made in February 1871 for an injunction to restrain *B C* from intermeddling with the estate or the accumulations, and for the appointment of the Receiver of the Court as Receiver, to whom all parties were to give up quiet possession. *B C* was in that suit declared entitled to a moiety of the property in suit. *Held*, on application by *D M* to the High Court for an order that the Receiver should sell the right, title, and interest of the widow and son of *B C* in the estate in his hands to satisfy the balance of his debt, that *D M* was entitled to an order that their interest should be attached in the hands of the Receiver, and that the Receiver should proceed to sell the same. Property in the hands of the Receiver of the High Court cannot be proceeded against by attachment in the mofussil. *HEMCHUNDER CHUNDER v. FRANKISTO CHUNDER*. I. L. R. 1 Calc. 403

97. ———— Government promissory notes in the Bank of Bengal—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 259, 268, 272, construction of*. By a decree of a mofussil Court the plaintiff had been declared to be entitled to certain Government promissory notes which were then in the custody of the Bank of Bengal on account of one *K D*, regarding the title to whose estate the suit was brought. On an application to the High Court by the plaintiff decree-holder for execution of the decree by attachment: *Held*, that s. 259 provides for the delivery of specific moveable property in the possession of the judgment-debtor, and was therefore inapplicable to a case where the property sought to be attached was not in the possession of the judgment-debtor, but of the Bank. *Held*, also, that ss. 272 and 268 apply to the cases of moveable property belonging to the judgment-debtor in the possession of a third party and in that of a Court or public officer, respectively, and were not, therefore, applicable where the property sought to be attached had been declared to belong to the plaintiff. The only remedy open to a plaintiff to recover possession of moveable property decreed to belong to him, and not in the possession or power of the defendants, is to proceeds by

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(p) PROPERTY AND INTEREST IN PROPERTY OF VARIOUS KINDS—*contd.*

suit against the person in whose possession or power it is. **PUDMANUND SINGH v. CHUNDI DAT JHA**

1 C. W. N. 170

98. ——— Malikana rights payable for ever—Civil Procedure Code—Act VIII of 1859, s. 237. *A* and *B* were entitled to receive annually and for ever a specified amount by way of malikana rights from the Collector as compensation for their extinguished rights in lakhiraj lands. In execution of a decree, *C*, on 13th September, purported to attach, under s. 237 of Act VIII of 1859, *A*'s share in such specified amount. Subsequent to this attachment,—namely, on 23rd September 1873,—*A* and *B* mortgaged their rights to the plaintiff. In a suit brought by him against *A* and *B* and *C*:—*Held*, that attachment under s. 237 was not applicable to a right to receive money for ever; that such an attachment is only good so far as it relates to any specific amount which may be set forth in the request to the officer in whose hands the moneys are, as being then payable or likely to become payable, and that the attachment in question was therefore invalid. *Semble*: The attaching creditor should have proceeded under s. 235 or s. 236. In either of such cases the defendant, the person to whom the money was payable, would be entitled to notice that he was not at liberty to alienate his rights. **NILKUNTO DEY v. HURRO SOONDEREE DOSSEE**

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 414; 1 C. L. R. 412

99. ——— Allowance payable through post office—Attachment of money in hands of public officer—Anticipatory attachment—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 272, Sch. 4, Form 142. S. 272 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) does not allow of an anticipatory attachment of money expected to reach the hands of a public officer, but applies only to moneys actually in his hand. **TULAZ FATESING v. BALABHAI LAKHMI-CHAND**

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 39

100. ——— Deposit by servant of railway company—Civil Procedure Code, s. 268—Rights of attaching creditor. Where money deposited with a railway company by one of its servants as a guarantee for the due performance of his duties was attached by a judgment-creditor of such servant under s. 268 of the Code of Civil Procedure:—*Held*, that the creditor was not entitled to have his decree satisfied out of the deposit, but was entitled to a stop order under cl. (c) of s. 268, and also to payment of the interest, if any, due by the company on such deposit to the servant. **KARUTHAN v. SUBRAMANYA**

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 203

101. ——— Cheque for money due on contracts—Right of nominal surety—Assignment of money due to assignor—Principal and Surety. The plaintiff was nominal surety, though really the principal in the case of two contracts entered into by one *R* with the Executive Engineer, Ahmednagar.

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(p) PROPERTY AND INTEREST IN PROPERTY OF VARIOUS KINDS—*contd.*

On completion of the works, the Executive Engineer handed over to the plaintiff a cheque on the Government treasury for the amount due on the first contract. Before the cheque was presented by the plaintiff for payment, the defendant, who was the judgment-creditor of *R*, served the Executive Engineer with a notice attaching any money in his hands due by him to *R*. The Executive Engineer thereupon stopped payment of the cheque, the amount of which was eventually paid to the defendant. *Held*, that at the date of the attachment the cheque had become the property of the plaintiff, and that the defendant should refund the amount received by him. The second contract was sold to the plaintiff by *R*, and the account in the Executive Engineer's office relating to it was closed, showing a sum of money to *R*'s credit at the date of the defendant's attachment. *Held*, that the plaintiff, being the only person really interested, was entitled to this sum also; for although the Executive Engineer would have been legally justified in paying it to *R*, he was not bound, it being really the plaintiff's property, to pay it to a third person such as the defendant, the judgment-creditor, who, if the sum was paid to him, must refund it to the plaintiff. **BHAGVANDAS KISHORDAS v. ABDUL HUSEIN**

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 49

102. ——— Deposit of material for carrying out contract—Interests liable to attachment. Where a person deposited upon the works of another certain materials to be used in carrying out a contract with such second person, and latter had recognized and accepted such deposit by the advance of the value thereof:—*Held*, that such materials had vested in the person with whom they were deposited as a purchaser, and were not liable to attachment under a decree against the depositor. **ANONYMOUS CASE**

2 N. W. 337

103. ——— Money deposited in Court—Discretion of Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 272. The Court has no discretion to refuse an application for attachment of property in Court made under s. 272 of the Civil Procedure Code. **NOOR JEHAN BEGUM v. MASHITTY KHANUM**

8 C. L. R. 7

104. ——— Standing crops—Civil Procedure Code, s. 266—Immoveable property. Standing crops are, for the purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure, immoveable property, and cannot, therefore, be attached under s. 266 of the Procedure Code. **MADAYYA v. YENKATA**

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 193

105. ——— Civil Procedure Code, s. 266—Immoveable property—General Clauses Consolidation Act (I of 1868)—Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887), sch. ii, cl. (6). Standing crops are immoveable property in the sense of the General Clauses Act (I of 1868), and of cl. (6) of the second schedule of the Small Cause Courts Act (IX

ATTACHMENT—contd.**1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—contd.****(p) PROPERTY AND INTEREST IN PROPERTY OF VARIOUS KINDS—contd.**

of 1887), and of the Civil Procedure Code. They cannot therefore be attached under s. 266 of the Code. *Madayya v. Yenkata*, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 193, approved. *CHEDA LAL v. MULCHAND. MINDAI v. KUNDAN SINGH*. I. L. R. 14 All. 30

106. ——— **Lease—Saleable interest—Alienation by operation of law—Condition restraining alienation—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 266.** A sued to recover possession of certain land which was leased in *osathowla* by his father to B. The lease expressly prohibited the lessee and his heir from making any assignment of the property either by sale or gift, but it did not contain any provision for forfeiture or for re-entry by reason of an assignment in violation of its terms, nor was there any provision restricting a sale in execution of a decree. The *osathowla* passed to B's executor, and was sold in execution of a decree against B. *Held*, the sale passed a good title. B, and also his executor at the time of the sale, had an interest in the lease, which was "saleable" within the meaning of s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Diwali v. Apaji Ganesh*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 242, distinguished. *GOLAK NATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. MATHURA NATH ROY CHOWDHRY*. I. L. R. 20 Cal. 273

107. ——— **Interest taken under will—Bequest to wife with obligation of maintaining and educating children—Interest taken under such bequest—Decree against wife—Attachment of interest under will—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 286, 274, 276—Assignment of interest while under attachment.** B died in 1891, leaving a widow (defendant No. 1) and two sons, P and D (defendants Nos. 4 and 5). By his will he bequeathed the residue of his property to trustees (of whom his widow was one) in trust to pay the rents and income thereof to his widow for life, "she thereout maintaining, educating, and bringing up" his children in a manner suitable to their degree in life. After his death the property, moveable and immoveable, was to be divided among his sons equally when D should attain the age of twenty-five. He attained majority in October 1895. At the date of suit, D was eighteen years old and P was twenty-five. It was contended that the widow was only a trustee of the rents for the benefit of her sons P and D. On the 13th June 1895, the plaintiffs obtained a decree for Rs. 3,976-10-10 against the widow and her son P. In execution of that decree, they attached, under an order dated 2nd July 1895, the immoveable properties which had belonged to the testator's estate on the ground that both the widow and P had an interest in them. The attachment was issued under s. 274 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). The defendants contended that the widow had no attachable interest at all in the said properties, she being under the will merely a trustee as abovementioned for her sons, and that,

ATTACHMENT—contd.**1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—contd.****(p) PROPERTY AND INTEREST IN PROPERTY OF VARIOUS KINDS—contd.**

if she had, it was an interest in moveable property, which should have been attached under s. 268 of the Code, that the attachment under s. 274 was ineffectual and inoperative. They further alleged that by an assignment dated the 20th February 1896 she had assigned and surrendered her life-interest to her son D, and that such interest was, therefore, not available to satisfy the plaintiff's decree against her. As to P's interest, the defendants alleged that by a deed of settlement, dated the 9th February 1895, it was validly settled for the benefit of himself and his family, and that, therefore, he had no interest in him which could be attached under the order of the 2nd July 1895. *Held*, (i) that the widow had an attachable interest in the property. (ii) That her interest was an interest in immoveable property, and was validly attached under s. 274 of the Civil Procedure Code. (iii) That her assignment of the 20th February 1896 was invalid as against the plaintiffs under s. 276 of the Civil Procedure Code. *NATHA KERRA v. DHUNBAIJI*. I. L. R. 23 Bom. 1

108. ——— **Right of personal service—Civil Procedure Code, s. 266—Vritti—Liability of a vritti to attachment and sale in execution of decree—Voluntary conveyances.** The nature of an *upadhikpana vritti* on the River Godavari at Nasik was stated to be as follows: "The vritti is an hereditary priestly office by virtue of which certain religious ceremonies are performed on the River Godavari on behalf of pilgrims who pay fees to the holders of such priestly offices for performance of such religious ceremonies at or about the time of their performance. By law and usage, a certain relationship grows up between certain pilgrims or worshippers and a particular priest, and when such relationship exists, such pilgrims or worshippers are called *yajmans*, or clients of the priest, whose right to offer and perform the religious ceremonies in question for such *yajmans* becomes exclusive against rival priests so far that, under the Hindu law as applied and followed in this Presidency, if any such *yajmans* accept the religious services of another priest, they must compensate the priest, whose *yajmans* they are, by giving to him a reasonable fee." *Held*, that such a vritti is a "right of personal service" within the meaning of cl. (f) of s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure (XIV of 1882), and, therefore, protected from attachment. *GANESH RAMCHANDRA DATE v. SHANKAR RAMCHANDRA*. I. L. R. 10 Bom. 395

109. ——— **Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 266 (f)—Jotishipana vritti—Liability to attachment in execution of a decree—Nature of vrittis under Hindu law.** The *jotishi vritti*, being a right to receive certain emoluments as a reward for personal services, is not liable to attachment under s. 266 (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). *Semble*: Under the Hindu law, vrittis

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(p) PROPERTY AND INTEREST IN PROPERTY OF
VARIOUS KINDS—*concl'd.*

are to be regarded as generally *extra commercium*.
GOVIND LAKSHMAN JOSHI *v.* RAMKRISHNA HARI
JOSHI I. L. R. 12 Bom. 386

110. ———— *Vritti or religious office—*
Alienation of religious office—Civil Procedure Code,
1882, s. 266. A *vritti* cannot be sold in execution
of a decree. Such a compulsory alienation is not
only opposed to the Hindu law and public policy,
but is also against the provisions of s. 266 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). But
private alienations are not absolutely prohibited.
No general rule can be pleaded in such matters.
The rules of succession depend upon each particular
foundation or office, and in respect of it, custom
and practice must govern and prevail over the text
law which prohibits both partition and alienation.
RAJARAM *v.* GANESH I. L. R. 23 Bom. 131

(q) PROVIDENT FUNDS.

111. ———— *Provident Fund of Corporation*
of Calcutta—Subscriptions—Calcutta Municipal Act
(Bengal Act III of 1899), s. 73 (c)—Provident Funds
Act (IX of 1897), ss. 2 (4), 4, 6—Provident Funds
Amendment Act (IV of 1903), s. 2—"Compulsory
Deposits"—Trustees. The Provident Fund estab-
lished by the Municipal Corporation of Calcutta
is governed by the provisions of the Provident Funds
Act of 1897 and the Provident Funds (Amendment)
Act of 1903. These Acts render any subscriptions
to the Fund in the hands of the Trustees of the
Fund not liable to attachment. SETH MANNA
LALL PARRUCK *v.* GAINSFORD (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 641
s. c. 12 C. W. N. 633

(r) RIGHT OF SUIT.

112. ———— *Right to bring a suit.* A
right to bring a suit cannot be attached under the
Civil Procedure Code, 1859. CARAPIET *v.* PANNA
LAL SEAL 14 W. R. 152

DRURY *v.* HARADHUN BHUTTACHARJEE

3 W. R. Mis. 8

MAHOMED HADEE *v.* SHEO SEVUK DOOBAY

6 N. W. 95

113. ———— *Right to sue for damages—*
Mesne profits—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 266,
cl. (e). The right to sue for *mesne profits* is a
"right to sue for damages" within the meaning of
s. 266, cl. (e), of the Code of Civil Procedure, and
therefore cannot be sold in execution of decree.
Where, therefore, the plaintiff purchased the right
to sue for *mesne profits* at a sale in execution of a
decree:—*Held*, that a suit by him to enforce the right
was not maintainable. SHYAM CHAND KOONDoo
v. LAND MORTGAGE BANK OF INDIA

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 695 : 12 C. L. R. 440

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(r) RIGHT OF SUIT—*concl'd.*

114. ———— *Right to appeal.* A judg-
ment-debtor's right to appeal cannot be attached in
execution of a decree. BIPRO PROTAP SAHU *v.*
DEO NARAIN ROY 3 W. R. Mis. 16

(s) SALARY.

115. ———— *Salary of officer of Small*
Cause Court, Calcutta—Execution of decree of
High Court. The attachment of pay of an officer
of the Small Cause Court will be set aside by an order
of the High Court, in satisfaction of judgment ob-
tained in that Court. KOOMKURRUN *v.* MICHAEL
BOURKE O. C. 259

116. ———— *Salaries of Railway Com-*
pany's servants—Jurisdiction of Mojtussil Small
Cause Courts—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 236, 239.
Salaries or other debts due from the Railway Com-
pany to any of its servants can be attached in satis-
faction of a Small Cause Court decree under Act
VIII of 1859, s. 236. The attaching Court must
make a written order to be fixed up in some con-
spicuous part of the Court-house, and a copy is to be
delivered or sent registered by post to the debtor.
The registered letter should be addressed to the
Agent of the Railway Company at the head office
of the Company. It need not be sent through the
High Court, although the head office is within the
jurisdiction of the High Court. *In the matter of*
HOLLICK 2 B. L. R. A. C. 109 : 10 W. R. 447

117. ———— *Salary of telegraph officer.*
The salary of a telegraph officer which is due for
past services is a debt which may be attached under
s. 236, Act VIII of 1859. HUSSEN BHAMJEE *v.*
HICKS 18 W. R. 124

118. ———— *Salary of peon of mamlat-*
dar. The whole salary of a peon in the service
of a mamlatdar under Government is liable to
attachment as it becomes due. TEJRAM JAGRUPAJI
v. KUSAJI BIN GANGJI 7 Bom. A. C. 110

119. ———— *Percentage received by*
khot—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 266, cl. (f).
A percentage received by a *khot* for collecting
the assessment on *dhara* lands is not "salary," nor
is such a *khot* a "public officer" within the con-
templation of s. 266, cl. (h) of the Civil Procedure
Code (Act XIV of 1882). The Collector, therefore,
cannot object to the attachment of such percent-
age in execution. RAVJI MORESHVAR *v.* SAYAJIRAO
GANPATRAO I. L. R. 13 Bom. 673

120. ———— *Salary of hereditary*
officer—Act XI of 1843. The official remunera-
tion of the officiating hereditary officer is not liable
to civil process so long as it is in the hands of the
Collector or other disbursing officer; but as soon as
it is in the hands of the hereditary officer himself,
it is deprived of any special protection. GANPAT-
LAL ANUPRAM *v.* SAMPATRAM GHELABHAI

10 Bom. 400

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(s) SALARY—*contd.*

121. ———— **Salary already due**—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 236, 237.* A judgment-debtor's salary, which has become due, is a debt within the meaning of Act VIII of 1859, s. 236, which indicates the remedy open to the judgment-creditor. S. 237 has no bearing on such a case. *KALU SHAIKH KHANSAMA v. BEATSON*
24 W. R. 446

122. ———— **Wages of private servant**—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 266.* The wages of a private servant cannot be attached in whole or in part before they become due and a debt exists. *AYYAVAYAR v. VIRASAMI MUDAL*
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 393

123. ———— **Moiety of salary of officer on half-pay**—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 266 (h)*—Attachment of moiety of salary of officer on half-pay. Under cl. (h) of s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, a moiety of the salary of a public officer drawing half-pay (exceeding ₹20 per mensem) on sick leave is liable to attachment. *BEARD v. EGERTON*
I. L. R. 6 Mad. 179

124. ———— **Moiety of salary of military officer**—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 266, expl. (b)*—Debtor subject to military law—Attachment of moiety of salary under ₹20 per mensem—*Army Act, s. 151.* S. 151 of the Army Act, 1881, not being affected by the provisions of s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the attachment by a Civil Court of a moiety of the monthly salary of a debtor subject to military law, not exceeding ₹20 is legal. *VIRARAGAVA v. RAMUDU*
I. L. R. 9 Mad. 170

125. ———— **Pay of Military Officer in Indian Staff Corps**—*Officer not officer of regular forces*—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 266, cl. (h)*, —*Army Act, 1881, s. 151*—Public officer. An officer of the Indian Staff Corps is a "public officer" within the meaning of cl. (h) of s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code, read with the interpretation clause (s. 2) of the Code. His pay is therefore subject to attachment in execution of a decree against him, but the operation of the attachment must be restricted to pay received from the Indian Government. The pay of an officer of the regular forces is not so subject to attachment. The attachment in this case was allowed subject to a decree previously passed against the defendant, by which, under s. 151 of the Army Act, half his pay was ordered to be deducted and applied in payment of the amount due under that decree—the repeal of that section not affecting a decree previously passed under it, and the right to enforce such a decree continuing until satisfaction has been obtained. *CALCUTTA TRADES ASSOCIATION v. RYLAND*
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 102 : 1 C. W. N. 138

126. ———— **Pay of military officer**—*Mutiny Act, s. 99*—Military officer—Attachment of moveable property. Where, with reference to s. 99 of the Mutiny Act, a decree for money made against

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(s) SALARY—*contd.*

a military officer serving in India directed that the judgment-debt should be stopped out of a moiety of such officer's pay.—*Held*, that the decree-holder could not obtain satisfaction of the decree by attachment of such officer's moveable property. *MERCER v. NARPAT RAI*
I. L. R. 1 All. 730

127. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 205*—Omission to provide for stoppage of pay in decree. The pay of a military officer cannot be attached in the hands of the Paymaster in the execution of a decree where no provision for its stoppage has been made in the decree. *BANSI LAL v. MERCER*
7 N. W. 331

128. ———— **Pay of non-commissioned officer in civil employ.** Execution of a decree against the pay of a non-commissioned officer in civil employ is entirely in conformity with law. *COHEN v. MCCARTHY*
14 W. R. 231

129. ———— **Military pay attached, refund of.** Where a part of the military pay of a sergeant employed under the Executive Engineer was erroneously remitted by his superior to a Small Cause Court, which had directed execution against the sergeant's pay, it was held that the sum remitted should be refunded to the Executive Engineer. *COHEN v. MCCARTHY*
14 W. R. 441

130. ———— **Military officer**—*Army Act (44 & 45 Vict., cap. 58), ss. 136, 151*—*Army (Annual) Act, 1895 (58 Vict., cap. 7), s. 4*—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 266*—"Public officer"—Attachment of moiety of pay of officer of Indian Staff Corps. The effect of s. 136 of the Army Act, 1881, as amended by s. 4 of the Army (Annual) Act, 1895, is to empower the Civil Courts to attach one moiety of the salary of an officer in the Indian Staff Corps, under s. 266, prov. (i), of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Calcutta Trades Association v. Ryland*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 102, followed. *WATSON v. LLOYD* (1901)
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 402

131. ———— **Railway servant.**—Execution of decree—Attachment of salary—Prohibitory order—*Railway servants, salaries of*—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 268, 617*—Small Cause Court, jurisdiction of—Disbursing office outside the jurisdiction of the Court—Transfer of decree for execution. A Small Cause Court has no authority to attach the salary of a railway servant that has not yet fallen due, by a prohibitory order issued under s. 268 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the officer whose duty it is to disburse the salary, when the disbursing office is situate outside the jurisdiction of the Court. The decree must be sent for execution to the Court within the local limits of which the disbursing office is situate. A disbursing officer who has so far submitted to such a prohibitory order as to recover and keep in deposit with him the portion of the salary attached, is not bound to pay the money into the Court which attached it

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(s) SALARY—*concl'd.*

without jurisdiction. *Hossein Ally v. Ashotosh Gangooly*, 3 C. L. R. 30, and *Parbati Charan v. Panchanand*, I. L. R. 6 All. 243, followed. *In the matter of J. Hollick*, 2 B. L. R. (A. C.) 108, explained. *ABDUL GAFUR v. ALBYN* (1903) I. L. R. 30 Calc. 713 : s.c. 7 C. W. N. 821

(t) TRUST PROPERTY.

132. —Debtor's interest in property assigned to trustees for benefit of creditors. A *bonâ fide* assignment by a debtor of his entire property to trustees for the benefit of his creditors divests him of any interest which can be the subject of attachment subsequently issued in execution of a decree against such debtor until the trusts of the deed of assignment have been carried out. *BAMANJI MANICKJI v. NAOROJI PALANJI*

1 Bom. 233

133. —Property placed in trust with managers. Property placed in trust with parties as managers, but not beneficial owners, is not liable to be taken in execution of a decree against them. *MOHEEPUT SINGH v. ETEBAREE CHOWDHRY*

19 W. R. 226

134. —Property held by judgment-debtor in trust for a specific purpose. Attempt to attach surplus after fulfilment of trust—*Civil Procedure Code*, s. 266. Neither the whole corpus, nor any specific portion of the corpus, of an estate in the hands of a trustee who is a judgment-debtor is rendered liable to attachment in execution of the decree against him, because a surplus of income is in his hands for his own benefit after due performance of the trusts; nor does such corpus or any part of it come for that reason within the meaning of s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which only authorizes the attachment of property over which the judgment-debtor has a disposing power exerciseable for his own benefit. Where a trust had been created for specific purposes, viz., the performance of religious and other duties, and the trustee had duly appointed another trustee in his place, the latter being entitled to hold the trust estate:—*Held*, that, a decree having been made against the trustee personally, the corpus of the trust estate could not be sold to satisfy the claim of the judgment-creditor, nor could any specific portion of the corpus of the estate be taken out of the hands of the trustee on the ground that there was, or might be, a margin of profit coming to him personally after the performance of the trusts. *BISHEN CHAND BASAWAT v. NADIR HOSSEIN*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 329 : L. R. 15 I. A. 1

135.—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)*, s. 622—Decree, execution of—Attachment of trust property—Jurisdiction—Small Cause Court—Notice—Procedure, irregularity of. Under a decree of the Presidency Small Cause Court (the decree being a

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—*contd.*(t) TRUST PROPERTY—*concl'd.*

personal one against the judgment-debtor), trust property, of which the judgment-debtor was the trustee, was attached in execution, the beneficiaries under the trust not being parties to the proceedings. *Held*, that the attachment of the trust property was irregular and improper; and that the judgment-creditors were not justified under the decree in attaching any property other than the personal property of the judgment-debtor. And that, before the creditors could obtain a decree which they could execute against the trust property, they would have to show (i) that the trust property, under the terms of the settlement, was devoted to the purpose of the business of an hotel; (ii) that the circumstances were such that the defendant as trustee would be entitled to be indemnified by the trust property to the extent of the claim, and (iii) that the plaintiffs, as creditors of the hotel business, were entitled to stand in the shoes of the trustee in respect of the indemnity, and to be recouped out of the trust estate. *Held*, also, that the mere fact that the trustee in carrying on the business of a trust, had rendered himself personally liable for the business-debts, would not of itself give creditors a right to proceed against the trust property; but the creditors would be at liberty to take such steps as they might be advised to proceed against the trust property in proceedings properly constituted for that purpose. *Strickland v. Symons*, L. R. 26 Ch. D. 245, 247, and *In re Johnson Shearman v. Robinson* L. R. 15 Ch. D. 548, referred to. *Raybould v. Turner*, [1900] 1 Ch. 199, distinguished. *Held*, further, that the attachment of the trust property was such an irregularity of procedure as would justify the interference of the High Court under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *In the matter of M. A. SHARD* (1901)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 574

(u) WAGES.

136. —Money paid to sirdar as wages of coolies—*Act VIII of 1859*, ss. 236, 237. The defendants were sirdars of coolies. A decree was obtained against them by the plaintiff in respect of goods supplied for the coolies. It was proved that by virtue of custom, a sirdar of coolies was entitled to have the wages of coolies paid to him so that he might deduct the amounts due to him by the respective coolies for food supplied by him to them; but it was not found that the coolies were hired on the basis of such custom. In execution of the decree, an order was made upon the officer of the Public Works Department in whose employ the coolies were, attaching "all moneys which are or may become payable to the debtors, whether on their own personal account or on account of the coolies over whom they were sirdars." *Held*, the attachment could not be maintained. The wages of the coolies were not liable to attachment under

ATTACHMENT—contd.**1. SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—concl'd.****(u) WAGES—concl'd.**

s. 236 or 237 of Act VIII of 1859. *SATIWAN v. GOPAL* **1 B. L. R. S. N. 15**
10 W. R. 149

137. ——— Money paid for spinning cotton—*Civil Procedure Code, Act X of 1877, s. 266, cl. (j)—Labourer—Wages.* Persons who agree to spin cotton belonging to a spinning and weaving company, and to receive a certain amount of money for a certain quantity of cotton spun by them, are labourers within the meaning of s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877), and, therefore, their remuneration is wages which, under cl. (j) of the section, cannot be attached in execution of a decree. *JECHAND KHUSAL v. ABA*

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 132

(v) WEARING APPAREL AND ORNAMENTS.

138. ——— Wearing apparel—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 205.* Necessary wearing apparel is not liable to attachment under s. 205 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *GANGARAM VELGI v. PARBHU DAYARAM* **I. L. R. 9 Bom. 272**

139. ——— Ornaments—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 266—Attachment—Wearing apparel—Mangalsutra (a neck ornament).* The mangalsutra, a neck ornament which is worn by a Hindu married woman during the lifetime of her husband and never removed, is a part of her necessary wearing apparel, and is exempt from execution under s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). *APPANA v. TANGAMMA* **I. L. R. 9 Bom. 106**

140. ——— Ornaments on person of Hindu wife—*Execution against husband.* Ornaments on the person of a Hindu wife, if forming part of her stridhan, cannot be taken under an execution against her husband. On certain occasions, however, the husband may take them, but the right is personal to him. *TUKARAM BIN RAMKRISHNA v. GUNAJI BIN MHALOJI* **8 Bom. A. C. 129**

2. ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT.

1. ——— Attachment before judgment, effect of. An attachment before judgment places the property in the custody of the law, but does not alter the right to it. *In the matter of GOCOL DASS SOONDERJEE.* *PETUMBER MUNDLE v. GOCOL DAS SOONDERJEE*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 32: Bourke O. C. 34

2. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 83 and 84.* In attachment before judgment under ss. 83 and 84 of Act VIII of 1859, the Court does not interfere with the legal disposal of the property attached, beyond declaring that possession shall not be taken without its previous sanction, undertaking only that, if no subsequent order to the contrary be made, the property shall be forth-

ATTACHMENT—contd.**2. ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT—contd.**

coming at the time of pronouncing the decree to abide whatever order it shall make about it. *JAYA RAMJI v. JADHAVJI NATHU* **1 Bom. 224**

SAVA RAMJI v. JADHAVJI NAHU: EX-PARTE GAMBLE **2 Bom. Rep. 150: 2nd Ed. 142**

3. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 89.* S. 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure renders an attachment before judgment ineffectual as a bar to process of execution against the property attached in satisfaction of a decree in another suit, whether obtained before or after the attachment. *ANONYMOUS CASE* **6 Mad. 135**

4. ——— Attachment before judgment, operation of, where there are no conflicting attachments. If there are no conflicting attachments, a sale of property under a decree may legally follow upon an attachment made before decree. *MUSTAN SAIB v. BROOKS* **7 Mad. 347**

5. ——— Subsequent attachment—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 89. Semble:* S. 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure was introduced, not for the purpose of restraining the ordinary effect of attachment, but for the purpose of preventing the same view being taken of attachments before judgment as had been taken by the Indian Courts of the writ of sequestration. When attachment of property has preceded decree, no fresh attachment is necessary subsequent to decree. *SARKIES v. BUNDHOO BAE*

1 N. W. Part 6, 81: Ed. 1873, 172

Contra. See SATBHAWAN v. SAHOO BANARASEE DOSS **2 N. W. 365**

6. ——— Writs of execution, priority of—*Lodging writ in office of Sheriff.* In considering which of two writs of attachment in execution of a decree is to have priority over the other, the time when the writs are lodged in the office of the Sheriff is the criterion by which priority is to be determined, and not the time when such writs reach the hands of that officer. *NARSINGDAS MULTANCHAND v. NAHUNUBAI. SUMARMAL JOHARIMAL v. NAHANUBAI* **7 Bom. O. C. 183**

7. ——— Where one of several writs first reaches the Sheriff, it has priority, and he has no power to deprive it of such priority and transfer it to another by first executing a writ delivered to him later. *DWARKANATH SHAW v. PRANKRISTO PAUL CHOWDHRY* **Bourke O. C. 260**

8. ——— Priority—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 81.* *N S.* and subsequently *J S.* filed plaints and obtained attachment orders against *J. P's* property. *J S.* who got a decree on the 13th and an order for sale on the 16th of February, claimed priority. Claim disallowed. *Held,* that, of several creditors who have attached a debtor's property under s. 81 of Act VIII of 1859, the one who first obtains judgment is entitled to priority. *JUGURNATH SHAW v. ISSURCHUNDER ROY*

Bourke O. C. 148

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*2. ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT—*contd.*

LUTCHMEEPUT DOGAREE *v.* KENARAM SEN
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 393

SHUMBHOONATH GHOSE *v.* NOBINMONEY DOSSEE

ROBERT AND CHARRIOL *v.* NOBINMONEY DOSSEE
Bourke O. C. 92

9. ——— Suit against one member of undivided Hindu family—*Death of defendant before decree—Right of survivorship.* Where, in a suit against one member of an undivided Hindu family, not as representing the family, there is an attachment before judgment of family property and the defendant dies before decree is passed, the right of survivorship takes effect before that attachment becomes effectual for the purpose of execution. Principle of decision in *Sadayappa v. Ponnama*, 1. L. R. 8 Mad. 554, followed. RAMANAYYA *v.* RANGAPPAYYA . . . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 144

10. ——— Suit on hypothecation-bond—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 483—Attachment of non-hypothecated immoveable property—Sale not necessary to satisfy Court that hypothecated property may prove insufficient.* S. 483 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not refer exclusively to moveable property. Where in a suit on an hypothecation bond the plaintiff sought to attach before judgment immoveable property of the defendant other than that hypothecated—*Held*, that it was not necessary in order that the Court might be satisfied that the proceeds of the sale of the hypothecated property were likely to prove insufficient to meet the decree which the plaintiff might obtain in his suit, that such property should be actually brought to sale. BISHAMBAR SAHI *v.* SUKHDEVI

I. L. R. 16 All. 186

11. ——— Attachment of money deposited in Court—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 483 and 484.* The term "property," as used in ss. 483 and 484 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is wide enough to include property of every description, moveable and immoveable, whether in the actual possession of the defendant or of some other person on his behalf; and the words "the Court may require him . . . to produce and place at the disposal of the Court" only refer to such property as is capable of being produced in Court. Where property ordered to be attached is deposited in the Court which made the order for attachment, that order is sufficient notice to itself that the property ordered to be attached is to be held subject to the further orders of the Court, and it is not necessary that a separate formal notice should be drawn up. CHEDI LAL *v.* KUARZI DICHIT

I. L. R. 17 All. 82

12. ——— Attachment before judgment of Company's property—*Winding up Company—Suit against manager of Company—Company not a party to the suit—Remedy of liquidator—Appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 283, 485, 487, 588, and 622.* The Dhulia manufacturing Company, Limited, carried on business at Dhulia

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*2. ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT—*contd.*

and had its registered office at Bombay. One *M*, was the manager at Dhulia, and he had authority to borrow money and draw hundis on behalf of the company. In August 1894, the directors opened negotiations for the sale of the company's factory to one *H*, and in September 1894, while the negotiations were pending, a special resolution was passed to wind up the company voluntarily. The resolution was confirmed in October 1894, and *A* was appointed liquidator under s. 177 of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882). In December 1894, the liquidator agreed to sell the factory to *H* for the said sum of Rs38,000. Under the agreement, *H* was to enter into possession of the factory, but the company was to have a lien upon it until the completion of the purchase, which was to take place in May 1895. A month before the date fixed for the completion of the sale, the plaintiff filed a suit in the Court of the first class Subordinate Judge of Dhulia against *M*, the manager of the company, in his individual capacity and as manager of the company. His claim was professedly against the company, but he did not make the company, which was then in liquidation, a party to the suit. Subsequently the plaintiff applied for and obtained an order for attachment before judgment of the company's factory at Dhulia. No notice of the application or of the order made on it was given to the liquidator. He at once applied to the Court to raise the attachment, contending that the Court had no power to attach the property of the company, which was not a party to the suit. The Court made the company a party, and dismissed the liquidator's application, confirming its previous order for attachment. The liquidator appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that the order of attachment should be reversed. The intended sale by the liquidator, which was the sole reason for making the order, was not with intent to obstruct any decree that the plaintiff might obtain against the company, but was being effected by the liquidator in the course of his duty and in pursuance of a contract entered into long before the suit was instituted. The plaintiff's claim, if established, would be satisfied *pari passu* with the other debts of the company. The plaintiff was not entitled to security for his claim in preference to the other creditors. It was contended that no appeal lay against the order of the Subordinate Judge, and that the liquidator's sole remedy was by suit under ss. 283 and 487 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882): *Held*, that, the company having been made a party to the suit, the order of attachment was made under s. 485 of the Civil Procedure Code, and consequently under s. 588 an appeal lay from that order. If the company had not been made a party, the High Court would have set aside the order of attachment under s. 622 of the Code, as in that case the Subordinate Judge would have had no jurisdiction to make it. MIR ALI MAHOMED PATEL *v.* BIHARILAL SUKLAL

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 273

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*2. ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT—*contd.*

13. — Attachment, effect of—*Necessity of subsequent attachment—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 89.* *R R* filed a plaint against *I R* on the 15th, and obtained a decree on the 27th of February, and a prohibitory order was made against *I R*'s property on the 18th of March, subject to three prior attachments: one by *J S*, whose plaint was filed on the 30th of January, and who obtained a prohibitory order on the 13th and a decree on the 16th of February; a second by *N S*, who filed his plaint and obtained a prohibitory order on the 30th of January, and obtained a decree on February 22nd; and a third by *K S*, who also filed his plaint and got a prohibitory order on January 30th, and a decree on February 28th for an order for the sale of the goods on notice to the other three plaintiffs; and the Court ruled that *N S* and *K S* were entitled to priority over *R R*. *Held*, that the process in attachment before judgment is in all respects the same as in cases of attachment after judgment, and the effect in binding the property attached, so as to prevent alienation, is the same. That an attachment, whether before or after judgment, places the property in the custody of the law. That if property have been attached before judgment, there is no need of a second attachment in the same suit after judgment. That the words "attachment before judgment" in s. 89 of Act VIII of 1859 must be read as equivalent to "attachments in pending suits," or, in other words, the phrase "before judgment" must be read as meaning "until after judgment." *RAJCHUNDER ROY v. ISSERCHUNDER ROY*
Bourke O. C. 139

14. — Jurisdiction of High Court—*Property situate out of jurisdiction.* The High Court has no power to attach before judgment a defendant's property situate outside the limits of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. *NUR MUHAMMAD v. ABUBAKAR IBRAHIM MEMAN*
8 Bom. O. C. 29

15. — Attachment before judgment, effect of—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 483, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490.* The effect of an attachment of a property under the Civil Procedure Code, whether made before or after decree, is the same, provided that in the former case a decree is made for the plaintiff at whose instance the attachment takes place. *Raj Chunder Roy v. Isser Chunder Roy*, Bourke O. C. 139, referred to. *GANU SINGH v. JANGI LAL*
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 531

16. — Act XXIII of 1840—*Warrant by Mofussil Court.* It was competent to the High Court, under Act XXIII of 1840, to order a warrant of attachment before judgment issued by a Mofussil Court to be executed within the limits of the High Court's ordinary original civil jurisdiction. *In re ABRAHAM* 6 Bom. A. C. 170

17. — Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 81—*Execution of decree—Endorsement*

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*2. ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT—*contd.*

of decree under Act XXIII of 1840, s. 1. The words in s. 81 of Act VIII of 1859, "where the defendant is about to dispose of his property or any part thereof, refer only to property within the jurisdiction of the Court where the suit is pending; therefore, where an order under that section by the First Subordinate Judge of the 24-Pergunnahs in respect of property in Calcutta was sent up to the High Court, in order that it might be endorsed in accordance with the provisions of s. 1 of Act XXIII of 1840, the High Court refused to endorse it. *BALARAM MULLICK v. SOLANO* . 8 B. L. R. 335

18. — Grounds of application—*Suit not commenced—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 81.* In an application made under s. 81, Act VIII of 1859, the Court must be satisfied that a removal of goods is being made, or about to be made, with a view to evade the execution of a decree in a specific suit, though it is not necessary that the suit should be actually commenced at the time of their removal. *RAMNARAIN PODDAR v. LEVY* . 2 Hyde 183

19. — Property within jurisdiction—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 483.* The words "any portion of his property" in the latter part of s. 483 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877, mean any portion of the property of the defendant which is within the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is pending. *KEDAR NATH DUTT v. SEEVA VEYANA RANA LUCHMAN CHETTY*
1 C. L. R. 336

20. — Property not in jurisdiction—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 483, 484.* Under the provisions of ss. 483 and 484 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, property of the defendant, which is not within the jurisdiction of the Court, cannot be attached before judgment. *KRISHNASAMI v. ENGEL*
I. L. R. 8 Mad. 20

21. — Security for satisfaction of decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 484—Security.* The defendants were, on the 10th of March 1881, called upon, under s. 484 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), to furnish security for the satisfaction of a decree that the plaintiff might obtain against them, or to show cause on the 28th March 1881 why security should not be furnished. To this direction the order was appended, which is provided by the form at the end of the Code of Civil Procedure for a provisional attachment under s. 484. The defendants, to avoid the attachment, gave security on the 12th March 1881 for satisfaction of the decree, and the attachment was not carried out. On the 28th March 1881, they showed cause why security should not be furnished, but the Subordinate Judge, as security had been furnished, thought the matter was at an end, and that he could not cancel the security bond. *Held*, that the Subordinate Judge was wrong; the security so given was really not the security expressly provided under s. 484, and did not preclude the

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*2. ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT—*contd.*

defendants from showing cause why no security should be furnished. *LOTLIKAR v. LOTLIKAR*

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 643

22. ——— Grounds for granting application—*Defendant leaving jurisdiction to avoid or delay process—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 74, 75.* Applications under ss. 74 and 75, Act VIII of 1859, on the ground first mentioned in s. 74, must show at least that defendant is about to leave the jurisdiction, with a view to avoid process, or to delay the plaintiff in the prosecution of his suit. Evidence sufficient to support this must be adduced in all cases. *TEENARAM v. RAMRUTTON*. 2 Hyde 181

23. ——— *Defendant leaving jurisdiction or dealing with property so as to make it unavailable—Ground for arrest of debtor.* A creditor is not entitled, merely because he has a just demand against his debtor, to move the Courts to put in force the extraordinary processes of arrest or attachment on mesne process; he must also have good reason to believe that his debtor is about to depart from the jurisdiction of the Court, or to deal with his property in such a manner that it will be unavailable for satisfaction of the claim against him. *GOUTIERE v. CHARRIOL*

1 N. W. Part 2, 32 : Ed. 1873, 91

24. ——— *Defendant leaving India—Good cause—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 74-80.* When it appears *prima facie* that the defendant is going to leave India with intent to remain absent so long that the plaintiff will or may be obstructed or delayed in the execution of any decree that may be passed against the defendant, he will be ordered, unless he show good cause, to find security for the amount of the claim and the costs of the suit. And "good cause" must be either (1) that he is not going to leave India, or not for so long a time as will obstruct, or be likely to obstruct, the plaintiff, should he succeed; or (2) that the suit is not a *bona fide* one; or (3) that, even if it is, the institution of it has been vexatiously delayed till the defendant is about to depart from India, in order to embarrass or coerce him. *SPENCE'S HOTEL COMPANY v. ANDERSON*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 294 note

25. ——— *Defendant leaving jurisdiction—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 80.* It is not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the defendant intends to obstruct or delay the plaintiff in execution of his decree, in order to justify an application to the Court for his arrest before judgment under Act VIII of 1859, s. 80: it is enough if his going away will have that effect. *AGRA AND MASTERMAN'S BANK v. MINTO*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 265

26. ——— *Defendant leaving the jurisdiction—Repairs of Ship, suit for price of.* The defendant having employed the plaintiffs to do repairs to his ship on the promise that they would

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*2. ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT—*contd.*

be paid for out of the proceeds of a letter of credit from the owners for that purpose, afterwards drew bills on the credit for other purposes. The defendant being about to leave Calcutta, on the application of the plaintiffs an attachment order was issued against him and proceeds of the bills in the hands of P's agent. *CALCUTTA DOCKING COMPANY v. PASSMORE*
Bourke O. C. 125: Cor. 151

27. ——— *Arrest of Master and part owner of ship where ship was lost—Repairs of ship, suit for price of.* In an action for repairs, where the ship had been lost, the Court granted an order for personal arrest of the defendant, the master and part owner, under s. 80 of Act VIII of 1859. *CHARRIOL v. COURTOIS* . . . Cor. 123

28. ——— *Security for personal appearance of defendant—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 477, 479—Bona fide suit.* A suit was instituted against the master of a vessel for repairs done to his vessel and for hire of a dock in which the vessel had been. The master being about to leave the jurisdiction of the Court with his vessel, the plaintiffs, under s. 477 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applied for an order that the defendant should give security for his appearance to answer any decree that might be passed against him, and a rule was issued calling on him to show cause why such security should not be furnished. The defendant showed cause, and alleged that the amount claimed for the repairs was excessive, that the repairs were badly done, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to dock-hire, and that some of the repairs charged for had not been executed. He further counter-claimed for a large sum for demurrage owing to the detention of his vessel and damages caused to it by the wrongful act of the plaintiffs. It was contended that, as the claim was on a contested account which on the face of it was stated, but unsettled, on the principle of the English authorities, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the order asked for. It was further contended that the suit was not a *bona fide* one, brought merely to harass the defendant, and that for this reason security should not be ordered to be given. It was not disputed that the defendant had no domicile in this country, and that he was shortly leaving in his vessel in the ordinary course of his business. The Court found the plaintiffs were undoubtedly entitled to recover some amount on account of repairs, and that the mere fact that the plaintiffs added on to such a claim one of a disputable character did not go to show that the suit was not a *bona fide* one. *Held*, that there is no authority for saying that the principles applied in England to the granting of writs *ne exeat regno* should be applied in this country; that the Court can only look to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure; that when a person comes on business to this country in which he has no property or domicile, and enters into a contract with a person to do work in connection with that business, and which must be

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*2. ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT—*contd.*

done before he leaves the country, and it is known he intends to leave as soon as the work is completed, there is an implied understanding, if the work was done on his credit, that it should be paid for before he leaves. *Held*, also, that the case fell within the provisions of s. 477 of the Code, and that the defendant should furnish security for his appearance while the suit was pending within a week in terms of s. 479, such security to be for the amount of the claim. *PROBODÉ CHUNDER MULLICK v. DOWEY*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 695

29. ————— *Disposing of property to delay or obstruct execution—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 483.* Before proceeding under s. 483 of the Civil Procedure Code to attach property, the Court should be thoroughly satisfied that the defendant is really disposing of his property with intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed against him. *SHOSHEE SHEKHORESWAR ROY v. HARO GOBEND BOSE*

13 C. L. R. 356

30. ————— *Residence—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 648—Arrest before judgment.* Where an officer proceeding from Burma to England on leave resided a few days in Madras on the way:—*Held*, that such residence was sufficient, for the purpose of s. 648 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to render him liable to arrest before judgment. *EVERET v. FRERE*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 205

31. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 491, 588—Attachment before judgment—Compensation—Appeal.* There is no appeal from an order awarding compensation under s. 421 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *NARASINGA BHAKSHI v. GOVINDA BHAKSHI* (1900)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 62

32. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 483 and 648—Property outside jurisdiction.* Case in which an order made attaching before judgment property outside the jurisdiction. *RAM PERTAB JHOWAR v. MADHO RAI* (1902)

7 C. W. N. 216

33. ————— *Execution—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 230, 269, 272, 295, 489, 490—Suit—Assets, rateable distribution of—Decree—Sale of goods subject to speedy and natural decay, effect of.* *R* in a suit against *M* attached certain goods before judgment and at *R*'s instance the goods were sold as perishable articles and the sale proceeds paid into Court. Subsequently *S* obtained a decree against *M* in another suit. *R* now obtained a decree in his suit. Upon this *S* attached the moneys in Court. On *R*'s application for an order that his claim be satisfied out of the moneys in Court in priority to the claim of *S* or in the alternative *pari passu*. *Held*, that *S* should rank *pari passu* with *R*. An attachment before judgment, though it gives a security, does not create any charge on the property attached, which remains that of the defendant. *Nor*

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*2. ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT—*contd.*

does a decree following such attachment place *ipso facto* in a better position the creditor, who must apply for execution from which he is not exempted by s. 490 of the Civil Procedure Code. On such application for execution, the attachment before judgment enures and becomes an attachment in execution. But neither attachment before judgment nor process incidental thereto, such as the sale of the goods attached prior to decree under s. 296, give a decree-holder applying for execution any right to preferential treatment over another judgment-creditor, who has also before the date of such application himself taken out execution of his decree. *SEWDUT ROY v. SREE CANTO MAITY* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 639

34. ————— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 29—Suit for compensation—Limitation—Terminus a quo.* *Held*, that the limitation applicable to a suit for damages on account of the alleged unlawful attachment before judgment of a shop belonging to the plaintiff was that prescribed by Art. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, and that limitation began to run from the date of the attachment. *Murugesu Mudaliar v. Jattaram Davy*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 621, *Multan Chand Kanyalal v. Bank of Madras*, I. L. R. 27 Mad. 346, and *Ram Singh Mohapatra v. Bhotro Manjee Sonthal*, 24 W. R. 298, followed. *Surajmal v. Manekchand*, 6 Bom. Law Reporter 704, distinguished. *Semle*: That such an attachment, if wrongful, is not a continuing wrong within the meaning of s. 23 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877. *RAM NARAIN v. UMRAO SINGH* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 615

3. ATTACHMENT OF PERSON.

1. ————— *Attachment against person and property simultaneously—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 201, 207—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 15—Discretion of Court.* Under s. 201 and other sections cited of Act VIII of 1859, a judgment-creditor has uncontrolled option whether he will proceed in the first instance against the person or the property of his judgment-debtor; and by s. 15, Act XXIII of 1861, the Small Cause Court is bound to issue execution according to the nature of the application, if made in writing after the passing of the decree under s. 207, Act VIII of 1859. The Court may, at its discretion, refuse execution against the person and property at the same time or against the same person when, under s. 13, Act XXIII of 1861, or under s. 19, Act XI of 1865, application for immediate execution is made verbally at the time of passing the decree. *DAVIS v. MIDDLETON*

8 W. R. 282

2. ————— *Execution of decree—Decree for sale of hypothecated property and against judgment-debtor personally—Execution against judgment-debtor's person—Decree-holder entitled to proceed against property or person as he*

ATTACHMENT—contd.**3. ATTACHMENT OF PERSON—contd.**

might think fit. Where a decree upon a hypothecation-bond allows satisfaction of the debt from the hypothecated property and also from the judgment-debtor personally, and contains no condition that execution shall first be enforced against the property, and where there is no question of fraud being perpetrated on the judgment-debtor, there is no principle of equity which prevents the decree-holder from enforcing his decree against the judgment-debtor's person or property, whichever he may think best. *Wali Muhammad v. Tarab Ali, I. L. R. 4 All. 497*, explained. *JOHARI MAL v. SANT LALL, I. L. R. 9 All. 484*

3. ——— Absconding debtor.

Where a defendant, against whose person an attachment in execution has been issued, absconded, a second attachment against his moveable property was granted, and the writ of attachment against the person was not recalled. *GREGORY v. HADZEE ESSUFF COONJEE, 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 244*

4. ——— Second application for attachment—Discretion of Court. *Held* by PHEAR J., that under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, a Court was not bound to grant, as a matter of course, a second application from a judgment-creditor for attachment, but ought always to require him to show why the steps previously taken did not lead to a full discharge of the debt, and ought not to grant its process a second time unless satisfied that the failure was not attributable to the applicant's own fault. *BYJNATH PUNDIT v. KUNHYA LALL PUNDIT, 9 W. R. 527*

5. ——— Discretion of Court—Act VIII of 1859, s. 221. In execution of a decree, a writ was issued against the defendant, who had not any property within the jurisdiction of the High Court. The first writ was made returnable in a month. Another writ, returnable in the same time, was issued, the first not being successful, but the defendants were not found. An application for a writ returnable in one year was refused. *Held*, on appeal, *per* PEACOCK, C.J., that, although the Judge had a discretion to refuse the writ under s. 221, Act VIII of 1859, yet the fact that the plaintiff had not used the utmost possible diligence was not sufficient ground on which the writ should be refused. *Per* MACPHERSON, J. The Court had a discretion under s. 221, and ought not to grant the writ where it is not satisfied that the parties have used every reasonable endeavour to execute former ones that have expired; as the former writs were returnable in so short a time, however, in this case the writ ought to be granted. *NITTAI CHANDRA PAL v. THAKUR DAS BISWAS, 8 B. L. R. 258* note

KALEE CHUNDER PAUL v. THAKUR DAS BISWAS, 12 W. R. O. C. 7

6. ——— Attachment and discharge—Further execution against debtor's property. After a debtor has been arrested in execution of a decree and discharged at the request of the

ATTACHMENT—contd.**3. ATTACHMENT OF PERSON—contd.**

creditor, his personal property may be taken in execution under the same decree. *JANOKI SINGH ROY v. KALOO MUNDUL, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 889: 9 W. R. 178*

7. ——— Non-satisfaction of decree against property of judgment-debtor—Right to attach person. Where a judgment-creditor had obtained a writ of attachment against the property of his judgment-debtor, but the debtor had no property to the knowledge of the creditor against which the attachment could be enforced:—*Held* (reversing the decision of the Court below), that he was entitled to an order for execution of the decree by attachment of the person of the debtor. *SETON v. BJOHN, 8 B. L. R. 255: 17 W. R. 165*

8. ——— Option of proceeding against person or property—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, 1882, s. 254 (1859, s. 201)—Execution of decree—Ex-parte decree. Under s. 201 of Act VIII of 1859, a judgment-creditor has the option of enforcing his decree against the person or property of the judgment-debtor, and the fact that such decree is an *ex-parte* one makes no difference. *RAJ CHUNDER ROY v. SHAMA SOONDARI DEBI, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 583*

9. ——— Arrest and discharge of debtor—Re-arrest. *D M*, a prisoner for debt, having been discharged for non-payment of subsistence-money, the execution-creditor applied for a rule *nisi* for his re-arrest, or for a new writ: *Held*, that a prisoner, once discharged on non-payment of his subsistence-money, cannot be re-arrested, nor can a new writ be issued against him for the former debt, and that the principle that no man shall be twice vexed on the same charge applies here. *Per* MORGAN, J. That there may be a distinction between the words "release" and "discharge" in Act VIII of 1859, and that the arrest of the person is not the full satisfaction here that it is under English law. *In the matter of DWARKALALL MITTER Bourke O. C. 109*

10. ——— Re-arrest—Distinction between arrest and imprisonment. The Code of Civil Procedure expressly preserves a distinction between arrest and imprisonment, and the immunity from further process is only generated by actual confinement. A second arrest, therefore, held to be legal. *CHINGALRAYA CHETTY v. SUBBIAH, 6 Mad. 84*

11. ——— Warrant of arrest, power of detention under—Illegal detention. The warrant of arrest in execution of decree empowers the Sheriff only to arrest the defendant in execution, and detain him for such reasonable time as is sufficient to allow of his being brought before the Court, and having an opportunity of applying for his discharge; the detention of such prisoner by the Sheriff after such reasonable time, without further authority of law, is illegal. *In re SUMBOO CHUNDER HALDAR. In re DURGAPERSAUD MITTER. In re RAKHAL DOSS, Bourke O. C. 59*

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*3. ATTACHMENT OF PERSON—*contd.*

12. ——— Imprisonment, period of—*Subsequent arrest in execution—Civil Procedure Code, Act XIV of 1882, ss. 481 and 342.* The defendant was arrested before judgment, and on the 5th February 1883 committed to jail under s. 481 of the Civil Procedure Code. On the 6th March following a decree in the suit was passed against him. On the 28th July, the defendant being then still in jail under the order of the 5th February, the plaintiff took out a fresh warrant of arrest in execution of the decree, and sought to have the defendant further imprisoned for the full period of six months limited by s. 342 of the Code. *Held*, that the defendant could be re-committed to jail, in execution of the decree, only for such a period as together with the period of imprisonment that had elapsed since the passing of the decree, would complete a period of six months, and that consequently he would be entitled to be liberated on the 5th September 1883. Imprisonment under s. 481 becomes, after decree, imprisonment in execution of the decree, and the imprisonment suffered after that date must consequently be taken into consideration in calculating the period of six months, which, by s. 342 of the Code, is the limit allowed for an imprisonment in execution of a decree. GHANASHAMDAS GOORSAMULL v. JOHARI-MULL KEDARINATH . . . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 431

13. ——— Imprisonment, several periods of—*Right to discharge.* A judgment-debtor, who has been imprisoned in execution of a decree, if the several periods of his imprisonment be added together, for more than the maximum period for which he can be legally kept in prison, is entitled to his release. KHODA BUKSH v. SHUKROOLLAH . . . 5 N. W. 220

14. ——— Order for arrest before judgment, form of—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, 1882, s. 481 (1859, ss. 78 and 276)—Commitment in execution of decree.* An order for the arrest before judgment of a debtor made in the form directed by s. 78 is, after judgment has passed, a commitment in execution of a decree within the meaning of s. 276. RAMPERSAUD ROY v. CALLACHAND DOSS . . . Bourke O. C. 423

15. ——— Discharge of judgment-debtor on offer to place estate at disposal of Court—*Act of bad faith subsequent to discharge—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 273, 275.* A judgment-debtor, having been arrested in 1871, offered to place his estate at the disposal of the Court, and was examined on oath as to the particulars of the estate and discharged from custody. His estate was never taken possession of, and part of it was subsequently disposed of by him to a stranger. *Held*, that he was not liable to be arrested again in execution of the decree. VENKATAKRISHNA CHARYA v. COELHO . . . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 170

16. ——— Decree payable by instalments—*Execution by arrest and imprisonment—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 341.* In the execution of a decree payable by instalments,

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*3. ATTACHMENT OF PERSON—*contd.*

the judgment-debtor cannot be arrested and imprisoned separately for default in the payment of each instalment. DAMODAR SHALIGRAM v. MALHARI . . . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 106

17. ——— Simultaneous execution by arrest and attachment of property—*Attempt to evade payment.* A warrant of arrest directed to be issued against the judgment-debtor, notwithstanding the previous proceedings by attachment, the Court being satisfied that the judgment-debtor was determined to evade, if possible, the payment of his debt. CHENA PEMAJI v. GHELABHAI NARANDAS . . . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 301

18. ——— Re-arrest of judgment-debtor—*Power of Court to arrest without petition.* It is not within the competence of a Judge to direct the re-arrest of a judgment-debtor without any petition or motion of the decree-holder to that effect. SHIB RAM MUNDLE v. ROHEEMTOOLLAH . . . 15 W. R. 69

19. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 341—*Non-payment of subsistence-money—Discharge.* The discharge of a judgment-debtor before imprisonment on account of the non-payment of the subsistence-money for the debtor is no bar to the debtor being re-arrested. SUBBA v. VENKATTA . . . I. L. R. 8 Mad. 21

20. ——— Discharge of debtor—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 336—Discharge of judgment-debtor arrested under decree of High Court—Right of discharge—Intention to be adjudicated insolvent.* A judgment-debtor, having been arrested in execution of a decree of the High Court in its Original Civil Jurisdiction and brought before the Court under the provisions of s. 336 of the Code of Civil Procedure, claimed to be discharged on the ground that he intended to apply to the Court to be declared an insolvent either under the provisions of Chap. XX of the Code or of 11 & 12 Vict., c. 21. *Held*, that the judgment-debtor, on expressing his intention to file a petition and schedule under 11 & 12 Vict., c. 21, and complying with the conditions of s. 336 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was entitled to be discharged. *Ex parte* PINSENT . . . I. L. R. 8 Mad. 276

21. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 336, 341, 344, 349—*Judgment-debtor—Imprisonment.* Ss. 336 and 349 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, are applicable to judgment-debtors under arrest, but not committed to jail. A judgment-debtor committed to jail can only be discharged under s. 341. *In re* QUARME . . . I. L. R. 8 Mad. 503

22. ——— Arrest of debtor in execution of decree—*"Arrest," meaning of—Insolvent judgment-debtor—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 349—"Arrest," "imprisonment," meaning of—Procedure where two methods of protection are open to the debtor.* A judgment-debtor arrested in execution of a decree for money, who has not, on his

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*3. ATTACHMENT OF PERSON—*contd.*

committal to jail, expressed his intention of applying to be declared an insolvent under Chap. XX of the Code of Civil Procedure, is nevertheless entitled during his imprisonment to make an application for that purpose; and the Court may, under s. 349, pending the hearing of such application, release him on his finding security to appear when called upon. The word "arrest" in s. 349 should be read as meaning "under detention" or "detained in custody." Where the Legislature has provided two methods by which a debtor can obtain protection from arrest or other serious consequences, and if one of those methods, in any particular case, turns out to be more favourable to the debtor than the other, the Courts will not deprive him of that advantage. *In the matter of HASTIE* . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 451

23. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 341 and 642—Execution of decree—Arrest of pleader while acting in his professional capacity—Discharge—Re-arrest.* Under s. 341 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the immunity of a judgment-debtor from a second arrest depends, not only upon his having been arrested, but upon his having been imprisoned under the arrest. *RAJENDRO NARAIN ROY v. CHUNDER MOHUN MISSER* . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 128

24. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 349—Court, power of, to release judgment-debtor after he is imprisoned—"Arrest" and "imprisonment."* "Arrest," as used in s. 349 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), does not include "imprisonment." Therefore the power conferred on the Court under that section to release a judgment-debtor arrested in execution of a decree on security being given by him ceases after he has been imprisoned or put into jail. *In the matter of Hastie, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 451*, dissented from. *In re Quarrie, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 503*, followed. *MAHOMED HUSEIN v. RADHI* . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 46

25. ———— *Insolvency—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 336, 337—Act VI of 1888—Debt not in schedule—Execution of decree obtained against insolvent for such debt—Scheduled debts.* A person who has taken the benefit of the insolvency sections of the Civil Procedure Code, and who is undischarged, but has not inserted in his schedule a debt for which a decree is subsequently obtained, is not protected from arrest in execution of such decree, merely because his property is in the hands of the Receiver in insolvency. Such a person is liable to arrest under the circumstances and in accordance with the procedure provided for by the Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VI of 1888). *PANNA LALL v. KANHAIYA LALL*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 85

26. ———— *Warrant of arrest—Imprisonment in jail other than that named in warrant—Release—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 336, 337.* A Sheriff's officer, of his own motion, delivered over to the officer in charge of the Alipore Jail a judgment-debtor who had been duly commit-

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*3. ATTACHMENT OF PERSON—*contd.*

ted to the Presidency Jail. *Held*, that the imprisonment was unlawful; that the delivery over to the officer in charge of the Alipore Jail amounted to a release; and that the prisoner was entitled, therefore, to be discharged. *SHAMSONESSA BEGUM v. LOVE*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 527

27. ———— *Re-arrest of debtor under same decree—Release on recognizance—Surrender under recognizance—Recognizance, expiry of—Arrest, fresh application for—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 239, 241, 341, 349, 357—Writ of attachment—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 491.* A judgment-debtor once arrested and imprisoned in execution of a decree cannot, under the Civil Procedure Code, be again arrested under a fresh writ of attachment on the same decree. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. JUDAH* . I. L. R. 12 Calc. 652

28. ———— *Arrest in execution of decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 341—Insolvency proceedings—Protection order, withdrawal of.* The Civil Procedure Code contemplates as immaterial the circumstances under which a judgment-debtor imprisoned in execution of a decree obtains his release from prison, and there is no power in the Court to order the arrest of such judgment-debtor a second time under the same decree. *The Secretary of State for India v. Judah, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 652*, followed. *In the matter of BOLYE CHAND DUTT*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 874

29. ———— *Arrest of purdah-nashin lady—Entering zenana—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 336.* It is not necessary that a special order of Court should be made, empowering an officer authorized to arrest a purdah-nashin lady to enter the zenana of the house in which she resides. Under s. 336 of the Civil Procedure Code, if the officer is able to enter the house, he may break into any room in the house, including the zenana, in order to effect the arrest. *KADUMBINEE DOSSEE v. KOYLASHKAMINEE DOSSEE*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 19: 9 C. L. R. 25

See DOORGA CHURN MITTER v. HUREE MOHUN GOOHO . 17 W. R. 86

30. ———— *Married woman—Imprisonment for debt.* Married women, against whom personal decrees for debt have been made, are not exempt from arrest or imprisonment in execution of such decrees under the Code of Civil Procedure. *LAKSHMANA v. KULLAMMA* . I. L. R. 9 Mad. 99

4. MODE OF ATTACHMENT AND IRREGULARITIES IN ATTACHMENT.

1. ———— *Attachment without sale—Sale in execution of decree.* Under the Code of Civil Procedure, property may be attached without

ATTACHMENT—contd.**4. MODE OF ATTACHMENT AND IRREGULARITIES IN ATTACHMENT—contd.**

view to immediate sale. *SARODA PROSAD MULLICK v. LUTCHMEPUT SINGH DOOGOR*

10 B. L. R. 214: 17 W. R. 289

14 Moo. I. A. 529

2. ———— **Sale without attachment—**
Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 203. Property must, under Act VIII of 1859, be attached before being sold in execution of decree, the words "attachment and sale" in s. 203 being taken together and not read distributively. *DENONATH RUCKIT v. MUTTY LALL PAUL*

1 Hyde 158: 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 125

3. ———— **Attachment of debts—**
Written notice—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 236. When the property to be attached consists of debts, a written notice of attachment is necessary under s. 236, Act VIII of 1859. Until the debtor receives such notice, he is bound to pay the amount of his debt to the creditor whose right to receive it has been declared by a decree of Court, and it is no part of the duty of the debtor to make enquiries whether his creditor is or is not entitled to receive the money. *THAKOOR DAS SINGH v. LUCHMEPUT DOOGOR*

7 W. R. 10

4. ———— **Proclamation of sale, issue of—***Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 285—Property not in jurisdiction.* Where an attachment is made under s. 285, Act VIII of 1859, the only further process required to bring the property to sale is the due issue of the proclamation of sale: the property need not be attached. If the property be not within the jurisdiction of the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree, the course to be followed by the decree-holder is that prescribed in ss. 285 and following. *MOOKTA KESHEE DEBEE v. KUNUCK MONEE DEBEE*

7 W. R. 267

5. ———— **Attachment by Court which did not pass decree—***Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 285.* The attachment of immoveable property by a Court other than that which passed the decree before the decree had been sent to it for execution vitiates the sale subsequently made of that property, as not being made in strict observance of the procedure prescribed by s. 285 of Act VIII of 1859. *SHURUTOOLAH MERDHA v. GOOROO CHURN DASS*

8 W. R. 310

6. ———— **Sale of shares of zamindari hypothecated by lessee for arrears of rent.** Where the shares of a zamindari hypothecated by the lessee are to be sold to recover arrears of rent due to the Court of Wards, no attachment is necessary, and the Collector has no power to attach the property previous to sale. *JOGESSUR SAHOY v. GOPAL LALL*

13 W. R. 173

7. ———— **Estates paying revenue to Government—***Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 213.* In attaching an estate paying revenue to Government, the attaching creditor must, in addition to the information required by the 1st clause of

ATTACHMENT—contd.**4. MODE OF ATTACHMENT AND IRREGULARITIES IN ATTACHMENT—contd.**

s. 213, Act VIII of 1859, in respect of ordinary immoveable property, give also the special information indicated in the latter clause of that section, that section being cumulative in respect of estates paying revenue to Government. *AJOODHIYA DOSS v. SHEO PERSHUN SINGH*

11 W. R. 175

8. ———— **Notice of attachment—***Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 213.* The intention of s. 213, Act VIII of 1859, is that the description in a notice of attachment should be sufficient to identify the property; and in the case of an estate paying revenue to Government, that there should be a specification of the revenue. *LACK RAM v. MOHESH DASS*

12 W. R. 488

DHERAJ MAHTAB CHUND v. BURODANATH MUNDUL

18 W. R. 411

9. ———— **Notice of attachment—***Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 213.* Where a property was described as a lakhiraj tank with four banks, the boundaries of which were given, the identification was held to be fully made out. *DHERAJ MAHTAB CHUND v. BURDAONATH MUNDUL*

18 W. R. 411

10. ———— **Decree directing sale of certain property and, in case of non-satisfaction, of other property—***Right to attach and sell first property, effect of failure to get satisfaction from second property on.* Where a decree directs the sale of A's property first, and then of B's, if the decree-holder is unable, from opposition, to sell A's property, and proceeds against B's and cannot realize his decree therefrom, he has not lost his right to attach and sell A's property. *STEPHENSON v. ANNODA DOSSEE*

6 W. R. 18

11. ———— **Attachment of money in hands of Receiver—***Attachment made without sanction of Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 272.* An attachment of money in the hands of the Receiver made without previous permission or sanction of the Court for such attachment is improper and irregular, and the Court will refuse to recognize it. *Khan v. Ali Mahomed Haji Umer, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 577*, followed. *MAHOMMED ZOHURUDDEN v. MAHOMMED NOOROODDEEN*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 85

12. ———— **Attachment of property in hands of Manager—***Mortgaged property—Second attachment.* Where attached property is mortgaged by the judgment-debtor with the consent of all parties concerned, yet, so as to leave some proprietary interest in the judgment-debtor, any judgment-creditor coming after the appointment of the manager and the making of the said mortgage has a right notwithstanding to attach and sell what remains of the judgment-debtor's interest in the property. An application for such second attachment cannot properly be refused by a Court on the ground of the property being under the management of the District Court pursuant to

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s. 243, even if the Judge's precept forbids such attachment. So far as the property sought to be attached is moveable, if in the hands of the Judge or the Judge's Court, it must be attached in the mode prescribed by the first part of Act VIII of 1859, s. 239, and a notice so sent to the Judge is an effectual attachment of such moveable property, although it is refused by the Judge, whose refusal to receive the notice cannot make that no attachment which would otherwise be a good attachment. *In the matter of the petition of TEIL & Co. TEIL & Co. v. ABDOL HYE* 19 W. R. 37

13. Attachment and sale of mortgage-bond—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 268, 274*—Lien of purchaser on mortgaged property after attachment under s. 268. In execution of a decree obtained by them against J and M, the plaintiffs attached a decree obtained by J and M against D, and on the allegation that J and M, in order to avoid the consequence of this attachment, executed a benami conveyance of their interest under the attached decree to B and P, and afterwards with the same object took in adjustment and satisfaction of that decree two bonds in favour of R and I, respectively, by which immoveable property was pledged as collateral security, the plaintiffs attached these two bonds by prohibitory order, under s. 268 of the Civil Procedure Code, and purchased them at the sale in execution of their decree. In a suit on the bonds against D, as the principal defendant with J, M, B, P, R, and I joined as parties:—*Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to enforce the lien created by the bonds against the immoveable property specified in them, notwithstanding that no attachment had been made in accordance with the provisions of s. 274 of the Code; a debt secured by a mortgage lien on immoveable property not being "immoveable property" within the meaning of that section. *DEBENDRA KUMAR MANDEL v. RUP LALL DASS* I. L. R. 12 Calc. 546

14. Civil Procedure Code, s. 274, cl. (c)—Rights of purchaser of mortgage-bond at sale in execution of decree. Where a person at an execution-sale purchases a mortgage-bond under which certain immoveable property is given as collateral security for an advance, the fact that he has not attached under s. 274 of the Code will not affect his right to have the collateral security enforced by the sale of the properties mortgaged. *KASINATH DAS v. SADASIV PATNAIK* I. L. R. 20 Calc. 805

15. Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 268 and 274—Attachment of mortgage-debt—Sale under irregular attachment—Suit by purchaser on mortgage. The plaintiff sued to recover principal and interest due on a mortgage. He claimed title as purchaser at a Court sale held in execution of a decree against the mortgagee. It appeared that there had been no attachment under

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*4. MODE OF ATTACHMENT AND IRREGULARITIES IN ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

Civil Procedure Code, s. 274, but under s. 268 only. *Held*, that the purchase by the plaintiff was not invalid by reason of the last-mentioned circumstance, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover as against the property. *DEBENDRA KUMAR MANDEL v. RUP LALL DASS*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 546, and *KASINATH DAS v. SADASIV PATNAIK*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 805, referred to. *MUNIAPPA NAIK v. SUBRAMANIA AYYAN* I. L. R. 18 Mad. 437

16. Sale of mortgage-debt in execution of a decree against mortgage—Sale carrying with it security without attaching mortgaged property—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 274*. The sale of a mortgage-debt described as such in execution of a decree carries with it the security without attaching the mortgaged property under s. 274 of the Civil Procedure Code. *DEBENDRA KUMAR MANDEL v. RUP LALL DASS*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 546, and *APPASAMI v. SCOTT*, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 5, 7, per *TURNER, J.*, followed. *BALDEV DHANRUP MARVADI v. RAMCHANDRA BALVANT KULKARNI* I. L. R. 19 Bom. 121

17. Civil Procedure Code—Rights and interests of mortgagee out of possession. Where the rights and interests under his mortgage of a mortgagee out of possession are attached in execution of a decree, the procedure by which such attachment must be effected is that prescribed by s. 268 of the Code of Civil Procedure. S. 274 of the Code cannot be applied in such a case. *KARIM-UN-NISSA v. PHUL CHAND* I. L. R. 15 All. 134

18. Sale in execution held in pursuance of an attachment irregularly made—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 268 and 274*—Rights of auction-purchaser. *Held*, that a sale of the mortgagee's rights under a mortgage duly held and confirmed was effectual to pass the mortgagee's rights to the auction-purchaser, even though the attachment subsequent to which such sale was held might have been made under a wrong section of the Code of Civil Procedure. *BAL KRISHNA v. MASUMA BIBI*, I. L. R. 5 All. 142; *L. R. 9 I. A. 182*, *MAHADEO DUBEY v. BHOLA NATH DICHIT*, I. L. R. 5 All. 86, *RAM CHAND v. PITAMMAL*, I. L. R. 10 All. 506, and *KARIM-UN-NISSA v. PHUL CHAND*, I. L. R. 15 All. 134, referred to. *SHEO CHARAN LAL v. SHEO SEWAK SINGH* I. L. R. 18 All. 469

19. Irregularity in attachment—*Beng. Reg. VII of 1825, s. 7*—Omission to require security. An attachment made under Bengal Regulation VII of 1825, without first requiring security as directed by s. 7 of that Regulation, was held to have been irregularly made, but the irregularity was not one which affected the jurisdiction of the Court or made the attachment void. *KHODAJANINISSA v. STEVENS* 20 W. R. 433

20. Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 239—Immaterial injury. An attach-

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*4. MODE OF ATTACHMENT AND IRREGULARITIES IN ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

ment of immoveable property is not voidable, merely because all the forms prescribed in s. 239, Code of Civil Procedure, have not been followed when the irregularities complained of are immaterial and not productive of any substantial injury to the person who objects to the proceedings. *KOORANEE DASSI v. BHUBUN MOHINEE DASSI*

6 W. R. Mis. 52

21. *Attachment of more property than is necessary.* Where the decree-holder wantonly attached more property than was necessary for the discharge of his claim, the Court may order sequestration of only a portion of the property attached. *PURSOTUM DOSS v. GOODEY NARAIN MULL*

1 Agra Mis. 3

22. *Incorrect description of property sought to be attached—Sale in execution of decree—Subsequent purchase of same property under a decree for pre-emption—Civil Procedure Code, s. 274.* In execution of a simple money-decree against the holders of a muafi interest in a certain village, who did not possess any zamindari interest in that village, an attachment was obtained by the decree-holder in 1884 of "an eight biswas zamindari share of mouza D," and under that attachment a sale took place in January 1886. Meanwhile, in December 1885, a decree for pre-emption in respect of a sale by the judgment-debtors in 1881 of their muafi interests in the village was decreed in favour of persons who were not parties to the litigation in which the attachment of 1884 was effected. The plaintiffs (who were in possession) sued for a declaration of their right to the muafi interests as against the auction-purchaser under the sale of January 1886. *Held*, that the attachment in 1884 was not a good attachment of the muafi interests of the judgment-debtors, and the auction-purchaser could not be held to have purchased those muafi interests, and the title of the plaintiffs under their pre-emptive decree of December 1885 must prevail. *HARGU LAL SINGH v. MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN*

I. L. R. 13 All. 119

23. *Attachment of assets of a judgment-debtor outside the jurisdiction of the attaching Court—Practice—Procedure.* The plaintiff, having obtained a decree against the defendant in the Court at Bhusaval, sought to execute it by attaching a moiety of the defendant's pay. The defendant was a sorter in the Railway Mail Service, and travelled between Bhusaval and Nagpur, at which latter place he raised and received his pay. By an order of attachment issued, at the plaintiff's instance, by the Bhusaval Court to the defendant's disbursing officer at Nagpore, a moiety of pay having been withheld by that officer, the defendant applied to the Bhusaval Court to cancel the order, contending that it was illegal, as neither he nor his disbursing officer resided at Bhusaval. On reference to the High Court:—*Held*, that the order of attachment was *ultra vires*, as neither the defendant nor

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*4. MODE OF ATTACHMENT AND IRREGULARITIES IN ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

his disbursing officer resided within the jurisdiction of the Bhusaval Court. The proper procedure was to send the decree of the Bhusaval Court for execution to Nagpore, where the disbursing officer resided and the defendant's pay was available for satisfaction of the decree. *RANGO JAIRAM v. BALKRISHNA VITHAL*

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 44

GOPAL v. LEVET . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 45 note

24. *Attachment before judgment—Termination of attachment—Sale in execution—Material irregularity in publishing or conducting sale without attachment—Waiver—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 311, 483.* The plaintiff instituted a suit against the defendant for recovery of money, and previous to judgment, that is, on the 8th January 1885, applied for, and on the 11th obtained, orders for attachment of several houses and premises belonging to defendant, and such attachment was made. The suit was dismissed, but eventually on appeal it was decreed, but the attachment was never withdrawn. Plaintiff then applied for execution of his decree, and his application was granted by an order directing that the property of the judgment-debtor should be notified for sale on the 1st February 1887, and accordingly, on the 21st December 1880, a sale notification was issued. Judgment-debtor twice applied for postponement of sale, but his applications were refused, and the sale took place on the date fixed. The judgment-debtor then objected to the confirmation of the sale, urging that the property sold was never attached in execution of the decree, and the attachment previous to judgment was infructuous, because afterwards the claim was dismissed by the Court of first instance; that there had been several other irregularities in publishing and conducting the sale; and that, owing to the irregularities, property had been sold at a grossly inadequate price, causing substantial injury. The Subordinate Judge, overruling the objections, confirmed the sale. On appeal by the judgment-debtor:—*Held*, following *Mahadeo Dubey v. Bholu Nath Dichit*, I. L. R. 5 All. 86, that a regularly perfected attachment is an essential preliminary to sales in execution of decrees for money; and where there has been no such attachment, any sale that may have taken place is not simply voidable, but *de facto* void, and may be set aside without any inquiry as to substantial injury being sustained by the judgment-debtor for want of a valid attachment; and that an attachment before judgment, like a temporary injunction, becomes *functus officio* as soon as the suit terminates. Further, that the phrase "a material irregularity in publishing or conducting" in the first paragraph of s. 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be liberally construed, and that absence of attachment of property at the time of sale thereof is "a material irregularity," attachment being the first step which a Court in executing a simple money-decree has to take to

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*4. MODE OF ATTACHMENT AND IRREGULARITIES IN ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

assert its authority to bring property to compulsory sale. *RAM CHAND v. PITAM MAL*

I. L. R. 10 All. 508

25. *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 268, 272—Official Trustee's Act (XVII of 1864)—Public officer—Attachment by notice.* A decree against a married woman provided that the amount due under it should be payable out of the separate estate of the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor was entitled to a life-interest in certain trust funds under a settlement of which the Official Trustee was the trustee. The decree-holder proceeded to execute his decree against the life-interest of the judgment-debtor by notice to the Official Trustee under s. 272 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but there were no funds in the hands of the Official Trustee which would have been attachable under s. 268. The decree-holder now applied that the life-interest might be sold. *Held*, that the interest of the judgment-debtor was not validly attached. *Semble*: The Official Trustee is a public officer within the meaning of s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. *ABDOOL LATEEF v. DOUTRE*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 250

26. *Attachment of equity of redemption—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 266 and 274—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 60.* The equity of redemption of the mortgagor is immoveable property, and is, as such, liable to be attached and sold in execution of a decree under s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). Its attachment can be effected under s. 274 of the Code by an order prohibiting the judgment-debtor from dealing with it in any way and all persons from receiving it, such order being proclaimed and notified as therein directed. *PARASHRAM HARLAL v. GOVIND GANESH PORGAUMKAR*

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 226

27. *Attachment of money in hands of Receiver—Attachment made without sanction of Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 272.* An attachment of money in the hands of the Receiver made without previous permission or sanction of the Court for such attachment is improper and irregular, and the Court will refuse to recognize it. *Kahn v. Alli Mahomed Haji Umar*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 577, followed. *MAHOMMED ZOHRUDDIN v. MAHOMMED NOOROODDEEN*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 85

28. *Attachment for arrears of rent—Notice of attachment before portion of arrears became due.* Where property was attached for arrears of rent:—*Held*, that the attachment was not vitiated by the circumstance that notice of the attachment was given before a portion of the arrears claimed had become due. *KAMALA NAYAK v. RANGA RAU*

1 Mad. 24

29. *Copy of order for attachment not fixed in Collector's office—Civil*

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*4. MODE OF ATTACHMENT AND IRREGULARITIES IN ATTACHMENT—*concl.*

Procedure Code, s. 274—Copy of order for attachment not fixed up in Collector's office. In execution of a money-decree, an order was issued, under s. 274 of the Civil Procedure Code, for the attachment of property which was the joint ancestral estate of the judgment-debtor and his father. A copy of this order was not fixed up in the office of the Collector of the district in which the land was situate, as required by s. 274. *Held*, that, though the defect in the manner in which the attachment was made might render the attachment ineffectual for the purpose of voiding alienations made, the attachment was effectual against the judgment-debtor, and the defect did not afford a ground for declaring the execution proceedings ineffectual. *RAI BALKISHEN v. RAI SITA RAM*

I. L. R. 7 All. 731

30. *Attaching creditor has no cause of action for wrongful removal of attached property—Such creditor's remedy, if any, lies in execution and not by separate suit—S. 91 (f) of Transfer of Property Act not applicable to attaching creditors.* An execution creditor does not by attachment acquire such an interest in the attached property as will enable him to maintain an action for its wrongful removal. The rights of attaching creditors are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure and the provisions of s. 91 (f) of the Transfer of Property Act do not apply to them. The remedy, if any, of the attaching creditor is by proceedings in execution and not by separate suit. *Godu Ram v. Suraj Mal*, I. L. R. 27 All. 378, doubted. *KARUPPAN CHETTI v. KANDASAMI THEVAN* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 207

5. PRIORITY OF ATTACHMENT.

1. *Question of priority of attachment—Attachment under decree of High Court of property already attached under decree of Small Cause Court—Claim to attached property, by what Court to be decided—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 272.* In execution of a decree obtained in the High Court, the plaintiffs, on the 22nd of March 1895, attached certain property of the defendant, which, however, had been already attached on the 22nd of February 1895 by one R, who had obtained a decree against defendant in the Court of Small Causes. The plaintiffs' attachment was therefore effected under s. 272 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) by a notice addressed by the Prothonotary of the High Court to the Registrar of the Small Cause Court. The claimant was mortgagee in possession, and the defendants were his tenants. On the 26th February he had lodged a claim in the Small Cause Court to the said property as mortgagee in possession, and on the 25th March 1895 a consent order was passed by the Chief Judge of that Court directing that R's attachment should stand subject to the claimant's claim. On the 22nd April 1895, the claimant

ATTACHMENT—contd.**5. PRIORITY OF ATTACHMENT—concl'd.**

applied to the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court to issue a notice to the plaintiffs in this suit, under s. 272 of the Civil Procedure Code, to determine the question of priority of claim to the attached property between him and the plaintiffs. His application was refused, the Chief Judge being of opinion that he could not interfere in a High Court suit. The claimant then filed his claim in the High Court, and took out this summons to remove the plaintiffs' attachment. *Held*, that, under s. 272 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Small Cause Court was the only Court to decide the question of priority between the claimant and the plaintiffs. JEYNARAYAN MEGHRAZ v. ISMAIL KURIMA

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 710

2. ———— *Creates legal rights though it creates no charge having priority over other creditors—Action maintainable for wilful infraction of such right, without justification.* An attaching creditor does not acquire any charge on the attached property which would give him priority over other creditors claiming rateable distribution or over the general body of creditors proving in an insolvency of the judgment-debtor. He however acquires a right to have the property kept in *custodia legis* for the satisfaction of his debt. An intentional interference, without sufficient justification with such right is an actionable wrong for which an action will lie. *Suraj Bunshe Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 148, 174, referred to. *Krishna Rau v. Lakshmana Shanbhogue*, I. L. R. 4 Mad. 302, referred to. *Frederick Peacock v. Madon Gopal*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 428, distinguished. *Krishnasawmy Mudaliar v. Official Assignee of Madras*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 673, distinguished. *Quin v. Leatham*, [1901] A. C. 495, referred to. Where property attached in execution is removed by one who is not a party to the suit, the decree-holder must enforce his claim by a separate suit and not in execution. *Mirza Mahomed Aga Ali Khan v. The Widow of Balmakund*, L. R. 3 I. A. 241, distinguished. SANKARALINGA REDDI v. KANDASAMI TEVAN (1907)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 413

6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT.

1. ———— *Effect on alienation of setting aside ex-parte decree—Civil Procedure Code, s. 240—Validity of attachment—Ex-parte decree.* The effect of granting an application under s. 119 of Act VIII of 1859 is to declare that there has not been yet a valid decree in the suit, and thereby any attachment that has issued in execution of the decree which has been set aside becomes invalid. A obtained a decree *ex-parte* against B. Property belonging to B was attached in execution. While under attachment, B sold the property to C. Afterwards B applied for and obtained an order, under s. 119 of Act VIII of 1859, to set aside A's decree and for a new trial. *Held*, that C's purchase was not null and void under s. 240 of Act VIII of 1859. LALA JAGAT NARAYAN v. TULSTRAM

I B. L. R. A. C. 71

ATTACHMENT—contd.**6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT—contd.**

JUGGUT NARAIN v. TOOLSEE RAM

10 W. R. 99

2. ———— *Incumbrance pending attachment—Right of purchaser at sale at instance of second attaching creditor.* The purchaser of the right, title, and interest of a judgment-debtor in certain immoveable property at an auction-sale which took place at the instance of a second attaching creditor was held to take the property subject to an incumbrance created by the judgment-debtor pending the first, but prior to the second, attachment, although the first attaching creditor was first paid out of the proceeds of the sale. *Quære*: What the sale ought not to have been under the first attachment as against which the incumbrance would have been void. GURU PRASAD SAHU v. BINDA BIBI

9 B. L. R. 180 : 18 W. R. 279

3. ———— *Bona fide private alienation—Act VIII of 1859, s. 240.* *Held* (MARKBY, J., dissenting), that a private *bona fide* alienation for value of property attached under Act VIII of 1859, made during the continuance of the attachment, is, by s. 240 of that Act, null and void only as against the attaching creditor or persons who may acquire rights under or through the attachment, and not as against the whole world. ANANDO LALL DASS v. RADHAMOHAN SHAW

2 B. L. R. F. B. 49 : 11 W. R. O. C. 1

Same case affirmed in the Privy Council. ANUND LAL DASS v. JULLODHUR SHAW

10 B. L. R. 134 : 17 W. R. 313 :

14 Moo. I. A. 543

RAM CHARAN LAL v. JHATU SAHU

12 B. L. R. 413 note : 14 W. R. 25

BALMOKUND v. RAMHIT DASS . 13 W. R. 134

4. ———— *Private alienation which does not interfere with any claim enforceable under a subsisting attachment.* The alienation which s. 276 of the Code of Civil Procedure is intended to prevent is an alienation which, if permitted, would defeat claims legally enforceable under the decree in execution of which the property alienated has been attached. When a private alienation of attached property is made under such circumstances that it in no way interferes with the rights secured by his decree to the attaching decree-holder, s. 276 is no bar to such alienation. *Narain Das v. Sheambar Ahir*, *Weekly Notes*, (1897) 37, and *Anund Loll Doss v. Jullodhur Shaw*, 10 B. L. R. 134 : 14 Moo. I. A. 543, referred to. ABDUL RASHID v. GAFPO LAL . I. L. R. 20 All. 421

5. ———— *Alienation during attachment—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 276.* Any private alienation of a property attached before judgment, during the continuance of the attachment, is void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. The effect of an attach-

ATTACHMENT—contd.**6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT—contd.**

ment of a property under the Civil Procedure Code, whether made before or after decree, is the same, provided that in the former case a decree is made for the plaintiff at whose instance the attachment takes place. *Raj Chander Roy v. Isser Chander Roy, Bourke O. C. 139*, referred to. *GANTU SINGH v. JANG LIAL* . . . **I. L. R. 26 Cal. 531**

6. ———— Effect of removal of attachment—Execution struck off from laches of decree-holder. Certain property was attached in execution of a decree, and while the attachment was in force, pottahs were granted to certain persons by the judgment-debtors. Twelve years after the attachment no further steps having been taken in the matter, the execution case was struck off the file, and the property was afterwards mortgaged by the judgment-debtors to *R*. Subsequently, a fresh attachment was issued at the instance of the heirs of the former attaching creditor, under which the property was put up for sale subject to *R*'s mortgage, and *R* herself became the purchaser. In a suit by *R* to set aside the pottahs granted during the continuance of the first attachment:—*Held*, that the prohibition against alienation of property under attachment avoids such alienation only as against the execution-creditor or person entitled to claim under him. A conveyance executed by the judgment-debtor after an attachment has been removed, and before a fresh attachment is issued, is valid, though the second attachment is under the same execution as the first. *Quære*: Whether an alienation of property under attachment void as against the execution-creditor becomes valid by relation when the attachment is removed. *Semble*: It may be presumed that an execution long neglected, and finally struck off, has ceased to be operative, and in that case a judgment creditor's title will only date from any subsequent attachment which he may obtain. *PUDDOMONEE DOSSEE v. ROY MUTHOORANATH CHOWDHRY*

12 B. L. R. 411 : 20 W. R. 133

GOONJESSUR KOONWAR v. LUCHMEE NARAIN SINGH . . . **20 W. R. 418**

ATONGINY DOSSEE v. CHOWDHRY JUNMUNJOY MULLICK . . . **25 W. R. 513**

Quære: Would this decision apply where the delay was caused by the decree-holder's willingness to give his debtor every indulgence and every opportunity of repaying the debt? See *per GLOVER J. INDURJEET KOER v. LUCHMUN SINGH*

24 W. R. 56

7. ———— Presumption of abandonment of attachment. A deed of alienation of certain property made pending an attachment of the property was held not to become valid by reason of the removal of the attachment. It does not follow because subsequent applications for attachment are made by a decree-holder, that the original one is abandoned. *DHIRAJ MAHATAB CHAND BAHADUR v. SURNOMOYEE DOSSEE*

12 B. L. R. 414 note : 15 W. R. 222

ATTACHMENT—contd.**6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT—contd.**

8. ———— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 273—Dismissal for an application for execution—Attachment of a decree—Execution of attached decree. The holder of a decree dated 1885 applied to execute it, but his application was dismissed in March 1887 on the ground that "no further steps had been taken." It did not appear that any notice was given to him before the order of dismissal was made. Nevertheless the decree-holder proceeded to execute a decree of the judgment-debtor attached by him and brought to sale certain property which was in question in the present suit, and it was purchased *bond fide* by the present defendant, who obtained a sale certificate from the Court. The present plaintiff claimed as assignee from the holder of the attached decree to execute it against the same land, and now sued for a declaration that it was liable to be brought to sale by him, and that the defendant's purchase was void as against him. *Held*, (1) that under the circumstances of the case the attachment in execution of the decree of 1885 was subsisting at the time of the purchase by the defendant; (2) that a judgment-creditor who attaches a decree is competent to execute it. *RANGASAMI CHETTI v. PERIASAMI MUDALI*

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 58

9. ———— Termination of attachment by abandonment. The plaintiff had an attachment against certain property. Owing to his not filing a necessary affidavit, the execution petition was struck off. Subsequently he applied for the sale of the property, and the Court directed a fresh attachment to issue. It was held that these facts did not amount to an abandonment of the first attachment by the plaintiff. *SRINIVASA SASTRIAL v. SAMI RAU* . . . **I. L. R. 17 Mad. 180**

10. ———— Assignment of decree—Second attachment by assignee—Presumption as to cessation of prior attachment. If at the date of the assignment of a decree the judgment-debtor's property is already under attachment, in execution of such decree, it is not necessary for the assignee of the decree to apply for a fresh attachment. When either the decree-holder or his assignee applies to have attachment under the decree of property which has been previously attached under the decree, it lies upon the decree-holder or the assignee of the decree, as the case may be, if the question is raised, to show that the second application was unnecessary by reason of the first attachment being still subsisting. Failing such evidence, a Court may presume that the prior attachment had ceased before the application for a second attachment was made. *PUDDOMONEE DOSSEE v. MUTHOORA NATH CHOWDHRY*, 12 B. L. R. 411, referred to. *HAFIJ SULEMAN v. ABDULLAH* . . . **I. L. R. 16 All. 138**

11. ———— Circumstances showing expiry of attachment. An attachment, which had, at one time, prohibited alienation of the property, and on which the plaintiffs relied as

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

having rendered the mortgage invalid, was held under the circumstances to have been no longer in operation at the time when the mortgage was executed, and the mortgage was upheld. *MAHOMED MOJUFFER HOSSEIN v. KISHORI MOHUN ROY*

I. L. R. 22 Cal. 909
I. L. R. 22 I. A. 129

12. ———— *Order releasing property from attachment—Subsequent decree establishing attaching creditor's right to attached property—Mortgage of attached property between release and subsequent decree—Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, ss. 276, 280, and 283.* A decree-holder attached the property of certain of the defendants, who then obtained an order of release under s. 280 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and subsequently mortgaged the property. The attaching creditor thereupon sued for and obtained, under s. 283 of the Code, a declaration that the mortgaged property was nevertheless liable to be sold under this attachment. A few days after obtaining such decree, he again attached the judgment-debtor's property. The mortgagees then sued on their mortgage, and obtained a decree for sale. The sale in execution of the attaching creditor's decree and that ordered by the decree in favour of the mortgagees were both advertised for the same day. The plaintiff purchased at the sale under the attaching creditor's decree, and then sued for a declaration that the property was not liable to be sold in execution of the mortgage-decree on the ground that the judgment-creditor's attachment was restored by the decree under s. 283 of the Code, and that the mortgage executed by the judgment-debtors was invalid as against the plaintiff, the purchaser at the execution sale. *Held* (affirming the decisions of the Subordinate Judge and the District Judge), that the plaintiff was entitled to the decree sought. *Mahommed Waris v. Pitumber Sein*, 21 W. R. 435, applied. *BONOMALI RAI v. PROSUNNO NARAIN CHOWDHRY* . . . I. L. R. 23 Cal. 829

13. ———— *Execution case struck off the file.* Where, certain immoveable property having been attached, the execution case was subsequently struck off the file, and the judgment-debtor applied again for attachment of the same property:—*Held*, looking to the particular circumstances of the case, that a private alienation of the property, after the date of such application, but before attachment, was not void under the provisions of s. 240 of Act VIII of 1859. The principle of the High Court's decision in *Ahmud Hussain Khan v. Muhammad-Azim Khan*, 1 N. W. 51: *Ed.* 1873, 48, followed. *JAIB-UN-NISSA v. JAIRAM GIR* . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 616

14. ———— *Alienation under irregular attachment—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 239, 240—Private alienation after attachment.* Certain land was attached in the execution of a decree in the manner required by s. 235 of Act VIII of 1859,

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

but a copy of the order of attachment was not, as required by s. 239 of that Act, fixed up in a conspicuous part or in any part at all of the Court-house of the Court executing the decree, nor was it sent or fixed up in the office of the Collector of the district in which the land was situated. Subsequently to the attachment of the land, the judgment-debtor privately alienated it by sale. *Held*, that, as the attachment had not been made known as prescribed by law, the provisions of s. 240 of Act VIII of 1859 did not apply, and the sale was not null and void. *Indra Chandra v. Agra and Masterman's Bank*, 1 B. L. R. S. N. 20: 10 W. R. 264, followed. *NUR AHMAD v. ALTAF ALI*

I. L. R. 2 All. 58

15. ———— *Alienation under attachment to satisfy future default—Decree for money payable by instalments—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 240, 243, 245.* A obtained a decree against B for a sum payable by instalments. B made default in payment of an instalment, and A attached certain immoveable property belonging to B. While under attachment, B sold the property to C, and out of the proceeds paid into Court the full amount of the debt then due and for which the property had been attached. A took out the money, but applied for and obtained an order from the Munsif that the property should remain under attachment, in order to satisfy any future sum which should fall due under the decree and in payment of which B should make default. B failed to pay a further instalment when due, and A obtained an order for sale of the property. A himself became the purchaser, and was put in possession by the Court, notwithstanding the claim of C, who had been in possession ever since his purchase. In a suit by C to recover possession:—*Held*, that the Court had no power to make the order continuing the attachment, the right of attachment being only for sums actually due, and the whole amount for which execution issued being satisfied out of the proceeds, the alienation of the property to C was not void as against A. *RAMDHAN MITTER v. KAILAS NATH DUTT*

4 B. L. R. A. C. 20: 12 W. R. 457

16. ———— *Alienation under attachment not properly executed—Suit for money paid to stay foreclosure—Act VIII of 1859, s. 240—Mortgage—Lien.* In execution of a decree, A, the judgment creditor, obtained an order for the attachment of certain property of B, the judgment-debtor, but it was not executed as required by Act VIII of 1859. The property was, however, advertised for sale, and B obtained an order staying the sale, on a petition alleging that A had agreed to give him time on condition that the attachment should remain good, and declaring that he (B) would not alienate the property until the whole of the decree was satisfied. Subsequently B mortgaged a portion of this property to C. A assigned his decree to D, upon whose application the property was attached

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

and sold, and *E* became the purchaser. *C* having taken steps to foreclose the mortgage, *E*, to prevent such foreclosure, paid the amount into Court. *Held*, that *E* could not maintain a suit against *C* to recover the amount so paid by him. The mortgage by *B* was not an alienation null and void under s. 240, Act VIII of 1859. *B*'s petition did not create a charge upon the property in favour of *A*. *RAMESWAR SINGH v. RAMTANTU GHOSE*

4 B. L. R. A. C. 24

RUTNESSUR SING v. RAM TANOO GHOSE

12 W. R. 491

17. ——— Alienation made under agreement for satisfaction—*Sanction of Court*—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 240*. The plaintiff sued to recover certain land which had been hypothecated to him in 1843, and subsequently sold to him in 1868, while under attachment in execution of a decree in a suit brought by the plaintiff to establish his hypothecatory claim. The third defendant claimed under a mortgage prior in date to the hypothecation to the plaintiff, and under a sale prior in date to the sale to the plaintiff, made to the third defendant whilst the land was under attachment in execution of the decree to the plaintiff. *Held*, that the sale to the third defendant, which was made not under any agreement with the plaintiff for the satisfaction of the decree through the Court, was invalid by reason of s. 240 of the Civil Procedure Code; but that the alienation to the plaintiff, the decree-holder, during the attachment to satisfy the decree, which was duly sanctioned by the approval of the Court which issued the process of attachment, was valid. *ANNAVUNADAVAN v. IYASAWMY PILLAY* . . . 6 Mad. 65

18. ——— Sale by consent of judgment-creditor—*Subsequent withdrawal of attachment*. Where a judgment-debtor raised a sum of money by a sale of part of the attached property and devoted some part of that money to a payment on account to the judgment-creditor, and the judgment creditor thereupon withdrew from the execution and from the attachment of the property:—*Held*, that the attachment would not invalidate the sale. *PRANNATH MITTER v. SUMBHOO CHUNDER NATH*

7 W. R. 430

19. ——— Mortgage pending attachment—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 240*. *Held* by LOCH and E. JACKSON, JJ., that a mortgage of any kind made after attachment is such an alienation as is contemplated by s. 240, Act VIII of 1859, and is null and void. *MUNNOO LALL v. REET BRUNGUN SINGH* 9 W. R. 544

20. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 276*—*Lease of property under attachment*. *Held*, that a *zur-i-peshgi* lease and an ordinary agricultural lease made by a judgment-debtor of property under attachment were alienations which were void by reason of the prohibition

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

contained in s. 276 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *DEVI PRASAD v. BALDEO* . I. L. R. 18 All. 123

21. ——— Requirements of attachment not complied with—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 240*. Before an attachment can be relied on under s. 240, Code of Civil Procedure, for the purpose of invalidating any subsequent alienation, it must be shown to have been duly made by a written order issued and published, viz., the prohibitory notice prescribed by law. *DWARKANATH BISWAS v. RAM CHUNDER ROY*

13 W. R. 136

22. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 235, 239, and 240*. *Held*, that the alienation of property cannot be declared void under the provisions of s. 240, Act VIII of 1859, where no attachment order was issued or notified in the manner prescribed by ss. 235 and 239 of the said enactment. Where there was no attachment after the manner prescribed in Act VIII of 1859, but the property was advertised for sale, and the judgment-debtor encumbered the property with lien:—*Held*, that the decree-holder could sell the property, but subject to liens which were not otherwise proved to be collusive. *SAHOO CHUND v. GEETUM SINGH*

2 Agra 206

23. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 240 (1882, s. 276)*, object of—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 240, 270, and 271*. A private alienation of property while under attachment is null and void only as regards the attaching creditor and those who claim under or through the attachment. *Anund Lall Doss v. Jullodhur Shaw*, 10 B. L. R. 134 : 17 W. R. 313, followed. Act VIII of 1859, s. 240, is for the benefit of an attaching creditor (subsequent to, and in defiance of, whose attachment the private alienation thereby declared void has been made), and of those claiming under or through him, and not for the benefit of puisne attaching creditors, whose attachment is laid later than such private alienation. *BALAJI RAMCHANDRA v. GAYANAN BABAJI* 11 Bom. 159

24. ——— Effect of good attachment on alienation—*Voidable alienation*. An alienation of property while under attachment is not absolutely void for all purposes and as to all persons, but voidable only, and capable of confirmation. *MAHOMED ALI v. GOKUL CHUND*

1 N. W. 19 : Ed. 1873, 18

e.g., as in case of the decree being set aside. *JUGGUT NARAIN v. TOOLSEE RAM* . 10 W. R. 99

1 B. L. R. A. C. 71

25. ——— *Voidable alienation*—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 240*. An alienation of property attached in execution of a decree, made for the *bona fide* purpose of satisfying the decree in respect of which the attachment has been made, and where the consideration for the alienation is applied to, and is found to be sufficient

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

for, the satisfaction of the decree, is not invalid under s. 240 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *FUR-MESHUR RAI v. HIDAYTOOLLAH. MEHPAL RAI v. HIDAYTOOLLAH*. 1 N. W. 60 : Ed. 1873, 114

26. ——— Alienation after satisfaction, but before removal of attachment—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 240*. A judgment-debtor satisfied a decree under which attachment of his property had been made. He reported the satisfaction to the Court, and on the following day he executed a mortgage of his property. The day after the execution of the mortgage the attachment was removed by the Court. *Held*, that the mortgage, if *bonâ fide*, was not null and void under s. 240 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *BULDEE SINGH v. KANAHA*. 1 N. W. 71 : Ed. 1873, 125

27. ——— Private alienation, meaning of—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 240—Insolvency Act, s. 7—Vesting order*. The expression "private alienation," in s. 240 of the Code of Civil Procedure, does not refer to an alienation effected by a vesting order of the Insolvent Court under s. 7 of the Indian Insolvency Act; such an alienation is rather an alienation by operation of law than one by the judgment-debtor. *SARKIES v. BUNDHOO BAE*. 1 N. W., Part 6, 81 : Ed. 1873, 172

28. ——— Illegal alienation—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 240*. Any alienation of property after attachment is illegal under s. 240, Act VIII of 1859. *JADUBANUND ROY v. BEJOY GOBIND CHOWDHRY*. 7 W. R. 511

MOORUL SINGH v. MOHUN KOOR 9 W. R. 167

MONOHUR LALL v. JUGGOMOHUN LALL
9 W. R. 307

29. ——— Prior lease for attached property. Where landed property is attached in execution of a decree, the party attaching is bound by a lease obtained for it prior to his attachment. *TEGREGO v. MAHOMED MUDESSUR*. 15 W. R. 75

30. ——— Alienation after one decree and before another—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 240*. Although, under the provisions of s. 240 of Act VIII of 1859, a private alienation by sale of property after attachment can be impugned by the holder of the decree in execution of which it was attached, if obstructive of the execution, yet such alienation cannot be impugned by the holder of the decree, under those provisions, because it obstructs the execution of another decree obtained by him subsequently to the date of the alienation. *MAHBUBAN v. RAHEEMUN*. 6 N. W. 217

31. ——— Alienation with knowledge and consent of creditor attaching—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 240*. While certain immoveable property was under attachment, the judgment-debtor mortgaged it for value to the Mussoorie Savings Bank, with the knowledge of the attaching creditor, the Delhi Bank, which acquiesced

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

in, and benefited by, the mortgage. The property was subsequently released from attachment, but was again attached, and was brought to sale in execution of the decree held by the Delhi Bank, and purchased by the defendants. The Mussoorie Savings Bank sued the auction-purchasers, claiming the right to bring the property to sale on the ground of its being under mortgage to the Bank prior to its purchase by the defendants. It was held that under the circumstances the defendants must take the consequences of having purchased the property without having satisfied themselves as to its condition. Had it not been for the conduct of the Delhi Bank, however, the rule that a private *bonâ fide* alienation for value of property attached under Act VIII of 1859 is, by virtue of s. 240 of the Act, null and void only as against the attaching creditor or persons who may acquire rights under or through the attachment, would have saved the defendants, and it would have done so, notwithstanding that the sale of the property in suit took place in pursuance of a second attachment. *DHURRUM DASS v. MUSSOORIE SAVINGS BANK*. 6 N. W. 296

32. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 276—Kanom granted during a subsisting attachment—Subsequent discharge of judgment-debt, and other later attachments—Claim for rateable distribution—Effect of discharge in rendering first attachment inoperative as against all creditors*. A kanom was executed by the karnavan of a tarwad in plaintiff's favour for valuable consideration for the discharge of judgment-debts decreed against the tarwad. On or before the date of the said kanom, plaintiff's father had placed under attachment the properties covered by the kanom deed in execution of one of the said decrees; but the claim having been satisfied, no Court-sale followed. While the said attachment was still subsisting, and at a date later than that of the kanom, first defendant and other judgment-creditors applied for and obtained orders for the attachment of the same properties. On plaintiff's suing to establish the validity of his kanom, it was contended that in consequence of the said attachment first defendant would be entitled to rateable distribution under s. 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that this was a claim enforceable under the attachment within the meaning of s. 276. *Held*, that the kanom was valid. The attachment subject to which the kanom had been granted ceased to be operative both as regards the attaching creditor and the other judgment-creditors when the judgment-debt was discharged, and there could be no sale by the Court, and no right on the part of the other creditors, in the circumstances, to apply for such a sale. *KUNHI MOOSSA v. MAKKI*
I. L. R. 23 Mad. 478

33. ——— Title acquired by private purchaser—*Incumbrance created after attachment—Civil Procedure Code, Act (VIII of 1859),*

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

s. 240. The title obtained by the purchaser on a private sale of property in satisfaction of a decree differs from that acquired upon a sale in execution. Under a private sale, the purchaser derives title through the vendor, and cannot acquire a title better than his. Under an execution-sale, the purchaser, notwithstanding that he acquires merely the right, title, and interest of the judgment-debtor, acquires that title, by operation of law, adversely to the judgment-debtor and freed from all alienations and incumbrances effected by him after the attachment of the property sold. In 1858 the respondent obtained a decree against *B*. In 1863, in satisfaction thereof, he caused to be attached a decree for mesne profits made in favour of *B* against the appellants in 1860. In May 1865 the respondent obtained an order for the sale thereof; but instead of proceeding to execution-sale, he purchased, in 1866, the whole of the mesne profits due under the decree of 1860 by private sale from *B*. Meanwhile in September 1865, an order of Court had been made, between *B* and the appellants, on their consent (but without the respondent being a party to it), whereby the decree for mesne profits was set off, *pro tanto*, against a prior decree for a larger amount, which the appellants had obtained against *B*. *Held*, that, the sale of 1866 having been a private one and not in process of execution, the respondent only obtained such title as *B* had in the decree of 1860, *viz.*, a title subject to the effect of the order of September 1865. *DINENDRONATH SANIAL v. RAMKUMAR GHOSE. TARACHANDRA BHUTTACHARJIA v. BAIKANTNATH SANIAL*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 107 :
I. L. R. 8 I. A. 65 : 10 C. L. R. 281

34. ———— Renewal of mortgage already existing. A renewal of a mortgage already existing on the property prior to attachment, which does not enhance the charge, is not an alienation within the meaning of s. 276 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *MAHADEVAPPA v. SRINIVASA RAU*

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 417

35. ———— Alienation under attachment making material error in description of property—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 276—Attachment of immoveable property—Private alienation after attachment.* Application was made for the attachment in execution of a decree of a muafi holding belonging to the judgment-debtor. The numbers and areas given in such application as the numbers and areas of the lands comprised in such holding were the numbers and areas of certain revenue-paying lands, and were not the numbers and areas of any lands, held as muafi by the judgment-debtor. The order of attachment described the property as described in the application for attachment. The judgment-debtor having alienated by sale a muafi holding belonging to him, the decree-holders sued to have such alienation set aside as void under the provisions of

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

s. 276 of Act X of 1877. *Held*, that, having regard to the description given in the application for attachment and the order of attachment, it could not be said that the muafi holding alienated by the judgment-debtor was under attachment at the time of the alienation, and its alienation was therefore not void under s. 276 of Act X of 1877. *Held*, also, that the material misdescription of the property in this case in the order of attachment protected the alienees, who are *bona fide* purchasers, from having the alienation set aside as void under s. 276, as the attachment could not under the circumstances be held to have been "duly intimated and made known" as required by that section. *GUMANT v. HARDWAR PANDEY* . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 698

36. ———— Conveyance under award directing it—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 276—Decree in accordance with award—Execution of conveyance—"Private alienation."* By agreement between *L* and *Q*, the parties to a suit, the matters in difference between them were referred to arbitration. An award was made directing that *L* should transfer certain property to *Q* by way of sale. Between the day the award was made and the day a decree was made, in accordance with the award, such property was attached in execution of a decree against *L*. After the attachment, *L*, in compliance with the decree made in accordance with the award, executed a conveyance of such property to *Q*. *Held* by the Full Bench (affirming the decision of *STRAIGHT, J.* and reversing that of *SPANKIE, J.*), that such conveyance was not a "private alienation" in the sense of s. 276 of Act X of 1877, and was therefore not void under that section as against a claim enforceable under such attachment. *QURBAN ALI v. ASHRAF ALI* . . . I. L. R. 4 All. 219

37. ———— Expiry of attachment, Effect of, on alienation—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 276.* A private alienation of property under attachment is void, under s. 276 of the Civil Procedure Code, "as against all claims enforceable under the attachment" only. Where, therefore, property attached in execution of a decree was alienated, and was after such alienation again attached, the first attachment having expired, and was brought to sale in pursuance of the second attachment, and the purchaser sued for possession of the property claiming on the ground that the alienation of the property was void under the provisions of s. 276:—*Held*, that, as no claim was enforced or was enforceable under the first attachment, under which the property was alienated, but the purchaser was claiming under the second attachment, such alienation could not be assailed under the provision of s. 276. *GOBIND SINGH v. ZALIM SINGH*

I. L. R. 6 All. 33

38. ———— Alienation after imperfect attachment of immoveable property—*Private alienation after such attachment—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 274, 276, 292, Sch. IV, No.*

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

141. A judgment-debtor, whose property had been attached in execution of a money decree, sold the property, and out of the price paid into Court the amount of the decree, and prayed that the attachment might be removed. While the attachment was subsisting, and prior to the sale, the holders of other money-decrees against the same judgment-debtor preferred applications, purporting to be made under s. 295 of the Civil Procedure Code, and praying that the proceeds of the sale of the property might be rateably divided between themselves and the attaching creditor. The Court refused to remove the attachment until these creditors had been paid. It was found that the sale by the judgment-debtor was a *bona fide* transaction, entered into for valuable consideration. *Held*, that, inasmuch as no order for attachment of the property was passed in favour of the decree-holders in manner provided by s. 274 of the Civil Procedure Code, their claims were not entitled to the protection conferred by s. 276 against private alienations of property under attachment; that these claims were not enforceable under the attachment which was made; that the sale by the judgment-debtor was valid; and that execution of the decrees could not take place. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*—That s. 276 of the Civil Procedure Code, being a restriction of private rights of alienation, should be strictly construed; that before property can be subjected to such restriction, there must be a perfected attachment; that the orders passed under s. 295 did not amount to such attachment, and that, even assuming them to amount to such attachment, they, not having been duly intimated and notified, could not make the prohibition of s. 276 applicable to the case. *Mahadeo Dubey v. Bhola Nath Dichit*, I. L. R. 5 All. 86, *Anand Lall Dass v. Jullodhur Shaw*, 14 Moo. I. A. 543; 10 B. L. R. 134, *Rameswar Singh v. Ramtani Ghose*, 4 B. L. R. A. C. 24, *Indro Chunder Baboo v. Dunlop*, 10 W. R. 264, *Gobind Singh v. Zalim Singh*, I. L. R. 6 All. 33, and *Gumani v. Hardwar Pandey*, I. L. R. 6 All. 698, referred to. *GANGA DIN v. KHUSHALI*

I. L. R. 7 All. 702

39. ——— Claim to rateable distribution under s. 295—*Civil Procedure Code*, ss. 276, 295. A claim under s. 295 of the Civil Procedure Code is not enforceable as an attachment against which an assignment is rendered void by the provisions of s. 276. *Ganga Din v. Khushali*, I. L. R. 7 All. 702, followed. In June 1883 A, B, and C obtained separate money-decrees against, amongst others, T as executor under the will of his father. Some time in 1884 B attached the whole of the testator's properties in execution of his decree, and A and C applied for rateable shares in the sale-proceeds. On the 2nd June 1884 the parties came to an arrangement, by which it was agreed that B's claims should be satisfied by means of all the attached properties with the exception of one, which should be left free for the benefit of the other judgment-creditors. By a deed dated the 16th June, but

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

which was found to have been actually executed on the 17th, T conveyed this property to A, and on the 17th June all the other attached properties were sold in execution of B's decree, and on the same day B put in an application for the removal of his attachment from this property. D, another decree-holder, on the 16th June, applied to be included in the rateable distribution of the properties attached by B, and on the 30th June D attached the property sold to A in execution of his decree. A preferred a claim to the property, which was disallowed, and A thereupon brought a suit to establish her right to it on the ground (*inter alia*) that B's attachment had ceased to exist on the date of her purchase, and that the sale was a valid one. *Held*, that the sale to A was valid against D. *DURGA CHURN ROY CHOWDHRY v. MONMOHINI DAS* I. L. R. 15 Calc. 771

40. ——— Sale of tenant's interest by landlord pending attachment by Civil Court—*Madras Act VIII of 1865*, s. 38—*Civil Procedure Code*, ss. 276, 295. The interest of a tenant in certain land having been attached by his creditor in execution of a decree for money, the landlord attached the same land for arrears of rent, brought it to sale, and purchased it under the provisions of the Rent Recovery Act. The creditor subsequently purchased the interest of the tenant, which was sold in execution of his decree. In a suit by the landlord to have the sale to the creditor declared invalid:—*Held*, that the landlord's purchase was subject to the creditor's attachment. *SUBRAMANYA v. RAJARAM* I. L. R. 8 Mad. 573

41. ——— Attachment for arrears of revenue—Subsequent attachment in execution of decree—*Madras Abkari Act (Madras Act I of 1866)*, s. 28. Certain land was put under attachment for arrears of revenue under the *Madras Abkari Act*, s. 28; the same land was subsequently attached in execution of a money-decree against the defaulter, and the defendant purchased it at the Court-sale. The Collector of the district intervened in execution, and objected to the sale of the land in question, but his objection was rejected. A suit was now brought in the name of the Secretary of State for a declaration that the land was liable for the arrears of revenue in respect of which the attachment under *Abkari Act* had been made. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration asked for. *SARANGAPANI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* I. L. R. 16 Mad. 479

42. ——— Two attachments—*Civil Procedure Code*, s. 276—Mortgage alleged to have been made pending an attachment—Attachment when to be considered as raised—Execution of decree. Where a party prosecuting a decree is compelled to take out another execution, his title should be presumed to date from the second attachment. *Puddomonee Dossee v. Mathoor Nath Chowdhry*, 12 B. L. R. 411, and *Hafiz Suleman v. Sheikh Abdullah*,

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*6. ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT—*concl.*

I. L. R. 16 All. 133, referred to. *KISHEN LAL v. CHARAT SINGH* (1900) . *I. L. R. 23 All. 114*

43. ——— **Mahomedan law—Will—Testator—Bequest to stranger of more than one-third of testator's property—Consent of heirs—Alienation—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 276.** Where a Mahomedan, by his will, bequeaths more than one-third of his whole property to a stranger, the consent of his heirs to such bequest, required by the Mahomedan law, need not be express; it may be signified by conduct showing a fixed and unequivocal intention. Such a consent, although given after the property bequeathed has been attached in execution of a decree against the testator's heirs, is good, and does not amount to an alienation such as is prohibited by s. 276 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *DAULATRAM KHUSHALCHAND v. ABDUL KAYUM NARUDIN* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 497

7. ATTACHMENT PENDING APPEAL.

1. ——— **Attachment before judgment—Continuation of attachment.** A plaintiff before judgment attached defendant's property, but the suit was dismissed by the High Court on appeal. He filed an appeal to the Privy Council, and on his application the High Court held that it could not continue the attachment over the defendant's property pending the appeal of the plaintiff to the Privy Council, nor could it call on the defendant respondent to give security for the value of the property attached before being allowed to remove it. *In re DITTA HARAKMAN SINGH* . *3 B. L. R. F. B. 45*

In the matter of DITTA HARUCKMAN SINGH v. MODHOOSUDUN PYNE . *12 W. R. F. B. 16*

8. LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL ATTACHMENT.

1. ——— **Claim to attach property—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 278, 283, 483—Attachment before judgment—Liability of creditor who caused attachment of goods not belonging to the debtor—Damages after sale—Difference between English and Indian law on the subject.** Orders for attachment in security under s. 483 of the Civil Procedure Code being issued on the *ex-parte* application of the creditor, who is bound to specify the property which he desires to have attached and its estimated value, it follows that the attachment is the direct act of the creditor for which he is immediately responsible. Should the goods be proved not to belong to the debtor, the litigation and delay, and also any depreciation of the goods by an intermediate fall in the market, between attachment and sale, are the natural and necessary consequences of the creditor's unlawful act. The plaintiff, having taken, without

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success, the summary proceeding under s. 278, to get the release of goods attached under s. 487, in a suit to which he was not a party, afterwards, in a suit brought by him in accordance with s. 283, established his right of property in the goods. *Held*, that (a) in order to entitle him to the full indemnity for the wrongful attachment he was not bound to allege and prove that the defendants had resisted his previous application under s. 278 maliciously, or without probable cause; and that (b) the goods having been sold under the Court's order the difference in market-value of the goods at the time of their attachment (November 1883) and their price when they were sold (June 1884), the selling prices having fallen intermediately, must be added to the damages. *Held*, also, that without bringing under review the judgment under s. 278, the effect of the judgment in the suit brought in accordance with s. 283 was to supersede the order under s. 278, and to render it inconclusive. The procedure on attachment not being the same in India as in England, where a judgment-creditor is not responsible for the consequence of a sale, under a judicial order, or goods taken in execution in satisfaction of his debt, that proposition does not hold good under the Indian procedure; and *Walker v. Olding*, *1 H. & C. 621 : 9 Jur. N. S. 53 : 32 L. J. Exch. 142*, is inapplicable to the latter. *KISSORIMOHUN ROY v. HARSUKH DAS* . *I. L. R. 17 Calc. 436*
I. L. R. 17 I. A. 17

9. STRIKING OFF EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS, EFFECT OF, ON ATTACHMENT.

1. ——— **Effect of striking off execution proceedings, how it affects attachment.** The striking an execution proceeding off the file is an act which may admit of different interpretations according to the circumstances under which it is done, and no general rule can be laid down which would govern all cases of that kind; but having regard to the circumstances of the present case, *viz.*, that the Court below had no opportunity of considering the circumstances under which the several execution proceedings were dismissed, it could not be held that there was no subsisting attachment, and that the order of the Court was bad in law. *BHAGWAN RAMANUJ DAS v. KHETTER MONI DASSI* . *1 C. W. N. 617*

2. ——— **Revival of attachment on reversal of sale in execution of decree.** An attachment, once legally made, is revived upon the reversal of the sale in execution. *GUNNO SINGH v. MUDDUN MOHUN SINGH* . *W. R. 1864, 26*

MOHESH NARAIN SINGH v. KISHANUNUD MISSEER
2 Ind. Jur. O. S. 1 : 5 W. R. P. C. 7
Marsh. 592 : 9 Moo. I. A. 324

3. ——— **Striking off case for neglect to pay talabana fees.** An attachment cannot subsist when the suit has been struck off for

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*9. STRIKING OFF EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS, EFFECT OF, ON ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

neglect to pay in the talabana for the service of the necessary sale processes. *PURBHOO DOSS v. GOMA BHUJUN SINGH* 5 W. R. Mis. 4

4. ———— **Extinguishment of attachment—Act VIII of 1859, s. 270—Execution of decree—Striking off execution case—Money-decree.** A obtained a decree against C for possession and mesne profits, but no specific amount of mesne profits was then assessed. In 1864 A, in execution of his decree, attached land belonging to C, but the execution case was struck off the file in 1865. After several ineffectual proceedings, A re-attached the property in March 1869. In execution of a decree against C, B had in February 1869 attached the same property. The property was sold under A's attachment in May 1869, and on the application of A, the Subordinate Judge, on the strength of A's attachment in 1864, gave priority to A's claim over that of B. The balance of the sale-proceeds, after satisfaction of A's decree, was only sufficient to cover a small portion of the decree obtained by B. In a suit by B against A, under s. 270, Act VIII of 1859, to recover the amount of her claim which remained unsatisfied:—*Held*, that the attachment of A in 1864, on the strength of which A's claim was considered by the Subordinate Judge to have priority over that of B, was not a sufficient and valid attachment under s. 270. The attachment contemplated by that section means an attachment after a final money-decree. *Held*, also, that the striking off of the execution case of A in 1865 caused an extinguishment of the effect of the attachment of 1864. *BINDA BIBEE v. LALLA GOPEENATH* 14 B. L. R. 323 : 21 W. R. 66

5. ———— **Striking off execution case.** The striking off of an execution proceeding affects only the files of the Court and the application for sale, and does not interfere with the continuance of any attachment under the decree which is executed. *NADIR HOSSAIN v. PEAROO THOVILDARINEE*

14 B. L. R. 425 note : 19 W. R. 255

JUGOBUNDHOO SEIN v. BHUGWAN CHUNDER DOSS 17 W. R. 15

6. ———— **Effect upon maintenance of attachment of order dismissing application for execution.** Where property has once been attached in execution of a decree, an order merely dismissing an application for execution, which order does not contain specific words withdrawing the attachment, and which is not an order declaring the decree incapable of execution, will not have the effect of raising the attachment; and if in appeal such order is set aside, the decree-holder will be in the same position as he was before and entitled to the full benefit of the attachment. *Gunga Rai v. Sakeena Begum*, 5 N. W. 72, *Nadir Hossein v. Pearoo Thovildarinee*, 14 B. L. R. 425, and *Golam Yaheya v. Sham Soonduree Kooree*, 12 W. R. 142,

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referred to. *BANK OF UPPER INDIA v. SHEO PRASAD* I. L. R. 19 All. 482

7. ———— **Continuation of attachment.** If property is once attached, the attachment will subsist, if not expressly abandoned by the party at whose suit it was issued, until an order is issued for its withdrawal, even although no further steps are taken on the attachment within a reasonable period. A mere striking of the execution case off the file by the Court, of its own motion, without notice to or consent of parties, will not invalidate an attachment. *JHATU SAHU v. RAMCHARAN LAL*

3 B. L. R. Ap. 68 : 11 W. R. 517

RAMCHARAN LALL v. JHATU SAHU

12 B. L. R. 413 note : 14 W. R. 25

8. ———— **Striking off execution case—Release from attachment.** The striking off a case from the file while pending in execution does not release a property from attachment. *GOLAM YAHEYA v. SHAMA SUNDORI KUARI*

3 B. L. R. Ap. 184 : 12 W. R. 142

(*Contra*) *KHADEM HOSSEIN KHAN v. KALEE PERSHAD SINGH* 8 W. R. 49

9. ———— **Attachment before and after decree—Striking off execution sale proceedings.** *Held*, that attachment issued after suit supersedes the attachment order obtained during the pendency of the suit, and that the former was taken off the property when the sale proceedings were struck off the file. *RAM JEWAN v. RAM LALL* 2 Agra 190

10. ———— **Implied withdrawal of attachment.** The implied withdrawal of an order of attachment, even though such order was not formally withdrawn, but was understood to be withdrawn by the decree-holder, bars objection against the validity of alienation of the attached property by mortgage or otherwise. *JUGUN NATH v. GHASEERAM* 1 N. W. 32 : Ed. 1873, 30

11. ———— **Case struck off for convenience of Court—Stay of execution for fixed period.** Execution cases in which a sale or other proceedings are stayed for a fixed period at the request of the debtor, and with the consent of the decree-holder, should not be struck off till that period has expired, and, if struck off for the convenience of the Court by an order which provides for the continuance of the attachment, sale may follow within the said period without a fresh attachment. *CHUMUN LALL CHOWDERY v. DOMUN LALL*

9 W. R. 205

12. ———— **Stay of execution for fixed period.** Certain property having been attached and advertised for sale in execution of a money-decree, the decree-holder asked the Court to stay further proceedings for six weeks, as the debtor had made part payment, praying that the attach-

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*9. STRIKING OFF EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS, EFFECT OF, ON ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

ment might be considered to be still in force. The execution case was accordingly removed from the file. *Held*, that the order striking the case off the file for the convenience of the Court did not put an end to the attachment. *Held* (JACKSON, J., dissenting), that the attachment continued in force, notwithstanding a year's delay on the part of the judgment-creditor in applying again for execution. *DACOSTA v. KALEE PERSHAD SINGH*

12 W. R. 260

13. ——— Order striking off attachment pending appeal. An order striking off an attachment pending an appeal does not release the property from attachment. *SHEW NARAIN SINGH v. MILLER*

17 W. R. 234

14. ——— Re-attachment—Abandonment of attachment. *Semble*: A re-attachment of property after decree does not imply an abandonment of an attachment obtained before decree. *RAMKRISHNA DASS SURROWJI v. SURFUNNISA BEGUM*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 129

15. ——— Stay of execution, keeping attachment in force—*Case struck off the files of the Court*. Where a sale of attached property is stayed by a Court upon the application of the judgment-debtor, on condition of the attachment remaining in force, the subsequent striking off of the application for execution from the file of the Court does not affect the rights of the decree-holder. *MUNGUL PERSHAD DICHIT v. GRIJA KANT LAHRI*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 51; 11 C. L. R. 113
L. R. 8 I. A. 123

16. ——— Order postponing sale and striking case off the file—*Effect of, on attachment*. Where property has been attached in execution of decree, and the parties applied that the sale might be postponed, the Court executing the decree ordered the sale to be postponed, and the case to be struck off the file." *Held* by the majority of the Court, the CHIEF JUSTICE and ROBERTS, TURNER, and SPANKIE, J.J., (ROSS and PEARSON, J.J., dissenting), that inasmuch as there was no order passed directing the removal of the attachment, but on the contrary it appeared that it was the intention of the Court and of the parties that the attachment should continue, the direction that the case should be struck off the file of pending cases did not operate to remove the attachment. *AHMUD HOSSEIN KHAN v. MAHOMED AZEEM KHAN*

1 N. W. 5; Ed. 1873, 48
Agra F. B., Ed. 1874, 175

17. ——— Case struck off file of pending cases—*Effect of, on attachment*. A case of execution of decree, in which an attachment had been taken out, was struck off the file of pending cases by the order of the Court executing the decree. The plaintiff never asked for or consented to the withdrawal of the attachment, nor did the Court by

ATTACHMENT—*contd.*9. STRIKING OFF EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS, EFFECT OF, ON ATTACHMENT—*contd.*

any formal order withdraw the attachment. *Held*, that the attachment was not terminated by the order which struck the case off the file of pending cases. *MOOKHESHUR RAI v. RAMPHUL SAHOO*

5 N. W. 70

18. ——— *Effect of, on attachment*. The attachment of property by a judgment-creditor ceases on his execution case being struck off the file, and he is remitted to his former position of a simple judgment-creditor, and must begin *de novo* and re-attach the property before a sale at his instance can take place. *LUCHMEEPUR v. LEKRAJ ROY*

8 W. R. 415

19. ——— Attachment without direction that money should be held subject to further order—*Dismissal of suit—Effect of, on attachment—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 237*. Where an attachment of money in the hands of a Deputy Collector was made by a Civil Court, without any such direction as is enjoined by s. 237, Civil Procedure Code, that the money should be held subject to the further order of the Court, it was held that the attachment ceased to be binding when once the suit was dismissed. *LUCHMEEPUR SINGH DOOGUR v. HUMPHRY*

14 W. R. 101

20. ——— Release of property from attachment—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246—Effect of decree in suit to establish right*. Certain property having been released from attachment on a claim made under Act VIII of 1859, s. 246, the attaching creditor brought a suit and obtained a decree establishing his right of attachment. *Held*, that the effect of that decree was to set aside the order of release and to restore the state of things which it had disturbed. *MAHOMED WARIS v. PITAMBUR SEN*

21 W. R. 435

21. ——— Stay of execution on security pending appeal—*Alienation pending attachment—Striking off execution case on inability to give security*. While an appeal from a decree was pending before the Privy Council, the decree-holder (M) applied for execution, and attached the property of the judgment-debtor (B), who thereupon obtained an order of the High Court for stay of sale until security could be furnished. The decree-holder having failed to furnish adequate security, the execution case was struck off. The appeal to the Privy Council having been dismissed, the decree-holder revived execution proceedings, adding costs and interest to her original claim. Upon this a third party intervened, and objected to the attachment on the ground that he had obtained a mokurari pottah of the properties from B's representative. The objection having been allowed under Act VIII of 1859, s. 246, M brought a suit to have the mokurari declared to be invalid and fictitious. *Held*, that plaintiff was not required to cause M's admitted proprietary right to be sold before she could maintain her suit. *Held*, that the act of the Court in

ATTACHMENT—concl'd.**9. STRIKING OFF EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS, EFFECT OF, ON ATTACHMENT—concl'd.**

striking off the execution proceeding because of the inability of the decree-holder to furnish the required security was only for the convenience of business, and it left intact all the proceedings which had been taken up to that stage; nor did the decree-holder abandon the attachment, which was therefore subsisting when the mukurari pottah was granted. Accordingly the alienation of the property by the pottah was invalid and inoperative. *SOONDUR SINGH v. BUHOORIA ALUM BASHEE*

24 W. R. 36

22. ——— Sale at instance of one attaching decree-holder during the pendency of other attachments—*Priority of attaching creditors—Rival decree-holders—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), ss. 240, 242, and 270, and Act XIV of 1882, ss. 284 and 295.* When a property is sold in execution of a decree, it cannot be sold again at the instance of another decree-holder who may have attached it before the attachment effected by the decree-holder under whose decree it is actually sold; and when a judicial sale takes place, all previous attachments effected upon the property sold fall to the ground. *KASHY NATH ROY CHOWDERY v. SURBANAND SHAHA*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 317

23. ——— Stay of execution and striking off case "for the present"—*Duration of attachment—Effect of mortgage made after "striking off" of execution proceedings.* An application for execution of a simple money-decree having been made on the 6th December 1873, and fresh attachment made thereon in terms of an arrangement between the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder, the proceedings were, on the 31st December 1873, stayed for a month, and the execution case was by an order "struck off for the present," the judgment-debtor undertaking not to alienate certain property in the meantime. Nothing was done by the decree-holder until the 30th November 1874, when a fresh application for attachment and sale was made. On the 2nd February 1874, the judgment-debtor had mortgaged the property in question. *Held*, that on that date there was no subsisting attachment, and that from that time the mortgage lien attached to the property. *GUNGA GOTTI PAL v. RAM SUNDER DUTT*

8 C. L. R. 157

ATTAINDER, LAW OF—

See ENGLISH LAW.

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 384

ATTEMPT TO COMMIT OFFENCE.

See CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION.

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 376

See FORGERY . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 726

See PENAL CODE, s. 511.

ATTEMPT TO COMMIT OFFENCE—cont'd.

See PENAL CODE, s. 422.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 314

See RAPE . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 403

See SENTENCE—SENTENCE AFTER PREVIOUS CONVICTION . 21 W. R. Cr. 35

I. L. R. 3 All. 773

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 140

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 357

I. L. R. 17 All. 120, 123

1. ——— Acts necessary to constitute an attempt—*Penal Code, s. 511.* S. 511 of the Penal Code was not meant to cover only the penultimate act towards completion of an offence and not acts precedent, if those acts are done in the course of the attempt to commit the offence, are done with the intent to commit it, and done towards its commission. Whether any given act or series of act amounts to an attempt of which the law will take notice, or merely to preparation, is a question of fact in each case. *In the matter of the petition of MACCREA* . . . I. L. R. 15 All. 173

2. ——— *Mischief by fire—Possession of a fire-ball.* *Held*, by GLOVER, J., that incendiarism having, on several occasions, occurred in a village, produced by a ball of rag, with a piece of burning charcoal within it, and the prisoner one evening being discovered to have a ball of that description concealed in his dhoti, which contained burning charcoal, he is, under s. 511 of the Penal Code, guilty of an attempt to commit mischief by fire. The possession of the instrument to commit mischief by fire, and the going about of the person with it, are sufficient to raise a presumption that he intended to commit the act, and had already begun to move towards the execution. These facts are sufficient to constitute an attempt. *Held*, by MITTAR, J., that the possession of a fire-ball and moving about it cannot support a conviction under ss. 436 and 511 of the Penal Code. These facts are not sufficiently indicative of an intention to destroy a building used for human dwelling. To constitute an offence under s. 511 of the Penal Code, it is not only necessary that the prisoner should have done an overt act towards commission of the offence, but that the act itself should have been done in the attempt to commit it. *QUEEN v. DAYAL BAWRI*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 55

3. ——— *Attempt when offence could not be committed.* A person cannot be convicted of an attempt to commit an offence under s. 511 of the Penal Code unless the offence would have been committed if the attempt charged had succeeded. *In the matter of the petition of RIASAT ALI EMPRESS v. RIASAT ALI*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 352: 8 C. L. R. 572

4. ——— *Attempt to murder—Inconsistency between English Law and Penal Code.* In order to constitute the offence of attempt to murder, under s. 307 of the Penal Code, the act committed by the prisoner must be an act capable

ATTEMPT TO COMMIT OFFENCE —*contd.*

of causing death in the natural and ordinary course of events. *Aliter* under s. 511 taken in connection with ss. 299 and 300. Therefore where the prisoner presented an uncapped gun at *F G* (believing the gun to be capped) with the intention of murdering him, but was prevented from pulling the trigger:—*Held*, that he could not be convicted of an attempt to murder upon a charge framed under s. 307 of the Penal Code, but that under the same circumstances he might be convicted upon a charge of simple attempt to murder framed under s. 511 in connection with ss. 299 and 300. Apparent inconsistency between the English law with reference to attempts, as laid down in *Reg. v. Collins*, 33 L. J. M. C. 177, and the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, explained. *REG. v. CASSIDY* . . . 4 Bom. Cr. 17

5. ————— *Penal Code, s. 307*
—*Murder*. The accused struck the deceased three blows on the head with a stick, with the intention of killing him. The deceased fell down senseless on the ground. The accused, believing that he was dead, set fire to the hut in which he was lying with a view to remove all evidence of the crime. The medical evidence showed that the blows struck by the accused were not likely to cause death, and did not cause death, and that death was really caused by injuries from burning when the accused set fire to the hut. *Held* (PARSONS, J., dissenting) that the accused was guilty of attempt to murder under s. 307 of the Penal Code. *Per* PARSONS, J. The accused was guilty of murder under s. 302 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KHANDU*
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 194

6. ————— *Facts necessary to constitute such attempt*. S. 511 of the Penal Code does not apply to attempts to commit murder, which are fully and exclusively provided for by s. 307 of the said Code. A person is criminally responsible for an attempt to commit murder when, with the intention or knowledge requisite to its commission, he has done the last proximate act necessary to constitute the completed offence, and when the completion of the offence is only prevented by some cause independent of his volition. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NIDHA* . . . I. L. R. 14 All. 38

7. ————— *Intention—Knowledge of probable consequences of act—Presumption*. Where a woman of twenty years of age was found to have administered dhatura to three members of her family, it was *held* that she must be presumed to have known that the administration of dhatura was likely to cause death, although she might not have administered it with that intention. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. TULSHA*
I. L. R. 20 All. 143

8. ————— *A young Brahman widow was confined of a child*. The chief constable of police, acting, as he stated, on information that the accused was about to kill a baby, went to search her house with a number of men, and found her lying on the first floor, and discovered on the second

ATTEMPT TO COMMIT OFFENCE— —*contd.*

floor a living new-born child wrapped up in a cloth with a cooking pot turned over it. The Sessions Judge convicted the accused of attempt to murder. The High Court on appeal reversed the conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support it. *REG. v. CHIMA* . . . 8 Bom. Cr. 164

9. ————— *Attempt at dacoity*. S. 511 of the Penal Code does not apply in a case of dacoity. Where a prisoner was found guilty of an attempt at dacoity under that section, and of causing grievous hurt in such attempt under s. 397, and a sentence of three years' rigorous imprisonment was passed on him, the finding was amended by striking out "ss. 397 and 511," and substituting "s. 395." *QUEEN v. KOONEE* . . . 7 W. R. Cr. 48

10. ————— *Attempt to fabricate false evidence—Concealment of salt*. Facts showing that an accused person had dug a hole intending to place salt therein, in order that the discovery of the salt so placed might be used in evidence against his enemy in a judicial proceeding, would justify a conviction for an attempt to fabricate false evidence. *QUEEN v. NUNDA* . . . 4 N. W. 133

11. ————— *Attempt to commit forgery—Penal Code, ss. 467, 511—Intention to commit offence*. To constitute the offence of attempt under s. 511, Penal Code, there must be an act done with the intention of committing an offence, and for the purpose of committing that offence, and it must be done in attempting the commission of the offence. The provisions of s. 511, Penal Code, do not extend to make punishable as attempts acts done in the mere stage of preparation. Although such acts are doubtless done towards the commission of the offence, they are not done in the attempt to commit the offence within the meaning of the word "attempt" as used in the section. *QUEEN v. RAMSARUN CHOWBEY* . . . 4 N. W. 46

12. ————— *Penal Code, ss. 467 and 511—Forgery—Facts necessary to constitute an attempt—Abetment*. One *C*, calling himself *K*, the son of *B*, went to a stamp vendor, accompanied by a man named *K S*. and purchased from him in the name of *K*. a stamp paper of the value of 4 annas. The two men then went to a petition-writer, and *C* again giving his name as *K*, they asked the petition-writer to write for them a bond for Rs50 payable by *K* to *K S*. The petition-writer commenced to write the bond, but, his suspicions being aroused, did not finish it, but took *C* and *K S* to the nearest thana. *Held*, that, under the above circumstances, *K S* was rightly convicted of an attempt to commit the offence defined in s. 467 of the Penal Code, and *C* of abetment of the said attempt. *Queen v. Ram Sarun Chowbey*, 4 N. W. 46, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KALYAN SINGH* I. L. R. 16 All. 409

13. ————— *Attempt to cheat—Penal Code, ss. 417, 511*. In a prosecution for an attempt to cheat, under ss. 417, 511 of the Penal Code, the accused was charged and convicted of having at the central octroi office made false representations.

ATTEMPT TO COMMIT OFFENCE— *contd.*

as to the contents of certain kuppas (skin vessels), the object of which was to obtain a certificate entitling him to obtain a refund of octroi duty. Prior to granting the certificate, the octroi officers examined the contents of the kuppas, and found that the representations of the accused regarding them were untrue. In consequence of this discovery, no certificate was given to him, and he was charged and convicted as above mentioned. The procedure necessary for obtaining a refund of octroi duty was that the central office, on satisfying itself that the articles produced were of the nature stated, would grant a certificate, which certificate would have to be indorsed by the outpost clerk when he passed the goods (on which refund was claimed) out of the town, and the owner would have to take back the certificate so indorsed to the central office and present it to be cashed. *Held*, that, even assuming the accused to have falsely represented the contents of the kuppas as alleged, he had not completed an attempt to cheat, but had only made preparation for cheating, and that the conviction must therefore be set aside. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DHUNDI*

I. L. R. 8 All. 304

14. ———— *Currency Office—*
Application for payment of lost halves of currency notes A man may be guilty of an attempt to cheat, although the person he attempts to cheat is forewarned, and is therefore not cheated. *R. v. Hensler, 11 Cox C. C. 570*, referred to. *M* wrote a letter to the Currency Office at Calcutta, enclosing the halves of two Government currency notes, stating that the other halves were lost, and enquiring what steps should be taken for the recovery of the value of the notes. The Currency Office, having upon enquiry, discovered that the amount of the notes had been paid to the holder of the other halves, and that the notes had been withdrawn from circulation and cancelled, sent *M* the usual form of claim to be filled up and returned to it. It appeared from the evidence that the Currency Office never contemplated paying *M* in respect of the notes. The form was filled up and signed by *M*, and returned by him to the Currency Office. *Held*, that, although there was no intention on the part of the Currency Office to pay the amount of the notes, *M* was guilty of an attempt to cheat. *GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL v. UMESH CHUNDER MITTER* I. L. R. 16 Calc. 310

15. ———— *Dacoity—Act XLV of 1860 (Indian Penal Code), ss. 397, 511—Attempt to commit dacoity—Use of arms in endeavouring to effect escape—Conviction, under what sections to be recorded.* Where several persons were found endeavouring to break into a house, and some of them, being armed, used violence, but only in attempting to escape being arrested, it was *held* that they could not properly be convicted under s. 397 read with s. 511 of the Indian Penal Code. *Queen v. Koonce, 7 W. R. Cr. 48*, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BENI (1900)*

I. L. R. 23 All. 78

ATTEMPT TO COMMIT OFFENCE— *contd.*

16. ———— *Forgery—Act XLV of 1860 (Indian Penal Code), ss. 193, 511—Fabricating false evidence—Attempt to commit forgery.* One Durga Charan Gir had an ejectment case against Ram Ghulam, which was decided against him. After this, on the 23rd of November 1901, Durga Charan took his servant Daulat to the town of Padrauna, and there purchased an 8-anna stamp paper in the name of Ram Ghulam. Daulat personated Ram Ghulam, and told the stamp vendor that he was Ram Ghulam, so that the stamp vendor put down the name of Ram Ghulam on the stamp paper as the purchaser of it. The stamp paper was subsequently found in the possession of Durga Charan, who had locked it up in a chest in his house. *Held*, upon the above facts, that Durga Charan was properly convicted of the offence of abetting the fabrication of false evidence, though his acts did not amount to an attempt to commit forgery. *Queen-Empress v. Mula, I. L. R. 2 All. 105*, followed. *EMPEROR v. DURGACHARAN GIR (1902)* I. L. R. 25 All. 75

ATTESTATION.

See DEED—ATTESTATION.

13 C. W. N. 931

See DEED—EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 20 All. 532

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 78, 246

3 C. W. N. 84

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 190

1 C. W. N. 81

2 C. W. N. 603

5 C. W. N. 454

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 59.

13 C. W. N. 40

— of mortgage—

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 68.

6 C. W. N. 395

See STAMP ACT, s. 3, CL. 4.

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 193

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 757

I. L. R. 17 All. 211

See WILL—ATTESTATION.

— want of—

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 68.

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 29

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 222

3 C. W. N. 228

1. ———— *Mortgage bond—*
Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 59. Where the signatures of the witnesses to a mortgage bond, who had witnessed the execution of the deed, were affixed for them to the deed by another person with their consent. *Held*, that the deed was properly attested within the meaning of s. 59 of the Transfer of Property Act. *SASI BHUSAN PAUL v. CHANDRA PESHKAR (1906)*

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 861

ATTESTATION—*concl.*

2. ————— *Effect of arbitration.* Mere attestation of a deed does not necessarily import an assent to all the recitals contained therein. *IMAM ALI v. BAIJNATH RAM SAHU* (1906)
10 C. W. N. 551
s.c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 613

3. ————— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 59—Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879), s. 63 (a)—Mortgage-deed—Signature by the Sub-Registrar—Statement by the writer of the deed in concluding the writing of the body of the document that it was written by him.* A deed of mortgage was signed by the Sub-Registrar who was bound to attest it under the provisions of s. 63 (a) of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879) and the writer of the deed in concluding the writing of the body of the document stated that it was written by him. The deed was not attested by two witnesses as required by s. 59 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882). *Held*, that neither the signature of the Sub-Registrar nor the statement by the writer that the body of the document was written by him were sufficient for effecting a valid mortgage. An attesting witness is a "witness who has seen the deed executed and who signs it as a witness." *Burdett v. Spilsbury*, 10 C. & F. 340, followed. *RANTU v. LAXMANRAO* (1908)
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 44

ATTORNEY.

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

See COUNSEL.

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 59; 6 C. L. R. 374

See GUARDIAN—LIABILITY OF GUARDIANS.
2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 269

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, CL. 10.
8 B. L. R. 418

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 179—NATURE OF APPLICATION—IRREGULAR AND DEFECTIVE APPLICATIONS.
I. L. R. 23 All. 499

See POWER-OF-ATTORNEY.

13 C. W. N. 1190

See PRACTICE. . . 13 C. W. N. 402

See PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

12 B. L. R. 249

See STAMP-DUTY. I. L. R. 36 Calc. 645

See TAXATION OF BILL OF COSTS.

7 B. L. R. Ap. 50

See WITNESS—CIVIL CASES—PERSON COMPETENT OR NOT TO BE WITNESS.

5 B. L. R. Ap. 28

————— *articled clerk to—*

See ATTORNEY . 13 C. W. N. 402

ATTORNEY—*contd.*

————— *change of—*

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 63

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—NEXT FRIEND . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 264

————— *change of pending suit—*

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—ATTORNEY AND CLIENT . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 368
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 769

————— *improper conduct of—*

See RECEIVER . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 648

————— *lien of, for costs—*

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

See SET-OFF—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 742; 4 C. L. R. 122

1. ————— *Striking off the roll—Misconduct.* Where an attorney knowingly prepares a conveyance containing untrue recitals of the transaction between the parties thereto, and attests the deed and a receipt for consideration-money, which, to his knowledge, was never paid, or intended to be paid, the production of such a document to the Court is sufficient ground for calling upon the attorney for an explanation of his conduct. But if such explanation be given, supported by evidence to the effect that there was no fraudulent intent, and if no fraudulent use of the deed has in fact been made or attempted, nor any injury caused thereby, it is not sufficient ground for striking the attorney off the rolls of the Court. *Semble*: The High Court in Calcutta is not authorized in striking an attorney off the rolls when such a step would not be sanctioned by the practice of the Courts in England. *In the matter of STEWART*

1 B. L. R. P. C. 55; 10 W. R. P. C. 43

2. ————— *Negligence—Allowing clerk to file false affidavit.* Where an attorney had been guilty of negligence in allowing his clerk to act in his absence and file a false affidavit, and adopted it without enquiring into its character, he was suspended from practising in the High Court in its original jurisdiction for one year, but he was at liberty to practise as *vakil* on the appellate side. It had not been proved that the clerk was acting as an attorney without a license, or had a share in the profits. Had this been so, the attorney would have been struck off the rolls. *In the matter of POORNOO CHANDRA MOOKERJEE*

Bourke O. C. 377

3. ————— *Practice as to non-publication of name when charges are brought against an attorney.* The practice which prevails in England as regards the non-publication of the name of an attorney against whom a rule has been obtained, approved of and followed. *In the matter of an ATTORNEY* . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 576

ATTORNEY—concl'd.

4. ——— **Vakalatnamah—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 186.** An attorney of the High Court, when appearing to defend a person in the Criminal Court, under s. 186 of the Criminal Procedure Code, should not be required to file a vakalatnamah. ANONYMOUS . 7 Mad. Ap. 41

5. ——— **Articled clerks—Assignment of articles.** An attorney may, subject to the sanction of the Court, have any number of articled clerks at one and the same time. Articles, the covenants of which have been released, cannot be assigned. *Re ARTICLES OF CLERKSHIP OF CALANOR SOOBRAMANAYAN* . 2 Ind. Jur. O. S. 15

6. ——— **Final examination for admission of Attorneys—Rules and Orders of the High Court, Rules 116, 117, 118 and 132—Board of Examiners—Jurisdiction—Certificate—Solicitors Act, 1877 (40 and 41 Vict., ch. 25), s. 9—Special Bench.** An application by a candidate against the refusal of the Board of Examiners for the Attorneyship Examination to grant him a certificate of his having passed a Final Examination should be made to a Special Bench constituted by the Chief Justice. The application refused on the merits of the case. *Per* WOODROFFE, J. By rule 116 of the Rules and Orders of this Court, discretion has been delegated to the Board of Examiners without any express reservation as made by s. 9 of the English Solicitors Act of 1877. The Court will not interfere with the exercise by the Examiners of the discretion confined in them, unless the Examiners refuse to exercise that discretion, or do not exercise that discretion honestly and conscientiously. *In the matter of PURNO CHUNDER DUTT* (1908) . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 915 sc. 12 C. W. N. 873

7. ——— **Practice—Attorney—Articled clerk, who can take—Assistant in a firm, if competent—Independent practitioner.** An attorney who is working as an assistant in a firm of solicitors is not competent to take to himself a clerk under articles of agreement. *In the matter of SAROJENDRA KUMAR DUTT* (1908) . 13 C. W. N. 402

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882) . 12 C. W. N. 1102

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—ATTORNEY AND CLIENT . 6 C. W. N. 306

See COSTS—TAXATION OF COSTS.

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 189

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 301

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 891

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—MODE OF EXECUTION—COSTS.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 152

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 514

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 84; 1871, ART. 85 . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 253, 505

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 1

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 943, 952 note

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT—cont'd.

See PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 91

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 655

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 631

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 265

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 263

See RULES OF HIGH COURT, BOMBAY—RULE NO. 183.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 152

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 514

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—INVALID SALES.

1 B. L. R. A. C. 95; 10 W. R. 128

1. ——— **Negligence, Liability for.** If a client places himself in the hands of an attorney, he places himself in his hands in regard to all matters having connection with the suit, and the attorney must be held liable for any negligence, even though his client do not take prompt action in the matter. *ALLY NUCKEE KHAN v. ANLEY*

1 Hyde 134

2. ——— **Negligence—Interference of Court, ground for.** Where a mate and crew applied to an attorney to obtain for them their wages in a suit against their ship, having first obtained an order for wages from the Magistrate, which order for some reason could not be enforced, the attorney thereupon stated that their case was a good one, and he required no money; but afterwards, finding that the master was suing the ship, and that the proceeds of her sale would not be sufficient to pay the wages of all, the attorney let the proceedings on behalf of the mate and crew drop, and refused afterwards to go on without fund:—*Held*, that this was negligence and want of skill in the attorney sufficient to justify the summary interference of the Court, and to warrant it in making an order for the attorney to proceed with the suit, and to deprive him of costs already incurred. *In the matter of an ATTORNEY AND PROCTOR* . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 305

3. ——— **Power to compromise—Want of client's consent.** A decree (embodying the terms of a compromise) made in open Court, upon the consent of counsel duly instructed, is binding as between the parties to the suit, although the attorney of the defendant has no authority from his client to consent to such decree, or even though he is expressly directed not to compromise, provided such want of authority is not known to the other side. *Semble*: That such decree is binding as between the attorney and his client, provided it embodies a reasonable and proper compromise, and is not made against the express directions of the client. *JAGANNATH DAS GURUBAKSHDAS v. RAMDAS GURUBAKSHDAS* . 7 Bom. O. C. 79

4. ——— **Fiduciary relationship—Agreement to pay pleader remuneration including property in suit.** Suit by a pleader against his client to enforce a contract which provided for the payment to the former of a large remuneration for his services, including a portion of the property in suit.

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Held, that such a contract stands on a different footing from one between private persons, and that the Court, before enforcing it, should require the plaintiff clearly to show its fairness, and that no undue advantage has been taken of the client. It is necessary in such a case to look to the whole of the circumstances and the substance of the transaction, and not merely to the language of the agreement. *NUTHOO LALL v. BUDREE PERSHAD*. 1 N. W. 1

5. — Intervention of third party—*Muktear*. The interposition of a third party does not necessarily affect the fiduciary relation between the legal adviser and his client. *TAYLER v. ASMERDH KOONWAR*. 4 W. R. 86

6. — Taxation of bill of costs—Interest on costs—Rate of interest. The plaintiff, an attorney of the High Court, made advances to the defendant, a banker and merchant, for whom he had been and was then acting in certain litigation in which the defendant was engaged in the High Court. At the time of the first loan in 1869, the defendant was considerably indebted, and one creditor had issued execution against his property, and he also owed the plaintiff a large sum for costs, for which, however, up to that time, no bills of costs had been delivered. Before the first loan the plaintiff delivered bills for all his costs then due, of which some were incurred in completed and others in pending suits, and offered to have them taxed; but the defendant then said there was no need for taxation, which would only increase his expenses. The advances were made on the security of mortgages executed by the defendant. The first was executed in August 1869, and the principal was repayable in February 1871. Interest was to be payable at 12 per cent. per annum, and compound interest at the same rate was also to be charged on all interest in arrear. In September 1870 a further advance on the same terms was made and a further mortgage executed, which included the original sum, with the interest then due, and the further advance. Further advances were made in the same way in October 1871 and March 1876. In all these transactions the defendant had no independent professional advice, and the mortgages were prepared in the plaintiff's office, but not charged for. In a suit to recover the sum due on the mortgages by sale of the mortgaged property, the plaintiff abandoned any accumulation of interest since the date of the third mortgage. *Held*, that the defendant, notwithstanding he had declined the offer of the plaintiff in 1869 to tax the bills, and notwithstanding the delay that had taken place, was entitled (having regard to the relation between the parties and to the fact that a portion of the costs was incurred in suits then pending) to have the bills taxed and to re-open the account. Under the circumstances the Court would not infer acquiescence from the delay on the part of the defendant, nor did the plaintiff's offer to tax, and the defendant's refusal of that offer, debar the defendant of his right to have the bills taxed in the usual way. *Held*, also, that there is no rule which prevents an attorney

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from taking security or otherwise arranging with his client for the payment of costs which have actually become due, and that the plaintiff was entitled to sale of the property, to accumulations of interest prior to the date of the third mortgage calculated by allowing annual rests, to interest at 10 per cent. as being a fair rate for the client to have undertaken to pay when the mortgages were executed, and to interest on his costs. *MONOHUR DOSS v. ROMANAUT LAW*. 1 L. R. 3 Cal. 473

7. — Trustee—Purchase by attorney from client. *T* had acted as trustee and agent for *M*, and *F* had acted in the place of *T* during *T*'s temporary absence. *T* and *F*, as attorneys in partnership, did solicitors' work for *M*. *T*, as trustee and agent for *M*, invested money on a mortgage. The equity of redemption was put up for sale at public auction in execution of a decree obtained by a third party against the mortgagors, and a portion was purchased by *T* and *F*, as attorneys in partnership. *Held*, that there was no equity compelling *T* and *F* to hold the equity of redemption for the benefit of *M*. *Semble*: The agency could not be separated from the attorneyship. *Held*, also, that under the circumstances there was no equity calling for a sale in substitution of the foreclosure claimed by *M*. *MACKINTOSH v. NOBIN-MONEY DOSSEE*. 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 160

8. — Trustees of insolvent retaining attorney to continue suit—Costs. The contract to be implied from the employment by the trustees of an insolvent, of an attorney to carry on a suit already commenced by the insolvent as plaintiff, and in which such attorney was retained for him, is a contract to pay all subsequent costs, but not the costs incurred prior to such employment. *SHAMRAY PANDURANG v. TRUSTEES OF BHUGVANDAS PURSHOTOMDAS*. 5 Bom. O. C. 163

9. — Lien—Costs—Lien on sum recovered by client—Attachment of fund by creditor. The plaintiff obtained a decree against the defendant, but before satisfaction of the decree, the amount of the decree was attached in the hands of the defendant by a third person, who had obtained a decree in a suit against the plaintiff. On an application by the attorney for the plaintiff that the defendant might be ordered to pay to him his costs of suit out of the sum which had been attached in the defendant's hands, and on which the attorney claimed to have a lien, the Court held that the attorney had a lien for his costs on the sum so attached, but that the only order it could make was an order to the defendant not to pay the sum attached to any one without notice to the attorney. *NAWAB NAZIM OF BENGAL v. HEERALALL SEAL*. 10 B. L. R. 444

10. — Lien for costs—Title-deeds delivered for specific purpose—Right to re-delivery. *D*, an attorney, who had a lien against *C* for costs on the title-deeds of certain property belonging to *C*, for whom he had been acting in negotiations for the sale of the property, delivered the deeds at the request of *C* to *M*, who was acting as attorney for *J*, an intending purchaser. *M*,

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on obtaining the deeds, signed a receipt for them, by which he undertook to "return them on demand without claiming any lien for costs or otherwise." *D* subsequently ceased to act for *C* in the matter of the sale of the property of which *J* become the purchaser. The title-deeds remained with *M*. *Held*, that *D* was entitled to have re-delivery of the deeds to him from *M*, even independently of the express contract to return them. He did not give up possession of them to *C* by delivering them to *M*, though that was done at *C*'s request. *In the matter of MACKERTICH*

15 B. L. R. Ap. 15

11. ———— *Lien for costs—Lien on documents—Discharge by dissolution of partnership—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 1, 171.* Where a firm of attorneys dissolved partnership after the death of a client, there being at that time papers and documents belonging to the client in their hands and a debt due in respect of costs from the client to them:—*Held*, that the dissolution of partnership operated as a discharge by the firm, and that the attorneys were not entitled to retain the papers and documents until their costs were paid, but were bound to hand them over to the administrator of the client. S. 171 of the Contract Act does not give an attorney an absolute lien. S. 1 provides that nothing in the Act contained shall affect any usage or custom of trade, and, as no part of the English law is inconsistent with s. 171, cases arising in this country must be governed by the English authorities. According to those authorities, while the relation of attorney and client exists, the client may either continue to employ the attorney or change him. When he claims to do the latter, the attorney being willing to act, he cannot ask the attorney to give up papers in his possession without first satisfying the lien. The attorney has his option,—he may, if he chooses, either go on acting for his client, or cease to act; if he adopt the latter course he must give up the papers. On the death of the client, his representative stands in exactly the same position with respect to the attorney as the client did. *In the matter of MCCORKINDALE*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 1 : 6 C. L. R. 406

12. ———— *Lien for costs—Lien on translation of document.* Messrs. *P* and *W* were solicitors for the plaintiff in this suit from its commencement. When the case was about to appear in the list for hearing, Messrs. *P* and *W* wrote to the plaintiff, requesting her to send them an advance of Rs. 1,000 to enable them to deliver briefs to counsel. They received no reply from the plaintiff, who afterwards obtained leave to sue as a pauper and appeared by other solicitors. Messrs. *P* and *W* were subsequently served with a subpoena to produce, at the hearing, certain translations and other documents relating to the plaintiff's case which had remained in their possession, and upon which they claimed a lien in respect of costs due to them by the plaintiff. *Held*, that Messrs. *P* and *W* could not be compelled to produce. A solicitor who is discharged

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by his client holds the papers entrusted to him subject to his lien for costs, and the plaintiff by her conduct had discharged Messrs. *P* and *W* from being her solicitors. A solicitor has the same lien upon translations as he has upon other documents, and the fact that they have been made by the Court's interpreters makes no difference. Having got the work done and paid for it, he need not part with such translations or produce them, except on terms which will secure him against fraud. *BAI KESSERBAI v. NARANJI WALJI* . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 353

13. ———— *Practice—Costs—Attorney's lien—Lien—Attaching creditor—Fund in Court attached.* A sum of money had been paid into Court as admittedly due to the plaintiff in a certain suit. The plaintiff not having satisfied in full his attorney's taxed bill of costs, the attorney applied for payment out of the fund in Court. Previously to this application, the fund had been attached by a third party. *Held*, that the attorney was entitled to enforce his lien as against the attaching creditor for all costs incurred up to the date of attachment; that the attaching creditor was then entitled to be satisfied before the attorney could claim payment out of the balance in Court of any sum remaining due to him on account of his costs. *SUPRAMANYAN SETTY v. HURRY FROO MUG* I. L. R. 16 Calc. 374

14. ———— *Constructive notice—Fraud in transaction with client.* The Court will not presume notice to have been given to his client by an attorney where such notice would involve a confession by the attorney of a fraud practised by himself. *HORMASSJI TEMULJI v. MANEUVARBAI*

12 Bom. 262

15. ———— *Purchase by attorney from client—Benami transaction.* The principle that in transactions carried out by an attorney for a client, the attorney should derive no benefit to himself, is equally applicable to the relationship of vakil and client; and in transactions of such a nature Courts should be careful not to allow them to be enforced in the name of a third person put forward as the real plaintiff. *FUZELUN BIBEE v. OMDAH BIBEE*

11 B. L. R. 60 note : 10 W. R. 469

16. ———— *Attorney, Change of—Discharge of attorney—Refusal to act till costs already incurred are paid—Attorney, duty of—Practice.* An attorney having undertaken to act for a client is bound to continue to act for him so long as the relationship between them of attorney and client subsists, and unless discharged by the client, it is his duty to proceed with the diligent prosecution of the business or matter for which he has been retained. No attorney has a right to insist on the payment of past costs as a condition to the further prosecution of his client's cause. By declining to act further for a client until costs already incurred are paid, an attorney discharges himself, and the client is entitled to a change from him without prepayment of his costs. *Quære* : Whether an attorney still has a lien on the papers and documents in his hands,

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after he has discharged himself as² aforesaid.
BASANTA KUMAR MITTER v. KUSUM KUMAR MITTER
 4 C. W. N. 767

17. ——— Application to restrain attorney changing sides. An attorney who has acted for a party to a suit and has discharged himself cannot afterwards act for the opposite party, and the Court will restrain him from doing so on an application made for that purpose. *Earl Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton*, 19 Ves. 261, followed. **RAM LALL AGARWALLAH v. MOONTA BIBEE**

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 79

18. ——— Agreement as to costs between attorney and client—Change of attorney—Right of attorney to his taxed costs. Where F, an attorney, agreed to conduct a suit for his client and to accept Rs150 for his personal services, and not in respect of out-of-pocket costs and counsel's fees, and in the event of his client being successful to recover his full costs from the opposite party, and to refund the Rs150, it was held upon the client desiring to change to another attorney, that he could do so upon payment to F of his taxed costs. **GHASSEE JEMADAR v. NASSIRUDDIN MISRY**

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 769

19. ——— Rules of Madras High Court, rule No. 320—Leave of Court for proposed change of attorney—Grounds upon which leave will be given or withheld—Payment of costs due to attorney. Leave will not be given by the Court for a change of attorney under rule No. 320 of the Rules of the Madras High Court (which provides that leave must be obtained before such a change of attorney can be made) until the costs of the attorney are first paid or provided for. **RAMASAMI CHETTI v. SUBBU CHETTI**

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 134

20. ——— Warrant of attorney—Filing appeal through another attorney without discharging the former attorney—Sanction to prosecute—Appearance through another attorney—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 39—Belchambers' Rules and Orders, rule 93. A warrant of attorney to defend, unless specially restricted in form, empowers an attorney to act for the defendant and to establish his grounds of defence in his Court, whether in its original or appellate jurisdiction. An application for sanction to prosecute under s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code, is not a proceeding in connection with the suit within the words of the original warrant to defend, and the defendant is entitled to appear through a new attorney without obtaining a discharge of his original warrant or retaining in favour of the original attorney. **CASSIM MAMOOJEE v. GOPAL LALL SEAL**

3 C. W. N. 579

21. ——— Delivery of bill of costs—Right to maintain suit—Executor. There is no law in force in India to prevent an executor of an attorney from maintaining a suit for business done by the attorney, without having previously delivered a bill of costs to the defendant, and left it with him for a reasonable time before bringing the action; and the fact that the defendant had notice

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that the bill was to be referred to taxation is immaterial. **WILKINSON v. ABBAS SIRCAR**

3 B. L. R. O. C. 96

22. ——— Duties of attorney—Attorney, application for change of—Discharge by attorney himself—Lien on cause-papers—Duties of attorney on record—Costs—Refusal by attorney to act until costs incurred are paid—Costs of the application. Having once undertaken the conduct of a case, an attorney is bound, whether the client is rich or poor, to prosecute the case with due diligence; and he cannot say that, unless a large sum is paid to him, he will not continue to conduct the case. Where a client himself discharges his attorney on record, the latter is entitled to hold the cause-papers till his costs are paid or an undertaking given for their payment. But where the attorney discharges himself, expressly or by implication, he has no such right; he must give up the papers to the new attorney to whom the client proposes to go, only retaining his usual lien on such papers. *Heslop v. Metcalfe*, 3 Myl. & Cr. 183; *Robins v. Goldingham*, L. R. 13 Eq. 440; *Wilson v. Emmet*, 19 Beav. 233, relied upon. **ATUL CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. SOSHI BRUSAN MULICK** (1901)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 63; s. c. 6 C. W. N. 215

23. ——— Managing clerk—Agreement for remuneration—Agreement kept secret from client—Fiduciary relationship. The plaintiff was managing clerk of a firm of Solicitors in Bombay, who were acting as Solicitors for one Cursondas in a suit which he (Cursondas) had filed in the High Court to recover a large amount of property. This suit was managed for Cursondas by a friend of his, Harivalabhdas Haridas (the defendant), and Cursondas agreed that, if he succeeded, he (Cursondas) would give Harivalabhdas a sum of Rs50,000. Harivalabhdas desired to obtain the assistance of the plaintiff in conducting Cursondas' suit, and agreed to give him a half share of the Rs50,000. The plaintiff alleged that Cursondas knew of this arrangement with the defendant at the time the Rs50,000 were promised, but the Court held that this was not proved. Subsequently, on the 10th January, 1893, Harivalabhdas gave the plaintiff a writing agreeing to pay him, as already agreed, a half share in case the litigation was successful. The suit was successful, and the plaintiff now sued Harivalabhdas for the Rs25,000 promised to him by the agreement of the 10th January, 1893. The Court found that the agreement by the defendant to give the plaintiff Rs25,000 out of the Rs50,000 promised by Cursondas was proved. *Held*, (i) that there was a fiduciary relationship existing between the plaintiff and Cursondas: the plaintiff was the managing clerk of the firm of Solicitors who were acting for Cursondas, and he was in charge of the suit; (ii) that, being in such relationship to Cursondas, the plaintiff had, by his agreement with defendant, attempted to acquire a benefit to the extent of Rs25,000 from Cursondas, who had no knowledge originally of the agreement and never subsequently acquiesced in it; (iii) that,

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under the above circumstances, the plaintiff could not recover anything under the agreement. *Per JENKINS, C.J.* If the transaction was not known to Cursondas (and this is the view we hold), it was vitiated as against him, so far as Bhai Jivanji (the plaintiff) is concerned, by reason of the secrecy of the profit sought; if it was known to him, and he was a party to it, the transaction was incapable of supporting Bhai Jivanji's claim, in that it was unconscionable, without consideration, and unsustainable by reason of the fiduciary relation in which he stood to the donor and the absence of independent advice. It is true that Cursondas is not now before us resisting the claim; but, in our opinion, the transaction which forms the foundation of the plaintiff's claim infringes so gravely those essential principles on which equity insists, that we cannot assist him in this Court. He cannot be permitted to profit indirectly by a transaction in which he could not have recovered from Cursondas directly. *HARIVALLABHDAS HARIDAS v. BHAI JIVANJI* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 689

24. ———— *Remuneration—Suit—Promissory note—Agreement by attorney to take a gross sum in lieu of costs—Client in Attorney's day book.* An attorney is not entitled to any reward for services rendered to his client beyond his just and fair professional remuneration during the subsistence of the relationship of attorney and client, unless the client had competent and independent advice to measure the amount of service rendered by the attorney. *Tyrrell v. Bank of London*, 10 H. L. C. 26, 44; *O'Brien v. Lewis*, 32 L. J. Ch. 569; *Holman v. Loynes*, 4 DeG. M. & G. 270; *Rhodes v. Bate*, L. R. 1 Ch. A. C. 252, 257; *Morgan v. Minett*, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 638; *Liles v. Terry*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 679, followed in principle. *In re Whitcombe*, 8 Beav. 140; *Lawless v. Mansfield*, 1 Dr. & War., 557, 665, referred to. And *Holditch v. Carter*, L. R. 3 P. & D. 115, distinguished. An attorney cannot split up his functions by acting partly as attorney and partly as agent of the same client. *Brojendro Nath Mullick v. Luckhimon Dassee* (1902)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 595; s.c. 6 C. W. N. 816

25. ———— *Solicitor's costs, suit for—Limitation—Order for taxation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 15, Sch. II, Art. 84—Practice.* An order for taxation of a solicitor's costs does not under s. 15 of the Limitation Act, stay the institution of any suit by him for his costs. Art. 84, Sch. II, of the Limitation Act is applicable to such a case. *Per HARRINGTON, J.* An order for taxation can only affect the right to institute a suit, if it relates to something which is a condition precedent to the bringing of a suit. *MAKHAM LAL MUKERJEE v. NALIN CHANDRA GUPTA* (1907)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 171

26. ———— *Settled Account, reopening of—Accounts settled on basis of Untaxed Bills—Fiduciary Relationship—Onus of Proof in transactions between Attorney and Client—Independent Advice—Assignment of Promissory Notes, vali-*

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dity of—“Final decree,” meaning of—Contract Act (IX of 1872) s. 16—Evidence Act (I of 1872) s. 111. Where the plaintiff, a solicitor, had acted for the predecessor in title of defendants in various matters and had also from time to time advanced money to him and also received various sums on behalf of the plaintiff, and subsequently an account was settled on untaxed bills between the plaintiff and the said predecessor of the defendants, in which an independent solicitor acted for the same, and as a result, at first a mortgage and then three further charges were executed in favour of the plaintiff, in a suit to recover the money due on these securities:—*Held, first*, that the mere existence of fiduciary relationship between attorney and client will not entitle the client to have a settled account, concluded by mortgage, re-opened unless *sufficient cause* be shown, i.e., a *prima facie* case is made out that the bills are extortionate, or at any rate incorrect. *Lawless v. Mansfield*, 1 Dr. & War. 557; 58 R. R. 303, explained. *Lambert v. Still*, [1894] 1 Ch. 73, *Morgan v. Higgins*, 1 Gif. 270 and *Blagrove v. Routh*, 8 DeG. M. & G. 620, followed. *Secondly*, that if an attorney advises his client to take independent advice and the client does so, it is not the business of the attorney to see that the new attorney is doing his duty diligently. *Thirdly*, that s. 16 of the Contract Act taken with s. 11 of the Evidence Act does not make it incumbent upon the attorney that, in order to prove his good faith, he must prove that all the accounts on which the settled account is based are correct. *Fourthly*, that according to the practice prevailing in the Original Side of the High Court taxation of bills of solicitors is optional, and bills are often adjusted without such taxation. *Monohur Doss v. Romannauth Law*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 473, distinguished. *Fifthly*, if parties to a promissory note agree that, on the debtor executing a bond in favour of a third person, the creditor would cancel the promissory note, the arrangement would be a perfectly valid contract although a promissory note is a negotiable instrument. *Lastly*, that where an order in precise terms orders accounts to be taken, it is a “decree.” *Coverji Luddha v. Morarji Punja*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 183, not followed. *Rahimbhoy Habibhoy v. Turner*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 155; L. R. 18 I. A. 6, followed. *SHAMALDHONE DUTT v. LAKSHMANI DEBI* (1908)

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 493

27. ———— *Attorney's Retainer, how revocable—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) ss. 2, 39—Continuance of Authority of Attorney—Bill of Costs—Cause of Action, accrual of—Limitation.* An attorney's retainer cannot be revoked by his client by a mere letter: it can be revoked only with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client and filed in Court, as provided in s. 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882. In the case of an attorney's costs, the cause of action arises when the work for which he was retained is completed, and limitation begins to run from that time. *Coburn v. Colledge*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 702, followed. Where the decree in the

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suit for which the attorney was retained, directed that the client should personally pay to other parties certain costs to be taxed:—*Held*, that the attorney's authority continued after judgment and covered the taxation of these costs, and the retainer was not at an end until the issue of the *allocatur*. *Lady de la Pole v. Dick*, 29 Ch. D. 351, referred to. *ATUL CHUNDER GHOSE v. LAKSHMAN CHUNDER SEN* (1909) . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 609

28. ——— Costs—*Petition—Taxing Master—High Court Rules, Rule 544—Solicitors' retainer denied—Taxation of costs*. An attorney can obtain an order in taxation of his costs although he knows that his client disputes the retainer as to the whole bill. *In re Jones*, 36 Ch. D. 105, followed. *In re MADHAVJI* (1908) . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 667

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——— *Auction-sale, reversal of—Refund of purchase money, suit for—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244*. The right of an auction-purchaser to a refund of the purchase-money where the auction-sale has been set aside for irregularity, is not a question arising between the parties to the suit or their representatives and relating to the decree, within the meaning of s. 244 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code: a separate suit for refund of such purchase-money is therefore maintainable. *JOTINDRA MOHAN TAGORE v. MAHOMED BASIR CHOWDHRY* (1905)
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See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—AWARD.

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See GUARDIAN—DUTIES AND POWERS OF GUARDIANS . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 334

See JURISDICTION—SUITS FOR LAND—GENERAL CASES . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 44

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I. L. R. 7 Calc. 333

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7 B. L. R. 186: 14 Moo. I. A. 40

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See HINDU LAW, JOINT FAMILY—NATURE OF JOINT FAMILY AND POSITION OF MANAGER . I. L. R. 16 All. 231

See JURISDICTION—TESTAMENTARY AND INTESTATE JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 238

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 335

See NAWAB NAZIM'S DEBTS ACT.

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See RES JUDICATA—ADJUDICATIONS.

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— loss of—

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—SECONDARY EVIDENCE—LOST OR DESTROYED DOCUMENTS . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 331
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 99

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1. — Arbitration—Suit to file an award—Want of jurisdiction in the arbitrators can be pleaded—Award is equivalent to a judgment even before a decree is passed upon the award—Partition is effected by the award itself. When a suit is brought to enforce an award a party to it can urge and show that it is not binding upon him on the ground of want of jurisdiction in the arbitrators. An award is equivalent to a judgment whether it has passed into a decree or not. It is binding upon the parties. In cases where it directs partition to be effected, it dissolves the joint family and from the moment of its date it severs their joint interests. *Muhammad Newaz Khan v. Alam Khan*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 414, and *Laldas v. Bai Lala*, 11 Bom. L. R. 20, followed. *BHAURAO v. RADHABAI* (1009)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 401

AUTREFOIS ACQUIT, PLEA OF.

See ACT XIII OF 1859.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 262

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 403.

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 35

1. — Former trial illegal and without jurisdiction. A former trial set aside on the ground of want of jurisdiction and illegality is not a bar to a second trial. *QUEEN v. MUTHOORA PERSHAD PANDAY* . 2 W. R. Cr. 10

2. — Complaint practically identical. Where a second complaint, though altered and revised, was practically the same as one on which defendant had been acquitted:—*Held*, that the second conviction was illegal. *GOVERNMENT v. DOULAT* . 2 Agra Cr. 3

3. — Criminal trespass, trial for, after dismissal of charge of rioting. The dismissal by one Court of the charge of rioting instituted by the police is no bar to the trial by another Court of a charge of criminal trespass instituted by a third person, although the two charges may substantially refer to the same occurrences. *QUEEN v. MORLY SHEIKH* . 6 W. R. Cr. 51

4. — Forgery—Similarity of signature in different documents—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 55. D was tried on a charge of forging, etc., document A, and acquitted. In order to

AUTREFOIS ACQUIT, PLEA OF—*contd.*

prove the charge, evidence was given in respect of another document *B*, which was also alleged to have been forged, and the prosecutor mainly based his case on the alleged exact resemblance between the signatures to *A* and *B*, both of which, it was said, exactly resembled a third signature admitted to be genuine. *Held* by PEACOCK, C.J., and KEMP, J. (MARKBY, J. dissenting), that the acquittal in respect of the document *A* did not operate as an acquittal in respect of the document *B* so as to enable the accused to plead *autrefois acquit*. REG. v. DWARKA NAUTH DUTT

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 87 : 7 W. R. Cr. 15

5. ——— Discharge by Sessions Court for irregularity of procedure—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 55*. Where a prisoner is released by the Court of Session on the ground that the proceedings had in his case were illegal and irregular, there is no bar under s. 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to his being subsequently tried and convicted of the same offence. QUEEN v. WAHED ALI

13 W. R. Cr. 42

6. ——— Order for release of accused as guiltless—*Acquittal*. The order for the release of the accused as *nirdosh* (guiltless) was held to be an acquittal and not a discharge, and therefore to have exempted them from a second trial for the same offence. RAMJOY SURMAH v. MIRZA ALI

18 W. R. Cr. 10

7. ——— Trial for murder after acquittal of grievous hurt—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 460*. *K, P, M, N, and O*, appellants, were convicted by the Court of Session of attempt at murder. They had previously been tried by a Deputy Magistrate on a charge of voluntarily causing grievous hurt founded on the same facts, and *K, P, and M* were then acquitted, while *N and O* were convicted. *N and O* appealed to the Court of Session, and that Court, considering that the evidence showed that they had been guilty of an attempt at murder, forwarded the record to the High Court when the conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered. The order referred expressly only to *N and O*, but proceedings were commenced *de novo* against all the five persons, and they were committed to the Court of Session for trial on a charge of attempt at murder, and convicted, as stated above, by that Court. The pleas of *autrefois convict* and *autrefois acquit* could not be urged as an answer to the charge on which the appellants were convicted by any of them. QUEEN v. PANNA

7 N. W. 371

8. ——— Theft and receiving stolen property—*Acquittal of charge of theft*. Although a person who is convicted of theft cannot, in respect of the same property, be convicted at the same time of receiving stolen property, yet a person who is acquitted of the theft of any property, or who is not charged with stealing it, may, in respect of the identical property, be charged with, and convicted of, receiving it, knowing it to be stolen ; so that the mere fact of a person's having once been acquitted of the charge of stealing any property does not of

AUTREFOIS ACQUIT, PLEA OF—*concl.*

itself prevent his trial at any future time on the charge of receiving the same property knowing it to be stolen. QUEEN v. NAZ ALI

25 W. R. Cr. 47

9. ——— Previous trial by competent Court—*Trial under Bombay Abkari Act (Bom. Act V of 1878), s. 3, cl. 5, and s. 56—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 403*. All offences against the abkari law (Bombay Act V of 1878) being cognizable by a Magistrate of the second class (s. 3, cl. 5, and s. 56), a person tried for any such offence by any such Magistrate and acquitted is not liable to be tried again for the same offence (s. 403), unless the acquittal has been set aside by the High Court on appeal by the Government. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GUSTADJI BARJORJI

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 181

10. ——— Single act constituting several offences. *Previous acquittal when no bar to further trial—Power of Appeal Court in disposing of appeal—Retrial, effect of order directing, in case where one act constitutes several offences, and there has been an acquittal on some charges and a conviction on others and an appeal from such conviction—“Verdict”—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 236, 403, and 423*. The word “verdict” as used in cl. (d) of s. 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in cases where an accused person is tried for various offences arising out of a single act, or series of acts, as contemplated by s. 236, means the entire verdict on all the charges, and is not limited to the verdict on a particular charge upon which an accused may have been convicted and appealed against. Where an accused person is charged with and tried for various offences arising out of a single act, or series of acts, it being doubtful which of those offences the act or acts constitute, and where he has been acquitted by the verdict of a jury of some of such offences and convicted of others and appeals against such conviction, and where the Appellate Court reverses the verdict of the jury, and orders a retrial without any express limitation as to the charges upon which such retrial is to be held, such retrial must be taken to be upon all the charges as originally framed, and the acquittal by the jury on the previous trial upon some of such charges is no bar to the accused being tried on them again, as, having regard to the provisions of s. 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the provisions of s. 403 in that respect cannot apply to such cases. KRISHNA DHAN MANDAL v. QUEEN-EMPRESS

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 377

AUTREFOIS CONVICT.

See ACT XIII of 1859.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 262.

AYAUTUKA STRIDHAN, DESCENT OF.

See HINDU LAW . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 23

See POSSESSION . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 33

B

BABEE.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—ENDOWMENT.
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 118

“BABUANA” GRANT.

See CONFISCATION . 51 C. W. N. 655

See GRANT . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 688

See HINDU LAW.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1158

10 C. W. N. 978

See MITAKSHARA.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1150

See PARTITION I. L. R. 35 Calc. 823

— nature of—

See HINDU LAW I. L. R. 36 Calc. 943

1. ———— *Durbhanga Raj*—*Incidents—Whether impartible and alienable without legal necessity—Will by grantee—Validity—Partition—Family custom—Kulachar.* Property granted as *babuana* to junior members of the family of the Maharaja of Durbhanga is ancestral property in the hands of the grantee governed by the ordinary rules of Mitakshara law; and the son of the grantee can claim the right to restrain alienation by him except in cases of legal necessity, and the right to claim partition; the original grantee has no power to dispose of the property by Will. *Ramesur Singh v. Jibendra Singh*, 9 C. W. N. 567; s. c. I. L. R. 32 Calc. 683; *Ram Chandra Marwari v. Mudheswar Singh*, 10 C. W. N. 978; s. c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1158, referred to. The peculiar incidents attaching to the Raj, viz., impartibility and succession by primogeniture cannot apply to *babuana* property in the absence of proof of particular custom taking it out of the ordinary category of Hindu family property. *LALITESHWAR SINGH v. BHABESWAR SINGH* (1908) 12 C. W. N. 958

2. ———— *Durbhanga Raj*—*Babuana grant—Mortgage by grantee—Legal necessity—Alienability—Ancestral property.* Property granted as *babuana* to junior members of the family by the Maharaja of Durbhanga is ancestral property and is governed by the ordinary rules of Mitakshara law to which the Raj itself would be subject but for the peculiar custom necessary for its continuance as a Raj. Such property is alienable for legal necessity. *Laliteswar Singh v. Bhabeswar Singh*, 2 C. W. N. 958; *Ram Chandra Marwari v. Mudheswar Singh*, 10 C. W. N. 978; s. c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1158, followed. *BHABESWAR SINGH v. GANGA PERSHAD SINGH* (1908) 12 C. W. N. 966

3. ———— *Babuana grant—Revenue and cess, liability for Durbhanga Raj—Contribution—Interest—Tenure-holder—Proprietor.* Held, in respect of a *babuana* grant of certain mehals in the Durbhanga Raj, that the Plaintiff Maharaja and the defendants (holders of the *babuana* grant) are neither co-proprietors, nor are the latter tenure-holders under the former. That in accordance with

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the *sanad* the defendants must pay all Government dues (including cesses) through the plaintiff and if the plaintiff pays the amount, he is to be fully re-imbursed by the defendants. That interest on cesses payable by the defendant should be allowed at the rate of 12 per cent. per mensem as in a contribution suit. *LALITESHWAR SINGH v. RAMESHWAR SINGH BAHADUR* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 118

4. ———— *Maintenance—Grant to junior members of family for Maintenance—“Babuana” grant, nature of—Power of Grantees to alienate—Custom of Durbhanga Raj—Property, not inalienable merely because it is impartible—Liability of “Babuana” to sale in execution of decree—Evidence of Custom.* Property granted as “*babuana*” to a junior male member of the Durbhanga Raj family, in lieu of money maintenance, was admittedly impartible, descending to the eldest male heirs of the grantee and being held and managed by the person to whom it descended for the maintenance of himself and his family. The Government revenue was conditioned to be paid by the grantee, or the person to whom the property descended, not directly to Government but through the Maharaja:—*Held*, that such property, though impartible, was not by reason of that fact inalienable. Property so granted may be alienable. *Udaya Aditya Deb v. Jadalal Aditya Deb*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 199; *L. R. 8 I. A. 248*, *Sartaj Kuari v. Deoraj Kuari*, I. L. R. 10 All. 272; *L. R. 15 I. A. 51*, and *Venkata Surya Mahipati Rama Krishna Rao v. Court of Wards*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 383; *L. R. 26 I. A. 83*, followed. Notwithstanding its impartibility the subject of such a grant came, in the absence of any special custom regulating its enjoyment, within the principle laid down in Mayne’s Hindu Law, 7th edition, page 415, paragraph 321, that “in cases governed by the Mitakshara Law a father may sell or mortgage, not only his own property in order to satisfy an antecedent debt of his own, not being of an illegal or immoral character and such transactions may be enforced against his sons by a suit, and by proceedings in execution to which they are no parties.” *Semble*: If the male descendant, in whom property so granted was for the time being vested, failed to pay the Government revenue as stipulated, and the Maharaja was himself obliged to discharge the claim of the Government, he might sue the defaulter for the amount so paid, and execute his decree by sale of the “*babuana*” property. A family custom to the effect that property granted for maintenance by a “*babuana*” grant was inalienable, was held to be not established. Absence of evidence of alienation without any evidence of facts which would make it probable that an alienation would have been made, cannot be accepted as proof of a custom of alienability. *Sartaj Kuari v. Deoraj Kuari*, I. L. R. 19 All. 272; *L. R. 15 I. A. 51*, followed. *DURGADUT SINGH v. RAMESHWAR SINGH* (1909) I. L. R. 36 Calc. 943.

"BABUANA" PROPERTY.

See "BABUANA" GRANT.

BAD FAITH.

See INSOLVENCY—INSOLVENT DEBTORS
UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

BAD LIVELIHOOD CASE—

— evidence of general repute—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 110 (f)
13 C. W. N. 244

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 123.
13 C. W. N. 318

BAIL.

See ARREST—CRIMINAL ARREST.
I. L. R. 14 All. 45

See CORONER, INQUISITION BY.
I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1

See CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872).
I. L. R. 32 Bom. 449

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.
8 C. W. N. 779

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 75, 76.
13 C. W. N. 1091

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.
5 C. W. N. 615

See RECOGNIZANCE TO APPEAR.
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 107

— cancellation of—

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— grant of, after Coroner's refusal—

See CORONER . 7 C. W. N. 889

— on arrest of ship.

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—ADMIRALTY
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I. L. R. 17 Calc. 84

See SALVAGE . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 84

— order for—

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
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I. L. R. 22 Bom. 549

— petition for—

See PRACTICE—CRIMINAL CASES—PETI-
TION FOR BAIL.
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 488

— release on—

See FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 872

— right to—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 80

See CUSTODY, DETENTION IN.
9 C. W. N. 80

BAIL—contd.

1. ——— Accused person—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 390—Convicted person—Sessions Judge.* The Court of Session has no power, under s. 390, Act X of 1872, to admit a convicted person to bail, a convicted person not being an accused person within the meaning of that section. *QUEEN v. THAKUR PERSHAD I. L. R. 1 All. 151*

2. ——— Discharge for want of evidence—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 212—Act X of 1872, s. 339.* The accused in a case of dacoity and assault were discharged by the Magistrate for want of evidence. At the same time, he ordered them to give security to the amount of Rs 250 to appear before him any time within six months if called upon. The Judge referred the question of the legality of the order to the High Court, by whom the order for security was quashed. *RAMLAL TEWARI v. SUPHARAM*

1 B. L. R. S. N. 26: 10 W. R. Cr. 84

3. ——— Insolvent convicted and sentenced to imprisonment under s. 50 of the Insolvency Act (Stat. 11 & 12 Vict., c. 21) —*Appeal by insolvent under s. 73—Power of High Court to admit insolvent to bail pending appeal.* An insolvency was convicted by the Insolvency Court of an offence under s. 50 of the Indian Insolvency Act (Stat. 11 & 12 Vic., c. 21), and sentenced to imprisonment. Under s. 73 of the Act, he appealed against the decision and sentence of the Insolvency Court and applied to be admitted to bail pending the hearing of his appeal. Held, refusing the application, that the High Court had no power to admit him to bail. *In the matter of HORMASJI ARDESIR HORMASJI*
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 384

4. ——— Power of Sessions Court to admit to bail—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), ss. 436, 411.* A person sentenced to one month's imprisonment by a Magistrate, from which sentence no appeal is allowed under s. 411 of Act XXV of 1861, is not an accused person within the meaning of s. 436 of the same Act, so as to be admitted to bail by the Court of Session, when his case is referred to the High Court under s. 434 of the same Act. *QUEEN v. MAHENDRANARAYAN BANGABHUSAN*
1 B. L. R. A. Cr. 7

BAGDEE MANJEE v. MOHINDRO NARAIN
10 W. R. Cr. 16

5. ——— Further remand—*Evidence of guilt—Necessity of taking evidence before refusing bail.* When an accused person is first brought before a Magistrate and a remand is required by the prosecutor, it is ordinarily sufficient to show by the evidence of a police officer that the police are in possession of information, believed to be reliable, that the accused has committed an offence; but when the accused is again brought up after remand and a further remand is needed, some direct evidence of the guilt of the accused should be required to justify the Magistrate in refusing bail, and with each remand the necessity for production of evidence of guilt becomes stronger. *PONNUSAMI CHETTI v. QUEEN*
I. L. R. 6 Mad. 69

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6. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 190, 194—Remand of case for evidence—Judicial proceeding—Reasonable ground for remand not supported by sworn testimony.* The proceeding in which it has to be determined whether an accused person should be admitted to bail by a Magistrate is a judicial proceeding, and, as such, cognizable by the High Court under s. 297 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872. S. 194 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, must be read as a proviso to s. 190, and authorizes a Magistrate for reasonable cause to remand an accused person to jail without examining any witnesses. Where evidence was available, but it appeared necessary to the Magistrate to defer the examination of witnesses in order that further evidence might be produced (so that the enquiry, when commenced, might be continuous):—*Held*, that such a reason recorded by the Magistrate, although not sworn to, justified a remand for five days and a further remand for four days. An accused person has a right to have the evidence against him recorded at as early a period as possible, and the fact that there is or may be a great body of evidence forthcoming against him is not a ground for detention for an inordinate period. *Per KERNAN, J.* When a Magistrate defers the examination of witnesses, adjourns the enquiry, and remands the prisoner under s. 194 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872, he is bound to express clearly on the record the reasonable cause from which such action became necessary or advisable. *MANIKAM MUDALI v. QUEEN*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 68

7. ————— *Power of single Judge of High Court, pending appeal—Release on bail.* A single Judge of the High Court may order the release of a prisoner on bail, pending the hearing of an appeal. *QUEEN v. JALOO SIRDAR*

W. R., 1864, Cr. 18

8. ————— *Discretion of Magistrate to accept or refuse bail.* The refusing or accepting bail is a judicial and not merely a ministerial duty, and a mistake in the performance of that duty without malice will not be sufficient to sustain an action. *PARANKUSAM NARASAYA PANTULU v. STUART*

2 Mad. 396

9. ————— *Contempt of Court—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 163.* In a case of contempt, the Court before which the offence is committed is bound, under s. 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to accept bail, if sufficient bail is tendered. *QUEEN v. CHUNDER SEEKUR ROY*

12 W. R. Cr. 18

10. ————— *Power of Sessions Judge to give bail pending reference to High Court.* A Sessions Judge has no power to release on bail persons convicted by the Magistrate, pending a reference to the High Court under Act X of 1872, s. 296. *ARADHUN MUNDUL v. MYAN KHAN TAKADGEER*

24 W. R. Cr. 7

11. ————— *Admission to bail after sentence—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 390.*

BAIL—contd.

Act X of 1872, s. 390, refers only to the period during which a case is under enquiry, and when the party concerned is still in the position of an accused. The Sessions Judge has no power to admit him to bail after he is sentenced and convicted. *QUEEN v. RAM RUTTON MOOKERJEE*

24 W. R. Cr. 8

QUEEN v. KANHAI SHAHU 23 W. R. Cr. 40

MOHESH MUNDUL v. BHOLANATH MUNDUL

3 C. L. R. 404

MOHESH MUNDUL v. BHOLANATH BISWAS

3 C. L. R. 405 note

12. ————— *Illegal practice—Police-officer—Court, duty of—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 344.* The practice of leaving to the police the decision as to the sufficiency of bail, when bail has been ordered by the Court, is contrary to law. The duty of deciding as to its sufficiency or otherwise is with the Court itself and not with the police. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GAYITRI PROSSUNNO GHOSAL*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 455

13. ————— *Release on bail of a person convicted by Sessions Court of Madras pending appeal to Privy Council—Jurisdiction of High Court.* A person was, at Criminal Sessions held in Madras, convicted of certain offences, and sentenced to imprisonment and fine. Upon a certificate being granted by the Advocate-General under s. 26 of the Letters Patent, the High Court reviewed the conviction and reduced the sentence. The accused obtained from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council special leave to appeal, and also applied to be released on bail; but the Judicial Committee expressed the opinion that the latter application should be decided by the Madras High Court. Upon application being made accordingly to the Madras High Court: *Held*, that the High Court had jurisdiction to make an order releasing the accused on bail pending the decision of the Privy Council; and that, having regard to the rule laid down by the Judicial Committee in *Ex parte Carew*, [1897] A. C. 719, as to the circumstances under which an appeal in a criminal matter will be admitted by the Privy Council, the accused ought to be released on bail in the present case. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SUBRAHMANIA AYYAR* (1900)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 161

14. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 107.* No bail should be called for from a person against whom proceedings under s. 107, Criminal Procedure Code, are contemplated but not actually initiated. The most that can be required of him is to furnish recognizance and that only when there is any likelihood of his absents himself from Court. *MEWA LAL THAKUR v. EMPEROR* (1906)

11 C. W. N. 415

15. ————— *Grounds for grant or refusal of—Remand to custody—Reasonable evidence of prisoner's guilt—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 344, 497 and 498.* *Held per MITRA J. (COXE J., diss.),* that the main question

BAIL—contd.

for consideration in determining matters of bail is whether there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused guilty of the offences charged. Other considerations must also arise in deciding this question, and one of these, which has always guided the English and Indian Courts, is whether there are any grounds for supposing that the accused would abscond. Under s. 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code an accused should ordinarily be released on substantial bail until reasonable grounds are made out for presuming his guilt. *In re Johur Mull, 10 C. W. N. 1093*, followed. If after a remand incriminating evidence is not adduced, and if the prosecution has already had sufficient time to adduce such evidence, the Court will reasonably conclude that such evidence is not forthcoming at the time. It should then under s. 497, sub-s. (2), release the accused on bail, whatever be the nature of the offence, though the preliminary enquiry should proceed. *Manikam Mudali v. Queen, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 63*, followed. Whether there are reasonable grounds or not must be decided judicially, that is to say, there should be some tangible evidence on the record on which, if unrebutted, the Court can conclude that the accused might be convicted. The statement by a witness that he has seen a certain act of an incriminating character done by the accused might be sufficient. But if there be no evidence whatsoever, or evidence of a very flimsy character on the face of it, the inference will be, after a reasonable time has elapsed since the beginning of the enquiry, that there are no reasonable grounds for supposing the accused to be guilty. The prosecution must, however, have a fair opportunity of adducing evidence of a really incriminating nature. At all events, the first information report should indicate with sufficient exactness, the character of the evidence likely to be forthcoming. The detention of an accused under trial is not intended to be penal, but its object is to secure attendance. The gravity of the offence and some evidence of its perpetration by the accused will, however, justify detention. *JAMINI MULLICK v. EMPEROR (1908)*

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 174

16. ———— *Ground for granting or refusing—Remand to custody—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) ss. 344, 497 and 498.* In exercising its discretion under s. 498 of the Criminal Procedure Code the High Court should not confine its attention only to the question, whether the prisoner is likely to abscond or not. There may be other circumstances, which may also affect the question of granting bail to accused persons charged with crimes of a grave character. If a person is accused before a Magistrate of a non-bailable offence then, unless he considers that there are no reasonable grounds for believing him to be guilty, he must refuse bail, though he may be certain that the accused will stand his trial. It is the right of an accused to demand that the charges against him should be tried without any unreasonable delay, and such delay will dispose

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the High Court to grant bail. Where a police officer of superior rank deposed that he had evidence which he believed, implicating the accused, and swore also to the truth of the first information, which alleged association of the accused in certain places and stated that the police had in their possession incriminating correspondence between the accused and a secret society in Calcutta, it was held that there was sufficient evidence for a remand under s. 344 of the Code, but that there had been unreasonable delay as regards the prisoners, who had been in custody for about six weeks, though not in the case of those who were in jail for three weeks. *NARENDRA LALL KHAN v. EMPEROR (1908)* . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 166

BAIL-BOND, FORFEITURE OF. *Bond for appearance before the Sessions Court—Production of the accused before such Court but not before the District Magistrate—Sureties, liability of—Bail-bond, terms of—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 514.* A bail-bond providing only for the production of certain accused persons before the Sessions Court on a certain date is complied with by the appearance of the accused before such Court on such date, and the sureties are not bound to produce them subsequently before the District Magistrate. A bail-bond to produce the accused in the Sessions Court on every date fixed for the hearing of an appeal, or whenever required, is also complied with by the attendance of the accused during the hearing; and, though a requisition might be made by the Court of Session for their subsequent production in that Court, the sureties are not bound to produce them thereafter before the District Magistrate. A bail-bond should contain a clear proviso for the production of the accused before the Court or officer who is to take measures to secure their surrender and to re-commit them to jail in terms of the warrant. *General Rules and Circular Orders (Criminal) of the High Court, Chap. I, Rule 119*, referred to. *BEHARI LAL CHATTERJEE v. EMPEROR, RASH BEHARI SEN v. EMPEROR (1909)* . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 749

— terms of—

See BAIL-BOND, FORFEITURE OF.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 749

BAILEES.

See CARRIERS.

See HOTEL-KEEPER AND GUEST.

I. L. R. 22 All. 164

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

See RAILWAY ACT (IX OF 1890), s. 72.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 257

BAILMENT.

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 108.

12 B. L. R. 42

20 W. R. 467

I. L. R. 9 All. 398

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 178.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 264

BAILMENT—contd.

See DAMAGES—MEASURE AND ASSESSMENT
OF DAMAGES—BREACH OF CONTRACT.
I. L. R. 2 All. 756

See HOTEL-KEEPER AND GUEST.
I. L. R. 22 All. 164

See ONUS OF PROOF—BAILMENTS.
I. L. R. 9 All. 388

1. ——— Law applicable to the mofussil
—English law. The general principles of the
law of bailment are applicable in the mofussil, and
they are substantially the same as those which
prevail under English law. DOOMUN PEADEA v.
SHOOK CHAND PAUL . 17 W. R. 90

2. ——— Non-delivery of goods—Bailee
—Onus probandi. A sent cotton to B's screw-
house to be screwed. It was placed in B's godowns
in charge of which was a servant of B's who kept
entries of cotton received and given out. B's
durwan kept the key of the godowns. B provided
dunnage; no rent was paid for godown room, but it
was shown that, on several occasions when cotton
had been left by owners for some time in the godowns
and removed unscrewed, rent had been paid; and it
was allowed that it was for the mutual interest of
both parties that the cotton should be so kept. The
custom was that the screwing charges should be paid
by the purchasers of cotton, to whom it was deli-
vered by B, by the direction of the vendors. In an
action by A for the non-delivery of some of his
cotton:—Held per NORMAN, J., that B was a gratui-
tous bailee of the goods, and that he was only bound
to account for the manner in which they had been
kept, which he had satisfactorily done. A's suit
must be dismissed. Decree affirmed on appeal;
but per PEACOCK, C.J.—Quære: Was B a bailee
at all? Per MARKBY, J.—B was a bailee for cus-
tody, but not a gratuitous bailee. MOOLCHAND v.
ROBINSON . 1 B. L. R. O. C. 68

3. ——— Seizure of goods—Interpleader
suit—Costs—Execution of decree of Small Cause
Court—Act IX of 1850, s. 88. A obtained a decree
in the Small Cause Court against B. In execution
of the decree, goods belonging to B, but in the
possession of a pledgee, were seized by a bailiff of
the Small Cause Court. The pledgee brought an
interpleader suit, under s. 88 of Act IX of 1850, to
recover the goods. Held, that the pledgee was en-
titled to have the goods released to him and to have
the costs of his suit paid by the execution-creditor.
BHINJI GOVINDJI v. MONOHARDAS .
5 B. L. R. Ap. 31: 14 W. R. 303

4. ——— Bailee's lien for work done—
Work done—Contract—Quantum meruit—Act IX
of 1872 (Contract Act), s. 170. S delivered J an
organ to repair, promising to repair it for R100. J
subsequently refused to repair it for that sum, and
claimed to be entitled to retain the organ until he
received certain remuneration for the work done.
Held, that as, where there is an express contract, it
must be performed in its entirety or nothing can be
claimed under it, and there is only room for a
quantum meruit claim where no express contract has

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been made, J was not entitled to retain the organ
until he was paid. SKINNER v. JAGER
I. L. R. 6 All. 189

**BALAMBHATTA, VALUE OF THE
COMMENTARIES OF.**

See HINDU LAW,
I. L. R. 32 Bom. 300

BALANCE OF ACCOUNT.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 64.
See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 85 (1859,
s. 8).

BALANCE SHEET.

See STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. I, CL. 1.
I. L. R. 15 Calc. 162

BALLOT FOR JURY.

See JURY . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 462

BALCONY.

See BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT
(BOM. ACT VI OF 1873), SS. 33 AND 42.
I. L. R. 27 Bom. 221

BANDHUS.

See HINDU LAW—ALIENATION BY WIDOW
I. L. R. 31 All. 454

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—GENE-
RAL HEIRS—BANDHUS.

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—SPECIAL
HEIRS—MALES.

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—SPECIAL
HEIRS—FEMALES.

——— preference among—

See HINDU LAW I. L. R. 31 Mad. 321

BANIAN OF FIRM.

See LIEN . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 573
I. L. R. 18 I. A. 78

——— liability of—

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—LIABILITY OF
AGENT . 2 B. L. R. O. C. 7
2 Hyde 129: Cor. 47
Bourke A. O. C. 117: 2 Hyde 301

——— lien of, on goods under agree-
ment with firm.

See PARTNERSHIP—RIGHTS AND LI-
ABILITIES OF PARTNERS.
3 B. L. R. O. C. 80

See LIEN . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 937

BANK MEMORANDUM.

See STAMP ACT, 1869, SCH. II, CL. 7.
I. L. R. 4 Cal. 829

BANK OF BENGAL.

See PRESIDENCY BANKS ACT.

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 300

1. ————, Act IV of 1862, s. 10—*Loans and advances on security of land—Security for past loan.* The prohibition contained in s. 30 of Act IV of 1862, which regulates the Bank of Bengal against making loans and advances on the security of land, is no prohibition against the Bank taking land as security for a past loan and an existing debt. *IBRAHIM AZIM v. CRUKSHANK*

7 B. L. R. 653 : 16 W. R. 203

2. ————, Act XI of 1876, ss. 17, 21—*Registration of transfer—Right of Bank to refuse to register.* The Bank of Bengal is entitled to refuse to register a transfer of shares when the application is made during the time the transfer books of the Bank are closed under the powers given by s. 21, Act XI of 1876, and after a public notification in accordance therewith. Though the Bank may not have given this reason for not registering at the time of the application being made, they are entitled to avail themselves of it subsequently, when a suit is brought to compel them to register the transfer. S. 17 of Act XI of 1876, which entitles the Bank of Bengal to refuse to register the transfer of shares until payment of any debts due by the person in whose name the shares stand, refers only to debts which are presently payable ; therefore, where *R* was indebted to the Bank, and gave bills as security therefor :—*Held*, that the Bank would not be entitled to refuse under s. 17 to register the transfer during the currency of the bills. *MOTHOORMOHUN ROY v. BANK OF BENGAL*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 392 : 1 C. L. R. 507

BANK OF BOMBAY.

See PRESIDENCY BANKS ACT.

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 350

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 319

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 466

See PRESIDENCY BANKS ACT (XI OF 1876), ss. 36, 37 . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 52

BANKER AND CUSTOMER.

See BANKERS.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 59.

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 338

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 60 (1859, s. 1, CL. 9) . 10 Bom. 300

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 25

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 390

1. ————, *Payment of cheque—Evidence.* Case in which it was held on the evidence that the respondent Bank had, on the presentation by the appellants' servant of a cheque drawn upon it in favour of the appellants, failed to pay the same in such manner as to be discharged of its obligation. *LALL CHAND v. AGRA BANK*

I. L. R. 18 I. A. 111

2. ————, *Entry in Pass book—Cheque lodged by customer for collection—Effect of entry in*

BANKER AND CUSTOMER—contd.

customer's pass-book of such cheque as if collected—Estoppel. Early in March, 1900, the Hope Mills Company purchased 600 bales of cotton from the plaintiff at R278 per candy, but, being unable to accept and pay for them, it was arranged between the Company and the plaintiffs that one Shridhan should take them over from the plaintiffs at R243-8-0 per candy (the price having fallen in the meantime), and that the Company should pay the plaintiffs the difference of price. In fulfilment of this agreement, the Company sent to the plaintiffs a cheque for R9,500, drawn by them on the Commercial Bank, being approximately the amount of the difference. This cheque was given to the plaintiffs on the 23rd March, 1900, but was post-dated the 3rd April. It was sent by the plaintiffs for collection to the defendant Bank (with which the plaintiffs had an account) on the next day (the 4th), at about 12 o'clock, together with the plaintiff's pass-book. The pass-book was asked for by the plaintiffs, and was returned to them at about 4-30 o'clock on the same day with R9,500 duly credited therein and initialled by one of the Bank's officers. On the same afternoon plaintiffs delivered 100 of the bales to Shridhan. On the next day (the 5th April) another 100 bales were delivered by the plaintiffs, to Shridhan, and after the delivery had proceeded thus far the plaintiffs at about 1-30 o'clock on the 5th April, received notice from the defendant Bank that the Company's cheque for R9,500 had been dishonoured. Subsequently to the receipt of this notice, the plaintiffs delivered the remaining 400 bales to Shridhan. The plaintiffs now sued the defendant Bank to recover the sum of R9,500, alleging that it was impossible to recover the amount from the drawers of the cheque (the Company), and contending that the defendant Bank, by entering the said amount in the plaintiffs' pass-book and delivering the said book to them, had led them to believe that the cheque had been duly honoured and the amount paid into their account, and they alleged that they would not have delivered the said bales to Shridhan if it had not been for the said representation by the Bank. They contended that the Bank was estopped from alleging the dishonour and non-payment of the cheque. *Held*, that the returning of the pass-book to the plaintiffs by the Bank, and the noting and initialling of the entry of R9,500 therein, was a representation by the Bank that it had received payment of the cheque and was prepared to give the plaintiffs credit for the amount. But *held*, upon the evidence, that the delivery of the bales by the plaintiffs to Shridhan was not made on the faith of such representation by the Bank. *Held*, further, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, and that the Bank was not estopped by the entry in the pass-book from alleging the non-payment of the cheque. The cheque having been lodged by the plaintiffs for collection of the 4th April, the Bank in the ordinary course of business had until the next day to give notice of its dishonour, and the entry in the pass-book made on the 4th was

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not intended to be an acknowledgment of cash received. The Bank never intended the plaintiffs to act upon the entry in the pass-book, made on the 4th upon the faith of its being an entry of cash actually received, and, further, the cheque was a post-dated cheque, and the plaintiffs when lodging it clearly had doubts as to whether it would be honoured or not, while the defendant Bank had no knowledge of any circumstance justifying doubts as to its payment. The parties thus did not deal on equal terms, and the defendant Bank was therefore not bound by the entry in the pass-book as a receipt. *Martin v. Morgan, 1 Bro. & B. 289*, referred to. *MOWJI SHAMJI v. NATIONAL BANK OF INDIA (1900)*

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 499

3. ———— *Mortgage payment—Mortgage held by banker against customer—Payment from customer's current account—Banker's duty—Interest—Privy Council—Practice—Transcript, preparation of—Inclusion of irrelevant matter.* In the absence of special direction to that effect a banker is not bound to pay off a mortgage, which he has against his customer from the latter's current account, and interest is properly charged upon it, until the customer directs that the principal should be paid off. *THAKUR JAWAHIR SINGH v. LACHMAN DAS (1905)*. **9. C. W. N. 745**

BANKERS.

See **BANKER AND CUSTOMER.**

——— *Liability of—*

See **CHEQUE . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 249**

1. ———— *Deposit of money—Obligation to keep funds separate—Breach of trust—Commission agents.* The insolvents carried on business as bankers and commission agents, receiving the money of their constituents on deposit, for investment or for remittance, charging a commission on each transaction, and allowing 4 per cent. interest on deposits. An opposing creditor, one of their constituents, sent them in April 1879 a letter instructing them to invest Rs40,000 in municipal debentures. The insolvents failed in November, and it was found on the evidence that they could not have procured the desired quantity of municipal debentures without paying more than the market price for them. They purchased Rs18,000 worth of such debentures, and were debtors to the opposing creditor for the balance. *Held*, that the money was in their hands as bankers, and not as agents; and this being so, they were not bound to keep the Rs40,000 separate from their own funds, nor even after the latter received in April to set it apart for investment. *In the matter of the petition of COWIE.*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 70: 7 C. L. R. 19

2. ———— *Loss of hundi—Negligence—Criminal act of Bank servant.* A sent a hundi by post to a bank. The bank presented it for payment by one of its servants, B, who brought it back, reporting that payment had been refused. The

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manager of the bank, with the intention of returning it to A, placed it in an envelope, sealed and stamped, which was laid upon the table ready for the post, it being the custom of the bank to post all letters in that manner. The hundi did not reach A, and it afterwards appeared that B presented it for payment the following day, and obtained cash for it. *Held*, that the bank was guilty of such neglect as to render it liable to A for the amount of the hundi. *PEOPLE'S BANK v. OBBARD*

2 Hyde 57

3. ———— *Lien of banker—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 171—Deposit of security with bank to secure debts due to bank.* The plaintiff deposited certain jewels with the defendant bank to secure certain debts. Afterwards he paid the secured debts, and demanded the return of the jewels being then otherwise indebted to the bank. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the jewels without discharging the other debts, unless he proved that the defendant had agreed to give up its general lien. *KUNHAN MAYAN v. BANK OF MADRAS*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 234

4. ———— *Banking company registered under Companies Act (VI of 1882)—Criminal breach of trust by banker—Payment of dividends dishonestly out of deposits—Directors—Manager and accountant—Person entrusted with property or with dominion over property—Agent—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 109, 191, 409, and 413—Cheating—Making false balance-sheet—Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 215—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 239.* When a bank takes a deposit from its customer, it takes it on the understanding that that deposit is not to be used to pay dividends to shareholders at a time when the bank is insolvent and cannot legally pay dividends. In the case of a bank registered under the Indian Companies Act as a company limited by shares, and governed by the regulations contained in table A in the first schedule to the Act, it was *held* that the directors had dominion over the property and the management of the funds of the bank; that they were bound not to pay dividends except out of the profits of the bank; and that, if they dishonestly, that is, knowingly and intentionally, paid dividends to the shareholders out of deposits when there were no profits, intending to cause gain to themselves or others to which they were not entitled, or to cause wrongful loss to other persons, they were guilty of criminal breach of trust as bankers under s. 409 of the Penal Code; but that the manager and the accountant or assistant manager were not, within the meaning of the section, persons who were entrusted with property or with dominion over property as bankers or agents, and therefore did not come directly under s. 409, though they might be guilty of abetment under s. 409 read with s. 109, by conspiring with the directors to commit criminal breach of trust if they assisted the directors to obtain the sanction of the shareholders to the illegal payment of dividends, and did so for the dishonest

2 D

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purpose of causing wrongful gain or wrongful loss. Whether the illegal payment of dividends under the circumstances stated could be regarded as causing wrongful loss to the bank as a corporate body. *Quære*: Whether moneys deposited in the bank by its customers and not in any way ear-marked could, after such deposit, be regarded as "property" of the depositors within the meaning of s. 409. *Held*, also, that if the directors, manager, and accountant dishonestly, that is, to obtain wrongful gain for themselves or to cause wrongful loss to others, put before the shareholders balance-sheets which they knew to be materially false and misleading and likely to mislead the public as to the condition of the bank, and concealed its true condition, and thereby induced depositors to allow their money to remain in deposit in the bank, they were guilty of cheating in the aggravated form made punishable by s. 418 of the Penal Code; and if they acted together to put forward such a false balance-sheet, they were guilty of abetment by conspiracy to cheat. *Semble*: The making of such a false balance-sheet is not an offence within s. 191 of the Penal Code, and, where it is made prior to the commencement of the winding up of the company, is not an offence within s. 215 of the Companies Act (VI of 1882). A balance-sheet of a company under the Indian Companies Act must be a true balance-sheet, in the sense that it must represent the actual state of the company's assets and liabilities. If it falsely states the condition of the company, it is a false balance-sheet, though it follows the accounts as shown in the books of the company, and correctly represents what is in the books. A balance-sheet which showed all the debts owing to the company, amounting to Rs 28 lakhs, under the head of assets, without specifying in accordance with the form of balance-sheet annexed to table A, which of such debts were good and secured, which good and unsecured, and which considered bad and doubtful, and also showed a divisible balance of profits amounting to Rs 19,000, the facts being that out of the Rs 28 lakhs some Rs 13 lakhs were bad and irrecoverable, and that the capital, reserve fund, and other provision for bad debts had been lost, and that the company, instead of making profits, was, and long had been, insolvent, was found to be false and misleading. Having regard to the nature of the charges above referred to, the Court, under s. 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, rejected an application by the defence that the accused should be tried separately. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MOSS*

I. L. R. 16 All. 88

BANKERS' BOOKS EVIDENCE ACT (XVIII OF 1891).*See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 76.*I. L. R. 31 Calc. 284
8 C. W. N. 125

s. 2—*Admissibility in evidence of certified copies of entries in books of banks to which that Act does not apply.* Copies of entries in the books, of a bank which does not come within the

BANKERS' BOOKS EVIDENCE ACT (XVIII OF 1891)—concl'd.

definition of a "Company" as given in sub-s. (1) of s. 2 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, though certified in accordance with the form prescribed by that Act, are not admissible in evidence under the provisions of that Act. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MCGUIRE* 4 C. W. N. 433

BANK NOTE.*See GOVERNMENT CURRENCY NOTE.*

7 Bom. O. C. 1

BANKRUPTCY IN MAURITIUS.*See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 85

BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869.*See INSOLVENT ACT, s. 40.*

13 B. L. R. Ap. 2, 9

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 15

BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1883 (46 AND 47 VICT., C. 15).

ss. 43, 118.

See INSOLVENCY I. L. R. 31 Calc. 761
8 C. W. N. 553**BANNS OF MARRIAGE, PUBLICATION OF—***See BIGAMY* . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 316**BARRISTER.***See ADVOCATE.**See COUNSEL.*

_____ exclusive audience before
Special Tribunal—

See SPECIAL TRIBUNAL.

13 C. W. N. 605

_____ receipt of fees by—

See STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. II, ART. 15.

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 140

I. L. R. 16 All. 132

1. _____ Suspension from practising—*Malus animus—Ground for suspension.* An order of a High Court suspending a barrister from practice for five years set aside on the ground that, although there had been grave irregularity, there was no *malus animus* to show an intention to commit a fraudulent act. *In re NEWTON*

10 B. L. R. 88: 17 W. R. 65

14 Moo. I. A. 237

2. _____ Agreement with client as to fee—*Disability to contract—Pleader—Suit by client for fees—Act I of 1846, s. 8.* A engaged G, a barrister practising in the mofussil, to conduct a suit for him, and promised to pay him a sum of money as a present in addition to the fee allowed by Regulation XIV of 1816, provided that the decree

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awarded to A a sum above Rs.1,000. The condition being fulfilled, G collected moneys for A under the decree, and retained the sum promised. It was not proved that A assented to the appropriation by G of the sum retained in payment of the promised present. A sued G to recover the sum retained. *Held*, (1) that, if G was to be regarded as a barrister, he was under a disability to contract with A as to his fees; (2) that if G was to be regarded as a pleader, he was prohibited by a Circular Order of the Sudder Adalat from enforcing this contract. *Semle*: The decision in *Kennedy v. Brown*, 13 C. B. N. S. 677, governs all agreements made by members of the English Bar in that character. *ACHAMPARAMBATH CHERIA KUNHAMMU v. GANTZ*
I. L. R. 3 Mad. 188

3. ——— Right of client to sue for return of fee when barrister was absent—*Advocate and client*. Taking it that the rule of English law, that the relation of counsel or advocate and client creates mutual incapacity to make a binding contract of hiring and service, either express or implied, governs the relation of advocate and client generally in this country, there must be the relation of advocate and client to give rise to the incapacity, and the incapacity is strictly confined to contracts relating to service as an advocate in litigation and matters ancillary to such service. The degree of barrister is but one of the qualifications for admission and enrolment as an advocate of the High Court. Where the defendant, a barrister who was not admitted an advocate of the High Court, or specially authorized to plead in the superior Court, accepted a vakalatnamah from the plaintiff to defend him upon a charge pending in the Session Court, and the defendant failed to appear on the day to which the trial of the plaintiff was adjourned, and the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover the amount of the fee paid:—*Held*, that the suit was maintainable. *KISHTNA ROW v. MUTTUKISTNA*.
4 Mad. 244

4. ——— Right to sue for fees for professional services—*Barrister enrolled as advocate*. A barrister enrolled as an advocate of the High Court is incapacitated from making a contract of hiring as an advocate, and cannot maintain a suit for the recovery of his fees. *SMITH v. GUNESHEE LAL*.
3 N. W. 83

5. ——— *Barrister with right to act as advocate and attorney*. Where a barrister renders services which go beyond his profession as a barrister, his incapacity to recover fees as a barrister does not extend to such extra-professional services; and where, as in Burma, the law enables an advocate to recover fees, and a barrister acts both as an advocate and in other capacities, the remuneration claimed by him ought to be divided into two parts; and while, in that part of his services in which he acts as attorney, he should be allowed to recover fees not much in excess of those allowed in Calcutta, no attorney's charges whatever should be allowed for that part of his services which are extra-professional; the commission or other allowance made for

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such services being the only proper and a full remuneration for them. *LAND MORTGAGE BANK OF INDIA v. ELMES*.
25 W. R. 332

6. ——— Barrister or pleader appearing as litigant in person—*Practice*. In cases where a barrister or pleader appears before the Court as a litigant in person, he must not address the Court from the Advocate's table or in robes, but from the same place and in the same way as any ordinary member of the public. *In the matter of the WEST HOPETOWN TEA COMPANY*
I. L. R. 9 All. 180

7. ——— *Counsel and client*
—*Suit by client to recover fees to Counsel—Cause of action—Status of a barrister practising as an advocate in the High Court for the North-Western Provinces—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 622—Revision*. An English or Irish barrister who in virtue of his call to the Bar, is enrolled as an advocate in the High Court of Judicature for the North-Western Provinces, and thereby is authorized to practise as an advocate in the said High Court and in the Courts subordinate thereto, is, in respect of fees paid to him by a client for professional service, in exactly the same position as if he were practising in England or Ireland, that is to say, the fees received by him for professional services are mere *honoraria*, and he can neither sue for the recovery of, nor be sued for the return of, such fees. *Kennedy v. Brown*, 32 L. J. C. P. 134; *Robertson v. McDonough*, 14 Cox. C. C. 469; *Krishna Row v. H. F. Muttukistna*, 4 Mad. H. C. Rep. 244; *Smith v. Gunneshee Lal*, N. W. P. H. C. Rep., 1871, 83; *Achamparambath Cheria Kunhammu v. Gantz*, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 138; *Reference under Stamp Act, s. 46*, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 140; *Stamp Reference*, I. L. R. 16 All. 132; *Queen v. Doutre*, 9 A. C. 745; and *In re LeBrasseur and Oakley*, [1896] 2 Ch. 487, referred to. A client who had paid a fee to a barrister for professional services, which in fact were not rendered, sued the barrister in the Court of a Munsif, claiming a refund of the fee paid. The Munsif dismissed the suit, holding that such a suit could not lie. On appeal the District Judge held that the suit would lie, and gave the plaintiff a decree. Against this decision the defendant applies in revision to the High Court. *Held* by STANLEY, C.J., and BLAIR, J. (BANERJI, J. dissentiente), that the High Court was competent to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. *Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 6, distinguished. *Jugobundhu Pattuck v. Jadu Ghose Alkushi*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 47; *Munisha Eradi v. Siyals Koya*, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 220; and *Chenbasaya v. Lakshman Ramchandra*, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 369, referred to by STANLEY, C.J. *Held* by BANERJI, J., that the application for revision preferred by the defendant could not be entertained under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 6; *Magni Ram v. Jiwa Lal*, I. L. R. 7 All. 336; *Badami Kuar v. Dinru Rai*, I. L. R. 8 All. 111; *Enat Mondul v. Batoram Dey*, 3 C. W. N. 581;

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Sarman Lal v. Khuban, I. L. R. 17 All. 499; and *Sundar Singh v. Doru Shankar*, I. L. R. 20 All. 78, referred to. *ROSS ALSTON v. PITAMBER DAS* (1903) I. L. R. 25 All. 509

BARRISTERS AND VAKILS.

— *Barristers—Vakils—Right of exclusive audience—Special Tribunal—Criminal Law Amendment Act (XIV of 1908)—High Court Charter Act of 1861 (24 & 25 Vict., c. 104), ss. 1, 9, 13 and 14—Letters Patent, 1865, cls. 22, 23 and 24—Ordinary and Extraordinary Original Criminal Jurisdiction—Rules of the High Court, Original Side, 70, 71 and 72.* Barristers have the right of exclusive audience before the Special Tribunal formed to try cases sent up for trial to the High Court under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 1908. *Re BARRISTERS AND VAKILS* (1909)

13 C. W. N. 605

BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS.

See MAINTENANCE, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO.

See WITNESS—CIVIL CASES—PERSONS COMPETENT OR NOT TO BE WITNESSES.
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 781

BASTI LAND.

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1888, s. 2.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 528

BASTU LAND.

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT.

9 C. W. N. 303

BATTA.

See DEKHKHAN AGRICULTURISTS' RELIEF ACT. I. L. R. 33 Bom. 249

BAZARS.

See BENGAL REGULATION XXVII OF 1793, s. 5.

15 W. R. 48

16 W. R. 268

11 W. R. 112

21 W. R. 383

BEHAVIOUR.

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

BELCHAMBERS' RULES, Nos. 70, 71.

See SPECIAL TRIBUNAL.

13 C. W. N. 605

Nos. 730, 785.

See TAXATION. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 827

BENAMI.

See BENAMIDAR.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW.

10 C. W. N. 706

BENAMI—cont'd.

1. ————— *Fraudulent transfer—Benami deeds with intent to defraud creditor—Fraud not carried into effect—Suit by real owner against benamidar.* Plaintiff against whom several decrees for money were outstanding, with the object of protecting his properties from the claim of the decree-holders, executed a deed of relinquishment in favour of the defendant declaring that the properties belonged to the latter; the decrees were ultimately set aside on appeal and the plaintiff sued to recover possession of the properties on declaration of his right thereto. *Held*, that, where the intention to commit fraud has not been carried into effect, a beneficial owner is entitled to sue for a declaration that a deed of transfer executed by him is *benami* and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. *Yaramati Krishnayya v. Chundra Papayya*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 326, and *Chenvirappa v. Puttapa*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 708, dissented from. Authorities reviewed by *MOOKERJEE, J. JADU NATH PODDAR v. RUP LAL PODDAR* (1906) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 967 s.c. 10 C. W. N. 650

2. ————— *Benami transaction—Gift—Sale—Intention—Imaginary consideration inserted in a deed of gift—Evidence of intention—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 92—Mother and Daughter—Undue influence—Presumption—Unsoundness of mind—Pleadings—Purdanashin, who is.* The question whether a transaction which on its face purports to be a gift or a sale is really a *benami* transaction is purely one of intention. Notwithstanding that a transaction purported to be a sale and a price was mentioned in the conveyance, it was held on the evidence to be a gift and not a sale—the question being regarded as purely one of intention. When transfers of property made by a mother in favour of a daughter were challenged on the ground of the unsoundness of mind of the donor, but no case of undue influence exercised by the donee on the donor was raised in the pleadings, and evidence was given with reference to the question of unsoundness of mind only. *Held*, that the question of undue influence could not properly be discussed and considered upon such evidence. The mere relation of daughter to mother in itself suggests nothing in the way of special influence or control. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee did not treat as *purdanashin* a lady, who had no objection to communicate, when necessary, in matters of business, with men other than members of her own family, who was able to go to Court to give evidence and to attend at the Registrar's office in person to acknowledge her deeds for the purpose of registration. *ISMAL MUSSAZEE MOOKERDAM v. HAFIJ BOO* (1906) 10 C. W. N. 570 s.c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 773 I. L. R. 33 I. A. 86

3. ————— *Benami, transaction whether—Oral evidence unsatisfactory—Surrounding circumstances and considerations of probability to be looked into.* Where the question was whether a document, which on its face was

BENAMI—concl'd.

a mortgage-bond, was a genuine or a fictitious transaction, but at the trial persons, who might have been expected to be prominent witnesses were not called, and the evidence that was called was open to much adverse criticism: *Held*, that in the circumstances, it was necessary to rely largely upon the surrounding circumstances, the position of the parties and their relation to one another, the motives which could govern their actions and their subsequent conduct. *DALIP SING v. CHAUDHRAIN NAWAL KUNWAR* (1908)

12 C. W. N. 609

s.c. L. R. 35 I. A. 104; I. L. R. 30 All. 258

BENAMIDAR.

See BENAMI.

See BENAMI TRANSACTION.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT., s. 173.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 554

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317.

I. L. R. 26 All. 82

See CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872), s. 69.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 92

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 179—

NATURE OF APPLICATION—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 388

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 179—

STEP IN AID OF EXECUTION—GENERAL-

LY. I. L. R. 9 Calc. 633

12 C. W. R. 146

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 355

See MORTGAGE ACT, 1882, s. 17.

I. L. R. 26 All. 82

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT (XXVI

OF 1881), ss. 8, 78.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 88

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—BENA-

MIDARS.

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—SURE-

TIES. 2 B. L. R. A. C. 237:

11 W. R. 120

See RES JUDICATA—PARTIES—SAME

PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.

B. L. R., Sup. Vol., 759:

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 327: 8 W. R. 428

5 B. L. R. 321: 13 W. R. 157

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 267

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—

SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY—

GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 418

1 C. W. N. 279

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 682

1.

Benamidar, right of, to bring suit—Can sue only if he can show some right under general law—Benamidar, merely as such, not a Trustee—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 149, applies only to suits brought by or on behalf of the Secretary of State. A person in whose name property is purchased benami

BENAMIDAR—cont'd.

cannot sue in his own name unless he can show some right under the general law to maintain the suit as, for instance, as trustee or agent of an undisclosed principal. In *benami sales*, the legal estate does not in all cases rest in the benamidar, and constitute him a trustee for the real owner. Art. 149 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act applies only to suits brought by the Secretary of State or on his behalf and not to suits brought by persons deriving title from him. *KUTHAPERUMAL RAJALI v. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 245

2.

Suit for sale on a mortgage—Decree giving benamidar a right to redeem—Right to redeem not availed of—Subsequent suit for redemption by alleged beneficial owner barred. A decree for sale on a mortgage was passed giving a right of redemption to a puisne mortgagee. The puisne mortgagee did not redeem and the decree became absolute. Held, that no subsequent suit for redemption would lie by a person alleging that he was the real puisne mortgagee and that the person, whose name appeared in the decree as puisne mortgagee, was merely a benamidar. KANIJ FATIMA v. WALI-ULLAH (1907)

I. L. R. 30 All. 30

3.

Benami transaction—Fraud—Deed—Creditor—Equitable mortgage—Suit—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Articles 91, 144—Deed declared inoperative and fraudulent. In order to defeat the claim of an equitable mortgagee of certain property, the predecessor in title of the respondent and co-member with him of a joint Hindu family executed on 11th June 1895, what purported to be a deed of sale of the property in favour of the predecessor in title of the appellant. The claim, however, was decreed, the Court finding that the vendee under the alleged deed of sale was aware of the equitable mortgage, when the deed was executed; and the decree was satisfied by money raised on the security of the property by the vendee. In a suit by the respondent against the appellant to have it declared that the deed of 11th June 1895, was merely a benami transaction, and recover possession of the property, it was found on the facts that the deed was benami and fraudulent and inoperative as against the plaintiff. Held, that the purpose of the fraud not having been effected, there was nothing to prevent the plaintiff from repudiating the transaction as being benami and recovering possession of the property. TAYLOR v. BOWERS, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 291, Symes v. Hughes, L. R. 9 Eq. 475, and In re Great Berlin Steamboat Co., L. R. 26 Ch. D. 616, followed. KEARLEY v. THOMSON, L. R. 24 Q. B. D. 742, distinguished. Held, also, that the deed being inoperative, it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to have it set aside as a preliminary to his obtaining possession of the property. The suit was therefore governed not by Art. 91, but by Art. 144 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) and consequently was not barred by lapse of

BENAMIDAR—concl'd.

time. *PETHERPERMAL CHETTY v. MUNIANDY SER-
VAI* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 551
s. c. 12 C. W. N. 562
L. R. 35 I. A. 98

4. ————— *Benamidar—Right
of suit by—Mortgage—Conveyance without con-
sideration.* A benamidar cannot bring a suit
for recovery of a mortgage-debt. A mortgagee
assigned over his interest under the mortgage
to the plaintiffs who instituted the present suit
against the mortgagors for recovery of the
mortgage-debt. It was found that the assign-
ment was a *benami* transaction and was intended to
put the mortgagors into difficulty. *Held*, that the
plaintiffs' suit was rightly dismissed. *Lal Achal
Ram v. Raja Kazim Husain*, 9 C. W. N. 477; s. c.
L. R. 32 I. A. 113; I. L. R. 27 All. 271, distin-
guished. The mere non-passing of consideration is
not sufficient to show that a transaction is *benami*.
BASIRUDDIN AHMED v. JALISH PATWARI (1908)
12 C. W. N. 409

BENAMI LEASE.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 967, 985

BENAMI TRANSACTION. Col.

1. GENERAL CASES . . . 876
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 - (a) ACTS XII OF 1841, I OF 1845,
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See BENAMI.

See BENAMIDAR.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT.
8 C. W. N. 594, 695

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317.
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s. 2).
2 B. L. R. A. C. 284: 11 W. R. 72

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38 AND 39 . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 655

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See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT.
I. L. R. 28 Mad. 244

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—BENA-
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5 C. W. N. 265.

See UNDUE INFLUENCE.
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 773:

1. GENERAL CASES.

1. ————— *Custom—Recognition of benami
transactions.* Benami transactions are a custom of
the country, and must be recognized till otherwise
ordered by law. Meanwhile the extent of their
compatibility with an honest purchase depends
upon the peculiar circumstances of each case.
KALLY MOHUN PAL v. BHOLANATH CHAKLADAR.
7 W. R. 138

2. ————— *Presumption as to
ownership.* The habit of holding land benami,
though inveterate in India, does not justify the
Courts in making every presumption against ap-
parent ownership. *JUDOONATH BOSE v. SHUMSOON-
NISSA BEGUM BUSLOOR RUHEEM v. SHUMSOONNISSA
REGUM* . 8 W. R. P. C. 3: 11 Moo. I. A. 551

3. ————— *Presumption—Evidence justify-
ing benami purchase.* Evidence raising presump-
tion of purchase at a sale in execution being made
benami for the judgment-debtor discussed. *RAM
CHUNDER BYSACK v. DINO NATH SURMA SIKKAR*
5 C. L. R. 470

4. ————— *Purchase of pro-
perty by manager of joint family property.* When
the manager of a joint Hindu family re-pur-
chases benami property sold for arrears of revenue,
the presumption is that the property so purchased

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**1. GENERAL CASES—contd.**

is held by him for the benefit of the joint family.
KALEE DOSS MOOKERJEE v. MOTHORANATH BANERJEE **5 W. R. 154**

5. ————— *Use of farzi name.*
 In the case of a benami purchase, the mere use of the farzi name is sufficiently disposed of if the party whose name is used sets up no claim, and if there appears to have been long-continued possession on the part of the person claiming to be the beneficial owner. **HOYMOBUTTY DASSEE v. SREEKRISHN NUNDY** **14 W. R. 58**

6. ————— *Purchase by father in name of son.* Where the father of a joint Hindu family purchases property in the name of his minor son, the presumption is that it is a benami purchase by the father on whose death it becomes the property of the family. **BHAGBUT CHUNDER DEY v. HURO GOBIND PAL** **20 W. R. 269**

7. ————— *Lease taken in name of wife and son.* Where a father obtained, once and again, a lease in the name of his wife and son, paying the consideration-money out of his own funds, and on the decease of his wife obtained the lease in the joint names of the son and of his daughter by the deceased, and it was found that latterly the possession was not with the father:—*Held*, that there was no error in law in the Judge's coming to the conclusion that the property was not intended by the father for his own benefit, but was given to his wife and children for their maintenance. **ZEEMUT ALI v. ALI-MOONISSA** **10 W. R. 277**

8. ————— *Purchase in the name of Hindu wife.* The question for decision was whether a purchase in 1842, in the name of a Hindu wife of an interest in part of her husband's ancestral estate, was for herself, or for her husband, her name being used benami for him. The High Court, at the hearing in appeal, considered certain previous decisions in cases arising out of benami transactions. But in arriving at its conclusion, which was that the property was the wife's, it proceeded entirely on the evidence in the particular case. The judgment of the Judicial Committee, which also went upon the evidence, was, on the contrary, that the husband was, in fact, the purchaser, the purchase being benami in his wife's name. **DHARANI KANT LAHIRI CHOWDRY v. KRISTO KUMARI CHOWDHURANI**

I. L. R. 13 Cal. 181: L. R. 13 I. A. 70

Reversing decision of High Court in **CHOWDHURANI v. TARINY KANT LAHIRY CHOWDRY**.

I. L. R. 8 Cal. 545: 11 C. L. R. 41

9. ————— *Purchase by husband in name of wife—Claim by husband when property is attached.* A husband who puts his wife into the position of being the true owner of an estate and allows her to deal with the world as the true owner, deprives himself of the right to set up, or rely on,

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**1. GENERAL CASES—contd.**

his benami title. **NIDHEE SINGH v. BISSONATH DOSS** **24 W. R. 79**

10. ————— *Property of husband bought from wife.* Where property is bought from a wife as the ostensible owner, the husband consenting to the sale, and the transaction is *bona fide* on the part of the purchaser for a consideration, the purchase is a good one, even if the property is not the wife's, but the husband's. **GOLAM RUSSOOL v. ABDOL RUHEEM**.
15 W. R. 19

11. ————— *Property of husband standing in name of wife.* Certain property standing in the name of a wife was mortgaged by her. The mortgage debt was paid off. The mortgagee, having a decree against the husband, attached and sold the property. *Held*, that, though payment of the mortgage debt by the wife might have given her a lien on the property to the extent of any money paid by her out of her own fund, the mortgagee's acting on the wife's assertion of title did not prevent him, when he subsequently discovered that the property was really the deceased husband's, from making it available for the satisfaction of his decree against the husband. **AMEERONISSA BEEBEE v. BENODE RAM SEIN** **2 W. R. 29**

12. ————— *Property acquired by Mahomedan married woman.* Where property is acquired by a Mahomedan lady living in a state of wedlock, and also by her legitimate daughter, a very small amount of evidence would suffice to dispose of the presumption arising from the fact of title deeds being with the lady, against the supposition of a benami purchase. **KUDEERUN v. LALLUN**
14 W. R. 366

13. ————— *Purchase in name of daughters—Right of bona fide purchaser from daughter.* A, having two daughters, B and C, granted a patni talukh of certain lands in his zamindari to them in their infancy, and transacted the business connected therewith as manager down to the time of his death. After his death, B sold her interest to her sister C, and C sold the patni talukh to D. The heirs of A brought a suit against D for the lands. *Held*, that the lower Court might, upon these facts, infer that the grant of the patni talukh by A to his daughters was by way of provision for them, and that it was not a case in which the daughters held benami for the father. Secondly, that even if it were so, D, acquiring by a *bona fide* purchase and without notice, had a good title against the heirs of A, since they claimed through the person by whose act the apparent ownership was vested in his vendor. **OBHOY CHURN MOOKERJEE v. FUNCHANUN BOSE** **Marsh 564: 2 Hay 630**

14. ————— *Person allowing another to appear as real owner.* Where a person allows another to hold himself out to the world as the real proprietor of an estate, the Court will not

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**1. GENERAL CASES—contd.**

consider him entitled to any consideration as against a person who may have advanced money upon the confidence so created. *NUNDELL v. TAYLER*.

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 55: 5 W. R. 37

15. ——— Benami purchase

—Alienation by benamidar. Property bought by *P* in the name of *S* was mortgaged by *P* through his benamidar *S* by conditional sale to *L*, who, dying after foreclosure, left it in possession of his widows defendants Nos. 3 and 4, from whom plaintiff purchased it at a sale in execution of a decree against them. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 resisted on the ground that *S*'s conditional sale did not pass the rights and interest of *P*, which they bought at an auction sale in execution of a decree against *P*. *Held*, that the decree of foreclosure was good and binding against Nos. 1 and 2, unless they could show fraud. If property is purchased in the name of a benamidar, and the *indicia* of ownership are placed in his hands, the true owner can only get rid of the effect of an alienation by showing that it was made without his acquiescence, and the purchaser took with notice of the fact. *BHUGWAN DOSS v. UPPOOH SINGH* 10 W. R. 185

16. ——— Benami possession. Where the property belonging to one family is conveyed to another by a deed of such a nature as secures the continuance of the profits to the former, the possession by the latter must be held to be on behalf of the former, until by some unequivocal act they show a distinct intention to hold on their own behalf. *JUGGERNATH PERSHAD DUTT v. HOGG* 12 W. R. 117

17. ——— Purchaser at execution-sale—Representative—Mortgage by alleged benamidar—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 115—Onus of proof. *E*, being in possession of the documents of title, mortgaged land to the plaintiff. *E* and his father *A* borrowed money from one *R*, who obtained a decree against *A*, and purchased the land at the execution-sale. In suit for foreclosure of the plaintiff's mortgage against *E* and *R*, the lower Courts held that *A* was the true owner, but the lower Appellate Court did not decide whether the plaintiff's mortgage was a valid transaction. *Held*, on second appeal, that *R* acquired the property adversely to *A* and not as his representative, and that there was no estoppel against him. *Dinendranath Sannial v. Ramkumar Ghose*, I. L. R. 7 Cal. 107: L. R. 8 I. A. 65, and *Lala Parbhu Lal v. Mylne*, I. L. R. 14 Cal. 401, followed. *Held*, further, that it was not necessary to decide whether the plaintiff's mortgage was valid as against *A*, the plaintiff not having raised the question in the lower Courts, but that, assuming the mortgage to be valid, the onus did not lie upon *R* to prove that the mortgage was not binding upon *A*. *Bhugwan Doss v. Upooh Singh*, 10 W. R. 185, commented upon. *BASHI CHUNDER SEN v. ENAYET ALI*

I. L. R. 20 Cal. 236

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**1. GENERAL CASES—contd.****18. ——— Benami purchase**

—Alienation by benamidar—Consent of true owner—Equitable rights of purchaser. Where a benamidar purchased property with moneys borrowed from the plaintiff, and afterwards mortgaged the purchased property to the plaintiff to secure the debt, the plaintiff being aware of the benami character of the title, and the real purchaser being cognizant of the mortgage: *Held*, in a suit against the benamidar and the beneficial owner, that even if the mortgagor had not created a valid hypothecation of the property still the plaintiff was entitled in equity to a declaration that the sums advanced with interest were a charge thereon. *SARJU PARSHAD v. BIR BHADDAR SEWAK PANDAY*

L. R. 20 I. A. 108

19. ——— Covenants by benamidar—Effect of, on beneficial owners. All the covenants made by a benamidar in the sale of a property are not necessarily binding upon the true owners, though there may be circumstances under which a person whose name does not appear upon a contract may be liable to perform its conditions. *BISSES-SUREE DEBIA v. GOVIND PERSHAD TEWARRE*

21 W. R. 398

20. ——— Covenant for quiet enjoyment—Vendor and purchaser—Suit for purchase money. Land forming part of a zamindari was brought to sale in execution of a decree, and was purchased by *A* benami for the zamindari. After the zamindari's death, *B*, her son and supposed heir, together with *A*, sold the land under a conveyance, which contained a joint covenant to remove any hindrance in the vendee's enjoyment of the land. Persons claiming under the lawful successor of the deceased zamindari obtained an ejectment decree against the representatives of the vendee, then deceased, and they were permitted to retain possession only on a payment made to the decree-holders. They now sued *A* and *B* for the amount of the purchase-money paid on the conveyance and the costs incurred in the ejectment suit. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to the decree sought by them against *A* notwithstanding that he was a benamidar merely. *SOMASUNDARAM AYYAR v. FISCHER*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 60

21. ——— Assignment of decree—Allegation of benami transaction. Before shutting out a decree-holder who has taken by assignment, on the ground that he is a mere benami-holder from one of the judgment-debtors, it is necessary to be very careful, and to ascertain beyond a doubt that the fact is so. *MAHOMED ISSA KHAN v. ONRAET*

8 W. R. 26

22. ——— Execution of decree. When a decree is assigned to *A* for his benefit in the name of *B*, *B*, the ostensible decree-holder, may take out execution. *PURNA CHANDRA ROY v. ABHAYA CHANDRA ROY*

4 B. L. R. Ap. 40

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**1. GENERAL CASES—contd.**

23. ——— Evidence of ownership—Title to property seized in execution—Evidence—Suspicion. In determining the right to property seized in execution, the Court must not declare a person claiming as purchaser to be a benamidar for the debtor upon suspicion merely, but its decision must rest upon legal grounds established by legal testimony. *FAEZ BUX CHOWDHRY v. FAKIRUDDIN MAHOMED AHASAN CHOWDHRY*

9 B. L. R. 456; 14 Moo. I. A. 234

Reversing decision of lower Court in *FUKEEROOD-DEEN MAHOMED AHSUN CHOWDHRY v. KURREEM BUKS CHOWDHRY* . . . 5 W. R. 43

24. ——— Breach of covenant—Cause of action—Plaint—Consent of benamidar. The plaintiff alleged that the three first defendants with a brother, since deceased, purchased a patni mehal therein described; that the same was thereafter sold for arrears of rent, and purchased by the said three defendants with their own funds; but that the collector, in compliance with their petition, entered the name of their mother, the fourth defendant, as the purchaser. The plaintiff then alleged a subsequent sale by the three first defendants to the plaintiff; that they, the said defendants, caused a kobala to be executed by the fourth defendant, and that they being the real owners, became witnesses to the deed, and received the whole of the consideration-money, and prayed by reason of ouster and disturbance, alleged for damages against all the defendants for breach of the following covenant contained in the kobala: "If any one making any objection to the sale by me of the said mehal give you trouble in any way, then I will put matters straight. If I fail to do so, I will return the consideration-money. If I do not return it, you will realize it by means of a suit." The Civil Judge in whose Court the plaintiff was filed held that no cause of action was shown, and the High Court on appeal remanded the case to try whether there had been the ouster and disturbance alleged, and whether, under the circumstances, they constituted a breach of the contract. The High Court, however, dismissed the suit against the three first defendants, holding that the mother only was bound by the contract. *Held*, by the Privy Council, that the plaintiff disclosed a cause of action against all the defendants, and that the case must be remanded accordingly. One issue raised by the plaintiff was whether the kobala was really entered into by the mother as the agent and on behalf of the three first defendants, and by their authority. *BISHESWARI DEBYA v. GOVIND PRASAD TEWARI*

L. R. 3 I. A. 194; 26 W. R. 32

Varying the decree of the High Court in

21 W. R. 398

25. ——— Suit on bond executed benami—Money lent by wife for husband. Where a woman sues to recover money advanced on a bond executed in her name, it is open to the obligor to plead that the money was not lent by the woman, but that the bond was merely an

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**1. GENERAL CASES—contd.**

acknowledgment of indebtedness from him to her husband. *BHOOBUNESSUR ROY CHOWDHRY v. JUGGESSUREE CHOWDHRY* . . . 22 W. R. 413

26. ——— Money lent by person other than holder of bond. In a suit upon a bond where defendant pleads that the bond, though executed in the name of the plaintiff, was really executed in favour of a third party, if it is found that plaintiff is not the real holder of the bond, the suit must be dismissed. *JUDONAUTH DEY v. GIRJA BHOOSUN MITTER* . . . 23 W. R. 446

27. ——— Benami purchase by judgment-debtor of property subject to mortgage decree—Effect of. *P L* brought a suit against *H*, and, while it was pending, executed a bond in favour of *R C* hypothecating the property in dispute. The suit was dismissed with costs, and another suit was brought by one *P M* upon the bond, and, while it was pending, the property in dispute was sold in execution of *H*'s decree for costs and purchased by *S*. The day after this, *i.e.*, on 10th November 1868, *P M* obtained a mortgage decree, which he transferred to *R B*, who executed it and attached the property in dispute when *S* intervened objecting that the mortgage, the mortgage decree, and the transfer of the decree were all fictitious and collusive, and brought about by *P L*. This objection having been rejected, a suit was brought on the same ground against *R B*, *P M*, and the widow of *P L* to establish *S*'s rights and to stop the pending sale. The property was, however, sold and purchased by *D*, who was then made a defendant in the suit. Both the lower Courts found that *R B* was a benamidar for *P L*, and upheld the title of *S* in preference to that of *D*. *Held*, on the principle of *In re Suroop Chunder Hazra, B. L. R., Sup. Vol., 938: 9 W. R. 230*,—*viz.*, that the purchase by a judgment-debtor extinguishes the decree,—that the same result followed in a benami transaction when the decree was a mortgage decree, and, therefore, although *S* by virtue of his auction-purchase was not entitled to the property in dispute, yet he was entitled to a declaration that so far as the amount of his purchase-money went to satisfy the decree of November 1868, it should be considered a charge on the property. *DHONDAI SINGH v. SULEEMOODDEEN HOSSEIN* . . . 24 W. R. 359

28. ——— Benami transfer—Mutation of names in settlement record. A transfer from a husband of a share in a village was not formally carried out otherwise than by its being evidenced by mutation of names in the settlement record; and a son, claiming as his father's heir, alleged that his mother's name was only used benami by the father. *Held*, that a finding that such mutation was not for the purpose of putting the property into the name of the wife benami for the husband, but for her own benefit, was substantially correct. *THAKRO v. GANGA PARSAD*

I. L. R. 10 All. 197; L. R. 15 I. A. 29

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**1. GENERAL CASES—contd.**

29. ——— Person allowing property to be purchased benami—*Sale by ostensible owner.* If a person allows property to be purchased for him in the name of another, and takes no steps to show to the world that he is the owner, he must make out a clear right to relief against any one who purchases that property *bonâ fide* from the ostensible owner. *NIDRA DOSSEE v. ABDOL WAHED*
25 W. R. 532

30. ——— Suit on bond, the consideration for which was advanced benami—*Right of assignee of bond.* Where, in a bond given by A to secure the repayment of money lent by B to A, it is stated that the money was lent by C, it is no answer to a suit on the bond, brought against A by a person who has purchased the bond from C *bonâ fide*, without notice, that the money advanced belonged to A. A person who lends money in the name of another must accept the consequences, if an innocent purchaser deals with the person whose name appears upon the document as the party really entitled to the receipt of the money. *DOKHINA KALLY DEBEE v. DENO NATH ROY CHOWDHRY*
3 C. L. R. 9

31. ——— Benamidar, right of, to sue in his own name—*Purchase by a non-agriculturist in name of an agriculturist—Suit by benamidar for redemption—Court-fees payable as if real purchaser was plaintiff—Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (Act XVII of 1879).* Where a purchase is made benami and a suit is brought by the benamidar in order that the real purchaser may escape the consequences to which the latter would be liable if he purchased and sued in his own name, the Court will look behind the record to see who the real purchaser is. A benamidar may maintain a suit in his own name, but the Court will put the defendant in the same position as if the real purchaser were the actual plaintiff. One D, an agriculturist, purchased certain land benami for K, a non-agriculturist, and brought a suit for redemption under the provisions of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act. Under the notification of the Government of India, No. 2092, dated the 29th July 1881, the fees in case of suits by agriculturists for redemption were remitted, and the plaintiff, therefore, paid no stamp duty on the plaint. *Held*, that D might maintain the suit in his own name, but must pay the usual stamp fees, and that the suit should proceed as an ordinary suit, as though K was the nominal as well as the real plaintiff. *DAGDU v. BALVANT RAM CHANDRA NATU*
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 820

32. ——— Right of benamidar to sue on negotiable instrument—*Suit on promissory note.* The payee and holder of a promissory note is not debarred from suing on it by reason of the fact that a third person is really interested in it. *BOJJAMMA v. VENKATARAMAYYA*
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 30

33. ——— Benami purchase by a Government officer prohibited from acquiring

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**1. GENERAL CASES—contd.**

land—Suit for declaration against benamidar. The plaintiff sued for declaration of his title to certain land which had been purchased by him in the name of the defendant. The object of the transaction was to conceal from the Collector the fact that the plaintiff, who was a tahsildar, had acquired property in his talukh contrary to the rules of his department. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration sought. *LOBO v. BRITO*
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 231

34. ——— Suit by benamidar to eject tenants—*Madras Revenue Recovery Act (Madras Act II of 1864), s. 38—Madras Revenue Recovery Amendment Act (Madras Act III of 1884), s. 1 (5)—Sale for arrears of revenue—Benami purchaser—Right of suit.* Land forming part of the endowment of a chattram was brought to sale for arrears of revenue, and was purchased by the plaintiffs, who now sued to eject the tenants, who were in occupation of the land. *Held*, (1) that the defendants were entitled to plead that the plaintiffs had purchased benami from the managers of the chattram; (2) that the above plea having been substantiated, the plaintiffs were not entitled to maintain the suit. *TIRUMALAYPPA FILLAI v. SWAMI NAIKAR*
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 469

35. ——— Benami deed executed with intention to defraud creditor—*Relief against fraudulent benami deeds executed by predecessor in title.* K executed in 1850 four benami documents with intent to defeat the claim of his employer on account of money embezzled by him: two of the documents were hibas (deeds of gift) in favour of P, his elder wife, in respect of a moiety of properties 1, 2, and 3; and two were kobalas (conveyances) in favour of G, that wife's brother, in respect of the other moiety of those properties. K remained in possession of the properties till his death in 1860. After his death P remained in possession of the properties 1, 2, and 3, and S, the younger widow, remained in possession of other properties. In November P executed, in respect of the 8 annas of the properties covered by the hibas, a kobala in favour of G's son, then a minor. S died in 1868, and P died in 1871. A daughter of K by S succeeded them, and that daughter died in August 1882. In a suit brought by a son of that daughter on 4th January 1893 for the recovery (*inter alia*) of possession of his share of properties 1, 2, and 3 from G's son, with mesne profits and for a declaration that the deeds executed by K were colourable transactions, and that the kobala executed by P was not valid and binding:—*Held*, as to the contention that plaintiff was not entitled to be relieved against the consequences of the fraud of his predecessors in title, that the balance of authority is decidedly in favour of the proposition that it is always open to a party to show that a document simply executed, but not carried into effect, is a benami and colourable document, and to recover possession of property against the party claiming under such document.

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**1. GENERAL CASES—contd.**

Symes v. Hughes, L. R. 9 Eq. 475, *Phool Bibee v. Goor Surun Doss*, 18 W. R. 485, *Sreenath Roy v. Bindoo Bashinee Debia*, 20 W. R. 112, *Debia Chowdhraim v. Bimola Soonduree Debia*, 21 W. R. 422, *Bykunt Nath Sen v. Goboolah Sikdar*, 24 W. R. 391, *Mukun Mullick v. Bamjan Sardar*, 9 C. L. R. 64, referred to. *Kalynath Kur v. Doyal Kristo Deb*, 13 W. R. 87, not followed. *Rangammal v. Venkatachari*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 378, and *Chenvirappa bin Virbhadrappa v. Puttappa bin Shrivasappa*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 708, distinguished. *Taylor v. Bowers*, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 291, followed. *Kearley v. Thomson*, L. R. 24 Q. B. D. 742, referred to. SHAM LALL MITRA v. AMARENDRO NATH BOSE

I. L. R. 23 Cal. 460

36. ———— **Colourable conveyance in fraud of creditors—Fraud carried into effect—Suit by real owner against benamidar and his transferee—Right of suit.** Plaintiff, with the object of defeating the claims of his creditors, executed a colourable conveyance of his property in favour of another person, and the transferee successfully resisted the creditors of the plaintiff from seizing the property in execution of their decrees. The transferee then conveyed the property to a third party, who took possession. *Held*, following the case of *Kali Charan Pal v. Rasik Lal Pal*, I. L. R. 23 Cal. 962, note, that the plaintiff was precluded from maintaining an action for the recovery of the property. *Held*, also, that there is a distinction between those cases in which the fraud was only attempted, and those in which it was actually carried into effect; and that in the latter class of cases the Court would, by granting relief to the wrongdoer, be making itself a party to the fraud. GOBERDHAN SINGH v. RITU ROY I. L. R. 23 Cal. 962

37. ———— **Fraud carried into effect—Suit by the real owners against benamidar—Right of suit.** Where property has been conveyed benami with the object of placing it beyond the reach of creditors, and the fraudulent purpose has been carried into effect, the real owner ought not to be permitted to succeed in a suit instituted by him for recovery of the property. A distinction exists between such a case and a case where the fraud has not been carried into execution. *Debia Chowdhraim v. Bimola Soonduree Debia*, 21 W. R. 422, explained. KALICHARAN PAL v. RASIK LAL PAL I. L. R. 23 Cal. 962, note

38. ———— **Suit by real owner against benamidar—Fraudulent purpose given effect to by claim successfully preferred by the benamidar.** A suit does not lie for a declaration that a conveyance executed by the plaintiff is a benami and fictitious transaction, when the alleged transaction has been used to accomplish the fraudulent purpose for which it was intended. The fraudulent purpose is accomplished when, the property conveyed being attached by a decree-holder, the benamidar is allowed to prefer a claim to it, and the

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**1. GENERAL CASES—contd.**

claim is allowed by the Court. BANKA BEHARY DASS v. RAJ KUMAR DASS

I. L. R. 27 Cal. 231
4 C. W. N. 289

39. ———— **Bond—Realization by benamidar of money due on a bond in his name—Payment of such money to bond fide transferee—Rights of beneficiary—Limitation—Act XV of 1877 (Indian Limitation Act), Sch. II, Art. 62.** A benamidar realized, upon a bond standing in his own name, money to which other parties were beneficially entitled, and paid over the money so obtained, in the course of a transaction apparently *bond fide* and not collusive, to a third party, who had no knowledge of the beneficiaries' interest therein. *Held*, on suit by one of the parties beneficially interested in the bond, that, his remedy against the benamidar having become barred by limitation, the plaintiff could not recover against the transferee, who had taken *bond fide* in ignorance of the plaintiff's interest. *Thomson v. Clydesdale Bank, Limited*, [1893] A. C. 282, referred to. SUNDAR LAL v. FAKIR CHAND (1902) I. L. R. 25 All. 62

40. ———— **Conveyance—Benami conveyance—Fraudulent transfer—Colourable conveyance to defraud creditors—Fraud, wholly or partially carried into effect—Suit by real owner against benamidar—Locus penitentie—Right of real owner to repudiate benami transfer—Effect of long-continued possession by the transferor—Adverse possession.** Where a colourable transfer is made for the purpose of enabling the transferor to defraud his creditors, and where the intended fraud has been wholly or partially carried into effect, the Court will not lend its aid to enable the transferor, who has thus defrauded his creditors, to get his property back from the transferee. *Goberdhan Singh v. Ritu Roy*, I. L. R. 23 Cal. 962; *Kali Charan Pal v. Rasik Lal Pal*, I. L. R. 23 Cal. 962 (note); *Banka Behary Dass v. Raj Kumar Das*, I. L. R. 27 Cal. 231; *Taylor v. Bowers*, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 291, referred to. But where the ostensible transferee never had any exclusive possession of the property in question, which was for a great many years treated as a part of the joint family property, and which was enjoyed by the joint family (of which the plaintiff was now the sole surviving member) for more than twelve years before suit: *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to have a declaration of his right to the property, and to confirmation of his possession thereof. *Bihans Kunwar v. Behari Lal*, 3 B. L. R. F. B. 15; and *Buhuns Kower v. Lalla Buhoree Lal*, 14 Moo. I. A. 496, 527, referred to and approved. GOVINDA KUAR v. LALA KISHUN PROSAD (1900) I. L. R. 28 Cal. 370

41. ———— **Suit to recover possession of property.** A benamidar, as such, is not entitled to maintain a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property of which he is a mere benamidar. *Hari Gobind Adhikari v. Akhoy Kumar*

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**1. GENERAL CASES—contd.**

Mozumdar, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 364, affirmed. *Bhola Pershad v. Ram Lal, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 34*, and *Ravi Appaji Kulkarni v. Mahadev Bapuji Kulkarni, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 672*, distinguished. *Nand Kishore Lal v. Ahmad Ata, I. L. R. 18 All. 69*, and *Yad Ram v. Umrao Singh, I. L. R. 21 All. 380*, dissented from. *MOHENDRA NATH MOOKERJEE v. KALI PRASAD JOHURI (1902)*

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 265; s.c. 7 C. W. N. 229

42. ———— *Suit to recover possession of immoveable property—Transaction, successfully set up by defendant in a previous suit—Defrauding of creditors—Defendants, if debarred from pleading transaction to be benami.* In a suit for recovery of possession of immoveable property, a defendant is not debarred from pleading that a transaction is *benami* by reason of his having previously successfully set up the *benami* transaction to defraud creditors, and it is competent for him to show the real nature of the transaction in order to defend his possession. *Babaji v. Krishna, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 372*, referred to and explained. *Banka Behary Dass v. Raj Kumar Dass, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 231*, referred to. *PREO NATH KOER v. KAZI MAHOMED SHAZID (1904)* **8 C. W. N. 620**

43. ———— *Benami, plea of.* Where the plaintiff in a suit for rent claimed as the purchaser from the *pro forma* defendant who admitted the genuineness of the sale but the tenant defendant disputed the *bona fides* of the sale. *Held*, that it was not open to the Court to find that the sale was *benami*. *AMRITA LAL MUKHERJEA v. GIRIDHAR GHOSE (1907)*

11 C. W. N. 581

44. ———— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 62, 120—Art. 62 applies to suits against benamidar by real owner to recover money received by the former.* The period of limitation for an action by the real owner against a benamidar to recover money received by the latter for the use of the former is that prescribed in Sch. II, Art. 62 of the Limitation Act. Art. 120 does not apply to such a case. *Mahabala Bhatta v. Kunhanna Bhatta, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 373*, followed. *SUBBANNA BHATTA v. KUNHANNA BANTA (1907)* **I. L. R. 30 Mad. 298**

45. ———— *Benami sale—Purchaser from benamidar—Attachment in execution of a money decree against the original owner—Raising of the attachment at the instance of the purchaser from benamidar—Suit by the purchaser to recover possession—Original owner setting up his own fraud.* *H.*, the owner of certain property, executed a *benami* sale-deed and the benamidar sold the property to the plaintiffs' father. The property was afterwards attached in execution of a money decree against *H.*, but the attachment was raised at the instance of the plaintiffs' father. Subsequently the plaintiffs brought a suit for the recovery of possession from *H.* *H.* pleaded his own

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**1. GENERAL CASES—concl'd.**

fraud as an effective answer to the claim. *Held*, allowing the plaintiffs' claim, that the defendant *H.* could not set up his fraud to a claim of immoveable property conveyed by him to the benamidar. *SID-LINGAPPA v. HIRASA (1907)* **I. L. R. 31 Bom. 405**

2. SOURCE OF PURCHASE-MONEY.

1. ———— *Source of purchase-money—Evidence of beneficial ownership.* It is not a principle of law that the issue to be framed in a case of benami purchase is from what source the purchase-money came, though that is an excellent criterion and test for determining the character of the purchase. *BRIJO BEHAREE SINGH v. WAJED HOSSEIN* **14 W. R. 372**

2. ———— *Evidence of beneficial ownership.* In cases of benami purchase in India, the criterion of beneficial ownership is the source from which the purchase-money is derived. *GOPEEKRISHN GOSSAIN v. GUNGAPERSAUD GOSSAIN* **6 Moo. I. A. 53**

AKBUR ALI v. MAHOMED FAIZ BUKSH **15 W. R. 12**

3. ———— *Possession.* In coming to a conclusion in a case of a benami purchase, the circumstances and probabilities are to be carefully considered and weighed,—*e.g.*, the object of the purchase, whether the purchase-money really belonged to the purchasers, and whether possession was taken after purchase; and, if not, why possession was not taken. *BHOOBUN MOHUN BURRAL v. NAGOREE DOSSIA* **15 W. R. 15**

4. ———— *Proof of consideration.* Where a deed of sale is executed benami under circumstances which suggest an intention to defraud creditors, it is not sufficient that the sale was formally made and the deed duly registered; the Court must be satisfied as to consideration having actually passed from the purchaser to the former owner, and as to the source from which the purchase-money was derived. *MUTHUOOLLAH v. TORABOODEEN* **15 W. R. 305**
See *LUCHMEE KOER alias BHUGORUTTY KOER v. FUTTEH SINGH* **24 W. R. 400**

5. ———— *Mahomedan, Purchase by.* Where a Mahomedan husband was found to have paid the purchase-money for a patni talukh standing in the name of his wife, it was held that his having been in possession of the money was *prima facie* evidence that the patni talukh belonged to himself and not to his wife, and that presumption was not rebutted by the fact that he purchased the patni in the name of his wife. *SURNOMOYEE v. LUCHMEEFUT DOOGUR* **9 W. R. 338**

6. ———— *Property acquired by separate funds.* In a suit for certain property as belonging to plaintiff's judgment-debtor, in which the defendant, the adoptive mother of the judgment-debtor, claimed the property as purchased

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**2. SOURCE OF PURCHASE-MONEY—contd.**

by her *bonâ fide* in the name of her son, but with her own funds:—*Held*, that this case could not be judged by the criterion laid down by the Privy Council in the case of *Gossain v. Gossain*, 6 Moo. I. A. 53, viz., whence came the purchase-money; for the question in that case related to property acquired by a member of a joint Hindu family, where the presumption would ordinarily be that all the property is joint. *NADIRJAN BIBEE v. KUREEMOONISSA CHOWDHRAIN* **12 W. R. 122**

7. ———— Hindu and Mahomedan Law—Presumption. In cases where the question is, whether property bought and held in the name of another than the party claiming as the real purchaser is the property of that other or merely bought and held in his name (*benami*) for the claimant, the criterion is to consider from what source the purchase-money came; the presumption is, that a purchase made with the money of *A* in the name of *B* is for the benefit of *A*; and where the purchase is by a father, whether Mahomedan or Hindu, in the name of his son, there is no presumption of an advancement in favour of the son. Upon the facts, the decision of the Court below reversed. *AZHAR ALI v. ALTAF FATIMA*

4 B. L. R. P. C. 1: 13 W. R. P. C. 1

UZHAR ALI v. ULTAZ FATIMA

13 Moo. I. A. 232

8. ———— Benami purchase—Whether property was held benami for the claimant or was a gift to the holder—Evidence of ownership—Source of purchase-money. The claimant, having supplied the purchase-money on the sale of the village in suit, took the transfer by sale-deed in the name of the first defendant, who remained in possession of it, receiving rents. The claim was for proprietary possession by the purchaser on the ground that the property was held *benami* for him. The first Court decreed the claim. The Appellate Court reversed this decision. The first Court had attributed too much to the fact that the plaintiff had supplied the purchase-money—an important fact in most of the cases raising the question of *benami*, or not *benami*, but not the only test of ownership. Here the source of that money was consistent with the claimant's having, as the defence alleged, intended to make a gift of the property to the holder of it; and the right inference from the fact was that it was not held *benami* for the claimant, but belonged to the defendant. *RAM NARAIN v. MUHAMMAD HADI* **I. L. R. 26 Cal. 227**

L. R. 26 I. A. 38

3 C. W. N. 113

9. ———— Apparent title in one person—Beneficial title in another, how proved—Burden of proof—Acquisition out of funds supplied by alleged beneficiary, necessity to prove—Possession presumption of title from—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 21, 110—Admission. Plaintiffs brought this suit to recover a cer-

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**2. SOURCE OF PURCHASE-MONEY—concl.**

tain coffee garden from their paternal uncle, the defendant. Plaintiffs' father and the defendant had separated and partitioned their ancestral property in 1870, but after their father's death in 1886, the plaintiffs, who were young, had lived in the defendant's protection. The plaintiffs' case was that the disputed garden had belonged to their father. Previous to the suit one of the plaintiffs alone, but describing himself as the guardian of his minor brother, had executed a sale deed in favour of the defendant, in which the disputed property was described as having been enjoyed by plaintiffs' father and as belonging to the plaintiffs after his death. It was nobody's case that this was a real sale. The High Court in decreeing the suit in plaintiffs' favour relied *inter aliâ* on this document as containing an important admission of plaintiffs' title in the property: *Held*, that the High Court was right in so using the document; that in order to displace this apparent title in the plaintiffs and to establish a beneficial title in himself, it was incumbent upon the defendant to show by satisfactory evidence that the funds, out of which the garden was purchased and developed, were his own funds. *PULIYAMPATTI NARANIER v. KUPPIER* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 89

10. ———— Hindu Law—Will—Unregistered memorandum of an oral gift—Subsequent disposal by will—Presumption of advancement—Indian Trusts Act (II of 1882), s. 82—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 123. According to the law as it prevails in Bombay, a purchase by a husband in the name of his wife does not raise any presumption of a gift to the wife, or of an advancement for her benefit. *Per BATTY, J.*—In India, as a general rule, the criterion as to ownership of property is the source from which the purchase-money was supplied; but it is not the sole criterion, and depends on the presence or absence of rebutting circumstances. Among Hindus the grounds against assuming advancement are specially unfavourable to the claim of a widow to an absolute estate. *BAI MOTIVAHOO v. PURSHOTAM DAYAL* (1905) **I. L. R. 29 Bom. 306**

3. ONUS OF PROOF.

1. ———— Onus probandi—Purchase by member of joint Hindu family in name of son—Presumption—Conveyance in English form. Where a purchase of real estate is made by a Hindu in the name of one of his sons, the presumption of the Hindu law is in favour of its being a *benami* purchase, and the burden of proof lies on the party in whose name it was purchased to prove that he was solely entitled to the legal and beneficial interest in such purchased estate. Purchase of a talukh in Bengal by a Hindu in his eldest son's name, the conveyance, though in the English form of lease and release, held to be a *benami* purchase, and the son in whose name it was purchased declared to be

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**3. ONUS OF PROOF—contd.**

a trustee, for the father, and the talukh part of the father's estate. *GOPEEKRISTO GOSAIN v. GUNGA-PERSAUD GOSAIN* **6 Moo. I. A. 53**

2 ————— *Registration of name.* The benami system being one of the recognized institutions of the country, a purchaser does not discharge himself of the onus which lies upon him, by looking only to the apparent title. Nor is the onus discharged by the mere fact of the name of the defendant's vendor being alone registered in the zamindar's books as the exclusive owner of the patni, or of the vendor only being sued by the zamindar for the rent of the patni. *JEEBUNISAS v. UMUL CHUNDRAS CHACKLANUVIS* **18 W. R. 151**

3. ————— *Evidence of ownership.* In cases of alleged benami sales effect should be given to the evidence of possession and enjoyment since the purchase, as showing who is the substantial owner. The burden of proof lies on the person who maintains that the apparent state of things is not the real state of things, and the apparent purchaser must be regarded as the real purchaser until the contrary be proved. *DEO NATH v. PEER KHAN* **3 Agra 16**

4. ————— *Parol evidence—Proof of purchase.* As between Hindus, oral evidence is admissible to show that land nominally purchased for A and conveyed to him by an instrument in writing was really purchased for A, B, and C. *POLINAYAPPA CHETTI v. ARUMUGAM CHETTI* **2 Mad. 26**

Following in this *GOPEEKRISTO GOSAIN v. GUNGA-PERSAUD GOSAIN* **6 Moo. I. A. 53**

5. ————— *Purchase at sale in execution of decree, assignment of.* Where a person became the purchaser of a talukh under a decree for sale obtained by judgment-creditors of the owner, and an assignee of a judgment-creditor sued to have it declared that the purchase did not affect any transfer of the ownership of the talukh:—*Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiff to prove that the talukh in question was still the property of the judgment-debtors, and not the property of the purchaser. In matters of this description, it is essential to take care that the decision of the Court rests not upon suspicion, but upon legal grounds established by legal testimony. *SEERAMUN-CHANDER DEY v. GOPAL CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY* **7 W. R. P. C. 10**

KADERNATH DUTT v. OKHOY COOMAR BHUTTA-CHAJEE **9 W. R. 202**

6. ————— *Benami lease—Proof of beneficial interest.* Where there is an allegation that a lease is held benami, it is not sufficient for the party in whose name the lease is drawn out to produce the documents, but it is necessary for him to prove that he has the beneficial interest in the property. *SARODAMOHUN ROY CHOWDHRY v. SHAMA SOONDERY DOSSIA* **7 W. R. 209**

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**3. ONUS OF PROOF—contd.**

7. ————— *Property purchased at sale in execution of decree.* A decree-holder, in execution of his decree, put up for sale certain property of his judgment-debtor which was purchased by plaintiff ostensibly on his own account. Having reason, however, to believe that the purchase was benami for the judgment-debtor, the decree-holder again took out execution against the same property and advertised it for sale. Plaintiff intervened, but his objections were disallowed by the Court, which found the judgment-debtor in *bond fide* possession on his own account. The property was then sold, and one of the defendants bought it. Plaintiff then sued to have the execution proceedings set aside, and to have it declared that the property had been bought on his own account and with his own money. *Held*, that the onus of proof lay on the plaintiff. *MUDDUN MOHUN SHAHA v. BHARUT CHUNDER ROY* **11 W. R. 249**

8. ————— *Presumption—Creditors claiming against benamidar—Evidence.* Although a purchase by a Mahomedan with his own money of an estate in the name of his son raises a presumption of the son's name being used benami for his father, proof that the father's object was to affect the ordinary rule of succession as from him to that property is sufficient to give, as respects strangers, a title to the son independent of, and adverse to, the father. Where *bond fide* creditors of the ostensible owner of property are claimants on that property, the Court will require strict proof on the part of any one seeking to have it declared that he held it only benami. *RUKNADAWLA NOWAB AHMED ALI KHAN v. HURDWAREE MULL* **5 B. L. R. 578**

AJAMUT ALI KHAN v. HURDWAREE MULL **14 W. R. P. C. 14: 13 Moo. I. A. 395**

9. ————— *Proof of beneficial ownership—Presumption from possession on receipt of rents.* Where there are benami transactions, and the question is who is the real owner, the actual possession on receipt of the rents of the property is most important. In a suit against a purchaser at a sale under Act XI of 1859, s. 13, the plaintiff claimed to have incumbrance by virtue of two mokurari pottahs, executed by the heirs of the last of a series of benamidars, and it appearing that the last benamidar had actual ownership of one-fourth of the property comprised therein:—*Held*, that the incumbrance was good to the extent of such fourth. *INAMBANDI BEGUM v. KUMLESWARI PERSHAD* **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 109: L. R. 13 I. A. 160**

10. ————— *Purchase by Hindu widow for a relation.* A step-son made over property to his step-mother for her support. Out of the produce she bought properties for her nephew in the name of other parties. *Held*, under the circumstances, that the purchased property, on her death, went to the nephew, and not to the step-son as heir of her husband. Although the

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**3. ONUS OF PROOF—contd.**

defendant, by his written statement, denied the fact of the purchases being with the widow's money, and it was proved that they were made with her money:—*Held*, that this did not remove from the plaintiff the burden of proving that the purchases were made benami for her. **CHANDRANATH ROY v. RUMJAI MUZUMDAR**

6 B. L. R. 303 : 15 W. R. P. C. 7

11. ————— *Creditors of benamidar, right of—Credit given to benamidar in good faith.* Certain property having been attached in execution of a decree against *B*, the plaintiff instituted a suit claiming the property and alleging that *B* was his benamidar. The allegation was established. It was contended that the public and the creditor at whose instance the attachment was made in execution of a decree for money advanced to *B* had been misled by the benami transaction. *Held*, that the creditor was bound to prove that he had actually advanced the money believing in good faith that the property belonged to *B*. **GOLUK CHUNDER DASS v. BHAGMUT DASS**

11 C. L. R. 106

12. ————— *Benami purchase by Hindu or Mahomedan—Property bought by a father in his son's name—Advancement—Presumption—Evidence—Nature of evidence to rebut.* When purchase is made by a Hindu or a Mahomedan in the name of his son, the presumption is in favour of its being a benami purchase; and it lies on the party in whose name it was purchased to prove that he is solely entitled to the legal and beneficial interest in the estate. When the rights of creditors are in issue in such a transaction, very strict proof of the nature of the transaction should be required from the objector to such rights, and the burden of proof lies with more than ordinary weight on the person alleging that the purchase was intended for the benefit of the son. **NAGINBHAI v. ABDULLA**

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 717

13. ————— *Allegation of benami conveyance.* *A* and *B* were co-sharers. *B* leased his share to *D* taking rent separately from him, and *A* sold his share to *C*, so that *B* and *C* became co-sharers. Afterwards *B* conveyed his share to *E* and delivered *D*'s kabuliati to him, the conveyance which was registered reciting payment of the consideration. Subsequently *E* sold the share to *C* for valuable consideration. In a suit brought by *C* for possession, *B* alleged that his conveyance to *E* was a benami transaction of which *C* was cognizant. *Held*, that the onus of showing that was on *B*, and that, *prima facie*, *C* was justified in supposing that *E* had a good title to convey. **SATYA MONI DASI v. BHUGGOBUTTY CHURN CHATTO-PADHYA**

1 C. L. R. 466

14. ————— *Husband and wife—Proof of bona fide purchase.* In a case of purchase after a decree, where the vendor is only a benamidar, and the vendor's husband (supposed to be the real

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**3. ONUS OF PROOF—contd.**

owner) wrote the deed and received the purchase-money (thereby making himself a consenting party), the onus lies on the plaintiff to prove that he is a *bona fide* purchaser for value, exercising due care and diligence. **MAN TURUNGINEE DABEE v. BOISTUB CHURN BHUDDER**

1 W. R. 110

See ALLI KHAN v. MEER NASSER ALI

1 W. R. 115

15. ————— *Benami advance of money for mortgage.* Where a plaintiff sued alleging that a certain deed of mortgage was executed by *M B* benami for the benefit of *H B*, through whom the plaintiff claimed, and also alleging that *H B* had advanced the money for the mortgage out of her own moneys, it was held that, if it could be shown that the money advanced was the money of *M B*, who executed the mortgage, it was immaterial to consider who was the nominal mortgagee, as the plaintiff could not set up a title inconsistent with the title set up in the lower Courts. In the absence of proof sufficient to establish the title of *H B*, and to show that the money was advanced by *H B*, the plaintiff's suit was dismissed. **BHAWUN DOSS v. MAHOMED HOSSEIN**

13 W. R. P. C. 38 : 13 Moo. I. A. 346

See ROOP CHAND ASWAL v. KARFOOL

25 W. R. 54

16. ————— *Suit for declaration of title.* When defendants admitted the execution of a document purporting to be a conveyance by them of certain land to the plaintiff for valuable consideration, but contended that the deed was not intended to have any effect, and was merely a benami transaction:—*Held* in a suit for declaration of his right by a plaintiff in possession of the land, that, under the circumstances of the case, the onus was on the plaintiff to show that the deed was what it appeared to be, and not a mere paper transaction. **MOOKTO KESHEE DEBEE v. ANUNDO CHUNDER CHATTO-PADHYA**

2 C. L. R. 48

17. ————— *Bona fide purchase—Certified purchaser.* The burden of proof is upon him who alleges that the certified purchaser and registered owner is a benamidar. **BALJ NATH SAHAY v. RUGHU NATH PERSHAD SINGH**

12 C. L. R. 186

18. ————— *Purchaser bona fide from benamidar.* Where a plaintiff claims land as purchaser in good faith from a benamidar who has been registered as owner, and who by the act of the true owners had been allowed to become the apparent owner, the burden lies upon him. **RUTTO SINGH v. BAJRANG SINGH**

13 C. L. R. 280

19. ————— *Purchase, ismfarzi, in the name of a person other than the real purchaser—Proof of the actual transaction.* In liquidation of a mortgage debt, the mortgagors sold the mortgaged property, and executed a sale deed with a recital that they had received from wife of the mortgagee the amount of the mortgage debt and interest with

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also a small sum of money. In after years the husband, now plaintiff, and the wife, defendant, contested which of the two was the real purchaser. *Held*, that the burden of proving that the mortgagee gave the consideration for the sale was upon him at the outset, as he claimed contrary to the tenor of the admitted document, which burden had been discharged by his evidence that the substantial consideration for the sale by the mortgagors was the extinction of the mortgage debt due to him. This proof shifted on to the wife the burden of showing that this extinction was effected by her money or of showing that she had continuous possession in accordance with the sale deed. She did not prove that any money was paid by her, either to the vendors or to the mortgagee; nor was there such an amount of possession proved as affected the question either way. The conclusion was that the wife's name was used *ismfarzi* for the husband's as alleged.

SULEIMAN KADR BAHADUR v. MEHNDI BEGUM
I. L. R. 25 Cal. 473
L. R. 25 I. A. 15
2 C. W. N. 186

4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS.

(a) ACTS XII OF 1841, I OF 1845, AND XI OF 1859.

1. ———— **Act XII of 1841—Suit to oust certified purchaser at sale for arrears of revenue.** S. 22, Act XII of 1841, did not apply to a suit for a declaration of the plaintiff's title in right of inheritance as against other members of the family. MAHOMED WAYEZ v. SUGEROONISSA 6 W. R. 38

2. ———— **Act I of 1845—Purchaser at sale for arrears of revenue.** The ruling of the Full Bench in *Bihari Kunwar v. Bihari Lall*, 3 B. L. R. F. B. 15; 11 W. R. F. B. 16, that a benami purchaser is debarred from setting up his title in opposition to a certified purchaser was held not to apply in a suit in which the plaintiff was a certified purchaser who had bought at a sale for arrears of revenue under Act I of 1845. BIRJO BEHAREE SINGH v. WAZID HOSSEIN 14 W. R. 372

3. ———— **s. 21—Purchases made benami.** S. 21, Act I of 1845, does not protect purchases made in the name of third parties from the operation of decrees against the persons beneficially entitled to the purchased property. AMEEROONISSA BEEBEE v. BENODE RAM SEIN 2 W. R. 29

4. ———— **Property purchased by member of joint family.** Property purchased by a member of a joint family with money out of the common estate is family property; even if purchased in the name of his son. Even if the son is a certified purchaser at a sale under Act I of 1845, the other members of the family are not debarred by s. 21 from claiming a share of the purchase as joint property. BOONIAI LALL v. DEWKEE NUNDUN LALL 19 W. R. 223

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

(a) ACTS XII OF 1841, I OF 1845, AND XI OF 1859—cont'd.

5. ———— **Onus probandi.** In a suit to recover possession by the ostensible purchaser of an estate sold for arrears of revenue under Act I of 1845, where it was found that plaintiff had stood by ever since his purchase, and had for 11 years allowed defendants to remain in possession and enjoy the usufruct as proprietors:—*Held*, that the burden of proof was rightly thrown on the plaintiff. *Jadub Ram Deb v. Ram Lochun Muduck*, 5 W. R. 56, and *Bihari Kunwar v. Bihari Lall*, 3 B. L. R. F. B. 15; 11 W. R. F. B. 16,—the former on s. 36, Act XI of 1859, and the latter on s. 260, Act VIII of 1859,—considered and applied to a case under s. 21, Act I of 1845. JOHUR ALI v. BRINDABUN CHUNDER 14 W. R. 10

6. ———— **Certified purchaser.** S. 21, Act I of 1845, does not apply to a suit brought to oust the certified purchaser on the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of another person, but to make void a *pottah* granted by his mother. BISSONATH SURMA BHUTTACHARJEE v. MORAN W. R., 1864, 353

7. ———— **Fraudulent purchase.** Act I of 1845 was not intended to afford statutable protection to a purchaser at a sale brought about by fraudulent default on a preconcerted arrangement, for the purposes of title. MUNSOUR ALI KHAN v. OJODHYA RAM KHAN 8 W. R. 399

8. ———— **Sale of arrears of revenue—Purchase by manager of joint Hindu family—Suit by one member to recover his share.** A purchase by a managing member of a joint Hindu family, in his own name, at a revenue sale held under Act I of 1845, is not affected by s. 21 of the Act. A suit by one of the members for recovery of possession of his share of the property, purchased by the managing member in his own name, but for the use of the family, is not a suit to oust a certified purchaser and, therefore, not affected by s. 21, Act I of 1845. TUNDAN SINGH v. PUKH NARAYAN SINGH 5 B. L. R. 546; 13 W. R. 347

Confirmed by P. C. on 9th June 1874.

22 W. R. 199; L. R. 1 I. A. 342

9. ———— **Act XI of 1859, s. 36, Act XII of 1841.** *Held* (by MITTER, J.), that s. 21, Act I of 1845, and s. 36, Act XI of 1859, do not apply to a purchase under Act XII of 1841. BOOA RUSSOOLEE v. NAWAB NAZIM OF BENGAL 11 W. R. 382

10. ———— **Act XI of 1859, s. 36, construction of—Title of benami purchaser, how limited—Benami property, its liability to claims against true owner.** The object of s. 36 of Act XI of 1859 is to prevent the true owner from disputing the title of his benamidar (certified purchaser), and not to preclude a third party from enforcing a claim

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

- a) ACTS XII OF 1841, I OF 1845, AND XI OF 1859
—concl'd.

against the true owner in respect of the benami property. *CHUNDA KAMINY DEBEA v. RAM-RUTTUN FATTUCK*. I. L. R. 12 Calc. 302

11. ————— *Suit to oust certified purchaser.* A purchased a mehal in the name of B's brother, and obtained possession. He then sued B, who was acting as his tahsildar, for an account and for delivery of certain papers connected with that mehal. *Held*, that the terms of s. 36 of Act XI of 1859 did not apply to bar the suit. *BRINDABUN CHUNDER NUNDI v. RAM SUNDER MOZUMDAR*. I. L. R. 21 Calc. 375

12. ————— *Penal section, Construction of—Suit to oust an assignee from a certified purchaser—Maintainability of suit.* Plaintiff instructed defendant No. 2 to purchase a certain property at a revenue sale on his behalf; defendant No. 2 purchased it in his own name, but with the money of the plaintiff, and afterwards agreed to execute a deed of release in favour of plaintiff, but without doing that he fraudulently executed a deed of sale in favour of defendant No. 1, who had notice of plaintiff's title. In a suit by plaintiff for recovery of possession and declaration of title of the property it was contended that s. 36 of Act XI of 1859 was a bar. *Held per MACLEAN, C.J., and GHOSE, J.*, that s. 36 of Act XI of 1859 is a penal section and ought to be construed strictly and literally, and in construing the section the Court ought not to go beyond the strict letter of the language used or to put a construction upon that language which would have the effect of materially extending the operation of the section. *Held, further, by MACLEAN, C.J.*, that s. 36 is no bar to the suit, inasmuch as this is not a suit "to oust the certified purchaser," but to oust somebody else, although he claims through the former; and the true ground upon which the suit is based is the fraud of defendant No. 2, of which defendant No. 1 had notice. *Held per GHOSE, J.*, that the suit might well be regarded as based upon the ground of fraud, and in this view of the matter the case falls outside the provisions of s. 36 of the Revenue Sale Law. *Bukuns Kowur v. Lalla Beharee Lall*, 14 Moo. I. A. 496, *Lokhee Narain Roy Chowdhry v. Kalypuddo Bandopadhyaya*, L. R. 2 I. A. 154, *Toondun Singh v. Pokhnarain Singh*, L. R. 1 I. A. 342, referred to. *Per TREVELYAN, J.* (dissenting)—S. 36 of Act XI of 1859 applies just as much to a suit to oust the assignee of a certified purchaser as it does to a suit to oust that purchaser. The Legislature, in enacting s. 36, intended to give to a certified purchaser in possession a statutory title against the person, if any, on whose behalf he had purchased, and therefore this protection should devolve upon his heir or assignee who would take a title in continuation of that of the certified purchaser. *RAJ CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. DINA NATH SAHA*. 2 C. W. N. 433

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

- (b) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317 (1859, s. 260).

13. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 317—Sale for arrears of revenue—Act XI of 1859, s. 36—Certified purchaser, suit against.* A, the certified purchaser of a talukh at a sale held under the provisions of Act XI of 1859 for arrears of revenue, and who had obtained symbolical possession, had at the time of the sale agreed with B, the former owner of the talukh, to re-convey to him (B) after the sale had been completed. In a suit by B to compel specific performance of the contract, alleging that he had never quitted actual possession of the talukh, objection was taken that the suit was not maintainable under s. 36 of Act XI of 1859 and s. 317 of Act XIV of 1882. *Held*, that the suit, not being one to oust the certified purchaser from possession, was not barred by s. 36; and that neither was it barred by s. 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, that section applying only to sales in execution of decrees of Civil Courts held under the Procedure Code. *FAZAL RAHAMAN v. IMAM ALI*. I. L. R. 14 Calc. 583

14. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 260—Party not a certified purchaser.* S. 260 of Act VIII of 1859 does not preclude a person purchasing benami from setting up his title against a person not being the certified purchaser or claiming through him. *SHOROSUTTY DASSEE v. GOPESOONDARY DASSEE*. Marsh 423 : 2 Hay 512

15. ————— *Suits between benamidar and beneficial owner.* Suits between the benamidar and the beneficial owner are alone referred to in s. 260, Act VIII, of 1859. *SEETANATH GHOSE v. MADHUB NARAIN ROY CHOWDHRY*. 1 W. R. 329

16. ————— *Purchase in another's name at Court sale—Liability of property to creditors of benamidar.* The immoveable property of A at a Court's sale was purchased by B with the money and on behalf of A. B subsequently conveyed the property to C for the benefit of A. *Held*, that the property could be taken in execution by the creditors of A. *Quære*: Whether, but for the subsequent conveyance, B, under the operation of ss. 259 and 260 of the Civil Procedure Code, would not have had a good title against the creditors of A. *SATAPU VALAD DAU DONGRE v. KARBASAPA*. 7 Bom. A. C. 21

17. ————— *Agreement to re-convey.* A's property was sold under a decree to B, a *bona fide* purchaser, who offered to A to re-convey to him on being repaid the purchase-money. *Held*, that, if A accepted the proposal, s. 260 of the Civil Procedure Code did not preclude a contract from arising. *MOR JOSHI v. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM*. 10 Bom. 344

18. ————— *Suit for possession against certified purchaser.* Suit for possession by purchaser from certified purchaser at an execu-

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

(b) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317 (1859, s. 260)—*contd.*

tion sale. Defendant in possession not only denied plaintiff's title, but that of his vendor, whose purchase was clearly fraudulent, being made in collusion with the judgment-debtor to defraud creditors. *Held*, that s. 260, Act VIII of 1859, did not prohibit a defendant under such circumstances from questioning the plaintiff's title; that it provided for the dismissal of a suit brought to question the title of the certified purchaser, but did not prohibit a defendant from questioning that title when the auction-purchaser sought to oust him. **KHYRAT ALI v. SYFULLAH KHAN . 8 W. R. 130**

19. — *Previous possession of party claiming to be the real purchaser.* The correct interpretation of s. 260, Act VIII of 1859, is to the effect that a suit by a party claiming to be the real purchaser of immoveable property sold in execution of a decree cannot be brought against the certified auction-purchaser, even though the claimant has had previous possession. **BYKUNT CHUNDER MOOSTAFEE v. KHEMA MOYEE DEBIA 9 W. R. 360**

20. — *Certified purchase—Purchaser under second sale in execution of decree.* The certified purchaser of property which had been a second time attached and sold in the execution of a decree as the property of the judgment-debtors sued to be confirmed in possession of the property by virtue of his certificate of sale and to obtain the cancelment of the second sale and the order disallowing his objections to that sale. *Held*, that the provisions of s. 260 of Act VIII of 1859 did not prohibit the consideration of the circumstances of the first sale, when the question for determination was whether, at the time of the second attachment, the judgment-debtors were in possession as owners of the property, or merely as lessees of the certified purchaser. **GANESH PRESHAD v. SHEO CHURUN LALL 6 N. W. 197**

21. — *Suit by decree-holder against certified purchaser.* S. 260 of Act VIII of 1859 does not preclude the Courts from entertaining a suit brought by a decree-holder against the certified purchaser of property to bring the property to sale in execution of his decree as the property of his judgment-debtor, on the allegation that the certified purchaser had purchased the property benami for the judgment-debtor, who had remained in possession as owner from the date of purchase, and was in possession as such at the time of attachment. **SOHUN LALL v. LALA GYA PERSHAD 6 N. W. 265**

22. — *Onus probandi.* Where plaintiff, as heir of the ostensible auction-purchaser, sued to oust defendant, who had been twelve years in possession, and the

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

(b) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317 (1859, s. 260)—*contd.*

latter pleaded that the sale was made benami:—*Held*, that the long possession would go to prove the truth of defendant's allegation that the auction-purchaser was merely a trustee for him, and it would be for plaintiff to show that his ancestor paid for the purchased property. *Held*, that ss. 259 and 260, Act VIII of 1859, did not apply, as the sale was made before that law came into operation. **ZOOLFEKAR ALI v. MAHOMED TUKEE 9 W. R. 438**

23. — *Certified purchaser.* The purchaser of immoveable property, sold in execution of a decree of a Civil Court, got a certificate under s. 259 of Act VIII of 1859, and subsequently sued for possession of that which he had purchased. *Held*, that the defendant (who was in possession) was by s. 260 debarred from pleading that he himself was the real purchaser, and that the purchase was made benami for him in the name of the plaintiff, the "certified purchaser." **JOKHEE LALL v. HUNS KOORER 10 W. R. 167**

24. — *Certified purchaser—Certificate of sale, form of—Liability of property to son's creditors.* There is nothing fraudulent or illegal in a father making provision that property over which he has complete control shall not go into the hands of an insolvent son; but a benami conveyance to female members, the father continuing the absolute and uncontrolled owner during his life, and the son entering into possession after his death, cannot exclude the claim of the son's creditors. Where a purchaser at a sale in execution was named in the sale certificate as "mother and guardian of her infant son," the title to the property was held to be vested by the certificate in the minor absolutely. **HEMANGINEE DOSSEE v. JOGENDRO NARAIN ROY 12 W. R. 236**

25. — *Certified purchaser—Fraud.* S. 260, Act VIII of 1859, does not apply when the name of the certified purchaser has been inserted by fraud and contrary to the wishes of the purchaser. **KOOSUMBA v. TUFUZZUL HOSSEIN 13 W. R. 85**

26. — *Suit by purchaser.* In a suit for possession of a tank, on the allegation that plaintiff purchased it in execution of a decree against one S D, and that, after being put in possession, she was subsequently ousted, defendant's plea being possession after prior purchase at an execution sale under a decree against the same S D; the lower Court found that the defendant's purchase was a fictitious transaction, being in reality for the benefit of S D, who was in actual possession and enjoyment of the property at the time of the plaintiff's purchase. *Held*, that the case did not come under the purview of s. 260, Act VIII of 1859.

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

(b) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317 (1859, s. 260)—*contd.*

TARA SOONDUREE DABEE v. OOOJUL MONEE DAS-
SEE 14 W. R. 111

27. ———— Right of suit—

Fraud. J and B borrowed a sum of money on a mortgage of property. Shortly after this they granted a mokurari of the property to plaintiff and afterwards sold their rights as proprietors to one R R. Subsequently to this the mortgagee brought a suit against the mortgagors, and obtained a decree declaring the property liable to be sold in satisfaction of his debt. The property was accordingly sold in execution and purchased by one R D, and the sale-proceeds were made over to the judgment-creditor. Plaintiff as mokuridar now sues to obtain possession on the ground that, the debt being paid off, the mortgage is no longer in existence. The Judge having found that the purchase by R D was not *bona fide*, but for and on the part of R R, who was in actual possession:—*Held*, that s. 260 of the Civil of Code Procedure was no bar to the suit, the ground of fraud alone giving plaintiff sufficient right to question the legality of the sale. SHAMA KESHEE v. RAJ KISHORE . . . 14 W. R. 179

28. ———— Suit against certi-

fied purchaser. If a person is the person to whom under s. 259, Act VIII of 1859, a Court is directed to grant a sale certificate, he is entitled to be regarded as the "certified purchaser" at any time after the acceptance of his bid at the execution sale, even though the certificate may not actually have been granted to him before any suit against him, in connection with the property purchased by him, has been instituted; and s. 260 applies so as to bar a suit by the alleged real purchaser against him. BUNDA ALI KHAN v. AMEERUN . . . 25 W. R. 493

29. ———— Suit by certified

purchaser. S. 260 of Act VIII of 1859 must be construed strictly and literally, and is applicable only to a suit brought against a certified purchaser to assert a benami title against him. Where the certified purchaser is a plaintiff, the real owner, if in possession, and if that possession has been honestly obtained, may show in defence that the holder of the certificate is a mere trustee. LOKHEE NARAIN ROY CHOWDHRY v. KALYPADDO BANDOPADHYA . . .

L. R. 2 I. A. 154 : 23 W. R. 358

30. ———— Sale in execution

of decree—Certified purchaser—Benami purchase. A talukh in possession of a mortgagee was put up for sale under an execution against the mortgagor, and was bought by A in his own name, but benami for the mortgagee. A obtained a certificate as purchaser, and was put formally in possession, the mortgagee remaining in actual possession. In a suit by A in ejectment to recover possession of the property purchased:—*Held* (L. S. JACKSON, J. *dissentiente*), that the defendant was debarred, not

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

(b) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317 (1859, s. 260)—*contd.*

only by s. 260, but by the general provisions of the Act, from pleading that the plaintiff, the certified purchaser, purchased not on his own behalf, but benami for him, the defendant. Such defendant must show a transfer of title to him from the purchaser, in whom alone, under the certificate, the title of the judgment-debtor has vested. The object of s. 260 is to prevent any enquiry between the purchaser *de facto* and any person on whose behalf he is alleged to have purchased. *Held*, on appeal (reversing the decision of the High Court) that s. 260 of Act VIII of 1859 is to be construed strictly, and that no suit would lie by A against the mortgagee to redeem. BIHANS KUNWAR v. BEHARI LAL . . . 3 B. L. R. F. B. 15 : 11 W. R. F. B. 16

On appeal 10 B. L. R. 159
18 W. R. 157 : 14 Moo. I. A. 496

MUTHOORA NATH DASS v. RAIEKOMUL DOSSEE
24 W. R. 278

31. ———— Civil Procedure
Code, s. 317—Suit by purchaser at sale in execution of decree. At a sale in execution of a decree, in February 1875, the plaintiff purchased certain property in the name of M, who was recorded as the purchaser. In 1886, eleven years after the execution-sale, M sold the property to H, whose name was subsequently registered as owner, notwithstanding the plaintiff's objections. The plaintiff thereupon, in 1888, brought a suit against H for a declaration of his title to the property on the grounds that it had originally been purchased on his behalf at the execution-sale, and that he had been in possession for more than twelve years:—*Held*, that the suit did not fall within s. 317 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Buhuns Koonwur v. Lalla Buhoree Lall*, 10 B. L. R. 159 : 14 Moo. I. A. 496, relied on. KARAM-
UDDIN HOSAIN v. NIAMUT FATEHMA

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 199

32. ———— Civil Procedure
Code, 1882, s. 317—Suit against heir of certified purchaser. *Held*, that s. 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not preclude a suit against a person who claimed title through the certified purchaser based on the allegation that the certified purchaser was not the real purchaser, but only purchased benami for the person through whom the plaintiff claimed. *Buhuns Kower v. Lalla Buhoree Lall*, 10 B. L. R. 159 : 14 Moo. I. A. 496, referred to. SIBTA KUNWAR v. BHAGOLI

I. L. R. 21 All. 196

33. ———— Suit for declaration
that the name of certified purchaser was inserted fraudulently. S. 260, Act VIII of 1859, is no bar to a suit for a declaration that the name of the certified purchaser was inserted in the certificate of sale fraudulently and without the consent of the real purchaser. GOSMIAH v. TAFUZZUL HOSSEIN

4 B. L. R. Ap. 32

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

(b) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317 (1859, s. 260)—*contd.*

34. ————— *Purchase by member of joint family in his own name with joint funds.* The provisions of s. 260, Act VIII of 1859, apply to ordinary benami purchases at execution sales, but do not affect purchases of property by one member of a joint Hindu family in his own name, but with the joint funds. *BODH SINGH DOODHOORIA v. GUNESH CHANDRA SEN*

12 B. L. R. P. C. 371 : 19 W. R. 356

35. ————— *Execution of decree—Certified purchaser.* A sued for declaration that P, the certified auction-purchaser of certain immoveable property, was merely a trustee for R, P's judgment-debtor; that the purchase in P's name was made with the intent of defeating or delaying him in the execution of his decree; and that he was at liberty to apply for execution against the property as the property of his judgment-debtor. *Held*, following *Sohn Lall v. Lala Gya Pershad*, 6 N. W. 265, that s. 260, Act VIII of 1859, was in no way a bar to the suit. *PURAN MAL v. ALI KHAN*

I. L. R. 1 All. 235

36. ————— *Suit by certified against actual purchaser.* The certified purchaser of certain property at a sale in execution of a decree sued to establish his right to the property and for possession thereof. *Held*, that the defendant in the suit was not precluded by s. 260, Act VIII of 1859, from resisting the suit on the ground that he was the actual purchaser of the property. *JAN MUHAMMAD v. ILAHI BAKHSH*

I. L. R. 1 All. 290

37. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 317—Suit by member of Hindu family against his father and a purchaser who has bought benami for him, for partition.* The provisions of s. 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure are no bar to a suit for partition brought by a Hindu son against his father and a certified purchaser of family property, who has bought benami for the father with the family funds at a sale in execution of a decree against the father. *NATESA AYYAR v. VENKATARAMAYYAN*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 135

38. ————— *Certified purchaser—Suit against certified purchaser—Grant of sale certificate after institution of suit.* A sued K, the purchaser of certain immoveable property sold in execution of a decree under Act VIII of 1859, for a declaration that K had purchased such property on her behalf. The suit was instituted after Act VIII of 1859 was repealed and Act X of 1877 came into force. When the suit was instituted, K did not hold a sale-certificate. After it was instituted, he applied for and obtained a sale-certificate under s. 317 of Act X of 1877. *Held*, that, when the suit was instituted, it was maintainable, as, the defendant not being a certified purchaser under s. 260 of Act VIII of 1859, that section did not apply; and

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

(b) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317 (1859, s. 260)—*contd.*

that, when the defendant obtained a certificate under s. 317 of Act X of 1877, he became a certified purchaser, and the suit would only be maintainable if the plaintiff made out a case falling within the provisions of the last part of s. 317. *ALDWELL v. ILAHI BAKHSH*

I. L. R. 5 All. 478

39. ————— *Benami purchaser—Stranger to the transaction not affected.* In a suit by A against B and C to recover land, A alleged that B bought the land at a Court-sale on his behalf. B did not contest the suit. C, who did not claim under B, pleaded that A could not recover by reason of the provisions of s. 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that s. 317 only enable the certified purchaser and those claiming under him to avoid arrangements made with him in the nature of a trust, and was no bar to the suit. *RAMAKRISHNAPPA v. ADINARAYANA*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 511

40. ————— *Suit for property purchased at execution sale.* In a suit to obtain possession of certain property purchased at an execution sale, the plaintiff, who alleged that the purchase had been made for his benefit and that the certified purchaser was his benamidar, made the certified purchaser, who admitted his allegation, a defendant along with the person in possession. *Held*, that the case came within the rule laid down in *Buhuns Koovur v. Lalla Buhoree Lall*, 14 Moo. I. A. 496 : 10 B. L. R. 159, and that the suit was not barred by s. 317 of the Civil Procedure Code. *HAZI AJJUN MULLICK v. FARUTULLA*

9 C. L. R. 295

41. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 317—Benami transaction—Fraud—Suit against purchaser buying benami—Sale certificate granted in name of benamidar.* Certain property belonging to a judgment-debtor was brought to sale and purchased by a person in the benami name of her daughter, then an infant, and the sale certificate was made out in the name of the latter. Subsequently the mother mortgaged the property, and the mortgagee brought a suit, obtained a decree, and had the property sold and purchased it himself. Upon his being resisted by the daughter in attempts to get his name registered as proprietor, he instituted a suit against both mother and daughter to establish his rights to the property. The daughter thereupon objected that such suit would not lie by reason of the provisions of s. 317 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that the provisions of that section, which were intended to prevent fraud, were inapplicable to the facts of the case, and that the suit was maintainable. *KANIZAK SUKINA v. MONOHUR DAS*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 204

42. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 317—Benami purchase at execution-sale for judgment-debtor—Remedy of subsequent purchaser for value—Misjoinder of parties.* In a

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

(b) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317 (1859, s. 260)—*contd.*

suit to redeem a kanom brought by the plaintiff who had purchased the land in execution of a decree against the jenmi, it appeared that the land had previously been purchased in the name of one who was joined as a supplementary defendant, with the funds of the jenmi's tarwad, and with the object of defrauding the creditors of that tarwad. A decree for redemption was passed, which was reversed on appeals filed by the supplementary defendant and the kanomdar respectively. The plaintiff preferred a second appeal against the decree in the first-mentioned appeal, joining the kanomdar as respondent. *Held*, that the plaintiffs could not succeed, as the kanomdar was not a party to the appeal against which the second appeal was preferred. *Semble*: apart from the above objection, the plaintiff was not entitled to a declaration that the purchase by the supplementary defendant was benami for the tarwad of the original jenmi and consequently invalid as against the plaintiff. *Kanizak Sukina v. Monohur Das*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 204, dissented from. *RAMA KURUP v. SRIDEVI* I. L. R. 16 Mad. 290

43. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 317—Suit by execution-creditor for declaration that property is liable to be sold in execution of decree as belonging to his debtor.* The plaintiff lent money to F on a bond, and after his death sued his representative to recover the money out of the deceased's assets, and obtained a decree, in execution of which he attached certain property. S preferred a claim to the property on the ground that she was the purchaser of it at an execution-sale, and it was released. The plaintiff then brought a suit against S and F's representative for a declaration that the property was the property of his debtor F, and was therefore liable to be sold in execution of his decree. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by s. 317 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Kanizak Sukina v. Monohur Das*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 204, *Seetanath Ghose v. Madhub Narain Roy Chowdhry*, I W. R. 329, *Khyrat Ali v. Syfulluh Khan*, 8 W. R. 130, *Sohn Lall v. Lala Gya Pershad*, 6 N. W. 265, and *Puran Mal v. Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 1 All. 235, followed. *Rama Kurup v. Sridevi*, I. L. R. 16 Mad. 290, dissented from. *SUBHA BIBI v. HARA LAL DAS* . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 519

44. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 317 and 244—Purchase by a benami-dar with funds belonging to a joint Hindu family—Right of member of family not being a party to benami transaction to sue for his share.* A Hindu sued for partition of his share of the family property, and obtained a decree, which he partially executed. He then died without issue, leaving a widow. The rest of the family remained undivided, and the plaintiff was born into it after the decree was passed. Some of the members of the family arranged for the purchase of late decree-holder's property with their money benami for them, and for a similar purchase

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

(b) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317 (1859, s. 260)—*contd.*

of other portions of the family property at Court-sales held a further execution of the decree. The plaintiff now sued for partition of, *inter alia*, those portions of the family property which had been the subject of the benami transaction. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to share therein, and was not precluded from asserting his right by Civil Procedure Code, s. 244 or s. 317. *MINAKSHI AMMAL v. KALIANRAMA RAYER* . . . I. L. R. 20 Mad. 349

45. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 317—Sale in execution of decree—Right to prove purchase benami.* Certain property was mortgaged in 1881 and again in 1882. In 1883 the interest of one of the mortgagors in the property was brought to sale subject to the mortgages in execution of a decree against him, and was purchased by the assignor of defendant No. 6. In 1884 a decree for sale was obtained on the mortgage of 1882, neither defendant No. 6 nor his assignor having been brought on to the record. In execution of that decree, the property now in question was purchased by the predecessor in title of the plaintiff, who now brought this suit for redemption, averring that the purchase of 1883 was benami for the mortgagors. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not debarred by the Civil Procedure Code, s. 317, from proving this averment. *KOLLANTAVIDA MANIKOTH ONAKKAN v. TIRUVALLI KALANDAN ALIYAMMA* . . . I. L. R. 20 Mad. 362

46. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 317—Assignment from a certified purchaser.* A person taking an assignment from a certified purchaser at a Court-sale is not entitled, under Civil Procedure Code, s. 317, to object to the maintainability of a suit to recover the land purchased on the ground that the purchase was made benami. *THEYYAVELAN v. KOCHAN* . . . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 7

47. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 317—Effect of benami purchase, and purchase as execution-debtor's agent—Right of suit for possession.* Where the purchaser at an execution-sale is the agent of the execution-debtor and buys the property as such, though he advances the purchase-money on the understanding that he is to be repaid, a suit for possession of the property is maintainable by the latter against the former. Such a transaction is not a mere benami purchase, and is not a bar to such a suit under s. 317 of the Civil Procedure Code. *SANKUNNI NAYAR v. NARAYANAN NUMBUDRI* . . . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 282

48. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 317—Sale under mortgage-decree—Benami purchaser—Purchase on account of a subsequent usufructuary mortgagee—Right of suit for possession.* Certain land was hypothecated to A and subsequently put in the possession of B under a usufructuary mortgage. A obtained a decree upon

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

(b) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317 (1859, s. 260)—*contd.*

his hypothecation for the sale of the property against B and the mortgagor. In execution the land was purchased by the agent of B with his money, and he agreed to execute a conveyance to B. This agreement was not carried out, and the nominal purchaser ejected B's tenant. *Held*, the suit was not barred by s. 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, that B was entitled to a decree for delivery of possession and execution of a conveyance. *KUMBALINGA PILLAI v. ARIAPUTRA PADIACHI*

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 436

49. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 294, 317—Trusts Act (II of 1882), ss. 82, 88—Purchase by alleged agent of decree-holder at sale in execution.* Certain decree-holders (appellants) were refused permission to purchase at the sale in execution, and subsequently the defendant, alleged by the decree-holders to be their agent, but of whose general duty the making of such purchase was not a part, purchased the property and got his name entered in the sale certificate. The decree-holders, hearing of the purchase, supplied the purchase-money, ratified the purchase, and agreed to take a conveyance of the property after confirmation of the sale. On the refusal of the defendant to execute the conveyance, the decree-holders sued for a declaration that they were the real purchasers and for possession of the property. *Held*, that under such circumstances the second paragraph of s. 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not exclude the application of the first paragraph of that section. *Held*, further, that ss. 82, 88 of the Indian Trusts Act (II of 1882) did not apply. *Sankunni Nagar v. Narayanan Nambudri*, **I. L. R. 17 Mad. 282**, and *Kumbalinga Pillai v. Ariaputra Padiachi*, **I. L. R. 18 Mad. 436**, distinguished. *Monappa v. Surappa*, **I. L. R. 11 Mad. 234**, referred to. *GANGA BAKSH v. RUDAR SINGH* . **I. L. R. 22 All. 434**

50. *Interference by benamidar with tenants of real purchaser—Real purchaser's right to sue benamidar—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 317.* At a sale in execution of a decree the plaintiff purchased certain property in the name of the defendant, and continued in undisturbed possession of the property for eight years after the sale. He then brought a suit against the defendant for a declaration of his right and for an injunction to restrain him from interfering with it. *Held*, affirming the decision of the Subordinate Judge, that the suit did not come within the scope of s. 317 of the Civil Procedure Code, but was maintainable. *SASTI CHURN NUNDI v. ANNOPURNA*

I. L. R. 23 Cal. 699

51. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 317—Application for execution of decree against a person alleged to be the beneficial owner, though not the certified purchaser.* The provisions of s. 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

(b) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317 (1859, s. 260)—*contd.*

contemplate suits between the certified purchaser and the beneficial owner, and will not operate so as to bar a third party from asserting that the certified purchaser is not the beneficial owner. *Sohun Lall v. Lala Gya Pershad*, **6 N. W. 265**, *Puran Mal v. Ali Khan*, **I. L. R. 1 All. 235**, and *Subha Bibi v. Hara Lal Das*, **I. L. R. 21 Cal. 519**, referred to. *UNCOVENANTED SERVICE BANK v. ABDUL BARI*

I. L. R. 18 All. 461

52. *Purchase by pleader of client's interest—Duty of pleader—Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 317.* At a sale in execution of a decree against the plaintiffs, the pleader who had acted for the plaintiffs purchased their property with his own money, but in the name of his mohurrir and for a very inadequate sum. The plaintiffs thereupon brought this suit against the defendants (the pleader and his mohurrir) for a declaration that the pleader-defendant, in so purchasing, was a trustee on their behalf, for an order directing the defendants to reconvey the property to the plaintiffs, and for other relief. At the time of filing the suit, possession of the land sold had not been given to anybody. *Held*, affirming the decision of the Subordinate Judge, that the suit was not barred, having regard to the case made in the plaint, by s. 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). *Held*, also (on the merits), that the pleader could not, according to equity and good conscience, retain for his own benefit the property so purchased by him. *AGHORE NATH CHUCKERBUTTY v. RAM CHURN CHUCKERBUTTY* . **I. L. R. 23 Cal. 805**

53. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 317—Sale in execution of decree—Benami purchase—Suit by creditor on the ground that the certified purchaser is not the real purchaser.* *Held*, that the provisions of s. 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure are subject to no limitation other than such as is contained in the section itself, namely, that the suit the maintenance of which is prohibited by that section should be (1) brought against a certified purchaser, and (2) based upon the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of a person other than the certified purchaser. The question of who the plaintiff may be is not material. The judgment of *KNOX, J.*, in *Delhi and London Bank v. Chaudhri Parlab Bhaskar*, **I. L. R. 21 All. 29**, approved. *Ram Kurup v. Sri Devi*, **I. L. R. 16 Mad. 290**, followed. *Uncovenanted Service Bank v. Abdul Bari*, **I. L. R. 18 All. 461**, distinguished. *Buhuns Kowur v. Lalla Buhooree Lall*, **14 Moo. I. A. 496**, and *Williamson v. Norris*, **68 L. J. Q. B. 34**, referred to. *KISHAN LAL v. GARURUDDHWAJA PRASAD SINGH* . **I. L. R. 21 All. 238**

54. *Suit by benamidar—Effect of decision in suit on beneficial owner—Proof of benami transaction.* So long as the benami system is recognized in this country, it is to be pre-

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

(b) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317 (1859, s. 260)—*contd.*

sumed, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that a suit instituted by a benamidar has been instituted with the full authority of the beneficial owner, and any decision made in such suit will be as much binding upon the real owner as if the suit had been brought by the real owner himself. *Meheroonissa Bibee v. Hur Churn Bose*, 10 W. R. 220, *Kalee Prosunno Bose v. Dino Nath Mullick*, 11 B. L. R. 56 : 19 W. R. 434, and *Sita Nath Shah v. Nobin Chunder Roy*, 5 C. L. R. 102, discussed. Where an application made by C and D to have their names registered in respect of certain malikana, as to right to which there was a dispute between A and B, was opposed by E, who alleged that A had been acting throughout as his benamidar, and was eventually rejected in 1876, on reference by the Collector to the Civil Court:—*Held*, in a suit brought by C and D against E for a declaration of their right to the malikana, and for a reversal of the order refusing to allow their names to be registered in respect thereof, that, inasmuch as the allegation made by E in the proceedings held in 1876 on the application by C and D before the Collector, and afterwards upon the reference before the Civil Court, that A had been acting in the matter merely as his benamidar, was uncontradicted by C and D in their plaint in the present suit, there was sufficient evidence upon which to hold that that fact was true. *Gopi Nath Chobey v. Bhugwat Pershad*

I. L. R. 10 Cal. 697

55. ———— *Suit against benami purchaser at Court-sale, by owner to recover the land after ejectment.* If, after obtaining a certificate of sale in execution of a decree, the purchaser acknowledges that his purchase is benami and gives up possession, or does some act which clearly indicates an intention to waive his right, or restores the property to the real owner, such act may, by reason of the antecedent relation of the parties, operate as a valid transfer of property. Defendant acted benami in buying certain land at a Court-sale for plaintiff, paid part of the purchase-money for plaintiff, and allowed plaintiff to remain in possession on the understanding that defendant was to transfer the property on repayment of the balance of the purchase-money. Defendant having ejected plaintiff, plaintiff sued to recover the land. *Held*, that s. 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure was no bar to plaintiff's suit. *Monappa v. Surappa*

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 234

56. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 317—Sale in execution of a decree—Suit against heirs or mortgagee of the certified purchaser.* S. 317 of the Civil Procedure Code is no bar to a suit against any person claiming through or under the certified purchaser, such as his heir or mortgagee. *Buhans Kowar v. Lalla Buhoree Lall*, 14 Moo. I. A. 496 : 10 B. L. R. 159 : 18 W. R. 157, and *Lokhee Narain Roy Choudhry v.*

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

(b) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317 (1859, s. 260)—*contd.*

Kallypuddo Bandopadhyaya, L. R. 2 I. A. 154 : 23 W. R. 358, referred to. *Raj Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Dina Nath Saha*, 2 C. W. N. 433, and *Theyyavelan v. Kochan*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 7, followed. *Dukhada Sundari Dasi v. Srimonta Joardar*
I. L. R. 26 Cal. 950 : 3 C. W. N. 657

57. ———— *Suit for establishment of title, against attaching decree-holder, to the property purchased in the benami of the judgment-debtor.* In execution of a decree for arrears of rent, plaintiff purchased property in the benami of his son R. This property was attached in execution of a decree by defendant No. 1 against R, and the plaintiff preferred a claim, which was rejected; plaintiff brought the present suit to have his title established; R having died, his son was made a party. *Held*, that s. 317 of the Civil Procedure Code is no bar to the suit; and that the protection afforded by that section extends only to the certified purchaser and not to one who derives title from him. *Raj Chandra Chuckerbarti v. Dina Nath Saha*, 2 C. W. N. 433; *Dukhada Sundari Dasi v. Sreemuntha Joardar*, 3 C. W. N. 657; *Theyyavelan v. Kochan*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 7, referred to. *Nokori Dhur v. Sarup Chunder Dey* (1900) 5 C. W. N. 341

58. ———— *Execution of decree—Sale in execution—Suit against certified purchaser for recovery of part of the property purchased.* Kishan Lal and Tokha Mal were joint mortgagees. After their death, Durga, the adopted son of Kishan Lal, and Todar, the son of Tokha Mal, brought a suit upon the mortgage, and obtained a decree for sale. After this decree had been obtained, it was settled, by a suit ending in a consent decree, that one Musammatt Pano was entitled along with Durga to a certain portion of the property of Kishan Lal. Kishan Lal and Todar brought their decree into execution, and caused the mortgaged property to be sold, and purchased it themselves. Thereupon the representatives of Musammatt Pano sued Durga to recover that portion of the property which they alleged ought to have come to Pano. *Held*, that the suit would not lie, as being in contravention of s. 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Durga v. Bhagwan Das* (1900) I. L. R. 23 All. 34

59. ———— *Suit by beneficial purchaser against certified purchaser—Suit not taken out of the section by reason of the beneficial purchaser being in possession and claiming only a declaration of his title—Execution of decree.* The plaintiff came into Court, alleging that, certain property of his having been put up to sale in execution of a decree against him, two of the defendants had, at his request, purchased the said property in their own names and obtained a sale certificate. He further alleged that the purchase-money had

BENAMI TRANSACTION—contd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—contd.**

(b) CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 317 (1859, s. 260)—*concl'd.*

been paid by him, and that he had all along remained in possession of the property; and he asked for a declaration that he was the real purchaser and in proprietary possession of the property in suit. *Held*, that such a suit could not be exempted from the prohibition contained in s. 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure, either upon the ground that the plaintiff being in possession claimed only a declaration, or upon the ground that there had been a transfer to the plaintiff, and a new title created in him by the action of the certified purchasers. *Sasti Churn Nundi v. Annopurna*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 699, and *Monappa v. Surappa*, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 234, distinguished. *Aldwell v. Ilahi Baksh*, I. L. R. 5 All. 478; *Mussumat Buhuns Kowur v. Lalla Buhoree Lall*, 14 Moo. I. A. 496, and *Lokhee Narain Roy Chowdhry v. Kalypuddo Bandopadhya*, L. R. 2 I. A. 154, referred to. *BISHAN DIAL v. GHAZI-UD-DIN* (1901) . . . I. L. R. 23 All. 175

(c) N.-W. P. LAND REVENUE ACT (XIX OF 1873), s. 184.

60. ————— *Sale for arrears of Government revenue—Alleged benami purchase—Suit on a mortgage against the debtor and the certified purchasers alleged to be benamidars of the debtor—Civil Procedure Code, s. 317. Per KNOX, J.—The operation of s. 184 of Act No. XIX of 1873 is not confined to disputes between certified auction-purchasers and persons who allege that such auction-purchasers purchased on their behalf as their benamidars, but extends to cases where the dispute is between the certified purchasers and third persons who allege that the certified purchasers are not the real purchaser. In such a case the claimants cannot succeed without proof of fraud. *Buhuns Kowur v. Lalla Buhoree Lall*, 14 Moo. I. A. 496, *Sohun Lall v. Lala Gya Pershad*, 6 N. W. 265, *Kanizak Sukina v. Monohur Das*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 204, *Chundra Kaminy Debea v. Ram Ruttun Pattuck*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 302, and *Tara Soondurce Debee v. Oojul Monee Dossee*, 14 W. R. 111, referred to. *Per BANERJI, J.—S. 184 of Act XIX of 1873 contemplates a suit between the person claiming to be the real purchaser and the certified purchaser, and not a suit by a creditor of such person in which the creditor seeks to establish that the purchase was in reality made by his debtor, and that the certified purchaser is only the benamidar of the debtor. S. 184 does not preclude a creditor of the beneficial owner from suing the certified purchaser on the allegation that his purchase was benami for the debtor, and that the latter is the real purchaser. *Buhuns Kowur v. Lalla Buhoree Lall*, 14 Moo. I. A. 496, *Bodh Singh Doodhooria v. Gunes Chunder Sen*, 12 B. L. R. 317, *Lokhee Narain Roy Chowdhry v. Kalypuddo Bandopadhya*, L. R. 2 I. A. 154, *Uncovenanted Service Bank v. Abdul Bari*, I. L. R.**

BENAMI TRANSACTION—concl'd.**4. CERTIFIED PURCHASERS—concl'd.**

(c) N.-W. P. LAND REVENUE ACT (XIX OF 1873), s. 184—*concl'd.*

18 All. 461, *Sohun Lall v. Lala Gya Pershad*, 6 N. W. 265, *Puran Mal v. Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 1 All. 235, *Kanizak Sukina v. Monohur Das*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 204, *Subha Bibi v. Hara Lal Das*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 519, *Ameer-oon-nissa Beebee v. Binode Ram Sein*, 2 W. R. 29, and *Chundra Kaminy Debea v. Ram Ruttun Pattuck*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 302, referred to. *DELHI AND LONDON BANK v. CHAUDHRI PARTAB BHASKAR* . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 29

BENAMI TRANSFER.

See BENAMIDAR.

BENARES FAMILY DOMAINS REGULATION (VII OF 1828).

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 576

BENARES FAMILY DOMAINS ACT (XIV OF 1881).

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 576

BENCH OF MAGISTRATES.

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

7 C. W. N. 527

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 483

1. ————— Trial of cases under Criminal Procedure Code, s. 530. A Bench of Magistrates has no power to deal with cases coming under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code. A Bench may be empowered under s. 50 of the Code "to try such cases or such class of cases only and within such limits as the Government may direct." The definition of the term "trial" shows that it refers to trials for offences, and these do not come within the miscellaneous matters mentioned in s. 530. *SUFFERUDDIN v. IBRAHIM*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 754

2. ————— Salaried officer of municipality, disqualification of—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 555—Municipal offence.* Notwithstanding anything contained in s. 555 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a conviction for an offence against any municipal law or regulation, had before a Bench of Magistrates, which includes a salaried officer of the municipality, is bad. *In the matter of the petition of NOBIN KRISHNA MOOKERJEE. NOBIN KRISHNA MOOKERJEE v. CHAIRMAN, SUBURBAN MUNICIPALITY*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 194

3. ————— Power of Bench—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 222, 224, 225.* A Bench of Magistrates, whether empowered under s. 224 or 225, cannot try a case of breach of the peace or any

BENCH OF MAGISTRATES—contd.

offence except those mentioned in ss. 222 and 225 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872. *QUEEN v. BEBHEKI PATHAK* . . . 21 W. R. Cr. 12

4. ————— **Jurisdiction of Bench—Offence of lurking house-trespass—Penal Code, s. 457.** A Bench of Magistrates has no jurisdiction to try a charge for lurking house-trespass by night or house-breaking by night, under s. 457 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. BACHUN KADIR* . . . 23 W. R. Cr. 6

5. ————— **Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 261—Madras Police Act (XXIV of 1859), s. 48—Offences against "Conservancy clauses"—Obstruction to, and nuisance in, road.** Offences under the Madras Police Act, s. 48, are within the cognizance of a Bench of Magistrates. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. OOLAGANADAN* . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 142

6. ————— **Conviction on proper materials—Interference by High Court.** Where a Bench of Magistrates has before it materials which are sufficient in law to support a conviction, the High Court has no authority to disturb it. *ABDOOL HUQ CHOWDHRY v. IDRAK* . . . 21 W. R. Cr. 57

See *QUEEN v. DWARKNATH MULLICK* . . . 21 W. R. Cr. 45

7. ————— **Irregularity in trial—Absence at adjourned trial of some members of the Bench before whom the case first came.** A case triable only by a Magistrate exercising powers of the 1st class came before a Bench of Magistrates, neither of whom individually exercised those powers, but sitting together the Bench was so invested. At the adjourned trial only one of these Magistrates was present. *Held*, that he was not competent to try the case alone, and the orders passed by him were set aside as illegal. *In the matter of BARODA PROSONNO CHUCKERBUTTY* . . . 2 C. L. R. 348

8. ————— **Absence of member from sitting and signature by him of final order.** In a trial before a Bench originally constituted of a stipendiary and two Honorary Magistrates, one of the latter, after the commencement of the trial, was absent, and important evidence was recorded in his absence. On the following day he returned to the Bench, and signed the final order convicting the accused. *Held*, that the conviction was bad on the ground of irregularity. *SHUMBHU NATH SARKAR v. RAM KOMUL GUHA* . . . 13 C. L. R. 212

9. ————— **Order irregularly made—Hearing of part of case by one Bench and decision by another.** Where in a summary case a Bench of Magistrates, after recording the evidence for the prosecution, postponed the case for the hearing of evidence for the defence, and on the day fixed for hearing another Bench of Magistrates, none of whom had been members of the former Bench, recorded the evidence for the defence and acquitted the accused:—*Held*, on a reference to the High Court, that the order must be set aside as being irregularly made. *RAM SUNDER DE v. RAJAB ALI* . . . I. L. R. 12 Calc. 558

BENCH OF MAGISTRATES—contd.

10. ————— **Absence of member of Bench—Hearing of part of case by one Bench of Magistrates and decision by another—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 16, 350—Rules framed by Local Government for the guidance of Benches of Magistrates under s. 16, Criminal Procedure Code—Ultra vires.** Rule 8 of the rules framed by the Local Government for the guidance of Benches of Magistrates is *ultra vires*. An Honorary Magistrate may not give judgment and pass sentence in a case unless he has been a member of the Bench during the whole of the hearing of the case. *HARDWAR SINGH v. KHEGA OJHA* . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 870

11. ————— **Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 15, 16—Constitution of the Bench under the rules of the Government of Madras.** The accused was tried on a charge under the Penal Code, s. 352, by a Bench of Magistrates consisting of a pensioned District Munsif who had been appointed Chairman of the Bench and one Special Magistrate. The Magistrates differed in opinion, but the Chairman gave his casting vote for conviction, and the accused was convicted and sentenced. *Held*, that the Court was not legally constituted under the rules of the Government of Madras, and the conviction should be set aside. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MUTHIA* . . . I. L. R. 16 Mad. 410

12. ————— **Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 16 and 350—Change in constitution of the Court during a trial—Offence under Madras Towns Nuisances Act (Madras Act III of 1889).** A trial under the Town Nuisances Act of 1889 was begun before a Bench of Magistrates, and adjourned. On the adjourned date the Bench was constituted differently, only one Magistrate being present of those who attended on the first occasion; but the trial was proceeded with, and resulted in a conviction. *Held*, that the conviction was illegal, and should be set aside. *Hardwar Singh v. Kheja Ojha*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 870, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BASAPPA* . . . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 394

13. ————— **Absence of member of Bench—Hearing of part of the case by two Magistrates and decision by three—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 350.** Only those Magistrates who have heard the whole of the evidence can decide a case. There is no provision of law which provides for a change in the constitution of Benches of Magistrates during the hearing of a case. S. 350 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to cases tried by Benches of Magistrates. *Shumbhu Nath Sarkar v. Ram Komul Guha*, 13 C. L. R. 212, and *Hardwar Singh v. Kheja Ojha*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 870, followed. *DAMRI THAKUR v. BHOWANI SAHOO* . . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 194

14. ————— **Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 16, 350—Madras District Municipalities Act (Act IV of 1884), ss. 263, 264.** A trial on the charge of making an encroachment upon public land under the Madras District Municipalities Act, 1884, ss. 167, 263, and 264, was

BENCH OF MAGISTRATES—concl'd.

begun before a Bench of seven Magistrates, and ended in a conviction by five of the Magistrates in the absence of the other two. *Held*, that on the facts of the case the conviction under s. 263 was right, and that it was not invalidated by the absence at the end of the trial of two of the Magistrates before whom it had begun. *KARUPPANA NADAN v. CHAIRMAN, MADURA MUNICIPALITY*
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 246

BENEFIT SOCIETY.

See MADRAS MUNICIPAL ACT, 1884, s. 103.
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 253

BENGAL ACTS.**1859—XI.**

See REVENUE SALE LAW.
See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE.

1862—VI.

See APPEAL—MEASUREMENT OF LANDS.
See BENGAL RENT ACT, 1869, ss. 25, 31, 37, 38, 41, 43—49, 58.

See MEASUREMENT OF LANDS.

s. 16.

See CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY.
10 W. R. 21

s. 20—*Suit for account and for money misappropriated by agent—Cause of action—Bengal Act I of 1879, s. 146—Agency, Creation of.* Where an agency for the collection of rents of toke *G* and *H* was created in district *M*, in which district toke *G* was situated, toke *H* being situated in district *L* :—*Held* in a suit brought against the agent for an account and for money fraudulently misappropriated and instituted in district *M* that, so far as the suit related to toke *H*, the Court of *M* had no jurisdiction to try it. Bengal Act VI of 1862 requires a suit to be brought in some Court within the district in which the land lies in respect of which the agency was created, and the question where the cause of action arose is material only in determining in which sub-division of the district the suit is to be brought. *NILMONI SINGH DEO v. NILU NAIK*
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 425

VIII.

See ZAMINDARI DAKS
4 W. R. 6
6 W. R. 100
8 W. R. 45
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 293

IX.

Mohurrir appointed under—

See PUBLIC SERVANT 20 W. R. Cr. 49

1863—III.

See COMPANY—WINDING UP—COSTS AND CLAIMS ON ASSETS.
2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 180

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
SPECIAL ACT—BENG. ACT III OF 1863.
10 W. R. Cr. 30

BENGAL ACTS—cont'd.**1863—V.**

See NAZIR.

11 B. L. R. 256 : 19 W. R. 335

See PEONS, APPOINTMENT OF.

9 W. R. 333

11 W. R. 158, 159

VI.

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT, 1863.

1864—III.

See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, 1864.

V, s. 16.

See OBSTRUCTION TO NAVIGATION.

2 B. L. R. A. C. 23 : 11 W. R. Cr. 18

VII.

See SALT, ACTS AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO—BENGAL.

1865—VI.

See COMPANY—WINDING UP—COSTS AND CLAIMS ON ASSETS.

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 180

ss. 31 and 32—*Protector of labourers, powers of—Wages of labourers—Mode of taking account—Criminal Procedure Code (XXV of 1861), s. 444.* *Held*, that until an enquiry is made under s. 31, Bengal Act VI of 1865, the Protector of labourers is not competent to act under s. 32; that the procedure under s. 31 must be conducted in accordance with s. 444 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861; that to support a conviction under s. 32, Bengal Act VI of 1865, it must be shown that the wages or part of the wages due have remained unpaid for more than six months. But in an account current, the payments are not to be appropriated for the wages of the month in which the payment was made. *In the matter of the NORTH-EAST ASSAM TEA COMPANY*

3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 39 : 12 W. R. Cr. 29

VII.

See SLAUGHTER-HOUSE 6 W. R. Cr. 77
16 W. R. Cr. 4
6 B. L. R. Ap. 28 : 14 W. R. Cr. 67

VIII.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—INCUMBRANCES.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—UNDER-TENURES, SALE OF.

1866—I.

See FERRY . . . 15 W. R. 132.

II.

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.
21 W. R. 28

BENGAL ACTS—contd.**1866—IV.**

See CALCUTTA POLICE ACT, 1866.

See POLICE MAGISTRATE.

1 B. L. R. O. C. 39

VI.

See CONVICTION. 1 B. L. R. O. Cr. 41

1867—II.

See BENGAL PUBLIC GAMBLING ACT.

See GAMBLING.

offence under—

See FALSE EVIDENCE—FABRICATING FALSE EVIDENCE. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 144

1868—VI, Sch. K.

See JUDICIAL OFFICERS, LIABILITY OF.
14 B. L. R. 254: 21 W. R. 391

VII.

See INSOLVENCY—INSOLVENT DEBTORS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.
3 C. L. R. 508

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—SETTING ASIDE SALE.

s. 1—Estate—Lands not permanently settled—Sunderbund estate—District of which portion only is permanently settled—Bengal Regulations IX of 1816 and III of 1828—Estate—Bengal Act VII of 1868. The plaintiff was the auction-purchaser at a sale under Act XI of 1859 by the Collector of the 24-Pergunnahs for arrears of revenue of an estate in the Sunderbunds on which the defendant was the holder of a mokurari mourasi jungleburi tenure, under which he was to clear away the jungle and then to cultivate the land with paddy. The estate was one borne on the register of revenue-paying estates in the Collectorate of the 24-Pergunnahs, and therefore within that Collectorate with regard to the provisions of Bengal Act VII of 1868, s. 10. The district of the 24-Pergunnahs is a permanently settled district, but the portion of it forming the Sunderbunds was declared by Regulation III of 1828, s. 13, not to be included in the permanent settlement. The Sunderbunds tract was, moreover, under Regulation IX of 1816, formed into a separate jurisdiction for settlement purposes under an officer styled the Commissioner of Sunderbunds, who is subject to the direct control of the Board of Revenue, and independent of the Collector of the 24-Pergunnahs. *Held*, that, though there was no permanent settlement of the lands sold to the plaintiff, they fell within the definition of an "estate" as given in Bengal Act VII of 1868. **BHOLANATH BANDYOPADHYA v. UMACHURN BANDYOPADHYA. UMACHURN BANDYOPADHYA v. BHOLANATH BANDYOPADHYA**

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 440

BENGAL ACTS—contd.**1868—VII—s. 2.**

See REVIEW—POWER TO REVIEW.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 419

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT (BEN. ACT VII of 1860).

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 73

s. 8.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1

7 C. W. N. 377

s. 18.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REVENUE COURTS—ORDERS OF REVENUE COURTS

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 771

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 789

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 698

4 C. W. N. 586

1869—II.

See CHOTA NAGPORE TENURES ACT, 1869.

VIII.

See BENGAL RENT ACT, 1869.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT.

ss. 59, 60, 64—

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—UNDER-TENURES, SALE OF.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 550

1870—III, s. 3.

1. Object of section—Transfer of decree for execution. The object of s. 3, Bengal Act III of 1870, was that a person against whom a decree was passed should not be harassed by two sets of proceedings in execution simultaneously carried on in two different Courts. **MUDDEN MOHUN BISWAS v. PUDDO MONEE DASSEE**
17 W. R. 139

2. Decree pending when Act came into operation. A decree in which no actual proceedings were pending in the Collector's Court at the commencement of Bengal Act III of 1870 (*i.e.*, where an order for attachment had been issued, but the attachment came to an end), was held to have been properly transferred to the Civil Court under s. 3 of that Act. **HURO-PERSHAD ROY CHOWDRY v. FOOL KISHOREE DASSEE**
16 W. R. 308

3. Decree transferred to Civil Court for execution—Appeal—Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 108—Act X of 1859, ss. 153, 155. In a suit brought for recovery of Rs 75 for arrears of rent, the plaintiff obtained an *ex-parte* decree on 18th March 1869, in the Court of the Deputy Collector. In October 1871, he applied to the Munsif for, and sued out, execution of his decree. In January 1872, one of the defendants applied to the Deputy Collector for a review of his judgment, and the Deputy Collector admitted the review and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

BENGAL ACTS—*contd.***1870—III, s. 3—*concl'd.***

On appeal, the Judge held that the Deputy Collector had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for review or to hear the case, the decree having been transferred under Bengal Act III of 1870 to the Munsif for execution, and reversed the judgment of the Deputy Collector. *Held*, that, the suit having been decided by the Deputy Collector before Bengal Act VIII of 1869 came into operation, the procedure, therefore, would be that laid down by s. 108 of the Act, *i.e.*, under Act X of 1859, and the appeal would lie to the Collector, not to the Judge, under ss. 153 and 155 of that Act. The decree alone was transferred to the Civil Court, and the application for review was rightly made to the Court of the Deputy Collector. *In the matter of RAMSOONDER BANDO-PADHYA* 10 B. L. R. Ap. 21

RAMSOONDER BANERZEE v. DOORGA CHURN BARUI 19 W. R. 128

In re JUGGODUMBA DASSEE

10 B. L. R. Ap. 22, note
15 W. R. 75

4. *Application to set aside decree—Jurisdiction.* When an *ex-parte* decree of a Revenue Court has been transferred to the Civil Court under the provisions of s. 3 of Bengal Act III of 1870, an application to set aside the decree must be made to the Civil Court, and not to the Revenue Court. *KRISHNA KISHORE PODDAR v. WOOMESH CHUNDER ROY* 13 B. L. R. F. B. 214 : 21 W. R. 448

In re WOOMA CHURN ROY MOJOOMDER

13 B. L. R. 215, note

WOOMA CHURN MOZOOMDAR v. CHUNDER KANT ROY CHOWDHRY 16 W. R. 255

OODWUNT MAHTOON v. BIDDHI CHAND CHOWDHRY 13 B. L. R. 216, note
18 W. R. 207

MOHESH CHUNDER SINGH SURMA v. BHOOBUN MOYEE DEBIA

13 B. L. R. 217 note : 18 W. R. 252

5. *Where a decree of the Collector was by the operation of Bengal Act III of 1870, s. 3, transferred to a Civil Court for execution, the effect was to make it as it were a case of execution, or a decree of that Court ; and in dealing with an order in such a case made by the Civil Court in execution, the High Court was bound to assume that the lower Court had acted properly and with jurisdiction, and its appellate jurisdiction followed as a matter of course.* *DINDYAL PARAMANICK v. DINOBUNDHOO CHOWDRY* 21 W. R. 412

IV (Court of Wards Act, 1870)

See COLLECTOR 18 W. R. 466

See COURT OF WARDS.

See LUNATIC 8 B. L. R. Ap. 50
17 W. R. 180

BENGAL ACTS—*cont'd.***1870—V.**

See PORT COMMISSIONER'S ACT.

VI.

See CHAUKIDARI ACT.

See VILLAGE CHAUKIDARS ACT.

See CHAUKIDARI CHAKRAN LAND.

1871—IX, s. 27.

Notice of suit—Tolls paid in excess of powers given—Suit for refund of money. In certain suits brought against a toll collector for the refund of money alleged to have been exacted by him improperly as toll under Bengal Act IX of 1871, the defendant pleaded that no notice of suit in accordance with s. 27 of that Act had been given. *Held*, that, such notice not having been given, the suit should be dismissed. *Waterhouse v. Keen*, 4 B. & C. 200, followed. *RAM PITAM SHAH v. SHOOBUL CHUNDER MULLICK* I. L. R. 15 Calc. 259

X.

See BENGAL CESS ACT (X OF 1871).

XXIII.

See PENSIONS ACT.

1872—II, s. 34.

See STORING JUTE 19 W. R. Cr. 4

1873—III.

See BENGAL EXCISE ACT (III OF 1873).

VI.

See EMBANKMENTS.

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 505 : 8 C. L. R. 553

1875—V.

See BENGAL SURVEY ACT.

1876—I.

See CHEATING I. L. R., 17 Calc. 606

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MARRIAGE, REGISTRATION OF.
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 607

II.

See OPIUM 13 C. L. R. 336

III.

See BENGAL IRRIGATION ACT.

IV.

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT, 1876.

V.

See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, 1876.

VI.

See CHOTA NAGPUR INCUMBERED ESTATES ACT.

BENGAL ACTS—contd.

1876—VII.

See LAND REGISTRATION ACT (BENGAL),
1876.

VIII.

See ESTATES PARTITION ACT, 1876.

1877—I.

See CHOTA NAGPUR LANDLORD AND
TENANT ACT.

1878—VII.

See BENGAL EXCISE ACT.

VIII.

See SERVICE TENURE.

1879—I.

See CHOTA NAGPUR LANDLORD AND
TENANT PROCEDURE ACT.

See GRANT . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 561.

VIII.

See RESUMPTION—EFFECT OF RESUMP-
TION—EFFECT ON PATTAS.
I. L. R. 30 I. A. 159

IX.

See COURT OF WARDS ACT.

1880—VI.

See DRAINAGE ACT.

VII.

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT,
1880.

IX.

See BENGAL CESS ACT.

1881—III.

See COURT OF WARDS ACT (BENGAL).

IV.

See BENGAL EXCISE (AMENDMENT) ACT.

1882—II, ss. 61, 76, and 80.

See EMBANKMENTS.
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 570

ss. 76 (a), 79—

See EMBANKMENT.
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 481

1884—III—

See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT.

V.

See CHOTA NAGPUR INCUMBERED ESTATES
(AMENDMENT) ACT.

BENGAL ACTS—concl.

1888—II.

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION
ACT.

1889—II.

See BENGAL PRIVATE FISHERIES PROTEC-
TION ACT.

1890—VI.

See BENGAL DRAINAGE ACT.

1892—I—(Village Chaukidars).

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO POLICE
OFFICERS . . . 2 C. W. N. 637

1895—I.

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT,
1895.

VII.

See BHOOTAN DUARS ACT (XVI OF 1869).

1897—V.

See PARTITION ACT.

IX.

See COURT OF WARDS ACT.

1898—III.

See BENGAL TENANCY AMENDMENT ACT—

1899—I.

See BENGAL GENERAL CLAUSES ACT.

III.

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT.

1902—II.

See BENGAL DRAINAGE AMENDMENT ACT.

1903—I.

See BENGAL TENANCY VALIDATION ACT.

V.

See CHOTA NAGPORE LANDLORD AND
TENANT PROCEDURE ACT.
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 115

1907—I.

See BENGAL TENANCY AMENDMENT ACT.

**BENGAL, AGRA AND ASSAM CIVIL
COURTS ACT (XII OF 1887).**

See BENGAL, N.-W. PROVINCES AND ASSAM
CIVIL COURTS ACT.

See MARRIAGE . . . 9 C. W. N. 323

See VALUATION OF SUIT—APPEALS.
6 C. W. N. 346

ss. 8, 10, 11, 12 (3), 22—District
Judge—Additional Judge—Transfer of part-heard
appeal to Additional Judge, legality of—Assign-
ment of "functions" to such Judge—Civil Procedure
Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 25. A District Judge
has no jurisdiction under s. 8 of the Bengal, North-

BENGAL, AGRA AND ASSAM CIVIL
COURTS ACT (XII OF 1887)—*concl'd.*ss. 8, 10, 11, 12 (3), 22—*concl'd.*

Western Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act, to transfer a case partly heard before himself to an Additional Judge for disposal. Where, therefore, the District Judge admitted an appeal, heard the arguments and reserved judgment on a certain date, but on the next day, upon the application of the appellant, deputed an amin and a pleader to make a survey and identify some lands, to prepare a map and to take certain evidence and after the receipt of their report fixed a date for further hearing, but ultimately transferred the appeal to the Additional Judge for disposal. *Held*, that the order of transfer was without jurisdiction. *Kumarasami Reddiar v. Subbaraya Reddiar*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 314; *Sita Ram v. Naini Dulaiya*, I. L. R. 21 All. 230; *Dumree Sahoo v. Jugdharee*, 13 W. R. 398; *Maulvi Abdool Hye v. Macrae*, 23 W. R. 1; *Kishori Mohun Sett v. Gul Mahomed Shaha*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 177, referred to. A District Judge may under s. 8 assign to the Additional Judge the function of hearing any particular class of cases, but it is extremely doubtful whether he can transfer to such Judge any particular case pending before himself. *BIDYA MOYEE DEBYA CHOWDHURANI v. SURJA KANT ACHARJI* (1905).

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 875
9 C. W. N. 705

s. 10.

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION
OF . . . I. L. R. 23 All. 455

s. 11.

See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASE—GENERAL
CASES . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 183

ss. 13, 17.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—TRANSFER
OF DECREE FOR EXECUTION.

5 C. W. N. 150

s. 17.

See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASE—GENERAL
CASES . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 183

s. 18—*Suits Valuation Act* (VII of 1887), ss. 2, 11—*Restitution of conjugal rights—Jurisdiction of Munsif—Valuation of suit—Mahomedan marriage, requirements of.* A suit for restitution of conjugal rights is not triable by a Munsif under s. 19, sub-s. (1), of Act XII of 1887, but is triable by a District Judge or a Subordinate Judge under s. 18 of that Act. *Matra Mondul v. Hari Mohun Mullick*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 155; *Golam Rahman v. Fatima Bibi*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 239; *Mowla Newaj v. Sajidunnissa Bibi*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 378; and *Shiri v. Shiri*, 5 Moo. P. C. 81, referred to. Where a Court of first instance exercised jurisdiction with respect to a suit by reason of an arbitrary valuation and no objection to jurisdiction was taken in that Court: *Held*, that the suit ought not to be dismissed by an Appellate Court on the ground of want of jurisdiction, regard being had to s. 11 of the *Suits Valuation Act*. *Semble* :

BENGAL, AGRA AND ASSAM CIVIL
COURTS ACT (XII OF 1887)—*concl'd.*s. 18—*concl'd.*

When a Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit the parties cannot by their mutual consent convert it into a proper judicial process. *Ledgard v. Bull*, I. L. R. 9 All. 191, I. L. R. 13 I. A. 134; *Munkeshi Naidor v. Subramanya Sastri*, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 26, I. L. R. 14 I. A. 160, and *Raja Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhurnain Bhagwant Kuar*, I. L. R. 13 All. 300, I. L. R. 18 I. A. 55, referred to. The formal requirements of a valid Mahomedan marriage discussed, *Badal Aurat v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 79, referred to. *AKLEMANESSA BIBI v. MAHOMED HETUN* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 849
s. c. 8 C. W. N. 705

ss. 18, 19, 21.

See RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS.
I. L. R. 31 Calc. 849

s. 19.

See RENT, SUIT FOR—BY WHAT COURT
TRIABLE . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 453

s. 21.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT IN
SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION.
I. L. R. 25 All. 277See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS—PARTI-
TION . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 381
I. L. R. 31 Calc. 365

Appeal—Forum of appeal—Bengal, N.-W. P. and Assam Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887), s. 21—Suit for account. When the plaintiff fixes a certain sum as the amount of his claim only approximately or tentatively, and prays that the amount of his claims may be ascertained in the course of the suit, the amount found by the Court to be due to him must be regarded as the value of the original suit for the purpose of determining the forum of appeal, under s. 21 of Act XII of 1887. *Mohini Mohan Das v. Satis Chandra Ray*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 704; *Nilmony Singh v. Jagabandhu Roy*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 536; and *Modhu Suddun Roy v. Prosanno Kumar Dutt* (unreported), referred to. *Rameswar Mahton v. Dilu Mahton*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 550, and *Nagendra Nath Mazumdar v. Russik Chandra Rai*, 6 C. W. N. 346, distinguished. *GULAB KHAN v. ABDUL WAHAB KHAN* (1904)
I. L. R. 31 Calc. 365
s. c. 8 C. W. N. 233

s. 21, sub-s. 2.

See APPEAL . . . I. L. R. 31 Cal. 344

s. 37.

See HINDU LAW—HUSBAND AND WIFE.
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 751See MAHOMEDAN LAW—INHERITANCE.
I. L. R. 23 All. 20

**BENGAL AND ASSAM LAWS ACT
(VII OF 1905).**

ss. 2, 3, 6.

See JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 636

s. 6.

See JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 853

BENGAL CESS ACT (X OF 1871).

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—ROAD CESS PAPERS . . . 22 W. R. 192

See FISHERY, RIGHT OF.

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 183

See ROAD CESS ACT.

1. ——— **Income tax—Suit for arrears of rent—Set-off—Effect of Act on agreement made before passing of Act.** In 1862, at the time the income tax was in force, A made a patni-settlement of certain lands with B, B agreeing to pay any enhancement of the revenue that might be made by Government at any time or "any impost in future to be levied by Government, the income tax to be paid by A according to his income, B having nothing to do with the same." In 1876 A brought a suit against B for arrears of rent. B, under the contract, claimed to have set off, as a tax on income, a sum which he had paid under the Road Cess Act, which had been passed in 1871, after the Income Tax Act had been repealed. *Held*, that the tax imposed by the Road Cess Act passed by the Bengal Council could not be considered to be a tax on income; the income tax having been a tax imposed by the Government of India on a person's annual income, levied upon whatever actually came to his hands as income, and not upon the value of his property; and that, therefore, B could not set off the amount as being income tax. *Held*, also that, although the Road Cess Act contains no saving clause in favour of contracts, it does not prohibit in future the making of contracts which shall interfere with the incidence of the road cess as directed by the Act, nor vacate contracts that may have been made before the passing of the Act; and in the absence of any provisions to that effect, an agreement entered into before the passing of the Act could not be affected by the subsequent passing of the Act. *SURNOMOYEE DABEE v. PURRISH NARAIN ROY*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 576

2. ——— **Construction of kabuliati—Suit for rent—Right of set-off.** The defendants executed a kabuliati, dated 1st October 1870, which contained the following stipulation: "If in future any chaukidari tax or any other new abwab or tax or fee or kar, or any additional fee or jumma, be fixed upon the mehal by Government, I will pay that separately." In a suit by the zamindar for increase of rent, the defendants claimed to set off a sum representing the amount which the zamindar was bound to contribute under the Road Cess Act and Public Works Cess Act, and which amount they

BENGAL CESS ACT (X OF 1871)—contd.

had paid to the Collector. *Held*, that the amount in question came within the terms of the kabuliati, and that the defendants were not entitled to the set off claimed by them. *SURNOMOYEE DABEE v. PURRISH NARAIN ROY*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 576, followed. *SHUM-BHU NATH MOOKHOPADHYA v. HURRO SUNDARI DABIA CHOWDRAIN* . . . 11 C. L. R. 140

1. ——— s. 3—**Liability of chakran or service tenure for road cess—"Tenure."** A chakran or service tenure comes within the definition of "tenure" in s. 3 of Bengal Act X of 1871, and is therefore liable for Road Cess and Public Works Cess under that Act. *JOY SUNKUR ROY v. SIDHI MOHAM* . . . 7 C. L. R. 373

2. ——— s. 3 and ss. 9, 10, 23, 25, and 26—**Sale for arrears of road cess, effect of—Right of purchaser—Interpretation clause, construction of.** In a suit on a bond by which certain land admittedly lakhiraj was mortgaged, the purchaser of a portion of the mortgaged property at an auction sale for arrears of road cess due under Bengal Act X of 1871 was added as a defendant, and the lower Courts, holding that the effect of such a sale was to pass the property to the defendants, free of incumbrances, made a decree excluding that portion from liability in respect of the mortgage-bond. *Held*, on the construction of Bengal Act X of 1871, that the sale had no such effect, and that the whole of the property was liable to be sold in satisfaction of the plaintiffs' claim. Although the effect of an interpretation clause is to give the meaning assigned by it to the word interpreted in all places in the Act in which that word occurs, it is not the effect of an interpretation clause that the thing defined has annexed to it every incident which may seem to be attached to it by any other Act of the Legislature. It does not follow, therefore, that because lakhiraj property is defined in the Road Cess Act, 1871, to be a tenure, all the interests and consequences attached by other Acts to tenures generally, or to particular classes of tenures, become annexed to lakhiraj property. *UMACHURN BAG v. AJADANNISSA BIBET*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 430

ss. 5, 7, and Part II, sch. A, part ii—**Bhowli tenures—Suit for rent.** S. 5 of the Road Cess Act requires the holders of any estate or tenure, of which the annual rent shall exceed one hundred rupees, to lodge returns of all lands comprised in an estate or tenure; bhowli lands are therefore to be included in such returns. Where such a return has not been made, the holder of the estate or tenure is precluded from suing for or recovering any rent due therefor. *JUGMOHUN TEWARI v. FINCH*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 62 : 11 C. L. R. 100

s. 25.

See DAMAGES—SUITS FOR DAMAGES—BREACH OF CONTRACT.

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 290

— Bengal Act IX of 1880 (Road and other Cesses), ss. 34 and 35—*Preparation and*

BENGAL CESS ACT (X OF 1871)—*contd.***s. 25—*concl'd.***

publication of valuation roll—Liability to pay cess. In the case of rent-paying lands the publication of the valuation rolls under s. 35 of the Cess Act (Bengal Act IX of 1880) is not a condition precedent to the attaching of liability to pay road cess in accordance with the valuation rolls. *Ashanullah Khan v. Trilochan Bagchi*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 197, distinguished. *BHUGWATI KUWERI CHOWDHURI v. CHUTTERPUT SINGH* . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 725
2 C. W. N. 407

s. 41—Landlord and tenant—Cess, liability of tenant to pay, although tenure not assessed. When the Collector has determined the annual value in respect of certain land, and a portion of that land is subsequently granted as a tenure to an under-tenant and the Collector has not separately assessed the annual value of the land of the tenure so created, the under-tenant will nevertheless be liable for any cesses in respect of that land. In such a case it is competent to the Court to ascertain the annual value of the land comprised in the defendants' tenure. *HARIMOHAN DALAL v. ASHUTOSH DHUR* . 4 C. W. N. 776

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—OTHER
GROUNDS . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 70
L. R. 20 I. A. 165

s. 47.

See APPEAL—ACTS—BENGAL TENANCY
ACT, s. 153. I. L. R. 20 Calc. 254

See SPECIAL APPEAL—ORDERS SUBJECT OR
NOT TO APPEAL. I. L. R. 18 Calc. 638

Sale in execution of decree for arrears of Cess—Procedure—Purchasers, rights of. Although the procedure for the realization of cesses may be the same as the procedure laid down for the realization of rent due upon the tenure, yet it does not necessarily follow that the effect of a sale for cesses should be the same as that of a sale for arrears of rent for which the tenure itself is liable to be sold. *Umachurn Bag v. Ajadannissa Bibee*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 430, followed. Notwithstanding, therefore, that s. 47 of the Cess Act, 1880, provides that "every holder of an estate or tenure to whom any sum may be payable under the provisions of this Act may recover the same with interest at the rate of twelve and a half per centum per annum in the same manner and under the same penalties as if the same were arrears of rent due to him," the effect of a sale by the Collector in execution of a decree for cesses against some of the owners of a tenure is not to convey to the purchaser the whole tenure, but only the right, title, and interest of the particular persons against whom the decree had been obtained. *MAHANUND CHUCKERBUTTY v. BANI MADHUB CHATTERJEE* I. L. R. 24 Calc. 27

ss. 50-71—Cesses—Rent-free lands—

Notice. Plaintiffs sued to recover arrears of road and public works cesses on account of certain rent-free land, claiming double the amount under s. 58

BENGAL CESS ACT (X OF 1871)—*concl'd.***ss. 50-71—*concl'd.***

of the Cess Act (Bengal Act IX of 1880). It was found that no notice of the valuation had been published as required by s. 52 of the Act, and it was held by the lower Court that the plaintiffs were therefore not entitled to recover double the amount under s. 58. It was then contended that he was, at any rate, entitled to recover the amount of the cesses with interest under s. 62. *Held*, that the latter section did not give the holder of the estate or tenure a right to recover the cesses payable under s. 56 before publication of notice, and that the plaintiff was therefore not entitled to a decree, and that his suit must be dismissed. *RAS BEHARI MUKERJEE v. PITAMBORI CHOWDHURI* . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 237

ss. 52, 53—Evidence Act, s. 114—Presumption. Where under an Act certain things are required to be done before any liability attaches to any person in respect of any right or obligation, it is for the person who alleges that that liability has been incurred to prove that the things prescribed in the Act have been actually done. *Held*, that the notice provided by s. 52 of the Road Cess Act did not come within the presumption of s. 114, cl. (e), of the Evidence Act, and must be proved. *ASHANULLAH KHAN BAHADUR v. TRILOCHUN BAGCHEE*
I. L. R. 13 Calc. 197

s. 56.

See CESS] . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 743
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 783

s. 95.

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—ROAD CESS PAPERS . 3 C. W. N. 343

BENGAL CESS ACT (BEN. ACT IX OF 1880).**See ROAD CESS ACT.**

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
DEPOSIT TO STAY SALE.
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 794

Income-tax—Mela, profits of—Liability to pay road-cess tax—Board of Revenue, authority of, to frame rules under Ben. Act IX of 1880, s. 106. The profits of a mela cannot be regarded as income derived from agriculture, and are not exempt from income-tax under s. 5 of the Income Tax Act (II of 1886). Land, the profits of which are subject to income-tax, should not be assessed with road-cess tax, except when such land is also used for agricultural purposes. S. III. B. rule 33 (p. 74, Cess Manual, 1900) is not such a rule as the Board of Revenue is authorized to make under the provisions of s. 106 of the Cess Act (Bengal Act IX of 1880). *UMED RASUL SHAHA FAKIR v. ANATH BANDHU CHOWDHURI* (1901)
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 637 ; s. c. 6 C. W. N. 128

s. 4—Cultivating raiyat—Tenure holder. A tenant holding land and paying as rent therefor a sum of money exceeding one hundred rupees per annum is, for the purposes of

BENGAL CESS ACT (BEN. ACT IX OF 1880)—concl'd.

_____ s. 4—concl'd.

assessment under the Cess Act, a tenure-holder and not a cultivating raiyat. *CASPERSZ v. KUMAR SINGH* (1900) . . . **5 C. W. N. 535**

_____ ss. 4, 20 (a) and (b).

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

11 C. W. N. 211

_____ s. 5.

See s. 99.

_____ ss. 6, 72.

See MINES . . . **I. L. R. 34 Calc. 257**

_____ ss. 34, 35, 36, 41.—*Publication of valuation roll—Liability to pay cess for rent-paying land.* Liability to pay road-cess, so far as rent-paying lands are concerned, does not depend upon the publication of the valuation roll under s. 34 of the Cess Act. *Bhupwati Kuwari Chowdhurani v. Chutter Singh*, **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 725**, followed. *Ashanullah Khan Bahadur v. Trilochan Bagchi*, **I. L. R. 15 Calc., 197**, distinguished. *RICKETTS v. RAMESWAR MALIA* (1900) . . . **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 109**

_____ s. 95.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 7.

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—ROAD-CESS PAPERS.
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1033

_____ s. 99.—*Arrears of cess—Cess whether a charge on an estate.* The amount of cesses payable to a Collector under the Cess Act (Ben. Act IX of 1880) is not a charge on the estate in respect of which they are due. *Shekaat Hosain v. Sasi Kar*, **I. L. R. 19 Calc., 783**, referred to. *Chatrapati Singh v. Girindra Chunder Roy*, **I. L. R. 6 Calc. 339**, discussed. *AHSANULLA v. MANJURA BANOO* (1903) . . . **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 778**
8 C. W. N. 357

_____ s. 106.—A rule made under s. 106 held to be *ultra vires*.

See BENGAL CESS ACT (BEN. ACT IX OF 1880) . . . **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 637**

BENGAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE—arbitration by—

See ARBITRATION **I. L. R. 36 Calc. 388**

BENGAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE RULES.

See ARBITRATION ACT.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1237

BENGAL CIVIL COURTS ACT (VI OF 1871).

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

_____ Power of High Court to hear appeals. *Per JACKSON, J.*—The power of the High Court to hear appeals from the Civil Courts in the interior is regulated by Act VI of 1871. *RUNJIT SINGH v. MEHARBANS KOER*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 662; 2 C. L. R. 391

_____ s. 11.—*Court of Subordinate Judge and District Judge.* The Court of a Subordinate Judge is inferior to the Court of a District Judge within the meaning of s. 11 of the Bengal Civil Courts Act. *PROSAD DOSS MULLICK v. RUSSICK LALL MULLICK*. *PROSAD DOSS MULLICK v. KEDAR NATH MULLICK* . . . **I. L. R. 7 Calc. 157**
8 C. L. R. 329

_____ s. 15.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 2.

13 C. L. R. 508

See INSOLVENCY—INSOLVENT DEBTORS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

3 C. L. R. 508

_____ s. 17.

See HOLIDAY . . . **I. L. R. 9 All. 366**

_____ s. 19.

See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASES—GENERAL CASES . . . **25 W. R. 21**

_____ s. 20.

See MUNSIF, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 104

_____ ss. 20, 22.

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS.

I. L. R. 4 All. 320

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 255

I. L. R. 8 All. 438

I. L. R. 12 All. 506

_____ s. 22.

See VALUATION OF SUIT—APPEALS.

_____ s. 24.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—DEBTS.

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 421

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—GIFT—LAW APPLICABLE TO.

6 N. W. 2: Agra, F. B., Ed. 1874, 286

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—GIFT—VALIDITY

6 N. W. 338

I. L. R. 9 All. 213

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—PRE-EMPTION—

RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 7 All. 775

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—PRESUMPTION OF

DEATH . . . **I. L. R. 7 All. 297**

See RELIGION, OFFENCES RELATING TO.

I. L. R. 7 All. 461

BENGAL CIVIL COURTS ACT (VI OF 1871)—*concl'd.*s. 24—*concl'd.*

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CHARITIES.

I. L. R. 5 All. 497

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 10.

I. L. R. 7 All. 518

1. ——— Hindu Law—Mahomedan Law—Convert—"Justice, equity, and good conscience." To entitle a person to have the Hindu or Mahomedan law applied to him under the first paragraph of s. 24 of Act VI of 1871, he must be an orthodox believer in the Hindu or Mahomedan religion. The mere circumstance that he calls himself, or is called by others, a Hindu or Mahomedan, as the case may be, is not enough. His only claim to have a special kind of law applied to him is that he follows and observes a particular religion that of itself creates his law for him. If he fails to establish his religion, his privilege to the application of its law fails also, and he must be relegated to that class of persons whose cases have to be dealt with under the latter paragraph of s. 24 of Act VI of 1871 according to justice, equity, and good conscience. *B.* alleging that his family was a joint undivided Hindu family, sued *R.* his father, for a declaration that certain property was joint ancestral property, and for partition of his share according to the Hindu law of inheritance of such property, *viz.*, one moiety. *R.* set up as a defence to the suit that the members of the family were Mahomedans, and were therefore not governed by the Hindu law. The evidence in the suit established that the members of the family were neither orthodox Hindus nor Mahomedans. It also established that the Hindu law of inheritance had always been followed in the family. *Held*, following the principle enunciated above, that the family not being Hindus nor Mahomedans, the rule of decision applicable to the suit was neither Hindu nor Mahomedan law, but justice, equity, and good conscience; that the Hindu law of inheritance having always been followed in the family, it was justice, equity, and good conscience to apply that law to the suit; and that therefore *B.* was entitled to demand partition of half of the family estate. *Abraham v. Abraham*, 9 Moo. I. A. 199, referred to. *RAJ BAHADUR v. BISHEN DAYAL* . . . I. L. R. 4 All. 343

2. ——— Mahomedan Law—Pre-emption. Under s. 24 of Act VI of 1871, Mahomedan law is not strictly applicable in suits for pre-emption between Mahomedans not based on local custom or contract, but it is equitable in such suits to apply that law. The application of Mahomedan law in a suit for pre-emption between a Mahomedan claimant of pre-emption and a Mahomedan vendee, on the basis of that law, is not precluded by the circumstances of the vendor not being a Mahomedan. *CHUNDO v. ALIMOODDEEN* . 6 N. W. 28

Agra F. B., Ed. 1874, 305

See MOTI CHAND v. MAHOMED HOUSEIN KHAN

7 N. W. 147

BENGAL CIVIL COURTS ACT (VI OF 1871)—*concl'd.*

s. 29.

See RIGHT OF APPEAL 16 W. R. 227

BENGAL DRAINAGE ACT (BEN. ACT VI OF 1880).

ss. 3, 44 (2), 55, 56—Collector, powers of, when exercisable by Deputy Collector—Award—Finality. An order under sub-s. 2 of s. 44 of the Drainage Act passed by a Deputy Collector, who is not empowered either under s. 55 or s. 56 of the Act, is not final and binding on the parties. A letter of the Collector to the Commissioner to the effect that he proposes to put the Deputy Collector in charge of the drainage office and the reply of the Commissioner that he agrees, were held not to contain an order under s. 56 such as would have the effect of giving the Deputy Collector the powers of a Collector. *GADHADHAR BHATTA v. BASUNTA KUMAR ROY* (1904).

8 C. W. N. 669

ss. 42, 44—Limitation—Time from which period begins to run—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 3, cl. 5, Sch. III. The period of limitation for a landlord to recover a sum of money payable by a tenant under s. 42 (b) of the Bengal Drainage Act (VI of 1880) begins to run from the date on which the landlord engages to pay the costs with which he is charged and not from the date on which the Collector assesses the amount payable by the tenant under s. 44. The period of limitation for such a suit is three years, and such a sum is recoverable as rent and the word "rent" in Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act includes "money recoverable under any enactment for the time being in force, as if it was rent." *MON MOHINI DAS v. PRIYA NATH BESALI* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 640

Landlord and Tenant—Drainage charges, recovery of, by landlord—Limitation—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), Sch. III, cl. (2), s. 3, cl. (5)—"Rent"—Waiver of statute by contract—Validity—Limitation, running of, from date other than that on which amount payable. A suit to recover drainage charges payable by a tenant to his landlord under s. 42, cl. (b) and s. 44, sub-s. (1) of the Bengal Drainage Act is governed by cl. (2) of Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act and must be brought within 3 years from the last day of the Bengali year in which the sum claimed fell due. Drainage charges payable by the tenant to the landlord as above are included within the definition of "rent" in s. 3, sub-s. (5) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Monmohini v. Preo Nath*, 8 C. W. N. 640, explained and followed. Although a sum of money may be payable on a specified date, the limitation for the recovery thereof need not necessarily run from that date. It is lawful for parties to substitute for their statutory obligation under the Drainage Act a contractual obligation. *Held*, in the present case, that the contract merely

BENGAL DRAINAGE ACT (BEN. ACT VI OF 1880)—concl'd.

ss. 42, 44—concl'd.
amounted to a covenant by the tenant to pay drainage charges in accordance with the statute and did not modify or supersede its provisions. *Jyoti Kumar v. Haridas*, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1019, approved. *Mackenzie v. Haji*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 1, referred to. *NAFFER CHUNDR MAJIE v. JYOTI KUMAR MUKERJEE* (1906) . 11 C. W. N. 57

BENGAL DRAINAGE ACT (BEN. ACT VI OF 1880 AS AMENDED BY II OF 1902).

ss. 42, 44B (b)—*Drainage, recovery of cost of—Contract—Illegality—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 23.* There is nothing in the Drainage Acts to render invalid a contract between a landlord and tenant, by which the latter agrees to pay the former drainage cost in respect of land on which rent has for the first time been imposed in consequence of any scheme of works carried out under the Acts benefiting it. S. 44B of the Act (as amended by Bengal Act II of 1902) does not apply where the plaintiff seeks to recover under a contract. *JYOTI KUMAR MUKERJEE v. HARI DAS MAITRI* (1905) . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1019

BENGAL EMBANKMENT ACT (BEN. ACT II OF 1882).

ss. 3, 77—
See EMBANKMENT . 5 C. W. N. 108
ss. 6, 76 (b), 80—
See EMBANKMENT . 7 C. W. N. 286
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 570

ss. 76(a), 79—
See EMBANKMENT.
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 481

BENGAL ESTATES PARTITION ACT (BEN. ACT V OF 1897).

ss. 29, 95.
See MAHOMEDAN LAW.—PRE-EMPTION.
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 575

BENGAL EXCISE ACT (XXI OF 1856).

See ABETMENT . 7 W. R. Cr. 53
1. ——— Excise Act, X of 1871, Effect of. Act XXI of 1856 was not repealed, so far as it related to the Lower Provinces of Bengal, by Act X of 1871. *QUEEN v. KHETTER NATH SHAHA* 22 W. R. Cr. 31

2. ——— Abkari Laws—*Realization of fine—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 61—Act VIII of 1869.* The provisions of s. 61 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, did not apply to fines imposed under Act XXI of 1856; such fines cannot be levied by distress and sale of the offender's property. *QUEEN v. JUNGLI BELDAR* 8 B. L. R. Ap. 47

GOVERNMENT v. JUNGLI BELDAR.
17 W. R. Cr. 7

BENGAL EXCISE ACT (XXI OF 1856)—concl'd.

3. ——— s. 22. A Magistrate may impose a fine exceeding R1,000 under Act XXI of 1856, s. 22 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, notwithstanding. *QUEEN v. SUROOP CHUNDER DUTT* 7 W. R. Cr. 29

4. ——— ss. 38 and 50—*Illegal sale of opium—Revocation of license.* According to s. 38, Act XXI of 1856, no conviction can be had under s. 50 against a person whose license has not been recalled. *QUEEN v. RAM DASS* 16 W. R. Cr. 69

5. ——— s. 43—*Liability to penalty—Licensees' servants.* Under s. 43, Act XXI of 1856, only persons holding licenses, and not their servants, are subject to the penalties specified in the section. *QUEEN v. RAMKISHEN* 8 W. R. Cr. 4

6. ——— *Sale of liquor by agent.* Where a person sells liquor in contravention of and under colour of a license which stands not in his own name, but in that of the person for whom he is the recognized agent, he cannot be allowed to evade the provisions of s. 43 of Act XXI of 1856 by setting up that it is not a license to himself. *In the matter of the petition of ISHEN CHUNDER SHAHA* 19 W. R. Cr. 34

7. ——— ss. 43, 44—*Sale by servant—Liability of owner of shop.* Where a sale of an excess quantity of ganja took place, and the man effecting the sale pleaded that he was only a servant, while the owner contended that he did not conduct the shop, and gave no authority to his servant to sell ganja in excess of his license:—*Held*, that the owner of the shop was responsible for the offence committed and liable to the fine which had been imposed on him. *QUEEN v. SRISTIDHUR SHAHA* 25 W. R. 42

8. ——— ss. 43 and 90—*Distillation of spirits.* To warrant a conviction under Act XXI of 1856, s. 48, the accused must have manufactured some country spirit made by the native process of distillation as described in s. 90 of the Act, or they must have sold spirituous or fermented liquors or intoxicating drugs. *QUEEN v. KOYLAS BOONA* 22 W. R. Cr. 8

s. 49.
See SUMMARY TRIAL.
I. L. R. 3 Calc. 366: 1 C. L. R. 442

s. 53.
See OPIUM . 20 W. R. Cr. 54

BENGAL EXCISE ACT (III OF 1873).

See MANDAMUS . 11 B. L. R. 250

BENGAL EXCISE ACT (VII OF 1878).

See CANTONMENT MAGISTRATE.
I. L. R. 15 Calc. 452

See OPIUM . 13 C. L. R. 336

See STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.
I. L. R. 8 Calc. 214

**BENGAL EXCISE ACT (VII OF 1878)—
contd.**

1. — Sale of liquor—
License—Agreement in contravention of Excise Act. The object of the Excise Act is to prohibit persons from selling or carrying on the business of selling exciseable articles without a license. The prohibition by the Act of sale of liquor without a license is based upon the principle of public policy and on moral grounds and the purpose of the Act is not confined to the protection of the Revenue. *Boistub Churn Naun v. Wooma Churn Sen*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 436, referred to. The principle deduced from the licensing Act of 1856 clearly underlies the later Act that an agreement, which contravenes the policy of the Act or which has for its object the carrying on of a business in contravention of the Excise law, is illegal. *Jadoo Nath Shaha v. Novin Chundra Shaha*, 21 W. R. 289, referred to. *BEHARI LAL SHAHA v. JOGODISH CHUNDRA SHAHA* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 789
s. c. 8 C. W. N. 635

2. — Revenue, protection of—
Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 23—Public policy. The Bengal Excise Act of 1878 is not an Act framed solely for the protection of the revenue, but is one embracing other important objects of public policy as well. An agreement therefore for the sale of fermented liquors, entered into by a person who has not obtained a license under that Act, is void, and cannot be recovered on. *BOISTUB CHURN NAUN v. WOOMA CHURN SEN*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 436

s. 4 and ss. 40 and 75—Bengal Excise Act Amendment Act (Bengal Act IV of 1881), s. 3—Right of search—Gurjat ganja—Exciseable article—Foreign exciseable article—Resistance to wrongful search by police—Penal Code, ss. 141 and 353. In a case where an Excise Sub-Inspector attempted to search a house for gurjat ganja, a "foreign exciseable article" under the Excise Act (Bengal Act VII of 1878), and resistance was offered:—*Held*, that, gurjat ganja being a "foreign exciseable article" under s. 4 of the Act as amended by Bengal Act IV of 1881, the Excise Officer had no legal authority to enter and search the house under s. 40 of the Act; he had authority only to enter and search for any "exciseable article as defined in s. 4 of the Act; and that no offence" either under s. 141 or s. 353 of the Penal Code was committed. *Held*, also, that s. 75 of the Act does not apply to a "foreign exciseable article." *JAGARNATH MANDHATA v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 324
1 C. W. N. 233

ss. 9, 58, 74—Introduction into Calcutta of spirituous liquor manufactured elsewhere—Limits fixed by Collector—Additional punishment—Alternative sentence of imprisonment. The provisions of s. 74 of the Bengal Excise Act as to additional punishment, where there has been a "previous conviction for a like offence," contemplate merely the case of the offen-

**BENGAL EXCISE ACT (VII OF 1878)—
contd.**

ss. 9, 58, 74—concl'd.

der having been already convicted of an offence punishable with a fine of Rs 200 or upwards, and being again convicted of another offence punishable with the same punishment: it is not necessary that he should have been previously convicted of the same offence. The accused were sentenced by the Presidency Magistrate, under ss. 58 and 74 of the Bengal Excise Act, to a fine of Rs 200 each, in default to three months' imprisonment, and in addition to six months' imprisonment, which was the maximum term that could be awarded under s. 74. *Held*, that the sentence of imprisonment was not in excess of the powers given to the Magistrate by s. 12 of the Presidency Magistrates Act, the imposition of the additional sentence of imprisonment not affecting the Magistrate's powers as regarded the original sentence under s. 58. No limits with regard to any distilleries in Calcutta having been fixed under s. 9 of the Act within which spirituous liquor manufactured otherwise than in that particular distillery shall be introduced or sold without a special pass, and the fixing of such limits being necessary to a conviction of an offence under s. 58, the convictions in this case were set aside. *RAM CHUNDER SHAW v. EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 575
8 C. L. R. 250

s. 14.

See CANTONMENTS ACT, 1880.

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 452

ss. 15, 17, and 61—Specified quantity of spirits—Maximum amount. Where under s. 15, Bengal Act VII of 1878, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, exercising the powers of the Board of Revenue, fixed, by a circular order, the limit at six quart bottles of country spirit as allowable for retail sales, and an accused was charged under s. 17 with possessing more than that quantity, but the amount he had was less than the amount stated in s. 15:—*Held*, that he was not guilty of any offence under s. 61, and that no lesser quantity than that specifically mentioned in s. 15 of country spirits which might have been declared to be the maximum quantity by any such order made under the provisions of s. 15 could be deemed to be the quantity specified in s. 15 within the meaning of s. 61. *EMPRESS v. KOLA LAIANG*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 214
10 C. L. R. 155

ss. 15 and 60—Sale by wholesale. A sale of more than twelve quart bottles or two gallons of spirituous or fermented liquors of the same kind made at one transaction is a sale by wholesale. *Quære*: Whether a sale of twelve quart bottles of one kind of liquor, and three quart bottles of another kind, at the same time, comes within the prohibition in the explanation clause of s. 15. *EMPRESS v. NUDDIAR CHAND SHAW*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 832
10 C. L. R. 389

BENGAL EXCISE ACT (VII OF 1878)—
contd.

ss. 39, 40.

See ARREST—CRIMINAL ARREST.

4 C. W. N. 245

ss. 41, 42, and 59—*Sale of liquor by servant—Breach of condition of license—License, production of.* The conviction of servants of a licensed vendor of spirits for a breach of the license is not necessarily illegal. *In re Ishur Chunder Shaha*, 19 W. R. Cr. 34, followed. *Empress v. Nuddiar Chand Shaw*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 832: 8 C. L. R. 152, dissented from. Two servants of a licensed vendor of spirits were charged with having committed two breaches of the conditions of the license, and the maximum fine for each breach was inflicted. *Held*, that the Magistrate was competent to punish each of the servants separately in this manner. The excise officer, to whom a licensed vendor of spirits is bound to produce his license, must be an excise officer of the higher grades, not any police officer who may be exercising the powers of an excise officer. *In the matter of the petition of BANEY MADHUB SHAW. EMPRESS v. BANEY MADHUB SHAW*

I. L. R. 8 Cal. 207: 10 C. L. R. 389

1. — s. 53—*Sale by licensed vendor contrary to terms of his license.* S. 53 of the Bengal Excise Act does not apply to sales by a licensed vendor contrary to the terms of his license. That section provides for a breach of the condition of a license not covered by the second clause of s. 59 of the Act. *EMPRESS v. NOBOCOMAR FAL*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 621

2. — *Sale by servant of licensed vendor in presence of master—Liability of servant.* The accused, who was the servant of a licensed retail vendor of spirituous and fermented liquors under Bengal Act VII of 1878, was convicted of an offence under s. 53 of that Act for selling exciseable liquor without a license. The sale charged against him was of a quantity of puchawai in excess of that allowed to be sold under the license of his master. The sale was made in the presence of the master, the licensee, the accused merely handing the liquor to the purchaser at his master's request. *Held*, that the conviction was bad, as the facts did not establish a sale by the accused, the mere mechanical act of handing the liquor to the purchaser not constituting a sale by the accused. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HARRIDAS SAN*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 566

3. — *Spirituous liquor—Medicinal preparation containing alcohol.* The term "spirituous liquor" in s. 53 of the Excise Act (Bengal Act VII of 1878) is not intended to include a medicinal preparation merely because it is a liquid substance containing alcohol in its composition. The case would be different if alcohol were manufactured separately for the purpose of being used in the preparation of a medicine. *GONESH CHUNDER SIKDAR v. QUEEN-EMPRESS.*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 157

BENGAL EXCISE ACT (VII OF 1878)—
contd.

s. 53—contd.

EMPRESS v. GONESH CHANDRA SIKDAR

1 C. W. N. 1

4. — *Ganja—sale of, without license, by servant, in presence of master—Receipt of money by servant—Servant, liability of—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 34, 40 and 114.* Where both master and servant were present at the sale of ganja in contravention of the terms of his license, and the servant received the money paid for the ganja: *Held*, that, having regard to the provisions of s. 34 of the Penal Code, the servant was guilty of the offence of selling ganja without a license, and that, under the circumstances of the case, s. 114 of the Penal Code had no application. *Queen-Empress v. Harridas San*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 566, distinguished. *KESHVAR LAL SHAHA v. GIRISH CHUNDER DUTT* (1902) I. L. R. 29 Calc. 496

s. 59—*Excise—Commission by servant of licensed manufacturer or vendor of act in breach of conditions of license—Liability of servant.* *Held*, that the servant of a manufacturer or vendor under Bengal Act VII of 1878 is not liable under s. 59 of the Act to the penalty provided by that section for the commission of an act in breach of any of the conditions of the license of such manufacturer or vendor not otherwise provided for in the Act. *The Empress v. Nuddiar Chand Shaw*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 832, and *In the matter of Nomullu Akond*, 11 C. L. R. 416, approved. *Ishur Chunder Shaha*, 19 W. R. Cr. 34, distinguished. *Empress v. Baney Madhub Shaw*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 207, overruled. *In the matter of KALU MAL KHETRI* (1902)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 606: s.c. 6 C. W. N. 674

Liability of servant. The licensed vendor, and not his servant, is liable under s. 59 of the Excise Act, Bengal Act VII of 1878, for contravention of the Act. *In the matter of NOMULU AKOND* . . . 11 C. L. R. 416

s. 60—*Liability of servant.* The licensed retail vendor himself is the only person liable to conviction under s. 60. *EMPRESS v. NUDDIAR CHAND SHAW.*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 832: 8 C. L. R. 152

See contra, *EMPRESS v. BANEY MADHUB SHAW.*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 207: 10 C. L. R. 389

ss. 60, 61—

Sale by servant of licensed vendor—Cooly employed by servant. The servant of a licensed vendor sold eight quart bottles of country spirit, and employed a cooly to carry them as he directed. The servant was convicted under s. 60, Bengal Act VII of 1878; and the cooly was convicted under s. 61 of the same Act. It was suggested that the servant should have been convicted under s. 53, and that the cooly had committed no offence. *Held*, that the conviction of the cooly was illegal, and must be set aside. *Held*, also, that the servant was properly convicted, and

**BENGAL EXCISE ACT (VII OF 1878)—
concl'd.**ss. 60, 61—*concl'd.*

whether under s. 60 or s. 53 was immaterial. *In re Ishur Chunder Shaha*, 19 W. R. Cr. 34, and *Empress v. Baney Madhub Shaha*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 207; 10 C. L. R. 389, followed. *EMPRESS v. ISHAN CHUNDER DE*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 847; 12 C. L. R. 451

ss. 60, 74—"Like offence"—Punishment on second or subsequent conviction under *Bengal Excise Act*—Selling retail with wholesale license. The offence of selling wine retail by a person who has only a wholesale license is an offence of a like nature to that of selling wine without a license at all, within the meaning of the term "like offence," as used in s. 74 of the *Bengal Excise Act*. *Ram Churn Shaw v. Empress*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 575, followed. *SCHIEIN v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 799

s. 61.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 403.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 174

Imported liquor—Possession—Pass—Consignee—Agent. Certain liquors arrived in Calcutta per S.S. Navarino, consigned to M & Co. at Agra, who requested A to pay on their behalf the duty and landing charges and forward the goods to Agra. While on the way from the steamer to the railway station, the goods were seized as being in the possession of A without a pass, within the meaning of s. 61 of *Bengal Act VII* of 1878, and A was convicted and sentenced to a fine under the provisions of that Act. Held, that the conviction was bad. *In the matter of the petition of KYTE. EMPRESS v. KYTE.*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 223; 11 C. L. R. 427

**BENGAL EXCISE AMENDMENT ACT
(IV OF 1881).**

s. 3.

See BENGAL EXCISE ACT, 1878, s. 4.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 324

**BENGAL GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
(BEN. ACT I OF 1899).**

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882) . . . 12 C. W. N. 434

See GENERAL CLAUSES ACT (BENGAL ACT I OF 1899).

s. 8, cl. (c)—Application to set aside rent sale—*Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act (Bengal Act I of 1897)*, s. 54—Right accrued previous to, but application after, repeal. A raiyati holding having been sold on the 7th May 1907 in execution of a rent-decree, an under-raiyat applied to have the sale set aside under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code on the 23rd May following. Held, that the application could not be entertained, the *Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act I* of 1907 having come into operation on the 22nd May 1907. S. 54 of the amending Act by enacting that s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code shall not apply to a ten-

**BENGAL GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
(BEN. ACT I OF 1899)—concl'd.**s. 8, cl. (c)—*concl'd.*

ure or holding attached in execution of a decree for arrears due thereon, does not repeal any portion of the *Bengal Tenancy Act* within the meaning of sub-s. (c) of s. 8 of the *Bengal General Clauses Act*. *ASIRUDDI MONDOL v. MUKHODAMOYEE DASSI* (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 543
s. c. 12 C. W. N. 434**BENGAL IRRIGATION ACT (BEN.
ACT III OF 1876).**

ss. 1 and 6—*Ben. Act III of 1876*, ss. 1, 6, 7, 8—Commencement of—Notification—Collector—Notice. An order made by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal under s. 1 of the *Bengal Irrigation Act*, 1876, was published in the *Calcutta Gazette* on the 28th December, 1881, extending that Act to the district of Burdwan, and providing that it should commence to take effect in that district on the 1st January, 1882. By a notification in the *Calcutta Gazette* of the same date, purporting to be published under s. 6 of the Act, the Lieutenant-Governor declared that the water of certain rivers and channels, including that of the river Banka in the district of Burdwan, would be applied by the Government for the purposes of the Eden Canal after the 1st April 1882. Held, that the notification purporting to be made under s. 6 of the *Bengal Irrigation Act* was of no legal effect, having been published before the Act was extended to the district of Burdwan; that the acts of the officers of Government under that notification with regard to the river Banka were without any legal authority; and that the people were entitled to their legal remedies against such acts, so far as they affected their rights of property. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. NRITYA GOPAL ADHIKARY* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 487

**BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF
1864).**

Power of Municipal Commissioners to close or divert public highways. *Bengal Act III* of 1864, which vested public highways in Municipal Commissioners for the purposes of the Act, did not by so vesting them give power to the Municipal Commissioners, nor, *a fortiori*, to the Vice-Chairman alone, to stop up or divert such public highways. *EMPRESS v. BROJO-NATH DEY* . . . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 425

ss. 6, 79—Power of Municipal Commissioners to administer oath—Order to close burning ground. Every Municipal Commissioner, being vested by *Bengal Act III* of 1864, s. 6, with the powers of a Magistrate under s. 23 of the *Criminal Procedure Code*, is authorized to administer an oath, if the purposes of the Act require that he should do so. *BRINDABUN CHUNDER ROY v. MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS OF SERAMPORE*

19 W. R. 309

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF 1864)—contd.

s. 10—Public highways—Roads vesting in Commissioners—Subsoil of roads, right to—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Res Judicata.* S. 10 of Bengal Act III of 1864 does not deprive a person of any right of private property that he may have in land used as a public road, nor does it vest the subsoil of such land in a municipality; and when such land is no longer required as a public road, the owner is entitled to claim its possession. A decision in a suit brought by the plaintiffs' predecessor in title to recover certain land from a municipality, which had been taken up as a public road and vested in the municipality subsequently under Bengal Act III of 1864, s. 10, on the ground that the plaintiffs had been ousted therefrom by reason of the municipality stacking stones on a portion thereof, having been dismissed, held not to be *res judicata* in a suit brought by the plaintiffs for ejectment and declaration of title to such land against a purchaser of the land from the municipality. *MODHUSUDAN KUNDU v. PROMODA NATH ROY*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 732

s. 19—Refusal to permit excavation of tanks—Discretion of municipality. By s. 19 of the bye-laws of the Howrah Municipality, framed under s. 84, Bengal Act III of 1864, and confirmed by the Lieutenant-Governor, it is within the discretion of the municipality to refuse permission for the excavation of a tank, and the Courts have no power to interfere with the *bona fide* exercise of such discretion. *BHYRUB CHUNDER BANNERJEE v. CHAIRMAN OF THE HOWRAH MUNICIPALITY*

17 W. R. 215

s. 27—Warrant of arrest—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, Ch. XV (ss. 257, 272). A Magistrate or Municipal Commissioner has no power, under Act III of 1864, Bengal Council, to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person who may have failed to appear on a summons to answer a charge, under s. 27 of that enactment, for using premises as a straw or wood depôt without a license. *Per LOCH, J.*—The provisions of Ch. XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not applicable to offences under Bengal Act III of 1864. *In the matter of the petition of BISSESSUR CHATTERJEE*

16 W. R. Cr. 1

s. 33—

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—MUNICIPAL BODIES I. L. R. 1 Calc. 409

1. s. 57—Obstruction of drain by tree blown down. The obstruction of a drain by a tree blown down by a cyclone is not an obstruction within the meaning of s. 57 of Bengal Act III of 1864. *ANONYMOUS*

3 W. R. Cr. 33

2. Blocking up private drain. The municipal authorities have no power under s. 57, Bengal Act III of 1864, to impose a fine on a person for blocking up a drain which is not shown to be public property, or along

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF 1864)—contd.

s. 57—concl'd.

the side of any highway. *QUEEN v. BANI MADHUR BANERJEE*

14 W. R. Cr. 23

1. s. 63—Right to pull down ruinous house—Notice of action. By s. 63, Bengal Act III, 1864, Municipal Commissioners, if they deem a house or building to be in a ruinous state, may, after the notice prescribed by that section, cause the same to be taken down. *GOPEE KISHEN GOSSAIN v. RYLAND*

9 W. R. 279

2. Bye-law of municipality—Covering buildings with inflammable material. A bye-law made by the Howrah municipality in the exercise of the authority vested in it by Bengal Act III of 1864, s. 63, which forbid the erection or renewal of the external roof and walls of buildings with inflammable materials, was construed to forbid the renewal even of a portion of the roof with such material. *CHAIRMAN OF THE HOWRAH MUNICIPALITY v. MONTANEE BEWAH*

24 W. R. Cr. 70

s. 67.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—MUNICIPAL OFFICERS SUITS AGAINST

23 W. R. 222

1. Fine for suffering premises to be in filthy state—Owners and occupiers. The Municipal Commissioners were empowered under s. 67, Bengal Act III of 1864, to fine either the owner or occupier of the land who suffered it to be in a filthy state. Where the land was occupied by tenants, and the owner admittedly lived in another district, and there was nothing to show that he suffered the land to be in a filthy state:—*Held*, that the imposition of a fine on owner was not a proper exercise of the discretion given by s. 67 of the Act. *QUEEN v. DWARKNATH HAZRA*

8 B. L. R. Ap. 9

16 W. R. Cr. 70

2. Allowing ground to remain in filthy state. The owner of ground is answerable under s. 67, Bengal Act III of 1864, whether his ground was made dirty by himself or by somebody else. *ANONYMOUS*

3 W. R. Cr. 33

Unless he has let it, then the occupiers are liable

QUEEN v. PARBUTTY CHURN SIRCAR

3 W. R. Cr. 57

QUEEN v. BROJO LALL MITTER

8 W. R. Cr. 45

ss. 67, 73—Omission to clear away jungle—Power of Magistrate as Municipal Commissioner. If upon a notice being served on a party under Bengal Act III of 1864, s. 73, he does not choose to clear away the jungle referred to, it is open to the Magistrate, as Commissioner of the Municipality, either to clear the jungle at the expense of the party in possession or to proceed under s. 67 and inflict a fine. *In the matter of the petition of GOPEE KISHEN GOSSAIN*

24 W. R. Cr. 79

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF 1864)—contd.

— s. 73—*Expense of clearing away jungle after notice to defendant.* The Municipal Commissioners were held entitled, under s. 73, Bengal Act III of 1864, to recover from the defendant the expense of clearing away any jungle which they found on his land, upon his failure after notice to clear it himself within the time specified in the notice. *BROWNE v. WOOMESH CHUNDER ROY* 7 W. R. 213

1. — s. 77—*Notice of action—Suit against Municipal Commissioners.* A notice of action against Municipal Commissioners is absolutely necessary under s. 77, Bengal Act III of 1864. A notice of objecting to, and asking for, a reconsideration of the order complained of is not sufficient. *ABHOY NATH BOSE v. THE CHAIRMAN AND THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE OF KISHNAGUR* 7 W. R. 92

2. — *Omission to take out license.* Where the accused was charged with a breach of s. 77, Act III of 1864, in not taking out a license for a wood-yard, and he pleaded that the yard had been in existence prior to 1864, it was held that the Magistrate was wrong in refusing to enquire into the allegation as to the existence of the yard prior to 1864. *CHAIRMAN OF THE SUB-URBAN MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS v. UMBICA CHURN MOOKERJEE* 15 W. R. Cr. 84

3. — *Using premises for offensive trades.* The words "uses any premises" in s. 77, Bengal Act III of 1864, means using and employing the premises as a place for the carrying on of the offensive trades mentioned in that section. *MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS FOR THE SUBURBS OF CALCUTTA v. ZAMIR SHEIKH* 16 W. R. Cr. 4

4. — *Burning bricks for private use.* S. 77 of Bengal Act III of 1864 refers to the burning of bricks for trading purposes, and not to cases where bricks are made for the particular use of the person burning them; such person need not take out a license for that purpose. *In the matter of the petition of SRIRAM CHUNDER HALDAR v. CHAIRMAN OF THE HOWRAH MUNICIPALITY* 20 W. R. Cr. 65

— s. 79—*Procedure—Medical report—Closing burning ground.* A proceeding taken under Bengal Act III of 1864, s. 79, is not a judicial proceeding, and the evidence referred to therein means evidence without oath. Regular reports signed by medical men would constitute evidence within the meaning of that section. S. 79 does not authorize Municipal Commissioners to close a burning ground which has been used for very many years merely because they think that the burning of dead bodies is offensive. It allows them to interfere only when it shall appear to them upon the evidence of competent persons that any burning-ghat or burying-ground is in such a state as to be dangerous to the health of persons living in

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF 1864)—contd.

— s. 79—*concl.*
the neighbourhood thereof. *BRINDABUN CHUNDER ROY v. MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS OF SERAMPORE.* 19 W. R. 309

— s. 81—*Notice of action—Mistake in notice.* A notice under any of the sections of Bengal Act III of 1864 preceding s. 81 may, under that section, either be served upon the person addressed, or left with some servant of the family. The mistake of a few rupees in a notice, caused by an error in addition, is not sufficient to impeach or affect the demand where the directions of the Municipal Act have been substantially complied with, s. 48 protecting the Commissioners against such mistakes. *GOPEE KISHEN GOSSAIN v. RYLAND* 9 W. R. 562

1. — s. 87—*Cause of action—Suit for possession against Municipality as wrong-doers.* Plaintiffs as proprietors sued the Howrah Municipal Committee to recover possession of land from which they alleged they had been ousted by defendants' stacking stones thereon; and they regarded their cause of action as arising when the Municipal Commissioners refused to remove the stones. Defendants' case was that the land had been in possession of Government till Bengal Act III of 1864 was extended to Howrah, since which time the Commissioners had held the land. *Held*, that the plaintiffs' cause of action could not be considered to have first arisen on the refusal of the Municipality to remove the stones. *Held* (by BAYLEY, J.), that the Municipal Commissioners had acted properly under the law, and were entitled to the application of s. 87, Bengal Act III of 1864. *Held* (by PHEAR, J.), that s. 87 could only protect defendants if sued for damages consequent on a wrong done by them in the reasonable belief that they were exercising their lawful powers; not if they were sued by parties kept out of possession by their continued wrong-doing. *POORNO CHUNDER ROY v. BALFOUR* 9 W. R. 535

2. — *Notice of action—Municipal Commissioners.* Municipal Commissioners are entitled to one month's notice of action under s. 87, Bengal Act III of 1864, while they have been acting *bonâ fide* in the belief that they were exercising powers given to them by that Act; not if their proceedings were not justified by that Act, and only colourably done under cover thereof. *GOPEE KISHEN GOSSAIN v. RYLAND* 9 W. R. 279

3. — *Suit against Municipal Commissioners for possession of land.* Previous to the institution of the present suit, one of the shareholders of a piece of land brought a suit against the Chairman of the Municipality for recovery of possession of his share. The other shareholders were made *pro formâ* defendants in the suit. This suit was dismissed as barred by the law of limitation. After the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff brought the present suit for recovery of his share of the land, on the allegation

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF 1864)—concl'd.

s. 87—concl'd.

that his tenant had relinquished the land within three months in consequence of his having been dispossessed by the Municipal Commissioners. *Held*, that s. 87, Bengal Act III of 1864, did not apply. *Semble*: Bengal Act III of 1864, s. 87, relates only to actions brought in respect of acts done by the Commissioners under that Act for the purpose of the Act. *PRICE v. KHLAT CHANDRA GHOSE*. 5 B. L. R. Ap. 50: 13 W. R. 461

4. *Cause of action, accrual of—Damages for detention of omnibus.* In a suit for the recovery of damages on account of a daily fine imposed by the Municipality of Howrah and the detention of an omnibus, which fine had been set aside by the High Court, and the detention pronounced illegal:—*Held*, that, if the plaintiff had any cause of action, it accrued upon the seizure of the omnibus, and not upon the order of the High Court, which allowed the conviction to stand as to one rupee, and that he could not under circumstances treat the continued detention of the omnibus as a fresh cause of action from day to day, and his suit, not having been brought within three months, was barred by s. 87, Bengal Act VI of 1864. *HUGHES v. MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS OF HOWRAH*

19 W. R. 339

5. *Suit to recover possession of land taken by Municipal Commissioners.* S. 87 of Bengal Act III of 1864 is applicable only in those cases where the plaintiff claims damages or compensation for some wrongful act committed by the Commissioners or their officers, in the exercise, or honestly supposed exercise, of their statutory powers. The notice in the earlier part of the section is meant to give the defendant an opportunity of making some pecuniary amends for the wrong without incurring the cost of litigation. *CHUNDER SIKUR BUNDOPADHYA v. OBHOY CHURN BAGCHI*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 8

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (V OF 1876).

s. 32—*Municipal Corporations—Commissioners—Right of way—Compensation—Land Acquisition Act, X of 1870.* S. 32 of Act V of 1876, the Bengal Municipal Act, enacts that "all roads, bridges, embankments, tanks, ghats, wharves, jetties, wells, channels, and drains in any municipality (not being private property), and not being maintained by Government or at the public expense, now existing or which shall hereafter be made, and the pavements, stones, and other materials thereof, and all erections, materials, implements, and other things provided therefor, shall vest in, and belong to, the Commissioners." *Held*, that the word "roads" in this section does not include the soil beneath the roads. *CHAIRMAN OF THE NAIHATI MUNICIPALITY v. KISHORI LAL GOSWAMI*

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 171

s. 216 and ss. 215 and 180—*Bench of Magistrates, power of—Omission to re-*

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (V OF 1876)—concl'd.

s. 216 and ss. 215 and 180—concl'd.

move obstruction. A notice was issued under s. 215, Bengal Act V of 1876, requiring A to remove an alleged obstruction. The requisition was not complied with, and A was prosecuted for non-compliance therewith, under s. 216, before a Bench of Honorary Magistrates. *Held*, that the Court had power to enquire whether the alleged obstruction was, in point of fact, an obstruction or not. *In the matter of the MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE OF Dacca. MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE OF Dacca v. SOMEER*. I. L. R. 9 Calc. 38

s. 234.

See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, 1884, s. 2.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 699

s. 313—*Bye-law—"Ultra vires"*—*Bengal Municipal Act (Bengal Act III of 1884), s. 2.* Where a municipality passed a bye-law purporting to be made under the provisions of s. 313 of Bengal Act V of 1876, which was duly sanctioned by the Local Government, to the effect that persons failing to trim trees overhanging tanks which were likely to foul the water with their falling leaves, after service of notice on them to that effect, should be liable to a penalty, and where subsequent to the repeal of that Act by Bengal Act III of 1884 a person was convicted and fined for having disobeyed such bye-law:—*Held*, that the conviction was bad, as the bye-law was not one authorized by the terms of s. 313, and was consequently *ultra vires*, and that s. 2 of Bengal Act III of 1884 could not make valid a bye-law which was originally invalid. *BENI MADHUB NAG v. MATI LAL DAS*.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 837

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (BEN. ACT III OF 1884).

See BURNING GHAT 10 C. W. N. 1044

See GRANT. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1290

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—MUNICIPAL BODIES I. L. R. 24 Calc. 107

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 811

3 C. W. N. 73, 508

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 849

prosecution under—

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 44

s. 2.

See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, 1876, s. 313.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 837

"Notification," meaning of—"Order" under Bengal Act V of 1876, s. 234—*Extension of Municipal Act to Balasore—Order notified.* The word "notification" in s. 2, Bengal Act III of 1884, includes an order made under s. 234 of Bengal Act V of 1876. An order, therefore, made and notified under s. 234 of Bengal Act V of 1876 extending the provisions of Chap.

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (BEN. ACT III OF 1884)—*contd.*s. 2—*concl.*

VII of the Act is, under the provisions of s. 2 of Bengal Act III of 1884, to be deemed to have been made and notified under the provisions of the Act of 1884. *BAIKANTHA NATH DAS v. LOLIT MOHAN SARKAR*. I. L. R. 20 Calc. 699

ss. 34, 37—*Lease—Contract in violation of the Bengal Municipal Act—Commissioners, power of, under the Bengal Municipal Act (Beng. III of 1884), ss. 34, 37—Ultra vires.* S. 34 of the Bengal Municipal Act must be read along with s. 37 of the said Act. Where in a suit by the Chairman of the Municipality to set aside a permanent lease executed by the defendant it was found that the contract was sanctioned by the Commissioners at a meeting and that it involved a value exceeding Rs500, but that the *kabuliyat* executed on behalf of the Municipality was signed only by the Chairman, and although two of the Commissioners witnessed it they did not sign it as contracting parties, and, furthermore, it was not sealed with the seal of the Commissioners. *Held*, that the contract was not binding on the Commissioners. *CHAIRMAN, SOUTH BARRACKPUR MUNICIPALITY v. ANULYA NATH CHATTERJEE* (1907)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 1030
12 C. W. N. 50

s. 37.

See s. 34, *ante*.

s. 45 and s. 353—*Powers of Chairman, delegation of—Prosecution for obstructing drain.* The proviso to s. 45 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884, cannot be considered as altogether overriding the body of the section, and relates only to specific acts in which an express or implied consent may have been given or held to have been given. It cannot be held to apply to a general authority, verbally given by a Chairman to a Vice-Chairman to institute prosecutions under the Act as such power can only, under the body of the section, be delegated by a written order. In a prosecution instituted by a Vice-Chairman for obstructing a drain, where it appeared that the Chairman had some months previously verbally given the Vice-Chairman general authority to institute all such prosecutions under s. 353 of the Act, and it appeared that a conviction had been obtained before a Bench of Magistrates, and that on appeal to the Magistrate the conviction had been upheld, the Magistrate himself being the Chairman and hearing the appeal with the express consent of the accused, and where it was contended in revision before the High Court that, although there was no written order by the Chairman delegating his powers, it must be taken upon the facts proved and the circumstances of the case that the prosecution had been instituted with the express or implied consent of the Chairman obtained both previously and subsequently, within the terms of the proviso to s.

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (BEN. ACT III OF 1884)—*contd.*s. 45 and s. 353—*concl.*

45:—*Held*, that the proviso did not apply to the case, that the prosecution had not been properly instituted, and that the conviction and sentence must be set aside. *KHERODA PROSAD PAUL v. CHAIRMAN OF THE HOWRAH MUNICIPALITY*
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 448

ss. 85, 114, 116.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—MUNICIPAL BODIES.

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 849

ss. 85, cl. (a), 87, cl. (d), 113, 114 and 116—*Jurisdiction of the Civil Court to question assessment—"Circumstances and property within the Municipality," meaning of.* S. 116 of the Bengal Municipal Act (III of 1884) does not take away the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in a case in which it is alleged and established that the assessment, the propriety of which is in controversy, is open to objection on the ground that it is *ultra vires*. *Navadip Chandra Pal v. Purnananda Shaha*, 3 C. W. N. 73, and *Kameshwar Pershad v. The Chairman of the Bhabua Municipality*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 849, referred to. A ratepayer, who occupied a holding within the Municipal limits, was assessed with an annual tax with reference to the salary earned by him within the Municipality. He took exception to the assessment under s. 113 of the Bengal Municipal Act (III of 1884), but his application was rejected by the Municipal authorities without recourse to the procedure laid down in s. 114 of the Act and he declined to pay the sum assessed. The Municipality brought a suit against him for recovery of arrears of tax. Upon an objection taken by the defendant that the assessment was *ultra vires* and that it was not made according to his "circumstances and property within the Municipality," *Held*, that the assessment was rightly made and that "the circumstances and property" meant the whole amount he earned, and not what he spent within the Municipality. *CHAIRMAN OF GIRIDIH MUNICIPALITY v. SRISH CHANDRA MOZUMDAR* (1908). I. L. R. 35 Calc. 859
s. c. 12 C. W. N. 709

ss. 85 (a), 112, and 363—*Liability to assessment—Persons occupying the holding—Limitation—Notice.* *Held*, that, under the Bengal Municipal Act, s. 85 (a), persons living with a particular individual occupying a holding by reason of some connection with or relation to him, such as sons or servants, would not be separately assessable, by reason of possessing separate incomes. *Held*, also, that the right to obtain a declaration that the plaintiffs were not liable to assessment under the Act was a recurring right, and an action to obtain such a declaration would be maintainable even if brought more than three months after the assessment. *Held*, further, that a refund of the money paid under protest can be claimed under these circumstances without giving a notice under s. 363 of the Act respecting the refund claimed, as the word "act" used in the section refers to

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (BEN. ACT III OF 1884)—*contd.*ss. 85 (a), 112, and 363—*concl'd.*

tortuous acts, and not to any act arising out of a contractual or quasi-contractual basis. *AMRIKA CHURN MOZUMDAR v. SATISH CHUNDER SEN.*

2 C. W. N. 689

ss. 113, 116—*Persons occupying holdings—Liability to assessment—Municipal Commissioners' power to tax—Assessment to tax.* The word "liability" in the second paragraph of s. 113 of Bengal Act III of 1884 means liability apart from the question of occupation, and must be taken to refer to the liability to assessment or rating of a person who is the occupier of a holding. The same restricted meaning must be placed upon the word "liability" in s. 116, which section has no application to a dispute as to whether a person assessed to a tax does or does not occupy a holding, and a suit brought to set aside an assessment on the ground that the person assessed does not occupy a holding is not therefore barred by the provisions of s. 116. *DWARKA NATH DUTT v. ADDYA SUNDARI MITTRA* . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 319

s. 122.

See SUMMARY TRIAL.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 67

s. 133—*False statement contained in application for license—Municipal Commissioners' power of, to institute prosecution under Penal Code—Penal Code, ss. 132, 199, 417, and 511—Revisional power of High Court in pending proceedings.* On the 5th May 1894 *C* applied in writing under the provisions of s. 133 of Bengal Act III of 1884 to a municipality for a license to be granted to him in respect of two carriages and six ponies, and filled up and signed the usual statement required by the section. The sum payable in respect of the license was received, and the license asked for by *C* was granted to him, and at the same time the statement was sent to an overseer of the Municipality for verification. On the 7th May the overseer reported that *C* had in his possession eight ponies and one horse. On the 8th May the Chairman of the Municipality passed an order directing *C* to be prosecuted for making a false statement in the schedule to his statement regarding the number of animals in respect of which he applied for the license. On the 9th May *C* presented a petition asking that the tax on the three animals might be received, and stating that he did not think he was liable to take out a license for them, as they were old and diseased and unfit for work. On the 13th May the Chairman passed an order on this application that he had no power to interfere, as the prosecution of *C* had already been ordered. Meanwhile on the 9th May a paper was sent to the Magistrate headed "List of municipal cases under Act III of 1884" in which *C* appeared as charged with an offence under s. 199 of the Penal Code for "filing a false statement, that is to say, putting down in the schedule six ponies only instead of eight ponies and one horse." On the 12th May the Deputy Magistrate directed a summons to issue to *C*, re-

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (BEN. ACT III OF 1884)—*contd.*s. 133—*concl'd.*

turnable on the 23rd. On the 18th May the District Magistrate passed an order to the effect that the Municipality could not institute a prosecution under the Penal Code, but that the Deputy Magistrate had power to do so, and that he should consider the provisions of ss. 182 and 417, read with s. 511, of the Penal Code as applicable to the facts of the case. On the 19th May the summons was issued, and the case was heard on the 23rd and 24th May and 19th June, on which date formal charges under ss. 199, 182, 417, and 511 of the Penal Code were framed. Thereafter the hearing proceeded till the 16th July, when, on an application to the High Court, the proceedings were stayed, and a rule issued to show cause why they should not be quashed. It was contended at the hearing of that rule that the High Court should not interfere at that stage of the proceedings under its revisional jurisdiction. *Held*, that the High Court has power to interfere at any stage of a case, and that, when it is brought to its notice that a person has been subjected, as in this case, for over two months to the harassment of an illegal prosecution, it is its bounden duty to interfere. *Held*, further, that it was quite clear that the Municipality had no power to institute the proceedings, and that, having regard to the provisions of s. 191 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did not appear that the Deputy Magistrate, having no private complainant before him, had power of his own motion to institute them; but that, whether he had such power or not, the admitted facts of the case did not in law constitute any of the offences with which *C* was charged, and that the whole proceedings must be quashed. The Municipal Act is intended to be complete in itself as regards offences committed against the Municipal Commissioners, and there is no indication of any intention to render a delinquent also liable to punishment under the Penal Code. There is no penalty in the Act attached to the omission to make a return under s. 133, and no words in the Act constituting the making a false return a penal offence; and as there are no such words in the Act as are necessary to make the provisions of the Penal Code applicable, the Court has no power to import them. The Municipal Commissioners in such a case have the remedy provided by the Act itself. *CHANDI PERSHAD v. ABDUR RAHMAN* I. L. R. 22 Calc. 131

ss. 142 and 146—"Habitually used," meaning of—*Liability to pay a fine for non-registration of a cart.* The accused kept his cart outside the limits of the Chanduria municipality, but used to bring it within the limits twice a week throughout the year. *Held*, that he could not be said to be "habitually" using the cart within the municipal limits, and was therefore not liable to pay a fine under s. 146 of the Bengal Municipal Act (Bengal Act III of 1884). *LEGAL REMEMBRANCE v. SHAMA CHARAN GHOSE* . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 52

ss. 155 and 156—*Ferry, meaning of—Boat plying for hire without license within*

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (BEN. ACT III OF 1884)—*contd.***ss. 155 and 156—*concl'd.***

prescribed limits of ferry—Right of ferryman to demand tolls. The expression "a ferry" in the Bengal Municipal Act means the exclusive right to carry passengers across the stream from one bank to the other on payment of certain prescribed tolls. The object of s. 155 of that Act appears to be to prevent the crossing of passengers from one bank of the river to the opposite bank by a boat plying for hire without a license within the prescribed limits. *Semble:* therefore, that the mere crossing of the bar of a khal leading into the limits of a municipal ferry would not constitute a breach of the Act. A ferryman has no authority to demand tolls from persons who are merely passengers in an unlicensed boat. The remedy against the person who keeps a ferry-boat without a license plying within the prescribed limits is provided by s. 156 of that Act. **GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL v. SENAYAT ALI**

**I. L. R. 27 Calc. 317
4 C. W. N. 348**

ss. 175, 235, 236, 237, 238, 273—

Building—Commencement of second storey to house—Re-building house—Alteration—Encroachment—Whether permission from Municipality necessary—Order for demolition of addition—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 438 and 439. The accused commenced building a second storey to his house without permission of the Municipality. He was convicted under s. 273 (1) of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884, and, in addition to a sentence of fine, the Magistrate, as Chairman of the Municipality, in the same order directed the demolition of the addition made to the house. *Held*, that the whole order was illegal. The case did not come under s. 273 (1) of the Act, and there was no necessity for the accused to have obtained permission. **EMPEROR v. MATHURA PRASAD (1902)**

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 491

s. 204—Projection caused by restoring a portion of an old building which has been pulled down with the object of its being rebuilt—Meaning of the words "which may have been so erected or placed"—Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vic., c. 102), s. 75. S. 204 of the Bengal Municipal Act (Bengal Act III of 1884) does not apply to the case of a projection forming part of a building which is merely in substitution for an old building, which has existed upon the same site before the date on which the District Municipal Improvement Act, 1864, or the District Towns Act, 1868, or the Bengal Municipal Act, 1876, as the case may be, took effect in the municipality. The words "which may have been so erected or placed" in s. 204 mean erected or placed for the first time. **ESHAN CHANDER MITTER v. BANKU BEHARI PAL**

**I. L. R. 25 Calc. 160
1 C. W. N. 660**

s. 217—Obstructing road not vested in Municipality over which public have a right of way—Road. The term "road" in cl. 5 of s. 217 of Bengal Act III of 1884 is not limited to roads

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (BEN. ACT III OF 1884)—*contd.***s. 217—*concl'd.***

vested in the Municipal Commissioners. A person was charged at the instance of a Municipality under that clause with obstructing a path through his paddy-field by erecting a fence at either end of it. It was found that the public had a right of way over the path, and the lower Courts convicted the accused of an offence under that clause. In revision it was contended that the conviction was bad as the clause could only refer to a road which had vested in the Municipal Commissioners. *Held*, for the above reasons, that the conviction was right, and must be upheld. **RAM CHANDRA GHOSE v. BALLY MUNICIPALITY**

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 684

ss. 224, 245, and 246—Acts done in accordance with ss. 245 and 246, whether subject to the jurisdiction of a Civil Court—Notice under s. 246 whether sufficient for the purpose of the removal of huts in a basti as well as a pucca priwy. Where a Municipality, having proceeded in accordance with ss. 245 and 246 of the Bengal Municipal Act, decide that certain works are necessary, that conclusion in the absence of mala fides or fraud or considerations of that nature cannot be questioned in a Civil Court. The action of the Municipality, so far as a priwy was concerned, was held not to be *ultra vires*, although in the notice issued in accordance with s. 246 of the Bengal Municipal Act they directed the plaintiff to remove not only certain huts, but also a pucca priwy, inasmuch as the Municipality had a right to require him to remove the priwy under s. 224 of the Act. **DUKE v. RAMESWAR MALIA**

**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 811
3 C. W. N. 508**

ss. 237, 238, and 273—Notice of intention to build—Commencing to build before sanction—Refusal of sanction within the period of six weeks—Liability to fine. If a person, after giving notice in writing of his intention to erect a house under s. 237 of the Bengal Municipal Act (Bengal Act III of 1884), commences to build without waiting for the six weeks mentioned therein [as he is not bound to do under the Act, there being no such provision in it], he does not necessarily contravene the law; yet when he so acts, the reasonable view must be that he does it at his risk, his act being liable to be treated as one in contravention of any legal order of the Commissioners issued within the statutory period of six weeks, if such order does not sanction the proposed building; the above appears to be the only reasonable view of s. 238 of the Act. **CHUNDRA KUMAR DEY v. GONESH DAS AGARWALLA**

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 419

ss. 238, 273—

See ante, ss. 175, ETC.

Sanction to build when not given within specified period—Right to build without sanction—Period of sanction, computation of—Adoption of suggestion of Municipality, if waiver of right. A person who submitted for the sanction of the Municipal Commissioners plans and specifications of a building cannot, when the Com-

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (BEN. ACT III OF 1884)—*contd.*ss. 238, 273—*concl'd.*

missioners omitted to pass orders within six weeks, be convicted under s. 273 (1) of the Bengal Municipal Act for commencing to build according to his own plan after such period. That he made certain alterations after such period at the suggestion of the Municipality does not make him forfeit his right under s. 238 of the Act to build on his own plan. The period in such cases is to be computed from the date when complete plans and specifications are submitted in such a form as to make consideration by the Municipal Commissioners possible. **SEW NANDAN RAI KAYAB v. VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE DARJEELING MUNICIPALITY** (1900)

5 C. W. N. 42

ss. 263, 273—*Keeper of hackney carriage—Milkman—License.* Where it was found that a person had 7 or 8 ponies and 4 cows and some sheep, and let out one carriage and a pair of ponies on monthly hire and kept the same in her stable, and also kept other ponies for sale and supplied milk to others from her cows: *Held*, that the facts found did not render her liable to punishment under s. 273 (2) read with s. 263 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884. **FAIRWEATHER v. SURESH CHUNDER DUTT** (1900) . . . 5 C. W. N. 331

ss. 270, 271, 353—*Bengal Municipal Act (Ben. Act III of 1884, as amended by Ben. Act IV of 1894), ss. 230, 231, 270, cl. (3), 271, 272, 353—Constructing a latrine without written permission of Commissioners—Requisition of Chairman, disobedience of—Proof necessary—Limitation—Offence, continuous or otherwise.* The offence under sub-s. (3) of s. 270 of the Bengal Municipal Act, *viz.*, construction of latrines in contravention of the provisions of ss. 230 and 231 of the Act, is not a continuous offence. S. 353 of the Act bars all prosecutions under the Act, or under any bye-law made in pursuance thereof, unless they are instituted within three months next after the commission of such offence or within three months of the date when such commission of the offence is brought to the knowledge of the Chairman. The service of requisition on the accused who is charged with disobedience thereof, as well as the requisition itself, should be proved and found before there can be a conviction for an offence under s. 271 of the Act. **BIDHU BHUSAN MULLICK v. ASSENSOLE MUNICIPALITY** (1901) . . . 6 C. W. N. 167

s. 273—

See ante, ss. 175, ETC., ss. 238 AND 273, 263 AND 273.

s. 320—

See FACTORIES ACT.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 454

s. 337 and ss. 338, 339, 344—*License for a provision market—Market—Order prohibit-*

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (BEN. ACT III OF 1884)—*contd.*s. 337 and ss. 338, 339, 344—*concl'd.*

ing use of unlicensed market—Powers of Municipal Commissioners to grant or withhold licenses. It is entirely within the discretion of the Municipal Commissioners, under the provisions of s. 339 of the Bengal Municipal Act (Bengal Act III of 1884), to grant or refuse a license for a market, and the Courts have no longer any jurisdiction to control such power, however arbitrarily exercised. **MORAN v. CHAIRMAN OF THE MOTIHARI MUNICIPALITY**, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 329, approved. A landowner on whose land a market had been held for some years previous, and which land lay within the bounds of a municipality, was prosecuted under s. 344 of the Bengal Municipal Act, and convicted and fined for using such market without having obtained a license under s. 338. He alleged that he had applied for a license, and that it had not been granted him, and that the neglect to grant it was due to the fact that his market interfered with a new market established by the Municipal Commissioners, and their desire to close his market. It appeared that some time previous to the institution of the prosecution, the Municipal Commissioners at a meeting passed a resolution "that the provisions of s. 337 of the Municipal Act (Bengal Act III of 1884) be extended to this municipality," and it was contended that by this resolution licenses became necessary to sell at any market any of the provisions mentioned in that section, and that selling without such license rendered the accused liable to prosecution and fine under s. 344. It appeared, further, that Part X of the Act, which includes s. 337, had been previously extended to the municipality by an order of the Government of Bengal. *Held*, that the resolution of the Commissioners was not an order such as is contemplated by s. 337, as it was not sufficiently precise to convey any definite meaning, and purported only to do what the Bengal Government had already done some time previously. *Held*, further, that the conviction and sentence must be set aside, there being no proper order under s. 337. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MUKUNDA CHUNDER CHATTERJEE** I. L. R. 20 Calc. 654

s. 339—*Obligation of Municipality to grant license—Interpretation of statute—"May," "shall."* There are no words which render it obligatory on a municipality to grant a license under s. 333 of Bengal Act III of 1884. The word "may" in s. 339 of that Act is not to be construed as "shall." **MORAN v. CHAIRMAN OF THE MOTIHARI MUNICIPALITY**

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 329

s. 353—

See ante, ss. 270, 271, 353.

ss. 353, 218—*Continuous offence—Removal of obstruction.* The petitioner was convicted of an offence of having erected culverts on pucca drains belonging to a municipality, and prosecution for such offence was made six months after the date on which the commission was first brought to the notice of the Chairman. *Held*, that, though

BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (BEN. ACT III OF 1884)—concl'd.

ss. 353, 218—concl'd.

the offence was continuous in its nature, the prosecution was barred under s. 353 of the Bengal Municipal Act, and that s. 218 had no application to a case of this kind. *LUTTI SINGH v. BEHAR MUNICIPALITY* . . . 1 C. W. N. 492

BENGAL MUNICIPAL AMENDMENT ACT (IV OF 1894).

s. 85.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—MUNICIPAL BODIES.

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 849

BENGAL, N.-W. PROVINCES, AND ASSAM CIVIL COURTS ACT (XII OF 1887).

See BENGAL, AGRA AND ASSAM CIVIL COURTS ACT.

See CIVIL COURTS ACT, 1887.

See SONTHAL PERGUNNAHS SETTLEMENT REGULATIONS.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 133

See VALUATION OF SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 16 All. 286

s. 13.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—TRANSFER OF DECREES FOR EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 315

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 272

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—INVALID SALES—WANT OF JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 871

s. 19.

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS.

I. L. R. 17 All. 69

s. 20.

See APPEAL—DECREES.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 275

s. 21.

See APPEAL—RECEIVERS.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 680

See VALUATION OF SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 13 All. 320

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 536

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 680, 704

I. L. R. 17 All. 69

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 954

s. 22.

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF . . .

I. L. R. 16 All. 363

s. 23.

See PROBATE—JURISDICTION IN PROBATE CASES. . .

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 340

ss. 23 and 24.

See DISTRICT JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 13 All. 78

BENGAL, N.-W. PROVINCES, AND ASSAM CIVIL COURTS ACT (XII OF 1887)—concl'd.s. 36—*Meaning of the word "officer."*

The word "officer" in s. 36 of the Bengal, N.-W. P. and Assam Civil Courts Act includes an officer with judicial powers. *HALADHAR MAHATO v. KALI PRASANNA GHOSE* . . . 2 C. W. N. 127

s. 37.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—PRE-EMPTION MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

I. L. R. 12 All. 284.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—PRE-EMPTION, RIGHT OF—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 16 All. 644.

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—PURCHASE MONEY AND OTHER PAYMENTS BY PURCHASER . . .

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 897

BENGAL PRIVATE FISHERIES PROTECTION ACT (II OF 1884).

1. s. 3—*Fishing in private waters—Adjoining fisheries—Bond fide dispute as to boundaries—Summary trial—Jurisdiction of the Criminal Court.* Where, in a charge under s. 3 of the Private Fisheries Protection Act, of having fished in the waters of another person, the matter in dispute was really a claim to a particular fishery, and the accused pleaded a *bond fide* claim to it, and it was shown that there had been various disputes and litigations between the parties :—*Held*, that the matter should not be tried by a Criminal Court, and still less in a summary way. Per STANLEY, J., that the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in going into this charge, and s. 3 of the Fisheries Act was not intended to meet a case of this nature. *SRIRAM CHANDRA ROY v. DINA NATH MUKHOPADHAYA* . . . 4 C. W. N. 247

2. *Fishing in private waters—Bond fide claim of right—Jurisdiction of Criminal Courts, ouster of—Fishing under a lease—Title of lessor, inquiry as to, if necessary—Explanation of Magistrate to supplement judgment, if proper.* A person who *bond fide* claims to exercise the right of fishing in private waters on the basis of a lease cannot be convicted of an offence under s. 3 of Bengal Act II of 1889. The question as to whether or not the lessee is bound before taking the lease to satisfy himself thoroughly that his lessor has a good title to the waters leased, is one which does not properly come into consideration under Bengal Act II of 1889. In the absence of any finding in the judgment of a Magistrate, a finding in the explanation submitted by the Magistrate in showing cause against a rule *nisi* should not be considered and given effect to at the hearing of the rule. *In the matter of NAZIE MALITA v. HARI CHARAN PARUI* (1901) . . . 6 C. W. N. 118.

BENGAL REGULATION.

See REGULATION.

1793—I, s. 9.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REGISTRATION OF TENURES.

13 W. R. 397

See RIGHT OF SUIT—REGISTRATION OF NAME

13 W. R. 397

III.

See LIMITATION—REGULATION III OF 1793.

s. 8.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—SOCIETIES

3 B. L. R. A. C. 91

IV—*Rules for decision in suits regarding Succession, Inheritance, Marriage, Caste, etc.—Law applying to one sect.* According to the true construction of the rules for decision in suits regarding succession, inheritance, marriage, and caste, and all religious usages and institutions provided in Bengal Regulation IV of 1793,—viz., that Mahomedan law with respect to Mahomedans, and Hindu law with regard to Hindus, are to govern such decisions,—the Mahomedan law of each sect ought to prevail as to the litigants of that sect, and not the general or Suni Mahomedan law. *DEEDAR HOSSEIN v. ZUHOORONNISSA*

2 Moo. I. A. 441

s. 9.

See BENGAL REGULATION XLVIII OF 1793, s. 24

4 B. L. R. Ap. 44

s. 15.

See RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS
8 W. R. P. C. 3
11 Moo. I. A. 551

s. 25—*Landed proprietors.* S. 25 of Regulation IV of 1793 was applicable to landed proprietors. *ROGHOOBUR DUTT v. GOVERNMENT*

6 W. R. Mis. 50

VIII.

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—LIABILITY TO ENHANCEMENT—DEPENDENT TALUKHDARS.

ss. 5 and 50.

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—RIGHT TO ENHANCE
I. L. R., 22 Calc., 214
I. L. R. 21 I. A. 131

See GHATWALI TENURE.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 251

See ONUS OF PROOF—ENHANCEMENT OF RENT

4 B. L. R. P. C. 8

See RESUMPTION—RIGHT TO RESUME.

5 Moo. I. A. 467

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—PURCHASERS, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF

2 B. L. R. P. C. 23

BENGAL REGULATION—contd.

1793—VIII—s. 41.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS, N.-W. P.
I. L. R. 8 All. 552

s. 46—*Suit for recovery of malikana.* A suit for recovery of malikana was barred by limitation if the malikana has not been received for a period of twelve years. *Quære:* Whether, under Regulation VIII of 1793, s. 46, a suit for recovery of malikana will lie at all. *BHULI SINGH v. NEHMU BEHU*

4 B. L. R. A. C. 29: 12 W. R. 498.

ss. 54, 55, and 61.

See CESS I. L. R. 15 Calc. 828.
I. L. R. 16 I. A. 152: I. L. R. 17 Calc. 131
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 726
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 680

X.

See ACT XL OF 1858, s. 3 16 W. R. 231.

s. 33.

See COURT OF WARDS.

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 289.
I. L. R. 8 Calc. 620

XI.

See HINDU LAW—CUSTOM—INHERITANCE AND SUCCESSION. I. L. R. 1 Calc. 186
19 W. R. 8

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—IMPARTIBLE PROPERTY 9 W. R. P. C. 15
12 Moo. I. A. 1

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—CUSTOM.

2 Moo. I. A. 441

XV.

See MESNE PROFITS—RIGHT TO, AND LIABILITY FOR.

B. L. R. Sup. Vol., 613.

See MORTGAGE—ACCOUNTS.

1. s. 6—*Reg. XVII of 1806, s. 3—Interest, rate of.* Under s. 6, Regulation XV of 1793, interest claimable under a bond must not exceed the amount of the principal. S. 3, Regulation XVII of 1806, is not inconsistent with the application of Regulation XV of 1793, inasmuch as the Regulation of 1806 refers to *rates* of interest and the Regulation of 1793 to accumulations of interest irrespective of rate. *BARDAKANT RAI v. BHAGWAN DAS*

I. L. R. 1 All. 344.

2. *Interest in excess of principal—Act XXVIII of 1855.* S. 6, Regulation XV of 1793 (prohibiting the Courts from awarding as interest a sum larger than the principal) is not applicable to a suit instituted after the passing of Act XXVIII of 1855. Even under Regulation XV of 1793 it was the practice of the Court to allow interest in excess of principal where the interest had accumulated owing to reasons not ascribable in any degree to procrastination on the part

BENGAL REGULATION—contd.**1793—XV, s. 6—concl'd.**

of the creditor. *HUROMONEE GOOPTIA v. GOBIND COOMAR CHOWDHRY* 5 W. R. 51

3. *Interest in excess of principal.* Regulation XV of 1793 (prohibiting award of interest in excess of principal) applies to sums decreed only, and not to interest which has accumulated through the neglect of the judgment-debtor to pay. *SHIB CHUNDER GOOPTO v. ALLAD MONEE DOSSIA* 5 W. R. Mis. 22

4. *Interest in excess of principal.* Where under s. 6, Regulation XV of 1793, interest upon the principal prior to the institution of the suit was adjudged to the plaintiff, limited to a sum equal to the principal, although that regulation was repealed when the suit was brought, yet, looking to the time when his contract was made, the plaintiff was held not entitled to any further interest before suit, but interest upon the principal was allowed to him from the date of suit to the date of decree. *JEEBNATH SINGH v. KUREEMUN BIBEE* 7 W. R. 172

5. *Usurious transaction.* To an action for recovery of arrears of rent due to the plaintiff under a sub-lease of a pergunna, the defendant pleaded that the sub-lease was part of a loan transaction, for the purpose of securing to the plaintiff an illegal interest upon the loan, and was void under Bengal Regulation XV of 1793. Held by the Privy Council (confirming the decision of the Courts below), that it was an usurious transaction, and that the suit should be dismissed. *WISE v. KISHEN KOOMAR BOSE* 4 Moo. I. A. 201

ss. 8 and 9—*Maintenance of suit—Usury.* Regulation XV of 1793, ss. 8 and 9, forbids the maintenance of any suit arising out of an usurious transaction. *WISE v. JAGABANDHU BOSE* 2 B. L. R. P. C. 69: 12 Moo. I. A. 477

1. *ss. 9 and 10—Rate of interest—Usufructuary mortgagee.* In a suit on a bond executed together with an assignment to the plaintiff of the rent of certain mehals farmed out to other parties, the Judge dismissed the suit under s. 9, Regulation XV of 1793, holding that a deduction of a certain sum from the jumma of the assignment was a device to obtain more interest than the legal rate. Held, that, under the decision of the Privy Council in *Anundo Mohun Pal Chowdhry v. Kishen Chunder Bannerjee*, 8 Moo. I. A. 358, that section does not apply where the transaction of the bond and the assignment are one and the same, and where the plaintiff has a claim to be treated as a usufructuary mortgagee under s. 10 of the same law. *RASSMONEE DOSSER v. MONSHAR ALLY* 1 Hay 483

2. *Interest—Usury.* Interference with the rate of interest in India was a thing of positive law and cannot be extended beyond the provisions of the Regulation (XV of 1793). S. 9 of the Regulation does not declare that where an attempt has been made to elude the usury laws

BENGAL REGULATION—contd.**1793—XV, ss. 9 and 10—concl'd.**

the contract is itself void, nor does it direct the return of the pledge without redemption. The mortgagee may retain his pledge until he has received out of it his debt with interest at 12 per cent., the maximum allowed by s. 10 of the Regulation. *SHAH MAKHUNLAL v. SRIKRISHNA SINGH* 2 B. L. R. P. C. 44
11 W. R. P. C. 19: 12 Moo. I. A. 157

TASADUK HOSSAIN v. BENI SINGH

13 C. L. R. 128

XIX.

See ONUS OF PROOF—RESUMPTION AND ASSESSMENT 4 Moo. I. A. 466

s. 6—*Dependent talukhdar—Expiration of settlement, effect of, on omission to renew lease.* A lessee whose interest is that which is declared by Regulation XIX of 1793, s. 6, is a dependent talukhdar, and does not forfeit his lease by simply omitting to renew his temporary settlement on its expiration. *JUNMEJOY MULLICK v. GUNGA RAM DUTT* 21 W. R. 26

s. 10.

See GRANT—POWER TO GRANT.

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 75, 774

12 W. R., 251

I. L. R. 2 All. 545, 732

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—

RENT AND REVENUE SUITS. N.-W. P.

I. L. R. 8 All. 552

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—CONSTITUTION OF RELATION—GENERALLY.

8 B. L. R. Ap. 82 note; 83 note; 85 note; 87 note; 89 note

See RESUMPTION—RIGHT TO RESUME.

15 W. R. 483

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. Ap. 8

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 109

8 B. L. R. 566

XXVI, s. 2.

See COURT OF WARDS.

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 289:

L. R. 3 I. A. 72: 25 W. R. 235

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 620

See MAJORITY, AGE OF.

15 B. L. R. 67: 23 W. R. 208

L. R. 2 I. A. 87

W. R., 1864, 83

5 W. R. 2, 5

7 W. R. 181, 502

XXVII.

See MUNSIF, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 19 Calc.

See RESUMPTION—RIGHT TO RESUME.

5 Moo. I. A. 467

See SETTLEMENT—CONSTRUCTION OF SETTLEMENT. I. L. R. 17 Calc. 458

BENGAL REGULATION—contd.**1793—XXVII—concl'd.**

1. _____ s. 5—*Bazars made since 1793.*
S. 5, Regulation XXVII of 1793, had no applica-
tion to bazars which did not exist in 1793. *AFTAB-*
ODDEN AHMED v. MOHINEE MOHUN DASS
15 W. R. 48

CHUNDER NATH ROY v. ZEMADAR
16 W. R. 268

RAM MANICK ROY v. ASGUR . 11 W. R. 112

2. _____ *Contract to collect*
duties. There is nothing illegal in a contract under a
farming lease from the owner of a hat to collect a
portion of the proceeds of sale from persons ex-
posing their goods for sale in the hat under tem-
porary sheds or in open places, and such collections
are not in the nature of internal duties, but of rent
for the use of land. The provisions of Regulation
XXVII of 1793 applied only to hats and bazars
existing at the time. *BUNGSHO DHUR BISWAS v.*
MUDHOO MOHULDAE . 21 W. R. 383

XXXVI, s. 17.

See REGISTRATION—BENGAL REGULA-
TION XXXVI OF 1793 8 W. R. 438

XXXVII, s. 15.

See GRANT—CONSTRUCTION OF GRANTS.
2 Agra, 284
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 222

XLIV.

See GHATWALI TENURE.
13 B. L. R. 124
I. L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 181

ss. 2, 5.

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—LIABILITY
TO ENHANCEMENT—DEPENDENT TAL-
UKHDARS . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 138

s. 5.

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—RIGHT TO
ENHANCE . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 612

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
PURCHASERS, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
OF . 2 B. L. R. P. C. 23

XLV.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 12 (1859,
s. 1, CL. 3) . 11 W. R. 261

s. 12.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—SET-
TING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.
8 Moo. I. A. 427

XLVIII, s. 14—*Quinquennial*
registers—Attestation of Zillah Judge. According to
Regulation XLVIII of 1793, s. 14, no counterpart
quinquennial registers in the native language are
considered authentic unless attested by the Zillah

BENGAL REGULATION—contd.**1793—XLVIII, s. 14—concl'd.**

Judge. GOBIND CHUNDER SHAHA v. PUDDO MONEE
DASSEE . 17 W. R. 400

_____ s. 24—*Reg. IV of 1793, s. 9—*
Jurisdiction of Collector. S. 24, Regulation
XLVIII of 1793, and s. 9, Regulation IV of 1793,
directed the Zillah and City Courts to transmit
their decrees to the Collector, but did not authorize
those Courts to make any orders on the Collector
as to how he shall enter the result of such decrees
in his books. *NIMDHARI SING v. KACHUN SING*
4 B. L. R. Ap. 44: 13 W. R. 162

1795—XIII, s. 15.

See GRANT—CONSTRUCTION OF GRANT.
2 Agra 284

XLI, s. 10.

See ONUS OF PROOF—RESUMPTION AND
ASSESSMENT . 1 Agra 167

1796—XI.

See FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY.
7 W. R. P. C. 18, 47

1797—IV.

See OFFENCE COMMITTED BEFORE PENAL
CODE . I. L. R. 1 All. 599
I. L. R. 2 Calc. 225

s. 24, cl. (2).

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 179 (1859,
s. 20)—STEP IN AID OF EXECUTION—
MISCELLANEOUS ACTS OF DECREE-
HOLDER . 4 B. L. R. A. C. 158

XVI, s. 4.

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—STAY OF
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.

1798—I.

See APPEAL—REGULATIONS.
19 W. R. 122

See MESNE PROFITS, RIGHT TO, AND LIA-
BILITY FOR. B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 613

See MORTGAGE—REDEMPTION—RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION.
B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 598
20 W. R. 387

1799—V, s. 5.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—CONSTITU-
TION OF RELATION—GENERALLY.
4 B. L. R. Ap. 80

1. _____ s. 7—*Moveable property.* S. 7 of
Regulation V of 1799 only applied to moveable pro-
perty. *SHIB RAM LALL v. RAJ COOMAR MITTER*
6 W. R. 48

2. _____ *Property of in-*
testate without heirs—Widow with certificate. A died
leaving a widow and two daughters and property
in cash and Government securities. None of his
heirs being present at the time, the Magistrate took

BENGAL REGULATION—contd.**1799—V, s. 7—concl'd.**

possession of the property. *Held*, that it should have been made over to the Civil Court under s. 7, Regulation V of 1799, and that Court should treat such property as in its temporary care. *Held*, also, that the widow having obtained a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, though opposed by one H, who alleged himself to be a cousin of the deceased, and who had appealed from the decision granting the certificate, the property might be delivered to the widow, who held the certificate, on her furnishing proper security for the purpose of indemnifying the appellant *H. ABID HOSSEIN v. REAZUN*

15 W. R. 302

3. **Escheat—Property taken possession of by District Judge—Period from which title vests in the Secretary of State.** Where property of a person dying intestate is taken charge of by a District Judge acting under s. 7 of Regulation No. V of 1799, such property does not vest in the Secretary of State until the period prescribed by the Regulation has expired. *RAM NARAIN DUBE v. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (1907)*

I. L. R. 29 All. 277**VII.**

See LIMITATION—BENG. REG. VII OF 1799.

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. Ap. 10 : 5 W. R. 100

1. **Decree—Act VIII of 1859, s. 206.** S. 206, Act VIII of 1859, did not apply to decrees under Regulation VII of 1799. *GOPAL CHANDRA DEY v. PEMU BIBI*

1 B. L. R. A. C. 76 : 10. W. R. 104

2. **Beng. Reg. VIII of 1831—Repeal, effect of.** A summary suit for rent under s. 15, Regulation VII of 1799, was pending when Act X of 1859 came into force, and was, therefore, governed by Regulation VIII of 1831, s. 4 of which declared that the decision in the summary suit should be final, subject to a regular suit. By s. 1, Act X of 1859, Regulation VII of 1799, ss. 1 to 20, and Regulation VII of 1831 were repealed, except as to proceedings commenced before the date of the Act coming into force. *Held*, that the repealing section did not take away the right to bring a regular suit. *GOBIND CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. KALLA GAJEE*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 626 : 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 119**GOBIND CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. KALA GAZI****7 W. R. 185**

s. 25—“Under-renter”—*Sale on default in payment of rent.* A raiyat holding a jote, for which he pays a particular rent to a Collector, who holds the land under khas management, was an “under-renter” within the meaning of s. 25, Regulation VII of 1799, and if he made default in the payment of rent, the proper procedure for the Collector was to sell his land at the end of the year. *RUNGO KOPHOOA v. DEHASSUR MUSSULMAN*

13 W. R. 302**BENGAL REGULATION—contd.****1800—X.**

See HINDU LAW—CUSTOM—INHERITANCE AND SUCCESSION **I. L. R. 1 Calc. 186**

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—CUSTOM.

2 Moo. I. A. 441**1803—II.**

s. 18, cl. (3)—*Good and sufficient cause—Limitation.* The words “other good and sufficient cause” in cl. 3, s. 18, Regulation II, 1803, of the Bengal Code, include insanity, whether there has been or is a commission of lunacy or the like or not; and the word “precluded” in the same clause does not mean precluded during the whole term of twelve years or merely at its commencement, but means in effect precluded during any part of it. In computing the twelve years’ period of limitation, there should not be reckoned any time elapsing while the person for the time being entitled to seek redress was not free from disability. *TROUP v. E. I. COMPANY. DYCE SOMBRE v. E. I. COMPANY.*

4 W. R. P. C. 111 : 7 Moo. I. A. 104**XXXI, s. 6.**

See GRANT—CONSTRUCTION OF GRANTS. **I. L. R. 21 All. 12**

XXXIV.

See MORTGAGE—ACCOUNTS.

I. L. R. 2 All. 593

See MORTGAGE—REDEMPTION—MODE OF REDEMPTION AND LIABILITY TO FORECLOSURE. **I. L. R. 8 All. 402**

LII.

See COURT OF WARDS.

I. L. R. 5 All. 142**9 W. R. P. C. 9****I. L. R. 22 All. 294****1805—II.**

See LIMITATION—BENG. REG. II OF 1805.

XII, s. 34.

See JAGHIR **W. R. F. B. 85**

1806—XVII.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 135.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 693

See MORTGAGE—FORECLOSURE—RIGHT OF FORECLOSURE **11 B. L. R. 301**

See MORTGAGE—REDEMPTION—RIGHT OF REDEMPTION.

7 B. L. R. 136 : 13 Moo. I. A. 560

See ONUS OF PROOF—MORTGAGE.

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 415

See PRE-EMPTION—RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION **I. L. R. 11 All. 164**

BENGAL REGULATION—*contd.*1806—XVII—*concl'd.*

Operation of, in Chupra.
Regulation XVII of 1803 came into operation
in the district of Chupra on September 11th, 1806.
BUKSHUSH HOSSEIN v. FUZEELONISSA

W. R. 1864, 189

s. 3.

See BENG. REG. XV OF 1793.

I. L. R. 1 All. 344

s. 7.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 120.

I. L. R. 14 All. 405

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 132.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 269

See MORTGAGE—FORECLOSURE—DEMAND
AND NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE.

I. L. R. 4 All. 276

See MORTGAGE—FORECLOSURE—RIGHT
OF FORECLOSURE . . .

5 B. L. R. 389

See MORTGAGE—REDEMPTION—MODE OF
REDEMPTION AND LIABILITY TO FORE-
CLOSURE . . .

3 B. L. R. A. C. 141

I. L. R. 3 All. 653

I. L. R. 9 All. 20

See MORTGAGE—REDEMPTION—RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION.

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 598

I. L. R. 9 All. 20

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 2.

I. L. R. 6 All. 262

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 582

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 583

s. 8.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 120.

I. L. R. 14 All. 405

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 132.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 269

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 144—
ADVERSE POSSESSION.

I. L. R. 11 All. 144

See MORTGAGE—FORECLOSURE—DEMAND
AND NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE.

See MORTGAGE—FORECLOSURE—RIGHT OF
FORECLOSURE . . .

I. L. R. 16 All. 59

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 228

I. L. R. 22 I. A. 183

See MORTGAGE—REDEMPTION—MODE OF
REDEMPTION AND LIABILITY TO
FORECLOSURE . . .

I. L. R. 9 All. 20

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 2.

I. L. R. 6 All. 262

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 582

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 583

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 451, 599

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 357

1. Notice of fore-
closure—Year of grace. The year mentioned in s. 8

BENGAL REGULATION—*contd.*1806—XVII—s. 8—*concl'd.*

of Regulation XVII of 1806 is to be reckoned from
the date of the service of the notice of foreclosure
under that section. *MAHESH CHANDRA SEN v.*
TARINI . . .

1 B. L. R. F. B. 15

S. C. MOHESH CHUNDER SEN. v. TARINEE

10 W. R. F. B. 27

2. Mortgage by
conditional sale—Foreclosure—*Parwanah*—“Official
signature”—*Procedure*. Held, that a *parwanah*
or notification to the mortgagor, issued, in a
suit for foreclosure of a mortgage by conditional
sale under the provisions of s. 8 of Regulation
XVII of 1806, which bore the seal of the Court
and the initials of the Judge of the Court from
which it issued, was a good and sufficient
notification within the meaning of the Regulation.
Madhopsad v. Gajudhar, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 111,
distinguished. *Kubra Bibi v. Wajib Khan*, I. L. R.
16 All. 59, *quoad hoc*, overruled. *BHAGWAT KURI*
v. BALDEO RAI (1906) . . .

I. L. R. 29 All. 145

XIX.

Petition under—

See RES JUDICATA—PARTIES—INTER-
VENORS . . .

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 705

1810—XIX.

See ACT XX OF 1863, s. 18.

15 B. L. R. 167

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 275

See ENDOWMENT I. L. R. 18 All. 227

1812—V—Notice of suit for arrears
of rent—Decree in former suit. A suit for arrears
of rent at a certain rate decreed in a former suit
may be maintained without notice under Regula-
tion V of 1812; the decree itself being held to be
sufficient notice. *RAMJEEBUN BOSE v. TRIPOORA*
DOSSEE
W. R. F. B. 93 : Marsh. 396 : 2 Hay 449

ss. 2 and 3.

See CESS . . .

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 828

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 726

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—NOTICE OF
ENHANCEMENT—SERVICE OF NOTICE.
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 608

s. 26.

See APPEAL—REGULATIONS.

12 B. L. R. 366

1. Beng. Reg. V of
1827—Dispute as to right to collect rents of undivided
estate. A dispute as to the right to collect the rents
of a joint undivided estate in a certain proportion
must be dealt with under Circular Order No. 10 of
18th April 1863, and s. 26, Regulation V of 1812,
as amended by Regulation V of 1827. S. 318 of

BENGAL REGULATION—contd.**1812—V—s. 26—contd.**

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, did not apply. *RAMRUNGINEE DOSSEE v GOOROODOSS ROY*
18 W. R. Cr. 36

In s. c. a review was applied for and rejected, and it was held that a consideration of the rights of private individuals, and not only the interests of the public with reference to the Government revenue or otherwise, was sufficient to bring a case under Regulation V of 1812 *GOOROODOSS ROY v. RAMRUNGINEE DOSSEE* . 20 W. R. 54

2. *Beng. Reg. V of 1827—Manager of joint undivided estate—Power of Judge.* A Judge has power to order the person appointed under Regulation V of 1812, s. 26, and Regulation V of 1827, to manage an estate, to make over the surplus, after payment of revenue and other outgoings to the person or persons entitled to receive the same. *In the matter of the petition of the COLLECTOR of RUNGPORE*
B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 655
2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 178 : 7 W. R. 273

3. *Collector, position of—Beng. Reg. V of 1827—Possession by Collector.* A Collector, in taking charge of property which came under attachment by an order of the Civil Court under s. 6, Regulation V of 1812, as modified by s. 3, Regulation V of 1827, was held to have taken and retained charge on behalf of the parties entitled, and, unless and until anything could be shown to have changed the state of things during such attachment, the parties in possession at the time when it commenced must be held to have continued in possession throughout the attachment. Purchasers subsequently put into possession by the Civil Court, who took from the Collectorate rents relating to an antecedent period, did not thereby exercise rights of ownership for such period. *SOOLOCHUNA DAYEE v. DURP NARAIN BOSE* . 12 W. R. 95

4. *Beng. Reg. V of 1827, s. 3—Attachment—Jurisdiction of Collector.* On an application under Act VIII of 1859, s. 200, the Judge ordered the attachment of certain properties, and thereafter sent a precept to the Collector under Regulation V of 1827, and ordered him to hold the properties in question and two others in attachment and to appoint a person for the due care and management of the same. *Held*, that Regulation V of 1827 was not intended to apply to any other cases of attachment of landed property than those provided for in the Regulation mentioned therein, and the order was therefore made without jurisdiction. *COLLECTOR OF NOAKHALLY v. PAXWELL* . 20 W. R. 78

5. *Beng. Reg. V of 1827—Power of Collector after order made by Judge.* When a Judge has made an order in the terms of

BENGAL REGULATION—contd.**1812—V—s. 26—concl'd.**

Regulation V of 1812, s. 26, as modified by Regulation V of 1827, he is *functus officio*, and it then lies upon the Collector, as manager and holder, to take at his own proper risk and upon his own responsibility everything that he finds to be part of the joint estate. *RAM RUNGINEE DOSSEE v. GOOROO DOSS ROY* . 22 W. R. 212

XVIII, s. 2.

See CESS . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 828

XX, s. 5.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 84 (1859, s. 1, CL. 9) . 9 W. R. 113

Hundis. S. 5, Regulation XX of 1812 (concerning the registration of "bonds, promissory notes, and generally of obligations for the payment of money"), was not applicable to hundis or other similar negotiable mercantile securities. BOISTUB CHURN DOSS v. PREM CHUND MITTER . 4 W. R. 93

1814—I.

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—REPORTS OF AMEEN AND OTHER OFFICERS.
9 W. R. 86

XIX.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REVENUE COURTS—PARTITION.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 510
2 W. R. Mis. 51
20 W. R. 182
I. L. R. 8 Calc. 126

See PARTITION.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.
8 B. L. R. 230

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—OTHER GROUNDS.
5 B. L. R. 135 : 17 W. R. 21

s. 9.

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—LIABILITY TO ENHANCEMENT—LANDS OCCUPIED BY BUILDINGS AND GARDENS.
3 B. L. R. A. C. 65

XXVII.

See PLEADER—REMUNERATION.
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 334 : 6 W. R. 108

ss. 13 and 21.

See PLEADER—APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE . I. L. R. 16 All. 240

BENGAL REGULATION—contd.**1814—XXIX.**

See GHATWALI TENURE.

Marsh. 117 : W. R. F. B. 34

14 W. R. 203

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 389

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 187

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 156

See LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1870, s. 39.

18 W. R. 91

1816—IX.

See BENGAL ACT VII OF 1868, s. 1.

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 440

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
INCUMBRANCES—ACT XI OF 1859.

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 440

XI.See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—IMPART-
IBLE PROPERTY . 3 W. R. 116**XIV.**

See PRISONS ACT, XXVI OF 1870.

4 N. W. 4

1817—V.

See TREASURE TROVE 4 W. R. Mis. 8

7 Mad. 150

7 B. L. R. Ap. 3

15 W. R. 525

XII, s. 16.

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 35.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 366

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 74.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 534

XX.See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO POLICE
OFFICERS . . . 2 C. W. N. 637**s. 10—**

See ZAMINDARI DAKS.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 293

s. 21.

See PENAL CODE, s. 188 7 C. L. R. 575

Village chaulkidar, Liability to pay wages of—Land-owner. A liability on the part of a landholder to pay the wages of a village chaulkidar appointed under s. 21, Regulation XX of 1817, cannot be inferred from the fact that the chaulkidar's salary was fixed by the heads of the village, and apportioned among the several house-holders without objection made by any of them, but must be proved in order to sustain a suit brought by the chaulkidar against the landholder. *GOLAMEE v. PASLAN* 18 W. R. 298

1818—III.

See ACT OF STATE . 6 B. L. R. 392

See HABEAS CORPUS.

6 B. L. R. 392, 459

BENGAL REGULATION—contd.**1818—III—cncl'd.**

1. *Validity of—Act XXXIV of 1850 and Act III of 1858—Arrest of native subject—Power of Indian Legislature—13 Geo. III, c. 63, s. 36—37 Geo. III, c. 142, s. 8—21 Geo. III, c. 70—3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 85, s. 43.* Regulation III of 1818 was applicable only to natives and those subject to the jurisdiction of the provincial Courts. It was passed under 37 Geo. III, c. 142, s. 28, not 13 Geo. III, c. 63, s. 36. It was passed by a legislative authority having full power in that behalf. Considering the circumstances under which it was enacted, Act III of 1858, which extended the effect of that Regulation to Calcutta, was not *ultra vires*. *In the matter of AMEER KHAN*

6 B. L. R. 392

2. *Act XXXIV of 1850—Act III of 1858.* Assuming the power of a Judge of the High Court to issue a writ of *habeas corpus*, and assuming the right of appeal against an order refusing such writ:—*Held*, that, it appearing that the prisoner was in custody under a warrant in the form prescribed by Regulation III of 1818, the detention was legal. The detention, to be legal, need only be covered by an actually existing warrant of the Governor General in Council in the form prescribed, without regard to the lawfulness of the arrest. The Regulation is not confined to prisoners of war or foreigners held in confinement for political reasons. The substance of Regulation III of 1818 was expressly re-enacted by Act XXXIV of 1850 and Act III of 1858, and therefore, as the result of these later Acts alone, the detention would be legal. Those Acts are not contrary to the power conferred on the Indian Legislature by 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 85, s. 43. *In the matter of AMEER KHAN*

6 B. L. R. 459 : 17 W. R. Cr. 15

3. *Warrant of arrest and commitment under—Effect of.* The Governor General, in issuing a warrant of commitment under Regulation III of 1818, does not in any way act judicially or as a Court of Justice, nor is he to be considered as having adjudicated that the person placed under personal restraint had been guilty of some specific offence. The proceeding is not in the nature of a conviction of the person placed under restraint; therefore the person so placed under restraint cannot, in any future proceeding taken, against him, plead that he has been already tried, convicted and punished. *QUEEN v. AMEER KHAN*

9 B. L. R. 36

1819—II.

See SETTLEMENT—RIGHT TO SETTLEMENT

5 B. L. R. 528 note, 529 note

8 B. L. R. 524

s. 28.

See SANAD . . . 12 B. L. R. 120

BENGAL REGULATION—*contd.*1819—II—*concl'd.*

s. 30.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—CONSTITUTION OF RELATION—GENERALLY.

8 B. L. R. Ap. 82 note, 83 note, 85 note, 87 note, 89 note

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—GOVERNMENT . . . 8 B. L. R. 524

See RESUMPTION—PROCEDURE.

VI, ss. 3 and 6.

See FERRY . . . 4 N. W. 149

s. 13, cl. (2).

See FERRY . . . 7 W. R. Cr. 32

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—FERRIES . . . 4 N. W. 146

B. L. R., Sup. Vol., 630

VIII.

See APPEAL I. L. R. 32 Calc. 572, 957

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, SCH. III, ART. 2. . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 191

See DECREE . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 630

See DECREE, EXECUTION OF. . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 972

See DEPOSIT IN COURT. . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 107

See EVIDENCE . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 710

See INTEREST, RATE OF. . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 258

See JURISDICTION. . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 162

See LANDLORD AND TENANT. . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 395

See LIMITATION . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 169

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 29 . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 440

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 144—ADVERSE POSSESSION. . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 787

See OCCUPANCY RIGHT, TRANSFER OF. . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 386

See OFFENCE . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 816

See PATNI TENURE. . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 744

See RECORD OF RIGHTS. . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 336

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 518

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT. . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 911

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 953

See SUIT . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 422

BENGAL REGULATION—*contd.*1819—VIII—*concl'd.*

1. ——— Transfer of tenure. A transfer of his tenure by a patnidar is not binding on the zamindar, unless made strictly in accordance with the provisions of Regulation VIII of 1819. *WATSON v. COLLECTOR OF RAJSHAHYE* 3 B. L. R. P. C. 48 : 13 Moo. I. A. 160

2. ——— Application of *Beng. Reg. XLIV of 1793*. Regulation VIII of 1819 was intended to apply to leases which might have been avoided by the grantor or his heirs during the time that Regulation XLIV of 1793 was in force ; but which, so far from having been avoided, had been acted upon by the parties after the expiration of ten years, and were treated and considered as in existence at the time when Regulation VIII of 1819 was passed. *SHEO PERSHAD SINGH v. KALLY DASS SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 543

3. ——— Suit for Rent—*Patni tenure, transfer of, by sale—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 195 (e)*. Regulation VIII of 1819 is not affected by the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 ; the Regulation being specially saved from its operation by s. 195 (e) of that Act. *GYANADA KANTHO ROY BAHADUR v. BROMO MOYI DASSI* . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 162

s. 2, cl. 4.

See s. 74 . . . 10 C. W. N. 527

s. 3, cl. (3).

See RENT . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 140

s. 3, cl. 5.

See PUTNI TALUK . . 10 C. W. N. 201

ss. 3, 4.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—EFFECT OF SALE . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 813

ss. 3 and 6.

See PATNI TENURE. . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 445

s. 5.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 15. . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 504

s. 6.

See APPEAL—REGULATIONS. . . I. L. R. 1 Calc. 383
5 C. L. R. 138

s. 8.

See APPELLATE COURT—OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 86

See PUTNI TENURE. . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 140.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.

s. 9.

—*Right of suit to recover deficiency for which defaulting purchaser is made answerable*. A suit to recover the deficiency for which the defaulting

BENGAL REGULATION—*contd.*1819—VIII—s. 9—*concl'd.*

purchaser is made answerable under s. 9 of Reg. VIII of 1819 is maintainable in a Civil Court. *RAGHU RAM HAZRA v. MOHESH CHANDRA BANDO-PADHYA* (1902) . . . 7 C. W. N. 111

s. 13—"Profits"—*Adjustment of accounts between defaulting tenure-holder and person who has held possession as mortgagee under Reg. VIII of 1819, s. 13.* The word "profits" in the 4th clause of s. 13 of Regulation VIII of 1819 means that which is left to the tenure-holder after payment of the rent of the tenure. A person who enters into possession of a tenure as mortgagee under the provisions of that section is bound in the first place to pay the rent due to the landlord out of the collections before applying the same to the liquidation of his own debt, and the defaulter is not to be liable for the rent of the tenure during the period of the possession by the person so holding it as mortgagee. *LALA BHARUB CHANDRA KARPUR v. LALIT MOHUN SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 12 Calc. 185

See SET-OFF—GENERAL CASES.

2 C. L. R. 414

s. 14.

See VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 826

s. 15, cl. (1).

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 17.

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 226

s. 17 (3)—

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—RIGHTS OF PURCHASERS . . . 6 C. W. N. 794

s. 17, cl. (3)—*Arrears of rent of a patni.* By cl. 3, s. 17 of Regulation VIII of 1819, arrears of rent for a patni being considered personal debts, a person who was no party to an original decree for arrears of rent on account of a patni cannot be held liable for them. *INDER CHUNDER BANERJI v. ESHAN CHUNDER ROY* . . . 1 Hay, 474

s. 18, cl. (4).

See LIMITATION—BENG. REG. VII of 1799 . . . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. Ap. 10

s. 18—*Attachment—Attachment for arrears of rent—Wrongful attachment—Liability to account for receipts and disbursements under.* Under Regulation VIII of 1819, a sezawal cannot be deputed and lands attached under its provisions, unless the arrears of rent claimed shall have been actually due for an entire month before the date of attachment. Whenever a person is proved to have exercised the power of attachment alluded to above illegally, he is bound to give a true and full account of all receipts (unauthorized cesses not excepted) and disbursements made by his agents, during his attachment, and only such

BENGAL REGULATION—*contd.*1819—VIII—s. 18—*concl'd.*

disbursements as are shown to be necessary and *bona fide* can be allowed. *GOBIND CHUNDER BURMONO v. ALLABUX* . . . 2 Hay 347

1821—I.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—OTHER GROUNDS
3 Moo. I. A. 100

1822—VII.

See ACT XIII of 1848.

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—ILLEGAL CESSES.

1 Agra 207

2 Agra 386

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—LIABILITY TO ENHANCEMENT—GENERAL LIABILITY . . . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 586

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 74.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 79

See GOVERNMENT OFFICERS, ACTS OF.

4 B. L. R. P. C. 36

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REVENUE COURTS—PARTITION.

4 N. W. 129

7 N. W. 9

15 W. R. 537

6 C. L. R. 365

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 45.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—INCUMBRANCES—ACT XI of 1859.

14 W. R. 1

15 W. R. 141

See SETTLEMENT—MISCELLANEOUS CASES

23 W. R. 436

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 586

See SETTLEMENT—MODE OF SETTLEMENT.

2 Agra 258

6 C. L. R. 365

s. 33.

See SURVEY AWARD . . . 1 Agra 267
11 W. R. 389

X.

See BOUNDARY . . . 8 W. R. 343
9 W. R. 426

XI, s. 9.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS, N-W P.

I. L. R. 1 All. 373

s. 29.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 134.

I. L. R. 9 All. 97

ss. 30, 33.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—INCUMBRANCES—BENG. REG. XI OF 1822.

BENGAL REGULATION—*contd.*

1823—VI, s. 5, cl. (2).

See DAMAGES—MEASURE AND ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES—BREACH OF CONTRACT . . . 3 Agra 77

s. 5, cl. (4)—*Contract to sow indigo—Default in sowing.* Held, that, in a contract to sow indigo, not sowing would be *prima facie* evidence of dishonesty; and that, in order to claim the benefit of cl. 4 of s. 5 of Regulation VI of 1823, it was necessary to show that the negligence to sow had been accidental. LAL MAHOMED BISWAS v. WATSON . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 3: 4 W. R. 62

s. 8.—*Joint liability in contract—Specification of liability.* In a suit to recover the value of the produce of land from defendants, who had agreed to cultivate it, but had failed to do so, it was held that, as defendants were jointly liable, a specification of liability was not required, as the case did not come within s. 8 of Regulation VI of 1823. MUNRAJ MUHTON v. HUDSON 12 W. R. 309

1824—I.

See RAILWAY COMPANY . 10 B. L. R. 241

Assessment of land formerly occupied for Government salt-works. Upon the relinquishment by the Government of lands, within the ambit of a permanently-settled zamindari, continuously used before and since the perpetual settlement of salt-works from the commencement of salt-making by the Government, until after the passing of Regulation I of 1824, the provisions of that Regulation are applicable to the mutual rights of the zamindar and of the Government. Such lands were held by the officers of the Salt Department, in terms of cl. 11 of that Regulation, "free of rent" and "under a perpetual title of occupancy," whether belonging to a permanently-settled estate or not. The force of the Regulation and the right of the Government to assess such land are not affected by "khalari," payments having been made, among other compensations, by the Government to the zamindar; and cl. 11 appears to contemplate some such payment. On a settlement of the relinquished lands, "khalari" payments, being "sums remitted to the zamindars and to be allowed in perpetuity" within the meaning of cl. 4 of s. 9 of Regulation I of 1824, must be continued to the zamindar; or, if a settlement should be made with others, he should be assessed only for the land retained by him. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. ANANDOMOYI DEBI

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 95

Reversing the judgment of the High Court in a decision unreported given after remand in GUJAN-DRO NARAIN ROY v. COLLECTOR OF MIDNAPORE

23 W. R. 197

1825—VII, s. 7.

See ATTACHMENT—MODE OF ATTACHMENT AND IRREGULARITIES IN ATTACHMENT. 20 W. R. 433

BENGAL REGULATION—*contd.*

1825—IX.

See ACT XIII OF 1848.

10 Moo. I. A. 511
2 B. L. R. P. C. 111

See COLLECTOR, JURISDICTION OF.

7 N. W. 302

XI.

See ACCRETION.

See ACT IX OF 1847 . 6 B. L. R. 25

See BOUNDARY . . . 9 W. R. 426

See LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1870, s. 39.

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 696

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ACCRETION TO TENURE.

s. 4.

See MALIKANA . . . 7 C. W. N. 846

See SETTLEMENT—EFFECT OF SETTLEMENT . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 732

s. 4, paras. 1 and 2—*Oudh Laws Act (XVIII of 1876)—Accretion—Riparian proprietors—Change in course of river—Gradual and imperceptible accretion—Alteration of land by sudden change of course of river or by violence of its stream—Ownership not changed—Tidal and non-tidal rivers.* The appellant sued to recover possession of a large extent of land, which she claimed as an accretion to her estate of Kamyar lying on the south side of the river Gogra, a non-tidal river, by reason of a change in the channel of the river the effect of which was, as stated in the plaint, that "the northern channel receding gradually to the north the said land was added to Kamyar as alluvial accretion towards the south of the said channel." It was found by the Judicial Committee that the predecessors of the respondent were the original owners of the land claimed; that there had been no slow and gradual pushing northward of the northern boundary of the appellant's land; and that there was still a channel of the river between the properties of the appellant and respondent, although the main stream had shifted to the north. Held, that it was not a case of accretion by gradual slow and imperceptible means, in which, as laid down in *Lopez v. Muddun Mohan Thakur*, 13 Moo. I. A. 467; 5 B. L. R. 521, the accreted land belongs to the owner of the adjoining land; but the principle applicable to it was that laid down in para. 2 of s. 4 of Regulation XI of 1825 (which was applied to Oudh by Act XVIII of 1876), that in cases in which a river by a sudden change in its course or by the violence of its stream separates land from one estate and joins it to another without destroying its identity and preventing the recognition of the land so removed, in such cases the land on being clearly recognized remains the property of the original owners—in this case the respondents. *Mayor of Carlisle v. Graham*, L. R. 4 Exch. 361, followed. The principle of that case, which had reference to a tidal river, is equally applicable to a

BENGAL REGULATION—*concl'd.*

1825—XI—s. 4, paras. 1 and 2
—*concl'd.*

non-tidal river. *RITRAJ KUNWAR v. SARFARAZ KUNWAR* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 27 All. 658

XIV.

See ONUS OF PROOF—RESUMPTION AND ASSESSMENT . . . 4 Moo. I. A. 466

s. 3.

See SANAD . . . 12 B. L. R. 120

XX.

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS—EUROPEAN BRITISH SUBJECTS. . . 13 B. L. R. 474

1826—XII.

See STAMP—BENGAL REGULATION XII OF 1826 . . . W. R. 1864, 289

1827—V.

See BENGAL REGULATION V OF 1812.

1828—III.

See BENGAL ACT VII OF 1868, s. 1. . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 440

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—INCUMBRANCES—ACT XI OF 1859. . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 440

See SPECIAL COMMISSIONERS. . . 1 W. R. P. C. 20

See SUNDERBUNS SETTLEMENT REGULATION . . . 2 B. L. R. P. C. 33
4 C. W. N. 513

XXVIII. s. 11—*Succession to mokurari tenures.*—S. 11, Regulation XXVIII of 1828, requiring successions to mokurari tenures to be reported to the Collector within six months, referred only to the security of the revenue, and not to private interests. *UMRITH NATH CHOWDHRY v. KOONJ BEHARY SINGH* . . . W. R. F. B. 34

1829—XIV.

See SECURITY FOR COSTS—APPEALS. . . 7 Moo. I. A. 431

1831—VIII.

See BENGAL REGULATION VII OF 1799. . . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 626

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—INCUMBRANCES 10 B. L. R. 139, 150 note

1832—VII.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—DOWER. . . 6 B. L. R. 54

s. 9—

See CONVERTS . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 546

1833—IX.

See ACT XIII OF 1848. . . 10 Moo. I. A. 511

BENGAL REGULATION—*concl'd.***1833—IX—*concl'd.***

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—SURVEY AWARDS . . . 3 N. W. 132
2 Agra 340
4 W. R. 79

See MORTGAGE—ACCOUNTS 3 Agra 314

See RIGHT OF SUIT—AWARDS, SUIT CONCERNING . . . 2 Agra 340
7 N. W. 169

XIII.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REGISTRATION OF TENURES. . . 13 W. R. 397

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—EUROPEAN BRITISH SUBJECTS. . . 13 B. L. R. 474

See RIGHT OF SUIT—REGISTRATION OF NAME . . . 13 W. R. 397

BENGAL RENT ACT X OF 1859.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882) . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 990

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 14. . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 368

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL. . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 532

See WITHDRAWAL OF SUIT—SUITS. . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 428, 514

1. ——— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 373.* The provisions of s. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code have no application to suits instituted under Act X of 1859. Where a plaintiff applied to withdraw a suit for rent and the Court permitted such withdrawal, but dismissed the suit and did not give distinct permission to bring a fresh suit upon the same cause of action: *Held*, that a fresh suit was maintainable. *GOLAM MAHOMED v. SIVENDRA PADA BANERJEE* (1908) . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 990
12 C. W. N. 893

2. ——— *Assam Rent Law.* The Rent Law, Act X of 1859, was held to be in force in Assam. *HOOTABOO RAOOT v. LOOM RAOOT* . . . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 440 note

JULLOW SURMA PATWAREE v. MADHUB RAM ATOI BURHA BHUKUT . . . 16 W. R. 202

3. ——— *Dehra Dhoon, district of.* The Rent Law, Act X of 1859, was held not to be in force in the Dehra Dhoon district. The Dhoon forms part of "the territories not subject to the General Regulation." *DICK v. HESELTINE* . . . 1 N. W. 196: Ed. 1873, 280

1. ——— s. 6—*Right, acquisition of—Chaukidari chakran land—Service tenure—Right of occupancy—Bengal Act VIII of 1869—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 19, 181.* A raiyati tenancy was created under a chaukidar in chaukidari chakran land so far back as 1846. *Held*, that

BENGAL RENT ACT X OF 1859—concl'd.

s. 6—concl'd.

having regard to s. 6 of Act X of 1859 as soon as the Act came into force, the raiyat acquired a right of occupancy. *Thakooranee v. Bishnessur*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 202 : s.c. 3 W. R. (Act X Rulings) 29; *Hyder Buksh v. Bhoopendra Deb*, 15 W. R. 231, referred to. That the right of occupancy acquired before 1859 would be maintained under the Act of 1859 as also under the provisions of s. 6 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, and would continue to exist under s. 19 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Hurrygram v. Nursinglal*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 129, followed. *Adhar Chunder v. Krista Chunder* (unreported), S. A. 2302 of 1885, referred to. *RAM KUMAR BHUTTACHARJEE v. RAM NEWAJ RAJGURU* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 860

2. s. 6—Right of occupancy—Ejection—Tenant-at-will. A right of occupancy may be acquired by a tenant even in chaulkidari chakran lands under s. 6 of Act X of 1859. *Thakoorani Dassee v. Bisheshur Mookerjee*, B. L. R. Sup. 202 : 3 W. R. (Act X) 29; *Hyder Buksh v. Bhoopendra Deb Kcomar*, 15 W. R. 231; *Hurry Ram v. Narsing Lal*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 129; and *Audhore Chunder Bahadur v. Kristo Churn*, 6 Leg. Comp. 15, referred to. *RAM KUMAR BHATTACHARJEE v. RAM NEWAJ RAJGURU* (1904) I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1021 s.c. 8 C. W. N. 860

ss. 160, 161—Appeal heard *ex parte*—Application for rehearing—Refusal—Order if appealable—Applicability of Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 556, 560 and 588 (27)—“Sufficient cause” for not appearing—Brief transfer of—Vakalatnama, if necessary—Adjournments, previous if ground for refusing adjournment for good cause. When an appeal preferred under s. 160 of Act X of 1859, against an order of a Deputy Collector was heard by the District Judge *ex parte*: Held, that under s. 161 of the Act, ss. 556, 560 and 588, cl. (27) of the Civil Procedure Code applied to the case and an appeal lay to the High Court from an order of the District Judge refusing an application for the re-hearing of the appeal. *Halloddhar Biswas v. Mohesh Chandra Halder*, S. D. A. Decisions for 1861, 154, and *Sadai Naik v. Serai Naik*, 5 C. W. N. 279 : s.c. I. L. R. 28 Calc. 532, relied on. *Quære*: Whether the proposition that Act X of 1859 is a complete Code in itself, in the sense that no provision of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to proceedings thereunder, may not require to be qualified in view of the decision of the judicial Committee in *Nilmony Singh v. Tara Nath*, L. R. 9 I. A. 274 : s.c. I. L. R. 9 Calc. 295. *HARE KRISHNA MAHANTI v. BHUSAN CHANDRA MAHANTI* (1908) 12 C. W. N. 888 s.c. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 799

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859).

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 7.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 263

See RENT, SUIT FOR.

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—LOSS OR FORFEITURE OF RIGHT.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 129

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—cont'd.

s. 2 (Act X of 1859, s. 2).

See KABULIYAT—FORM OF KABULIYAT.

6 B. L. R. 356

Suit for delivery of pottahs. The Rent Act contemplates suits for delivery of pottahs by raiyats in possession only. *BHARUT CHUNDER SEIN v. OSEEMOODDEEN*

6 W. R., Act X, 56

ss. 3 and 4 (Act X of 1859, ss. 3 and 4).

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—EXEMPTION FROM ENHANCEMENT BY UNIFORM PAYMENT OF RENT, AND PRESUMPTION.

s. 6 (Act X of 1859, s. 6).

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY.

s. 7 (Act X of 1859, s. 7).

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—MODE OF ACQUISITION . 17 W. R. 552

25 W. R. 114

8 B. L. R. 165, 166 note

1. s. 8 (Act X of 1859, s. 8)—Tenant without right of occupancy. If a raiyat has a right of occupancy, and insists on that right, he impliedly undertakes to give a kabuliati at fair and equitable rates if his landlord requires him to do so. But if the right of occupancy is absent, the raiyat can only remain on the land by the permission of the landlord, *viz.*, on such terms as may be agreed upon between the landlord and himself. *SUTTO CHURN GHOSAUL v. GOURAM PERSHAD ROY*

13 W. R. 117

2. Right to pottah—Agreement fixing rent. A tenant not having a right of occupancy is not entitled to a pottah under s. 8, Act X of 1859, unless there is an arrangement with his landlord fixing the rate of rent. *NUBUDEEP CHUNDER SIRCAR v. LALLA SHEEB LALL*

Marsh. 325

s. 10 (Act X of 1859, s. 9).

See KABULIYAT—REQUISITE PRELIMINARIES TO SUIT.

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 25, 202

W. R., Act X, 2, 37, 60

5 W. R., Act X, 88

See KABULIYAT—REQUISITES PRELIMINARY TO SUIT—TENDER OF POTTAH

Marsh. 400

s. 11 (Act X of 1859, s. 10).

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—JURISDICTION—CONTRACT.

1 B. L. R. S. N. 13

1. Damages for withholding receipts for rent. The damages mentioned in s. 10 of Act X of 1859 are not penalties invariably to be decreed against person withholding

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.***s. 11 (Act X of 1859, s. 10)—*concl'd.***

receipts for rent, but they are to be ascertained by an actual enquiry into the circumstances of each particular case, and never to exceed double the amount for which receipts have been withheld.

RASHMONEE DEBEA *v.* RAMJOY SHAHA

2 May 516

2. *Power to award damages.* Under s. 10, Act X of 1859, the power of a Judge to award damages for receipts withheld is discretionary only as to the amount to be awarded. The tenant being entitled by law to double the amount paid as rent, the Judge cannot refuse him costs on the ground that he had demanded double what was due to him. ZOOMEEROODUNNISSA KHANUM *v.* PHILLIPE. SADUT ALI KHAN *v.* PHILLIPE 1 W. R. 290

3. *Money paid as rent.* Damages under s. 10, Act X of 1859, are recoverable only in respect of money actually paid as rent. SUMEENA BEBEE *v.* KOYLASH CHUNDER ROY 6 W. R., Act X, 79

4. *Receipt.* A challan bearing a mublukbundi or total in figures, and some mark, not a signature, of the tehsildar, is not a "receipt" within the meaning of s. 10, Act X of 1859. JOHEEROODEEN MAHOMED *v.* DABEE PERSHAD SINGH 13 W. R. 22

ss. 12, 13.

See BENGAL TENANCY VALIDATION ACT.

8 C. W. N. 239

s. 13 (Act X of 1859, s. 12).

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—AGENTS.

16 W. R. 254

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PURCHASERS . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 247

1.—*Sale, confirmation of—Deposit of landlord's fee—Sale certificate, application for—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 178—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244—Appeal—Second appeal.* There is no limitation for an application to deposit landlord's fee as prescribed by the Bengal Tenancy Act, and for confirmation of the sale and the granting of the sale certificate. An order upon such an application may be regarded as one under s. 244, cl. (c), Civil Procedure Code, and as such an appeal and second appeal lie. KRISHNA CHANDRA DUTT *v.* ANUKUL CHANDRA CHUCKERBUTTY (1901) 6 C. W. N. 190

2.—*Confirmation of sale—Subsequent payment of landlord's fee—Jurisdiction of Court.* An auction sale was confirmed by the Court overlooking through mistake the fact that no landlord's fee was paid under s. 13 of the Tenancy Act. Subsequently, on the discovery of the mistake, the purchaser applied for the confirmation of the sale after payment of the landlord's fee, and the Court passed an order to that effect. *Held*, that the order was good

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*cont'd.***s. 13 (Act X of 1859, s. 12)—*concl'd.***

and the Court had jurisdiction to pass such an order. MOHESH CHUNDER DAS *v.* HORI MOHAN CHAKRABUTTY (1903) 7 C. W. N. 388

3.—*Confirmation of sale without payment of landlord's fee—Sale, validity of—Application for possession by auction-purchaser—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 318—Appeal—Second appeal.* Where the sale of a permanent tenure was confirmed without previous payment of the landlord's fee in the manner required by s. 13 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and the judgment-debtor objected to the auction-purchaser's application for being put into possession under s. 318, Civil Procedure Code, on the ground that the sale was invalid: *Held*, that the question was one under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, and a second appeal lay. *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kalidas Sanyal* I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683, relied upon. *Held*, also, that the payment of the landlord's fee does not affect the position of the judgment-debtor, but affects the right of the landlord to object to a transfer of a tenant's right without payment of the fee, the object of such payment being to issue notice to the landlord, in a case of this description, of the transfer of the tenant's right; and it was not competent to the judgment-debtor to raise an objection to the delivery of possession under s. 318, Civil Procedure Code. *Babar Ali v. Krishna Mahani Dassi*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 603, distinguished. MOHIM CHANDRA BHUTTACHARJEE *v.* RAM LOCHAN DEY (1903) 7 C. W. N. 591

4. *and s. 195 (e)—Sale in execution of decree for arrears of rent—Dar-patni tenures.* S. 13 of the Bengal Tenancy Act applies to sales of dar-patni tenures in execution of decrees. MAHOMED ABBAS MONDUL *v.* BROJO SUNDARI DEBIA I. L. R. 18 Calc. 360

s. 14 (Act X of 1859, s. 13).

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—NOTICE OF ENHANCEMENT.

See LEASE—CONSTRUCTION.

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 99

s. 15 (Act X of 1859, s. 14).

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—RESISTANCE TO ENHANCEMENT.

s. 16 (Act X of 1859, s. 15).

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—EXEMPTION FROM ENHANCEMENT BY UNIFORM PAYMENT OF RENT AND PRESUMPTION—GENERALLY . . . 3 B. L. R. Ap. 40

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—LIABILITY TO ENHANCEMENT—DEPENDENT TALUKDARS 15 B. L. R. 120

ss. 16 and 17 (Act X of 1859, ss. 15 and 16)—*Districts to which permanent settlement has not been extended—Surborakari tenures in Outlack—Transferable tenures.* The provisions of ss. 15 and 16 of Act X of 1859 apply to the whole

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

- ss. 16 and 17 (Act X of 1859, ss. 15 and 16)—*concl'd.*
- of the Provinces of Bengal, Behar, Orissa, and Benares, and not only to such of the districts in those provinces to which the Permanent Settlement has been extended. Surborakari tenures in Cuttack are permanent, hereditary, and transferable. *SADDANUNDO MAITI v. NOWRATTAM MAITI*
8 B. L. R. 280: 16 W. R. 289
- s. 17 (Act X of 1859, s. 16).
- See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—EXEMPTION FROM ENHANCEMENT BY UNIFORM PAYMENT OF RENT, AND PRESUMPTION—GENERALLY. I. L. R. 4 Calc. 793
- See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—EXEMPTION FROM ENHANCEMENT BY UNIFORM PAYMENT OF RENT, AND PRESUMPTION—PROOF OF UNIFORM PAYMENT.
8 W. R. 284
22 W. R. 487
- s. 18 (Act X of 1859, s. 17).
- See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—GROUNDS OF ENHANCEMENT.
- s. 19 (Act X of 1859, s. 18).
- See ABATEMENT OF RENT.
17 W. R. 449
1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 7
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 284
- See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 120.
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 284
- s. 20 (Act X of 1859, s. 19).
- See RELINQUISHMENT OF TENURE.
- s. 21 (Act X of 1859, s. 20).
- See INTEREST—ARREARS OF RENT.
- See RIGHT OF SUIT—SURVIVAL OF RIGHT.
10 W. R. 59
- “Established usage,” meaning of. S. 20, Act X of 1859, referred to the established usage in the pergunnah, and not to the established usage between the parties. *CHYTUNNO CHUNDER ROY v. KEDARNATH ROY*
14 W. R. 99
- s. 22 (Act X of 1859, s. 21).
- See LANDLORD AND TENANT—EJECTMENT.
—GENERALLY. I. L. R. 14 Calc. 33
- See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—LOSS OR FORFEITURE OF RIGHT.
I. L. R. 8 Calc. 612
- s. 23 (Act X of 1859, s. 22).
- See RECEIVER. I. L. R. 11 Calc. 496
- s. 23 (4).
- See RENT, SUIT FOR.
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 485

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

- s. 23 (5).
- See LANDLORD AND TENANT—EJECTMENT—NOTICE TO QUIT. 6 C. W. N. 199
- See LANDLORD AND TENANT—FORFEITURE—DENIAL OF TITLE.
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 135
- s. 26 (Act X of 1859, s. 27).
- See CO-SHARERS—GENERAL RIGHTS IN JOINT PROPERTY. 9 W. R. 806
- See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REGISTRATION OF TENURES.
1 B. L. R. A. C. 175
- See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ALTERATION OF CONDITIONS OF TENANCY—DIVISION OF TENURE, ETC.
3 B. L. R. A. C. 349
15 W. R. 320
- See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT—REVENUE COURTS.
4 B. L. R. F. B. 43
1. *Registration of tenure.* A patnidar is not bound to split up a tenure and to record separately the jumma payable by the holder of a share. Instead, also, of the latter bringing a suit in the first instance to compel the patnidar to register his share, he should have made an application for registration to the patnidar under s. 27, Act X of 1859. *BHOOPUTTEE ROY v. UMBICA CHURN BANERJEE*
17 W. R. 196
2. *Registration of transfer.* The purchaser of the rights and interests of a cultivator is not bound under s. 27 to notify his purchase to the zamindar. *SUTTEESCHUNDER ROY v. MUDDOOSOODUN PAUL CHOWDHRY*
W. R. 1864, Act X, 91
3. *Non-registration of transfer—Knowledge by zamindar.* Mere cognizance or supposed cognizance by the zamindar of the fact of a party having purchased a tenure is not sufficient to cure the defect of non-registration of such tenure in the zamindar's sherista. *SARKIES v. KALI COOMAR ROY*
W. R. 1864, Act X, 98
4. *Transfer of tenure—Registration of tenure.* The transferee of a tenure not in possession, instead of depositing the rents in Court under this section, should take steps under s. 27, Act X of 1859, to register his transfer in the sherista of the zamindar, and to apply to the Collector in case of the refusal of the zamindar to do so. *DULLI CHAND v. MEHER CHAND SAHOO*
8 W. R. 138
5. *Tenure not intermediate.* Where the tenure is not one “intermediate between the zamindar and the cultivator,” s. 27, Act X of 1859, does not apply. *UMA CHARAN SETT v. HARI PROSAD MISRY*
1 B. L. R. S. N. 7
- WOOMA CHURN SETT v. HUREE PERSHAD MISREE*
10 W. R. 101

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 26 (Act X of 1859, s. 27)—*contd.*

6. ———— *Registration of transfer of tenure—Intermediate tenures.* In determining whether a tenure is a permanent transferable interest within the meaning of s. 26, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, the issues should be so framed as to raise distinctly the question whether the tenure was an intermediate one between the landlord and the raiyat. *SHIB-CHURUN SEN v. JONARDHON DEY* 1 C. L. R. 397

7. ———— *Mortgagee who has obtained foreclosure.* When the mortgagee of a jote obtains a foreclosure decree, it is his duty under s. 26, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, to have his name registered in the lessor's sherista. *WATSON v. GONESH CHUNDER SAHOO* 3 C. L. R. 240

s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30).

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, SCH. III, ART. 3 I. L. R. 16 Calc. 741

1. ———— *Act I of 1868.* In a suit under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 to recover possession of land, on the allegation that the plaintiffs had acquired a right of occupancy, and had been dispossessed, the Court following the interpretation of 'year' given in Act I of 1868: *Held*, that the computation of the limitation must be according to the English calendar. *KHASRO MANDAR v. PREM-LAL* 9 B. L. R. Ap. 41: 18 W. R. 403

2. ———— *Suit for illegal exaction of rent.* The fact that incidentally the genuineness of a kabuliati has to be determined, does not make a suit for illegal exaction of rent one not determinable under the Rent Act. *KASHEE RAM v. GUNGA PERSHAD* 2 N. W. 304

3. ———— *Suit for excess rent collected under lease.* A suit for excess rents collected under a lease under which the lessee was, in consideration of a certain sum of money, to pay the Government revenue, and reimburse himself from the remainder of the assets, and which provided for an annual measurement and assessment, was held not cognizable under the Rent Act as a suit for illegal excess of rent. *SHORAFUT ALI v. RAMZAN* W. R. 1864, Act X, 53

PROSUNOMOYEE DOSSEE v. SOONDER COOMAREE DEBIA 2 W. R., Act X, 30

MADHUB CHUNDER BIDYARUTTON v. TARA SOONDEREE GOOPTANEE 2 W. R., Act X, 92

NILMONEY SINGH DEO v. SHARODA PERSHAD MOOKERJEE 16 W. R. 173

4. ———— *Suit to recover excess of rent—Act X of 1859, ss. 10 and 23, cl. 2—Exaction of sum in excess of rent.* Contemporaneously with the execution of a pottah, it was verbally agreed that the tenant should supply the zamindar with a certain quantity of rice, and that a deduction should be made from the rent reserved in respect thereof. The zamindar took proceedings against the tenant, under Regulation VIII of 1819, for the

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*

recovery of the entire amount of rent, notwithstanding the tenant had supplied the rice and was entitled to the reduction. The tenant, without contesting his liability, or demanding an investigation as to the amount due, paid the entire amount. *Held*, that this was not "an exaction from the raiyat of a sum in excess of the rent specified in the pottah" within the meaning of s. 10, Act X of 1859 (Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 11), and that a suit was not maintainable in respect of it under the Rent Act. *CHUNDERMONEE CHOWDRAIN v. DEBENDERNATH ROY CHOWDRY* Marsh. 420: 2 Hay 519

5. ———— *Suit against zamindar for excess rents collected under zur-i-peshgi lease.* A zamindar, after he had granted a zur-i-peshgi lease, collected the rent from the raiyats. *Held*, that the lessee was entitled to recover from the zamindar the amount of rents so received in excess of the rent due under the lease, and that a suit to recover such excess was properly instituted under the Rent Act. *RAMPERSHAD VOGUT v. RAMTOHTUL SINGH* Marsh. 655

6. ———— *Suit to contest notice of enhancement.* A suit under s. 14, Act X of 1859 (s. 15, Bengal Act VIII of 1869) to contest a notice of enhancement is properly instituted under the Rent Act, though, *quære*, whether it is a suit for illegal exaction of rent. *SOROOP CHUNDER PAUL v. DURUP DE DOMBAL* 1 W. R. 72

7. ———— *Suit by sub-lessee to recover from lessor malikana which he was compelled to pay.* A suit brought by a sub-lessee to recover from his lessor the amount of malikana which he was compelled to pay, and which was properly payable by his lessor, is not one for illegal exaction of rent, and should not be brought under the Rent Act. *TARSANAH v. KADHAREY LAL* 5 N. W. 1

8. ———— *Suit for rent illegally exacted.* Plaintiff took from defendant a lease of a certain quantity of land at a stipulated rate. Finding, however, that the land fell short of the quantity specified in the lease, and that defendant notwithstanding realized the full rent from him, he obtained a decree for abatement under Act X of 1859. The present suit was brought for the excess rent levied from plaintiff between the date of taking possession and of the Act X decree. *Held*, that, if the suit did lie at all, it would be a suit for an illegal exaction of rent, and should be brought under the Rent Act. *SURBO CHUNDER DOSS v. WOONAMUND ROY* 11 W. R. 412

9. ———— *Suit to recover money deposited to pay rents.* A suit to recover money deposited with the defendants to be applied in payment of rents (the deposit having been unsuccessfully pleaded in a suit for rent) should not be brought under the Rent Act. *DABEE GOLAM SINGH v. CHUNDER KANT MOOKERJEE* 3 W. R. 109

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*

10. ———— *Suit for money paid in excess of road cess—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 96.* In a suit to recover money alleged to have been paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants in excess of the sum demandable by the latter from the former on account of road cess : *Held* (reversing the decisions of the Courts below), that the suit was governed, not by the special law of limitation contained in s. 27, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, but by Art. 96, Sch. II of the Limitation Act, XV of 1877. *MATHURA NATH KUNDU v. STEEL*
I. L. R. 12 Calc. 533

11. ———— *Suit for abatement of rent—Land, Diluviation of.* A suit for abatement of jumma and refund of excess rents paid on account of diluviated lands is cognizable under the Rent Act. *BARRY v. ABDOL ALI* W. R. 1864, Act X, 64

12. ———— *Suit for abatement of rent.* So is a suit for abatement of rent by a patnidar. *MAN GUROBINEE DOSSEE v. KHETTUR CHUNDER GHOSE*
2 W. R., Act X, 47

PROSUNOMOYEE DOSSEE v. SOONDUR COOMAREE DEBIA 2 W. R., Act X, 30

13. ———— *Suit for abatement of rent—Land sold with erroneous description.* Where A conveys to B an interest in land under a description as to title which turns out to be erroneous, a suit by B against A for diminution of rent on the ground of the erroneous description ought to be brought under the Rent Act. *NEELMONEY SINGH DEO v. GORDON STUART & Co.* 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 356
6 W. R. 152

14. ———— *Suit for abatement of rent—Eviction from part of tenure.* In a suit by tenants for abatement of rent in consequence of having been dispossessed of two mauzahs which were included in their lease, and for which separate rents were fixed, the landlord pleaded limitation. *Held*, that Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 27, did not apply to a case of this description. In such a case the eviction might either give the tenant a cause of action for damages or suspend the rent during the time it lasts. In the latter case the cause of action would not arise until the landlord sought or threatened to recover rent. *AITCHISON v. NILMONEE SINGH DEO*
20 W. R. 347

15. ———— *Suit for abatement of rent—Suit for declaration of liability to pay less rent.* A suit by a tenant against his original lessors for a declaration that he is not liable to pay them the whole rent payable under his pottah in consequence of a third person having, subsequently to the grant of such pottah, by suit established a right to a share of the rent, is not a suit for abatement under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, and therefore not subject to the rule of limitation prescribed by s. 27 of that Act. *CHAND MONI DAS v. LOKENATH CHATTERJI*
6 C. L. R. 494

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*

16. ———— *Ejectment, suit for.* A suit by a patnidar to recover khas possession of land against a tenant who has sold his rights and interests to a third party may be brought under the Rent Act. *KEDAR MONEE DOSSEE v. CHUNDER KOOMAR ROY*
2 W. R., Act X, 75

17. ———— *Suit for land with hut on it.* If the land is the substantial thing let out, the mere fact of there being a hut on it will not prevent the suit to recover possession from the tenant being brought under the Rent Act. *MATUNGINEE DOSSEE v. HARADHUN DOSS* 5 W. R., Act X, 60

18. ———— *Suit for ejectment.* Suit for ejectment cannot be brought under the Rent Act in the following cases :—

Suit for dispossession between raiyats. *RADHA-NATH MOZOOMDAR v. PURIKHIT BODRIK*
W. R. 1864, Act X, 60

KALLY DOSS BANERJEE v. BONOMALEE DOSS
W. R. 1864, Act X, 61

OBHOY CHURN NEWGEE v. SRISTIDHUR BAGDEE
1 W. R. 101

MODHOO SOODUN CHUCKERBUTTY v. NUFUR BAWUL 1 W. R. 196

BHUGGOBUTTY CHURN MOOKERJEE v. HUROMOHUN MOOKERJEE 2 W. R., Act X, 55

TEELUCK CHUNDER OSWAL v. GOURCHUNDER SHAHA 2 W. R., Act X, 100

19. ———— *Suit for ejectment of a raiyat who, the plaintiff alleges, possesses no right of occupancy.* *BUDREE DOSS v. HUNWANT SINGH*
4 N. W. 69

20. ———— *Suit where the tenant is a mere tenant-at-will.* *GOOR BUKSH v. CHOONNOO LALL*
1 Agra Rev. 70

21. ———— *Suit for possession of land.* A suit to recover possession of lands which the plaintiff alleged he had leased to the defendant as manager of an indigo factory, and also of other lands over which he had given a zur-i-peshgi lease, should not be brought under the Rent Act. *MACDONALD v. RAJARAM ROY*
3 B. L. R. Ap. 28: 11 W. R. 371

22. ———— *Suit for possession of land.* Nor should a suit by a landlord to recover possession of land from a raiyat who had ceased to pay rents, but whom the landlord had omitted to sue when he first ceased payment, and set up an adverse title. *SHIB PERSHAD CHUCKERBUTTY v. MUDDUN MOHUN CHUCKERBUTTY* W. R. 1864, Act X, 80

See contra, UMA KISHOREE DASSI v. HURO GOBIND SHAHA 5 W. R., Act X, 95

23. ———— *Suit for possession after establishing title.* A suit against a raiyat who sets up title as tenant to a hostile zamindar, against both of whom (as defendants) the plaintiff established his title to

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*

the land of which he sues to recover possession, is not a case that falls within the Act. **FAKEER ROHOMAN v. BHABOSCONDERY DEBIA**

1 W. R. 232

24. ———— *Suit for possession against alleged trespasser who sets up a permanent raiyati tenure.* Nor is a suit which is brought to recover possession of lands with mesne profits from one who is alleged to be in possession as a trespasser, notwithstanding the defence set up is that in respect of part of the land the defendant has a permanent raiyati tenure.

HARI NATH DAS v. ASMUT ALI

6 B. L. R. Ap. 118: 15 W. R. 171

25. ———— *Suit for possession against trespasser.* Where plaintiff alleged that defendant was a trespasser, and on the ground of that trespass sued for possession, the suit should not be brought under the Rent Act. **NOBIN CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY v. BHOWANEE PERSHAD DOSS**

W. R. 1864, Act X, 52

GOBIND CHUNDER MOJOOMDAR v. BISSUM-BHUREE DOSSEE

2 W. R. 5

BANEE MADHUB BANERJEE v. JOY KISHEN MOOKERJEE

4 W. R., Act X, 16

26. ———— *Suit to eject raiyat.* A suit by a zamindar to eject a raiyat who holds on after the period of his lease is not cognizable under the Rent Act. **SADAT ALI v. SADATTUNISSA**

3 B. L. R. Ap. 101: 12 W. R. 37

27. ———— *Suit against transferee of tenure.* Nor is a suit for possession against an occupant by transfer, whom the landlord does not recognize as his tenant. **TARAMONEE DOSSEE v. BIRRESSUR MOZOOMDAR**

1 W. R. 86

28. ———— *Suit for ejectment and possession for forfeiture of lease.* Nor a suit by a proprietor for possession and ejectment of the lessee, on the allegation that, by cancelment of his lease, the lessee, after having resigned his lease, has forcibly taken possession of the demised property. **KAFAR-TOOLLAH KHAN v. FUTTEH ALI**

1 Agra Rev. 28

29. ———— *Suit for ejectment for forfeiture by transfer of tenure.* Unless it be proved that by express contract or local custom an alienation by the tenant by way of sale or mortgage renders the holding liable to be forfeited, a suit for ejectment on such ground should not be brought under the Rent Act, but the remedy of the zamindar is by suit to have the transaction set aside. **RAMDYAL v. JANKEY DOBEY**

3 Agra 274

NUTHOO v. DAN SUHAI

2 Agra 279

IMAM BUKSH v. HOOB ALI

3 Agra Rev. 8

30. ———— *Suit for ejectment for forfeiture by transfer of tenure.* A suit for ejectment against tenants who are alleged to have illegally alienated their tenant rights cannot be brought under the

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*

Rent Act against the vendor because he is alleged to be out of possession, nor against the vendee because he is not the plaintiff's tenant. **CHUMMAN SHAH v. ISHREE PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH**

4 N. W. 175

31. ———— *Suit for ejectment for non-payment of arrears of rent.* Where a lessor sued to eject the lessees for non-payment of arrears of rent, and to the amount claimed joined a claim for arrears due at the commencement of the leases, the latter claim being based on a stipulation contained in the leases that the lessees would pay such arrears, or on failure would pay the expenses of the servants of the lessors who might be sent to realize such arrears:—*Held*, that the claim was not one cognizable under the Rent Act. **GULABI SINGH v. RAI NORMAL CHUND**

6 N. W. 342

32. ———— *Suit for ejectment—Act X of 1859, s. 30.* In 1857 the plaintiff gave a lease of a garden to defendant, who agreed to plant, within five years from the date thereof, 2,000 betel-nut trees. The defendant failed to do so. In 1867 the plaintiff brought the present suit for ejectment on account of the breach of the contract entered into by the defendant. *Held*, that by s. 30, Act X of 1859, the suit was barred by limitation. **KALI KAMAL MAZUMDAR v. SHIB SUHAI SUKUL**

3 B. L. R. Ap. 47: 11 W. R. 452

33. ———— *Suit to eject for breach of contract—Act X of 1859, s. 30.* *Held*, that a suit to eject a cultivator for a breach of contract by planting a bagh must be brought within one year, under s. 30 of Act X of 1859, from the date of the first accruing of the cause of action. **RUHMUTOOLLAH v. TURFUZZOOL HOOSSEIN**

1 Agra Rev. 67

34. ———— *Breach of contract in planting trees on land let for agricultural purposes.* S. 27 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 only relates to such suits as could be brought either by the landlord or tenant under Act X of 1859, and will not apply to an alternative claim, put forward in a suit for ejectment, to compel the defendant to remove trees from certain lands leased to him for agricultural purposes. Art. 120 of Sch. II of Act XV of 1877 is applicable to such claims. **GUNESH DOSS v. GONDOUT KOORMI**

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 147: 12 C. L. R. 418

35. ———— *Suit to eject raiyat for making a well—Act X of 1859, s. 30.* *Held*, that the limitation of one year under s. 30, Act X of 1859, in a suit by a landlord to eject a cultivator for sinking a well, should be computed from the date when the building of the well has assumed such a form that there can be no doubt of the purpose for which it was intended. **HEERA KOOREE v. NOOR ALI**

3 Agra Rev. 1

36. ———— *Suit for possession after refusal to give possession under award in arbitration.* Where the parties agree to refer the question of title to arbitration, and the award being adverse to the

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

_____ s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*
 defendant he refuses to give up possession, a new cause of action arises, and one of a different character from any mentioned in Bengal Act VIII of 1859, s. 27. **RAJ NARAIN ROY v. MODHOO SOODUN MOOKERJEE** 20 W. R. 19

37. _____ *Suit to cancel lease and for arrears of rent.* A suit to cancel a lease for breach of the conditions and for arrears of rent should be brought under the Rent Act. **BEHAREE COOMAREE v. SOOBRUN SINGH** 2 W. R., Act X, 12

RAMCHUNDER DUTT v. DIN DAYAL PORAMANICK
 2 W. R., Act X, 16

38. _____ *Suit to set aside lease—Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 5.* A suit to set aside a lease as null and void is not cognizable under the Rent Act, even though plaintiff mentions that a balance of rent is due by defendant. **TAJEH MAHOMED PURDHAN v. JOGENDRO DEB ROYKUT**

8 W. R. 368

39. _____ *Suit to cancel zur-i-peshgi lease.* A suit to cancel a zur-i-peshgi, by which the lessee was to receive the usufruct as interest for his advance, and to repay the principal by the rent reserved, is of the nature of an usufructuary mortgage, and as such cannot be brought under the Rent Act. **RUTTON SINGH v. GREEDHAREE LALL**

8 W. R. 310

MAHOMED ALI v. BATOSH DAO NARAIN SINGH
 1 W. R. 52

40. _____ *Suit to get release from tenancy on ground of fraud.* Where the tenant seeks to have himself released from a contract of tenancy on the ground of fraud, the suit is not one to be brought under the Rent Act. **BHOLANATH KHAN v. RAM CHUNDER SIRCAR** 7 W. R. 62

41. _____ *Suit where lease is alleged to be forged.* Nor where the lease is said to be a forgery. **MAHMOOD LUSHKUR v. PAKAR KHAN**

Marsh. 496

42. _____ *Suit for possession after ejectment—Suit for possession on declaration of title.* The words "suits to recover the occupancy or possession of any land" in cl. 6 of s. 23, Act X of 1859 (s. 27, Bengal Act VIII of 1869), refer only to possessory actions against the person entitled to receive the rent, and not to suits in which the plaintiff sets out his title and seeks to have his right declared and possession given him in pursuance of that title. **GOOROODOSS ROY v. RAMNARAIN MITTER. GOOROODOSS ROY v. BISHTOO CHURN BHUTTACHARJEE** B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 628
 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 112: 7 W. R. 186

SERAJ MUNDUL v. BISTOO CHUNDER ROY
 7 W. R. 459

GUNGA GOBIND ROY v. KALA CHAND SURMA GANGOOLY 20 W. R. 455

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

_____ s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*
LALLJEE SAHOO v. BHUGWAN DOSS
 8 W. R. 337

Contra, **GOOROO CHURN COOMAR v. KHETTER MOHUN ROY** W. R. 1864, Act X, 79
 and in **PUDDOLABH DEO v. OBHOYRAM SINGH**
 W. R. 1864, Act X, 30

it was held that a suit to try whether the tenant had been rightly evicted was properly tried under the Rent Act.

43. _____ *Act X of 1859, s. 23—Possessory suits—Limitation.* Following a Full Bench decision: —**GOOROODOSS ROY v. RAMNARAIN MITTER, B. L. R. Sup. Vol., 628: 7 W. R., 186** as to the proper interpretation of Act X of 1859, s. 23, it was held that the same words in Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 27, described only possessory actions against persons entitled to receive rent, and not suits setting out title, and seeking to have right declared and possession given in pursuance thereof; and that consequently the limitation prescribed by s. 27 applied only to simple cases of possessory action. **NISTARINEE v. KALEE PERSHAD DOSS CHOWDHRY** 21 W. R. 53

SURJOO PERSHAD v. KASHEE RAWUT
 21 W. R. 121

BROJO KISHOR RAKHIT v. BASHI MUNDUL
 21 W. R. 251

ASMAN SINGH v. ABEEDODDEEN
 23 W. R. 460

RAMJOY MUNDUL v. RAM SUNDER MUNDUL
 2 C. L. R. 4

44. _____ *Suit for possession—Landlord and tenant—Limitation.* In a suit for possession of land, it appeared that the defendants had obtained a *darpatni* lease of the land in question in 1271 (1865), and that they had immediately dispossessed the plaintiff, and had never acknowledged him to be their tenant. The plaintiff instituted his suit within twelve years from the date of dispossession. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by limitation under s. 27 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869. That section only applies to cases where the relation of landlord and tenant exists, and cannot be pleaded in bar by a defendant who does not admit that such relation has existed. **NILMADHUB SHAHA v. SRINIBASH KURMOKAR**

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 442: 9 C. L. R. 137

45. _____ *Suit for possession after ejectment.* When the dispute between the parties was whether the plaintiffs, who, by themselves and their ancestors, had long held the land in dispute, could be lawfully dispossessed by the defendant, who claimed it under a *pottah* recently granted by the zamindar: *Held*, that the matter was not one for adjudication under the Rent Act, not being a question between landlord and tenant. **AFA KHAN v. KISHEN MOONJOREE DOSSEE**

W. R. 1864, Act X, 17

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1859 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*MOFUZZEL HOSSEIN v. TUSSOODUK ALI KHAN
W. R. 1864, Act X, 89UFSUROODEEN v. AKBUR ALI
2 W. R., Act X, 77

46. ———— *Suit by purchaser against raiyats and zamindar.* A suit by the purchaser of a mukurari tenure against the raiyats and the zamindar for illegal dispossession and for establishing permanent title to the property should not be brought under the Rent Act. NOBBO DOORGA DEBEE v. NIS-TAREENEE DOSSEE . . . 1 W. R. 48

KANAYE MOLLAH v. DEBNATH ROY
3 W. R., Act X, 161OOMADHUR BHUT v. MAHOMED LUTEFF
1 W. R. 229

GOKOOL PERSHAD v. RAJENDUR KISHORE SINGH . . . W. R. 1864, Act X, 4

47. ———— *Suit for confirmation of title and possession.* A suit for confirmation of the plaintiff's title and possession as shikmi talukhdar under the defendant is not cognizable under the Rent Act. BROJO SOONDUR MITTER v. RAM CHUNDER ROY . . . 2 W. R., Act X, 40

48. ———— *Suit for confirmation of possession by raiyat.* Suits by raiyats for confirmation of possession in a tenure which is threatened are not cognizable under the Rent Act. RITTOO RAJ RAE v. JUGGESHUR RAE . . . 1 N. W., Part 2, 40; Ed. 1873, 98

49. ———— *Suit by transferee for declaration of title as tenant.* A suit by the purchaser of a permanent transferable tenure for a declaration of his title as tenant to possession is not cognizable under the Act. NOBEEN KISHEN MOOKERJEE v. SHIB PERSHAD PUTTUCK . . . 8 W. R. 96

50. ———— *Suit where purchaser is opposed—Suit against zamindar by purchaser of transferable tenure.* A case where the zamindar opposes the entry of the purchaser of a transferable raiyat's tenure would come under the Rent Act. DEGUMBUREE DABEA v. SHAMASOONDUREE DEBEA . . . W. R. 1864, Act X, 81

51. ———— *Suit for land—Suit for declaration of right to share in produce of trees—Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 6.* A suit for the declaration of the right of the plaintiff to a share in the produce of certain trees, on the allegation that those trees were planted by a person whose rights had passed to the plaintiff by a bill of sale, is not cognizable under the Rent Act. RAMZAN ALI v. ANWAR ALI . . . 2 B. L. R. Ap. 19; 11 W. R. 52

52. ———— *Suit to establish right to use and cut trees.* Held, that a suit by a cultivator to establish his right to cut and make use of the trees situate on the borders of his holding was not a suit of the nature triable under the Rent Act. PUCHOOA v. MAHOMED TALA ASSUD-OOLLAH . . . 2 Agra 217

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1859 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*

53. ———— *Suit for maintaining possession.* There must have been ejection, therefore a suit for maintenance of possession in the holding from which the plaintiff was not actually ejected does not come within the Act. DOWLAT RAI v. GYA MISSEER . . . 2 Agra 95

54. ———— *Suit by holder of lease who has never been in possession.* Nor does a case where a plaintiff sued to recover possession of land of which he had never been in possession, but which he claimed under a pottah alleged to be valid, on the allegation that he had been illegally ejected. JODOO NATH GHOSE v. SOOKHMOYE DOSSEE . . . 1 W. R. 201

55. ———— *Suit by purchaser who has never obtained possession.* So with a purchaser of an under-tenure who has never obtained any real substantive possession. ANUND NATH ROY v. JUNMEJOY BISWAS . . . 8 W. R. 240

56. ———— *Ejection of cultivators—Dispossession of farmer.* The disturbing or dispossessing the cultivators is tantamount to ejecting and disturbing in the receipt of rent the farmer to whom they pay rent, for which a suit will lie under the Rent Act. LUNGUT MAHTOON v. RAMESHUR ROY . . . W. R. 1864, Act X, 54

57. ———— *Mode of dispossession.* It matters not how the ejectment is brought about, whether under colour of award of a Criminal Court or otherwise; so long as it is between landlord and tenant, the suit to recover possession can be brought under the Rent Act. MUTHOORANATH KOOND v. SAMEER-UDDEE MOLLAH . . . 1 W. R. 42

UMRIT LALL BANERJEE v. BHOOBUN MOHINEE DOSSEE . . . 7 W. R. 24

58. ———— *Dispossession irregularly made—Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 6.* Where a zamindar pursues his right to eject in a manner which is not legal, possession will be restored, although, if the zamindar had proceeded legally, he could have ejected his raiyat; such cases are contemplated by s. 23, cl. 6, of Act X of 1859, and Bengal Act VIII of 1859, s. 27. GUNGA GOBIND ROY v. KALA CHAND SURMA GANGOOLY . . . 20 W. R. 455

59. ———— *Suit to set aside illegal ejectment—Cause of action.* Where a tenant was restored to his holding by a decree to set aside the auction sale of his right: Held, that the cause of action for the tenant to sue under cl. 6, s. 23, Act X of 1859, arose on the zamindar's refusal to admit him into possession of his holding; and a suit brought within one year from the date of such refusal, which was practically an illegal ejectment by the zamindar, would not be barred under s. 30 of that enactment. LUCHMUN SINGH v. MAHOMED HOSSEIN . . . 1 Agra Rev. 42

60. ———— *Suit by tenant—Suit by shikmi talukhdar for possession.* A shikmi talukhdar may . . . 2 H

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

_____ s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*
sue under the Rent Act to recover possession. *RAJ CHUNDER SURMA GOSSAIN v. ALI NEWAZ KHAN*
W. R. 1864, Act X, 133

Provided he sue the zamindar, and not only in respect to a portion of his tenure. *HUR PERSHAD v. MATA BUKSH* . . . 3 W. R. Act X, 225

61. _____ *Suit by lakhirajdar.* A suit by a lakhirajdar does not come within the Act. *GOOROO PERSHAD ROY v. NIMAYE CHAND PULSHANI*
3 W. R. Act X, 5

62. _____ *Suit by patnidar.* But a suit by a patnidar against the zamindar may be brought under it. *THAKOOR DOSS MOZOOMDAR v. RADHA SOONDERY DOSSEE* . . . 2 W. R. Act X, 3

63. _____ *Suit by dar-maurasidar.* Where a zamindar sold a maurasi tenure for arrears of rent, and purchased it himself, and then evicted the dar-maurasidar, and made a fresh settlement for the tenure with a third party: *Held*, that a suit for ejectment by the dar-maurasidar against the zamindar was cognizable under the Rent Act. *WOOMA SUNKORY v. ALLY ASHRUFF*
W. R. 1864, Act X, 96

64. _____ *Suit by tenant with right of occupancy.* So is a suit to recover possession by a tenant with a right of occupancy, illegally ejected by the zamindar, with or without the assistance of the Collector. *RAM BHUJUN BHUKUT v. KETAYE RAM CHOWDHRY* . . . 6 W. R., Act X, 21

TARANATH BHUTTACHARJEE v. ORHOY CHURN HALDAR . . . 7 W. R. 471

65. _____ *Suit by tenant with right of occupancy.* Where plaintiffs alleged themselves to be tenants with rights of occupancy, and as such not liable to ejectment by defendant, the owner of the land, under a religious grant as alleged by them (plaintiffs): *Held*, that the suit was exclusively cognizable by the Revenue Court, under cl. 6, s. 23, Act X of 1859. *SEWAK RAM v. RAM BHAWAN OJHA* . . . 1 Agra 212

66. _____ *Suit to recover possession as heir of occupancy raiyat.* Where the plaintiff sues on the ground that having been in possession of, and cultivated, land of an occupancy raiyat during her lifetime, he is entitled to succeed to possession at her death, he might sue under the Rent Act; but when, never having been in possession, he claims as heir by Hindu law to succeed to the occupancy right, he should not. *PEM KOOR v. UPPER BALEE SINGH*
2 N. W. 86

67. _____ *Suit by zamindar to establish his right against maafeedar and for possession—Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 6.* *Held*, that the Rent Act, which refers to suits to recover occupancy in any land, farm, or tenure from which a raiyat, farmer, or tenant has been illegally ejected by a person entitled to receive the rent, does not apply to a suit brought by a zamindar against a maafeedar to

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

_____ s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*
establish his right as such, and to recover possession and malikana allowance secured to him at the time of settlement. *RADHA MOONEE v. KISHNA*
2 Agra, Pt. II, 188

68. _____ *Ejectment—Limitation—Suit for possession on declaration of title.* The only remedy for a party in the position of an occupancy raiyat, who alleges he has been ejected in contravention of the proviso to s. 22 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, is a suit on the ground of the illegal ejectment, and such a suit must, under s. 27, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, be brought within one year from the ejectment. *GOLABOLEE v. KOOTOS-BOOLLAH SIRCAR* . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 527

69. _____ *Suit to recover possession after ejectment.* Where a raiyat, having a mere right of occupancy in certain land, has been wrongfully dispossessed by the zamindar, his suit to recover possession must be brought, under s. 27 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, within one year from the date of dispossession. *BRINDABUN CHUNDER SIRCAR v. DHUNUNJOY NUSKUR*
I. L. R. 5 Calc. 246 : 4 C. L. R. 443

70. _____ *Possession under zur-i-peshgi mortgage—Landlord and tenant—Limitation.* Where the plaintiff claimed a right to enjoy possession of certain land for a term of years on the footing of a mortgage transaction (zur-i-peshgi), it having been a part of his contract with the mortgagor-defendants that he should repay himself money advanced by taking the rent reserved on the zur-i-peshgi lease during its pendency: *Held*, that the relation between the parties was different from that of landlord and tenant contemplated in Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 27, and that the suit could not be governed by the limitation prescribed in that law. *PARIAG DUTT ROY v. FEKOO ROY*
19 W. R. 160

71. _____ *Ejectment by a suit against person entitled to rent.* The only suits for recovery of possession that are cognizable under the Rent Act are suits by a tenant who has been illegally ejected by the person entitled to receive the rent of the land or tenure. *RAJ COOMAR SINGH v. RAJBUNSEE KOOR* . . . W. R. 1864, Act X, 108

LUCKEE PREEA DABEA v. JUGGODUMBA DABEA
3 W. R., Act X, 8

HOSSEINEE KHANUM v. RUBIA KHANUM
5 W. R., Act X, 14

DEBRANI DOSSI v. SHITAL KAREEGUR. NILUMBER SEN v. HARANUND SOOREE
W. R. 1864, Act X, 10

GOBIND MONI v. RAJENDRO KISHORE CHOWDHRY
15 W. R. 18

72. _____ *Suit against ijaradar—Act X of 1859, s. 30.* A suit on the ground of illegal ejectment can be brought where the defendant is the ijaradar entitled to the rents. *GOBIND MONEE v. RAJENDRO KISHORE CHOWDHRY* . . . 15 W. R. 18

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*

See BROJO MOHUN DE SIRCAR v. DENGU

7 C. L. R. 141

—a case under s. 27, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, where it was held that "person entitled to receive the rent" means "all the persons" if there are more than one; and when the suit was brought against one ijaradar only out of several, it was held that the section would not apply.

73. ————— *Ejection not directly by landlord.* To bring a case of ejection within the Rent Act, there must have been some direct act on the part of the person entitled to receive the rent towards ejecting the tenants, either personally or by his servants, or by joining with those who actually ejected them. JOYKISSEN MOOKERJEE v. MUDOOSOODUN KULLIAH

W. R. 1864, Act X, 90

WISE v. HURO CHUNDER SHAHA

6 W. R., Act X, 90

AMJAD ALI KHAN v. GHOLAM HYDER KHAN

1 W. R. 313

MODHOOSOODUN CHUCKERBUTTY v. NUFUR BAWAL

1 W. R. 196

74. ————— *Landlord and tenant—Limitation.* Where a landlord does not himself directly take steps to interfere with the rights of cultivation of his tenants, but does so through other persons, whose acts he may, if it so pleases him, afterwards ignore, he is not in a position to set up a special plea of limitation under the Rent Law (Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 27). KALLIDA PERSHAD DUTT v. RAM HARI CHUCKERBUTTY

I. L. R. 5 Cal. 317

75. ————— *Ejection not by zamindar.* A suit by plaintiff complaining of having been ejected by the defendants, who were not the zamindars of the land in dispute, or the persons entitled to collect rent from the plaintiff, cannot be entertained under the Rent Act. The mere allegation of the defendants that they were the zamindars, unless admitted to be true by the plaintiff, will not give jurisdiction under that Act. KISHUN MOHUN SINGH v. TOOLSEE SINGH

2 N. W. 102

RAM DEHUL PANDEY v. KASHER RAWUT

14 W. R. 232

HURISH CHUNDER ROY v. SEONASHEE DALAL

14 W. R. 466

76. ————— *Suit by raiyat for possession against transferees of zamindari.* The ownership of a zamindari having changed hands under a decree, a raiyat with a right of occupancy brought a suit on the ground of illegal dispossession by the new zamindars. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable under the Rent Act. SHEO PROKASH MISSEER v. FUKKER ROY

13 W. R. 20

77. ————— *Suit after ejection by purchaser from Government.* The Government purchased the zamindari rights in a pergunnah, under Regulation

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*

XXI of 1822, at a sale for arrears of Government revenue, and re-settled one of the talukhs in the pergunnah, which talukh had been created subsequently to the Decennial Settlement, with the plaintiffs as talukhdars. Subsequently, and after the expiration of the terms for which they had re-settled with the plaintiffs, the Government sold their zamindari rights to the defendant, who ejected the plaintiffs. In a suit by the plaintiffs for possession: *Held*, that it was properly brought under the Rent Act. ASSANOOLLAH v. OBBHOY CHURN ROY

13 W. R. P. C. 24; 18 Moo. I. A. 317

78. ————— *Suit against other than person entitled to rent.* If a tenant in a suit to recover possession of land from which he has been ejected finds it necessary to implead a person other than the person entitled to receive the rent of the land, he should not bring his suit under the Rent Act. RITTOO RAJ RAE v. JUGGESHUR RAE

1 N. W. Pt. II, 40; Ed. 1873, 98

NUFFER MYTEE v. MONOHUR SIRDAR

13 W. R. 334

AMRITA v. NUND KISHORE

2 Agra 333

BUSHEEROODDEEN v. DAL CHAND

3 Agra 236

As for instance, a person alleged to be in collusion with the zamindar to eject. SOWANTEE v. SEWA RAM

2 N. W. 35

MUGNEE ROY v. LALL KHOONEE LAL

6 W. R., Act X, 19

MADRUB CHUNDER DEY v. RAM DYAL GUHO

8 W. R. 303

MAHOMED JAKEE v. GOPEE ROY

10 W. R. 5

SREEKANT ROY CHOWDHRY v. KITABOODDEEN SIRDAR

10 W. R. 49

79. ————— *Suit by shikmi raiyat against tenants.* A suit by a shikmi cultivator, or under tenant, to recover possession of land from which he has been illegally ejected by the defendants, themselves only tenants, and not zamindars, is cognizable under the Act. JEY SINGH v. MOORLEE

2 N. W. 93; Agra F. B., Ed. 1874, 164

80. ————— *Suit for possession of land assigned as security for a loan—Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 6, and s. 25.* Neither cl. 6, s. 23, nor s. 25 of the Rent Act, applies to a suit for recovery of possession on expiry of assignment of land assigned over for a term of years as security for a loan and as the means for its repayment. KHETTUR MOHUN PAUL v. RAM COOMAR PAUL

5 W. R., Act X, 2

81. ————— *Suit against person entitled to rent for wrongful ejection—Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 6.* A, after the grant of a patni talukh to B, fraudulently granted a pottah of the same land to his own daughter, and by means thereof she

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—contd.s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*

intervened in a suit by *B* against a raiyat for rent, and prevented *B* from recovering in the suit. *Held*, that this was evidence to support a suit by *B* against *A* under Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 6, for illegally ejecting him from the tenure, and the pottah being a mere device. Notwithstanding the daughter was joined as a defendant in the suit, the suit could be entertained under the Rent Act. *HURRI DIAL CHUKKE v. BIRJESURREE DOSSEE*

Marsh. 604

82. ———— *Question of title—Ejectment—Limitation.* S. 27 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 applies only to such suits for possession as the Court is asked to decide irrespectively of any title, but simply on the ground that the plaintiffs have been ousted otherwise than by legal means. *FORBES v. SREE LAL JHA* . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 365

83. ———— *Suit for possession—Title—Limitation.* The limitation provisions of s. 27, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, have no application to a case in which the plaintiff relies upon his title, and seeks to recover possession upon the strength of that title, and in which the defendant denies that title. *Gooroo Doss Roy v. Ramnarain Mitter*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 628 : 7 W. R. 186, *Nistarinee v. Kali Pershad Dass Chowdhry*, 21 W. R. 53, and *Nil-madhuk Shaha v. Srinibash Kurnokar*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 442, referred to. *JOYUNTI DAS v. MAHOMED ALLY KHAN* . . . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 423

84. ———— *Landlord and tenant—Possession, Suit for, on dispossession by landlord—Title, claims for declaration of.* Where a suit by a tenant against his landlord is both in form and substance one to recover possession on the ground of illegal dispossession by the landlord, and no question of the plaintiff's title is raised, the insertion in the plaint of a claim for declaration of the plaintiff's title is not sufficient to prevent the application of the limitation prescribed by s. 27 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *Dhurjobutty Chowdrain v. Chumroo Mundul*, 25 W. R. 217, distinguished. *IMAM BUKSH MUNDUL v. MOHIN MUNDUL*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 280

85. ———— *Suit for possession on declaration of title—Limitation.* Where a suit was brought to recover possession of land of which plaintiff alleged that he was dispossessed by the zamindar in Jeyt 1281, and the zamindar rejoined that plaintiff had relinquished the greater portion of the land in suit in Bysack 1280, and was now barred by limitation:—*Held*, that, as this was a suit to recover possession by establishment of title, plaintiff was at liberty to bring it within twelve years, and was not barred by the lapse of one year. An objection of limitation is not most suitably sustained by evidence of relinquishment from a period the lapse of time from which exceeds the period of limitation. *DHURJOBUTTY CHOWDRAIN v. CHAMROO MUNDUL*

25 W. R. 217

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—contd.s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*

86. ———— *Suit for possession with mesne profits—Defendants—Title—Limitation.* A suit for possession of certain lands "by establishing the plaintiff's howla right," and for mesne profits, brought against a shareholder of the talukh in which the lands are situated, a former talukhdar, and certain raiyats who paid rent to the first defendant, is not a suit to recover the occupancy of the land from which the plaintiff has been illegally ejected by the person entitled to receive the rent, within the meaning of s. 27 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, and is not governed by the limitation provided by that section. *ASHANOLLAH v. RAMDHONE BHUTTACHARJEE* . . . I. L. R. 1 Calc. 325

87. ———— *Question of title—Limitation.* In a suit to recover possession of certain lands as the ancestral mairasi mukurari jote of the plaintiffs, from which they had been dispossessed by the defendant, the latter denied the dispossession and alleged that the plaintiffs had themselves relinquished the land in question. It was found, although the alleged title was not proved, that the plaintiffs had established an occupancy right, but had been dispossessed by the defendant. On appeal it was contended that the suit was barred under s. 27 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, as not having been brought within one year from the date of the dispossession. *Held*, that the suit involved a question of title, and that the limitation of a year prescribed by s. 27 of the Rent Act, therefore, did not apply. *TAMIZUDDIN MUNSHI v. HURO NATH PAL* . . . 9 C. L. R. 253

88. ———— *Suit for possession—Question of title—Limitation.* Where the plaintiff alleged that he was the holder of a jote under the defendant by whom he had been forcibly dispossessed, and sued for declaration of his title and for restoration to possession; and the defendant did not question the plaintiff's tenure nor his original title, but denied the forcible dispossession, and alleged that the plaintiff had relinquished the land: *Held*, that the suit was not one to try a question of title, but was governed by the one year's period of limitation prescribed by s. 27, Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *Jonardun Acharjee v. Haradun Acharjee*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 1020 : 9 W. R. 513, and *Imam Buksh Mondul v. Momin Mondul*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 280, approved. *SERNATH BHATTACHARJEE v. RAM RATAN DE* . . . I. L. R. 12 Calc. 606

89. ———— *Limitation—Suit for possession—Question of title.* Where the plaintiff alleged that he was the holder of a jote under the defendant by whom he had been forcibly dispossessed, and sued for a declaration of his title and for recovery of possession claiming a right of occupancy, and the defendant, while admitting that the plaintiff had for one or two years been a tenant of a small portion of the land in suit, denied his title to the remainder, or that he had acquired a right of occupancy:—*Held*, that the suit was one to try a *bona fide* question of title, and that it was not barred by one year's

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

— s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*contd.*
 limitation under s. 27 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, but was maintainable within 12 years from the date of the cause of action. *Srinath Battacharji v. Ram Ratan De*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 606, distinguished. *BASARUT ALI v. ALTAF HOSAIN*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 624

90. — *Wrongful distraint—Suit for damages—Act X of 1859, s. 143.* A suit for recovery of damages, by reason of wrongful distraint, is cognizable under s. 143 of the Rent Act, X of 1859, s. 99 (Bengal Act VIII of 1869). *RAM CHANDRA CHOWDHY v. SUBAL PATRO*

3 B. L. R. Ap. 74 : 11 W. R. 539

SHUMBHOONATH BANERJEE v. TARINEE CHURN BOSE 6 W. R., Act X, 33

91. — *Wrongful distraint—Act X of 1859, ss. 139, 143, and 323.* A distrainted the paddy of B, alleging that it belonged to C, who was A's raiyat. It was found that there was no relation of landlord and tenant between A and B, and that C was acting in collusion with A. B attempted, under s. 139, Act X of 1859, to get possession of the distrainted paddy from D and E, to whose custody it had been made over under s. 118 of Act X of 1859, but was unsuccessful. In a suit by B against A, C, D, and E for damages : *Held*, that the suit was one falling either under s. 139 or s. 143 of Act X of 1859, and came under s. 23 of that Act, and was cognizable under the Rent Act. All suits which are specially provided for by Act X of 1859, and which arise out of the exercise of the power of distraint, or out of any acts done under colour of the exercise of the said power, are within the provisions of s. 23 of that Act. *JOY LALL SHEIKH v. BROJONATH PAUL CHOWDHRY*

9 W. R. 162

92. — *Wrongful distraint—Suit for damages by under-tenant.* A suit for damages for an illegal distraint upon an under-tenant who has paid his rent, for rent due from his lessor to the superior landlord, lies under the Rent Act. *GHOLAM ALLY v. NUNDAYA* Marsh. 264 : 2 Hay 108

93. — *Wrongful distraint—Suit to set aside collusive decree for rent—Question of title.* A suit by A to set aside an alleged collusive decree for rent obtained by B against C, under which decree A was ejected from his lands and his crops seized, is distinguishable from a case of illegal distraint by a landlord. Such a suit raises a question of title, and should not be brought under the Rent Act. *GOOPENATH DUTT v. PREONATH SIRCAR*

6 W. R., Act X, 7

94. — *Wrongful distraint—Suit for property illegally distrainted.* A suit by a raiyat for the recovery of the value of his property illegally distrainted as the property of another raiyat is one which should be brought under the Rent Act. *RAM BHISTO ACHARJEE v. CHEYT LALL TEWARY*

15 W. R. 451

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

s. 27 (Act X of 1859, s. 30)—*concl.*

95. — *Wrongful distraint—Illegal distraint of crops—Suit for damages.* Certain sub-lessees sued the zamindar and others employed by him for the value of crops seized and carried away under a certificate, as was alleged by the defendants, granted to them by the Collector, but which they failed to produce. *Held*, that the suit was properly brought under the Rent Act. *RADHA MOHAN NASKAR v. JADU NATH DAS*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 261 : 12 W. R. 68

96. — *Wrongful distraint—Misappropriation of distrainted crops.* The Rent Act makes no provision for a case where, before the sale of the distrainted property, because the defaulter paid the debt demanded by the landlord, the crops distrainted and alleged by the plaintiff to be his were made over to the raiyat, who, the plaintiff stated, had misappropriated them. In such a case a suit for damages cannot be brought under that Act. *GUREBBOOLAH v. SYEFOOLLAH*

7 W. R. 41

1. — s. 28 (Act X of 1859, s. 31)
 — *Suit to determine rate of rent—Offer to give pottah—Conditional offer.* A suit under s. 28, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, asking the Court to determine the rate of rent which plaintiff is entitled to receive, and offering to execute a pottah at that rate, must be accompanied by an unconditional offer by the plaintiff to execute a pottah at the rate directed by the Court. The omission of such an offer is fatal to the claim, and plaintiff has no right to make it a condition to the execution of such a pottah that all previous arrears should be paid at the rates to be so fixed. *REHLY v. JUDOO NATH GHUTTUCK*

25 W. R. 175

2. — *Suit by co-parcener to assess sir land—Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 1.* *Held*, that a suit by plaintiff, a co-parcener in the land in question, against another co-parcener holding as his sir land, to assess the same, was not one cognizable under the Rent Act. *JODHA SINGH v. OMAD SINGH*

2 Agra Rev. 5

3. — *Resumption, effect of—Creation of tenancy.* In a suit in a Civil Court a decree was obtained in 1863, declaring the land of the defendant "to be resumed and subject to assessment of revenue, the amount to be fixed by the Collector :—" *Held*, that the decree was conclusive ; that the lands were not considered mal at the time of the settlement in 1790 ; and, further, that their resumption in 1863 did not create a tenancy, and that therefore s. 28 of Act VIII of 1869 did not apply. *FORBES v. BHUJLOO ROY*

6 C. L. R. 301

s. 29 (Act X of 1859, s. 32).

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 110 (1859, s. 1, CL. 8).

1. — *Suit for rent.* The limitation in a suit for arrears of rent brought under the Rent Act, X of 1859, was that provided by s. 32 of that Act, and not that provided by Act XIV of 1859

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 29 (Act X of 1859, s. 32)—*contd.*

UNNODA PERSAUD MOOKERJEE v. KRISTO COOMAR MOTTRA . . . 15 B. L. R. P. C. 60 note
19 W. R. 5

POULSON v. MODHUSUDAN PAL CHOWDHRY
B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 101:
2 W. R., Act X, 21

2. ———— *Special period of limitation.* The period of limitation specified in Act X of 1859 has reference exclusively to suits brought under that Act. PROSONNO COOMAR PAL CHOWDHRY v. MUDDUN MOHUN PAL CHOWDHRY

11 B. L. R. Ap. 31 note: 13 W. R. 390

SURBESSUR DEY v. MAHOMED SIRCAR
7 W. R. 243

3. ———— *Computation of time according to English calendar.* Held, in accordance with former decisions of the High Court, that, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation prescribed by s. 29 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, the calculation is to be made according to the English calendar. MAHOMED ELAHEE BUKSH v. BROJOKISHORE SEN . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 497
3 C. L. R. 398

And "month" means a calendar month. LUCH-MEETUP SINGH BAHADOOR v. RAJCOOMAREE DABEA
23 W. R. 275

KASHEE PERSHAD SEN NEOGEE v. JAMIR PAKAR
2 C. L. R. 265

SARODA PERSHAD GANGULI v. PATIALI MAHANTI
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 913

4. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 32—Construction of "after passing of the Act."* The words in Act X of 1859, s. 32, limiting suits for arrears of rent due at the passing of the Act to a period of "three years after the passing of the Act" refer to the date when the Act passed, and not to the subsequent date fixed for its coming into operation. PEARY MOHUN DOSS v. MCARTHUR . . . Marsh. 637

MORAN v. BINDUBASINEE DEBIA
W. R. 1864, Act X, 5

WATSON v. RUTNOKANT ROY
W. R. 1864, Act X, 19

5. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 32—Suit brought for period preceding Act.* When a suit was brought within three years from the passing of Act X of 1859, for arrears of rent of 1266 to 1269, and three months of 1269: Held, that the suit was not barred by limitation under s. 32, and that the claim for the arrears of 1266, which were not due till 1267, was in time, though that was a period preceding the passing of the Act. MASHISHUREE DOSSEE v. RAM SAGUR SINGH . . . W. R. 1864, Act X, 69

6. ———— *Act X of 1859, ss. 30 and 32—Suit for arrears of rent after enhancement.* A landlord, having obtained a decree for enhancement against his tenant, sued him for arrears of rent. Held (with reference to ss. 30 and 32 of Act X of 1859),

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 29 (Act X of 1859, s. 32)—*contd.*

that the suit might be brought within one year from the date of the final decree fixing the rent in the suit for enhancement, or within three years from the end of the month of Jeyt of the Fusli or Willayati year for which such rent was claimed. JOYMONTEE DASEE v. HURRONATH ROY

2 W. R., Act X, 51

See HURRONATH ROY v. GOOROO DOSS BISWAS
3 W. R., Act X, 19

7. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 32—Suit for arrears of rent—Cause of action.* An arrear of rent is not due within the meaning of s. 32, Act X of 1859, until the rent itself has been determined. COMUL LOCHUN ROY v. MORAN

2 W. R., Act X, 82

8. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 32—Suit for arrears of rent.* Act X of 1859 does not authorize the recovery of only three years' rent. Thus, where a suit was commenced within three years from the end of the Bengal year 1268, the plaintiff was held entitled to recover the whole of that year's rent. DOORGA DOSS CHATTERJEE v. NOBIN MOHUN GHOSAL . . . 6 W. R., Act X, 63

9. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 32—Suit for arrears of rent.* S. 32, Act X of 1859, does not authorize the recovery of only three years' rent, but requires suits for the recovery of rents to be instituted within three years from the end of the Bengali or Fusli year, as the case may be. GOSSAIN UMUR NARAIN POOREE v. ARURUT LALL alias BABOO JAN . . . 7 W. R. 301

10. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 32—Suit for arrears of rent.* Under s. 32, Act X of 1859, the rent of any portion of one year (1273) is recoverable at any time up to the last day of the third year (1276) after its close. BYKUNT RAM ROY v. SHURFOONISSA BEGUM . . . 15 W. R. 523

11. ———— *Award of damages in former suit—Cause of action.* Where rents are not sued for within three years from the end of the year for which they are alleged to be due, the fact that damages were awarded against the plaintiff in a former suit for not giving receipts for that year will not create a cause of action. HURO PERSHAD ROY CHOWDHRY v. WOOMA TARA DEBEE
15 W. R. 194

12. ———— *Suit to contest enhancement of rent.* Where a raiyat's suit contesting a notice of enhancement was dismissed, and the dismissal confirmed in special appeal in the month of May, the landlord's suit, brought in December of the same year, for rent at an enhanced rate, according to notice, was held to be barred by s. 32, Act X of 1859. HUREE KISHORE GHOSE v. KOMODINEE KANT BANERJEE . . . 10 W. R. 41

13. ———— *Suit for arrears of rent.* The words of s. 29, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, are intended to apply, specially and exclusively of Act XIV of 1859, to the same class of cases as those to which.

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 29 (Act X of 1859, s. 32)—*contd.*

s. 32, Act X of 1859, applied, though that class cannot now be defined, as it formerly could, by reference to the jurisdiction of the Court in which the cases fall to be entertained. The class is limited to suits for arrears of rent simply, as "arrears of rent" are defined in s. 21, Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *GOBIND COOMAR CHOWDHRY v. MANSON*

15 B. L. R. 56: 23 W. R. 152

14. ——— *Suit for arrears at enhanced rates—Limitation.* The intention of s. 29 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 is that a suit for arrears at enhanced rates should not be deferred beyond the third month after the year for which enhancement is claimed. *GLASSCOTT v. RAJCHUNDER MOOCHY MUNDUL*

25 W. R. 381

15. ——— *Suit for compensation for land.* A suit to make the defendant liable for compensation in the shape of rent for the land which he held in the name of his servant is not a suit for rent to which s. 29 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 applies. *KISHENBUTTY MISRAIN v. ROBERTS*

16 W. R. 287

16. ——— *Suit for arrears of rent—Act XIV of 1859, s. 1, cl. 16—Pro forma defendants—Limitation.* The plaintiffs sued the defendants, who were ijaradars of the property in which they were co-sharers, for arrears of rent extending over a period of six years. The suit was first brought in the Revenue Court, and as their co-sharers had not joined in the suit, the plaintiffs made them defendants, and their being defendants preventing the plaintiffs from continuing the suit in the Revenue Court, they instituted it afresh in the Civil Court after Bengal Act VIII of 1869 came into operation. The defendants objected that, under the limitation provided by s. 29 of that Act, no more than three years' rent could be recovered; but the Judge held, affirming the decision of the Munsif, that the case was governed by cl. 16, s. 1, Act VIII of 1869, and that six years' rent could be decreed. *Held*, on special appeal to the High Court, that the fact of the co-sharers being made *pro forma* defendants did not alter the real character of the suit, which was to recover arrears of rent, and that, therefore, the provisions of s. 29, Act VIII of 1869, were applicable, and a decree for three years' rent only was given. *GUNGA GOBIND SEN v. GOBIND CHUNDER DASS*

11 B. L. R. Ap. 31: 19 W. R. 347

17. ——— *Suit for arrears of rent—Limitation.* The period of limitation within which a suit for arrears of rent may, under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 29, be instituted, must, in the absence of any special agreement, be calculated from the last day of the year following the expiration of the year for which such rent is claimed. *WOOMESH CHUNDER BOSE v. SOORJEE KANTO ROY CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 713: 6 C. L. R. 49

18. ——— *Suit for arrears of rent—Limitation.* The last day on which a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent can be instituted under s. 29,

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X CF 1859)—*contd.*s. 29 (Act X of 1859, s. 32)—*contd.*

Bengal Act VIII of 1869, is the last day of the third year from the close of the year in which the rent became payable. The word "arrear" in that section means "rent in arrear." *Woomesh Chunder Bose v. Soorjee Kanto Roy Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 713: 6 C. L. R. 49, overruled. *KASIKANT BHUTTACHARJI v. ROHINIKANT BHUTTACHARJI* I. L. R. 6 Calc. 225: 7 C. L. R. 342

19. ——— *Suit for arrears of rent—Suit against registered tenant.* A suit having been brought in 1284 for arrears of rent of a dar-patni for the years 1281-83 and part of 1284 against A as the widow and heiress of the former dar-patnidar, who died in 1256, A pleaded that she was not the representative of her husband, as in 1276 she had adopted a son. Whereupon, in 1285, more than three years from the time the rent of 1281 became due, the son was made a defendant. It appeared that from the time of her husband's death A had allowed her own name to remain on the sherista of the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs had no notice of the adoption. *Held*, reversing the decision of the lower Appellate Court, that the claim for the rent for the year 1281 was not barred as against A and the tenure, but that no decree could be made against the son in respect of it. *DWARKANATH MITTER v. NOBONGO MONJORI DASS*

7 C. L. R. 233

20. ——— *Suit for arrears of rent—Limitation.* It having been decided in a former case that the zamindar's claim against defendants for the rent of 1271, being a suit for arrears of rent recoverable upon a liability arising out of matters not within the cognizance of a Revenue Court, was not governed by the special limitation prescribed by s. 32, Act X of 1859, but by the ordinary law of limitation, Act XIV of 1859: *Held*, that the zamindar's present claim of a precisely similar nature against the same parties in respect of the year 1272 was not barred by the special limitation prescribed by s. 29, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, corresponding to s. 32, Act X of 1859. *PROSUNNO COOMAR PAL CHOWDHRY v. RAMDHUN CHATTERJEE*

18 W. R. 8

21. ——— *Suit for arrears of rent—Limitation.* Certain suits brought in the Collector's Court for rent of 1270 and subsequent years having been dismissed in consequence of the defendant's plea that the whole of the estate had been resumed, and that there was no distinct land for which plaintiff was entitled to any separate rent, plaintiff was obliged to bring a civil suit to establish his right to recover those rents. Having obtained a decree he brought a suit for arrears of rent from 1271 to 1279, but obtained a decree for the rents of three years only, the cause of action for the years previous to 1277 having been considered to be barred. *Held*, that this decision was right, as there was nothing to prevent the plaintiff from including in the civil suit which he brought, or any previous suit, a claim for

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

— s. 29 (Act X of 1859, s. 32)—*contd.*
rent as well as for declaration of right. **BURODA KANT ROY v. CHUNDER COOMAR ROY**
23 W. R. 281

22. — Act X of 1859, s. 32—*Suit to recover rent in cash and kind with declaration of plaintiff's right.* A suit to recover rent in cash and kind which comprehended a claim to have a particular share of the rent declared as the property of the plaintiff was held to be one which a Collector, acting under Act X of 1859, would have refused to entertain, and therefore to be governed not by the limitation prescribed by Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 29, but by the ordinary law of limitation. **HEERA SINGH v. MEER AKBUR ALI** . . . 24 W. R. 382

23. — Act X of 1859, s. 32—*Pendency of suit for enhancement—Limitation.* The three years' limitation provided by s. 32, Act X of 1859, is in general terms, and does not admit of any exceptions, *e.g.*, the pendency of a suit for enhancement for 1265 will not save limitation in respect to the rent for 1266. **NOBOKANTH DEY v. BORODAKANTH ROY** . . . 1 W. R. 100

DAKHINA DABEA v. ROMESH CHUNDER DUTT
1 W. R. 142

24. — *Grant of perwanah—Contingency*
When a person lets land under a kabuliati, and subsequently grants a perwannah, undertaking not to ask for rent till a certain contingency occurs, the perwannah will not alter the original agreement so far as to prevent limitation applying to a suit for rent. **BEBEE v. MAHOMED GHONSI**
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 31

25. — Act X of 1859, s. 32—*Cause of action—Suit for enhancement of arrears of rent.* A suit for arrears of rent at an enhanced rate, brought more than three years after the rent had accrued due, was held to be barred by lapse of time under s. 32 of Act X of 1859, notwithstanding that it was commenced within one year from the date of a decree made in a suit brought in the Civil Court declaring that the plaintiff was entitled to enhance. The cause of action was the non-payment of the rent at the enhanced rate, and not the declaration of the Civil Court that the plaintiff had a right to enhance. **DOYAMOYE CHOWDRANEE v. BHOLAKANTH GHOSE**
B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 592 : 6 W. R., Act X, 77

26. — Act X of 1859, s. 32—*Suit for arrears of rent.* The plaintiff had sued the defendant at the end of the year 1272 to recover arrears of rent for 1271, and to eject him for non-payment. The litigation lasted till 1276, when the plaintiff obtained a decree, which, however, was not executed, as the defendant paid the amount and costs within fifteen days. In 1276 the plaintiff brought this suit to recover the rents of 1272 and of subsequent years. *Held*, that the plaintiff's claim for the rents of 1272 was not barred by the lapse of

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

— s. 29 (Act X of 1859, s. 32)—*contd.*
three years, under s. 32, Act X of 1859. **DINDAYAL PARAMANIK v. RADHA KISHORI DEBI**
8 B. L. R. 536 : 17 W. R. 415

ISHAN CHANDRA ROY v. KHAJA ASHANULLA
8 B. L. R. 537 note : 16 W. R. 79

(*Contra.*) **MADHUB CHUNDER GHOSE v. RADHIKA CHOWDHRAIN** . . . 7 W. R. 405

Rejecting review of same case in
6 W. R., Act X, 42

HURONATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. GOLUCKNATH CHOWDHRY . . . 19 W. R. 18

27. — Act X of 1859, s. 32—*Sale for arrears of rent—Sale afterwards set aside—Subsequent suit for arrears of rent.* A, a zamindar, sold the rights of B, his patnidar, for arrears of rent under Regulation VIII of 1819. This sale was subsequently set aside at the suit of B for irregularity. A then sued B for the arrears under Act X of 1859, and B raised the defence that the suit was barred, more than three years having elapsed from the close of the year in which the arrears became due. *Held* (reversing the decision of the High Court), that, upon the setting aside of the patni sale, the patnidar took back the estate subject to the obligation to pay the rent, and that the particular arrears of rent claimed must be taken to have become due in the year in which that restoration to possession took place, and plaintiff could sue within three years from the close of that year. **SWARNAMAYI v. SHASHI MUKHI BARMANI**
2 B. L. R. P. C. 10 : 11 W. R. P. C. 5 : 12 Moo. I. A. 244

28. — *Suit for arrears of rent—Allowance of time occupied by suit for ejectment.* Where limitation is pleaded in a suit for arrears of rent, deduction must be allowed to the landlord for the time he was suing to eject defendant as trespassers. **ESHAN CHUNDER ROY v. KHAJAH ASSANOULLAH**
16 W. R. 79

29. — Act X of 1859, s. 32—*Suit for arrears of rent—Assignment of rent in payment of bond.* Plaintiff, a zamindar, being indebted on a bond, gave the bond-holder an assignment on the patnidars for the greater portion of the patni rent to be paid to the bond-holder until the debt was liquidated. The bond-holder, not receiving his money, sued the zamindar in the Small Cause Court, whereupon the zamindar brought this suit against the patnidars for the rent due. The lower Appellate Court, reversing the decision of the first Court, held that the claim for the rent of 1273 was not barred by limitation, because brought within three years from the time that plaintiff knew of the non-payment of the rent by defendants. *Held*, upon the principle of the decision of the Privy Council in *Swarnamayi v. Shashi Mukhi Barmani*, 2 B. L. R. P. C. 10 : 11 W. R. P. C. 5, that plaintiff was

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

s. 29 (Act X of 1859, s. 32)—*contd.*
entitled to recover the rent of 1273. MOHES CHUNDER CHAKLADAR v. GUNGAMONEE DOSSEE

18 W. R. 59

30. ———— *Suit delayed pending final decision as to rent.* A previous suit was brought in 1859, which was not finally decided in appeal by the High Court until December 1855, the effect of which decision was to take the talukh then in dispute out of the class of those protected by s. 51, Regulation VIII, 1793, and to make it liable to enhancement. *Held*, that the plaintiff's cause of action for rent did not accrue until ascertainment of the rent by that decision, and that her present suit for about five years' rent from 1st July 1859, having been brought within one year from the date of that decision, could be maintained. MADHUB CHUNDER GHOSE v. RADHKA CHOWDHRAIN. 6 W. R., Act X, 42

31. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 32—Suit for arrears of rent—Deduction of time when bonâ fide suing defendant as a trespasser.* A landlord can be allowed a deduction in respect of limitation for the time he is suing a tenant as a trespasser, only when he is acting under a bonâ fide belief that the tenant is a trespasser, and not in suits when, from the circumstances of the case, he must have known of the defendant's right to hold as a tenant. HUONATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. GULUCKNATH CHOWDHRY

19 W. R. 18

32. ———— *Tenancy in abeyance—Res judicata—Limitation.* A, the zamindar, granted a patni lease of certain talukhs to B, who assigned it to C and D. On B's death, C and D applied to the Collector for registration of the patnitalukh in their names as assignees of B. A objected to the registration on the ground that the lease insured only for the life of B. A's objection being overruled, he instituted a regular suit to eject C and D, the present defendants, which was decided against A finally by the Privy Council in 1874. During the pendency of this litigation, the zamindar sued to recover the rent for the year 1868, not upon the basis of the patni lease, but for use and occupation, treating the tenants as mere trespassers. This suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff ought to have sued on the lease. In 1875 the plaintiff brought the present suit for the rent of 1868 on the patni lease. The defendants pleaded *res judicata* and limitation. The plaintiff contended that the suit was within time on the ground that the right to recover the rent was in suspense during the pendency of the litigation regarding the lease. *Held*, that the suit, though not *res judicata*, was barred under s. 29 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869. Swarnamayi v. Shashi Mukhi Bramani, 2 B. L. R. P. C. 10, distinguished. WATSON & Co. v. DHONENDRA CHUNDER MOOKERJEE

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 6

33. ———— *Deduction of time whilst another suit was pending—Limitation.* A sued for enhancement of rent of certain lands for a specified year.

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

s. 29 (Act X of 1859, s. 32)—*contd.*

On the dismissal of this suit, A more than five years after the rent fell due, sued for arrears of rent for the same year. *Held*, that A was not entitled to deduct the time occupied in the conduct of his enhancement suit from the period which elapsed since the rent first fell due in order to bring his case within the period of limitation prescribed for such last mentioned suits by s. 29 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869. BROJENDRO COOMAR ROY v. RAKHAL CHUNDER ROY

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 791

34. ———— *Limitation—Holiday.* A rent suit under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 must be brought strictly within the term of three years prescribed by s. 29 of that Act, which contains the only law of limitation applicable to the case. Where, therefore, the last day of the term so fixed was a close holiday, and the plaint in such a suit was filed on the following day: *Held*, that, inasmuch as s. 29 contains no provision for relaxing the terms fixed by it, such as is contained in the general law of limitation, the suit was barred. PURRAN CHUNDER GHOSE v. MUTTY LALL GHOSE JAHIRA

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 50 : 2 C. L. R. 543

35. ———— *Limitation—Suit for arrears of rent.* After the expiration of the period prescribed by s. 29 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, a plaintiff suing for arrears of rent cannot insist on the pendency of another suit, brought by him for possession of the land, as preventing limitation from running, where there has been no time during which such rent could not have been recovered if he had acted on his right of suing for it. In Rani Surnomoyee v. Shoshee Mookhee Burmonia, 12 Moo. I. A. 244 : 2 B. L. R. P. C. 10, the claimant of rent was, until the setting aside of the sale that had taken place, in the position of a person whose claim had been satisfied. The right to sue in that case had been suspended, and it was therefore distinguishable from the present. The plaintiff's ancestor purchased a talukh from the Government, subject to an ijara therein held by the defendants, which expired in 1866. A suit brought by the plaintiff in 1874 for possession was dismissed finally in 1876, the defendant's claim to remain in possession under another tenure being allowed. The plaintiff in 1876 sued the defendants for arrears of rent for the years 1866—1872. *Held*, that the suit was barred under s. 29, notwithstanding the proceedings of 1874. HURO PERSHAD ROY v. GOPAL DAS DUTT

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 255 : 12 C. L. R. 129 :
L. R. 9 I. A. 82

Affirming the decision of the High Court in HURO PROSAD ROY v. GOPAL DOSS DUTT

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 817 : 2 C. L. R. 450

36. ———— *Limitation—Suit for arrears of rent.* The defendant held a patni in respect of a share in a zamindari, which share was held and the patni granted by a Hindu widow, who died in Pous 1281. The plaintiffs were the heirs who succeeded to the zamindari on the death of the

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

— s. 29 (Act X of 1859, s. 32)—*concl'd.*
 widow. In Pous 1284 they brought a suit against the defendant for the purpose of setting aside the patni, and on the 16th Pous 1285 obtained a decree declaring the patni invalid, and giving them khas possession with mesne profits. This decree was, however, reversed on appeal on the 6th Srabun 1288, and their suit was dismissed. In a suit for arrears of rent from 1282 to 1288 : *Held*, that the plaintiff was not protected from the operation of the law of limitation during the pendency of his suit to set aside the patni, and that his suit was barred except as to the arrears accruing within three years preceding the suit. *Hurro Pershad Roy v. Gopal Doss Dutt*, 1. L. R. 9 Cal. 255, followed. *Rani Surnomoyee v. Shoshi Mookhi Burmania*, 2 B. L. R. P. C. 10, distinguished. *SHERIFF v. DINA NATH MOOKERJEE*

I. L. R. 12 Cal. 258

— s. 30 (Act X of 1859, ss. 24 and 33).

See JURISDICTION OF REVENUE COURT.

13 W. R. 433

A suit under the Rent Act, X of 1859, s. 24, was not maintainable, unless the defendant was an agent or servant employed in the management of lands or collection of rents. The Bengal Rent Act, 1869, however, does not define who are agents.

1. — Agent, suit against—*Suit for papers in possession of sadar amlahs*. It was held that a suit for papers in the possession of sadar amlahs employed in keeping the books of the office, and in performing the other duties incidental to the office of sadar amlahs and not mofussil amlahs, was not one cognizable under the former Act. *MOHEN-DRONARAIN SINGH v. LALLA RUTTUN*

Marsh. 239 : 2 Hay 278

OODOY NARAIN SIRCAR v. KRISTO CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHEY . . . 13 W. R. 433

2. — Agent, suit against—*Tehsildar*. A suit to recover from defendant rent collected by him for the plaintiffs as their tehsildar, for the due performance of which office he had bound himself by agreement under security, was held to be maintainable under the Rent Act, 1859. *GRANT v. RAM TONOO BHOOMICK* . . . 10 W. R. 83

SHRISTEEDHUR BOSE v. SHAMA CHURN GHOSE . . . 14 W. R. 53

3. — Agent, suit against—*Tehsildar*. A claim for moneys collected by the defendant as plaintiff's tehsildar was held to be one cognizable under the Rent Act, and the fact that the matter was referred to arbitration and an award made was held to make no difference. *SHOSHEE MOHAN SHAHA v. SHEER SIRCAR* . 5 W. R., Act X, 13

4. — Agent, suit against—*Naib or gomashtha*. The suit of a zamindar against a naib or a gomashtha for papers, accounts, and moneys

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

— s. 30 (Act X of 1859, ss. 24 and 33)—*contd.*

collected, is cognizable under the Rent Act. *KALEE NATH GHOSAL v. CHUNDEE CHURN SIRCAR*

10 W. R. 51

See, however, *KADUMBINEE DOSSEE v. BHUGO-BUTTY CHURN GHOSE* . . . 10 W. R. 7

5. — Agent, suit against—*General manager*. Where an agent was employed as the manager of a trading business and as a general manager, and in that capacity received rents collected by sub-agents employed by the zamindar — *Held*, that a suit for rendition of accounts against such agent was not cognizable under the Rent Act. *BUTAS KOONWAR v. JANKEE PERSHAD*

3 Agra 292

6. — Agent, suit against—*Agent and sureties*. A suit by a zamindar against an agent and his sureties for money received by the agent in collection of the rents of the zamindari should be brought under the Rent Act. *WOOZEER ALI v. DOORGA CHURN ROY* . 5 W. R., Act X, 79

7. — Agent, suit against—*Suit for accounts from heir of agent*. *Semble*: A suit for the delivery of accounts under the Rent Act, X of 1859, lay against the heir of an agent, the Act being intended to facilitate the recovery of accounts by zamindars, and to make the heir of an agent equally responsible with the agent. *GOWHAR HOSSEIN v. RAM COOMAR CHOWDHRY*

8 W. R. 481

8. — Agent, suit against—*Suit against agent for rent received and misappropriated*. An agent may be sued under the Rent Act for rents received by him, whether or not he has committed, with respect to such rents, an offence under the Penal Code. *SKINNER v. RUJUB ALI KHAN*

2 W. R., Act X, 105

9. — Act X of 1859, s. 33—*Agent, suit against—Accounts*. S. 33, Act X of 1859, gives the benefit of the extended period of limitation to a man who shows reasonable diligence, but not to one who, having the means of knowledge, carelessly neglects to investigate the accounts. *DHANPUT SINGH DOGAR v. RAHMAN MANDAL*

2 B. L. R. A. C. 269 : 11 W. R. 163

s. c., before remand.

2 B. L. R. A. C. 270 note : 9 W. R. 329

10. — *Discovery of fraud—Agency—Suit for an account and for money misappropriated by agent*. Where the plaintiff alleged that the fraud committed by the agent came to his knowledge on a certain date, and the suit was brought within one year from such date and within three years from the termination of the agency : *Held*, that the case came within the proviso of s. 33 of Act X of 1859, and the suit was not barred by limitation. *Held*, further, that in suits for money misappropriated by an agent where fraudulent accounts have been rendered, the plaintiff has an extended period

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 30 (Act X of 1859, ss. 24 and 33)—*contd.*

of limitation of one year which, in the words of s. 33 of Act X of 1859, runs from the time when the fraud is first known to him; but in any particular case the Court, having regard to the nature of the fraud, the facility with which it may be known, and the likelihood of attention being called to it, may infer such knowledge when the means of knowledge first come, or have for a reasonable time been, within the plaintiff's reach or, in other words, may hold the plaintiff fixed with constructive knowledge of the fraud. The Court must, therefore, in every such case, ascertain when the plaintiff first had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the fraud. *Mackintosh v. Woomes Chunder Bose*, 3 W. R., Act X, 121, *Dhampur Singh v. Rohaman Mundul*, 11 W. R. 163, and 9 W. R. 329, and *Huree Mohun Gookoo v. Anund Chunder Mookerjee*, 5 W. R., Act X, 63, referred to. *NILMONI SINGH DEO v. NILU NAIK*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 425

11. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 33—Suit on account stated—Agent.* By s. 33 of Act X of 1859, "suits for the recovery of money in the hands of an agent, or for the delivery of accounts or papers by an agent, may be brought at any time during the agency, or within one year after the determination of the agency of such agent." *Held*, where an agent was dismissed, and after such dismissal rendered an account showing a balance due to the landholder, that a suit for such money might be maintained, notwithstanding the lapse of more than a year from the dismissal of the agent before the suit was commenced, because a cause of action arose out of the admitted balance of account. *Semble*: That a suit may be maintained upon such account stated, in which the period of limitation would be regulated, not by Act X of 1859, but by Act XIV of 1859. *Semble*: If the account so rendered were fraudulent, then the latter clause of s. 33 of Act X of 1859, that "if any fraudulent account shall have been rendered by the agent, the suit may be brought within one year from the time when the fraud shall have been first known to such person," would apply to extend the time.

CHOWDHRY CHATTERPAL SINGH v. FOUZDAR ROY
Marsh. 405: 2 Hay 509

See PEAREE MOHUN GHOSE v. JARDINE, SKINNER & Co. 22 W. R. 333

12. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 33—Suspension of agent—Determination of agency.* If a principal suspends an agent, the agency must be held to have been determined within the meaning of s. 33, Act X of 1859. *MUDDUN MOHUN ROY v. GOFEE MOHUN ROY* W. R., 1864, Act X, 8

MAHATAB CHAND v. JUDOO MOHUN MITTER
5 W. R., Act X, 91

13. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 33—Suit against agent and surety of agent.* A suit by a zamindar against his agent and the agent's surety for money improperly and fraudulently charged by the agent in his accounts is barred if not brought

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 30 (Act X of 1859, ss. 24 and 33)—*contd.*

within one year from the rendering of the accounts which is the time of the accruing of the plaintiff's cause of action, he then having the means of knowing of the fraud. *MACKINTOSH v. WOOMESH CHUNDER BOSE* 3 W. R., Act X, 121

HURO CHURN NARAIN SINGH v. ROOCHEE DOBER
6 W. R., Act X, 30

14. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 33—Suit against surety of agent for losses occasioned by embezzlement.* A suit under Act X of 1859 against the surety of an agent employed in the collection of rents, for losses occasioned by the embezzlement of his principal, is not governed by the period of limitation prescribed by s. 33 of the Act, but by that prescribed by s. 30, namely, "one year from the date of the accruing of the cause of action." *BEELASMONEE v. NUSSEEROLAH*

Marsh. 410: 2 Hay 510

15. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 33—Admission of amount by agent—Cause of action.* The principal acquires no fresh cause of action against the agent from the date on which the agent admitted the amount which was due from him, and executed an agreement to pay it. *MAHATAB CHAND v. JUDOO MOHUN MITTER* 5 W. R., Act X, 91

16. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 33—Fraud preventing knowledge of rights.* In a suit against an agent under s. 33, Act X of 1859, where fraud is alleged, before applying the limitation prescribed by that section, the plaintiff should have an opportunity of proving that by the fraud of the defendant he was kept from a knowledge of his rights. *RAM KANT CHOWDHRY v. BROJO MOHUN MOZOOMDAR* 6 W. R., Act X, 20

17. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 33—Cause of action—Suspension of agent.* In a suit for the recovery of money in the hands of an agent, the limitation prescribed by s. 33, Act X of 1859, counts from the date of the suspension of the agent. *RADHIKA PERSHAD CHATTERJEE v. RAMDHUN POOROHEET* 6 W. R., Act X, 27

18. ———— *Act X of 1859, ss. 30 and 33—Claim against sureties of deceased agent for misappropriation of money.* S. 30, and not s. 33, Act X of 1859, is applicable to the case of sureties of a deceased agent against whom a claim is made for money appropriated by him, and the cause of action accrues from the time when the plaintiff had means of knowing what was the amount due to him from the deceased agent,—i.e., from the date on which his accounts were put in by his sureties, and not from the date of his death. *PUREE SOONDEEY DEBIA v. BHOLANATH ROODRO* 8 W. R. 159

19. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 33—Fraud—Cause of action.* In a suit against an agent for moneys received on plaintiff's account, in which defendant set up a plea of limitation, plaintiff sought to extend the period of limitation on the ground that fraudulent accounts were delivered

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

_____ s. 30 (Act X of 1859, ss. 24 and 33)—*contd.*

Held, that the Judge should have found specifically when the fraud was first known to the plaintiff; limitation in such a case running from the date of knowledge of the fraud, not merely from that of suspicion of the fraud, or of delivery of accounts. *DHUNPUT SINGH DOOGUR v. RUHMAN MUNDUL*

9 W. R. 329

2 B. L. R. A. C. 270 note

HUREE MOHUN GOOHOO v. ANUND CHUNDER MOOKERJEE . . . 5 W. R., Act X, 63

20. _____ Act X of 1859, s. 33—*Suit against surety of deceased agent.* In a suit by the manager of a factory to recover from a surety certain sums collected as rent by a deceased patwali, in which suit the defendant pleaded limitation: *Held*, that plaintiff was not entitled to reckon the year which the law gave him to bring the suit from the date on which he acquired from the surety information of the state of his accounts. If a person's ignorance of the state of his accounts is owing to his own negligence, he can claim no benefit under s. 33, Act X of 1859. *BIDDELL v. CHUTTERDHAREE LALL*

12 W. R. 116

21. _____ *Suit against agent for accounts.* A suit under s. 30, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, against a gomashtha to obtain accounts after the agency has determined, must be brought within a year from such determination. The proviso in that section refers to suits for money, and under that proviso, where a fraudulent account has been given in by the agent, concealing the fact of the receipt of certain moneys, the zamindar has one year from the discovery of the fraud to bring his suit for such money. *JAN ALI CHOWDHRY v. ISHAN CHUNDER SEIN*

16 W. R. 149

22. _____ *Suit to contest an account against gomashtha.* In a suit to contest an account brought, against a gomashtha under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, the only ground on which the plaintiff can claim an allowance of time beyond the period of limitation provided in s. 30 is by showing that there was fraud in the case, and that he came to the knowledge of it within a year before the date of his action. *RADHA KISHORE ROY v. AMEER CHUNDER MOOKHOTY*

20 W. R. 386

23. _____ *Suit against agent—Delay after discovery of fraud of agent.* A suit against an agent for the recovery of money under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 30, though brought within three years after the termination of the agency, was held to have been barred as not having been brought within a reasonable time from the date of the discovery of the fraud alleged against the agent. *JAN ALI CHOWDHRY v. TABINI CHURN RUKHEET*

21 W. R. 107

24. _____ *Suit against zamindari agent.* There is no limitation but that prescribed by s. 30, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, to the bringing of a suit against an agent with regard to zamindari matters

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1839 (X OF 1853)—*contd.*

_____ s. 30 (Act X of 1853, ss. 24 and 33)—*contd.*

(e.g., tahsildar and collector of rents) for the recovery of money or the delivery of accounts and papers. *RAM BHURSA CHOWDHRY v. HUNOOMAN SINGH*

21 W. R. 240

25. _____ *Suit for account—Subsequent suit for amount falsely entered—Res judicata.* Plaintiff brought a suit for collection papers against the defendant, his agent, and got a decree. Having received and inspected the papers, he brought another suit for moneys which, he alleged, the defendant had falsely entered as expended. *Held*, that the suit was barred. *Quere*: Whether the Rent Act, s. 30, contemplates the bringing of two successive suits,—one for an account, and the other for the amount due on that account. *GOLKE NATH SEN BISWAS v. RAM KANT DEY SIRCAR*

3 C. L. R. 444

26. _____ Act X of 1859, s. 33—*Suit against agent—Change of employment.* A suit against an agent, under Act X of 1859, s. 24, was resisted on the ground that the defendant's employment as tahsildar had terminated by the plaintiff having employed him as a moonshee, and the defendant relied for proof on the fact of his subsequent re-appointment as tahsildar. The lower Appellate Court construed s. 33 as applicable to the case. *Held*, that this was not a correct interpretation of the section, and that, so long as the defendant continued to be employed in the plaintiff's service, his agency had not terminated. *NILMONI SINGH DEO v. RAM GOLAM BUNDOPADHYA*

21 W. R. 154

27. _____ *Suit against agent.* The fact of an agent furnishing his principal with an account under his signature with a letter upon which a balance appeared due is a cause of action irrespective of Act X of 1859, s. 33, and the principle is applicable to cases decided under the present law. *PEAREE MOHUN GHOSE v. JARDINE, SKINNER & Co.*

22 W. R. 338

See *CHOWDHRY CHATTERPAUL SINGH v. FOUDJAR ROY* . . . Marsh. 405 : 2 Hay 509

28. _____ *Fraud of agent, evidence of—Not filing accounts in proper time.* In a suit by a zamindar against a gomashtha, where fraud is not alleged, the Court cannot assume it merely on the ground that the accounts were not filed till the close of the year of the determination of the agency. *KOONJO LAL MUNDUL v. DABEE PERSHAD TEWAREE*

22 W. R. 398

29. _____ *Suit for an account against an agent—Limitation.* A suit for an account against an agent employed to collect rents is barred under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 30, after the expiration of one year from the time of his resigning or leaving his agency. Notwithstanding the general provisions of s. 19 of the Limitation Act of 1877, by which a new period of limitation, according to the nature of the original liability, is allowed, provided that the

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*concl.*

s. 30 (Act X of 1859, ss. 24 and 33)—*concl.*

acknowledgment of liability is made in writing before the expiration of the period prescribed for the suit, a suit cannot be brought upon an acknowledgment or account stated, signed by a person who has been an agent to collect rents, if his signature was not procured till more than a year after the determination of his agency. *PARBUTINATH ROY v. TEJOMOY BANERJI* I. L. R. 5 Calc. 303

GOLAP CHAND NOWLUCKA v. KRISTO CHUNDER DASS BISWAS I. L. R. 5 Calc. 314

30. ——— *Principal and Agent—Account Suit for—Zamindar—Limitation.* A suit by a zamindar against his land agent, for payment of sums not accounted for by the latter, must, under s. 30 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, be brought within three years from the termination of the defendant's agency. The zamindar should never bring a suit of this kind for an account merely, or for the delivery of accounts or account papers merely; but the suit should be framed for an account and for payment of what, on the taking of the account, may be found due from the defendant to the plaintiff. *SHOSHI BHOOSHUN PAL v. GURU CHURN MOOKHOPADHYA* I. L. R. 7 Calc. 89; 8 C. L. R. 285

31. ——— *Suit against tahsildar—Special agreement—Limitation.* The defendant was tahsildar of one of the plaintiff's zamindaris, and after his dismissal on the 24th of August 1876 he submitted an account which was found to be incorrect, and time was given to him to make good certain items on his executing an ikrar promising to pay whatever balance should be found due from him to the plaintiff. In a suit brought on the 28th of October 1878 to recover the balance found on enquiry to be due: *Held*, that s. 30 of Act VIII of 1869 had no application, the special agreement taking the case out of the scope of that section, and therefore the suit was not barred by reason of having been brought more than one year after the defendant's dismissal. *BEER CHUNDER MANICKYA v. HURRO CHUNDER BURMAN*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 211
12 C. L. R. 329

32. ——— *Suit against administrator of deceased agent for sums misappropriated.* In April 1875, A entered into an agreement in writing with B, whereby he agreed to act as the manager of B's zamindaris and other landed properties for three years, on certain terms therein mentioned. The agreement was duly registered. On the 15th of June 1882, B sued the Administrator General of Bengal as administrator of A's estate, to recover certain sums of money set forth in detail in the plaint as having been received by A and not accounted for, stating that they had been misappropriated by A. *Held*, that in respect of such sums as were received by A in virtue of his position as manager under the registered agreement, the limitation of six years applied; but that in respect of the sums received by him in the course of trans-

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*concl.*

s. 30 (Act X of 1859, ss. 24 and 33)—*concl.*

actions which did not come within the scope of the registered agreement, the limitation of three years applied. *Held*, also, that the suit was not such as is contemplated by Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 30. *HARENDER KISHORE SINGH v. ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL OF BENGAL* I. L. R. 12 Calc. 357

s. 31 (Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 6).

See BENGAL RENT ACT, 1869, s. 47.

18 W. R. 126

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 5.

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 690

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—RENT SUITS FOR, AND INTERVENERS IN, SUCH SUITS 21 W. R. 277

1. ——— *Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 6—Suit for enhancement of rent.* The limitation of six months prescribed by s. 6, Bengal Act VI of 1862, applies to deposits made after rents have become due, and does not interfere with the limitation for suits for enhanced rent, as prescribed by s. 32, Act X of 1859. *TARAMONEE KOONWAREE v. JEEBUN MUNDAR*

6 W. R., Act X, 98

2. ——— *Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 6—Applicability of Act—Deposit of rent.* Bengal Act VI of 1862 applies to cases where the amount which the raiyat thinks due is deposited by him, and the landlord may either accept it or sue for whatever he himself may deem due to him for the same period for which the deposit is made; but not to suits for rent for the year preceding that for which the deposit is made. *MAHOMED SHUH-ROOLAH CHOWDHRY v. ROOMYA BIBEE*

7 W. R. 487

3. ——— *Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 6—Suits for enhanced rent after notice.* Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 6, refers to the period within which suits on account of rent which has accrued prior to the date of the deposit under s. 5 may be brought, and not to suits for rent at an enhanced rate after notice. *AHMED HOSSEIN v. KERAMUT*

8 W. R. 353

4. ——— *Notice of payment or deposit in Court—Suit for arrears of rent—Limitation.* By a condition in the lease of a talukh, additional rent became payable in respect of all lands which, not being in a state of cultivation at the time of the lease should be subsequently brought into cultivation so soon as the lessee had enjoyed them rent-free for the space of seven years. Rent having become due under this condition on certain lands which had not been in a state of cultivation at the time of the making of the lease, the lessee deposited in Court, as the entire rent payable in respect of the talukh, the same amount as he had paid in previous years. In a suit brought a year after the lessor had notice of such deposit, to recover the entire rent payable in respect of the lands

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

s. 31 (Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 6)
—*concl'd.*

newly brought into cultivation: *Held*, that such suit, having been instituted more than six months after service of notice of such deposit on the lessee, was barred under s. 31 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *RAM SUNKER SENAPUTTY v. BIR CHUNDER MANIKYA* I. L. R. 4 Calc. 714

5. — and ss. 46, 47—*Limitation*
—*Deposit of rent—Suit for enhancement of rent.* To bring into operation the special limitation enacted in s. 31 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, where deposit had been made under s. 46, the deposit could only have been effectively made of rent that had accrued due before the date of such deposit. *SURJA KANT ACHARJYA v. HEMANTA KUMARI*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 498
L. R. 20 I. A. 25

s. 32 (Act X of 1859, s. 69).

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—AGENTS.

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 450
11 W. R. 43

ss. 33 and 34.

See BENGAL RENT ACT, 1869, s. 102.

23 W. R. 171

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 151

s. 34.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—DECREE UNDER RENT LAW.

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 748

Suits for rent—Act VIII of 1859, s. 119. S. 119 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859) was made applicable to rent suits under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 by the provisions of s. 34 of the latter Act. *DRA-BAMAYI GUPTIA v. TARACHARAN SEN*

7 B. L. R. 207: 16 W. R. 17

s. 37 (Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 9).

See APPEAL—MEASUREMENT OF LANDS.
6 B. L. R. 1

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—DECREES UNDER RENT LAW. 7 C. L. R. 345

See MEASUREMENT OF LANDS.

s. 38 (Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 10).

See APPEAL—MEASUREMENT OF LANDS.
24 W. R. 171

See MEASUREMENT OF LANDS.

See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT—REVENUE COURTS.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 507

s. 41 (Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 11).

See MEASUREMENT OF LANDS.

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

s. 44 (Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 2).

See DAMAGES, SUIT FOR—RENT SUITS.

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 290

W. R. 1864, Act X, 22, 68, 73, 84

1 W. R. 100, 290, 343

2 W. R., Act X, 11

1. — s. 46 (Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 4)—*Patni talukhdars—“Under-tenants.”* Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 46, applies to *patni talukhdars*, the term “under-tenant” being wide enough to include them. *THAKOOR DASS GOSSAIN v. PEAREE MOHUN MOOKERJEE* . 22 W. R. 431

2. — *Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 4—Deposit of arrears—Tender—Registration of transfer—Act X of 1859, s. 27.* O S purchased from the former raiyat his jotedari right and entered into possession of the land. H M, the talukhdar, had notice of this: but while O S was in possession, he sued the former tenant and obtained a decree against him for arrears of rent, under which he sold the tenure in execution. O S had deposited the amount of the arrears, but by mistake as payable to “D (the wife of H M’s brother) of Lodi Syudpore,” instead of to “H M of Lodi Culpo.” H M was aware the amount had been deposited. *Held* the deposit was sufficient tender under s. 4, Bengal Act VI of 1862, and that registration of the transfer of the raiyati tenure was not necessary, inasmuch as s. 27 of Act X of 1859 did not apply, the tenure not being one “intermediate between the zamindar and the cultivator.” *UMACHARAN SETT v. HARIPROSAD MISRY.*

1 B. L. R. S. N. 7

s. c. WOONA CHURN SETT v. HUREE PERSHAD MISSEER 10 W. R. 101

3. — *Bengal Act VI of 1862 s. 4—Tender of payment of rent.* A raiyat’s tender of payment to be valid must be made at the proper place and to a person authorized to receive the same. *ESHAN CHUNDER ROY v. KHAJAH ASSANOULLAH* 16 W. R. 79

4. — *Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 4—Tender not followed by deposit or payment—Power to award interest.* Act VI of 1862 does not forbid the Court to advert or give effect to a tender not followed by a deposit or payment into Court of the money, nor does it alter or affect the discretionary power of the Court to award interest or costs in a decree for arrears. *BISSONATH DEY v. HURBO PERSHAD CHOWDHRY*

2 W. R., Act X, 88

5. — *Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 4—Transfer of tenure Act X of 1859, s. 27—Registration of transfer.* S. 4, Bengal Act VI of 1862, applies only to under-tenants and raiyats of whose possession there can be no doubt. *DULLI CHAND v. MEHER CHAND SAHOO*

8 W. R. 138

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

s. 46 (Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 4)
—*concl.*

6. ———— *Bengal Act VI of 1862 s. 4—Set-off—Deposit of arrears of rent.* In a suit for rent, where defendant claimed credit for a sum which he had deposited under the provisions of s. 4, Bengal Act VI of 1862, in the Deputy Collectorate of the sub-division within which plaintiff's malkacheri was situated, giving notice to plaintiff under s. 5: *Held*, that defendant was entitled to a set-off. *GRISH CHUNDER SEN v. EASTERN BENGAL JUTE MANUFACTURING COMPANY*. 10 W. R. 492

7. ———— *Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 4—Deposit of arrears of rent—Omission to tender.* A party is not entitled to benefit from a deposit under Act VI (Bengal) of 1862, if it was paid in without a tender to, and refusal by, the opposite party. *KRISTO PROTIBAR v. ALLADINEE DASSEE*. 15 W. R. 4

1. ———— s. 47 (Beng. Act VI of 1862, s. 5) and s. 31—*Notice of deposit on account of rent—Form of notice.* The omission of the words "you must institute a suit in Court for the establishment of such claim or demand within six calendar months from this date, otherwise your claim will be for ever barred," from the notice referred to in s. 47 when a deposit is made under s. 31, Act VIII of 1869, was held fatal to the defendant's claim to the benefit of his having paid his rent into the Collectorate. *KANCHUN MALLA DOSSIA v. RAJENDRO CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY*. 18 W. R. 126

2. ———— *Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 5—Limitation—Suit for accrued rent.* S. 5, Bengal Act VI of 1862, refers to deposits by tenants, of the rent which they consider to be the full amount of rent due from them, and s. 6 refers to the period within which suits on account of rent which has accrued prior to the date of the deposit under s. 5, may be brought, not to suits for rent at an enhanced rate after notice. *AHMED HOSEIN v. KERAMUT*. 8 W. R. 353

s. 52 (Act X of 1859, s. 78).

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—EJECTMENT
—GENERALLY. I. L. R. 14 Calc. 33
See RECEIVER. I. L. R. 11 Calc. 496

1. ———— "Reversed," meaning of. The word "reversed" in Bengal Act VIII of 1869, ss. 52 and 54, means reversed in respect of that part of the arrears which is contested in the Appellate Court. *PATTARY SIRCAR v. SURN MOYEE*. 24 W. R. 185

2. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 78—Suit for cancellation of lease—Condition for forfeiture.* S. 78, Act X of 1859, applies to all cases of suits for the ejectment of a raiyat or the cancellation of a lease for non-payment of rent, whether such ejectment or cancellation be sought under the provision of ss. 21 and 22, respectively, or under an express stipulation in that behalf contained in

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

s. 52 (Act X of 1859, s. 78)—*contd.*

the engagement between the parties. *JAN ALI CHOWDHURY v. NITYANUND BOSE*

E. L. R. Sup. Vol. 972: 10 W. R. F. B. 12

3. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 78—Ejectment for non-payment of rent.* S. 78 of Act X of 1859 authorizes the joinder of a claim for rent in an ejectment for non-payment of rent. *Held*, that the section does not empower a landlord to eject his tenant for non-payment of rent due in the middle of the Bengali year, but that an ejectment for such default is maintainable only for arrears due at the end of the year under s. 21. *SAVI v. CHAND SICKDAR*

Marsh. 348: 2 Hay 438

SRIRAM BISWAS v. JUGGERNATH DOSS

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 187: 5 W. R., Act X, 45

4. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 78—Breach of condition for forfeiture.* Where in a perpetual lease there was a condition that, on default being made in payment of a certain number of instalments of rent, the lease should be void,—*Held*, that in a suit under cl. 5, s. 23 of Act X of 1859, for cancellation of the lease on account of a breach of the condition, the lessee was entitled to the benefit of s. 78, even though the defence set up was false in fact. *DULI CHAND v. MEHER CHAND SAHU*. 12 B. L. R. P. C. 439

Affirming decision of High Court in *DULI CHAND v. MEHER CHAND SAHU*. 8 W. R. 138

See *AMEER KOOLEE KHAN v. RUSSICK LALL SINGH*. 8 W. R. 495

5. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 78—Suit for ejectment of raiyat for non-payment of rent.* The provisions of the last clause of s. 78, Act X of 1859, apply to every suit in which ejectment of a raiyat is sought on the ground that he has failed to pay rents. *MAHOMED HOSSEIN KHAN v. KHUSHROO FAKHER*. 1 N. W. 44: Ed. 1873, 41

6. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 78 and s. 22—Suit for ejectment after realizing arrears.* A landlord cannot sue for cancellation of lease and ejectment under s. 22, Act X of 1859, after he has sued for and realized the arrears of rent due. *WOOMESH CHUNDER CHATTERJEE v. KUMUROODEEN LUSKUR*. 7 W. R. 20

7. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 78—Receipt of rent after decree for ejectment.* A landlord cannot execute his decree for ejectment obtained under s. 78, Act X of 1859, if he has accepted the rent from the tenant. *NUBO KISHEN MOOKERJEE v. HURISH CHUNDER BANERJEE*

7 W. R. 142

8. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 78—Cancellation of lease—Ejectment.* S. 78, Act X of 1859, applies equally whether the raiyat's liability to be ejected arises under s. 21 of that Act or under special stipulation in the contract between him and his landlord. *MAHOMED HOSSEIN v. BOODHUN SINGH alias ROOPNARAIN SINGH*. 7 W. R. 374

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 52 (Act X of 1859, s. 78)—*contd.*

9. *Act X of 1859, s. 78—Forfeiture for default in payment of rent.* Plaintiff sued defendant under cl. 5, s. 23, Act X of 1859, for direct or khas possession of a farm (for which the latter had paid a bonus), stating that the contract between them was that, on default in payment of the farming rent as per kistbundi, a suit was to be instituted for the arrears, and in execution of the decree the lease was to be forfeited, and the plaintiff, the lessor, entitled to enter upon khas possession, unless the amount was paid within 15 days. It was further urged that defendants, the lessees, had defaulted; that plaintiff had obtained decrees; and that defendants, having failed to pay within fifteen days, had violated the lease and were liable to be ejected. *Held*, that the terms of the contract were in strict accordance with the provisions of s. 78, Act X of 1859, and the plaintiff ought to have brought his suit under that section, and obtained a decree for ejectment. From the date of such decree, specifying the amount of arrear, the lessors would have fifteen days for payment. *RUGHOO MOHINEE DOSSEE v. KASHEENATH ROY CHOWDHRY. KASHEENATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. SABITREE SOONDEREE DOSSIA* . . . 10 W. R. 156

10. *Act X of 1859, s. 78 and s. 22—Erroneous decree, effect of.* *Held*, by NORMAN, J., that a Deputy Collector's decree for rent cancelling a mokurari tenure, with reference to s. 22, Act X of 1859, as not creating a permanent or transferable interest, though erroneous, cannot be treated as a nullity or as passed without jurisdiction. The tenure, however, is not cancelled as long as the decree is not executed. *LALLA SHAM SOONDUR v. SOORAJ LALL* . . . 13 W. R. 441

11. *Act X of 1859, s. 78—Failure to rely on s. 78.* Where a judgment-debtor fails to invoke the protection of s. 78, Act X of 1859, against a decree-holder, he cannot afterwards in special appeal claim the fifteen days' time allowed under that section. *CHOONEE MUNDUR v. CHOONEE LALL DASS* . . . 14 W. R. 178

12. *Act X of 1859, s. 78—Decree for ejectment—Effect of erroneous decree—Suit to question its validity.* Where in suit for arrears of rent of a transferable tenure, to which a person claiming as mortgagee was no party, a decree for ejectment, under s. 78, Act X of 1859, was made instead of a decree for sale: *Held*, that the decree for ejectment could not confer upon the decree-holder (the purchaser in execution of a decree against the mortgagor) the right to avoid the mortgage by the ejectment of the mortgagor, and was no bar under s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, to a suit by the mortgagee to question the validity of that decree, and to show that the Collector had no power under Act X of 1859 to make a decree for ejectment. *TRIBHOBUN SINGH v. JHONO LAL* . . . 18 W. R. 206

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 52 (Act X of 1859, s. 78)—*contd.*

13. *Act X of 1859, s. 78—Term of grace—Condition in lease.* The fifteen days' grace allowed to a lessee prior to ejectment cannot be negated by any condition in the lease. *MADHUB CHUNDER ADIT CHOWDHRY v. RAM KALOO BAPAREE* . . . 16 W. R. 151

14. *Act X of 1859, s. 78—Suit for ejectment of raiyat and for arrears of rent—Person paying rent in position of subordinate proprietor.* In a suit under s. 78, Act X of 1859, to eject the defendant from certain land, and to recover arrears of rent, the defendant was in the habit of receiving the rents of his tenants, and was bound only to pay a certain sum on account of Government revenue and village expenses. He was also competent to sell or mortgage his rights. *Held*, that he was not a tenant, but a subordinate proprietor, and that, therefore, the suit could not be brought under the above section. *BATOO BEBEE v. JAGUT NARAIN* . . . 4 N. W. 172

15. *Act X of 1859, s. 78—Execution of decree for arrears of rent against purchaser at an execution sale.* A zamindar, in execution of a decree, sold the rights and interests of his tenant. He subsequently ejected the purchaser at that sale under a decree (dating prior to the above sale) for arrears of rent and ejectment under s. 78, Act X of 1859, which latter decree became complete on the expiry of fifteen days without deposit of the arrears due. *Held*, that, until the purchaser adopted means to have his name registered in the zamindar's sherista, the latter was not bound to give him notice to pay the arrears due on the tenure which he purchased before proceeding to give effect to the decree. *BHUBO TARINEE DOSSIA v. PROSONOMOYEE DOSSIA* . . . 10 W. R. 304

Reversed on Review in *PROSUNNOMOYEE DOSSIA v. BHUBO TARINEE DOSSIA* . . . 10 W. R. 494

16. *Act X of 1859, s. 78—Cancellation of lease for breach of stipulation in payment of rent.* The property in suit had been sublet to defendant on the stipulation that, if the rent was in arrear for three kists, the lease would be liable to cancellation. Plaintiff sued to eject the lessee on the allegation that the lease was forfeited. *Held*, that, as the only ground given for cancellation was non-payment of arrears of rent, the case fell under s. 78, Act X of 1859; and as the amount due had been paid into Court, defendant was entitled to the protection afforded by the latter portion of that section. *KUMLA SAHOY v. RAMRUTTUN NEOGY* . . . 11 W. R. 201

17. *Act X of 1859, s. 78—Ejectment for forfeiture of lease by breach of its conditions—Suit for cancellation of lease.* *M* granted a lease of certain lands to *R* for a term of thirteen years on the 25th of November 1870. One of the conditions of the lease was that rent was to be paid harvest by harvest, otherwise the lessee would be liable to ejectment. On the 12th of September

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 52 (Act X of 1859, s. 78)—*contd.*

1873, *M* obtained a decree against *R* for arrears of rent which became due in May. On the day following, *M* instituted a suit under cl. 5, s. 23, Act X of 1859, for the cancelment of the lease and the ejectment of *R* on account of the non-payment of rent when due, according to the terms of the lease. *R* paid into Court the amount of the arrear on the 18th of September, *i.e.*, within fifteen days from the date of the decree, and in the course of the suit under s. 23, cl. 5. In special appeal the suit was dismissed, it being held that the circumstances of the case brought it within the operation of the provisions of ss. 21 and 78 of Act X of 1859, which were applicable in deciding it. *RAMDYAL v. MUSH-TAK AHMAD* 6 N. W. 326

18. Act X of 1859, s.

78—*Modification of decree in review—Date from which time for payment runs.* A decree in a suit for ejectment of a raiyat for non-payment of rent was modified upon review by reducing the amount of arrears awarded to the plaintiff. *Held*, that the amended decree was the final decree in the suit, and that the raiyat was entitled, under s. 78, Act X of 1859, to fifteen days from its date for payment of the arrears with costs and interests. *RADHAMOHUN MUNDLE v. BUCKSHEE BEGUM*

Marsh. 471 : 2 Hay 595

19. Act X of 1859, s.

78—*Suit for ejectment—Stay of execution.*—The latter part of Act X of 1859, s. 78, which enacts that "in all cases of suits for the ejectment of a raiyat, or cancelment of a lease, the decree shall specify the amount of arrears; and if such amount, together with interest and cost of suit, be paid into Court within fifteen days from the date of the decree, execution shall be stayed," applies not only to suits for ejectment of the raiyat or cancelment of the lease on account of the non-payment of arrears of rent, but to all suits for ejectment brought by the lessor on account of a breach of the conditions of his lease by the defendant. *FITZPATRICK v. GOWAN*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 420 : 6 W. R., Act X, 64

20. Act X of 1859, s.

78—*Omission to specify previous unsatisfied decree.*—Where in a suit for the rent of the current year and for ejectment under s. 78, Act X of 1859, supported by a previous unsatisfied decree, a decree was passed for the rent of the current year without including the amount claimed under the previous unsatisfied decree, and the plaintiff neither applied to the lower Court to amend its decree nor appealed against that part of it: *Held*, that the defendant, having paid the amount of arrear specified in the decree, had saved himself from ejectment. *SAVI v. MOHESH CHUNDER BOSE*

W. R. 1864, Act X, 29

21. Act X of 1859, s.

78—*Computation of time.* In calculating the fifteen days allowed for payment of arrears of rent by s.

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 52 (Act X of 1859, s. 78)—*contd.*

78 of Act X of 1859, the day on which the decree was passed should be excluded from the computation. *SHEOPALAU SINGH v. NABEE ASHRUF KHAN* 3 N. W. 342

22.

Act X of 1859, s.

78—*Stay of execution.* It is not necessary to declare in a decree given under s. 78 of Act X of 1859 that fifteen days' time should be allowed to the tenant. But the decree must specify the amount of the arrear, and payment of this, with costs and interest as decree, within fifteen days, *ipso facto* stays execution. *SEETUL SINGH v. THAKOOR TEWARY*

1 N. W., Part 2, 31 : Ed. 1873, 89

ALI HOSSEIN v. NANDAR KHAN . 2 N. W. 62

23.

Act X of 1859, s.

78—*Interest on deposit.* When a tenant is sued for arrears of rent, even though he should deposit the rent in Court during the pendency of the suit, he is still liable to have the decree passed against him as the arrear was admittedly due when the suit was brought. Interest to date of deposit in Court and costs of suit being paid within fifteen days, execution would be avoided. *SHEO NATH SINGH v. RAM THUL RAE*

1 N. W., Part 2, 39 : Ed. 1873, 97

24.

Act X of 1859, s.

78—*Stay of execution—Private agreements, suits to enforce.* S. 78 of Act X of 1859 contains a positive direction of law by which the Revenue Courts are required, in all suits for ejectment for non-payment of rent, clearly to specify in the decree the amount of rent default in payment of which has conferred a right of re-entry on the landlord, and to stay execution of their decrees if the amount found due, with interest and costs, be paid into Court within the time therein specified. This overrides all private agreements to the contrary, or rather renders their enforcement by suit in the Revenue Court impossible. *LULLOO SINGH v. THAKOOR PERSHAD* 2 N. W. 249

25.

Act X of 1859, s.

78—*Stay of execution of decree.* The Court has discretion to stay execution on other grounds than those on which it is bound to do so under s. 52 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *RAO BANEERAM v. RAMNATH SHAH*

10 B. L. R. Ap. 2 : 18 W. R. 412

NUBOKISTO MOOKERJEE v. RAMESSUR GOOPTO
18 W. R. 412 note

26.

Act X of 1859, s.

78—*Stay of execution—Payment of arrears by purchaser.* Execution may be stayed on a decree for arrears of rent by payment of the amount, under s. 78, Act X of 1859, by a purchaser from the tenant of his interest in the terms. *SARODAPERSAD ROY CHOWDHRY v. NOBINCHAND DUTT*

Marsh. 417 : 2 Hay 527

27.

Payment into

Court—*Liability to ejectment.* Payment into Court

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 52 (Act X of 1859, s. 78)—*contd.*

by a judgment-debtor, within fifteen days from the date of decree, of rent, interest, and costs, with a protest as to the sum improperly charged against him as interest, is a sufficient payment, under s. 52, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, to save him from liability to be ejected from his tenure. *SREES-TEEDHUR DEY v. DOORGA NARAIN NAG*

17 W. R. 462

28. Act X of 1859, s.

78—*Stay of execution as to part of decree—Extension of time for payment.* The Court, whose duty it is to execute a decree, is bound to execute it in the shape in which the decree comes before it, and has no authority to permanently stay the execution of any portion thereof,—e.g., where a decree is for money and for ejectment in the event of non-payment within fifteen days, the Court executing is not competent to extend the period for payment in order to save the judgment-debtor from the alternative consequence. *SUNKUR SINGH v. HUREE MOHUN THAKOOR.*

22 W. R. 460

29. Act X of 1859, s.

78—*Stay of execution—Payment into Court—Extension of time when Court is closed—Decree—Suit for arrears of rent.* When a tenant has been sued for arrears of rent and a decree obtained against him under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 52, which provides for the stay of execution if the amount of the arrears, together with interest and costs of suit, be paid into Court within fifteen days from the date of the decree, and the Court is closed on or before the last day of the period so limited, the tenant is at liberty to pay into Court the arrears, interest, and costs on the first day that the Court re-opens; and if he does so, execution must be stayed. *HOSSEIN ALLY v. DONZELLE*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 906 : 6 C. L. R. 239

30. Act X of 1859, s.

78—*Forfeiture—Stay of execution of decree.* The provisions of s. 52 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 are exactly similar to those of s. 78 of Act X of 1859, and applicable to the case of a mokurari lease; and therefore a decree passed in conformity therewith, which allowed fifteen days for the payment of the arrears of rent found due and interest thereon, was a good decree. *MAHOMED AMEER v. PERYAG SINGH*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 566 : 9 C. L. R. 185

31. Mokurari lease—

Covenant to forfeit lease if rent be unpaid—Payment of rent after suit, but before decree—Relief against forfeiture. S. 52 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 is applicable both to cases where the right to cancel a lease arises under the provisions of the Act and to cases where the right arises under agreement between the parties. But the object of the section being to prevent forfeiture, if the rent be paid within the time specified by the section, the Courts will grant relief against a forfeiture where the rent is so paid. *DULI CHAND v. RAJKISSORE*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 88 : 11 C. L. R. 326

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 52 (Act X of 1859, s. 78)—*contd.*

32.

Ejectment—Right of occupancy—Forfeiture—Landlord and tenant. The mere omission to pay rent for five years does not of itself amount to forfeiture of a raiyat's right of occupancy, and will not be sufficient to sustain an action by the landlord for the recovery of the raiyat's holding. A raiyat having a right of occupancy cannot be legally ejected, unless under an order regularly obtained under s. 52 of the Rent Law,—that is, under a decree for arrears of rent unsatisfied within fifteen days from the passing of the decree. *Duli Chand v. Rajkissore*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 88 : 11 C. L. R. 326, followed.

MUSYATULLA v. NOORZAHAN

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 808

S. C. BROJENDRO KUMAR ROY CHOWDHRY

v. BUNGO CHUNDER MUNDOL . 12 C. L. R. 389

33.

Ejectment proviso in lease for forfeiture—Release from effect of forfeiture. A se-patni was granted to B by A, who held a dar-patni containing the following conditions, viz.: "I shall pay rent month by month; should I fail in that, I shall pay interest on instalments overdue at 1 per cent. per month. I shall pay the rent in full by the close of every year; should I neglect to make the payments, you will, of your own authority, take over possession of the said dar-patni talukh after the expiration of one month of the next succeeding year, and I shall have no complaint against your doing so." Upon non-payment of rent for the year 1281, a suit for khas possession of the lands was brought against A and B. The defendants claimed an equitable right to prevent forfeiture by paying all arrears according to the terms of the dar-patni, together with all costs. *Held*, that, whether or not the provisions of the Rent Law actually applied to the case, the Court was bound by the analogy of that law to apply in favour of the defendants an equity similar to the equity there given, and accordingly a decree was passed, that if the defendants should pay the whole of the rent due up to date, with interest according to the conditions of the dar-patni, together with the costs in the High Court and Courts below, they should be released from the effect of the forfeiture. *Mothoor Mohun Pal Chowdhry v. Ram Lal Bose*

4 C. L. R. 469

34.

Suit for ejectment from land assigned under a contract for building. The only suits for ejectment contemplated by Bengal Act VIII of 1869 are those consequent on the non-payment of arrears of rent, but not a suit for ejectment from land assigned for building purposes brought upon a contract (a kabuliati) by which the defendant had bound himself to give up the land when required by the plaintiff to do so on receipt of a year's rent and the cost of carrying away the

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—contd.s. 52 (Act X of 1859, s. 78)—*contd.*building materials. *RAMNARAIN MITTER v. NOBIN CHUNDER MOORDAFARASH* . 18 W. R. 208

35.

Suit for ejectment—Tenant with right of occupancy. Where tenants have obtained a right of occupancy under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 6, a suit for ejectment against them can only be brought under that Act. *JOWAD HOSSEIN v. MOHABEER SAHEE*

23 W. R. 412

36.

Talukhdar with power of transfer—Ejectment. Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 52, does not apply to the case of a talukhdar who has power to transfer his land and is liable, under the terms of his kabuliati, to immediate ejectment in the event of default. The question whether a talukhdar is liable to ejectment must be determined by the provisions of his lease. *MUMTAJ BIBEE v. GRISH CHUNDER CHOWDHRY*

22 W. R. 376

37.

Suit for arrears of rent and for ejectment—Payment into Court—Suit to cancel lease. Where a suit is brought both to recover arrears of rent and to eject the raiyat, it falls under the purview of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 52, and not within s. 22; and if decreed, the defendant is entitled to pay into Court, within fifteen days from the date of decree, the arrear with interest and costs. Where the lower Court's decree was altered to this effect by a decision of the High Court, the fifteen days were held to date from the later decision. Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 52 (as answering to Act X of 1859, s. 78), applies to cases in which it is sought to cancel a lease for non-payment of rent, as well as to all suits for ejectment. *ABDUR RUHMAN v. DIGAMBUREE DOSSEE*

18 W. R. 477

38.

Decree for arrears of rent and ejectment. A party who is under an obligation by the terms of a decree not only to pay arrears of rent, but also to give up possession, is allowed by Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 52, relief from the operation of the latter portion of the decree if he pays the money decreed within fifteen days of the date of the decree. *GOKHLANUND v. LALJEE SAHOO*

21 W. R. 11

39.

Act X of 1859, s. 78—Execution of decree for ejectment for arrears of rent. Where a Munsif gave, under Act X of 1859, s. 78, a decree for ejectment and for the recovery of a certain amount of rent, and the decree was not modified in review, it was held that the lower Appellate Court was right in holding that, inasmuch as the tenant did not deposit the money within fifteen days from the date of the decree, execution should issue to recover possession of the property. *PURESH NATH GHOSE MUNDUL v. KRISHTO LAL DUTT* . 23 W. R. 50**BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—contd.**s. 52 (Act X of 1859, s. 78)—*concl'd.*

40.

Decree for rent, execution of—Appellate Court, decree of, effect of—Liability to ejectment. A decree under s. 52, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, provided that, unless the amount due was paid within fifteen days from the date thereof, the tenant (judgment-debtor) would be liable to ejectment. That decree was confirmed in appeal, no step to execute it having been taken in the meantime. The tenant paid the decretal amount into Court within fifteen days of the appellate decree. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the appellate decree must be presumed to incorporate the terms of the original decree, and was the only decree of which execution could be taken, the tenant (judgment-debtor), having paid the decretal amount within fifteen days of that decree, was protected from ejectment. *NOOR ALI, CHOWDHURI v. KONI MEAH I. L. R. 13 Calc. 13*

41.

Liability to ejectment—Payment of amount of decree, but not amount due. Where a judgment-debtor complied with the terms of a rent-decree, as he found them in the certified copy issued to him, he was held to be protected from ejectment, even though the amount paid (owing to an error in the copy) was less than the amount really due. *RUNNOO ROY v. KADDOO LALL*

25 W. R. 58

42.

Suit for ejectment for arrears of rent—Bhaoli tenure. Under the provisions of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, a suit in ejectment will lie for arrears of rent due on a bhaoli tenure. A suit which is in reality a claim for compensation for use and occupation of lands cannot be described as a suit for arrears of rent under s. 52 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *KISHEN GOPAL MAWAR v. BARNES*

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 374

43.

Ejectment—Decree for arrears of rent ejectment, and damages. A decree which gave damages in addition to a decree for arrears of rent and ejectment in default of payment upheld, as being a decree which conformed substantially to s. 52 of the Rent Act, though it was doubtful whether the Court exercised a wise discretion in adding damages to the decree. In the spirit of the Rent Law, a decree for ejectment operates as an award of damages. *HEERAMUN ROY v. JHUBOO SINGH*

22 W. R. 511

s. 53.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—EJECTMENT—GENERALLY

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 135

s. 58 (Act X of 1859, s. 92, and Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 17).

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 179—PERIOD FROM WHICH LIMITATION RUNS—CONTINUOUS PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 385

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

s. 58 (Act X of 1859, s. 92, and Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 17)—*contd.*

1. *construction of—“Issued”—Execution of decree.* The word “issued” in the sentence, “no process of execution of any description whatever shall be issued,” at the commencement of s. 92 of Act X of 1859, is to be interpreted to mean “sued out” or “applied for with success”; that is, no application for a process of execution shall be successful unless the application for it is made or it is sued out within the fixed time. (BAYLEY and KEMP, J.J., dissenting.) RHIDOY KRISHNA GHOSE v. KAILAS CHANDRA BOSE
4 B. L. R. F. B. 82 : 13 W. R. F. B. 3

HERALALL SEAL v. PORAN MATTEAH

6 W. R., Act X, 84

In the matter of HOSSEIN ALI

13 W. R. 295

2. *Judgment—Value of stamps.* In considering whether a “judgment” under this section is under R500 or not, the value of the stamps necessary in taking out execution is to be included in the judgment on the principle of ss. 187 and 188 of Act VIII of 1859. CAMPBELL v. ABDOL HUA
6 W. R., Act X, 8

3. *Calculation of amount of judgment—Interest.* In ascertaining the amount of a judgment with a view to the applicability or otherwise of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 58, the interest which accrues subsequently to the date of the decree is not to be included. BRINDABUN DUTT v. BEHAREE MOHUN SEN
24 W. R. 442

4. *Division of joint decree to bring case within s. 58.* A joint decree against two defendants for a sum exceeding R500 cannot be divided so as to fall within the scope of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 58. SYER-OOLLAH KHAN v. FORBES
25 W. R. 55

5. *Execution of decree—Attachment—Limitation.* A decree in a suit instituted under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 was passed on the 13th of March 1873. Application for execution was made on the 18th of February 1876, but no process of attachment or sale was issued until the 2nd of April 1876. Held, that the attachment was valid, and not void as barred by limitation under s. 58, Bengal Act VIII of 1869. HEERA LALL SEAL v. PORAN MATTEAH, 6 W. R., Act X, 84, RHIDOY KRISHNA GHOSE v. KOYLASH CHUNDER BOSE, 4 B. L. R. F. B. 82 : 13 W. R. F. B. 3, and LALA RAM SAHOY v. DODRAJ MAHIO, 20 W. R. 395, cited. DEODHARY SINGH v. DOWLAT RAM
3 C. L. R. 189

6. *Delay in executing decree—Limitation.* The holder of a rent decree having made application for attachment and sale within three years from the 3rd September 1868, the date of decree, attachment was effected and

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

s. 58 (Act X of 1859, s. 92, and Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 17)—*contd.*

an order passed fixing 21st November 1871 as the date for sale. On consent of parties and part payment, postponement of sale was allowed for three months. After the lapse of this period, the judgment-debtor delayed two months longer and then applied for sale. The application was refused. Held, that the judgment of the lower Court was right, proceedings having been barred by Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 58. *Quære*: Had the Court any power, on consent of parties or otherwise, to extend the period of time prescribed by the statute of limitation? LALLA RAM SAHOY v. DODRAJ MAHIO
20 W. R. 395

7. *Release of property from attachment—Decree in suit to set aside order releasing it.* Where property has been released from attachment in execution of a decree, and in a subsequent suit brought for the purpose, a decree is obtained declaring it liable to be attached and sold in execution of the former decree, the effect of the decree in the latter suit is to set aside the order which released the property from attachment, thus leaving matters as they were before that order was passed, and therefore, it being unnecessary to issue further process of execution, the execution proceedings are not barred under s. 58 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869. WOOMA CHURN CHATTERJEE v. KADAMBINI DABEE
3 C. L. R. 146

8. *Failure to carry out order for execution—Limitation.* On a decree for rent dated 18th July 1870, execution process was taken out on 21st April 1873. On 24th October following, an order was passed for talabana to be deposited within seven days, but before that time expired (i.e., on 27th October), the case was struck off by an order which was not appealed against. The next execution process was taken out on the 6th December 1873. Held, that, as the last process, being for a set-off, was not of the same nature as the first, which was for attachment of property, it could not be considered to be a carrying out of the former; and as the order of 27th October 1873 remained uncanceled, the decree was barred under the Rent Law, s. 58. AKRAM SHERE v. LALJEE SINGH
24 W. R. 16

9. *Decree payable by instalments—Limitation.* Per GARTH, C. J., and MORRIS, J. (PRINSEP, J., dissenting)—The words “from the date of such judgment,” in s. 58 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 should be read as if they were “from the date when the rent is adjudged to be payable.” Per PRINSEP, J. The “date of such judgment,” in s. 58 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, means the date on which the judgment was delivered. GURSEBULLAH SIKRAR v. MOHUN LALL SHAHA
I. L. R. 7 Calc. 127 : 8 C. L. R. 409

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

s. 58 (Act X of 1859, s. 92, and Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 17)—*contd.*

10. ———— *Landlord and tenant—Rent decree—Execution of decree—Limitation.* Where an application for the transfer of a rent decree for execution has been made and granted by the Court which passed the decree within three years from the date of the decree, but no application for execution is made to the Court to which the decree has been transferred within three years from the date of the decree, the execution of the decree will be barred by limitation, under the provisions of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 58. *BHOLANATH ROY v. NURENDRO NATH ROY*. I. L. R. 9 Calc. 380 12 C. L. R. 58

11. ———— *Landlord and tenant—Execution of decree—Instalments—Limitation.* On the 10th of July 1878, a rent decree was passed in favour of certain parties for the sum of Rs168, payable in two equal instalments, on the 4th of June 1879 and the 30th of October 1879, respectively. On the 18th July 1881, the decree-holders applied for execution of the decree. *Held* by the majority of the Full Bench (GARTH, C. J., and MITTER J., dissenting), that the application was barred by limitation under the provisions of s. 58, Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *Gureebullah Sircar v. Mohun Lall Shaha*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 127; 8 C. L. R., 409, dissented from. *MAMTAZUL HUQ v. NIRBHAI SINGH* I. L. R. 9 Calc. 711; 12 C. L. R. 318

12. ———— *Application for execution of decree for arrears of rent—Proper application—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882, ss. 235 237, 245)—Limitation.* Within the period of three years from the date of a decree for arrears of rent under Rs500, the judgment-debtor applied for execution of his decree without giving a list of the properties which he sought to attach, but stating that a list was filed with a previous application, and praying that that application might be put up with the present one. Subsequently, upon an order made by the Court, a fresh list was filed after the period of a year had elapsed. *Held*, that, though the application was not in strict accordance with the provisions of s. 237 of the Civil Procedure Code, it was still an application under s. 235, and that execution of the decree was not barred, but that it must be limited to the property specified in the previous application. *Mahomed v. Abedoolah*, 12 C. L. R. 279, followed. *HURRY CHURN BOSE v. SUBAYDAR SHEIKH* I. L. R. 12 Calc. 161

13. ———— *Application for execution of decree for arrears of rent—Circular Order, 10th July 1874—Limitation.* The words "no process of execution of any description whatsoever shall be issued on a judgment in any suit . . . after the lapse of three years," in s. 58 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, mean that

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

s. 58 (Act X of 1859, s. 92, and Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 17)—*contd.*

execution shall not issue unless a proper application for execution is made within three years from the date of the judgment. Therefore, where, on an application made on 5th July 1875 for execution of a decree for arrears of rent obtained on the 31st January 1873, a warrant for the arrest of the judgment-debtors was issued, but not executed, a subsequent application for execution of the same decree made on 17th March 1876 was held not to be barred. The law, as laid down in *Rhidoy Krishna Ghose v. Kailas Chandra Bose*, 4 B. L. R., F. B., 82; 13 W. R., F. B., 3, is not affected by the Circular Order No. 18, dated 10th July 1874. *GOLOKEMONEY DABIA v. MOHESH CHUNDER MOSA* I. L. R. 3 Calc. 547; 1 C. L. R. 149

14. ———— *Execution of decree—Delay and laches—Costs—Limitation.* In a suit for arrears of rent under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, a decree was obtained, on the 30th June 1876, for a sum which with costs amounted to less than Rs500. Application for execution was made, in December 1877, against property other than that for which the rent was due; but was, in the first Court, opposed successfully by the judgment-debtor on the ground that the under-tenure should first be proceeded against, though such under-tenure had already been sold away in execution of another decree and the execution proceeding was struck off on the 15th March 1878, and the property released from attachment. The judgment-creditor appealed, and was successful both in lower Appellate Court and the High Court, the latter decision being dated 26th February 1879. The costs awarded him in these proceedings, if added to the amount of the decree, would amount to a sum of more than Rs500. The next application for execution was made on 19th August 1879. *Held*, that the costs of the appeals in the execution-proceedings should not be added to the decree, and, therefore, the decree being for less than Rs500, the provisions of s. 58, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, applied to it. *Held*, also, that the attachment having been removed in March 1878, the execution of the decree was barred under that section. *KADUMBINI DABYA v. KOYLASH CHUNDER PAL CHOWDHRY* I. L. R. 6 Calc. 554; 8 C. L. R. 19

15. ———— *Execution of decree—Suit for rent not brought under Bengal Act VIII of 1869—Decree of Court of Foreign State—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 434—Limitation.* The law of limitation applicable to the execution of a decree of the Civil Court of Cooch Behar, for rent for a sum under Rs500 in a suit not brought under the Rent Act, is by s. 434 of the Civil Procedure Code which gives the Courts in British India power to execute decrees passed by the Courts of a Foreign State, s. 58 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869. That section

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

_____ s. 58 (Act X of 1859, s. 92, and Bengal Act VI of 1862, s. 17)—*concl'd.*

is not confined to suits brought under that Act. *In the matter of the petition of HUKUM CHAND ASWAL. HUKUM CHAND ASWAL v. GYANENDER CHUNDER LAHIRI* . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 570
Reviewing S. C. . . I. L. R. 13 Calc. 95

_____ ss. 59, 60 (Bengal Act VIII of 1865, ss. 4 and 5).

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—INCUMBRANCES.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—PORTION OF UNDER-TENURE, SALE OF

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—UNDER-TENURE, SALE OF.

_____ ss. 59, 60, 66.

See ONUS OF PROOF—SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT I. L. R. 13 Calc. 1

_____ ss. 59-61 (Act X of 1859, s. 105)

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—DECREES UNDER RENT LAW.

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 748

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 675

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 547

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—INCUMBRANCES.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—UNDER-TENURE, SALE OF.

_____ ss. 59, 61, 65.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—DECREES UNDER RENT LAW

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 14

_____ s. 62 (Bengal Act VIII of 1865, s. 6).

See SET-OFF—GENERAL CASES.

2 C. L. R. 414

_____ s. 63 (Act X of 1859, s. 106).

See RIGHT OF SUIT—ORDERS, SUITS TO SET ASIDE . . . 3 C. L. R. 146

1. _____ Act X of 1859, s. 106—*Sale of under-tenure—Suit to establish proprietary right.* Ss. 106 and 107, Act X of 1859, apply only to cases in which the existence of the under-tenure and the decree-holder's right as landlord are admitted, not where they are denied and an adverse proprietary title is set up by the claimant as owner of the land. The remedy open to the owner of the land in such a case is under s. 77 before the decree is made, but after he allows it to be made he cannot have it set aside in execution. *GOLAM CHUNDER DEY v. NUBDIAR CHAND ADHEEKAREE* . . . 16 W. R. 1

2. _____ Act X of 1859, s. 106—*Suit by purchaser for possession of under-tenure.* A suit by an auction-purchaser to obtain khas possession of an under-tenure

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

_____ s. 63 (Act X of 1859, s. 106)—*concl'd.*

which had been sold under Bengal Act VIII of 1865 was dismissed on the ground that the suit in which the zamindar had obtained the decree was a fraudulent one and the purchaser knew that it had been against the wrong party. In special appeal, Act X of 1859, s. 106, was pleaded in justification of the zamindar. *Held*, that the zamindar could not bring such a suit as he had brought against a person other than the one whom he knew to be the proprietor of the under-tenure, and from whom for a series of years he had been receiving rent. *NOBIN CHUNDER SEN CHOWDHRY v. NOBIN CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY* . . . 22 W. R. 46

WOOMA CHURN CHATTERJEE v. KADOMBINI DABEE . . . 3 C. L. R. 146

_____ s. 64 (Act X of 1859, s. 108).

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—PORTION OF UNDER-TENURE, SALE OF

15 W. R. 6, 524

22 W. R. 67, 414

24 W. R. 313

2 C. L. R. 325

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 464

_____ s. 66 (Bengal Act VIII of 1865, s. 16).

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—INCUMBRANCES.

1. _____ *Rent, arrears of—Purchase—Sale—Unregistered tenant—Defaulter.* The expression the previous holder in s. 66 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 includes a person beneficially interested in a tenure, who is in a position to protect his interest by paying the rent into Court and yet omits to do so with the result that the tenure is brought to sale by the superior landlord. That he is not a registered tenant or is only interested in a portion of the tenure or that he is not liable directly to the zamindar is not sufficient to prevent the last clause of the section from applying to him. Default "which deprives a person of the benefit of the section does not necessarily imply moral obliquity or breach of contractual obligation: it simply means non-payment, failure or omission to pay. *FAKIR CHANDER DUTT v. RAM KUMAR CHATTERJEE* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 901

s.c. 3 C. W. N. 721

L. R. 31 I. A. 195

2. _____ One of several tenure-holders for whose default in the payment of rent the tenure was sold cannot by purchase of the tenure at a sale for its own arrears claim the advantageous position which has been set out in s. 66 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 and as such cannot avoid an encumbrance. The last paragraph of s. 66 does not make any exception in favour of a shareholder defaulter. *NAWAB ALI CHOWDHRY v. HEMANTA KUMARI DEBI* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 117

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

_____ s. 68 (Act X of 1859, s. 112).

See DISTRESS . . . 4 N. W. 76

_____ ss. 71, 74 (Act X of 1859, ss. 115, 118).

See DISTRESS.

1 N. W., Pt. 3, 53, Ed. 1873, 108

_____ ss. 72, 74, 76 (Act X of 1859, ss. 116, 118, 120).

See CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 26

_____ s. 80 (Act X of 1859, s. 124).

See DISTRESS . . . 21 W. R. 37

_____ s. 98 (Act X of 1859, s. 142).

See DISTRESS . . . 9 W. R. 162

W. R. 1864, Act X, 77

See WRONGFUL DISTRAINT.

3 B. L. R. A. C. 261

10 W. R. 70

5 W. R., Act X, 68

8 W. R. 291

_____ *Suit for value of crops*
—*Distraint—Jurisdiction—Small Cause Court.*
The plaintiff made a complaint to the Magistrate against the defendant, his landlord, for forcibly carrying away his crops; whereupon the defendant was tried, convicted of theft, and punished. The plaintiff then instituted a suit against the defendant in the Munsif's Court, apparently under s. 95 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, and obtained a decree declaring the distraint to be illegal, and directing the crops to be given up to him. The defendant offered to give up a smaller quantity than was mentioned in the decree. The plaintiff refused to take the same, and brought a suit in the Small Cause Court to recover the value of the quantity he had claimed before the Munsif and something additional. *Held*, that the Small Cause Court had no jurisdiction, and that the suit ought to have been brought under s. 98 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *HYDER ALI v. JAFAR ALI*
I. L. R. 1 Calc. 183: 24 W. R. 222

_____ s. 99 (Act X of 1859, s. 143).

See WRONGFUL DISTRAINT.

3 B. L. R. A. C. 261

5 W. R., Act X, 67, 68

9 W. R. 162

15 W. R. 543

_____ s. 100 (Act X of 1859, s. 144)—
Cause of action—Suit for wrongful distraint—Limitation. The time limited by Act X of 1859, s. 144, for suing in respect of distraints for rent, "namely, three months from the date of the occurrence of the cause of action," was to be reckoned, in the case of a suit for a wrongful distress afterwards abandoned, from the abandonment of the distress, and not merely from the date of

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*

_____ s. 100 (Act X of 1859, s. 144)
—*contd.*

the original seizure. *THUKREE ROY v. HEERAMUN SINGH* . . . Marsh. 470: 2 Hay 597

TARINEE CHURN BOSE v. SHUMBOONATH PANDAY . . . 3 W. R., Act X, 139

_____ s. 101 (Act X of 1859, s. 145).

See PENAL CODE, s. 206.

2 B. L. R. S. N. 4: 10 W. R. Cr. 46

See WRONGFUL DISTRAINT.

20 W. R. 445

_____ *Act X of 1859, ss. 145 and 160—Complaint—Suit.* A complaint under s. 145 of Act X of 1859 is not a suit, and did not fall within the description of the suits in which, under s. 160, an appeal was given to the Zilla Judge. *In the matter of the petition of AMANATULLA* 6 B. L. R. 569: 15 W. R. 136

1. _____ s. 102—"Suit"

—*Appeal in execution proceedings.* The word "suit" in Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 102, is intended to cover all proceedings prior to decree and subsequent ones in execution. *KRISHTO COOMAR CHUCKERBUTTY v. ANUND COOMAR DUTT*
19 W. R. 307

KEDARNATH BISWAS v. HURO PERSHAD ROY CHOWDHRY . . . 23 W. R. 207

2. _____ *Intention of section—Effect of decree under.* S. 102 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 was enacted in order to protect parties in the position of raiyat-defendants, and to prevent their being dragged up to the High Court in cases where the decree or demand is under Rs. 100. In such cases the decree is intended to have the same effect as that of a Small Cause Court. *DOORGA NARAIN SEN v. RAM LALL CHHUTAR* . . . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 330

S. C. DURGA NARAIN MISSEER v. GOBURDHUN GEORSE . . . 9 C. L. R. 86

3. _____ *Special appeal—Power of Bengal Legislature.* Bengal Act VIII of 1869 (ss. 33, 34) gives jurisdiction to Civil Courts to try suits brought for any cause of action arising under that Act; but it is a jurisdiction to try them according to the Code of Civil Procedure except where it is otherwise provided by the Act: and s. 102 modifies the effect of s. 34, and provides that there shall be no special appeal in rent suits for an amount under Rs. 100 except in certain circumstances. *Quære:* Has the Bengal Legislative Council power to give to the High Court any appellate jurisdiction not conferred by the Charter? *POORNO CHUNDER ROY v. KRISTO CHUNDER SINGH* . . . 23 W. R. 171

4. _____ *Special appeal—Practise.* In a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment, the right of appeal is taken away by s. 102, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, only when

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—contd.s. 101 (Act X of 1859, s. 145)—*contd.*

it is shown that the amount sued for, and the value of the property claimed, is less than R100. Unless that fact appears, either from the finding of the District Judge or elsewhere upon the proceedings, the High Court has no right to draw any inference to that effect. **TULSI PANDAY v. BUCHU LAL**

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 596 : 12 C. L. R. 223

5. *Special appeal—Sale in execution of decree for rent.* No appeal lies under s. 102, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, from the order of a District Judge on an application connected with the sale of a tenure in execution of a decree for arrears of rent below R100. **DEB COOMAREE DASSEE v. GUNGADHUR DUTT**

17 W. R. 189

6. *Special appeal.* In suits for recovery of rent below R100, a special appeal lies to the High Court from the decision in appeal by a Subordinate Judge. **MAHOMED MUNOOR MEA v. JYBUNEE**

10 B. L. R. Ap. 29 : 19 W. R. 200

7. *Special appeal.* In a suit for arrears of rent below R100, an appeal lies to the High Court from a decree passed in appeal by an Additional Judge. **NOBOKISTO KOONDOL v. MAHOMED SHEIKH**

10 B. L. R. Ap. 30 : 19 W. R. 202

8. *Special appeal—Suit for rent under R100—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 372.* Held by the Court (JACKSON, J., dissenting), that no appeal lies to the High Court from the decision of a District Judge in a suit for rent under R100, when no question of right to enhance or vary the rent of a raiyat or tenant, nor any question relating to a title to land or to some interest in land as between parties having conflicting claims thereto, has been determined by the judgment. **LUNGESSUR KOORER v. SOOKHA OJHA. RADHAY KISHAN v. KALI MISSEER**

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 151

LAKHESSUR KOER v. SOOKHA OJHA

1 C. L. R. 39

9. *Special appeal—Suit for ejectment and rent under R100.* An appeal does not lie to the High Court from a decision of a District Judge staying execution in a suit for arrears of rent and for ejectment where the value of the amount decreed is less than R100. Nor can an application, made to eject the tenant on his default to pay into Court the moneys due under the decree within the time fixed by s. 52 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, confer such right of appeal. **PARBUTTY CHURN SEN v. MONDARI**

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 594 : 5 C. L. R. 513

10. *Special appeal—District Judge—Subordinate Judge—Act XVI of 1868—Bengal Civil Courts Act (VI of 1871).* The

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—contd.s. 101 (Act X of 1859, s. 145)—*contd.*

words "District Judge" in s. 102 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 do not include a Subordinate Judge, to whom, under Act XVI of 1868 or Act VI of 1871, the District Judge may make over appeals filed in his Court. **DOYAL CHAND SAHOY v. NABIN CHANDRA ADHIKARI**

8 B. L. R. 180 : 16 W. R. 235

11. *Special appeal—Additional Judge—District Judge—Bengal Civil Courts Act (VI of 1871)—Appeal.* Held (JACKSON, J., dissenting), that an Additional Judge invested with the powers given to him by Act VI of 1871 is a District Judge within the meaning of s. 102 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, and no appeal lies from his decision in suits of the nature described in that section. **BROJO MISSEER v. AHLADI MISSEER**

13 B. L. R. F. B. 376 : 21 W. R. 320

ISHAN CHUNDER GHOSE v. NOBIN PAL

13 B. L. R. 377 note

12. *Special appeal—Right to enhance or vary the rent.* The question in a suit for arrears of rent as to a right to convert the money-rent into a rent payable in kind is a question which, if determined, renders the suit appealable. **ELAHEE BUKSH v. JAFFUR ALY**

1 N. W. 109 : Ed. 1873, 157

13. *Special appeal—Right to enhance or vary rent.* A special appeal was held to lie to the High Court under s. 102, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, in a suit for rent below R100 in which the question of right to enhance had been determined. **WATSON & CO. v. RAM DHUN GHOSE**

17 W. R. 495

14. *Special appeal—Question of title.* In this case the Judge dismissed plaintiff's suit on the ground that no notice had been served on defendant, the nature of the suit being not one for enhancement, but to recover rent at rates previously settled, and no notice being therefore required. The value of the suit was under R100, and the High Court held that the Judge had not decided any right to vary or enhance the rent, and therefore they could not interfere, there being no appeal under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 102. **GOLUCK CHUNDER DUTT v. MEAH RAJA MIJEE**

17 W. R. 119

15. *Special appeal—Question between parties having conflicting claims.* In a suit for rent less than R100, the decision turned upon whether, in a former suit against the plaintiff by a third party, a decree had been recovered for possession of a portion of the land now in dispute. Held, that, as neither the land nor the rent of such portion was claimed by the defendant, the question as to title was not decided between parties having "conflicting claims" thereto; consequently there was no right of appeal. **REEDOYNATH DOORIPA v. PUDDO LOCHUN CHUCKERBUTTY**

22 W. R. 205

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s.101 (Act X of 1859, s. 145)—*contd.*

16. ——— *Special appeal—*
Question of title. The issue whether or not there has been a binding enhancement of rent, and whether or not the tenant has paid at the enhanced rate, involves no question of title or of right to enhance or vary the rent, and the appeal in such a suit properly lies to the Collector. **BAHADUR SINGH v. HURA** 3 N. W. 73

AGER SINGH v. BOOJHAWUN 4 N. W. 61

17. ——— *Special appeal—*
Decision as to varying rent. In a suit for arrears of rent on the basis of a shironamah, where the raiyat denied that he had executed that document, and produced evidence to show that the rates mentioned in it were not correct: *Held*, that there was no question of right to vary the rent, and that the case therefore did not come under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 102. **NITRESSUR SINGH v. JHOTEE TELY** 23 W. R. 343

18. ——— *Special appeal—*
Decision as to varying rent. Where the amount of jumma is not disputed, but there is a question as to whether it is payable by instalments or in a lump sum, the decision cannot be said to involve a question of "right to enhance or vary the rent." **PEARI MOHUN MOOKHOPADHYA v. MADHUB CHUNDER BABOO** 23 W. R. 385

19. ——— *Special appeal—*
Question of fact—Question of nature of rent. In a suit for arrears of rent, where the question was whether the defendants were holding on payment of nugdi rents or as bhauli tenants,—*Held*, that the decision was a finding of fact. *Held*, further, that, as the suit was for an amount under R100, and as no question to vary the rate was determined, nor any question of title as between parties having conflicting claims thereto, there was no special appeal. **SHUMBUL SINGH v. TOONDUN SINGH** 24 W. R. 469

20. ——— *Special appeal—*
"Right to vary rent." A suit for rent under R100 is not taken out of the purview of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 102, by the fact of the rate of rent having been varied by the decision of the Court, unless the Judge determined "the right to vary the rent." **WATSON & Co. v. MOHENDRO NAUTH PAUL** 23 W. R. 436

SREENATH ROY v. AINOODDEN SHAHA
 25 W. R. 103

21. ——— *Special appeal—*
Question as to whether rent has varied. Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 102, does not apply where the point decided is simply whether the rent fixed by a previous decision has been subsequently altered and a new arrangement come to. **NURUB-DESSUR PERSHAD ROY v. JUNGLE** 24 W. R. 49

22. ——— *Special appeal—*
Question as to variation of rent. In a suit for arrears of rent under R100, in which the ques-

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s.101 (Act X of 1859, s. 145)—*contd.*

tion was whether the landlord had the right to raise and had raised the rent, and the Judge decided that there had been no alteration in the rent: *Held*, that no appeal lay to the High Court. **ROY JUNG BAHADUR v. JUGDEO ROY**
 25 W. R. 247

23. ——— *Special appeal—*
Question of title. Where the Judge practically came to no determination at all, on the erroneous supposition that a review had been wrongly admitted by the Munsif, a special appeal was held to be not barred. **GOORDIAL ROY v. DEKA NOONYA** 22 W. R. 446

24. ——— *Special appeal—*
Co-sharer—Suit for rent. The plaintiff, one of several co-sharers of a talukh, sued to recover her share of rent, making her co-sharers, who resisted her claim, defendants. The first Court raised and tried questions of title between the plaintiff, her co-sharers, and the raiyat, and decided in favour of the plaintiff. The lower Appellate Court, without expressing any opinion on the rights of the parties, dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not maintainable. On special appeal it was contended that no appeal would lie, as the amount of the claim was less than R100, and no question of title was determined by the judgment; but this objection was overruled on the ground that the decree of the lower Appellate Court, dismissing the suit, had the effect of deciding the question of title against the plaintiff. On appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent: *Held*, that the judgment, rather than the decree, is to be looked at in applying s. 102, Bengal Act VIII of 1869. No appeal lay from the judgment of the lower Appellate Court, inasmuch as that judgment showed not only that no question of title was determined, but that the Judge did not even consider it. **KARIM SHEIKH v. MUKHODA SOONDERY DASSEE**
 15 B. L. R. 111: 23 W. R. 268

Reversing decision in **MOKHODA SOONDEREE DOSSEE v. KUREEM SHEIKH** 23 W. R. 11

25. ——— *Special appeal—*
Question of title. Where in a suit under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 82, to contest the demand of the distrainer, a question as to area was raised merely as subordinate to the issue as to the amount of rent due without any dispute as to the relationship of landlord and tenant, the case was held not to come within the provisions of s. 102. **HURO PERSHAD CHUCKERBUTTY v. SREEDAM CHUNDER CHOWDHRY**
 20 W. R. 15

HURISH CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. HURREE BEWAH 20 W. R. 16

26. ——— *Special appeal—*
Question of title. Where in a suit for rent the Judge simply upholds as against an intervenor

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 101 (Act X of 1859, s. 145)—*contd.*

the possession of the party found to have succeeded on the death of the last owner to the quiet possession of his estate under a show of title and gives him a decree for rent, he does not determine a question of title so as to admit an appeal under s. 102, Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *KALLY CHURN BANNERJEE v. GOPAL CHUNDER BANNERJEE* 26 W. R. 100

27. ————— *Special appeal*

—*Question of title.* In a suit for rent under R50, in which no question to enhance or vary the rate was decided, and in which, although the first Court went into the question of title, the lower Appellate Court came to no decision on the point: *Held*, that the case fell within the purview of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 102, and no special appeal lay. *BHUGWAN DUTT MISSER v. NOWNNEEDH LALL* 25 W. R. 153

28. ————— *Special appeal*

—*Decision on genuineness of document in order to decide as to amount of rent.* Where a suit for rent of certain years, not exceeding R100, based upon a kabuliati and jumabundi, was dismissed in appeal on the ground that those documents were forged, and the lower Appellate Court, in order to arrive at a decision as to the amount of rent due, enquired into, and decided upon, the genuineness of the mokurari pottah set up by the defendant: *Held*, that Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 102, precluded any special appeal in the case. *MAHOMED TOQUE v. FOUDAR ROY* 25 W. R. 14

29. ————— *Special appeal*

—*Question of title.* In a suit for rent, in which the sum claimed was less than R100, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had ceased to have any interest in the land, and the suit was dismissed. There was no finding as between the plaintiff and any other person claiming title to the land. *Held*, that a special appeal to the High Court was barred by s. 102, Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *Kashee Ram Doss v. Maharanees Sham Mohinee*, 23 W. R. 227, and *Dilbur v. Issur Chunder Roy*, 21 W. R. 36, cited and followed. *DONZELLI v. TEKAN NODAF* 2 C. L. R. 558

30. ————— *Special appeal*

—*Question of title.* In a suit for ejectment valued under R100, the defendants, who were sued as yearly tenants, replied that their tenure was a maurasi gujasta tenure, and in proof of their allegation adduced evidence which was not displaced by the plaintiffs. The lower Court considered that the defendants' allegation was well founded. *Held*, that, although the value of the suit was under R100, an appeal was not barred by the provisions of s. 102 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, as the lower Court had determined a question of law as to whether the tenure was gujasta. *BITTO NATH SAHOO v. RAMDOUT ROY* 7 C. L. R. 369

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 101 (Act X of 1859, s. 145)—*contd.*31. ————— *Special appeal*

—*Question of title.* Separate suits for rent by A and B having been instituted against the tenants of certain land to which both laid claim, a suit was filed by A to establish his title against B, and pending that suit the rent suits which were each for a sum under R100, and which had been appealed to the District Judge, were stayed. The suit between A and B having been decided against A, the District Judge dismissed his suits against the tenants. *Held*, on appeal, that no question of title could be said to have been decided in such suits, and that consequently no second appeal lay. *DURGA NARAIN MISSER v. GOBURDHUN GHOSE* 9 C. L. R. 86

32. ————— *Special appeal*

—*Parties having conflicting claims.* Where there was a question of title raised between the plaintiff and an intervenor, and the Judge dismissed the suit for want of proof of relationship of landlord and tenant between them: *Held*, that, the suit being for less than R100, no special appeal lay to the High Court. *HURRY MOHUN MOZOOMDAR v. DWARKANATH SEIN* 18 W. R. 42

DILBUR v. ISSUR CHUNDER ROY 21 W. R. 36*NANKOO KOEREE v. NUND COOMAR PAUREY* 22 W. R. 326*KASHEE RAM DOSS v. SHAM MOHINEE* 23 W. R. 227*KRIPAMOYEE DEBIA v. DROPUDEE CHOWDHURAIN* 24 W. R. 21333. ————— *Special appeal*

—*Suit for arrears of rent.* D C S, the zamindar, brought a suit against B, a raiyat, for recovery of arrears of rent valued below R100, to which N C A, who claimed under a mokurari title, was made a party under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859. The Munsif passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal by N C A, which was heard and decided by the Subordinate Judge, on reference by the District Judge, the decree of the first Court was reversed, and the suit dismissed. *Held*, that a special appeal lay to the High Court. *DAYAL CHAND SAHOY v. NABIN CHANDRA ADHIKARI* 8 B. L. R. 180 : 16 W. R. 235

ISWAR CHUNDRA SEN v. BEPIN BEHARI ROY 8 B. L. R. 188 note : 16 W. R. 13234. ————— *Special appeal*

—*Decision of varying rent.* Where a Judge found in a rent suit that, although R30-6-6 had for a great number of years been paid by the tenant, R29-15 only was paid as rent, the remainder being a kind of cess or fee for testing the coin paid: *Held*, that he did not determine any question which amounted to a varying of the rent of the tenant. *DWARKANATH SINGH ROY v. NUBO COOMAR BOSE* 20 W. R. 270

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*contd.*s. 101 (Act X of 1859, s. 145)—*contd.*

35. ————— *Special appeal*
—*Claims by plaintiff as zamindar, and defendant as mortgagee, to rent.* In a suit in which plaintiff claims rent as zamindar and defendant, admitting his own tenancy, claims it as mortgagee, there cannot be said to be conflicting claims to a title to, or some interest in, land within the meaning of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 102. *RAJKISHEN MOOKERJEE v. PEAREE MOHUN MOOKERJEE*
24 W. R. 114

36. ————— *Special appeal*
—*Question against intervenor.* The circumstance that a question has been determined at the hearing of the appeal in a rent suit, by which an intervenor may be injuriously affected, will not make the appeal cognizable as a special appeal, unless the decision has involved some title or interest in land of parties having conflicting claims thereto. *RAJ KISHEN MOOKERJEE v. SREENATH DUTT* . . . 23 W. R. 408

37. ————— *Special appeal*
—*Rent suit under R100—Title.* A and B, both of whom set up a claim to certain land, brought separate rent suits against the tenants. In none of these suits did the amount claimed exceed R100. Subsequently to the institution of the rent suits, A sued B to establish his title to the land in dispute. The District Judge, before whom the rent suits came on appeal, allowed them to stand over until the decision in the suit between A and B. That suit was decided in favour of B, and the Judge then decided the rent suits instituted by B in his favour, and dismissed the suits instituted by A. *Held*, that no second appeal would lie in the rent suits, as no question of title between parties having conflicting claims was decided in them. *DOORGA NARAIN SEN v. RAM LALL CHHUTAR*
I. L. R. 7 Calc. 330

S. C. DURGA NARAIN MISSEER v. GOBURDHUN GHOSE . . . 9 C. L. R. 86

38. ————— *Special appeal*
—*Suit for rent below R100—Landlord and tenant.* In a suit for rent below R100, the defendant set up the title of a third person (the third person was, however, no party to the proceedings), and the lower Court, finding that relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties, and that the rent was unpaid, decided the suit on that ground in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendant appealed to the District Judge, who decided that the defendant had paid the rent, and reversed the decision of the Court below. The plaintiffs appealed to the High Court, but were met with the objection that no special appeal would lie. *Held*, that s. 102 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 prohibited the appeal, the case being one between landlord and tenant, and there consequently being no question relating to title as between parties having conflicting

BENGAL RENT ACT, VIII OF 1869 (X OF 1859)—*concl'd.*s. 101 (Act X of 1859, s. 145)
—*concl'd.*

claims. *ROMAPROSAD ROY v. SHORUP PARAMANICK* . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 712

s. 103—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 119—Ex-parte decree—Re-hearing.* S. 103 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 does not apply to applications for a re-hearing after an *ex-parte* decree on the ground of ignorance of the suit. *DRABAMAYI GUPTIA v. TARACHARAN SEN*
7 B. L. R. 207 : 16 W. R. 17

s. 108.

See BENGAL ACT III OF 1870.

10 B. L. R. Ap. 21 : 19 W. R. 128
10 B. L. R. Ap. 22 note : 15 W. R. 75

BENGAL SURVEY ACT (BEN. ACT V OF 1875).

s. 40.

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 935

s. 45—

See PENAL CODE, s. 186.

6 C. W. N. 120

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT
—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 935

s. 45, cl. (b), and s. 62—*Survey proceedings not taken for public purposes—Right of suit.* S. 45, cl. (b), of Bengal Act V of 1875 applies only to a survey or some similar proceeding taken by a revenue officer "for some public purpose," and against which any party who may be affected by the boundary laid down by such officer would have a right to object. Therefore, where such a proceeding, although initiated under Bengal Act V of 1875, has been taken for the purpose of setting the boundaries of private property as between the owners of it, the party aggrieved by the order of the Collector in such proceeding is not debarred by s. 62 of the Act from bringing a suit in the Civil Court to have the boundaries ascertained. *HURRI PRASAD v. JAUMNA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 453 : 7 C. L. R. 491

1. ————— s. 62—*Boundary dispute—Possession, evidence of—Suit based on title.* A formal decision on the question of boundary in a boundary dispute under s. 62 of Bengal Act V of 1875, although conclusive as to possession, is no bar to a suit based upon title. *KALA CHARA TEA CO., LD. v. SUKUL SINGH*

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 280

2. ————— *Decision by a Survey Collector—Right of suit.* A decision under the Survey Act relating to a boundary dispute is conclusive as to possession, but would not bar, a suit based on title. A suit for declaration of title is

BENGAL SURVEY ACT (BEN. ACT V OF 1875)—concl'd.

— s. 62—concl'd.

not barred by s. 62 of the Survey Act, although no appeal is preferred either under s. 59 or s. 60. Where the evidence of possession is conflicting, it may be presumed that possession follows title. *KASTURI SINGH v. RAJKUMAR BABU BISSUN PRAGAS NARAIN SINGH* (1904). 8 C. W. N. 876

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885).

See APPEAL—ACTS—BENGAL TENANCY ACT.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882.
6 C. W. N. 118

See CO-SHARERS.

I. L. R. 35. Calc. 331

See EJECTMENT, JUNGLEBURI LEASE, REVENUE SALE, OCCUPANCY RAIYAT, INDIGO I. L. R. 31 Calc. 174, 725, 786, 932, 960, 1014.

See FIRST CHARGE.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 550

See INTEREST. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 34

See LAND ACQUISITION.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 763

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—FORFEITURE—BREACH OF CONDITIONS.
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 590

See RELINQUISHMENT. 8 C. W. N. 315

— Applicability of Act to lands outside the limits of the town of Calcutta, but within municipal boundaries—*Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act (Bengal Act II of 1888), s. 3—Town of Calcutta, Municipal boundaries of.* The Bengal Tenancy Act applies to lands situated outside the limits of the town of Calcutta, but within its municipal boundaries as defined by Bengal Act II of 1888. *BYRAJ MOHINI DASSI v. GOPESWAR MULLICK*
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 202

— enhancement of rent—

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—ROAD-CESS PAPERS.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1033

— s. 3, cl. (2).

See post, s. 60 . 5 C. W. N. 482

— s. 3, cls. (3) and (5) and ss. 4 and 5, cls. (2) and (3)—*Liability to ejectment—Non-occupancy raiyats—“Rent”—Payment for “use and occupation.”* The defendants were cultivating raiyats who had held certain land under Government, but not for a period sufficient to give them a right of occupancy. The plaintiffs in a suit against the Government succeeded in

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—concl'd.

— s. 3, cls. (3) and (5) and ss. 4 and 5, cls. (2) and (3)—concl'd.

proving their title to the land. In a suit to eject the defendants as trespassers, inasmuch as they could have derived no title from Government who themselves had no title, and no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between them and the plaintiffs who had not recognized their right to cultivate the land: *Held*, that under s. 3, cls. (3) and (5), ss. 4 and 5, cls. (2) and (3), of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the defendants were “non-occupancy raiyats,” and therefore not liable to ejectment except for the reasons and on the conditions specified in that Act; and no such reasons or conditions existed in this case. Liability to pay for the “use and occupation” of land by a person between whom and the proprietor of such land there exists no relationship of landlord and tenant, is a “liability to pay rent” within the meaning of s. 3, cl. (5), of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Cl. (3), s. 5 of that Act, is intended merely to define the position of a raiyat in respect to a proprietor or tenure-holder, and to distinguish him from what is afterwards described as an under-raiyat. *MOHIMA CHUNDER SHAH v. HAZARI PRAMANIK*
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 45

— s. 3, cl. (5).

See CESS . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 726
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 680

— s. 3, cl. (5).

See RENT . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 140
10 C. W. N. 201

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—SMALL CAUSE COURT SUITS—TAX.
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 680

— s. 3, cl. (5)—*Kabuliyat, construction of—Putni tenure—Putnidar—Government revenue—Agreement—Regulation VIII of 1819, s. 3, cl. (3)—Liability of tenure to be sold for arrears of Government revenue under agreement by putnidar to pay it—Penalty for default provided by kabuliyat.* The respondent held certain properties under the appellant on putni tenure on terms which were embodied in two kabuliyats executed by the respondent in 1885 and 1893 respectively, in the former of which it was stated that “the annual jumma of this putni mahal is fixed at Rs. 6,000. Besides the said putni rent I take upon myself the duty of depositing in the Collectorate the Government revenue of Rs. 40,156 fixed for the eight-anna share of the said mahals.” The kabuliyat of 1893 was to the effect that, “having agreed to pay an additional rent of Rs. 1,000 in respect of the putni, which I took . . . on the condition of paying you a putni jumma of Rs. 6,000 per year and of the Rs. 40,156 into the Collectorate year by year and kist by kist as Government revenue for the said eight-anna share, I hereby promise . . . that from the present year I shall pay the Rs. 1,000 in excess as jumma for my said putni

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 3, cl. (5)—*conclld.*

taluk." Provision was also made in the kabuliyats for payment by the respondent of certain cesses. On default in payment of the jumma of R7,000 of the cesses they were to be recovered as arrears of rent under Regulation VIII of 1819; but for default in payment of the Government revenue the penalty was declared to be forfeiture of the tenure. *Held* (affirming the decision of the High Court), that according to the true construction of the kabuliyats read with Regulation VIII of 1819, the Government revenue was not "money payable to the landlord" and therefore not "rent" within the meaning of s. 3, cl. (5) of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885): and consequently it could not be recovered by summary sale under the provisions of Regulation VII of 1819. *JOTINDRA MOHUN TAGORE v. JARAO KUMARI* (1905)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 140

s.c. 10 C. W. N. 201

L. R. 33 I. A. 30

s. 3, cl. (9), and s. 65—"Parcel," "Holding," meaning of. The term "parcel" or "parcels" in s. 3, cl. 9, of the Bengal Tenancy Act, means "entire parcel" or "entire parcels," and is not intended to include an undivided fractional share in a "parcel" or "parcels" of land. Undivided shares in parcels of land cannot constitute distinct "holdings" within the meaning of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Punchanan Banerjee v. Raj Kumar Guha*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 610, *Jardine, Skinner & Co. v. Sarat Soondari Debi*, 3 C. L. R. 140, and *Gour Buksh Roy v. Jee Lal Roy*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 127, distinguished. *HURRY CHURN BOSE v. RUNJIT SINGH* . . . 1 C. W. N. 521

HARI CHARAN BOSE v. RUNJIT SINGH.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 917 note

s. 3, cl. (16).

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—INCUMBRANCES . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 66

s. 5.

See GENERAL CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1868, s. 6.

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 86

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—LIABILITY FOR RENT . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 790

1. ——— The description of a property as a "jote" does not necessarily show that it is not a tenure and that it is simply an ordinary cultivating "jote" or holding. If the area of a "jote" exceeds (100) one hundred bighas, the presumption in the Bengal Tenancy Act should be applied under which, until the contrary is shown, the holding must be regarded as a tenure. *Gokul Mandar v. Pudmanund Singh*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 707, referred to. *NAWAB ALI v. HEMANTA KUMARI DEBI* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 117

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 5—*contd.*

2. ——— cl. (1)—*Suit for rent against a person holding land within a municipality and the land not proved to have been let out for agricultural or horticultural purposes.* The mere fact that a person has acquired from a proprietor or from another tenure-holder a right to hold land for the purpose of collecting rent is not sufficient to prove that he is a tenure-holder within the meaning of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It must be proved that the land was let out as a holding for agricultural or horticultural purposes. *UMRAO BIBI v. MAHOMED RAJABI* . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 205
4 C. W. N. 76

3. ——— cl. (2)—*Raiyat, definition of—Person taking land for horticultural purposes.* *Semble:* The definition of "raiya" in the Bengal Tenancy Act (Act VIII of 1885) is not exhaustive, and there is nothing in that definition which would exclude a person who had taken land for horticultural purposes. *HURRY RAM v. NURSINGH LAL* . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 129

4. ——— *Non-occupancy raiyat—Ejectment—Trespasser.* A person having, previously to the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act, been settled on certain land as raiyat and tenant by a trespasser, and having acquired no right of occupancy at the time of suit brought, was in 1888 sued in ejectment by the true owner, who had obtained possession of the land from such trespasser through the Court on the 27th January 1886. *Held*, that such person was a non-occupancy raiyat within the meaning of s. 5, sub-s. (2), of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and was protected from ejectment by that Act. *Mohima Chunder Shah v. Hazari Pramanik*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 45, approved. *BINAD LAL PAKRASHI v. KALU PRAMANIK* . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 708

cl. (5).

See GHATWALI TENURE 6 C. W. N. 94

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—MODE OF ACQUISITION . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 272
L. R. 23 I. A. 158

Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 5 (5). 107—*Presumption as to kind of tenancy—Tenure-holder and raiyat—Res judicata—Decision of Revenue Court, effect of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Construction of statute.* Where the area of land held by a tenant exceeds 100 bighas, the presumption under s. 5 (5) of the Bengal Tenancy Act is that he is a tenure-holder and not a raiyat. This presumption is not sufficiently rebutted by the fact that the kabuliyat executed by the tenant was on a printed form intended for cultivators, or that, in a receipt for rent given by the landlord to the tenant, the latter was described as a raiyat, the question whether a tenant is a tenure-holder or a raiyat being one

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 5 (5)—*conclld.*

of substance and not of form. Under s. 13, Civil Procedure Code, a decree in a previous suit cannot be pleaded as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit unless the Judge by whom it was made had jurisdiction to try and decide, not only the particular matter in issue, but also the subsequent suit itself in which the issue is subsequently raised. In this respect this section goes beyond the law laid down in the *Duchess of Kingston's case*, 2 *Smith's Leading Cases*, 10th Ed., 713. The essence of a Code is to be exhaustive on the matters in respect of which it declares the law, and it is not the province of a Judge to disregard or go outside the letter of the enactment according to its true construction. *GOKUL MANDAR v. PUDMANUND SINGH* (1902)

6 C. W. N. 825 : s.c. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 707
I. R. 29 I. A. 196

ss. 5, 49—*Tenant of homestead land under a raiyat—Raiyat—Notice to quit—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 106.*

Where the lands included in the holding of an agricultural raiyat consisted partly of agricultural and partly of homestead lands, and the portion, which could be used as homestead, was let out for use as homestead : *Held*, that the under-tenant was an under-raiyat within the Bengal Tenancy Act, and the Transfer of Property Act has no application. That in order to maintain a suit in ejectment a notice under s. 49, cl. (6), of the Bengal Tenancy Act was necessary, and it was to be served in accordance with the rules framed under the Act. *RAM ROY v. MAHENDRA NATH SAMANTA* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 454

ss. 5 (2), 79, 82, 160 (e)—

See NON-OCCUPANCY RAIYAT.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 516

1. — s. 7—*Enhancement—Rent—Zemin-dar*. In a suit for enhancing the rent payable by certain fractional shareholders in a taluk, the zamindar put in as evidence several road-cess returns, which had been filed on behalf of another fractional shareholder and which showed that the tenants were receiving from sub-tenants considerably higher rent than they were paying to the zamindar—and this was found to be the only reliable evidence produced by either party. *Held*, that the returns, though not conclusive, *prima facie* showed that the existing rate was not fair or equitable, and this evidence shifted the onus on the tenants to rebut any presumption raised by the returns by producing the collection papers. As the tenants had not done this the Court was justified under s. 114 (g) of the Evidence Act, to award enhanced rate on the basis of the returns. *HEM CHANDRA CHOWDRY v. KALI PROSUNNA BHADURI* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 1

2. — *Enhancement of rent—Fair and equitable rent—Construction of lease. Held,*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 7—*conclld.*

upon a construction of the *kabuliat* in the present case, that the tenant's liability to pay an enhanced rent under s. 7 of the Bengal Tenancy Act has not been in any way restricted by the *kabuliat*. Where in a suit for enhancement of rent under s. 7 of the Bengal Tenancy Act the rent assessed by the lower Court amounted to 70 per cent. on the net assets after deducting collection charges, and therefore 30 per cent. was left as the tenure-holder's net profits, but the rent was thereby nearly trebled : *Held*, that the rent settled was somewhat larger than what was fair and equitable. *RAM KUMAR SINGH v. WATSON & Co.* (1905) . . . 9 C. W. N. 384

1. — s. 11—*Transfer of tenure piece-meal, if sub-division—Liability of transferor for rent*. Where a *dur-putnidar*, to the knowledge of his landlord, transferred a portion of the *dur-putni* to one person on one date, and the remainder to another person on a subsequent date. *Held* (MACLEAN, C.J., *dubitante*), that, after the second transfer, the liability of the *dur-putnidar* for rent ceased and the two transferees became jointly and severally liable to the landlord for the same. *Kristo Bulluv Ghose v. Kristo Lal Singh*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 642 ; *Chintamoni Dutt v. Rash Behari Mondal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 17, and *Sreemutty Jogemaya Dassi v. Girindra Nath Mukerjee*, 4 C. W. N. 590, referred to. MACLEAN, C.J.—The act of the *dur-putnidar* in transferring the tenure piece-meal had the effect of dividing the tenure contrary to the provisions of s. 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *KISHORI RAMAN KAPURIA v. ANANTA RAM LAHA* (1905) 10 C. W. N. 270

2. — ss. 11, 12.—*Release by co-sharer, if transfer—Stamp—Registration—Non-payment of landlord's fee, if invalidates transfer—Bengal Tenancy Validation Act (Bengal Act 1 of 1905), s. 1—Breach of covenant—Cesser of liability*. Certain co-sharers in a permanent tenure by a deed, dated 2nd December 1893, which was registered in Book 1, under s. 51 of the Registration Act, relinquished all their right, title and interest and claim in the tenure in favour of the remaining co-sharer who, it was stipulated, was to remain in possession and was to be entitled to sell the tenure. He was also to pay certain debts mentioned in the deed for which the other co-sharers were to be under no liability. The deed was stamped with a five rupee stamp as a release. No landlord's fee was paid as required by s. 12 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Held*, that the deed was a transfer within the meaning of s. 12 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and the transfer was complete as soon as the document was registered. The non-payment of the landlord's fee did not render the transfer invalid owing to the operation of s. 1 of Act I of 1905. *Held*, further, that the liability of the co-sharers under the lease ceased with the transfer. *Kristo Bulluv Ghose v. Kristo Lal Singh*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 642, and *Chintamony Dutt v. Rash Behari*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 11, 12—*concl'd.*

Mondul, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 17, followed. *HEMEN-DRA NATH MUKERJI v. KUMAR NATH ROY* (1908)
12 C. W. N. 478

s. 12—

See APPEAL . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 580

1. ———— *Transfer of a permanent tenure—Permanent tenure, registration of.* The transfer of a permanent tenure under s. 12 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is complete as soon as the document is registered. *KRISTO BULLUV GHOSE v. KRISTO LAL SINGH* I. L. R. 16 Calc. 642

2. ———— *Transfer of tenure—Registration—Notice of transfer—Landlord and tenant—Liability for rent.* After a recorded tenant has transferred his tenure to another person, and that transfer has been duly registered under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, he is no longer liable for the rent of the tenure, although the landlord may not have received actual notice of such transfer. *Kristo Bulluv Ghose v. Kristo Lal Singh, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 642*, relied on. *CHINTAMONI DUTT v. RASH BEHARI MONDUL*
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 17

3. ———— *Transfer of tenure—Contract regarding transfer of tenure—Conditional transfer—Condition not performed.* A transfer of a tenure made in terms of the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 is not binding on the landlord if there be a contract between the landlord and the tenant that the transfer shall not be valid and binding until security to the satisfaction of the landlord has been furnished by the transferee, and such security has not been furnished. The tenant is still liable for the rent. *DINOBUNDHU ROY v. BONERJEE*
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 774

4. ———— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 59—Permanent tenure—Mortgage—Registration.* The provisions of s. 59 of the Transfer of Property Act must, having regard to s. 6, be taken to be subject to the provisions of s. 12 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Accordingly a mortgage of a permanent tenure can only be effected by a registered instrument whether the amount secured be greater or less than Rs. 100. *SOSHI BHUSAN BOSE v. SHAHADEB SHAHA*
3 C. W. N. 499

5. ———— and s. 13.—*Sale of a tenure in execution of a decree not for arrears of rent—Effect of non-payment of landlord's fee or the fee for service of notice of the sale on the landlord before the confirmation of sale.* Under s. 13 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, when a permanent tenure is sold in execution of a decree other than a decree for arrears of landlord's rent due in respect thereof, and the fee prescribed by s. 12 of the said Act is not paid before the confirmation of the sale, the sale is invalid. *BABAR ALI v. KRISHNANANINI DASSI*
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 603
3 C. W. N. 531

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*

ss. 12, 17, 88.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 279

Transfer of a tenure—Liability of tenant. Where the defendant held separately a share of a *sikmi taluq* under the plaintiff, and transferred that share to a third party and served a notice of the transfer on the plaintiff landlord as prescribed by s. 12 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Held*, that the act of the defendant in making the transfer did not amount to a subdivision of the tenure, and that the defendant was not liable for rent for any period subsequent to the transfer. *Chintamani Dutt v. Rash Behari Mondul, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 17*, referred to. *KALI SUNDARI DEBI v. DHARANI KANTA LAHIRI* (1905)
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 279
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 272

1. ———— s. 15—*Bengal Rent Act (VIII of 1869), s. 26—Act X of 1859, s. 27—Suit by landlords against a tenure-holder in occupation of a share of the tenure without joining other co-sharers of the defendants for recovery of rents and cesses whether and when maintainable.* It is the duty of the persons succeeding by inheritance to a permanent tenure to notify the succession, and it is not the duty of the superior landlord to find out who all the heirs of a deceased tenure-holder are. There is no law which compels a landlord in order that he might succeed in a suit for rent to sue all the heirs of a deceased tenure-holder when he has no notice who the heirs are. Where, as in this case, the defendant was admittedly one of the heirs and in possession as such, he is liable for the rent, and he cannot defeat the plaintiff's suit by showing that there were other heirs equally liable, unless he also shows that their names were notified to the landlord as successors of the original holders, or that they have been paying rent and getting receipts as successors. *KHETTER MOHAN PAL v. PRAN KRISTO KABIRAJ* 3 C. W. N. 371

2. ———— *Succession by a shebait to debutter property—Suit for rent—Endowment.* The right to possession and management of a dedicated property belongs to the shebait and the right to bring a suit for rent is vested in the shebait and not in the idol; consequently when on the death of one shebait another shebait succeeds to a permanent tenure and does not according to s. 15 of the Bengal Tenancy Act give a notice of succession to the landlord, s. 16 is an effective bar to the recovery of a decree for rent. *MABA-TULLAH NASYA v. NALINI SUNDARI GUPTA* (1905)
10 C. W. N. 42

3. ———— and s. 16—*Operation of those sections in a suit for rent of land, to which the plaintiff succeeded before the Bengal Tenancy Act came into force—Construction of statute.* Ss. 15 and 16 of the Bengal Tenancy are not retrospective. *PROFULLAH CHUNDER BOSE v. SAMIRUDDIN MONDUL* I. L. R. 22 Calc. 337

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 15—*concl'd.*

4. ——— and s. 16—*Arrears of rent, suit for*—*Suit by a patnidar on the death of the last owner against the dar-patnidar, without complying with the provisions of s. 15 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, whether maintainable*—*Holder of a tenure.* In a suit for arrears of rent for the years 1299 B.S. to Falgoon 1302 B.S. brought by patnidars on the death of the last owner on the 14th Aghran 1302 B.S., the defence of the dar-patnidar mainly was that the plaintiffs not having complied with the provisions of s. 15 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the suit was not maintainable. *Held*, that, as the plaintiffs did not claim the rent, which fell due during the lifetime of the last owner as the holder of the tenure, but claimed it either as the representative of the holder of the tenure for the time being or as representative of their father, the rent became an increment to the estate of the father, and therefore the suit was maintainable. *Nogendra Nath Bose v. Satadul Bashini Bose*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 526, referred to. *SHERIFF v. JOGEMAYA DAS* . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 535

5. ——— and ss. 16 and 26—*Whether an heir of an occupancy raiyat can claim recognition by the landlord on the death of his ancestor, who was the recorded tenant.* An heir of an occupancy raiyat can claim recognition by the landlord on the death of his ancestor, who was the recorded tenant. *ANANDA KUMAR NASKAR v. HARI DASS HALDAR* I. L. R. 27 Calc. 545
4 C. W. N. 608

6. ——— and ss. 16 and 195—*Patni tenure—Bengal Regulation VIII of 1819, s. 5.* Ss. 15 and 16 of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 apply to patni tenures. *DURGA PROSAD BUNDOPADHYA v. BRINDABUN ROY*
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 504

——— s. 16—*Right of suit—Succession to permanent tenure—Omission to give notice of succession to Collector, effect of—Non-payment of fees, effect of, on right to decree.* S. 16 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not preclude a party from instituting a suit for rent, notwithstanding that the Collector has not received the notice and the fees referred to therein. But that section is a bar to the plaintiffs obtaining a decree before the notice and the fees are received by the Collector. *KALIHUR GHOSE v. UMAE PATWARI*
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 241
1 C. W. N. 98

ss. 17 and 18.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—TRANSFER BY TENANT.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 433

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 152

ss. 17, 88, 161—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

11 C. W. N. 217

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*

s. 19.

See REVENUE SALE LAW, s. 37.

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—LOSS OR FORFEITURE OF RIGHT.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 129

3 C. W. N. 751, 860

s. 20.

See RELINQUISHMENT . . . 8 C. W. N. 31

See REVENUE SALE LAW.

8 C. W. N. 601, 751

1. ——— *Relinquishment by some of several co-sharers, effect of—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 20, 21, 78, 86, 88—Holding bonâ fide under a person having no title.* A relinquishment made in favour of the landlord by some of several tenants of a joint occupancy holding does not operate by way of enlarging the right of the other co-sharers, who did not relinquish, and depriving the landlord of what ordinarily would belong to him. The rule laid down in the case of *Binad Lal Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 708, is based upon that the assumption that the tenant entered upon the land and held under a *de facto* proprietor, who might not be the real owner, in good faith. That element being wanting in the present case, plaintiffs cannot get any relief. *PEARY MOHUN MONDAL v. RADHIKA MOHUN HAZRA* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 513

2. ——— cl. (3)—*Right of non-occupancy raiyat—Death of raiyat having right of non-occupancy—Heirs—Re-entry by landlord.* The right of a non-occupancy raiyat (who does not hold under any express engagement) in his holding is not heritable. *KARIM CHOWKIDAR v. SUNDAR BEWA* . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 207
1 C. W. N. 88

3. ——— ss. 20, 21—*Suits pending at time Act came into force—Suit for ejectment—Acquisition of right of occupancy—General Clauses Act (I of 1868), s. 6.* S. 21 of the Bengal Tenancy Act applies to suits pending at the time the Act came into force, *viz.*, 1st November 1885, which had not then resulted in a decree. In a suit instituted on 8th October 1885, to eject the defendants after notice to quit, it was held that, although the defendant had held the land from which it was sought to eject him for less than 12 years and therefore would not, if the Bengal Rent Act (VIII of 1869) had been applicable, have acquired a right of occupancy, yet the effect of ss. 20 and 21 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was to give him a right of occupancy, and therefore he could not be ejected. *JOGESSUR DAS v. AISANI KOYBURTO* . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 553

4. ——— *General Clauses Act (I of 1868), s. 6—Retrospective enactment when applicable to pending suit—Pending suit—Landlord and tenant—Right of occupancy.* S. 21, sub-s. (2) of Act VIII of 1885 is expressly retrospective, and applies to suits pending at the date of the com-

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.***s. 20—*concl.***

mencement of that Act. *Jogessur Das v. Aisani Koyburto*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 553, followed.
TUPSEE SING v RAMSARUN KOERI
 I. L. R. 15 Calc. 376

5. ss. 20, cl. (7) and 180—*Chur land*—Onus of proof—Presumption of holding *chur land* continuously for twelve years—Reg. XI of 1825, s. 4—*Raiyat* having no pre-existing right to the land—*Right of accretion*. Held, that the presumption, which is created by s. 20, cl. (7), of the Bengal Tenancy Act in respect of that section could not be applied to s. 180 of that Act. In *dearah* or *chur land* the person, who alleged that he had been for twelve continuous years in possession, would have to prove that allegation. Held, further, that s. 4 of Reg. XI of 1825 could not apply, there being no pre-existing right to the land in the tenants, to which any right to the later accretion can be said to be annexed. *BENI PERSAD KOERI v. CHATURTI TEWARY* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 444

s. 21.

See *RELINQUISHMENT* . 8 C. W. N. 315

See *ZURIPESHGI LEASE* . 10 C. W. N. 35

1. ———— Occupancy, right of

—*Occupancy right may be acquired in urban area*—*Village*—Act X of 1859—*Bengal Act VIII of 1869*. A tenancy is found to have existed for at least 50 years in respect of a piece of land, which was used for agricultural or horticultural purposes and which is situated within the limits of the Dacca Municipality: Held, that even if the Bengal Tenancy Act has no operation in urban areas, the tenant had acquired a right of occupancy before the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act, under the repealed Acts X of 1859 and VIII of 1869. *Semble*: The term "village" as defined in s. 3, sub-s. (10) of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not confined to non-urban areas. The Act applies to urban areas outside the town of Calcutta. It has no operation as regards homestead lands, whether situated in towns or outside towns. *HASSAN ALI v. GOBINDA LAL BASAK* (1905) . . . 9 C. W. N. 141

2. ———— Zurpeshgi lease—

Lease for cultivation—*Occupancy, right of, whether can arise*—*Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885)*, s. 21. Neither of the cases, *Bengal Indigo Co. v. Raghubar Das*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 272, and *Ram Khelawan Roy v. Sambhoo Roy*, 2 C. W. N. 753, is authority for the proposition that a raiyat by taking a *zuripeshgi* lease of land of which he was previously or then put in possession as a raiyat, loses his *raiya* status or divests himself of his right to acquire a right of occupancy in the land. Held, on the terms of the present lease, that it was a cultivating lease and that the lessee did by 12 years' continuous possession acquire a right of occupancy over the leased land. *RAMDHARI SINGH v. MACKENZIE* (1905) . . . 10 C. W. N. 351

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.***s. 22.**

See *MERGER* . . . 13 C. W. N. 913

See *RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—LOSS OR FORFEITURE OF RIGHT*.
 I. L. R. 18 Calc. 121

See *RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—TRANSFER OF RIGHT* . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 869
 I. L. R., 24 Calc. 143, 521
 I. L. R., 27 Calc. 473
 3 C. W. N. 62
 4 C. W. N. 569

Quære: Whether an occupancy right may be served from the tenancy right or whether in no circumstances is such a separation possible except to the extent and in the manner indicated in s. 22 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Girish Chandra v. Kedar Chandra*, 4 C. W. N. 569, doubted. *UDAI CHANDRA DAS v. HARIDAS BAIRAGI* (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 937

s. 22 (1).

See *SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—INCUMBRANCES* . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 205

s. 22, sub-s. 2—*Purchase of an occupancy holding by a co-sharer landlord—Termination of occupancy right*. Held by the Full Bench (*RAMPINI, J.*, dissenting), that the result of a purchase by a co-sharer landlord of the occupancy holding of a tenant will not be the termination of the tenancy right altogether, but only of his occupancy right in the holding. *Jawadul Huq v. Ram Das Saha*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 143, approved. *RAM MOHAN PAL v. SHEIKH KACHU* (1905) . . . 9 C. W. N. 249

ss. 22, 49, 85 (1).

See *LANDLORD AND TENANT*.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 104, 718

s. 23.

See *LANDLORD AND TENANT—PROPERTY IN TREES AND WOODS ON LAND*.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 742, 744 note, 746 note
 748 note, 751 note
 I. L. R. 23 Calc. 854

See *SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT*, s. 54.

9 C. W. N. 87

ss. 23, 76 (2) (1), 77—*Improvements—Masonry dwelling-house—Homestead land—Purposes of tenancy—Permanency, proof of—Injunction*. An occupancy raiyat has a right to erect as a dwelling-house a building, consisting of masonry walls with a corrugated-iron roof, on the site of his ancestral dwelling-house within the homestead land of the holding; there is nothing in ss. 23 and 76 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to prevent him from doing so. There is nothing in s. 76 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to indicate that a suitable dwelling-house of an occupancy raiyat as described in that section must be of a temporary description only. *Nyamutoolah Ostagur v. Govind Churn Dutt*, 6 W. R.

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 23—*concl'd.*

(Act X) 40, followed. *Prosunno Coomar Chatterjee v. Jagun Nath Bysack*, 10 C. L. R. 25, referred to. *Anund Coomar Mookerjee v. Bissonath Banerjee*, 17 W. R. 416; and *Beni Madhab Banerjee v. Jai Krishna Mookerjee*, 7 B. L. R. 152; 12 W. R. 495, distinguished. *HARI KISHORE BARNA SARMA v. BARADA KISHORE ACHARJYA CHOWDHURI* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1014
s. c. 8 C. W. N. 754

s. 25.

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—ACQUISITION
OF RIGHT—MODE OF ACQUISITION.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 272
I. L. R. 23 I. A. 158

s. 25, cl. (a).

See LIMITATION ACT, ART. 32.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 160

s. 26.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—LIABILITY
FOR RENT . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 790

s. 26—*Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 22, 26—Occupancy holding—Mortgage—Death of raiyat without heirs—“Transfer, succession or otherwise” does not include failure of heirs of raiyat—Landlord takes free from mortgage—Interpretation—Ejusdem generis.* When an occupancy raiyat dies without heirs, all his interest in the holding ceases and becomes extinct and with it the security of a mortgage executed by him. The landlord in whom the holding vests takes it free from incumbrances. S. 22 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not apply to the case of a vesting of the holding in the landlord under s. 26 of the Act upon a failure of heirs of the occupancy raiyat. The words “transfer, succession or otherwise” in s. 22 do not include such a case. The expression “or otherwise” as used in the section means “or in a similar way.” *Badan Chandra Das v. Rajeswari Debya*, 2 C. L. J. 570, referred to. *MUKTA KESHI DAS v. PULIN BEHARI SINGH* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 12

s. 29.

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 74.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 658

See ENHANCEMENT.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 200

See LEASE . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 604

See SECOND APPEAL.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 200

1. *Suit for enhancement of rent—Enhancement of rent by contract by more than two annas in the rupee—Void agreement—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 23 and 24.* A contract under s. 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to pay an enhanced rent by more than two annas in the rupee is void. *KRISTODHONE GHOSE v. BROJO GOBINDO ROY* . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 895

1 C. W. N. 442

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 29—*contd.*

2. *Landlord and Tenant—Suit for rent—Enhancement of rent—Enhancement of rent by a registered kabuliyat within fifteen years from a previous oral agreement to pay enhancement of rent, effect of.* By an oral agreement in the year 1885 the tenant defendant agreed to pay an enhancement of rent, and he paid rent at that rate until subsequently he executed in the year 1893 a registered kabuliyat, by which he agreed to pay a further enhancement of rent which was more than two annas in the rupee. Upon a suit for rent by the landlord based on the registered kabuliyat: *Held*, that, inasmuch as the enhancement of rent in s. 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act refers to enhancement after the promulgation of the Act, if in this case the enhancement which was made in the year 1885 was before the Act came into force, it would not bar an enhancement during the period of fifteen years from the date thereof as contemplated by cl. (3) of s. 29. But if the said enhancement was made after the Act came into force, it would also not bar a subsequent enhancement within fifteen years from the date thereof, as the previous contract was only an oral one and was not effectual and binding upon the defendant. *Held*, also, that having regard to cl. (b) of s. 29, as the enhancement was more than two annas in the rupee, the registered kabuliyat was bad in law, if the rent then agreed to be paid was an enhanced rent. The kabuliyat would also be bad in law, if the rent agreed to be paid is partly enhanced and partly increased rent. *Held*, further, that having regard to prov. (1) of s. 29, as also the provisions of s. 27, the plaintiff would at any rate (*i.e.*, failing the kabuliyat) be entitled to recover rent at the rate paid by the defendant for more than three years. *MOTIURA MOHUN LAHIRI v. MATI SARKAR*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 781

3. *Enhancement of rent by registered contract—Increase in the amount of rent by reason of increase of area—Applicability of s. 29 in such cases.* S. 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act applies only to an increase in the rate of rent, and not to an increase in the amount of rent, by reason of an increase of the area. *SATISH CHUNDRA GIRI v. KABIRUDDIN MALLICK*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 233

4. *Enhancement of rent by contract—Agreement not within the section.* An agreement embodied in a kabuliyat to pay a certain amount of rent agreed upon by the parties in settlement of differences between them as to what had been the amount and character of the rent, and to avoid further litigation, is not an agreement to enhance within the meaning of s. 21, cl. (b), of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *SHEO SAHOY PANDEY v. RAM RACHIA ROY* . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 333

5. *Landlord and tenant—Suit to set aside a kabuliyat—Enhancement of rent*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 29—*concl.*

by contract—Consideration for such contract—Agreement to pay enhanced rent in settlement of *bona fide* disputes—*Res judicata*. An agreement, embodied in a *kabuliyat*, to pay a certain amount of rent agreed upon by the parties in settlement of *bona fide* disputes regarding the rate of rent and to avoid further litigation, is not an agreement in violation of the terms of s. 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Sheo Sahoy Panday v. Ram Rachia Roy*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 333, followed. *NATH SINGH v. DAMRI SINGH* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 90

6. — s. 29, cl. (b)—*Proviso (1)*—Enhancement of rent by more than 2 annas in the rupee—Continuous repayment for more than 3 years at a higher rate—Suit on *kabuliyat*—Pleadings—Issues. Proviso (1) to s. 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not control sub-s. (b) of that section. *Mathura Mohan Lahiri v. Mati Sarkar*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 781, distinguished. *BEPIN BEHARI MONDAL v. KRISHNA DHONE GHOSE* (1905) 9 C. W. N. 265

7. — s. 29 (b), prov. (ii), (iii).—Occupancy holding—Rent, enhancement of, over 2 annas in the rupee—Relieving tenant from other liabilities—Improvements not mentioned in *kabuliyat*, proof of—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 91. Where an occupancy raiyat executed a *kabuliyat* in favour of the landlord stipulating to pay rent at an enhanced rate of more than two annas in the rupee and the *kabuliyat* did not refer to any improvements of the kind mentioned in proviso (ii) of s. 29 of the Bengal Tenancy Act: *Held*, that s. 91 of the Evidence Act did not preclude the landlord from proving improvements in consideration of which the enhanced rate was agreed upon. The consideration did not constitute a term of the contract within that section. The fact that the tenant has been exonerated from certain liabilities under a previous contract cannot give validity to a stipulation to pay rent at an enhanced rate exceeding 2 annas in the rupee. *Ratio decidendi* of *Sheo Sahoy Panday v. Ram Rachia Roy*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 333, and *Nath Singh v. Damri Singh*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 90, indicated. *PROBOD CHANDAR GANGOPADHYA v. CHERAG ALI* (1906) . . . 11 C. W. N. 62

8. — s. 29. The onus of proving that a *kabuliyat* contravenes the provisions of s. 29 (b) of the Bengal Tenancy Act is upon the tenant. Decree for rent was passed on the basis of a *kabuliyat* showing a higher rate than that entered subsequently in the record-of-rights. *LUCHMI PERSHAD v. EKDESHWAR SINGH* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 181

s. 30.

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—GROUNDS OF ENHANCEMENT—RATE OF RENT LOWER THAN IN ADJACENT PLACES.

1 C. W. N. 310

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 30—*concl.*

1. — “Holding,” meaning of. The term “holding,” as used in s. 30 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, means an entire holding. *BAIDYA NATH DE v. ILIM I. L. R. 25 Calc. 917*
2 C. W. N. 44

2. — “Holding,” definition of—Enhancement of rent. An undivided share of lands comprising a holding does not fall within the definition of a holding given in the Bengal Tenancy Act; and s. 30 of the Act does not apply to an enhancement of rent of such a share. *HARIBOLE BROHMO v. TASIMUDDIN MONDUL*
2 C. W. N. 680

3. — Suit for enhancement of rent—Prevailing rate, meaning of—Average rate. The words “prevailing rate,” in s. 30, cl. (a), of the Bengal Tenancy Act, mean not the average rate of rent, but the rate actually paid and current in the village for land of a similar description with similar advantages; they should be construed, therefore, in the same sense as was given to the same words in the earlier cases decided under Act X of 1859. *SHTAL MONDAL v. PROSSONNAMOYI DEBYA* . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 986

4. — Enhancement suit—Equitable rate—Prevailing rate. In a suit for enhancement of rent under s. 30 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the case was referred to arbitration, on the application of the parties, and the arbitrator settled a fair and equitable rate. *Held*, that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to do so, inasmuch as the parties declared that they would be bound by what the arbitrator would decide. *GANGA CHARAN ROY v. SASTI MANDAL* (1901) . 6 C. W. N. 614

ss. 30, 52—Joinder of causes of action. There is nothing in the law which prevents one suit being brought for enhancement under s. 30 and for increase of rent under s. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The two causes of action may be joined in one suit. *SARADA CHARAN CHATTERJEE v. ISWAR SAMLI* (1907)

11 C. W. N. 1154

s. 38.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

12 C. W. N. 767

Settlement of rent—Grounds for abatement of rent—Permanent and temporary deterioration. A liberal interpretation should be put upon the word “permanently” in s. 38, sub-s. (1), cl. (a), and the word construed with reference to existing conditions. It cannot be said that a deterioration is not permanent, only because by the application of capital and skill it might be removed. In determining the liability to additional rent, the Settlement Officer is by s. 52, sub-s. (2), cl. (c), bound to consider the length of time during which the tenancy has lasted without dispute as to rent or area. Although only an occu-

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*concl'd.***s. 38—*concl'd.***

pancy raiyat can bring a suit under s. 38, the principles laid down in that section ought to be taken into consideration in all proceedings for settlement of rent, whatever be the status of the raiyat. *GOURI PATTRA v. REILY*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 579

1. **s. 40—*Commutation of rent—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.*** An order passed in appeal by a Revenue Court under s. 40 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is final, and no suit lies in the Civil Courts by which its propriety can be questioned. *LALLA SALIGRAM SINGH v. RAMGIR*

3 C. W. N. 311

2. **Order commuting *blowli* rent to *naqdi* rent—Omission to state time when order is to take effect.** The provisions of cl. 5, s. 40 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, are imperative, and should be strictly complied with. Where, therefore, an order under that clause omitted to state the time from which it was to take effect, it was held to be inoperative. *CHOWDHRY RAGHU NATH SARIN SINGH v. DHODHA ROY*

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 467

s. 44.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—FORFEITURE—DENIAL OF TITLE 1 C. W. N. 156

s. 46, sub-ss. (6) and (9)—*Non-occupancy raiyat—Enhancement of rent—Fair and equitable rent.* Sub-s. (9) of s. 46 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not exhaustive. It was not intended that if there was no land of a similar description and with like advantage in the same village as the land in suit, it should be impossible to enhance the rent of a non-occupancy raiyat upon any other ground. *HOSAIN ALI KHAN v. HATI CHARAN SHAW*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 476

4 C. W. N. 321

s. 48—*Operation of s. 48 on suit instituted before Act came into force.* S. 48, cl. (a), of the Bengal Tenancy Act is retrospective. *Ram Kumar Jugi v. Jafar Ali Patwari*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 199, note, approved of. *GURU DAS SHUT v. NAND KISHORE PAL*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 199

RAM KUMAR JUGI v. JAFAR ALI PATWARI

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 199 note

48, cl. (a)—*Under-raiyat—Limit of rent—Retrospective effect.* The provisions of s. 48, cl. (a), of the Bengal Tenancy Act are retrospective, and apply to a tenancy created before the passing of that Act. *Guru Dass Shurt v. Nand Kishore Pal*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 199, followed. *BABALUDDIN MAHOMED v. DWARKA NATH SINGH* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 166

s. 49.

See EJECTMENT, SUIT FOR.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 396

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*concl'd.***s. 49—*concl'd.***

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

13 C. W. N. 913

See post, s. 105 . 13 C. W. N. 1149

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—

EJECTMENT—NOTICE TO QUIT.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 308

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 231

1 C. W. N. 133

2 C. W. N. 125, 238

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 200

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—FORFEITURE—DENIAL OF TITLE.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 101

TRANSFER BY TENANT.

6 C. W. N. 916, 919

See UNDER-RAIYAT . 11 C. W. N. 519

1. **Written lease, meaning of.** The expression "written lease" in cl. (b) of s. 49 means such a lease as is mentioned in cl. (a), i.e., a written lease defining the terms of the tenancy. *KOMARUDDI v. SREENATH CHOWDHURY* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 136

2. **Unwritten lease.** S. 49 of the Bengal Tenancy Act contemplates two classes of cases: (a) written leases for terms, and (b) unwritten leases; it does not contemplate the case of a written lease without any term. *MOHENDRA NATH SEPAI v. PARBUTTY CHARAN DASS* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 136

3. **Written lease, meaning of.** The words "written lease" in cl. (b) of s. 49 of the Bengal Tenancy Act mean a written lease for a fixed term of years. *IDUGAZI DOCTOR v. CHANDRA KALI SUNDRANI* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 139

4. **ss. 49 (b), 167—*Under-raiyat—Notice—Trespass—Right of occupancy.*** An under-tenant, who is not an occupancy raiyat, cannot be ejected by the landlord without the notice prescribed by s. 49 (b) of the Bengal Tenancy Act in order to take khas possession of the holding. *Peary Mohun Mookherjee v. Badut Chandra Bagai*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 205, distinguished. *AMIRULLAH MAHOMED v. NAZIR MAHOMED* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 932

s. 50.

See post, s. 115.

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—RENT RECEIPTS . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 251

See LAND ACQUISITION ACTS (XVIII OF 1885 AND I OF 1894).

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 801

1. **Record-of-rights—Presumption from twenty years' uniform payment of rent—Raiyats holding at fixed rates.** In a proceeding for record-of-rights under Ch. X of the

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.**s. 50—contd.**

Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), it having been found that certain raiyats were holding their lands at rates which had not been changed during twenty years before the institution of the proceeding, the Settlement Officer recorded them as "raiayats holding at fixed rates." In second appeal, *held*, that under s. 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the Settlement Officer was right in giving effect to the presumption that the raiyats were holding at fixed rate of rent and in recording them as "raiayats holding at fixed rates." *Bansi Das v. Jagdip Narain Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 152, dissented from. *Dulhin Golab Koer v. Balla Kurmi*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 744
2 C. W. N. 580

Dissenting from *BANSI DAS v. JAGDIP NARAIN CHOWDHRY* I. L. R. 24 Calc. 152

2. — and ss. 115, 104 (sub-ss. 2 and 3), 113—*Record-of-rights—Presumption as to fixity of rent—Settlement of fair and equitable rent—Enhancement for excess land—Enhancement for rise in price of crops.* The provision contained in s. 115 of the Bengal Tenancy Act against the presumption as to fixed rent under s. 50 (2) of the Act arising in certain cases has no application in a suit brought by a tenant for the purpose of contesting the correctness of the decision of a Revenue Officer in regard to the entry as to the status of a raiyat in a record-of-rights prepared under Ch. X of the Act. In such a suit the tenant is entitled to the benefit of the presumption. Given the circumstance of an increase or decrease in the area of the land for which a tenant is paying rent, it is competent to the Revenue Officer under s. 104 (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act to settle a fair and equitable rent in respect of the whole of the land of the tenant, including the excess area, and the Revenue Officer can in such a case enhance the rent under the provisions of the Tenancy Act, e.g., on the ground of the rise in the prices of the food crops, and so forth. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. KAJIMUDDI* I. L. R. 26 Calc. 617

3. — and s. 191—*Permanent Settlement—Presumption—Uniform rent.* When a question arises as to whether a tenant is entitled to the presumption under s. 50, cl. (2), of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the fact that the estate within which the tenure in question is situated was not permanently settled in the year 1793 does not make any difference. S. 191 of the Bengal Tenancy Act has no application to the present case, inasmuch as the estate, though not permanently settled in 1793, was subsequently permanently settled in the year 1811. *TAMASHA BIBI v. ASHUTOSH DHUR* 4 C. W. N. 513

4. — *Presumption as to uniform payment of rent.* When a tenant has paid rent, for over twenty years prior to the date of suit, at a uniform rate which has not changed, the presumption of law, under s. 50,

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.**s. 50—contd.**

sub-s. (2), of the Bengal Tenancy Act, would arise if there is no allegation or proof that a tenancy commenced in a particular year after the Permanent Settlement. The mere fact that the tenant shows by documentary evidence that the rate of rent has not changed from a particular year would not preclude him from the benefit of the presumption given by sub-s. (2) of s. 50. *MONGOLA v. KUMUD CHUNDER SINGH* (1900) 5 C. W. N. 60

5. — *Sub-s. (2)—“Suit or other proceeding under this Act,” meaning of—Suit by landlord to eject the purchaser of a holding on the ground of non-transferability—Whether the presumption arises in such suit.* The application of s. 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is limited to a suit or proceeding under the Bengal Tenancy Act. Where the plaintiff sued for recovery of possession, alleging that the defendant was a trespasser, and the defendant claimed to be a tenant: *Held*, that, until the fact that defendant was a tenant was made out, the suit could not be said to be one under the Bengal Tenancy Act, and the fact was to be made out, independently of s. 50, that the suit was against a tenant; and until that was made out s. 50 had no application. *Nilmani Maitra v. Mathura Nath Joardar*, 4 C. W. N. 159, followed. *Dulhin Golab Koeri v. Bulla Kurmi*, 2 C. W. N. 580, considered. *RASAMOY PURKAIT v. SRINATH MOYRA* (1902) 7 C. W. N. 132

6. — *Presumption—Landlord and tenant—Ejectment.* Where a landlord brings a suit for ejectment on the allegation that his tenant, who had a non-transferable holding, has sold it to a third person (one of the defendants) and has abandoned the holding. *Held*, that s. 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act has no application to such a case. *SARAT CHANDRA GHOSE v. SHYAM CHAND SINGH* (1906) 10 C. W. N. 930

7. — *Land Acquisition proceeding—Apportionment of compensation between landlord and tenant—Presumption of permanency of holding.* Although s. 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not apply when the question of the permanency or otherwise of a tenure arises in a proceeding for the apportionment between landlord and tenant of money awarded for compulsory purchase of land, the principle involved in that section is a useful guide to the Courts in deciding it. *NANDA LAL GOSSAMI v. ATARMONI DASSI* (1908) 12 C. W. N. 432

8. — ss. 50, 106—*Presumption as to amount of rent—Permanent tenure.* The plaintiff's predecessors held a tenure from long before the Permanent Settlement at a rental of R4-8-0. In 1884 the tenure was split up into two tenancies bearing a rental of R2-4-0 each. In the Record-of-Rights of 1906 the tenure was described as not held at a fixed rent. The plaintiff brought a suit under s. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act claiming the tenure to be a perma-

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 50—*concl'd.*

nent one, and the rent as fixed in perpetuity : *Held* that the old tenure did not still exist in the shape of the two new tenancies, the land held by the tenure-holder being affected by the division, under cl. (3) of s. 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *UDOY CHANDRA KARJI v. NRIPENDRA NARAYAN BHUP* (1909) **I. L. R. 36 Calc. 287**

s. 51—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Res judicata—Rent-suit—Presumption.* A decision in a previous rent suit, as to the amount of rent payable, was held not to operate as *res judicata* in a suit for the rent of subsequent years, although it was held that it gave rise to a presumption under s. 51 of the Bengal Tenancy Act that the rents for subsequent years remained the same. *BENT PERSHAD KOBRI v. RAJ KUMAR CHOWBEY* (1902) **6 C. W. N. 589**

s. 52.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

13 C. W. N. 635

See *post*, ss. 90, 52, 188 **7 C. W. N. 93**

See *post*, s. 158 . . . **6 C. W. N. 592**

1. ———— *Landlord and tenant—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 52, 154—Additional rent for excess land—Back rent—Suit for rent.* There is nothing in the Bengal Tenancy Act to prevent the landlord from claiming back rents for any additional area under s. 52 of that Act, if such additional area was in the use and occupation of the raiyat, provided the period for which the claim is made is within that prescribed by the law of limitation. *JAGANNATH MANJHI v. JUMMAN ALI PUTWARI* (1901) . . . **I. L. R. 29 Calc. 247**

2. ———— *Additional rent, suit for—Enhancement.* A landlord cannot successfully claim additional rent under s. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act in respect of an excess of area, when he fails to show what the area of the tenure was when first created, and that the rent originally fixed did not cover and was not intended to cover such excess of area. The expression "the area for which rent has been previously paid," in s. 52, sub-s. (1), cl. (a), means the area with reference to which the rent previously paid had been assessed or adjusted. *RAJENDRA LAL GOSWAMI v. CHUNDER BHUSAN GOSWAMI* (1901) . . . **6 C. W. N. 318**

3. ———— *Additional rent for increased area—Landlord and tenant—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 52, 74—Limitation.* All impositions upon tenants, under the denomination of *abwab*, etc., and "all stipulations and reservations for the payment of such," referred to in s. 74 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, relate to both past and future stipulations : such stipulations made before the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act are therefore void. The right to recover additional rent for increased area is a recurring one, and a landlord is entitled to ex-

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 52—*concl'd.*

ercise it whenever he finds it necessary to do so. *JOTINDRO MOHAN TAGORE v. CHANDRA NATH SAPUI* (1902) **6 C. W. N. 360**

4. ———— *Increase of rent for increased area—Burden of proof.* In a suit brought by a landlord for increase of rent on account of an increase in the area of a holding it was found that the tenant was holding the same lands without any variation in the boundaries ; that the landlord failed to prove what area was originally leased to the tenant ; and there were no materials before the Court for the determination of the question whether the rent was a consolidated rent or not. *Held*, that the landlord was not entitled to any increase under s. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In order to succeed the landlord must prove facts and circumstances showing that there was some reason not within the control of the landlord for additional lands being included in the holding. *Gouri Patra v. Reily, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 579*, and *Rajendra Lal Goswami v. Chundra Bhuson Goswami*, **6 C. W. N. 318**, relied on. *RATAN LALL BISWAS v. JADU HALSANA* (1905) **10 C. W. N. 46**

5. ———— *cl. (6) and s. 188—Abatement of rent—Suit for rent by several joint landlords against one of the joint tenants, whether in such a suit the tenant can claim abatement of rent—"Tenant," meaning of.* The expression "tenant" in s. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not include the case of a mere co-sharer tenant who has only a fractional share in the tenure ; it means the tenant of the tenure and not one of many tenants. In a suit for rent, brought by some of several joint landlords against one of several joint-tenants for recovery of the plaintiff's share of the rent payable on account of the defendant tenant's share of the tenure under a previous arrangement, such tenant-defendant cannot claim abatement under the provisions of s. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *BHOOPENDRO NARAIN DUTT v. ROMON KRISHNA DUTT* **I. L. R. 27 Calc. 417**
4 C. W. N. 107

s. 53.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PURCHASERS.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 388

1. ———— *Established usage of locality.* The established usage of the locality, and not the usage between the parties, is that contemplated by s. 53 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Hira Lal Dass v. Mothura Mohun Roy, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 714*, followed. *WATSON AND COMPANY v. SREEKRISTO BHUMICK* **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 132**

2. ———— *Established usage, meaning of.* The words "established usage" in s. 35 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, do not refer

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 53—*concl.*

to a practice previously prevailing between the landlord and his tenant, but to the established usage of the pergunnah in which the holding is situate. *HERA LAL DAS v. MOTHURA MOHUN ROY CHOWDHRY* . . . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 714

s. 54.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—PAYMENT OF RENT—GENERALLY

4 C. W. N. 324

ss. 54, 61, 67.

See INTEREST . . . 11 C. W. N. 983 :
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 34

ss. 55, 107, 109, 109A, 192.—*Payment of rent—Appropriation must be specific—Temporary Revenue Settlement—Settlement of rent if can be made except upon application by landlord or tenant—Settlement affirmed by Special Judge—Finality—Res judicata.* The provisions of s. 55 of the Bengal Tenancy Act are very different from those of s. 59 of the Contract Act. Under s. 59 of the Contract Act, the Court may have regard not only to the debtor's express intimation but also to circumstances implying that the payment is to be applied to the discharge of some particular debt. Under s. 55 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the debtor must declare the year, or the year and the instalment to which he wishes the payment to be credited. If he does not do so, the payment may be credited to the account of such year and instalment as the landlord thinks fit. Where by an arrangement between the landlord and the tenant the latter paid a certain sum annually to Government on behalf of the former : *Held*, that there was no appropriation of the amount so paid each year to the rent of that year within s. 55, Bengal Tenancy Act. *MOHIM CHANDRA ROY v. KALITARA DEBYA* (1906)

11 C. W. N. 939

ss. 56, cl. (4), 187, cl. (3) and s. 188—*Joint landlords—Authorized agent—Receipt given by agent—Presumption.* In a case where there are several joint landlords it is necessary for the Court, before giving effect to a presumption under s. 56, cl. 4, of the Bengal Tenancy Act, to find affirmatively that the agent was authorized by them all either verbally or in writing. *GOPINATH CHAKRAVARTI v. UMAKANTA DAS ROY*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 169

s. 60.

See LAND REGISTRATION ACT, s. 78.

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 712

3 C. W. N. 381

1. ——— *Registered proprietor, suit for rent by—Whether the plea that rent is payable to third party allowable—Land Registration Act (VII of 1876), s. 78.* Plaintiffs, as registered proprietors, brought a suit for recovery of rent. It was found that defendant,

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 60—*concl.*

in good faith and under the reasonable belief that the land held by him was included in the estate of a third person, attorned to him some four years prior to the suit, and it was held by the lower Appellate Court that under the circumstances the defendant ceased to be plaintiff's tenant, and they could not recover rent. *Held*, that upon the above facts s. 60 of the Bengal Tenancy Act did not estop the defendant from pleading that rent was due to a third person, notwithstanding plaintiffs were registered proprietors. *DURGA DAS HAZRA v. SAMASH AKON*

4 C. W. N. 606

2.

Suit for rent—Assignment by landlord of portion of interest to a mortgagee—Registered proprietor—"Rent due"—Right of mortgagee, whether may be set up in defence—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 3, cl. (3), 60. In a suit for rent by a proprietor registered under the Land Registration Act (Ben. Act VII of 1876), the defendants are precluded by reason of s. 60 of the Bengal Tenancy Act from pleading as a defence to the claim that the rent is due to a mortgagee to whom the landlord has assigned a part of his interest but whose name has not been registered under the Land Registration Act. *HEM CHUNDER MISRI v. SOURINDRA MOHAN TAGORE* (1898)

5 C. W. N. 482

3.

Rent suit—Defence that plaintiff is a benamdar of another person—Land Registration Act (VII of 1876), s. 78. By s. 60 of the Bengal Tenancy Act a defendant, in a suit for rent brought by a person registered as proprietor, is precluded from raising a defence that the plaintiff is a benamdar of another person and as such not entitled to rent. *SADHU CHARN PAL v. RADHIKA MOHAN ROY* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 695

4.

Registered proprietor, suit for rent by—Tenant's defence on ground of title—Admissibility—Title upon which registration obtained declared void by Court. S. 60 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not preclude a tenant defendant from proving that the title under which the plaintiff claims to hold and in respect of which he has been registered under the Land Registration Act has been held by a Court properly constituted to be void and of no effect. Where this was proved, *held*, that this was a good defence to the suit. *GIRISH CHANDRA CHONGDAR v. SATISH CHANDRA SARKAR* (1908)

12 C. W. N. 622

s. 61.

See *post*, SCH. III, ART. 2 (a).

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 283

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—ARREARS OF RENT . 7 C. W. N. 720

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—CONSTITUTION OF RELATION—ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF TENANCY BY RECEIPT OF RENT, ETC.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 1

L. R. 24 I. A. 164

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 61—*contd.*

See LEGAL TENDER.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 305

1. ———— *Deposit of rent in Court—Bond fide doubt of tenant as to who is entitled to rent—Costs where conduct of defendant did not make litigation necessary.* The deposit of rent in Court under s. 61 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (where the tenant entertains *bond fide* doubt as to who was entitled to receive it) operates as an acquittance; and where such deposit is proved as a defence to a suit for rent, the suit should be dismissed. Where in such a suit the defendant is found to have been not to blame for the litigation, he is entitled to his costs. *STALKARTT v. GURU DAS KUNDU CROWDHRY*. I. L. R. 21 Calc. 680

2. ———— *Suit for rent—Deposit of rent by a tenant through the transferee of the holding from him, whether valid.* A deposit of rent, though not made by a tenant himself, but made on his behalf by a transferee of the holding from him, is a valid deposit within the meaning of s. 61 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *BEHARY LAL MOOKERJEE v. BASARAT MANDAL*. I. L. R. 25 Calc. 289

3. ———— and s. 62—*Deposit of rent—Review of order receiving deposit of rent.* When under ss. 61 and 62 of the Tenancy Act a deposit of rent is made by a tenant, and the Court grants him a receipt, the zamindar has no right to come in and be heard in the matter, there being no machinery whatsoever provided by the Act for the Court to enter into a judicial enquiry in connection with the matter of the deposit. As far as the tenant is concerned, after such deposit is made and receipt granted, the Court is *functus officio*, and is not authorized to return the money to the tenant upon an application made by the zamindar. The words "the full amount of the money then due" in s. 61, and the words "the amount of rent payable by the tenant" in s. 62, mean nothing more than the words "what he shall consider the full amount of rent due from him at the date of the tender to the zamindar" as used in Bengal Act VIII of 1869, and have no relation whatever to the amount of rent justly due or justly payable by the tenant. *In the matter of SIRDHAR ROY v. RAMESWAR SING*. I. L. R. 15 Calc. 166

4. ———— and s. 182—*Deposit of rent by a tenant of homestead land, who is also a raiyat of the village, but under a different landlord.* Plaintiff brought a suit for rent of a plot of *bastu* land from the defendant, who was a *raiya*t of the village under another landlord. The defendant pleaded that, owing to a dispute between rival landlords, he had deposited the rent under s. 61 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and that there was a full acquittance by the deposit. *Per GHOSE, J.*—It was not necessary to decide in the case whether the defendant was a *raiya*t under s. 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and whether a deposit

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 61—*concl.*

could be made under s. 61. The deposit had been made in fact, and the question, which remained for determination, was as to who amongst the rival landlords was entitled to the money made available by the deposit. The present suit was therefore liable to be dismissed. *Per GEIDT, J.*—The suit was liable to be dismissed because s. 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act applied and the deposit under s. 61 was a valid deposit. *PROTAP CHANDRA DAS v. BISSEWAR PRAMANIC* (1905). . . . 9 C. W. N. 416

s. 65.

See *post*, s. 167 . . . 13 C. W. N. 412See *post*, s. 170 . . . 13 C. W. N. 650See *post*, s. 188 . . . 6 C. W. N. 124

See ACQUIESCENCE . . . 7 C. W. N. 170

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—DECREES UNDER RENT LAW.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 301

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—LIABILITY FOR RENT . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 103

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—TRANSFER OF RIGHT . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 355

1 C. W. N. 396

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 727, 937

3 C. W. N. 586

3 C. W. N. 742, 747

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—INCUMBRANCES . . . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 364

6 C. W. N. 834

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PURCHASERS

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 169

6 C. W. N. 794, 877

1. ———— "Charge," meaning of—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 100.* *Semle*; The "charge" referred to in s. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not such a charge as that defined by s. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. *FOTICK CHUNDER DEY SIKKAR v. FOLEY*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 492

2. ———— and s. 3, cl. (5), and s. 161—*Sale of tenure for arrears of road cess under decree—"Rent"—Road cess—Cesses—Incumbrance by defaulting tenant, effect of sale in execution of decree for road cess on.* The word "rent" in s. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, includes road cess payable by the landlord. A tenur-holder granted a usufructuary mortgage of certain lands within his tenure to A, and directed the tenants to pay their rents to him. Subsequently the superior landlord brought a suit for road cess against the tenure holder, and in execution of his decree sold the tenure under s. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. A then brought a suit against one of the tenants for arrears

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 65—*contd.*

of rent, and contended that all that passed under the auction-sale was the right, title, and interest of the tenure-holder, and that his rights under the mortgage were unaffected by the sale, and that he was still entitled to the rent. *Held*, that Ch. XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act must be read with s. 65 of the Act, and that, having regard to the definition in cl. 5 of s. 3, "rent," as used in that section, includes road cess payable by the tenant, and that the sale was a sale of the tenure, the purchaser acquiring the property free from the incumbrance created by the tenure-holder in favour of A, it not being a registered and notified incumbrance within the meaning of s. 161 of the Act. *NOBIN CHAND NUSKAR v. BANSENATH PARAMANICK*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 722

3. ——— and s. 66—*Sale of defaulting tenure at the instance of landlord who has lost his interest in the estate—Rent decree.* S. 66 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not apply to a case in which the person seeking to execute the decree is not a landlord at the time of the execution, and s. 65 is limited in the same manner as s. 66. So where a landlord, after obtaining a decree for arrears of rent, loses his interest in the estate, he cannot bring the defaulting tenure itself to sale in execution of his decree. *HEM CHUNDER BHUNJO v. MON MOHINI DASSI*

3 C. W. N. 604

4. ——— and s. 188—*Sale of a tenure—Co-landlord's decree—Execution.* The sale of a tenure in execution of a decree for rent obtained by certain persons, who do not constitute the entire body of landlords at the date of the suit and of the decree, and who are not the entire body of landlords at the date at which part of the claim, for which the rent suit was brought, accrued due, would pass, not the entire tenure, but only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtors in the tenure at the date of the sale. *NARAIN UDDIN v. SRIMANTA GHOSE* (1901)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 219

5. ——— A decree-holder has in execution of a rent decree the right to ask for personal execution against the judgment-debtor notwithstanding that he has also the power to sell the tenure in arrears. *BHABANI CHARAN DUTT v. PRATAP CHANDRA GHOSE* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 575

6. ——— *Ticcadar—Lease—Rent—Execution proceedings—Landlord.* A ticcadar on the expiry of his lease obtained a decree against a tenant for rent, which fell due during the pendency of his lease. In execution of this decree, the tenure was sold and purchased by A. The landlord obtained a decree for rent for subsequent years against the same tenant. In the proceedings in execution taken on the decree obtained by the ticcadar, the landlord decree-holder put in an application stating that he

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 65—*contd.*

had obtained a decree for arrears of rent for later years. Subsequently the landlord took out execution of his decree and had the tenure put up to sale. A then intervened, objecting to the sale of the tenure. *Held*, that, under s. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, rent being a first charge on the tenure, that first charge did not stand in favour of the ticcadar for the rent, which fell due during the pendency of his lease, but it stood in favour of the landlord in possession, for the rent which fell due afterwards, and that the ticcadar in execution of his decree could not sell the tenure itself so as to pass all rights in it to the auction-purchaser A and annul the first charge standing on it in favour of the landlord. The tenure itself was liable to sale under the decree obtained by the landlord against the tenant. *Hem Chunder Bhunjo v. Mon Mohini Dassi*, 3 C. W. N. 604, referred to. *SHRIMANT ROY v. MAHADEO MAHATA* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 550

s.c. 8 C. W. N. 531

7. ——— *Right of co-sharer landlords to collect rent jointly.* A and B being co-sharer landlords collected rent from their tenants C and D separately. Subsequently C and D sold the interest to E. A and B then demanded rent from E jointly. E objected on the ground that A and B having collected their rent separately for many years, could not now sue jointly. *Held*, that there was nothing to prevent the co-sharer landlords from suing E jointly for their rent, there being no evidence to show that the former agreement to collect rent separately was to be perpetual. *Shyama Charan Bhattacharya v. Akhoy Kumar Mitter*, 10 C. W. N. 167, *Grish Chunder Mukhopadhyaya v. Chhatradhar Ghose*, 3 C. L. J. 379, followed. *Gani Mahomed v. Moran*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 96, *Gopal Chandra Das v. Umesh Narain Chowdhury*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 695, referred to. *Raja Promoda Nath Roy v. Raja Ramoni Kanta Roy*, 9 C. W. N. 34, distinguished. *AKSHOY KUMAR MITRA v. GOPAL KAMINI DEBI* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1010

s.c. 10 C. W. N. 952

8. ——— *Benami transactions—Benami lease—Authority of benamdar registered tenant to pledge the tenure for arrears of rent—Mortgage—Form of mortgages—Agreement not to alienate—Transfer of interest—Creation of charge—Absence of attestation—Charge—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 58, 59, 100—Charge for rent.* When A held a tenure in the benami of B, who was the recorded tenant, and the latter without the knowledge or consent of A executed a bond in favour of the landlord, who knew that B was merely a benamdar, mortgaging or charging the tenure for arrears of rent due in respect thereof. *Held*, that the bond could not affect the tenure and that the landlord suing on the bond was not entitled to claim a charge on

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the land under s. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Per MOOKERJEE, J.*—The test is whether *B* acted within the scope of his authority. A nominal owner has no implied authority to pledge the property in arrears on the real owner failing to pay the rent regularly. An instrument, by which the payment of money is secured on land, must be taken to create a mere charge, unless there is an indication in it that some interest in specific immoveable property was transferred; a clause entitling the creditor to recover his dues by attachment and sale of the property and a clause against alienation lend support to the view that a mere charge was intended to be created. S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act does not mean that a transaction purporting on the face of it to be a mortgage is converted into a charge, if the instrument cannot operate as a mortgage by reason of defective execution or non-compliance with the formalities prescribed by the law. *ROYZUDDI SHEIKH v. KALI NATH MUKERJEE* (1905). I. L. R. 33 Calc. 985

9. — ss. 65, 159, 188—*Co-sharer landlords*—Agreement to pay rent separately—*Suit for whole rent brought by a co-sharer, making others defendants*—*Maintainability*—*Contract, rescission of*—*Joint contractors*—*Avoidance for breach*—*Failure of consideration*. Where a whole body of co-sharer landlords and their tenants have come to an arrangement by which rent is made payable to the co-sharers separately in proportion to their shares in the estate, it is not competent for one of the co-sharers, so long as such arrangement subsists, to bring a suit for the full rents of the tenure by making his co-sharers parties defendants in the suit. *PROMODA NATH ROY v. RAMONI KANTO ROY* (1905). . . . 9 C. W. N. 34

ss. 65, 70, 87.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

ss. 65, 159—*Sale in execution of a decree for arrears of rent at the instance of a co-sharer landlord*—*Interest of unrecorded tenant how effected*. An occupancy holding was recorded in the landlord's books in the names of *N, B* and *T* as tenants. Plaintiff purchased the interest of *N* and *B*. The validity of his purchase was established. Subsequently one of the co-sharer landlords brought a suit against *N, B* and *T* for his share of the rent and got a decree; in execution of the decree the holding was sold and purchased by the 1st defendant. *Held*, that the 1st defendant purchased only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtors. *AFRAZ MOLLAH v. KULSU-MANNESSA BIBEE* (1906). . . . 10 C. W. N. 176

ss. 65, 170—*Plaintiff also a landlord at the date of the suit and decree for arrears of rent*—*Sale*—*Tenure*—*Claim*—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 278*. If at the time when a suit for arrears of rent is instituted and a decree made, the plaintiff is still the landlord, the fact that he has

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subsequently sold his interest in the property does not prevent him from obtaining the benefit of s. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and executing the decree against it. The suit having been instituted and the decree passed under this Act, s. 170 of the Bengal Tenancy Act excludes the operation of s. 278 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Hem Chandra Bhanja v. Monmohini Dassi*, 3 C. W. N. 604, overruled. *KHETRA PAL SINGH v. KRITARTHA-MOYI DASSI* (1906). . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 566
s. c. 10 C. W. N. 547

1. — s. 66—*Suit for arrears of rent brought before expiry of Bengali year*—*Right to eject tenant*. Where a suit is brought before the expiry of the Bengali year in respect of the arrears of rent for that year, the landlord is not entitled to eject the tenant under s. 66 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *GURU DASS SHUT v. NAND KISHORE PAL*. I. L. R. 26 Calc. 199

2. — *Landlord and tenant*—*Suit for arrears of rent*—*Execution of decree for ejectment for arrears of rent*—*Extension of time for payment*. *Per PRINSEP and BANERJEE, JJ.*—The extension of time authorized by s. 66, cl. 3, of the Bengal Tenancy Act, can be granted by the Court after the decree, and not only when framing the decree under cl. (2) of that section. *Per RAMPINI, J. (contra)*. *Per PRINSEP and BANERJEE, JJ.*—The decree for ejectment passed under s. 66, cl. 2, of the Bengal Tenancy Act, need not incorporate the terms as to the ejectment being avoided by payment within fifteen days from the date of the decree. These terms are rather in the nature of a direction to the Court of execution. *Per PRINSEP, J.*—The application for such extension of time may therefore be made by the judgment-debtor on a mere petition, and not in the form of an application for review of judgment. *BODH NARAIN v. MAHOMED MOOSA*. I. L. R. 26 Calc. 639
3 C. W. N. 628

s. 67.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 13.
9 C. W. N. 466

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—RIGHT TO ENHANCE. . . . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 214
L. R. 21 I. A. 131

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—ARREARS OF RENT.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 87
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 130, 315
3 C. W. N. 36, 194
4 C. W. N. 324
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 227
29 Calc. 674
7 C. W. N. 203, 720
11 C. W. N. 215

1. — *Kabuliyat, rate of interest mentioned in*—*Purchaser at auction sale,*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*concl.*— s. 67—*concl.*

liability of, to pay interest. A purchased at an auction sale in execution of a rent decree a tenure covered by a *kabuliyat*, which stipulated for interest at a specified rate:—*Held*, that the tenure being subsisting, A bought the tenure subject to the terms and conditions of the lease, and was liable for interest at the rate mentioned in the *kabuliyat*, and not at the rate mentioned in s. 67 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. LAL GOPAL DUTTA CHOWDHRY v. MANMATHA LAL DUTT CHOWDHRY (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 258
s.c. 9 C. W. N. 175

2. — *Interest—Rent.*

The word “rent” does not necessarily include interest; so if any sum of money be paid by a tenant to a landlord as rent, and the latter receives it as such, he cannot be permitted to apply that money towards any interest which might then be due. *Raicharan Ghose v. Kumud Mohun Dutta Chowdhury*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 571, *Kaylash Chandra De v. Tarack Nath Mandal*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 575, referred to. BHAGABATI DEBYA CHOWDHURANI v. BASANTA KUMARI DEBI (1906)

11 C. W. N. 110

3. — *Interest on arrears of rent—Orissa—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 67, 178.* In Orissa where the provisions of s. 67 of the Bengal Tenancy Act have been extended but not those of s. 178, a contract may be made between a landlord and a tenant, modifying the provisions of s. 67 with regard to the payment of interest on arrears of rent. GOBINDA CHANDRA MAHAPATRA v. CHAUDHURY RAM CHANDRA NISANKA MAHAPATRA (1908)

13 C. W. N. 95

4. — *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 67—Interest on arrears of rent—Holding created before Act—Purchaser of portion after Act obtaining recognition and apportionment of rent from landlord—New tenancy if created.* A holding was created before the Bengal Tenancy Act by a lease which stipulated that the tenant should pay interest on arrears of rent at 75 per cent. Subsequent to the passing of the Act, the defendants acquired a portion of the holding from the tenant and obtained recognition as such from the landlord who also apportioned the rents:—*Held*, that the transaction could not be described as a new contract of tenancy, and s. 67 of the Bengal Tenancy Act did not apply. MADHU MALA v. ALFAZUDDI KAZI (1909)

13 C. W. N. 962

— ss. 67, 74, 178 (3) cl. (h).

See ABWAB I. L. R. 33 Calc. 683

— s. 68. In a suit for rent in kind plaintiff is not entitled to damages at a higher rate than 25 per cent. under s. 68 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. APURBA KRISHNA ROY v. ASUTOSH DUTT (1905)

9 C. W. N. 122

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*

— s. 69.

See PENAL CODE, s. 186.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 518.

— ss. 69 and 70.

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHERE SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 872

1. — *Deposit of crops by order of Collector—Suit against depositaries—Right of suit—Privy—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.* In the course of proceedings held under ss. 69 and 70 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), the landlord's (ticcadar's) share of the produce was deposited by the Amin, by order of the Collector, with two persons. The depositaries executed and delivered a receipt to the Amin. Some time after, the ticcadar made an application to the Collector in order to obtain his share of the produce; but, on a representation being made by one of the depositaries that the crops (with the exception of a small portion) had been destroyed by rain, the Collector declined to grant any relief to the ticcadar. The ticcadar then brought this suit against the depositaries for recovery of the value of the crops deposited. *Held*, that the receipt executed and delivered to the Amin established privy between the plaintiff and the defendant so as to enable the former to maintain the suit. *Held*, also, that the suit was maintainable in the Civil Court. Ss. 69 and 70 of the Bengal Tenancy Act refer to and contemplate proceedings between the landlord and the tenant. When a plaintiff seeks relief, not against his tenant, but against a third party, a depositary or bailee, the suit is not barred by anything contained in those sections. JAGA SINGH v. CHOOA SINGH

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 480.

2. — *and s. 188—Rent bhaoli or nugdi—Jurisdiction of Deputy Collector.* When there is a *bona fide* dispute as to the nature of the rent, i.e., whether it is bhaoli or nugdi, the Deputy Collector has no jurisdiction to proceed under the provisions of ss. 69 and 70 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. An application under s. 69 of Bengal Tenancy Act cannot be made by some only of a body of landlords, such an application being authorized by the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and not by those of the Civil Procedure Code. NUKHEDA SINGH v. RITU MARDAN SINGH

4 C. W. N. 239

— s. 72.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—TRANSFER BY LANDLORD I. L. R. 25 Calc. 445

2 C. W. N. 108

7 C. W. N. 454.

— s. 73.

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—TRANSFER OF RIGHT.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 355, 642.

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.**s. 73—concl'd.**

1. ——— *Abwab—Rent—Collection charges—Lease, consideration for.* A fixed amount mentioned in a lease as payable annually for collection charges in addition to rent, the total being described as the jama and forming the consideration for the lease, is not to be regarded as an abwab, but is in reality a part of the rent and recoverable as such. *Mahomed Fayez Chowdhury v. Jamoo Gazeer*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 730, referred to. *Chultan Mahton v. Tilukdari Singh*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 175, and *Radha Prosad Singh v. Bahowar Koeri*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 726, distinguished. *RADHA CHARAN RAY CHOWDHURY v. GOLAK CHANDRA GHOSE* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 834 s.c. 8 C. W. N. 529

2. ——— and ss. 82, 101, 164, 165, 167—*Notice to annual incumbrance—Apportionment—Mortgage.* S. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act applies in a case where the incumbrancer is a third party and not where the purchaser and incumbrancer are identically the same person. Pending a suit to enforce a mortgage, one of the properties, viz., property No. 4, was sold for arrears of rent and was purchased by the plaintiff in the mortgage-suit, the sale being apparently under s. 165 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Held*, that the purchaser being the incumbrancer himself no notice was necessary to be given under s. 167 for annulling the incumbrance. The effect of s. 73 of the Transfer of Property Act is that the mortgagee has no charge upon the property sold for rent, such charge being taken to be extinguished and transferred to the surplus sale-proceeds. Such charge on the surplus sale-proceeds was declared in this case and plaintiff was held to be entitled to sell the mortgaged properties other than property No. 4 for the satisfaction of the remainder of his claim. *HEM CHANDRA CHOWDHURY v. TAFAZZUL HOSSEIN KHAN* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 332

s. 74.

See CESS . . . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 828
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 680
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 611
3 C. W. N. 608
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 17
6 C. W. N. 360

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 13.
9 C. W. N. 469

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—ARREARS OF RENT.
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 674

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—LIABILITY OF AGENTS . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1011

1. ——— *Abwabs—Permanent tenure holder under lease created before the Act—Stipulation to pay the price of 3 cocoanuts and render one day's personal service over and above rent, if enforceable—Reg. V of 1812, s. 3—Act X of 1859, s. 10.* Abwabs are not recoverable from a

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permanent tenure-holder under a lease created before the Bengal Tenancy Act came into operation. They could not be recovered under Reg. V of 1812 and Act X of 1859, and cannot be recovered under s. 179 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, owing to the operation of cl. (4) of s. 2 of the Act. *APURNA CHURN GHOSE v. KASAM ALI* (1906)
10 C. W. N. 527

2. ——— *Mokurari, meaning of—Abwab—Rent.* The word "mokurari" means "with fixed rent" that is to say, when applied to a tenure held at a fixed and permanent rate of rent. *Held*, upon a construction of the lease in this case, that it was not a mokurari lease and that the stipulation in the lease for payment of Rs 3 instead of delivery of 2 goats was an abwab and that the case did not fall within the provisions of s. 179 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *GAYRATULLA SARDAR v. GIRISH CHANDRA BHOWMIK* (1907)
12 C. W. N. 175

s. 76—*Dwelling-house of an occupancy raiyat—Masonry building.* A suitable dwelling-house of a raiyat within the meaning of s. 76 of the Bengal Tenancy Act need not necessarily be of a temporary description. The question raised in the case was whether the defendants, who were occupancy raiyats, had a right to erect as a dwelling-house a building consisting of masonry walls and a corrugated iron roof 18 cubits in length and 14 cubits in breadth on a site in the holding on which the dwelling-house had all along stood, and which had been used as the homestead land of the holding from the time of his father and of his predecessors in interest before him. *Held*, that the defendants had a right to do so. *HARI KISHORE BARNASARMA v. BARADA KISHORE ACHARJYA CHOWDHURY* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1014 s.c. 8 C. W. N. 754

s. 84.

See APPEAL—ACTS—BENGAL TENANCY ACT . . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 271
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 485

1. ——— *Acquisition of land by landlord—Reasonable and sufficient purpose—Certificate of Collector—Jurisdiction and functions of the Civil Court.* The proprietors of a taluk who had constructed an indigo factory and employed a European manager applied to the Civil Court, under s. 84 of the Tenancy Act, to acquire by compulsory sale a small piece of land made up of several raiyati holdings within the estate. The application was opposed by the proprietors of another indigo factory who had taken under leases from the raiyats the greater part of the land of the village, including the holding within which the plot in question was comprised. The Collector of the district had certified under s. 84 that the purpose for which the land was required was reasonable and sufficient. The Munsif tried the matter as a

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disputed question of fact, and held that the purpose alleged was not reasonable or sufficient, and declined to authorize the purchase. The District Judge on appeal reversed the Munsif's finding and authorized the compulsory acquisition of the land. *Held*, that there is no appeal against an order passed by a Civil Court under s. 84 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and that the order of the District Judge was without jurisdiction and must be set aside. *Held* by PRINSEP and AMEER ALI, JJ. (PETHERAM, C.J., dissenting)—That the Collector's certificate under s. 84 is not conclusive as to the reasonableness and sufficiency of the purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired; that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not confined to giving effect to the Collector's certificate, but the Court is to hold a judicial enquiry to determine the reasonableness and sufficiency of the purpose and all matters coming within the section, and is competent to consider the grounds upon which the certificate was granted: that the appointment of a European manager and the necessity for erecting buildings for his comfort and convenience are insufficient grounds for authorizing the compulsory acquisition of land under s. 84. The purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired must have a direct relation to the good of the holding, and objects which might have a remote or speculative bearing upon the good of the holding are foreign to the scope of the Act. *Held* by PETHERAM, C.J.—The section gives to the Collector jurisdiction to decide whether the alleged purpose is reasonable and sufficient, leaving to the Civil Court to settle the amount to be paid for the land, and the decision of the question whether the land is *bona fide* required for the alleged purpose. The words "satisfied on the certificate" mean that the Civil Court is to be satisfied on the certificate alone, and has no jurisdiction to take other evidence on that question, but is to accept the decision of the Collector as final. *GOGHUN MOLLAH v. RAMESHUR NARAIN MAHTA*, *RAMESHUR NARAIN MAHTA v. GOGHUN MOLLAH* . . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 271

2. ———— *Acquisition of land by landlord for building purpose—Right to apply—Increase of revenue—Sufficiency and reasonableness of purpose—Collector's certificate not conclusive.* A person, who is not the immediate landlord of a holding, cannot make an application for acquisition of land under s. 84 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Where the lower Court ordered the acquisition of land under s. 84 of the Bengal Tenancy Act on the ground that by the acquisition the revenue would be increased and consequently it would be for the improvement of the estate: *Held*, that the purpose was not reasonable and sufficient within the meaning of s. 84. The Collector's certificate as to whether the purpose is reasonable is not conclusive; the Civil Court should hold an enquiry as to the

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reasonableness and sufficiency. *NARAIN MAHTO v. TEKAIT BROJO FEHARI SINGH* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 472

s. 85—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—TRANSFER BY TENANT.

6 C. W. N. 377, 916, 919

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 148

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 46

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—INCUMBRANCES . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 205

See SUPERIOR LANDLORD

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 256

1. ———— *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 22, 49, 85 (1)—Under-raiyat holding under an oral lease—Raiyat's interest purchased by landlord—Latter if may evict under-raiyat—Merger.* A landlord purchasing the interest of an occupancy raiyat under him is not entitled to treat as a trespasser an under-raiyat holding the land under an oral lease from the raiyat. *Amirulla Mahomed v. Nazir Mahomed*, I. L. R. 31 Calc. 932, and *Amirulla Mahomed v. Nazir Mahomed*, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 164, approved. *Peary Mohun v. Badal Chunder*, 5 C. W. N. 310: s. c. I. L. R. 28 Calc. 205, distinguished. *LAL MAHOMED SARKAR v. JAGIR SHEIKH* (1909)

13 C. W. N. 913

2. ———— cl. (2)—*Sub-lease—Term exceeding nine years—Validity Suit for ejectment by raiyat—Notice.* Cl. (2) of s. 85 of the Bengal Tenancy Act has not been enacted merely for the protection of the superior landlord. A sub-lease by a raiyat for a term exceeding nine years is invalid even against the raiyat. *Gopal Mondal v. Eshan Chandra Banerjee*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 148, and *Madan Chandra Kapali v. Jeki Karikar*, 6 C. W. N. 377, distinguished. *BASARATULLA MUNDLE v. KASIRUNNESSA BIBI* (1906) . . . 11 C. W. N. 190

s. 86.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—LIABILITY FOR RENT . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 790

—Nothing in s. 86 of the Bengal Tenancy Act requires the surrender of a raiyat's occupancy right to be in writing. *KHANKAR ABDUR RAHAMAN v. ALI HAFEZ* (1900) . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 256: s. c. 5 C. W. N. 351

ss. 86, 87, 88.

See RELINQUISHMENT . 8 C. W. N. 315

s. 87.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ABANDONMENT—RELINQUISHMENT OR SURRENDER OF TENURE

1 C. W. N. 198

3 C. W. N. 46

4 C. W. N. 493

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 87—*concl'd.*

1. ————— *Construction of s. 87.* The provisions of s. 87 of the Transfer of Property Act are not exhaustive. SAMUJAN ROY v. MAHATON . . . 4 C. W. N. 493

2. ————— *Transfer—Right of occupancy—Original tenant remaining in possession as sub-tenant of the transferee—Abandonment—Ejectment.* Where a tenant having a non-transferable right of occupancy sold such right to a third person, obtained a sub-lease from the purchaser and remained in possession of the land and was cultivating the same. *Held*, that the landlord was not entitled to the *khas* possession as against him. *Dina Nath Roy v. Krishna Bejoy Saha*, 9 C. W. N. 379; *Sristidhur Biswas v. Mudan Sirdar*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 648, followed. *Kallinath Chakravarti v. Upendra Chunder Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 212, distinguished.

In order to entitle a landlord to re-enter on abandonment by the tenant, it must be an abandonment in the words of s. 87 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, namely, that the raiyat voluntarily abandons his residence and ceases to cultivate, without notice to the landlord and without arranging for the payment of his rent as it falls due. *Nurendro Narayan Roy v. Ishan Chandra Sen*, 22 W. R. 22, and *Dwarkanath Misser v. Hurriah Chunder*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 925, referred to. MADAB MONDAL v. MAHIMA CHANDRA MAZUMDAR (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 531

3. ————— *Cls. (1) and (2)—Non-transferable occupancy holding—Abandonment—Notice by landlord, if necessary—Mortgage of holding—Sale by mortgagee, if constitutes abandonment.* Service of notice under cl. (2) of s. 87 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not indispensable to effect a legal abandonment and to allow valid re-entry by the landlord. The only effect of service of notice under s. 78, cl. (2) is to make it obligatory upon the tenant to have a speedy determination of the question whether there has been an abandonment or not. Abandonment is the effect of the act of the tenant in vacating the holding without making arrangement for payment of his rent as it falls due and for cultivating the land. Whether there has been abandonment or not in any individual case is a question of intention to be determined upon the facts of the particular case. When an occupancy raiyat mortgages his (non-transferable) holding and the mortgagee enforces the mortgage, has the holding sold, and purchases it himself, the possession of the raiyat completely ceases and there is an abandonment of the holding by him. RAM PERSHAD KOERI v. JAWAHIR ROY (1908)

12 C. W. N. 819

s. 88.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT, MANAGER, POWERS OF.

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 88—*contd.*

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—TRANSFER BY TENANT.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 433

1. ————— *Suit for rent—Question as to amount of rent—Sub-division of tenancy—Rent receipts signed by one of several co-sharers.* Several plaintiffs, co-sharers, sued two defendants to recover the sum of R78 odd for arrears of rent in respect of a tenure, the annual amount of rent payable being alleged to be R15. One of the defendants appeared and pleaded that the tenure had been some time previously divided by the principal plaintiff (who was the kurta of the family and collected the rent), and that after the division he had paid R7-8 per annum, being the rent in respect of his half of the tenure, to the kurta; in support of such payments, he produced dakhilas or rent receipts signed by the kurta. The suit was dismissed by the Munsif, but on appeal the additional Judge gave the plaintiffs a decree for the amount of rent claimed less the amount proved to have been paid by the defendant, who contested the suit, as shown by the dakhilas. He held that the division has not been proved, and that the dakhilas did not amount to the written consent required by s. 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Held*, on appeal to the High Court, that the dakhilas or rent receipts did not amount to a written consent as required by s. 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and that the decree of the lower Court must be upheld. AUBHOY CHURN MAJI v. SHOSHI BHUSAN BOSE . . . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 155

2. ————— *Suit for rent—Subdivision of tenancy—Evidence of consent of landlord to—Rent receipt signed by the agent.* A receipt for rent granted by a landlord or his agent containing a recital that a tenant's name is registered in the landlord's sherishta as a tenant of a portion of the original holding at a rent which is a portion of the original rent, does amount to a consent in writing by the landlord to a sub-division of the holding and a distribution of the rent payable in respect thereof, within the meaning of s. 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. PYARI MOHUN MUKHOPADHYA v. GOPAL PAIK . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 531
2 C. W. N. 375

JAGADISHUR BHUTTACHARJI v. JOYMONI DEVI
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 533 note
2 C. W. N. 378 note

3. ————— *Transfer of a portion of occupancy holding—Custom—Ejectment—Possession.* The transfer of a portion of an occupancy holding is contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of s. 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, VIII of 1885, and the existence of a custom in a particular place by which such a holding is transferable is immaterial, and gives no right to the transferee as against the

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 88—*contd.*

landlord. KULDIP SINGH v. GILLANDERS, ARBUTHNOT & Co. I. L. R. 26 Calc. 615
4 C. W. N. 738

4. *Receipt of rent by Tahsildar or gomasta—Division of holding.* Where a holding is in the occupation of several tenants at one entire rental, the fact that the landlord's tahsildar has accepted from the various tenants proportionate parts of the rent does not bind the landlord to recognize a separation of the tenancy in absence of evidence to connect the landlord with the receipt of any proportionate rate of rent by the tahsildar. BENI PERSHAD KOERI v. GOBERDHAN KOERI (1902) 6 C. W. N. 823

5. *Division of tenure—Distribution of rent—Rent receipt and fraud, construction of—Consent to a division or distribution of tenure.* A receipt for rent granted by a landlord or his agent, containing no specification of the total jama of the taluk, no statement of the area of the taluk or the portion of the taluk which was separated and separately settled with the tenant, nor of the share separated nor containing a recital that the tenant was registered in the landlord's sherista as a tenant of a portion of the original holding at a rent, which was a portion of the original rent, does not amount to a consent in writing by the landlord to a subdivision of the holding within the meaning of s. 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Pyari Mohan Mukhopadhyaya v. Gopal Paik*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 531, distinguished. An entry in a *furd* or account which appeared on the face of it to have been written by a servant of a tenant and exhibited payments of rent made in respect of six different taluks by the tenant to the landlord, and which was signed and receipted by a *sumarnavis* of the said landlord, does not amount to a consent in writing on behalf of the landlord to a division of the tenure or distribution of the rent. JNANENDRA MOHAN CHOWDHRY v. GOPAL DAS CHOWDHRY (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1026
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 923

6. *Sub-division of tenancy—Rent receipts how far evidence of sub-division—Joinder of parties—Wrongly adding a person as a defendant.* Receipts for rent granted separately by the landlord's tahsildar to the tenants of a holding, whose names were also entered in the landlord's *sherista* in the place of that of the tenant, who held the tenancy before them, does not amount to a consent in writing on the part of the landlord to a subdivision of the tenancy within the meaning of s. 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Peary Mohan Mukerjee v. Gopal Paik*, 2 C. W. N. 375 : s.c. I. L. R. 25 Calc. 531, F. B., distinguished. *Jnanendra Mohan Chowdhury v. Gopal Dass Chowdhury*, 8 C. W. N. 923 : s.c. I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1026, applied. *Moharani Beni Pershad Koeri v. Gobur-*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 88—*concl'd.*

dhan Koeri, 6 C. W. N. 823, referred to. BENI PERSHAD KOERI v. RAMDAHIN PANDEY (1906)
10 C. W. N. 216
s.c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 444

s. 89.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 3.
7 C. W. N. 218

s. 89—*Service tenure—Suit for ejectment.* Service tenures are excepted from the operation of s. 89 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *MOKBUL HOSSAIN v. AMEER SHEIKH*
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 131

ss. 90, 52 and 188—*Suit for measurement of area and increased rent—Right of suit—Right of landlord to measure when there is an intermediate tenant—Contract executed between landlord and tenant before the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act—Estoppel—Joint landlords, who are.* A *kabuliyat* executed, before the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act, by defendant No. 1, the holder of a *dar-mourasi patta*, in favour of his immediate landlord, a *mokuraridar*, provided that the former should have his name entered in the zamindar's *sherista* in place of the *mokuraridar's*, and pay rent direct to the zamindar, and also, in case the area of the tenure should exceed a certain number of bighas, that he should pay rent on each excess bigha at the rates of 12 annas and 2 annas to the zamindar and the *mokuraridar*, respectively. The agreement was ratified by the zamindar. On the zamindar suing defendant No. 1 for measurement of the tenure and increased rent, it was objected that under the *kabuliyat* only the *mokuraridar* was entitled to sue for such measurement. *Held*, that every landlord has a right, under s. 90, Bengal Tenancy Act, to sue for measurement. *Held*, further, that, by accepting the zamindar as landlord defendant No. 1 has made himself liable to be sued by the zamindar. Where it was further objected that the zamindar and *mokuraridar* were joint landlords, and the zamindar could not sue alone : *Held*, that, though they were both landlords of defendant No. 1, they were not joint landlords within the meaning of s. 188 ; and that, even if they were joint landlords, by their subsequent conduct, in collecting rent and suing separately, they had ceased to be so. *Tejendro Narain Singh v. Bakai Singh*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 658, followed. *Held*, further, that, as the *kabuliyat*, upon which the suit was based, was executed prior to the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the suit was not under s. 52, Bengal Tenancy Act, and so would not be barred by the provisions of s. 188, Bengal Tenancy Act. *Panchanan Banerji v. Raj Kumar Guha*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 610, followed. *Held*, also, that, as the rate of rent was already fixed under the *kabuliyat*, and the suit was for measurement only, the suit could not be regarded as one under s. 52, Bengal Tenancy Act, and s. 188

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.

— 90, 52, and 188—conclld.

of the Bengal Tenancy Act would not apply in bar of it. *MATUNGINI DASSI v. RAM DASS MULLICK* (1902) 7 C. W. N. 93

— ss. 90, 91—*Measurement proceeding, form of, order on.* In a proceeding under s. 90 the order should be limited to one directing, in the words of s. 91, that the tenants do attend and point out the land, and a declaration made in such order that the petitioner is entitled to make the measurement with a pole of a certain measure, is bad in law and without jurisdiction. *DYA GAZI v. RAM LAL SUKUL* 2 C. W. N. 351

— s. 91—*Application for measurement by a landlord, who is realising his rent separately, whether maintainable—Joint owner—Joint landlord.* Held, that, if one set of landlords obtains separate kabulyats entering into separate contracts for rent with the tenants, such landlords cease to be joint landlords with the other co-proprietors of the land. They become joint owners and not joint landlords. *Matungini Dassi v. Ramdas Mullick*, 7 C. W. N. 93, and *Gobind Chandra Pal v. Hamidulla Bhuiyan*, 7 C. W. N. 670, referred to. Held, further, that such a landlord is entitled to make an application for measurement of the land comprised in his estate under s. 91 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *JOGNESH PROKASH GANGULI v. MANIRADDI* (1908) I. L. R. 35 Calc. 417

— s. 93.

See APPEAL—ACTS—BENGAL TENANCY ACT I. L. R. 14 Calc. 312

1. — *Manager—Co-sharers—Practice in making applications under s. 93 of Act VIII of 1885 where the co-sharers hold various and complicated shares in the property—Notice.* Where a property consisted of 243 estates or tenures, 60 of which were entered under separate numbers in the Land Register of the Collector, other portions of the property being talukhs, dependent tenures, and raiyati holdings, and a single application is made by 12 of the co-sharers in such property (many of whom held shares in several of the tenures and estates) calling upon the remaining four sharers in the property to show cause why a common manager should not be appointed under s. 93 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the Court should, before granting the application, call upon the applicants to state whether all of them are entitled in common to the various estates and tenures, and, if not so entitled, should call upon them to divide themselves into as many groups as there are properties held by them in common; and in the latter case each group of shareholders should put in separate applications on which separate Court-fees should be levied. The notice in the case of tenures should be as provided by s. 93 of the Act, and should be of the same character and to the same effect as in the case of estates. *In the matter of the petition of FAZEL*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.

— s. 93—conclld.

ALI CHOWDHRY. FAZEL ALI CHOWDHRY v. ABDUL MOZID CHOWDHRY I. L. R. 14 Calc. 659

2. — and ss. 95 and 99—*Common manager—minor co-sharers—Court of Wards—District Judge, jurisdiction of.* On the 8th June 1891 one of the co-sharers in an estate applied for the appointment of a common manager; but on objection taken by the other co-sharers, this application was withdrawn. On the 4th March 1891, the same co-sharer applied to the Court to the effect that "proceeding might be taken under s. 93 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and that the management of the estate might be taken over by the Court of Wards." The other co-sharers and the representative of certain minor co-sharers objected to the appointment of a common manager, but consented to the estate being made over to the Court of Wards. On the 30th March 1892, the District Judge, without satisfying himself as to the necessity of the appointment of a common manager ordered that the estate should be made over to the Court of Wards. The Court of Wards took over the estate, but subsequently refused to act, and the Board of Revenue directed that the estate should be released. On the 13th August 1892, the District Judge issued notices on the co-sharers under s. 93, calling on them to show cause why a common manager should not be appointed. All the co-sharers appeared and objected to the appointment of a common manager, but one of them and the representative of the minor co-sharers stated that they had agreed to appoint a private person manager of their shares. The District Judge, therefore, appointed such person temporarily as a common manager of the entire estate until the co-owners should take steps under s. 99 to satisfy the Court that they were in a position to manage the estate, and on the 24th March 1893 passed two orders on separate applications made by two of the co-sharers for the release of the estate, refusing to release it, as he was not satisfied that the management of the estate could be conducted without injury to the rights of the minor. Held, that these orders of the 24th March 1893 were *ultra vires*. *GANODA KANTA ROY v. PROBHBATI DAS*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 881

— ss. 93, 94:

See COMMON MANAGER.

11 C. W. N. 1143

— ss. 93, 98—*Powers of manager—Mortgage by manager—Restraint on powers of co-owners while estates under management—Mortgage by co-owner of his share, effect of—Appeal to Privy Council—Sufficiency of certificate of leave to appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 595, 596, 600.* The powers given by s. 98 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to a manager of joint property appointed under s. 93 "for the purposes of management," include the power to mortgage or to sell the property. The restraint put upon the co-owners

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*ss. 93, 98—*conclld.*

by s. 98, sub-s. (3), of the Act, whilst the estate is under management, is co-extensive with the power conferred on the manager; it does not extend to the exercise of individual rights. Where one of the co-owners of an estate under management mortgaged his share, which in execution of a decree on the mortgage was purchased by the mortgagee: *Held*, that the mortgagee thereby became a co-owner under the manager, and as such was entitled to the benefit of a decree for redemption in a suit on a mortgage of the estate by the manager. On an objection taken that the appeal had not been properly admitted: *Held*, that the case was governed by *Webb v. Macpherson*, I. L. R. 31 Cal. 57: L. R. 30 I. A. 238, and that the certificate of leave to appeal was sufficient. *AMAR CHANDRA KUNDU v. SHOSHI BHUSAN ROY* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Cal. 305
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 225

s. 95.

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 20 Cal. 724

1. ———— *Manager of estate*
—*Obligation of Manager to have his name registered before he can collect rent of estate—Land Registration Act (Bengal Act VII of 1876), s. 78.* A person who has been appointed manager of an estate under the provision of s. 95 of the Bengal Tenancy Act must have his name registered under the provisions of s. 78 of the Land Registration Act before he can recover rent from the tenants of the estate of which he has been appointed manager. *MAQBUL AHMED CHOWDHRY v. GIRISH CHUNDER KUNDU*

I. L. R. 22 Cal. 634

2. ———— *Appointment of common manager—Consent of parties—Rights of holder of subsequent patni lease of lands formerly under ijara.* A common manager of lands was appointed, under s. 95 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, with the consent of the co-owners. The owner of a 3-anna share of the lands had let out in ijara his share to the other co-owners. After the expiry of the ijara and during the continuance of the management by the common manager, the owner of the 3-anna share granted a patni thereof to A, who attempted to collect the rents payable to him as patnidar. *Held*, that A was bound by the order appointing the common manager and could not himself collect such rents, as he was in no better position than the shareholder from whom he obtained his patni. *Ganoda Kanta Roy v. Probhabati Dasi*, I. L. R. 20 Cal. 881, distinguished. *JUGGUT CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. GOLACK CHUNDER GHOSH*

I. L. R. 23 Cal. 522

3. ———— and ss. 98, cl. (3), and 100
—*Rules made by the High Court under s. 100*
—*Power of common manager to mortgage—Power of co-owner during existence of common management.* A common manager, appointed under the pro-

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.**conclld.*

s. 95 and ss. 98 cl. (3), and 100—

visions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, has power to mortgage property with the permission of the District Judge. While the common management exists, the powers of the co-owners must be regarded as in abeyance, and therefore a mortgage created by a co-owner during the existence of the common management cannot in any way interfere with, or derogate from, the rights created under any transaction made by the common manager with regard to the joint property. *AMAR CHANDRA KUNDU v. ROY GOLOKE CHANDRA CHOWDHURI*

4 C. W. N. 769

4. ———— *Land—Common Manager.* A common manager appointed under s. 95 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is competent, on behalf of the co-owners, to sue for recovery of possession of land. *SIBO SUNDARI GHOSH v. RAJ MOHON GUHA* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 214

5. ———— *Appointment of a successor to a common manager.* Having once made an appointment of a common manager under s. 95 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, it is not open to the District Judge to appoint a successor to the manager on his resignation. *DWARAKA NATH MITRA v. BANKUTESH LAL MITRA* (1905)

10 C. W. N. 437

ss. 101, 106—*Settlement Officer, jurisdiction of.* The particulars specified in s. 102 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, when recorded and compiled under s. 103, amount to a "Record-of-Rights" as contemplated in Chapter X of the Act; and proceedings taken by a Revenue Officer, after making a record of the particulars under s. 103, including those under s. 165 of the Act, are not therefore void for want of jurisdiction. *Dharani Kanta Lahiri v. Gaber Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 3 Cal. 339, relied upon. *Per PARGITER, J.*—The difference between s. 103 of the old Act and the present section is, that under the former, the Revenue Officer was to record the particulars specified in s. 102; but under the present Act s. 103 gives an applicant the right to select what particulars he may wish to have recorded. If the applicant asks that all or almost all particulars mentioned in s. 102 be recorded, that would constitute a "Record-of-rights"; but if only the particulars mentioned in cls. (a) and (c) of s. 102 be recorded, they not involving any rights, the record could hardly be called a "Record-of-rights." *SUDHENDU NARAIN ACHARJYA CHOWDHRY v. GOBINDA NATH SIRCAR* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Cal. 518
s.c. 9 C. W. N. 504

ss. 101 to 108 (Ch. X)—*Res judicata—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 101 to 108 117 to 119, 158, 189—Record-of-Rights—Survey and measurement of land—Rules—Jurisdiction—Revenue-officer—Court—Landlord and tenant—Ejectment—Bengal Act VIII of 1869, ss. 38, 39—Bengal Act V of 1875. Ss. 104 to 108 of the*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*ss. 101 to 108—*conclld.*

Bengal Tenancy Act (before the amendment of 1898) applied to proceedings taken under s. 103 in the same way as o proceedings taken under s. 101. On an application under s. 103, a Revenue-officer is competent to take a survey and prepare a record-of-rights without any order of the Government under s. 101. When there is a total denial of relation of landlord and tenant by one of the parties, Revenue-officer has jurisdiction in a proceeding under s. 103 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to decide that question, but his decision, although it may have the force of a decree, cannot operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit in ejectment and for declaration of title, brought in a Civil Court. *DHARANI KANTA LAHIRI v. GABER ALI KHAN* (1902)
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 339 : s.c. 7 C. W. N. 33

ss. 101 to 111A (Ch. X)—*Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Suit for possession and mesne profits—Suit to settle dispute prior to completion of Record-of-Rights—Status of tenants—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss 11, 12.* There is no legal bar to the maintenance of a suit in the Civil Court for possession and mesne profits by ejectment of the defendants from certain plots of land in respect of which a survey and preparation of a record-of-rights have been ordered under Ch. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885, as amended by Bengal Act III of 1898), in which record the defendants have already been recorded as tenants, when the plaintiff's objections to such record are still pending before the Revenue-officer and the record has not been finally published. *Achha Mian Chowdhary v. Durga Churn Law*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 146, distinguished. *TRAYLOKHYA-NATH BOSE v. MACLEOD* (1900)
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 28

ss. 101 to 115 (Ch. X).

See RENT, SUIT FOR. 6 C. W. N. 914

1. _____ *Power of Settlement Officer to resume and assess lakhiraj land.* In proceedings under Ch. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), the Settlement Officer has no power to resume and assess with rent land which has been held as lakhiraj. *PADMANAND SINGH v. BAJO* . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 577

2. _____ *Record-of-Rights—Settlement Officer's decision—Subsequent civil suit—Res judicata.* A decision by a Settlement Officer under Ch. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act as to which of two persons claiming to be tenant ought to be recorded as such does not operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent civil suit between the same parties concerning the title to the land. *PANDIT SARDAR v. MEAJAN MIRDHA*.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 378

3. _____ *Conditions or incident of tenancy—dispute as to right of way*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*ss. 101 to 115—*conclld.*

between two neighbouring tenants—Jurisdiction of Settlement Officer. A Settlement Officer has no jurisdiction to decide civil disputes between tenant and tenant. A dispute as to a right of way between two neighbouring tenants is of a civil nature, and the existence of a right of way cannot be regarded as a condition or incident of a tenancy. *Pandit Sardar v. Meajan Mirdha*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 378, followed. *HARO MOHAN ROY CHURAMONI v. PRAN NATH MITTER* . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 364
4 C. W. N. 127

s. 102.

See post, s. 108.

1. _____ ss. 102 and 101—*Power of Settlement Officer—Proceedings in preparation of Record-of-Rights—Decision as to validity of lakhiraj titles—Power of Revenue Officer to declare land claimed as lakhiraj liable to rent.* Held by the Full Bench (PETHERAM C.J., and PRINSEP, PIGOT, O'KINEALY, and GHOSE, JJ.).—In preparing record-of-rights under s. 102 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, a Revenue Officer is not competent to determine the validity of rent-free titles set up by persons occupying lands with the area under inquiry, so as to resume such lands and to declare them liable to settlement of rent. *Gokhul Sahu v. Jodu Nundun Roy*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 721, referred to. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. NITYE SINGH*. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. BAIKUNT NATH PRODHAN*. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. RAM TARUCK DAS* . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 38

2. _____ *Power of Settlement Officer—Decision of Special Judge—Res judicata—Question whether land is mal or lakhiraj.* The plaintiff had been proprietor of an estate which was sold for arrears of Government revenue and re-purchased from the then purchaser by the plaintiff in 1886. He applied under Ch. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act for the measurement of the estate and the preparation of a record-of-rights, and the Revenue Officer deputed for these purposes found that a portion of the estate held by the defendant was mal land, though it was held as lakhiraj under certain sanads, and as he also found that no rent had ever been paid for it, it was entered on the record-of-rights as mal land held under those sanads as lakhiraj. The Special Judge, on appeal by the plaintiff, held that the land, having been found to be mal, should have been entered as mal land unassessed with rent. In a suit to have the land assessed with rent, it was found that the sanads under which the defendant claimed to hold, were granted not by any predecessor in title of the plaintiff, and were of a date anterior to the Permanent Settlement. Held (reversing the decision of the lower Appellate Court), that the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land was mal or lakhiraj, and that his judgment as to its being mal did not therefore operate as *res judicata*. *Secretary of State for India v. Nitye Singh*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 38, referred to.

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 102—*conclld.*

Gokul Sahu v. Jadu Nundun Roy, I. L. R. 17 Cal. 721, distinguished. The case was remanded for a finding whether the land was mal or lakhiraj.
Karmi Khan v. Brojo Nath Das
 I. L. R. 22 Cal. 244

See PARTITION ACT, s. 46.

13 C. W. N. 93

1. s. 103—*Record-of-Rights—Dispute as to boundaries—Powers of an executive officer.* An executive officer, acting under the provisions of s. 103 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, has no power to determine the boundaries between contiguous estates as to which a *bona fide* controversy exists between the owners of such estates.
Norendra Nath Roy Chowdhry v. Srinath Sandel, I. L. R. 19 Cal. 641, relied on. *Bidhu Mukhi Dabi v. Bhugwan Chunder Roy Chowdhry*
 I. L. R. 19 Cal. 643

2. and ss. 102, 106, 108—*Powers of Settlement Officers—Record-of-Rights—Dispute as to boundaries.* A Settlement Officer has no power, under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, to entertain any dispute between the persons interested in neighbouring estates as to the title of any land.
Norendra Nath Roy Chowdhry v. Srinath Sandel
 I. L. R. 19 Cal. 641

3. *Record-of-Rights—Khwat—Prima facie evidence.* If there is no settlement of rent under Chap. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the entry in the record-of-rights, if it was duly published, would be only *prima facie* evidence in favour of the landlord—evidence which may be rebutted by the tenant.
Abdul Rasheed v. Jogesh Chandra Roy (1906)
 11 C. W. N. 153

4. (before amendment by Act I of 1907)—*Record-of-Rights—Entries as to character of holding and status of tenant—Correction of entries—Proper procedure.* Before the passing of Bengal Act I of 1907, an entry in a finally published record-of-rights that lands held by tenants were *mal* lands or that the status of the tenants was that of settled *rai*yats could not be corrected by the Settlement Officer except in a suit instituted under s. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. He had no authority to revise such an entry under s. 108 of the Act.
Shambhu Chandra Hazra v. Purna Chandra Pal (1907) . 12 C. W. N. 122

s. 103A—

See RES JUDICATA—ADJUDICATIONS.

I. L. R. 28 Cal. 471

ss. 103A, 103B, 104A, 104J—*Entry in a Record-of-Rights—Rebuttable presumption.* Where in a certain *khwat* finally framed and published under s. 103A (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act it was stated that certain persons were joint holders of a tenure. *Held*, that the entry was

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 103A—*conclld.*

correct until the contrary was proved and that this presumption was rebutted when it was shown that the tenants had for 60 years separately held possession of their respective plots on payment of separate rents.
Rajnarain Mitra v. Ananta Tarai (1906) . . . 10 C. W. N. 908

1. ss. 103A, 105, 106A, 109A—*Second appeal—Entry in the khatian by Revenue Officer that no rent fixed—Application for assessment of fair and equitable rent.* Where in an application by the landlord under s. 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act for settlement of a fair and equitable rent, the Settlement Officer settled a fair and equitable rent, and the Special Judge, on appeal by the tenant, confirmed the decision of the Settlement Officer. *Held*, that under s. 109A of the Bengal Tenancy Act, no second appeal lay to the High Court against that decision.
Ram Bishen Raut v. Rajaram (1906) I. L. R. 33 Cal. 832

2. *Rent—Apportionment—Transfer of lessor's interest by operation of law—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 2 (d), 36.* R was *hikim* and as such was entitled to certain *mauzas*, which were held by M as mortgagee in possession under him. On the 7th *Sraban* 1307 *Fasli*, R ceased to be *hikim* and plaintiff became *hikim* and took possession of the *mauzas* by ousting M. M had collected from the tenants of the *mauzas* the entire rent for the year 1307, and plaintiff brought this suit for a refund of the rent for the period from the 7th *Sraban* to the end of the year 1307. *Held*, that s. 36 of the Transfer of Property Act being inapplicable to the case; having regard to s. 2 (d) of that Act, the plaintiff's claim was not sustainable.
Satyendra Nath Thakur v. Nilkanta Singha, I. L. R. 21 Cal. 383, and *Lashminarrappa v. Melothraman Nair*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 540, referred to. *Mathewson v. Sunder Sinha* (1906)
 I. L. R. 33 Cal. 786

ss. 103A, 111A—

See RECORD-OF-RIGHTS, OBJECTION TO.
 11 C. W. N. 48

s. 103B.

See *post*, s. 104J . 13 C. W. N. 210See *post*, s. 105 . 13 C. W. N. 1149

See CHOTA NAGPUR TENANCY ACT, s. 164.
 13 C. W. N. 111

s. 103B—*Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 29 (b), 103B—Record-of-Rights—Suit to correct entry—Presumption—Onus—Enhancement of rent.* The presumption under s. 103B of the Bengal Tenancy Act is a presumption that the entries were correct at the time of the preparation of the record.
Luchmi Pershad v. Ekdeswar Singh (1908) . . . 13 C. W. N. 181

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*

ss. 103B, 105, 106, 108.

See RECORD-OF-RIGHTS.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1013

s. 104.

See APPEAL—ACTS—BENGAL TENANCY ACT . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 326

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 776

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT —CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 723

See VALUATION OF SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 723

1. _____ and ss. 38, 52, sub-s. 2, cl. (c), Ch. X, s. 101, sub-s. 2, cl. (a)—*Ancient holdings—Additional rent for excess lands—Onus of proving lands in excess of area originally let—Permanent deterioration—Liability to additional rent—Duty of Settlement Officer.* S. 104, sub-s. (2), of the Bengal Tenancy Act is subject to the provisions of s. 52 of the Act. The mere fact that on a measurement made by a zamindar under the authority of Government, given under Ch. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, it is found that the tenants generally are in possession of lands in excess of the areas entered in his zamindari-papers and their rent receipts, does not necessarily prove that he is entitled to additional rent for the excess areas. Where settlements or holdings are of very old date and lands are let out by areas ascertained without any accurate survey, but as contained within certain recognized boundaries, for instance, by reference to other holdings, it is incumbent upon the zamindar seeking enhancement of rent very many years after the original settlement to show that the lands held by the raiyats are in excess of the lands originally let to them in consequence of some encroachment or some alluvial increment, or that the settlement was made on the basis of measurement and the rates of rent as applied to the area then determined, while on a fresh measurement made by the same length of measure it has been found that he is entitled to receive additional rent which by carelessness or neglect or some other cause he had hitherto lost. A liberal interpretation should be put upon the word "permanently" in s. 38, sub-s. (1), cl. (a), and the word construed with reference to existing conditions. It cannot be said that a deterioration is not permanent, only because by the application of capital and skill it might be removed. In determining the liability to additional rent the Settlement Officer is by s. 52, sub-s. (2), cl. (c), bound to consider the length of time during which the tenancy has lasted without dispute as to rent or area. Although only an occupancy raiyat can bring a suit under s. 38, the principles laid down in that section ought to be taken into consideration in all proceedings for settlement of rent whatever be the status of the raiyat. *GOURI PATTRA v. RAILY* . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 579

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 104—*contd.*

2. _____ *Order of Settlement Officer as to rate of rent—Res judicata—Bengal Tenancy Act, ss. 105, 106, and 107—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Objection—Dispute.* Where a Settlement Officer of his own motion settled what appeared to him to be a fair and equitable rent in respect of the lands held by the plaintiffs and other tenants under s. 104, cls. 2 and 3, of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and the plaintiffs preferred an objection under s. 105, cl. 1, to certain entries in the record enhancing their rents on the ground that their rents were not liable to be enhanced, which objection was disallowed and the record finally published under s. 105 (2).—*Held*, that the proceedings of the Settlement Officer were of an executive, rather than of a judicial, character, and did not operate either as a *res judicata* under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or as a final decree under s. 107, estopping the plaintiffs from having the same matters tried by the regular Civil Court. The words "objection" and "dispute" in ss. 105 and 106 are not synonymous terms. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. KAJIMUDDY*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 257

3. _____ *Revenue Officer—Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act (III of 1898), s. 9—"Every settlement of rent or decision of a dispute by a Revenue Officer"—Settlement Officer, jurisdiction of.* The words "every settlement of rent or decision of a dispute by a Revenue Officer" are applicable only to those cases which a Revenue Officer has jurisdiction to try, and are not applicable to a decision of a Settlement Officer as to the validity of a *lakhiraj* title under s. 104 of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885. *RADHA KISHORE MANIKYA v. DURGANATH BHUTTACHARJEE* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 162

s. 104 (2).

See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT—REVENUE COURTS.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 252

ss. 104 (2), 107—Where a settlement of rent was made under s. 104 (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act before its amendment by the Amendment Act of 1898, the decision of the Settlement Officer had the effect of a decree under s. 107 of the Act (before amendment), and is evidence in a suit for rent subsequently brought by the landlord even though it may not operate as *res judicata*. *MOHIM CHANDRA ROY v. KALI TARA DEBYA* (1907) . . . 11 C. W. N. 1028

s. 104J—*Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 103B, 104J—Temporarily settled estate—Record-of-rights—Settlement of rent—Entries, if final or only presumed to be correct.* When settlement of rent has been made under Part II of Chap. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, no evidence is admissible to prove that a different rate of rent is

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.**s. 104—concl'd.**

payable from that entered in the rent roll, such entries being conclusive under s. 104J of the Act. S. 103B of the Act does not operate to modify the effect of s. 104J. *AMBICA CHARAN CHAKRAVARTI v. JOY CHUNDRA GHOSH* (1908) . 13 C. W. N. 210

s. 105.

See post, s. 108.

See RES JUDICATA—

ADJUDICATIONS ;

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 471

COMPETENT COURT—REVENUE
COURTS . 5 C. W. N. 798

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 257

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS
SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL,

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 596

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 462

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT
—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 596

Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) as amended by Act III, B. C., of 1898, and before amendment by Act I, B. C., of 1907, ss. 105, 115—Ss. 50, 102 (b), 103A, 103B, 106, 107, 109A, 111—Record-of-rights, final publication of—Landlord's application for settlement of rent of tenant entered as occupancy raiyat—Raiyat if may plead fixity of rent under s. 50—Question of status if may be raised in such proceeding—Second appeal. In proceedings by the landlord for settlement of rent under s. 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act as it stood before its amendment by Act I, B. C., of 1907, the tenants were in practice allowed to take objections which would properly come under s. 106 of the Act ; and when in such a proceeding, the lower Courts decided any such matter a second appeal would be entertained by the High Court. A tenant in such a proceeding is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of fixity of rent arising under s. 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act from proof of uniform payment of rent for 20 years, s. 115 of the Act not displacing such a presumption in a proceeding under s. 105 or s. 106. *Quære* : Whether the words "recorded under this chapter" in s. 115 mean "recorded after all chances of amendment of the record under any other provision of the chapter are over including a suit as contemplated by s. 111." The view expressed in *The Secretary of State v. Kajimuddi*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 617, that "s. 115 contemplates a case in which raiyat is seeking to get the benefit of the presumption for a period subsequent to the time when the record-of-rights was framed" disapproved, as being opposed to the plain terms of the section. *PIRTHY CHAND LAL CHOWDREY v. SHEIKH BASARAT ALI* (1909)

13 C. W. N. 1149

— and ss. 109A, 155, 178 (1)—*Rent*
—Second appeal—Case where the existing rent

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.**s. 105 and ss. 109A, 155, 178 (1)—**

concl'd.

is not varied and the increase of rent is sought for on the ground of increase in area—Whether decision in such a case is a "decision settling a rent." The words in sub-s. (3) of s. 109A of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885, as amended by Act III of 1908), "not being a decision settling a rent," include cases in which the existing rents were not varied and increase of rent was sought for, amongst other grounds, on account of the increase in the area of the holdings. Therefore, where the Special Judge on appeal held that no case was made out for enhancement of rent on the ground of increase in the area of the holdings, no appeal lies against that decision to the High Court. *RAMESWAR SINGH v. BHUBANESWAR JHA* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 837

s. 106.

See post, s. 105 . 13 C. W. N. 1149

See post, s. 188 . 7 C. W. N. 400

See APPEAL . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 510

See RECORD-OF-RIGHTS.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1013

See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT—
REVENUE COURTS.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 721

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 257

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 167

2 C. W. N. 491

5 C. W. N. 798

See RES JUDICATA—

PARTIES . 5 C. W. N. 421

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS
SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 776, 935

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 477

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 462

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT
—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 935

1. *Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act (Bengal Act III of 1898), s. 9—Revenue Officer, decision of, on question of title—Decision before amendment—Finality.* The effect of s. 9 of the Amending Act, III of 1898, is to make final the decisions of a Revenue Officer, made under s. 106 of Act VIII of 1885 before the commencement of the Amending Act, only in regard to disputes, which could be decided by the Revenue Officer under s. 106 of Act VIII of 1885. A question of title between rival purchasers of a tenure could not be dealt with and determined under s. 106 of Act VIII of 1885 as it stood before its amendment by Act III of 1898. *Pundit Sardar v. Meajan Mirdha*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 378 ; *Haro Mohon Roy Churamons v. Pran Nath Mitter*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 364, followed. A decision on such a question passed by a Revenue Officer before the commencement of the amending Act, does not prevent the question from being now

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 106—*concl'd.*

litigated in the Civil Court. *DONAY DASS v. KESHUB PRUTHI* (1904) . 8 C. W. N. 741

2. ————— *Suit between rival proprietors—Scope of suit—Question of possession or title—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 22—Substitution of executor in place of supposed legal representative—New defendant.* In a suit under s. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, certain lands were alleged to have been erroneously recorded as part of mouzah P. and it was prayed that the record-of-rights be amended and the disputed lands entered as part of plaintiff's own mouzah R. from the record of which the same had been omitted. The suit was instituted more than two months after the final publication of the record-of-rights for mouzah R., but within two months of the final publication of the record-of-rights for mouzah P. *Held*, that the suit was not time-barred. In such a suit the Revenue Officer, and in case the suit is transferred to the Civil Court, the Civil Court is confined to the question of possession and cannot be asked to adjudicate upon the title of rival proprietors. The suit was originally instituted against the person, whose name was entered in the record-of-rights. But it appeared that this person was the widow of the deceased proprietor and her name was entered as representing the estate of her deceased husband. *Held*, that the executors to the estate of the deceased proprietor, who were substituted as defendants, were not new defendants within s. 22 of the Limitation Act. *MOHUNT PADMALAY RAMANUJA DAS v. LUKHMI RANI* (1907) . 12 C. W. N. 8

3. ————— *Record-of-rights—Application to correct entry, made before Amending Act of 1898—Reference to Civil Court under Amending Act—Jurisdiction—Interpretation of Statute—Change of procedure during pendency of proceeding.* A record-of-rights having been prepared in 1896 the landlord applied in 1897 for the correction of an entry under s. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act as it then was. After the Amending Act of 1898 was passed the case was referred to the Civil Court under the proviso to s. 106 of the Act as amended. *Held*, that the Court has jurisdiction to try, notwithstanding that the proceedings were commenced prior to the passing of the Amending Act, which first empowered a reference to the Civil Court. In matters of procedure an Amending Act would affect legal proceedings instituted under the repealed provision. *RAHIMUDDIN SARKAR v. JAGAT KISHORE ACHARYA* (1908) . 12 C. W. N. 987

ss. 106, 108—*Suit in Civil Court if maintainable, for alteration of entry published.* A suit in the Civil Court for the alteration and correction of certain entries made in the record-of-rights published under Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, is not maintainable. *JOGENDRA NATH ROY v. KRISHNA PRAMADA DASEE* (1908) I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1013 s.c. 12 C. W. N. 1032

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*

ss. 106, 109A—*The words "a decision settling a rent"—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 21—Sale certificate, statement in—Admission.* The words "a decision settling a rent" in s. 109A of the Bengal Tenancy Act do not mean and include any decision upon the question what is or what ought to be the rent. They mean only a decision settling a fair and equitable rent in place of the existing rent, and the words do not include a decision determining what the existing rent is. *Mathura Mohun Lahiri v. Uma Sundari Debi*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 34, referred to. A second appeal lies to the High Court from a decision of a special Judge reversing or affirming a decision of a Settlement officer, who decided under s. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act what was the rent payable by the plaintiff, it not being "a decision settling a rent" within the meaning of s. 109A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Any statement, as to rent payable for a holding, made by a person in a sale certificate, which was obtained by him as purchaser of the holding at a sale in execution of a decree against the former tenant, being in the nature of an admission, cannot be used as evidence on his behalf, as such a statement does not come within the exception to s. 21 of the Evidence Act. *RAMANI PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH v. MAHANTH ADAIYA GOSAIN* (1904) I. L. R. 31 Calc. 380

s. 107.

See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT—REVENUE COURTS . 8 C. W. N. 825
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 257
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 167
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 252

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 776

s. 107 (before amendment)—*Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 107, 109A—Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act I of 1895), s. 7—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 14 and Art. 120—Settlement of rent—Ex-parte order—Admissible evidence—Res judicata—Certificate of public demands—Suit for cancellation or modification of certificate.* In some settlement proceedings, A and B were arrayed against each other as plaintiff and defendant, but B, though notice was issued, did not appear or raise any objection. The Settlement Officer took evidence, and decided the question of B's rent in May 1891. A's estate being under the management of the Court of Wards, a certificate was issued in 1895-96 for the realization of arrears of rent due from B, whose objection to the certificate was disallowed in January, 1897, and in July he instituted this suit for its cancellation or modification. *Held*, (1) that the Settlement Officer's decision had, under s. 107 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the force of a decree,

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 107—*concl'd.*

and, though it did not make the question of *B's* rent *res judicata*, it was admissible in evidence as to his rent; (2) that *B's* suit was barred by the law of limitation, under Art. 14 or Art. 120 of Sch. II to the Limitation Act (XV of 1877); and that he could not be allowed to bring a suit, after the period of limitation, for the alteration of his rent, under the guise of a suit for the amendment of a certificate. It cannot be right or intended by the Legislature that while tenants' rents, after being settled by a Settlement Officer, became final after the lapse of a certain time, if not impugned in the way provided by the law, tenants' wards' estates should have the means of upsetting such settlements by bringing suits to cancel or modify certificates for arrears of rent. *ASHUTOSH NATH ROY v. ABDUL* (1901)
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 676

ss. 107, 109—*Undisputed entry—Presumption of accuracy, how rebutted.* The presumption under s. 109 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) in favour of the accuracy of an undisputed entry as to the rate of rent is sufficiently rebutted by the decree in a contested suit *inter partes* showing a different rate. S. 109 of the Bengal Tenancy Act lays down a rule of evidence; it does not override the rules of *res judicata*, which are of general application. *GHANESHAM MISSER v. PADMANAND SINGH* (1905) . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 336
s.c. 9 C. W. N. 610

ss. 107, 109, 109A, 192—

See RES JUDICATA . 11 C. W. N. 939

s. 108.

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 776, 935

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 477

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 462

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 935

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 723

See VALUATION OF SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 667

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 723

Special Judge, jurisdiction of—Publication of record-of-rights—Bengal Tenancy Act, ss. 55, 105, 106. There is nothing in s. 108 of the Bengal Tenancy Act which limits the jurisdiction of a Special Judge to deal only with matters of objection taken after publication of the record-of-rights. *DURGA CHARAN LASKAR v. HARI CHURN DASS* . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 521

ss. 108, 109, sub-s (3).

See RECORD-OF-RIGHTS.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 176

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*

s. 109A.

See APPEAL—ORDERS . 7 C. W. N. 440

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 510

See s. 105. . 13 C. W. N. 1149

s. 111—*Suit for arrears of rent—*

Agreement to pay additional rent for excess land. When a tenant agrees to pay additional rent for excess land found on measurement to be in his possession, and a suit is brought for the recovery of rent for such excess land: *Held*, that such a suit is a suit for arrears of rent, and is not barred under s. 111 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, as being a suit for alteration of rent within the meaning of cl. (a) of that section, merely because, subsequent to the accrual of the rent, there have been settlement proceedings under the Act, and the land has been measured in connection therewith. *RAMJAN ALI v. AMJAD ALI*
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 903

See s. 105 . 13 C. W. N. 1149

s. 115—*Res Judicata—Presumption as to status from uniform payment of rent, after record-of-rights published—Suit for increase of rent for increased area—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Res judicata.* Where after an entry in the record-of-rights that the tenant is an occupancy-*raiyat*, the landlord brought a suit for enhancement of rent. *Held*, that notwithstanding the provisions of s. 115 of the Bengal Tenancy Act the tenant was entitled upon proof of uniform payment of rent for 20 years, before the record-of-rights were framed, to the benefit of the presumption under sub-s. (2) of s. 50. That the word "thereafter" in s. 115 refers to a period subsequent to publication of the record-of-rights. *RADHA KISHORE MANIKYA v. UMED ALI* (1908) . 12 C. W. N. 904

s. 116.

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—PERSON BY WHOM RIGHT MAY BE ACQUIRED.

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 546

3 C. W. N. 336

1. *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 116, 178—Suit for ejectment—Zerai, proof of land being—Onus—Admission in the lease—Estoppel.* In a suit by a landlord to eject a tenant on the ground of the land being the former's *zerai* land, the onus is on the landlord to prove that the land was *zerai* so as to bring it within the provisions of s. 116 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Narsing Narain Singh v. Dharam Thakur*, 9 C. W. N. 144, distinguished. The mere fact that in the lease the land is described as *khudkast* land, would not be sufficient in itself to prevent the tenants from acquiring occupancy rights, regard being had to the provisions of s. 178 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and would not shift the onus on the tenant. *AJODHYA PROSAD SINGH v. RAM GOLAM SINGH* (1908)
13 C. W. N. 661

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 116—*concl'd.*

2. ———— *Landlord and tenant—Suit for ejectment—Land claimed as zerait—Onus in the first place on landlord—Shifting of onus.* In a suit for ejectment brought against a tenant by a landlord the onus is in the first place on the landlord to prove either that the land is *zerait*, or any other title on which he claims to be entitled to eject the tenant. If such a title is made out, it will then be for the tenant to prove his title in order to save himself from ejectment. *HERBERT MANNERS v. CHATTER MAHTO* (1907)

13 C. W. N. 664

3. ———— *Landlord and Tenant Act (Bengal Act VIII of 1869), s. 6—Kamat land—Right of occupancy—Tenant, holding over.* Where the rights of the parties were governed by Act VIII of 1869, lands which were *kamat* did not cease to be so by virtue of a *mokurari* settlement of the same. A tenant of *kamat* land does not acquire a right of occupancy by holding it over after the expiry of the lease. *KHALILUR RAHMAN v. RUPAN MAHTON* (1908)

12 C. W. N. 436

ss. 117 to 119.

See *ante*, ss. 101 to 108.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 339

1. ———— s. 120—*Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 120—Zerait land—Admission—Recital in a deed—Estoppel.* The last sub-section to s. 120 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not exclude evidence which under the Evidence Act is otherwise admissible. In determining the question whether a piece of land is *zerait* or not: *Held*, that an admission in a *kabuliyat* as to the character of the land is relevant evidence. *BHAGTU SINGH v. RAGHUNATH SAHAI* (1908) . 13 C. W. N. 135

2. ———— s. 120, sub-s. 2—*Record of proprietor's land as private land—Grounds for determining land to be private—Evidence.* In enacting sub-s. (2) of s. 120 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the Legislature had before it the attempts which might be expected on the part of landlords to frustrate the intention of the Legislature, as asserted in the draft Bill laid before the Council for consideration, to extend the occupancy-rights of tenants before the measures then declared to be in contemplation became law; and therefore the particular date, the 2nd day of March 1883, the date on which the draft Bill was published in the *Gazette*, and leave was obtained to introduce the Bill into the Council, was declared to be the latest date on which there should be free action on the part of zamindars to assert their private rights, so as to prevent the accrual of special tenant-rights. From the wording of that sub-section, it was intended that, in determining whether land is the private land of the proprietor, regard should be had to any declaration made before the 2nd March 1883 by the landlord, and communicated to the tenants, in respect to the reservation

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 120—*concl'd.*

of the proprietor's right over the land as his private land: the words "any other evidence that may be produced" in that sub-section mean, therefore, any other evidence tending in the same direction that may be produced to show the assertion of any title on the part of the proprietor and communicated to the tenant before that date. *NILMONI CHUCKERBUTTI v. BYKANT NATH BERA*
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 466

3. ———— *Zerait—Admission subsequent to 2nd March, 1883.* The mere fact of certain land having been taken on lease as *zerait* by the defendant would not give to that fact any evidentiary value, when the letting was not—as s. 120, sub-s. (2), Bengal Tenancy Act, requires, to make it evidence—before the 2nd day of March, 1883. *SHER BAHADUR SAHU v. MACKENZIE* (1902)
7 C. W. N. 400

1. ———— ss. 121 and 140—*Suit for compensation for illegal distraint.* A suit for compensation for illegal distraint under s. 121 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) was brought by one of two persons jointly entitled to the crops distrained. *Held*, that s. 140 of the Bengal Tenancy Act did not exclude a suit of this kind. *JAGDEO SINGH v. PADARATH AHIR*
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 285

2. ———— *Distraint by a registered proprietor—Suit for damages—Land Registration Act (Bengal Act VII of 1876), s. 78.* A suit for compensation for illegal distraint under s. 140 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is maintainable only on the ground that the distraint was made in violation of the provisions of s. 121 of that Act. A tenant cannot deny the right of a registered proprietor to distraint and plead payment of rent to a third person whose name is not registered. *HANUMAN AHIR v. GOBINDA KOER* 1 C. W. N. 318

s. 121.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 28 7 C. W. N. 728

3. ———— ss. 121, 122 and 140—*Application for distraint permissible for arrears of rent and interest, but not for damages—Separate application for each holding—Wrongful distraint—Compensation—Principles of computation.* Under s. 121 and s. 122 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), a landlord can apply for distraint, for the purpose of recovering the arrear of rent of the holding due for the preceding agricultural year, together with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent. per annum, but not for the recovery of damages, nor can he by one application apply for distraint for the rent of more than one holding. Principles on which compensation for wrongful distraint in a suit instituted under s. 140 of the Bengal

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*ss. 121, 122 and 140—*concl'd.*

Tenancy Act should be computed, discussed.
SHEOBARAT SINGH v. NAWRANGDEO NARAIN SINGH (1901) . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 364

s. 140.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II,
 ART. 28 . . . 7 C. W. N. 728

s. 143.

See *ante*, ss. 101 to 108.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 339

See APPEAL—ACTS—BENGAL TENANCY
 ACT . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 312

Rules framed under s. 189 of the Bengal Tenancy Act—Whether proceedings under s. 103 of the Bengal Tenancy Act are suits between landlord and tenant—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882)—Review of judgment. Proceedings under s. 103 of the Bengal Tenancy Act are suits between landlord and tenant within the meaning of s. 143 by virtue of the rules framed under s. 189 of that Act; therefore the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to review of judgment are applicable to such proceedings. *ACHHA MIAN CHOWDHRY v. DURGA CHURN LAW*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 146

2 C. W. N. 137

ss. 143, 170—Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act (Bengal Act I of 1907, s. 54—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 310A. Even before the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act of 1907, s. 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to a tenure or holding attached in execution of a decree for arrears due thereon. *ASIRUDDI MANDAL v. MOKHADA MOYEE DASI* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 543

s.c. 12 C. W. N. 434

s. 144.

See RENT, SUIT FOR—BY WHAT COURT
 TRIABLE . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 453

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—SMALL
 CAUSE COURT CASES—RENT.

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 842

4 C. W. N. 95

s. 148.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—IN-
 CUMBRANCES . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 364

1. Issue in suit for arrears of rent. In a suit for arrears of rent where the plaintiff claims a certain rent as payable in respect of certain lands mentioned in the plaint, and the defendant denies the occupation of the lands at the rents alleged by the plaintiff, but admits that he holds other lands at different rents, the proper issue to be tried is whether the defendant holds the lands set forth in the plaint at the rent specified. Having

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 148—*contd.*

regard to the provisions of s. 148, cl. (b), of the Bengal Tenancy Act, a simple issue as to whether the defendant holds the jamas set forth in the plaint under the plaintiff is not sufficient. *BHAI CHAL NASYA v. SHAM NUYASI MAHOMED. BALU NASYA v. SHAM NUYASI MAHOMED*

1 C. W. N. 152

2. Assignee of decree—Trustees applying for execution for benefit of assignor's heir. The word "assignee," as used in s. 148, cl. (h), of the Bengal Tenancy Act, does not include trustees who execute decrees under an assignment which is not for their own benefit, but for the benefit of the heir of the assignor. *CHHATRAPAT SINGH v. GOPI CHAND BOTHRA* . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 750

4 C. W. N. 446

3. Decree for arrears of rent, assignment of—Execution of decree by assignee. The fact that an assignment of a decree for arrears of rent was made before the Tenancy Act will not protect from the provisions of s. 148 (h) an assignee who proceeds to execution afterwards; but execution cannot be refused where, before that Act came into operation, the assignment had been recognized by a Court of execution under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code. *KOILASH CHUNDER ROY v. JODU NATH ROY* . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 380

4. Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 148, cl. (h)—Rent decree, Assignment of, recoverable as a civil demand—Landlord's interest vesting in the assignee. Unless the assignee of a rent decree has the landlord's interest in the land, he cannot execute it, and the rent-decree so assigned to a person in whom the landlord's interest is vested ceases to be a rent decree and becomes only an ordinary civil demand recoverable under the Code of Civil Procedure. *DENO NATH DEY v. GOLAP MOHINI DASI* . . . 1 C. W. N. 183

5. Rent-decree—Decree for arrears of rent—Application for execution by the assignee of such a decree—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 316. An application for execution by the assignee of a decree which was obtained by a landlord against a defaulting tenant, for arrears of rent which accrued due between the date of the sale of the tenure in execution of a previous decree for arrears of rent and the date of the confirmation of such sale, is barred by cl. (h) of s. 148 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, as being one for the execution of a decree for arrears of rent. *KARUNA MOYI BANERJEE v. SURENDRA NATH MOOKERJEE* . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 176

6. Execution, application for, by assignee of decree for arrears of rent—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 232. When, after the expiration of an ijara lease,

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 148—*contd.*

an ijaradar assigns to the superior landlord a decree he had obtained for rent, the transferee cannot apply for the execution of the decree, as s. 148, cl. (h), of the Bengal Tenancy Act is a bar to such an application. *DWARKA NATH SEN v. PEARI MOHUN SEN* . . . 1 C. W. N. 694

7. — cl. (b)—*Identification of the land in suit—Description.* Case where it was held that the description of a tenure, given in a plaint in a suit for rent, was *prima facie* sufficient for identification, and that the plaint ought not to have been rejected in a summary way. *DURGA CHURN LAW v. KALA CHAND BISWAS* (1903)

7 C. W. N. 615

8. — *Rent suit, issue in—Plaint, whether to contain extent and boundaries of the lands.* In a suit for recovery of rent where the allegation was that the defendant held a tenure consisting of 61 odd bighas of land within certain boundaries as specified in the plaint, and the defence was that the area was only 36 bighas within certain boundaries as mentioned in the written statement at a certain rate of rent per bigha, and the lower Appellate Court decreed the suit without deciding the question as to the area of the lands, and keeping the question open : *Held*, that the decision of the Subordinate Judge was correct, and did not contravene the provisions of s. 148, cl. (b), of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Per BANERJEE, J.*, (1) that in a rent suit it is not absolutely necessary for the plaintiff to give the extent and boundaries of the lands in respect of which rent is claimed, where there is any difficulty in giving those particulars; and that in such cases it is enough if a description sufficient for identification is given; and (2) that the Court is not bound in every suit for arrears of rent to determine the extent and boundaries of the defendant's holding or tenure. *Bhai Chal Nasya v. Shaik Shammuyasi Mahomed*, 1 C. W. N. 152, and *Rash Dhary Gope v. Khakon Singh*, 1 C. W. N. 24 Calc. 433, distinguished and explained. *PIJRADDI NASKAR v. AMBIKA CHURN MITTER* (1900) . . . 5 C. W. N. 121

9. — cl. (h)—*Decree for rent obtained by a landlord who ceases to have interest in the land—Execution of decree—Assignment—Construction—Strict interpretation.* A decree obtained in a suit for rent, brought by a landlord who ceases to have interest in the land during the pendency of the suit, is not a decree for rent, and the provisions of s. 148, cl. (h), of the Bengal Tenancy Act do not apply to such a decree. When therefore such a decree is assigned by the decree-holder, and is afterwards reassigned to him, s. 148, cl. (h), is no bar to the execution of the decree. S. 148, cl. (h), should be interpreted strictly. *NAGENDRA NATH BOSE v. BHUBAN MOHAN CHAKRAVARTI* (1901) . . . 6 C. W. N. 91

10. — cl. (h)—*Sale in execution at the instance of assignee of rent decree—Sale in execu-*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 148—*concl.*

tion of mortgage decree—Rights of purchasers—Superior title. A sale held in execution of a decree for arrears of rent on an application by the assignee of the decree, when the landlord's interest in the property itself was not transferred to the assignee, passed no title to the auction-purchaser under cl. (h), s. 148 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. A purchaser of the same property at a sale held in execution of a mortgage decree obtained after the first sale acquired a good title as against the first purchaser. *GURU CHARAN NATH BEPARI v. KARTIK NATH* (1905) . . . 10 C. W. N. 44

1. — s. 149—*Suit by third party claiming rent paid into Court in rent suit, nature of—Title suit—Institution stamp.* A suit by a third person under cl. (3) of s. 149 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not a title suit, and need not be stamped as such. *Per TOTTENHAM, J.*—Such suit is in the nature of a suit, for an injunction under the Specific Relief Act, or else a declaratory suit. *JAGADAMBA DEVI v. PROTAP GHOSE*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 537

2. — *Suit by third party claiming rent paid into Court in rent suit, nature of—Title suit.* The object of s. 149 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is to prevent tenants being harassed when disputes arise between rival claimants to the land in respect of which the rent is due. In a suit, therefore under cl. (3) of s. 149 the plaintiff is entitled to have the question of title as well as that of possession tried, and to obtain the injunction therein mentioned. *Jagadamba Devi v. Protap Ghose*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 537, referred to and explained. *RUBIUNNESSA v. GOOLJAN BIBEE*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 82

3. — s. 149, cl. (3)—*Suit by third person for money admitted to be due as rent—Plaintiff claiming only by right of possession—Maintainability—Procedure—Question of title how may arise—Question of possession to be tried first.* A suit brought under s. 149, cl. (3), of the Bengal Tenancy Act, in which the plaintiff claims the right to receive rent by reason of his being in possession of the land (as shown by the receipt of rent for a reasonably sufficient period), is maintainable, though the decision of the suit may or may not ultimately rest on the question of possession merely without reference to the question of title. The question of possession should be tried first in the suit and the suit dismissed, if that question be decided against the plaintiff, as he does not rely on his title; but if decided in the plaintiff's favour, the defendant would be put to the proof of his title and the question of title would have to be tried. *Rubiunnissa v. Guljan Bibi*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 829, referred to. *JADUB LAUL ROY CHOUDHURY v. SRIMUTTY KHEMANKARI DEBYA* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 248

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 149—*conclld.*

4. ———— *Suit for rent in deposit—Onus—Title—Res judicata.* Where a suit was brought under the provisions of s. 149, cl. (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act and the plaintiff made out a very strong case in support of his title to the rents in deposit: *Held*, that the onus was then shifted on the defendant and that plaintiff was entitled to succeed although he was not in a position to prove realization of rents from the tenant, the plaintiff's case being that the defendant had been preventing her from realising them. Although the matter relating to the title of the plaintiff was not *res judicata* against the defendant, still the matter, having been in issue in a suit in which the defendant was a party and that suit having been decided in favour of the plaintiff, and in accordance with the decree passed in that suit a conveyance having been executed in favour of the plaintiff's predecessor-in-title. *Held*, that this constituted a strong case in favour of the plaintiff's title and possession which it lay heavily on the defendants to displace. *TRILOKYA MOHINI DAS v. KALI PROSANGA GHOSH* (1907)

11 C. W. N. 380

5. ———— ss. 149, 153—*Title suit—Landlord and tenant, relationship of—Deposit of rent—Right of suit—Revision—Error of law—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622.* A suit contemplated by s. 149 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is a suit with reference to the money deposited in Court and for an injunction restraining the paying out of the money. The section does not contemplate a suit or establishment of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Where a District Judge acted in contravention of the powers vested in him by the proviso to s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act by interfering with the judgment of the Munsif on a question of law, the District Judge acted without jurisdiction and the High Court can revise his order. *HORANANDA BANERJEE v. ANANTA DAS* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 492

1. ———— s. 150—*Admission of rent due to landlord.* S. 150 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is highly penal in its character, and cannot be put in force against a defendant, unless he has intentionally admitted money to be due and has not paid it; and such admission must be in the action. Under the circumstances of this case, it was held that the defendant had made no such admission. *ALI AHAMMAD SIRDAR v. BEPIN BEHARI BOSE*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 595

2. ———— *Rent, suit for—Money admitted to be due to landlord—Burden of proof—Plea of 'confession and avoidance'—Rate of rent.* S. 150 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is limited in its operation to those cases in which the plea of the tenant is one in respect of which the burden of proof lies upon him; in other words, where it is a plea of confession

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 150—*conclld.*

and avoidance. The section does not, therefore, apply to a case where the rate of rent is in dispute. *BANARASI PERSHAD v. MAKHAN ROY* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 947

ss. 152, 153—*Appeal—Title, question of, as between parties having conflicting claims.—Plaintiff and defendant both claiming under the same landlord under the same title—Rent suit—Second appeal—Finding of fact.* In a suit for rent not exceeding Rs 100 in value plaintiff and defendant both claimed under the same landlord—plaintiff claiming as jotedar and defendant as a bargadar, the settlement with the defendant having been prior to that with the plaintiff. The lower Appellate Court held that plaintiff's position as tenant was not superior to that of defendant and there was no proof of an assignment of plaintiff's lessor's right to collect rent from defendant. The suit was accordingly dismissed. *Held* (by MITRA, J.), that a second appeal was not barred by the proviso to s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, as the question of title was between parties having conflicting claims thereto. That the decision of the lower Appellate Court as regards the status of the plaintiff in relation to the defendant was foreign to the object of the suit and quite irrelevant and that the plaintiff's position was that of an intermediate holder with a right to receive rent from defendant. On appeal under s. 15 of the Letters Patent: *Held* by MACLEAN, C.J., and PARGITER J., that upon the finding of fact by the lower Appellate Court the High Court had no right to interfere in second appeal. *RAM KANAI DAS v. FAKIRCHAND DAS* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 438

s. 153.

See APPEAL—ACTS—BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 153.

See RIGHT OF APPEAL.

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 107

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 107, 231

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 638

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 571, 571 note

1 C. W. N. 687, 711

2 C. W. N. 297

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 484

4 C. W. N. 269

5 C. W. N. 515

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 116

1. ———— *Revisional power of District Judge in rent suits—Judicial Officer.* The words "Judicial Officer as aforesaid," as used in the proviso to s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, have reference to the "Judicial Officer" spoken of in cl. (b) of that section and to such officer only, and the District Judge has no power to revise decrees or orders passed by a

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 153—*contd.*

District Judge, Additional Judge, or Subordinate Judge referred to in cl. (a) of the section. SANKARMANI DEBYA *v.* MATHURA DHUPINI

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 327

2. *Suit for rent by a co-sharer landlord—Appeal—Second appeal.* The provisions of s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act do not apply to the case of a suit for rent by a co-sharer landlord. JOGENDRA NATH GHOSH *v.* PABAN CHANDRA GHOSH (1904)

8 C. W. N. 472

3. *Land Registration Act (VII of 1876), ss. 42, 78—Suit for rent—Right of suit—Appeal.* Where in a suit instituted by a co-sharer landlord for the recovery of rent the amount claimed did not exceed a hundred rupees, but the question raised and determined was not merely the amount of rent payable to the co-sharer, but whether he had a title to recover a particular share of the rents of a particular mouzah: *Held*, that the suit came under the exception mentioned in s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Narain Mahlon v. Manofi Pattuk*, 3 C. L. R. 140, referred to. PORESH MONI DASSYA *v.* NOBO KISHORE LAHIRI (1904)

8 C. W. N. 193

4. *Appeal—Lease—Registration.* Where in a suit for rent not exceeding R100 in value, plaintiff and defendant both claimed under the same landlord and plaintiff alleged that defendant was his sub-tenant: *Held*, that an appeal and a second appeal lay and the question was one between parties having conflicting claims thereto. A tenant may prove his tenancy right without proving his lease even if he has any. *Lala Surabh Narain Lal v. Catherine Sophia*, 1 C. W. N. 248, relied on. SITA NATH PAL *v.* KARTICK GHARAMI (1904)

8 C. W. N. 434

5. *Appeal.* Where in a suit for rent not exceeding R100 in value the question was one between a tenure-holder and a raiyat and the latter set up the title of the superior tenure-holder, who was not a party to the suit: *Held*, that no second appeal lay under s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. RAM MOHAN MOHESH *v.* BADAN BARAI (1904)

8 C. W. N. 436

6. *Appeal—Second appeal.* Where in a suit for rent the defendant claimed to hold under the plaintiff and his mother under a right different from what was set up by the plaintiff: *Held*, that it was not a question as between parties having conflicting claims thereto and an appeal was barred by s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. DINA BANDHU NUNDI *v.* NOBIN CHUNDRA KUR (1904)

8 C. W. N. 437

7. *Appeal—Second Appeal—Suit for rent in kind—Interest—Damages*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 153—*contd.*

—*Landlord and tenant.* A question in a rent-suit whether rent is payable in money or kind is a question as to the amount of rent annually payable within the meaning of s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. APURBA KRISHNA ROY *v.* ASUTOSH DUTT (1905)

9 C. W. N. 122

8. *Appeal from order.* *Held* by the Full Bench (RAMPINI, J., dissenting) that an order setting aside or declining to set aside a sale in execution of a decree for rent, the decree-holder being the purchaser, falls within the proviso to s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and is appealable, although there could be no appeal from the decree in the suit on account of the prohibition contained in that section. KALI MANDAL *v.* RAMSARBASWA CHAKRAVARTI (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 957

s. c. 9 C. W. N. 721

9. *Order setting aside sale—High Court—Revision, power of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622.* An order setting aside a sale in execution of a decree decides a question relating to the title to the land or to some interest in the land as between parties having conflicting claims thereto, and is therefore appealable under s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), although it was made by an officer specially authorized under the section in a suit for rent valued at less than fifty rupees. In deciding whether an order is appealable under that section the point for consideration is not what that decree in the suit decided, but what the order decided. *Monmohiny Dasi v. Lakhinarain Chandra*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 116, distinguished. Where a Court rejects an application under ss. 244 and 311 of the Civil Procedure Code on the ground that the applicant had no *locus standi*, the case would not fall within s. 622 of the Code. GANGA CHARAN BHATTACHARJEE *v.* SHOSHI BHUSAN ROY (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 572

10. *Landlord and tenant—Munsif with special power, decision of—Appeal—Suit—Valuation of suit.* When a Munsif has once been specially empowered to exercise final jurisdiction under s. 153 (b) of the Bengal Tenancy Act: *Held*, first, that it is not necessary that the power should be conferred again on him on his transfer to another district; second, that no appeal lies from a decision of the Munsif, where the only question decided was, whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed or not and the value of the suit did not exceed fifty rupees. *Held*, further, that where the original claim was more than fifty rupees but it was reduced to below fifty on the case coming on for trial, the claim must be regarded as one for less than fifty rupees. SHILABATI DEBI *v.* RODRIGUES (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 547

s. c. 12 C. W. N. 448

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 153—*concl.*

11. ———— *Co-sharer landlord—Suit for share of rent without making other co-sharers parties—Appeal—Second appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622.* A suit by a co-sharer landlord for his share of the rent only without making the other co-sharers parties is a suit instituted by a landlord for the recovery of rent within the meaning of s. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Where the rent claimed in such a suit did not exceed ₹50 and it was tried and dismissed by a Munsif, who was specially empowered under cl. (b) of s. 153. *Held*, that no appeal lay to the Subordinate Judge and hence no second appeal from his decision reversing that of the Munsif. But the decision of the Subordinate Judge being without jurisdiction was set aside under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Prmotha Nath Roy v. Ramani Kanta Roy*, 12 C. W. N. 249, applied. *Jogendra v. Paban*, 8 C. W. N. 472, not followed. *BHAGABATI BEWA v. NANDA KUMAR CHUCKERBUTTY* (1908) 12 C. W. N. 835

12. ———— *Right of appeal when a co-sharer landlord sues for his share of rent and makes his other co-sharers parties to the suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908), s. 115—Revisional powers of the High Court.* The suit of a co-sharer landlord for his share of the rent falls within the purview of s. 153, Bengal Tenancy Act. Where the plaintiff, a co-sharer landlord, brought a suit for his share of rent amounting to less than ₹50, and he made his co-sharers *pro forma* defendants to the suit: *Held*, that an appeal to the High Court from the decision of the lower Appellate Court is barred under s. 153, Bengal Tenancy Act. *Jogendra v. Paban*, 8 C. W. N. 472, not followed. *STAL CHANDRA BHATTACHARJEE v. SHEIKH AFILUDDIN* (1909) 13 C. W. N. 793

s. 155.

See LIMITATION ACT, ART. 32.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 160

1. ———— *Suit for ejectment—Notice, sufficiency of—Omission from notice of requisition on tenant to pay compensation—Alternative relief.* The words of s. 155 of the Bengal Tenancy Act “and in any case to pay reasonable compensation,” etc., mean in every case; and a notice not containing a requisition to the tenant to pay such compensation is insufficient to support a suit for ejectment brought under that section. Where the suit was for ejectment from certain land, but the plaint contained other prayers, namely, for a declaration that the defendant had no right to build houses on the land, and for an injunction on him to remove houses he had built thereon, and the suit for ejectment failed from the insufficiency of the notice under s. 155, the Court *held* that the plaintiff

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 155—*concl.*

was not entitled to a declaration or injunction as asked for. *PERSHAD SINGH v. RAM PERTAB ROY* I. L. R. 22 Calc. 77

2. ———— *Notice—Ejectment, suit for—Alternative relief—Limitation.* A suit for the ejectment of a tenant for misuse of the land was dismissed by the Court below on the ground that the notice served on the tenant under s. 155 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was bad, as the compensation claimed in the notice for the misuse was demanded in the alternative. *Held*, that the notice was not bad in law merely because the compensation was demanded in the alternative. *Pershad Singh v. Ram Pertab Roy*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 77, distinguished. *BOIDYA NATH PANDAY v. GHISU MANDAL* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1063

3. ———— ss. 155, 181—*Ejectment, suit for—Service-tenure—Denial of landlord's title—Notice to quit—Determination of lease—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 106, 111.* A lessee of a service-tenure incurs a forfeiture of his tenancy by denial of the landlord's title; and the landlord in a suit for ejectment would be entitled to recover judgment, if he did, by some act or other, declare his intention to determine the lease antecedent to the institution of the suit, notice to quit in such a case not being obviously necessary; otherwise the suit should be dismissed. Such a case falls within the Transfer of Property Act and not under the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Haidri Begam v. Nathu*, I. L. R. 17 All. 45, and *Ansar Ali Jemadar v. C. E. Grey*, 2 C. L. J. 403, referred to. *ANANDAMOYEE v. LAKSHI CHANDRA MITRA* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 339

s. 157.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—CONSTITUTION OF RELATIONSHIP—ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF TENANCY.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 324

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 428

3 C. W. N. 266

s. 158.

See RES JUDICATA—MATTERS IN ISSUE.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 249

See ante, ss. 101 TO 108.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 339

1. ———— *Incidents of tenancy, application to determine—Validity of lease.* In a proceeding under s. 158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (Act VIII of 1885), it is open to a petitioner, if he acknowledges the opposite party to be a tenant, to dispute the validity of the lease under which he alleges his holding, and the Court is bound to go into and decide that question if raised. *BHUPENDRO NARAYAN DUTT v. NEMYE CHAND MUNDAL*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 627

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 158—*contd.*

2. ————— Question as to boundaries—Standard measure of the district—Evidence taken by an Ameen under s. 158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Under a proceeding under s. 158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, in which an enquiry was directed, amongst other things, as to the boundaries of certain plots held by certain raiyats, the Ameen took evidence as to the standard measure of the district, and the Court decided the case on their evidence. *Held*, that in determining the boundaries the question as to what was the standard measure of the district arose, and that the evidence was rightly received and acted upon. *DEOKI SINGH v. SEGOBIND SAHOO* I. L. R. 17 Calc. 277

3. ————— Application to determine incidents of tenancy and to set aside a lease—Admission of tenancy—Landlord and tenant. An application made nominally for the determination of the incidents of a tenancy, but substantially for the purpose of setting aside the lease under which the tenant came into possession, does not come within the scope of s. 158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Per PETHERAM, C.J., PRINSEP, PRIGOT, and GHOSE, JJ.*—An admission of a tenancy in order to give jurisdiction under s. 158 does not bring the case within the meaning of the section, the object of the section being to enable the Court to ascertain what are the incidents of the existing arrangement between a landlord and his tenant, and not to enable the Court, in effect, to make a new contract for parties between whom no contract was in existence at and before the date of the application. *Per NORRIS, J.*—The true construction of the application was a question for the determination of the Division Bench. *DEBENDRO KUMAR BUNDOPADHYA v. BHUPENDRO NARAIN DUTT*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 182

4. ————— Application to determine incidents of tenure—Applications against separate tenants—Form of petition—Procedure. S. 158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not authorize one application being made against a number of tenure-holders having separate and distinct tenures. The proper procedure is by separate applications against each. *GOLAP CHAND NOWLAKHA v. ASHUTOSH CHATTERJEE*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 602

5. ————— Application for enhancement of rent when no settlement proceedings are in operation. The Court, in dealing with an application under s. 158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, cannot pass a decree for enhancement of the rent. Where therefore a landlord seeks to enhance the rent of his tenant when no settlement proceedings are going on, he must institute a suit for the purpose, and cannot do so by means of an application under s. 158. *RAJESHWAR PERSHAD SINGH v. BURTA KOER*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 807

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 158—*concl.*

6. ————— Tenure, incidents of—Application against some tenant holding two or more tenancies—Form of petition. *Held* by PETHERAM, C.J., and BANERJEE, J. (RAMPINI, J., dissenting), that, under s. 158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the landlord is authorized to include in one application two or more tenancies held by the same tenant. *Golap Chand Nowlakha v. Ashutosh Chatterjee*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 602, referred to. *Held*, further, by BANERJEE, J., that by virtue of s. 647 of the Civil Procedure Code, the provisions of that Code may be applied to all proceedings under the Bengal Tenancy Act, so far as they can be made applicable; and therefore the inconvenience resulting from the proceedings becoming complicated by the inclusion of more tenancies than one in an application under s. 158 may be obviated by following the course prescribed by s. 45, Civil Procedure Code. *Thakur Prasad v. Fakirullah*, I. L. R. 17 All. 106 : L. R. 22 I. A. 44, referred to. *DIJENDRANATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. SOYLENDRA NATH ROY CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 197
1 C. W. N. 236

7. ————— Transferability of holding, question as to—Rents paid by raiyats as holding adjacent lands—Inquiry under s. 158, subject-matter of. The question whether the holding of the defendants is transferable cannot be gone into under s. 158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Where, in a proceeding under s. 158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the Court sent the case to the Collector for the purpose of a local inquiry with a view to determine the matters referred to in that section, and it was directed, among other matters, that the Revenue Officer should find out what may be the rents payable by raiyats holding lands in the vicinity of a similar description : *Held*, that the Revenue Officer ought not to have directed his inquiry to the question mentioned above, but the inquiry should have been directed to find out what was the rent that was being paid by the particular defendants or had previously been paid by them. *PURNA RAI v. BUNSHIDHUR SINGH*

3 C. W. N. 15

8. ————— Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 52, 158, cl. (d)—Jurisdiction—Additional rent for additional land, whether it can be determined. Under s. 158, cl. (d), of the Bengal Tenancy Act, a Court has to determine what the existing rent is, and it has no jurisdiction to determine what the rent should be; and consequently additional rent for additional area cannot be assessed in such a proceeding. *NARAIN THAKUR v. LUCHMESHWAR SINGH* (1901)

6 C. W. N. 592

s. 160—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 160—Raiyat holding at fixed rates if acquires occupancy right—His interest not "protected

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 160—*conclld.*

interest—*Tenure or raiyati lease—Construction.* Per MOOKERJEE, J., agreeing with DOSS, J., (JENKINS, C.J., not expressing any opinion), that the interest of a raiyat at fixed rates is not a "protected interest" within the meaning of s. 160 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. A raiyat holding at fixed rates does not, after he has been in occupation for 12 years, become a "settled raiyat" of the village and thus acquire a right of occupancy. BHUT NATH NASKAR v. SURENDRA NATH DUTT (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 1025

ss. 160 (g), 163—

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—EFFECT OF SALE . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 813

ss. 160 (g), 167—*Protected interest—Incumbrance—Service of notice—Annulment of incumbrance.* A *patni kabuliya* contained the following clause: "If I should let out this mehal in *dur-patni* to any person, such *dur-patni-dar* shall act according to the terms of my *kabuliya*." Held, that even assuming that the *patni patia* contained the counterpart of the clause, the words did not amount to an express or implied permission to create a sub-tenure, and the knowledge of the proprietor of the creation of the sub-tenure and the acceptance by him of the rent of the *patni* taluk through the sub-tenure-holder was not sufficient to constitute the sub-tenure a protected interest within the meaning of s. 160 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. MAHAMMAD KAEM v. NAFFAR CHANDRA PAL (1905) . . . 9 C. W. N. 803

s. 161.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—INCUMBRANCES . . . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 364
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 254
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 537, 746

See s. 167 . . . 13 C. W. N. 412

ss. 162, 163.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—GENERAL CASES. . . 3 C. W. N. 333

ss. 164, 165, 167.

See MORTGAGE . . . 8 C. W. N. 332

s. 165—*Decree for rent—Tenure for holding, sale of—Landlord and tenant.* A 16-anna proprietor obtaining a decree for the whole rent due in respect of a *mokarari* tenure in a suit brought against all the tenants is entitled under s. 165 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to sell the tenure in execution of the decree, although he recognized the fact that the tenants had sub-divided the tenure and chose to accept a decree making each of them separately liable for his own share of the rent. Tarini Prosad Roy v. Narayan Kumari Debi, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 301, referred to and explained. SURBO LAL v. J. M. WILSON (1905).

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 680

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*

s. 166.

See post, s. 167.

ss. 166, 167—*Occupancy-holding—Mortgage—Incumbrance, annulment of—Fraud.* Where an occupancy-holding, which had been mortgaged by the raiyat of the holding, was purchased by a person in execution of a decree for money obtained by him, and the purchaser repurchased it in execution of a rent decree against the old tenant for arrears, which had accrued previous to his first purchase and annulled by a notice under s. 167 the mortgage of which he was aware at the time of his re-purchase. Held, that the purchaser did not commit any fraud in re-purchasing the property and was entitled to annul the mortgage, and the mortgagor was not entitled to get a decree upon the mortgage making the holding liable for the mortgage debt. That the purchaser was not bound as representative of the old tenant to pay off the decree for rent obtained by the landlord. SURENDRA MOHAN SINGH v. BANSIDHAR MAHWARI (1907) . . . 12 C. W. N. 114

s. 167.

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 618

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882) . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 618

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 298

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 7.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 813

See MESNE PROFITS—MODE OF ASSESSMENT AND CALCULATION.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 536

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—INCUMBRANCES.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 364

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 746

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 551

4 C. W. N. 268, 735

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 66, 180, 205 :

5 C. W. N. 272

See EFFECT OF SALE.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 813

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 73.

9 C. W. N. 117

1. ———— *Rent sale—Annulment of mortgage by notice—Right of mortgagee to apply to set aside sale.* The service of notice under s. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act annulling a mortgage is no bar to the mortgagee making an application to set aside a sale of the tenure. BRIJ KUMAR ROY v. DHANUKDHARI RAUT (1906)

10 C. W. N. 976

2. ———— *Sale in execution—Encumbrances, annulment of.* Per GEIDT, J. (before the reference). S. 167, Bengal Tenancy Act, does not apply to a sale in execution of a rent decree of a portion only of a tenure or

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 167—*conclld.*

holding, and the auction-purchaser cannot proceed under that section to annul encumbrances. *RAMKINKER BISWAS v. AKHIL CHANDRA CHOWDHURY* (1907) . . . 11 C. W. N. 350

3.

“Final decree”—*Order of remand—Suit to annul incumbrances—Notice—Dismissal of suit on the ground of non-service of notice—Appellate Court holding service proved and remanding case.* Where a suit to annul incumbrances by the purchaser of a *putni* at a sale for its own arrears was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove the service of notices under s. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, but the High Court on appeal held that the service of notices was proved and remanded the suit for the trial of the other issues in the case: *Held*, that though the order of the High Court was in form an order of remand, it finally decided the cardinal point in the case, *viz.*, whether the notices were properly served or not. The order was therefore a “final decree” within the meaning of s. 505 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Saigid Muzhar Hossain v. Bodha Bibi*, I. L. R. 17 All. 113; *Rohimbhoy Habibhoy v. Turner*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 155, referred to. *ANANDA GOPAL GOSSAIN v. NAFAR CHANDRA PAL* (1905) I. L. R. 35 Calc. 618 s.c. 12 C. W. N. 545

4.

Priority—Purchase of *jote* at successive rent and mortgage sales—*Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 65, 161, 167—Mortgage-decree if an incumbrance.* After a mortgagee had obtained a decree for sale on his mortgage, the landlord of the *jote*, the subject of the mortgage, brought in suit for rent and sold the *jote* in execution of a decree obtained therein. Later on the property was sold in execution of the mortgage-decree and purchased by the mortgagee, who took possession: *Held*, in a suit for possession brought by the purchaser at the rent sale after notice served on the mortgagee under s. 167, Bengal Tenancy Act, purporting to annul the mortgage, that the question was really one of priorities, and the purchaser at the rent sale had priority over the purchaser in execution of the mortgage-decree. *Akhoy Kumar v. Bejoy Chand*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 813, referred to. *GOPI NATH MOHAPATRO v. KASHI NATH BEG* (1909) 13 C. W. N. 412

5.

Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 160, 161, 167—Suit by purchaser to eject after notice annulling incumbrance—Onus of proof as to Defendant's tenancy being an incumbrance. The onus is on the plaintiff who seeks to annul an incumbrance under s. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to prove that the tenancy held by the defendant is in fact an incumbrance within the meaning of the Act. *NARMADA SUNDARI DEBI v. TORIP MOLLAH* (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 720

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*

s. 169.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PURCHASERS . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 169 I. L. R. 34 Calc. 724

s. 169, cl. (c).

See INTEREST ON RENT.

11 C. W. N. 1106

Sub-s. (1), cl. (c)—“Date of sale,” meaning of. The words “date of sale,” in s. 169, sub-s. (1), cl. (c), of the Bengal Tenancy Act, mean the date of confirmation of sale, and not the actual date of sale. *MATANGINI CHAUDHURANI v. SREENATH DAS* (1903)

7 C. W. N. 552

1. s. 170—*Decree for rent under Bengal Act VIII of 1869—Attachment under decree obtained under Rent Law of 1869, subsequently to the passing of Act VIII of 1885—General Clauses Consolidation Act (I of 1868), s. 6.* Before the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 came into operation, a decree for rent was obtained under Bengal Act VIII of 1869. After the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 had become law, the tenancy in respect of which the rent had become due was attached in execution of such decree. A claim was subsequently put in to the attached property by a third person, which claim was disallowed as being forbidden by s. 170 of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885. *Held*, that the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 were applicable to the proceedings in execution; the term “proceedings” in s. 6 of Act I of 1868 not including proceedings in execution after decree. *DEB NARAIN DUTT v. NARENDRA KRISHNA* . . . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 267

2. Attachment of tenure

in execution of decree for arrears of rent by a fractional co-sharer—*Arrears of rent of separate share.* An attachment of a tenure or holding in execution of a decree obtained by a fractional co-sharer for arrears of the rent of his separate share is not such an attachment as is contemplated by s. 170 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *BENI MADHUB ROY v. JAOD ALI SIRCAR*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 390

See SADAGAR SIRCAR v. KRISHNA CHUNDER NATH . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 937

3.

and s. 188—*Decree for rent obtained by one of several co-sharers, effect of—Execution—Claim—Attachment—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 278.* Where a decree for the entire rent of a tenure is obtained by one of several co-sharers by making the others party-defendants, and is executed by him alone and the defaulting tenure is attached, no claim by a third person under s. 278, Civil Procedure Code, to the attached property is maintainable by virtue of s. 170 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The decree has in this case the same effect as if the decree has been ob-

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 169—*contd.*

tained by all the co-sharers, and s. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act has no application to a case like the present. *CHUNDRĀ SĒKHAR PATRA v. MANJHEE* 3 C. W. N. 386

4. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 278—Claim, maintainability of.* S. 170 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is confined to claims to the tenure, and not to claims adverse to the tenure and in which the nature of the question to be tried is whether the property claimed is part of the tenure or not. *JAGABUNDHU CHATTOPADHYA v. DEENU PAL* 4 C. W. N. 734

5. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 278—Claim, maintainability of—Attachment of defaulting tenure.* Where in execution of a decree for arrears of rent the defaulting tenure is attached, no claim under s. 278, Civil Procedure Code, is maintainable, whether the claim is to the tenure or adverse to the tenure. *MAKBUL AHMED v. RAKHAL DAS HAZRA* 4 C. W. N. 732

6. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 278—Whether claim maintainable, to a tenure, or holding attached in execution of a decree for arrears of rent.* Held by the Full Bench (*BANERJEE J.*, dissenting), that s. 170 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) bars a claim, under s. 278 of the Civil Procedure Code, to a tenure or holding attached in execution of a decree for arrears of rent due thereon, in all cases where it is shown that the decree was one for such arrears. *AMRITA LAL BOSE v. NEMAI CHAND MUKHOPADHYA* (1901). I. L. R. 28 Calc. 382 : s. c. 5 C. W. N. 474

7. ————— *Decree for rent—Execution—Claim under s. 278, Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)—Admissibility—Landlord's interest in tenure sold after decree—Decree, if continues to be a first charge on tenure.* When the plaintiff in a suit for rent is shewn to have been the landlord at the date of the suit and also at the date of the decree, both suit and decree would clearly be a suit and a decree under the Bengal Tenancy Act. As provided in s. 170 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, no claim can be preferred under s. 278, Civil Procedure Code, when such a decree is put in execution. The fact that the plaintiff sold his interest in the tenure subsequently to obtaining the decree, would not prevent him from obtaining the benefit of s. 65 of the Act. *Hem Chunder Bhunjo v. Mon Mohini Dassi*, 3 C. W. N. 604, overruled. *KHETRA PAL SINGH ROY v. KRITARTHANMOYI DAS* (1906) 10 C. W. N. 547 : s. c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 566

8. ————— *sub-s. (3)—Purchaser of a tenure, right of, to deposit decretal amount—Interest of purchaser void or voidable.* When a tenure is advertised for sale the purchaser of the tenure has no right to make a deposit under sub-s. (3) of s. 170 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and prevent the

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 169—*concl'd.*

sale, as he is not a person having an interest in the tenure voidable upon the sale. Where a tenure was advertised for sale and the purchaser of the tenure from the tenant against whom the decree for rent was obtained was allowed by the lower Court to deposit the decretal amount under sub-s. (3) of s. 170 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to prevent the sale, the High Court on revision did not set aside the order on the ground that on a former occasion under similar circumstances the purchaser had made a similar deposit and the decree-holder had withdrawn the deposit. *JOTINDRA MOHAN TAGORE v. DURGA DABE* (1905) 10 C. W. N. 438

9. ————— *Decree for arrears of rent due on two holdings—Claim, whether maintainable—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 278.* S. 170 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) does not apply to a decree obtained by a co-sharer landlord for his share of rent in respect of two holdings; and that, therefore, when the holdings are attached in execution of such a decree, a claim under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure is maintainable. *Hriday Nath Dass Chowdhury v. Krishna Prasad Sirkar*, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 298; 11 C. W. N. 497, and *Baikanta Nath Roy v. Thakur Debendra Nath Sahi*, 11 C. W. N. 676, referred to. *BIPRA DAS DEY v. RAJARAM BANERJEE* (1909) I. L. R. 36 Calc. 765

10. ————— *"Rent decree"—Decree for arrears due on two holdings—Attachment of holdings—Claim under s. 278, Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), if admissible.* A decree for arrears of rent due in respect of two holdings is not a decree for rent as contemplated in Ch. XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act. When the holdings are attached in execution of the decree, s. 170 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is no bar to a person preferring a claim under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). *Hriday Nath Dass Chowdhury v. Krishna Prasad Sirkar*, 11 C. W. N. 497; *Baikanta Nath Roy v. Thakur Debendra Nath Sahi*, 11 C. W. N. 676, followed. *BIPRA DAS DEY v. RAJARAM BANDOPADHYA* (1909) 13 C. W. N. 650

s. 171.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—INCUMBRANCES I. L. R. 24 Calc. 537

1. ————— *Unrecorded purchaser of share of durputni if may apply—Possession, suit for, by depositor, if necessary.* An unrecorded purchaser of a share in a *durputni* tenure has an interest in the tenure which is voidable upon a sale in execution of a decree for rent obtained by the *putnidar* against the recorded tenants of the *durputni*, and as such can apply under s. 171, Bengal Tenancy Act. On depositing the amount mentioned in that section, he would be entitled to get possession, without being required to institute

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*concl'd.*

_____ s. 171—*concl'd.*

a suit for that purpose. *Umatul Fatima v. Nemai Charan Banerji*, 6 C. L. J. 592, referred to. *RADHIKA NATH SARKAR v. RAKHAL RAJ GAYEN* (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 1175

2. _____ *Rent—Payment to prevent sale.* Where a decree made in a suit for rent was in the main one for rent, although it included other sums, which were not strictly rent, within the meaning of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and in execution thereof the tenure in area was ordered to be sold under Chapter XIV of the Act and advertised: *Held*, that the holder of an under-tenure liable to be avoided would be justified in making a payment to prevent the sale of the superior tenure and having made the payment, would be entitled to the rights, which are given to a person, who makes a payment under s. 171 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. A lease provided that a certain sum was payable by a tenant direct to the landlord as *matikana* and certain other sums were payable by the tenant for Government revenue and other demands, which the landlord was himself bound to pay. *Held*, that the latter sums, though not actually payable to the landlord, were payable for the use and occupation of the land held by the tenant, and might have been made payable to the landlord direct, although for convenience it was arranged that the tenant should pay them for the landlord, and came within the definition of rent in s. 3 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *JNANADA SUNDARI CHOWDHURI v. ATUL CHANDRA CHAKRAVARTI* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 972

3. _____ *Right of depositor to obtain possession—Procedure—Application or suit.* Where a deposit is made under s. 171 of the Bengal Tenancy Act the depositor can, as against the judgment-debtor, obtain delivery of possession of the holding advertised for sale, by application to the execution Court: but by such application the depositor is not entitled to invite the execution Court to oust a stranger to the proceeding. If he is met by a stranger, his remedy is by a regular suit for recovery of possession. *RAM NARAIN ROUTH v. LAL DAS ROUTH* (1907) . . . 12 C. W. N. 55

4. _____ *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 86, 171—Surrender by raiyat—Under-raiyat in possession having paid rent due by raiyat—Mortgage—Ejectment.* Where a raiyat surrendered his holding at a time when the holding was in possession of the under-lessee of the raiyat under s. 171 of the Bengal Tenancy Act: *Held*, that the superior landlord's claim to *khas possession* by virtue of the surrender should be postponed till the amount due to the under-lessee by virtue of the mortgage under the operation of law under s. 171 is satisfied. *NABADIP CHANDRA PAL v. BHAIKAR CHANDRA DHAR* (1908) . . . 13 C. W. N. 97

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*concl'd.*

_____ s. 173.

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 825

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 244.
9 C. W. N. 134

See LIMITATION ACT, ART. 178.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 707

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—(ORDERS SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 707

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 73.
9 C. W. N. 117

_____ *Sale for arrears of rent—Purchase by benamidar for judgment-debtor—Sale void or voidable—Suit to set aside sale—Proper Court to decide whether sale should stand or not.* Where a sale takes place under the Bengal Tenancy Act in execution of a decree for arrears of rent, and the purchaser is found to be a mere benamidar for the judgment-debtor: *Held*, in a suit to set aside the sale on that ground, that on the wording of s. 173 the sale was only voidable, and not absolutely void; that section leaves it in the discretion of the Court to set aside the sale or not as it thinks fit. Under that section, the proper Court to determine whether the sale should stand or not is the Court that held the sale. *GOPAL CHUNDER MITRA v. RAM LAL GOSHAIN* . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 554

_____ s. 174.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 310A

13 C. W. N. 224

See CO-SHARERS—GENERAL RIGHTS IN JOINT PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 800

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EFFECT OF CHANGE OF LAW PENDING EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 767

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—SETTING ASIDE SALE—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 393, 396, note

1. _____ *Act creating new rights, Effect of—Application for execution.* The provision of an Act which creates a new right cannot, in the absence of express legislation or direct implication, have a retrospective effect. *Held*, accordingly, that a judgment-debtor's right under s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to set aside a sale did not avail where the sale was held in pursuance of a decree, the execution whereof had been applied for before that Act came into operation. *LAL MOHUN MUKERJEE v. JOGENDRA CHUNDER ROY. BONOMALI CHUNDER GHOSAL v. RAMKALI DUTT* . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 636

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.**s. 174—contd.**

2. *Execution applied for after passing of Act VIII of 1885—Decree being previous to the Act—Bengal Act VIII of 1869—Construction of statute.* A sale in execution of a decree passed under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, execution having been applied for after Act VIII of 1885 had come into force, cannot be set aside under s. 174 of the latter Act. Principle of *Lal Mohun Mukerjee v. Jogendra Chunder Roy*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 636, applied. *UZIR ALI v. RAM KOMAL SHAHA* . . . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 383

3. *Judgment-debtor, meaning of.* The word "judgment-debtor" as used in s. 174 of Act VIII of 1885 does not include a transferee or assignee from a judgment-debtor, but must be construed strictly as referring to a judgment-debtor alone. *RAJENDRO NARAIN ROY v. PHUDY MONDUL* . . . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 482

4. *Tenure sold in execution of a decree for cesses—Rent, definition of, Bengal Tenancy Act, s. 3, cl. 5—Bengal Cess Act (Bengal Act IX of 1880), s. 47.* S. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is applicable to the case of a tenure or holding sold by the landlord in execution of a decree for arrears of cesses due thereon, although s. 174 is not specifically mentioned in s. 3, cl. 5, as one of the sections to which the extended definitions of rent is applicable. *KISHORI MOHUN ROY v. SARODAMANI DASI* . . . 1 C. W. N. 30

5. *and s. 162—Setting aside sale—"Decree," meaning of.* The word "decree," in s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, no doubt primarily refers to the decree of which execution is sought for; but if in the meantime, that is to say, before the sale is actually held, the decree of the first Court, of which execution was applied for, is modified in appeal in favour of the judgment-debtor, then necessarily "the decree" must be the decree of the Appellate Court. So where a decree for rent was passed by the first Court on the 11th January, and in execution of the decree the defaulting tenure was sold on the 5th June, but in the meantime the decree had been modified by the Appellate Court on the 18th May: *Held*, that the judgment-debtor could set aside the sale by depositing within 30 days from the date of sale the amount covered by the decree of the Appellate Court, together with a sum equal to five per centum of the purchase-money. *BHIKI SINGH v. BHANU MAHTON* . . . 3 C. W. N. 231

6. *Proceeding in execution of decree—Application for execution—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 647.* A proceeding under s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not a proceeding for the execution of a decree; it may be a proceeding relating to the execution of a decree, but it does not come within the Explanation to s. 647 of the Civil Procedure Code as being an application for the execution of a decree. *SUBH*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.**s. 174—contd.**

NARAIN LALL v. GOROKE PROSAD

3 C. W. N. 344

7. *Deposit, nature of—Power to set aside sale.* The deposit under s. 174 of the Tenancy Act must be of such a nature as to be at once payable to the parties, and a Court has no power to set aside a sale under that section unless the judgment-debtor has complied strictly with its provisions. *RAHIM BUX v. NUNDO LAL GOSSAMI* . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 321

8. *Nature of deposit required.* A deposit under s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act must be such as the decree-holder may draw out at once; a deposit not made payable to the decree-holder until a certain event had happened is not a good deposit within the meaning of that section. *SHAKOTE v. JOTINDRA MOHUN TAGORE* . . . 1 C. W. N. 132

9. *Sale for arrears of rent—Deposit, extension of time for, when Court is closed.* Where a tenure is sold for arrears of rent under the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, the judgment-debtor, under s. 174 of the Act, may apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in Court for payment to the decree-holder the amount recoverable under the decree with costs, and for payment to the purchaser a sum equal to 5 per cent. of the purchase money; and if the Court be closed on or before the last day of the period limited, the judgment-debtor may pay the said sum into Court on the first day the Court re-opens, notwithstanding the absence of express provision to that effect. *SHOOSHEE BHUSAN RUDRO v. GOBIND CHUNDER ROY*

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 231

See PEARY MOHUN AICH v. ANUNDA CHARAN BISWAS . . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 631

10. *Amount of deposit payable incorrectly calculated by an officer of the Court—Sale for arrears of rent.* The judgment-debtor within 30 days from the date of sale deposited in Court, under s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the amount which had been calculated in the office of the Munsif as the amount payable under the section. Subsequently on its being discovered that the amount was short by a small sum, the calculation being incorrect, the Munsif held that the provisions of the section had not been complied with, and passed an order confirming the sale. *Held*, that, when the amount payable by the judgment-debtor under s. 174 has been calculated and settled by an officer of the Court, and when that amount has been paid into Court, an order setting aside the sale must be made by the Court as a matter of right. The order of the Munsif confirming the sale was therefore without jurisdiction, and must be set aside. *UGRAH LALL v. RADHA PERSHAD SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 255

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 174—*contd.*

See MAKBOOL AHMED CHOWDHRY v. BAGLE
SABHAN CHOWDHRY . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 809

11. ———— *Application to set aside sale for arrears of rent—Deposit of decretal amount incorrectly calculated by ministerial officers of Court—Effect of deposit without a prayer in express terms to set aside the sale—Challans—Practice.* The judgment-debtor, within thirty days from the date of sale of his holding for arrears of rent, deposited in Court, under s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the decretal amount by a challan endorsed by the chief ministerial officer of the Court executing the decree. Subsequently it was discovered that the amount was short by 9 pies, which the judgment-debtor forthwith paid in, making up the deficiency, and presented a petition, praying that "the execution case may be declared as finally closed," but without applying in express terms to have the sale set aside. *Held*, that, under s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the Court was bound to set aside the sale, notwithstanding that the applicant did not in express terms ask for that relief. *Ugrah Lall v. Radha Pershad Singh*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 255, referred to. *Per AMEER ALI, J.*—The fact of his depositing the amount was a sufficient indication of his intention to seek the relief. *Per MACPHERSON, J.*—The challan, which sets out the purpose of the deposit, may be regarded as a sufficient application. *ABDUL LATIF MOONSHI v. JADUB CHANDRA MITTER*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 216

12. ———— *Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 11—Right of suit to set aside sale for arrears of rent—Deposit in Court.* No suit is maintainable to set aside sale under the provisions of s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The right under the section to have a sale set aside is not an abstract right which can be enforced by suit against any particular person, but is a right to call upon a Judge to set aside a sale, and on his refusal to proceed in revision. *KABILASO KOER v. RAGHU NATH SARAN SINGH*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 481

13. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 295—Deposit made by judgment-debtor.* S. 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to a deposit made by the judgment-debtor under s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *BIHARI LAL PAL v. GOPAL LAL SEAL*, 1 C. W. N. 685

14. ———— *Setting aside of sale—Deposit—Calculation by an officer of the Court.* Where, upon setting aside a sale under s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, it was found that the amount of deposit fell short of the amount required to be deposited under the law, but that this was owing to a mistake

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 174—*conclld.*

in calculation by the officer of the Court who ordinarily supplied such information, and it appeared that the Chief Ministerial Officer of the Court had also signed his approval of the information by signing the *challan*: *Held*, that this was a case in which the High Court ought not to interfere. *Chandi Charan Mandal v. Banke Behary Lal*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 449, distinguished. *Ugra Lall v. Radha Persad Singh*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 255, referred to. *Abdool Latif Moonshi v. Jadub Chandra Mitter*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 216, followed. *SHEIKH FAKIR v. BERAJ MOHINI DAS* (1906) 11 C. W. N. 118

15. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 311—Applications under both sections—Withdrawal of latter—Effect—Appeal.* An order under s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is appealable if the question is between the parties to the suit or their representatives and the question raised is a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. The word "applies" in the proviso to s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act means "applies and prosecutes." If a judgment-debtor has made an application under s. 311, C. P. C., he is competent to apply under s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act if he withdraws his application under s. 311, C. P. C. Where a judgment-debtor made an application under s. 311, C. P. C., on the 13th of July to set aside a sale held on the 8th July, and subsequently on the 5th August he applied under s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and the Court ordering that the money might be received if the application under s. 311 was withdrawn, the necessary deposit was made on the following day, and on his application on the 7th August to withdraw the application made under s. 311, C. P. C., the same was dismissed on the 24th August and the application under s. 174, Bengal Tenancy Act, allowed; *Held*, that the order under s. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act for setting aside the sale was validly made. *SITAL RAI v. NAND LAL* (1909)

13 C. W. N. 591

s. 176.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—INCUMBRANCES . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 364

s. 178.

See *ante*, s. 67 13 C. W. N. 95

See *ante*, s. 116 13 C. W. N. 661

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—ARREARS OF RENT.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 37

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 130, 315

3 C. W. N. 37, 194

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—FORFEITURE—DENIAL OF TITLE.

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*con'd.***s. 178—*concl'd.***

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—ACQUISITION
OF RIGHT—MODE OF ACQUISITION.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 272 :
I. L. R. 23 I. A. 158

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—TRANSFER
OF RIGHT .

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 427
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 184

Right of occupancy—

Agreement restricting right of occupancy—Suits pending when Act came into force. S. 178 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (Act VIII of 1885) has no application to suits instituted before the date on which that Act came into force. So where a landlord sued to eject a tenant who had executed a solenamah agreeing to hold the land in suit for a specified period at a specified rent, and providing that the landlord was to be at liberty to enter on the lands at the expiry of the period, and the suit was instituted on 6th October 1885, and where it was found that at the date of the solenamah the tenant had acquired a right of occupancy with respect to some of the lands in suit:—*Held*, that the tenant was not entitled to the benefits conferred by s. 178, cl. 1, sub-cl. (b), of the Bengal Tenancy Act, but was liable to be ejected. *MOHESHWAR PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH v. SHEOBARAN MAHTO. HOHESHWAR PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH v. DURSUN RAUT*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 621

s. 178 (1), cl. (a), s. 173 (3), cl. (a),
s. 181.

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 136

s. 178, sub-s. (1), cl. (a), sub-s. (3), cl. (a)—*Contract stipulating re-entry on raiyat's death—Validity—Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 7.* A valid contract of tenancy providing that the tenant, a raiyat, should hold the land for his lifetime, and that the landlord would have the right to re-enter on his death, could be created before the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Such a contract does not come within the terms of the provisions in cl. (a), sub-s. (1) or cl. (a), sub-s. (3) of s. 178 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and is therefore enforceable. The contract in this instance having been created by a *solenamah* in 1877 and the tenant dying in 1902. *Held*, that the landlord can recover *khas* possession. *BAUL CHANDRA CHAKRAVARTI v. NISTARINI DEBI* (1905)

10 C. W. N. 533

s. c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 136

s. 178 (b).

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS—CASES
—ARREARS OF RENT.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 227
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 674

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*con'd.***s. 179.**

See CESS . . . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 828
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 611
3 C. W. N. 608

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—
ARREARS OF RENT.

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 130
3 C. W. N. 37

Landlord and tenant—

Mokurari lease—Abatement of rent—Diluvion—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 52, 178, 179. A tenant holding under a permanent *mokurari* lease is not entitled to get abatement of rent by reason of a portion of the land in his occupation having been diluviated by the action of a river. *NANDA LALL MUKERJEE v. KYMUDDIN SARDAR* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 886

s. 180.

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—ACQUISITION
OF RIGHT—MODE OF ACQUISITION.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 393

s. 181.

See CHAUKIDARI CHAKRAN LAND.

9 C. W. N. 571

See GHATWALI TENURE.

6 C. W. N. 94

See OCCUPANCY RIGHT.

8 C. W. N. 860

See SERVICE TENURE.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 131

s. 182—*Homestead land of raiyat—Occupancy right.* It is not required by s. 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act that a tenant in occupation of homestead land should be a *raiya*t in the village, in which the homestead land is situated, nor is it necessary for him to be the tenant under the same landlord as the landlord of the homestead land. *KRIPA NATH CHAKRABUTTY v. SHEIKH ANU* (1906) . . . 10 C. W. N. 944

s. 183.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

8 C. W. N. 235

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—TRANSFER OF
RIGHT . . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 179, 427

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 184

1. s. 184 and Sch. III, Part I, Art. 3—*Occupancy raiyat—Suit—Limitation.* The suit mentioned in s. 184 and Sch. III, Part I, Art. 3, of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, means a suit by an occupancy raiyat as such, that is, an occupancy raiyat claiming a right of occupancy as against his landlord. *CHUNDER KISHORE DAY alias MUKHORI DEY v. RAJ KISHORE MOZUMDAR*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 450

2. s. 184, and Sch. III, Art. 3—*Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 47—*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 184—*concl.*

Attachment under s. 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code—Appellate Court, power of, to take cognizance of limitation for the first time—Suit to recover possession of land by occupancy-raiyat. On the 9th of February, 1895, the plaintiff was dispossessed from his *raiya* lands and on the 31st of May, 1895, those lands were attached under s. 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and on the 31st of May, 1897, the plaintiff instituted a suit to recover possession of the same. *Held*, that the suit was barred by limitation under Art. 3, Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act; and, the limitation having already commenced to run from the 9th February, 1895, *i.e.*, from the date of the actual dispossession, the plaintiff could not have a fresh start of limitation from the date of the subsequent attachment by the Criminal Court. *Held*, further, that the lower Appellate Court was empowered to take cognizance of the question of limitation under s. 4 of the Limitation Act and s. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, although it had not been raised as a defence in the Court of first instance, if upon the proceedings in the case it was clear that the suit was barred by limitation. *DEO NARAIN CHOWDHURY v. WEBB* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 86;
5 C. W. N. 160

s. 188.

See ante, ss. 65 and 188.

See ante, ss. 90, 52, 188.

See CO-SHARERS—SUITS BY CO-SHARER WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—KABULIYATS.

7 C. W. N. 670

See LANDLORD AND TENANT

13 C. W. N. 635

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 622.

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 47

1. *Co-sharers, suit by*

Parties. S. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act applies only to such matters as a landlord is, under the Act, authorized or required to do; there is nothing in that Act which requires or authorizes a landlord to sue thereunder for arrears of rent. One of several joint landlords is competent to sue for the entire rent due from a tenant making his co-sharers parties to the suit. *PREM CHAND NUSKUR v. MOKSHODA DEBI*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 201

UMESH CHUNDER ROY v. NASIR MULLICK

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 203, note

2. *Suit for rent—Co-sharers, suit by—Joint undivided estate—Jurisdiction—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622.*

A District Judge, in deciding a rent-suit, held that s. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act prohibited the Court from entertaining the suit

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 188—*contd.*

in the form in which it had been framed, and therefore dismissed the suit. *Held*, on an application under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code to have the judgment of the District Judge set aside, that the District Judge had acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally, inasmuch as s. 188 had no application to the case, and that his decision must be set aside. *Prem Chand Nuskur v. Mokshoda Debi*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 201, and *Umesh Chunder Roy v. Nasir Mullick*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 203 note, followed. *Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh*, I. L. R. 1 Calc. 6; I. L. R. 11 A. 237, distinguished. *JUGOBUNDHU PATTUCK v. JADU GHOSE ALKUSHI*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 47

3. *and s. 158—Co-sharers—Joint landlords—Application under s. 158 by one of several joint landlords—Refusal by joint landlords to join in such application, effect of.* An application under s. 158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, cannot be made by one of several joint landlords. S. 188 of the Act requires that such an application should be made by all the landlords acting together, and it is not a sufficient compliance with its provisions to make the landlords, who refuse to join, parties to the proceedings under s. 158. *Chuni Singh v. Hera Mahto*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 633, *Kali Chandra Singh v. Rajkishore Bhuddro*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 615, *Rashbehari Mukerji v. Sukhi Sundari Dasi*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 644, *Abdul Hossein v. Lall Chand Mohtan*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 36, *Prem Chand Nuskur v. Mokshoda Debi*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 201, and *Jogobundhu Pattuck v. Jadu Ghose Alkushi*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 47, referred to. *MOHEEB ALI alias DUMMER v. AMEER RAI*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 538

4. *Co-sharers—Suit for enhancement of rent or for additional rent—Joint landlords.* Having regard to the provisions of s. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, where two or more persons are joint proprietors, they must all join in bringing a suit for enhancement of rent or for additional rent. *Guni Mahomed v. Moran*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 96, referred to. *GOPAL CHUNDER DAS v. UMESH NARAIN CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 695

5. *Ejectment, suit for—Co-sharers—Joint landlords.* S. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 is no bar to a suit for ejectment by one or two joint owners when the suit is brought under the contract law on a breach of the conditions of a lease by the tenant. *HARIPRIA DEBI v. RAM CHURN MYTI*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 541

6. *Lands formed by drying up of bil or marsh—Suit for share of new lands and for assessment—Suit for possession of whole of land and for assessment.* The principal defendants held a holding under the plaintiffs and their co-sharers. Subsequent to the creation of the original holding, defendants took possession

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 188—*contd.*

of certain lands by gradual encroachment. Plaintiffs brought a suit for recovery of their share of the encroached lands or for assessment of rent, and made their co-sharers parties. *Held*, that it was altogether a new holding, and the rent that would be assessed upon that would be a new rent in respect of the new holding, and a suit for the assessment of rent is not an act that is authorized by s. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and s. 52 was not applicable. *Prem Chand Naskur v. Mokshoda Debi*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 201, *Umesh Chunder Roy v. Nasir Mullick*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 203 note, and *Jugobundhu Pattuck v. Jadu Ghose Alkushi*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 47, referred to. But where a co-sharer landlord claims for khas possession with an alternative claim for rent, not merely of the additional land found in possession of the tenants over and above the land of their own holding, but in respect of the entire quantity of land found in possession of the tenants including the lands of their old holding:—*Held*, that s. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act applied, and s. 188 would bar the maintainability of such a suit at the instance of a co-sharer landlord. *Gopal Chunder Das v. Umesh Narain Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 695, relied on. *KHANDAKAR ABDUL HAMID v. MOHINI KANT SAHA* 4 C. W. N. 508

7. ———— *Decree for rent obtained by only some of co-sharer landlords—Sale in execution of such decree of occupancy holding not transferable by custom.* A decree for rent obtained by some of certain co-sharer landlords, and not by the whole body of them, is not a decree under the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Prem Chand Naskur v. Mokshoda Debi*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 201, and *Jugobundhu Pattuck v. Jadu Ghose Alkushi*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 47, referred to. An occupancy holding which is not transferable by custom, as also the interest of the judgment-debtor in the said holding, are not saleable in execution of such decree. *Bhiram Ali Shaik Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 355, referred to. *DURGA CHARAN MANDAL v. KALI PRASANNA SARKAR*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 727 :
3 C. W. N. 586

8. ———— *Joint landlords—Tenure, enhancement of rent of—Fractional co-sharers—Suit for enhancement of rent of a tenure by some only of several joint-landlords.* The provisions of s. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act apply to a suit by some only of several joint-landlords to enhance the rent of a tenure, whether such tenure was in existence at the date of the permanent settlement or not, and preclude such a suit being brought. The plaintiffs, who were some only of the co-sharers in a zamindari, instituted a suit to enhance the rent of a tenure within the zamindari and to recover their share of the rent at the enhanced rate for a specified period. Of the tenure-holders, some were co-sharers of the plaintiffs in the zamindari, and the remainder were not interested therein.

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 188—*contd.*

It was admitted that the plaintiffs collected their share of the rent of the tenure separately from their co-sharers, who were sharers in the tenure. The plaintiffs alleged that they had requested the latter to join them in instituting the suit, but that they had declined to do so, and they accordingly made them defendants in the suit. *Held*, that the plaintiffs could not maintain the suit having regard to the provisions of s. 188 of the Act. The term "joint-landlords" in that section must be taken as including all co-sharers under whom a tenant holds, whether such co-sharers collect their quota of rent from the tenants jointly or separately. *Prem Chand Naskur v. Mokshoda Debi*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 201, *Gopal Chunder Das v. Umesh Narain Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 695, and *Beni Madhub Roy v. Jaod Ali Si car*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 390, referred to. *HALADHAR SAHA v. RHIDHOY SUNDRI* I. L. R. 19 Calc. 593

9. ———— *Joint landlords—Arrangement with fractional co-sharers, effect of—Separate tenancy, Creation of.* Where a tenant has agreed to allow one of several co-sharer landlords to deal with him as if he were his own tenant without any regard to the interests of the other co-sharers, the effect is to create a separate tenancy under such fractional co-sharer, and s. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is inapplicable to such a case. *Gopal Chunder Das v. Umesh Narain Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 695, distinguished. *PANCHANAN BANERJEE v. RAJ KUMAR GUHA*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 610

10. ———— *Co-sharers—Suit by one co-sharer entitled to collect rent separately, for additional rent for land brought under cultivation payable in terms of lease—Joint landlords—Suit for rent—Collection of rent separately.* A tenant held 19½ bighas of land under a kabuliati granted by three joint landlords, which provided, *inter alia*, that rent was to be paid at the rate of R1-8 per bigha in respect of 8 bighas only, and that the remaining 11½ bighas, which were then unculturable, should, when they became fit for cultivation, be assessed with rent at the same rate. One of the co-sharers, who was admittedly entitled, under arrangement, to collect his share of the rent separately, instituted a suit against the tenant, joining his co-sharers as defendants, to recover arrears of his share of the rent for a specific period, and claimed to be entitled to recover rent in respect of the whole 19½ bighas, on the allegation that the 11½ bighas had then become fit for cultivation, and were therefore liable to be assessed with rent at the rate mentioned in the kabuliati. The tenant objected that, having regard to the provisions of s. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the suit would not lie at the instance of the plaintiff alone. *Held*, that the suit did lie. It was clearly not one for enhancement of rent in the sense in which that term is used in the Bengal Tenancy Act, nor was it one for additional rent

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for excess land within the meaning of s. 52 of that Act, and as the plaintiff was entitled to collect his share of the rent separately, there was no reason why he should not be entitled to claim separately the rent payable, not upon any fresh adjustment of the rent inconsistent with the continuance of the old tenancy, but upon an ascertainment of the rent payable in accordance with the terms of the original letting. *Guni Mahomed v. Moran*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 96, and *Gopal Chunder Das v. Umesh Narain Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 695, distinguished. *RAM CHUNDER CHUCKRABUTTY v. GIRIDHUR DUTT* . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 755

11.

Suit by co-sharer for rent payable under terms of lease—Suit by one of several joint-landlords. Plaintiff, the co-plaintiff, defendant No. 1, and other persons, who also were defendants, held a tenure, under which defendant No. 1 held an under-tenure. Plaintiff brought this suit for the whole of the rent, claiming only his own share of it, making these co-sharers defendants who did not join as plaintiffs. The terms of the defendant's pottah were that, the whole of the lands being brought under cultivation, the landlords would be at liberty to measure the lands of the ganti, and, if the land be found greater in quantity than 150 bighas, the tenant would pay rent at the rate of 10 annas per bigha. The lands being found greater than the said quantity, the plaintiff prayed for a decree for rent at that rate for the whole area. The defendant pleaded, *inter alia*, that the plaintiff, as a fractional sharer in the landlord's interest, could not sue him alone. Held, that the suit was maintainable at the instance of the plaintiff alone, and that it was not a suit to alter the rent under the provisions of s. 52 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Ram Chunder Chukrabutty v. Giridhur Dutt*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 755, relied upon. *Gopal Chunder Das v. Umesh Narain Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 695, distinguished. *DINTARINI DAS v. BROUGHTON* 3 C. W. N. 225

12.

Right of fractional co-sharer to maintain a suit for enhancement of rent—Agreement with fractional co-sharer to pay rent separately, effect of—Joint landlords. A fractional shareholder cannot bring a suit for enhancement of rent. Under the provisions of s. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, where there are several joint landlords, they must all join in bringing a suit for enhancement of rent; an agreement in a kabuliyat by one tenant to pay an enhanced rent to some of the landlords, if, on measurement, the jama of his jote is increased, does not create a right to maintain such a suit by those landlords. Such a suit cannot be brought otherwise than under the terms of the Bengal Tenancy Act. An agreement by a tenant with some of several joint-landlords to pay his share of the rent separately, does not create a separate tenancy. *Gopal Chunder Das v. Umesh Narain Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 695, and *Hari Charan Bose v. Runjit*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*s. 188—*contd.*

Singh, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 917 note : 1 C. W. N. 521, approved of. *Panchanan Banerjee v. Raj Kumar Guha*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 160, and *Tejendro Narain Singh v. Bakai Singh*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 658, distinguished. *BAIDA NATH DE SARKAR v. ILIM* . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 917
2 C. W. N. 44

HARI CHARAN BOSE v. RANJIT SINGH

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 917, note
1 C. W. N. 521

See *SADAGAR SIRCAR v. KRISHNA CHANDRA NATH* . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 937

13.

Partition of estates.—Joint-landlords. A tenure was held under a zamindari which originally formed one entire estate. The estate was subsequently partitioned by the revenue authorities into four several estates. The rent of the tenure was thereupon allotted proportionately to each of the four estates thus formed, although the land forming the tenure remained undivided. In a suit for enhancement of the rent of the tenure brought by the proprietor of some of the estates : Held, that the effect of the partition of the parent estate was to create separate and distinct tenures out of the original single tenure under the proprietors of each of the estates; that the proprietors of the several estates were not joint landlords of the tenure within the meaning of s. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and that therefore a suit for enhancement of rent would lie by a proprietor of one of the estates in respect of the rent allotted to his estate. *Sarat Soonduree Debia v. Someeroodeen Talookdar*, 22 W. R. 537, and *Sarat Soondary Dabea v. Anund Mohun Surma Ghuttack*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 273, followed. *HEM CHANDRA CHOWDHRY v. KALI PRASANNA BHADURI* . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 832

14.

Joint landlords—Suit for apportionment of rent and for splitting a jama—Frame of suit—Parties—Arrears of rent. S. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not prohibit joint landlords from ceasing to be joint, or preclude them from suing for their shares of the rent separately, when they have ceased, or wish to cease, to be joint landlords; provided that the suits are so framed as to free the tenant from all further liability to any one of them. When, therefore, the plaintiffs, who are joint landlords, have, in suits separately instituted by them against the defendant tenant, asked for apportionment of rent and for recovery of rents due on such apportionment, and all the parties interested have been made parties to the suits, there is no reason why the plaintiffs should not have the rent apportioned; and the apportionment may take place in respect both of the arrears alleged to be due and the future rent. *RAJNARAIN MITTER v. EKADASI BAG*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 479
4 C. W. N. 449

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.

s. 188—contd.

15. ——— and ss. 65 and 52—*Abatement of rent*—Authority of a co-sharer to grant abatement. A fractional shareholder of a tenure has no right to grant abatement of rent in respect of a holding within the tenure independently of his co-sharers. *SYAMA CHARAN MANDAL v. SAIM MOLLAH* . . . 1 C. W. N. 415

16. ——— *Suit for damages for cutting down trees*. A suit for recovery of damages for value of trees cut down by a tenant is maintainable at the instance of one of several joint landlords. *HRISIKES SINGHA v. SADHU CHARAN LOHAR* . . . 2 C. W. N. 80

17. ——— and ss. 65, 188—*Money decree—Suit for rent for four years—Plaintiffs constituting the entire body of landlords for two years—Whether decree may be split up*. In a suit to recover rent for four years, the plaintiffs constituted the entire body of landlords as regards the claim for the first two years, but only fractional co-sharers as regards the claim for the last two years. *Held*, that the decree passed was not a rent decree under the Bengal Tenancy Act, but only a money decree under the ordinary law. *Beni Madhub Roy v. Jaod Ali Sarkar*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 390, and *Hem Chunder Bhunjio v. Mon Mohini Dassi*, 3 C. W. N. 604, referred to. *NAIMUDDIN v. SRIMANTA GHOSE* (1901) . . . 6 C. W. N. 124

18. ——— *Co-sharers, suit by*—Civil Procedure Code, s. 53. A suit by a co-sharer landlord for his proportionate share of the rent cannot be maintained when there is no contract under which the tenant is bound to pay his share separately, although the other co-sharer landlords are made defendants in the suit. A suit by a co-sharer landlord for his proportionate share of the rent cannot be treated as claiming in the alternative either the individual share of the plaintiff or the full rent, nor can the plaint be allowed to be amended to convert the suit into one for the recovery of the full rent, as that would contravene the provisions under s. 53 of the Civil Procedure Code. *LALA RAM SARAN LAL v. NEM NARAIN SINGH* (1902) . . . 6 C. W. N. 326

19. ——— *Bengal Tenancy Act, s. 106—Joint landlords*—“Anything which the landlord is under this Act required or authorized to do.” One of several joint landlords instituted proceedings under Ch. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, disputing certain entries made by the Settlement-officer. *Held*, that, disputing an entry made in the course of a record-of-rights, proceeding under s. 106 of the Act does not come within the meaning of the words “anything which the landlord is under this Act required or authorized to do,” as used in s. 188. *SHER BAHADUR SAHU v. MACKENZIE* (1902) . . . 7 C. W. N. 400

20. ——— *Co-owner, possession by—Adverse possession—Management, when*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.

s. 188—concld.

adverse. Possession or occupation of the property by one co-sharer does not constitute adverse possession against the other co-sharer. Management of joint property on behalf of some of the co-owners without any assertion of hostile title, does not constitute adverse possession against the other co-owner. *UJALBI BIBEE v. UMAKANTA KARMOKAR* (1905) . . . 9 C. W. N. 32

21. ——— *Co-sharer landlords—Separate collection of rent—Suit by all the co-sharers for entire rent—Maintainability*. Where it appeared that some of several co-sharer landlords had been collecting their portion of the rent separately for 25 years, but there was no division of the tenure. *Held*, that there is nothing to prevent the co-sharers from reverting to their original condition, if they are all agreed; and a suit brought by all the co-sharers for the recovery of the entire rent is maintainable. An arrangement under which fractional shares of the rent are paid separately to different co-sharers does not bind the parties for all time, and may be put an end to by the tenants or by the landlords collectively though not by one of the landlords against the consent of the others. *Guni Mahamad v. Moran*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 96; *Gopal Chunder Das v. Umesh Narain Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 695; *Raja Promoda Nath Roy v. Raja Ramoni Kanta Roy*, 9 C. W. N. 84, referred to. *SHYAMA CHARAN BHATTACHARYA v. AKHOY KUMAR MITTER* (1905) . . . 10 C. W. N. 787

22. ——— *Co-sharer landlords—Separate collection—Right of sharer to sue for whole rent making co-sharers defendants*—“Required or authorised to do” under the Act—*Filing of suit—General principles of legal procedure*. Agreement either expressly proved or implied by the conduct of the parties may establish the right of co-sharer landlords to sue separately for the shares of rent receivable by them. But such an arrangement merely affects the right to sue separately for rent, and in no other respect modifies the terms of the holding. The right to bring the tenure to sale for arrears of rent remains intact, as also the right of one sharer to sue, making his co-sharers defendants, when they will not join as plaintiffs. The filing of a suit is not a thing which the landlord is, under the Bengal Tenancy Act, required or authorised to do; and s. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is no bar to a sharer suing (under the general rules of legal procedure) for the whole rent of the tenure making his co-sharers, who refuse to join as plaintiffs, defendants in the suit. *PRAMADA NATH ROY v. RAMANI KANTA ROY* (1907) . . . 12 C. W. N. 249

s. c. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 331
I. L. R. 35 I. A. 73

s. 189—

See ante, ss. 101 to 108.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 339

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*

— s. 189—*concl.*

— rules made under.

See RULES MADE UNDER ACTS—BENGAL TENANCY ACT.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 590

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—EJECTMENT—NOTICE TO SUIT.

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 774
2 C. W. N. 125

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 723

See VALUATION OF SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 723

— s. 193.

See JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 601

— s. 195.

See BENGAL REGULATION VIII OF 1819.
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 162

— Sch. III.

See DRAINAGE ACT, ss. 42, 44.

8 C. W. N. 640

— Sch. III, Cl. (2)—

See DRAINAGE CHARGES, RECOVERY OF
11 C. W. N. 57

— Sch. III, Art. 2 (b).

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

9 C. W. N. 96

1. — Sch. III, Art. 2—*Limitation—Suit for arrears of rent at excess rate.* In 1865 the plaintiff sued and obtained a decree for payment of additional rent for excess land held by the defendant, and, on the 29th March 1877, instituted another suit against the defendant for khas possession of newly-accreted lands, or, in the alternative, for an assessment of rent thereon according to the terms of the defendant's kabuliati. This suit was dismissed on the 29th June 1881; but, on appeal to the High Court, this decision was reversed on the 11th May 1883, and khas possession was given to the plaintiff. On appeal, the Privy Council on the 24th July 1886, reversed the decree for khas possession, and declared the plaintiff entitled to a decree, fixing the extent of the excess lands and assessing rent therefor in terms of the kabuliati, such rent to be payable from and after the 28th March 1878, and remitting the case for a finding as to the extent of the excess lands. The Subordinate Judge, to whom the case was remitted, gave the plaintiff a decree on the 21st March 1887 for increased rent in respect of 2 kanis 7 gundahs 2 cowries of excess land. On the 14th July 1887, the plaintiff instituted a suit to recover excess rent for the years 1878 to 1886, and for rent at the old rate plus the excess rent for a portion of the year 1887. *Held*, that the suit, so far as the rent for 1878 to 1883 was concerned, was barred

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*

— Sch. III, Art. 2—*contd.*

by limitation. HURRO KUMAR GHOSE v. KALI KRISHNA THAKUR . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 251.

2. — *Limitation for rent suit—Rent payable under a lease—Registered lease.* The Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) prescribes one period of limitation for all suits for rent brought under its provisions. Art. 2 of the third schedule of that Act includes a suit to recover arrears of rent payable under a lease, and there is no distinction as to the form of the lease or as to whether it is registered or not. *Umesh Chunder Mundul v. Adormoni Dasi*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 221, and *Vythilinga Pillai v. Thetchanamurti Pillai*, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 76, distinguished. ISWARI PERSHAD NARAIN SAHI v. CROWDY

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 466

3. — and s. 184—*Limitation—Suit for rent on registered contracts.* Suits for rent founded on registered contracts in respect of lands subject to the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, are governed by the limitation provided in that Act. *MACKENZIE v. MAHOMED ALI KHAN* . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 1

4. — *Lease not for agricultural or horticultural purposes—Building lease.* The special limitation provided by Art. 2, Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act, is not applicable to a registered lease granted for building purposes and for establishing a coal depôt, such lease not being one for agricultural or horticultural purposes within the meaning of that Act. *RANIGANJ COAL ASSOCIATION v. JUDONATH GHOSE*
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 489

5. — *Limitation—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 184—Suit for arrears of rent—Bengal Regulation VIII of 1819.* A landlord, to recover arrears of rent for the year 1297 B.S. from the patnidar, filed a petition on the 1st Bysack 1298 (13th April 1891) in the Court of the Collector, under the provisions of Regulation VIII of 1819, praying for the sale of of the patni talukh. The talukh was sold and was purchased by the landlord on the 1st Jeyt 1298 (14th May 1891). The whole of the arrears not being realized by the sale-proceeds, the landlord brought an action on the 14th May 1894 for the balance of the patni rent to the end of 1297 B.S. (12th April 1891). The defence was that the suit was barred by limitation. *Held*, that the suit was governed by the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, s. 184, and Sch. III, Art. 2 (b); the period of limitation in a suit for rent provided by that article is three years from the last day of the Bengali year in which the arrear falls due, and as in this case the arrear fell due in the Bengali year 1297, which ended on the 12th April 1891, and the suit was not commenced until 14th May 1894, more than three years from the last day of the Bengali year in which the arrear fell due, it was

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.

— Sch. III, Art. 2—*concl'd.*

barred by limitation. *BURMA MOYI DASSEE v. BURMA MOYI CHOWDHURANI*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 191

6. — *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 116—Tenure-holder—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 117.* In a suit for rent for a period of six years by an ijaradar upon the basis of the kabuliat alleged to have been executed by the predecessor of the defendant, it was contended for the first time before the Appellate Court that the suit was barred by limitation, being one for rent for a period of more than three years. It was found that the land was not let out for agricultural or horticultural purposes. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the land was not let out for agricultural or horticultural purposes, the Bengal Tenancy Act did not apply, and therefore the suit was not barred by limitation. *UMRAO BIBI v. MAHOMED ROJABI* I. L. R. 27 Calc. 205

4 C. W. N. 76

7. — *Suit for arrears of rent brought by assignee of landlord.* Art. 2 of pt. I of Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not apply to a suit brought by the assignee of the arrears from the landlord, but Art. 110 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act applies to such a suit. *MOHENDRO NATH KALAMAREE v. KOILASH CHANDRA DOGRA* 4 C. W. N. 605

8. — *Art. 2, cl. (a)—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 61, and Sch. III, Art. 2 (a)—Deposit of rent—Notice of deposit on one of several joint landlords, effect of—Limitation.* Service of notice, on one of the landlords, of the deposit of rent under s. 61 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) has not the effect of reducing the period of limitation to six months as provided in Art. 2 (a) of Sch. III to the Act, if there are co-sharer landlords jointly and severally entitled to the rent. *RUP CHAND MAHTON v. GURDAN SINGH* (1901)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 283;

6 C. W. N. 15

9. — *Art. 2—Arrears of rent—Suit.* Where a suit for the recovery of the arrears of rent was brought more than three years after the due date: *Held*, that the fact that a suit for enhancement had been brought by the plaintiffs within that period and in that suit the plaintiff had claimed enhanced rate for the year in question, stayed the operation of the law of limitation. *HEM CHUNDER CHOWDHURY v. KALI PRASUNO BHADURI* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 1

10. — *Art. 2 (b)—Suit for rent by a co-sharer landlord against some of several joint tenants—Limitation—Maintainability.* Art. 2 (b) of Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act applies to a suit for rent by a co-sharer landlord. A suit for rent against some of several joint tenants is maintainable as joint tenants are jointly and severally liable. *JOGENDRA NATH ROY v. NAGENDRA NARAIN NANDI* (1907) 11 C. W. N. 1026

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.

1. — *Sch. III, Art. 3—Limitation—Suit by occupancy raiyat to recover possession from trespasser, limitation for.* Sch. III, Art. 3 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (Act VIII of 1885), relates to suits brought by an occupancy raiyat against his landlord and not to a suit brought against a third party who is a trespasser. *RAMTANEE BIBEE v. AMOO BEPAREE* I. L. R. 15 Calc. 317

2. — *Suit by occupancy raiyat to recover possession after dispossession by landlord—Question of title—Possessory suits—Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 27—Limitation.* A suit by an occupancy raiyat to recover possession of land of which he has been dispossessed by his landlord, in which the title of the tenant is denied and put in issue, is governed by the special period of limitation prescribed by the Bengal Tenancy Act, Sch. III, Art. 3, namely, two years from the date of dispossession. It was intended by that enactment to provide for all suits to recover possession of land brought by an occupancy raiyat, and to limit the period previously allowed by the Courts for suits to recover possession by reason of a title set up and provided by the plaintiff, and not to provide only for suits of a possessory nature such as were previously dealt with by s. 27 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *SARASWATI DASI v. HORITARUN CHUCKERBUTTI* I. L. R. 16 Calc. 741

3. — *Limitation—Bengal Tenancy Act, s. 184—Suit for possession by an occupancy raiyat.* Having regard to the provisions of s. 184 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, the period of limitation for a suit for the recovery of land by an occupancy raiyat is two years, as prescribed by Art. 3, Sch. III of the Act. *Saraswati Dasi v. Horitarun Chuckerbutti*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 741, followed. *RAMDHAN BHADRA v. RAM KUMAR DEY* I. L. R. 17 Calc. 926

4. — *Limitation—Suit by occupancy raiyat for possession brought against a tenant settled by landlord.* Art. 3 of Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), prescribing a limitation of two years, is not restricted to suits against the landlord alone; it applies to a suit brought against a tenant with whom the land was settled by the landlord. *Ramjane Bibee v. Amco Beparee*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 317, and *Chunder Kishore Dey v. Rajkishore Mozumdar*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 450, distinguished. *BHEKA SINGH v. NAKCHHED SINGH* I. L. R. 24 Calc. 40

5. — *Limitation—Dispossession by landlord—Possession, recovery of, suit for—Occupancy raiyat, suit for recovery of possession by, against a landlord.* The special limitation of two years as laid down in the Bengal Tenancy Act does not apply to a case where an occupancy raiyat is dispossessed from his holding by his landlord, not as a landlord, but as a representative of the persons whose right, title, and interest he has purchased. *ABHOY CHURN MOOKERJEE v. TITU* 2 C. W. N. 175

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.**Sch. III, Art 3—contd.**

6. *Limitation—Dispossession by a landlord from occupancy holding.* Where the plaintiff purchased an occupancy holding at an auction-sale in execution of a mortgage decree against an occupancy raiyat and sued the landlord to recover possession of the same, although plaintiff had never been in actual possession at all, and his predecessor had been ejected from possession by the landlord of the occupancy holding more than two years before suit and the latter claimed to maintain his possession by virtue of a decree which he obtained for possession as against the occupancy raiyat, the mortgagor: *Held*, that the case was not governed by the special limitation of two years. *Abhoy Churn Mookerjee v. Titu*, 2 C. W. N. 175, referred to. *DINOBUNDHU SAHA v. LOLIT MOHUN MOITRA* 2 C. W. N. 595

7. *Limitation—Occupancy-holding, Suit to recover possession of.* In a suit by a purchaser from former holder for recovery of possession of an occupancy-holding, where the defendants were in occupation, they having been inducted into the land by the agents of the landlord:—*Held*, that the period of limitation is two years, inasmuch as it is under the authority of the landlord that the ouster took place. *Bheka Singh v. Nakchhed Singh*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 40, relied on. *Eradul v. Daloo Sheikh*, 1 C. W. N. 573, *Abhoy Churn Mookerjee v. Titu*, 2 C. W. N. 175, and *Dinobundhu Saha v. Lolit Mohun Moitra*, 2 C. W. N. 595, distinguished. *CHINTAMONI SAHU v. UPENDRA NATH SARNOKAR* 4 C. W. N. 326

8. *Occupancy raiyat, ouster of—Limitation.* Where the plaintiff, an occupancy raiyat, was ousted by the defendant, and after the ouster the defendant took a settlement from the landlord: *Held*, that two years' limitation would apply to a suit for the recovery of possession. *HARA KUMAR NATH v. NASARUDDIN* 4 C. W. N. 665

9. *Suit for recovery of possession by an occupancy raiyat—Limitation—Dispossession by landlords, sole, fractional, or entire body of.* The period within which an occupancy raiyat can sue to recover possession of land from which he has been dispossessed by his landlord is two years as laid down in Sch. III, Art. 3 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, whether such dispossession be by a fractional landlord, the sole landlord, or the entire body of landlords. *Joolmutty Beva v. Kali Prasanna Roy*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 127 note, referred to. *PARAMESWAR NOMOSUDRA v. KALI MOHAN NOMOSUDRA* I. L. R. 28 Calc. 127 4 C. W. N. 801

JOOLMUTTY BEVA v. KALI PRASANNA ROY
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 127, note
4 C. W. N. 803, note

10. *Limitation—Dispossession by a co-sharer landlord—Recognition of tenant's title.* Where one of two co-sharer landlords

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—contd.**Sch. III, Art. 3—contd.**

brought a suit to have his right established to sell the occupancy holding of the raiyat in execution of a decree for money obtained by him, and it was proved that the other co-sharer landlord had dispossessed the raiyat more than 2 years before the institution of the suit, but, notwithstanding the unlawful dispossession, the title of the raiyat was throughout recognised by all parties concerned, and the recognition had been up to within two years of the institution of the suit: *Held*, that the suit was not barred by the two years' rule. *SARAFUDDIN MONDUL v. CHANDRA MANI GUPTA* (1900)

5 C. W. N. 405

11. *Dispossession by a landlord not acting as such—Suit by occupancy raiyat—Limitation.* Art. 3 of Sch. III to the Bengal Tenancy Act applies only to suits as between landlord and tenant, and is not applicable to a suit where the dispossession is by the defendant acting, not as landlord, but expressly in a different capacity, namely, that of auction-purchaser of the right, title and interest of a tenant at a sale held in execution of a rent decree obtained by him as a co-sharer landlord. *BROJO KISHORE MAHAPATRA v. SARASWATI DASSI* (1901) 6 C. W. N. 333

12. *Limitation—Suit by an occupancy raiyat where the landlord has no hand in the ouster.* When an occupancy raiyat is dispossessed, and the landlord has had no hand in the ouster, the period of limitation applicable is twelve years, and not two years under Art. 3, Sch. III, to the Bengal Tenancy Act. The case of *Hara Kumar Nath v. Sheikh Nasaruddin*, 4 C. W. N. 665, so far as the question of limitation was concerned, was not rightly decided. *RANI-JULLA v. ISHAB DHALI* (1902)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 610
6 C. W. N. 702

13. *Dispossession by a fractional co-sharer landlord—Occupancy raiyat, suit for recovery of possession by—Limitation.* The special limitation of two years provided by Art. 3 of Sch. III to the Bengal Tenancy Act is restricted to suits between persons occupying the position of landlord and tenant, for it is in regard to such relations that the Act has been designed. It is of no consequence whether the ejectment is by some co-sharers or by the entire body of landlords. *ANNADA SUNDARI CHANDALINI v. KEBULRAM CHANGA* (1903) 7 C. W. N. 542

14. *Non-occupancy raiyat, suit by, for recovery of possession—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 9.* *Held* by the majority of the Full Bench (PRINSEP, J., dissenting), that the remedy indicated in s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act is not the only remedy which the Legislature has provided for a non-occupancy raiyat, who has been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. *Bhagabati Charan Roy v. Luton Mondul*, 7 C. W. N. 218, overruled. That the period of

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*Sch. III, Art. 3—*contd.*

limitation applicable to the case of a non-occupancy raiyat, who has been dispossessed of his holding otherwise than in execution of a decree, is either six or twelve years as provided in the Limitation Act. *TOMIJUDDIN v. ASHRUB ALI* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 647
8 C. W. N. 446

15. ———— *Occupancy raiyat, suit for possession by—Dispossession by tenant set up by landlord—Limitation—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 562, 566—Appellate Court—Power—Remand, order of, where decision of Subordinate Court on merits—Remand of particular issues only allowable.* Where an occupancy raiyat is dispossessed by a person, whom the landlord has set up as tenant, the dispossession being really by the landlord, the limitation applicable to a suit for recovery of possession by the raiyat is that prescribed in Art. 3 of Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Ranijulla v. Ishab Dhalí*, 6 C. W. N. 702 : s.c. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 610, distinguished. *RAKHIT MAHANTA v. PUDDO BAURI* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 54

16. ———— *Occupancy holding—Dispossession of raiyat by auction-purchaser at sale in execution of landlord's decree—Suit to recover—Limitation.* Where a landlord obtained a rent decree against some of the heirs of an occupancy raiyat and certain other heirs of the raiyat were dispossessed by the purchaser at the sale held in execution of the decree: *Held*, that a suit by the dispossessed heirs for the recovery of the holding is governed by the two years' rule of limitation under Art. 3, Sch. III. of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *AMINUDDIN MUNSHI v. ULFATUN-NISSA BIBI* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 108

Art. 6—

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 179—LAW APPLICABLE TO APPLICATION FOR EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 54

1. ———— *Limitation—Ex-parte decree in suit for rent—Civil Procedure Code, s. 108—Execution of decree, application for—Final decree—Execution proceedings struck off—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 143, 144, 148.* Having regard to ss. 143, 144, and 148 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, there is a special procedure laid down for rent suits; and therefore decrees in rent suits are decrees under Art. 6 of Sch. III of that Act. The words "final decree" in Art. 6, Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act, refer to the final decree in the suit, and cannot be held to include an order of an Appellate Court made in an application to set aside that decree under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An *ex-parte* rent decree having been obtained on the 30th May 1888 for a sum under Rs500, the decree-holder on the 27th May 1889 applied for execution thereof and attached certain

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—*contd.*Sch. III, Art. 6—*contd.*

properties of the judgment-debtor, the date fixed for the sale being the 31st August 1889. The judgment-debtor applied, under s. 108 of the Civil Procedure Code, for a re-hearing of the rent suit, and on the day fixed for the sale applied for stay of execution: the sale was stayed, and the Court of its own motion and for its own convenience directed the execution case to be struck off the file "for the present." On the 28th December 1889 the Court passed an order refusing a re-hearing of the suit, which order was upheld on appeal on the 16th May 1890. On the 21st January 1892 the decree-holder again applied for execution, at the same time praying that his application might be taken to be in continuation of his former application of the 27th May 1889. *Held*, that the application was one in continuation of the former proceedings in execution so far, at least, as regarded the property mentioned in the former application, but as regards other properties, it must be held to be barred as not having been made within three years from the decree of the 30th May 1883. *BAR-KANTA NATH MITTRA v. AUGHORE NATH BOSE*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 387

2. ———— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Art. 179—Execution of decree—Period from which limitation runs—Date of decree—Date of payment.* On the 26th May 1890, a rent decree was passed for the sum of Rs400, payable on the 15th August 1890. On the 9th August 1893, the decree-holders applied for execution of the decree. *Held*, that the period of limitation ran from the date of the decree, and not from the date fixed for payment, and that the application was barred by Art. 6 of Sch. III, Act VIII of 1885. *RAM SADAY MUKERJEE v. DWARKA NATH MUKERJEE*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 644

3. ———— *Decree for rent by a co-sharer landlord for a sum not exceeding Rs500 in value—Application for execution—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 179.* An application for execution of a decree, for a sum not exceeding Rs500 in value, obtained by one of two or more joint-landlords for his share of the rent, is governed, not by the special rule of limitation laid down in Art. 6 of Sch. III to the Bengal Tenancy Act, but by the general law of limitation, namely, Art. 179 of the second Schedule to Act XV of 1877. *Prem Chand Naskar v. Mokshada Debi*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 201; *Jugobundhu Pattuck v. Jadu Ghose Alkushi*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 47; *Beni Madhub Roy v. Jacd Ali Sarkar*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 390; *Narain Mahton v. Manoft Pattuk*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 489; *Parameswara Namasudra v. Kali Mohan Namasudra*, 4 C. W. N. 801; *Durga Churn Mundal v. Kali Prosunno Sircar*, 3 C. W. N. 586, referred to. *KEDAR NATH CHATTERJEE v. ARDHA CHANDRA ROY CHOWDHURY* (1901)

5 C. W. N. 763

4. ———— *Execution of decree—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 19—Acknowledg-*

BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885)—concl'd.**Sch. III, Art. 6—concl'd.**

ment of liability. An acknowledgment of liability under s. 19 of the Limitation Act made by a judgment-debtor to the decree-holder's right to execute a rent decree gives the decree-holder a fresh starting point for counting the period of limitation prescribed by Art. 6 of Sch. III of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *HARIHAR LAL v. GUNENDAR PERSHAD* (1905) . . . 9 C. W. N. 1025

BENGAL TENANCY AMENDMENT ACT (BENGAL ACT V OF 1894).**s. 9.**

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 106.

8 C. W. N. 74

BENGAL TENANCY AMENDMENT ACT (BENGAL ACT III OF 1898).**s. 9.**

See JURISDICTION I. L. R. 32 Calc. 162

—Decision of Settlement Officer that land not held rent-free—Res judicata—Decision under Ch. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) before amendment. In a proceeding under Ch. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act before the passing of Act III B. C. of 1898, the Settlement authorities found that lands claimed by the tenants as their rent-free lands were not rent-free and they accordingly assessed the same with rent: *Held*, that by the operation of s. 9 of Act III B. C. of 1898, the Civil Court is precluded from adjudicating on the same matter. *NABIN CHANDRA CHAKRABARTI v. RADHA KISHORE MANIKYA* (1907)

11 C. W. N. 859

BENGAL TENANCY AMENDMENT ACT (BENGAL ACT I OF 1907).**s. 54.**

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885). . . 12 C. W. N. 112

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882), s. 310A . . . 12 C. W. N. 434

BENGAL TENANCY VALIDATION ACT (BENGAL ACT I OF 1903).**s. 1**

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885) . . . 12 C. W. N. 478

Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 12—Non-payment of landlord's fee—Validity of transfer. A decree passed before the passing of Bengal Act I of 1903, but pending in appeal at the commencement of that Act, is governed by s. 1 of that Act as not being final, so that the plaintiff's claim for rent would not be liable to dismissal on the ground that the transfer to the plaintiff was invalid by reason of the landlord's fee

BENGAL TENANCY VALIDATION ACT (BENGAL ACT I OF 1903)—concl'd.**s. 1—concl'd.**

not having been paid as required by s. 12 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *PEARY MOHUN PAUL v. ARSED ALI* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 239

BEQUEST.

See CHARITABLE BEQUEST.

See HINDU LAW.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1306

„ 35 Calc. 896

See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS—PERPETUITIES, TRUSTS, AND BEQUESTS TO A CLASS.

See OCCUPANCY-HOLDING.

12 C. W. N. 1086

See STRIDHAN . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 229

See WILL—CONSTRUCTION.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 433

— for charitable purposes.

See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS—BEQUEST FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES.

See HINDU LAW—WILL.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 111, 166, 895

See WILL—CONSTRUCTION.

— for masses.

See WILL—CONSTRUCTION.

2 B. L. R. O. C. 148

2 Hyde 65

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 424

— for religious purposes.

See HINDU LAW—WILL—POWER OF DISPOSITION . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 353

See WILL—CONSTRUCTION.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 112

— of self-acquired property.

See HINDU LAW—ALIENATION—ALIENATION BY FATHER.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 429

— to a class.

See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS—VESTED AND CONTINGENT INTERESTS . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 699

— to charity.

See WILL . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 261

— to daughters and their respective sons.

See HINDU LAW I. L. R. 35 Calc. 896

— to “eldest son to be born”

See WILL—CONSTRUCTION.

5 C. W. N. 729

BEQUEST—conclld.

to heir.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—INHERITANCE.
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 683

to Idol.

See HINDU LAW—ENDOWMENT.
See PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT,
s. 3. 10 C. W. N. 232
See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION
OF WILLS—BEQUEST TO IDOL.
2 B. L. R. A. C. 137, note

to stranger.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—WILL.
I. L. R. 26 Bom. 497

to widow.

See HINDU LAW—WIDOW—POWER OF
WIDOW—POWER OF DISPOSITION OR
ALIENATION 5 C. W. N. 300

validity of.

See HINDU LAW I. L. R. 34 Calc. 823

void for uncertainty.

See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION
OF WILLS I. L. R. 18 Bom. 136
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 646

See WILL—CONSTRUCTION.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 443
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 774

BETROTHAL.

See CONTRACT—BREACH OF CONTRACT.
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 412

See HINDU LAW—MARRIAGE—BETROTHAL
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 412
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 23

See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
I. L. R. 1 Calc. 74

BETTIAH RAJ.

gift by—

See TITLE I. L. R. 36 Calc. 311

“*Nimak sayar mehal*,”
created before 1804—Regs. VIII of 1812 and IV of
1814, how affects right of grantees—Exclusive right to
take saltpetre—Incorporeal right, grant of, at the time
of Permanent Settlement—Monopoly—Abolition.
The present proprietress of the Bettiah Raj is
entitled to the declaration of her right as the
permanent settlement-holder under Government
of the saltpetre mehal of Sarkar Champaran which
passed to the Bettiah Raj by purchase in 1804.
Regs. VIII of 1812 and IV of 1814 were not intended
either to extend or to limit the right which the
Bettiah Raj had to the *nimak sayar mehal*. The
abolition of the monopoly of the East India Com-
pany by the latter Regulation was not intended to

BETTIAH RAJ—conclld.

gift by—conclld.

affect the right of the Raj to realise its dues either
in the shape of royalty from the manufacturers or
itself to manufacture saltpetre to the exclusion of
all other persons or proprietors of land in Sarkar
Champaran. The right to grant licenses and
realise royalty would not be inconsistent with the
abolition of monopoly. *GOLAB CHAND v. MOHARANI*
JANKI KOER (1908) 13 C. W. N. 454

BETTING ON RAINFALL.

See GAMBLING I. L. R. 13 Bom. 681
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 184

BHAG.

See BHAGDARI ACT
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 116

BHAGDARI ACT (BOMBAY).

See BOMBAY ACT V OF 1862.

**BHAGDARI AND NARWADARI ACT
(BOM. V OF 1862).**

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACH-
MENT—BUILDINGS AND HOUSE MATE-
RIALS I. L. R. 12 Bom. 363
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 538

1. ———— **Bhagdari tenure—Partition**
among narwadars, bhagdars. There is nothing in
Bombay Act V of 1862 which debars a Civil Court
from making a decree for the partition of narwadar
land among the bhagdars, even though such
partition may cause a further division of recognized
sub-divisions of bhags. *VERIBHAI v. RAGABHAI*
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 225

2. ———— **Dismemberment**
of bhag—Narwa—Bhag—Alienation previous to
Bombay Act V of 1862. The principal object of
Bombay Act V of 1862 is to prevent the further
dismemberment of bhags or shares in bhagdari
villages : it renders null and void any future aliena-
tion of any portion of a bhag, other than a recog-
nized subdivision, but it does not invalidate pre-
vious alienations. A sale of a portion of a bhag,
previously to the passing of Bombay Act V of 1862,
amounts to a dismemberment of the bhag, and what
remains in the bhagdar's hands continues to be a
complete bhag, while the portion separated from it
becomes a new bhag. *BHAI SHANKER v. COLLECTOR*
OF KAIRA I. L. R. 5 Bom. 77

3. ———— **Purchase by stranger**
of building erected on gabhan. In a suit brought
by a bhagdari, or shareholder in a bhagdar village
to recover possession of a gabhan, or building-site,
and a vada, or homestead, appurtenant to his
bhag, from a stranger who had purchased at an
auction-sale a building erected on the gabhan by a
third person with the bhagdar's consent : *Held*
(reversing the decision of the District Court), that
the purchaser of the building had only acquired a
right to remove the building materials, and that he
had no right, by reason of his having purchased the

**BHAGDARI AND NARWADARI ACT
(BOM. V OF 1862)—contd.**

building, to continue, without the bhagdar's consent in possession of the gabhan and vada, which by the Bhagdari Act could not be alienated apart or separately from the bhag or some recognized subdivision thereof. *PRANJIVAN GAVAN v. JAI-SHANKAR BHAGVAN* . 4 Bom. A. C. 64

4. ———— *Alienation of less than the whole of a bhag—Power of Collector to declare such alienation void—Suit to have the declaration set aside.* In 1860, prior to the coming into force of the Bombay Bhagdari Act, V of 1862, W, a recognized holder of a bhag in the Broach district, divided it equally among his four sons, A, B, C and D, who immediately entered into possession of their respective shares. In 1876 A and C sold their shares to the plaintiff. B and D protested against the sale as being a dismemberment of a bhag; and the plaintiff was called upon by the Collector, under s. 3 of the Act, to deliver the deed to be cancelled, but declined to do so, and applied that the sale should be recognized. By an order the Collector refused to grant his prayer. The plaintiff, therefore, brought a suit to set aside the order. Both the lower Courts rejected his claim. On appeal to the High Court: *Held*, confirming the decree of the lower Appellate Court, that the sale to the plaintiff, having been effected after the Bombay Bhagdari Act (V of 1862) had come into force, was void. A bhag, as contemplated by the Act, would seem to mean an aliquot share of a village subject to an aliquot portion of the total land-tax imposed on it, and not any subdivision by partition or otherwise. *Bhai Shankar v. Collector of Kaira*, I. L. R. 5 Bom. 77, distinguished. *GOLAM NAROTAM v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* I. L. R. 8 Bom. 596

1. ———— ss. 1 and 2—*Sale of unrecognized portion of a bhag—Application by Collector to set it aside.* N held an unrecognized fourth share in a certain bhag. R obtained a decree against N, and in execution of it sold his right, title, and interest in the bhag on the 28th February 1876. It was purchased by B. The sale was subsequently confirmed, and B was put in possession of a portion of the land. On the 30th September 1880 the Collector applied to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground that it was illegal under Bombay Act V of 1862. It appeared that the Collector did not know till November 1877 that the land sold was an unrecognized portion of the bhag, and not the whole of it. *Held*, that the sale might be set aside under the provisions of s. 2 of Act V of 1862, notwithstanding its confirmation and the subsequent delivery of possession. *Quære*: Whether any provision of limitation applied to such application under the Bhagdari Act. *COLLECTOR OF BROACH v. RAJARAM LALDAS* . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 542

2. ———— *Sale of unascertained shares in an undivided bhag—Dismemberment—Physical dismemberment—Right to sue to set aside illegal sales.* S. 1 of the Bombay Bhagdari Act (V of 1862) does not prohibit the sale of an

**BHAGDARI AND NARWADARI ACT
(BOM. V OF 1862)—contd.**

ss. 1, 2—*concl'd.*

unascertained share of an undivided bhag. The object and intention of the Act is to prevent a physical dismemberment of a bhag, or recognized subdivisions thereof, and not a mere increase in the number of persons who may from time to time be owners of the bhag. S. 2 of the Act does not bar the right of any person prejudicially affected by any illegal sale from suing to set aside the sale. Four brothers owned a bhag in common. In 1871 the right, title, and interest of three of the brothers in the bhag was sold in execution of decrees against them. The defendants were the auction-purchasers. They were put in joint possession of the whole bhag. In 1878 the plaintiff purchased the whole bhag from the four brothers, and filed a suit in 1883 to oust the defendants, and to obtain possession, alleging that the defendants' purchase of a portion of the bhag was illegal and invalid under s. 1 of the Bombay Bhagdari Act (V of 1862). The suit was dismissed on the ground that, though the defendants' purchase was illegal under the Act, the plaintiff had no right to oust the defendants until the Collector had taken action, under s. 2 of the Act, to set aside defendants' purchase. *Held* reversing the decision of the lower Court, that the suit was not barred by s. 2 of the Bombay Bhagdari Act (V of 1862). *Held*, also, that the defendants' purchase of unascertained shares in the undivided bhag was not opposed to s. 1 of the Act. *BAI KUVARBAI v. BHAGVAN ICHHARAM*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 203

1. ———— ss. 1 and 3—*San mortgage—Bhagdari and narwadari tenures—Mortgage before passing of the Act—Execution of decree—Operation of Act.* The plaintiff in 1874 sued on a san mortgage, dated 15th November 1861,—i.e., five months before the passing of Bombay Act V of 1862,—to recover a sum of money by sale of the mortgaged property, which formed part of a bhag in a bhagdari village, which bhag the defendant had purchased at a Court's sale subsequent to the date of the mortgage. *Held* (assuming s. 1 of the Act to apply), that it does not bar the right of action; that, therefore, a Civil Court would be bound to make a decree, even though it might anticipate that s. 1 of the Act would stand in the way of the execution of that decree. *Semble*: That, after a decree has been passed against a portion of a bhag, the Collector might recognize such portion as a division of the bhag, if assured that justice required that the decree should be executed. *Held*, further, that no retrospective operation can be given to s. 1 of the Act, so as prejudicially to affect existing rights. The words "attachment or sale by the process of any Civil Court," used therein, were intended to prevent attachment and sale under simple money decrees, and not to prevent the sale of mortgaged property in satisfaction of a valid mortgage. *RANCHODDAS DOYALDAS v. RANCHODDAS NANABHAI*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 581

BHAGDARI AND NARWADARI ACT
(BOM. V OF 1862)—*contd.*

ss. 1, 3—*concl'd.*

2. ————— *Sale of unrecognized portion of bhag—Application by Collector to set it aside—Limitation Acts, IX of 1871 and XV of 1877, Sch. II, Art. 178.* No law of limitation applies to proceedings taken by a Collector under Bombay Act V of 1862. The words in the first section of that Act, "no portion of a bhag, etc., shall be liable to seizure, sequestration, attachment or sale by the process of any Civil Court," mean that no portion of a bhag shall be seized, sequestered, attached, or sold by the process of any Civil Court, and any such seizure, sequestration, attachment, or sale is thereby rendered absolutely illegal and void. S. 3 of the Act has no bearing on sales by order of a Civil Court, but is intended to apply to unlawful sales and alienations of portions of bhags made out of Court, or by private individuals. It is under s. 2 that the Collector is authorized and bound to move in order to get the process of a Civil Court set aside or quashed. *COLLECTOR OF BROACH v. DESAI RAGHUNATH*. I. L. R. 7 Bom. 546

s. 2.—*Sale of a portion of a bhag in execution of a decree—Process for sale—Collector's right to get the process quashed.* The appellant was the mortgagee of a portion of a bhag under a mortgage dated 1880, and in a suit brought upon the mortgage obtained a decree for sale of the mortgaged property. An attachment was issued, and an order for sale was made. Thereupon the Collector applied, under s. 2 of Bombay Act V of 1862, to set aside the attachment and order for sale. *Held*, that the mortgage of a portion of a bhag was unlawful under s. 3 of the Act, and a process having been issued for the sale of such portion, the Collector was entitled to have it quashed. *Ranchoddas Doyaldas v. Ranchoddas Nanabhai*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 581, distinguished. *NARBHERAM v. COLLECTOR OF BROACH* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 737

s. 3.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 13.
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 479

See MORTGAGE—CONSTRUCTION OF MORTGAGES . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 283

See POSSESSION—ADVERSE POSSESSION.
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 710

1. ————— *Bhagdari and narwadari tenures—Sale of unrecognized portion of—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 213—Undivided share, Sale of—Partition.* The sale of a portion of a bhag or share in a bhagdari or narwadari village, other than a recognized subdivision of such bhag or share, or of a building site appurtenant to it, is illegal under s. 3 of Bombay Act V of 1862; and a judgment-creditor cannot, in execution of his decree, evade the law by describing his debtor's separate portion in a bhag as his "right, title, and interest in the whole bhag;" for, under s. 213 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the creditor is bound to specify the debtor's share or interest to the best of his belief, or

BHAGDARI AND NARWADARI ACT
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s. 3—*contd.*

so far as he has been able to ascertain the same. *Quære*: If the sale of an undivided share in a bhag be lawful, but even if it be, the purchaser cannot insist upon the possession of any particular portion of the bhag, as representing the share of his debtor. All he can do is to sue for partition. But, *quære*, if such partition could be made. *ARDESIR NASAR-VANJI v. MUSE NATHA AMJI* I. L. R. 1 Bom. 601

2. ————— *Bhagdari tenure—Undivided share of a bhag, alienation of.* The alienation of an undivided portion of a bhag, or share in the bhag, to a person who is not a bhagdar, is void under s. 3 of Bombay Act V of 1862. *BIRDWOOD, J.*, dissented. *PARSHOTAM BHAISHANKAR v. HIRA FARAG*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 172

3. ————— *Land Revenue Code (Bom. Act V of 1879), s. 83—Fruit-yielding trees standing on a portion of a Bhag—Permanent tenancy—Annual tenancy—Construction—Obstruction to tenant in the enjoyment of trees—Permanent injunction.* The plaintiff who claimed to be a purchaser from a permanent occupant of certain land which formed portion of a Bhag, sued for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from obstructing him from the enjoyment of certain fruit-yielding trees and preventing him from entering on the land in which the trees were situated and taking the produce of the trees and having the same watched every year. The defendant denied the plaintiff's right as permanent occupant and the legality of his purchase, and relied on the provisions of the Bhagdari and Narwadari Act (Bom. Act V of 1862). The first Court held that the plaintiff was a permanent tenant and that his purchase was valid. On appeal by the defendant, the Judge held that a permanent lease was inconsistent with the provisions of the Bhagdari and Narwadari Act (Bom. Act V of 1862), and (even though proved) could not be recognized, having regard solely to s. 83 of the Land Revenue Code (Bom. Act V of 1879). He therefore found that the plaintiff was a tenant from year to year and modified the decree of the first Court by directing that the injunction should continue until the determination of the tenancy from year to year. On second appeal by the plaintiff: *Held*, reversing the decree of the Judge and restoring that of the first Court, that on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, and the revenue register and having regard to s. 83 of the Land Revenue Code (Bom. Act V of 1879), the plaintiff was a permanent tenant. *Held*, further, that there was nothing in the Bhagdari and Narwadari Act (Bom. Act V of 1862) to prevent a permanent tenant of a Bhagdar from alienating the fruit of the trees growing on the land of which he is a tenant. *PER BEAMAN, J.*:—S. 3 of the Bhagdari and Narwadari Act (Bom. Act V of 1862) does not prohibit a permanent tenant from disposing of trees on his

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land. S. 83 of the Land Revenue Code (Bom. Act V of 1879) creates no new rights, it simply insists on the Courts adopting a better method of ascertaining whether in fact the right existed. *NAHANCHAND v. MODI KEKHUSHRU* (1906)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 183

4. ———— *Bhag—Unrecognised subdivision of a bhag—Alienation—Suit to set aside the alienation—Limitation.* Possession acquired under an alienation made in contravention of section 3 of the Bhagdari Act (Bom. Act V of 1862) can become adverse so as to bar a suit for recovery by the individual alienor or his representatives in interest. The Bhagdari Act (Bom. Act V of 1862) contains nothing which by express provision or necessary implication abrogates the law of limitation in favour of a private person. *Dala v. Parag*, 4 Bom. L. R. 797 and *Jethabhai v. Nathabhai*, I. L. R. 28 Bom. 399, distinguished. *ADAM UMAR v. BAPU BAWAJI* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 116

5. ———— *ss. 3, 5—Bhag—Narwa—Recognized subdivisions of a narwa compromise effecting a subdivision not recognized—Void compromise—Collector's action—Appeal to Commissioner—Civil Court—Adverse possession—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 115—Estoppel.* At the death of K, a sub-sharer, holding a recognized subdivision in a narwa, disputes arose between plaintiffs and defendants as to the heirship. The disputes led to a suit by the plaintiffs, wherein they failed. Before, however, the period for appeal expired, the parties effected an amicable settlement, by which the defendants gave up their rights in favour of the plaintiffs over half of a survey number, which was a part of a narwa holding governed by the Bhagdari and Narwadari Act (Bombay Act V of 1862). Later on the plaintiffs leased their portion of the land in perpetuity to a third party. The defendants thereupon applied to the Collector, complaining that the plaintiffs had alienated the property contrary to the provisions of the Bhagdari and Narwadari Act (Bombay Act V of 1862), and praying that the alienation being void, they (the defendants) should be placed in possession of the land. The Collector declined to interfere; but, on appeal, the Commissioner held otherwise and directed the defendants to be put in possession of the land. The plaintiffs then filed a suit to recover possession of the land. *Held*, that, as the effect of the compromise arrived at between the parties was to alienate a portion of a bhag or share in a narwa other than a recognized subdivision of such bhag or share, it was void within the meaning of s. 5 of the Bhagdari and Narwadari Act (Bombay Act V of 1862); that the plaintiff acquired no rights under the compromise, and that therefore they were not entitled to any relief. An appeal from an order passed by the Collector under s. 3 of the Bhagdari and Narwadari Act (Bombay Act V of 1862) lies to the Commissioner. The Collector can take

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action at any time under s. 3 of the Bhagdari and Narwadari Act (Bombay Act V of 1862); and the plea of adverse possession cannot prevail against any order that he may make. *Raot v. Parag Khushal*, 4 Bom. L. R. 797, followed. It is of the essence of the title by adverse possession that it must relate to some property, which is recognized by law. *JETHABHAI v. NATHABHAI* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 399

BHAGDARI TENURES.

See BHAGDARI AND NARWADARI ACT,
BOMBAY ACT V OF 1862.

See CUSTOM . . . 5 Bom. A. C. 123
I. L. R. 5 Bom. 482

See SETTLEMENT—MODE OF SETTLEMENT
2 Bom. 244 : 2nd Ed., 231

**BHALE SULTAN CHATTRI TRIBE OF
OUDH.**

Custom—Inheritance. *Held*, that the evidence adduced in this case proved the existence amongst the Bhale Sultan Chattris in Oudh of a general custom excluding daughters and their issues from inheritance. *BAJRANGI SINGH v. MANOKARNIKA BAKSH SINGH* (1908) . . . 12 C. W. N. 74
s.c. L. R. 35 I. A. 1
I. L. R. 30 All. 1

BHAOLI TENURE.

See BENGAL RENT ACT, 1869, s. 52.
I. L. R. 2 Calc. 374

See RENT IN KIND.

See SECOND APPEAL.
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 200

**BHOPAL APPEAL FROM GOVERNOR-
GENERAL'S AGENT AT SEHORE.**

See APPEAL . . . I. R. L. 35 Calc. 648

BHUINHARI REGISTER.

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—REGISTERS.
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 91

BHUTAN DUARS ACT (XVI OF 1869).

——— *Schedule and rules under Act—Bhutan Duars' Repealing Act (Bengal Act VII of 1895), s. 3—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), application of, to Bhutan Duars—Minors, fraud against—Suit to obtain relief against fraudulent transfers effected, and entries made in the record-of-rights under Act XVI of 1869, during one's minority.* The plaintiff's father died, possessed of a 4-anna share in a jote in Bhutan Duars. During their minority their elder brothers sold that jote to the first three defendants in fraud of the rights of the plaintiffs, and the purchasers took possession of the jote accordingly and had entries made in their own

BHUTAN DUARS ACT (XVI OF 1869)—
concl'd.

names in the record-of-rights. The plaintiffs brought this suit under Act XVI of 1869 against the defendants to recover their share in the jote. The lower Appellate Court, without going into the merits, dismissed the case as not cognizable in view of the provisions of Act XVI of 1869 and the Repealing Act VII of 1895. On appeal therefrom:—*Held*, that the notification extending the Civil Procedure Code to Jalpaiguri had not the effect of introducing the Civil Procedure Code to the Bhutan Duars, although the latter are a part of Jalpaiguri, inasmuch as Act XVI of 1869, which was then in force in the Bhutan Duars, excluded that jurisdiction in express terms. But the effect of the repeal of Act XVI (without any qualification) by Bengal Act VII of 1895 has left the Civil Procedure to be administered in the Bhutan Duars. That the plaintiffs are not precluded by the entry in the record-of-rights from obtaining relief against the defendants. An entry in a record under Act XVI of 1869 in order to be conclusive evidence of any right, interest, or other matter must be one which has been honestly and fairly obtained. *BROJO KANTO DAS v. TUFAN DAS*. 4 C. W. N. 287

BIAS.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

9 C. W. N. 619

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 904

BICYCLE.

See MADRAS MUNICIPAL ACT, SCH. B.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 83

BID.

— leave to.

See LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877).

12 C. W. N. 621

— under misapprehension.

See SALE. I. L. R. 36 Calc. 323

BIDDERS AT COURT-SALE.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—

BIDDERS. I. L. R. 14 Mad. 235

BIGAMY.

See ABETMENT. I. L. R. 4 Calc. 10

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 126

W. R., 1864, Cr. 13

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COM-

PLAINT, AND NECESSARY PRELIMI-

NARIES. I. L. R. 25 All. 132, 209

1. — Authority of caste to declare marriage void—*Penal Code, s. 494*. Courts of law will not recognize the authority of a caste to declare a marriage void, or to give permission to a woman to re-marry. *Bonâ fide* belief that the consent of the caste made the second marriage valid does not constitute a defence to a charge under s. 494

BIGAMY—cont'd.

of the Penal Code, of marrying again during the lifetime of the first husband, or to a charge of abetment of that offence under that section combined with s. 109. *REG. v. SAMBHU RAGHU*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 347

2. — Publication of banns of marriage—*Penal Code, s. 494*. The act of causing the publication of banns of marriage is an act done in the preparation to marry, but does not amount to an attempt to marry. Where, therefore, a man, having a wife living, caused the banns of marriage between himself and a woman to be published, he could not be punished for an attempt to marry again during the lifetime of his wife. *QUEEN v. PETERSON*

I. L. R. 1 All. 316

3. — Divorce among Rajput Gujaratis in Khandesh—*Penal Code, ss. 494 and 109—Marrying again during the lifetime of husband—Deed of divorce by husband—Validity of divorce*. A member of the caste of Ajanya Rajput Guzars residing in Khandesh executed a deed of divorce to his wife. The Court held on the evidence that the deed was proved, and that in this caste a husband was for a sufficient reason, such as incontinence, allowed to divorce his wife; that the deed in the present case had not been executed for a sufficient reason; and that, consequently, the parties entering into a second marriage were guilty of an offence under s. 494 of the Penal Code (XLV of 1860); and that the priest who officiated at that marriage was an abettor under ss. 494 and 109. Mere consent of persons to be present at an illegal marriage, or their presence in pursuance of such consent, or the grant of accommodation in a house for the marriage, does not necessarily constitute abetment of such marriage. *EMPRESS v. UMI*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 126

4. — Nika marriage—*Penal Code, ss. 494, 495*. A nika marriage falls within the purview of ss. 494 and 495 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. JUDOO*

6 W. R. Cr. 60

5. — Dissolution of marriage at will—*Re-marriage (natra) in lifetime of first husband—Invalid marriage—Custom*. *Held*, that a custom of the Talapada Holi caste that a woman should be permitted to leave the husband to whom she has been first married, and to contract a second marriage (natra) with another man in his lifetime and without his consent, was invalid, as being entirely opposed to the spirit of the Hindu law; and such marriage was "void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband," and therefore punishable as regards the woman under s. 494 of the Penal Code. *REG. v. KARSAN GOJA. REG. v. BAI RUPA*

2 Bom. 124; 2nd Ed., 117

6. — Hindu Christian convert relapsing into Hinduism. A Hindu Christian convert, relapsing into Hinduism and marrying a Hindu woman, cannot be convicted of bigamy on the ground that he has another wife living, whom he married while a professing Christian. *ANONYMOUS*

3 Mad. Ap. 7
2 N 2

BIGAMY—contd.

7. ————— *Penal Code, ss. 103 and 494—Native Christian—Marriage by relapsed convert.* A was baptized in infancy into the Roman Catholic Church, but subsequently relapsed, with the rest of her family, into Hinduism, and was married to a Hindu. Her Hindu husband afterwards discarded her, and alleged that he would not have married her if he had known that she had been baptized. A was subsequently re-admitted into the Roman Catholic Church and married by B, a priest, to a Roman Catholic during the lifetime of her Hindu husband. *Held*, that A's marriage with the Hindu was subsisting and valid at the time of her Christian marriage; that she was guilty of the offence of bigamy; and that B was guilty of abetting that offence. *Lopez v. Lopez, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 706*, discussed. *In re MILLARD*

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 11

8. ————— *Custom as to marriages—Penal Code, s. 494.* A conviction under s. 494 of the Penal Code for marrying again during the lifetime of a husband or wife cannot be upheld where there is evidence to show that such marriages are not unusual among persons of the same caste as the accused, and it is not proved that such marriages are void. *In the matter of CHAMIA*

7 C. I. R. 354

9. ————— *Conversion of a Hindu wife to Mahomedanism—Marriage with a Mahomedan—Penal Code, s. 494.* The conversion of a Hindu wife to Mahomedanism does not, *ipso facto*, dissolve her marriage with her husband. She cannot, therefore, during his lifetime enter into any other valid marriage contract. Her going through the ceremony of nika with a Mahomedan is consequently an offence under s. 494 of the Indian Penal Code. *GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY v. GANGA*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 330

10. ————— *Marriage with Mahomedan—Mahomedan Law—Marriage—Penal Code, s. 494.* The petitioner, originally a Hindu woman and the illegitimate offspring of Chattri parents, was duly married according to Hindu rites to D, who was also by caste a Chattri. Subsequent to the marriage, the petitioner became a convert to Mahomedanism and married a Mahomedan. She was charged with and convicted of an offence under s. 494 of the Penal Code. It was contended on her behalf that (1) the marriage between her and D was invalid under Hindu law by reason of her illegitimacy and the consequent difference of caste between the contracting parties; (2) the marriage between her and D became dissolved under the Hindu law on her conversion to Mahomedanism; and (3) the second marriage was not void under the Mahomedan law by reason of its taking place in the lifetime of D, and that the conviction was therefore erroneous. There was no evidence of any notice having been given to D previous to the second marriage calling on him to become a Mahomedan. *Held*, that illegitimacy under Hindu law is no absolute disqualification for marriage, and that, when one or both contracting parties to a marriage are illegiti-

BIGAMY—contd.

mate, the marriage must be regarded as valid, if they are recognized by their caste people as belonging to the same cast. *Held*, also, that there is no authority in Hindu law for the proposition that an apostate is absolved from all civil obligations, and that, so far as the matrimonial bond is concerned, such a view would be contrary to the spirit of that law, which regards it as indissoluble, and that accordingly the marriage between the petitioner and D was not, under the Hindu law, dissolved by her conversion to Mahomedanism. *Rahmed Beebee v. Rokeya Beebee, 1 Norton's Leading Cases on Hindu Law, p. 12*, dissented from. *Held*, further, that, as the validity of the second marriage depended on the Mahomedan law, and as that law does not allow a plurality of husbands, it would be void or valid according as the first marriage was or was not subsisting at the time it took place; that no notice having been given to D as required by Mahomedan law previous to the second marriage, and no recourse having been had to the Courts for the purpose of obtaining a declaration that the former marriage was dissolved, and as British India cannot be held to be a foreign country for the purpose of rendering such notice unnecessary, the previous marriage was not dissolved under Mahomedan law, and the subsequent marriage was therefore void. *Held*, accordingly, that the conviction was right. *In the matter of the petition of RAM KUMARI* . . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 264

11. ————— *Mahomedan law—Marriage—Child marriage—Option of minor of repudiating marriage on attaining puberty—Want of ratification after puberty—Penal Code, s. 494.* B, a Mahomedan girl whose father was dead, was alleged to have been given in marriage by her mother to J some years before she attained puberty. Prior to her attaining puberty, J was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for theft. While he was in jail, B, after she had attained puberty, contracted a marriage with P. The marriage with J was never consummated. On J being released from jail, he proceeded to prosecute B and P for bigamy and abetment of bigamy, and also charged P with adultery. It appeared that, before taking proceedings, J requested B to return to him, but she refused to do so. The marriage between B and J was sought to be proved by the evidence of J, B's mother, and two witnesses who were said to have been present. B and P were both convicted. *Held*, on appeal, that the evidence of the marriage between B and J was insufficient to justify a conviction in the absence of proof that a Molla was present at the ceremony, or that the *sigha* required to be recited at the marriage of minors was recited, or the *akd* performed. *Held*, further, that, assuming B to have been given in marriage to J when a mere child by her mother, she had the option of either ratifying or repudiating such marriage on attaining puberty. Under the Shia law, such a marriage is of no effect until it has been ratified by the minor, and under the Sunni law it is effective till cancelled by the minor. Under both schools of law, the minor has the absolute power, on attaining puberty, to ratify

BIGAMY—contd.

or cancel an unauthorized marriage, though under the Sunni law ratification is presumed if the girl remains silent after attaining puberty and allows the marriage to be consummated. *Held*, on the facts of the case, that the circumstances afforded sufficient indication, even assuming the girl to be governed by the Sunni law, that she never ratified the marriage. *Held*, also, that a judicial order was not necessary to effect the cancellation of the marriage. *BADAL AURAT v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 79

12. ———— *Sagai or nika marriage—Relinquishment of wife—Penal Code, s. 494.* A conviction under s. 494 of the Penal Code cannot be supported where there is evidence to show that by the custom of the caste, sagai or nika marriage was admissible, and that the husband had relinquished his wife. *In re Chamia, 7 C. L. R. 354*, followed. *JUKNI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 627

13. ———— *Complaint by the husband—"Person aggrieved"—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 198—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 494.* The husband is a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of s. 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code upon whose complaint the Court should take cognizance of an offence under s. 494 of the Penal Code. *Queen-Empress v. Rukshmoni, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 340*, and *In the matter of Ujjala Bewa, 1 C. L. R. 523*, referred to. *DEPUTY LEGAL REMEMBRANCER v. SARNA KAHMI*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 336

QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BAI RAKSHMONI

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 340

CHELLAM NAIDU v. RAMASAMI

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 379

14. ———— *Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 109, 494—Marriage of a Hindu girl given a second time—Abetment.* Where a Hindu, having given his daughter, said to be eight years old, in marriage to a certain person, again gives her in marriage to another in the lifetime of her first husband: *Held*, that he is guilty of an offence under s. 109, read with 494, of the Indian Penal Code, although his daughter had not the knowledge and intelligence necessary to enable her to commit an offence under s. 494 of that Code. *In the matter of the Empress v. Abdool Kurreem, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 10*, distinguished. *NAND LAL SINGH v. THE CROWN (1902)*

6 C. W. N. 343

15. ———— *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 494—Native Christian having Christian wife living, and marrying Hindu woman, guilty of bigamy under the section.* A Native Christian, who, having a Christian wife living, marries a Hindu woman according to Hindu rites without renouncing his religion, is guilty of an offence under s. 494, Indian Penal Code. *In re Millard, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 218*, followed in principle. *In re Ram Kumari, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 264*, followed in principle. *Proceedings, dated 8th*

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November 1866, 3 M. H. C. R. App. VII, not followed. *Obiter*: It will make no difference even if he had renounced the Christian religion before contracting the second marriage. *EMPEROR v. LAZAR (1907)* . . . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 550

BILL IN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, DEBATE ON.

See COMPOUNDING OFFENCE.

I. L. R. 3 All. 283

See STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 241

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 133

BILL OF COSTS.

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

3 B. L. R. O. C. 96

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 473

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 609

See COSTS—TAXATION OF COSTS.

7 B. L. R. Ap. 50

2 Hyde 89

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 84 (1871, ART. 85) . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 253, 505

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 1

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 943, 952, note

See TAXATION OF COSTS.

BILL OF EXCHANGE.

See DECREE—FORM OF DECREE—BILL OF EXCHANGE I. L. R. 16 Calc. 804

See HINDU LAW—CONTRACT—BILL OF EXCHANGE.

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—BILL OF EXCHANGE 2 C. L. R. 349

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 446

See LETTER OF CREDIT.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 706

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 69.

14 W. R. O. C. 5

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—BILL OF EXCHANGE . 7 B. L. R. 434, note

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT (XXVI OF 1881) . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 247

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 541

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 182

See PROMISSORY NOTE.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 242

See STAMP ACT 1879, SCH. I, ART. 11.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 432

power to issue.

See COMPANY—POWERS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS.

7 B. L. R. 58

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 92

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 439

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 275

BILL OF EXCHANGE—*contd.*

presumption of payment.

See SHIPMENTS . . . 5 B. L. R. 619

1. ——— Evidence of dishonour and of presentment—*Noting on bill.* The mere noting on the bill, even if it disclose the name of the notary in full, is not evidence of the presentment or of the dishonouring of the bill. *BOMBAY CITY BANK v. MOONJEE HURRIDOSS*

Bourke O. C. 274

2. ——— Notice of dishonour—*Reasonable notice.* In an action brought in the district of Patna against the indorser and acceptors of bills of exchange, after a part-payment by the acceptors, no objection having been taken as to the misjoinder of defendants, and the Judge having omitted to find whether the indorser had received notice of dishonour or not: *Held*, that the case must be remanded to ascertain, first, whether notice had been given within reasonable time, and, if not, whether thereby the indorser had been injured or exposed to material risk of injury; and, secondly, whether (English law not being applicable to the case), by the usage of merchants at Patna, a part-payment by the acceptors and receipt by the plaintiff discharged the indorser from liability. *GOPAL DAS v. ALI*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 198

s. c. after remand. *ALI v. GOPAL DOSS*

13 W. R. 420

3. ——— Reasonable notice. Even when English law regarding bills of exchange does not apply, the holder of the bill is bound to give the maker notice of dishonour in reasonable time. If the maker, for want of notice, has sustained injury or risk of injury, he is no longer liable. *PIGUE v. GOLAB RAM*

1 W. R. 75

JEETUN LALL v. SHEO CHURN

2 W. R. 214

4. ——— Reasonable notice. Ordinarily notice of the dishonour of a bill of exchange drawn in India and payable in England should be posted by the first mail which leaves England after the dishonour of the bill. *UNCOVERED SERVICE BANK v. DUFFIN*

3 N. W. 99

5. ——— Dishonour of cheque taken in payment of bill of exchange when due. The defendant endorsed to the plaintiff a bill of exchange drawn by *N S & Co.* and accepted by *C N & Co.* The bill, at the time it was endorsed to the plaintiff by the defendant, bore the previous endorsement of *N S & Co.* to the defendant. The bill fell due on December 3rd, 1870, which was a Saturday, and on that day the plaintiff sent his jemadar to *C N & Co.*, the acceptors, to present the bill for payment. The bill was taken by *A*, one of the members of the firm of *C N & Co.*, who gave a cheque for the amount, and took a receipt from the plaintiff's jemadar, striking out the signature of *C N & Co.* as acceptors, but without the plaintiff's consent. The plaintiff's jemadar took the cheque immediately to the bank, but the bank was closed. Thereupon he returned to *C N & Co.*,

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and informed them that the bank was closed and demanded cash. The plaintiff alleged that it was then stated that the cheque would be honoured on Monday. The plaintiff's jemadar then went and informed the gomashtha of the plaintiff of what had been done. The plaintiff's gomashtha sent him to the defendant's firm to give him notice of what had taken place. It was alleged that at this interview the defendant's liability was admitted in case the cheque was not honoured, and the plaintiff's jemadar was advised to wait until Monday, the defendant stating that he also had a cheque for *Rs. 7,000* from *C N & Co.* This was denied by the defendant. On Monday, 5th December, the cheque was presented to the bank for payment, and was dishonoured. The plaintiff's gomashtha went to the defendant's kotli, and gave notice of the dishonour of the bill and cheque, and asked him to pay the amount of the bill. The defendant asked for the bill, and the plaintiff's gomashtha went to *C N & Co.* and brought back the bill, with the name of *C N & Co.*, which had been struck out, replaced. The defendant, seeing the bill was overdue, refused to pay the amount. The cheque was thereupon returned to *C N & Co.*, and the bill retained by the plaintiff, who, on 6th December, caused written notice of dishonour to be given to the defendant. *Held*, that the cheque must be taken to have been merely, a conditional payment, and when it was dishonoured, the liability of the original bill revived. *Held*, also, that reasonable notice of dishonour was given, whether the bill be taken to have been dishonoured on the Saturday or on the Monday. *SOMARIMULL v. BHAIRO DAS JOHURRY*

7 B. L. R. 431

GAPINATH v. ABBAS HOSSAIN

7 B. L. R. 434, note

6. ——— Accommodation acceptor—Principal and surety—Discharge for surety—Equitable mortgage—Trust-deed for benefit of creditors—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 132, 139—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 92. In the years 1870 and 1873, *A* drew certain bills of exchange upon *B*, which were accepted by *B* for the accommodation of *A*, and endorsed by *A* to the Bank of Bengal. In May 1876, *A*, by letter, agreed to execute a mortgage of a certain portion of his property, consisting of a share in a Privy Council decree, to *B*, and in the meantime to hold such property at the disposal of *B*, his successors and assigns. In the month of June 1876, *A* became unable to meet his liabilities, and in the month of August following executed a conveyance of all his property to the Official Trustee upon trust for the benefit of *A*'s creditors. The bank assented to and executed this deed after it had been assented to and executed by some of the other creditors. The deed did not contain any composition with or release by the creditors, nor any covenant on their part not to sue *A*. In a suit by the bank against *B* as acceptor of the bills: *Held*, that *B* was not precluded by the provisions of s. 132 of the Contract Act and s. 92 of the Evidence Act from pleading that he was an

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accommodation acceptor only; but *held* that the letter of May 1876 constituted a good equitable mortgage, and that *B* was not thereafter entitled, as against the bank, to the equitable rights of an accommodation acceptor. *Held*, further, that the trust did not impair the "eventual remedy" of *B*, and that therefore he was not discharged from his suretyship under the provisions of s. 139 of the Contract Act. *POGOSE v. BANK OF BENGAL* I. L. R. 3 Calc. 174

7. — Failure of payment at sight

—Liability of parties to draft—Effect of acceptance. Immediately on failure of payment of a draft at sight, whatever may be the real state of the account between the drawer and drawee, the former becomes liable to the payee for the amount which would place him at the stipulated time and place in the same position as if the money had been duly paid. Where there is no acceptance, no cause of action can arise to the payee against the drawee. Nor is the legal relation between the drawer and the payee altered by a partial acceptance, the contract being in its nature indivisible; much less can any mere promise to pay part at a future time in any way satisfy the payee's claim, or postpone his right to reimbursement of his loss from the drawer. *SHETH KAHANDAS NARANDAS v. DAHIABHAI* I. L. R. 3 Bom. 182

8. — Suit on Bill by indorsee for value against acceptor—Sale by indorsee of goods against which bill drawn—Acceptor entitled to credit for amount of proceeds of sale. *J* consigned goods to defendant, and for the price drew on the defendant two bills of exchange, each for the sum of Rs. 406-4-0, payable thirty days after sight, which were duly accepted by defendant. *J* indorsed the bills for value to the plaintiffs, who, in default of payment by defendant, sold the goods and credited him with the amount realized. After giving him credit for the amount, there remained due by the defendant to the plaintiffs, in respect of the said bills, a sum of Rs. 1,017. The plaintiffs abandoned Rs. 17 of this amount, and sued the defendant for Rs. 1,000 in the Small Cause Court at Bombay. In that suit the defendant pleaded that the goods, in respect of which the bills were drawn, were damaged, and that he had, therefore, refused to accept them as he was entitled to do. The Judge thereupon dismissed the suit on the authority of *Shortt v. Abdul Rohiman*, 6 Bom. O. C. 53, holding that the plaintiffs could not under the circumstances, give the defendant credit for the goods, and that the claim was not, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court. The plaintiffs then brought the present suit in the High Court upon the bills of exchange alleging that they held the proceeds of the goods for the consignor. The defendant contended that in no case could the plaintiffs recover from him more than the amount of the bills, less the proceeds of the goods. *Held*, that the defendant was entitled to credit for the net proceeds of the sale of the goods. The plaintiffs had by the sale already realized part of

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the amount due to them; and to allow them now to recover from the defendant the whole amount due on the bills would be to permit them to realize this part of their claim a second time: in that case they would be bound to hand over the amount so realized to the drawers. But the drawers, when they negotiated the bills with the plaintiffs, got all they were entitled to, and would have to account, in equity, to the defendant for anything further obtained by them. *Held*, therefore, that the defendant was exonerated to the amount of the proceeds of the goods, but was liable for the remainder of the sum claimed by the plaintiffs. *AGRA BANK v. ABDUL RAHIMAN*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 1

9. — Remission of, for sale for specific purpose—Property in bill of exchange—Suit, for value of, on misappropriation. Where bills of exchange are remitted for sale and the proceeds directed to be applied to a specific purpose, the property in the bills remains in the remitter until the purpose for which they were remitted is satisfied. And where the money realized by the sale was wrongfully applied by the agent, it was held by the Judicial Committee (affirming the judgment of the Court at Calcutta) that the remitter was entitled to recover the value of the bills in assumpsit, upon an indebitatus count from the purchaser of them, who had notice of the purpose for which they were remitted, and the misapplication of the proceeds by the agent. *MUTTY LAL SEAL v. DENT* 5 Moo. I. A. 328

10. — Agency. The drawer of a bill of exchange cannot plead agency, unless it is shown on the face of the bill that he drew it as an agent. *PIGOU v. RAM KISHEN* 2 W. R. 301

11. — Endorser, liability of. *Held*, that an endorser of a bill is in the nature of a new drawer, and is liable to the holder in default of acceptance or payment by the drawer; and that an endorser cannot be absolved from liability because the drawer was exonerated or not impleaded. *JUMNA DAS v. MEHUR SINGH* 1 Agra 182

12. — Liability of Drawer—Dishonour of bill. There is no debt due by a drawer of a bill of exchange until dishonour. *MILLER v. NATIONAL BANK OF INDIA* I. L. R. 19 Calc. 146

13. — Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), s. 17—Drawer and drawee the same person—Forged endorsement of payee—Payment by drawee on forged endorsement—Liability of drawer—Ambiguous instrument—Election to treat it as a promissory note. On the 29th April 1889, the plaintiff's brother-in-law, *E*, purchased from the defendant's branch at Mauritius a bill of exchange drawn on their Bank at Bombay payable on demand to the plaintiff's order in Bombay. The bill was on the following terms:—"The New Oriental Bank Corporation, Limited, Mauritius, 29th April 1889. On demand pay this first of exchange (second of same tenor and date being unpaid) to the order of *Sulleman*

BILL OF EXCHANGE—concl'd.

Hussein six hundred and forty rupees for value received. For the New Oriental Bank Corporation, Limited. To the New Oriental Bank Corporation, Limited, Bombay." *E* sent the bill by registered post to Bombay addressed to the plaintiff. During its transmission it was stolen. On the 18th May it was presented by some person to the defendant's Bank in Bombay bearing a forged endorsement in blank of the plaintiff, and it was paid by the Bank. The plaintiff, as soon as he heard of the loss of the bill, made inquiry at the Bank, and was told that the bill had been paid. On being shown the endorsement, the plaintiff pronounced it to be a forgery, and demanded payment of the bill, which the Bank refused. He thereupon filed this suit against the Bank as drawers of the bill. *Held*, (1) that the document was an "ambiguous instrument" within the meaning of s. 17 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), and that the plaintiff had elected to treat it as a bill of exchange. (2) That, treating the document as a bill of exchange, the defendants, as drawers, were discharged by the payment to the *de facto* holder who presented it for payment. *SULLEMAN HOSSEIN v. NEW ORIENTAL BANK CORPORATION* . . . I. L. R. 15 Rom. 267

14. ———— *Cheque—Payment on a forged cheque—Principal and agent—Negligence—Banker, Liability of.* When a banker makes a payment on a forged cheque, he cannot make the customer liable, except on the ground of negligence imputable to the customer. *Young v. Grote*, 4 Bing. 253, distinguished. *Scholfield v. Earl of Londesbrough*, [1896] A. C. 514, referred to. *BHAGWAN DAS v. CREET* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 249

15. ———— *Return of bill by indorsee to drawer—Re-indorsement, whether necessary—Drawer's right of action against acceptor.* A bill of exchange drawn by J. & Co. to their order was accepted by S and was endorsed by J. & Co. to C who discounted the bill. The bill was presented at maturity and was dishonoured, whereupon C debited J. & Co.'s account with the amount of the bill, and returned the bill to them, but without re-indorsement. On an action by J. & Co. against S on the bill: *Held*, that the drawers had the right to sue the acceptor on the bill, by virtue of being a party to the bill and as suing on the contract contained in the bill between themselves and the acceptor. *JAMESON & Co. v. SCOTT* (1908)

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 274

BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT (V OF 1866).

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, SUMMARY
PROCEDURE ON.

BILL OF LADING.

See CHARTER PARTY.

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 573

See CONTRACT . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 547

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 173

See NEGLIGENCE I. L. R. 30 Mad. 79

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 95

BILL OF LADING—cont'd.

1. ———— *Varying bill of lading—Shipping order—Custom.* In a suit instituted by a shipper to obtain bills of lading from the captain in accordance with the terms of the order granted by the ship's charterers: *Held*, that the captain was entitled to vary the bills of lading in respect of any excess of measurement over the dimensions specified in the order, and that an alleged custom, precluding such variation, after the goods have been received on boardship, was contrary to law. It is the duty of the shipper to comply strictly with the terms of the shipping order. *GENTLE v. THOMSON* . . . 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 69

2. ———— *Ship in port only on Sunday—Non-delivery of goods—Lord's Day Act, 29 Chas. II, c. 7.* The owners of a steamer by their bill of lading stipulated that they would not land specie, but would deliver it on presentation of bills of lading, or carry it on at the consignee's risk, if delivery were not taken during the steamer's stay in port. The steamer arrived in port late on Saturday, and sailed at daybreak on Monday without delivering the specie shipped by the plaintiff, who sued for damages. *Held*, that the Lord's Day Act, 29 Chas. II, ch. 7, did not apply to Moulmein; and that, even if it had done so, it could not prevent the shipowners from availing themselves of the stipulation they had made, and that no action for damages was maintainable against them. *GRASEMANN v. GARDNER*

3 W. R. Rec. Ref. 3

3. ———— *Liability of Shipmaster.* When a shipmaster undertakes that goods shipped by him shall be delivered subject to the exceptions and conditions mentioned in a bill of lading, in good order and condition, he takes upon himself the consequences and contingencies other than the exceptions expressed in the bill of lading, or which are implied by law. *SHETLIF v. SCOTT*

22 W. R. 39

4. ———— *Construction—River Navigation in India—Difficulties or casualties of navigation.* Plaintiff sued to recover the value of certain hides which were lost in defendant's flat. The bill of lading contained among other exceptions, the words "difficulties or casualties of navigation and all and every danger and accident of the river and navigation whatsoever." In evidence it was proved that the flat was destroyed by some projection embedded in the river. *Held*, that the casualty was comprised among the exceptions in the bill of lading, and further that, having regard to the dangerous navigation of Indian rivers, parties entering into contracts of a similar nature should protect themselves by insurance. *DHAUNSEE v. INDIA GENERAL STEAM NAVIGATION CO.*

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 125 : 1 Hyde 283

5. ———— *Insufficiency of package—Negligence.* The defendants by a condition annexed to their bill of lading stipulated that they should not be responsible for "leakage or breakage or other consequences arising

BILL OF LADING—contd.

from the insufficiency of the address or package." The plaintiff shipped for conveyance from Hong-Kong to Bombay certain goods on board a steamer of the defendants in packages which were proved to be insufficient. These goods, in accordance with a condition to that effect contained in the bill of lading, were transhipped at Galle. On their being landed in Bombay it was found that all the packages were broken, and in a much more damaged condition than is usual in the case of such goods carried from Hong-Kong to Bombay in similar packages. The contents had to a large extent escaped from the packages, but were otherwise uninjured. *Held*, that, under a bill of lading in the above form, the *onus* of proving that the packages were insufficient and that the injury which they had sustained was the consequence of such insufficiency lay upon the defendants, but that, when the result of the evidence on both sides was to leave it in doubt whether the injury was caused by negligence or was the consequence of the insufficiency of the packages, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. *P. & O. STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v. SOMAJI VISHRAM*

5 Bom. O. C. 113

6. *Insufficiency of package—Negligence—Mercantile Usage, evidence of.* The defendants carry between Hong-Kong and Bombay. By a condition annexed to their bill of lading they stipulated that they should not be responsible for damage to goods arising from insufficiency of package. The plaintiff shipped certain goods in the defendants' steamer in packages which, though in fact insufficient, were packages of the kind ordinarily used for the conveyance of such goods from Hong-Kong to Bombay. On their being landed in Bombay it was found that the packages were more or less broken, and the contents were in some instances injured, and had to a small extent escaped from the packages. In an action brought to recover damages in respect of such injury, it was held that evidence of mercantile usage or of custom would be admissible to show that the words "insufficiency of package" should not be taken in their ordinary sense, but as meaning insufficient according to a special custom of the China trade. *Held*, also, that the evidence of those packages being ordinary China packages, and of such packages having always been carried by the defendants without objection, was not sufficient in the absence of proof of negligence, to fix the defendants with liability for damage done to them, there being no proof that it had been the practice either of the defendants or any other ship-owners protected by a similar clause in their bill of lading to make compensation for injury to goods contained in such packages. *P. & O. STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v. MANICKJEE NASERVANJEE PADSHA*

4 Bom. O. C. 169

7. *Carriers by sea—Liability for damage to goods—Negligence.* A steam navigation company was employed by plaintiff to carry cargo from Calcutta to Rangoon

BILL OF LADING—contd.

and to deliver it into the receiving ship, or to land it at the consignee's expense, their liability ceasing as soon as the goods were free from the ship's tackle. When the ship arrived at port, the consignee not having had his own boats alongside, the goods were put into other boats, one of which, through the negligence of the boatmen, was swamped and the contents damaged. Plaintiff sued for damages. *Held*, that, as defendants were not shown to have neglected the duty of taking reasonable and proper care in the selection of boats, they were not liable for the loss incurred. *BULLOCK BROTHERS & CO. v. TOAY AUNG*

24 W. R. 74

8. *Exemption from damage occasioned by neglect of Company's servants—Suit to recover goods destroyed—Contract Act, s. 151.* The plaintiff shipped two plate-glass show-cases from Calcutta to Rangoon by a steamer of the defendant company, and signed a bill of lading which contained the following clause:—"Carried and delivered subject to the conditions after mentioned . . . loss or damage for any act, neglect, or default whatsoever of the pilot, master, or mariners or other servants of the company, etc., excepted." In landing the two cases, one of them was entirely destroyed owing to the carelessness of the company's servants. The plaintiff sued the company, setting out that the damage was occasioned by the negligence of the company's servants. The defendant company (who were not subject to the Carriers Act) relied on the abovementioned clause in their bill of lading. *Held*, that the defendant company were protected by their bill of lading, the terms of which had been accepted by the plaintiff. *JELICOE v. BRITISH INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO.*

I. L. R. 10 Cal. 489

9. *Liability of master—Negligence—Onus probandi—Estoppel.* The defendant, master of the steamer *Scindia*, signed a bill of lading, by which he agreed with *C & Co.* of London to deliver at Calcutta to them or their order four casks of brass wire, which were shipped on board the *Scindia*. The casks were described in the bill of lading as bearing a certain mark beneath which was the word "Calcutta" as being the port of destination, and they were stated as being carried subject to the following exceptions:—"The ship is not liable for obliteration or absence of marks, numbers, address or description of goods shipped: and expenses and losses by detention of ship or cargo, caused by incorrect marking, or by incomplete or incorrect description of contents, shall be borne by the owners of the goods. In case any part of the within goods cannot be found during the ship's stay at the port of destination, they are, when found to be sent back by first steamer at the ship's risk and expense, and subject to any proved claim for loss of market. The ship shall not be liable for incorrect delivery, unless each package shall have been distinctly marked by the shippers before shipment with the

BILL OF LADING—*contd.*

port of destination." The bill of lading was endorsed by *C & Co.* to the plaintiff, a trader in Calcutta, who, on the arrival of the *Scindia* at that port, applied for delivery of the four casks; and it then appeared that they had been landed at Colombo. In a suit to recover the price of the goods: *Held*, that the defendant was estopped from alleging that the casks were not marked as stated in the bill of lading. It was open, however, to the defendant to prove that the casks did not on their arrival at Colombo bear the word "Calcutta," and thus to bring himself within the clause in the bill of lading exempting the ship from liability for obliteration or absence of marks; but on proof of this, in order to disentitle the plaintiff to succeed, the defendant must show that the absence or obliteration caused the landing at Colombo. It was found on the evidence that he had failed to do this, and a decree was given for the plaintiff *MADHUB CHUNDER DEY v. LAW*

13 B. L. R. 394

10. *Stowage—Negligence of the crew or other servants of the ship—Period of loading covered by the contract of carriage—Fitness or unfitness of the ship.* The plaintiffs shipped certain bags of sugar on the 11th and 12th November 1887, on board the defendants' ship *The Byculla* for conveyance to Bombay. There being a dispute as to the number of bags shipped, no mate's receipts were given, and no bill of lading was signed until the 28th November. *The Byculla* started on her voyage on the 15th November, and duly delivered the sugar in Bombay. The sugar, however, was found to be damaged by water which was due to its having been stowed in immediate proximity to a quantity of wet timber. The plaintiffs sued the defendants in the Small Cause Court for the damage so caused. The defendants sheltered themselves under the terms of the exemptive clause in their bill of lading of the 28th November, which clause ran as follows:—"The act of God, the Queen's enemies . . . and all the perils, dangers, accidents of the sea, . . . and accidents, loss, or damage from any act, neglect, or default whatsoever of the pilot, master, or mariners, or other servants of the Company, or from any deviation, excepted." The plaintiffs contended that a bill of lading did not relate to or cover the period of loading, and that, even if it did, the exception relied upon in this bill of lading related only to negligence subsequent to the commencement of the voyage. They also contended that the ship was not a ship "reasonably fit for the voyage" within the meaning of the rule laid down in *Steel v. The State Line Steamship Company*, L. R. 3 Ap. Ca. 72. In the Small Cause Court judgment was given in plaintiffs' favour. On appeal to the High Court on the case stated, this judgment was reversed. *Held*, that this was not a case to which the rule laid down in *Steel v. The State Line Steamship Company*, L. R. 3 Ap. Ca. 72, applied, as there was no question here of any defect inherent in the ship. It was simply a case of negligent and

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improper stowage. *Held*, further, following *Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Co. v. Baker*, 7 Bom. O. C. 186, that the reasonable mode of construing the contract evidenced by a bill of lading was to hold the exceptions to be co-extensive with the liability, and that there was no evidence to be found in this bill of lading of any other intention. *Held*, further, that the goods were covered by the bill of lading from the time they were put on board to be loaded; consequently, the defendants were protected from liability under the exemptive clause. *The Duero*, 2 A. & E. 393, and *Hayes v. Cuttiford*, L. R. 4 C. P. D. 182, commented on and followed. *HASSANHOY VISRAM v. BRITISH INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 571

11. *Shipping Company, liability of.* A Shipping Company is *prima facie* bound to deliver goods in good order and condition, but this obligation is subject expressly to the conditions inserted in the bill of lading. Where a cask of brandy was shipped at Madras in good order and condition, but on arrival at Calcutta was found to be empty. *Held*, that the company were protected by the special words inserted in the bill of lading "Hogshead brandy covered with gunny, not responsible for condition and contents." *CUTLER PALMER & Co. v. BRITISH INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION Co.* . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 654

2 C. W. N. 423

12. *Liability for loss—Absence of negligence.* A & Co. at Madras shipped by the B. I. S. N. steamer *Mahratta* a box of coral, to be delivered to their Agent *M* at Bimlipatam. At the time of shipment they declared the value and paid enhanced freight on account of such value. By the bill of lading the company undertook to deliver the case in good order at Bimlipatam to the consignee *M*, subject to certain conditions annexed. By one of these conditions, if the consignee did not take delivery when the ship was ready to discharge, the goods might be warehoused at the merchant's risk, and the company's liability was to cease when the goods left the ship's side. The consignee did not take delivery at the ship's side, and the company's agent at Bimlipatam took the case to the Custom House, as he was bound to do by the regulations of the port. If the Superintendent of the Custom House had known that the case contained corals, it would have been placed in an inner room, but the company's agent did not know the contents of the case, and therefore was unable to give any such information to the Superintendent. While the case was lying at the Custom House, application was made on plaintiff's behalf to the company's agent for delivery of the case upon the usual guarantee. The agent refused to deliver the case without the production of the bill of lading. Afterwards the bill of lading was received from Madras, and the case was delivered up. At some time between its leaving the ship's side and delivery to the con-

BILL OF LADING—contd.

signee the case was opened and a portion of the contents stolen. *Held*, that the defendants were not liable. *MACKINNON, MACKENZIE v. MINCHIN*

6 Mad. 353

13. ————— *Declaration of value and nature of contents.* A was the consignee and holder of a bill of lading signed by B at Bombay, as master of the steam-vessel *John Bright*, for the safe carriage and delivery of a box addressed to A, which in fact contained diamonds of the value of Rs11,670, three rubies, and three emeralds, in all of the value of Rs15,940. On the face of the bill of lading was printed, "This bill of lading is issued subject to the following conditions." One condition was that a "written declaration of the contents and value of the goods is required by the owner, and must be delivered by the shipper to the owner's agents with the bills of lading. A wrong description of contents or false declaration of value shall release the owner from all responsibility in case of loss, etc., and the goods shall be charged double freight on the real value, which freight shall be paid previous to delivery." The declaration in this case was contained in the following letter from the shipper to the agent of the ship-owner:—"Dear Sir, Be good enough to give me an order for a small box containing diamonds to the value of about Rs14,000, to be shipped on board the steamer *John Bright* for Calcutta. Yours etc." The box was lost by the negligence of B or his servants. In a suit by A to recover "the value of the goods, viz., Rs14,000": *Held*, that all the shipowner was entitled to was that the shipper should make a declaration of what *bona fide* he believed to be the value. The declaration as to contents was not vitiated by the omission to enumerate all the different species of articles contained in the box. Upon the evidence, the declaration as to the value and nature of the contents was *bona fide*; therefore A was entitled to recover the value of the diamonds lost. *DRUNJEEBHAY BYRAMJEE METHA v. BETHAM*

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 305

14. ————— *Leakage—Breakage—Damage caused by leakage from other goods.* Piece-goods were carried from London to Bombay under a bill of lading, the exceptions in which protected the master from "leakage, breakage, rust, decay, loss, or damage from machinery, boilers . . . misfeasance, error in judgment, negligence or default of . . . persons in the service of the ship . . . and the ship not being liable for any consequences of causes therein excepted, however originating." The piece-goods, on their arrival in Bombay, were found to be damaged by oil and by chafing,—i.e., by rubbing against other goods in the hold,—but there was no evidence to show how such damage was occasioned. *Held*, that the term "leakage" did not include leakage from other goods on to the piece-goods, nor did "breakage" include damage caused by chafing, and that, as no negligence was proved, the master

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was not protected by the exception "damage from negligence." *GRAHAM v. HILLE*

10 Bom. 60

15. ————— *Leakage, damage done by—Provision for place of claim, effect of, on jurisdiction of Court.* Plaintiff shipped some bales of cloth from Calcutta to Rangoon under a bill of lading by which the defendants were bound to deliver,—accidents, loss or damages from fire, machinery, boilers, steam, and all the accidents of the sea, rivers, land-carriage and steam navigation, etc., excepted. On the voyage one of the boilers burst, and steam and water escaping, some of the bales were damaged. *Held*, that the damage was within the exceptions of the bill of lading, and therefore that the defendants were not liable to make good the loss. *Quære*: Whether notwithstanding the exceptions in the bill of lading, the defendants might not have been made liable in a suit on the implied warranty if it had been proved as a fact that the boiler was not reasonably fit for the voyage. *BRITISH INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v. IBRAHIM MOOSUM* . 8. W. R. 35

16. ————— *Exception in bill of lading—Seaworthiness—Suit for damage to goods by leakage while ship in dock.* The plaintiff's goods were loaded in the defendants' steamer then lying in dock to be carried from Bombay to certain ports in East Africa. At the time of loading, the ship was apparently in a sound and seaworthy condition. Two days after the goods had been put on board, and when the ship was still in dock, it sprung a leak, and the water came into the hold and damaged the plaintiff's goods. The ship was taken to the dry dock, the cargo was shifted, and the leak repaired. It appeared that the leak had arisen from the fact that one of the plates of the ship had been worn thin in one particular spot, so that, when the cargo was put on board, and the ship lay deeper in the water, the pressure became so great that a hole was made, and the water rushed in. The plaintiff sued the defendants for damages. The defendants pleaded (1) that the ship was in a seaworthy condition when the goods were put on board; (2) that they were protected by the bill of lading, which contained the following exception, viz., "Accident, loss and damage from vermin, barratry, jettison, collision, fire, machinery, boilers, steam and all the perils, dangers and accidents of the sea, rivers, land-carriage and steam navigation of whatever nature and kind and accident, loss or damage from any act, neglect or default whatsoever of the pilot, master or mariners or other servants of the Company or from any deviation excepted." *Held*, that the defendants were liable. While the ship was in dock, it was not seaworthy, and the exception in the bill of lading did not limit the implied warranty of seaworthiness. *VITHULDAS GOBER v. BOMBAY AND PERSIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO.*

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 639

17. ————— *Loss by fire—Carriers—Wharfingers.* Under the terms of a bill of

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lading, "goods were to be delivered from the ship's tackles as fast as the steamer could discharge, failing which the agents were to be at liberty to land the goods at their godowns;" the bill of lading further, among other exceptions, provided "that the shipowners should not be liable for loss by fire." The steamer, on arriving at the port of discharge, came alongside the wharf, and commenced unloading at the Custom-house godowns without giving the consignees the option of landing the goods from the ship's tackle. The consignees, however, did not object to the goods being landed at the godowns, and they paid, also without objection, a sum for the wharfage of a part of the goods in their godowns. *Held*, that the ship-owners, if the goods placed in the godowns were in their possession as carriers, were protected under the clause of the bill of lading providing against fire, as much as if the fire had occurred on boardship; and, on the other hand, if the goods were in the possession of the ship-owners as wharfingers, they were not liable for the loss, inasmuch as the goods were destroyed by fire without any default on their part. *CHIN HONG & Co. v. SENG MOH & Co.*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 736 : 3 C. L. R. 585

18. ——— *Charges for landing and wharfage—Liability of consignees.* A bill of lading, given by the defendants to the plaintiff for certain goods, contained a stipulation that the goods were to be taken from the steamer's tackles by the consignees as fast as the steamer could discharge, failing which the steamer's agents were to be at liberty to land the same into godowns; the cost of lighterage, godown rents, etc., thereby incurred to be borne by the respective consignees. *Held*, that under this bill of lading the ship-owners were entitled to charge for landing and wharfage, only in default of the consignees failing to take the good from the steamer's tackles within reasonable time. *Held (per PONTIFEX, J.)*, that for the speedy discharge of their vessel the ship-owners were entitled to land and wharf the goods, though not to charge for landing and wharfage, unless the plaintiff had had an opportunity of landing the goods himself. *COSSIM HOSSEIN SOORTU v. LEE PHEM CHAUN*. **I. L. R. 5 Calc. 477 : 5 C. L. R. 157**

19. ——— *Loss by fire before delivery—Exemption from liability.* The defendant received goods on board his steamer under a bill of lading which exempted him from liability for loss occasioned "by the act of God, the Queen's enemies, fire, and all and every other dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers, and navigation of whatsoever kind or nature," and lawfully landed them on the Custom-house Bunder at Bombay, where they were accidentally burned before they were delivered to the consignee. *Held*, that he was protected by the above exception in the bill of lading. *HONG-KONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION v. BAKER*. **6 Bom. O. C. 71**

Held, on appeal, that so long as the goods remained in his custody after being so landed, he

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was protected from liability under the above exemption in the bill of lading. **7 Bom. O. C. 186**

20. ——— *Delivery in dock—"Landing or cramage charges"—Practice of dock to recover from consignee—Liability of ship-owner.* Certain boilers consigned to the plaintiff in Bombay were shipped at Liverpool in two steamers belonging to the same owners, under two bills of lading in these terms: "Shipped in good order and condition, etc., to be delivered, subject to the exceptions and conditions hereinafter mentioned, in the like good order and condition, from the ship's tackles (where the ship's responsibility shall cease) at the aforesaid port of Bombay," etc. One of the exceptions and conditions above referred to was as follows:—"The ship-owner shall have the option of discharging in dock, and of making delivery of the goods under the bills of lading either over the ship's side or from lighters, or a store-ship, or Custom-house, or warehouse, at merchant's risk." Freight was prepaid in Liverpool. On their arrival at Bombay, the two steamers went into the Prince's Dock, belonging to the Port Trust, and discharged the boilers, by means of the Port Trust cranes, on to the dock wharves. The plaintiff subsequently sent to remove the boilers, but was not allowed by the dock authorities to do so until he had paid to them various sums, amounting in the aggregate to Rs930, on account, as stated in the bill furnished him by the Port Trust, of "landing charges" for the said boilers. The bills also contained certain additional charges for "wharfage." These the plaintiff was ready to pay, but the "landing charges" he paid only under protest, and in order to get possession of his goods, and now sought to recover the same from the defendants, who represented the ship-owners. It was the practice of the Port Trust to recover these charges in all cases from the consignees of goods discharged in their dock, and the charge was said to be levied on all goods landed on the wharves of the dock, whether by the dock's cranes or by the ship's own tackles. The charge was incurred the moment the goods touched the wharf. In their rates, sanctioned by Government, which by their Act the Port Trust were entitled to charge, this charge was called, not a "landing charge," but a "dock and cramage" charge. Had the plaintiff been given delivery of these goods in the stream, and afterwards himself landed them at any wharf belonging to the Port Trust in the Port of Bombay, the Port Trust would have sought to have made the same charge for allowing the goods to be landed, whether that was done by their appliances or not. *Held*, that the ship-owner, and not the consignee, was bound to pay these charges, they being in reality charges for work and labour done in and about the landing of the goods—an operation which, under the bills of lading, was within the duty of the ship-owner. *Per LATHAM, J.*—The ship having elected to discharge in the dock, it was her duty to land the goods on the wharf. Every charge which had to be incurred before that could be done was a charge an-

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tecedent to delivery, and one, therefore, which must be paid by the ship-owner. *SCOTT v. FINLAY* I. L. R. 7 Bom. 386

21. ———— "Weight, contents, and value unknown"—*Act IX of 1856, s. 3—Assignee of bill of lading for value.* A bill of lading purporting to be for 50 tons of coal and containing a printed clause, "weight, contents, and value unknown," and similar words written above the signature of the master, does not amount to an admission by the master that he has received 50 tons of coal on board. Upon the true construction of the Bills of Lading Act (IX of 1856), s. 3, a bill of lading in the above form is not, in the hands of a consignee for value, conclusive evidence against the master of the shipment of 50 tons. *NICOL & Co. v. CASTLE*. 9 Bom. 321

22. ———— *Freight, payment of—Incorporation in bill of lading of terms of charter-party—Cargo—Freight payable on intake measurement—Measurement at port of delivery—Discrepancy in measurements—Evidence—Burden of proof—Suit by consignee for excess freight.* K V at Moulmein consigned to the plaintiff at Bombay 135 logs of teak timber shipped on board the defendant's ship. The bill of lading, which was signed by the defendant, described the logs as marked K V, and measuring tons 115-12-10, and it provided for the payment of freight thereon at Bombay, at the rate of R17 per ton of 50 cubic feet on right delivery. The last clause of the bill of lading was in the handwriting of the defendant, and was as follows:—"Marks, number, quantity, and measurement unknown: all other conditions as per charter-party." The charter-party was expressed to be between the owners of the ship and Messrs. B of Rangoon as charterers of the whole ship, and provided for the payment of freight "at the rate of R18 per ton of 50 cubic feet for all timber, one rate throughout except 100 tons broken stowage at half freight, by intake measurement." On arrival of the ship at Bombay, the plaintiff, as consignee of the timber and holder of the bill of lading, paid the defendant (the captain of the ship) R1,500 on account of freight, and took delivery of the 135 logs. On measuring them he found that, according to his method of measurement, the total measurement of the 135 logs came only to tons 58-27-11-6, and not tons 115-12-10 as mentioned in the bill of lading. He claimed, therefore, to be chargeable with freight only on the smaller quantity (*viz.*, R995-8), and to recover from the defendant the difference (*viz.*, R504-8) between that sum and R1,500 paid on account as for an overpayment of freight. It was proved that all the timber on board has been measured at Moulmein by an employé of the charterers acting apparently as agent of all the different shippers, and that the measurements in the bills of lading were supplied by this person to the defendant as the measurements of the different consignments. It was also proved that the 135 logs received and measured by the plaintiff in Bombay

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were the same logs that were shipped under the bill of lading, and that the plaintiff's measurement of them was correct according to the mode of measurement which he adopted. There was no evidence as to what was the mode of measurement followed at Moulmein, nor, except the statements in the bill of lading, as to what was the actual intake measurement of the timber there. *Held*, that the effect of the last clause in the bill of lading was to incorporate into that document the clause of the charter-party which provided that freight should be payable on the intake measurement; that the burden of proving what the intake measurement actually was lay upon the plaintiff, who sought to recover back money which he alleged he had paid in excess of what was due; and that, in the absence of such evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, the statement of quantity contained in the bill of lading was *prima facie* evidence of the intake measurement of the timber. *CURSETJI RUSTOMJI SETNA v. WILLIAMS* . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 313

23. ———— *Freight, payment of—Lien of ship-owner.* Where a bill of lading, dated at the port of shipment, contains the words "freight for the said goods being paid here," it operates as a receipt for the freight. The ship-owner is not bound to deliver the same to the shipper until payment of the sum to be charged for the carriage of the goods; but such sum is not freight, and the ship-owner has no lien for the amount upon the goods, nor the bill of lading which represents them. *SOOMAR JAFFER v. ABDOL KURREEM* . . . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 230

24. ———— *Freight, lien for, on Cargo—Advances on account of freight—Master's lien for freight—Charter-party.* By a charter-party made in London, the ship W was chartered to carry a cargo from Liverpool to Calcutta, where she was to load from the factors of the charterer a full homeward cargo to be carried by her to Europe. Freight for the whole round, out and home, was made payable on safe delivery of the homeward cargo, but at so much per ton of the outward cargo delivered in Calcutta. The master was to have a lien on the cargo for freight, etc., cash not exceeding £8.0 was to be advanced to the ship in Calcutta on account of freight, but subject to insurance; and £600 was to be advanced by the charterer's acceptance at three months, or in cash under discount, at charterer's option, on the sailing of the vessel from Liverpool, less five per cent. for insurance. The charterer himself loaded the ship, and the master signed a bill of lading which declared the cargo to be shipped by the charterer to be delivered at Calcutta, as the agents of the charterer might direct, unto order or to his assigns, freight to be paid as per charter-party. In the margin of the bill was written, "Received in advance of the within freight, £600 as per charter-party." The £600 had been paid, not in cash, but by the charterer's bill at three months. The charterer became bankrupt and the bill was dishonoured, and the

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fact of the bankruptcy and dishonour was known in Calcutta when the ship arrived there. On the ship's arrival in Calcutta, *J O & Co.*, who were the holders for value of the bill of lading, demanded delivery of the cargo. The master claimed a right of lien, and refused to deliver unless *J O & Co.* would pay the £600 bill which had been dishonoured, and would further advance £800 for the ship's use, and load a homeward cargo, according to the terms of the charter-party. *Held*, that *J O & Co.* took the bill of lading with notice of the charter-party, but that, under the circumstances, the master had no lien, and was bound to deliver the cargo to *J O & Co.* *OGLE v. NASH-HOLM* *Bourke O. C. 171*

25. ———— *Freight, lien for, on Cargo—Advances on account of freight—Lien of owners.* Goods were shipped deliverable to the order of the shippers or their assigns. The bill of lading stated that "freight for said goods was to be paid as per charter-party, with average accustomed, reserving lien in full on cargo for full amount as stipulated therein." The charter-party showed "that *H & Co.* undertook to supply a full cargo for the ship, and that *R H*, agent for the ship, agreed with *H & Co.* that the said ship should proceed to London dock, or any other suitable dock, for loading salt at party's option, or so near thereto as she can safely get, to be at all times afloat and in safety, and then load for the charterer's agent a full and complete cargo of salt, not exceeding what the master considers sufficient cargo, which the charterers engage to ship, not exceeding what she can reasonably carry with her stores, provisions, and furniture, and being so loaded shall therewith proceed to Calcutta, or so near thereto as she may safely get, and there deliver as per bills of lading, and on being paid freight at the rate of twenty-three shillings per ton." The freight to be paid thus: "£500 by charterer's acceptance at two months on sailing, less 2½ per cent. insurance; or cash on sailing, less 5 per cent. interest and insurance, at charterer's option, and the balance in cash on delivery as master requires, at current rate of exchange; 2 per cent. commission to charterers in lieu of consignment." *Held*, that "a sum of money payable before the arrival of the ship at her port of discharge and payable by the shippers of the goods at the port of shipment, is not freight in the strict legal acceptance of the term, with all the incidents of freight in giving the ship-owner the right of lien, unless it is stipulated for." Here the owners had a lien upon the goods for freight, notwithstanding that the bill of exchange for £500 had been given. *THOMAS v. OGLE* *Bourke A. O. C. 100*

26. ———— *Freight, lien for, on Cargo—Advances on account of freight—Dishonour of bills.* The captain of a ship has no lien on the cargo in respect of a portion of the freight stipulated to be advanced, and advanced by bills afterwards dishonoured, nor in respect of a portion of the freight stipulated to be advanced at the port

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of discharge. A lien cannot arise in any case when the master has not a right to retain the goods till the freight is paid. Such advances are not freight, but advances to be made under discount, and upon the security of the captain's bill on the freighter. The master has no lien at law or in equity in respect of breaches of covenants in the charter-party, other than those relating to the payment of freight for goods actually carried. *PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY v. SMALL* *Bourke O. C. 309*

27. ———— *Claim for short delivery—Place for preferring claim—Condition precedent.* Where a bill of lading contained a clause to the following effect:—"Any claim for short delivery or damage done to goods, and all other claims whatsoever, to be made at the port of Calcutta, and at no other port, and the goods are shipped and this bill of lading granted subject to this express condition," it was held by the Recorder of Rangoon to operate so as to make the preferring of a claim in Calcutta—a condition precedent to a suit in this Court. *Held*, by the High Court that this opinion was correct, and that a suit for short delivery under the bill of lading could not be maintained without a claim being made in Calcutta. *MAHOMED ISHMAILJEE NADA v. BRITISH INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY* *9 W. R. 396*

28. ———— *Short delivery of goods—No evidence as to how goods were lost—Burden of proof—"Or otherwise," meaning of.* The plaintiff was the consignee of a large consignment of goods shipped from Bombay in bags on board the defendants' steamship *Java* for carriage to Zanzibar. On arrival of the *Java* at Zanzibar, the goods were landed by the defendant company and placed in the Customs godown, where the plaintiff in due course demanded delivery. Some of the bags were not forthcoming, but the evidence did not show how the loss had occurred. The bill of lading contained the following condition:—"The Company's liability shall cease as soon as the packages are free of the ship's tackle, after which they shall not be responsible for any loss or damage, however caused. If stored in receiving ship, godown or upon any wharf, all risks of fire, dacoity, vermin or otherwise shall be with the merchant, and the usual charges shall be paid before delivery of the goods. Fire insurance will be covered by the company's agents on application." In a suit brought by the plaintiff for short delivery of goods: *Held*, that the defendants were liable. They did not show how the loss occurred, and as it might have occurred from causes not covered by the exception (*e.g.*, from misdelivery), they did not bring themselves within the protection afforded by the exemption. The general words "or otherwise" contained in the tenth clause of the bill of lading could not be read so as to cover all possible losses, for that would make them include wilful misconduct on the part of the defendant's servants, and general words are not read with such an extended meaning. Nor would

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they include misdelivery, for that was provided for in the eighth clause. *BRITISH INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v. RATANSI RAMJI*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 184

29. *Claim for short delivery—Place for preferring claim.* A bill of lading contained a provision that any claim for short delivery or for damage done to goods should be made at the port of Calcutta, and not elsewhere. *Held*, that this clause did not affect the plaintiff's right of suit in the Court at Rangoon, and that, if the defendants meant to object that no claim had been made in Calcutta before the commencement of the suit, they should have done so in proper time, *viz.*, in their written statement. An objection on that ground taken for the first time at the hearing of the appeal was disallowed. *BRITISH INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v. IBRAHIM MOOSUM* **8. W. R. 35**

30. *Claim for short delivery to be made at a certain place within a certain time—Reasonable condition—Common carrier, Liability of—Carriers Act, III of 1865.* A stipulation by persons carrying on extensive business as carriers that they should be apprised of claims made on them for default on the part of their servants, at a specified place and no other, and within a time which will render enquiry likely to be attended with some result, is not unreasonable. The defendants were owners of a fleet of steamships plying periodically along the coast of British India, by which they undertook to convey for freight parcels of goods for all persons indifferently from and to specified ports. They stipulated in their bills of lading that claims for short delivery should be made at the port of Calcutta only, within one month after delivery, of any portion of the goods entered in the bill of lading. *Held*, in a suit against defendants for compensation for value of goods short delivered, that this was not an unreasonable stipulation, and that a claim made on the agents of the defendants, who were authorized only to retain the goods, receive freight, and give delivery, was not a sufficient compliance with the condition. *Held*, also, that defendants were common carriers, though not for the purposes of the Indian Carriers Act, and that their character of carriers continued so long as the goods remained in their hands and undelivered. *BRITISH INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY v. HAJEE MAHOMED ESACK & Co.*

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 107

31. *Delivery of goods to consignee—Cargo unclaimed on arrival of ship—Rights of ship-owner to land goods—Damages by rain—Madras Harbour Trust Act (Madras Act II of 1886).* The defendant's steamship arrived at Madras on 4th December 1891, bringing bags of grain consigned to the plaintiffs under a bill of lading by which the defendants were to have the option of delivering the goods into a receiving ship or landing them at consignee's risk and expense, and their liability was to cease when the

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goods were free of the ship's tackle. The plaintiffs, on the date of the arrival of the goods, were not authorized to receive them. The plaintiffs set up a custom that cargo of this description ought to be landed on the beach; but as this could not be done in the absence of the consignees, the defendants landed it the same day on the pier and delivered it into the custody of the Madras Harbour Trust for storage, pending delivery to the consignees. On the 8th of December 1891, heavy rain fell, and on the same date plaintiffs learnt that the cargo had been delivered on the pier. When the plaintiffs came to take delivery on that day, a considerable portion had been damaged by rain, for which they now sued the defendants. *Held*, (i) that where the consignees were unable to take delivery in the ordinary way on the beach, the master of a ship has the option of landing and warehousing the goods, and that delivery to the Harbour Trust for custody was not wrongful; (ii) that in the absence of proof that the defendants were negligent, or that they failed to deliver the goods, the suit must be dismissed. *BRITISH INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY v. IBRAHIM SULAIMAN* **I. L. R. 19 Mad. 169**

32. *Condition requiring notice of claim within prescribed period—Waiver of condition—Limitation—Acknowledgment—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 19, Sch. II, Art. 31—Carrier.* Plaintiff delivered 200 casks of oil to the defendants, for carriage per *S.S. Moshitari* from Bombay to Jeddah. The bill of lading stated that the goods were shipped subject to the condition that any claim for short delivery, etc., should be made in writing in Bombay within two months of date of steamer's arrival at port of consignment. The *S.S. Moshitari* left Bombay on the 13th June, 1900, and arrival at Jeddah on the 11th July, 1900, and 35 cases of the plaintiff's oil were short delivered. On the 18th October, 1900, the defendants' agents at Jeddah issued a shortage certificate to the plaintiff, and on its receipt the plaintiff, on the 15th November, 1900, made a claim in writing on the defendants in Bombay for the 35 cases short delivered. In July, 1901, the plaintiff called on the defendants and stated that the cases had never been offered to the consignee at Jeddah, and the defendants, at his request, wrote a letter, dated the 18th July, 1901, to their agents at Jeddah, referring the matter to them in order that they might "settle matters with him by re-offering the cases in question and withdrawing the certificate, and hoping the matter would be satisfactorily settled." This letter was given to the plaintiff, to be presented by him. Nothing was, however, gained by sending this letter, and on the 20th December, 1901, at the plaintiff's request, the defendants again wrote to their agents at Jeddah, stating that 35 cases had been short delivered, but that they had been traced and would be re-shipped to Jeddah, and requesting the agents "to offer same to the consignee and take back the shortage certificate." This letter also was

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entrusted to the plaintiff for presentation. On the 28th January, 1902, the plaintiff filed this suit to recover ₹750 damages for the non-delivery of the 35 cases. The defendants contended (*inter alia*) that the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation, and that plaintiff, not having made his claim at Bombay within two months of the steamer's arrival at Jeddah, could not maintain this suit. The plaintiff contended that the defendants, by granting the shortage certificate, and by their letters of the 18th July and 20th December, had waived their rights under the above clause in the bill of lading, and that the said certificate and the letters amounted to an acknowledgment of liability under s. 19 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). *Held*, (1) that the certificate and the letters by themselves did not amount to a waiver by the defendants of their rights under the bill of lading: the question whether the fact of the defendants' agents having signed these documents and other evidence of their conduct in the negotiations between the parties, did lead the plaintiff to believe that they waived such rights and to act on such belief, was a question of fact for the Court which tried the case to decide; (2) that the certificate and the letters did amount to an acknowledgment of liability by the defendants within s. 19 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877); (3) that Art. 31 of Sch. II to the Limitation Act, 1877, was the article applicable to the case; (4) that the suit was not barred by limitation. *Haji Ajam Goolam Hoosein v. Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 562

33. *Sea-Insurance—Stamp duty—Stamp Act (II of 1899), ss. 2 and 7, and Sch. I, Art. 47A—“Contract for sea-insurance”—“Policy of sea-insurance.”* The documents, annexed to the statement of the case referred, are bills of lading within the meaning of the Stamp Act (II of 1899), and as such are liable to stamp duty under that Act. *Sewell v. Burdick*, L. R. 10 App. C. 74, referred to. When by such a document a company, for an increased payment, takes upon itself all risks attending goods while on board a ship or vessel, the document is not a “policy of sea-insurance,” but only a “contract for sea-insurance,” and is therefore not liable to be stamped as a “policy of sea insurance” under the Act. *In the matter of a reference under the INDIAN STAMP ACT, 1899* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 565

34. *Stipulation relieving ship-owner from liability as soon as goods free of ship's tackle, and before delivery, if enforceable—“Landing agents” at Penang how far agents of ship-owners—Loss of goods after delivery to landing agent but before delivery to consignee.* Where the bill of lading provided that “in all cases and under all circumstances the liability of the ship-owner shall absolutely cease when the goods are free of the ship's tackle and thereupon the goods shall be at the risk for

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all purposes and in every respect of the shipper or consignee,” and the goods were delivered over-side into lighters and taken to the wharf and kept by a “landing agent,” and then disposed of without the production of a bill of lading or a delivery order in fraud of the persons entitled: *Held*, that there was no reason why the clause providing for cesser of liability of the ship-owner on the goods being free of the ship's tackle should not be held operative and effectual although they might have been lost before delivery to the persons entitled. The stipulation was one which the parties were perfectly free to make, unembarrassed by any implied condition or any original underlying obligation, such as exists when a ship-owner seeks to relieve himself of liability to the shipper in case his vessel should be found to have been unseaworthy. *Elderslie Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Borthwick*, L. R. [1905] A. C. 93, and *Nelson Line (Liverpool) Ltd. v. James Nelson and Sons, Ltd.*, [1908] A. C. 16, distinguished. The position of the “landing agents,” at the port of Penang indicated. *Semble*: They are intermediaries owing duty to both parties—agents of the ship-owners as long as the contract of affreightment remains unexhausted, agents for the consignees as soon as the bill of lading is produced with delivery order endorsed. *THE CHARTERED BANK OF INDIA, AUSTRALIA AND CHINA v. THE BRITISH INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO., LD.* (1909)

13 C. W. N. 733

BILL OF QUIA TIMET.

See HINDU LAW . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 24

BILL OF SALE.

See EVIDENCE—PAROL EVIDENCE—VARYING OR CONTRADICTING WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS.

See MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 57 & 58 VICT., CHAP. 69.

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 526

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—BILLS OF SALE.

BIRT ZAMINDARS.

Oudh Estates Act, 1869—Birt zamindars—Rights of persons holding under-proprietary rights in villages under taluqdars before annexation of Oudh—Policy of Government under Record-of-Rights—Circular No. 2 of 1861—Heritable and transferable rights. The defendants, either by themselves or their predecessors in title, had from before the annexation of Oudh held under proprietary rights (known as birt or birt zamindari rights) in villages in the taluqa of which the plaintiff was the taluqdar. In the Record-of-Rights Circular No. 2 of 1861, the policy of the Government was declared “that the Birtias who were found in direct engagement with the State at annexation, or who have uninterruptedly held whole villages on the terms of their pattahs under the taluqdars must be maintained in the full enjoyment of their

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rights in subordination to the taluqdars." In suit by the taluqdar to recover the villages: *Held*, on the evidence and under the circumstances of the case, that the defendants had shown themselves to come within the benefit of the policy declared in the above circular, and had therefore acquired, upon the annexation of Oudh by the British Government, heritable and transferable rights as against the plaintiff in the villages in suit. *MUHAMMAD MUMTAZ ALI KHAN v. MURAD BAKHSI* (1907) **I. L. R. 29 All. 708 : L. R. 34 I. A. 142**

BIRTH, PROOF OF.

Minority—Plaintiff having three years to sue after attaining majority—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 7—Nature of evidence required to prove date of birth. Although in India it is difficult to prove such a fact as the date of birth after a lapse of many years, and it would be unreasonable to require such a class of evidence as would be justly demanded in a similar case in England, the evidence must yet be such as to carry reasonable conviction to the mind. In this case on the proof of the date of the plaintiff's birth, depended the question of whether or not the suit was brought within three years of her attaining majority, and it was held that the evidence was insufficient to prove the true date of her birth, and that therefore the suit was barred by limitation. *ARA BEGAM v. NANHI BEGAM* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All. 29 : L. R. 34 I. A. 1

BLANK PAPER.

signature on.

See **DEED—EXECUTION.**

6 C. W. N. 329

BLANK STAMPED PAPERS.

signature on—

See **ESTOPPEL—ESTOPPEL BY DEEDS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS.**

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 39

BLANK TRANSFER.

registration of.

See **COMPANY—TRANSFER OF SHARES AND RIGHTS OF TRANSFEREES.**

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 317

BLINDNESS.

See **HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—DIVESTING OF, EXCLUSION FROM, AND FORFEITURE OF, INHERITANCE—BLINDNESS.**

2 B. L. R. F. B. 103

2 Bom. 5

14 B. L. R. 273

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 177, 557

See **MALABAR LAW—JOINT FAMILY.**

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 307

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 483

BOARD OF EXAMINERS.

See **ATTORNEY . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 915**

1. Pledership Examination—

Board of Examiners raising standard of marks required for pass certificate without notice to candidates—Petition to High Court by unsuccessful candidates. The Board of Examiners having, without giving any notice to the candidates at the annual examination for pleaderships of the upper subordinate grade, raised the minimum number of marks qualifying for a pass certificate, some of the unsuccessful candidates petitioned the High Court that the result of the examination might be reconsidered, and the former standard reverted to. *Held*, that the Court having delegated its powers in connection with the examination to the Board of Examiners, and the Board having exercised its powers legally, properly, and for the benefit of the public, there was no cause for interference. *In the petition of DWARKA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 9 All. 611

2. Pledership and Mukhtearship Examination—Candidate-Examination. When a candidate applies to the Board of Examiners for Pledership and Mukhtearship to be allowed to present himself for examination, stating that he has complied with the rules and regulations entitling him to enter for such examination, the Board of Examiners for the time being should inquire into each individual case and form its own opinion as to the fitness of such applicant, even though such applicant may have been rejected as an improper person on a previous application to the Board in some past year when composed of different members. *In the matter of RUDRA NARAIN ROY* (1901) **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 479**

BOARD OF REVENUE.

See **SALE . . . 10 C. W. N. 969**

appeal to.

See **POTTAH . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 324**

orders of.

See **ACT IX OF 1847.**

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 590

powers of.

See **SETTLEMENT—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.**

3 B. L. R. Ap. 82

sanction of.

See **PARTITION—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.**

5 B. L. R. 135

BOARD OF REVENUE, RULES OF.

See **PARTITION ACT, s. 46.**

13 C. W. N. 93

See **PRE-EMPTION—CONSTRUCTION OF WAJIB-UL-ARZ . I. L. R. 17 All. 447**

See **PRE-EMPTION—RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION . . . I. L. R. 16 All. 40**

I. L. R. 17 All. 226

BOARD OF REVENUE, RULES OF—
concl'd.

See **BENGAL CESS ACT (BEN. ACT IX OF 1880)** . . . **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 637**

— rules of 1859.

See **REVENUE SALE LAW, ACT XI OF 1859** . . . **8 C. W. N. 827**

— **Land Registration Act (Beng. VII of 1876), s. 88—Evidence—Admissibility—Deposition before Land-Registration Deputy Collector not taken in accordance with the provisions of Civil Procedure Code.** Rules passed in the course of a proceeding of the Board of Revenue and not drawn up by the Board under s. 88 of the Land Registration Act (Beng. VII of 1876) have not the force of law. Where the Deputy Collector in a proceeding under the Land Registration Act (Beng. VII of 1876) recorded the deposition of a witness, which was not read over and interpreted to the witness: *Held*, that the deposition was not inadmissible in evidence as the rule of the Board of Revenue which directed that "the depositions of witnesses are to be taken as directed in the Code of Civil Procedure, by the presiding officer and not by the *amla* of the Court" was passed in the course of the Board's proceeding and not drawn up by the Board under s. 88 of the Land Registration Act, and therefore has not the force of law. **DEBI SARAN MISSEER v. EMPEROR (1907)**

11 C. W. N. 470

BOARDING-HOUSE KEEPER;

See **HOTEL-KEEPER AND GUEST.**

3 Bom. O. C. 137

BOMBAY,

— limits of town of—

— **Land situate in District of Mahim—Jurisdiction—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 69.** Land situate in the district of Mahim within the island of Bombay, and within the local limits of the original jurisdiction of the High Court, is situate within the town of Bombay, in the sense in which that expression is used in s. 69 of the Transfer of Property Act. **TRIMBAK GANGADHAR RANADE v. BHAGWANDES MULCHAND** . . . **I. L. R. 23 Bom. 348**

BOMBAY ABKARI ACT (V OF 1878).

— **s. 3, cl. (11), and s. 43, cl. (f)—Drawing toddy—Manufacture of liquor.** Drawing toddy is not "manufacturing liquor" as defined in cl. 11 of s. 3 of the Bombay Abkari Act (V of 1878). The mere possession of implements for the purpose of drawing toddy is not an offence punishable under cl. (f) of s. 43 of the Act. **QUEEN EMPRESS v. PRIO KALIO**

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 428

BOMBAY ABKARI ACT (V OF 1878
—concl'd.

— **ss. 3 and 56.**

See **AUTREFOIS ACQUIT.**

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 181

— **ss. 3 (9) and 62—Medicated article—Intoxicating drug—Cocaine.** The term "medicated article," as used in s. 62 of the Bombay Abkari Act (Bom. Act V of 1878), applies to something which is manufactured and by that manufacture is imbued with certain medicinal properties. It therefore does not include cocaine, which is a medicine *per se*. The word "intoxicating," as used in s. 3, cl. (9), of the Bombay Abkari Act (Bom. Act V of 1878), cannot be confined to its derivative meaning, namely, poisonous: the word must be taken to be used in its popular sense, which would include the effects produced by cocaine. **EMPEROR v. JAMSETJI CAWASJI CAMA (1903)**

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 551

— **ss. 3 (10), 9, 43—Cocaine—Import by sea into the Bombay Harbour—"Import," meaning of—Sea Customs Act (VIII of 1878), s. 19.** S. 9 of the Bombay Abkari Act (Bombay Act V of 1878) does not prohibit importing cocaine generally; it merely prohibits its importation unless duty has been paid. The intention and requirement of the section in the case of articles liable to duty under the Tariff Act are that the duty shall be paid. That intention and requirement can only be contravened when reasonable opportunity to pay the duty has been afforded and has been evaded. The mere entry into the Bombay harbour of a ship conveying dutiable goods or merely tying it up against the dock wall is not importing goods in contravention of the obligation to pay duty. The term "import" as used in the Bombay Abkari Act, 1878, includes the conveying into any part of the Presidency of Bombay by sea. **EMPEROR v. DE SILVA (1909)**

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 380

— **ss. 14, 20, 64, 65, 66, and 67—Tree—Toddy-producing tree.** The words "any tree" in s. 14 and "every toddy producing tree" in s. 20 of the Bombay Abkari Act, V of 1878, mean all trees in the Bombay Presidency to which the Act applies, from which toddy is drawn or produced, and not merely those in regard to which no special rights of drawing toddy previously existed. **ARDESIR JEHANGIR v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA** . . . **I. L. R. 6 Bom. 398**

— **s. 16—Country Liquor—Attachment in execution of a money-decree—Sale.** Country-liquor is not exempt from attachment and sale in execution of a money-decree passed by a Civil Court. Under s. 16 of the Bombay Abkari Act the Collector's permission is necessary for the sale, but it is not necessary to the attachment so far as the attachment can be made without removal of the liquor. But sale without the Collector's permission would apparently subject the seller

BOMBAY ABKARI ACT (V OF 1878)
—*contd.*

— s. 16—*concl.*

to prosecution under the Bombay Abkari Act.
PURSHOTTAM v. BALVANT (1907)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 157

— s. 24.

See BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION
ACT (X OF 1876).

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 462

Juice of toddy-producing tree—Land revenue. Per BIRDWOOD, J.—The expression "land revenue" as used in Act X of 1876 does not include either the duties leviable, under Regulation XXI of 1827, on the manufacture of spirits or the taxes on the tapping of toddy trees, the levy of which in certain districts was legalized by s. 24 of the Bombay Abkari Act, No. V of 1878. A farmer of duties on the manufacture of spirits is not authorized to levy a duty on any juice in trees, either under Regulation XXI of 1827, or Act X of 1876, or Bombay Act V of 1878. Juice in toddy-producing trees is not spirit, which includes toddy in a fermented state only. *NARAYAN VENKU KALGUTKAR v. SAKHARAM NAGU KORE-GAUMKAR* . . . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 462

ss. 29, 67—*Parties—Suit for money illegally levied by a farmer of abkari revenue—Collector not a necessary party to such a suit.* The Collector is not a necessary party to a suit brought against a farmer of abkari revenue for a refund of money illegally levied at his instance by the Collector under s. 29 of the Bombay Abkari Act (V of 1878). S. 67 of the Act expressly exempts the Collector from responsibility. Though a person subjected to an undue demand may, under s. 29 of the Act, take steps by which the Collector's proceedings may be stayed, still his abstinence from such a course will not deprive him of his ordinary right to recover money wrongfully taken from him for the benefit of a third person. *NARAYAN VENKU v. SAKHARAM NAGU* . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 519

1. — s. 43 and s. 47—*Illegal importation of liquor—Illegal possession of liquor—When separate offences.* A man who illegally imports liquor may keep it in his possession for some time after he imports it. The importation and possession in such a case would be distinct offences under ss. 43 and 47, respectively, of the Bombay Abkari Act (V of 1878). But where the importation involves possession of liquor, the accused can only be convicted of the offence under s. 43 of the Act. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHAND VALAD KITAB* . . . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 583

2. — and s. 53—*Possession of liquor not satisfactorily accounted for—Presumption arising from such possession.* The accused had in his possession a quantity of toddy in excess of that permitted by law. He was unable to account satisfactorily for the possession of the excess quantity. He was, therefore, prosecuted

BOMBAY ABKARI ACT (V OF 1878)
—*contd.*

— s. 43—*concl.*

ted under ss. 43 and 47 of the Bombay Abkari Act (V of 1878) and convicted under both sections. *Held*, that the conviction under s. 43 was bad. In the absence of any evidence to show that the accused had manufactured the toddy, or been in possession of a still, or had transported toddy from one place to another, no presumption could be drawn, under s. 53, of any offence described in s. 43. The only presumption arising from possession not properly accounted for was that the possession was illegal, and the accused could only be convicted under s. 47 of the Act. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BYRAMJI KHARSEDJI*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 93

3. — *Abkari—Possession of distilling materials.* Mere possession, without a license, of utensils for distilling liquor is not an offence punishable under s. 43 of the Abkari Act (Bombay), V of 1878. It is only in cases where such possession is not satisfactorily accounted for that, under s. 53, is to be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that a person in possession of such utensils has committed an offence under s. 43. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PESTANJI BARJORJI* . . . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 456

4. — *Mowa flowers, possession of—Liability of seller of the flowers where purchaser makes illicit use by distilling liquor therefrom—Burden of proof.* Mere possession of mowa flowers does not constitute an offence under s. 43 of the Abkari Act V of 1878, unless such possession is made out by the prosecution to have been for the purposes of distilling liquor therefrom. Nor is a seller of these flowers criminally responsible for any illicit use of them after they have passed from his control. *In re the petition of LIMDA KOYA* . . . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 556

— s. 45.

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—*ILLEGAL CONTRACT—GENERALLY.*

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 422

1. — and s. 53—*Servants of a holder of a license, Liability of.* Under s. 45 (c) of the Bombay Abkari Act (V of 1878), the servants of the holder of a license granted under the Act cannot be made liable for a breach of the conditions of the license. Though under s. 53 of the Act the holder of a license under the Act is responsible, as well as the person there described as "the actual offender," for any offence committed by any persons in his employ or acting on his behalf under ss. 43, 44, 45, or 46 as if he had himself committed the offence, unless he shall establish that all due and reasonable precautions were exercised by him to prevent the commission of such offence, yet s. 45 does not make "the actual offender," if he be the servant of a licensee, punishable, unless he is himself the holder of a license

BOMBAY ABKARI ACT (V OF 1878)
—concl'd.

s. 45—concl'd.

granted under the Act. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMCHANDRA MATADIN* . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 45

2. ———— *Omission to keep the minimum quantity of liquor according to the terms of license, not an offence under the Act.* Where the accused, who was a licensed liquor contractor omitted to keep in his shop the minimum quantity of liquor required by the terms of his license: *Held*, that the omission of the accused did not come within the meaning of s. 45, cl. (c), of the Bombay Abkari Act (V of 1878). *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GOBIND* . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 669

——— s. 55.—*Construction of Statutes—“Or” read “nor”—Order of confiscation.* S. 55 of the Bombay Abkari Act (V of 1878) provides that “no order of confiscation shall be made until the expiration of one month from the date of seizing the things intended to be confiscated or without hearing any person who claims a right thereto, and the evidence, if any, which he produces in support of his claim.” Certain casks of vinegar belonging to the plaintiffs were seized by the Collector of Bombay on the 5th November 1891, and an order of confiscation was made on the 17th November 1891. The order was made after hearing the plaintiffs. *Held*, that under the provisions of the Abkari Act, s. 55, the Collector could not make a valid order of confiscation before the expiration of one month from the date of seizure. *FRANJJI MANEKJI PUNJAJI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 154

BOMBAY ACTS.

——— 1827—II.

*See BOMBAY REGULATION II OF 1827.**See PLEADER* . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 252

——— 1862—V, s. 3.

See BHAGDARI ACT.
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 116*See RES JUDICATA.*
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 479

——— 1863—II.

See SERVICE TENURE.
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 13*See SETTLEMENT—EFFECT OF SETTLEMENT* . . . I Bom. 171

——— s. 6: cl. (2)—*Non-recognition of adoption—Provision for benefit of Government only.* The provision in Bombay Act II of 1863, s. 6, cl. 2, as to the non-recognition of adoption by any Civil Court, relates only to the question of the assessability of lands when raised between Government and a claimant of exemption. It is not open to a party to rely upon a provision of which Government only is entitled to take advantage. *VASUDEY ANANT v. RAMKRISHNA AND SHIVRAM NARAYAN* . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 529

BOMBAY ACTS—contd.

——— 1863—II, s. 8, cl. (3).

See ENDOWMENT.

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 393

See HINDU LAW—ENDOWMENT—ALIENATION OF ENDOWED PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 34

——— III.

See DISTRICT JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.
5 Bom. A. C. 26*See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS—BOMBAY.* . . . 11 Bom. 39

——— VI.

See MASTER AND SERVANT.

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 119

See HACKNEY CARRIAGE ACT.

——— VII.

See BOMBAY SUMMARY SETTLEMENT ACT.

——— IX.

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACTS—BOMBAY COTTON FRAUDS ACT.
3 Bom. Cr. 12*See COTTON FRAUDS ACT.**See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—BOMBAY ACT IX OF 1863* . . . 3 Bom. Cr. 12

——— 1864—IV.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—ENDOWMENT.
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 401

——— V.

See MAMLATDARS' COURTS ACT, 1864.

——— XX.

See BOMBAY MINORS ACT.

——— 1865—I.

See BOMBAY SURVEY AND SETTLEMENT ACT, 1865.

——— II.

See BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT, 1865.

——— III.

See CONTRACT—WAGERING CONTRACT
12 Bom. 51
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 358
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 899*See EVIDENCE—PAROL EVIDENCE—VARYING OR CONTRADICTING WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS* . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 585*See PROMISSORY NOTE.*8 Bom. A. C. 131
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 899

BOMBAY ACTS—*contd.*1865—III—*concl'd.*

Operation of Act—Contract Act (IX of 1872). Bombay Act III of 1865 is still in force, and has not been repealed by the Contract Act. *Dayabhai v. Lakhmichand*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 358 followed. *PEROSHA CURSETJI v. MANEKJI DOSSABHOY*. I. L. R. 22 Bom. 899

IV.

See SUBSISTENCE MONEY.

5 Bom. A. C. 84

1866—II.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT.

6 Bom. A. C. 72

III.

See GAMBLING.

s. 1, cl. (2)—*Act, interpretation of "Three miles."* Held, that the words "three miles" in Bombay Act III of 1866, s. 1, cl. 2, must be construed as three miles measured in a straight line along the horizontal plane, that being the most convenient meaning of the words, and the most capable of being ascertained. *REG. v. BHIKOBA VINOBA*. . . 4 Bom. Cr. 9

VII.

See HINDU LAW—DEBTS.

2 Bom. 64: 2nd Ed., 61

10 Bom. 361

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 220

VIII.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—BOMBAY ACT VIII OF 1866 . . . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 167

X, s. 1, cl. (7).

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—BOMBAY ACT V OF 1879 . . . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 591

XII.

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—EUROPEAN BRITISH SUBJECTS.

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 561

1867—III—(Military Cantonments).

See CANTONMENT ACT (BOMBAY ACT III OF 1867).

IV.

See BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT II OF 1865.

9 Bom. 217

See RIGHT OF SUIT—MUNICIPAL OFFICES, SUITS AGAINST . 5 Bom. O. C. 145

VII.

See BOMBAY DISTRICT POLICE ACT.

VIII.

See BOMBAY VILLAGE POLICE ACT.

BOMBAY ACTS—*contd.*

1868—IV.

See BOMBAY SURVEY AND SETTLEMENT AMENDMENT ACT.

1869—III.

See BOMBAY LOCAL FUNDS ACT, 1869.

XIV.

See BOMBAY CIVIL COURTS ACT.

1872—III.

See BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT, 1872.

1873—I.

See BOMBAY PORT TRUST ACT, 1873.

VI.

See BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT.

1874—I.

See BOMBAY TRAMWAYS ACT.

III.

See HEREDITARY OFFICES ACT (BOMBAY).

1875—III.

See BOMBAY TOLLS ACT.

1876—I.

See BOMBAY VILLAGE POLICE AMENDMENT ACT.

II.

See LAND REVENUE.

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 483

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 714, 752

III.

See MAMLATDARS' COURTS ACT.

X.

See BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION ACT.

1877—XVI.

See BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION ACT.

1878—IV.

See BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT.

V.

See BOMBAY ABEKARI ACT.

1879—V.

See BOMBAY LAND REVENUE ACT.

See LAND REVENUE CODE.

VI.

See BOMBAY PORT TRUST ACT.

VII.

See BOMBAY IRRIGATION ACT.

BOMBAY ACTS—contd.

1880—I.

See KHOTI SETTLEMENT ACT.

1881—V.

See BOMBAY TOLLS AMENDMENT ACT.

1884—II.

See BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT.

1886—III.

See BOMBAY GENERAL CLAUSES ACT.

V.

See HEREDITARY OFFICES ACT AMENDMENT ACT.

1887—IV.

See BOMBAY PREVENTION OF GAMBLING ACT, 1887.

See GAMBLING (BOMBAY ACT IV OF 1887).
I. L. R. 26 Bom. 533

See BOM. ACT IV OF 1887, s. 8.
I. L. R. 26 Bom. 641

VII, s. 5.

See TODA GIRAS ALLOWANCE ACT.

1888—III—

See BOMBAY CITY MUNICIPAL ACT.

VI.

See GUJARAT TALUKHDARS ACT.

1890—I.

See GAMBLING . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 283
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 184

II.

See BOMBAY SALT ACT.

IV.

See BOMBAY DISTRICT POLICE ACT.

1898—IV—

See BOMBAY CITY IMPROVEMENT ACT.

1900—I.

See BOMBAY CIVIL COURTS ACT.

1901—III—

See BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT.

1902—IV—

See BOMBAY CITY POLICE ACT.

1904—I.

See BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT.

XIV.

See BOMBAY CITY IMPROVEMENT ACT.

BOMBAY ACTS—concl'd.

1905—II.

See GUJARAT TALUKDARS' ACT.

1906—II.

See MAMLATDARS' COURTS ACT.

**BOMBAY CITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
(BOM. ACT IV OF 1898).**

See LAND ACQUISITION ACT.

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 483

Jurisdiction—Legislative powers of Governor of Bombay in Council—Jurisdiction of High Court to consider whether Act is ultra vires—Subordinate Legislature—Creation of new Courts—Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)—Indian Councils Acts, 1861 and 1892—Question of policy, High Court's power to discuss—Tribunal established by Improvement Trust Act is not a Court—Notices; formality; no injury caused by error in—What defects vitiate an Act—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 424—Injunction against Secretary of State—Ex parte injunction when not to be granted—Notice of suit.

In the year 1898 certain improvements were projected in the City of Bombay, and an Act, called the City of Bombay Improvement Act, 1898, was passed, giving to a Board thereby constituted certain powers, with a view to carry those improvements into effect. On the 25th of September, 1902, there was published in the Bombay Government Gazette a declaration, purporting to be in pursuance of the Act, stating that the Governor of Bombay in Council had sanctioned a street scheme made by the Trustees for the Improvement of the City of Bombay under the provisions of the Act (that being the style of the Board thereby constituted), and that certain lands, including those in suit, were "needed to be acquired by the said Trustees for the purposes of executing the said street scheme" and were required for a public purpose. The plaintiff received notice from the Special Collector (defendant 3), stating that certain premises therein mentioned were about to be taken up by the Government under Act I of 1894 (Land Acquisition Act) and that the said properties were to be acquired under the said Act. The notice did not purport to be issued under the City of Bombay Improvement Act. *Held*, that, as the Improvement Act did not prescribe that the notice should be expressed to be under that Act, there was no omission of a formality directed by the Act, and that the plaintiff had not been shown to have been in any way misled or damaged by what was, at most, a misdescription. One of the Special Collectors, having made an award of the compensation to be allowed, gave notice to the plaintiffs to hand over possession. The plaintiffs thereupon commenced this suit against the Secretary of State for India in Council and the Trustees for the Improvement of the City of Bombay. The Special Collector was subsequently added as a party. It was contended by the plaintiffs that the Improvement Act was *ultra vires* of

BOMBAY CITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
(BOM. ACT IV OF 1898)—*concl'd.*

the Bombay Legislature. *Held*, that the Governor of Bombay in Council is a subordinate Legislature, so that the High Court has the right and is charged with the duty of deciding judicially whether the impugned legislation is within the scope of its authority. *Held*, further, that the Act was not *ultra vires* in that it amended or repealed the Land Acquisition Act so far only as it affected a particular corporation in a particular locality. The reference to the "province" in s. 5 of the Indian Councils Act, 1892, is merely for the purpose of defining the limits of legislative operation, and in no way imposes the condition that all legislation should affect the whole of that area. *Quære*: Whether the Land Acquisition Act is amended or repealed by the Improvement Act, having regard to the fact that the Board of Trustees is not a company within the meaning of the former Act, while the compensation is not payable out of the public revenues or out of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority. It was further contended that the Improvement Act did not comply with the provisions of the Indian Councils Act, 1861, in that it was not in fact "for the peace and good government" of the Presidency. *Held*, that the High Court had no jurisdiction to discuss the policy of the Act. It was further contended that the Act was vitiated in that it created a new Court and thereby interfered with the functions and jurisdiction of the High Court. As to this it was *held*, (i) that the tribunal created by the Act was not a Court, and was therefore free from the control and supervision of the High Court, except where an appeal was sanctioned by its President; (ii) that the Improvement Act could not confer on the High Court jurisdiction to entertain appeals from such a tribunal; (iii) that the whole Act was not vitiated merely by this defect in the prescribed machinery for ascertaining the compensation payable; (iv) and that, applying the principle of the Colonial Laws Act, 1865, to the Improvement Act, the provisions for taking possessions are not void. It was contended on behalf of the Secretary of State that, having regard to s. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code, the suit was not maintainable against him, as no notice of suit had been given. *Held*, that, in the circumstances of this case, no injunction could be claimed against the Secretary of State, and therefore the suit was not maintainable without notice. *Per JENKINS, C.J.*—This was not a case in which an *ex parte* injunction should have been granted. The Courts should, if possible, always require notice, however short, to be given. **HARI PANDURANG v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (1903)**

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 424

BOMBAY CITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
(BOM. ACT XIV OF 1804).

Trustees for the improvement of the City of Bombay—Acquisition of property—Scheme of development—Portion fully developed—Portion capable of further development—

BOMBAY CITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
(BOM. ACT XIV OF 1804)—*cont'd.*

Rental capitalized at 16½ and 16 years' purchase—Six per cent. investment—Allowance for the risk attendant upon scheme of development. A certain property was acquired by the trustees for the Improvement of the City of Bombay under the powers of the City of Bombay Improvement Act. The said property, though a single parcel, was treated by the Tribunal of Appeal as falling under two categories, that part which abutted the street was regarded as fully developed and the portion lying at the back as capable of further development. The rental for the front part was capitalized by the Tribunal at 16½ years' purchase and the back portion at 16 years' purchase. The scheme of development provided for the erection of four blocks of chawls running practically at right angles to the front premises and these chawls were to have three upper floors for residential purposes, while in each case the ground floor was to be used for godowns. Against the decision of the Tribunal the claimants appealed, urging that the Tribunal ought to have allowed four upper floors to the hypothetical chawls and that it was wrong in allowing only 16½ and 16 years' purchase. The trustees also preferred a cross-objection that the allowance made by the Tribunal of ½ year's rental was not sufficient for the risk attendant upon a scheme of development such as that adopted by it on the basis of its award. *Held*, confirming the decision of the Tribunal on all points, that (i) it cannot be said that the scheme of development involving four upper floors was so obvious that it would enter into the calculations of an intending purchaser and influence his offer; (ii) the Tribunal's estimate of 16½ years' purchase for the front and 16 years' purchase for the back premises was fair and reasonable, the difference between 16½ years' purchase and 16 years' purchase was due to the allowance of ½ year's rental as a reward for the enterprise and compensation for risks so that the purchase was treated as a 6 per cent. investment; (iii) the allowance made by the Tribunal at ½ year's rental for the risk attending upon the proposed scheme of development was adequate. **ANANDRAV VINAYAK v. SECRETARY OF STATE (1905)**

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 565

s. 48 (11)—Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)—Acquisition of land with buildings thereon—Compensation—Net rental—Number of years' purchase—Award by Tribunal of Appeal—Appeal—Cross objections—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 561. S. 48 (11) of the City of Bombay Improvement Act does not provide for leave to appeal being granted to any individual, but for a certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal, that is, the whole case and not any particular part of it. The consequence of the grant of the certificate is that there shall be an appeal to the High Court from the award or any part of the award, and this must mean that there shall be a right to appeal or, to use the language of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), an appeal will lie to the High Court

BOMBAY CITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
(BOM. ACT XIV OF 1904)—*concl'd.*— s. 48 (11)—*concl'd.*

and the respondents will be entitled to object in the manner provided by s. 561 of the Code. *Per JENKINS, C.J.*—The enquiry is essentially one where experience is of the greatest use, and in this respect the Tribunal is in a far stronger position than this Court. It has been in existence and at work now for some years, and though its members have changed from time to time, still it must have gained from the multiplicity of cases that have come before it an insight into the value of land in Bombay, which we do not possess, and an experience which must make this Court slow to interfere with its adjudication on a question of value, involving no legal principle, in the absence of evident error. And all the more must this be so when regard is had to the constitution of the Tribunal. *RAGHUNATH DAS v. SECRETARY OF STATE* (1965)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 514

BOMBAY CITY LAND-REVENUE ACT
(BOM. ACT II OF 1876).

— ss. 8, 9—

See LAND-REVENUE.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 339

BOMBAY CITY MUNICIPAL ACT
(BOM. ACT III OF 1888).

See DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT.

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 400

— s. 3, cl. (w), (x), (y), and s. 461—*Building bye-laws Nos. 49, 42—Street—Construction.* The owner of a large plot of ground abutting on a highway divided the plot into 19 small plots and sold them to different purchasers. These plots were mapped out as abutting on the sides of two parallel roads, which were marked out as proposed roads. Each of the purchasers of the plots entered into a covenant with the owner to keep open that portion of the proposed road, which stood in front of his plot and to prepare so much of the road. The question arose whether the proposed road was a street within the meaning of the City of Bombay Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888): *Held*, that the proposed road would constitute a street within the meaning of the City of Bombay Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888). *MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER OF BOMBAY v. MATHURABAI* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 558

— s. 195—

See post, ss. 527 AND 195.

— ss. 231 and 471—*Municipal Commissioner—Notice to construct drains—Effect of negotiations—Limitation.* Accused was convicted and fined Rs 25 for not complying with a notice issued by the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay under s. 231 of Bombay Act III of 1888. The notice required him to make an open drain in the gully on the west of his premises, this drain to be so constructed as to adjoin the west wall of his build-

BOMBAY CITY MUNICIPAL ACT
(BOM. ACT III OF 1888)—*cont'd.*— ss. 231 and 471—*concl'd.*

ing. *Held* (reversing the conviction and sentence), that the notice was *ultra vires*, inasmuch as it required the accused to construct a drain adjoining a particular part of his premises. *Held*, that on a notice being served by the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay, under s. 231 of Bombay Act III of 1888, if negotiations ensue, which are tantamount to a request by the party served with the notice, and a consent by the Commissioner to reconsider the matter, such negotiations will have the effect of waiving the notice, and it is competent to the Commissioner to issue a fresh notice after the negotiations have closed. Limitation in this event under s. 514 of the Municipal Act will not run from the original notice. *EMPEROR v. NADIRSHA* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 35

— s. 249—*Place of public resort—Theatre.* A theatre is a place of public resort and as such falls within the purview of s. 249 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888). *EMPEROR v. DWARKADAS* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 392

— s. 297—*Municipality—Provision to make public street—Regular line of street.* In 1888 the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay prescribed the regular line of a certain public street in Bombay, in accordance with the provisions of s. 297 of the Municipal Act (Bom. Act III of 1888). *Held*, that it was not open to the Municipal Commissioner in 1893 to prescribe a different line setting back the line prescribed by his predecessor. *ESSA JACOB HAJI JAMAL v. MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER OF BOMBAY* (1960) . . . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 107

— s. 394—*Storing of oil—What amounts to "storing."* The wording of s. 394 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act requires that the premises, in order to attract the operation of the section, should be used for the purpose of storing. The phrase "for the purpose" indicates that it must be the intention of those using the premises to store; that storing must be the object aimed at;—the final cause for which the premises are used. There is nothing in the exemption which sub-s. 3 declares in favour of the mills specified to imply that sub-s. 1 was intended in the case of premises not so exempted, to include any use to which they might be put, which was merely incidental or subsidiary to the paramount purpose to which the premises are devoted. *EMPEROR v. WALLACE FLOUR MILL COMPANY* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 193

— ss. 410 (1), 24, Sch. D (4)—*Prohibition of sale of fish except in a market—Sale from a basket placed on the Chowpatti foreshore—Sale from a vessel—Private market—Onus of proof—City of Bombay, limits of—Bombay General Clauses Act (Bombay Act I of 1904), s. 3 (1A).* The accused, a fisherwoman, was charged under s. 416 (1) of the Bombay City Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888) with selling or exposing for sale without a license from the Municipal Commissioner fish intended for human food, on the Chowpatti foreshore, in the City of Bombay. The sale was from

BOMBAY CITY MUNICIPAL ACT
(BOM. ACT III OF 1888)—*contd.*

ss. 410 (1), 24, Sch. D (4)—*concl'd.*

a basket, which the accused had placed on the sand, at some distance from the water, between the high and low water mark. The fish sold was fresh fish and was brought from one of the boats then in Back Bay. The Presidency Magistrate acquitted the accused on the grounds that (i) the Bombay City Municipal Act did not apply as the place of sale was outside the limits of the City of Bombay as laid down in the City of Bombay Municipal Act; (ii) s. 410 of the Act had no application because the place was a private market established from time immemorial; and (iii) the sale fell within s. 410 (2) of the Act. On appeal against this order of acquittal, by the Government of Bombay: *Held*, reversing the order of acquittal and convicting the accused, that the accused was not protected by s. 410 (2) of the Bombay City Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888), since it was impossible in the present case to say that the fish had been sold from a vessel, when as a matter of fact it had been sold from the basket on the shore, it having been brought from the vessel, which was in the water. *Held*, also, that the onus of proving that the place in question was a "private market" lay upon the accused. *Held*, further, that the Bombay City Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888) applied to the spot in question, because it came within the expression "City of Bombay" as defined by the Bombay General Clauses Act (Bombay Act I of 1904). *EMPEROR v BUDHOBAI* (1905)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 126

ss. 527 and s. 195—*Notice of suit, when necessary—Refund of town duties—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 2.* The plaintiff sued to recover certain town duties which he had paid on importing grain and sugar, but which under s. 195 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act (Bom. Act III of 1888) he was entitled to have refunded on exporting the goods. He had applied for a refund in October, 1899, but his claim was rejected on the 21st February, 1900. The suit was filed on the 21st August, 1900. S. 527 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act (Bom. Act III of 1888) prescribes that one month's notice shall be given of any suit intended to be brought in respect of any act in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the Act, or in respect of neglect or default in the execution of the Act, and Art. 2 of Sch. II to the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) prescribes, as the period of limitation for such suit, ninety days from the date of the act or omission complained of. Due notice of the suit was therefore given, but the suit brought in pursuance of it was not filed until the 21st August, i.e., six months after the act complained of, viz., the refusal to refund. The defendant admitted the amount claimed and the plaintiff's right to be repaid it, but defended the suit on the ground that he, as Municipal Commissioner, had no authority to discharge a claim which was not legally enforceable, the suit being barred by limitation. *Held*, (i) that s. 527 of the Act did not apply, and that no notice to the defendant of this suit was necessary: the defendant could not claim that his

BOMBAY CITY MUNICIPAL ACT
(BOM. ACT III OF 1888)—*concl'd.*

s. 527 and s. 195—*concl'd.*

conduct had any relation to the execution of the Act if he knowingly and intentionally acted in contravention of its provisions: here the amount payable by way of refund was ascertained, and the plaintiff's right to recover it was admitted, and the refusal to refund was a deliberate and conscious contravention of the provisions of the Act: in such a case it could not be held that the money was *bond fide* withheld in execution of the Act, and, that being so, the defendant was not entitled to notice under s. 527; (ii) that the suit was therefore not one of the class referred to in Art. 2, Sch. II, to the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), and was not barred: when it is provided in an Act that notice shall be given to the defendant of any suit intended to be brought in respect of an act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the Act or in respect of neglect or default in its execution, such provision does not apply when the action is brought on a contract, for the conduct giving rise to the action is a wrongful act or omission under the contract, as distinct from one in the execution of the Act. *RANCHORDAS MOORARJI v. MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER FOR THE CITY OF BOMBAY* (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 387

BOMBAY CITY POLICE ACT (BOM. ACT IV OF 1902).

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 111

ss. 12, 16, 18.

—*Commissioner of Police—Orders issued by the Commissioner forbidding meetings by the members of the police force to discuss matters concerned with the force—Orders relating to discipline and general government of the force—Construction of statutes.* The Commissioner of Police in Bombay, under the powers vested in him by s. 12 of the Bombay City Police Act (Bombay Act IV of 1902), issued the following notification—"The Commissioner of Police under the provisions of s. 12 of Bombay Act IV of 1902 hereby prohibits any member of the police force from calling or attending a meeting to discuss any subject connected with the police force, without his permission." This notification was read over to the members of the police force at a muster parade at which the accused was present. Notwithstanding this, the accused attended a meeting of the members of the police force convened to discuss subjects connected with the force. For this disobedience, the accused was proceeded against under s. 18 of the Bombay City Police Act (Bombay Act IV of 1902). *Held*, that the Commissioner of Police was authorized to issue the notification under s. 12 of the Act, for the object of the notification was not to deprive the policemen of their private right but to regulate their conduct in their police capacity; that, therefore, the accused in disobeying the order had committed an offence punishable under s. 18 of the Act. The order which the Commissioner of Police is competent to issue under the head of discipline and general government, under

BOMBAY CITY POLICE ACT (BOM. ACT IV OF 1902)—concl'd.

ss. 12, 16, 18—concl'd.

s. 12 of the Bombay City Police Act (Bombay Act IV of 1902), must be one having reference to the conduct of the police officers in their capacity as such officers. Over their conduct in other relations of life, his disciplinary power does not extend, so long as no element or question of their police duty enters into those relations. If it does enter, the controlling authority of the Commissioner comes into play and it becomes a matter of police discipline. The meaning of s. 16 of the Act is that even when a police officer is not actually at his post discharging the duty assigned to him, he is for the purposes of the Act to be regarded as being at that post, with all the rights and obligations of his office attaching to him. In construing an expression of doubtful import occurring in a statute, the Court may well have regard to considerations outside the language of the Act. *EMPEROR v. ATMARAM* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 480

BOMBAY CIVIL COURTS ACT (BOM. ACT XIV OF 1869).

See APPEAL—BOMBAY ACTS—BOMBAY CIVIL COURTS ACT.

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 675

See DISTRICT JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 65

8 Bom. A. C. 166

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 627

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 107

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—TRANSFER OF DECREE FOR EXECUTION, ETC.

9 Bom. 113

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF . . .

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 529

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS.

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 675

ss. 9 and 10.

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—BOMBAY—CIVIL.

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 480

1. s. 16—Cases referred by District Judge to Assistant Judge for trial—"Miscellaneous applications"—Land Acquisition Act (X of 1870)—References to District Court by the Collector—Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1869)—Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)—Applications under special Acts. Although the expression "miscellaneous applications" in s. 16 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act (XIV of 1869) may be large enough to include references by the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act (X of 1870), the latter part of s. 16, as it stood before that section was amended by Acts VII of 1889 and VIII of 1890, indicates that it was not the intention of the Legislature to empower a District Judge to refer to an Assistant Judge applications under special Acts for disposal. *ASSISTANT COLLECTOR OF PRANT BASSEIN v. ARDESIR FRAMJI* . . .

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 277

BOMBAY CIVIL COURTS ACT (BOM. ACT XIV OF 1869)—cont'd.

s. 16—concl'd.

2. Amending Act (Bombay Act I of 1900), s. 2—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 51, 52 and 86—Indian Councils Act, 1892, s. 5; 55 and 56 Vict., c. 14—Application for probate—Value of the subject-matter not exceeding Rs. 5,000—Order of the Assistant Judge—Appeal—District Judge—Jurisdiction. The Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881) being made by an authority in India is subject to the powers of repeal and amendment granted to the local Legislature by s. 5 of the Indian Councils Act, 1892 (55 and 56 Vict., c. 14). Therefore the provision of the Bombay Civil Courts Act (XIV of 1869), by which a probate matter can be tried in the first instance by the Assistant Judge and by which the appeal in cases, where the amount of the subject matter does not exceed Rs. 5,000, will lie to the District Court, is one which the local Legislature was competent to make. In so far as the provisions of the Probate and Administration Act are inconsistent with those of the amendments introduced into the Bombay Civil Courts Act by Bombay Act I of 1900, the provisions of the first mentioned Act must be taken to have been impliedly repealed for this Presidency. *LAXMI v. ABA* (1908) . . .

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 634

3. Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)—Assistant Judge hearing a claim—Value of the claim under Rs. 5,000—Appeal lies to District Court and not to High Court—Jurisdiction—Practice and procedure. Where a claim under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is heard by the Assistant Judge and the amount in dispute does not exceed Rs. 5,000 in value, the appeal lies to the District Court and not to the High Court. *Laxmi v. ABA*, 32 Bom. 634, followed. *RANCHHODDBHAI v. COLLECTOR OF KAIRA* (1909) . . .

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 371

s. 24.

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 528, 543

s. 25.

See JURISDICTION—QUESTION OF JURISDICTION—WRONG EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION . . .

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 31

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS.

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 31

s. 26.

See VALUATION OF SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 265

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 963

s. 27.—Power "to hear" appeals—Power to hear question of limitation—Practice. Where a District Judge admits an appeal filed beyond time, and the appeal is referred for disposal to a Subordinate Judge with appellate powers,

BOMBAY CIVIL COURTS ACT (BOM. ACT XIV OF 1869)—concl'd.

— s. 27—concl'd.

the Subordinate Judge has the power to consider whether the delay in presenting the appeal is sufficiently accounted for. The power "to hear" an appeal conferred by s. 27 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act (XIV of 1869) includes also the power to hear any question as to limitation relating thereto. *MULNA AMAD v. KRISHNAJI GANESH GODBOLE*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 594

— s. 32.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 424.

I. L. R. 20. Bom. 697

See COLLECTOR.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 318, 628

See MAMLATDAR, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 761

1. ——— *Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), s. 15—Guardian under Minor's Act, XX of 1864—Officer of Government.* The Nazir of a Civil Court, who is appointed guardian of the estate of a minor under Act XX of 1864, is not an officer of Government within the meaning of s. 32 of Act XIV of 1869 as amended by s. 15 of Act X of 1876. An officer of Government, in order to come within those enactments, must be a party to a suit in his official capacity. *MOHAN ISWAR v. HAKU RUPA*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 638

2. ——— *Civil Court—Jurisdiction—Suit against Administrator-General.* A suit against the Administrator-General as representing the estate of a deceased private individual must be brought in the District Court and not in the Court of a Subordinate Judge, by virtue of s. 32 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act (XIV of 1869). *ANTONE v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BOMBAY (1904)*

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 529

BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT (XXVI OF 1850).

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PENAL CODE, s. 174 . . . 5 Bom. Cr. 33

See CONVICTION . . . 5 Bom. Cr. 103

See FINE . . . 7 Bom. Cr. 55

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—ACT XXVI OF 1850

3 Bom. Cr. 36

5 Bom. Cr. 10

8 Bom. Cr. 12, 39

See NUISANCE—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

1 Agra Cr. 34

See PENAL CODE, s. 188.

5 Bom. Cr. 33

See PUBLIC SERVANT . 4 Bom. A. C. 93

5 Bom. Cr. 33

BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT (XXVI OF 1850)—concl'd.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—MUNICIPAL OFFICER, SUIT AGAINST . 7 Bom. A. C. 33

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 384

See RULES MADE UNDER ACTS.

8 Bom. Cr. 39

BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT (BOM. ACT VI OF 1873).

See COLLECTOR . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 628

1. ——— s. 3.—*Place, definition of—Ota of a house.* The word "place," as defined in s. 3 of Bombay Act VI of 1873, does not include a house or ota of a house. *In re the petition of PABA KHOJI*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 272

2. ——— and s. 17.—*Street—Court—Public right of way—Removal of erection.* The plaintiff was the owner of two houses and mortgagee of a third house out of a set of six which surrounded an open court in the town of Dhandhuka, and which, including the court, originally belonged to a single individual. The plaintiff built an "ota" or verandah, and put up a wooden bench in front of his house, which the municipality of the town ordered to be removed. In a suit by the plaintiff to have this order set aside, the District Court found that the occupant of each house had the right of way across the court, which was used as the means of access to the houses which surrounded it by persons having business with the house-holders. *Held*, that such limited access by the public was not sufficient to show that the court ceased to be private property, and was converted into a "street" vesting in the municipality within the meaning of ss. 3 and 17 of Bombay District Municipal Act, VI of 1873; and that the municipality had not any right to interfere with the plaintiff's erection, whatever liability he might have incurred to an action by any of the other house-holders who occupied the court. *KALIDAS v. MUNICIPALITY OF DHANDHUKA*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 686

1. ——— s. 11, cl. (1)—*Notice of meeting, omission to give—Validity of resolution passed.* The provisions of s. 11, cl. (1), as to notice of meeting, are not directory, but obligatory; and notice to all the commissioners of the meeting, being a material part of the machinery provided by the Act for imposing a legal tax, was a condition precedent to the validity of that tax. Consequently, where a resolution was come to without conforming to those provisions, it was held to be not legal, and, whether sanctioned or not by the Government, it always retained its inherent defect. *JOSHI KALIDAS SEVAKRAM v. DAKOR TOWN MUNICIPALITY*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 399

2. ——— *Bombay Municipal Act (Bombay Act II of 1884), s. 57—Liability to pay taxes—Halalkhore tax—Water tax—Notice by municipality—Burden of proof—Presumption—Evidence Act, I of 1842, s. 117, ill. (c).* A defendant who, in answer to a claim for arrears of taxes by a

**BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT
(BOM. ACT VI OF 1873)—*contd.*****s. 11—*conclld.***

Bombay district municipality, alleges that the taxes were illegal (1) because no notice had been given him under s. 57 of Bombay Act II of 1884; (2) because no notice had been issued by the municipality to the commissioners under s. 11 of Bombay Act VI of 1873, must prove the defence; and, in the absence of such proof, the Court will presume that the municipality has used the regular procedure, and that the common course of business has been followed in the particular cases. The liability to pay the halalkhore tax does not arise until after notice has been given under s. 57 of the Act (Bombay Act II of 1884). **MUNICIPALITY OF SHOLAPUR v. SHOLAPUR SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 732**

s. 14.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—MUNICIPAL OFFICERS,
SUITS AGAINST.

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 384

1. **s. 17—Public street—Bombay Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888), s. 3.** In a suit brought by the plaintiff against the municipality of Ahmedabad, the question was whether a certain street was a public street within the contemplation of the Bombay District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI of 1873). The District Judge, on the evidence and having regard especially to the fact that the street in question was protected by a gate closed at night by a polia, or watchman, who lived over the gate, and was under the control of, and paid by, the owners of the houses in the street:—*Held*, that there had been no dedication of the land to the public, and that the public had not acquired such a right of going over it as to make it a public street vested in the municipality. On second appeal by the defendant, the High Court refused to interfere with the decision of the lower Court. In the absence of a definition of a public street in the Bombay District Municipal Act, the High Court refused to apply the definition contained in the City of Bombay Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888). **AHMEDABAD MUNICIPALITY v. MANILAL UDENATH . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 146**

2. **and s. 33—Street—Authority of the municipality under s. 33—Civil Court's interference with the discretion given to public bodies.** The word "street" in s. 17 of the Bombay District Municipal Act (VI of 1873) means and includes not merely the surface of the ground, but so much above and below it as is requisite or appropriate for the preservation of the street for the usual and intended purposes. The plaintiff proposed to make a balcony projecting over a public road. The Municipality objected to the work as an encroachment on a public street. He therefore sued the municipality to establish his right to build the proposed balcony. *Held*, that, so far as the column of space standing over the street was vested in the municipality, the plaintiff had no right to

**BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT
(BOM. ACT VI OF 1873)—*contd.*****s. 17—*conclld.***

occupy it with a balcony, which by intercepting light and air would greatly impair the use of the area as a street. S. 33 of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1873, gives the municipality a discretion to issue such orders as it thinks proper with reference to a proposed building. Civil Courts cannot interfere with that discretion, unless it is exercised in a capricious, wanton, and oppressive manner. The plaintiff was the owner of two houses on each side of the passage of a khidki, or open square, containing three or four other houses. He proposed to connect the two houses by building a story across the passage at such a height as not to interfere with the passage of those who were entitled to go to and fro. He applied to the local municipality for permission to build in the manner he proposed. The municipality forbade the work, on the ground that it was likely to interfere with the access of light and air to the neighbouring houses. The plaintiff thereupon sued the municipality to establish his right to build the proposed structure. It was contended for the plaintiff that the municipality ought not to have refused permission in the interests of the neighbouring householders, who were able to protect their own rights in case of injury. *Held*, that the suit would not lie, as the order of the municipality refusing permission was not an unreasonable one under the circumstances of the case. *Held*, further, that the authority of the municipality was not in any way affected by the circumstance that the proposed erection might be an encroachment on private rights subjecting the plaintiff to an action by the persons injured. **NAGAR VALAB NARSI v. MUNICIPALITY OF DHANDHUKA . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 490**

ss. 17, 48 and 64—Public street—Street lighted and swept by Municipality. The mere circumstance that a street is lighted and swept by a Municipality is not of itself sufficient to convert a private into a public street. **ANKLESVAR MUNICIPALITY v. RIKHAVCHAND KAPURCHAND (1906) . . . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 315**

1. **s. 21—Disposal by Government of objections to tax—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.** S. 21, which enables the Government to dispose of objections made to a tax by the inhabitants of a town, is quite consistent with the well-established jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide as to the validity of any fresh tax or impost, and affords no sufficient ground for the conclusion that the intention of the Legislature was to take away that jurisdiction. **JOSHI KALIDAS SEVAKRAM v. DAKOR TOWN MUNICIPALITY . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 399**

2. **Octroi duties—Imposition of tax—Inhabitants' objections—Consideration by municipality and opinion.** The requirements of cl. 2, s. 21 of Bombay District Municipal Act, VI of 1873, which enacts that "any inhabitant of the municipal district objecting to such tax, toll, or impost, may, within a fortnight from the date of

BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT
(BOM. ACT VI OF 1873)—*contd.*

s. 21—*contd.*

the said notice, send his objection in writing to the municipality, and the municipality shall take such objection into consideration and report their opinion thereon to the Governor in Council," is not satisfied by the Chairman of the Managing Committee considering the objections of the inhabitants and reporting his opinion to the Governor in Council or his representative the Commissioner of a Division. The provision for forwarding the opinion of the Municipality on the objections is an essential part of the machinery provided by that section for the legal imposition of a tax. **MUNICIPALITY OF POONA v. MOHANLAL**. I. L. R. 9 Bom. 51

3. — s. 21, cls. (1) and (2)—*Bombay District Municipal Amendment Act (Bombay Act II of 1884), s. 27, cl. (7), and s. 32—Tax imposed by municipality.* In 1891 the municipality of Surat appointed a committee to revise the taxation of the city, proposing to reduce some of the existing taxes and impose others with a view (*inter alia*) of obtaining a better water-supply for the city. A scheme of taxation drafted by the committee was subsequently adopted by the municipality, and it included a new house and property tax. The municipality then issued a notice with regard to this last-mentioned tax under the provisions of s. 21 of Bombay Act VI of 1873 setting forth the particulars of the proposed tax and requiring objections to be lodged within a fortnight from the date of the notice. A number of objections were received which were laid on the table for twenty-one days for perusal and consideration by the municipal commissioners. At the end of that time a special meeting of the Commissioners was held, at which it was resolved that the objections were invalid, and the scheme and the rules with regard to the levying of the tax were forwarded to Government and were sanctioned. The plaintiffs sued for an injunction restraining the municipality from levying the tax, contending that it was illegal, on the ground (i) that there was no municipality desirous of imposing the tax for any of the purposes allowed by the Act, inasmuch as the commissioners who passed the resolution to impose the tax did not know for what purpose the tax was to be imposed; (ii) that the resolution imposing the tax was illegal because the notice calling the meeting of the commissioners which passed the resolution did not specify this tax as the object of the meeting; (iii) that the notice given under s. 21 of Bombay Act VI of 1873 was bad, as it did not state the purpose of the proposed tax; (iv) that the nature and the amount of the tax were not sufficiently stated in the notice; (v) that the notice ought to have stated the mode in which the valuation of property for the purpose of the tax was to be made; (vi) that the objections of the rate-payers were not sufficiently considered; (vii) that it did not appear whether the tax was to be paid in advance or not; and (viii) that the assessment of the tax was made on a wrong basis. *Held*, (1) that the purpose of the tax was sufficiently

BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT
(BOM. ACT VI OF 1873)—*contd.*

s. 21—*concl.*

known to the commissioners; (2) that the resolution imposing the tax was not invalid, although the notice convening the meeting did not specify the object of the meeting; (3) that the notice need not specify the purpose of the tax; (4) that as to the nature and the amount of the tax, the notice was sufficient, as it stated that the amount would depend on the valuation of the property; (5) that the notice need define the mode of valuation; (6) that the objections were sufficiently considered; (7) that the tax was to be paid partly in advance; (8) that the assessment would not affect the validity of the tax, but would give a right of appeal to have the valuation set right. *Held*, therefore, that the tax was legally imposed. **SURAT CITY MUNICIPALITY v. OCHHAVARAM JAMNADAS**
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 630

s. 24.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—MUNICIPAL BODIES I. L. R. 24 Bom. 600

1. — s. 33—*Sanad under the Bombay City Survey Act (Bombay Act IV of 1868). The right of the municipality to call for the production of the sanad.* Under s. 33 of the Bombay District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI of 1873), the Municipality has no right to insist on the production of a sanad issued under s. 10 of the City Survey Act (Bombay Act IV of 1868) before granting permission to build. *In re JAMNADAS DULABDAS*
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 516

2. — *Demolition of building—Suit for damages.* Plaintiff having built a new wall on the site of an old wall, including the old foundations, the municipality pulled the wall down. Plaintiff thereupon sued the municipality for damages. The Judge rejected the claim for damages. *Held*, that the building of a new wall on the site of the old wall, including the old foundations, was not an addition to the existing building within the meaning of s. 33 of the District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI of 1873). The municipality was, therefore, liable in damages for any expenses which the plaintiff was put to by their pulling down the wall. **KRISHNAJI NARAYAN POKSHE v. MUNICIPALITY OF TASGAON**
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 547

3. — *Notice of proposed building—Right of municipality to demolish building erected without permission to build.* On the 18th August 1890, plaintiffs sent a notice to the town municipality of Umreth, intimating their intention to erect a building on their land, and giving a rough sketch plan of the land intended to be built upon. In this notice plaintiffs did not expressly state their intention to build the wall in dispute. On the 28th August 1890, the municipality wrote to the plaintiffs, requiring them to furnish a plan showing the design of the proposed building with its measurements. On the 30th

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(BOM. ACT VI OF 1873)—contd.
s. 33—contd.

September 1890, the plaintiffs, without furnishing the plan as required, built a wall on their land. Thereupon the municipality gave a notice to the plaintiffs requiring them to pull it down, as it has been built without their permission. The plaintiffs having failed to comply with this notice, the wall was demolished, and its materials were carried away by the municipal servants. Thereupon the plaintiffs sued the municipality to recover damages for the wrongful demolition of the wall. *Held*, that the plaintiffs had contravened the provisions of cl. 1 of s. 33 of Bombay Act VI of 1873, inasmuch as they had built the wall without giving any notice, or (if they did) gave notice without affording the information required by the municipality. The municipality were, therefore, justified in ordering the wall to be demolished. *DAVE HARISHANKAR v. TOWN MUNICIPALITY OF UMRETH* . . . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 27

4. *Building beyond area for which permission is granted—Omission to give notice of building—Power of municipality to order alteration or demolition of a building erected without notice or in excess of the permission.* Under the Bombay District Municipal Act, where an owner, having obtained permission under s. 33 to build on one portion of his land, builds on another portion without having obtained fresh permission, if such part of his building as is outside the limits for which permission has been granted is built without notice, the municipality can in their discretion order it to be demolished. *BHAWANISHANKAR v. SURAT CITY MUNICIPALITY*

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 187

5. *and s. 42—Discretion of municipality to take action under s. 33, cl. (3)—Court's power to interfere with such discretion.* A suit for an injunction to restrain a municipality from removing a certain building or construction is not an action "for anything done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of the Act" within the meaning of s. 48 of Bombay Act II of 1884. Such a suit can, therefore, be brought without giving previous notice to the municipality. Apart from the provisions of s. 33 of Bombay Act VI of 1873, it is only if the site of a building is vested in a municipality under s. 17 that this body is empowered, whether by s. 42 or by any other section to take steps for the removal of the building. The discretion of taking action or otherwise under the 3rd clause of s. 33 is vested in the municipality, which alone can determine whether or not the removal of a building erected contrary to the provisions of s. 33 is or is not a measure likely to promote the public convenience. If the municipality adopt the proper procedure, no Court can review its decision on the ground that in the opinion of the Court the removal of the building is not likely to promote public convenience. The Legislature has confided to the municipality, and the municipality alone, the duty of deciding what

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(BOM. ACT VI OF 1873)—contd.
s. 33—concl'd.

measures within its legal powers are for the public convenience, and its discretion is not subject to control by the Courts. *PATEL PANACHAND GIRDHAR v. AHMEDABAD MUNICIPALITY*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 230

6. *and 42—Municipality—Private street—Balcony projecting over private street—Notice to Municipality—Disobedience of the permission granted by Municipality.* *Held* by CHANDAVARKAR and ASTON, JJ. (BATTY, J., dissenting), that under the District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI of 1873) a Municipality has power to regulate or control the construction of balconies projecting over private streets. *TRIBHOVAN CHUNILAL v. AHMEDABAD MUNICIPALITY* (1902)

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 221

s. 36—*Privy, power of municipality to order to be built by owner of a house—Such order not imperative, but permissive—Discretion of Court.* The terms of s. 36 of Bombay Act VI of 1873 are not imperative in requiring a municipality to call on the owner of a house to build a privy, but are permissive, leaving it to the discretion of the municipality to determine when the power conferred on them shall be exercised. Accordingly, where the plaintiff complained that the defendants had erected a privy so close to his house as to be a nuisance, and the lower Appellate Court found it to be a nuisance, but rejected the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the defendants had erected the same under the orders of the municipality issued under s. 31 of the Act:—*Held*, reversing the decree of the lower Appellate Court, that the municipality had no authority to order the defendants to erect the privy regardless of the plaintiff's right, and that the defendants, therefore, could not plead that they acted under the orders of the municipality. The High Court directed an injunction to remove the privy within three months from the date of its decision. *JAFIR SAHEB v. KADIR RAHIMAN* . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 634

s. 42, cl. (1), and ss. 48 and 75—*Removal of obstruction in public street—Notice of removal—Corporate bodies—Practice—Suit for injunction.* Under the District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI of 1873), a municipality has power to have all obstructions in a public street removed, whether the obstruction were placed there lawfully or not. The only distinction which the Act draws is between obstructions erected or placed before the Act came into operation and those which have been erected or placed since it came into operation. As to the former, s. 42, cl. (1), of the Act provides that notice should be given, and, if legally placed on the street, compensation should be awarded for their removal. As to the latter, the municipality can remove them under s. 48 even without giving any notice. The public have a right of passing over the whole of a street if it is a public street. It is not the practice of the Court to interfere with

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(BOM. ACT VI OF 1873)—*contd.*

s. 42—*concl'd.*

corporate bodies, unless they are manifestly abusing their power. **AHMEDABAD MUNICIPALITY v. MANILAL UDENATH**. I. L. R. 19 Bom. 212

s. 48.

See ante, ss. 17, 48.

s. 48—*Re-erection of a structure formerly existing not within the section.* S. 48 of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1873, refers to the erection of a thing for the first time, and not to the re-erection of an old structure which had been taken down for a temporary purpose only. The accused was the owner of a shop in a public street at Thana. The shop had planks attached to it in front, overhanging a public gutter. These planks had been in existence before the District Municipal Act came into operation at Thana. In April 1897, the planks were temporarily removed under the orders of the plague authorities. The plague having ceased, the accused replaced the planks in October 1897 without the permission of the municipality. For this he was prosecuted and fined under s. 48 of Bombay Act VI of 1873. *Held*, reversing the conviction and sentence, that the refixing of the planks was not an "erection" within the meaning of s. 48 of the Act. **KALA GOVIND v. MUNICIPALITY OF THANA**

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 248

See ESHAN CHANDER MITTER v. BANKU BEHARI PAL I. L. R. 25 Calc. 160 and **MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, TANJORE v. VISVANATHA RAU** . . . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 4

s. 54—"Offensive liquid"—*Allowing waste or dirty water to run on to public street.* Person does not render himself liable to a penalty under s. 54 of Bombay Act VI of 1873 for allowing mere waste or dirty water to run from his premises on to a public street, unless the water is "offensive." *In re GULABDAS BHAIIDAS*

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 83

s. 64.

See ante, ss. 17, 48.

1. s. 66—*Selling vegetables in verandah of house.* Selling vegetables on the ota of a house is not using the ota "as a market" within the meaning of s. 66. Accordingly, a person who sold vegetables on the ota of his house was held not thereby to have committed any offence under s. 66 of the Municipal Act (Bombay) VI of 1873. *In re the petition of PABA KHOJI*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 272

2. *Sale of fruit in a private shop—Power of the municipality to prevent such a sale—Market, definition of.* The municipality of Ahmedabad issued a notification to the effect that no one should, within six hundred yards of the municipal market, open or establish a shop for the purpose of selling vegetables or fruits without a

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(BOM. ACT VI OF 1873)—*contd.*

s. 66—*concl'd.*

license, and that, if any one acted in contravention of this notification, he would be dealt with according to law. The accused hired a house, and opened a shop for selling fruit within six hundred yards of the municipal market without obtaining a license from the municipality. The second class Magistrate convicted and sentenced each of the accused to pay a fine of Rs. The District Magistrate, relying on the case of *In re Paba Khoji*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 272, reversed the conviction and sentence. *Held*, that what the municipality had authority to direct under s. 66 of (Bombay) Act VI of 1873 was that no place, other than the municipal market or other places licensed as markets, should be used by any body as a market; but they had no authority to issue a notification affecting other places which might be used for selling vegetables, etc., otherwise than as a market; that, inasmuch as the using of the shop by the accused was confined simply to the selling of fruit, and not of "vegetables" in the popular sense, it could not be affected by the prohibition contemplated by s. 66 of the Act that, if the prohibition of the municipality was meant to affect the private rights of persons to use their shops for selling their own commodities, that would amount to an excess of the authority conferred by the District Municipal Act (Bombay) VI of 1873; that the shop used by the accused for the sale of their own commodities was not a "market" within the meaning of s. 66 of Bombay Act VI of 1873. *Mayor of London v. Law*, 49 L. J. Q. B. 144, and *Mayor of Manchester v. Lyons*, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 287, followed. The case of *In re Paba Khoji*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 272, explained. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MAGAN HARJIVAN**

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 106

s. 73—*Power of the municipality to suppress caste-feasts on the outbreak of cholera—Meaning of the words "take such measures as may be deemed necessary"—Penal Code, s. 188—Construction of statutes.* The City of Ahmedabad being threatened with an outbreak of cholera, the president of the local municipality, acting under s. 73 of Bombay Act VI of 1873, issued an order, in the form of a proclamation, prohibiting the holding of caste-feasts when over thirty persons were to assemble. After the promulgation of this order, the accused gave a feast in a private house to upwards of thirty people of his caste. He was thereupon convicted, under s. 188 of the Penal Code, for disobedience of an order duly promulgated by a public servant, and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 35. *Held* (reversing the conviction and sentence), that s. 73 of the Bombay District Municipal Act (VI of 1873) did not empower the municipality to place an interdict on people meeting together to eat and drink in their own houses. The words in the section, "take such measures as may be deemed necessary to prevent, meet, or suppress the outbreak," imply in themselves something actively to be done by the municipality, rather than any

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— s. 73—*concl.*

limitation to be imposed on the private rights of the citizens in their relations of daily life. Special measures for the health of the town—such as sulphur fumigation, daily flushing of sewers, insistence on good house sanitation, isolation of infected districts, and other similar steps to be taken by the authorities themselves—fall naturally within the meaning of the terms of the section. The Court ought not to strain an Act in favour of an interference with private rights which is not justified by the primary sense of the language. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HARILAL*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 180

1. — s. 74 and ss. 36, 39—*Notice by municipality—Offence under Act.* Non-compliance with notices issued by the municipality under s. 36 or cl. 1 of s. 39 of the Bombay District Municipal Act, VI of 1873, is not an offence punishable under the Act, as cl. 1 of s. 74 of that Act does not apply to either of those provisions. The latter clause applies only to the 2nd clause of s. 39. *In re TUKARAM VITHAL* . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 527

2. — and s. 33—*“External alteration”*—Opening of a new doorway in a building without notice to municipality. Opening a new external door is an “external alteration” of the building in which the door is opened, and such act done without the notice to the municipality, contemplated by s. 33 of Bombay Act VI of 1873, is an offence punishable under s. 74 of the same Act. *Seemle*: Where such act does not cause any inconvenience to any person, a slight nominal fine is an adequate punishment. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GUJRIA* . . . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 568

— s. 84.

See *BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT, 1884*, s. 49 . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 400

See *MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—GENERAL JURISDICTION.*

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 442

1. — *Nature of proceedings taken under s. 84 for the recovery of municipal taxes—Magistrate's duty under the section.* A proceeding before a Magistrate for the recovery of municipal cesses and taxes instituted under s. 84 of Bombay Act VI of 1873 is a criminal prosecution, and must be conducted in the manner prescribed for summary trials under Ch. XXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882). In such a proceeding a Magistrate is not bound to order payment of the full amount claimed by the municipality, but must satisfy himself as to the extent of the defaulter's legal liability before passing any order against him. *MUNICIPALITY OF AHMEDABAD v. JUMNA PUNJA* . . . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 731

2. — *Contract to collect a tax levied by a Municipality—Suit for money*

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(BOM. ACT VI OF 1873)—*contd.*

— s. 84—*contd.*

due under such contract. A person who had obtained a contract to collect a certain tax imposed by a district municipality, having failed to pay over the money due under the contract at the stipulated time, was convicted by a Magistrate under s. 84 of the Bombay District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI of 1873) and ordered to pay it to the municipality with interest, and also to pay a fine and Court-fee charges. *Held*, reversing the order, that the section did not apply. *In re JAGU SANTRAM* . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 709

3. — as amended by Bombay Act II of 1884—*Arrears of rent—Penalty in addition to arrears of rent.* S. 84 of the Bombay District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI of 1873) allows penalties to be imposed in addition to arrears of cesses or taxes, but it does not provide for the imposition of a penalty in addition to the arrears of rent. *In re RANGU* . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 708

4. — *Taxation—Duty on goods imported within municipal limits—“Imported”*—Meaning of the word. A rule of the Thana Municipality provided for the levy of octroi duty on certain articles “when imported within the Thana Municipal District.” *Held*, that goods merely passing through the municipal district in the course of transit to Bombay were “imported” within the meaning of the rule, and were, therefore, liable to duty. *In re RAHIMU BHANJI*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 843

5. — *House valuation for purposes of taxation—Valuation made by municipality—Magistrate's power to revise the valuation.* Under the rules passed under the Bombay District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI of 1873) as amended by Bombay Act II of 1884, the Municipality of Wai estimated the annual letting value of a house belonging to the accused at Rs50 and levied a house-tax of Rs2-8-0. A, a tax-payer, applied to the managing committee for a reduction of the tax, but his application was dismissed. Default having been made in payment of the tax, A was prosecuted under s. 84 of the Act before a second class Magistrate. He contended that the estimate made by the municipality was too high, and that his house would not let for more than 10 or 12 rupees a year. The Magistrate took evidence on the point, and found that the annual rental of the house would not exceed Rs12, and he ordered payment of 12 annas only on account of the tax. *Held*, that the Magistrate had no power to go behind the estimate of value framed by the managing committee under the powers giving to it by the rules. He ought to have accepted as conclusive the amount found by the managing committee to be the letting value of the house, and held the legal liability of the accused to pay the tax based on this amount to be proved. The remedy of the accused, if he considered his house assessed too highly, was to apply to the managing committee, and no other mode of redress.

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was open to him. *Municipality of Ahmedabad v. Jumna Punja*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 731, distinguished.
MUNICIPALITY OF WAI *v.* KRISHNAJI GANGADHAR
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 446

See *MORAR v. BORSAD TOWN MUNICIPALITY*.
I. L. R. 24 Bom. 607

s. 86.

See *BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT*,
1884, s. 48. I. L. R. 18 Bom. 19

See *LIMITATION ACT*, 1877, s. 14.
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 529

1. *Suit against Municipality for damages.* S. 96 of Bombay Act VI of 1873 is not applicable to suits in the nature of actions of ejectment, but only to suits for damages. *JOHARMAL v. MUNICIPALITY OF AHMEDNAGAR*
I. L. R. 6 Bom. 580

2. *Illegal tax—Notice of action for refund—Time within which to bring suit—Limitation.* On the 18th March 1880, the Dakor Town Municipality, acting under the powers conferred upon them by the Bombay Act VI of 1873, convened a meeting at which it was resolved to impose a house-tax on the town; and also another meeting on the 2nd of April 1880, at which a classification of the houses was made and the rates fixed. The Revenue Commissioner, N. D., on behalf of the Government, sanctioned the resolutions on the 2nd of June 1880. Notice of the meeting of the 18th of March 1880 was not served on three of the commissioners, they being absent at the time from Dakor, and no notice specifying the business to be transacted therein was posted up at the kutcherry as required by s. 11, cl. (1), of the Act. K, a householder, sent a notice to the municipality on the 25th of January 1881, impeaching the legality of the tax. On the 3rd of June 1881, he paid the tax—namely, R2—for which he had been rated, and on the 6th of January 1882 he sued for a refund of the said sum from the municipality. *Held*, that the suit was not brought too late to satisfy the requirements of s. 86 of the Act. When the notice of the 25th of January 1881 was sent by K, he had no cause of action against the municipality for anything done; no notice, therefore, such as is contemplated by s. 86, was ever sent by K, and consequently there could be no final order on such notice from which the three months prescribed by that section would run. *Quære*: Whether s. 86 of the Bombay Act VI of 1873 applies to an action for money had and received. *JOSHI KALIDAS SEVAKRAM v. DAKOR TOWN MUNICIPALITY*
I. L. R. 7 Bom. 399

3. *Notice—Municipality—Nature of action.* A person suing a municipality constituted by Bombay Act VI of 1873 for the refund of money illegally levied from him as house-tax is bound to serve a previous notice on the said municipality as re-

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(BOM. ACT VI OF 1873)—*concl'd.*****s. 86—*concl'd.***

quired by s. 86 of the Act. The object of that provision would appear to be to give municipal bodies or officers, who in the *bond fide* discharge of their public duties may have committed illegal acts not justified by their powers, an opportunity of tendering sufficient amends for such acts before being harassed with an action. S. 86 of the Act is not confined to an action of damages, but is applicable to every claim of a pecuniary character arising out of the acts of municipal bodies or officers, who in the *bond fide* discharge of their public duties may have committed illegalities not justified by their powers. *RANCHOD VARAJBHAI v. MUNICIPALITY OF DAKOR*
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 142

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(BOM. ACT II OF 1884).****s. 23.**

See *SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT*
—*CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE*, s. 622.
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 279

s. 27.

See *BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT*,
1873, s. 21. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 630

s. 27 (2), (17), (30).

Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 2, 23, 25 and 63—Special general meeting—President—Dispensation or remission—Promise—Contract by Corporation—Executed consideration. In order that a meeting of the Special General Committee of a District Municipality should be properly constituted, it must be called by the President under s. 27 (2) of the District Municipal Act (Bombay Act II of 1884). If the meeting be not so called, the defect is not cured by s. 27 (17). Under s. 63 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), there can be dispensation or remission only by means of a promise. There must be a proposal of the dispensation or remission which is accepted. Under s. 10 of the Contract Act, consideration is not an essential of an agreement. In the Act the word "agreement" refers both to "a promise" and a "set of promises forming the consideration for each other." Though a contract by a Corporation must ordinarily be made under seal, still, where there is that which is known as an executed consideration, an action will lie, though this formality has not been observed. *ABAJI SITARAM v. TRIMBAK MUNICIPALITY (1904)*. I. L. R. 28 Bom. 66

s. 30

See *DAMAGES—SUITS FOR DAMAGES—BREACH OF CONTRACT*.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 618

1. *s. 48—Bombay District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI of 1873), s. 86—Suit against municipality for ejectment.* The words "in the case of any such action for damages" in

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(BOM. ACT II OF 1884)—contd.
s. 48—contd.

s. 48 of the Bombay District Municipal Amendment Act (Bombay Act II of 1884) clearly show that it was contemplated that there might be actions of another description to which the provisions in the former paragraph would be applicable. The section does not contemplate only "suits to recover monetary compensation for a wrongful act." A suit in ejectment—not being a suit brought to recover damages "for an act done or intended to be done"—was excluded under s. 86 of the Bombay District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI of 1873), but being an "action for an act done," that act, being the dispossession by the municipality with a view to being restored to possession, falls under the provisions of the first paragraph of s. 48 of Bombay Act II of 1884. *Nagusha v. Municipality of Sholapur*. . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 19

2. *Suit against Municipality for injunction—Notice of action.* A suit for an injunction to restrain a municipality from removing a certain building or construction is not an action "for anything done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of the Act" within the meaning of s. 48 of Bombay Act II of 1884. Such a suit can, therefore, be brought without giving previous notice to the municipality. *PATEL PANACHAND GIRDHAR v. AHMEDABAD MUNICIPALITY* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 230

3. *Bombay Act VI of 1873, s. 86—Purchase from mortgagee by municipality—Suit by mortgagor to recover possession—Ejectment—Limitation—Notice.* A mortgagee (defendant No. 1 refused to give up part of the mortgaged land when the mortgage was paid off in 1881. He remained in possession, and in 1888 he sold this land to the Municipality of Mahad (defendant No. 2). The mortgagor subsequently sued the municipality and its vendor to recover possession. The municipality contended that the suit was barred by limitation under s. 48 of the District Municipal Act, 1884. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by s. 48. That section does not apply to actions of ejectment brought against a municipality. Such an action brought to try the title to land is not an action for anything done or purporting to be done in pursuance of the Act. *Nagusha v. Municipality of Sholapur*, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 19, distinguished. *KASHINATH KESHAV JOSHI v. GANGABAI*
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 283

4. *Ejectment suit against municipality—Notice.* The plaintiff was the inamdar of the village of Dakor. He filed an ejectment suit against the municipality of Dakor, alleging that the municipality had illegally and wrongfully encroached upon a portion of the Gomti Lake at Dakor by laying the foundations of a building which they intended to erect for the purpose of a dharmshala. The municipality pleaded (*inter alia*) that the suit was bad for want of notice of action under s. 48 of the Bombay District Municipal

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(BOM. ACT II OF 1884)—contd.
s. 48—contd.

Act, 1884. *Held* (by a majority of the Full Bench), that the provisions of s. 48 of Bombay Act II of 1884 do not apply to actions for the possession of land brought against a municipality. *Per PARSONS, J.*—The provisions of s. 48 apply only to actions for the possession of land whereof the plaintiff has been dispossessed by the municipality acting or purporting to act under some section of the Municipal Act, which empowers them to take possession of, or oust any one from, that land. *Per RANADE, J.*—S. 48 does not generally apply to suits for the possession of land, except in those cases where the claim arises on account of some act or omission of the municipality when it acts in pursuance of its statutory powers, and encroaches upon private rights. *Nagusha v. Municipality of Sholapur*, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 19, overruled. *MANOHAR GANESHI TAMBEKAR v. DAKOR MUNICIPALITY*
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 289

5. *Suit for damages, possession, and injunction—Notice of action.* In a suit brought against a municipality to recover possession of a piece of land taken by it, for damages for pulling down a wall on the land, and for an injunction: *Held*, that, as regards damages, the suit came under s. 48 of the District Municipal Act, 1884, but, as regards possession and injunction, notice of action was not necessary under the section. *SHIDMALLAPPA NARANDAPPA v. GOKAK MUNICIPALITY* . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 605

6. *Suit for specific performance of a contract or for damages for breach thereof.* S. 48 of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1884, does not apply to a suit for the specific performance of a contract or for damages for breach thereof. *MUNICIPALITY OF FAIZPUR v. MANAK DULAB SHET* . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 637

7. *Suit for an injunction to restrain municipality.* A suit was brought by the plaintiff against a municipality for an injunction to restrain them from laying water-pipes on his land. The lower Courts dismissed the suit for want of notice under s. 48 of the District Municipal Act, 1884. *Held*, reversing the decree, that the suit was not a suit for anything done in pursuance of the Act, but to prevent the municipality from doing what the plaintiff alleged to be an illegal act, and that s. 48 did not apply. *HARILAL RANCHODLAL v. HIMAT MANEKCHAND*
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 636

8. *Municipality—Suit against Municipality for declaration and injunction—Notice of action.* The plaintiffs sued the Municipality of Parola to obtain a declaration that a certain building erected by them had been built in accordance with, and not in contravention of, orders issued by the Municipality; and, further, to obtain an injunction restraining the Municipality from pulling it down. The Municipality contended (*inter alia*) that the suit was not maintainable, as

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no notice of the suit had been given as required by s. 48 of the District Municipal Act (Bom. Act II of 1884). *Held*, that notice was not made an indispensable preliminary to such a suit by s. 48 of the Act. **MUNICIPALITY OF PAROLA v. LAKSHMANDAS SUPADUBHAI** (1900)

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 142

s. 49—*Bombay District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI of 1873), s. 84—Non-payment of taxes—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), s. 40—Penalty—"Fine"—Imprisonment in default of payment of penalty.* There is no distinction between the word "penalty" as used in Bombay District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI of 1873) and the word "fine" as used in s. 64 of the Penal Code (XLV of 1860). Imprisonment can, therefore, be awarded in default of any penalty inflicted under s. 84 of the Municipal Act. *In re LAKMIA*

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 400

s. 57.

See **BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT, 1873, s. 11** . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 732

BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT
(BOM. ACT III OF 1901).See **PENAL CODE, ss. 21, 186.**

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 213

1. ——— *Non-feasance—Negligence in performance of duty towards plaintiff—Suit for damages.* The plaintiff, an inhabitant of Ahmedabad, having brought a suit against the Ahmedabad Municipality to recover damages sustained by him on receipt of an injury caused to his horse and carriage in consequence of the neglect of the Municipality to repair a road: *Held*, that, as the default leading to the damage was a mere non-feasance, the suit must fail, for the Statute does not impose upon the Municipality a duty towards the plaintiff, which they negligently failed to perform. **ACHRATLAL v. THE AHMEDABAD MUNICIPALITY** (1904). . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 340

2. ——— *District Municipal Election Rules, Rule 13—Plaintiff candidate for election as Councillor—Plaintiff's name not published in the list of candidates—Receiving Officer—Suit against Municipality—Declaration—Injunction.* The plaintiff offered himself as a candidate to be elected a Councillor in the Municipal elections, but his name was not included in the list of candidates published by the Receiving Officer appointed by the Collector under Rule 13 of the District Municipal Election Rules. The plaintiff thereupon brought a suit against the Municipality for a declaration that he was entitled to be elected a Councillor at the elections and for an injunction restraining the Municipality from holding the elections without accepting him as a candidate and without receiving the votes of his voters. The first Court rejected the plaint on the ground that it disclosed no cause of action. On

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(BOM. ACT III OF 1901)—*concl'd.*

appeal by the plaintiff the Judge reversed the order and remanded the proceedings for decision of the suit according to law. On appeal by the Municipality: *Held*, reversing the order of remand, that the suit for a declaration against the Municipality could not lie because the Municipality neither denied nor was interested to deny the character or right which the plaintiff sought to establish. It was the officer mentioned in Rule 13 of the District Municipal Election Rules that was concerned with that question and over him the Municipality had no control. The claim for an injunction could not be sustained against the Municipality, when it had done no wrong and had proposed to proceed in accordance with the District Municipal Act and the rule, so far as they relate to it. **SURAT CITY MUNICIPALITY v. CHUNILAL** (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 409

ss. 82 (c) and 86—*House-tax—Suit for injunction restraining levy of tax—Right to sue in Civil Court without first proceeding under s. 86—Injunction, when granted—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 56—Discretion.* The Surat City Municipality served, under s. 82, cl (3), of the Bombay District Municipal Act (III of 1901), a notice of demand upon the plaintiff for house-tax due by him. The plaintiff, instead of proceeding under s. 86 of the Act, instituted a suit in the Civil Court for an injunction to restrain the Municipality from recovering the house-tax from him. The lower Courts rejected the claim, on the ground that, as the plaintiff had omitted to appeal to a Magistrate under s. 86 of the Act, his suit was premature. *Held*, that s. 86 was permissive merely, and that it did not make it incumbent in every case upon a party complaining of an illegal levy of a tax by a Municipality to appeal against the action of the Municipality to a Magistrate before suing in a Civil Court. But *held*, also, (confirming the decree), that the injunction prayed for in this case could not be granted. By s. 56 of the Specific Relief Act, an injunction cannot be granted where efficacious relief can be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding. S. 86 of Bombay Act III of 1901 gave a remedy to the plaintiff, but instead of resorting to it he filed this suit for an injunction. It was discretionary for a Court to grant an injunction, and that discretion must be exercised judicially, with extreme caution, and only in very clear cases. This was not a case of that kind. **CHUNILAL THAKORDAS MODI v. SURAT CITY MUNICIPALITY** (1903) . . . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 403

BOMBAY DISTRICT POLICE ACT (VII OF 1867).

See **JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS—EUROPEAN BRITISH SUBJECTS.**

7 Bom. Cr. 6

s. 16.

See **BOMBAY LAND REVENUE ACT, ss. 153, 159** . . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 455

BOMBAY DISTRICT POLICE ACT (VII OF 1867)—*concl.*s. 16—*concl.*

See BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION ACT, s. 4 . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 455

s. 23—*Police-officer below the rank of Inspector. Power of, to prosecute—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 495.* The provisions of s. 23 of Bombay Act VII of 1867 have not been superseded by s. 495 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), but are still in force. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HONKERAPA* I. L. R. 8 Bom. 534

s. 27—*Prohibition of music in private house.* S. 27 of Bombay Act VII of 1867 does not empower the police to prohibit the use of music in private houses. *REG. v. LUKHMA CHANGO* 9 Bom. 153

ss. 28, 29—*Order under s. 28—Powers of Police under the Act, s. 28.* An order issued under s. 28 of the Bombay District Police Act (VII of 1867) need not be in writing: disobedience of a verbal order given under that section is punishable under s. 29. The words of s. 28 of the District Police Act, which authorize the police to keep order in the neighbourhood of places of worship during the time of public worship, confer upon the police a power of regulating traffic and putting a stop to noises in the neighbourhood of places of worship during the time of worship, but do not limit their general powers of keeping order at and within all places of public resort, temples, jattras, or the like, when necessary. *REG. v. BASSEJI GUNGARAIN* 7 Bom. Cr. 2

s. 31.

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.

5 Bom. Cr. 43

Operation of section—Notification by Government—Magistrate. Bombay Act VII of 1867, s. 31, became at once operative in all places where a Magistrate was resident, without having been specifically extended thereto by Government notification. *REG. v. KERUBIN RAMSHET* 5 Bom. Cr. 100

s. 33—*Meaning of the word "Booth"*

Structure contemplated by the section, nature of—Structure not on public road and causing no nuisance to the public. The accused had a house on each side of a public road. On the occasion of a wedding he put bamboos across the street from the top windows of one house into the top windows of the other house, and laid a covering of cloth over the bamboos, thus making a canopy, or awning, over the street. It was at such a height that no obstruction or inconvenience whatever was caused to persons or animals passing along the street. The accused erected the structure without the permission of a Magistrate or Municipal Commissioner. For this act the accused was convicted by a Magistrate under s. 33 of the Bombay District Police Act, 1867, and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 5. *Held,*

BOMBAY DISTRICT POLICE ACT (VII OF 1867)—*concl.*s. 33—*concl.*

reversing the conviction and sentence, that the structure erected by the accused was not a "booth" within the meaning of s. 33 of Bombay Act VII of 1867. The structure contemplated by the section must be on the road itself and cause some nuisance to the public. As no part of the structure in question touched the road, it could not be said to have been constructed on the road. *In re NAHAICHAND* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 742

s. 42.

See LIMITATION Act, 1877, s. 14 (1859, s. 14; . . . 10 Bom. 204

BOMBAY DISTRICT POLICE ACT (IV OF 1890).

s. 47—*Right of the police to have free access to a place of public amusement or resort—Race-course enclosure.* Races were held in a certain enclosed ground at Poona which belonged to the Military authorities, and was lent for the purpose to the Western India Turf Club. The part of the ground to which the public were admitted was fenced in by ropes, and soldiers were stationed at intervals to prevent any persons entering or leaving the enclosure otherwise than through the passages provided for the purpose. The Inspector of Police, who was present on duty in that capacity, contrary to the regulations prescribed by the stewards of the races, crossed over the fencing ropes into the enclosure instead of going in by the regular entrance. This was reported to the honorary secretary of the club, who had general charge of the arrangements. He sent for the inspector, and, after an interview with him, ordered two soldiers, who were in attendance to keep order, to put him out of the enclosure. They accordingly did so, laying hands on him in the first instance, but immediately at his request letting him go and merely escorting him outside. He thereupon, under s. 353 of the Penal Code, charged the secretary of the club with using criminal force to a public servant in the exercise of his duty. *Held,* that the offence had been committed. Under s. 47 of the Bombay Police Act, 1890, the police had a right of free access to the race-course. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ROSS* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 746

1. s. 48, cl (a)—*Order as to conduct of procession.* A District Superintendent of Police issued a notification to the following effect:—"No member of any sect can be permitted to proceed naked to the *tirth* to bathe, nor while there to bathe naked, nor to pass the streets naked on any account. If any one does this, he will be dealt with according to law." *Held,* that this notification was not illegal or *ultra vires*. It was not any order or command as to costume, but merely a warning to the people that an indecent exposure of the person was an offence under the law, and would be dealt with as such. *In re HUKUMPURIBAVA GOSAVI* . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 715

BOMBAY DISTRICT POLICE ACT (IV OF 1890)—concl'd.

s. 48—concl'd.

2. ——— cl. (b)—*Nuisance—Noise*—“Near a street,” meaning of the words—*Power of the police to regulate the playing of music in private houses.* S. 48, cl. (b), of Bombay Act IV of 1890 does not empower the District Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent of Police to stop music in private houses. The words in the clause “near a street” are intended to mean open spaces by the sides or at the ends of streets. *In re JAMNADAS BHUKHANDAS*

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 737

ss. 51 and 52.

See ABETMENT I. L. R. 20 Bom. 394

s. 53, cl. (2), and s. 65—*Refusal to attend in order to make a panchnama.* The accused refused to attend to make a panchnama regarding an obstruction to a public road caused by a grain-dealer by keeping his grain bags on the road. He was thereupon convicted under s. 53, cl. (2), and s. 65 of the Bombay District Police Act, 1890. *Held*, that the conviction was illegal. Non-attendance to make the panchnama in question was not an offence punishable under the Police Act. *In re BHOLASHANKAR* . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 970

BOMBAY GENERAL CLAUSES ACT (III OF 1886).

See REGISTRATION ACT, s. 17.

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 387

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—
JURISDICTION—IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 387

BOMBAY GENERAL CLAUSES ACT (BOM. ACT I OF 1904).

See BOMBAY CITY MUNICIPAL ACT.

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 126

BOMBAY GOVERNMENT RESOLUTION.

No. 512 of 1882.

See HEREDITARY OFFICES ACT, s. 4.

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 738

BOMBAY HIGH COURT.

See LETTERS PATENT 10 C. W. N. 185

See NATIVE STATES . 10 C. W. N. 361

BOMBAY IRRIGATION ACT (BOM. ACT VII OF 1879).

ss. 3, sub-s. (2), 5, 8, 23, 27, 87—*Nala—Water-course—Canal—Irrigation Department—Right to control water or to obstruct the use thereof—Riparian proprietor—Enjoyment and benefit of water—Strict construction of Statutes encroaching on the rights of subjects.* The defendant was in possession of a plot of land, Survey No. 13, and a nala, that is, a water-course, ran past that

BOMBAY IRRIGATION ACT (BOM. ACT VII OF 1879)—cont'd.

s. 3—cont'd.

Plot of land. The nala was crossed at a considerable distance to the north of the defendant's land by a Government irrigation canal. The water flowing in the nala was derived from two sources: (i) from the rain water from the hills and catchment area of the nala, and (ii) from percolation of water or waste from the canal. Apart from abnormal periods of drought, the second of the two sources was perennial and the more important of the two. Before the canal was made there was a surface flow in a portion of the nala, and this flow lasted through the rains and for a portion of the cold weather and there was no flow after December. For seven hundred yards below the point of contract of the canal and the nala, the nala was normally dry and gravelly for many months, but at a point some seven hundred yards lower down the canal there was a spring and thence downwards there was a perennial stream. The nala, however, throughout the rainy months held a fair body of water. In the year 1897, the Irrigation Department put a dam across the nala and thereby infringed the defendant's riparian right. The defendant thereupon brought a summary suit against the Executive Engineer for Irrigation and his subordinates in the Court of the Mamlatdar of Haveli for the removal of the dam and obtained a decree in his favour. Thereupon, the Secretary of State for India as plaintiff, brought the present suit against the defendant praying that his right to control the water in the water-course (nala) in suit and to obstruct the use of such water therein by the defendant subject to the conditions imposed by the Bombay Irrigation Act (Bom. Act VII of 1879) should be declared. The first Court rejected the suit. The plaintiff having appealed: *Held*, confirming the decree, that the water-course with which the defendant was concerned was a stream as that word is legally understood. It was a natural channel and not one constructed under the provisions of the Bombay Irrigation Act. It was not in direct communication with the canal; there was no agreement for the supply of water under the Act, and such water (if any) as found its way from the canal into it came there by percolation. The defendant got the water from the canal not, because he was entitled to it, but because it came to him, and it would be open to the canal authorities to take such measures as would prevent the percolation. As defendants had the right of a riparian proprietor to the usufructuary interest in the water in the nala, which was incidental to the possession of the adjacent soil, it followed that whatever might be the nature of the tenancy, he as the occupant of the land abutting on the stream, and not the Government, was entitled to the enjoyment and benefit of the water as it flowed past. A natural stream, though its flow of water be in part derived by percolation from a canal, is not a canal, until the Governor in Council has applied to it the provisions of s. 5 of the Bombay Irrigation Act. Statutes, which encroach on the rights of subjects whether as regards person

BOMBAY IRRIGATION ACT (BOM. ACT VII OF 1879)—concl'd.

s. 3—concl'd.

or property, must receive a strict construction. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA *v.* BALVANT GANESH (1904) . . . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 105

1. ——— s. 48—*Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), s. 4 (b)—Water-rate—Land revenue—Percolation of canal water—Opinion of the canal officer—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.* Where water-rate is levied under s. 48 of the Irrigation Act (Bombay Act VII of 1879), the question as to the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in suit for the determination of the legality or otherwise of such levy depends upon whether the incidence of the rate is authorized by the provisions of the section. Under it, the condition precedent to levying the rate is not the fact ascertained by deciding whether the water in dispute has percolated from the canal, but the opinion of the canal officer that it has so percolated, he and not the Civil Court being made the Judge of such percolation for the purposes of the Act. Such water-rate falls within the denomination of land revenue. BALVANT GANESH OZE *v.* SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 377

2. ——— *Leakage water—Rights of riparian proprietors—Water-course.* The Irrigation Department has no power under Bombay Act VII of 1879 to dam a stream or a water-course on the ground that it derives its supply of water by leakage from an irrigation canal. S. 48 of the Act only gives the department the special right of charging a water-rate on land which derives benefit from the leakage. Water which has leaked from a canal into the land of another person does not belong to the Irrigation Department, so as to give the latter the right to follow it up and claim it as their own. If the leakage flow was such that it itself had become in the eye of the law a canal or water-course, then the rights of the persons through whose lands it flowed would be governed by the law applicable to canals or water-courses. BALVANTRAO *v.* SPROTT . . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 761

BOMBAY LAND-REVENUE ACT (V OF 1879).

See BOMBAY LOCAL FUNDS ACT, 1869.
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 422

See LAND-REVENUE.
I. L. R. 26 Bom. 504

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ARTS. 120 AND 110 . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 556

ss. 3 and 203—*Forest Officer, Revenue Officer.* A Forest Officer is not a Revenue Officer within the definition in s. 2 of the Land Revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879), and does not become one merely by being placed under a Revenue Officer for purposes of control. NARAYAN BALLAL *v.* SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 803

BOMBAY LAND-REVENUE ACT (V OF 1879)—cont'd.

s. 15.

See MAMLATDARS' COURTS ACT, 1876, s. 3.
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 585

Land-revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879), ss. 4, 13, 15, 18, 19, and 20—*Mamlatdars' Courts Act (Bombay Act III of 1876), s. 3—Mamlatdar—Substitute designated under the Land-revenue Code—Exercise of the powers of Mamlatdar.* A substitute designated under s. 15 of the Land Revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879) cannot exercise the powers conferred by the Mamlatdars' Courts Act (Bombay Act III of 1876) on the Mamlatdar to whose office he has temporarily succeeded. DEORAV *v.* NARAYANDAS HARAKCHAND (1900)
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 318

s. 37.

See s. 135 . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 424

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—ORDERS OF CRIMINAL COURTS.
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 293

See LAND REVENUE CODE.
I. L. R. 31 Bom. 456

ss. 38 and 39.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS, BOMBAY.
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 684

s. 56.

See MORTGAGE—REDEMPTION—RIGHT OF REDEMPTION I. L. R. 16 Bom. 134
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 396

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 381

1. ——— and ss. 57, 81, 214 (e), and (i) —*Failure to pay Government assessment—Forfeiture—Payment of the arrears by tenant actually in possession—Forfeiture not followed by sale of occupancy—Lease not destroyed by the forfeiture—Tenant's liability for rent subsequent to the forfeiture.* A registered occupant of land having failed to pay the arrears of Government revenue, his occupancy was forfeited under s. 56 of the Land Revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879), but the forfeiture was not followed by sale of the occupancy, the Collector having allowed the registered occupant's tenant under a lease to be registered as occupant on his paying up all arrears of Government revenue due on the land. Afterwards a question having arisen as to the tenant's liability for rent under the lease subsequent to the forfeiture: Held, that the tenant was liable. When a registered occupant's tenancy is forfeited under s. 56 of the Land Revenue Code, and that forfeiture is not followed by sale of the occupancy (the Collector allowing the person actually in possession to be registered as occupant on his paying up all arrears of Government revenue due on the land), the lease by which

BOMBAY LAND-REVENUE ACT (V OF 1879)—contd.**s. 56—concl'd.**

the person actually in possession was holding from the former registered occupant is not destroyed by the forfeiture, and the lessee is still under liability to his landlord. *GANPARSHIBAI v. TIMMAYA SHIVAPPA HALLPAIK* . . . **I. L. R. 24 Bom. 34**

2. ——— and ss. 122, 153, 155, and 187—*Charges incurred in connection with boundary marks—Effect of revenue sale—Mode of recovering such charges—Sale for recovery of such charges—Rights of incumbrancers.* The effect of s. 187 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879) is to make the provisions of ss. 153 and 56, and also those of s. 155, applicable to sales for the recovery of charges assessed under s. 122 in connection with boundary marks. Such charges may be recovered either by forfeiture of the occupancy in respect of which the arrear is due, or by sale of the defaulter's immoveable property other than the land on which the arrear is due. In the former case the land is freed from all incumbrances created by the occupant. In the latter case the rights of incumbrancers are not touched. *VENKATESH RAMKRISHNA v. MHAL PAIBIN NARU PAI* . . . **I. L. R. 15 Bom. 67**

ss. 56, 57, 153—Arrears of assessment—Forfeiture by Government—Mortgage—Land in possession of the occupant—Re-grant by Government to the occupant—Suit by mortgagee to recover possession—Equities arising out of the conduct of the parties. Forfeiture ordinarily implies the loss of a legal right by reason of some breach of obligation. When arrears of assessment are levied by sale, then s. 56 of the Land Revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879) in pursuance of an obvious policy, empowers the Collector to sell "freed from all tenures, incumbrances and rights created by the occupant . . . or any of his predecessors-in-title or in anywise subsisting against such occupant." Should the Collector otherwise dispose of the occupancy, the section affords no such protection, and the legal relations must be determined by reference to the ordinary law. So judged, the effects of a forfeiture and the subsequent acquisition of the forfeited property are subject to the control of equities arising out of the conduct of the parties. *Balkrishna Vasudev v. Madhavarav Narayan*, **I. L. R. 5 Bom. 73**, followed. *AMOLAK BANECHAND v. DHONDI* (1906) . . . **I. L. R. 30 Bom. 466**

s. 57.

See MORTGAGE—REDEMPTION—RIGHT OF REDEMPTION . . . **I. L. R. 16 Bom. 134**

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY. . . . **I. L. R. 21 Bom. 381**

s. 61 and ss. 37, 38—Omission to number lands at a survey—Effect of such omission on owner's rights—Summary settlement—Exclusion of land from summary settlement—Effect of such exclusion—Bombay Act VII of 1863—Sanad under

BOMBAY LAND-REVENUE ACT (V OF 1879)—contd.**s. 61—concl'd.**

the Act. The plaintiffs, who were the inamdars of certain land, sued for a declaration of their ownership in and of their right to cultivate (a) two plots of land which (they alleged) formed part of their inam, and (b) the bed of a stream which flowed through their land. It was contended for the defendants as to these two plots of land that the plaintiffs had no right to cultivate them, as they had been made a part of a village site, and on that understanding they had not been numbered at the survey in 1863, and had been exempted from assessment for twenty years. As to the bed of the stream, it was contended that the stream was a public stream, and that the bed of the stream as it dried up belonged to Government, and not to the plaintiffs. It was held by the lower Appellate Court that s. 61 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code applied; that Government were competent to set apart a portion of the lands comprised in the sanad of the plaintiffs for a village site, and that, as these lands had not been numbered at the survey of 1863, and had been exempt from assessment for more than twenty years, the plaintiffs had lost their right to cultivate them. On appeal to the High Court: *Held* (reversing the decree of the lower Court), that the plaintiffs were entitled to the declaration prayed for. *Held*, also, (i) that s. 61 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code did not apply. That section relates back to s. 38, and both refer only to lands the property of Government in unalienated villages or unalienated portions of villages. They do not empower the Government to confiscate any land belonging to an inamdar and to confer it on the persons living in his village. (ii) That the mere omission to number the plots of land could not have the effect of turning them into a part of the village site or take away the right of the plaintiffs. Nor did the omission of Government to assess these lands deprive the plaintiffs of them, or make them the property of Government. (iii) That the bed of the stream was the property of the plaintiffs, who owned the land upon its banks. *VINAYAKRAO KESHAVRAO v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . . . **I. L. R. 23 Bom. 39**

ss. 65 and 66—Fine leviable for appropriation of land to a non-agricultural purpose—Collector's omission to acknowledge receipt of application—Defence to the imposition of fine. *Per PARSONS and CANDY, JJ.*—Under ss. 65 and 66 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, where a person appropriates land to a non-agricultural purpose, he must, in order to escape liability to the fine imposed by s. 66, be able to show either (a) that he first obtained the permission of the Collector, or (b) that he waited for three months from the date of the Collector's acknowledgment of his application for permission to appropriate it. But the three months' time does not begin to run until such acknowledgment has been received, so that, where a person is charged with thus appropriating his land,

BOMBAY LAND-REVENUE ACT (V OF 1879)—*concl'd.***s. 65—*concl'd.***

It is no defence to plead that the Collector, though he received the application, neglected to furnish the applicant with a written acknowledgment of the receipt of the application. *Per* RANADE, J.—Where the Collector has received the application and omitted to send an acknowledgment, the occupant need only wait for three months from the time of his sending in the application. After the expiration of this time, if the occupant appropriate his land to a non-agricultural purpose, the Collector cannot levy the fine provided by s. 66. *NAYAK PURSHOTUM GHELJI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA*. . . . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 240

s. 71.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—
REGISTRATION OF TENURES.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 43

and ss. 79, 85, 86, and 87—
Deshmukhi vatan—Alienated land—Registered occupant—Superior holder—Payment of rent to co-landholder. In 1892, V, a deshmukhi vatandar, died, leaving five sons—four by one wife, of whom K was the eldest, and one son B by another wife. K and B each claimed to be the eldest son of V. On the 16th June 1893, the Collector of Satara, in proceedings under s. 71 of the Land Revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879), ordered K's name to be registered in the revenue books in place of V's. Prior to this, however, the plaintiff and other tenants paid B rents for 1892—94. K then applied for and obtained from the Collector an order, under s. 86 of the Code, rendering him assistance in recovering these rents. The plaintiff, in August 1894, brought this suit to restrain K from recovering the rents and to avoid the order for assistance. The Subordinate Judge granted the injunction, but the District Judge reversed that decision and dismissed the suit on the ground that K was the registered occupant of the land, and that the order for assistance was valid, and that payment of rent to B did not discharge the tenants. On appeal to the High Court: *Held*, reversing the decree of the District Judge and restoring that of the Subordinate Judge, that, the lands in question being alienated land, s. 71 of the Land Revenue Code did not apply, and K was not a registered occupant under the Code. The lands passed on V's death to his five undivided sons, unless a custom of primogeniture existed in the family, and payment by the plaintiff to B, a co-landlord, was a valid discharge. *SAMBHU v. KAMALRAO VITHALRAO* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 794

s. 74.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ABANDONMENT, RELINQUISHMENT, OR SURRENDER OF TENURE. I. L. R. 13 Bom. 294
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 348

BOMBAY LAND-REVENUE ACT (V OF 1879)—*concl'd.***s. 81.**

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—LOSS OR FORFEITURE OF RIGHT.

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 747

s. 83.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—NATURE OF TENANCY . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 392

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 646

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 221, 443

s. 84.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—EJECTMENT—NOTICE TO QUIT.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 407

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 150

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 311

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 360

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—FORFEITURE—DENIAL OF TITLE.

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 354

ss. 85, 86—*Inamdar, assignee of—Suit to recover enhanced rent—Assistance of the Collector.* Ss. 86 and 87 of the Land Revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879) do not make it compulsory on the inamdar, or his assignee, to ask for the assistance of the Collector to recover enhanced rent from the tenants. If the inamdar, or his assignee, had made a demand on the tenants for the enhanced rent through the hereditary patel, or village accountant, as required by s. 85 of the Code, and they had refused, he would have become at once entitled to his ordinary civil remedy. *GOVINDRAV KRISHNA RAIBAGKAR v. BALU BIN MONAPA*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 586

s. 86.

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—LOSS OR FORFEITURE OF RIGHT.

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 677

s. 87.

See BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION ACT (X OF 1876) . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 462

Mamlatdar's order. A mamlatdar's order under s. 87 of Bombay Act V of 1879 does not preclude the parties from having recourse to the Civil Courts, if dissatisfied with it. *GANESH HATHI v. MEHTA VYANKATRAM HARJIVAN*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 188

s. 108.

See KHOTI SETTLEMENT ACT, s. 16.

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 729

See KHOTI SETTLEMENT ACT, s. 17.

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 475

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 467, 480

s. 113.

See COLLECTOR I. L. R. 12 Bom. 371

BOMBAY LAND-REVENUE ACT (V OF 1879)—contd.

ss. 119, 120, 121—*Boundary dispute—Settlement of such dispute by Collector—Civil Court's jurisdiction—Jurisdiction.* S. 121 of the Land-revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879) must be read along with ss. 119 and 120 of the Code. It is only when a boundary dispute arises between the owners of adjoining lands, and the Collector is called upon to determine the dispute, that his determination becomes final under s. 121 of the Code so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. *LAKSHMAN v. ANTARI* (1900)

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 312

ss. 119 and 121—*Fixing boundaries—Boundaries, effect of decision of revenue authorities as to—Meaning of the term "determinative."* In 1877 a dispute arose between plaintiffs and defendant as to the boundaries of certain land, being survey Nos. 88 and 87, of which the plaintiffs and the defendant were respectively occupants under Government. In 1879 the boundaries were fixed by a revenue officer under the orders of the Collector, and the piece of land in dispute was found to belong to the plaintiffs as occupants of survey No. 88. Subsequently, the defendant having encroached upon it and dispossessed the plaintiffs, the present suit was filed. The Court of first instance awarded the plaintiffs' claim, holding that the decision by the revenue officer was conclusive as to the boundary. The defendant appealed, and the lower Appellate Court reversed the lower Court's decree. On appeal by the plaintiffs to the High Court: *Held*, restoring the decree of the Court of first instance, that, under the provisions of s. 121 of Act V of 1879, the decision of the Collector as to the boundaries was conclusive, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to possession. *BAI UJAM v. VALJI RASULBHAI*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 456

s. 125.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—BOMBAY ACT V OF 1879.

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 291

s. 135 and s. 37—*Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 14—Grant of land by Collector—Suit to recover possession as against grantee.* On the 1st September 1882, the Collector of Ahmednagar, by an order under s. 37 of the Land Revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879), granted a piece of open ground to N for building purposes. On the 31st March 1888, S brought a suit against N and the Secretary of State for India in Council to recover possession of the ground, and to set aside the Collector's order. *Held*, that the suit, not being brought within one year from the date of the Collector's order, as provided for in s. 135 of the Land Revenue Code, was time-barred. *NAGU v. SALU*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 424

s. 150.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 381

BOMBAY LAND-REVENUE ACT (V OF 1879)—contd.

s. 153.

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—LOSS OR FORFEITURE OF RIGHT.

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 677

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 747

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 381

1. ——— and s. 57—*Landlord and tenant—Mulgeni lease—Forfeiture not followed by sale.* A declaration of forfeiture, under s. 153 of the Land Revenue Code, of the interests of a lessee holding under a permanent lease, not followed by a sale, but by an order transferring possession of the holding to the lessor under s. 57, has not the effect of defeating prior incumbrances created by the lessee in favour of third persons. *NARAYAN SHESHGIRI PAI v. PARSHOTAM SHESHGIRI*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 309

2. ——— and ss. 159 and 162—*Attachment for arrears of land revenue—Forfeiture—Applicability of the Land Revenue Code to talukhdari villages—Bombay District Police Act (Bombay Act VII of 1867), s. 16—Cost of punitive police post.* The Bombay Land Revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879) applies to talukhdari villages in the Ahmedabad district. Such villages fall within the description of "alienated holdings" as defined by the Code. When a talukhdari village is attached under s. 159 of the Code for arrears of land revenue so long as the attachment subsists, an order of forfeiture under s. 153 is illegal. The plaintiff was the talukhdar of the village of K. At the end of the revenue year 1878-79, that is, on 31st July 1879, the plaintiff was a defaulter in respect of the assessment payable to Government for that year. In November 1879, a punitive police post was established in the village under s. 16 of Bombay Act VII of 1867 on account of the turbulent conduct of the inhabitants. Between April and January 1880 the Collector sold certain property of the talukhdar for arrears of revenue, and realized by the sale a sum of Rs. 1,608, a sum more than sufficient to cover the arrears due for 1878-79 as well as the assessment payable for 1879, but the Collector, after deducting the arrears due for 1878-79, applied the rest of the sale-proceeds towards the payment of the cost of the punitive post. The assessment for 1879-80 having remained unpaid, the village was attached on the 1st July 1880 under s. 159 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code (Act V of 1879). The attachment was followed on the 6th January 1881 by an order declaring the village to be forfeited under s. 153 of the Code. In 1886 the plaintiff sued Government to recover possession of the village and for a declaration that the order of forfeiture was illegal and *ultra vires*. The defendant contended that it was valid and legal. *Held*, that the village having been attached for arrears of land revenue under s. 159 of Bombay Act V of 1879, on the 1st July 1880, the plaintiff

BOMBAY LAND-REVENUE ACT (V OF 1879)—*contd.***s. 153—*conclld.***

had twelve years' time from the date of the attachment within which he could apply for the restoration of the village under s. 162 of the Act. The order of forfeiture of the 6th January 1881 was, therefore, null and void. *Held* (*per* BIRDWOOD, J.), that the Collector had no power, under s. 16 of Bombay Act VII of 1867, to recover the cost of the punitive post from the talukhdar, (i) as he was not an inhabitant of the village, and (ii) because the cost could only be defrayed by a local rate imposed on the inhabitants of the district in which the punitive post was established. *SAMALDAS BECHAR DESAI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 455

s. 162.*See* KHOTI TENURE.

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 525

s. 182—*Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244—*Mortgage with possession—Default by mortgagee in payment of assessment—Sale for arrears of revenue—Certified purchasers—Purchase for mortgage—Purchasers or mortgagee trustees for mortgagor—Suit by mortgagor for redemption.* In 1872 the plaintiffs' father mortgaged three plots of land (Nos. 303, 304, and 305) to the first defendant with possession. In 1880 and 1881, the first defendant having made default in paying the assessment, plots Nos. 303 and 305 were sold by the revenue authorities and were brought respectively by defendants Nos. 2 and 3. In the latter year (1881) plot No. 304 was sold in execution of a money decree obtained by the mortgagee (defendant No. 1) against the mortgagor and was purchased by his (the first defendant's) undivided brother without leave of the Court. In 1892 the plaintiffs (heirs of the mortgagor) brought this suit against defendants Nos. 1, 2, and 3 to redeem the said three plots of land from the mortgage of 1872. Defendant No. 1 pleaded that he had inherited plot No. 304 from his brother, who had become the owner of plot No. 304 by his purchase at the execution sale in 1881. He disclaimed all interest in plots Nos. 303 and 305. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 answered that they had become absolute owners by the purchase at the revenue sales. As to these latter, it was alleged that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were in possession of the said two plots for the first defendant. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 contended that by s. 182 of the Land Revenue Code the plaintiffs were precluded from raising this point. *Held*, that, though s. 182 forbade the Court to entertain a suit against defendants Nos. 2 and 3 on the ground that they had bought the land for defendant No. 1, it did not debar it from entertaining a suit against them on the ground that subsequently to the sale they were holding on behalf of defendant No. 1 or against defendant No. 1 on the ground that he was himself really in possession through defendants Nos. 2 and 3 as his agents or tenants. The same principle of equity which would make

BOMBAY LAND-REVENUE ACT (V OF 1879)—*contd.***s. 182—*conclld.***

defendant No. 1 a trustee for the mortgagors if he had bought in his own name would make defendants Nos. 2 and 3 trustees for them if subsequently to the sale they held the land on behalf of defendant No. 1, and would also make defendant No. 1 himself a trustee if subsequently to the sale the property came into his possession as beneficially entitled thereto owing to an agreement between him and the certified purchasers. *GENU v. SAKHARAM* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 271

s. 196.*See* JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REGISTRATION OF TENURES.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 43

s. 211.*See* KHOTI SETTLEMENT ACT, s. 17.

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 244

s. 214.*See* MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—BOMBAY ACT V OF 1879 I. L. R. 8 Bom. 591*See* RULES MADE UNDER ACTS.

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 291

1. s. 216—*Suit by an inamdar against a khot to recover balance of land revenue—Survey made by the British Government—Change in rate of assessment—Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Village partially alienated.* In a suit by an inamdar of a village against a khot to recover rent in kind (according to the market rate at the time of payment), the defendant (khot) contended that he was only liable to pay cash assessment as fixed by the survey made by the British Government which was at a lower rate than he had previously paid, and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit under the Land Revenue Code, 1879, s. 216, sub-cl. (b). *Held*, that the payment which the khot had been making to the inamdar before the time of the British survey was in the nature of assessment or rating by Government; but *held*, also, that the plaintiffs were entitled to the old assessment as claimed by them. It was plain that in cases falling within sub-cl. (a) and (c) of s. 216 of the Land Revenue Code, the inamdar's interest in the assessment would not be affected by the application of Chs. VIII to X of that Act. He would still get the old assessment in the alienated lands in the village in the former case and the same amount of assessment in the latter, and the same must have been the intention in cases contemplated by sub-cl. (b). The "holder of the village" in the concluding paragraph of s. 216 must be read as meaning the "holder of the assessment or any part thereof of an alienated village." *GANGADHAR HARI KARKARE v. MORBHAT PUROHIT* I. L. R. 18 Bom. 525

2. Holder of an alienated village—Application for introduction of survey by a co-sharer of an inam village. Under s. 216

BOMBAY LAND-REVENUE ACT (V OF 1879)—concl'd.

s. 216—concl'd.

of the Land Revenue Code, it is competent to one out of several co-sharers of an alienated village to apply on behalf of, and with the consent of, all the other co-sharers for the introduction of survey into the village; and it is not open to the cultivators of lands in the village to question the action of Government in introducing the survey on such application. The section does not require that the application should be made or signed by all the sharers. *GOPKABAI v. LUKSHMAN*. I. L. R. 24 Bom. 539

BOMBAY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

See GOVERNOR OF BOMBAY IN COUNCIL.

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 264

8 Bom. A. C. 195

BOMBAY LOCAL BOARDS' ACT, 1884 (BOM. ACT I OF 1884).

See LAND-REVENUE.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 504

BOMBAY LOCAL FUNDS ACT, 1869 (BOM. ACT III OF 1869).

s. 8.

See LAND-REVENUE.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 504

1. *Local cess—Landlord and tenant—Fraudulent collection of cess.* The plaintiffs sued to recover back from the defendant the amount levied by him as local cess on certain wanta lands belonging to the plaintiffs, the defendant claiming to be the superior holder of the village in which the lands were situated. The amount was levied by the defendant through the assistance of the mamlatdar under Bombay Act III of 1869, s. 8. The defendant contended that, in consequence of a demand from Government, he had paid local cess on the whole of his talukh, including the village in which the plaintiffs' lands were situated, and was therefore entitled, under ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), to recover from them the amount which he had paid to Government as a portion of the cess which rateably fell upon their lands. It was found that the defendant was not the proprietor of the lands held by the plaintiffs, and that the relation of landlord and tenant did not exist between them; also that defendant paid local cess for the plaintiffs' lands fraudulently and with the intention of thereby making evidence of title to their lands, knowing that he had no lawful or just claim to them. *Held*, that the defendant was not the superior holder of the lands within s. 8 of Bombay Act III of 1869, and was, therefore, not entitled to the assistance of the revenue officers of Government to recover the cess provided by that section for superior holders as against tenants and occupants, although he might have paid the local cess due on the land in the plaintiffs' possession; and that, consequently, the aid of the mamlatdar was illegally and improperly given to the

BOMBAY LOCAL FUNDS ACT, 1869 (BOM. ACT III OF 1869)—concl'd.

s. 8—concl'd.

defendant for the recovery of the amount from the plaintiffs. *Held*, also, that the defendant was not a person "interested in the payment" of the money made by him to Government within the meaning of s. 69 of the Contract Act, assuming that a portion of that sum was demanded by Government in respect of the plaintiffs' wanta lands, and that they were "bound by law to pay" it to Government. *Held*, further, that the defendant did not "lawfully" make the payment within the meaning of s. 70 of the Act, inasmuch as he did so fraudulently and dishonestly. *DESAI HIMATISINGJI v. BHOVABHAI KAYABHAI*. I. L. R. 4 Bom. 643

2. *Local-fund cess—*

Tenant's liability to pay the cess imposed by an Act subsequent to the lease—Landlord and tenant. Under s. 8 of Bombay Act III of 1869, a lessor, who is in the position of a superior holder, may recover the local-fund cess from his lessee. *Ranga v. Suba Hedge*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 473, followed. *RAM TUKOJI v. GOPAL DHONDI*

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 54

3. *Local-fund cess—*

Inamdar—Superior holder—Liability of inamdar to pay the cess. An inamdar is a "superior holder" within the definitions of Regulation XVII of 1827 and Bombay Acts I of 1865 and V of 1879. He is, therefore, the person primarily liable to pay the local-fund cess under s. 8 of Bombay Act III of 1869. There is no provision of law entitling an inamdar to charge for his expenses in collecting the cess. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. BALVANT RAMCHANDRA NATU*

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 422

BOMBAY MINORS' ACT (BOM. ACT XX OF 1864).

See MINOR—BOMBAY MINORS' ACT, XX OF 1864.

s. 18—*Minor—Administrator—Sanction of the Court—Transfer of minors' interest as mortgagee in possession—Any immoveable property—Mortgagee in possession expending money to defend his title against mortgagor—Suit for account—Minor—Contract with minor void—Refund of money—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 41.* The expression "any immoveable property" in s. 18 of the Bombay Minors' Act (XX of 1864) means immoveable property of any character or kind whether held by the minor as owner, or mortgagee, or in any other right. Hence the administrator of a minor, appointed under Act XX of 1864, could not sell immoveable property held by the minor as a mortgagee in possession without the previous sanction of the Court. A mortgagee in possession is, under s. 72 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), entitled to add to his mortgage-debt, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, sums spent by him for making his own title thereto good against the mortgagor. The mere fact that in a redemption suit the mortgagee in possession did

BOMBAY MINORS' ACT (BOM. ACT XX OF 1864)—concl'd.**s. 18—concl'd.**

not give details of the sums either in the course of the trial or in his written statement is not sufficient to deprive him of his right, seeing that those details can be gone into after the redemption decree providing for an account has been passed. The decision in *Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose*, *I. L. R. 30 Calc. 559*, is to the effect that a contract by a minor, such as a mortgage, is void and that a money-lender, who has advanced money to a minor on the security of the mortgage, is not entitled to repayment of the money on a decree being made declaring the mortgage invalid. That decision, however, is also an authority for the proposition that the circumstances of a particular case may be such that having regard to s. 41 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), the Court may, on adjudging the cancellation of an instrument, require the party to whom such relief is granted to make any compensation to the other which justice may require. *DATTARAM v. VINAYAK* (1904) . . . *I. L. R. 28 Bom. 131*

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACTS.

See BOMBAY CITY MUNICIPAL ACT.

See BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT.

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT (II OF 1865).

See SERVICE TENURE.

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 198

s. 2—Bombay Act IV of 1867—
Liability of Railway Company for rates and taxes. The Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company which, under an agreement with Government, hold the land upon which their Railway is constructed free of rent for ninety-nine years, are occupiers only, and not owners, of such land within the meaning of s. 2 of Bombay Act II of 1865, and are therefore not liable to be rated as owners of the ground used by them for the purposes of the railway within the city of Bombay. Principles upon which railway companies are liable to be rated considered and laid down. *JUSTICES OF THE PEACE FOR THE CITY OF BOMBAY v. GREAT INDIAN PENINSULA RAILWAY COMPANY*

9 Bom. 217

ss. 4 and 11.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—MUNICIPAL OFFICERS,
SUITS AGAINST . . . **5 Bom. O. C. 145**

ss. 131 and 160.

See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—PUB-
LIC OFFICERS WITH STATUTORY POWERS.
8 Bom. O. C. 85

s. 240—Ejectment, suits for—Suit for
mesne profits of land for which plaintiff sues in ejectment. Bombay Act II of 1865, s. 240, does not apply to suits in the nature of an action of ejectment. *Quære*: Whether a claim to recover the

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT (II OF 1865)—concl'd.**s. 240—concl'd.**

*mesne profits of land for which the plaintiff sues in ejectment comes within the provisions of Bom-
bay Act II of 1865, s. 240.* *Price v. Khilat Chand-
ra Ghose*, *5 B. L. R. Ap. 50*, and the judgment of
PHEAR, J., in *Pooroo Chandra Roy v. Balfour*, *9
W. R. 535*, approved. *SARABJI NASSARVANJI
DANDAS v. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE FOR THE CITY
OF BOMBAY* . . . **12 Bom. 250**

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACTS (III OF 1872 AND IV OF 1878).

s. 163—Compensation—Frontage land
*—Fifteen per cent. addition to compensation not
allowed.* A certain mosque in Bombay was abut-
ted on the north, west, and east by public streets.
In December 1886, the Municipal Commissioner,
pursuant to s. 166 of the Bombay Municipal Acts
III of 1872 and IV of 1878, required the trustees
of the mosque to set back the building on the said
three sides for the purpose of improving the pub-
lic streets. It was contended that the amount of
compensation to be paid to the trustees was to be
measured by the loss of rent which they would
have received for certain rooms which they had
proposed to build on the land in question. *Held*,
that the words of s. 163 of the Municipal Acts III
of 1872 and IV of 1878 were intended to ensure
compensation to the owner for every sort of dam-
age, and not to restrict it to compensation for such
damage as he might by his own arrangement
reduce it to. Compensation becomes due under
the section as soon as the Corporation takes pos-
session, which is when the owner begins to build,
and there being no words in the section to show
a contrary intention, the compensation must be
assessed according to the state of things then
existing, and not upon the basis of what the owner
may have it in his power to do towards diminish-
ing the damage which would otherwise result to
him. *Held*, also, that in cases of compensation
granted under s. 163 of the Municipal Acts III
of 1872 and IV of 1878, the addition of 15 per cent.
cannot be allowed. *MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER
FOR THE CITY OF BOMBAY v. PATEL HAJI MAHOMED
JANU* . . . **I. L. R. 14 Bom. 292**

s. 195—Obstruction—Power given in
Act for public benefit—Construction of Act. The
eaves of certain buildings belonging to the plaintiff
projected over the public road. On the 17th May
1886, the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay
gave notice to the plaintiff requiring him within
thirty days to remove the said eaves as being "a
projection, encroachment, or obstruction" within
the meaning of s. 195 of Acts III of 1872 and IV
of 1878. The plaintiff thereupon filed this suit,
praying for an injunction against the Municipal
Commissioner. The eaves in question projected
to the extent of one foot eight inches. The width
of the road in front of the buildings was about
forty feet, and the length of the eaves varied from
seven feet to nine feet two inches above the road.

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACTS [(III OF 1872 AND IV OF 1878)—concl'd.

s. 195—concl'd.

way. At the time this suit was filed there was an open drain or gutter, one foot three inches wide, running along by the side of the plaintiff's buildings and between them and the road. That gutter, however, subsequently to the filing of this suit, but before the hearing, was covered over, and so much additional width was thereby added to the road. *Held*, that the eaves constituted an obstruction within the meaning of the above section, and that the Municipal Commissioner was entitled to remove them. Under the above section, the question to be decided is not whether there is a real practical inconvenience to the public traffic in the street. Those are not the words used in the section, and if that was the intention of the Legislature, it would have been expressed. Where an Act gives power to a municipality or corporation for the public benefit, a more liberal construction should be given to it than where powers are to be exercised merely for private gain or other advantage. *OLLIVANT v. RAHIMTULA NUR MAHOMED*

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 474

s. 220 (amended by IV of 1878)

Houses—City of Bombay—Ridge ventilation—Notice. The Municipal Commissioner for the City of Bombay issued a notice requiring the owner of a range of buildings to put it in a proper state by providing ridge ventilation within seven days which the owner did not comply with. *Held*, that s. 220 of Bombay Municipal Act III of 1872, as amended by Bombay Act IV of 1878, does not empower the Municipal Commissioner to direct structural alterations, that the notice requiring ridge ventilation to be provided was illegal, and the owner, by refusing to comply with it, committed no offence. *EMPRESS v. SADANAND KRISHNAJI*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 151

Sch. B—Spirits—Toddy juice. Toddy juice, whether in a fermented or unfermented state is not "spirits" within the meaning of Bombay Act III of 1872 and is therefore not liable, on importation into Bombay, to a town duty of annas 4 per gallon imposed on spirits by Sch. B of that Act. *HARMASJI KARSETJI v. PEDDER*

12 Bom. 199

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF 1888).

s. 3.

See BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT, s. 17 . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 146

s. 33.—*Election of Councillor, validity of—Applicant's right to question election—"Election," Meaning of—Chief Judge of Small Cause Court has sole jurisdiction to try suits relating to election petitions—Jurisdiction of High Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 11.* Unders. 33 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act,

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF 1888)—concl'd.

s. 33—concl'd.

1888, an applicant can question the election of every candidate on the ground that the election as a whole was invalid, for the section, after specifying two permissible grounds of objection, provides that the validity of any election may be questioned for any other cause, and these words are wide enough to cover the ground of objection urged in this case. It is clear that the word "election" in the section is designed to express something wider than a legally valid election, and the words used are consistent with the view that an election which in fact took place under conditions that made it possible that there should be a valid election can be questioned. Under s. 33 the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of a contested election. The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. Where a special tribunal, out of the ordinary course, is appointed by an Act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation of that Act, then, except so far as otherwise expressly provided or necessarily implied, that tribunal's jurisdiction to determine those questions is exclusive. It is an essential condition of those rights that they should be determined in the manner prescribed by the Act, to which they owe their existence. In such a case there is no ouster of the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts for they never had any. The jurisdiction of the Courts can be excluded not only by express words but also by implication and there certainly is enough in s. 33 of the Municipal Act for this purpose. *Semble*: If the High Court has jurisdiction there might be a conflict between the view of the High Court and the orders of the Chief Judge in which the order of the Chief Judge must by the express terms of the Act prevail. *BHAISHANKAR v. THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF BOMBAY* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 604

ss. 143, 144—*University buildings—*

Building occupied for charitable purposes—Charitable purposes—Stat. 43 Eliz., c. 4—Municipal taxation, exemption from. The following buildings occupied by the University of Bombay, viz., the Sir Cowasji Jehangir Hall, the Library and the Rajabai Tower, are not Government property and are not included in the property for which Government pays a lump sum under s. 144 of the Bombay Municipal Act (III of 1888). The above buildings are exempt from taxation, being "buildings exclusively occupied for charitable purposes," within the meaning of cl. (a) of s. 143 of the Bombay Municipal Act (III of 1888). The words "charitable purposes" have acquired a technical meaning in the Presidency of Bombay, and in that sense they include all purposes within the meaning of Stat. 43 Eliz., c. 4. *UNIVERSITY OF BOMBAY v. MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS OF BOMBAY*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 217

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF 1888)—*contd.*

— s. 158—*Tax—Drawback—General conditions prescribed by the Standing Committee limiting right to drawback.* Under s. 158 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888), the following general conditions were prescribed by the Standing Committee with reference to claims for drawback of the general property tax leviable in Bombay:—“(1) Except with the special sanction of the Commissioner, no claim for drawback shall be entertained unless submitted to the Commissioner not less than thirty days before the commencement of the half-year to which such claim relates. (2) Drawback of the one-fifth part of the general tax shall be sanctioned by the Commissioner in cases falling within either of the following classes and in no others:—(a) Chawls or buildings let out for hire in single rooms either as lodging or godowns for the storage of goods. (b) Properties which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, are usually or frequently vacant either wholly or partially. (3) No sanction for drawback shall extend or apply to any floor on which trade or manufacture is carried on, or any goods are sold.” The Commissioner having refused to sanction a drawback of the tax leviable on certain properties of the plaintiff on the ground that they did not fall within the terms of the above conditions, the plaintiff filed this suit. It was contended on his behalf that the second and third of the above conditions were bad, and that the Standing Committee could not by so-called general conditions limit or curtail the right given to tax-payers by s. 158. *Held*, that the conditions prescribed by the Standing Committee were not *ultra vires*, and that the Commissioner was justified in refusing the drawback. *GOVARDHANDAS GOCULDAS TELPAL v. MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS OF BOMBAY*

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 394

— ss. 222, 265—*Water-works—Municipality of Bombay—Right to enter on land of Railway Company to lay pipes, etc.—Railway Act IX of 1890, s. 12—Accommodation works.* Under the Bombay Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888), the Corporation of Bombay has the right, for the purpose of supplying the city with water, to enter upon land belonging to other owners to make connections between the mains, and to lay the pipes forming the connections through or under such lands without the owners' permission, though not without giving them reasonable notice in writing. *Held*, also, that s. 12 of the Railways Act (IX of 1890) does not exclude the above right of the Corporation of Bombay to enter on land belonging to the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company for the said purposes. *GREAT INDIAN PENINSULA RAILWAY v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF BOMBAY*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 358

— s. 248—*Fazendar—Liability to provide privy accommodation—“Owner”—“Premises”—Construction of statutes.* A fazendar is not the person liable as owner of the premises to provide privy accommodation under s. 248 of

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF 1888)—*contd.*

— s. 248—*conclld.*

the Bombay Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888), the beneficial owner of the house built on the fazendar's land being “the owner” within the meaning of the section. *Per RANADE, J.*—The word “premises” in s. 248 of Municipal Act is used with reference to the building to which the privy belongs. *MUNICIPALITY OF BOMBAY v. SHAPURJI DINSHA* . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 617

1. — s. 249—*“Employed,” Meaning of the word—Discretion vested in the Municipal Commissioner.* The word “employed” in s. 249 of the Bombay Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888) refers to employment of any kind or for any length of time. *Municipality of Bombay v. AHMEDBHAY HABIBBHAY* . . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 528

2. — *Notice to construct urinals in a particular place in the owner's premises—Illegality of such notice.* Accused was convicted and fined Rs 50 for not complying with a notice issued by the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay under s. 249 of Bombay Act III of 1888. The notice required him to construct a urinal of six compartments in the open space inside the entrance gateway to the Cloth Market from Champawady, and a water-closet in the corner of the entrance from 1st Ganeshwady near the fire-engine station. *Held*, reversing the conviction and sentence, that the notice was *ultra vires*, inasmuch as it required the accused to construct urinals in a particular place in his premises. *in re KHIMJI JAIRAM* . . . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 75

— ss. 298, 299, and 301.

See APPEAL—BOMBAY ACTS—BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT, 1888.

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 184

1. — *Compulsory acquisition of land—Set back—Compensation paid to owner or land with buildings—Basis of valuation of land.* Where in a case of set back, land with buildings thereon was taken up by the Municipal Commissioner from a private owner under Bombay Act III of 1888, ss. 298, 299 and 301:—*Held*, that the amount of compensation awarded to the owner should be calculated with regard to the price given within a few years previously for land of a similar character in the immediate neighbourhood of the land in question. *Held*, also, that the addition of 15 per cent. could not be allowed. *Municipal Commissioner v. Patel Haji Mahomed*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 292, followed. *MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER FOR THE CITY OF BOMBAY v. ABDUL HUK*

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 184

2. — and ss. 504 and 527—*Land taken by the municipality for street improvement—Compensation for land taken—Dispute as to amount of compensation—Notice of suit—Limitation.* In 1891 the municipal authorities of Bombay gave notice to the plaintiffs under s. 209 of Bom.

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF 1888)—*contd.***s. 298—*contd.***

bay Act III of 1888 that they required 23·30 square yards of the plaintiff's land for street improvement. On the 14th December 1891, the plaintiff gave possession of the land to the municipality, and on 27th January 1892 claimed R60 per square yard as compensation. By letter dated 23rd February 1892, the Municipal Commissioner (without prejudice) offered R50 per square yard as compensation, and stated that, on the plaintiff producing the title-deeds and papers to establish his title, the necessary documents in connection with the payment would be prepared. Nothing further took place in the matter until the 14th February 1894, on which date the plaintiff wrote a letter to the Municipal Commissioner in which, without mentioning any sum, he requested the payment of the amount which might be due to him as compensation for his land taken by the municipality. The Commissioner refused to pay the compensation, contending that the plaintiff's claim was time-barred. The plaintiff thereupon brought this suit claiming R1,165 (being at the rate of R50 per square yard) as compensation for the land taken by the defendant or in the alternative for that sum as damages for the breach of contract to pay purchase-money for the land. The defendant pleaded (i) that notice under s. 527 of the Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888) was necessary before suit filed; and (ii) that the suit was barred by limitation. The Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court found for the defendant with costs, and dismissed the suit contingent on the opinion of the High Court. On a case stated for the High Court: *Held*, (i) that notice under s. 527 of Bombay Act III of 1888 was not necessary, that section not being applicable to suits brought to enforce payment of compensation under s. 301 of the Act; (ii) that the suit was not barred by limitation. *Per FARRAN, J.*—A suit against the municipality of Bombay for compensation for land acquired by the municipality under s. 299 of Bombay Act III of 1888 is not an action of tort or quasi-tort, but a simple action for the price of land which the terms of s. 301 of the Act impose upon the Commissioner to pay. The obligation to pay that price is of the same nature, (i) whether the owner assents to the valuation of the land placed upon it by the Commissioner; (ii) whether the value is determined by the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court; or (iii) whether it is left undetermined. S. 527 does not apply to any of these three cases. In all of them the obligation to pay is imposed by s. 301, and does not arise from the manner in which the amount of the price to be paid is arrived at. S. 504 prescribes the only mode in which, in case of dispute, the value of the land can be determined. If the owner of land disputes the Commissioner's valuation, he must apply to the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court within a year. If he does not do so, the result is that he loses the power of effectually disputing the Commissioner's valuation, but does not

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF 1888)—*contd.***s. 298—*contd.***

lose his right to the amount of the valuation. The owner of land has a remedy independent of the provision of s. 504. That section only deals with cases, where there is a dispute as to the value of the land, and leaves untouched those cases where there is no such dispute, but where the Commissioner for some reason declines to pay. In such cases the owner is left to his ordinary remedy, no special mode of procedure being prescribed. Cases in which there has been a dispute, but in which the owner abandons his claim to dispute the valuation of the Commissioner, fall within the latter category. *MANEKLAL MOTILAL v. MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER OF BOMBAY*. I. L. R. 19 Bom. 407

s. 353—*Notice to a house-owner to reduce the height of his building given more than three months after its completion—"Completion," meaning of.* One R was served with a notice, under s. 353 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888), requiring him to reduce the height of a building which he had erected. The building was completed in June 1893, and the notice was issued on 13th January 1894. R was prosecuted for not complying with this notice. He contended that the notice was time-barred, as it had not been given within three months after the completion of the building. In answer to this plea, it was urged, on behalf of the municipality, that the building could not be said to have been completed, unless and until such accommodations as privies and cesspools had been executed in accordance with the requirements of the Health Department, and that, therefore, the notice was within time. *Held*, that the notice was time-barred. The word "completion" in s. 353 of Bombay Act III of 1888 must be taken in its ordinary sense, and the Court cannot read into the section "in accordance with sanitary regulations" or "sanitary officers' opinions." *In re RAGHUNATH MAKTUND*. I. L. R. 19 Bom. 372

s. 354—*Construction—Municipal Commissioner—Power to remove dangerous structure—Exercise of the power—"Appear," meaning of—Discretion vested in the Commissioner—Exercise of discretion through agent—Notice by Commissioner to a party to remove structure in ruinous condition—Right of the party to be heard by the Commissioner in answer to the notice—Injunction restraining Commissioner from pulling down a house.* The primary object of s. 354 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act (Bom. Act III of 1888) is the safety of the public to secure which the Commissioner must of necessity be given very wide powers. But it does not follow that those powers can be exercised arbitrarily and without due consideration to the provisions of the section and the right of individuals. The word 'appear' in the section does not involve 'appear to the eye.' It is sufficient if it appears to the Commissioner on the presentation of a competent officer whose duty it is to make such representations. But the Com-

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF 1888)—*concl'd.***s. 354—*concl'd.***

missioner's action when 'it appears' is judicial, so that he must exercise his discretion in determining what action should be taken. It is not sufficient that he should merely sign a notice which was sent to him by the Executive Engineer because it has previously been signed by that officer. It should be considered as a notice to show cause. It is not invalid, at the same time it cannot deprive the person served with it of his right to object unless the Legislature has clearly deprived him of such a right. Danger means peril, risk, hazard, exposure to injury from pain or other evil and can vary in degree according as the apprehended injury is expected to occur at once or at some future time. S. 354 applying to all degrees of danger and prescribing various precautionary measures to be taken to prevent injury resulting therefrom, it follows that first, the decree of danger must be ascertained, and then the appropriate precautionary measure prescribed. Where it is not suggested that the danger is imminent, a duty is imposed on the Commissioner to decide judicially what should be done to assure the safety of the public having due regard to the interest of the owner of the structure. The discretion must not be arbitrary: *Paskall v. Passmore*, 15 Pa. St. D. 304; *Gungjiboy v. The Municipal Corporation of Bombay*, 1 Bom. L. R. 754, 764. But the Court is in the first instance entitled to inquire whether the discretion has been exercised. Discretion has to be exercised, first, in coming to the conclusion as to the state of the structure, and, then in fixing upon the appropriate remedy. It is sufficient exercise of his discretion in deciding what structures are dangerous if he appoints a competent person to represent to him what structures are dangerous. But if a notice is issued, based on the representation of such a person, it is open to the owner to prove that that person has not exercised his discretion or has been actuated by improper motives in prescribing the steps to be taken. If the owner can prove to the satisfaction of the Court that his house was not in such a dangerous condition as to warrant an order to pull down, that would be *prima facie* evidence that the person appointed by the Commissioner has not exercised his discretion. The Commissioner can exercise his discretion through an agent, but it follows that if the agent has not exercised his discretion nor has the Commissioner, the Commissioner has the opportunity to remedy this when the owner complains. Under certain circumstances the safety of the public must be considered in priority to the right of private individuals, as in the case of imminent danger, but where there is no suggestion of imminent danger, the person affected is entitled to be heard as a matter of common justice. *Lal-Bhai v. Municipal Commissioner of Bombay* (1908) . . . **I. L. R. 33 Bom. 334**

s. 381—Low ground—Low-lying ground—Notice by Municipal Commissioner re-

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF 1888)—*concl'd.***s. 381—*concl'd.***

quiring owner of low-lying ground to fill it with sweet earth up to a certain level. Under s. 381 of the Bombay Municipal Act III of 1888, the Municipal Commissioner for the City of Bombay issued a notice to the appellant as owner of certain low-lying ground. The notice stated that in the opinion of the Commissioner the ground accumulated water in the monsoon and caused nuisance to the tenants of two chawls situated on the premises. The owner was, therefore, required by the notice "to fill in the low-lying ground with sweet earth to the level of the road and slope it towards the new drain on the road side." As the owner refused to comply with the notice, he was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of R15 by the Presidency Magistrate under s. 471 of the Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888), *Held*, reversing the conviction and sentence, that the notice was illegal. The words used in s. 381 are "low ground," which is not the same as low-lying ground. And though the section gives power to the Commissioner to require the owner of low ground to cleanse and fill up the same, it does not permit him to issue an order that an indefinite extent of low-lying ground shall be filled up, much less that it shall be filled up to some particular level, or filled up with sweet earth, or that it shall be sloped in a particular direction. **MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER OF BOMBAY v. HARI DWARKOJI**

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 125

s. 394—License—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 45—Discretion. The power of the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay to grant a license under s. 394 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act (III of 1888) includes the power to refuse it. *Per Curiam*:—The Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Municipal Commissioner. Unless it is clear beyond doubt that the Municipal Commissioner is using his authority with some indirect motive and for a collateral purpose, not for the purpose for which the Legislature has armed him with the power, the Court cannot interfere with his discretion. **Haji Ismail v. Municipal Commissioner of Bombay. Ahmed Moosa v. Municipal Commissioner of Bombay** (1904) . . . **I. L. R. 28 Bom. 253**

s. 461 (d)—Bye-law restricting the height of buildings on a site previously built upon—Validity of such bye-law. The Municipality of Bombay has power, under s. 461, cl. (d), of Bombay Act III of 1888, to make a bye-law restricting the height of a new building erected on a site which had been previously built upon. **Municipality of Bombay v. Sunderji** **I. L. R. 22 Bom. 980**

s. 472—Continuing offence—Punishment for such offences after a fresh conviction—Separate prosecution for continuing the offence. A Presidency Magistrate, having convicted certain accused persons and fined them under s. 471 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act (Bombay

BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT III OF 1888)—concl'd.

s. 472—concl'd.

Act III of 1888), proceeded in the same order, purporting to act under the provisions of s. 472, to fine them so much per day in case they continued the offence. *Held*, that the latter order was illegal under s. 472 of the Act. The section requires a separate prosecution for a distinct offence, a prosecution in which a charge must be laid for a specific contravention for a specific number of days, and for which charge, if proved, the Magistrate is to impose a daily fine of an amount which is left to his discretion to determine. *In re LIMBAJI TULSIRAM* . . . **I. L. R. 22 Bom. 766**

s. 527—*Suit for damages against Municipal Commissioner—Notice of suit—What is sufficient notice.* The plaintiffs were owners of a house consisting of a ground floor and upper story and measuring 77 feet in length. On the south side of the house was a gully, 3 feet 6 inches wide, separating it from another upper-storied house. The plaintiffs in this suit complained that in January 1891 the defendant by his servants dug a trench, 8 feet deep, along the whole length of the gully for the purpose of laying a drain pipe, and that the work was done so negligently that the plaintiff's house was injured and became in such a dangerous condition that it had to be pulled down. The plaintiffs claimed Rs. 996 as damages. The defendant denied the negligence and alleged that the work was not done by his servants or agents, but by a contractor. For the defendant it was contended that the notice of action given by the plaintiffs under s. 527 of the Bombay Municipal Act (III of 1888) was insufficient. The notice stated "that one S L, a contractor under you, and as such being your agent and servant, excavated a trench, etc." It was argued that this was not a good notice, as it only alleged a cause of action arising out of the acts of the defendant's servants and agents, and not out of the acts of a contractor. *Held*, that the notice was sufficient. The section only required the notice to state with reasonable particularity the cause of action, and this was done. The individual by whom the damage was done was specified, and the acts which caused the damage were clearly set forth. **DHONDIBA KRISHNAJI v. MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS OF BOMBAY**

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 307**BOMBAY PORT TRUST ACT (I OF 1873).**

See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—PUBLIC OFFICERS WITH STATUTORY POWERS
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 132

See LIBEL . . . **I. L. R. 1 Bom. 477**

BOMBAY PORT TRUST ACT (VI OF 1879).

ss. 43 and 62.

*See SALE OF GOODS.***I. L. R. 17 Bom. 62****BOMBAY PREVENTION OF GAMBLING ACT (BOM. ACT IV OF 1887).***See GAMBLING. I. L. R. 30 Bom. 348*

ss. 3, 4, (a)—*Instrument of gaming—Single page of paper used for registering wagers.* The expression "instruments of gaming" as defined in s. 3 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (IV of 1887) includes a single page of paper used for registering wagers. **EMPEROR v. LAKHAMSI (1905)** . . . **I. L. R. 29 Bom. 264**

ss. 3, 4, 12—*Gambling in a machhwa—Public place—Bombay Harbour.* The accused, fourteen in number, chartered a machhwa (boat), and, having got it anchored in the Bombay Harbour a mile away from the land, carried on gambling there. For this they were convicted of an offence under s. 12 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (IV of 1887) for gaming in a public place: *Held*, that the accused were not guilty of an offence under s. 12 of the Act, since they cannot be said to be gambling in a public place. *Per BARTA, J.*—The word "place," which is patent of many different meanings, must necessarily in each instance in which it is used by the Legislature, be construed with reference to the intention to be inferred from the context. Thus in s. 12 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (IV of 1887), or in s. 3 of 36 & 37 Vict., c. 38, in connection with such words as roads, streets and thoroughfares, it has a very different meaning from that which it bears in s. 4 of the Act, and from that given to it in connection with s. 3 of 16 & 17 Vict., c. 119, by judicial decisions. The mischief aimed at in s. 4 of the Act is a mischief clearly distinct from that aimed at in s. 12 of the Act. In the former the mischief aimed at is the practice of individuals making a profit by providing a spot of their own selection known as a place where gambling is to be carried on, and making a livelihood by attracting people to a place which they would not otherwise frequent. In the latter the offence is not that the individual members are making a profit at all, but simply that they are carrying on their gambling with such publicity that the ordinary passer-by cannot well avoid seeing it and being enticed—if his inclinations lie that way—to join in or follow the bad example openly placed in his way. In the one case comparative privacy for profit, in the other the bad public example and accessibility to the public, would seem to constitute the gravamen of the offence. S. 12 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (IV of 1887) aims at gambling in a public place or thoroughfare, ordinarily with no intervening obstruction to the public view, where there is voluntary publicity. **EMPEROR v. JUSUB ALLY (1905)**

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 386*See GAMBLING. I. L. R. 31 Bom. 438*

ss. 4, 5, 6, 7—*Keeping a common gaming-house—Applicability of presumption under s. 7 to cases under s. 4—Warrant under s. 6—Delay in executing the warrant—Previous conviction—*

BOMBAY PREVENTION OF GAMBLING ACT (BOM. ACT IV OF 1887)

—concld.

ss. 4, 5, 6, 7—concld.

Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 342—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 11, 54. On the 19th May 1903 a warrant was issued by the Commissioner of Police at Bombay under s. 6 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Bombay Act IV of 1887) for the arrest of accused No. 1. In execution of this warrant, when on the 7th June 1903 the police entered the room of accused No. 1, no actual play was seen by the raiding party, but there were found playing cards on the ground and ten persons, including accused No. 1, were found sitting in a circle. Upon these facts the Magistrate convicted the accused of keeping a common gaming-house, an offence under s. 4 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Bombay Act IV of 1887), by applying to him the presumption created by s. 7 of the Act; and taking into consideration the previous convictions of the accused under the Act, he sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 500, the maximum amount of fine allowed by the section. On appeal to the High Court: *Held* by CHANDAVARKAR and ASTON, JJ. (JACOB, J., dissenting), affirming the conviction, (i) that the presumption created by s. 7 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act could be applied to cases falling under s. 5 as well as to those falling within the purview of s. 4 of the Act. (ii) That the applicability of s. 7 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act was affected by the fact that a considerable interval had elapsed between the issue of a warrant under s. 6 of the Act and the execution thereof. (iii) That the evidence that the accused had been previously convicted of the same offence was admissible to show guilty knowledge or intention. *Held*, JACOB, J., dissenting, (i) that the presumption created by s. 7 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Bombay Act IV of 1887) is sufficient for the purposes of s. 5 of the Act. It is also sufficient for the purposes of s. 4 (a) so far as regards the fact that the house, etc., is so used, but it is not alone sufficient for the purpose of showing that the house was so kept or used by any specified person. (ii) That in a trial for an offence under s. 4 (a) of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act the evidence that the accused was previously convicted of a similar offence cannot be admitted either under s. 54 or s. 11 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872). (iii) That the question whether the delay between the issue of a warrant under s. 6 of the Act and its execution has been reasonable or otherwise is one which must be decided with reference to the circumstances of each case. *EMPEROR v. ALLOO-MIYA HUSAN* (1904) . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 129

ss. 4, 5, 7—Common gaming house—

Jamātkhāna of the Borah community. The accused were found playing for money with cards in a building ordinarily used as a *Jamātkhāna*, but accessible to such members of the Borah community as have no place to live in and are too poor to afford the rent of a room. This place was frequented by the

BOMBAY PREVENTION OF GAMBLING ACT (BOM. ACT IV OF 1887)

—concld.

ss. 4, 5, 7—concld.

petitioners and others and instruments of gaming were found there, when the accused were arrested. The Magistrate convicted the accused of offences under ss. 4 and 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (IV of 1887) *Held*, that it was open to the Magistrate to rely on the presumption which under s. 7 of the Act might be drawn, that this place was used as a common gaming house, unless the contrary was made to appear by the evidence before him: there was, therefore, no ground to interfere in revision with the conviction under s. 5 of the Act: *Held*, further, that no presumption arose under s. 7 of the Act that the place was "kept" by any person as a common gaming house: the conviction under s. 4 was therefore wrong. In order to constitute an offence under s. 4 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Bombay Act IV of 1887) of keeping a common gaming house, it is necessary to show in the first place, that the person charged with that offence is the owner or occupier, or a person "having the use" of the place alleged to be kept as a common gaming house. It is not sufficient to show that the accused used the place in question for the purpose of gaming there. *EMPEROR v. WALIA MUSAJI* (1905) . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 228

BOMBAY REGULATION.

1800—I, s. 13.

See LIMITATION—BOMBAY REGULATION OF 1800.

5 W. R. P. C. 31; 1 Moo. I. A. 154
1 Moo. I. A. 414

1808—I, s. 4.

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—RIGHT TO ENHANCE . . . 11 Bom. 162

1818—IV, s. 52

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF . . . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 778

1823—VI.

See DAMAGES—MEASURE AND ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES—BREACH OF CONTRACT . . . 1 Agra 69

1827—II.

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—LAW GOVERNING PARTICULAR CASES.

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 285

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—CASTE . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 534

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 429

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 507

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 190

See PENSIONS ACT, s. 4.

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 224

BOMBAY REGULATION—*contd.*

- 1827—II, s. 1.
 See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—CASTE . . . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 599
 See LIMITATION ACT, s. 26. . . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 592
- s. 5.
 See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 622. . . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 610
- s. 5, cl. (2).
 See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—BOMBAY—CIVIL . . . 9 Bom. 249
- s. 16, cl. (2).
 See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODES. . . 2 Bom. 112; 2nd Ed., 106
- s. 21.
 See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—CASTE . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 83
 I. L. R. 6 Bom. 725
 I. L. R. 7 Bom. 323
 See RIGHT OF SUIT—CASTE QUESTIONS. . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 470
- s. 21, cl. 1.
 See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—CASTE . . . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 174
- s. 43.
 See PUBLIC SERVANT. . . 4 Bom. A. C. 93
 See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF. . . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 754, 773
- s. 47.
 See PLEADER—APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE . . . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 105
- s. 52.
 See PLEADER—REMUNERATION. . . 9 Bom. 33
 I. L. R. 21 Bom. 43
- s. 52.—*Vakil's fee—Calculation according to the actual value of the property in suit.* A vakil's fee should be calculated on the amount of the actual value of the property, the subject matter of the suit, and not on the amount of the claim as estimated for the purposes of the payment of Court fees. *Per JENKINS, C.J.*—"The principle and rule of taxation ought (in our opinion), as far as possible, to be such as to secure that the successful party should recover from his opponent such costs as are necessary to enable him to place his case properly before the Court, and this can best be secured by adopting the actual value as the basis of taxation." *BAI MEHERBAI v. MAGANCHAND MOTIJI* (1965) . . . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 229

BOMBAY REGULATION—*contd.*

- 1827—II, s. 54.
 See PLEADER—APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 654
 I. L. R. 23 Bom. 657
- s. 56.
 PLEADER—Misbehaviour
 —*Suspension of Sanad—High Court's disciplinary jurisdiction.* Pleaders are a privileged class enrolled for the purpose of rendering assistance to the Courts in the administration of justice. Their position, training and practice give them influence with the public and it is directly contrary to their duty to use that influence for the purpose of bringing the administration of justice into contempt. A pleader who presides at a public meeting and therein procures the passing of a resolution contemptuously denouncing or protesting against the conduct of a High Court Judge in passing sentence at a trial at the Criminal Sessions, is guilty of misbehaviour (under section 56 of Regulation II of 1827). *GOVERNMENT PLEADER v. JAGANNATH* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 252
- IV, s. 26.
 See CUSTOM . . . 1 Bom. 36
 See ENGLISH LAW. . . 2 Bom. 38; 2nd Ed. 36
 2 Bom. 55; 2nd Ed. 52
 See PARSIS . . . 5 Bom. A. C. 109
 See MAHOMEDAN LAW—CUSTOM. . . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 198
- s. 27, cl. (1)—*Family custom or usage—Duty of the Courts.* Cl. 1, s. 27, Regulation IV of 1827 (Bombay), imposes no obligation on the Courts to ascertain whether there is family rule or usage where there is no allegation of such fact in the pleadings or where the parties have waived resort to the course prescribed by the Regulation. *MODDEE KAIKHOOSROW HORMUZJEE v. COOVERBAEE* . . . 4 W. R. P. C. 94; 6 Moo. I. A. 448
- V.
 See GRANT—RESUMPTION OR REVOCATION OF GRANTS. . . 14 Moo. I. A. 55
 See LIMITATION—BOMBAY REGULATION V OF 1827.
 See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 147. . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 781
 See MORTGAGE—POSSESSION UNDER MORTGAGE . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 475
 See MORTGAGE—POWER OF SALE. . . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 267
 See PLEADER—APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 85
 See POSSESSION—EVIDENCE OF TIME. . . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 592
 See RIGHT OF SUIT—CASTE QUESTIONS. . . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 429

BOMBAY REGULATION—contd.**1827—V—concl'd.**

Prescriptive right—Title by long possession. The holder of a cocoanut oart in Bandora, in the Island of Salsette, in the Thanna district, paying an annual assessment of R39 to Government, built a bungalow upon it without the permission of the Collector, who, under the rule purporting to have been issued by the Government of Bombay on the 1st February 1869 in accordance with the provisions of s. 35 of Bombay Act I of 1865, demanded from him a fine equal to sixty times the assessment, and on the plaintiff's failure to pay the fine, summarily attached the land under the provisions of s. 48 of that Act. *Held*, that, by virtue of uninterrupted enjoyment for more than thirty years, the plaintiff had, under s. 1 of Regulation V of 1827, acquired a prescriptive title to the land, and had become its absolute proprietor. *COLLECTOR OF THANA v. DADABHAI BOMANJAI*
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 352

s. 7.

See MAJORITY, AGE OF.

5 Bom. A. C. 95

s. 12.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 132.

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 233

s. 15, cl. (3).

See MORTGAGE—CONSTRUCTION.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 303

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 296

VII.

See ARBITRATION—ARBITRATION UNDER SPECIAL ACTS AND REGULATIONS—BOMBAY REGULATION VII OF 1827.

6 Moo. I. A. 134

VIII.

See APPEAL—CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 748

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 399

See CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION—CERTIFICATES UNDER BOMBAY REGULATION VIII OF 1827, ETC.

See REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PERSON . . . 8 Bom. A. C. 152

Certificate of heirship—

Minor. Under the provisions of Regulation VIII of 1827, a certificate of heirship cannot be granted to a minor. *BAI BAIBA v. BAI DAGUBA*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 728

s. 2.

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF . . . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 230

s. 10.

See PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—APPELLANTS.

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 102

BOMBAY REGULATION—contd.**1827—VIII, s. 10—concl'd.**

See REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PERSON . . . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 102

IX.

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 17.

3 Bom. A. C. 167

s. 6.

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 50.

1 Bom. 60

9 Bom. 121

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 332

XII, ss. 5 and 41.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—RAILWAY ACTS, 1854.

3 Bom. Cr. 54

s. 19.

See NUISANCE—MISCELLANEOUS CASES

8 Bom. Cr. 32

s. 32.

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—CHEMICAL EXAMINER . . . 6 Bom. Cr. 75

XIV.

See OFFENCE COMMITTED BEFORE PENAL CODE . . . 1 Bom. 93

XVI.

See HEREDITARY OFFICES ACT (BOMBAY)

I. L. R. 5, Bom. 283, 435, 437

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 211

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 420

See SERVICE TENURE.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 13

XVII.

See BOMBAY SURVEY AND SETTLEMENT ACT I OF 1865 . . . 7 Bom. A. C. 82

10 Bom. 216

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS—BOMBAY.

12 Bom. Ap. 1, 225, 275, 276

See LAND REVENUE. 10 W. R. P. C. 13

11 Moo. I. A. 295

12 Bom. Ap. 1, 225

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 70

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 483

See MAMLATDAR, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 372

s. 16.

See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL CASES—CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.

8 Bom. Cr. 115

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

8 Bom. Cr. 115

s. 31, cl. (3).

See JURISDICTION OF REVENUE COURT—BOMBAY REGULATIONS AND ACTS.

2 Bom. 193 : 2nd Ed. 185

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See APPELLATE COURT—ERRORS AFFECTING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE.

11 Bom. 129

See STAMP (BOMBAY REGULATION XVIII OF 1827).

s. 10.

See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 34.

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 493

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See JURISDICTION OF REVENUE COURT—BOMBAY REGULATIONS AND ACTS.

5 Bom. O. C. 1

XXI.

See BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION ACT (X OF 1876) . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 462

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—BOMBAY REGULATION XXI OF 1827 . . . 3 Bom. Cr. 39, 50

7 Bom. Cr. 59

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1 Bom. 96

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See PENSIONS ACT, s. 4.

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 222

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 224

appeal under—

See SERVICE TENURE.

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 431

1829—III.

See COTTON FRAUDS REGULATION.

1 Bom. 17

1830—XIII.

See AGENT OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN.

1 Bom. 96

1831—XVIII.

See DISTRICT JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

5 Bom. A. C. 26

BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION ACT (X OF 1876).

See DOCUMENT . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 19

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—OFFICES, RIGHT TO . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 578

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 614

BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION ACT (X OF 1876)—*contd.*

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I. L. R. 22 Bom. 377

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REVENUE—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS, BOMBAY.

ss. 3, 4, 5—*Abkari—Land Revenue—Toddy spirit—Bombay Abkari Act V of 1878, ss. 24, 29, 54, and 67—Land Revenue Code, Bombay Act V of 1879, s. 87—Reg. XXI of 1827, s. 60.* The plaintiff sued to recover from the defendant, a farmer of abkari duties on the manufacture of spirits, under s. 60 of Bombay Regulation XXI of 1827, a sum of money alleged to have been illegally levied by him as tax or rent through the mamlatdar in respect of certain cocoanut trees tapped by the plaintiff in 1877-78 and 1878-79. *Held*, that the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. If the claim be held to be one in respect of land revenue, it falls within the exception contained in cl. (c) of s. 5 of Act X of 1876. If it is not, s. 4 of the Act has no application. *Per* BIRDWOOD, J.—The expression “land revenue,” as used in Act X of 1876, does not include either the duties leviable, under Reg. XXI of 1827, on the manufacture of spirits, or the taxes on the tapping of toddy trees, the levy of which in certain districts was legalized by s. 24 of the Bombay Abkari Act, V of 1878. A farmer of duties on the manufacture of spirits is not authorized to levy a duty on any juice in trees, either under Regulation XXI of 1827, or Act X of 1876, or Bombay Act V of 1878. Juice in toddy-producing trees is not spirit, which includes toddy in a fermented state only. *NARAYAN VENKU KALGUTKAR v. SAKHARAM NAGU KOREGAUMKAR* . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 462

s. 4.

See BOMBAY IRRIGATION ACT, s. 48.

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 377

See HEREDITARY OFFICES ACT, s. 17.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 581

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—OFFICES, RIGHT TO. I. L. R. 12 Bom. 614

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REVENUE COURTS, ORDERS OF.

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 73

See PENSIONS ACT, s. 4.

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 222

See RIGHT OF SUIT—OFFICE OR EMOLUMENT . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 614

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—RIGHT OF SALE . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 73

1. ————— “Competent Officer.”

Governor in Council—Powers conferred by Act XI of 1852. Per BIRDWOOD, J.—The words “competent officer,” as used in prov. (k) of s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, includes the Governor in Council, who is one of the authorities

**BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION
ACT (X OF 1876)—*contd.***

— s. 4—*contd.*

upon whom judicial powers were conferred by Act XI of 1852. *JANARDANRAV v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . . . **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 442**

2. — *Limitation—Limitation Act, 1877, Art. 120—Attachment for arrears of land revenue—Suit for declaration that order of forfeiture was illegal—Bombay District Police Act (Bombay Act VII of 1867), s. 4—Punitive police post.* The plaintiff was the talukhdar of the village of K. At the end of the revenue year 1878-79, i.e., on 31st July 1879, the plaintiff was a defaulter in respect of the assessment payable to Government for that year. In November 1879 a punitive police post was established in the village, under s. 16 of Bombay Act VII of 1867, on account of the turbulent conduct of the inhabitants. Between January and April 1880 the Collector sold certain property of the talukhdar for arrears of revenue, and realized by the sale a sum of Rs. 1,608-12-8. This sum was more than sufficient to cover the arrears due for 1878-79 as well as the assessment payable for 1879-80, but the Collector, after deducting the arrears due for 1878-79, applied the rest of the sale-proceeds towards the payment of the cost of the punitive post. The assessment for 1879-80 having remained unpaid, the village was attached on the 1st of July 1880, under s. 159 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code (Act V of 1879). The attachment was followed on the 6th January 1881 by an order declaring the village to be forfeited under s. 153 of the Code. In 1886 the plaintiff filed the present suit against Government to recover possession of the village, and for a declaration that the order of forfeiture was illegal and *ultra vires*. The defendant pleaded (*inter alia*) that the suit was barred under s. 4, cl. (c), of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), that it was also barred by limitation. *Held*, also, that the plaintiff's claim for a declaration that the order of forfeiture was illegal was not barred by s. 4, cl. (c), of Act X of 1876, as the order of forfeiture could not be considered "a proceeding for the realization of land revenue." The proceeding authorized by law for the realization of land revenue, i.e., the attachment of the village, having been taken, no other proceeding could legally be taken, as against the plaintiff, till the expiration of twelve years from the date of the attachment. *Held*, further, that the claim for a declaration that the order of forfeiture was illegal was not time-barred, as it was governed by Art. 120 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). *SAMALDAS BECHAR DESAI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . . . **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 455**

3. — *Service inam land—Suit for a declaration of title to trees thereon and for damages—Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Hereditary Offices Act (Bombay Act III of 1874)—Hereditary officer—Officiator.* The plaintiff complained that he was prevented from cutting the

**BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION
ACT (X OF 1876)—*contd.***

— s. 4—*contd.*

trees growing on land situate in the village of Tungarli, belonging to certain persons who had sold the trees to him. He claimed damages and an injunction restraining the Collector from interfering with him. The defendant pleaded that the trees did not belong to the plaintiff's vendors, being on service inam land. The lower Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim, holding that the land, on which the trees were growing, was service inam land, and that the plaintiff's vendors had no title to them. On appeal, the High Court, on the evidence, upheld the lower Court's decision that the land was inam service land, but held that it did not necessarily follow that the trees upon it were the property of Government, and not of the vatandars. The latter might be the owners of the trees subject to a condition. The case was, therefore, remanded to the District Court for a finding on an issue as to whether the holders of service inam lands had a title to the trees on the lands, and, if so, whether they had the right to cut down trees without the permission of the Collector. On this finding the District Judge found in the affirmative. The case then came again before the High Court, when a preliminary objection was taken that under s. 4 of Act X of 1876 the Court had no jurisdiction. *Held*, that, it having been decided that land in question were service inam land, the Court, under s. 4, cl. (a), of Bombay Act X of 1876, ceased to have jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim against Government in respect of the trees growing thereon, as such claims related to property appertaining to the office of a village officer. *DESOUZA DEVINO v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . . . **I. L. R. 18 Bom. 319**

4. — "Any other written grant"—*Land free from assessment—Treaty—Civil Courts—Jurisdiction—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 42—Suit for declaration—Consequential relief—Amendment of plaint—Construction of documents.* In s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), the clauses (h), (i), (j) and (k) are independent of one another: the source of title referred to in each stands apart from the rest and each clause is connected only with that portion of the proviso, which precedes clause (h). The expression "any other written grant" in clause (j) therefore means any written grant other than that which falls within clauses (h) and (i) of the section. The term "treaty" in s. 4 (a) of the Act is not to be broadly construed, but is to be confined in its interpretation to its accepted meaning, i.e., an agreement between two or more independent sovereign powers or states. Generally speaking, the name given by the parties to a document is not conclusive as to its nature; but the designation given by the parties themselves to it cannot be lost sight of where the document is ambiguous and is susceptible of more than one construction as to its nature and scope. The effect of the amendment

BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION ACT (X OF 1876)—*contd.***s. 4—*contd.***

by Act XVI of 1877 is that nothing in s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876) shall be held to prevent the Civil Courts in the Districts mentioned in the second schedule annexed to that Act from exercising jurisdiction over claims against Government to hold lands wholly or partially free from payment of land revenue. The plaintiffs filed a suit against the Secretary of State for India in Council for a declaration that they were entitled to hold certain lands free from assessment. The defendant objected that the suit was barred under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877). After the settlement of the issues in the case, the plaintiffs applied for leave to amend the plaint by adding thereto a prayer for injunction by way of consequential relief. The lower Court refused to grant the prayer. *Held*, that the lower Court should have exercised its discretion in plaintiffs' favour, although the prayer for amendment was made very late, as it was a mere matter of form which could not affect the merits of the claim or transform the nature of the suit. *KALABHAI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 19

5. ——— s. 4 (a)—*Service land—Sanad grant—Suit for the recovery of possession—Secretary of State for India in Council, defendant—Jurisdiction.* The plaintiff, a vendee of certain lands assigned as remuneration for village service, having brought a suit for the recovery of the lands against the Secretary of State for India in Council and another defendant, who was put in possession of the lands by Government officers: *Held*, that under s. 4 (a) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against the Secretary of State for India in Council (the grant being of land and not of revenue). The plaintiff having contended that his claim was for the possession of lands and not for the revenue arising therefrom, which alone was granted: *Held*, that the plaintiff's vendor was put into the occupation of the land free from assessment as the reward of his service and that his remuneration did not and could not consist in an exemption from assessment in respect of the lands without reference to his occupation. *APPAPI v. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 435

6. ——— s. 4 (b)—*Inamdar—Occupancy tenant—Claim by the inamdar to recover assessment according to the survey rates—Tenant setting up fixed assessment—Objections under s. 4 (b)—Civil Court—Jurisdiction.* The plaintiff, an Inamdar, sued to recover from the defendant, an occupant, the assessment of the lands held by him in accordance with the survey rates. The defendant contended, among other things, that under certain *maphi istawa kowls* held by him he had acquired the right to hold the lands permanently on payment of a fixed sum as rent.

BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION ACT (X OF 1876)—*contd.***s. 4—*concl.***

Plaintiff contended that by virtue of s. 4, cl. (b), of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876) the Civil Court was precluded from entertaining the defendant's contention. *Held*, that cl. (b) of s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876) presented no bar to the hearing by the Civil Court of the contention set up by the defendant. An objection to come within 1st head of s. 4, cl. (b), of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), must be "to the amount or incidence of any assessment of land revenue" itself and as such, in other words, apart from the question of any other and independent right, if an occupancy tenant complains that though he is bound to pay the assessment of land revenue, the amount or incidence of it as authorised by Government is too high, having regard to the nature of the soil and quality of his land and other like considerations, the objection is one purely and simply to such amount or incidence. But if, without questioning the legality or propriety of the amount or incidence *per se*, he asserts a right independent of and having no relation to it, such as a right to pay a certain fixed amount annually under a contract between him and the Inamdar, he cannot be said to object to the amount or incidence of the assessment. Nor can such a tenant be said by his objection to object to the validity or effect of the notification of survey or settlement under the 3rd head of cl. (b) of s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876). "Objections" in s. 4, cl. (b), of the Act can be raised by a suit or in defence to a suit. *LAKSHMAN v. GOVIND* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 74

1. ——— s. 11—*Revenue Officer—Forest Officer—Forest Act (VII of 1873)—Right of Appeal.* S. 11 of Act X of 1876 only applies to an act or omission of a Revenue Officer, and only in cases where the law allows an appeal. A Forest Officer is not a Revenue Officer. Act X of 1876 must be construed strictly. No right of appeal can be given except by express words. *NARAYAN BALLAL v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 803

2. ——— *Practice—Procedure.* Under s. 11 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), in a suit to which that Act applies, the Court, before taking evidence on the merits, should require the plaintiff to prove first of all that he has, previously to bringing the suit "presented all such appeals allowed by the law for the time being in force as within the period of limitation allowed for bringing such suit it was possible to present. *RANCHHOD HORIBHAI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 173

3. ——— *Suit against Government—Practice—Procedure—Appeal from an order of a Revenue Officer—Presentation of such appeal.* All that s. 11 of the Bombay Revenue

BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION ACT (X OF 1876)—concl'd.**s. 11—concl'd.**

Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876) requires is that the appeal referred to therein shall be presented. When, therefore, the only appeal allowed by law against a certain order of the Collector lay to the Commissioner, and such appeal was presented:—*Held*, that the plaintiff was not bound to wait for a reply before filing his suit against Government. *ABAJI PARASHRAM v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 579

4. *Meaning of the words "appeal allowed by law"—Limitation.* The words "an appeal allowed by law" used in s. 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876) do not mean "an appeal within the time allowed by law." They refer to the appeals which the law prescribes, and have no reference to the limitation in point of time, which the law may impose upon the bringing of such appeals. *RANCHOD HARI-BHAI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 583

5. *Suit against Government on account of any act or omission of any Revenue officer—All such appeals allowed by the law—Appeals in respect of the act or omission.* The expression "all such appeals" in s. 11 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876) means appeals in respect of the act or omission. Therefore, the bar of section 11 would not apply to a suit wherein the cause of action is not an order or decision in respect of which there was a right of appeal under the Land Revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879). *SAKHARAM v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1904) . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 332

s. 15.

See MAMLATDAR, JURISDICTION OF. I. L. R. 23 Bom. 761

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—SMALL CAUSE COURT SUITS. I. L. R. 7 Bom. 100

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 358
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 441
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 754, 773

BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION ACT (XV OF 1880).

See GUARDIAN—APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 306

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF . . . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 754

BOMBAY SALT ACT (II OF 1890).

1. *s. 47 (a)—Possession of salt water with the intention of manufacturing salt.* The mere possession of salt water with the intention of manu-

BOMBAY SALT ACT (II OF 1890)—concl'd.**s. 47 (a)—concl'd.**

facturing salt therefrom is not an offence under the Bombay Salt Act (Bombay Act II of 1890). *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DABHAI KAEHAI*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 788

2. *Salt—Removal of salt—Intention—Knowledge—Ingredients of the offence.*

To support a conviction under s. 47 (a) of the Bombay Salt Act (Bombay Act II of 1890), it is not necessary to prove dishonest intention on the part of the accused: since the wording of the clause does not in express terms or by necessary implication make intention or knowledge an essential ingredient of the offence. What is prohibited by the Act is the removal of salt in contravention of any license or permit and that shows that such removal is prohibited in itself. *EMPEROR v. MAGANLAL* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 346

BOMBAY SUMMARY SETTLEMENT ACT (VII OF 1863).

See LAND REVENUE.

12 Bom. Ap. I, 225, 276

See SERVICE TENURE.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 18

See SETTLEMENT—CONSTRUCTION OF SETTLEMENT . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 407

s. 2.

See SERVICE TENURE.

8 Bom. A. C. 185

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 188

ss. 2, 6, 9.

See CONTRACT ACT, ss. 69, 70.

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 244

See CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS.

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 244

s. 7.

See SETTLEMENT—EXPIRATION OF SETTLEMENT . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 367

ss. 27 and 32.

See DUTIES.

2 Bom. 253: 2nd Ed., 239

s. 32.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REVENUE . . . 5 Bom. A. C. 202

BOMBAY SURVEY AND SETTLEMENT ACT (I OF 1865).

See BOMBAY LOCAL FUNDS ACT, 1869. I. L. R. 17 Bom. 422.

See KHOTI SETTLEMENT ACT, s. 17. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 235

See LAND REVENUE. I. L. R. 1 Bom. 70

BOMBAY SURVEY AND SETTLEMENT ACT (I OF 1865)—*contd.*

1. ———— Revenue survey—*Entry of tenants in registers—Landlord and tenant.* The mere entry of the names of the tenants of a khot in the Government registers as occupants under the Revenue Survey Act, I (Bombay) of 1865, does not constitute an injury to the landlord of a tangible kind, of which the Civil Courts can take cognizance. The khot's rights as landlord, if they can be established, cannot be prejudiced by any proceeding under the Survey Act, there being nothing in that Act, or the rules framed under it, which affects the rights of subjects of the Government *inter se*. The utmost benefit which the tenants can derive, as against their landlord, from being entered as occupants under the Act, is a right to claim a deduction of the amount of assessment paid by them direct to the Government. If they deny his title, he can sue them either to establish his title and recover the full rent due to him under his contract with them, or to eject them as holding possession of his lands by a title which they themselves repudiate. *BAM v. SURVEY COMMISSIONER AND THE COLLECTOR OF RATNAGIRI*

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 134

2. ———— Boundary dispute. "Boundary dispute," as used in the Survey Act (Bombay Act I of 1865), means a contention between two neighbouring land-proprietors as to where a boundary line or boundary marks has or have been fixed by the survey officers. After the functions of the latter officers have ceased in a district, the Collector acting under Act III of 1846 is the proper officer to determine such a dispute, and fix the proper position of the boundary marks. But where a landholder claims to recover from a neighbouring holder land alleged to have been usurped or encroached upon by the latter, the person aggrieved must file his plaint in Court (which in the case of a claim for mere possession may be the Court of the Mamlatdar or the ordinary Civil Court), where the determination of the Collector as to the proper position of the boundary line or marks (although it of itself confers or withdraws no right of possession) affords valuable evidence in adjudicating upon the rights of the parties. *PITAMBAR DHARI v. SAMBHAJIRAV*

8 Bom. A. C. 185

3. ———— Bom. Reg. XVII of 1827—*Building-sites in towns before Bom. Act IV of 1868.* *Semble:* That Bombay Regulation XVII of 1827 and Bombay Act I of 1865 were not applicable to building-sites in towns and cities until Bombay Act I of 1865 was expressly made applicable to such sites by Bomay Act IV of 1868. *DADABHAI NARSIDAS v. SUB-COLLECTOR OF BROACH*

7 Bom. A. C. 82

s. 11.

See KHOTI TENURE.

7 Bom. A. C. 41

————— *Entry into private house for survey purposes.* *Quære:* Whether s. 11 of Act I of 1865 (Bombay) justifies surveyors in entering

BOMBAY SURVEY AND SETTLEMENT ACT (I OF 1865)—*contd.*s. 11—*concl'd.*

private houses for the purpose of measuring them. *REG. v. BHAGTIDAS BHAGVANDAS* 5 Bom. Cr. 51

s. 14.

See INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS.

11 Bom. 231

s. 25.

See LAND REVENUE.

12 Bom. Ap. 1, 225

————— *Power of Government to raise assessment—Bom. Reg. XVII of 1827, s. 4, cls. 2 and 3.* The words in s. 25 of Bombay Act I of 1865 confer upon Government no absolute power in all cases to fix any assessment they may please. But that section as also s. 4, cl. 2, Regulation XVII of 1827, distinctly limit the power of Government to raise the assessment on land held partially exempt by right. Government, however, may set aside such limitations at their discretion by a legislative enactment, as provided by cl. 3 of the above Regulation. But Government can exercise this power only under "specific" rules. In Bombay Act I of 1865, s. 25, no such "specific" rules are to be found as would indicate that the Legislature intended to set aside the provisions of cl. 2, s. 4, Regulation XVII of 1827, and to enable the revenue officers to ignore all exemptions except those which they may themselves choose to recognise. Where plaintiff had enjoyed "savai sut" or a remission of one-fourth for a period of more than thirty years with respect to lands on which assessment became leviable in 1805 A. D., he was held by the High Court to have established a prescriptive right to such a remission. *COLLECTOR OF COLABA v. GANESH MARESHVAR MEHEENDALE*

10 Bom. 216

s. 32.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—
RENT AND REVENUE SUITS, BOMBAY
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 684

————— *Village cattle—Sanction of Revenue Commissioners to grazing.* The phrase "village cattle" in s. 32 of Bombay Act I of 1865 does not include the cattle of any roving grazier who may choose to squat for a few months on the public ground of a village. That Act does not vest the right of sanctioning such a diversion of the village grazing ground in the villagers themselves, but in the Revenue Commissioner, whose consent must be obtained. *COLLECTOR OF THANA v. BAL PATEL*

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 110

s. 34.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 144—
ADVERSE POSSESSION.

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 585

————— ss. 35, 48—*Power of local Legislature—Government land—Suit to set aside attachment on land—Building, erection of.* In a suit for setting aside a summary attachment, under Bombay Act I of 1865, placed by the Collector on land

BOMBAY SURVEY AND SETTLEMENT ACT (I OF 1865)—*concl'd.*ss. 35, 48—*concl'd.*

held on a settlement for a period not exceeding thirty years, the value was held to be five times the assessment, and the stamp duty calculated upon it, irrespective of the actual market value or the amount for which the land was attached. The holder of a coconut oart in Bandora, in the island of Salsette, in the Thana district, paying an annual assessment of Rs 39 to Government, built a bungalow upon it without the permission of the Collector, who under the rule purporting to have been issued by the Government of Bombay on the 1st February 1869 in accordance with the provisions of s. 35 of Bombay Act I of 1865, demanded from him a fine equal to sixty times the assessment, and, on the plaintiff's failure to pay the fine, summarily attached the land under the provisions of s. 48 of that Act: *Held, first*, that the Government of Bombay had no authority to make the rule of 1st February 1869, and that, s. 35 of the Survey Act providing no penalty for building without the Collector's permission, the attachment was illegal. *Secondly*, that the expressions "Government land" and "Land belonging to Government" in Bombay Act I of 1865 mean land of which Government is the proprietor, and do not apply to land in which the proprietary right in the soil vests in a private individual, whether or not it be subject to the payment of assessment to Government. *Quære*: Whether the amount of the fine contemplated in s. 35 of Bombay Act I of 1865, if not paid, is a charge leviable by summary attachment under s. 48. COLLECTOR OF THANA *v.* DADABHAI BOMANJI

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 352

s. 36—*Revenue survey—Right of tenant to hold land on paying ordinary assessment—Usage having force of law.* S. 36 of Bombay Act I of 1865 applies only to lands to which a revenue survey has been extended under that Act. Prior to the passing of the above Act, by usage having the force of law, Government was unable to eject an ordinary tenant of land so long as the latter was willing to pay the reasonable assessment upon the land occupied by him. This usage might be limited or varied by special contract,—*e.g.*, by the terms of a lease inconsistent with it. DULIA KASHAM *v.* ABRAMJI SALE . 8 Bom. A. C. 11

s. 38.

See KHOTI TENURE . 7 Bom. A. C. 41

s. 40.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—PROPERTY IN TREES AND WOODS ON LAND.

6 Bom. A. C. 188

s. 42—*Survey settlement—Notice of increased assessment.* S. 42 of Bombay Act I of 1865 (which prohibits an occupant from relinquishing his holding, unless he gives a written notice to the Collector on or before the 31st of March in each

BOMBAY SURVEY AND SETTLEMENT ACT (I OF 1865)—*concl'd.*s. 42—*concl'd.*

year) is not applicable only to the holders of land under a survey settlement, but by implication imposes on the revenue officers the obligation of giving the holder notice when an increased assessment is about to be demanded from him within a reasonable time before the latest date on which he can exercise his right of relinquishing his lands. GOVIN VINAYAK GADRE *v.* COLLECTOR OF RATNAGIRI . . . 6 Bom. A. C. 101

s. 48.

See LAND REVENUE.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 70

s. 49.

See LAND REVENUE.

12 Bom. Ap. 1, 225

BOMBAY SURVEY AND SETTLEMENT AMENDMENT ACT (IV OF 1868).

See BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT, 1873, s. 33 . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 516

See BOMBAY SURVEY AND SETTLEMENT ACT, 1865 . . . 7 Bom. A. C. 82

1. ———— *Liability to assessment—Possession without payment of land in a town.* Where land in a town in the Presidency of Bombay was found to have been in plaintiff's possession from 1858 to 1871, without any payment by him of land revenue to Government: *Held*, that it was not liable to pay assessment under Bombay Act IV of 1868. VEJAYALABHDASS KHUSHALDAS *v.* COLLECTOR OF AHMEDABAD . 10 Bom. 190

2. ———— s. 5, cl. (1), para. (2)—*Bombay Act I of 1865—Building-sites—Exemption from payment of Government land revenue.* On the 6th April 1836, the Collector of Ahmedabad demised by lease a building-site in that city to the plaintiff's grandfather for a term of ninety-nine years. No rent was reserved by the lease as then presently payable, but it contained a provision that the lessee should pay, in respect of the said site, such land tax as might "fall upon all." The lessee and his heirs held the site from the date of the lease down to 1878 without paying or being required to pay any land-tax or rent to Government. In 1878, however, Government levied from the plaintiff Rs 2-11-0 as land revenue assessed on the site. Plaintiff thereupon sued the Collector of Ahmedabad for recovery of the amount, on the ground that the assessment and levy were illegal. *Held*, that the plaintiff's building-site was exempted from liability to assessment by Bombay Act IV of 1868, s. 5, cl. 1, para. 2, which enactment applied to the case. *Held*, also, that this exemption was not to continue beyond the term for which the site had been demised by Government, but that on its expiration it will be open to Government to resume the land altogether, or to re-let it on such terms as

BOMBAY SURVEY AND SETTLEMENT AMENDMENT ACT (IV OF 1868)—concl'd.

s. 5, cl. (1), para. (2)—concl'd.

to assessment, or otherwise, as might be the pleasure of Government. The origin of Bombay Act IV of 1868 mentioned, and the provisions contained in it relating to exemption from the payment of assessment, referred to and discussed. *COLLECTOR OF AHMEDABAD v. BALABHAI KEVALDAS*
I. L. R. 4 Bom. 505

s. 15.

See INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS.

11 Bom. 231

BOMBAY TALUKHDARI ACT (VI OF 1862).

See LAND REVENUE.

12 Bom. Ap. 276

See SERVICE TENURE.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 586

Operation of Act—Right of alienation in Ahmedabad Zillah. The Bombay Talukhdari Act (Bombay Act VI of 1862) did not affect talukhdari villages, the right, title and interest of the talukhdar in which had been sold before that Act came into operation, though possession of such villages had not then been obtained by the purchaser. *Quære*: As to the right of talukhdars in the Ahmedabad Zillah to alienate their talukhdari villages. *COLLECTOR OF AHMEDABAD v. SAMALDAS BECHARDAS* 9 Bom. 205

L. — s. 12—Inability of guardian to contract on behalf of infant ward, so as to bind him personally—Effect of Act VI of 1862 (Bombay), s. 12, in regard to a charge upon a talukhdari estate in the Ahmedabad District during the period of management. A guardian cannot contract in the name of a ward, so as to impose on him a personal liability. Act VI of 1862 (Bombay), "for the amelioration of the condition of talukhdars in the Ahmedabad Collectorate and for their relief from debt," was intended to deal with all debts and liabilities which could possibly impose a charge upon the talukhdari estate at the end of the period of management; when the estate was to be restored to the talukhdar free of incumbrance, excepting the Government revenue. If debts amounted to more than the surplus of rents during the management of which the maximum period was twenty years, they were not to be paid. A widow, as guardian of her infant son, the heir of talukhdari estate in the above district, validly transferred villages, part thereof, and in the deed of transfer to which her ward was, by her as his guardian, nominally a party, contracted to indemnify the purchaser in case the Government should claim and enforce a right to revenue upon the villages which she transferred as being rent-free. The deed purported to make both guardian and ward personally liable in this respect, and also

BOMBAY TALUKHDARI ACT (VI OF 1862)—concl'd.

s. 12—concl'd.

charged the liability upon other parts of the talukhdari estate. The infant attained majority and the estate was then placed under management within Act VI of 1862. During the period of management the Government claimed and enforced payment of revenue upon the villages. *Held*, that there was no personal liability on the part of the talukhdar created by the above; also that if, the charge on the estate had been validly made, it fell, at all events, within the terms of s. 12 of Act VI of 1862, absolving estates from liability for debts incurred, not only before, but during the period of management. *WAGHELA RAJSANJI v. MASLUDIN*
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 551 : L. R. 14 I. A. 89

2. — and s. 20—Talukhdar's power of disposal over his landed estates after the expiration of the management by the Talukhdari Settlement Officer. Under s. 12 of the Ahmedabad Talukhdars Act (VI of 1862), debts or liabilities incurred by a talukhdar during the management of the Talukhdari Settlement Officer are not enforceable against landed estates. His personal liability for the same remains unaffected by the Act. This personal liability furnishes a sufficient consideration for a subsequent obligation, so as to bind the landed estates by a contract made *after* the period of the management by the Talukhdari Officer had expired. From and after the expiration of that period, the talukhdar becomes, under s. 20, the absolute proprietor of his estate, and he is *then* at liberty to create a valid charge upon his estate for debts contracted *during* the period of the management. Accordingly, where a talukhdar had, after the withdrawal of the management by the Talukhdari Settlement Officer, encumbered his landed estate under several mortgage-bonds, passed partly in renewal of old bonds and partly in consideration of old debts contracted during the period of the management:—*Held*, that the mortgage-bonds created valid and binding encumbrances upon the estate. *BOO JINATBOO v. SHA NAGAR VALAB KANJI* . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 78

BOMBAY TOLLS ACT (III OF 1875).

s. 7—Lease to levy tolls—Lessee, right of, to admit partners—Keeping two sets of accounts—False accounts kept to deceive Government. A lessee from Government of the right to levy tolls admitted into partnership with him the plaintiff and two others. One of the conditions attached to the lease prohibited sub-letting. The plaintiff having brought a suit for his share of the profits realized in the transaction, the Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that the partnership was illegal, being of opinion that sub-letting and admitting a partner were identical. *Held*, reversing the decree, that the partnership was not illegal. Where in such a partnership two sets of account were kept, one true and the other false, *held*, that

**BOMBAY TOLLS ACT (III OF 1875)—
concl'd.****s. 7—concl'd.**

such practice, however reprehensible, was not illegal under s. 7 of the Tolls Act (Bombay Act III of 1875), and did not disentitle the plaintiff to show as between himself and his partners what was the actual profit of the concern. **GANESH VITHAL v. SHRIPAD DATTOBA NAIK**

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 668

s. 10.

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 623

**BOMBAY TOLLS AMENDMENT ACT
(V OF 1881).**

See BOMBAY TOLLS ACT.

**BOMBAY TRAMWAYS ACT (I OF
1874).**

s. 24—Meaning of the words “Regulating the travelling”—Validity of Regulation made under the section for regulating the conduct of the Company’s servants. The words “regulating the travelling” in s. 24 of the Bombay Tramways Act (Bombay Act I of 1874) mean laying down rules as to how persons shall travel, that is to say, rules for the conduct and behaviour of the persons who travel, and cannot be held to include rules for the conduct of the Company’s servants, prescribing what they shall do, or what they shall not do in the matter, for instance, of issuing tickets. S. 24 of Bombay Act I of 1874 authorizes the Bombay Tramway Company to make regulations “for regulating the travelling in or upon any carriage belonging to them.” Under this section the Company made the following regulation:—“Any conductor who shall neglect to issue a ticket to a passenger, or shall issue to such passenger a ticket bearing a number other than one of the numbers contained in such books, or shall issue a ticket of a lower denomination than the amount of the fare, or non-consecutive in number, or a ticket other than the ticket provided by the Company for the journey to be travelled, shall for every such offence be liable to a penalty not exceeding Rs. 25.” **Held**, that the regulation was *ultra vires*. **MANOCKJI DADABHAI v. BOMBAY TRAMWAY COMPANY**

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 739

s. 30—Purchase by Municipal Corporation of Bombay of tramway undertaking—Notice of intention to purchase—Arrangement by Corporation with third person—Date of purchase for purpose of ascertaining compensation—Liability of Tramway Company for track rent during period between notice and date of purchase. By an agreement, dated 12th March 1873, the Municipal Corporation of Bombay (the respondents) allowed certain persons, of whom the Bombay Tramway Company (the appellants) were the assignees, to construct and work tramways in the City of Bombay. S. 30 of the Bombay Tramways Act (Bom-

**BOMBAY TRAMWAYS ACT (I OF
1874)—concl'd.****s. 30—concl'd.**

bay Act I of 1874) gave the respondents the right to purchase the tramways from the appellants “with the plant, stores, rolling-stock and everything connected therewith after the expiration of 21 years from the 12th day of March 1873, upon declaring their intention so to do within six months after the expiration of the said 21 years” and gave them “a renewed right to purchase at the end of every seven years after the expiration of the said 21 years upon similar notice being given.” Notice of the intention to exercise such renewed right of purchase was duly given by the respondents on 14th March 1901. In a suit by the appellants against the respondents to have their rights under the purchase declared. **Held**, by the Judicial Committee (affirming the decision of the Courts below), that the notice was not invalid by reason of the respondents having made an arrangement with a third person who was to find the money for the purchase and work the tramways, when acquired by the respondents, it appearing that the respondents were acting as principals in the matter, and not as agents of such third person, and that there was nothing in the Act to prohibit such a transaction or to show that, when acquired, the respondents were bound to keep the tramways in their own hands, and work them themselves. By s. 30 of the above Act it was further enacted that “the amount to be paid in the event of such purchase shall be the actual *bonâ fide* value (exclusive of any compensation for good will, premium, or compulsory sale or other consideration whatsoever) of the tramways and of the works and materials connected therewith and of the lands and buildings and all other the property of the grantees, such value, in case the parties do not agree, to be decided by arbitration as provided by the agreement of 12th March 1873; and as compensation for the good will, premium, or compulsory sale and other consideration the grantees shall be paid an amount equal to 20 years’ purchase calculated on the average profits of the previous 3 years next preceding the purchase.” The first Court decided that the date of the purchase for the purpose of ascertaining the compensation was the date of the notice, namely, the 14th March 1901; but both parties appealed from that decision. The High Court on appeal held that the date of the purchase would be the date when the value was ascertained. **Held**, by the Judicial Committee, that the proper date to be fixed would have been when the relation of vendor and purchaser was definitely created by the service of the notice of intention to purchase, that is, the 14th March 1901; but that, having regard to the course taken by the parties, neither party without the consent of the other could insist that that date ought to be adopted, and that under the circumstances there were no grounds for disturbing the date fixed by the High Court on appeal, namely, the date of the award fixing the value of the

BOMBAY TRAMWAYS ACT (I OF 1874)—concl'd.**s. 30—concl'd.**

corporeal property of the appellants. Pending the ascertainment and payment of the purchase-money, the appellants agreed to continue to work the tramways on the understanding that they received "the income and profits of the tramway business during such period." *Held*, by the Judicial Committee (affirming the decision of the High Court on appeal), that the appellants were liable for track rent during the period they so continued to work the tramways: so long as they took the profits, they must pay the ordinary expenses of working them, and the track rent. **BOMBAY TRAMWAY COMPANY v. THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF BOMBAY (1904)** . . . **I. L. R. 28 Bom. 502**

s. 30—Purchase of tramways by Corporation—Arrangement with third persons—Validity—Corporation not bound to work tramways themselves—Liability of Tramway Company to pay track rent after purchase. In acquiring the tramways under s. 30 of the Bombay Tramways Act, the Corporation of the City of Bombay were not bound to keep them in their own hands and to work themselves. Although the Corporation had made arrangements with another person so that the latter was to find the money for the purchase and to work the tramways when acquired, yet the Corporation were acting as principals and not as the agents of that person. There was nothing in the Tramways Act which expressly or impliedly prohibited such a transaction. The Tramway Company was liable to pay the ordinary expenses of working the tramways and the track rent for the period (subsequent to acquisition and pending the ascertainment and payment of the purchase-money) during which they had expressly agreed with the Corporation to work the tramways on the understanding that they received the income and profits. **BOMBAY TRAMWAY COMPANY, LIMITED v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BOMBAY (1905)** . . . **9 C. W. N. 337**

BOMBAY UNIVERSITY ACT (XXII OF 1857).

s. 12—Candidate for a Degree—Obligation to present certificate of previous examination. The words "candidate for a degree" in s. 12 of the Act (XXII of 1857) to establish the University of Bombay mean a candidate for the final examination, the passing of which entitles him to a degree. They do not mean a candidate for a degree at any stage of his University career. Students, therefore, presenting themselves for the previous examination prescribed by the Senate of the Bombay University need not present the certificate required by that section. *In the matter of* **DARASHA RUSTOMJEE**

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 465

BOMBAY VILLAGE POLICE ACT (VIII OF 1867).

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—CHEMICAL EXAMINER . . . **6 Bom. Cr. 75**

BOMBAY VILLAGE POLICE ACT (VIII OF 1867)—concl'd.**s. 9.**

See **SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHERE SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE.**
I. L. R. 4 Bom. 357

Police patel neglecting to report encroachment made by villagers on public road. Conviction of a police patel for neglecting to report an encroachment made by the villagers on the public road reversed, as the circumstances of the case did not bring it within the provisions of s. 9 of Bombay Act VIII of 1867. **REG. v. UKHA SAV** . . . **7 Bom. Cr. 88**

ss. 10, 11, and 12—Duties of the police patel in cases of unnatural or sudden death—Ancient village system of Police, how affected by the Code of Criminal Procedure (1882). The ancient village system of police, as regulated by Bombay Act VIII of 1867, remains unaffected by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1862) except where the Code contains a specific provision. Under Bombay Act VIII of 1867, the police patel has to do much more than merely inform the district police. He has himself to investigate the matter of a crime and obtain all procurable evidence. Under s. 11 of the Act, if an unnatural or sudden death occur, or any corpse be found, he must forthwith hold an inquest and investigate with the panch the causes of death and all the circumstances of the case, and make a written report of the same. If it appears that the death was unlawfully caused, he must immediately give notice to the police station, and if the state of the corpse permits, he shall at once forward it to the Civil Surgeon or other appointed medical officer. These provisions of the law are likely to be defeated if the police patel refrains from the proper action until the district police officers arrive on the spot. **QUEEN-EMPERESS v. RAGHO MAHADU**
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 612

s. 13.

See **SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHERE SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE** . . . **I. L. R. 4 Bom. 479**

BOMBAY VILLAGE POLICE AMENDMENT ACT (I OF 1876).

See **SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHERE SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE.** . . . **I. L. R. 4 Bom. 357**

BONÂ FIDES.

See **BENGAL PRIVATE FISHERIES PROTECTION ACT** . . . **6 C. W. N. 118**

See **DEFAMATION** . **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 124**
4 W. R. Cr. 22

2 N. W. 473

I. L. R. 6 All. 220

8 Bom. Cr. 168

I. L. R. 3 All. 342, 684, 815

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 298

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 289

BONÂ FIDES—concl'd.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—MODE OF
EXECUTION—INSTALMENTS.

I. L. R. 24 All. 85
7 C. W. N. 117

See JUDICIAL OFFICERS, LIABILITY OF.

I. L. R. 1 All. 280
I. L. R. 1 Mad. 89

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 134
(1859, s. 5; 1871, ART. 134).

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE CODE . . . 6 C. W. N. 886

See PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES
—DEFENDANTS . . . 7 C. W. N. 529

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 53
I. L. R. 20 Mad. 465

See TRESPASS . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 433

See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 249

bonâ fide claim of right—

See MISCHIEF . . . 7 C. W. N. 859

purchaser for value—

See HINDU LAW—ENDOWMENT
I. L. R., 36 Calc., 1003

See WILL . . . 10 C. W. N. 862

test of—

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 53.
I. L. R. 27 Bom. 322

BOND.

See ADMINISTRATION. 12 C. W. N. 481
See DECREE . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 150

See DISQUALIFIED PROPRIETOR.
I. L. R. 28 All. 570

See FORGERY . . . 5 C. W. N. 887

See GUARDIAN AND MINOR.
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 320
I. L. R. 31 Mad. 458

See GUARANTEE . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 597

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—
BOND.

See INTEREST—OMISSION TO STIPULATE,
ETC.

See LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877).
I. L. R. 30 All. 123

See LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877), SCH.
II, ART. 75 . . . I. L. R. 29 All. 431

STIPULATIONS AMOUNTING OR NOT TO
PENALTIES;

MISCELLANEOUS CASES—BOND.
I. L. R. 25 All. 284

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 66.

See LIMITATION ACT, SCH. II, ART. 75
13 C. W. N. 1004, 1010

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.
91 . . . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 560

BOND—concl'd.

See MORTGAGE—MONEY DECREE ON
MORTGAGE.

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1866, s. 53.

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 455

See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 3.

alteration of—

See CONTRACT—ALTERATION OF CON-
TRACT—ALTERATION BY PARTY.
I. L. R. 25 All. 580

bail bond—

See RECOGNIZANCE TO APPEAR.
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 107

See BAIL-BOND, FORFEITURE OF
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 749

creating or not charge on im-
moveable property.

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 17.

forfeiture of—

See SURETY BOND.
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 562

payable by instalments.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 75.

recitals in—

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—RECITALS
IN DOCUMENTS I. L. R. 20 Bom. 636

See ONUS OF PROOF—DOCUMENTS RE-
LATING TO LOANS, ETC.

1. Form of bond—Bond not to be
operative until dishonour of hundi with respect to
which bond has been executed. An instrument which
is in the nature of a bond is not the less a bond be-
cause it does not come into operation unless and
until the hundi with respect to which it is passed
has been dishonoured. LAKSHMANDAS RAGHU
NATHDAS v. RAMBHAU MANSARAM

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 791

2. Condition in bond for money
lent—Right of suit. An agreement to put a party
in possession of certain lands if default be made in
the payment of money lent does not preclude that
party from suing for the money lent if he elect to
do so. ANNASAMI v. NARANAYEN

2 Ind. Jur. O. S. 12

3. Admission of liability on
bond—Remission of condition—Default—Right of
suit. When the full sum specified in a bond was
admitted to be due, the fact of the plaintiff having,
on condition of the payment of half the amount by
a certain day, agreed to remit his claim to the
other half, cannot affect his right to recover the
entire amount due on the defendant failing to
fulfil the condition. VENGAPPAYAN v. RAJAPA-
YAN . . . 1 Mad. 208

BOND—contd.

4. ———— Bond with collateral agreement to accept rents—*Right of suit*. In a suit to recover money (principal and interest) alleged to have been due on a bond, defendant pleaded that subsequent to the execution of the bond plaintiff had taken from the obligor an ijara and a dur-ijara and executed ijara kabuliats, agreeing to accept payment of the bond by setting off the rents due under the kabuliats. It was found that the kabuliats stipulated that during their term the rent should, year after year and instalment by instalment, be credited in payment of the bond debt, and that at the end of the term of the ijara accounts should be settled and the balance paid, neither party being at liberty to put an end to the lease. *Held*, that till the termination of the lease plaintiff could not sue on the bond, his right of suit having been suspended during the continuance of the ijara and dur-ijara, the stipulations in which qualified the stipulation in the bond for absolute payment at the end of a specified period. *DYA CHAND OSWAL v. MOORTEEDA DABEE* . 13 W. R. 24

5. ———— Cause of action—*Limitation*. J, after entering into a bond for the payment of a sum of money, adopted one S, who took the family estate at J's death. While in the enjoyment of the estate, the bond-holders brought a suit against him to realize the debt, and obtained a decree. Under the decree, the obligees sought to sell the property which by the time of the execution had come into the hands of R (a great-nephew of J's), who sued and eventually succeeded in having J's adoption declared void. R then sued to set aside, so far as it affected him, the decree for the sale of the property, and in this suit also he eventually succeeded. The representative of the original bond-holders then brought a suit against R to recover the money due on the bond. *Held*, that plaintiff's right of suit first arose, not from the last decree in favour of R, but from the time when the debt became due under the terms of the bond. *RAJKRISTO SING v. HURO SOONDUREE CHOWDRAIN* . 13 W. R. 313

6. ———— *Suit to recover share of bond debt*. In a suit by the widow of one of three judgment-creditors to recover the third part of a bond debt which had been decreed in their favour, and of which execution had been taken out: *Held*, that, as she had failed in her endeavour to be made a party to the original suit, her only course was to sue for her share of the money received under the decree; though she might have sued to have herself declared a sharer in the decree, her not adopting that form of action *held* not to bar her suit. As the entire sum due on the bond, with penal interest to date of decree, had been recovered, plaintiff's cause of action had fully accrued, though a balance of interest was still due. *BUZMOONISSA v. ROWSEAN JAHAN* 10 W. R. 397

7. ———— *Suit on bond before due date—Denial of execution*. *Held*, reversing the decision of the Court below, that the denial

BOND—contd

of the execution of a bond in the Criminal Court by the defendant does not give the plaintiff any cause of action to recover the amount of the bond before due date. *SUJEEWUN SINGH v. RUPPAL SINGH* . 10 W. R. 351

8. ———— Failure to deliver bond—*Suit for amount before due date*. If an obligor fraudulently withholds delivery of a bond which has been executed within a reasonable time after the receipt of the money, the obligee has a right to sue for the return of the money before the time fixed for payment. *PEAREE MONEE DOSSEE v. THAKOOR DOSS DUTT* . 21 W. R. 443

9. ———— Right of one of several heirs to sue creditor for share of debt—*Joint obligation—Obligation—Act XXVII of 1860—Contract Act IX of 1872, ss. 42, 45*. *Held* by the Full Bench (MAHMOOD, J., dissenting), that when upon the death of the obligee of a money-bond the right to realize the money has devolved in specific shares upon his heirs, each of such heirs cannot maintain a separate suit for recovery of his share of the money due on the bond. *KANDHIYA LAL v. CHANDAR* . I. L. R. 7 All. 313

10. ———— Suit by obligee against some of obligors taking fresh bond from the rest. Where an obligee sues some of the persons jointly liable to him under a bond, and takes another bond from the rest for what he considers to be their share of the debt, he does not discharge the latter from their liability to contribute according to the shares in which they are liable among themselves, nor does his transaction with them (they not being sureties) destroy the joint liability. *SHUSHREE MOHUN PAL CHOWDHRY v. RAM KOOMAR KOONDOO* 22 W. R. 193

11. ———— Bond used to pay debt of third party—*Liability of third party*. The fact that the money raised on a bond is used to pay a debt due by a third party (G) does not make such third party liable to the party who executed the bond, unless the latter joined in the bond at the request of the third party or of some one acting under his authority. *GOUR KISHORE DUTT CHOWDHRY v. OZEER ALI* . 24 W. R. 99

12. ———— Sale of interest of obligee in a hypothecation-bond—*Civil Procedure Code, 1889, ss. 268, 274*. The interest of the obligee in a bond hypothecating certain land as security for a debt having been attached under s. 274 of the Code of Civil Procedure and sold, a suit was brought by the purchaser upon the said bond; it was objected that the suit was not maintainable because the bond had not been also attached as a debt under s. 268. *Held*, that the fact of the bond not having been attached as a debt under s. 268 did not affect the right of the purchaser to realize the amount due under it. *SAMI AYYAR v. KRISHNASAMI* . I. L. R. 10 Mad. 169

13. ———— Fraudulent alteration of hypothecation clause. The obligee of a bond for the payment of money, in which a certain

BOND—contd.

share of a village had been hypothecated as collateral security, having fraudulently altered such bond so as to make it appear that a larger share of such village was hypothecated, sued the obligor to recover the money due on such bond by the sale of such larger share. The obligor admitted the execution of the bond, and that a certain sum was due thereon. *Held*, on the question whether under these circumstances the obligee was entitled to relief as regards his claim for money, that he was not so entitled, inasmuch as the bond on which his suit was brought must be discarded, being a forgery, and therefore the suit as brought failed. *GANGA RAM v. CHANDAN SINGH*

I. L. R. 4 All. 62

14. ——— Appropriation of payment—*Mode of calculating interest—Reg. XV of 1793.* Where payment was made upon a bond, the amount paid being less than the interest due:—*Held* that the payment ought to go to reduce the amount of interest due, and the creditor in a suit upon the bond was entitled to a decree for the principal and balance of interest up to date of decree. *LUCHMESWAR SINGH v. LUFT ALI KHAN*

8 B. L. R. P. C. 110

15. ——— Failure of bond—*Evidence—Non-registration.* In an action on a bond and mortgage, which was not registered, and the *factum* of which was denied, the Principal Sudder Ameen decided in favour of the plaintiffs; but such judgment being reversed by the High Court, the Judicial Committee, considering that too much weight had been given to the fact of non-registration, reversed that finding, and, after a careful analysis of the evidence, found the bond to be genuine. *GANGAPRASAD v. MAWJI LAL*

9 B. L. R. 426 : 18 W. R. P. C. 30

16. ——— Presumption of payment—*Possession of bond by obligor.* The presumption of payment of a bond which arises from its possession by the obligor loses much of its force when raised, not between the original creditor and the debtor, but between the debtor and the purchaser of the debt at an execution sale. *DEBENDRA KUMAR MANDAL v. RUP LALL DASS*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 546

17. ——— Evidences of payment—*Error in account—Waiver—Estoppel—Indorsement.* Where the defendant executed to the plaintiff a bond for the payment of the balance found to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff upon an adjustment of the account of their mutual dealings, which bond contained the following stipulation: "I shall pay the money after causing the payment to be entered on the back of this bond, or after taking a receipt for the same. I shall not lay any claim to any payment made except in this way,"—*Held*, that though the defendant at the time of the adjustment disputed the correctness of the account, yet that, by having executed the bond and made payments under it, he must be held to have waived his objection, and in a suit on the

BOND—contd.

bond could not be permitted to re-open the question of the correctness of the balance, though he might possibly have been allowed to do so had he alleged that he had discovered errors in the account after the execution of the bond, and had he specified some of the alleged errors. *Held*, also, that the stipulation in the bond could not be permitted to control Courts of justice as to the evidence which, keeping within the rules of the general law of evidence in this country, they may admit of payments and the Anglo-Indian law of evidence not excluding oral evidence of payments, it would be against good conscience and the policy of the law to reject it, though the absence of indorsements is a circumstance of some importance which ought not to be overlooked, but is by no means conclusive. *Bekana Tatiah v. Vasuntum Chinnu, Mad. S. D. A., 1855, pp. 49 and 50, impeached. Sashachellum Chetty v. Gobindappa, 5 Mad. 451, Kashinath Balal Oka v. Narria Jan, Bom. Sp. Ap. 438 of 1872, and Nugur Mull v. Azemoolah, 1 N. W. 146, approved. NARAYAN UNDIR PATIL v. MOTILAL RAMDAS*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 45

KALEE DOSS MITTRA v. TARACHAND ROY

8 W. R. 316

See GIRDHAREE SINGH v. LALLOO KOONWAR

3 W. R. Mis. 23

18. ——— Novation of bond—*Surety, Liability of.* B became surety under a bond to Government for the treasurer of a Collectorate. The Collector yearly examined the accounts and struck a balance which he certified to be correct. B on each such occasion executed a new bond, but the old bonds were not cancelled or given up. On subsequent enquiry, the treasurer was discovered to have embezzled money during each year. *Held*, that on such discoveries being made, B was still liable under the old bonds, there having been no novation. *LALA BANSHIDHAR v. GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL*

9 B. L. R. 334 : 14 Moo. I. A. 86

16 W. R. P. C. 11

19. ——— Bond given in renewal of former bonds. Where a bond is given in renewal of former bonds such bond constitutes a new security, to take effect from its date. *HAMED BUX v. BINDEABUN*

2 N. W. 37

20. ——— Fraud—*Undue influence and threats.* The three childless widows of a zamindar instituted a suit against the rightful heir to their husband's estate, in which they unsuccessfully disputed his legitimacy. Previously thereto they had obtained advances of money from the present plaintiff and executed in his favour an agreement and a bond, whereby they secured to him the payment of large sums in case they recovered their husband's estate, and virtually gave to him the entire control of their suit. Subsequently they agreed with the rightful heir to compromise the suit, which compromise, however, was never acted upon, partly owing, it was alleged, to the subsequent conduct of the heir. At

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the date of the compromise, the heir, who had just attained his majority, and was without proper counsel or assistance, and acted under threats from the plaintiff, a powerful and wealthy banker, that he would carry on the litigation against him *per fas aut nefas*, was induced, contrary to his own judgment and sense of right, and without any evidence that the sum claimed was really due to the plaintiff, to execute a bond in his favour, whereby he bound himself to pay a large sum of money claimed by the plaintiff as being due from the widows; the plaintiff on his part agreeing that he would treat such payment as a satisfaction of his claim against the widows, but meanwhile that he would retain the securities which he held from them. In a suit brought by the plaintiff against the heir to enforce the last-mentioned bond:—*Held*, that the bond was wholly invalid and fraudulent as against the defendant, and that, as there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant independently of the bond, it could not stand as a security for anything which might be justly due from the widows. *Semle*: The transaction, even if valid, did not amount to a novation, for the plaintiff never abandoned his claim against the widows, but only agreed to abandon his remedy against them in case he obtained satisfaction of his claim from the heir. *CHEDAMBARA CHETTY v. RENJA KRISHNA MUTHU PUCHANJA NAIKAR* 13 B. L. R. 509 : 22 W. R. 148 : L. R. 1 I. A. 241

Affirming decision of High Court 7 Mad. 85

21. ———— *Bond for payment of bills of exchange—Collateral security—Presumption.* Where a person who is indebted on certain bills of exchange accepted by him gives a bond for securing payment of the whole amount with interest by instalments, the fact that the bills were not to be given back until all the instalments should be paid raises a presumption that the bond was only intended to be a collateral security, and not a substitution for the obligation arising from the bills of exchange. Such a presumption may be impliedly rebutted by other circumstances. *Weston v. Foster*, 2 Bing. N. C. 693, cited. *RADHA GOBIND SHAHA v. BANK OF BENGAL*

2 C. L. R. 565

22. ———— *Verbal assignment of rent of land in satisfaction of interest—"Jamog"*—*Mutation of names in favour of assignee not effected—Suit on bond—Claim for interest notwithstanding assignment.* Subsequent to the execution and registration of a bond, a jamog was made orally between the creditor and the debtor, by which the former agreed to take the rents of certain tenants of the latter in satisfaction of interest; the latter agreed to release the tenants from payment of rent to himself, and the tenants (who were parties to the arrangement) agreed to pay their rents to the creditor. No mutation of names in favour of the creditor was effected in the revenue registers. The creditor brought a suit against the debtor to recover the principal and interest

BOND—contd.

agreed to be paid under the bond, alleging that he had never received any rents under the jamog. *Held*, that the effect of the jamog or novation was that the plaintiff's right to recover interest from the defendant was gone, and the plaintiff was therefore not entitled to maintain his suit against the defendant in respect of the interest which was payable under the bond. *ATTU SINGH v. AJUDHIA SAHU* . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 249

23. ———— *Bond payable by instalments—Limitation—Act XIV of 1859, s. 1—Cause of action.* Where a bond, payable by instalments, provided that upon default in payment of any one of the instalments the whole amount secured by the bond should become payable:—*Held*, that a suit to recover the money due upon the bond, brought after a lapse of more than three years from the date when the first default was made, though within three years from the date of the last payment, was barred by lapse of time. *HURRONATH ROY v. MAHEROOLAH MOLLAH* B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 618 : 7 W. R. 21

24. ———— *Cause of action—Decree payable by monthly instalments.* When a bond is entered into to pay off money due under a decree monthly by instalments, each monthly instalment becomes a separate cause of action, and limitation applies to each instalment separately. *KHIDU v. KALI SAHU* 3 B. L. R. Ap. 112 : 12 W. R. 71

25. ———— *Default—Cause of action.* Where a bond was given to secure a debt which was to be repaid by seven annual instalments, and the bond provided that upon failure to pay a single instalment the whole principal sum secured should immediately become due and recoverable with interest:—*Held*, that the cause of action in respect of the principal and interest arose on failure to pay the first instalment. *KARUPANA NAYAK v. NALLAMMA NAYAK*

1 Mad. 209

MADHO SINGH v. THAKOOR PERSHAD

5 N. W. 35

26. ———— *Limitation—Waiver. Quære*: Whether a suit on a bond for payment by instalments, with a clause making the whole amount payable on default in payment of any instalments, must be instituted within three years from the time of the first default. Payments made and accepted afterwards may operate to waive the effect of a default, and to restore the provision for payment by instalments. *HULLODHUR BANGAL v. HOGG* . . . 1 W. R. 189

See BREEN v. BALFOUR . . . Bourke 120

(*Contra*), *MADHO SINGH v. THAKOOR PERSHAD* 5 N. W. 35

SUMBHOO CHUNDER SHAHA v. BARODA SOONDUREE DEBEA . . . 5 W. R. 45

27. ———— *Suit upon a bond executed by the defendants to the plaintiff for the payment of a sum of money by instalments. The*

BOND—contd.

bond contained a proviso that, on default being made in the payment of any one instalment, the whole amount should become due. Default was made in the payment of several instalments, but subsequently payments were made by the defendants and accepted by the plaintiff on account of the unpaid instalments. The defendants pleaded the law of limitation. The suit was brought more than three years after the first default in payment of an instalment had been made, but within three years from the time when, taking into account the payments that had been made, the first instalment claimed became due. *Held*, that these payments as regards both parties must be considered as if made at the time fixed; that the defendants could not rely upon the stipulation as making the whole debt due, and fixing the period from which the time of limitation ran; and that, the first of the instalments claimed having become due within three years, the suit was not barred. **RAM KRISHNA MAHADEV v. BAYAJI BIN SANTAJI**
5 Bom. A. C. 35

But see **GUMNA DAMBERSHET v. BHIKU HARIBA**
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 125

28. *Execution of decree—Failure to keep decree alive—Suit on bond.* In execution of a decree, seven out of nine judgment-debtors with the consent of the decree-holder, filed an instalment-bond, agreeing to pay the amount of the decree with interest thereon in two instalments. The decree-holder neglected to take proceedings to keep alive the decree, and his application to execute the decree was disallowed. In a suit brought by the decree-holder against the person who had executed the instalment-bond for the amount of principal and interest due thereon:—*Held*, that the suit was maintainable. **ASHIDHARI CHOWDHRY v. JAGESSEE KUMAR**
6 B. L. R. Ap. 32

S. C. ASHDHAREE CHOWDHRY v. JAGESSEE KUMAR
14 W. R. 430

29. *Waiver of default—Limitation.* Suit brought on 24th April 1873 for principal and interest due on a bond dated 30th October 1850. The debt was payable by eight annual instalments, on failure of any one of which the whole amount was to be payable on demand. No instalment was paid, and when the suit was brought, defendant pleaded that the suit was barred as three years had elapsed from the date on which the last instalment became due. *Held*, that the usual clause, that on failure to pay one instalment the whole amount shall be payable on demand, gave a mere election to plaintiff of converting the obligation into a different one; that that election was never exercised, and that the document continued to be one securing the payment of a debt by instalments as to all of which the action had long been barred; and that it was unnecessary, therefore, to consider whether, in the present case, "on demand" must not be construed according to its meaning at the period

BOND—contd.

at which the words were written. **EATHAMAKALA SUBBAMMAH v. RAGHIAH**
7 Mad. 293

30. *Construction of bond—Payments towards interest and principal.* Defendants were indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of R1,400. With the object of liquidating this debt with interest at 12 per cent. per annum the parties executed a bond, whereby it was agreed that the defendants should grant an ijara lease of certain property for the term of fourteen years to the plaintiff's husband; and that the rent reserved on this lease should be paid by the lessee to the plaintiff during the terms in semi-annual payments each of R3-12. *Held*, that, on the proper construction of this agreement, the semi-annual instalments were to be applied first to the reduction of the principal money due, and not to the payment of the interest. **SHURNOMOYEE DOSSEE v. UMA SOONDERY CHOWDHRAIN**
2 C. L. R. 138

31. *Cause of action—Waiver of default in payment.* When a sum of money is payable under a bond by instalments with a condition that, in default of paying one instalment the whole amount shall then become due, and default is made, but the obligee subsequently accepts payments of one or more sums as an instalment or instalments due under the bond, such acceptance amounts to a waiver of the condition of forfeiture, and puts an end to the cause of action which had accrued, so that the bond is set up again as a bond payable by instalments, and no cause of action under the condition arises until some fresh default is made in the payment of a subsequent instalment. **PASSANMA ROW GART v. TOLETI VENKIYA**
5 Mad. 198
See on the same principle. **HUR PERSHAD v. KHOWANEE**
5 N. W. 18

32. *Default—Waiver.* Where, after default in payment of an instalment upon a bond, conditioned that upon such a default the whole amount of the bond should become due, plaintiff accepted payment of such instalment, as also several subsequent ones:—*Held*, that by so doing the parties reverted to the old arrangement for payment by instalments, or made a new one to the same effect, and that the penalty occasioned by the first default could not be enforced. **GYAN CHUND v. JAWAHUR**
2 N. W. 83

33. *Waiver of default—Limitation Acts, 1871 and 1877, Art. 75—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 194; 1877, s. 210—Power of Court to alter contract between the parties.* Where a bond is payable by instalments, and expressly stipulates for the payment of the whole debt on failure in the payment of any instalment, the law of limitation runs on the whole amount of the bond against the obligee from the day on which the obligor first makes default in the payment of any instalment, unless the obligee waive the default, and afterwards from the day on which any fresh default is made in respect of which there is no waiver. The obligee may waive the default under Acts IX of 1871 and XV of 1877, Sch. II, Art. 75

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but the Courts have no authority to compel him to waive it. Neither Act VIII of 1859, s. 194, nor Act X of 1877, s. 210, confers any authority on the Courts to relieve a contracting party from such an express stipulation in a bond payable by instalments as to the consequence of default in punctual payment of the instalments. A debt being presently due, an agreement to pay it by instalments, with a stipulation that on default the creditor may demand immediate payment of the whole balance due with interest, is not to be relieved against in equity. Such a stipulation is not in the nature of a penalty, inasmuch as its object is only to secure payment on a particular manner. The defendant executed to the plaintiff a bond payable by instalments, and expressly stipulating for the payment of the whole amount on failure to pay any instalment on the day fixed. He paid the first instalment, but made default in paying the second, which fell due on the 3rd August 1878. On the 20th August plaintiff sued to recover the whole balance due on the bond. Defendant admitted the bond, but pleaded tender of the amount of the second instalment soon after the due date, and prayed for payment by instalments without any interest. The first Court passed a decree in the plaintiff's favour for the amount claimed with costs, but ordered defendant to pay ₹100 and the costs at once, and the balance by yearly instalments of ₹100 each with interest at six per cent. till payment. The District Judge, on appeal, affirmed the decree, with a slight variation as to interest, which he directed the defendant to pay on overdue instalments only. *Held* by the High Court, on second appeal, that neither of the lower Courts had jurisdiction, without the consent of the parties, to substitute, for the contract made by them, terms which the Court preferred. *Held*, also, that plaintiff was entitled to sue on the day after that on which the default was made,—viz., on the day after that fixed for the payment of the instalment,—and that the Subordinate Judge had no power to rule the contrary. *RAGHO GOBIND PARANJE v. DIPCHAND*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 96

34. ———— *Waiver of default*
—*Limitation Act, 1871, Art. 75.* Where a bond is payable by instalments, with a provision that upon default of payment of any instalment the whole sum then unpaid shall become due with interest, the creditor, though he can elect but once to enforce this provision, may waive the benefit of it not only on the first but on any subsequent default. *SATRACHERIA v. SETARAMA*

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 61

35. ———— *Default in payment*
—*Expiration of time for specific enforcement of contract.* A bond for money provided that on failure on the part of the obligor to pay interest as agreed in the bond, and within a certain period from date of the bond, the obligee might sue for possession of the immoveable property mortgaged in the bond. Default was made in the payment of

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interest as agreed, but the obligee deferred bringing a suit for possession of the mortgaged property so long that the time mentioned in the bond expired before he could obtain a decree. *Held*, that under these circumstances a decree for possession of the property could not be granted to him. *BALWANT SINGH v. GUMANI RAM*

I. L. R. 5 All. 591

36. ———— *Suit on bond—Limitation—Burden of proof—Indorsement of payment of instalments.* Where a defendant sets up the defence of limitation, he must plead it, and show that the claim is barred. If, when the plaintiff has proved his case, the fact show that the cause of action accrued at a date earlier than the period of limitation, and the plea of limitation has been set up by the defendant, the latter will be entitled to take advantage of the plaintiff's evidence that the claim is barred, and to have judgment given in his favour. The obligee of a bond by which obligor covenanted to pay the sum of ₹3,000 by annual instalments of ₹200, and in which it was also agreed that payments of the instalments should be indorsed on the bond, brought a suit against the obligor, alleging default in payment, and claiming to recover the amount of the bond. He gave credit for payment of the instalments for seven years, and alleged that his cause of action arose upon default in payment of the eighth instalment. The bond showed on its face indorsements of the payments for which credit was given. The obligor alleged that no instalments were paid after the third year, that therefore the debt became due at an earlier date than that stated by the plaintiff, and that the claim was barred by limitation. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the defendant adduced no evidence to show that the later instalments were not paid, and inasmuch as the evidence produced by the plaintiff did not show that the debt accrued at a date earlier than the limitation period, the plea of limitation failed. *RADHA PRASAD SINGH v. BHAJAN RAI*

I. L. R. 7 All. 677

37. ———— *Power of Court to alter terms of specially-registered bond—Act VIII of 1859, s. 194—Order to pay by instalments—Superintendence of High Court.* By a bond specially registered under Act XVI of 1864, the obligor stipulated to pay the entire amount secured thereby with interest at the rate therein mentioned on a day therein mentioned. There was a further stipulation that, on default of payment, the bond was to be enforced as a decree. On failure of payment, the obligee applied for execution under s. 53, Act XX of 1866, but the Subordinate Judge ordered the payment to be made by instalments. On an application to the High Court under s. 15 of the Charter Act :—*Held*, that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to pass a decree on the bond altering or varying its terms. S. 194, Act VIII of 1859, did not apply. *KHETTRA MOHUN BABOO v. RASHBEHARI BABOO*

5 B. L. R. 167 : 13 W. R. 252

BOND—*contd.*

38. ———— Bond registered under Act XVI of 1864, ss. 51 and 52—*Execution in default of payment of interest.* Where a bond was registered under ss. 51 and 52 of Act XVI of 1864, and by its terms a fixed amount of interest was to be paid at the end of every month:—*Held*, that, by virtue of special registration, the obligee was entitled to move for execution in respect of each instalment of interest due. *MANTHARESWARA AIYAR v. KAMALA NAIKER* . . . 3 Mad. 88

39. ———— Penalty—*Stipulation to pay double the amount of debt on default of payment of any instalment.* A stipulation by which, on default of payment of one instalment, double the entire amount of the debt due under an instalment bond was to become at once payable, *held* to be in the nature of a penalty. *JOSHI KALIDAS v. KOLI DADA ABHESANG* . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 555

40. ———— *Suit for contribution by debtor who has paid money due under a bond against heir of co-obligor of bond—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 8—Minority—Nature of the rights of co-obligees discussed.* In the case of co-obligees of a money bond, in the absence of anything to the contrary, the presumption of law is that they are entitled to the debt in equal shares as tenants in common. *Steeds v. Steeds*, 22 Q. B. D. 537, referred to. Hence, where one of two co-obligees is a minor, limitation will run as against the other co-obligee, who is not a minor, in respect of that portion of the debt to which he is entitled; and s. 8 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, will not apply. *MANZUR ALI v. MAHMUD-UN-NISSA* (1902) . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 155

41. ———— Stamp Act (II of 1899), s. 2 (5) (b)—*Promissory Note.* The defendant passed to the plaintiff a document to this effect: I have this day taken from you in cash R48 (forty-eight). I have received this amount. I shall repay this money without taking any objection, when you should demand [it].” The document was attested by two witnesses. It bore a one-anna adhesive stamp. *Held*, on a construction of the document, that it was a bond within the meaning of s. 2 (5) (b) of the Indian Stamp Act (II of 1899); since the document was attested and was not payable to order or bearer, and the executant obliged himself to pay the money to another. *VENKU v. SITARAM* (1905) I. L. R. 29 Bom. 82

42. ———— Guardian and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), ss. 34, 35, 36 and 37—*Minor—Guardian—Administration bond passed to Judge—Refusal of the Judge to assign—Appeal.* No appeal lies from an order passed by the District Judge under s. 35 of the Guardian and Wards Act (VIII of 1890) declining to assign the bond. A bond under s. 34 of the Guardian and Wards Act (VIII of 1890) is to be given to the Judge of the Court as inure for the benefit of the Judge for the time being, with or without sureties as may be prescribed, engaging duly to account for what the guardian may receive in respect of the property of the

BOND—*contd.*

ward. There is nothing in the section or in the form, as given in the schedule of the High Court Circular Orders, which suggests that the bond ceases to operate either on the death of the guardian or of the ward or on the cesser or otherwise of the guardianship, so that a right of suit would still continue notwithstanding the happening of these events. The District Judge can in his discretion under such circumstances assign such a bond to a proper person. *GANPAT v. ANNA* (1905)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 164

43. ———— *Altering a document—Material alteration.* Any change in an instrument, which causes it to speak a different language in legal effect, from that which it originally spoke, which changes the legal identity or character of the instrument either in its terms or the relation of the parties to it, is an alteration, which will invalidate it against all parties not consenting to the alteration. It is of no consequence whether the alteration would be beneficial or detrimental to the party sought to be charged on the contract. Where after a bond had been executed by the first defendant and delivered to the plaintiff, the name of the second defendant was added as an executant without any authority from him and without the assent of the first defendant. *Held*, that this was such an alteration in the deed as would vitiate it against the first defendant. *Held*, further, that the plaintiff was not entitled to succeed on the basis of the original consideration and to rely on the altered bond as proof of acknowledgment. *Master v. Miller*, 1 Sm. L. C. 767 (11th Ed.), 2 R. R. 399; *Cariss v. Tattersal*, 2 M. & Gr. 890; 10 L. J. C. P. 187; *Dodge v. Pringle*, 29 L. J. Ex. 115; *In re Howgate and Osborn's Contract*, [1902] 1 Ch. 451; *Gogun Chunder Ghose v. Dhoronidhur Mandal*, I. L. R. 7 Cal. 616; *Davidson v. Cooper*, 13 M. & W. 343; 67 R. R. 638; *Gardner v. Walsh*, 5 E. & B. 83; 24 L. J. Q. B. 285; *Karam Ali v. Narain Singh* 2 Punjab L. R. 107; *Motilal Shaha v. Monmohun Gassami*, 5 C. W. N. 86; *Atmaram v. Umedram*, I. L. R. 25 Bom. 616; *Subrahmanya Ayyan v. Krishna Ayyan*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 137; *Mangal Sen v. Shankar Sahai*, I. L. R. 25 All. 580; *Alderson v. Langdale*, 3 B. & Ad. 660, referred to. *GOUR CHANDRA DAS v. PRASANNA KUMAR CHANDRA* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Cal. 812
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 788

44. ———— Instalment bond, registered—*Cause of action—Default—Waiver—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 75 and 116.* Where in an instalment bond it was provided that on default in the payment of one kist the creditor would be able to realise the entire amount due under the bond: *Held*, that it was open to the creditor, if default were made, to sue at once for the whole amount or if he so elected to waive the benefit of the proviso. *Default* was made in October 1897 and the present suit was brought in 1906 for instalments for six years before suit. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to a

BOND—contd.

decree, Art. 116 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act being applicable to the suit which was brought on a registered bond. *RUP NARAIN BHATTACHARYA v. GOPI NATH MANDOL* (1906)

11 C. W. N. 903

45. *Unconscionable bargain—Circumstances under which relief may be granted by the Court.* A person of the age of some twenty-eight years, the son of a wealthy father, but of profligate habits and greatly in need of money, his father having refused to supply him, executed a bond to secure a sum of Rs. 500, with interest which amounted to Rs. 37-8-0 per cent. per annum, with six-monthly rests. The bond further contained a stipulation that the borrower should not be empowered to repay the money within three years. And if he did pay within three years, he should nevertheless be obliged to pay three years' interest at the rate mentioned. *Held*, that although it could not be said that the execution of this bond was procured by means of undue influence or that the rate of interest penal, nevertheless the bargain was an unconscionable bargain against which the Court might properly give relief. The High Court affirmed the decree of the lower Appellate Court which gave the plaintiff the principal sum with simple interest at the rate of 24 per centum per annum. *Madho Singh v. Kashi Ram*, I. L. R. 9 All. 228; *Kirpa Ram v. Sami-ud-din Ahmad Khan*, I. L. R. 25 All. 284; *Kamini Sundari Chaudhrani v. Kali Prosunno Ghose*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 225; *Kunwar Ram Lal v. Nil Kanth*, L. R. 20 I. A. 112; and *Rajah Mokam Singh v. Rajah Rup Singh*, L. R. 20 I. A. 127, referred to. *BALKISHAN DAS v. MADAN LAL* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 303

46. *cancellation of—Power of the District Magistrate to cancel a security bond.* A District Magistrate has power under s. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to direct the cancellation of a bond to keep the peace, executed on an order by a Subordinate Magistrate, on other grounds than that the bond is no longer necessary. *Barka Chandra Dey v. Janmejy Dutt*, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 948, overruled. *NABU SARDAR v. EMPEROR* (1906)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 1

47. *execution of—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 68—Attesting witness, if available, must be called to prove a mortgage bond even if object is only to enforce the personal covenant.* Where one of the witnesses who have attested a mortgage bond is available, the execution of such bond cannot, under s. 68 of the Evidence Act, be proved otherwise than by the evidence of such witness, even when the object of proving such execution has reference only to a personal covenant to pay, which is severable from the security created by the bond. *VEERAPPA KAVUNDAN v. RAMASAMI KAVUNDAN* (1907)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 251

48. *Bond given for the performance of a public duty, but not under the provisions of any law not within the exception to s. 74*

BOND—concl.

of Contract Act—Right of suit—Civil suit maintainable in respect of act amounting to criminal offence—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 6, 115—Local Board's Act (Madras), ss. 162-C and 162-D do not bar a civil suit on contract. An agreement between a contractor and a Local Board contained the following terms: "As I have taken over under contract for R406 the right to collect the fees on the articles brought for sale in Udipi market from 1st April 1902 to 31st March 1903, I am bound to act according to the following conditions:—I am not entitled to collect more than the undermentioned rate of fees from the persons seated and trading on the site of the fair.

Rate of fees.

	R	A.	P.
Each head-load	.	.	0 0 2
„ cart-load	.	.	0 2 0

I am bound to put up a board with the rates of fees to be collected by me and my name in English and Canarese in a public place in the market. If I, my agent, or servant were to act contrary to the above regulations, I shall be liable to pay a fine not exceeding R50 imposed by the President of the Taluk Board, or I am not entitled to object if my gutta is put up for auction again subject to the loss that may be sustained by the Taluk Board." Under the terms of the above contract, the President of the Taluk Board imposed on the defendant a fine of R20 on 4th November 1902 in respect of illegal excessive collections made by his agent. The defendant not having paid the fine, the President instituted a civil suit for the amount of the fine on 4th January 1904. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable, although the acts of the defendant's agent amounted to a criminal offence and no criminal proceedings were taken against the agent. It is doubtful whether the doctrine that a person injured by a felonious act cannot seek civil redress without prosecuting the felon in the Criminal Courts, applies in India; and the doctrine does not apply where a principal is used in the Civil Courts in respect of the wrongful acts of his agent. *Held*, also, that the agreement in question was not a bailbond or recognisance within the meaning of the exception to s. 74 of the Contract Act, and though given for the performance of a public duty, it was not given under the provisions of any law. The exception to s. 74 did not apply and the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable damages under the section. *Held*, also, that the suit was based on contract and for purposes of limitation fell within Art. 68 or 115 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act and not under Art. 6 of the schedule. *Held*, further, that the penal clauses of ss. 162-C and 162-D of the Local Board's Act did not preclude the plaintiff from suing the defendant on his contract. *PRESIDENT OF THE TALUK BOARD, KUNDAPUR v. BURDE LAKSHMINARAYANA KAMPTHI* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 54

BOOKS.

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS, BOOKS.

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 241

See EVIDENCE—ACCOUNTS AND ACCOUNT BOOKS.

See MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT, s. 2.

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 232

See TRADE MARK.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 289

"BOOTH."

meaning of—

See BOMBAY DISTRICT POLICE ACT, 1867.
s. 33 . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 746

BOTTOMRY-BOND.

1. ——— Advance for repair of ship—*Master's lien for wages—Priority.* A, the agent for the ship in port at Bombay, lent the master money on a bond, in the nature of a bottomry-bond, which he obtained from the master under pressure of necessity. It appeared that A, at the time of the making of the bond, had funds of his principal's in hand. *Held*, that the master's lien for wages has priority over the bond-holder. *In the matter of the "GOOD SUCCESS,"* MACQUEEN v. FUZZUL MAHOMED ESSAU

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 303

2. ——— Supply of necessities to foreign ship—*Claim for, against proceeds of ship—Statute 7 Geo. I, c. 21, s. 2.* The Statute 7 Geo. I, c. 21, s. 2 (which declared void all contracts by way of bottomry made by any subject of His Majesty on any ship in the service of foreigners bound or designed to trade to the East, and all contracts for loading or supplying such ships with goods, etc., or with any provisions, stores, or necessities, etc.), is repealed by implication. When a suit is brought by material men for necessities supplied to a foreign ship against the surplus proceeds of such ship lying in the registry of the Court, and there is no opposition on the part of the owners of these proceeds, the Court has a discretionary power to allow the claim of the material men to be paid out of such unclaimed proceeds. *In re the proceeds of the "ASIA,"* EXPARTE HORMASJI

5 Bom. O. C. 64

3. ——— Master's lien for wages—*Sale of ship—Charterer—Priority.* The charterer of a ship advanced money to enable her to complete the voyage, and obtained as security a "bottomry-bond," signed by both the master and owner. On the completion of the voyage, the charterer got the ship arrested and sold, and the money was brought into Court. Before any order had been made for the payment of the proceeds out of Court, the master also had got the ship arrested at his suit for wages due, but no decree had been obtained. Subsequently, the charterer, without notice to the master, obtained an order of Court for the payment of the proceeds of sale to satisfy

BOTTOMRY-BOND—contd.

his bottomry-bond. Thereupon the master applied to restrain the charterer from taking the money out of Court until the claim for wages had been first satisfied. *Held*, that the master had a lien on the proceeds for wages due to him at the time of the sale of the ship, prior to that to the bottomry-bond-holder, and that he was entitled to have the proceeds retained in Court until the hearing of his claim. *In the matter of the ship "PORTUGAL,"* . . . 5 B. L. R. 258

4. ——— Master's lien for disbursements and wages—*Towage—Priority of lien.* A ship was chartered for a voyage from Calcutta to Jedda and back. While at Jedda, the master found it necessary to borrow money for the wages of the crew and other purposes; and with the consent of the owner, tenders were invited by advertisement for a sum for which a bottomry-bond was to be given. Several tenders were made, and one by the Charterer of the ship was accepted. A bottomry-bond was executed by the master, with the consent of the owner, in which was included the expense of certain repairs which had been found necessary at an intermediate port on the voyage from Calcutta, and for which the master had made himself liable. By the bond the master bound himself, his heirs, executors, and administrators, for the payment of the sum named therein, and part of the consideration was expressed to be the payment of the debt which the master had incurred at the intermediate port. On arriving in the Hooghly, the ship was taken in charge by a pilot, under whose advice the master engaged a steamer to tow her to Calcutta. He was sued in Calcutta for the hire of the steamer, and had to pay the claim. When the ship arrived in Calcutta, the bond-holder obtained a decree on his bond, and had the ship arrested and sold; but on the application of the master, who had put in a claim for wages, the Court ordered that the proceeds should remain in Court pending the consideration of the master's claim. In a suit by the master to recover the balance of wages due to him as master of the ship, and for the expense of the steamer which towed the ship up the river to Calcutta:—*Held*, that the towage was a disbursement fairly made, and of which the bond-holder had the benefit; the master, therefore, had a lien on the ship for such disbursement. *Seemle:* The master also had a lien for wages down to the time when he was duly discharged, and not merely down to the time of the arrival in port and arrest of the ship. The master, however, having bound himself by the terms of the bond, was precluded thereby from setting up his lien against that of the bondholder, to whom, on the face of the bond, he had constituted himself a debtor. *In the matter of the ship "PORTUGAL,"* . . . 6 B. L. R. 323

5. ——— Right of suit. A suit will not lie in an ordinary bottomry-bond given by the master of a vessel against the owner to recover the amount thereof. *GLADSTONE, WYLLIE & Co. v. HARRISON* . . . 24 W. R. 50

BOTTOMRY-BOND—concl'd.

6. ——— Owner's covenant to pay—*Construction of deed of hypothecation—Uncertainty of agreement.* The owners of a vessel for the purpose of repairing it borrowed a sum of R10,000 from the plaintiff and executed an instrument stating the purpose of the loan and hypothecating the vessel to him and promising to repay the principal with interest by the 12th of March 1891. The instrument proceeded as follows :—" You have no connection with the security or seaworthiness (yogyam) of the said ship up to the above stipulated time. If the money is not paid in the said stipulated time, we shall add vattam at R20 per cent. per annum on the amount of principal and interest accruing on that date, adding vattam once in twelve months until date of payment after the said stipulated time on the hypothecation security (adamana yogyam) of the said ship, and shall get back this mortgage bond." The money was not repaid on the stipulated date, and the vessel, after making several voyages, foundered in port. *Held*, that the instrument was not a bottomry-bond, and the plaintiff was not entitled under it, regarded as an instrument of hypothecation merely to recover the enhanced interest referred to in the passage above quoted, because that part of the agreement was void for uncertainty. *ASAN KUTHU SAHIB MERCOYAR v. RAMANATHAN CHETTI* I. L. R. 22 Mad. 26

BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTES.

See CONTRACT—BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTES.
See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—SECONDARY EVIDENCE—UNSTAMPED OR UNREGISTERED DOCUMENTS.
 I. L. R. 14 Bom. 102
See EVIDENCE—PAROL EVIDENCE—VARYING OR CONTRADICTING WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS.
 9 B. L. R. 245
 I. L. R. 17 Calc. 173
See STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. I, ART. 46.
 I. L. R. 14 Bom. 102

BOUNDARY.

See DECREE—FORM OF DECREE—GENERAL CASES.
 I. L. R. 4 Calc. 69
See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MAPS.
 I. L. R. 16 Calc. 186
See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REVENUE COURTS—ORDERS OF REVENUE COURTS.
 16 W. R. 109
See LANDLORD AND TENANT
 13 C. W. N. 702
See SUNDERBUNS BOUNDARY.
 2 B. L. R. P. C. 33

alteration of—

See ZAMINDAR—POWER OF ZAMINDAR.
 W. R. 1864, 355

BOUNDARY—cont'd.**confusion of—**

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—OBLIGATION OF TENANT TO KEEP HOLDING DISTINCT.
 5 C. W. N. 846

description of, in plaint—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 148, CL. (b)
 5 C. W. N. 121
 7 C. W. N. 615

dispute as to—

See BENGAL SURVEY ACT V OF 1875.
 I. L. R. 6 Calc. 453
 I. L. R. 13 Calc. 280

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 103.
 I. L. R. 19 Calc. 641, 643

See BOMBAY LAND-REVENUE CODE, ss. 119, 120, 121.
 I. L. R. 25 Bom. 312
 I. L. R. 10 Bom. 456

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MAPS.
 I. L. R. 27 Calc. 336

See ONUS OF PROOF—LIMITATION AND ADVERSE POSSESSION.
 I. L. R. 19 Calc. 660

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—DISPUTES AS TO RIGHT OF WAY, WATER, ETC.
 6 C. W. N. 161

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.
 I. L. R. 21 Calc. 935

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—OTHER ERRORS OF LAW OR PROCEDURE—LOCAL INVESTIGATION.
 I. L. R. 21 Calc. 504

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622.
 I. L. R. 21 Calc. 935

fluctuating—

See ACCRETION—NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—RIVERS OR CHANGE IN COURSE OF RIVERS.
 11 B. L. R. 265 : 18 W. R. 160
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marks—

See BOMBAY LAND REVENUE ACT, 1879, s. 56.
 I. L. R. 15 Bom. 67
See MADRAS BOUNDARY MARKS ACT.
 I. L. R. 1 Mad. 192
 I. L. R. 7 Mad. 280

interfering with—

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—BOMBAY LAND REVENUE ACT (V OF 1879).
 I. L. R. 13 Bom. 291
See RULES MADE UNDER ACTS.
 I. L. R. 13 Bom. 291

BOUNDARY—*contd.*

— proof of—

See RES JUDICATA—MATTERS IN ISSUE
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 312

— question of—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 158.
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 277

— specification of—

See GRANT—CONSTRUCTION OF GRANT.
I. L. R. 22 All. 96

See PLAINT—FORM AND CONTENTS OF
PLAINT—BOUNDARIES.

1. ——— Demarcation of boundary line—*Beng. Reg. X of 1822, ss. 2, 3, and 8—Suit for declaration of boundary contrary to survey award—Proprietary rights, exercise of—Presumption of ownership—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, s. 5, cl. 12.* At the time of the Permanent Settlement the northern boundary of the pergunnah Shoosung (situated in Mymensingh, at the foot of the Garrow hills) was not defined by Government. From before that time, and certainly for more than sixty years, the zamindars of the pergunnah have always, but in an irregular and uncertain manner, exercised certain rights in the Garrow hills and over the inhabitants, who are half savages, such as hunting elephants, cutting wood, levying cesses on the inhabitants when possible (including in some parts of the hills a tribute of one rupee per hut), and exacting occasional services from them. Government held a survey, and declared the northern boundary of pergunnah Shoosung to be a line running along the base of the Garrow hills. The zamindar thereupon sued to set aside the survey, and for a declaration that the northern boundary lay many miles further north, and that the intermediate hill country belonged to him as forming part of pergunnah Shoosung. *Held* (by SETON-KARR, J.), that the acts of possession proved by the zamindar were sufficient under the circumstances to prove his proprietary right in the disputed tract, and for the passing of a decree in his favour. *Held* (by MACPHERSON, J.), that they were not sufficient to entitle him to a decree, being acts of mere easement independent of possession. *Held* by PEACOCK, C.J., JACKSON and PHEAR, JJ., on appeal under the Letters Patent, that the rules laid down by Regulation X of 1802 were intended to take effect only within the tract of country described in s. 2, within which the administration of civil and criminal justice, etc., was by s. 3 declared to be vested in an officer to be denominated the Civil Commissioner of the north-eastern parts of Rungpore. The proviso in s. 8 was not intended to give substantive powers to the Governor General in Council in respect of other tracts of the country, and cl. 2 of the same section did not intend to take away the power of any Civil Court except within that tract. The proviso contained in s. 8 does not authorize Government to separate any part of the Garrow country beyond that des-

BOUNDARY—*contd.*

cribed in s. 2 from the district and from the general Regulations, but merely directs the separation of such tracts from the estates of the neighbouring zamindars, and the discontinuance of the collection of cesses by the zamindars from the Garrows. By cl. 2, s. 8, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is taken away only in respect of acts of the above description, done under the authority of the Government; but that does not take away the right of a zamindar to contest a survey award drawing a line which deprives him of part of his zamindari and his permanently-settled estate. Where a Rajah had exercised rights and collected dues on certain hills and in forests north of an alleged line, and it was the unanimous opinion of all the revenue authorities that the forests were within his permanently-settled estate, the assumption by them and Government of such line as the boundary of the Rajah's estate, throwing upon him the onus of proving his claim to any portion north of that line, was held to be arbitrary and anomalous. If such proceedings were adopted under cl. 12, s. 5, Regulation IX of 1825, they were wholly irregular, and the irregularity can be no ground for excluding the Court from examining them. When a man is found exercising, on both sides of a boundary line, without objection, rights of ownership or incorporeal rights, and when it is not shown that there is any other owner of the soil, or that any objection to the exercise of such rights was made during a long course of years, his acts cannot be treated as the encroachments of a wrong-doer. *Per* PHEAR, J.—Where acts of user illustrate all the modes of enjoyment of which a disputed property can reasonably be expected to be capable, it can be rightly attributed to proprietorship of the tract upon which they were exercised. GOVERNMENT v. RAJKISHEN SINGH

8 W. R. 343; and on appeal, 9 W. R. 426

2. ——— Disputed boundary—*Survey—Suit for land from lessee of adjoining Mouzah.* In a suit by the lessee of a mouzah to recover possession of a piece of land from a lessee of an adjoining mouzah, both making title under one zamindar where a survey had taken place at a time when both mouzahs to which respectively the land was claimed as belonging were in his possession, and when neither of the leases were in existence:—*Held*, that the suit involved simply a question of boundary, and what was to be ascertained was to which mouzah the land in dispute was found to belong at the time of the survey. AMERREE BEGUM v. GOBIND PANDEY . . . 15 W. R. 35

3. ——— Question of boundary—*Evidence in cases of disputed boundary—Onus probandi.* In questions of boundary, especially where the dividing line in dispute runs through waste lands which have not been the subject of definite possession, the rule as to the burden of proving the affirmative is not applicable. The litigants are in the position of counter-claimants, and both parties are bound to do what they can to aid the

BOUNDARY—concl'd.

Court in ascertaining the true line. *LUKHINARAIN JAGADEB v. JADU NATH DEO*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 504
L. R. 21 I. A. 39

4. ———— *Privy Council, practice of—Reports of Deputy Collectors at local investigations.* Unless there be very good grounds for dissenting and differing from the reports made by the Deputy Collectors upon local investigations, the Courts even in India, and *à fortiori* the Courts in England, in dealing with boundary questions ought to give great weight to them and to be guided by them. The Privy Council will never interfere with the finding of an Indian Court upon a question of boundary, unless they are clearly satisfied that there has been some plain miscarriage in the conduct or decision of the case upon which they can put their hands, and make it the ground for an order reversing or varying the decree. *RAM GOPAL ROY v. GORDON, STUART & Co.*

17 W. R. 285; 14 Moo. I. A. 453

5. ———— *Ascertaining and defining boundaries.* The appellant having obtained a decree in 1854 declaring him entitled to erect boundary pillars according to a certain *khusrāh* :—*Held*, that it was now a work of great difficulty to ascertain and define the boundaries, and that the Court in executing that decree was not precluded from taking into consideration other decrees between the same parties, not as contradicting or altering that *khusrāh*, but as explaining and supporting the views taken by the Court of what the boundaries really were according to the *khusrāh*. *RAJENDRO KISHORE SINGH v. HYABUL SINGH*

17 W. R. 379

BRAHMINS, FEEDING OF.

See WILL . . . 12 C. W. N. 1083

BRAHMO SAMAJ.

See HINHU LAW—ADOPTION—EVIDENCE OF ADOPTION I. L. R. 30 Calc. 999

See PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT (V OF 1881); . . . 7 C. W. N. 895

——— *Marriage—Polygamy—Act III of 1872, s. 19.* A marriage performed in accordance with the rites of the Brahmo-Somaj is invalidated by the fact that either of the parties thereto has a husband or wife by a previous marriage alive. *SONALUXMI v. VISHNUPRASAD* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 597

BREACH OF CONDITION.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ALTERATION OF CONDITIONS OF TENANCY.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—FORFEITURE—BREACH OF CONDITIONS.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 32

See WILL—CONSTRUCTION

12 B. I. R. 1

14 B. I. R. 60; 22 W. R. 377

L. R. 1 I. A. 387

BREACH OF CONTRACT.

See ACT—1859—XIII.

See CONTRACT—BREACH OF CONTRACT.

See DAMAGES. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 419

See DAMAGES—MEASURE AND ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES—BREACH OF CONTRACT.

See DAMAGES—SUITS FOR DAMAGES—BREACH OF CONTRACT.

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDICTION—CAUSE OF ACTION—BREACH OF CONTRACT.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ARTS. 115, 116 (1859, s. 1, CLS. 9 AND 10).

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 116.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 50, 55, 587

See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 626

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—BREACH OF COVENANT . . . 7 C. W. N. 905

See WORKMEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT ACT (XIII OF 1859) s. 1.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 917

——— *before complete performance—*

See DAMAGES, MEASURE OF.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 617

——— *by decree-holder—*

See DECREE—CONSTRUCTION OF DECREE—CONSENT DECREE.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 557

1. ———— *Procuring breach—*

Knowledge of the contract—Suit for damages. In a suit to recover damages for procuring a breach of contract, the plaintiff must establish not merely that the defendant procured the other defendants to commit a breach of contract, but that he did so knowing that there was that contract. *PANDURANG v. NAGU* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 598

2. ———— *Breaches of Contract Act (XIII of 1859), ss. 2 and 3—Expiry of term—Recovery of advance and enforcement of contract after term expired—Successive complaints, dismissal of—Effect.* When the term of a contract coming within Act XIII of 1859 expires, the contract cannot be specifically enforced, nor can the money advanced be recovered, by a proceeding before the Magistrate under that Act, when successive complaints against a workman were dismissed. *Held*, that any remedy the complainant might have had under the Act was barred. *KHODA BUKSH v. MOTI LAL JOHORI* (1906)

11 C. W. N. 247

BREACH OF CONTRACT ACT (XIII OF 1859).

See WORKMEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT ACT.

——— *ss. 2, 3—*

See BREACH OF CONTRACT.

11 C. W. N. 247

BREACH OF COVENANT.

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—BREACH OF COVENANT.

— by lessee—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

12 C. W. N. 628

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 683

See LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877).

12 C. W. N. 628

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 683

BREACH OF THE PEACE.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT V OF 1898), ss. 5, 106, 107, 110.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 145.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 771

See SECURITY TO KEEP THE PEACE.

— dispute likely to cause—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

8 C. W. N. 180, 373, 517, 590, 781

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF PEACE.

See PUBLIC SERVANT. POSSESSION, RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP THE PEACE.

See RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP THE PEACE.

— meaning of "offences involving a breach of the peace"—

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 366

— procession likely to cause—

See MADRAS POLICE ACT, s. 21.

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 37

1. — Disobedience of order—Evidence—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 188—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 144. To constitute an offence under s. 188 of the Penal Code of disobedience to an order issued under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, there must be definite evidence on the record to show that such disobedience is likely to lead to a breach of the peace. *Brojo Nath Ghose v. Empress*, 4 C. W. N. 226. *RAM GOPAL DAW v. EMPEROR* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 793

2. — Dispute concerning land—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145 (1)—Initiatory order—Omission to state therein specific grounds for the apprehension of a likelihood of a breach of the peace—Express reference in the order to a police report containing sufficient grounds for such apprehension—Sufficiency of statement of grounds. Where an initiatory order under s. 145 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code was drawn up in the following terms:—"Whereas it appears from the police report, dated the 23rd January 1905, that

BREACH OF THE PEACE—concl'd.

there exists a dispute, which is likely to cause a breach of the peace, between the abovenamed parties for the possession of 2 bighas and 18 cot-tahs in three plots of land . . . it is ordered that the said parties do attend, etc."—and the police report set out sufficient grounds for the apprehension of a likelihood of breach of the peace. *Held*, that the order was not defective, because it was not self-contained and did not state in express terms the grounds upon which the Magistrate was satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed, when such grounds appeared in the police report on which the order was founded and to which it made reference in express terms. *Golack Chundra Pal v. Kali Charan De*, 1. L. R. 13 Calc. 175; *Dhrupt Singh v. Chatterput Singh*, 1. L. R. 20 Calc. 413, approved of. *KHOSH MAHOMED SIEKAR v. NAZIR MAHOMED* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 352

BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE.

See MARRIAGE.

See SMALL CAUSE COURT PRESIDENCY TOWNS—JURISDICTION—BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 652

BREACH OF TRUST.

See CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.

See CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATION.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 49

See ENDOWMENT.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 587

See EXECUTOR . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 301

See HINDU LAW. I. L. R. 31 Mad. 236

See LIMITATION ACT, s. 10.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 398

See PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.

13 B. L. R. 307, 308, note, 310, note

See TRUST . . . 1 C. L. R. 80

BREACH OF WARRANTY.

See WARRANTY.

BRIBE.

See PENAL CODE, s. 161.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 335

— offer of, to Public Servant—

See ACCOMPLICE I. L. R. 26 Bom. 193

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 331

BRITISH SUBJECT.

See EUROPEAN BRITISH SUBJECT.

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—EUROPEAN BRITISH SUBJECTS.

— offence committed by, in foreign territory—

See WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 72

BROACH ENCUMBERED ESTATES ACT (XIV OF 1877).

s. 19—"Suit"—*Application for execution of decree.* The term "suit" in the last paragraph of s. 19 of Act XIV of 1877 includes applications for execution of decrees. *BHULJI BECHAR v. BAWAJI DAJI* . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 448

BROACH AND KAIRA ENCUMBERED ESTATES ACT (XXI OF 1881).

See PUBLIC OFFICER.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 395

BROACH TALUKDARS' RELIEF ACT (XV OF 1871).

s. 23—*Manager of Thakoor's estate—Liability for damages for attachment in execution.* The Broach Talukdars' Relief Act, XV of 1871, does not bar the cognizance, by the Civil Court, of a suit to recover the amount improperly levied as rent of rent-free land, and to obtain a declaration that such land is not subject to the payment of rent, albeit that under s. 23 of the Act the manager of a Thakoor's estate is exempt from personal liability for anything done by him *bona fide* pursuant to the Act, and is not subject to an action for damages on account of the attachment of the plaintiff's property. *ASMAL SALEMAN v. COLLECTOR OF BROACH* . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 135

BROKER.

See CONTRACT—WAGERING CONTRACTS.

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 899

See PARTNERSHIP—

WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP.

6 C. W. N. 429

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL . 6 C. W. N. 429

See RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTNERS. 6 C. W. N. 429

acting as principal, effect of—

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

I. L. R. 84 Calc. 628

1. ——— Position and rights of broker

—*Agent—Right to commission—Claim of brokerage from both vendor and vendee—Vendor and purchaser.* A broker is entitled to his commission if the relation of buyer and seller is really brought about by him, although the actual sale has not been effected by him. A broker is entitled to his commission where he has induced in the vendor the contracting mind, the willingness to open negotiations upon a reasonable basis, even though a change or modification of the terms of the contract is made by the buyer and seller without his intervention. A broker sued the Municipality of Bombay for brokerage in respect of lands purchased by them : *Held*, that if during the time that the broker was negotiating with the vendor the latter was induced to consent to the sale, the broker was entitled to his brokerage. It was not material to inquire what operated upon the mind of the vendor, and whether

BROKER—contd.

it was the advice of friends, or the knowledge that his land could be acquired compulsorily, or the persuasions of the broker. It was sufficient to support the broker's claim if the vendor's acceptance of the terms was brought about during his intervention ; and the fact that the Municipal Commissioner stepped in at the last moment, and himself actually struck the bargain, did not deprive the broker of his brokerage. Primarily a broker is merely the agent of the party by whom he is originally employed. To make the other side liable to pay him brokerage, it must be shown that he has been employed by such party to act for him, or that in the contract he has agreed to pay brokerage. *MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF BOMBAY v. CUVERJI HIRJI. MOTILAL v. CUVERJI HIRJI* . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 124

2. ——— *Suit for brokerage—Contract effected by broker not carried out by purchaser—Quantum meruit.* The plaintiff was employed by the defendants as broker to sell certain property. The defendant's letter, dated 3rd January 1895, engaging him as broker stated as follows :— "It is understood that the brokerage will be paid on receipt by us of the money, and that this transaction is to be completed within a fortnight from date." The plaintiff negotiated with one Pestonji Patel and his brother, who eventually agreed to become purchasers, but stipulated for four or five months within which to pay the purchase-money. On the 1st February 1895, the defendants through the plaintiff finally closed the contract with the purchasers, one of the terms of which provided that Rs. 10,000 should be paid immediately as earnest and the balance (Rs. 27,000) of the purchase-money to be paid within four months. The purchasers were, however, unable to pay the Rs. 10,000 earnest-money, and they handed to the defendants three Bank of Bombay shares as security for the performance of the contract. One of the purchasers shortly afterwards died : the defendants apparently abandoned the idea of enforcing the contract, and at the end of the year they returned to the purchasers' family two of the Bank of Bombay shares, having (as they alleged) sold the third to defray the expenses which they had incurred in connection with the transaction. The plaintiff sued to recover Rs. 1,500 as brokerage from the defendants. *Held*, that under the circumstances the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the Rs. 1,500, but only to a *quantum meruit*, there being no previous agreement as to the time when the brokerage was to be paid ; and that he was only entitled to a percentage (5 per cent.) on the value of the shares which had been actually received by the defendants. Part of the business for which the plaintiff was employed was to find a solvent purchaser. *STOKES v. SOONDERNATH KHOTE* . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 540

3. ——— —*Contract—Principal and agent—Title—Brokerage.* A contracted with a broker to negotiate for a loan of money on the first mortgage of properties, and agreed to pay brokerage. The broker brought a creditor, who was willing to advance the amount and actually

BROKER—concl'd.

placed money in the hands of the attorney. The attorney found certain defect in A's title, and the transaction fell through. *Held*, that, if a broker has negotiated a loan and found a lender willing to lend the amount, he is entitled to his brokerage, although the transaction was not completed by reason of the inability of A to satisfy the attorney as to the title. *Held*, further, that, regard being had to the terms of the agreement, a broker is not bound to prove some real defect in the title in order to recover the remuneration claimed. *ELIAS v. GOVIND CHUNDER KHATICK* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 202
7 C. W. N. 297

BROTHER.

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—SPECIAL HEIRS—MALES—NEPHEW.

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 379

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—SPECIAL HEIRS—FEMALES—SISTER.

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—MIGRATING FAMILIES. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 433

BROTHERS OF THE HALF BLOOD.

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—SPECIAL HEIRS—MALES—HALF BLOOD RELATIONS.

BUDDHIST LAW.

See BURMESE LAW—DIVORCE.
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 469

BUILDING.

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—BUILDING AND HOUSE MATERIALS. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 588

See HINDU LAW. 13 C. W. N. 396

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ALTERATION OF CONDITIONS OF TENANCY—ERECTION OF BUILDINGS.

BUILDINGS ON LAND, ETC., RIGHT TO REMOVE, AND COMPENSATION FOR IMPROVEMENTS. 13 C. W. N. 513

_____ compensation for, on ejectment of tenant—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—EJECTMENT—NOTICE TO QUIT. 6 C. W. N. 134

_____ "completion" of—

See BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT, s. 353.
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 372

_____ demolition of—

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT, 1899—SS. 391 AND 449; 7 C. W. N. 374
s. 449. 7 C. W. N. 554

BUILDING—cont'd.

_____ erection of—

See ACQUIESCENCE. I. L. R. 1 All. 82

See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (III OF 1884)—

ss. 175, ETC; I. L. R. 29 Calc. 491

ss. 238 AND 273. 5 C. W. N. 42

See BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT, 1873, s. 33. I. L. R. 18 Bom. 547

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 27

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 187

See BOMBAY SURVEY AND SETTLEMENT ACT, 1865, ss. 35, 48—ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 352

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT (II OF 1888), ss. 247, 250, 427.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 317

See CO-SHARERS—ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—ERECTION OF BUILDINGS.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 901

See IMPROVEMENTS. 25 W. R. 205
3 C. L. R. 194

See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—

BUILDING. 6 C. W. N. 308

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ALTERATION OF CONDITIONS OF TENANCY—ERECTION OF BUILDINGS.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—BUILDINGS ON LAND—RIGHT TO REMOVE, AND COMPENSATION FOR, IMPROVEMENTS.

See MISCHIEF. I. L. R. 3 Calc. 573

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE. 6 C. W. N. 886

See OBSTRUCTION OR INJURY TO RIGHTS OF PROPERTY. I. L. R. 26 Bom. 136

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—CASES WHICH MAGISTRATE CAN DECIDE AS TO POSSESSION.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 573

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 460

_____ erection and demolition of—

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BEN. ACT III OF 1899), ss. 449, 580 AND 631. 7 C. W. N. 853

_____ occupied for charitable purposes.

See BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT, 1888, ss. 143, 144. I. L. R. 16 Bom. 217

_____ on land compulsorily acquired—

See ZANZIBAR. I. L. R. 28 I. A. 121

_____ repair of—

See MADRAS DISTRICT MUNICIPALITIES ACT, s. 179. I. L. R. 19 Mad. 241

BUILDING—*concl.*

— right to removal of—

See CO-SHARERS—ERECTION OF BUILDINGS—ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—BUILDINGS ON LAND, RIGHT TO REMOVE, AND COMPENSATION FOR IMPROVEMENTS.

See PRESCRIPTION—EASEMENTS—LIGHT AND AIR.

— value of—

See LAND ACQUISITION ACT, s. 23.

13 C. W. N. 487

Deviation—Demolition

—Plan—Reassessment of premises including portion objected to—Prosecution—Magistrate, discretion of—*Calcutta Municipal Act (Bengal Act III of 1899)*

—Jurisdiction of the High Court to set aside the order. The petitioner completed certain additions to his premises in August 1902, deviating to some extent from the sanctioned plan and he also erected a cooking-shed at the beginning of 1903 without permission. A part of the premises was re-valued and its assessment increased, in March 1903, in consequence of the improvements made including the deviations. In May 1903 a prosecution was instituted against him in respect of the cooking-shed only, and an order for partial demolition passed in August of the same year. The rest of the premises was re-assessed in September 1904 at a higher rate on account of the improvements. In February 1905 a notice was served on the petitioner to show cause why the additions, which were not in accordance with the sanctioned plan, should not be demolished, and an order was made by the Magistrate in August 1905 directing the demolition of such portion of the premises :—*Held*, that under s. 349 of the *Calcutta Municipal Act* it is discretionary with the Magistrate to pass an order of demolition or not, and that, under the circumstances of the case, the order was not a fair or proper one and could be set aside by the High Court. *ABDUL SAMED v. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1905)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 287

BUILDING ERECTED BY ADJOINING OWNERS.

Liability of adjoining owners for costs of party wall—*Agreements for building—Decision of Government surveyor made final in case of dispute—Right of suit—Right of one owner over portion of party wall not used or built on by the other.* Under separate agreements made by them respectively with Government, the plaintiff and defendant held adjoining plots of land for building. The agreements contained the same terms and stipulations, among which were the following :—“(a) The buildings to be continuous, with party walls common to both adjoining houses. (b) All disputes regarding the cost and maintenance of party walls to be decided by the Government surveyor, whose decision shall be binding on both parties.” The plaintiff employed a contractor to erect a house upon his plot of land. The house

BUILDING ERECTED BY ADJOINING OWNERS—*concl.*

was completed in 1870, the north wall of which was built as a party wall in pursuance of the conditions contained in the agreement with Government. Disputes subsequently arose between the plaintiff and his contractor, which were not settled until the 26th August 1878, on which date the plaintiff paid the contractor a sum of Rs20,515-4-11, which included the cost of the party wall. After the plaintiff's house had been completed, the defendant built his house upon the adjoining land, and in so doing he used a large portion of the party wall as the southern wall of his house. He paid the plaintiff half the cost of the portion used by him. The rear portion of the said wall not used by the defendant, as his house did not extend so far to the rear as the house of the plaintiff. The plaintiff demanded payment of half the cost of that part of the wall not used by the defendants, but the defendants refused to pay. The plaintiff then claimed that part of the wall as his own property, and proceeded to open windows in it. The defendants objected. The plaintiff subsequently filed the present suit, claiming from the defendants payment of half the cost of the said portion of the wall not used by the defendants, and, in the event of such payment not being awarded, he prayed for a declaration that he was the sole owner of the said portion of the wall, and for an injunction restraining the defendants from disturbing him in the sole enjoyment thereof. The brother (Khatav Luddha) of the first defendant was originally made the second defendant of the suit. He, however, disclaimed all interest in the premises, and it appeared that in 1876 the first defendant had sold the property to him (Khatav Luddha), who in 1879 sold it to Kesserbai, the first defendant's wife. Kesserbai accordingly was made the second defendant in the place of Khatav Luddha. Both the defendants pleaded limitation, and denied their liability to pay any part of the cost of that part of the wall which they did not use. The first defendant further alleged that he had paid the whole cost of the foundation and other parts of the said wall, and claimed to set off this payment against the claim of the plaintiff. At the original hearing, *SCOTT, J.* held (i) that the part of the wall in dispute, although not used by the defendants, was a party wall, having regard to the terms of the agreement under which the said wall was erected; (ii) that Kesserbai was liable, equally with the first defendant, to pay for this part of the wall, having purchased the property subject to the terms of the original agreement of which she presumably had notice; (iii) that the suit was not barred, but that there was no right of action for the cost of the party wall independently of the award of the Government surveyor, in whose decision lay all disputes as to such cost; and that, until his decision was given, there was no complete cause of action. *SCOTT, J.*, accordingly, on 11th December 1882, decreed that the defendants were severally liable to pay the half of whatever sum the Government surveyor might certify to be due for the cost of the disputed part

BUILDING ERECTED BY ADJOINING OWNERS—concl'd.

of the said wall, and that the defendants were entitled to set off, in the calculation of what was due from them, the cost of any work or materials which the Government surveyor might find had been contributed by the first defendant. The case was thereupon adjourned, in order that the certificate of the Government surveyor might be obtained. The Government surveyor subsequently gave his certificate as to the cost of the unused portion of the said wall, but stated that on the evidence before him he was unable to decide as to the ownership of the foundations, etc., of the wall. The case came on again before SCOTT, J., who decided to take evidence on the points left undetermined by the Government surveyor. Witnesses were accordingly examined, and on 11th December 1883 the Court disallowed the defendant's claim of set-off and gave judgment for the plaintiff for half the sum certified by the Government surveyor as the cost of the disputed part of the wall. The defendants appealed. *Held*, that, having regard to the terms of the agreements under which the plaintiff and defendants respectively held their property, the Court was not competent to determine the question of the defendant's set-off or the other points raised by the pleadings. These were matters to be decided by the Government surveyor, whose certificate was a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to sue and upon which the Court might give judgment. *Held*, also, that the plaintiff was not entitled to use the portion of the wall not occupied by the defendants in any way except as a party wall. It was erected under the agreement as a party wall, and that it should be used for a purpose inconsistent with the idea of its being a party wall would be opposed to the true intention of the parties to the agreement, whether Government or the lessees. The plaintiff was not entitled to the full right of ownership over it, as if it had been built on his own ground: the declaration and injunction asked for, therefore, were refused.

COVERJI LUDDHA v. MORARJI PUNJA

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 183

See COOVERJI LUDDHA v. BHIMJI GIRDHAR

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 528

BUILDING LEASE.

Party wall, liability for cost of—
Agreement to refer disputes to a third person—
Effect of such agreement on the right to sue— Award
of such third person essential to right of action—
Surveyor's certificate—Limitation—Covenant—Right
to sue—Stranger to consideration—Landlord and
tenant. The plaintiff sued to recover from the defendant half the cost of a party wall. The plaintiff and defendants were lessees of adjoining pieces of land under agreements made between them respectively and the Secretary of State for India in Council as lessor. The terms and conditions of the two agreements were the same. By these agreements the plaintiff and defendant respectively agreed to build houses upon the said pieces of land

BUILDING LEASE—concl'd.

in the manner therein specified, and the agreements contained the two following clauses :—(1) "The buildings to be continuous with party walls common to both adjoining houses." (2) "All disputes regarding the cost and maintenance of party walls to be decided by the Government surveyor, whose decision shall be binding on both parties." In pursuance of the said agreements, the plaintiff and defendants respectively erected buildings on the said pieces of land. The plaintiff caused the northern wall of his building to be built as a party wall, and it was used by the defendants as the southern wall of the building, erected by them. The defendants paid the builder, who was employed by the plaintiff, a sum of R700 on account of the cost of erecting the party wall, but the rest of the cost was defrayed by the plaintiff. The party wall was completed in November 1871, but, in consequence of disputes which arose between the plaintiff and the building contractor, the sum payable to the latter was not ascertained for some years. In March 1879 the plaintiff caused the party wall to be measured by a surveyor, and on the 7th June 1879 demanded from the defendants payment of half the cost. The defendants, however, failing to pay the sum demanded, the plaintiff, after notice to the defendants, caused the cost of the said party wall to be ascertained by the Government surveyor, who by a certificate, dated the 25th February 1882, certified that the share of the cost to be borne by the defendants for the said party wall was R3,226. The plaintiff in this action sought to recover this sum from the defendants minus the R700 which, as above stated, the defendants had already paid, and for which the plaintiff gave them credit. The defendants in their written statement alleged that the party wall had been partly built with materials supplied by them, and that in the year 1870 they had adjusted accounts with the plaintiff in respect of the said materials and the said party wall, and it was then agreed that the sum of R700 paid by the defendants should be treated as a final settlement. They also alleged that the plaintiff had settled disputes with the building contractors, and had only paid them three annas in the rupee on the amount of their claim in full satisfaction; the defendants pleaded that they ought not to be charged with more than their due proportion of such reduced amount. It was further contended for the defendant that their obligation to pay half the cost of the party wall existed independently of the arrangement between them and the plaintiff to refer the matter to the Government surveyor; that this latter covenant was only collateral, and did not interfere with the plaintiff's right to sue the defendants for their half share of the cost; that the plaintiff's cause of action in this respect arose on the 15th October 1878, when the contractor's claim was finally settled, and that this suit not having been brought for more than three years after that date, it was barred by limitation. *Held*, that the suit was not barred. There was no right of action independently of the valuation and award of the Government surveyor. There was no separate

BUILDING LEASE—concl'd.

covenant to pay compensation to which the covenant for reference to the Government surveyor could be collateral. The rights of the parties were defined by the contracts, and under these each lessee might have the benefit of a party wall on such terms, and no others, as he on his part submitted to. Payment of a share of the cost was not one of those terms except in so far as each lessee, if a dispute arose, was bound by the decision of a Government surveyor. That decision was not ancillary, serving to give greater explicitness to a right already fully subsisting. It was essential to the right itself, and, until it was made, no cause of action for the moiety of the cost arose. Where, in leases granted by one lessor to several lessees taking sites for buildings intended to be contiguous and to form one block or group in mutual relation, there is a common covenant which is an inducement to the lessee to take the lease, and which he must know is equally an inducement to his neighbour to take his lease, neither can be called a stranger to the consideration. Each may be regarded as an equitable assignee of the covenants which the lessor made for his benefit as lessee. Each, consequently, has an equitable right to enforce against the other the obligation stipulated for in his interest, and serving as a part of his inducement (as the other knew) to the contract. *COOVERJI LUDDEA v. BHIMJI GIRDHAR* . . . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 523

See *COVERJI LUDHHA v. MORARJI PUNJA*
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 183

BUILDING ON LAND WITHOUT TITLE.

Right of person building to compensation—*Bona fide belief of title*. Where a man builds on land belonging to another, he will not, when ejected, be allowed any compensation for the buildings, unless the circumstances show that he built in good faith, believing the land to be his own. *Bani Madhub Das v. Ramjoy Rokh*, 1 B. L. R. A. C. 213, *Rama v. Jan Mahomed*, 3 B. L. R. A. C. 18, *Bromo Moye Debea v. Koomoodinee Kant Banerjee*, 17 W. R. 467, and *Banee Madhub Banerjee v. Jai Krishna Mookerjee*, 7 B. L. R. 152: 12 W. R. 495. *FURZAND ALI KHAN v. AKA ALI MAHOMED* . . . 3 C. L. R. 194

See *WAHADOOLLAH v. GOLAM AKBUR*.
25 W. R. 205

BULAHAR, OFFICE OF.

Nature of office—*Power of zamindar to dismiss officer*. The office of a bulahar is an office held only during the zamindar's pleasure, and the person holding such an office is removable by the zamindar. *SUNOO KHAN v. OODEA*. 2 Agra 140

BULL.

— definition of—

See *PENAL CODE*, s. 420,
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 457

BULL—cont'd.

— set at large in accordance with Hindu religious usage.

See *RELIGION, OFFENCES RELATING TO*.
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 852

See *THEFT* . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 852

BUND.

See *PUBLIC NUISANCE*.
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 930

BUNDELKHAND ENCUMBERED ESTATES ACT (I OF 1903).

— ss. 2 and 12—*Joint decree—Execution of decree—Effect of some out of several joint judgment-debtors taking advantage of the Act*. Five out of six joint judgment-debtors took the benefit of the Bundelkhand Encumbered Estates Act, 1903. A notification was issued under the Act, but the decree-holders did not make any claim within the time prescribed. *Held*, that the decree-holders could not recover from the judgment-debtor, who had not taken advantage of the Act anything more than his proportionate share of the judgment debt. *MAKUND RAO v. JANKI BAI* (1908)
I. L. R. 30 All. 141

BUNKAR, RIGHT OF.

Proprietorship on the soil. The right of bunkar (a right of cutting wood) is a right indicative of a certain dominion over the soil. *SEELANUND SING v. MOHESHWAR SINGH*
3 W. R. P. C. 19: 10 Moo. I. A. 81

BURDEN OF PROOF.

See *ACT I OF 1900*.

See *BENGAL TENANCY ACT*, s. 29.
13 C. W. N. 181

See *CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE* (ACT XIV OF 1882), s. 283 I. L. R. 30 All. 321

See *CONTRACT ACT*, IX OF 1872, s. 16.
I. L. R. 31 All. 386

See *DEVASTHAN COMMITTEE*.
I. L. R. 30 Bom. 508

See *EVIDENCE ACT* . . . 10 C. W. N. 33

See *GIFT* . . . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 578

See *HINDU LAW*
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1039
I. L. R. 31 All. 176, 454, 477

See *LANDLORD AND TENANT*.
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 444

See *NEGLIGENCE* . . . I. L. R. 32 Mad. 95

See *ONUS OF PROOF*.

See *POSSESSION* . . . 12 C. W. N. 273

See *PRESUMPTION OF DEATH*
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 173

BURDEN OF PROOF—concl'd.

See REVENUE SALE LAW.

10 C. W. N. 137

1. ————— *Inventions and Designs Act (V of 1888)—Rule issued under s. 30 on respondent—Respondent shewing cause by a affidavit—Issue directed to be tried—Onus of proof at trial.* The applicant obtained a rule under s. 30 of the Inventions and Designs Act, calling upon the respondent to show cause that he had not acquired an exclusive privilege in a certain invention. The respondent showed cause against the rule by affidavits, but the Court, instead of discharging the rule, directed the issue to be tried. *Held*, at the trial, the onus of proof lay on the respondent. *In the matter of* ALEXANDER GRAY (1906)

10 C. W. N. 985

2. ————— *Broker—Want of authority.* In order to make a broker liable on the ground of want of authority, the onus is upon the plaintiff to affirmatively prove such want of authority. *BISSESSUR DASS v. JOHANN SMIT* (1906)

10 C. W. N. 14**BURIAL.**

————— right of—

See JURISDICTION . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 15

BURIAL-GROUND.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CHARITIES AND TRUSTS . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 187

See MADRAS CITY MUNICIPAL ACT, 1884, ss. 392, 433 AND 458.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 118

————— prohibiting use of—

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT, s. 381 . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 492
2 C. W. N. 145

————— trespass on—

See RELIGION, OFFENCES RELATING TO.

I. L. R. 18 All. 395**BURMA CIVIL COURTS ACT (XVII OF 1875).**

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACTS—BURMA COURTS ACT.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 667

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—GENERAL CASES . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 643

————— s. 4—*Buddhist law of marriage in British Burma—Wife's claim upon husband for maintenance.* By the Buddhist law of marriage, as administered in the Courts of British Burma, it is the duty of the husband to provide subsistence for his wife and to furnish her with suitable clothes and ornaments. If he fails to do so, he is liable to pay debts contracted by her for necessities; but it appears that this law would not be applicable where she has sufficient means of her own. No authority has been found for saying that, where the wife

BURMA CIVIL COURTS ACT (XVII OF 1875)—concl'd.

has maintained herself, she can sue her husband for maintenance for the period during which she has done so. A wife married according to Burmese rights and customs claimed from her husband, in a Court in British Burma, a certain sum for her expenses of necessaries and living for a past period during which she had maintained herself. *Held*, that this was a question "regarding marriage" within the meaning of the Burma Courts Act, XVII of 1875, s. 4, and that, therefore, the Buddhist law formed the rule of decision. The law, as stated above, was accordingly applicable. *Semble*: That if this had been a case in which, by the above Act, a Court would have had to act according to the rule of justice, equity, and good conscience, there would have been no ground for making the husband liable upon this claim, regard being had to the Burmese law as to the property of married persons. *MOUNG HMOON HTAW v. MAH HPWAH*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 777**L. R. 11 I. A. 109**

————— s. 27—*Limitation for second appeals.* A second appeal under s. 27 of the Burma Courts Act is not subject to the limitation of time prescribed for an appeal to a High Court under the Limitation Act of 1877. *MAHOMED HOSSEIN v. INODEEN* . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 946

s. 49.

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—VALUATION OF APPEAL . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 30

1. ————— *Restitution of conjugal rights—Appeal from decree of Recorder of Rangoon—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 540.* The proviso in s. 49 of the Burma Courts Act amounts to an express declaration that it is a condition precedent to the right of appeal from the Recorder's Courts that the suit shall be one which has an amount or value capable of being estimated in money, and that that amount or value must fall within certain specified limits. A suit for the restitution of conjugal rights is incapable of being valued, and no appeal, therefore, in such a suit will lie under the Burma Courts Act from a decision of the Recorder of Rangoon. *GOLAM RAHMAN v. FATIMA BIBI* . . . I. L. R. 13 Calc. 232

2. ————— and s. 95—*Certificate of Administration Act XL of 1858, s. 28—Appeal under Act XL of 1858.* The appeal given by s. 28 of Act XL of 1858 is subject to the ordinary law of appeal laid down in the Burma Courts Act. No appeal, therefore, will lie from an order refusing an application for the issue of a certificate of administration under Act XL of 1858, it being impossible to place any specific money valuation on such an application. *In the matter of the petition of MULLA ADJIM* . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 351

3. ————— and s. 97—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 3, 4, 540—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 156.* An appeal from

BURMA CIVIL COURTS ACT (XVII OF 1875)—concl'd.

ss. 49 and 97—concl'd.

the Court of the Recorder of Rangoon to the High Court is an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code, and must be made within the time prescribed by Art. 156, Sch. II of the Limitation Act. *AGA MAHOMED HAMADANI v. COHEN*

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 221

BURMA COURTS ACT (XI OF 1889).

s. 4—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 76—Justice, equity, good conscience.* That an account should have been taken between mortgagor and mortgagee in possession consistently with the direction in s. 76 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is in accordance with the "justice, equity, and good conscience" required to be administered by s. 4 of the Lower Burma Courts Act, 1889. *KADIR MOIDIN v. NEPEAN*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 1

s. 40.

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—VALUATION OF APPEAL I. L. R. 24 Calc. 30

s. 42.

See RECORDER OF RANGOON.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 488

ss. 50 and 68.

See INSOLVENT ACT, s. 50.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 605

BURMESE LAW—ADOPTION.

1. Adoption—Evidence of adoption—*Keitima* adoption—Date and manner of adoption alleged, but not proved. Held (reversing the decision of the Chief Court of Lower Burma), that the evidence of a *keitima* adoption alleged to have taken place 40 years ago fully proved that the relationship of *keitima* daughter existed between the plaintiff and her alleged adoptive mother: and that being so, it was a matter of only secondary importance to show when such relationship began. *MA ME GALE v. MA SA YI* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 219
I. L. R. 32 I. A. 72

2. Adoption—Evidence of adoption—Adult niece claiming to be adopted daughter of childless uncle, and entitled to his estate—Proof of publicity of relationship and notoriety essential—Inferences from past statements and conduct. According to the law of Burma, by which no formal ceremony is necessary to constitute adoption, the fact of adoption can either be proved as having taken place on a distinct and specified occasion, or may be inferred from a course of conduct which is inconsistent with any other supposition. But in either case publicity must be given to the relationship, and the amount of proof of publicity required will be greater in cases of the latter category when no distinct occasion can be appealed to. In the

BURMESE LAW—ADOPTION—concl'd.

case of a child leaving its natural parents and being brought up in the house of another person who treats it as a father would a child, the inference of the relationship existing, and the publicity of the relationship may naturally be drawn from the facts of the lives of the parties, apart from their verbal statements. But in the case of an adult adoption where the inferences to be drawn from "bringing up" are necessarily absent, it is especially requisite to insist on adequate proof. In this case an orphan adult niece claimed the estate of a childless uncle with whom it was only natural she should live, on the ground that she had been taken by him as his adopted daughter when she was over 30 years of age, the evidence of the publicity of the relationship alleged depending upon the testimony of the claimant herself, and the statements of the deceased uncle spoken to by witnesses, and the consequence of upholding the adoption being the disinherison of those entitled to succeed:—Held, that the evidence was not sufficient to establish the adoption. Where parties might have precluded the raising of subsequent questions by means of an actual, though not ceremonial, adoption in the presence of witnesses, and they had not done so, but had left the fact of adoption to be inferred from past statements and conduct, adequate proof of publicity and notoriety of the relationship should be insisted on. *MA YWET v. MA ME* (1909)

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 978

BURMESE LAW—DIVORCE.

Burman Buddhists, Law as to Divorce among—Husband and wife—Buddhist Law—*Dhammathats*, authority of—*Menu Kyay*, authority of—Desertion—Procedure. In a suit for divorce instituted by a Burman husband on the ground that his wife had deserted him for no reason whatever, and had been living separate for the past eight months, refusing to resume cohabitation with him (there being no charge against the wife of misconduct affecting morality or of any bad habits), the wife pleaded in defence that the above ground was, under Buddhist Law, no ground for a divorce, and further pleaded the conduct of the petitioner as a justification for her refusal to cohabit with him. No division of property had taken place between husband and wife. Held, upon a reference to the High Court, that upon the law as administered among Buddhists the petitioner was not entitled to a divorce. If the plaintiff in a suit for divorce governed by the above law establishes any of the grounds which the *Dhammathats* recognize as good grounds for a divorce, he will be entitled to a divorce. The *Dhammathats* contemplate grounds justifying a divorce other than those mentioned in the judgment of the Special Court in *Nga Nue v. Mi Su Ma* (unreported), viz., other than matricide, parricide, killing, stealing, shedding the blood of a Buddha, *rahan*, heresy, and adultery. A desertion, properly so-called, by the wife is a good ground for divorce by the husband, provided that during the period of one year prescribed by the *Menu Kyay* (bk. V, ch. 17) the husband has not supplied anything to

BURMESE LAW—DIVORCE—concl'd.

the wife. Suits for divorce between Burman Buddhists, being suits of a civil nature not governed by the Indian Divorce Act, should be commenced by a plaint and not by a petition. The decision of the Special Court in *Nga Nwe v. Mi Su Ma* observed upon. Passages in the *Menu Kyay Dhammathat* cited and commented upon. *MOUNG TSO MIN v. MAH HTAH* . . . **I. L. R. 19 Calc. 469**

BURNING GHAT.

See GRANT . . . **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1290**

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE . . . **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 425**

Acquisition by Government—Compensation—Respective claims of Municipality and owner of the soil—Dedication of user—Extinction of use—Reverter to owner—Market-value of burning ground—Bengal Municipal Act (Bengal Act III of 1884), s. 30—Construction—"Land"—"Ghat,"—Meaning of. An owner of lands may appropriate land to public use and yet retain in himself all such rights in the soil as are compatible with the full exercise and enjoyment of the public use to which the property has been devoted, and it is not essential to constitute a valid dedication that legal title should pass from the owner. Nor is it inconsistent with an effectual dedication that the owner should continue to make any and all uses of the land, which do not interfere with the uses for which it is dedicated. *Held*, in respect of land, which had not been expressly dedicated, but was used by the public as a burning ground, that the circumstances of the case showed that the owner made a dedication of the user of the property for the purposes of a burning ground, such dedication to remain in force only so long as the property continued to be used as a burning ground. When the sole use to which property had been dedicated becomes impossible of execution by reason of a statutory acquisition and compulsory use for purposes inconsistent with the original dedication it reverts to the dedicator or his representative. Although it is an essential element of a good dedication that it should be irrevocable, nevertheless when, after a valid dedication has been made, the use for which the property is dedicated becomes impossible of execution or the object of the use wholly fails, there is an abandonment in consequence of which the rights of the public therein fail and a reversion takes place, the dedication being taken to have spent its force when the use ceases. *Monmotha Nath v. Secretary of State*, 1 C. W. N. 698; s. c. **L. R. 24 I. A. 177**; **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 194**, distinguished. Unlike the road-land, which was acquired by the Collector in the above case, the burning ground in this case, treated as such, had a market-value, which had been actually assessed. Therefore the person, who was proved to be the owner of the soil, was entitled to the compensation assessed. The word *ghat* in s. 30 of the Bengal Municipal Act does not include a tract of and used as a burning ground. The sub-soil under a *ghat* does not vest in the Municipality under s. 30 of the Bengal Municipal Act; but the *ghat* itself

BURNING GHAT—concl'd.

does. The Legislature by enacting s. 30 intended that such roads, etc., as are private property or are maintained by Government or at the public expense should not vest in the Municipality. *CHAIRMAN, HOWRAH MUNICIPALITY v. KHETRA KRISHNA MITTER* (1906) . . . **10 C. W. N. 1044**
s. c. **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1290**

BURNING-GROUND.

See MADRAS CITY MUNICIPAL ACT, 1884, ss. 392, 433 AND 458.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 118

BUSTEE IMPROVEMENT.

See PROSECUTION.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 909

BUSTEE LAND.

valuation of—

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT, s. 557.

10 C. W. N. 289

BUTCHER'S LICENSE.

See MADRAS DISTRICT MUNICIPALITIES ACT, s. 198 . . . **I. L. R. 10 Mad. 216**

BYE-LAWS.

See BOMBAY CITY MUNICIPAL ACT.

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 400

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT, 1863.

Bourke O. C. 412

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT, s. 412 . . . **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 605**

See CONTRACT—CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. . . . **I. L. R. 29 All. 228**

See MADRAS TOWNS IMPROVEMENT ACT, s. 165 . . . **8 Mad. Ap. 3**

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

I. L. R. 29 All. 228

See ULTRA VIRES . . . **11 C. W. N. 1099**

must be reasonable—

See N. W. PROVINCES AND OUDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT (N. AND O. ACT I OF 1900), s. 128 . . . **I. L. R. 24 All. 439**

of Bombay Port Trust.

See SALE OF GOODS.

I. L. R. 71 Bom. 62

validity of—

See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, 1876, s. 313.
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 837

See BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT, 1888.

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 980

See MADRAS HARBOUR TRUST ACT, s. 70.
I. L. R. 22 Mad. 524

See N.-W. P. AND OUDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT, s. 55 . . . **I. L. R. 19 All. 732**

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

I. L. R. 23 All. 367

C

CALCUTTA.

— application of Common Law of England in—

See SLANDER . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 452

— immoveable property in—
Crown as landlord—

See TRANSFER PROPERTY ACT, s. 51.
13 C. W. N. 931

CALCUTTA CORPORATION.

* *Mandamus, action for—Calcutta Municipal Act (Bengal III of 1899), ss. 9, 14, 95, 371, 375, 377—Corporation, rights of—Permission to erect masonry building—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 45.* There is no provision under the Calcutta Municipal Act, either express or implied, which gives the Calcutta Corporation any control over the General Committee in matters specifically delegated by the Act to the General Committee. The Chairman has the right to reject or approve any plan submitted, and an appeal may be made to the General Committee whose decision is final. The Corporation has no jurisdiction to approve or reject any plan. No action in the nature of a mandamus lies against the Corporation to compel them to approve any plan for making additions or alterations to buildings. The plaintiff's remedy in such a case is against the General Committee or Chairman under s. 45 of the Specific Relief Act. *BHOLARAM CHOWDHRY v. THE CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1909). I. L. R. 36 Calc. 671

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG. VI OF 1863).

1. — Obstruction—Bye-law 7—Conviction of owner of bazar for permitting obstruction. It is necessary to show that the owner of a bazar in Calcutta actually permitted an obstruction in the paths of the bazar, in order that a conviction may be sustained against him under Bengal Act VI of 1863, bye-law 7. *In the matter of the JUSTICES OF THE PEACE FOR THE TOWN OF CALCUTTA v. HERA LALL SEAL* . . . Bourke O. C. 412

2. — Construction of Act—Right of way. In cases of obstruction the Court will hold that the words "lands, walks, gangways, or other thoroughfares," must be restricted to mean those spaces over which the public, by consent or dedication of the owner, enjoy the right of passing and repassing for market purposes. *In re THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE FOR THE TOWN OF CALCUTTA v. MAHARANEE OF BURDWAN*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 102

— ss. 151, 226, 229, and 230—Liability of Justices for compensation for damage in making sewers, etc.—Negligence—Amount of damages—Writ of mandamus. By s. 151, Bengal Act VI of 1863, the Justices are empowered in making any main or sewers for the drainage of Calcutta, "to carry such sewers through, across, or under any street, or any place laid out as, or intended for, a street or any cellar or vault which may be under

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG. VI OF 1863)—contd.

— ss. 151, 226, 229, and 230—concl'd.

any of the streets, and (after reasonable notice in writing in that behalf) into, through, or under any enclosed or other land whatsoever, making full compensation for any damage done thereby; and if any dispute shall arise touching the amount or apportionment of such compensation, the same shall be settled in the manner hereinafter provided for the settlement of disputes respecting damages and expenses." S. 229 provides that "in all cases where any damages, costs, or expenses are by this Act directed to be paid, the amount of the same, in case of dispute, shall be ascertained and determined by a Judge of the Calcutta Court of Small Causes." S. 226 provides that a month's notice shall be given before any action is brought under the Act against the Justices. By Act V of 1857 the Oriental Gas Company was empowered to lay down pipes and execute other necessary works for the supply of gas to Calcutta. In an application by the Company for a writ of mandamus to compel the Justices to join with the Company in referring to a Judge of the Small Cause Court to ascertain the amount payable to the Company as compensation for damage alleged to have been occasioned to their pipes, etc., by the drainage works of the Justices, an affidavit was filed, in which the Company's manager stated specifically the loss that had been occasioned, and that he had, on personal inspection, satisfied himself that the loss was occasioned by the negligent execution of the drainage works of the Justices. The affidavit on behalf of the Justices stated that, "in carrying out such drainage works, the Justices, or their contractors, agents, or servants, have not damaged the pipes, etc., of the Company, and that the Justices deny that they are in any manner liable for the damage in respect of which compensation is sought by the Company, or that they have done or caused any damage to the Company." *Held* (per PHEAR, J.), on the facts, that the Justices works had caused damage to the Company's main and pipes. *Held*, also, that the compensation-clause of s. 151, Bengal Act VI of 1863, makes the Justices liable to compensate owners of land, or of any interest in land through which the drainage works are authorized to be carried, for any damage caused by any proceedings in such works. It applies to cases where the works have been done with due care and skill, and where but for the Act there would have been a right of action against the Justices. *Held*, also, that the denial of liability by the Justices was simply a general denial that any damage had been done to the Company; the question, therefore, between the parties resolved itself into a dispute as to the amount of damage which, by s. 151, must be settled in the manner provided by s. 229. Hence the Company was entitled to a writ of mandamus. *Held*, also, that s. 226 applies to proceedings *dehors* the Act, and not to proceedings taken to enforce compliance with the provisions of the Act. *JUSTICES OF THE PEACE FOR CALCUTTA v. ORIENTAL GAS COMPANY* . 8 B. L. R. 433: 17 W. R. 364

**CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG.
VI OF 1863)—concl'd.**

s. 180.

See MANDAMUS . 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 182

s. 200—*Warrant for search and seizure—Jurisdiction of Chairman of Justices and of Justices—Procedure.* The Chairman of the Justices of Calcutta, on the complaint of the Health Officer, issued a warrant for the seizure of certain articles of food, and without notice to the owners, or reducing the proceedings to writing, condemned them as unfit for use. In support of a rule *nisi* for a *certiorari* for bringing up the order that it might be quashed, it was argued that the Chairman had not, as such, jurisdiction to make the order; and that it was invalid, as notice had not been given, and the proceedings had not been reduced to writing. Cause was shown that the description of the Chairman was immaterial, as he was also a Justice of the Peace, and that such summary proceedings were necessary for the public safety. *Held*, that the Act does not empower the Chairman of the Justices, as such, to issue a warrant under the 200th section; that such a warrant must show, on the face of it, that the Justice issuing it had jurisdiction; that the application under s. 200 must be reduced to writing; that the evidence taken therefrom must be recorded; and that notice must be given to the party proceeded against. *DAY & CO. v. JUSTICES FOR THE TOWN OF CALCUTTA* . . . **Bourke O. C. 232**

s. 226—*Suit against Justices for damage in repairing drains—Contractors—Negligence—Cause of action—Notice of action.* In a suit for alleged damage done to the plaintiff's premises by excavations for drainage purposes, which the Justices are authorized to make by Bengal Act VI of 1863, it being shown that the Justices had entrusted the execution of the work to skilled and competent contractors: *Held*, that the Justices were not liable. In such a suit no cause of action will be allowed to be raised, except that disclosed in the notice of action required to be given to the Justices by s. 226 of the Act. *ULLMAN v. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE FOR THE TOWN OF CALCUTTA* . . . **8 B. L. R. 265**

**CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG.
IV OF 1876).**

See RIGHT OF WAY.

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 136

ss. 75-79.

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—
GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 209

ss. 75, 77, 79—*Evidence, refusal to hear—Finality of assessment—High Court's Criminal Procedure Act (X of 1875), s. 147.* A, alleged to have carried on business in Calcutta without having taken out a license under Bengal Act IV of 1876, was summoned at the instance of the Corporation by B, a servant of the Corporation, and also a Justice of the Peace. The case was subsequently heard

**CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG.
IV OF 1876)—concl'd.**

ss. 75, 77, 79—concl'd.

by B, and it was shown that notice of the assessment under class II, Sch. 3, had been duly served on A, and that, though he then denied his liability to take out any license, and stated that he carried on no business as alleged, he had not appealed against the assessment under s. 79. It was further shown that the assessment had been confirmed by the Chairman of the Corporation, but that the amount had not been paid. A thereupon tendered evidence to show that he was not liable to take out any license; but B refused to hear such evidence, and, convicting A, sentenced him to pay a fine. On an application, under the above circumstances, to the High Court under s. 147, Act X of 1875: *Held*, that the finality of the decision of the Chairman referred to in s. 79 has only reference to the class under which a particular person, who is admittedly bound to take out a license under s. 75, should be assessed, and not to the case where the liability to take out a license at all is denied, this being a question which can only be determined judicially after taking evidence by a competent Court in a prosecution under s. 77, and that, therefore, the refusal of B to hear the evidence tendered by A on this point was illegal. *WOOD v. CORPORATION OF THE TOWN OF CALCUTTA*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 322: 9 C. L. R. 193

s. 77—*License—Assessment—Fine—Boarding-house keeper.* In order to obtain a conviction under s. 77, Bengal Act IV of 1876, for keeping a boarding-house without taking out a license, it must be shown that the accused held himself out to the public as one whose business or profession it is to receive boarders for profit. In order to pass a proper sentence of fine under s. 77, Bengal Act IV of 1876, evidence should be given of the amount of assessment on the accused's house or place of business, and of the amount payable on account of the license which the accused should have taken out. *In the matter of the petition of WOOD.* *WOOD v. CORPORATION FOR THE TOWN OF CALCUTTA* . . . **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 891: 11 C. L. R. 357**

s. 88—*Municipal Commissioners, jurisdiction of—Assessment—House Rate—Annual value.* Per WILSON, J. The words "annual value" in s. 88 of the Municipal Act must be taken to mean "annual letting value." *NUNDO LAL BOSE v. CORPORATION FOR THE TOWN OF CALCUTTA* . . . **I. L. R. 11 Calc. 275**

s. 104 and s. 88—*Construction of s. 104.* Per WILSON, J.—*Quære:* Whether s. 104 of the Act is in the nature of an interpretation clause or merely directory as containing instructions to the Commissioners how to proceed when exercising the jurisdiction conferred by s. 88. *NUNDO LAL BOSE v. CORPORATION FOR THE TOWN OF CALCUTTA* . . . **I. L. R. 11 Calc. 275**

s. 117.

See CERTIORARI . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 275

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG. IV OF 1876)—*concl'd.*

ss. 189, 191, 213, 252.

See MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 445

— **s. 248**—*Conviction for keeping animals without license—Continuing offence between date of summons and date of conviction—Second prosecution for same offence on different date before conviction.* Under s. 248 of Bengal Act IV of 1876, a milkman, who has been convicted and fined for keeping an animal without a license, cannot again be prosecuted for the continuance of the same offence before conviction, nor can he be separately prosecuted for the same offence for each day the offence is continued as a separate and distinct offence under that section before conviction. In a summons taken out on the 27th March against a milkman for an offence under s. 248, Bengal Act IV of 1876, the offence was stated to have been committed on the 16th March; the case was fixed for the 8th April, when the defendant was convicted and fined by the Magistrate. Another summons had been taken out against him on the same day (27th March) for a similar offence stated to have been committed on the 25th March. *Held*, that he could not be convicted on the second charge. *In the matter of the CORPORATION FOR THE TOWN OF CALCUTTA v. MATOO BEWAH*

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 108

ss. 280, 281, 282.

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1888, s. 2.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 528

— **s. 357**—*Limitation—Accrual of right to sue—Suit for damages—Notice in writing—Continuing damage.* The plaintiff in April 1888 sued the defendants for damages for injuries caused by the defendants' works to his house. On the case coming on for hearing it appeared that the notice of action served upon the defendants was defective in form, and the suit was, on the 11th December 1888, dismissed with liberty to the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action. On the 15th December 1888 the plaintiff served the defendants with a fresh notice, and on the 15th March 1889 instituted the present suit. It appeared from the plaintiff's evidence that in the beginning of December 1888 the house had been reduced to such a condition that it was incapable of sustaining further damage. *Held*, that the right to sue accrued to the plaintiff upon the happening of damage by reason of the subsidence arising from the defendants' act; that the plaintiff had not shown that a right to sue upon which the suit could be maintained had accrued within three months before the institution of the suit as required by s. 357 of the Municipal Act (Bengal Act IV of 1876), and within the terms of the notice of the 15th December; and that the suit was therefore barred. *Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, L. R. 11 Ap. Ca. 127; L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 125*, distinguished. *Per PRYOT, J. Semble*: that, as to

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG. IV OF 1876)—*concl'd.*

s. 357—*concl'd.*

whether under s. 357, damage arising out of a subsidence referred to in the notice, but arising after the date of the notice, could be recovered without fresh notice and fresh suit, a liberal construction should be placed upon s. 257 as to the requirements of the notice. *DWARAKA NATH GUPTO v. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA*

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 91

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG. III OF 1899).

See BUILDING. **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 287**

— **s. 3 (25)**—*Ss. 351, 352 and Sch. XVII, Part 3—"Masonry building," if it includes a masonry wall—"Hut."* A detached wall built of masonry is not a masonry building as defined by s. 3, cl. (25) of Bengal Act III of 1899. *CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA v. JOGESWAR LAHA (1904)*

8 C. W. N. 487

ss. 3 (32), 320, 574—

See RECEIVER. **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 721**

ss. 9, 14, 95, 371, 375, 377—

See CALCUTTA CORPORATION.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 671

ss. 15, 63 to 65—

See DAMAGES, SUIT FOR.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 868

s. 73(c)—

See ATTACHMENT **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 641**

s. 108—

See NOTICE. **11 C. W. N. 508**

s. 152—

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT (BEN. ACT II OF 1888), s. 135.

6 C. W. N. 480

ss. 153, cl. (b), 159, 175, 225—

— *Bustee land—Assessment—Distress—Irregularity—Damages.* A plot of land assessed by the Municipality was divided into separate shares. The plaintiff, as owner of one of these shares, applied for a separate assessment and number. The shares were thereupon separately valued by the Corporation and the valuation treated as a revaluation of the whole plot under s. 153, cl. (b) of the Municipal Act. The plaintiff was informed by a notice under s. 159 that his share was separately valued and assessed from the commencement of the third quarter of the year 1901-02. The Corporation demanded from the plaintiff, after receipt of the notice, payment of rates on the basis of the assessment prior to such notice, and it was contended on behalf of the Corporation that, as the owners of certain other shares into which the plot was divided objected to the assessment made of their shares effect could not be given, until the disposal of such objections, to the notice of separate assessment.

**CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG.
III OF 1899)—*contd.***

ss. 153, cl. (b), 159, 175, 225—*conclld.*

Held, that the Corporation were justified in refusing to give effect to the notice of separate assessments, until the disposal of such objections. The objections in question were disposed of during the currency of the quarter commencing on the 1st October 1901, and the assessment book was amended during that quarter. *Held*, that the separate assessment under s. 170 of the Municipal Act took effect from the commencement of the next quarter. The Corporation also distrained for rates claimed on the basis of the previous assessment, such distraint being made without previous presentation of rate bills, or notice of demand, as required by the provisions of the Act. *Held*, that the omission to present such bills, and to serve a notice of demand, amounted to a mere irregularity under s. 225, and the only damages recoverable would be the special damages actually sustained. *BEPIN CHANDRA BISWAS v. THE CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 452

ss. 198, 466, Sch. II, rules (1), (2), (7).

See LICENSE . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 913

s. 320.

See ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 927

s. 341—

—*Encroachment—Projection—“ Fixture ”—Obstruction on public street—Calcutta Municipal Act (Bengal Act III of 1899), ss. 3, sub-s. (37), 286, 336, 341.* A verandah attached to and projecting from a house and supported on pillars sunk down into the soil between a street and a drain which runs between the street and the front of the house, is a “ fixture ” and “ a projection, encroachment or obstruction over or on a public street ” within the meaning of s. 341 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. *CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA v. IMADUL HUQ* (1907)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 844

ss. 351, 352.

See ante, s. 3 (25).

s. 383.

See post, s. 449 . 7 C. W. N. 554

ss. 391 and 449—*Application of, to buildings commenced before the Act but completed after it came into operation—Bengal General Clauses Act (Ben. Act I of 1899) s. 8, saving effect of—Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act (Ben. Act II of 1888), ss. 236, 241—Necessity of sanction to erect a detached building—Liability for building without such sanction.* The Calcutta Municipal Act (Ben. Act III of 1899) relates only to acts done after the commencement of that Act, including acts done to complete a building commenced before the Act came into force. S. 449 (3) relate to things done in breach of s. 391, which itself does not relate to the alteration of or addition to a building commenced before the Act came into operation. S. 8 of the

**CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG.
III OF 1899)—*contd.***

ss. 391 and 449—*conclld.*

Bengal General Clauses Act (Ben. Act I of 1899) saves the operation of a repealed Act in such a case, where the building was commenced when the old Act was in force. The words “ material alteration of the structure of any house,” in s. 236 of Ben. Act II of 1888, contemplated the erection of anything on a site attached to, or detached from, any building standing on it, so as to alter the structure of the house, that is to say, of the house with all the buildings standing on that site. Sanction was necessary for such building, and failure to obtain the same entailed the liability under s. 241 of that Act. Where, therefore, a building, detached from other houses, but standing on the same site, was commenced before Ben. Act III of 1899 came in force, but was completed after that period: *Held*, that Ben. Act II of 1888 applied, and that sanction was necessary under s. 236 of the latter Act, and the liability under s. 241 of that Act continued. But an order of demolition passed thereon under s. 449 (3) of Ben. Act III of 1899 was illegal. *KESHUB CHANDRA SEN v. CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION* (1902) . 7 C. W. N. 374

ss. 408, 574—

See PROSECUTION.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 909

ss. 408 and 574—*Notice pending litigation.* Directions given in a notice under s. 408 of the Calcutta Municipal Act (Bengal Act III of 1899) to the owners of property, during the pendency of litigation in respect of that property, cannot be said to be lawfully given, if it is not open to the owners at that time either individually or collectively to alter the property by carrying out the improvements mentioned in the notice. *POORNA CHAND BURAL v. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1905) . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 699

ss. 408, 645—

See HIGH COURT . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 30

ss. 448, 628, 629—*Order for demolition—Municipal Magistrate, power of, to make—Power not limited according to value of building—Adjournment, costs of—Magistrate's discretion.* The words “ a Magistrate ” in s. 449 of the Calcutta Municipal Act mean any Magistrate having jurisdiction in Calcutta and includes a Municipal Magistrate. An order for demolition made by the Municipal Magistrate under s. 449 of the Calcutta Municipal Act was upheld. *In the matter of the Corporation of Calcutta v. Keshub Chunder Sen*, 8 C. W. N. 142, distinguished. A Magistrate is authorised by law to make an order for demolition under s. 449 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, without regard to the value of the building directed to be demolished. An order requiring the accused to pay the costs of an adjournment is one which a Magistrate in his discretion may make under s. 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Where such an order was found to be not unreasonable under the circumstances of the case, it was not disturbed by

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG. III OF 1899)—contd.

ss. 448, 628, 629—concl'd.

the High Court. *SHEO PROSAD PODDAR v. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1905) . 9 C. W. N. 18

1. — s. 449—Ss. 449, 452, 579, 383, 449—*Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act (Ben. Act II of 1888)—Sanction of building under old Act—Deviation from plan sanctioned under old Act—Liability of owner for building in contravention of rules laid down by the new Act—Penalty—Notice under s. 383 of new Act.* If a building is constructed in deviation from its plan as sanctioned under the old Municipal Act of 1888, so as to render the owner liable to a penalty under the said Act, then he cannot show that he acquired under the old Act, before the new Act came into operation, a right entitling him to build in contravention of the provisions and rules laid down by the new Act, so as to bring himself within cl. (c) of s. 8 of Ben. Act I of 1899 (General Clauses). Under such circumstances, he will be liable to prosecution under the new Act. The question what penalty should be enforced under ss. 449, 452, 579 of Ben. Act III of 1899 is in the discretion of the Magistrate, and is not a question of law which the High Court, on reference, will answer. There is nothing in the Act making a notice under s. 383 of the present Municipal Act a condition precedent to a proceeding under the first sub-section of s. 449 of that Act. *CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA v. AMRITA LAL MUKERJEE* (1903) . 7 C. W. N. 554

2. — s. 449—*Demolition—Deviation from sanctioned plan—Building in existence before sanction—Sanction not relating to such building.* S. 449 of the Calcutta Municipal Act does not give authority to the Magistrate to direct the demolition of the whole or any part of a building, which was in existence before the sanction was given, but only of a building erected in contravention of the plan submitted to and sanctioned by the Corporation. *HYAM v. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 646

3. — ss. 449, 450, 452 and 579—

—*Discretion of Magistrate—Demolition of buildings—Limitation.* The Municipal Magistrate should exercise the discretion vested in him under ss. 449, 450 and 452 of the Calcutta Municipal Act (Beng. Act III of 1899) with due regard to those rules, which guide Courts of Equity in granting injunctions, with this difference that he has also to consider whether or not a building ought to be demolished on the ground of its being a danger or obstruction to the public. The discretion is to be used after receiving evidence and hearing the defence. *Abdul Samad v. The Corporation of Calcutta*, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 287, referred to. The fact that in respect of the same deviation from the sanctioned plan of a building, the Corporation instituted two different proceedings at different times, one under s. 579 and another under s. 449, does not deprive the Magistrate of his discretion under s. 452 of the Act. The Calcutta Municipal Act does not prescribe any period of limitation for an action under s. 449 or s. 450, but the

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG. III OF 1899)—contd.

ss. 449, 450, 452 and 579—concl'd.

Court should, in directing a demolition, consider how far the delay in the institution of the proceedings would affect the action. *CHUNI LAL DUTT v. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1906)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 341

4. — ss. 449 (1), 451, and 574—*Rule No. 2 of Part II, Sch. 17 of the Act, interpretation of—Height, limit of, of building facing a street and an open platform—Angle of 45 degrees whence to be drawn.* On one side of a street was a bathing platform open to the sky. On the opposite side a building was erected facing the street and the platform: *Held*, that in determining the height-limit of the building in accordance with rule No. 2 of Part II, Sch. 17 of the Calcutta Municipal Act (III B. C. of 1899), the angle of 45 degrees must be drawn from the street alignment on the side of the street and not from the side of the platform farthest from the street. *SHEOMAIL GOENKA v. THE CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1908) . 13 C. W. N. 74

5. — ss. 449, 580 and 631—*Sanction for erection of house, given under misapprehension—Order directing demolition—Default—Continuing offence—Limitation—Daily fine, propriety of imposing.* S. 580 of the Calcutta Municipal Act is not a section which merely provides for the punishment of offences committed under another section, viz., s. 449 of the Act. S. 580 itself creates the offences, both the primary offence, consisting of default in carrying out an order under s. 449, and the secondary or continuing offence, committed on each day thereafter by reason of the continuance of the default. Where an order under s. 449 was made on the 8th September for demolishing a building within three months, the primary offence of non-compliance with that order was complete on the 8th December. After that, every day's default in carrying out the order became a distinct offence under s. 580. Consequently, where summons was issued against the offender for such continuing offence on the 6th May following, on a complaint made on the 10th March, the prosecution could not be regarded as barred by limitation under s. 631 of the Act. No fresh order under s. 449 is necessary for authorising the imposition of a daily fine for such continuing offence. *Ram Krishna Biswas v. Mohendra Nath Majumdar*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 565; *Kirsto Dhone Dutt v. Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners of the Suburbs of Calcutta*, 25 W. R. Cr. 6; *In matter of W. N. Love*, 18 W. R. Cr. 44; *In the matter of Sagore Dutt*, 18 W. R. 44, footnote; and *In re Limbaji Tulsiram*, I. L. R. 22 Bcm. 766, distinguished. Where the Corporation gave its sanction to the erection of a building, under a misapprehension which was due to the applicant not drawing the attention of the Corporation to all the necessary facts connected with the position and surrounding of the proposed building: *Held*, that sanction so given would not exonerate

**CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG.
III OF 1899)—contd.**

ss. 449, 580 and 631—*concl'd.*

the applicant from liability under the Act if the building be afterwards found to have been constructed in contravention of the provisions of the Act. *NONI LAL SETT v. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1903) 7 C. W. N. 853

6. — ss. 449, 631—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 432.* S. 631, sub-s. (1) of the Calcutta Municipal Act has no application to proceedings taken under s. 449 of that Act. *CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA v. KESHUB CHUNDER SEN* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 142

s. 452—

See ante, s. 449.

s. 495—*Adulteration—Mustard oil (as commercially known)—Sale “to the prejudice of purchaser”—Manufacture for sale.* Where a Food Inspector purchased samples of mustard oil from the manufactory of the accused, which, on analysis, were found to be adulterated with *til* oil, and the accused were convicted under s. 495 of Bengal Act III of 1899: *Held*, that such adulterated oil not being what is commercially known as mustard oil, and the adulteration being to the prejudice of the purchaser, the accused had been rightly convicted. *Baishub Charan Das v. Upendra Nath Mitra*, 3 C. W. N. 66, distinguished. *MOTI LAL PAL v. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 643; s.c. 7 C. W. N. 637

ss. 502, 505—*Human food, destruction of articles for—Purchase of damaged rice, intending to sell it as food for pigs—Order for its destruction—Circumstances necessary to justify such order.* In order to justify an order under s. 505 of the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1899, the Magistrate must be satisfied, and there must be a finding in his judgment, that the article directed to be destroyed comes within s. 502 of the Act, and that it was either exposed or hawked about for sale, or deposited in, or brought to, any place for the purpose of sale, or preparation for sale, and is intended for human food. Where certain damaged rice, which had been purchased by a person who intended to sell it as food for pigs, was ordered to be destroyed by a Magistrate under s. 505 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, and the judgment of the Magistrate contained no finding that the rice was brought for the purpose of sale or that it was intended for human food, but contained a finding that there always was a risk that it might be sold for human consumption to the poorer classes, or might be used in a flour mill worked by unscrupulous persons: *Held*, that the fact that this danger existed did not justify the order, and that, until some attempt was made to sell the rice for consumption by the poorer classes, the Corporation was not justified in destroying the property of a man who was disposing of it in a way which was perfectly legitimate. *CHUNDRA COOMAR BISWAS v. CALCUTTA CORPORATION* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 421; s.c. 7 C. W. N. 27

**CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG.
III OF 1899)—contd.**

s. 556—

See LEASE . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 271

s. 557, cls. (a) and (d)—*Acquisition of land for Municipality—Market-value, presumption as to—Applicability—“Re-assessment,” meaning of—“District,” meaning of—Bustee land, valuation of—Owner and tenant’s interests.* The performance by the Chairman of the Corporation of the duties of a Collector under cl. (a) of s. 557 of the Calcutta Municipal Act is not a condition precedent to the applicability of the provisions of the other clauses of the section. Where, therefore, land was acquired in Calcutta for the Municipality, but the Chairman did not act as Collector in the proceedings: *Held*, that this would not prevent the application of the presumption under cl. (d) of the section that the market-value is 25 times the annual valuation of the property as entered in the assessment book prescribed by the Calcutta Municipal Act. The term “land” as used in s. 557, cl. (d), includes “bustee” land. The term “district” as used in the proviso to that section is equivalent to the term “ward.” The term “re-assessment” in the same proviso signifies revaluation and not reimposition of rate or tax. Valuation does not mean merely the amount of the valuation, but covers the whole process or act of valuation. Where, therefore, a substantial part of the act of assessment or valuation was completed before the commencement of the present Act, it cannot be said that there was a re-assessment after the commencement of the Act, merely because the valuation did not become final within the meaning of s. 163, cl. (1), until after the commencement of the Act. *Corporation of Calcutta v. Bhupati Roy Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 74, 77, referred to. *Held*, that there has been no re-assessment made after the commencement of the Act for Ward No. X, as the valuation for that ward had been made before the commencement of the Act, though it came into operation on the 1st April 1900 and under s. 7 of the present Act, is to remain in force till the 31st March 1906. Therefore the presumption under s. 557, cl. (d), does not arise with reference to land in that ward. In assessing compensation payable to owners of bustee land in Calcutta acquired on behalf of the Municipality: *Held*, that the proper method of valuing such land was to ascertain the value of the land and huts as a whole, and deducting therefrom the value of the huts of which the tenants were the owners, their tenancy (being a tenancy-at-will) having practically no market value. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. BELCHAMBERS* (1906) 10 C. W. N. 289
s. c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 396

s. 574—

See ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 927

s. 579—

See ante, s. 449 . 7 C. W. N. 554

ss. 580, 631—

See ss. 449, 580 AND 631.

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT (BENG. III OF 1899)—concl'd.

s. 634—

See LIMITATION . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 277

s. 634, cl. 6—“Accrual of the right to sue” in cl. 26, s. 634, meaning of—*Limitation*. The words “accrual of the right to sue” in cl. 2, s. 634 of the Calcutta Municipal Act do not mean accrual of the cause of action, but have reference to the expiry of the month’s notice under cl. 1 of that section, and the plaintiff will not be barred, if he brings his action within three months from the date, when the month’s notice has expired. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA v. SHYAMA CHARAN PAL (1905) . . . 9 C. W. N. 217

Sch. XVII, rule 24.

Municipal gully, 2 feet wide, if “open square or the like” within Rule 24 of Sch. XVII. A Municipal gully only 2 feet wide is not “an open square or the like which is dedicated to public use” within the meaning of Rule 24, paragraph (1), of Sch. XVII to the Act. On a construction of the rule as a whole: *Held*, that “an open square or the like,” to come within the rule, must be at least 4 feet wide, and, if the open space is not less than 4 feet wide, the owner of the house should have 4 feet of open space more, as indicated by cl. (b) of the 2nd paragraph of the rule. *Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes*, p. 319, and *Salmon v. Duncumbe*, 11 App. Cas. 627, referred to. NONI LAL SETT v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA (1903) . . . 7 C. W. N. 853

Sch. XVII, Part 3.

See ante, s. 3 (25).

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT (BENG. II OF 1888).

s. 2 and ss. 252, 256, 257, 265—*Calcutta Municipal Act (Bengal Act IV of 1876)*, ss. 280, 281, 282—*Basti land—Urgency—Trespass—Suit for damages*. S. 2, paragraph 5, of Bengal Act II of 1888, the Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act, by which Act the former Calcutta Municipal Act (Bengal Act IV of 1876) is repealed, provides that pending proceedings which may have been commenced under any repealed Act shall be deemed to have been commenced under the new Act; but though commenced before the passing of the new Act, they must, to be effectual, be continued under its provisions, and can only be used to enforce rights and powers in existence at the time when it is sought to enforce them. Where, therefore, before the passing of Act II of 1888, and whilst Act IV of 1876 was in force, the municipality took measures under the latter Act to cleanse basti land which was in an insanitary state, and notwithstanding the passing of Act II of 1888, which provided totally different preliminaries and procedure for the purpose, continued the improvements practically under the Act of 1876:—*Held*, that, even if the proceedings could be considered, under s. 2 of Act II of 1888, to have been commenced under the new Act, the action of the municipality amounted to trespass, for which they were liable in damages to the owner of the

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT (BENG. II OF 1888)—concl'd.

s. 2 and ss. 252, 256, 257, 265—*concl'd.*

land. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA v. JADU LALL MULLICK . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 528

s. 3.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT.

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 202

1. s. 31 and ss. 24, 25—*Municipal election—Joint family representation for voting purposes—Judicial discretion of Chairman as to list of candidates—Franchise*. S. 31 of Bengal Act II of 1888 does not impose on the Chairman of the Municipality the duty of exercising any judicial discretion or taking any judicial action with regard to the list of candidates prepared under that section. In this case, therefore, a rule which had been granted on the application of one of the candidates calling on the Chairman to show cause why the name of another of the said candidates should not be removed from the list, he being merely the manager appointed to vote on behalf of a joint-family under s. 24 and not qualified to be elected as a Commissioner, was discharged by TREVELYAN, J. *In the matter of MUTTY LAL GHOSE*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 192

2. and ss. 11, 12. In a case in 1882 in which a similar rule had been granted calling on the Chairman of the Municipality to show cause why the name *R J M* should not be expunged from the list of candidates for election as Municipal Commissioners, he being merely the manager and trustee of certain debutter property, having no beneficial interest in such property and being ineligible for election as a Commissioner as not coming under s. 11 or 12 of the Municipal Act, NORRIS, J., made the rule absolute, and directed the Chairman to expunge the name from the list of candidates. *In the matter of RAJENDRA LALL MITTER* . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 195 note

3. and ss. 8, 24, 25. In another case in 1889, where a rule had been granted calling on the Chairman to show cause why he should not forbear from counting certain votes given in favour of *R B D*, one of the candidates at a municipal election, which votes were those of persons who were merely agents appointed under ss. 24 and 25 of the Act by joint families or firms to vote on the ground that they possessed none of the qualifications required by s. 8, and were not members of such joint-families or firms, and therefore had no right to vote: NORRIS, J., whilst thinking that the Legislature intended that a joint family or firm should be represented by one of their own members, and that the omission so to provide was one which might well be taken into consideration by the Legislature, *held*, that he could not put an interpretation on the Act which would involve the addition to the Act of words which the Legislature had left out, and therefore discharged the rule. *In the matter of the election of MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS FOR WARD No. 10, CALCUTTA* I. L. R. 19 Calc. 198

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT (BENG. II OF 1888)—*contd.*

_____ s. 31—*cnclld.*

4. _____ and ss. 8, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23—*Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 45*—*Municipal election—Municipal Commissioner, election of—List of voters—Chairman, jurisdiction of—Quo warranto—High Court, jurisdiction of—Rules of Local Government.* There is nothing in the Calcutta Municipal Act (Bengal Act II of 1888), or in the Local Government Rules issued under s. 19 of the Act, which requires that the name of a candidate, or of the proposer, seconder, or approver of a candidate, at a municipal election, should be published in the revised list of voters. Ss. 20 and 23 of the Act only lay down rules applicable to voters; they do not control the qualifications of proposers, seconds of approvers. *Semle:* The High Court has jurisdiction by proceeding in the nature of a *quo warranto* to restrain a person who has not been duly elected from exercising the functions of a duly elected Commissioner. The Chairman has no judicial discretion in preparing the list of candidates. *In the matter of Mutty Lall Ghose, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 192, approved.* Under s. 31 of the Act, every candidate for election must send in his name to the Chairman not less than seven days before the day fixed for election, together with the names of his proposer, seconder, and approvers. The Chairman has no power to waive this rule. Where there is a *prima facie* compliance with s. 31 of the Act, the Chairman has no power to go further and determine questions affecting the status of persons claiming to be candidates. The Chairman can only revise the original list of voters in the manner laid down by s. 22, or on applications made under s. 21, or in pursuance of an order from the Presidency Magistrate under s. 23. The issue of a supplementary list of voters is not sanctioned by the Act. A definition of the term "elector" with necessary qualifications is given in s. 8 of the Act. There is nothing in the Act preventing a person qualified to vote under s. 8 from voting, although his name does not appear on the revised list of voters. The only prohibition is that found in the Local Government Rules issued under s. 19 of the Act. *In the matter of CORKHILL*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 717

1. _____ s. 87 and Sch. II—*Insurance Companies registered in England and carrying on business through agents in Calcutta, liability of, to pay the municipal license tax.* The Standard Marine Insurance Company, being an insurance company which is registered in England and carries on insurance business through the agency of a firm of general merchants in Calcutta, is not liable to pay the license tax imposed by s. 87 and the second schedule of the Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act (Bengal Act II of 1888). The business of insurance is not one of the occupations mentioned in the second schedule of the Act, and s. 87 only imposes the tax upon persons who exercise some or one of the professions, trades, or callings mentioned in that schedule. The words of the section limit its operation to "persons," which expression in-

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT (BENG. II OF 1888)—*contd.*

_____ s. 87—*contd.*

cludes joint-stock companies who exercise the particular occupations prescribed in the schedule. The Standard Marine Insurance Company is not liable to be taxed, as keepers of a place of business, under class VI of the second schedule of the above Act, because its business is carried on in Calcutta by its agents at their own offices, and the Company has no place of business of its own at all in Calcutta. *CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA v. STANDARD MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY* . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 581

2. _____ Rule 7, cl. (6)—*License tax—Liability to tax of Company carrying on business through agents in Calcutta and not having a registered place of business.* A joint-stock company carrying on money-lending business through agents in Calcutta, where it has no registered place of business, is liable to pay license tax under s. 87 and sch. II of the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1888. *Corporation of Calcutta v. Standard Marine Insurance Company, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 581, distinguished.* *CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA v. EASTERN MORTGAGE AGENCY CO.* . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 483

2 C. W. N. 328

_____ ss. 117 and 119.

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—
JURISDICTION—MUNICIPAL TAX.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 835

_____ s. 135—*Bengal Act III of 1899, s. 152*—*Calcutta Small Cause Court, jurisdiction of, to set aside entire valuation—Valuations in force at the commencement of Bengal Act III of 1899—Assessments—Jurisdiction to declare old valuations to be still in force—High Court, jurisdiction of, to interfere—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622—Letters Patent, s. 15.* In 1894, the Municipal Commissioners, acting under Bengal Act II of 1888, made valuations of certain properties. On these valuations, assessments of rates were made for a period of six years expiring on various dates on or before the 31st March, 1900. On 1st April, 1900, Bengal Act III of 1899 came into force. Shortly before that date the Commissioners made new valuations. These valuations were made under Bengal Act II of 1888, which was then in force, and were all completed prior to the 1st April, 1900. Objections to the valuations and the assessments made thereon were filed by the owners under Bengal Act II of 1888. The objections were disposed of by the Vice-Chairman, and the owners appealed therefrom to the Small Cause Court. These appeals were filed after 1st April, 1900, under the provisions of Bengal Act III of 1899. The Chief Judge held that the new valuations and assessments were not in force at the commencement of Bengal Act III of 1899 within the meaning of s. 152 thereof, and he set them aside. He further declared that the valuations in force at the commencement of Bengal Act III of 1899 were the previous valuations of 1894, and he directed those valuations to remain in force for the periods mentioned in Sch. VII, col. 2, of Bengal Act III of 1899. *Held*, that the Small Cause

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT (BENG. II OF 1888)—*contd.*s. 135—*concl'd.*

Court has jurisdiction to deal with the entire valuation and to set it aside, the only condition being that the procedure, as to the filing of objections to the valuations, laid down by s. 135 of Bengal Act II of 1888 has been correctly followed. The procedure laid down by that section as to the form of the notice is directory only. The Small Cause Court having jurisdiction to deal with the matter, the High Court cannot interfere either under s. 622, Civil Procedure Code, or s. 15 of the Charter. The Small Cause Court had no jurisdiction to declare that the assessments under the previous valuations still in operation and must remain in force for further periods of years. *CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA v. COHEN* (1901) **6 C. W. N. 480**

ss. 135, 157—"Valuation," meaning of—*Re-valuation made by the Municipality within six years from the date of the valuation made after hearing objection, legality of—Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887), s. 25—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622—Stat. 24 & 25 Vic., c. 104, s. 15—Superintendence of High Court.* The word "valuation" in s. 135 of the Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act (Bengal Act II of 1888) means, not "the amount of the valuation" only, but also the process or act of valuation. A valuation was made by the Calcutta Municipality of a holding, the rate-payer objected to the amount, and the Vice-Chairman of the Municipality, on hearing the objection, fixed the valuation at a certain amount. Within six years from this valuation fixed after objection, a re-valuation was made by the municipality and the rate-payer objected to the legality of such valuation on the ground that the municipality had no power to make a re-valuation within six years from the date of the last valuation. The Vice-Chairman overruled the objection, and the rate-payer appealed under s. 157 of the Act to the Judge of the Court of Small Causes at Sealdah, who allowed the appeal. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the objection raised by the rate-payer was an objection to the valuation within the meaning of s. 135 of the Act, the Judge of the Small Cause Court had jurisdiction to deal with it. That being so, it was not open to the High Court to interfere either under s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, or under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or under s. 15 of 24 & 25 Vic., c. 104. *CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA v. BHUPATI ROY CHOWDERY*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 74
3 C. W. N. 70

ss. 236, 241—

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT, 1899—

ss. 391 AND 449 **7 C. W. N. 374**s. 449 **7 C. W. N. 554**

ss. 247, 250, 427—*Building—Sanction—Limitation—Damages.* A sanction to build, given by the Municipal Corporation of Calcutta under s. 247 of the Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act (Ben. Act II of 1888), is absolute, and when such sanction is once given there is nothing

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT (BENG. II OF 1888)—*contd.*ss. 247 250, 427—*concl'd.*

in the Act which enables the Corporation to revoke it. The Corporation, having granted sanction to the plaintiff, after the site had been duly inspected and approved of by its officer, to erect a mill on his giving an undertaking, is not entitled, in an action for damages caused by the withdrawal of the sanction, to plead in defence that the officer made a mistake, and that the sanction is not binding. The Corporation, after granting sanction under s. 247 of the Act, withdrew it on the ground that the plaintiff had not complied with what it believed to be his undertaking. *Held*, that the withdrawal of the sanction was not done, nor did it purport to have been done, under the Act; and that, the suit for damages having been based upon such withdrawal, the special limitation of three months as provided by s. 427 of the Act did not apply to it. *TULLARAM v. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1902) **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 317 : 7 C. W. N. 329**

ss. 307, 335, 336, sch. II, rule 6

—*Liability for keeping animals without license—Penalty, to whom attached—Owner—Lessee.* The petitioners, as owners, let out a stable on hire, where ticca gharries and horses were kept by the lessee without taking out a license from the Municipal Commissioners. The petitioners were convicted under ss. 307 and 336 of the Calcutta Municipal Act (Bengal Act II of 1888) for having permitted offensive matters, etc., and animals to be kept on the premises in contravention of the provisions of s. 335 of the Act. *Held*, that the convictions were bad, the lessee alone being answerable in such a case for disregarding the provisions of the Act. The penalty under s. 336 of the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1888 attaches to the owner of any land for permitting any animals to be kept thereon, when he has direct possession of the land, and not when he has leased it out to another. *ABHOY CHARAN DASS v. MUNICIPAL WARD INSPECTOR*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 625

2 C. W. N. 289

s. 335—*Date of taking out license.*

In a case where the owner of a cowshed delayed taking out a license under s. 335 of the Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act (Bengal Act II of 1888) until the end of the month of May and was prosecuted for keeping an unlicensed cowshed :—*Held*, that, under the section as it stands, there is nothing to compel a licensee to take out his license before 1st June in every year. *AUKHOY CHANDRA HATI v. CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 360

s. 364—*Sale of articles of food not of the proper nature, substance, or quality—Mixture—Usage of market, with regard to—Adulteration.* Where a person is accused of selling adulterated articles of food on the evidence of a Chemical Analyst, and alleges in defence that it is a mixture recognized in the market, he ought to be allowed to prove his allegation. So where an oil-seller was

CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT (BENG. II OF 1888)—concl'd.

s. 364—concl'd.

prosecuted by a food-inspector for selling mustard oil mixed with other kinds of oil, and he succeeded in proving that what is known as mustard-oil in the market was ordinarily prepared in the same manner as the specimen analyzed, the case was held to be protected under the first proviso to s. 364 of the Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act (Bengal Act I of 1888). *BAISTAB CHARAN DAS v. UPENDRA NATH MITRA* . . . 3 C. W. N. 66

ss. 381, 382—Burial ground—Certificate for closing a burial ground, requisites of. The municipal authorities issuing a certificate under the provisions of s. 381 of the Calcutta Municipal Act (Bengal Act II of 1888), prohibiting the use of a burial ground, must definitely specify the point of time from which the period fixed by them under that section is to run. *LUTFER RAHMAN NUSKUR v. MUNICIPAL WARD INSPECTOR, CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION* . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 492

LUTFER RAHMAN NASKAR v. CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION . . . 2 C. W. N. 145

s. 412 and ss. 417, 419—Bye-laws (C) 4, 6, 7—Permit for removal of offensive matter or rubbish—Failure to take out permit—Continuation of offence. Where a milkman who had been convicted for not taking out before the 1st December 1891 a half-yearly permit for the half-year ending the 31st March 1892, in accordance with bye-laws (C) 4, 6, made by the Municipal Commissioners of Calcutta, under the provisions of s. 412 of Bengal Act II of 1888, and was charged with continuing his offence by failing for the space of seven days subsequent to the said conviction to take out the permit whilst still carrying on his business of a milkman:—*Held*, that the offence of which he had been convicted of not taking out a permit on or before 1st December 1891, which was complete when that day had passed, could not be continued by his omission to take out a permit. *Quære*: Whether it is competent for the Municipal Commissioners, by the bye-laws made under s. 412, to create the duty or obligation of taking out a permit, and whether under s. 417 disobedience to such bye-laws constitutes a punishable offence. *CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA v. JADUB DOOLEY* . . . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 605

CALCUTTA POLICE ACT (BENG. ACT IV OF 1886).

s. 5 and s. 46—Deputy Commissioner of Police, powers of—Search-warrants in gaming cases. A Deputy Commissioner of Police appointed under s. 5 of the Calcutta Police Act has all the powers of the Commissioner of Police, subject to the control of that officer, that is to say, the Commissioner may, at any time, set aside any of his orders, or he may give, either in writing or verbally or otherwise, any special direction with regard to any matter. Apart from such special direction, however, any act of a Deputy Commissioner, provided it be within the powers of the Commissioner, is valid, and no instructions, either in writing or otherwise, or general or in regard to

CALCUTTA POLICE ACT (BENG. ACT IV OF 1886)—concl'd.

s. 5 and s. 46—concl'd.

specific acts, are necessary to render such act valid. A Deputy Commissioner has power to issue search-warrants under s. 46 of the Act. *FORSYTH v. WILSON* . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 670

ss. 36, 37, 39, 40.

See OPIUM .

13 C. L. R. 336

s. 99 (1) and ss. 2, 9, 11, 76 and 77—Limitation—Interpretation of Statutes—"Prosecution," meaning of—Inspector detaining persons in custody for police inquiry—Act done or intended to be done under the Act—Circular order issued by Commissioner authorising the Police to investigate, effect of—Practice—Objection to prosecution, on a question of law raised for the first time in appeal, given effect to. The word "prosecution" in cl. (1) of s. 99 of the Calcutta Police Act means "criminal prosecution"; and the clause, so far as the rule of limitation goes, applies to criminal prosecutions as well as to civil action. *Dukhimulla v. Halway*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 55; *Sutton v. Sutton*, L. R. 22 Ch. D. 511; and *Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes*, 3rd Ed., pp. 58, 59, referred to. Where a circular order, issued by the Commissioner of Police in Calcutta authorised the Police to make investigations, and an Inspector attached to a Thana in Calcutta detained a person in custody for the purpose of a police-inquiry, and it was not shown that he did so in abuse of his authority and under colour of it for the purpose of harassing or injuring him: *Held*, (i) that the circular order was one issued for the purpose of "rendering the police-force efficient in the discharge of all its duties," within the meaning of s. 9 of the Calcutta Police Act; (ii) that the act of the Inspector detaining such person in custody was done, or at least intended to be done, under the provisions of the Calcutta Police Act, within the meaning of s. 99, cl. (1), of that Act; and criminal prosecution under s. 342, Indian Penal Code, instituted against the Inspector for such act after the expiry of three months, was time-barred. Objection to the prosecution of an accused, grounded on a question of law, allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal, and given effect to. *BIJOYENDRA LAL MITTER v. EMPEROR* (1903) . . . 7 C. W. N. 883

CALCUTTA SMALL CAUSE COURT, JURISDICTION OF.

See TITLE . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 823

CALINGULA.

See LIMITATION ACT.

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 72

CAMP-FOLLOWERS.

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—JURISDICTION—MILITARY MEN.

2 B. L. R. S. N. 7

CANAL.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—NATURE OF TENANCY.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 693

CANAL DUES.

— recovery of —

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT
AND REVENUE SUITS.

I. L. R. 25 All. 527

CANARA FOREST RULES.

— 7, 12, and 23.

See MADRAS FOREST ACT, s. 26.

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 21

CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENT.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 271

CANCELLATION OF SALE DEED.

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 39—Suit for declaration—Consequential relief—Valuation. The plaintiff having sued for the cancellation of a sale-deed framed the prayer in the plaint so as to seek a declaration that the sale-deed was fraudulent and for an order to have it cancelled and a copy was sent to the Sub-Registrar as provided by s. 39 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877). *Held*, that the suit was one for a declaration with a distinct prayer for consequential relief. *Karam Khan v. Daryai Singh*, I. L. R. 5 All. 331, dissented from. *PARVATIBAI v. VISHVANATH* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 207

CANDIDATE.

— for Pledership or Mukhtear-ship—

See BOARD OF EXAMINERS.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 479

CANDIDATE FOR DEGREE AT UNIVERSITY.

See BOMBAY UNIVERSITY ACT.

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 405

CANTONMENT.

1. — Grant of land for building purposes—*Right of Government to eject grantee—Regulations and orders for the Bengal Army—Alluvial land—Assessment of rent.* Certain ground situate within the limits of a cantonment was granted for building purposes by the military authorities in 1802. In June 1873 such cantonment was abandoned, and the ground comprised therein was made over to the Collector of the district in which it was situate. The Government subsequently sued P, who had succeeded to such grant, claiming (i) a declaration of its proprietary right to the ground comprised in such grant, and to the alluvial accretions to such grounds; (ii) that P should be directed to pay rents for such ground and such alluvial accretions; and (iii) that, should P refuse to pay the rents fixed, she might be ejected and the Government put in possession. *Held*, that, inasmuch as under the Military Regulations relating to such grants such a grant cannot be resumed by the Government without a month's notice and without payment of the value of any buildings which may have been authorized to be erected, and

CANTONMENT—contd.

as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter of assessing rent on such alluvial accretions which were outside the original grant, the Government was not entitled to the second and third reliefs it claimed, but was entitled only to a declaration of its proprietary title to such ground and to such alluvial accretions. *PATERSON v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA*. I. L. R. 3 All. 669

2. — Grant of land by military authorities for building purposes—*Resumption of land by civil authorities—Assignment of profits of the land to municipal Committee—Liability of grantee to pay ground-rent—Refusal of grantee to pay ground-rent to municipality—Suit by the Secretary of State for India for declaration of title and assessment of rent—Cause of action—Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Right of grantee to compensation in case of ejectment.* Certain land situate within the limits of a cantonment was granted free of rent for building purposes by the military authorities. Under the Military Regulations relating to such grants, such a grant could not be resumed by the Government without a month's notice, and without the payment of the value of such buildings which might have been authorized to be erected. The land was subsequently resumed by the civil authorities, and, the land being within municipal limits, the ground-rents on it were assigned to the municipality. The Municipal Committee having demanded ground-rent in respect of the buildings erected on such land under such grant from the representative in title of the original grantee, and the latter having refused to pay the same or to vacate the land, the Secretary of State for India in Council sued him in the Civil Court for a declaration of proprietary right to the land for its assessment to ground-rent, and in the event of the refusal of the defendant to pay such rent, when fixed, for his ejectment therefrom, and for mesne profits of the land for six years. The cause of action was stated in the plaint to be the refusal of the defendant to pay ground-rent or to accept a lease or to surrender the land, after a notice to that effect had been issued to him by the Municipal Committee as the plaintiff's agents. *Held*, that the Municipal Committee were the plaintiff's duly authorized agents to lease and obtain rent for the land occupied by the defendant's buildings with their compounds; that such notice was properly issued in that character on behalf of the plaintiff; and that the defendant's subsequent refusal to pay rent, or to accept a lease or evacuate the premises, amount to a sufficient denial of the plaintiff's title to afford him a good cause of action; that assuming that no agreement to pay rent existed, the plaintiff was entitled to demand and recover reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the land by the defendant; that the suit was maintainable in the Civil Court, and it had power to grant the plaintiff the reliefs sought; that by the conditions of the grant by the military authorities the plaintiff was not disqualified from demanding ground-rent for the land before he had paid the defendant the value of the buildings, but that, looking to those

CANTONMENT—concl'd.

conditions, it would not be fair or equitable to grant the plaintiff a degree, pure and simple, for the ejectment of the defendant, but he should be put under the condition that, if in case of the defendant's refusal to pay the rent fixed he desired to eject him, the value of the buildings as cantonment residences must first be determined and, when determined, must be tendered to the defendant, and, if the latter refused to accept it, the plaintiff would then be entitled to eject him.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA *v.* JAGAN PRASAD I. L. R. 6 All. 148

3. ———— **Right of military authorities to quarter troops in houses belonging to private individuals in cantonments—**
Military Regulations. The military authorities have no right to appropriate to their own use houses the property of private individuals in cantonments, except, subject to the conditions prescribed by the Military Regulations, on the faith of which the houses were built or purchased. *Held* by the Appellate Court, that when a person was in the occupation of a house in cantonments, he could not be ejected without due notice. *CAREY v. ROBINSON*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 88 : Bourke O. C. 399
s.c. in the Court below . . . Cor. 187

CANTONMENT AUTHORITIES.

See NATIVE STATE.
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 478

CANTONMENT MAGISTRATE.

1. ———— **Jurisdiction—Act III of 1859, s. 1—European British subject.** A European British subject, not belonging to or connected with the army, who resides within a cantonment, was amenable to the jurisdiction of a Cantonment Joint Magistrate under s. 1 of Act III of 1859. *SHAPURJI JEhangir v. MORGAN* . . . 4 Bom. A. C. 187

2. ———— **Small Cause Court Act, XI of 1865, ss. 12 and 8—Act III of 1859.** A plaintiff may sue in the Court of the Cantonment Magistrate, although he is not carrying on business or resident within the limits of the military cantonment. If a defendant is amenable to the Articles of War contemplated by s. 4 of Act III of 1859, he can only be sued in the Court of the Cantonment Magistrate; but in all other cases a defendant may also be sued in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, provided the cause of action arose within his jurisdiction. *SUNDARAS JAGJIVANDAS v. MOHANDAS TIOMDAS* I. L. R. 9 Bom. 454

3. ———— **Power to cancel license—Bengal Excise Act (III of 1880).** A Cantonment Magistrate in his judicial capacity has no authority to cancel a license under the Bengal Excise Act III of 1880. The power to cancel licenses belongs to the revenue authorities. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMDHANI PASSI*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 452

CANTONMENT MAGISTRATE—concl'd.

4. ———— **Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 15.** The plaintiff, who was a money-lender residing within the limits of the Ahmedabad Cantonment, sued the defendants, who resided within the jurisdiction of the City Small Cause Court at the same place, upon a bond executed by them at the cantonment. He presented his plaint to the Cantonment Magistrate, whose pecuniary jurisdiction extended to Rs200 only; but that officer, being of opinion that the suit was cognizable by the City Small Cause Court, returned it to the plaintiff who subsequently presented it to the Judge of the City Small Cause Court, whose pecuniary jurisdiction extended to Rs500. On reference by him to the High Court : *Held*, that both the Courts had jurisdiction to try the suit, but that the Court of the Cantonment Magistrate was to be regarded as the Court of lower grade, and therefore, under s. 15 of the Civil Procedure Code, was the proper Court to try the suit. *Dwarkanath Dutt v. Bhaten Hawaldar*, 22 W. R. 457, followed. *MOHANLAL RAICHAND v. VIRA PUNJA*
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 189

5. ———— **Madras Act I of 1866, s. 22—General Clauses Act, 1868, s. 5.** S. 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1868, does not authorize a Cantonment Magistrate to award rigorous imprisonment in default of payment of a fine imposed under Act I of 1866 (Madras). *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GOUNDADU* I. L. R. 8 Mad. 350

6. ———— **Summary conviction—Police Act (V of 1861), s. 29—Complaint.** *Held*, that the summary conviction and punishment of two police officers under s. 29, Act V of 1861, by a Cantonment Magistrate, without formal trial, was irregular and illegal. *Held*, also, that a Cantonment Magistrate has power to try cases, under s. 29 of the Police Act, without complaint. *GOVERNMENT v. GIRDHAREE LALL* 1 Agra Cr. 24

CANTONMENT PROPERTY.

Grant—Notice of resumption—Offer of compensation—Condition precedent—Notice to one of three executors—Joint occupants. A certain plot known as No. 1, Queen's Gardens, situate within the limits of the Poona Cantonment, was in the year 1862 granted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army to one Edalji Nasarvanji Colabavala under the terms of a General Order, dated the 31st July 1856. The 14th clause of the said General Order was in these terms :—"Permission to occupy such ground in a military cantonment confers no proprietary right, it continues the property of the State. It is resumable at the pleasure of Government, but in all practicable cases one month's notice of resumption will be given, and the value of the buildings which may have been erected thereon, as estimated by committee, will be paid to the owner." After the grant the grantee erected a bungalow on the plot, and in the year 1874 sold the bungalow and all his interest in the land to Hari Ravji Chiplunkar, who died in the year 1896 leaving a will under

CANTONMENT PROPERTY—concl'd.

which he appointed defendants Nos. 1—3 as executors. On the 19th October 1903 the military authorities gave to defendant No. 1 a notice requiring him to deliver possession of the land to the Cantonment Magistrate on the 1st December following. The notice further stated that Government was prepared to pay defendant No. 1 Rs. 5,500 as compensation for all the buildings standing on the land, or if the defendant disputed the said amount, then such amount as may be determined by a Committee of Arbitration, and that on defendant's failure to comply with the terms of the notice a suit in ejectment would be filed. The defendants having failed to comply with the notice, the Secretary of State for India in Council brought the present suit in the year 1904 to recover possession of the land, claiming that "there is a right of resumption, which is presently exercisable." Defendants Nos. 1—3 denied the right and contended that the notice of resumption was not proper and that the plaintiff had no right to resume, the value of the buildings being not estimated by a committee. Defendant No. 4, who was a lessee of defendants Nos. 1—3, expressed his willingness to abide by the orders of the Court as to giving up possession. The Judge having dismissed the suit on the ground that the notice to give up possession was not proper and was not given to the proper parties, the plaintiff appealed. *Held*, reversing the decree, that the General Order stated in terms as clear as possible that no proprietary right was conferred by reason of a permission to occupy the ground which alone was granted, and that the ground continued the property of the State and was resumable at the pleasure of Government. *Held*, further, that the notice of resumption was not a condition precedent to the right of resumption. Even assuming that notice was a condition precedent, that provision had been satisfied by giving notice to one of the three executors, who were joint occupants. The provision as to notice was nothing more than a statement of what will be done, when practicable, for the purpose of saving the occupant from such inconvenience as an immediate resumption might involve. *Held*, further, that though the value of the buildings erected had not been estimated by a committee, it was not a condition precedent to resumption, though, no doubt, the right to that payment would arise on resumption. *Secretary of State v. Jagan Prasad*, I. L. R. 6 All. 148, distinguished. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. VAMANARAV* (1905)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 137

CANTONMENTS ACT (BOMBAY ACT III OF 1867).

See PLAINT—FORM AND CONTENTS OF PLAINT—DEFENDANTS.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 286

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—NATURE, FORM, AND SUFFICIENCY OF SANCTION . . . 7 Bom. Cr. 87

CANTONMENTS ACT (BOMBAY ACT III OF 1867)—concl'd.

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT AND FINE.

7 Bom. Cr. 87

CANTONMENTS ACT (MADRAS ACT I OF 1866).

Cantonment Rules, ch. IV. s. 16—*Failure to report small-pox.* Failure by a householder to report a case of small-pox in his house, as directed by s. 16 of Ch. IV of the Cantonment Act Rules, is not punishable under Madras Act I of 1866. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LALLA*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 428

s. 30—*Beer—"Spirituous liquor."* Beer is not a "spirituous liquor" as the term is used in s. 30, Madras Act I of 1866. *ANONYMOUS*
7 Mad. Ap. 15

CANTONMENTS ACT (XIII OF 1889).

s. 13—

Supply—Intoxicating drug—Supply of liquor to a European soldier—Servant of a soldier buying liquor with soldier's money for soldier's use. The accused, a servant of a soldier, bought with his master's money liquor from a shop in obedience to his master's directions and gave it to him. On these facts, the Magistrate held that the act of the accused amounted to "supplying" liquor to a soldier within the meaning of the term as used in s. 13 of the Cantonments Act (XIII of 1889), and convicted and sentenced him under the section. *Held*, reversing the conviction and sentence, that the term "supply" in s. 13 of the Cantonments Act (XIII of 1889) must have a restricted meaning put upon it and it is inapplicable in the case of a servant giving his master liquor belonging to the master himself. Its context "barter or sells" indicates that it has the same idea underlying it in common with them. It also must relate to a transaction between two persons dealing at arm's length and therefore independent of each other. *EMPEROR v. PASCAL SHIMAU* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 523

CANTONMENTS ACT (III OF 1880).

See CANTONMENTS ACT (XIII OF 1889).

1. s. 14—"Soldier"—*Sub-Conductor—Sale of spirituous liquor.* A Sub-Conductor in the Commissariat Department is not a "soldier" within the meaning of s. 14 of Act III of 1880; and consequently the sale of spirituous liquor to the wife of such a person without the license required by that section is not an offence against that section. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. DOSABHOY FRAMJI*

I. L. R. 3 All. 214

2. *Bengal Excise Act (Bengal Act VII of 1878), ss. 4, 11, 29, 32—Spirituous liquor—Tari—Cantonment Magistrate, powers of, to cancel license—Revenue authorities.* "Tari" or "toddy" is "spirituous liquor" within the meaning of s. 14 of Act III of 1880. The words

CANTONMENTS ACT (III OF 1880)—
concl'd.

— s. 14—*concl'd.*
"spirituous liquor." "wine," and "intoxicating drugs" in that section must be taken in their popular and ordinary meaning. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMDHANI PASSI*. I. L. R. 15 Calc. 452

CANTONMENTS ACT (XIII OF 1889).

— s. 2, cl. (2) and s. 10—*Jurisdiction—Order of the Local Government to the contrary—Pecuniary limits of jurisdiction of Cantonment Court—Cantonments Act (III of 1880), repeal of.* Under s. 10 of the Cantonments Act (XIII of 1889), the Cantonment Judge has jurisdiction up to Rs 500 only, in the absence of any order of the Local Government to the contrary. In a suit filed in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Belgaum, in its small cause jurisdiction, to recover Rs 172 as arrears of rent, a question having arisen whether that Court, the pecuniary limit of whose jurisdiction as the Court of Small Causes was Rs 500, or the Court of the Belgaum Cantonment Magistrate invested with small cause powers, had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. *Held*, that the Cantonment Court alone had jurisdiction. By notification No. 2305, published at page 314 of the *Bombay Government Gazette* for 1887, the pecuniary limit of the (Belgaum) Cantonment Court is declared to be Rs 200; and the declaration which was made under Act III of 1880 [which is an Act repealed by the Cantonments Act] is kept alive by s. 2, cl. 2, of the Cantonments Act, and it is, therefore, such an order of the Local Government as is contemplated by s. 10 of Act XIII of 1889. *GULABCHAND MOTIRAM v. GEORGES*. I. L. R. 16 Bom. 702

— s. 26—*Rule 2 of the rules made under s. 26—Additional fine for continuing offence.* The additional fine referred to in rule 2 of the rules framed under s. 26 of the Cantonments Act, XIII of 1889, is not only to be imposed after the first conviction, but is to follow proof that failure is persisted in. The additional fine cannot be imposed as a threat in case of possible persistence, which, being in the future, cannot be made matter of present proof. The continuing failure must be matter of later and separate inquiry and proof. *In re Limbaji Tulsiram*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 766, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PLUMNER*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 841

CARRIAGE.

See HACKNEY CARRIAGE ACT, s. 6.
I. L. R. 27 Bom. 307

CARRIERS.

See BILL OF LADING.
I. L. R. 26 Bom. 562

See NEGLIGENCE. I. L. R. 1 All. 60
9 W. R. 73

See OPIUM ACT. 8 C. W. N. 349

See RAILWAYS ACT.

See RAILWAY COMPANY.
I. L. R. 29 All. 228

CARRIERS—*cont'd.*

— failure to deliver goods.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 31.
13 C. W. N. 851

— liability of—

See CARRIERS. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 419

1. — Misdescription—*Loss of goods.* Misdescription of the nature of goods entrusted to a common carrier disentitles the sender to recover for their loss, although the goods would not be subject to any extra rates had they been properly described. *ROHEEMOOLAH v. PALMER*. Cor. 133

S. C. in Court below. Cor. 24

2. — Time for delivery of goods—*Lien for carriage of goods.* Although a carrier may not be bound to deliver goods on any specific day or within any specific time, he is bound to deliver them within reasonable time, and what constitutes reasonable time must be determined upon the consideration of all the circumstances of the case. A carrier is entitled to his freight and charges, and he is entitled to retain the goods in satisfaction of his lien upon them. *BULDEO DASS v. NATHOOMUL*. 2 Agra. 132

3. — Delivery of goods to carrier at consignor's risk—*Delivery to consignee.* So long as goods, though delivered to a common carrier appointed by the consignee, remain at the risk of the consignor, they are not delivered to the consignee. *WINTER v. WAY*. 1 Mad. 200

4. — Delivery of goods carried by sea—*Landing goods—Custom of port of Bombay—Possession of goods.* A carrier by sea is obliged to make an actual delivery of goods carried by him to the consignee, but such *prima facie* obligation may be affected by the custom of the port where the goods are to be delivered. Neither by the custom of the port of Bombay nor by the provisions of the Customs Act is the master of a ship bound to wait fifteen days before commencing to land his cargo; but within a reasonable time after the arrival of his ship—48 hours in the case of a sailing vessel, and somewhat less in the case of a steamer—he is at liberty to land goods if the consignee has not sent boats for them; and such landing is not unlawful, nor a breach of contract as carrier on the part of the master. The landing of the goods under the above circumstances and setting them apart for the consignee do not constitute a delivery of them to the consignee; but such goods, after being so landed, continue in the possession of the master as carrier. Course of legislation with reference to the landing of goods on the custom-house wharf reviewed. *Quære*: Whether, under the special circumstances of this case, the goods, when so landed, remained in the custody of the master in his capacity of common carrier or as a warehouseman? *HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION v. BAKER*

6 Bom. O. C. 71 : 7 Bom. O. C. 186

CARRIERS—*contd.*

5. — *Dāk-carriage proprietor—Bailee for hire—Negligence—Onus of proof.* A person carrying on the ordinary business of a proprietor of dāk-carriages does not come within the term "common carrier" as that term is understood in the English Law. Such a person is bound to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in respect of baggage entrusted to him, but is not responsible for any loss which may not arise from the negligence or default of himself or his servants, he not being a common carrier bound to ensure the safe conveyance of the baggage against all risk, save the act of God or the Queen's enemies. He is to be regarded as a bailee for hire, and the fact that he does not deliver the baggage at the end of the journey should be accepted as *prima facie* proof that the loss has been occasioned by negligence for which he is responsible, and consequently the onus of proof lies on him that reasonable care was exercised by him. *TODAL SINGH v. THOMPSON*

2 N. W. 237

6. — *Conveyance of goods by Government bullock train—Post Office Act XIV of 1866—Bailee for hire—Negligence—Condition.* Goods conveyed by the Government bullock train are not entrusted to the Post Office for conveyance within the meaning of Act XIV of 1866. In respect of the Government bullock train, Government must be regarded as an ordinary bailee for hire, and not as a common carrier. As such bailees apart from any special condition limiting its liability, it is bound to take ordinary care of good, entrusted to it for conveyance; and if goods are stolen through the negligence of its servants, it is liable to make good the loss to the consignor. But it may, as may any other bailee for hire, limit its liability by conditions, provided those conditions are not repugnant to public policy or positive law. A condition that it will not be responsible for loss occasioned by the negligence of its servants is certainly not repugnant to positive law, nor a condition repugnant to public policy. *POSTMASTER of BAREILLY v. EARLE*

3 N. W. 195

7. — *Suit for damages for negligence—Onus probandi.* In an action to recover damages for injury caused to the goods by the negligence of the defendant as a common carrier, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to give evidence of such negligence unless the defendant has shown that the injury was occasioned by a cause which was within the exceptions. Then the plaintiff would be at liberty to show that there was negligence so as to deprive the defendant of the benefit of the exceptions. *SHETLIFF v. SCOTT*

22 W. R. 39

8. — *Passenger's luggage, loss of—Negligence—Conditions indorsed on ticket—Foreign Steam-ship Company—Contract Act, s. 151.* In a suit for damages for loss of passenger's luggage by the wreck of a ship belonging to a foreign company, it appeared that the plaintiff had received a ticket in the French language, which on its face stated that it ought to be signed by the passenger, and that it was issued subject to certain conditions

CARRIERS—*contd.*

on the back. These conditions, among other things, stated that the company would not be responsible for loss or damage arising from accidents or risks of the sea; that the ticket was delivered subject to the conditions that certain articles of a specified nature should be made the subject of a special declaration, in default of which the company would not be liable; that the company would not be answerable for unregistered luggage; and that luggage might be insured at any of the company's offices. It was not stated where registration of luggage might be effected. The ticket was not signed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that he did not understand the French language, and that the conditions had not been explained to him by any person. *Held*, that the company being a foreign company were not common carriers; that the plaintiff was bound by the clauses and conditions on the back of the passage-ticket; that none of the conditions had the effect of relieving the company from the consequences of their own negligence; that, in order to establish a defence upon the ground that the plaintiff's luggage was not registered, it was necessary for the defendants to prove, not only that the plaintiff was bound by the conditions, but also that they were ready and willing to register the plaintiff's luggage, and that the plaintiff did not in fact register it; that as the contract was made in Calcutta, the defendants were bound by the provisions of s. 151 of the Indian Contract Act. *MACILLICAN v. COMPAGNIE DES MESSAGERIES MARITIMES DE FRANCE*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 227

7 C. L. R. 49

9. — *Special contract—Railways Act (IV of 1879), s. 10—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 151, 161—Railway Company.* The plaintiff despatched certain goods by the East Indian Railway Company for carriage to A, and signed a special contract, in conformity with the form approved by the Governor General in Council "under s. 10 of Act IV of 1879, holding the Company harmless and free from all responsibility in regard to any loss, destruction, or deterioration of, or damage to, the said consignment from any cause whatever, before, during, and after transit over the said railway or other railway lines working in connection therewith." The goods were short delivered, and the plaintiff brought a suit to recover the value. *Held per GARTER, C.J., PRINSEP, J., and WILSON, J.*, that the Railway Company could not be held liable to account to the consignee for any loss from any cause whatever during the whole time that the goods were under their charge, inasmuch as the plaintiff had entered into a special contract to hold them harmless in accordance with s. 10 of Act IV of 1879. *Held per O'KINEALY, J.*, that it was doubtful whether ss. 151 and 161 of the Contract Act applied to carriers by rail; but even assuming that these sections did not apply, the Railway Company would be in the position of carriers before the passing of the Carriers Act, and were entitled to protect themselves from lia.

CARRIERS—*contd.*

bility by special contract. *MOHESWAR DAS v. CARTER* . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 210
12 C. L. R. 122

10. ——— Common carriers—*English law—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 151, 152—Carriers Act (III of 1865)—Railways Act (IV of 1879), s. 10—Statements of objects and reasons of the Contract Act.* The common law of England regulating the responsibility of common carriers was at the time of the passing of the Carriers Act, 1865, and is still in force in this country, and is unaffected by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act. *Kuwerji Tulsidas v. G. I. P. Railway Co.*, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 109, dissented from. The plaintiffs entrusted to the defendants, who were common carriers under the Carriers Act, III of 1865, certain goods which were lost in the course of their carriage on one of the defendants' steamers. On the facts it was found that the defendants took as much care of the goods as a man of ordinary prudence would under similar circumstances take of his own goods of the same bulk, quality, and value as the goods bailed; and that the loss was not occasioned by the act of God or the Queen's enemies. There was no special contract of the nature provided for by s. 6, Act III of 1865. *Held*, that ss. 151, 152 of the Contract Act did not apply, and that the defendants were liable for the loss of the goods. *MOTHOORA KANT SHAW v. INDIA GENERAL STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY* I. L. R. 10 Calc. 166 : 13 C. L. R. 342

11. ——— Carriers Act (III of 1865), ss. 6, 8—*Negligence—Accident, loss by—Special contract—Divisibility of contract.* A flat belonging to the defendants, carrying goods belonging to the plaintiff, was lost by coming into contact with a snag in the bed of a certain river, the existence of which snag could not have been ascertained by any precautions on the part of the defendants. The goods were received for carriage by the defendants under conditions printed on the back of "forwarding note" signed by the plaintiff, by one of which conditions the defendants protected themselves from liability against accident of certain particular kinds, and "from any accident, loss, or damage resulting from negligence, etc." *Held*, that the loss was not occasioned by the negligence of the defendants; that the forwarding note "was a special contract" within the meaning of the Carriers Act; that the clause purporting to protect the defendants from negligence was bad as being in contravention of the Carriers Act; but that, nevertheless, the contract was not thereby rendered wholly bad, but was divisible, being good so far as it provided that the defendants were not to be liable for loss by accident, but had so far as it provided that they should not be liable for negligence. *INDIA GENERAL STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v. JOYKRISTO SHAHA* . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 39

12. ——— Carriers by railway, liability of—*Railways Act (IV of 1879), s. 210—Loss by negligence—Insurer—Act of God.* A carrier by railway is, under Act IV of 1879, liable as an insurer of goods entrusted to him, and not

CARRIERS—*contd.*

merely for loss occasioned by negligence. *CHOGE-MUL v. COMMISSIONERS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE PORT OF CALCUTTA* . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 427

13. ——— Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 148, 151, 152—*Carriers Act (III of 1865)—Insurers—Railways Acts (IV of 1879 and IX of 1890)—Bailees.* That the duties and liabilities of a common carrier are governed in India by the principles of the English common law on that subject, however introduced, has been recognized in the Carriers Act (III of 1865). His responsibility to the owner does not originate in contract, but is cast upon him by reason of his exercising this public employment for reward. His liability as an insurer is an incident of the contract between him and the owner not inconsistent with the provisions of the Contract Act; and the Law of Carriers partly written and partly unwritten remained as before that Act. The Railways Acts of 1879 and 1890 reduced the responsibility of carriers by railway to that of bailees under the Contract Act, but this does not affect the construction of the law relating to common carriers and the Act of 1865. Notwithstanding some general expressions in the chapter on bailments, a common carrier's responsibility is not within the Contract Act, 1872. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in *Mothoora Kant Shaw v. India General Steam Navigation Co.*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 166, approved, and that of the Bombay High Court in *Kuwerji Tulsidas v. G. I. P. Railway Co.*, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 109, not supported. *IRRAWADDY FLOTILLA CO. v. BUGWANDAS* . . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 620
L. R. 18 I. A. 121

14. ——— Railways Act (IV of 1879), s. 11—*Railway Company, liability of—Carriage of gold and silver, etc.—Insurance, increased charge for.* Plaintiffs delivered a box of coins for carriage to the servants of a railway, and declared the nature of the contents at the time of delivery. No demand was made on the part of the railway for any increased payment for insurance. The box having been miscarried: *Held* on the authority of *Great Northern Railway Company v. Behrens*, 7 H. & N. 950, that the railway were liable for the loss. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. BUDHU NATH PODDAR* . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 538

15. ——— Common carriers—*Foreign carrier contracting in Calcutta, law applicable to—Negligence and misfeasance.* Carriers by sea, for hire, are common carriers by the Common Law of England; and, where the contract is made in Calcutta, whatever be the nationality of the carriers, they will be governed by the *lex loci contractus*, which is the Common Law of England. *Mackilloan v. The Compagnie Des Messageries Maritimes de France*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 227, not followed. Under the English Common Law, a common carrier may protect himself from liability for deliberate acts or misfeasance on the part of himself or his servants, but he must do so by clear, definite, unambiguous words. Landing goods in rainy weather, instead of delaying delivery, is negligence and not misfeasance.

CARRIERS—concl'd.

HAJEE ISMAIL SAIT v. THE COMPANY OF THE
MESSAGERIES MARITIMES OF FRANCE (1935)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 40

16. *Contract to carry partly by river and partly by land—Liability of carriers—Damages—Divisible contract—Carriers Act (III of 1865), ss. 3 to 5, 8—Railways Act (IX of 1890), s. 75—Excepted articles—Misdescription of goods.* In a suit for damages for loss of goods carried partly in steamers of one company and partly by trains of another, the plaintiff failed to declare the value and description of the goods as required under the provisions of the Carriers Act and the Railways Act:—*Held*, that so far as the journey is by river, the steamer company is entitled, as regards the acts of its agents and servants, to the protection afforded by the provisions of the Carriers Act, and so far as the journey is by rail, it is similarly entitled to claim the protection afforded by the Railways Act. *Le Conteur v. The London and South-Western Railway Company, L. R. 1 Q. B. 54, and Baxendale v. The Great Eastern Railway Company, 38 L. J. Q. B. 137, referred to. NARANG RAI AGARWALLA v. RIVERS STEAM NAVIGATION CO., LD. (1907)*

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 419

17. *Carriers Act (III of 1865), ss. 3, 8, and 9—Through booking of goods by steamer and rail—Liability of Steamer Company for loss during transmission by rail—Railways Act (IX of 1890), s. 75.* The plaintiffs consigned a parcel of silk articles through the India General Steam Navigation and Railway Company, Ltd., for delivery at Khagra, knowing that the articles would be carried in the first instance by the defendant company, then by the Eastern Bengal State Railway and then by the East Indian Railway Company. They did not declare the value of the articles, which exceeded Rs100, nor disclose the contents of the parcel. It was found that the goods were lost after they had been made over to the Eastern Bengal State Railway. *Held*, that the agreement was in substance with both the Steam Navigation Company and the Railway Companies and the former could not be held responsible for the loss. *Narang Rai Agarwalla v. Rivers Steam Navigation Company, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 419; 11 C. W. N. 1071, followed. GOKUL CHANDRA DAS v. INDIA GENERAL STEAM NAVIGATION AND RAILWAY COMPANY, LD. (1907)*

11 C. W. N. 1076

CARRIERS' ACT (III OF 1865).

See BILL OF LADING.

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 107

See CARRIERS.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 166; 13 C. L. R. 342

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 39

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 620

L. R. 18 I. A. 121

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 109, 120

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 417

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 445

CARRIERS' ACT (III OF 1865)—cont'd.

ss. 3, 5, 8—

See CARRIERS . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 419

ss. 3, 8, 9—

See CARRIERS, LIABILITY OF

11 C. W. N. 1076

1. *ss. 6 and 8—Negligence—Accident, loss by—Special contract—Suit for damages.* The plaintiffs delivered to the defendants certain goods for carriage to Calcutta in a flat belonging to the defendants. The goods were carried under the terms of a special contract or "forwarding note," signed by the shipper. One of the conditions of the forwarding note was as follows:—"The company will not be under any liability for damages or compensation in respect of loss of, or damage to, goods . . . except such liability as they are or may be subject to under the provisions of any law for the time being in force or of any contract other than this for the time being in existence between the Company and the shipper." While on board the defendants' flat, the goods were destroyed by fire. At the trial of the case, the defendants gave evidence showing the state of things before the fire occurred, the circumstances leading to the discovery of the fire (but not the cause or origin of it), and the measures taken to extinguish the fire. *Held*, that the occurrence of a fire, under the circumstances disclosed in the case, without any explanation as to the origin of it, was of itself evidence of negligence. *Held*, also, reversing the decision of SALE, J., that the defendants had not discharged the onus cast upon them by law of showing that there was no negligence. *Central Cachar Tea Company v. Rivers Steam Navigation Company, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 787, note, explained. Held* on the construction of the above clause (*per SALE, J.*, in the Court below, and *per TREVELYAN, J.*, in the Court of Appeal), that the words "in any law for the time being in force" must be taken to refer not to the common law, but to the law as laid down in the Carriers Act (III of 1865), and that, unless their liability was enlarged by express contract, the defendant company were liable only for loss or damage of which, under s. 6 of that Act, they were not allowed to relieve themselves, that is, only for loss occasioned by the negligence or criminal acts of themselves, their servants or agents. The decision of HILL, J., in *Central Cachar Tea Co. v. Rivers Steam Navigation Co.*, unreported, followed. *Semble*, on appeal (*per MACPHERSON, J.*, MACLEAN, C.J., doubting), that the above construction of the clause was correct. *CHOUTMULL DOOGUR v. RIVERS STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 783

1 C. W. N. 200

2. *The Judicial Committee dismissed an appeal in the above case from the decree of the Appellate High Court, which proceeded on s. 9 of the Carriers Act (III of 1865), that Court having taken the non-delivery as placing the burden of proving absence of negligence on the carriers. There were facts showing that no*

CARRIERS' ACT (III OF 1865)—concl'd.

— ss. 6 and 8—concl'd.

adequate means had been provided by the defendants for extinguishing a fire on board, and that the watch was inefficient. The defendants, accordingly, had failed to exonerate themselves. *RIVERS STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v. CHOUTMULL DOOGAR* . . . I. L. R. 26 Cal. 398
I. R. 26 I. A. 1
3 C. W. N. 145

CARRYING ON BUSINESS.

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDICTION—DWELLING—CARRYING ON BUSINESS, ETC.

CASE STATED.

See ADEN COURTS ACT, 1864, ss. 8, 9.
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 708

CASH ALLOWANCE.

See PENSIONS ACT I. L. R. 31 Bom. 512

CASTE.

See CUSTOM . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 495

See DEFAMATION . . . 6 Mad. Ap. 47
I. L. R. 6 Mad. 381
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 495
I. L. R. 22 Cal. 46
I. L. R. 24 Bom. 13

See HINDU LAW—CUSTOM—CASTE.

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 133
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 222

See HINDU LAW—CUSTOM—IMMORAL CUSTOMS . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 479

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—DIVESTING OF, EXCLUSION FROM, ETC.—OUTCASTES.

See HINDU LAW—MAINTENANCE—RIGHT TO MAINTENANCE—WIDOW.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 559

See HINDU LAW—MARRIAGE—RESTRAINT ON, OR DISSOLUTION OF, MARRIAGE.

2 N. W. 300
I. L. R. 9 Mad. 169

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—CASTE.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CASTE QUESTIONS.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—INTEREST TO SUPPORT RIGHT . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 131

See RIGHT OF WAY.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 552

— abandonment of—

See MADRAS REGULATION, 1816, XI, s. 10.
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 271

— authority of, to declare marriage void.

See BIGAMY . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 347

— loss of—

See HINDU LAW—GUARDIAN—RIGHT OF GUARDIANSHIP . I. L. R. 1 All. 945

CASTE—concl'd.

— marriage between persons of different castes—

See HINDU LAW—MARRIAGE—VALIDITY OR OTHERWISE OF MARRIAGE.

7 C. W. N. 619

CASTE DISABILITIES REMOVAL ACT (XXI OF 1850).

— s. 1—Act VIII of 1890, s. 17—*Hindu Law—Guardian and minor—Right of Hindu mother to be guardian of her infant daughter.* In the absence of any special reason to the contrary a Hindu mother has a better right to the guardianship of her infant daughter than the infant's paternal grandfather, and this right is not taken away by the fact that the mother has been outcasted. *Kanahi Ram v. Biddya Ram*, I. L. R. 1 All., followed. *KAULESRA v. JORAI KASAUNDHAN* (1995) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 233

CATALOGUE.

See COPYRIGHT . I. L. R. 35 Cal. 463

CATTLE, ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF.

See JURISDICTION I. L. R. 34 Cal. 926

CATTLE TRESPASS.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—RAILWAYS ACT.

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 228

See MISCHIEF . . . 6 B. L. R. Ap. 3
10 W. R. Cr. 29
16 W. R. Cr. 72
6 Mad. Ap. 30, 37
4 Bom. Cr. 14
I. L. R. 7 Bom. 126
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 173

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE . 2 B. L. R. A. Cr. 45
9 B. L. R. Ap. 36

CATTLE TRESPASS ACT (III OF 1857).

See COURT FEES ACT, 1870, SCH. II, ART. 1 . . . 8 Bom. Cr. 22

See DAMAGES—SUITS FOR DAMAGES—TORTS . . . 15 W. R. 279

See FINE . . . 7 Bom. Cr. 55

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—CATTLE TRESPASS ACT.

1 Bom. 100
4 Bom. Cr. 13
5 Bom. Cr. 13
7 W. R. 155

See MISCHIEF.

See SENTENCE—GENERAL CASES.

16 W. R. Cr. 12

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.

5 Mad. Ap. 21
7 Mad. Ap. 22

CATTLE TRESPASS ACT (III OF 1857)
—concl'd.

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUM-
MONING AND ATTENDANCE OF WITNESS—
ES. 10 W. R. Cr. 42

CATTLE TRESPASS ACT (I OF 1871).

See DAMAGES—SUITS FOR DAMAGES—
TORTS . . . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 159

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS.
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 926

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—GENE-
RALLY . . . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 238

See RIGHT OF SUIT—COMPENSATION.
2 C. L. R. 344
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 549

See SENTENCE—GENERAL CASES.
16 W. R. Cr. 12

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPR-
ISONMENT AND FINE . 2 C. L. R. 507

ss. 6 and 27—*Pound-keeper—*
Police patel. Where a Magistrate convicted,
under s. 27 of Act I of 1871, a person who was not
himself a pound-keeper, but was merely entertained
by the police patel, who was *ex-officio* pound-keeper
under s. 6 of the Act, the High Court annulled the
conviction and sentence passed upon the accused.
REG. v. VAKTA VALAD LAKHU . 9 Bom. 164

s. 10.
See MISCHIEF . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 126
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 173

Who may seize. Where an in-
digo factory supplies the seed, pays for the labour
of sowing and gives compensation to raiyats grow-
ing indigo on their own land, but no advance in
cash is proved to have been made: *Held*, that a
servant of the factory is not a person authorised
under s. 10 of the Cattle Trespas Act, to seize
cattle doing damage to the indigo. RAM KARAN
THAKUR v. EMPEROR (1905) . 9 C. W. N. 624

s. 11.
See FOREST ACT, s. 69.
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 933

s. 19.
See CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.
8 B. L. R. Ap. 1

s. 20.
See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—TO
ACCUSED ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT
2 C. L. R. 507
I. L. R. 13 Calc. 304
I. L. R. 9 Mad. 102, 374

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPE-
CIAL ACTS—CATTLE TRESPASS ACT.
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 300, 442

1. ———— *Criminal Proce-*
dure Code, 1882, s. 560—Frivolous and vexatious
complaint—Complaint of wrongful seizure of cattle
—“Offence.” A complaint of the wrongful seizure
of cattle is not a complaint of an offence within the

CATTLE TRESPASS ACT (I OF 1871)—
cont'd.

s. 20—concl'd.
meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Con-
sequently, on the dismissal of such a complaint, it
is not competent to a Court to act under s. 560 of
the Code and award compensation to the persons
against whom the complaint is made. *Pitchi v.*
Ankappa, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 102, Kottalanada v.
Muthaya, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 374, Kala Chand v.
Gudadhur Biswas, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 304, and
Nedaram Thakur v. Joonab, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 248,
referred to. MEGHAI v. SHEORHIK
I. L. R. 18 All. 353

2. ———— and ss. 22 and 23—*Criminal*
Procedure Code, 1882, s. 4 (p), and Ch. XXII—
Illegal seizure of cattle—“Offence.”—Summary
trial. The illegal seizure of cattle alluded to in
ss. 20 to 23 of the Cattle Trespas Act (I of 1871)
is not an “offence” under s. 4 (p) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, and cases connected therewith
are accordingly not triable by the summary
procedure described in Ch. XXII of that Code.
Pitchi v. Ankappa, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 102, and
Kottalanada v. Muthaya, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 374,
followed. NEDARAM THAKUR v. JOONAB
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 248

3. ———— s. 20, Sch. II—*Illegal Seizure*
of cattle—“Offence.”—Power of District or specially
authorized Magistrate to transfer such case—Subor-
dinate Magistrate, power of, to try—Criminal
Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 4 (a), 192,
and Sch. II, last clause. The illegal seizure or
detention of cattle, referred to in s. 20 of the
Cattle Trespas Act (I of 1871), is an “offence”
under s. 4 (o) of the Criminal Procedure Code of
1898 and is, by virtue of the last clause of
Sch. II thereof, triable by any Magistrate; and
though, under s. 20 of the Cattle Trespas Act, a
complaint of such illegal seizure or detention must
be entertained by a District Magistrate or one
specially authorized as required by the section, such
Magistrate has power, under s. 192, to transfer such
cases, after taking cognizance, to any Subordinate
Magistrate for trial. *Shama v. Lechhu Shekh, I. L.*
R. 23 Calc. 300, and Raghu Singh v. Abdul Wahab,
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 442, declared obsolete. BUDHAN
MAHTO v. ISSUR SINGH (1907)
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 926

s. 22.
See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASE—ACTS—
CATTLE TRESPASS ACT.

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 230
3 N. W. 200
I. L. R. 15 Calc. 712
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 259
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 238

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—
FOR LOSS OR INJURY CAUSED BY
OFFENCE . . . 2 C. L. R. 507
I. L. R. 7 Mad. 345
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 175
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 238
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 139

CATTLE TRESPASS ACT (I OF 1871)
—*concl'd.*

s. 22—*concl'd.*

See FINE. . . . 7 Mad. Ap. 24

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—CATTLE TRESPASS ACT.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 300, 442

1. _____ *Power of Magistrate—Seizure of cattle and dispute as to ownership of land.* Where there was a dispute as to the ownership of land on which the complainant's cattle were found, the complainant stating the land belonged to A, who gave him the right to graze his cattle there, and the party charged (who had seized and impounded the cattle) claiming the land as his own, it was held that the order of the Magistrate referring the parties to the Civil Court was illegal, and that he should have disposed of the case himself under the Cattle Tresspass Act, I of 1871, s. 22. *TUNNOO v. KUREEM BUKSH*

23 W. R. Cr. 2

2. _____ *Joint fine—Fine and compensation.* Proceedings under s. 22 of the Cattle Tresspass Act are quasi-civil in their nature, a Magistrate being at liberty under that section to assess and enforce in a summary manner compensation for an injury for which a civil action might be brought. An order, therefore, for the payment of a sum as fine and compensation, passed against two persons under that section, which does not specify the proportionate amount payable by each, is good. *In the matter of NEAZ v. MONSOR*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 175

3. _____ *Illegal seizure of cattle—Theft—Compensation—Fine—Imprisonment in default of payment of compensation—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 386—Penal Code, s. 378.* An accused was found to have loosed the complainant's cattle at night from a cattle pen, and to have driven them to the pound with the object of sharing with the pound-keeper the fees to be paid for their release. He was proceeded against under Act I of 1871 (Cattle Tresspass Act), and under the provisions of s. 22 ordered to pay compensation to the complainant, and in default to undergo one month's rigorous imprisonment. *Held*, that s. 22 was inapplicable to the facts of the case, and that the order must be set aside. On the facts it was not a case of "illegal seizure and detention" of cattle, but rather one of theft, as all the elements of that offence were present, and the accused should have been charged with and tried for that offence. *Held*, further, that the sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of the compensation was not warranted by law. Compensation may be levied as a fine, and the ordinary mode of levying fines is laid down in s. 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The law nowhere provides that fines may be levied by means of imprisonment. *PARYAS RAI v. ARJU MIAN*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 139

4. _____ *Compensation awarded under Cattle Tresspass Act—Imprisonment*

CATTLE TRESPASS ACT (I OF 1871)—
concl'd.

s. 22—*concl'd.*

in default of payment. Imprisonment cannot be inflicted in default of payment of the compensation awarded under the Cattle Tresspass Act. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LAKSHMI NAYAKAN*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 238

5. _____ *Illegal seizure of cattle—Fine—Compensation.* A Magistrate is not competent, under s. 22 of the Cattle Tresspass Act, to pass any sentence of fine; he can only award compensation for the illegal seizure of cattle. *BHAGIRATHI NAIK v. GANGADHAR MAHANTY*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 992

6. _____ *Illegal seizure of cattle—Fine on conviction, legality of—Imprisonment in default if proper—Compensation.* A Magistrate is not competent, under s. 22 of the Cattle Tresspass Act, to pass a sentence of fine. He can only award compensation for an illegal seizure of cattle. An order of imprisonment in default of payment of such fine is also illegal. *BHAGIRATHI NAIK v. GANGADHAR MAHANTY* (1910)

5 C. W. N. 32

s. 24—*Rescue of cattle after seizure for trespassing on public property—Conviction—Omission to record finding as to whether locality was public property—Legality of conviction.* Certain persons had been fined for rescuing cattle after seizure under s. 24 of the Cattle Tresspass Act, 1871. The judgment contained no finding to the effect that the land on which the cattle had been seized was public property in charge of the Public Works Department. *Held*, that the conviction must be set aside, and the case remanded. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LAKSHMANNA* (1900)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 318

ss. 40, 22—*Appeal lies against order made under s. 19 of the Cattle Tresspass Act.* By s. 4 (o) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the word 'offence' includes an act in respect of which a complaint may be made under s. 20 of the Cattle Tresspass Act; and a person against whom an order under s. 22 of the Cattle Tresspass Act is made is a "person convicted on a trial" and is entitled to appeal under s. 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *In the matter of PONNUSAMI* (1901)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 517

CAUSE LIST.

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—CAUSE LIST.

2 Hyde 86

Bourke O. C. 238

4 B. L. R. Ap. 75

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 355

CAUSE OF ACTION.

See APPEAL . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 249

See APPEAL—ORDERS—ORDER REJECTING A PLAINT 6 C. W. N. 585

See APPELLATE COURT—OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—RIGHT OF SUIT.

CAUSE OF ACTION—*contd.*

- See* BOND . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 54
See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882.
 I. L. R. 27 Mad. 80
See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 26.
 10 C. W. N. 508
See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 43.
 I. L. R. 29 All. 256
 I. L. R. 27 Mad. 116, 380
 I. L. R. 28 Bom. 447
See COMPANIES ACT, s. 58.
 10 C. W. N. 906
See CONSPIRACY I. L. R. 36 Calc. 134
See CO-SHARER—SUITS BY CO-SHARERS
 WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY.
 I. L. R. 28 Calc. 223
See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—
 REMOVING ATTACHMENT.
 I. L. R. 25 All. 347
See DEFAMATION . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 48
See EVIDENCE ACT I OF 1872.
 I. L. R. 26 All. 178
See FRAUD . . . 13 C. W. N. 87
See FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
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 57 . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 429
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 120 . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 9
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 II, ART. 142 . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 821
See MISJOINDER . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 367
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 I. L. R. 31 Bom. 516
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CAUSE OF ACTION—*contd.*

splitting of—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 43.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 379

1. *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 43—Earlier suit on adjusted account—Subsequent suit on a mortgage—Distinct causes of action—Relief not claimed in the earlier suit.* A plaintiff omitted to claim relief in a suit on an adjusted account, which he subsequently claimed in a suit based upon a mortgage. *Held*, that, the causes of action for the two suits being distinct, the omission to claim the relief in the earlier suit did not operate as a bar to the subsequent suit under s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *HANSRAJ LAKHMIDAS v. LALJI ANANDJI* (1904). I. L. R. 28 Bom. 447

2.

Jurisdiction—

Foreign judgment—Cause of action—Award, suit on—Arbitration Act (52 and 53 Vict., c. 49), s. 12. An award was made against the defendant in England for payment of a certain sum of money to the plaintiffs and an order under s. 12 of the Arbitration Act (52 and 53 Vict., c. 49) was made thereon. The defendant, who at the time of the commencement of the suit was not dwelling, or carrying on business, or personally working for gain, within the limits of the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of this Court in consideration of the plaintiff's agent (in Calcutta) undertaking not to institute any suit for a certain time, made a promise to pay in part £500 within a certain period and the balance of the amount of the award in time. The plaintiffs instituted, with leave under cl. 12 of the Letters Patent, this suit for the amount of the award. *Held*, that under the above circumstances, the consideration for the promise on the part of the plaintiff's agent was illusory, amounting only to a promise on the defendant's part to do what he was already legally bound to do, and the transaction formed no part of the cause of action and this Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. "Cause of action" defined. *Read v. Brown, L. R. 22 Q. B. D. 128*, referred to. *Semble*: An order under s. 12 of the Arbitration Act (52 and 53 Vict., c. 49) enforcing an award made in England is not such a judgment that a suit in a Court in this country can be instituted on it as on a foreign judgment. But on the facts as stated above, the Court was at liberty to make the decree it did, on the footing that the suit was one based on the award and not on the order made under s. 12 of the Arbitration Act. *DEEP NARAYAN SINGH v. DIETERT* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 274

s. c. 8 C. W. N. 207

3.

Suit for "main-

tenance" of possession—Pleadings—Suit virtually to procure rectification of an erroneous decree. Plaintiff in a suit for possession as usufructuary mortgagee of 13 bighas had to redeem five prior usufructuary mortgages comprising part of 13 bighas mortgaged to him and some 15 bighas in addition: but the decree, which he obtained, was drawn up erroneously and gave the plaintiff a

CAUSE OF ACTION—*contd.*

right to the possession of 13 bighas only and not of the whole 28 bighas. Plaintiff never appealed against this decree, nor did he apply in review to have the error in the decree corrected, but he subsequently brought a suit in which he asked, first, for "maintenance" of possession in respect of the 15 bighas and, secondly, for recovery of possession, if he should be found not to be in possession. He alleged in his plaint that he was in possession and that one of the defendants at the instigation of another was interfering with his rights. It was found that plaintiff had never obtained possession of the 15 bighas. *Held*, that the suit did not lie. If the suit was for maintenance of possession no cause of action appeared, and in any other view the suit was one virtually to set right an erroneous decree, which could not be done by means of such a suit. *BASAWAN KURMI v. NAKKHEDI PANDE* (1905). I. L. R. 27 All. 174

4.

Malicious pro-

secution—Letters Patent, cl. 12—Leave—Liability of prosecutor when prosecution ordered by Court. "Cause of action" means that bundle of essential facts which it is necessary for a plaintiff to prove before he can succeed in the case. A person is responsible not merely for starting a prosecution, but also for continuing the same and he is so responsible whether such prosecution was ordered by the Court or was initiated by the party himself. The plaintiff, a resident in British India, was charged with a criminal offence by the defendant in the Magistrate's Court at Rajkot. In order to secure his attendance the defendant moved the Bombay Government to initiate extradition proceedings against the plaintiff before the Chief Presidency Magistrate in Bombay, who, however, held that a case for extradition had not been made out. The plaintiff obtained leave from the High Court to file a suit against the defendant in Bombay for malicious prosecution. On an application by the defendant to have the leave rescinded: *Held*, that a material part of the cause of action accrued in Bombay and that the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. *Fitzjohn v. Mackinder, 9 C. B. N. S. 505, 530, 531*, applied. *MUSA YAKUB v. MANILAL* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 368

5.

Slander of title

—Cause of action—Damages—Counterfeiting trademark—Allegation to the Collector of Customs—Detention of goods in consequence by the Collector—Action of Collector whether a judicial proceeding—Merchandise Marks Act (IV of 1889). There were allegations in the plaint (a) that the defendants were interested in putting a stop to the sale of goods imported by the plaintiff, (b) that when the same were in the Calcutta Customs House, the defendants with intent to injure the plaintiff had falsely alleged to the Collector of Customs that the marks on those goods were an imitation of somebody else's, (c) that the defendants had thereby induced the Collector to detain the goods in the Customs House and had also persuaded

CAUSE OF ACTION—concl'd.

and induced the Collector to make an *ex parte* order that the plaintiff's marks were a fraudulent imitation, and (d) that in consequence the plaintiff had suffered special damage. *Held*, that the plaint did disclose a cause of action and should not have been rejected. *Ratcliffe v. Evans*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 524; *White v. Mellin*, [1895] A. C. 154, referred to. *MACLEAN, C.J.* This was virtually a case of slander of title, and in order to succeed, the plaintiff had to show that the statements of the defendants were false, malicious, and that he had suffered special damage. Here, though malice had not been specifically pleaded, it was undoubtedly to be implied from the allegations (a) and (b). In any case, the suit should not have been dismissed on this account, but the plaintiff ought to have been allowed to plead special damage. *SALE, J.* No question arose in this case as to the legality of the Collector's action. Moreover, the finding of the Collector was not a judicial act and the plaintiff was entitled to disregard it so far as his right to sue in the Civil Court was concerned, and he was not bound to move the higher executive authorities to have the finding set aside. *NEMI CHAND v. WALLACE* (1905) . . . 10 C. W. N. 107

CAUSE PAPERS.

— lien on—

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 63

CAUSING DEATH BY NEGLIGENCE.

— Lessee of Government ferry allowing unsound boat to be used on ferry—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 304A.* The lessee of a Government ferry having the exclusive right of conveying passengers across a certain river at a particular spot allowed an unsound boat to be used at the ferry. In consequence of its unsoundness, the boat sank while crossing the river, and some of the persons in it were drowned. *Held*, that the lessee of the ferry was properly convicted of the offence provided for by s. 304A of the Penal Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BHUTAN*

I. L. R. 16 All. 472

CAVEAT.

See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

15 B. L. R. Ap. 8

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 87

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 164

See PROBATE—OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF, GRANT.

See PROBATE, WILL

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 186, 357

CENTRAL PROVINCES CIVIL COURTS ACT (II OF 1904).

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 636

CENTRAL PROVINCES LAND REVENUE ACT (XVIII OF 1881).

— s. 4 (8A)—*Central Provinces Tenancy Act (XI of 1898)*—*Gaontia in Sambalpur District—Suit for ejectment by—Jurisdiction of Civil Court—“Gaontia,” if proprietor—Gochar land, if “common land”*—Recognition of defendant's tenancy by settlement department after institution of suit—*Second appeal.* Gochar lands are lands reserved for the proprietor of a Government village in the district of Sambalpur and cannot be classed in the same category as common lands, which are the property of the general body of villagers. For the purposes of a suit in ejectment brought by a *gaontia* of a village, the *gaontia* must be taken to be a “proprietor” of the same as defined in s. 4 (8A) of Act XVIII of 1881 and as such he is entitled to bring the suit. Civil Court must adjudicate on the rights of the parties as they existed when the plaint was filed, and a recognition of the defendant's tenancy by the Settlement Department subsequent to the institution of an ejectment suit by the *gaontia* is of no avail to the defendant. Besides the entry in the settlement record is not conclusive. It is only a matter of presumption. “The holder of a survey number” mentioned in s. 2 (10), Expl. II of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act XI of 1898, means the holder when proceedings are instituted in the Civil Court and a holder under a subsequent settlement cannot claim to be a tenant of the farmer or *gaontia*. *PURKHIT PANDA v. ANANDA GAONTIA* (1908) . . . 12 C. W. N. 1036

— s. 87.

See HINDU LAW—PARTITION—REQUISITES FOR PARTITION I. L. R. 27 Calc. 515
4 C. W. N. 582

CENTRAL PROVINCES TENANCY ACT (IX OF 1883) AS AMENDED BY ACT XVII OF 1889.

See CENTRAL PROVINCES TENANCY ACT (XI OF 1898).

CENTRAL PROVINCES TENANCY ACT (XI OF 1898).

— ss. 45, 46, 47 and 95—*Act IX of 1883, as amended by Act XVII of 1889, s. 43—Ejectment, suit for—Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Limited interest—Limitation.* Under s. 46 of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act (XI of 1898), the transfer of an occupancy-holding, either in whole or in part, is voidable at the instance of the landlord who, in order to recover possession of the holding on the ground of such a transfer, must follow the procedure as laid down in s. 47 of the Act. *Bhandi Sing v. Ramadhin Rai*, 2 C. L. J. 359, referred to. *Held*, further, that when the transfer was made before Act XI of 1898 came into force, under s. 43 of Act IX of 1883, as amended by Act XVII of 1889, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain such a suit for ejectment, and that its jurisdiction was not taken away by the passing of the new Act. Under s. 43 of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act

CENTRAL PROVINCES TENANCY ACT (XI OF 1898)—concl'd.

ss. 45, 46, 47 and 95—concl'd.

(IX of 1883, as amended by Act XVII of 1889), a transfer of a portion only of an occupancy-holding is not void, and it does not entitle the landlord to exercise his right of re-entry, either as regards the entire holding or as regards the portion transferred. A person can plead tenancy and in the alternative, possession of a limited interest; such a possession may be just as much adverse for the purpose of barring a suit for the determination of that limited interest. *Ishan Chandra Mitter v. Ramwanjan Chakerbutty*, 2 C. L. J. 125, referred to. *ICHARAN SINGH v. NILMONEY BALIDAR* (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 470
s. c. 12 C. W. N. 636

CEREMONIES.

See HINDU LAW—ADOPTION—REQUISITES FOR ADOPTION—CEREMONIES.

See HINDU LAW—

ADOPTION—WHO MAY OR MAY NOT ADOPT;

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 168

MARRIAGE—CEREMONIES.

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I. L. R. 27 Bom. 492

CERTIFICATE.

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—LEAVE TO APPEAL.

5 C. W. N. 689

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 194

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882) . I. L. R. 30 ALL. 390

effect of—

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT, ss. 8, 10 . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 811

of nationality—

See MARRIAGE . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 232

sale in execution of—

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT (BEN. ACT I OF 1895).

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 619

1. ——— Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act I of 1895), ss. 7, 10, 16, 19, 31—Signature as Collector—Notice, service of, by registered post—Certificate of execution—Proclamation of sale—Signature as Judge—Irregularity in publication—Suit to set aside sale—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 12 (b). A certificate under s. 7 of the Public

CERTIFICATE—concl'd.

Demands Recovery Act drawn up on an old form where the word "Collector" occurred, but which was signed by a person, who obviously was the certificate Officer and who had in another part of the document signed himself as such, is not invalid. Under the proviso to s. 31 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, service of notice required by s. 10 can, in the first instance, be made by registered post addressed to the judgment-debtor's last known residence, though no other mode of service has been previously resorted to. A sale proclamation, when issued by the properly qualified officer, is equally effectual whether he signs himself as "Certificate Officer" or as "Judge." Where there is credible evidence of the service of the sale proclamation, and there has been a considerable lapse of time, it is to be presumed that all the necessary formalities were complied with. S. 19 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, as amended by Bengal Act I of 1897, renders s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code applicable in its entirety to proceedings in execution of a certificate, and a separate suit to set aside a sale held in the enforcement of such certificate is not maintainable. *Janki Dass v. Ram Golam Sahu*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 813, referred to. The present suit, if regarded as one to set aside a certificate under s. 7 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, is barred by s. 16; and if as one to set aside the sale, is barred by Art. 12 (b) of Sch. II of the Limitation Act. *BAKHAMDEO NARAYAN SING v. BIBI RASUL BANDI* (1905) . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 691

2. ——— Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act I of 1895, amended by Bengal Act I of 1897), ss. 7, 15, 17, 19, 20, 31—Sale—Suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244. The mere fact that a greater sum is claimed as due in a certificate made under the Public Demands Recovery Act does not render the certificate and notice bad so as to exclude the operation of the rule of limitation laid down in s. 15 of the Act. A certificate can only be modified on such a ground provided that a suit for such purpose is not barred. S. 19 of Bengal Act I of 1895 as amended by Bengal Act I of 1897 makes s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code applicable to proceedings in execution of a certificate made under the Act. *Ram Taruck Hazra v. Dilwair Ali*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 94 (note); *Janki Das v. Ram Golam Sahu*, 6 C. W. N. 331, and *Ramrup Sahay v. Khushal Misser*, 6 C. W. N. 630, distinguished. Where a sale in execution of a certificate is sought to be set aside, not on the ground of invalidity of the proceedings anterior to execution, which are the foundation of the sale, but on the ground of irregularity in the execution proceedings, the judgment-debtor must proceed under s. 20 of the Act, and s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code bars a separate suit. The procedure prescribed by s. 31 of Act I of 1895 for the service of notice under s. 10 of the Act should be strictly followed. *UMED ALI BHUYAN v. RAJ LAKSMI DEBYA* (1905) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 84

CERTIFICATE OFFICER.

See COLLECTOR OF 24-PARGANAS.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 286

CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION.

Col.

1. CERTIFICATE UNDER BOMBAY REGULATION VIII OF 1827, AND ACTS XIX AND XX OF 1841 . . . 1365
2. ACTS XXVII OF 1860 AND VII OF 1889, AND GRANT OF CERTIFICATE . 1369
3. RIGHT TO SUE OR EXECUTE DECREE WITHOUT CERTIFICATE . . . 1373
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I. L. R. 8 Mad. 207

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 213

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 48

1. CERTIFICATE UNDER BOMBAY REGULATION VIII OF 1827, AND ACTS XIX AND XX OF 1841.

1. ——— Bom. Reg. VIII of 1827—*Right of suit—Suit to establish title under will.* A plaintiff can sue to establish his title under a will without producing a certificate under Regulation VIII of 1827. *Mulchand v. Motchand Hargovandas*, 9 Bom. H. C. A. C. 31, distinguished. *MAFATLAL NARANDAS v. BAI PARSON*.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 320

2. ——— *Certificate of heirship, effect of grant of.* A certificate of heirship granted under Regulation VIII of 1827 was not *prima facie* evidence that the holder of it was the rightful heir of the deceased. The effect of such certificate was merely to give security to persons in possession of, or indebted to, the estate of the deceased in dealing with such holder as the legal representative of the deceased. *RAMCHANDRA KULKARNI v. VITHOJI VALAD MALHARJI PATIL*

4 Bom. A. C. 178

3. ——— *Effect of certificate under Regulation VIII of 1827, s. 7, cl. 2—Representative of estate.* A certificate of administration granted under Regulation VIII of 1827 only indicates the person who for the time being is in the legal management of the property in respect of which it is granted, but does not constitute the

CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION
—*contd.*1. CERTIFICATE UNDER BOMBAY REGULATION VIII OF 1827, AND ACTS XIX AND XX OF 1841—*contd.*

holder of the certificate a representative of the estate for the purpose of distributing it amongst his co-sharers. *KESHAV JAGANNATH v. NARAYAN SAKHARAM* I. L. R. 14 Bom. 236

4. ——— *Reversal of order—Payments made before reversal.* Where a widow obtained an order for a certificate of administration to the estate of her deceased husband, which order was, however, reversed on appeal before the certificate was granted, it was held that payments made to the widow before the order was reversed were unauthorized. *DAMODHAR BAPUJI PACHA-PARKAR v. ZINGA KOM KANDLIKA*

7 Bom. A. C. 31

5. ——— *Payment of debts to supposed heir of deceased before grant of certificate of heirship.* A defendant who is sued by the holder of a certificate of heirship to a deceased Hindu for a debt due from the defendant to the deceased is at liberty to show, notwithstanding the certificate of heirship, that he has paid the debt to the actual heir of the deceased before the grant of the certificate. It will not, however, be sufficient for such defendant to show that he has paid his debt to a person whom he *bonâ fide* believed to be such heir. *PURSHOTAM MANSUKH v. RANCHHOD PURSHOTAM* 8 Bom. A. C. 152

6. ——— *Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827, s. 7—Holder of such certificate a transferee of decree within the meaning of s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)—Right of such person to execute decree.* A holder of a certificate of administration granted under s. 7 of Regulation VIII of 1827 is a transferee by law of a decree obtained by the deceased within the meaning of s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code, and is competent to apply for execution of such a decree. *KHANDERAV RAYAJIRAV v. GANESH SHASHTRI* I. L. R. 11 Bom. 368

7. ——— *Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827, s. 9—Construction of the words "may appoint"—Appointment of administrator—Discretion of Court.* Where the right of succession to the estate of a deceased person is disputed between two or more claimants, and none of them have taken possession, the District Judge, within whose jurisdiction the property is situate, is bound on the application of one of the parties concerned, to appoint an administrator under s. 9 of Regulation VIII of 1827. The words of the section are imperative, and not permissive. The use of the words "may appoint" in this section does not imply that the District Judge has any discretion in a proper case to appoint or not to appoint an administrator. If any discretion is given as to the exercise of the power thereby conferred, it is that of determining

CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION

—contd.

1. CERTIFICATE UNDER BOMBAY REGULATION VIII OF 1827, AND ACTS XIX AND XX OF 1841—contd.

whether the occasion has arisen in the particular case. *VISHWAMBHAR PUNDIT v. VASUDEV PUNDIT*
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 37

8. ————— *Application for certificate of heirship based on adoption—Procedure.* *H* applied under Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827 to a District Judge for a certificate of heirship to a deceased *D* under a registered deed of adoption by his widow executed nearly fifty years after *D*'s death. The opponent claimed to be the heir, and denied the legality of the adoption. The District Judge referred the applicant to a regular suit to establish the validity of his adoption. *Held*, in appeal, that the District Judge was bound to investigate the case, following the procedure laid down in s. 4 of Regulation VIII of 1827, and had no authority to dismiss the application and refer the applicant to a regular suit to establish the validity of the adoption. *HARISING DEVISING-RAO v. BHAUSING* . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 548

9. ————— *Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827, s. 9—Administrators appointed by the Court—Order to deliver property—"Determined"—"Finally determined"—Right of appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622—Superintendence of High Court—Illegal exercise of jurisdiction.* S. 9 of Regulation VIII of 1827 empowers the District Court to make an order directing the administrators appointed under the Regulation to make over the property, when "it has been determined" between the rival claimants who is the heir of the deceased; but, to give full effect to the object of the Regulation, the word "determined" must be understood "finally determined." Where the Judge considered that he was bound to make an order directing administrators appointed under Regulation VIII of 1827 to make over the property of the deceased to one of the rival claimants who was judicially declared to be the heir of the deceased:—*Held*, that, so long as the party against whom the decision in the matter of the rival claims was given had a right of appeal, the order of the Judge was one which he could not make under the Regulation, and that in exercising his jurisdiction under the Regulation he had exercised it illegally, and, that being so, the High Court had power, under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, to interfere in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. *ISHVAMBHAR PANDIT v. VASUDEV PANDIT*
I. L. R. 16 Bom. 708

10. ————— *Certificate under Act XXVII of 1860—Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827, s. 9—Jurisdiction to grant certificate of administration—Foreigners residing abroad.* Under s. 3 of Act XXVII of 1860, a certificate can be granted only for the estate of a British subject either resident within the district where the certi-

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—contd.

1. CERTIFICATE UNDER BOMBAY REGULATION VIII OF 1827, AND ACTS XIX AND XX OF 1841—contd.

ficate is sought, or else having no fixed place of residence. The Act does not make provision for administration of the effects of a foreigner domiciled abroad. While Act XXVII of 1860 has regard to the person, Regulation VIII of 1827, on the other hand, looks simply to the locality of the assets as the ground of the Court's jurisdiction to grant a certificate of administration. The intention of s. 9 seems to be that when there are assets within a zilla, and the circumstances exist which are specified in the section, a certificate of administration may be granted. The authority given under s. 9 must be understood to be the same as under s. 7. *B*, a sardar of Baroda, residing within the Gaikwar's territory, died there, leaving considerable property in the district of Surat. On his death, *L*, the Assistant Collector of Surat, was appointed administrator of *B*'s estate, under s. 9 of Regulation VIII of 1827. Shortly after his appointment as administrator, *L* went to England on furlough. During his absence, the plaintiffs sued, as heirs of *B*, to recover the balance of principal and interest due on a bond executed by the defendants in favour of *B*. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were incompetent to sue. *L* having been appointed administrator of *B*'s estate, and never having been relieved of his office as administrator by the Court, as contemplated by s. 9 of Regulation VIII of 1827, his status still subsisted, and while it subsisted, no one else could represent the estate. The appointment of an administrator excludes other representatives so long as it endures. *IBRAHIM ALI KHAN v. ZIAULNISSA LADLI BEGAM*
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 150

11. ————— *Act XIX of 1841—Summary procedure—Act XXVII of 1860.* *A* (a Hindu) died intestate in December 1865, leaving his widow in possession of his property, moveable and immoveable. The descent of *A*'s property was admittedly governed by the law of the Mitakshara. On the 19th January 1866, *A*'s nephew presented a petition to the Zillah Court, under Act XIX of 1841, denying the title of the widow. Upon this alone the Judge directed the widow to come in and show cause, which she did on the 2nd February following. A daughter of *A* on the 19th March presented a petition in opposition to the nephew's claim for possession. The nephew filed a reply. In the meantime, the widow applied for a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, which was opposed by both nephew and daughter. The nephew also filed a cross-petition under Act XXVII of 1860. All these petitions came on by consent together for adjudication on a state of facts admitted by all parties through their pleaders, who also, by consent between themselves, submitted their view of the question of law to be decided on the Acts of 1841 and 1860. The questions so submitted were:—(1) Did it appear on the evidence that there was a separation between

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—*contd.*

1. CERTIFICATE UNDER BOMBAY REGULATION VIII OF 1827, AND ACTS XIX AND XX OF 1841—*concl'd.*

A and his nephew according to the Mitakshara doctrine? (2) If the evidence *per se* established a legal separation, was such separation negated by certain admissions of A? The Judge refused the application of the widow under Act XXVII of 1860, and granted possession to the nephew under Act XIX of 1841. The nephew was a man of substance, and able to bring a regular suit, and there was no evidence of possession by force or fraud on the part of the widow, the only question being her right according to the Mitakshara law. *Held*, that the Judge was in error in proceeding summarily under Act XIX of 1841 on the declaration of the applicant alone and without other enquiry, but that this defect was cured by the widow's appearing. That the Judge ought not to have tried the cases under Act XIX of 1841 and Act XXVII of 1860 together and on the same issues; but the Judge having jurisdiction over the subject-matter and to frame the issues, his order was not open to appeal or review. *JUSODA KOONWUR v. GOWREE BYJNATH PERSHAD*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 365; 6 W. R. Mis. 53

12. ———— Act XX of 1841—*Order granting certificate, effect of.* The effect of an order granting a certificate under Act XX of 1841 was not to establish a will incontestably against the whole world, or to prevent a will from being impeached in a suit if set up to defeat the rights of parties claiming under the Law of Inheritance. *MAHOMED AZEEMOOLLAH KHAN v. SUHOODRA BEBEE* W. R. 1864, 227

13. ———— *Nature of certificate.* A certificate for collecting the debts due to the estate of a deceased person given under Act XX of 1841 gives a personal right, and is not transferable by sale. *MEHDEE ALLY KHAN v. LUCHMEEPUT BABOO* 1 W. R. Mis. 28

14. ———— *Cancelling of certificate.* A Court cannot, solely on the petition of a party, cancel a certificate granted to him under Act XX of 1841, or declare that his trust and guardianship have ceased. If he gives up his duties of his own accord, he does so on his own responsibility, and the Court will not order him to act. *SUMBHOO CHUNDER KHAN v. ISHAN CHUNDER BANERJEE* W. R. 1864, Mis. 24

2. ACTS XXVII OF 1860 AND VII OF 1889, AND GRANT OF CERTIFICATE.

1. ———— Act XXVII of 1860—*Object of Act—Trustee.* The object of Act XXVII of 1860 is not to enable parties to litigate questions of disputed title, but to enable debtors to pay the debts due by them with safety to the representatives of deceased Hindus and others, and to facilitate the collection of such debts by removing all doubts as

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—*cont'd.*

2. ACTS XXVII OF 1860 AND VII OF 1889, AND GRANT OF CERTIFICATE—*cont'd.*

to the legal title to demand and receive the same. In other words, the objects of the Act are to enable debtors to get sufficient acquittances when they pay money due to the estate of a deceased, and to preserve that estate from loss by giving some one the right to collect the debts, lest they should be lost, *e.g.*, by the operation of the law of limitation. The holder of a certificate is a trustee liable to account for the moneys received by him to the legal heirs or representatives of the deceased. *In the matter of the petition of NOBODIP CHUNDER BISWAS. PRANKISTO BISWAS v. NOBODIP CHUNDER BISWAS* I. L. R. 8 Calc. 868

2. ———— *Application of Act—Act XXVII of 1860, s. 2—Presidency Town—Natives—Refusal to pay—Want of fraudulent or vexatious motive in withholding debt.* Act XXVII of 1860, which provides that no debtor of a deceased person shall be compelled to pay his debt to any person claiming to be entitled to the effects of such deceased person, without the production of a certificate to collect debts or probate or letters of administration, except under certain circumstances, is applicable to Hindus within the Presidency Towns. Where a debtor of a deceased Hindu who died intestate declined to pay the debt to his widow unless she produced letters of administration to the estate of the deceased, and the widow sued to recover the debt without taking out a certificate or letters of administration, and it was found that there was no reasonable doubt that the widow was entitled to the debt, but that the debtor refused to pay neither from any fraudulent nor vexatious motive, but to avoid the risk of having to pay the debt twice over:—*Held*, that the suit must be dismissed. *MUTTAMMAL v. BANK OF MADRAS*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 115

3. ———— *Jurisdiction to grant certificate of administration—Foreigners residing abroad.* Under s. 3 of Act XXVII of 1860, a certificate can be granted only for the estate of a British subject either resident within the district where the certificate is sought, or else having no fixed place of residence. The Act does not make provision for administration of the effects of a foreigner domiciled abroad. *IBRAHIM ALI KHAN v. ZIAULNISSA LADLI BEGAM*

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 150

4. ———— Act XXVII of 1860, s. 2—*Bond given to secure debt due to estate of deceased Hindu—Suit by heir—Waiver of right to protection implied.* R, being a debtor to the estate of a deceased Hindu, executed a bond promising to pay the debt to V, the divided brother of the deceased, as his heir. A suit having been filed against V by the widow of the deceased, who claimed his estate, R offered to pay the debt to V on production of a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, but not otherwise. *Held*, that, as R had

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executed a bond promising to pay the debt to V, he could not rely on the protection afforded by Act XXVII of 1860. **KOTTAM ZAMINDAR v. PITTAPUR ZAMINDAR** . . . **I. L. R. 9 Mad. 171**

5. . . . *Omission to pay debt—Withholding debt from vexatious motive—Holder of certificate of administration.* A sued as only son and heir of B. C, the widow of B, had, with the concurrence of A, taken out a certificate of administration to his estate. *Held*, that s. 2 of Act XXVII of 1860 prohibited A from suing alone, for although he was, no doubt, beneficially entitled to recover the debt, yet there was no vexatious or fraudulent withholding of the debt within the meaning of that section. *Per GARTH, C.J.* A debt cannot be said to be "vexatiously withheld" within the meaning of that section, simply because the debtor omits to pay it. **CHUNDER COOMAR ROY v. GOCOOOL CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE** **I. L. R. 6 Cal. 370**

6. . . . *Necessity for grant of certificate.* Before the grant of a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, some necessity for it must be shown, as that there are debts to be collected. **RAJ CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE v. MEERTUNJOY SHEEROMONYE** . . . **2 Hay 299**

7. . . . *Necessity for certificate—Procedure on application under Act XXVII of 1860.* When an application is made for a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, the Judge, instead of considering the necessity or otherwise for a certificate, should ascertain whether the applicant or any one else is entitled to the certificate sought, and grant the same accordingly. *In re MEAN JAN* **5 W. R. Mis. 20**

JAMESDJI KAVASJI v. MOTIBAI
2 Bom. 397 ; 2nd Ed. 375

8. . . . *Existence of recoverable debts—Act XXVII of 1860.* Where an application is made for a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, the Judge, instead of enquiring whether any debts are due, and whether or not those debts are barred by limitation, ought simply to determine the right to the certificate; and if there be such a right, to grant the certificate. *In the matter of the petition of KALEENATH DUTT* . . . **8 W. R. 12**

9. . . . *Existence of debts.* Before granting a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, a Judge is not required to ascertain whether there are any debts due to the estate of the deceased. **SHURUT CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. THAKOORMONEE DEBIA** . . . **9 W. R. 240**

10. . . . *Existence of debts—Act XXVII of 1860, s. 2—Debtor.* Certificates under Act XXVII of 1860 should be granted in those cases only in which it is shown that the deceased person at the time of his death had certain

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debts owing to him, or, in other words, that there were persons who could be called debtors of the deceased. A person in whose hands are the surplus sale-proceeds of a property belonging to the deceased is a debtor within the meaning of s. 2. **BISHNOO DAS v. MUNGUL DASS** . . . **24 W. R. 203**

11. . . . *Existence of debts.* A petitioner for a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 need do nothing more than prove his title to collect the debts if there are any, not even give *prima facie* evidence of the existence of debts. The title is the thing to be looked to, and that would be established (no other reason being shown to the contrary) by relationship to the deceased. **BEEMUL DOSS v. SHIKHUR CHAND** . . . **24 W. R. 211**

12. . . . *Existence of debts.* A certificate of administration ought not to be given without it being proved that there are debts, and that the grantee has the best right to collect them. **UCHHUBA DOSSIA v. NITTANUND SHAHA** . . . **24 W. R. 463**

WOOMA TARA GOOPTA v. KALEE TARA GOOPTA
25 W. R. 93

13. . . . *Existence of debts—Act XXVII of 1860—Questions to be determined on application.* The sole question in an application for a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 is the title to collect the debts due to the estate of the deceased, and it is not a matter for the Judge's consideration whether there are any, and what, debts due to the estate. **BHUGOBUTTY KOORER v. BHOLANATH THAKOOR** . . . **8 W. R. 317**

14. . . . *Existence of debts.* To entitle an applicant to a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, it is not necessary for him to show that debts are actually due; it is sufficient if circumstances render it possible that debts may be due, or may accrue within the jurisdiction of the Court. *In the matter of BAKAKALLEE DOSSEE* **10 W. R. 4**

15. . . . *Existence of debts.* Where application is made for a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, on the allegation that there are debts due to the estate of the deceased, and the allegation is not denied, the Court is bound to hear the petition. **FUZL MOULA v. GHOLAM SHURRUFF** . . . **12 W. R. 505**

16. . . . *Act VII of 1889—Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 14—Refund of deposit.* If an application for a succession certificate is granted, the sum deposited by the applicant cannot be refunded; but if no order for the grant of the certificate has been made, a refund can take place. **SANKARA AYYAR v. NAINAR MOOPANAR** . . . **I. L. R. 21 Mad. 241**

17. . . . *Act VII of 1889, s. 4, sub-s. (1), cl. (a)—Suit upon an usufructuary Mortgage*

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by the heirs of the deceased mortgagee, whether maintainable without a succession certificate in a case where the mortgagee becomes entitled to a personal decree against the mortgagor on the happening of certain events. In a suit by the heirs of a deceased mortgagee upon an usufructuary mortgage, by the terms of which the mortgagee was precluded from suing for the money, the Court of first instance gave a personal decree against the mortgagor by reason of the mortgage security having been impaired on the happening of subsequent events. The lower Appellate Court reversed the decision of the first Court on the ground that, having reference to s. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), the suit was not maintainable without a certificate. *Held*, that in such a case it could not be said that the money for which the suit was brought was a debt due to the estate of the deceased mortgagee within the meaning of s. 4, sub-s. (1), cl. (a) of the Succession Certificate Act, and that the suit was maintainable. *UMESH CHANDRA PRAMANICK v. MOTHURA MOHAN HALDAR* (1901)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 246;
s.c. 5 C. W. N. 607

18. — Act VII of 1889—*Right to sue without a certificate—Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 4—"Debt"—Suit by son of deceased mortgagee for amount due on usufructuary mortgage—Failure to produce certificate of heirship—Right to recover.* A Hindu, being the usufructuary mortgagee of certain lands, died, leaving an adopted son and two widows. The widows assigned the mortgage without consideration. The mortgagor sold the equity of redemption to a purchaser who paid off the mortgage to the assignee of the widows. The adopted son then sued the mortgagor, the widows, their assignee and the purchaser of the equity of redemption, to recover the amount due under the mortgage, or for possession of the lands until the mortgage amount should be paid; but he did not produce a certificate of heirship. *Held*, that he was entitled to recover as against the mortgaged property. The money sued for was not due under a contract, but was in reality the value of the plaintiffs' mortgage interest. In strictness, plaintiff was entitled to a decree for the land itself, and it was only by his consent that money was awarded in lieu of the land. The amount could not, therefore, rightly be treated as a debt, within the meaning of the Succession Certificate Act, and the failure of the plaintiff to produce a certificate was no bar to a decree being passed in his favour. *ARUMUGAM PILLAI v. VALURA KOUNDAN* (1900)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 22

3. RIGHT TO SUE OR EXECUTE DECREE WITHOUT CERTIFICATE.

1. — Representative of deceased creditor, suit by—*Act XXVII of 1860—Court*

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Fees Act, 1870, Sch. 1, cl. 12. A certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 is not necessary to give to a person, claiming to be the representative of a deceased creditor, the right to institute a suit to recover a debt due to the estate of the deceased, or the right to present an application for execution of a decree obtained by the deceased. But such certificate, or a probate, or letters of administration, must be produced by the person proceeding as representative before a decree or order can be passed, or process of execution issued for payment of the debt due, unless the Court should think that payment is withheld from fraudulent or vexatious motives, and not from any reasonable doubt as to the party entitled. The effect of the provision in the note to Art. 12, Sch. 1 of the Court Fees Act (No. VII of 1870), on the operation of a certificate duly granted, which has become liable to cancellation under that provision, but has not been cancelled, considered. Until cancellation, the certificate remains in full force as proof of the representative right to sue or obtain execution, whatever be the amount of the debt. *GOVINDAPPAH v. KINDAPPAH SASTRULU. GOVINDAPPAH v. KYATADOO. MATTAPPA v. NAGANNAH* . . . 6 Mad. 131

2. — *Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 4—Suit by assignee of a debt due to a deceased creditor.* One S lent a sum of money to the defendant and died, leaving an adopted son, who assigned the debt to the plaintiff. Neither the plaintiff nor his assignor obtained a certificate under Act VII of 1889. The plaintiff now sued to recover the amount of the assigned debt. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, no certificate having been obtained under Act VII of 1889. *KARUPPASAMI v. PICHU*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 419

3. — *Legal representative, Suit by, to recover debt due to the deceased—Act XXVII of 1860.* The production of a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 is not a condition precedent to the institution of a suit by a person claiming to be the legal representative of a deceased creditor. It is only where there is a reasonable doubt as to the person entitled to the property claimed in the suit that such a certificate can be required. *In re the petition of RAMDAS BRIJ GOVANDAS* . . . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 107

4. — *Right to recover debts of deceased person—Act XXVII of 1860.* Where payment of a debt is not being withheld for fraudulent or vexatious motives, but from a reasonable doubt as to the party entitled to it, the person desirous of recovering the amount of the debt is bound to produce a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 before he can obtain a decree, or execute a decree already obtained by the deceased, though he may institute his suit, or apply for execution without such certificate, provided a certificate is

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filed before decree or before execution issues. *JANAKI BALLAV SEN v. HAFIZ MAHOMED ALI KHAN* . . . I. L. R. 13 Calc. 47

5. ———— *Suit by representative of deceased creditor—Act XXVII of 1860, s. 2—Special defence when not put in issue, effect of—Want of certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, plea of.* The want of a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 is not of itself necessarily a bar to a suit by the representative of a deceased creditor, and such a special defence, unless insisted upon and put in issue in the Court of first instance, should not be entertained in appeal. *Semble*: The word "debtor" in s. 2 of Act XXVII of 1860 does not include the purchaser of a mortgaged property who is in no sense a debtor, nor does that section contemplate a case of a decree other than a personal decree. *Janaki Ballav Sen v. Hafiz Mahomed Ali, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 47*, doubted. *ROGHU NATH SHAHA v. PORESH NATH PUNDARI* . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 54

6. ———— *Adoptive son of deceased creditor—Act XXVII of 1860.* Suit by the adoptive son of the obligee (deceased) of a hypothecation-bond to recover principal and interest due on the bond against the land comprised in the hypothecation. Defendant No. 1, the obligor of the bond, had executed it as manager of a joint Hindu family, of which defendant No. 2 was a member, and for the rightful purposes of the family. The family subsequently became divided, and the hypothecated property was divided between defendants Nos. 1 and 2. Defendant No. 1 afterwards hypothecated part of his share of a private debt to defendant No. 3, who having sued on his hypothecation and brought the land to sale in execution, became the purchaser. *Held*, that the plaintiff was under no obligation to obtain a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 for the purpose of maintaining the suit. *GOPALA v. SAMINATHAYYAN* I. L. R. 12 Mad. 255

7. ———— *Assignee of mortgaged property—Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 4—"Debtor"—Certificate to collect debts—Mortgagee asking for sale of mortgaged property.* The assignee of a property mortgaged is not a debtor within the meaning of s. 4, Act VII of 1889; and a mortgagee praying for the sale of the property, and asking for no relief personally against the mortgagor, is not bound to take out a certificate under that Act before he can obtain a decree. *Roghu Nath Shaha v. Poresh Nath Pundari, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 54*, applied in principle. *Janaki Ballav Sen v. Hafiz Mahomed Ali Khan, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 47*, distinguished. *KANCHAN MODI v. BAIJ NATH SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 336

8. ———— *Application for execution by legal representative without certificate—Execution of decree.* S. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act, 1889, merely provides that the Court

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shall not proceed upon an application of a person claiming to be entitled to execute a decree, except on the production of a certificate or other authority of a like nature. But it does not follow from that section that an application might not be made without the production of a certificate, the certificate being supplied during the pendency of the proceedings. *Janaki Ballav Sen v. Hafiz Mahomed Ali Khan, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 47*, followed. *Brojo Nath Surma v. Isswar Chundra Dutt* I. L. R. 19 Calc. 482.

9. ———— *Act XXVII of 1860, s. 2—General Clauses Consolidation Act (I of 1868), s. 6—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 88—Procedure—Suit for sale on a mortgage—Suit by representative of deceased mortgagee—Production of certificate of succession a condition precedent to decree.* S. 4 of Act VII of 1889 made no change in the substantive law, but enacted merely a rule of procedure. Inasmuch, therefore, as "no one has a vested right in any particular form of procedure," the abovementioned section is applicable to suits instituted before the coming into force of Act VII of 1889. *Ganga Shahai v. Kishen Sahai, I. L. R. 6 All. 262*, followed. *Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 69*, *Warner v. Murdoch, L. R. 4 Ch. D. 752*, and *Wright v. Hale, 6 H. & N. 227*, referred to. S. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889) applies to suits for sale under s. 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. *Ammanna v. Gurumurthi, I. L. R. 16 Mad. 64*, distinguished. *Kanchan Modi v. Baij Nath Singh, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 336*, dissented from. *FATEH CHAND v. MUHAMMAD BAKHSH* . . . I. L. R. 16 All. 259

10. ———— *Execution of decree—Application for execution made before production of certificate.* In cases where a certificate of succession is required before execution of a decree can be taken out, all that is necessary is that the certificate should be produced before an order for execution can be made. It is not necessary that the certificate should be produced along with the application for execution. *Brojo Nath Surma v. Isswar Chundra Dutt, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 482*, and *Mangal Khan v. Salim-ullah, All. Weekly Notes, (1893), 197*, referred to. *KALIAN SINGH v. RAM CHARAN* . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 34

11. ———— *Application for execution not accompanied by certificate.* Though under certain circumstances a Court may be prohibited by Act VII of 1889 from granting execution of a decree unless a certificate of succession as provided by the Act is produced before it, it does not, therefore, follow that under such circumstances an application for execution is a bad application because it is unaccompanied by a certificate. *Brojo Nath Surma v. Isswar Chundra*

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Dutt, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 482, followed. MANGAL KHAN v. SALIM-ULLAH KHAN

I. L. R. 16 All. 26

12. ——— *Right to maintain suit without certificate—Death, during execution proceeding, of the original mortgagee and substitution of his heir.* S. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889) is not a bar to an execution proceeding instituted on a mortgage decree upon the application of the original mortgagee, by reason of the original mortgagee having died during the pendency of the proceeding and his legal representatives, who were substituted in his place, not having produced any succession certificate. *Fateh Chand v. Muhammad Bakhs, I. L. R. 16 All. 259, dissented from. MAHOMED YUSUF v. ABDUR RAHIM BEPARI*

**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 839
4 C.W. N. 558**

13. ——— *Recovery of property of deceased from party wrongfully in possession, Suit for—Act XXVII of 1860.* A certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 authorizes the holder of it to collect debts due to the deceased, but not to recover property which belonged to the deceased from a person wrongfully in possession. *AWKINFEE v. MEE NAY*

8 W. R. 1

SEETARAM SAHOO v. SHEO GHOLAM SAHOO

18 W. R. Cr. 34

14. ——— *Hindu widow, suit by—Suit for recovery of immoveable property—Hindu widow.* A Hindu widow, as holder of a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, is not necessarily the proper person to continue a suit for the recovery of immoveable property, though she is entitled to do so as heir of the deceased, if he died without issue, and was the sole owner of the property. *SEVINTHIA PILLAY v. MOOTOOSAWMY*

8 W. R. 2

15. ——— *Act XXVII of 1860, s. 2—Power of Hindu widow to sue executors and trustees for share of estate without certificate.* S. 2 of Act XXVII of 1860 applies to debts, and not to claims against executors and trustees. At all events, it does not apply to claims for immoveable property, and therefore where a Hindu widow brought a suit for a share of the residuary immoveable property of a testator:—*Held*, that she was not disabled from suing by reason of her not having obtained a certificate of administration. *TREEPOO-RASOONDARY DOSSEE v. DEBENDRANATH TAGORE*

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 45

16. ——— *Devisee under a will, suit by—Suit for rent—Possession.* A devisee under a will need not take out a certificate, and can sue for rent without having obtained possession. *BANEE MADHUB GHOSE v. THAKOOR DAS MUNDUL*

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17. ——— *Necessity to produce certificate—Order directing certificate to issue.* A plaintiff suing as the heir of a deceased person is (where a certificate of heirship is necessary to enable him to sue) bound to produce the certificate itself. It is not sufficient for the heir to show that the order has been made directing the issue of such certificate to him. *MULCHAND v. MOTICHAND HARGOVANDAS*

9 Bom. 37

18. ——— *Representatives of deceased decree-holder, right of, to execute decree.* Parties who are representatives of deceased holders on the record are *prima facie* entitled to take proceedings in execution and draw the money standing to the credit of the deceased under their decree, without the necessity of taking out a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, when there are no debts to be collected as due to the estate of the deceased decree-holder. *MANICK MOYEE CHOWDRAIN v. POORNO CHUNDER ROY*

17 W. R. 510

19. ——— *Application for execution of decree by heir of deceased decree-holder—Act XXVII of 1860—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 208.* To enable the heir of a deceased person to apply under s. 208 of Act VIII of 1859 for the execution of a decree held by such person, a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 is not indispensable. *KARAM ALI v. HALIMA*

I. L. R. 1 All. 686

20. ——— *Representative of assignee of debt by devise, right of, to sue—Act XXVII of 1860—Probate.* The representative of an assignee by devise, of a debt, cannot sue to recover the debt without having either taken out probate of the will of the testator, or having obtained a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 to realize the debts belonging to his estate. *SHODONE MOHALDAR v. HALALKHORE MOHALDAR*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 645 : 3 C. L. R. 462

21. ——— *Debt due to estate of deceased person—Suit by legal representative—Certificate for collection of debts.* It is not an imperative condition precedent to the institution of a suit by the legal representative of a deceased person for a debt due to his estate that such legal representative should first obtain a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860. *LACHMIN v. GANGA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 4 All. 485

22. ——— *Debt due to estate of deceased person, execution of decree by representative for—Necessity for certificate.* *Held*, following the principle enunciated in *Lachmin v. Ganga Prasad, I. L. R. 4 All. 485*, that the possession of a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 was not "an imperative condition precedent to the institution" of execution-proceedings by the representative of a deceased decree-holder; but that, where the judgment-debtor objects to the title

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of the person claiming to execute the decree, the Court should consider whether the objection is vexatiously raised or is a *bond fide* one. *HOTI LAL v. HARDEO* . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 212

23. ———— **Right of heir to sue—Act XXVII of 1860.** A certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 is not indispensable in order to allow a party who is next heir to come in to represent a deceased party in a suit. *OLONGO MOONJOREE DOSSEE v. GOBINDNATH SEN* . . . W. R. 1864 Mis. 13

EKRAM HOSSEIN v. KIRTEE CHUNDER
3 W. R. Mis. 9

24. ———— **Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 4—Suit by undivided son of deceased creditor—Suit on bond.** A Hindu is not entitled to sue on a bond executed in favour of his undivided father, deceased, without the production of a certificate under Act VII of 1889 unless it appears on the face of the bond that the debt claimed was due to the joint family, consisting of the father and the son. *VENKATARAMANA v. VENKAYYA* . . . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 377

25. ———— **Application for execution.** Act VII of 1889, s. 4, cl. (b), does not apply to applications to execute decrees which were pending at the date of the passing of the Act, but it refers to applications made after the Act came into force. *RAMA RAU v. CHELLAYANMA*

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 458

26. ———— **Proceedings in execution taken before, and pending at, the time at which the Act came into force.** Cl. (b) of sub-s. 1 of s. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889) does not apply to applications or proceedings in execution of a decree made before and pending at the time at which the Act came into force. The application therein mentioned must mean one made after the Act is in force, and the proceeding of the Court in execution must be an initial one under that application, and not one in continuation of proceedings taken on applications made before the Act came into force. *BALUBHAI DAYABHAI v. NASAR BIN ABDUL HABIB FAZLY*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 79

27. ———— **Consent decree.** The plaintiffs brought a suit to recover a certain sum of money due on a mortgage bond executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of their (the plaintiffs') deceased father by the sale of the mortgaged property, as well as from the defendants personally. Some time after the institution of the suit, the parties compromised the claim. The plaintiffs applied to the Court to pass a decree in terms of the compromise. The Subordinate Judge referred the question whether a certificate under Act VII of 1889 was necessary before he could pass a decree as applied for. *Held*, that a certificate was necessary. S. 4 of Act VII of 1889 distinctly and

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peremptorily forbids any Court from passing a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt, except on production, by the person claiming, of probate or letters of administration. A decree would be "against the debtor" when passed, although he consented to it. *SANTAJI KHANDERAO v. RAVJI* . . . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 105

28. ———— **Application of Act—Decree passed prior to Act—Execution of decree after the passing of Act—Pending proceeding.** S. 4 sub-s. (1), cl. (b), of Act VII of 1889 is not confined to the execution of decrees passed subsequently to the coming into operation of the Act. *Held*, that the heir of a judgment-creditor applying for execution of the decree after Act VII of 1889 came into operation was bound to obtain a certificate of heirship under that Act. The fact that he had already on two occasions presented a *dar-khast* which had been disposed of before the Act came into force did not affect the question. *Balubhai Dayabai v. Nasar bin Abdul Habib Fazly*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 79, referred to. *CHIMNIRAM UMAJI v. HANMANTA* . . . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 265

29. ———— **Debtor of a deceased person—Sale of *deshmukhi hak*—Vesting of the *hak* in the vendee—Death of the vendee—Recovery of the *hak* by the vendors—Suit for damages—Money had and received.** S. 4 of Act VII of 1889 (Succession Certificate Act) prevents a Civil Court from passing a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt, except on production of one or other of the documents there mentioned. *T* and others, who were entitled to recover from the Government treasury a certain sum on account of *deshmukhi hak*, sold it to *B* in 1873 in consideration of a debt due to him. *B* died in the year 1884. In the year 1886 *T* and his co-vendors themselves recovered from the Government the said sum, which, under the sale-deed, was recoverable by *B*. In a suit brought by the heirs of *B* to recover the amount from *T* and the other executors of the sale-deed:—*Held*, that a certificate under Act VII of 1889 was not required to enable the plaintiffs to sue. By the sale in 1873 the property in the amount of the *hak* sold had become vested in the deceased before his death, but the defendants never became his debtors at any time, as the amount so assigned was not received by them from the revenue authorities till after his death in 1884. For wrongfully receiving it in 1886, the defendants could either be sued in damages by the persons entitled to receive the *hak* or treated as debtors and sued for money had and received to their use. *NARAYAN BHAI BARTAKE v. TATIA GANPATRAO DESHMUKH* . . . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 580

30. ———— **Death of one of two undivided brothers—Suit by surviving brother and manager for debt due to family—Filing award in suit referred to arbitration.** *R* and *N* were

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undivided brothers; *N* was the elder, but *R* was the manager of the family property. *N* died, leaving a widow and three sons, and after his death *R* sued the defendant to recover certain debts due to the family. The parties referred the dispute to three arbitrators appointed by them without the intervention of the Court, and applied to the Court to have the arbitrators' award filed. A question having arisen whether the award could be filed without a succession certificate under Act VII of 1889:—*Held*, that there was nothing in Act VII of 1889 to prevent the award being filed without a certificate. **RAMCHANDRA HARI v. BAPU**

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 240

31. — *Undivided brothers—Decree obtained by one of two undivided brothers—Right of surviving brother to execute decree—Certificate of heirship.* A decree was obtained by one of two undivided brothers. He died, and the surviving brother applied for execution of the decree. *Held*, that, if the debt was in its nature a family debt, the right to execute the decree would have devolved on him by survivorship, and not as the heir of his deceased brother, and in that case no certificate of heirship under s. 4 of Act VII of 1889 would be necessary; but if, on the contrary, the debt was part of the separate property of the deceased, the applicant could only execute the decree as heir, and must, in that case, obtained a certificate to enable him to proceed. **RAGHAVENDRA MADHAV v. BHIMA**

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 349

32. — *Death of plaintiff—Suit continued by legal representative before representation taken out—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 50.* Where the original plaintiff dies, the suit, since the passing of Act VII of 1889, if not under s. 50 of the Civil Procedure Code, may be continued by his legal representative, although the latter has not taken out administration to the original plaintiff's estate. All that the defendant can insist on in such a case is that representation shall be complete before decree. **TORREGROSA VASQUEZ v. PRAGJI HURJI**

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 519

33. — *Where a party applied for leave to sue in formā pauperis to recover assets forming part of the estate of a deceased person, and his application was dismissed on the ground that he produced no certificate under Act VII of 1889:—Held*, that the application was wrongly dismissed, no certificate being necessary for such a suit. **KAMMATHI v. MANGAPPA**

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 454

34. — *Act coming into force while suit was pending, effect of, on suit—Suit for foreclosure or sale—Mortgage by conditional sale.* On 28th March 1871, the defendant's father borrowed a sum of money from the plaintiff's

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father, and placed him in possession of certain land under an instrument of mortgage, which provided for the application of the usufruct in liquidation of the interest and then in reduction of the principal; the instrument also contained a covenant for the repayment in four years of the balance that might then be due by the mortgagor and a stipulation that, on default, the mortgagor was to surrender the property to the mortgagee as if it had been sold to him. In 1874, the mortgagor resumed possession without discharging the mortgage-debt. The mortgagee having died, his sons, on 14th April 1888, filed the present suit on the mortgage, and prayed for a decree for foreclosure or sale. During the pendency of the suit the Succession Certificate Act of 1889 came into operation, but the plaintiffs obtained no certificate under it. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were not precluded from obtaining a decree by reason of their not having obtained a certificate under the abovementioned Act. **AMMANNA v. GURUMURTHI**

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 64

35. — *Mohunt, decree obtained by, on behalf of muth—Endowment, representation of.* A decree in favour of a deceased mohunt for costs incurred in proceedings carried on by him on behalf of the muth may be executed by the successor and representative of the mohunt without probate, certificate, or letters of administration being obtained. **JOGENDRONATH BHARATI v. RAM CHUNDER BHARATI**

I. L. R. 20 Cal. 103

36. — *Foreign Court, proceedings of—Probate issued from Native Court in Cutch—Certificate of Political Agent—Suit in British India.* A suit in British India by the executors of the will of a native of Cutch was dismissed, on its appearing that the plaintiffs were furnished only with probate issued from a Native Court, of which they produced a copy certified by the Political Agent of Cutch, and since stamped in accordance with the Court Fees Act, 1870. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree without taking out probate or letters of administration in British India under Act V of 1881 or a certificate under Act VII of 1889, but instead of dismissing the suit, the Court should have allowed time for the plaintiffs to have so completed their title to sue. **MANASING v. AMAD KUNHI**

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 14

37. — *Suit by surviving partner and heir of deceased partner—Suit on promissory note by surviving partner of firm—Parties—Right of suit—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 48.* In a suit on a promissory note made by the defendant in favour of two Hindus carrying on business in partnership, it appeared that one of the partners was dead, and no succession certificate or letters of administration had been obtained. The plaintiffs were the surviving partners and the undivided sons

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of the deceased partner. *Held*, that a surviving partner can sue alone for the recovery of a partnership debt. *Held*, further, that such a suit may be maintained by a surviving partner jointly with the heir of the deceased partner, in which case a certificate of heirship will be necessary, unless it appears on the face of the documents sued on that the debt is a coparcenary debt. *VIDYANATHA AYYAR v. CHINNASAMI NAIR* . . . **I. L. R. 17 Mad. 108**

38. ———— *Landlord and tenant—Suit by surviving partners of firm for rent—Right of suit.* A certain firm mortgaged with possession its immovable property to two other firms trading jointly, who let out the property to the mortgagor firm. Afterwards some of the partners of the mortgagee firms having died, the surviving partners and the sons of the deceased brought a suit against the mortgagor firm to recover rent which accrued due after the deaths of the deceased partners. The Judge held that the plaintiffs could not proceed with the suit without a certificate under the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889). *Held*, reversing the order, that as the rent sued upon became due after the deaths of the deceased partners, it formed no part of their estates at the time of their respective deaths, and no certificate was, therefore, necessary under the Succession Certificate Act. *RANCHORDAS NATHUBHAI v. BHAGUBHAI PARAMANANDAS* . . . **I. L. R. 18 Bom. 394**

39. ———— *Suit on mortgage-bond by heir—Suit continued by party substituted for plaintiff who has taken out certificate.* A mortgage-bond was executed by the defendant in favour of H, who died, leaving two sons, J and S, the elder of whom, J, took out a certificate to collect the debts of his father, and instituted a suit on the bond in which he asked both for sale of the mortgaged property and for a personal decree against the defendant. Whilst the suit was pending, J died, and S was allowed to be substituted in his place as plaintiff. A decree was made for sale of the property, but the personal relief was not granted, as it was held to be barred by lapse of time. *Held*, that this was not "a decree against a debtor for payment of his debt" within the meaning of s. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889). *Roghunath Saha v. Poresch Nath Pundari*, **I. L. R. 15 Calc. 54**, and *Kanchan Modi v. Baij Nath Singh*, **I. L. R. 19 Calc. 336**, approved. This suit was therefore maintainable, notwithstanding that no certificate had been taken out by S. *Semle*: It is doubtful whether that Act would apply at all to the case of a person who has been substituted as plaintiff for one who, having taken out a certificate, has died pending the suit. *BAID NATH DAS v. SHAMANAND DAS* . . . **I. L. R. 22 Calc. 143**

40. ———— *Debt—Unliquidated claim.* X, a Hindu, left some sheep with Y,

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who failed to return them. X having died, his widow applied for a succession certificate to enable her to sue Y for damages for wrongful detention of the sheep. *Held*, that no debt was owing by Y to X within the meaning of the Succession Certificate Act, s. 4, sub-s. (2), and therefore no certificate was necessary to enable his widow to sue Y. *SUBBANNA v. MUNEKKA* . . . **I. L. R. 18 Mad. 457**

41. ———— *Debt—Price fixed for goods sold.* Where the claim was for the refund of the price alleged to have been paid for goods sold, but not delivered, it was held to be not an unliquidated claim for damages, but a claim for a liquidated sum of money which in some way or other the defendant could be compelled to pay; it was therefore a debt, and the suit could not be brought without a certificate under s. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act. *PENTA REDDI v. AUKI REDDI* . . . **I. L. R. 22 Mad. 144 note.**

42. ———— *Debt—Suit for account of share of deceased partner—Unliquidated claim.* A Mahomedan, being the son of a deceased member of a firm, brought a suit as his legal representative against the surviving partners praying for an account of the partnership assets and for payment to him of the amount which might be found due to the share of the deceased. The plaintiff had neither letters of administration nor a succession certificate. *Held*, that the plaintiff's claim, being unliquidated, was not a debt within the meaning of Succession Certificate Act, 1889, s. 4, sub-s. 1 (a). *Penta Reddi v. Auki Reddi*, **I. L. R. 22 Mad. 144 note**, distinguished. *SABJU SAHIB v. NOORDIN SAHIB* . . . **I. L. R. 22 Mad. 139**

43. ———— *"Debt," meaning of—Suit for rent—Certificate of succession.* Rent is not a "debt" within the meaning of s. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act, and therefore no certificate of succession is necessary before bringing a suit for rent. *NAGENDRA NATH BASU v. SATADAL BASINI BASU* . . . **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 536**
3 C. W. N. 294

44. ———— *Collection of debt on succession—Certificate of heirship—Act XXVII of 1860, s. 2—Right of succeeding trustee to collect.* In a suit brought by a widow who had succeeded her husband as trustee of an endowment for a debt due thereto:—*Held*, that she was not suing as being entitled to the effects of her deceased husband, or for payment of a debt due to the estate which had been his, but that she was suing as representing the endowment in the capacity of a trustee of its money. Accordingly, neither Act XXVII of 1860, s. 2, nor Act VII of 1889, s. 4, was applicable to her claim, and the fact of her not having obtained a certificate of heirship to her husband's estate did not disentitle

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her to a decree. *YARLAGADDA MALLIKARJUN v. MAKERLA SRIDEVAMMA*. I. L. R. 20 Mad. 162
I. L. R. 24 I. A. 73
1 C. W. N. 497

45. ———— *Joint family property—Suit for family debt by right of survivorship.* Under the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), a plaintiff does not require a certificate where his claim is for family property by right of survivorship. *JAGMOHANDAS KILABHAI v. ALLU MARIA DUSKAL*. I. L. R. 19 Bom. 338

46. ———— *Joint Hindu family—Suit by survivor for debt due to joint family—Survivorship.* Where a debt is advanced from the funds of a joint Hindu family and is due to that family, no certificate under Act VII of 1889 is necessary to enable the survivor of such family to recover the said debt. *Jogmohandas Kilabhai v. Allu Maria Duskal*, I. L. R. 19 Bom. 338, followed. *PATESHURI PARTAP NARAIN SINGH v. BHAGWATI PRASAD*. I. L. R. 17 All. 578

47. ———— *Survivorship—Letters of administration—Hindu law, joint family—Revival of suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 372.* On the death of the plaintiff, his sons, who were members of a joint Hindu family, governed by the Mitakshara law, of which their father, the deceased plaintiff, was a managing member, applied for the revival of the suit. *Held*, that it was not necessary that either letters of administration or a certificate under Act VII of 1889 should be obtained in order to entitle the applicants to ask that they may be permitted to proceed with the suit. *BEERAJ v. BHYROPERSAUD*. I. L. R. 23 Calc. 912

BISSEN CHAND DHUDHURIA v. CHATRAPAT SINGH. I. L. R. 1 C. W. N. 32

48. ———— *Suit by person claiming property of undivided family by right of survivorship.* Where a plaintiff claimed by right of survivorship to recover money due on a mortgage bond which had been executed by the defendants in favour of the former managing member of the plaintiff's undivided family:—*Held*, that the Succession Certificate Act did not apply, and that plaintiff need not produce a succession certificate under that Act. *PALLAMRAJU v. BAPANNA*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 380

49. ———— *Suit for debt due to Hindu family jointly.* In a suit by the members of a joint Hindu family for a debt due on a document executed in favour of a deceased member of the family, the plaintiffs need not produce a certificate under the Succession Certificate Act, if they can prove that the debt was due to the family jointly. *Quære*: Whether a plaintiff in a suit to recover money by the sale of property mortgaged need produce a certificate under the Succession

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Certificate Act. *SUBRAMANIAN CHETTI v. RAKKU SERVAI*. I. L. R. 20 Mad. 232

50. ———— *Curator—Act XIX of 1841.* A curator appointed under the Curator's Act (XIX of 1841) is not a person claiming to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person whose estate he is appointed to manage, and is not required to take out a certificate under s. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889) before he can obtain a decree. *BABASAB v. NARSAPPA*. I. L. R. 20 Bom. 437

51. ———— *"Debt," meaning of.* The Succession Certificate Act refers only to such debts as the deceased could sue upon. So for debts falling due after death an heir may sue without certificate. *NEMDHARI ROY v. BISSESSARI KUMARI*. 2 C. W. N. 591

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1. ———— *Issue of Certificate—Time for issuing.* A certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 should be issued directly it is granted, provided the proper stamp prescribed for such certificate be furnished. *DRUNPUT SINGH DOOGUR v. GOVERNMENT*. 17 W. R. 439

2. ———— *Jurisdiction—Person with no fixed residence—Act XXVII of 1860, s. 3.* Where a person had no fixed place of residence at the time of his death, the Judge of the district in which his debts are has authority to grant a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860. *GHOLAM SOBHAN alias SABOO MEAH v. MAHOMED ROUF*. 20 W. R. 286

3. ———— *Order in recognition of two wills—Act XXVII of 1860.* Under Act XXVII of 1860, an order cannot be obtained from the Court in recognition of two wills. *BEMOLA MOYEE DEBEA v. KISHTOMONEE DEBIA*. W. R. 1864 Mis. 10

4. ———— *Certificate for collection of debts of endowment—Act XXVII of 1860.* A District Judge was held to have rightly refused a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 for the collection of the debts of an endowment. *In the matter of the petition of BHYRUB BHARUTTEE*. 21 W. R. 340

5. ———— *Act XXVII of 1860—Karnavan of tarwad property—Debt due by karnavan.* A certificate to collect debts under Act XXVII of 1860 may properly be refused to a karnavan of a Malabar tarwad, when the bulk of the debt to be collected is found to be due by the karnavan himself under a decree obtained against him by his predecessor. *MADHAVA PANIKAR v. GOVINDA PANIKAR*. I. L. R. 5 Mad. 4

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6. *Right to certificate—Heir—Act XXVII of 1860.* As a general rule, the heir is the person who should have a certificate to collect the debts and manage the estate of a deceased person under Act XXVII of 1860. If he as heir is entitled to the whole surplus of the estate, the fact of his having been hostile to the deceased is immaterial. When there are several heirs and no disputes amongst them, he who is entitled to the largest share may, in the absence of other disqualifying circumstances and in the discretion of the Court, be entrusted with the duty. *ABDOOL ALI v. ABDUNNISSA KHATOON* . W. R. 1864 Mis. 41
7. *Heir.* The certificate to collect debts should ordinarily be granted to the person entitled to the inheritance. *JOKNA v. BHUGWANEE* 3 N. W. 320
8. *Heir.* Where the will set up by objectors to an application by the natural heir for a certificate of administration is not sufficiently proved, a Court is justified in looking on the natural heir as the party entitled to the certificate. *DINOBUNDHOO CHOWDRY v. RAJMOHINEE CHOWDRAIN* 15 W. R. 73
9. *Persons primâ facie entitled—Act XXVII of 1860—Order in respect of property of deceased.* When application is made for a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, a Judge should determine who is entitled, and should grant the certificate accordingly. He has no power to make an order in respect of the property of the deceased. *OHEED KHAN v. COLLECTOR OF SHAHABAD* 9 W. R. 502
10. *Person primâ facie entitled—Enquiry as to title—Questions to be decided.* In administering the provisions of Act XXVII of 1860, Courts are not bound to enter on the determination of intricate questions of law or fact, but are bound to grant a certificate to the person who has *primâ facie* the clearest title to the succession as the natural heir. *SURFOJI v. KAMAKSHIAMBA* I. L. R. 7 Mad. 452
11. *Selection where there are several claimants—Act XXVII of 1860.* If there are several applicants for a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, the heir of the person or persons having the largest interest in the estate are entitled to the certificate, in preference to others whose interests are less considerable. If the Court thinks any small interest not sufficiently protected, it may call upon the party taking the certificate to give security to the extent requisite for the protection of such interest. *AZEEM KHAN v. AMEERUN* 12 W. R. 38
12. *Heiress.* An heiress was held entitled to a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, although the owner of the property had died nine years previously, and the property

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had been previously managed by a third party. *PULASH MONEE DOSSEE v. ANUND MOYEE DOSSEE* 8 W. R. 398

13. *Daughter-in-law as heiress—Ground for opposing certificate.* An application by a daughter-in-law under Act XXVII of 1860 for a certificate as heiress would be properly rejected upon the sole ground that the applicant was not the heiress. *BANDAM SETTAH v. BANDAM MAHALAKSHMY* 4 Mad. 180
14. *Trustee of Government securities—Act XXVII of 1860.* A trustee who had been appointed by will to act in respect of Government securities belonging to an estate having demised, and the minor heir having come of age, the parties entitled applied for a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 to enable them to draw interest on the securities. Upon this, the Judge recorded an order that they might apply for a certificate in respect of the deceased trustee's estate. *Held*, that the applicants had nothing to do with the trustee's estate, and that it was the duty of the Judge to grant the application if no person showed a better right. *In the matter of the petition of PREONATH SIRCAR* 13 W. R. 325
15. *Executor—Act XXVII of 1860.* The executor under a will, if it be not contested, has an undoubted right to a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, though he be not the legal heir. If the will be contested, the Judge should enquire into its validity, and, if he consider it proved, should give a certificate, leaving the parties dissatisfied to set it aside by a regular suit. *BIDHOO BHOOSHUN MUKERJEE v. ISSUR CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY* . W. R. 1864 Mis. 4
16. *Claimant under will—Failure to prove will.* In an application for a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, where applicant's title was based upon a will to which the signatures of the witnesses were found to have been affixed previously to that of the testator, the Court held that the deed was inoperative as a will; but inasmuch as it expressed fully the testator's wishes regarding the management of his affairs, and was very distinct as to the confidence reposed in the applicant (the second wife), the Court decided that she was the proper person to have the certificate. *KHUTTUN KOER v. POONA KOER* 24 W. R. 322
17. *Executor and legal representative.* A person was trustee of "waqf" or trust property. He had also some other property (how much was not clear) of his own. He made a will relating only to the trust-property, and appointed an executor. *Held*, that the executor mentioned in the will was entitled to a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 with regard to the trust-property, and the legal personal representative of

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the deceased was entitled to a certificate under the same Act with respect to any other property of which he died possessed. *DAUD ALI v. NADIR HOSSEIN*. 3 B. L. R. A. C. 46: 11 W. R. 388

18. ————— *Member of joint Hindu family.* Certain members (*N* and *A*) of a joint Hindu family having commenced a suit to set aside an adoption by one of the family (*C*), a compromise was effected by which the several parties took separate shares of the family property. *C* having died, *N* and *A* applied for a certificate to collect the debts due to his estate, but were opposed in a joint petition made by the widow and adopted son. *Held*, that the applicants could not be entitled to the certificate which might, however, be given to the son with the consent of the widow. *MUNBASEE KOER v. NOWRUNGEE LALL*. 15 W. R. 135

19. ————— *Member of joint family—Separate members.* Where a certificate of administration was granted to certain applicants who asked it with reference to a particular debt putting in a bond of the judgment-debtor, and showing that they were joint in estate with the deceased, the certificate was held to have been rightly granted, and to have been properly refused to another member of the family who had separated from the deceased. *RAM GHOLAM SAHOO v. JANKEE PERSHAD SAHOO*. 25 W. R. 31

20. ————— *Member of joint Hindu family—Act XXVII of 1860, ss. 2 and 3.* A certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 cannot be refused merely because the deceased was a member of a joint Hindu family. Ordinarily the managing member would be the person best entitled to the certificate, but this would not be the case where the members had fallen out. *CHOWDHRY KRIPPA SINDHOO DASS v. RADHA CHURN DASS*. 23 W. R. 234

21. ————— *Minor, rights of in family governed by the Mitakshara law—Act XXVII of 1860—Act XL of 1858.* *K B*, a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara law, died, leaving two sons, *G P* and *K P*, a minor, and a widow, *G K*, the mother of *K P*. *Held*, on applications by *G P* and *G K* respectively to obtain certificates under Act XXVII of 1860, to collect the debts due to the estate of *K B*, that *G P* alone was entitled to obtain such a certificate; and on the application of *G K* for a certificate to take charge of the estate of her minor son *K P* under Act XL of 1858, that as there was no evidence that *K P* was entitled to any separate estate, she was not entitled to such a certificate. *Held*, also that, if occasion should arise, a suit might be filed in the name of the minor by his mother as his next friend, without her having first obtained a certificate under Act XL of 1858, and without her having previously obtained

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permission from any Court. *GOURAH KOERI v. GAJADHUR PERSHAD*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 219: 4 C. L. R. 398

22. ————— *Minor by next friend. Semble:* A certificate to collect debts under Act XXVII of 1860 may be granted to a minor by his next friend. *KALI KOOMAR CHATTERJEE v. TARA PROSONO MOOKERJEE*. 5 C. L. R. 517

23. ————— *Certificate to collect debts—Certificate granted—Minor—Next friend—Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889).* *Held*, that a certificate of succession may be granted under Act VII of 1889 to a minor through his next friend. *Kali Koomar Chatterjee v. Tara Prosono Mookerjee*, 5 C. L. R. 517, referred to. *RAM KUAR v. SARDAR SINGH*

I. L. R. 20 All. 352

24. ————— *Sister's son—Half brother. Held*, that the certificate in this case was given to the party best entitled to it with reference to the object of Act XXVII of 1860, i.e., the deceased's full sister's son, who was the party in possession, in preference to the deceased's half brother. *LALL MAHOMED v. BUZLOOL HOSSEIN*

17 W. R. 562

25. ————— *Father's brother's daughter's son—Father's father's brother's son—Spiritual benefit—Act XXVII of 1860.* The father's father's brother's son of a deceased person stands nearer to him in right of succession than his father's brother's daughter's son; the former is therefore preferentially entitled, on the death of the deceased person's widow, to a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, enabling him to collect the debts due to the estate. *GOPAL CHUNDER NATH COONDOD v. HARIDAS CHINI*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 343

26. ————— *Father's brother's grandson—Spiritual benefit—Proximity of residence and of kinship—Act XXVII of 1860.* Proximity of residency and of kinship are not such considerations as should warrant a Judge in granting a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 to any person in preference to another who has *prima facie* the better title to the beneficial ownership of the debts. Adopting the principle laid down in the case of *Gobind Pershad Talookdar v. Mohesh Chunder Surmah Ghuttack*, 15 B. L. R. 35, a father's brother's grandson has a right to obtain a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 in preference to a brother's daughter's son. *In the matter of the petition of CODOYCHURN MITTER*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 411

27. ————— *Nephew—Spiritual benefit.* A nephew is entitled to a certificate of administration in preference to a deceased son's daughter's son. *AREE MURDUN BHUGGUT v. JANNATH BHUGGUT*. 15 W. R. 328

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—*contd.*

4. ISSUE OF, AND RIGHT TO, CERTIFICATE
—*contd.*

28. *Nephew—Act XXVII of 1860—Act XL of 1858.* Where a will appointed the nephews of the testator to manage 4 annas of the property (the subject of the will) in their own right and 12 annas as guardians of a minor son :—*Held*, that the nephews were entitled to one certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 to collect the debts of the whole estate, and to another certificate under Act XL of 1858 to take charge of the minor's 12 annas. *MAKHUN CHUNDER SHAHA v. CHAND MONEE DASSEE* . 8 W. R. 105

29. *Nephew—Certificate of uncle's property.* Whether a nephew takes his uncle's share by mere survivorship or by inheritance, if he takes on the ground of their having been joint in estate, he "succeeds to," and "becomes entitled to the effects of," the deceased within the meaning of Act XXVII of 1860. *JUSODA KOONWAR v. GUREEB BYJNATH SAHAJ SINGH* 6 W. R. 139

30. *Disciple—Certificate to estate of Hindu devotee—Mental incapacity to succeed.* The person entitled to a certificate enabling him to collect the debts due to the estate of a deceased ascetic or devotee must be the disciple, or spiritual brother, or preceptor of the deceased, and such person should not be deprived of his right, even though mentally incapable of succeeding to the office of the deceased. *GUREEB DOSS v. MUNGUL DOSS* . 14 W. R. 333

31. *Spiritual son—Personal estate of a deceased mohunt—Spiritual brother.* The person entitled to collect the outstanding debts due to the private estate of a deceased mohunt is the spiritual son (the chela) and not the spiritual brother (guru bhai) of the deceased. *DUKHARAM BHARTI v. LUCHMUN BHARTI* I. L. R. 4 Calc. 954 : 4 C. L. R. 49

32. *Illegitimate sons.* There being evidence in this case of the deceased having assigned his property to his illegitimate sons and acknowledged them as his sons, a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 to administer to his estate was granted to them in preference to the childless widows of his brother and nephew. *PRODHAN RAM v. JERIA KOOR* . 17 W. R. 189

33. *Adopted son—Act XXVII of 1860—Title under adoption.* An adoption *de facto* must be supposed valid until it is set aside, and a party so adopted is entitled to object to other parties receiving a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 in respect of the property he takes under the adoption. In granting such a certificate, a Judge must look to fitness as well as to propinquity. *NUNKOO SINGH v. PURM DHUN SINGH* 12 W. R. 356

34. *Adopted son—Right to certificate of a son adopted after the death*

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—*contd.*

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—*contd.*

of his adoptive father. A son adopted in pursuance of an unoomoti patto (power to adopt), some time after the death of his adoptive father, does not require, and is not entitled to obtain, a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, to enable him to collect debts in respect of the properties left by his adoptive father, which accrued due while they were under the management of his adoptive mother. The estate of the adoptive father, if the adoption is a good one, vests immediately on the adoption in the adopted son ; and debts to it, if they accrued due after the death of the adoptive father, are debts recoverable by the adopted son in his own right and not as representative of his adoptive father. *NARAIN MAL v. KOOR NARAIN MYTEE* I. L. R. 5 Calc. 251

35. *Grandmother—Act XXVII of 1860—Act XL of 1858.* Where the grandmother of minors applied for certificates under Acts XL of 1858 and XXVII of 1860, the father consenting and approving, it was held that there was nothing in the law to prevent the certificates being granted if the applicant was competent and willing to take them. *COMRAO DOOLHAEN v. AGA MEER* . 12 W. R. 119

36. *Mother-in-law—Act XXVII of 1860.* The circumstance of a deceased party having on the day of his death informed his debtor that he had given the whole of the moneys due to him to his mother-in-law was held to be a sufficient indication (whether the gift was valid or not) that she was the proper person to receive the money due to the deceased and the certificate under Act XXVII of 1860. In cases under Act XXVII of 1860, Judges should always certify whether the certificate has been actually granted. *ZEEMUTOONISSA KHANUM v. KHUTOO BEGUM* . 12 W. R. 239

37. *Mother—Husband.* A mother is not entitled to a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 to collect debts due to her deceased daughter, in preference to the husband of the deceased. Such certificate, however, will not authorize the husband's interference with the mother's possession of the landed property which she claims as her own. *MOHUN SOONDUR KOONWAR v. RAMANOOGRO NARAIN* . 3 W. R. Mis. 3

38. *Mother of adopted son.* The mother of a deceased adopted minor son is his legal representative, and entitled to a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 as his legal heir. *DEENO MOYEE DOSSEE v. DOORGA PERSHAD MITTER* . 3 W. R. Mis. 6

DEENO MOYEE DOSSEE v. TARACHURN COONDOR CHOWDHRY 3 W. R. Mis. 7 note : Bourke A. O. C. 43

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 —contd.

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39. ————— *Widow—Disputed adoption.* When the title of a person claiming as adopted son of the deceased is disputed, the certificate may properly be granted to the widow of the deceased. *DING PAUL SINGH v. GAINDA KOONWAR* 1 Agra Mis. 13

40. ————— *Widow—Act XXVII of 1860 s. 3—Act XL of 1858, s. 3.* A, as widow of B and guardian under a will of his minor son, obtained a certificate under s. 3 of Act XL of 1858. C, another widow of B, subsequently applied for a certificate under s. 3 of Act XXVII of 1860. The Judge summarily rejected C's application on the ground that the grant of a certificate to her would lead to confusion. *Held*, on appeal, that the Judge ought to have issued notices and proceeded under s. 3 of Act XXVII of 1860. *In the matter of RAISUNNISSA BEGUM*
 2 B. L. R. A. C. 129 : 10 W. R. 62

41. ————— *Widow—Certificate as guardian after grant of certificate of administration.* Two certificates of administration cannot run together. So a widow who fails to appear and contest the grant of a certificate to another party, made prior to her own application, cannot claim one for herself afterwards, but she may be allowed a certificate to act as guardian of her minor (adopted) son. *SHAM MANNA v. RAMDYAL GOOHOO*
 1 W. R. Mis. 3

42. ————— *Widow—Widow as guardian of son.* A certificate may be granted to a widow, as guardian of her minor son, to collect the debts due to her deceased husband, notwithstanding that the adoption of the husband may have been set aside. *NITTO KALLEE DEBEE v. OEHOO GOBIND CHOWDHRY* 5 W. R. Mis. 10

43. ————— *Widow—Cousin and partner.* A widow is entitled (in preference to a cousin who also claimed as surviving partner) to a certificate to collect the debts, joint as well as separate, of her late husband. *SHIB GOLAM SAHOO v. GUNGA KOONWAREE* . 1 W. R. Mis. 32

44. ————— *Widow—Claims of objectors on application for certificate.* The allegation of objectors who claim the property of a deceased person under a tukseemnamah transferring the property from the widow to them should be enquired into; and if it is proved to be genuine, the objectors are entitled to a certificate, instead of the widow, as legal heir of the deceased. *DEB PERSHAD v. MONGA KOONWAR* . . 4 W. R. Mis. 19

45. ————— *Widow—Certificate of husband's property.* The petitioner, a Hindu widow, applied for a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 of her deceased husband's estate, and stated in her petition that her husband possessed, at the time of his death, self-acquired property, besides the property he had inherited from his

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brother. The opposing parties set up a will of the deceased's father, under which a certain share of the testator's estate was given to the petitioner's husband, and in the event of his death without children to his mother, and after her death to his brother. *Held*, that it was not necessary for the purpose of the application to decide on the validity or otherwise of the will, as the widow was entitled to a certificate in respect of her husband's property; and further that the will, which purported, in certain events, to give to the testator's widow that share of the property which he bequeathed to his son (the petitioner's husband), could not affect her claim to the certificate in respect of her husband's self-acquired property. *KHOODOOMONEY DABEE v. GOLUCKMONEY DABEE* . 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 36

46. ————— *Widow—Failure of objector to prove title.* Where a Judge, holding that the special title put forward by an objector had not been proved, decided that the widow of the deceased was best entitled to a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, the decision was held to be correct, inasmuch as the Judge was not deciding upon the general right and title of the parties to the property, but under a special law for the collection of debts and for the protection of debtors. *PROTAP NARAIN DOSS v. POORNOMASHEE DAVE*
 14 W. R. 415

47. ————— *Widow—Application for certificate to enable widow to receive sale-proceeds of estate sold after death of husband.* Where the widow of a deceased applied for a certificate, without which she was refused some sale-proceeds of an estate of the deceased sold after his death for arrears of revenue, and the Judge rejected her application on the ground that the case did not come within the scope of the Act, as "the sum in deposit was not in any sense a debt due to the deceased at the time of his death":—*Held*, that, as the sale-proceeds were payable to the estate of the deceased, there was nothing in the law to prevent the Judge from entertaining the application. *In the matter of the petition of TRIPOORA SOONDUREE*
 22 W. R. 45

48. ————— *Right to guardianship of Hindu widow—Grant of certificate of administration under Act XL of 1858.* The relations of her deceased husband are entitled to be the guardians of a Hindu widow in preference to her paternal relations. A certificate of administration under Act XL of 1858, was, therefore, granted to one of the former in preference to the latter. *KHUDIRAM MOOKERJEE v. BONWARI LALL ROY*
 I. L. R. 16 Cal. 584

49. ————— *Representative of a deceased person—Person claiming to be entitled to the effects of the deceased—Purchaser at sale in execution of a decree against a deceased person—Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 4.*

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A certain debt due to P (deceased) was sold in execution of a decree against him, and was purchased by M. In order to enable him to recover the said debt, M applied to the District Judge for a certificate under the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889). The Judge rejected the application on the ground that the applicant was not a representative of the deceased. *Held*, reversing the decree, that the applicant, having purchased at the auction-sale the debt as part of the deceased's effects, which was sold as such by the Court, was entitled to a certificate under s. 4 (a) of the Succession Certificate Act. *MANCHARAM PRANJIVAN v. BAI MAHALI* . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 315

50. ———— *Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 1, cl. 4—Right to certificate under will—Validity of will—Hindu Wills Act, XXI of 1870.* Cl. 4 of s. 1 of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889) does not preclude an applicant from obtaining a certificate under the will of the deceased. A will having been held to be genuine in a contest between the parties, and there being no suggestion that the will was one to which the Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870) applied:—*Held*, that the Court could not refuse to grant the certificate. *DAVE LILADHAR KASHIRAM v. BAI PARVATI* . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 608

5. NATURE AND FORM OF CERTIFICATE.

1. ———— *Certificate for portion of property.* The Act does not authorize the grant of a certificate for a portion of the property or debts, whether such portion be separate and defined or not. *BEYCHAN SAHOO v. GANESH SAHOO* . . . 2 N. W. 439

2. ———— *Limited certificate.* A certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 cannot be limited to particular debts. *In the matter of the petition of PRAN KHAN* . . . 17 W. R. 238

3. ———— *Certificate to collect fractional share of debts.* Certificates to collect fractional parts of debts due to a deceased cannot be granted to different heirs according to their respective shares in the inheritance, but one certificate to collect debts should be granted to all or such of the heirs as would consent to act in concert. *AMIRUNISSA BARKAT v. AFFIATTUNISSA* . . . 3 B. L. R. A. C. 404: 12 W. R. 307

4. ———— *The appellant was the son by the first wife of the deceased: the respondent, the second wife of the deceased, applied for a certificate for herself and on behalf of her minor sons; the Judge gave her a certificate for a 12-anna share. Held*, on appeal, that the certificate should be granted jointly to the appellant and respondent. The granting of a certificate does not determine any question of title, or decide what property does or does not belong to the estate of the

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deceased. It merely enables the person to whom it is granted to collect the assets of the deceased, and is conclusive of her representative title against all debtors to the deceased. A certificate cannot be granted for the collection of fractions of the debts of the deceased. *WASELUN HAK v. GOWHURUNNISSA BIBI*

1 B. L. R. S. N. 7: 10 W. R. 105

5. ———— *Act XXVII of 1860 does not contemplate a division of the certificate, or a power to collect fractional shares of debt.* *BHOODUN v. JAN KHAN* . . . 13 W. R. 265

6. ———— *Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 7—Grant of certificate not to be partial.* A District Court acting under s. 7 of Act VII of 1889 must, if there are several applicants, elect to which, if any, a certificate should be granted. It is not competent to such Court to grant separate certificates to different persons for partial collection of the debts in respect of which a certificate is sought. *SHITAB DEI v. DEBI PRASAD* . . . I. L. R. 16 All. 21

7. ———— *Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 6—Certificate not necessarily to collect all the debts of the deceased.* A Court may legally grant to an applicant, under Act VII of 1889, a certificate for the collection of a specified debt or specified debts of a deceased person. The Court is not bound to grant a certificate only for the collection of the whole of the debts of the deceased. *In the matter of the petition of INDARMAN* . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 45

8. ———— *Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 4—Application for certificate for collection of part only of a debt.* A certificate for collection of debts under Act VII of 1889 may be given for the collection of any one or more separate debts of the deceased, but not for the collection of part only of a debt. Where, however, a portion of a debt in respect of which a certificate is sought has been discharged, it is not necessary for the applicant to pay duty on more than the unsatisfied portion of the debt. *MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN v. PUTTAN BIBI* . . . I. L. R. 19 All. 129

9. ———— *Joint certificate—Ground for appeal against order.* It is no ground for appeal against an order granting a certificate that the Judge joined with the appellant another person who had an interest in the debts to be collected. *In the matter of the petition of PRAN KHAN* . . . 17 W. R. 238

10. ———— *Rival claimants—Discretion of Judge.* Where there are rival claimants for a certificate to collect the debts of a deceased person, the Judge has, under s. 3, Act XXVII of 1860, a discretion to present it to such person as, under the circumstances of the case, shall appear best entitled to it. *Quære*: Has he

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power, under the Act, to grant them a joint or separate certificate? *RAISUNNISSA BEGUM v. KHUJJUNISSA*

4 B. L. R. A. C. 149: 13 W. R. 143

11. _____ *Power of Judge.* Act XXVII of 1860 gives a Judge no power to grant a joint certificate to two persons, his duty being to determine which of the applicants has the better right to a certificate. *In the goods of SEETARAM GOWRA v. KEKREE SINGH*

4 N. W. 60

But see *EAD ALI KHAN v. WAHAD ALI KHAN*

23 W. R. 25

12. _____ *Grant to several persons jointly—Act XXVII of 1860.* A certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 should not be granted to several persons jointly, but, where there are several claimants to the certificate, the District Court should determine which of such persons has the best title to the certificate, and grant the same accordingly. *MADAN MOHAN v. RAMDIAL*

I. L. R. 5 All. 195

ROOKMINEE v. CHOONEE LAL. 1 Agra Mis. 6

13. _____ *Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889)—Grant of a joint certificate.* Under the provisions of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), a joint certificate to recover debts cannot be granted. *MADAN MOHAN v. RAMDIAL*, I. L. R. 5 All. 195, and *JAMNABAI v. HASTUBAI*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 179, referred to. *LONACHAND GANGARAM MARWADI v. UTTAMCHAND GANGARAM MARWADI*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 684

14. _____ *Succession certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 7—Adverse claimants.* It is not illegal to grant a joint certificate to two persons who claim adversely to each other to be entitled to collect the debts due to the estate of the deceased under Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889). *NARAYANASAMI v. KUPPUSAMI*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 497

15. _____ *Widows of deceased.* Where the widows of an intestate applied for administration to the estate of the deceased:—*Held*, that the District Judge, before whom the application was made, was right in following the usual practice (which was declared to be a reasonable practice) of his Court in refusing to grant such administration to the widows jointly. *NITTYE KALI DEBIA v. KADER NATH CHATTERJEE*

5 C. L. R. 368

16. _____ *Joint certificate to widows of two sons of owner of estate.* *R* and his sons, *L* and *S*, were members of an undivided family. *S* predeceased *R*, who subsequently died, leaving *L* him surviving, and on the death of *L*, the widows of *L* and *S* applied for a joint certificate of

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heirship to the estate of *R*. Before their application was heard, *L*'s widow repudiated the joint application, and prayed for the grant of a certificate to her alone. The District Judge, however, ordered a joint certificate to be issued to the two widows. On appeal from this order by *L*'s widow:—*Held*, that, under Act XXVII of 1860, a joint certificate could not be granted. *S* having predeceased *R*, his interest in the family property and sacra reverted to *R* and *L*, and after *L*'s death the estates vested in *L*'s widow, who had, therefore, a better claim to be entrusted with getting in the debts. The order of the lower Court was varied by directing the certificate to go to *L*'s widow alone on her giving security for half the amount of the outstandings. *JAMNABAI v. HASTUBAI*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 179

17. _____ *Fresh certificate—Act XXVII of 1860, s. 6.* The fresh certificate contemplated by s. 6 of Act XXVII of 1860 means a certificate granted to a person other than the person to whom the first certificate was granted. *NAURANGI KUNWAR v. RAGHUBANSI KUNWAR*

I. L. R. 9 All. 231

See *GANGIA v. RANGI SINGH*.

I. L. R. 9 All. 173

6. PROCEDURE.

1. _____ *Evidence improperly taken.* In an application for a certificate of administration, the District Judge having delegated the examination of the witnesses in the case to the Nazir of the Court and having on the evidence so taken made an order granting the certificate:—*Held*, that the procedure was illegal, and that the order so passed must be annulled, and further proceedings for the investigation of the title directed, in which the witnesses should be examined by the Judge himself. *LUKSHMIBAI RAM SANSHEDEPPA v. RUDRAPPA BIN GANGOPPA* 2 Bom., 2nd Ed., 382.

2. _____ *Enquiry as to right—Evidence of right.* Although no question of title is judicially determined as the result of an enquiry under Act XXVII of 1860, yet the Court is bound under the Act to give the certificate to the person who makes out a title, and for that purpose, when parties are not agreed as to the facts, to try the issues in the ordinary way by the aid of evidence. *ANUNDEE KOOR v. BACHOO SINGH*

20 W. R. 476

3. _____ *Ground for refusal.* A Hindu woman applied for a certificate of administration under Act XXVII of 1860 to the estate of her brother, who had died seven years before and whose property had since been in the possession of his so-called heir-at-law. The applicant alleged that at the time of her brother's death

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she was pregnant, and subsequently gave birth to a son, who died in infancy. As representative of that son, who was deceased's legal heir, she asked for the certificate. The lower Court summarily rejected her application on the ground of lapse of time. *Held*, that this was not a sufficient reason for rejecting the application, and that the Judge must proceed to an enquiry under the Act. *DURGADASI DABI v. JUDUNAUTH MOOKERJEE*

2 B. L. R. Ap. 26

4. *Application for succession certificate—Order for costs of adjournment against opposing party—Effect of non-compliance with such order—Civil Procedure Code, s. 158.* A widow applied for a succession certificate to her late husband. The application was opposed by his brother who claimed to have been undivided from him. The matter came on for hearing but was adjourned on his application, he being ordered to pay the costs. He failed to pay the costs, and the certificate was issued to the widow. *Held*, that s. 158 of the Civil Procedure Code was inapplicable to the case in the absence of a specific order making the payment of costs a condition precedent to the hearing of the evidence of the party in default. *VIRABHADRAPPA CHETTI v. CHINNAMMA*

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 403

5. *Question of legitimacy.* On an application for a certificate of administration under Act XXVII of 1860, where the applicant claimed as heir of the deceased and impugned his marriage:—*Held*, that the Judge was bound to enquire summarily into the question of the marriage of the deceased and the consequent legitimacy of his children. *TAYLOR v. NUNDU*

W. R. 1864 Mis. 25

6. *Question of validity of will.* An application having been made by the widow of a deceased proprietor for a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 on the ground that she was entitled in right of inheritance (her husband having separated himself from his brother, the objector), and a will also having been set up which gave her extensive rights over the estate, the Judge granted the application without going into the validity of the will. *Held*, that, for the purposes of the Act, it was quite sufficient to decide the case upon the question whether the estates of the two brothers were joint or separate at the time of the death of the applicant's husband. *SOOKRAJ BAHADOOR v. JUREENA BIBEE*

11 W. R. 341

7. *Claim under will.* When a party claims a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 by reason of a will said to have been executed by the deceased, the Judge should decide upon the issue raised by him and say whether under the will he has a preferable right, instead of granting a certificate to the widow of the deceased upon her giving security to satisfy any claims which

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may be brought, should the will be proved to be a genuine document in a Civil Court. *JUGGUT CHUNDER ROY v. CHUNDER MONEE SHAHA*

17 W. R. 277

8. *Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), ss. 1, 4, and 6—Question of validity of will—Remand, order of.* K F and K A applied to the District Court for a certificate of administration under s. 6 of Act VII of 1889 to enable them to collect the debts due to one P, deceased. They alleged that P had made a will appointing them trustees to collect his debts. B also applied for a certificate on the ground that she was P's heir. She disputed the genuineness of the alleged will. The District Judge rejected both the applications on the ground that the validity of the will could not be settled in a summary proceeding. On appeal the High Court remanded the matter for rehearing holding that the District Judge had jurisdiction to decide upon the genuineness of the will. At the rehearing, B withdrew her application, but the Judge held that, as K F and K A claimed a certificate as executors of the will and not as heirs, they should take out probate of the will. He, therefore, refused their application. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that the duty of the District Judge in carrying out the remand order of the High Court was confined exclusively to determining whether the applicants or the heir was entitled to the certificate, and that he could not refuse the certificate simply because the applicants might have asked for probate, as the case did not fall under cl. 4 of s. 1 of Act VII of 1889. *KALIDAS FAKIRCHAND v. BAI MAHALI*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 712

9. *Question of validity of alleged adoption—Question of title.* A, alleging himself to be an adopted son, opposed the application for the grant of a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 to B, who, irrespective of the alleged adoption, would be the legal lineal heir of the deceased. The Court before whom the application was made refused the grant of the certificate on the ground that sufficient *prima facie* evidence existed establishing the validity of the adoption. On appeal:—*Held*, that the Appellate Court, concurring with the opinion expressed by the Court of first instance in respect of the *factum* of the adoption, would not be justified in setting aside the decision on the ground that such Court was wrong in entering into and deciding the question as to the validity of the adoption. On an application for the grant of a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, which is opposed by a party who alleges he has a preferable title to it, the Court should adjudicate the question of title, with a view to determine which party has the preferential right to the certificate. *In the matter of the petition of SHEETANATH MOOKERJEE v. PROMOTHONATH MOOKERJEE*

I. L. R. 6 Cal. 303:7 C. L. R. 475

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6. PROCEDURE—contd.

10. ————— *Act XXVII of 1860—Question of Title.* The Court will refuse to grant an application for a certificate to collect the debts of an intestate who has been dead forty years at the time of making the application, the presumption being that, owing to the operation of the law of limitation, there could be now no debts due to him which could be recovered. A question of title cannot be judicially determined between parties in an application under Act XXVII of 1860; therefore, where the object of such an application was to obtain a judicial determination as to the validity of an alleged adoption:—*Held*, that such a question could only be decided in a Civil Court. *KOONJ BEHARY CHOWDHRY v. GOCOOOL CHUNDER CHOWDHRY* . . . **I. L. R. 3 Calc. 616**

11. ————— *Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 7 (3)—Inquiry as to right to certificate—Question of Title.* The intention of sub-cl. (3) to s. 7 of the Succession Certificate Act is not to save the Court the trouble of making any inquiry at all where the applicant is not heir to the deceased, but it is to allow the *prima facie* title to the certificate to prevail when a question of law or fact arises on inquiry too difficult to be determined in a summary proceeding. *SIVAMMA v. SUBBAMMA* . . . **I. L. R. 17 Mad. 477**

12. ————— *Act XXVII of 1860—Rival claimants for certificate—Procedure—Trial of questions of title.* In a case of rival claimants to certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 to the estate of a deceased Mahomedan lady, A based his claim on the ground that the deceased was a Sunni, and that he being a Sunni was her nearest heir. B's claim was founded on the allegation that the deceased was a Shiah, and that he being a Shiah had the preferential title. The Judge declined to receive the whole of the evidence tendered, and to go into the question of title. On appeal the case was remanded to the Judge for determination of the question whether the deceased was a Sunni or a Shiah, and which of the parties had the preferential title to the certificate upon the entire evidence. *Per GHOSE, J.* Where the question as to right to a certificate is between two parties, one of whom, according to certain given facts, would be the heir and the other a total stranger, those facts must be gone into and determined, although such procedure involve to a certain extent the trial of a question of title. Cases distinguished where the question of the title to obtain a certificate is raised between one who is undoubtedly a natural heir and another who sets up a special title, or between two persons equally entitled to the succession, but one of whom claims exclusive title upon some special grounds. *ASGAR REZA v. ABDUL HOSSEIN* **I. L. R. 15 Calc. 574**

13. ————— *Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 7, sub-s. (3)—Inquiry, nature of—Title, question of.* In proceeding

CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION —contd.

6. PROCEDURE—concl'd.

under the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 7, sub-s. (3), there must be some inquiry into the title set up by the applicant before his application is disposed of. *Kali Koomar Chatterjee v. Tara Prosono Mookerjee*, 5 C. L. R. 517, dissented from. *Surfoji v. Kamakshiamba*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 452, distinguished. *Shitanath Mookerjee v. Promothonath Mookerjee*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 303, *Asgar Reza v. Abdul Hossein*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 574, and *Sivamma v. Subbamma*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 477, referred to. *HURRI KRISHNA PANDA v. BALABHADRA PANDA* . . . **I. L. R. 23 Calc. 431**

14. ————— *Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 7, cl. 1—Obligation of Court to decide the right to the certificate.* Under cl. 3, s. 7 of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), the District Court must decide in a summary way an application for a succession certificate, even if the question at issue between applicant and opponent be as to the status of the family to which deceased belonged. *DHARMAYA SANGAPPA v. SAYANA MALAPA* . . . **I. L. R. 21 Bom. 53**

15. ————— *Inquiry before grant of certificate.* In granting a certificate under the said Act, the Court should, before granting it, take at least some evidence to show that there is a *prima facie* case that the property in respect of which the certificate is granted belonged to the deceased person. *RADHA RANI DASI v. BRINDABUN CHUNDER BASAK* . . . **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 320**
2 C. W. N. 59

16. ————— *Order as to security for certificate—Act XXVII of 1860, s. 5—Discretion of Court—Security.* Under Act XXVII of 1860, s. 5, the Court granting a certificate has a discretion to determine whether or not it will require security to be given by the person to whom it grants it. The High Court will not, on appeal or review, interfere with the exercise of such discretion by the lower Courts. *MHALSABAI v. VITHOBA KHANDAPPA GULVE* . . . **7 Bom. Ap. 26**

17. ————— *Power of Judge where order for security is made by High Court—Return of security.* Where security has been taken by an order of the High Court from the holder of a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, a Zillah Judge is not competent of his own motion to release the money and give it back. If he thinks the time for doing so has arrived, it is for him to report the circumstances to the High Court for orders. Security taken from the holder of a certificate of administration should not be returned till the time allowed for an opposing claimant has expired. *GOUR SOONDUR PARAY v. KRIST KANT MAHATON* . . . **15 W. R. 108**

7. EFFECT OF CERTIFICATE.

1. ————— *Indemnity to debtors paying debts.* The effect of a certificate under Act

CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION

—contd.

7. EFFECT OF CERTIFICATE—contd.

XXVII of 1860 is that it is conclusive of the representative title against all debtors to the deceased, and affords full indemnity to all debtors paying their debts to the persons to whom the certificate has been granted. *BHUGBUTTY KOORER v. BHOLANATH THAKOOR* 8 W. R. 317

2. *Certificate for collection of debts—Effect of certificate against debtors—Cause of action—Act XXVII of 1860, s. 4.* A judgment-debtor sued for a declaration that the son of the deceased decree-holder, to whom a certificate had been granted under Act XXVII of 1860 in respect of the debts due to his father's estate, was not competent to apply for execution of the decree, as, being illegitimate, he was not the legal representative of the deceased decree-holder. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable, the certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 being, under s. 4 of the Act, conclusive of the defendant's representative character, and a full indemnity to all persons paying their debts to him. *GAURA v. GAYADIN* I. L. R. 4 All. 355

3. *Right of co-heir against holder of certificate—Misappropriation of property of deceased.* A co-heir is entitled to follow property of the deceased into the hands of any person who has misappropriated it, and such right is not taken away by the certificate of administrator granted under Act XXVII of 1860. *NGA THA YA v. MI KHAN MEHAW* 5 B. L. R. 371: 13 W. R. 443

4. *Adjudication of title—Protection of debtors—Act XXVII of 1860.* The certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 does not determine any question of heirship, but merely protects debtors of a deceased person from liability for payments made to a certificate holder. If it be found that such certificate-holder was not the rightful heir, the question of heirship may be tried in a regular suit, notwithstanding the grant of a certificate. *JOKNA v. BHUGWANEE* 3 N. W. 320

5. *Possession.* The grant of a certificate of administration under Act XXVII of 1860 does not decide any question of title to possession of land. *DHUNRAJ GIRI GOSWAMI v. SRIPATI GIRI GOSWAMI* 2 B. L. R. A. Cr. 27

QUEEN v. SREEPUTT GIRI GOSSAIN 11 W. R. Cr. 23

In the matter of petition of OBILASHERY DEBIA 9 W. R. Cr. 18

6. *Protection of debtors.* Act XXVII of 1860 does not provide for and adjudication of the rights of parties to succeed to property, or their actual title to it, its whole object being the security of debtors paying debts due to the estates of deceased persons. *MAHOMAD EUNOOS v. LALLA JAMARAD LALL* 13 W. R. 356

CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION

—contd.

7. EFFECT OF CERTIFICATE—contd.

JHANJOO KOORER v. DAMEENAH KOORER 17 W. R. 343

CHUNDRO MONEE DEBIA v. RASH BEHARY CHOWDHRY 21 W. R. 24

HURRO KISTO DOSS v. RAMANUNDO DOSS 22 W. R. 274

RAMPROTAB MISSER v. ABHILAK MISSER 3 C. L. R. 170

7. *Under Act XXVII of 1860, no question of title to any specific property can properly be tried. A party seeking to raise such a point should be referred to a regular suit.* *IMAMUN v. NUNNOO* 17 W. R. 193

8. *Act XX of 1841.* *Held*, that a certificate granted under Act XX of 1841 did not establish the right of inheritance of the party to whom it was granted, but simply empowered him to collect debts due to the estate of the deceased. The title of plaintiff or her father could not, under the circumstances, be questioned by a co-sharer after its public acknowledgment and practical effect given to that acknowledgment during a long period of years. *SKINNER v. SKINNER* 2 Agra 128

9. *Right to receive certificate—Act XXVII of 1860.* In a proceeding to obtain a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, for the collection of debts payable to the representatives of deceased persons, the Court determines merely that the applicant is entitled to receive a certificate, and not his title as heir or legal representative of the deceased. The rights as between each other of several persons claiming to be interested in the property of the deceased, are not for consideration and determination in such a proceeding. *BEYCHAN SAHOO v. GANESH SAHOO* 2 N. W. 439

10. *Act XXVII of 1860—Right of succession.* A certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 gives no title to the property in succession to the deceased, neither does it authorize the holder to sue for and collect debts which have accrued due at the death of the deceased to persons who have subsequently become owners of his property. *GOUREE BYZNATH PERSHAD v. LOCHUN KOORER* 22 W. R. 102

11. *Act XXVII of 1860.* Certificates under Act XXVII of 1860 can only be granted to persons claiming to be representatives of deceased persons to enable them to recover debts and receive interest or dividends; but such certificates include only the debtors of the estate, and the procedure given by the Act was not intended to apply to the decision of any right to succeed to the estate of a deceased person. *Ex parte RAU NARASINGA* 2 Mad. 164

CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION —*contd.*

7. EFFECT OF CERTIFICATE—*contd.*

12. ———— *Effect of Certificate in subsequent suit.* A certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, obtained on the allegation of being heir of the deceased, does not preclude a suitor from showing that the relationship certified to did not exist. *BUNDHOO BHUGUT v. MAHOMED HOSSEIN*
2 W. R. 70

13. ———— *Decision as to validity of will—Suit to contest will.* A decision as to the validity of a will under the provisions of Act XXVII of 1860 will not bar a regular suit under Act VIII of 1859, between the same parties, to contest the validity of the same will. *ANUND CHUNDER MITTER v. BANAY MADHUB MITTER* . 11 W. R. 127

KALEE CHUNDER SURMA v. GOBIND PERSHAD SURMA . 12 W. R. 454

14. ———— *Act XXVII of 1860, effect of decision under.* A decision under Act XXVII of 1860 does not in any way preclude the unsuccessful party from contesting the validity of the will in a regular suit. *ANUND MOHUN MULLICK v. INDRO MONEE CHOWDRAIN*
16 W. R. 214

SOOKHO SOONDUREE DABIA v. WOOMA SOONDUREE DABIA . 18 W. R. 255

15. ———— *Decision under Act XXVII of 1860, effect of—Subsequent regular suit.* When the question of granting a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 is dealt with by the Court with all the available evidence before it just as in a regular suit, and the matter of the certificate is decided upon after full deliberation, the position of the parties becomes very different from what it is at the conclusion of a really summary proceeding. Technically, there may still be the right to bring a regular suit, but the regular suit in such a case is a re-hearing, and the Court is bound to pay due respect to the judgment already arrived at. *GREEDHAREE SINGH v. FOOLJHUREE KOER*
24 W. R. 173

16. ———— *Power to negotiate Government Securities—Act XXVII of 1860, ss. 8 and 21.* A Judge can, under ss. 8 and 21 of Act XXVII of 1860, empower the holders of a certificate under that Act to negotiate a Government security mentioned in the will. *In the matter of HJ OBUTTY DEBIA*
3 W. R. Mis. 18

17. ———— *Effect of certificate on title effected by will—Succession Act, s. 187.* The grant of a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 on the title afforded by a will, which gives the grantee the estate in respect of which the debts accrued, does not establish a right as executor or legatee within the meaning of the words of s. 187 of the Succession Act. *KRISTO CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. CHUNDEE PERSHAD BANERJEE*
23 W. R. 252

CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION —*contd.*

7. EFFECT OF CERTIFICATE—*concl.*

18. ———— *Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), ss. 17 and 20—Certificate of heirship—Grant of certificate by Political Agent—Irregularities in making grant—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.* A District Judge cannot treat a certificate of heirship granted by the Political Agent in a Native State as invalid because the applicant had not given to him the requisite information as to the other members of the family, and no notices had been issued to them. These irregularities of procedure may be a reason for the Political Agent to cancel the grant, but they do not enable the District Court to treat it as a nullity. A certificate of heirship stamped with the proper stamp, and granted by the Political Agent of a Native State, must be recognised by the Civil Courts in British India "as having the same effect in British India as a certificate granted under this Act" as provided by s. 17 of Act VII of 1889, and under s. 20 precludes the granting of a certificate by a Civil Court. *ANNAPURNABAI v. LAKSHMAN BHIKAJI VAKHARKAR* . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 145

8. CANCELMENT AND RECALL OF CERTIFICATE.

1. ———— *Act XXVII of 1860, s. 6—Grant of certificate by District Court—Petition to High Court by objector for fresh certificate—Supersession of certificate granted by District Court.* S. 6 of Act XXVII of 1860 contemplates two different proceedings which may arise under different circumstances. One of these proceedings is an appeal, which has the effect of suspending the "granting," i.e., the issuing of the certificate; and the intention of the Legislature was that, upon an adverse order being made, the person objecting to it might thereupon appeal, and the effect of this would be to oblige the District Judge to hold his hand and not to issue the certificate until the decision of the appeal. The other proceeding is by way of petition to the High Court, after the certificate has been granted by the District Court, to grant a fresh certificate in supersession of the first; and the latter portion of s. 6 shows that the person who obtains the fresh certificate need not be the person who obtained the first, and there is nothing to limit the powers of the Court on petition to grant a fresh certificate to any person, including the person who opposed the granting of the original certificate who may prove himself entitled thereto, or to confine the exercise of such powers to cases where the first certificate was defective in form. *GANGIA v. RANGI SINGH* . I. L. R. 9 All. 173

2. ———— *Application for cancellation—Act XXVII of 1860, s. 6—Cancelling certificate.* S. 6 of Act XXVII of 1860 contemplates the application for cancellation being made to the High Court. *SUSMAN GOSSAIN v. RAM CHURN BHUKUT* . 5 W. R. Mis. 48

CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION —*contd.*

8. CANCELMENT AND RECALL OF CERTIFICATE—*contd.*

3. ———— **Refusal to recall certificate.**
—*Act XXVII of 1860. Held, that the lower Appellate Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to recall a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, because there was an heir in a nearer degree to the deceased than the person to whom the certificate was granted; the object of that Act being to give facilities to debtors and not to assist parties in establishing a disputed right or title.* KUBEER CHUNDER BUNDO *v* RAMKANYE DOSS BISWAS
17 W. R. 174

4. ———— **Jurisdiction to recall—Judge sitting on Original Side, power of.** NORMAN, J., ruled that, sitting on the Original Side of the Court, he could not grant a certificate of administration in supersession of one which had been granted by the Judge of the 24-Pergunnahs under Act XXVII of 1860. *In the goods of SHAMLAL DASS*
5 B. L. R. Ap. 21

5. ———— **Recall of certificate granted without jurisdiction.** The High Court on appeal remanded a case for enquiry as to an allegation that a certificate granted under Act XXVII of 1860 had been granted without jurisdiction, and ordered that, if found to have been granted without jurisdiction, it should be recalled. *In re JAGESWAR DAS*
6 B. L. R. Ap. 128

S. C. JUGGESSUR DHUR *v* BHUGOBUTTY DASSEE
14 W. R. 464

6. ———— **Recall of certificate of administration fraudulently obtained.** A certificate of administration granted under Act XXVII of 1860 may be recalled, if it has been obtained by a false and fraudulent statement. *In the matter of the petition of BHABADA DAS*
8 B. L. R. Ap. 13

7. ———— **Where, after a certificate has been granted under Act XXVII of 1860, an application is made by a party claiming to be the rightful heir, with a distinct allegation of fraud having been committed in obtaining the certificate, it is the duty of the Judge to call upon the opposite party to substantiate their allegation that the claimant disqualified from inheriting.** KHETTER MONEE DABEE *v* MADHUB CHUNDER ROY
13 W. R. 160

8. ———— **Power of Judge to recall—Enquiry, extension of.** Whether or not a Judge has power to recall a certificate granted under Act XXVII of 1860, he has power, where there are charges made that a certificate has been obtained by fraud, to institute an enquiry, and, if necessary, to refuse an extension of the certificate or to refuse to grant a fresh one according to the form of the application. BHIRUN *v* ELAHI KHANUM
8 B. L. R. Ap. 14 note; 11 W. R. 153

CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION —*contd.*

8. CANCELMENT AND RECALL OF CERTIFICATE—*contd.*

9. ———— **Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 18, cls. (b) and (c)—Certificate granted under mistake, the applicant concealing circumstance which he should have disclosed—District Judge, Jurisdiction of.** P died in 1889, leaving behind him his daughter, B. P, it was alleged, had made a will appointing certain persons his executors. The executors applied for a certificate under the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889) to recover a debt due to the deceased's estate from one N. B opposed this application and claimed the certificate for herself by a separate application. The District Judge rejected B's application, and issued a certificate to the executors on 14th September 1892. In the meantime, one M obtained a decree against B as legal representative of P, and in execution bought P's right, title, and interest in the debt due from N. On 12th September 1892, M applied for certificate, under Act VII of 1889, to recover this debt. The District Judge rejected this application. M appealed to the High Court. To this appeal the executors were made parties at their own request. The High Court reversed the District Judge's order, and remanded the case for disposal on the merits. Upon the remand the executors did not appear before the District Judge to contest M's application, and the District Judge granted him a certificate. Thereupon he applied for revocation of the certificate previously granted to the executors, and the executors in their turn applied for a revocation of the certificate granted to him. The District judge revoked M's certificate on the ground that he had fraudulently concealed from the Court the previous grant of a certificate to the executors. *Held, on appeal by M, that the District Judge had a right, under s. 18, cl. (b) or (c), of Act VII of 1889 to revoke the certificate he had granted under a mistake of fact to M.* MANCHHARAM *v* KALIDAS
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 821

10. ———— **Power to recall certificate obtained by fraud and misrepresentation.** In a case in which a Judge refused, on the ground of want of competency, to entertain a petition which asked him to recall a certificate granted by him under Act XXVII of 1860, as having been obtained by fraud, it was held that it is a power inherent in every Court of Justice on finding that an order has been obtained from it by fraud and misrepresentation, and that, if the real facts had been known to the Court, it would not have acted in the matter to recall the order made in ignorance of the true circumstances, by reason of the misrepresentation alleged. HAMEEDA BIBEE *v* NOW BIBEE
9 W. R. 394

SHEO PURSHUN CHOBEY *v* COLLECTOR OF SARUN
13 W. R. 256

11. ———— **District Court, power of, to cancel certificate granted—Act XXVII of**

CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION

—*contd.*

8. CANCELMENT AND RECALL OF CERTIFICATE—*concl'd.*

1860. Under Act XXVII of 1860, a District Judge has no power to cancel a certificate granted to collect the debts of a deceased person. *VENKATAMMA v. CHENGALRAYAPPA*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 555

12. ——— Suspension or recall of certificate—*Act XXVII of 1860, s. 6—Omission to file schedule of debts.* The High Court, under s. 6, Act XXVII of 1860, suspended a certificate which had been wrongly granted in a case where there was no list of debts due to the estate of the deceased. *FAYZ ALI v. TALEB ALI*

18 W. R. 330

13. ——— Recall of certificate granted without list of debts being filed. It is not necessary, as a general rule, that a list of debts should be filed before a certificate can be granted under the provisions of Act XXVII of 1860. *RA-DHIKA CHURN SEN v. JUDONATH GOSSAMEE*

20 W. R. 412

14. ——— Recalling or cancelling certificate, ground for—*Non-appearance to object to grant.* A certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 having been granted to the widow of a deceased party, his sister's son subsequently represented that he was entitled to the estate under a will, and prayed that the certificate might be cancelled. *Held*, that, as notice had been issued and the petitioner did not appear and object to the widow obtaining the certificate, the Judge was right in refusing to cancel the certificate and in referring him to a regular suit. *MANICK CHUNDER alias PROTAP CHUNDER ROY v. RAJ LAKSHMI DOSSEE*

19 W. R. 252

15. ——— Cancelling grant empowering person to deal with securities claimed by another. If a Civil Court is proceeding under s. 8 of Act XXVII of 1860 to grant or has granted a certificate authorizing a person to deal with Government securities which are claimed by a third person as his property, that is a ground on which such third person may come into Court to oppose the grant of a certificate or to seek for its cancelment. *BANDAM SETTAN v. BANDAM MAHA LAKSHMI*

4 Mad. 180

9. BOMBAY MINORS' ACT (XX OF 1864).

1. ——— Mother of minor—*Bombay Minors' Act XX of 1864—Unwillingness to act as guardian—Default in appearance to order for issue of certificate.* An order for the issue of a certificate of administration to a particular individual ought not to be made until it is ascertained whether that individual is willing to take it. A certificate of administration ought not to be forced upon the mother of a minor unwilling to take it. Where an order for the issue of such a certificate to the mother of an infant was made, on the default

CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION

—*cont'd.*

9. BOMBAY MINORS' ACT (XX OF 1864)—*cont'd.*

of the mother to appear and show cause why it should not be issued to her:—*Held*, that such default in appearance ought not to have been accepted as her assent to the issuing of the certificate to her. Course pointed out where no relative or friend of a minor can be found willing to take such a certificate. *BABAJI BIN KUSAJI v. MARUTI*

11 Bom. 182

2. ——— Joint Hindu family—*Minors' Act XX of 1864.* Where a member of a Hindu family dies, leaving to his children only his undivided share in the joint family property, administration cannot be granted under Act XX of 1864; nor, under such circumstances, can a guardian of the persons of the minor children be appointed; but if the deceased has left any separate property, administration of such property may be granted, and a guardian may be properly appointed at the same time. *GURACHARYA v. SVAMIRAYACHARYA*

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 481

3. ——— *Minor—Act XX of 1864—Property—Ascertainment of share.* A certificate of administration may be granted, under Act XX of 1864, for the share of a minor who is a member of an undivided Hindu family. When a certificate is given in such a case, the District Court has no jurisdiction to attach the undivided property in which the minor has a share, with a view to ascertain and divide off the minors' share. Such ascertainment and division can only be effected by a regular suit. *BABAJI v. SHESHGIRI*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 593

4. ——— Certificate granted to Collector—*Form or certificate—Act XX of 1864, s. 11—Effect of certificate—Moveable property.* Where the Court, under s. 11 of Act XX of 1864, directs a certificate of administration to the estate of a minor to be granted to the Collector of a district, such certificate should extend to the moveable as well as the immoveable estate of the minor. *LAKSHMIBAI v. GANESH ANTAJI*

4 Bom. A. C. 129

5. ——— Effect of certificate on adoption—*Act XX of 1864—Effect of such certificate—Adoption.* By a deed of adoption a Hindu widow adopted a minor son, the deed stipulating that until such minor attained majority the widow was to manage the property. It subsequently appeared that she was incompetent to manage the property; and the natural father of the minor having applied for a certificate of administration, the lower Court granted one to him. On appeal by the widow to the High Court against the decision of the lower Court:—*Held*, that the order of the District Judge granting the certificate should be confirmed. The certificate did not alter the rights and interests of the minor or of the widow in the property. Any right of property or possession that could properly be asserted against the

CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION —*concl'd.*

9. BOMBAY MINORS' ACT (XX OF 1864)— —*concl'd.*

minor before the certificate was granted could be asserted equally after it was granted. *GURUPADVA v. PUTAPA* . . . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 599

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE AT LECTURES.

See FORGERY . I. L. R. 15 All. 210

CERTIFICATE OF GUARDIANSHIP.

See ACT XL OF 1858.

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 35.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 849

I. L. R. 18 All. 478

See GUARDIAN—APPOINTMENT.

See HINDU LAW—GUARDIAN—RIGHTS OF GUARDIANSHIP.

See PROBATE—EFFECT OF PROBATE.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 832

CERTIFICATE OF NATIONALITY.

See MARRIAGE I. L. R. 35 Calc. 232

CERTIFICATE OF PLEADER.

—renewal of—

See LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT, s. 7.
13 C. W. N. 415

CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC DEMAND.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 107.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 676

See PENAL CODE, s. 206.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 217

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT.

6 C. W. N. 302

CERTIFICATE OF SALE.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 316.

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 670

See DEED—CONSTRUCTION.

L. R. 30 I. A. 71

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II,

ART. 178 . I. L. R. 3 Bom. 433

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 202, 206

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 586

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 172

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 257, 377

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 228

See POSSESSION—NATURE OF POSSESSION .

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 433

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 206

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—CERTIFICATE OF SALE.

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 472, 526

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT

9 C. W. N. 150

10 C. W. N. 130

CERTIFICATE OF SALE—*cont'd.*

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 17, cl. (o) (1871, s. 17; 1866, s. 17).

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 49 (1871, s. 49) . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 155

7 C. L. R. 115

21 W. R. 349

See SALE . . . 10 C. W. N. 969

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 381

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—

SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—

ERRORS IN DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY

SOLD . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 334

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—

PURCHASERS, TITLE OF—CERTIFICATES

OF SALE.

See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 24.

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 470

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 18

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 92

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 47

See STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. I, ART. 16.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 532

—amendment of—

See APPEAL—EXECUTION OF DECREES—

QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 23 All. 476

1. ——— Construction—*Misdescription—Intention of parties.* Mere inaccuracy of language or misdescription will not vitiate a sale certificate. The intention of the parties must be looked to. *MOULA BUKSH v. KURUCK LALL*

7 W. R. 245

MANSON v. GOLAM KEBRIA MOONSHEE

15 W. R. 490

TARANATH CHUCKERBUTTY v. JOY SOONDUREE DABEE . . . 21 W. R. 93

2. ——— *Misdescription of*

land. Where a sale certificate declares the sale of the rights of a particular party in land of which the identity is not in dispute, the mere fact that the right thus transferred is called by mistake jote dakhali instead of some other term nearly importing the same thing does not constitute a difficulty in the way of giving the purchaser possession. *KULEEMOODDEEN DAROGAH v. ASHRUF ALI KHAN*

19 W. R. 276

3. ——— *Power to go behind*

certificate. The Court in construing a sale certificate refused to go into facts lying behind it for the purpose of contradicting its terms. *LALLA BISSESSUR DYAL v. DOOLAR CHAND SAHOO*

22 W. R. 181

See PEAREE MOHUN MOOKERJEE v. GOSTO

BEHARY DEY . . . 26 W. R. 104

CERTIFICATE OF SALE—concl'd.

4. _____ Power of Court to amend certificate—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 259.* A Court is not legally competent to make an *ex-parte* order amending a sale certificate granted under Act VIII of 1859, s. 259. *RUGHOO NUNDUN SINGH v. WILSON* . . . 23 W. R. 301

5. _____ Inaccuracy in sale certificate—*Extraneous evidence.* Where a sale certificate, though containing errors, was accurate as to any part of the description of the subject of sale, and could be used to identify it, with the assistance of extraneous evidence, such evidence could be received to show what was intended to be dealt with. *MALEEBUN v. RASHEEDA* . . . 25 W. R. 401

6.—The certificate of sale is not the title; it is merely the title-deed. *NARAYAN BHAGWAN GANDHI v. SHAMRAO LAXUMAN* (1903)

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 379

CERTIFICATE UNDER BENGAL ACT VII of 1880.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 14.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 264

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT.

CERTIORARI, WRIT OF—

1. _____ High Court's Criminal Procedure Act, X of 1875. The power of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari was not taken away by s. 147 of the High Court's Criminal Procedure Act, X of 1875. *REG. v. RAMDAS SAMALDAS* . . . 12 Bom. 217

2. _____ Removal of case from Small Cause Court—*Letters Patent, cl. 13—Inability of Small Cause Court to issue commission.* The Bombay Court of Small Causes is subject to the superintendence of the High Court within the meaning of cl. 13 of the Letters Patent of the High Court, and the latter has, therefore, power, for purposes of justice, to remove a case from the Small Cause Court and itself to try and determine such case. The inability of the Small Cause Court to issue a commission to examine for the defence witnesses residing outside its jurisdiction, though not in general, may, under peculiar circumstances, be a good ground for granting an order to remove a case from the Small Cause Court into the High Court. Terms upon which such order will be granted. *PIRBHAI KHMJI v. BOMBAY, BARODA AND CENTRAL INDIA RAILWAY COMPANY*

8 Bom. O. C. 59

3. _____ *Act IX of 1850, s. 54.* A writ of certiorari lay, as of course, to remove, before judgment, all cases commenced in the Calcutta Court of Small Causes, subject to the limitation imposed by s. 54 of Act IX of 1850, unless such cases fell within the usual exceptions recognized in English practice, so far as such exceptions may be applicable to the High Court. *PILLANS v. PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL STEAMSHIP COMPANY* . . . 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 68

CERTIORARI, WRIT OF—concl'd.

4. _____ *Act XXVI of 1864, s. 7.* It is no ground for removal of a cause by certiorari from the Court of Small Causes that a difficult point of law is likely to be involved in it. The proper course is to apply to the lower Court under s. 7 of Act XXVI of 1864. *MADHUB KISSEN SETT v. GOUR SOONDER SETT*

Cor. 90

5. _____ Police Act XIII of 1856, s. 111—*Conviction on merits—Error in decision on merits—Affidavits, use of.* S. 111 of the Police Act (XIII of 1856) did not give jurisdiction to the High Court, when a case was brought before it on certiorari, to enquire whether the Magistrate had come to a correct conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner. The object of that section was to limit the objections to a conviction to some substantial meritorious ground, such as want of jurisdiction or the like, and to prevent a conviction from being quashed on a mere error of form or of procedure. But the section did not give the High Court any right to interfere on the ground that the Magistrate had come to a wrong conclusion on the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused person. Though affidavits may be used to show a want of jurisdiction in a Magistrate, even though such affidavits contradict for this purpose the finding of the Magistrate, they cannot be used as affording materials for reviewing the Magistrate's decision on the merits. *REG. v. NATHOLAL PITAMBAR* . . . 10 Bom. 102

REG. v. SAKHARAM ANATOBA

10 Bom. 109 note

6. _____ Rule nisi to quash conviction—*Practice.* Where a writ of certiorari is granted to bring up a conviction of Justices, in order to quash it, and a rule nisi to quash the conviction moved for, the certiorari should be returned into Court before the motion for the rule nisi is made. *REG. v. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 293

7. _____ Power of High Court to quash conviction—*Bengal Act IV of 1876, ss. 88, 104, and 117—Municipal Commissioners, their jurisdiction—Power of the High Court.* The power of the High Court to quash proceedings on certiorari, is not affected by the provisions of s. 117 of the Municipal Act, and if it should appear either on the face of the proceedings or upon affidavits that the Commissioners have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, the Court will interfere. *NUNDO LAL BOSE v. CORPORATION FOR THE TOWN OF CALCUTTA* . . . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 275

CESS.

See ABWABS . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 683

See APPEAL—ACTS—BENGAL TENANCY ACT . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 254
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 132

See BENGAL CESS ACTS.

CESS—*contd.*

See BOMBAY LOCAL FUNDS ACT, 1869,
s. 8 . . . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 643
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 54, 422

See CESS, ASSESSMENT OF.
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 82
11 C. W. N. 1053

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CON-
TRACTS—ILLEGAL CESSES.

See CUSTOM . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 49
1 Agra 184, 135
I. L. R. 1 All. 440

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
12 C. W. N. 154

See LAND-REVENUE.
I. L. R. 26 Bom. 504

See MADRAS LOCAL BOARDS ACT, ss. 57,
64, 149 . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 114

See NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES LOCAL
RATES ACT . . . I. L. R. 23 All. 505

See ROAD CESS AND PUBLIC WORKS CESS.

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—
JURISDICTION—CESS.

See U. P. LAND REVENUE ACT (III OF
1901) . . . I. L. R. 27 All. 183

See WAJIB-UL-AZ. . . I. L. R. 30 All. 235

See ZAMINDARI DAK.
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 293

illegal—

See ABWABS.

See ILLEGAL CESS.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—SUBSTANTIAL
INJURY . . . 4 C. W. N. 439

liability to pay—

See BENGAL CESS ACT, ss. 34, 35, 36, 41
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 109

1. ———— Liability to pay cess—*Holders under biswadars*—Contract to pay. Held, that if the biswadars were not liable to cesses claimed, those holding under them could not be liable to plaintiff's claim; and that the liability of the defendants, whether they be lessees or mortgagees under the biswadars, must depend, firstly, on the liability of the biswadars themselves; and, secondly, on the terms of the lease or mortgage under which they are found to be in possession. *DHUNEE RAM v. MOORLEE DHUR* . . . 2 Agra 325

2. ———— Contract to pay.
Where the talukdar has engaged to pay certain cesses for roads, schools, etc., he cannot recover them from the biswadars, unless they are bound to pay them by some positive law, or have engaged or have consented to do so; nor is any individual biswadar bound to pay merely because his co-partners have agreed to pay or have paid them. *DHUNEE RAM v. MOORLEE DHUR* . . . 2 Agra 326

CESS—*contd.*

3. ———— Cess not sanctioned or taken into account in fixing Government revenue—*Right of suit*. A suit cannot be maintained for a cess which was not avowed nor sanctioned nor taken into account in fixing the Government revenue at the settlement. *BISHARUT ALLY v. SEETUL MISSEER* . . . 1 N. W. 40

4. ———— Alteration of rent by paying in different coinage—*Extra or illegal cess*. Rent is not altered by being paid in a different coin, viz., in kuldar, instead of sicca, rupees; and the apparent addition of one anna per rupee (the difference in value between the two kinds of rupees) is not a real addition to the rent, nor is it an extra cess of an arbitrary nature or an illegal character. *ROOCHA RAM MISSEER v. NAGA DOSS* . . . 2 N. W. 92

5. ———— Right to levy cess—*Absence of any contract to pay*. A Government lessee is not entitled to sue for a declaration of his right to levy a cess upon a jotedar who grazes his cattle on his own jote within the precincts of the lessee's mehal, there being no contract between them whereby defendant is bound to pay such a cess. *BHUGGEERUTH SHIKDAR v. RAMNARAIN MUNDUR* . . . 9 W. R. 299

6. ———— Consent of raiyat to pay *abwab* or cess. If a zamindar demands a cess over and above the original rent, and the raiyat consents and contracts to pay it, this demand and the old rent form a new rent lawfully claimable under the contract. *JEEATOOLLAH PARAMANICK v. JUGODINDRO NARAIN ROY* . . . 22 W. R. 12

7. ———— *Madras Rent Recovery Act, s. 11*—*Water-cess*—*Tenants*—*Cultivation improved by water taken from landlord's tank*. A landlord has a right to charge water-cess when his tenant cultivates a wet crop on dry land or a second wet crop on wet land by means of water taken from the landlord's tank. *THAYAMMAL v. MUTTIA* . . . I. L. R. 10 Mad. 282

8. ———— Cesses on debutter lands—*"Owner and holder"*—*Beng. Act IX of 1880, s. 56*. Bengal Act IX of 1880 contemplates the payment of the cesses by persons beneficially interested in the land in respect of which the cesses are levied. The words "owner and holder" in s. 56 of that Act are not limited to any one person, nor for the purposes of that section must the owner be in actual possession. The plaintiff, who was a patnidar of the defendants, having paid certain cesses in respect of what he described in his plaint to be "debutter lakhiraj lands" lying within the ambit of his patni, sued the defendants to recover the amount of such cesses. The defendant admitted that he was proprietor of the estate in which the lands were situated, but denied his liability for the cesses. Held, that the defendant was not liable to pay the amount of the cesses, but that the person liable was the idol through its shebait, or some person in receipt of the rents and profits of the land, or some person in actual

CESS—*contd.*

possession of the land in occupation of it. *GOPAL CHUNDER SIRCAR v. ADHIRAJ APTAB CHAND MAHTAB* . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 743

9. ——— Abwabs paid before Permanent Settlement—*Beng. Reg. VIII of 1793, s. 54—Beng. Reg. IV of 1794—Beng. Reg. V of 1812, s. 3—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 11—Act X of 1859, s. 10—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 23.* Where it is not actually proved that abwabs have been paid or have been payable before the time of the Permanent Settlement, a landlord is not legally entitled to recover them as against his raiyats, even assuming that by the custom of the estate the raiyats, and their ancestors before them, have for a great number of years paid such abwabs. *Semble*: That a claim for the recovery of abwabs existing before the time of the Permanent Settlement would not be enforceable. *CHULTAN MAHTON v. TILUKDARI SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 175

In the same case in the Privy Council: *Held*, affirming the High Court decision, that payments over and above rent, and described as abwabs in the zamindari accounts, for which as abwabs, the tenant was sued, were held to be rightly treated as abwabs and not as forming part of the rent fixed. They were held not to be recoverable from the tenant, although they had been paid for a period of unknown length, and according to a long standing practice, not having been, if payable at the time of the Permanent Settlement, consolidated with the rent, as they should have been if then payable, under s. 54 of Regulation VIII of 1793. Not having been so consolidated, they could not be recovered under s. 61. If not payable at the time of the Permanent Settlement, they came under the term of new abwabs, and in that case were illegal under s. 55. *TILUKDARI SINGH v. CHULHAN MAHTON* . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 131
L. R. 16 I. A. 152

10. ——— *Illegal cess—*
Abwabs—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 74, 179—Beng. Regs. VIII of 1793, s. 54; V of 1812, ss. 2 and 3; and XVIII of 1812, s. 2. What is or is not an abwab must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case in which the question arises. Where by a *kabuliat* dated 1869 the defendant, as holder of a *mokurari* tenure, agreed to pay a certain fixed sum as rent, and also certain items designated *tehwari* and *salami*, it was held that they were not illegal cesses within the Full Bench ruling of *Chultan Mahton v. Tilukdari Singh*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 175, not being uncertain and arbitrary in their character, but specific sums which the tenants agreed to pay to the landlords, and the payment of which, no less than the payment of the rent itself, formed part of the consideration upon which the tenancy was created, and which were in fact part of the rent agreed to be paid, although not so described; they were recoverable therefore under Reg. V of 1812. *PUDMANUND SINGH BAHADUR v. BAIJ NATH SINGH*
I. L. R. 15 Calc. 828

CESS—*contd.*

11. ——— *Cess Act (Bengal Act IX of 1880)—Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act VII of 1880), s. 10—Personal debt—Recovery of cesses—Property belonging to a person not recorded as proprietor.* An amount due on account of cesses under the Bengal Cess Act, 1880, is only a personal debt and cannot properly be recovered under the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1880, from the property on which it is assessed, when such property belongs to a third person who may not have been recorded as proprietor under Bengal Act VII of 1876. *SHEKAAT HOSSAIN v. SASI KAR* . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 783

12. ——— *Construction of Act XIX of 1844, abolishing cesses on trades—Bombay town duties.* On a question whether a cess of two annas per candy on all cotton bought in, and exported from, Broach, paid by the buyer according to usage from time immemorial, to a temple in that town, was abolished by Act XIX of 1844:—*Held*, that it was a cess of a mixed kind, local and indirect, upon the trade of a cotton buyer carried on in Broach, attaching when he bought cotton in that town for exportation, and that it fell within the meaning of that Act, so that the right to claim it had been thereby abolished. *KALYANRAJ v. MOFUSSIL COMPANY*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 526
L. R. 17 I. A. 103

13. ——— *Illegal cess—*
Asul and abwab—Rent—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 3 (5), 74—Beng. Reg. VIII of 1793, ss. 54, 55, 57, 58, 61—Beng. Reg. V of 1812, ss. 2, 3. In a suit for rent at the rate of R22-2 per annum the defence was that the yearly rent was not R22-2, but R18-10-6, and that the difference was made up of certain illegal cesses such as *sarak*, *neg*, and *khuruch*, which had been paid for a long time with the rent and without specification in the rent receipts. Both the lower Courts found that R18-10-6 was the defendant's *asul jama*. *Held* by the Full Bench, upon a review of the history of abwabs, that the amounts sued for under the head of *sarak*, *neg*, and *khuruch* were abwabs, and were therefore not recoverable, and that all additions to the actual rent under the denomination of abwabs are illegal, and any agreement to pay them is void. *Pudma Nund Singh v. Baij Nath Singh*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 828, dissented from. *Per PETHERAM, C.J.* The law, whether under the Regulations, or the Bengal Tenancy Act, or as laid down by the Privy Council in *Tilukdari Singh v. Chultan Mahton*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 131: L. R. 16 I. A. 152, is the same, namely, that no imposition under any name whatever shall be recovered from the tenant for or an account of the occupation or tenure of the land beyond the sum which has been fixed for rent, whether that sum has been paid by agreement or by judicial determination between the landlord and the tenant. Any contract, whether express or implied, to pay anything beyond that sum, under any name whatever, for or in respect of the occupa-

CESS—*contd.*

tion of the land cannot be enforced. The case of *Pudmanund Singh v. Baij Nath Singh*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 828, has been overruled by the Privy Council in *Tilukdhari Singh v. Chultian Mahton*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 131: I. L. R. 16 I.A. 162. Per GHOSE, J. If in any given case the Court finds that any particular sum specified in the lease, or agreed to be paid, is a lawful consideration for the use and occupation of any land, that is to say, if it is really part of the rent, although not described as such, the Court would be justified in holding that it is not an abwab, and is recoverable by the landlord. *Pudmanund Singh v. Baij Nath Singh*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 828, explained. RADHA PROSAD SINGH v. BAL KOWAR KOERI

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 726

14. ———— *Chowkidari tax*
—*Abwab—Village Chowkidars Act (Bengal Act VI of 1870)—Suit for arrears of chowkidari tax payable by patnidar under patni settlement—Rent—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 3 (5) and 74—Bengal Regulation VIII of 1793, ss. 54 and 55.* In a suit for arrears of chowkidari tax, payable by the patnidar under the patni settlement, the defence was that it was an illegal cess, and could not be legally recovered. *Held*, that, as the payment of the chowkidari tax was one of the terms of the patni settlement itself, which was entered into between parties competent to contract and was made for valuable consideration, and the patni regulation declares that patni talukhs “shall be deemed to be valid tenures in perpetuity according to the terms of the engagements under which they are held,” and, moreover, as the amount which the patnidar agrees to pay as chowkidari tax is paid quite as much on account of the occupation of the property as that which is expressly called the rent, and is part of the ground rent quite as much as the latter, it is not an abwab, and is therefore, recoverable. *Surnomoyee Dabee v. Koomar Puresh Narain Roy*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 576, followed. *Tilukdhari Singh v. Chultian Mahton*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 131, and *Radha Prosad Singh v. Balkowar Kori*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 726, distinguished. *Pudmanund Singh v. Baij Nath Singh*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 828, referred to. ASSANULLA KHAN BAHADUR v. TIRTHABASINI . . . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 680

15. ———— *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 74 and 179—Stipulation for payment of abwab—Permanent tenure-holder.* The defendant, a darpatnidar, stipulated in the kabuliati for the annual payment of R4 in lieu of certain quantities of jack fruit, bamboos, and fish. This stipulation was contained in a clause perfectly distinct from that containing the payment of rent which was payable quarterly. *Held*, that (i) such a stipulation is a stipulation for the payment of an abwab; (ii) a stipulation for the payment of an abwab, under a permanent mukurari lease, is valid, and s. 74 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not control s. 179 of the Act. *Assanulla Khan v. Tirthabashini*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 680, and *Atulya Churn Bose v. Tulsi Das Sarkar*, 2 C. W. N. 543,

CESS—*contd.*

referred to and followed. *Basanta Kumar Roy Chowdry v. Promotho Nath Bhattacharjee*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 130, distinguished. KRISHNA CHANDRA SEN v. SUSHILA SOONDURY DASSEE

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 611
3 C. W. N. 608

16. ———— *Stipulation for payment of cesses—Rent—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 3, cl. 5, ss. 179, 195.* Where it was stipulated in a patni lease that the patnidar was to pay on behalf of the zamindar two sums of money, one sum as cesses upon the property to the Collector and another sum as expenses for the maintenance of a masjid on the property to the party who had to conduct the expenses of the masjid respectively: *Held*, that the two items of money are lawfully payable on account of the use and occupation of the land, and are, therefore, rent. *Assanullah Khan Bahadur v. Tirthabashini*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 680, and *Rutnessur Biswas v. Hurish Chunder Bose*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 221, distinguished. MOHEBUT ALI v. MAHOMED FAIZULAH 2 C. W. N. 455

Sec BASANTA KUMARI DEEYA v. ASHUTOSH CHUCKERBUTTI I. L. R. 27 Calc. 67
4 C. W. N. 3

17. ———— *Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, s. 74.* “All impositions upon tenants under the denomination of abwab,” etc., and “all stipulations and reservations for the payment of such,” referred to in s. 74 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, relate to both past and future stipulations; such stipulations made before the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act are therefore void. *JOTINDRA MOHUN TAGORE v. CHANDRA NATH SAFUI* (1902)
6 C. W. N. 360

18. ———— *Res judicata—Illegal cess not objected to in former suit for rent—Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, s. 74.* Where, in a suit for rent, the rent claimed expressly includes an item which is objected to as an illegal cess, the mere fact that, in a previous rent suit between the same parties regarding the same tenure, the defendant did not raise the same plea, although he could have done so, would not, in the absence of a judicial determination of the point in the previous suit, preclude him from raising the plea in the subsequent suit. *Kailash Mondul v. Baroda Sundari Dasi*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 711, followed. *Radha Prosad Singh v. Bal Kowar Kori*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 726, referred to. WOOMESH CHANDRA MAITRA v. BARADA DASS MAITRA (1900) I. L. R. 28 Calc. 17

19. ———— *Abwab—Rent—Collection charges—Lease, consideration for.* A fixed amount mentioned in a lease as payable annually for collection charges in addition to rent, the total being described as the jama and forming the consideration for the lease, is not to be regarded as an abwab, but is in reality a part of the rent and recoverable as such. *Mahomed Fayez Chowdry v. Jamoo Gazee* I. L. R. 8 Calc. 730, referred to. *Chultian Mahton v. Tilukdhari Singh*, I. L. R. 11 Calc.

CESS—concl'd.

175, and *Radha Prosad Singh v. Balhowar Koeri*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 726, distinguished. *RADHA CHARAN RAY CHOWDHRY v. GOLAK CHANDRA GHOSE* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 834
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 529

20. _____ **Mela, profits of**
—*Cess Act (Bengal Act XI of 1880), ss. 4, 5, 6—Annual value of land—Rent.* A mela or fair was held yearly on lands included in the holdings of agricultural tenants, at a time when they were not used for agricultural purposes, by certain persons, called *fakirs*, who executed in favour of the zemindar a *kabuliat* agreeing to pay an annual *sayari chandina jama* for the right to hold the fair. The *fakirs* gave the right to hold the fair to *ijaradars*, who derived profits by levying tolls on sellers of cattle and other animals at a certain rate per animal, from stall-keepers at so much per stall and from certain other persons frequenting the fair. Held, that the profits were not paid by the tenant to the landlord, nor for the use and occupation of land, and, consequently, were not rent, and did not fall within the definition of "annual value of land" in s. 4 of the Cess Act; and that an assessment of cesses made by the Collector on the basis of such profits was illegal and *ultra vires*. Held, also, that the fact that the profits were not exempt from income-tax was no bar to cesses being assessed thereon. *Manindra Chandra Nandi v. Secretary of State for India*, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 257, approved. *Umed Rasul Shaha Fakir v. Anath Bandhu Chowdhuri*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 637, disapproved in part. Held by BRETT, WOODROFFE and MOOKERJEE, JJ., that the *fakirs*, the *ijaradars*, the cattle-sellers and stall-keepers were mere licensees and had no interest in the land. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. KARUNA KANTA CHOWDHRY* (1907)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 82
11 C. W. N. 1053

CESS ACT (BENG. IX OF 1880).

See *BENGAL CESS ACTS.*

See *CESS.*

_____ certificate issued under.

See *SALE* . 10 C. W. N. 969

_____ ss. 4, 5, 6.

See *CESS.*

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 82
11 C. W. N. 1053

_____ ss. 14, 94, 95.

See *PENAL CODE*, s. 177

13 C. W. N. 191

_____ s. 41.

See *LANDLORD AND TENANT.*

12 C. W. N. 154

CESSER, PROVISIO FOR.

See *WILL—CONSTRUCTION.*

12 B. L. R. 1

CESSION OF BRITISH TERRITORY IN INDIA.

1. _____ **Evidence of cession—Transfer or re-arrangement of jurisdiction in British territory**
—*Statutes 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 85, s. 43—Statutes 24 & 25 Vic., c. 67, s. 22—Statutes 24 & 25 Vic., c. 104, s. 9—Evidence Act, s. 113—Effect of cession of territorial jurisdiction.* The power to cede territory was not one of the powers to which the Secretary of State for India in Council succeeded under 21 & 22 Vic., c. 106, when the Government of India was by that statute transferred to Her Majesty, inasmuch as such a power was not possessed by the East India Company. *DAMODAR GORDHAN v. GANESH DEORAM*

10 Bom. 37

Held, on appeal to the Privy Council, as follows :—
Semble : That the general and abstract doctrine laid down by the High Court at Bombay, that it is beyond the power of the British Crown, without the consent of the Imperial Parliament, to make a cession of territory within the jurisdiction of any of the British Courts in India, in time of peace, to a foreign power, is erroneous. Where an objection is taken to the territorial jurisdiction of a British Court, on the ground that the territory over which the jurisdiction of the Court extended has been ceded to a foreign power, such a cession must be regularly proved, and cannot be established by uncertain inferences from equivocal acts. An agreement on the part of the Government of India purporting to transfer certain villages, forming part of a Regulation province within the Bombay Presidency, and subject to ordinary British jurisdiction, to the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Political Agency of a Native State, does not constitute a cession of territory. A re-arrangement of jurisdiction within British territory in India, by the exclusion of a certain district from the Regulations and Codes there in force, and from the jurisdiction of all the High Courts, with a view to the establishment therein of a native jurisdiction under British supervision and control, cannot be carried out except by legislation, under the provisions of the Imperial Statutes 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 85, s. 43; 24 & 25 Vic., c. 67, s. 22; and 24 & 25 Vic., c. 104, s. 9. The Governor General in Council being precluded by the Act 24 & 25 Vic., c. 67, s. 22, from legislating directly as to the sovereignty or dominion of the Crown over any part of its territory in India, or as to the allegiance of British subjects, cannot, by any legislative Act (e.g., by The Evidence Act of 1872, s. 113) purporting to make a notification in the Government Gazette conclusive evidence of a cession of territory, exclude judicial enquiry as to the nature and lawfulness of that cession. Where the foundation of the jurisdiction of a British Court over the subject-matter of a suit and the parties thereto is territorial, and the territory by a valid cession

CESSION OF BRITISH TERRITORY IN INDIA—concl'd.

ceases to be British, the jurisdiction of the Court can no longer be exercised, whatever be the stage or condition of the litigation at the time of such cession. *DAMODHAR GORDHAN v. DEVRAM KANJI*
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 367
25 W. R. 261: I. L. R. 3 I. A. 102

2. ——— Power of Crown to cede.

Held, that the British Crown has the power, without the intervention of the Imperial Parliament, to make a cession of territory within British India to a foreign prince or feudatory. The opinion expressed by the Privy Council in *Damodhar Gordhan v. Devram Kanji*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 367, followed. Question as to what amounts to a cession in sovereignty discussed. *LACHMI NARAIN v. PARTAB SINGH*
I. L. R. 2 All. 1

CESTUI QUE TRUST.

See TRUSTEE . . . 9 C. W. N. 9

Appointment of Cestui que trust as trustee—Indian Trusts Act (II of 1882). There is no provision in the Indian Trusts Act (II of 1882) that a *cestui que trust* shall not be appointed a trustee. He is not as such incapacitated from being trustee for himself and others; but as a general rule he is not altogether a fit person for the office in consequence of the probability of a conflict between his interest and his duty. *ASHIDBAI v. ABDULLA* (1906)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 271

CHAIRMAN.

See COMPANY—MEETINGS AND VOTING.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 164

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 36.

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 342

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 83

See SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, s. 45.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 192, 195 note, 198

of municipality.

See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, 1884, s. 45.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 448

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT, s. 31.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 192, 195 note, 198

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 717

See DAMAGES, SUIT FOR.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 863

CHAK.

See CUDD LAWS ACT.

I. L. R. 26 All. 574

CHALGENI OR MULGENI TENURE.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 528

CHAMBER JUDGE.

See GUARDIAN AND WARDS ACT.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 590

See HIGH COURT RULES.

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 163

CHAMBERS.

See RECEIVER . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 250

CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE.

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 374

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 4

See RIGHT OF SUIT . 9 C. W. N. 477

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

I. L. R. 27 All. 271

1. ——— Maintenance—Void agreement—Alienation by Hindu widow—Waste. A Hindu widow, as the heiress of her husband, sued his four surviving brothers, who retained the enjoyment of the whole joint estate, for the recovery of her share. While the suit was pending, on the 24th April 1859, she entered into an agreement with the defendant *G*, by which, after reciting the nature of her claim, and stating that she was too poor to prosecute it, she assigned to him all she might be entitled to receive from the joint estate in right of her deceased husband, together with all interest and accumulations thereon, and all advantage to be derived from the suit about to be instituted by the defendant *G*, and she appointed him her attorney to institute and carry on any suit in her name for recovering her right and share in the property; it being agreed that he should retain one moiety of what might be recovered absolutely for his own benefit as remuneration, and out of the other moiety should repay himself such sums as he might from time to time have advanced or paid for her maintenance, with interest at 12 per cent. per annum, and also such sums and costs as he might from time to time have advanced or been put to in carrying on the suits, with interest at 12 per cent. per annum, and should pay over the residue to the widow herself. Subsequently that suit was withdrawn. In May 1859, the widow, by *G*, filed a fresh bill against her husband's surviving brothers for recovery of her husband's share in the estate together with accumulations, and in August 1861 obtained a decree for a large sum of money out of the joint estate—"the whole to be enjoyed by her as a Hindu widow in the manner prescribed by Hindu law." By a deed dated November 14th, 1860, *G* assigned his interest under the assignment of April 1859 to *H S*, the defendant. In a suit brought on the 22nd February 1866 by the reversionary heirs of the husband, in the Court of the Principal Sudder Ameen of Hooghly, against the widow, *G*, and *H S*, the last one of whom alone resided in Calcutta, which suit was on the 23rd of April 1866 removed into the High Court on the application of *G* and *H S*, it was prayed that the

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agreement of April 1859 and all sub-assignments that might have been made be set aside as void, and that the money should be paid into Court and kept there during the life of the widow defendant for the benefit of the reversionary heirs, and in order to prevent waste. *Held* by PHEAR, J., that the suit, being one to prevent contemplated waste, was not barred by lapse of time. The agreement of 4th April 1859 was void as being without definite consideration, and being in the nature of a gambling transaction, not valid against heirs under Hindu law; and it was also void, being of a champertous nature, and contrary to public policy. The law which forbids and avoids all acts contrary to public policy, and subversive of the general interests of society, is in force in this country. Independent of the Charter, there is a power inherent in any Court of Justice which receives its authority from the State to make the interests of private persons subordinate to those of the public, and to take care that where they are in conflict, the latter should prevail. *Held* on appeal by PEACOCK, C.J., and MACPHERSON, J., that the suit could be maintained for the relief sought, and for the protection of the property; that the deed of the 4th April 1859, so far as it related to the moiety of the property assigned to the defendant *G* absolutely, was not binding on the plaintiffs or on the persons who, upon the death of the widow, might succeed to the property of her deceased husband. Though not void on the ground of champerty, it was an unconscionable bargain, and a speculative, if not a gambling, contract, and there was no necessity for such an alienation by the widow. But so far as regards the assignment of the moiety as security for the advances and expenses which *G* or his assigns might reasonably and properly make or incur for the maintenance of the widow, for carrying on the necessary proceedings to enforce the rights, with 12 per cent. interest on such advances, it was not void, but created a charge upon that moiety, which was binding upon the reversionary heirs of the husband to the extent of such advances and expenses. There was legal necessity for such charge, and it affected the moiety both of principal and accumulations. *Held* by MACPHERSON, J., that the agreement of April 1859 was void by English law as being a mere gambling transaction and contrary to public policy and illegal. *GROSE v. AMRITAMAYI DASSEE*

4 B. L. R. O. C. 1: 12 W. R. O. C. 13

2. ——— Assignment of debutter land in consideration of defendant ejecting by suit, at his own cost, the Brahmins, etc. A Hindu widow, together with the next heir, joined in assigning to the defendant a debutter estate, in consideration of the defendant conducting, at his own cost, proceedings for the ejection of Brahmins and Baniyas then in occupation as poojaries to conduct the worship of the idols; and upon the condition that he should thereafter conduct such worship, and out of the proceeds and offerings

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retain three-fourths for his own purposes and for hospitality, and pay the remaining fourth for the maintenance of the widow and the heir. *Held*, that the assignment was valid, the purpose for which the lands were dedicated being provided for; and that, although the transaction amounted to champerty, that was no ground for treating it as invalid. An assignment between Hindus of property the subject-matter of litigation, on conditions which constitute champerty, is not on that ground invalid. *JADUBINDU ODHAKAREE v. LOKENAUTH GEREE* Marsh. 303: 2 Ray 130

3. ——— Bond given to secure money for litigation. A suit will lie on a bond given for the purpose of securing money to be expended in carrying on law proceedings. *NOBEEN CHUNDER GHOSE v. RAMGOGERNATH GOPE*

W. R. 1864, 63

4. ——— Transfer of property for purpose of litigation. The Courts will not interfere when a transfer is completed at once,—e.g., when a party buys a certain share of a litigant's risk and stands or falls by his purchase, having only the right to recover his share from the party suing if the latter wins his case, and having no claim at all if the Courts decide against him. *Quære*: Whether, in the present state of the law in India (1864), champerty can be pleaded at all. *PUNCHANUN MUZOOMDAR v. DOORGA NATH ROY*

W. R. 1864, 300

5. ——— Law in Bengal. *Held* by GLOVER, J. (MACPHERSON, J., dissenting), that there is no law against champerty or maintenance in Bengal. *PANCH COWREE MAHTOON v. KALEE CHURN*

9 W. R. 430

6. ——— Assignment of interest for purpose of litigation. *Quære*: Whether champerty or maintenance, according to English law, is forbidden by the law of India. Where *A* sues in respect of his own interest for the violation of a contract made for him by *B* as agent only, the assignment of *B*'s interest in the agreement, in order to enable *A* to bring his suit, is not champerty or maintenance. *FISCHER v. KAMALA NAICKER*

3 W. R. P. C. 33: 8 Moo. I. A. 170

JUGMOHUN LAL v. BUDDUN KOER 9 W. R. 243

7. ——— Agreement against public policy—*Void agreement*. *R* entered into an agreement with *G* that if a suit which was then about to be brought by *G* for the recovery of certain lands should be decided in favour of *G*, *R* was to pay *G* Rs5, and *G* was to make over to *R* half the land recovered. *R* was to pay Rs50 in certain proportions, which *R* was to lose if the suit was not decided in favour of *G*. *G* recovered the land, and *R* then sued him upon the above agreement. *Semble*: That the agreement was not void on the ground of champerty; at any rate, that it was capable of explanation by a consideration of the surrounding circumstances, which the plaintiff

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should have had an opportunity of giving in evidence. *RAMRAY KHUNDERAV v. GOVIND PAND-SHET* 6 Bom. A. C. 63

8. ——— Maintenance—Application of law of champerty—Duty of Court—Specific performance of lease savouring of champerty. The law of England as to the offences of maintenance and champerty does not apply to natives of India. In dealing with objections to their contracts, on the ground of maintenance and champerty, the Court must look to the general principles regarding public policy and the administration of justice upon which that law at present rests. To constitute "maintenance" improper litigation must have been stirred up with a bad motive for purposes contrary to public policy and justice. "Champerty" is a species of "maintenance" and of the same character, but with the additional feature of a condition or bargain providing for a participation in the subject-matter of the litigation. Specific performance decreed of a lease, though the lease formed part of an arrangement whereby, as a consideration for the lease, the plaintiff was to lend the defendant money to enable him (*inter alia*) to commence proceedings against the then tenant of the subject-matter of the intended lease. *PITCHAKUTTI CHETTI v. KAMALA NAYAKKAN* 1 Mad. 153

9. ——— Agreement to carry on law-suit—Public policy. One *M H*, being apprehensive that (in consequence of an action of trespass in the Supreme Court which *M R* and *A R* had brought against *P P*) he was in danger of being deprived of a piece of land of which he was then possessed, entered into an agreement with *K N* that he, *K N*, should conduct the pending case at his own costs and necessary expenses, and that after *M H* should have proved that the piece of land was his sole property, *K N* and *M H* should erect a building on it at their joint expense, and that the rents and profits of such building should be enjoyed by *K N* and *M H* jointly during the lifetime of *M H*, after whose death the property, with the building, was to be the sole and absolute property of *K N*. Held, that the above agreement (when considered in connection with its surrounding circumstances) did not savour of maintenance or champerty, nor was it void as being against public policy. The question as to how far the English law relating to maintenance and champerty is applicable to Hindus in the presidency towns considered. *Quære*: Whether that law was ever applicable to cases where pecuniary assistance is afforded to defendants. *DAMODHAR MADHAVJI v. KAHANDAS NARANDA* 8 Bom. O. C. 1

10. ——— Invalidity of contract on ground of maintenance—Agreement against public policy. A commissariat officer named *M* had a butler named *L*, who was employed to put forward with the money of *M*, or his own, various large contracts. Two accounts were opened in several houses of agency in the names of *M* and

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L. To secure himself, *M* caused *L* to execute a will leaving his whole estate to *M*. Testator and legatee perished together in the *Persia* steamship in 1864. The Administrator General of Madras administered to *L*'s estate, but the personal representatives of *M* contested the right of the Administrator General to pay over the fund to those of *L*. The result was that *L*'s representatives were recommended by their attorney, *C*, to apply to one *J* (the present plaintiff), who was also a client of *C*'s, for the necessary funds. *J* consented to advance money for the purpose of the suit, and on the 28th July 1869 a so-called deed of mortgage, drawn up by *C*, was executed between the present defendants as mortgagors and the plaintiff, *J*, as mortgagee, whereby, in consideration of an advance of the sum of Rs.5,000 (the receipt of Rs.1,800 of which was by the instrument acknowledged) to be made by *J* to such attorney as he should select, before the 31st of December 1869, the defendants mortgaged everything which they might be entitled to recover by suit, the mortgage to be defeasible on payment of 50 per cent. of what they might recover by suit, and a further 50 per cent. upon all to which they might be entitled as the persons entitled to *L*'s estate. They also covenanted to repay the money lent with interest. The present defendants succeeded in their suit against the Administrator General, and this suit was brought by *J* to recover a commission of 50 per cent. on the sum recovered, and the sums advanced, with interest. Defendants denied that plaintiff had fulfilled his part of the agreement and alleged that in consequence of his neglecting to supply funds they had been compelled to borrow of a third party. They also pleaded that the agreement was void for champerty and maintenance. Held, that by the law of England, which prevailed in the present suit, this contract was clearly void, being contrary to the plain provision of the common and statute law against maintenance, and that it was also void as being contrary to public policy. The Court further found that the plaintiff had failed to fulfil his part of the contract, but allowed him to recover the sum really advanced by him, viz., Rs.2,200 with interest. *MULLA JAFFARJI TYEB ALI v. YACALI KADAR BI* 7. Mad. 128

11. ——— Contract with a litigant to supply funds on security of property in dispute—Maintenance. A contract made in good faith by a person with a litigant to supply him with funds to carry on the suit on the security of the property in dispute will be enforced. Such a contract is distinguishable from an officious intermeddling in the suits of other persons, or acts tending to prevent unnecessary litigation. *Quære*: Whether contracts involving maintenance and champerty, as those offences are defined by English law, will be enforced. *NUTHOO LALL v. BUDREE PERSHAD* 1 N. W. 1

12. ——— Purchaser joining in suit to recover property. Where the purchaser of a share of land joins his vendor in a suit to

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recover his own property, his action cannot be termed "champerty." *MUNIRAKHUN SINGH v. BHODOY SINGH* . . . 12 W. R. 133

13. ——— Speculative purchase of right of appeal. *Quære*: Ought the speculative purchase of a right of appeal to be recognized by a Court of Justice? *TROYLUCKONATH BANERJEE v. BRINDABUN CHUNDER SIKKAR CHOWDHRY* . . . 18 W. R. 438

14. ——— Suit by assignee against assignor—*Maintenance*. An assignee of property is not entitled to recover against his assignor on the footing of a champertous contract. An assignee of property whose assignor was not in possession when the assignment was made, can only recover, even from the hands of third persons upon showing that he would have had a right to enforce specific performance of his contract against his assignor if the property were come back to the hands of the assignor. *BOODHUN SINGH v. LUTEE FUN* . . . 22 W. R. 535

15. ——— Alienation by Hindu widow. *K D*, a Hindu widow, having applied to *H S* to aid her in leaving the family dwelling-house of her late husband, *G C C*, where she alleged she was improperly treated and placed under restraint by the plaintiff, her husband's sole surviving brother, *H S*, at his own cost, enabled her to do so. She then applied to *H S* to advance funds for the payment of certain debts incurred by her in consequence of the plaintiff's refusal to pay her any portion of the family estate, to allow her a monthly sum for maintenance, and to manage and conduct for her a suit which she proposed to institute to establish her right to a portion of the joint estate; and *H S* consented to do so upon certain terms, which were embodied in a deed by which *K D* assigned to *H S* all her right, share and interest as widow of *G C C* in the joint estate and in the accumulations thereof, and in the separate estate of *G C C*, and all benefit to be derived from the intended suit; on trust, first, to repay all the costs of the suit; secondly, to retain, by way of remuneration for managing the suit, one half of what might be recovered therein; and, thirdly, to hold the residue as security for repayment, with interest at 12 per cent., of the sums advanced by *H S*; the surplus, after satisfying all such sums, to be paid to *K D*. Then *K D*, with the aid and under the management of *H S*, brought a suit against the plaintiff and other members of the joint family of *G C C* for a declaration of her rights under the will of his father, *R C*, and for the administration of *G C C*'s share of the joint estate. The result of this suit was that *K D* was (among other things) declared entitled as a Hindu widow to *R1,01,302-14-10* in respect of the accumulations of the joint property, between the dates of *R C*'s and *G C C*'s deaths, the plaintiff paid the *R1,01,302-14-10* into Court, under an order made in the suit. *K D* subsequently obtained an order, under which she took this sum out of Court, not-

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withstanding that the plaintiff applied for an injunction to restrain her taking it out. Upon her obtaining that order, the plaintiff, as immediate reversionary heir of *G C C*, instituted the present suit against *K D* and *H S*, to restrain *K D* from taking the *R1,01,302-14-10* out of Court, and to compel her to bring back any portion thereof which she might have already received; and for a declaration that the assignment to *H S* created no valid charge thereon. *Held* (following the decision in the case of *Grose v. Amritamayi Dasi*, 4 B. L. R. O. C. 1), that the assignment to *H S* was not binding on the reversionary heirs of *G C C*, except as regards the charge on one moiety for expenses incurred and advances made by *H S* whether by way of maintenance or otherwise, with interest thereon at 12 per cent. *BISWANATH CHUNDER v. KHANTAMANI DASI* . 9 B. L. R. 76

16. ——— Operation of conveyance pendente lite—*Conditional transfer—Maintenance*. *N*, claiming to be entitled to certain real and personal property as heir of one *J*, brought a suit under Act XIX of 1841 to obtain possession thereof; and, in order to provide funds to carry on the litigation, executed an *ikrarnama*, whereby he purported to relinquish and convey to one *K* a moiety of his right, title, and interest in the property, in consideration of the sum of *R50*, *K* agreeing to take all proper steps and to defray all expenses necessary for the recovery of the property, which was valued in the *ikrarnama* at *R75,000*. *K* accordingly carried on the suit and incurred costs to the extent of *R1,700*, but the suit was ultimately dismissed. The property was afterwards taken possession of by the Court of Wards on behalf of one *S*, who claimed under an alleged adoption by one *A*, the person last in possession. Thereafter *K* sold his interest under the *ikrarnama*, which he valued at *R2,18,000*, to the plaintiff for the sum of *R1,700*. In a suit brought against the Court of Wards as representing *S* for the recovery of a moiety of the property or its value, in which *N* refused to join as plaintiff and was made a defendant:—*Held*, that the suit was not maintainable; the conveyance by *N* to *K* did not operate as a present transfer of the property, but only as an agreement to transfer it on conditions which were never fulfilled; the plaintiff was not entitled to recover as against *S*, who was no party to the deed. *Held*, also, that the transaction was void as being contrary to public policy, and one to which effect ought not to be given by the Court. *TARA SOONDAREE CHOWDHRAIN v. COLLECTOR OF MYMENSINGH* . 13 B. L. R. 495: 20 W. R. 446

See *BHOBOSOONDREE DASSEAH v. ISSUR CHUNDER DUTT* . . . 11 B. L. R. 36: 18 W. R. 140

17. ——— Suit against public policy—*Malicious suit by assignee of right to sue—Maintenance*. In the case of a person who, having been defeated in a former suit, seeks out from vindictive feelings others who he thinks can establish a claim to the property in dispute, and prevails upon them.

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to assign to him their supposed rights, it would be contrary to public policy to allow such a suit to be maintained. *BISHONATH DEY ROY v. CHUNDER MOHUN DUTT BISWAS* . . . 23 W. R. 185

18. ——— Bond executed by Hindu widows—*Maintenance—Fraud—Undue influence and threats.* The three childless widows of a zamindar instituted a suit against the rightful heir to their husband's estate, in which they unsuccessfully disputed his legitimacy. Previously thereto they had obtained advances of money from the present plaintiff, and executed in his favour an agreement and a bond, whereby they secured to him the payment of large sums in case they recovered their husband's estate, and virtually gave to him the entire control of their suit. Subsequently they agreed with the rightful heir to compromise the suit, which compromise, however, was never acted upon, partly owing, it was alleged, to the subsequent conduct of the heir. At the date of the compromise the heir, who had just attained his majority, and was without proper counsel or assistance, and acted under threats from the plaintiff, a powerful and wealthy banker, that he would carry on the litigation against him *per fas aut nefas*, was induced, contrary to his own judgment and sense of right, and without any evidence that the sum claimed was really due to the plaintiff, to execute a bond in his favour, whereby he bound himself to pay a large sum of money claimed by the plaintiff as being due from the widows; the plaintiff on his part agreeing that he would treat such payment as a satisfaction of his claim against the widows, but meanwhile that he would retain the securities which he held from them. In a suit brought by the plaintiff against the heir to enforce the last-mentioned bond:—*Held*, that the bond was wholly invalid and fraudulent as against the defendant, and that, as there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant independently of the bond, it could not stand as a security for anything which might be justly due from the widows. *Quære*: Whether the plaintiff could have recovered from the widows, if they had been successful against the heir, the large sums of money secured by their bond and agreement. The law of champerty and maintenance is not the same in India as in England. The English statute with regard to champerty is not applicable in the moussil in India. The Indian Courts in every transaction must decide upon the fact whether it is merely the acquisition of an interest in the subject of litigation *bona fide* entered into, or whether it is an unfair or illegitimate transaction got up for the purpose merely of spoil, or of litigation, disturbing the peace of families, and carried on from a corrupt or other improper motive. *CHE-DAMBARA CHETTY v. RENJA KRISHNA MUTHU VIRA PUCHANJA NAIKER*

13 B. L. R. P. C. 509: L. R. 1 I. A. 241
22 W. R. 148

Affirming the decision in the High Court.

7 Mad. 85

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19. ——— Agreement against public policy—*Maintenance—Malicious prosecution—Reasonable and probable cause—Practice—Security for costs by a person not a party to the suit.* In a deed, dated 17th July 1867, it was recited that A was entitled to certain property then in possession of D and E, and that A and B, her husband, "having no funds to adopt or to commence legal proceedings" for the recovery of the property, had applied to C to assist them in commencing and conducting the necessary suits and to make all the requisite disbursements connected therewith until their final termination, and that C had agreed to do so; and also, as A and B had "no means whatever" to pay to them or the survivor R150 a month until the final termination of the litigation. Then followed the appointment by A and B of C to be their attorney to institute and prosecute all necessary suits, to sign all papers and documents, to receive all moneys and take possession of all lands, etc., to which A and B might become entitled under any decree or order that might be made, and to appoint attorneys and vakils. C then covenanted to institute and prosecute the necessary suits, and to make the necessary advances and payments and to pay R150 a month to A and B. Then it was agreed that out of the moneys or proceeds of lands, etc., recovered, C should, in the first place, retain and reimburse himself all advances and payments made by him with interest thereon at 12 per cent.; in the second place, retain to himself, by way of remuneration for his trouble and risk, one-third of the nett proceeds of the litigation; and, in the third place, make over the remaining two-thirds to A and B. A and B covenanted not to intermeddle with C in prosecuting the litigation, that they would render him all possible assistance, and that the power-of-attorney given by them to C should be irrevocable so long as he prosecuted the litigation and paid the monthly allowance of R150. It was provided, however, that if B wished to devote all his time thereto, he might have the management of the litigation, but under the control of C; and that A and B might revoke the power-of-attorney on repayment to C of all money advanced by him with interest at 12 per cent. and the sum of R2,000 by way of liquidated damages. A power was also reserved to A and B to compromise, but only with the consent of C, unless the sum to be received on the compromise should exceed the total amount of C's advances with interest at 12 per cent. In pursuance of this agreement, a suit was instituted in the names of A and B against D and E to recover possession of the property. This suit was by the High Court decreed in the plaintiff's favour, but was on appeal dismissed by the Privy Council with costs. While the suit was in the Court of first instance, D and E applied to have C added as a party. This application was refused, and D and E did not appeal from that refusal. Pending the litigation, A and B brought a suit against D and E for *wasilat*, and obtained a decree. On

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the 21st September *A* and *B* executed a memorandum of agreement, whereby *C* purchased all their rights in the two suits brought by them against *D* and *E*. *D* and *E* now brought a suit against *C*, alleging that they had suffered loss and damage by the litigation instituted by *A* and *B*; that *C* was guilty of champerty and maintenance; that the litigation was commenced and continued maliciously by *C* in the names of persons who had no legal or equitable right, and without reasonable or probable cause; that the agreement of 17th July 1867 was illegal and contrary to public policy; that the litigation was carried on by *C* at his own expense and for his own benefit; and that *C* was the real mover in the proceedings, and illegally used the procedure of the Court to the damage and injury of the plaintiffs. *Held*, in the Court below and on appeal, that there was reasonable and probable cause for the institution of the *wasilat* suit brought by *A* and *B* against *D* and *E*. *Held*, by MACPHERSON, J., that the agreement of July 1867 was illegal and against public policy, as also were the subsequent institution and maintaining of the suit against *D* and *E* by *C*; and that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover from *C* the loss they had sustained by reason of the suits which he (substantially only for his own benefit) had maintained against them. *Held*, on appeal (reversing the decision of the Court below), that the suit was not maintainable. The English statutes with regard to champerty and maintenance do not apply to India. In England, champerty and maintenance were offences punishable by the Common Law; and the ground on which an action is allowed in England,—*viz.*, that *C* had been guilty of an offence by which the plaintiff had suffered damage,—does not exist in India. The only ground, on which agreements which savour of champerty or maintenance are held to be void in this country, is that they are contrary to public policy. Assuming that the agreement of July 1867 was a valid one, and that *C* did thereby acquire an interest in the subject-matter of the suit, and supplied the means of carrying it on, such acts did not entitle the plaintiffs to maintain the present suit, or to recover against *C* the costs of the former suit. *C* ought to have been made a co-plaintiff with *A* and *B* in the former suit, or he ought to have been called upon to give security for the costs of that suit. CHUNDERKANT MOOKERJEE v. RAMCOOMAR KOONDOD. 13 B. L. R. 530: 22 W. R. 138

In the same case: *Held*, on appeal to the Privy Council, that the English laws of maintenance and champerty are not of force as specific laws in India, either in the mofussil or in the presidency towns. The ground on which contracts of the nature of champerty and maintenance should be held by the Indian Courts to be invalid is that they are contrary to public policy. An agreement to supply funds to carry on a suit in consideration of having a share in the property if recovered is not necessarily opposed to public policy, since cases

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may easily be supposed in which it would be in furtherance of right and justice that a suitor who had a just title to property, and no means to support it, should be assisted in this way. But agreements purporting to be made to meet such cases, when found to be extortionate and unconscionable so as to be inequitable, or to be entered into for improper objects, as for the purpose of gambling in litigation or of injuring others by encouraging unrighteous suits, are contrary to public policy, and ought not to have effect given to them. Since by the law of India a shamperious agreement does not constitute a punishable offence, an action in that country, founded on alleged champerty, to recover losses and costs incurred in litigation, cannot be sustained on the ground that a remedy by action accrues where an indictable offence has been committed. No action will lie for improperly putting the law in motion in the name of a third party, unless it is alleged and proved that it has been done maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause. In the absence of such proof, an action for losses and costs incurred in defending a suit will not lie as against a person who is alleged to have been a mover in that suit, and to have had an interest in it, but who had not been made a party to the record, since such a state of things creates no legal privity from which a promise can be implied on which an action on contract can be founded, nor does it, *ex hypothesi*, constitute a legal wrong. RAMCOOMAR KOONDOD v. CHUNDER KANTO MOOKERJEE

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 233: L. R. 4 I. A. 23

20. — Agreement to supply money for another person's suit—Excess of the reward rendering such agreement inequitable. A fair agreement to supply money to a suitor to carry on a suit, in consideration of the lender's having share of the property sued for, if recovered, is not to be regarded as necessarily opposed to public policy, or, merely on this ground, void. But in agreements of this kind the questions are (a) whether the agreement is extortionate and unconscionable, so as to be inequitable against the borrower; or (b) whether the agreement has been made not with the *bond fide* object of assisting claim believed to be just and of obtaining reasonable compensation therefor, but for improper objects, as for the purpose of gambling in litigation, or of injuring others, so as to be, for these reasons, contrary to public policy. In either of these cases, effect is not to be given to the agreement. Here, upon the facts, the above case (b) did not arise, and this agreement was not contrary to public policy. But this agreement fell within case (a), and the judgment of the High Court was affirmed, that the agreement was so extortionate and unconscionable, in regard to the excess of the reward, that it was inequitable, and, therefore, not enforceable against the defendant. Ramcoomer Koondod v. Chunder Kanto Mookerjee, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 233:

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L. R. 4 I. A. 23, referred to and followed.
MOHKAM SINGH v. RUP SINGH

I. L. R. 15 All. 352
L. R. 20 I. A. 127

21. ——— Suit for specific performance—Purchase by Mahomedan mooktear from Hindu family—*Onus probandi*. Where a mooktear of the Court, a Mahomedan, brought a suit for specific performance of an agreement alleged to have been made by him with the members of a Hindu family, which agreement savoured of champerty, it was held that the plaintiff must show that the claim was certain, fair, and just in every way. The Courts will not countenance suits of such a description. ABED HOSSEIN v. LALLA RAMSARAN

13 B. L. R. 516 note: 13 W. R. 426

22. ——— Assignment of a right to sue—Maintenance. In 1869, *P*, the liquidator of the *N F Co.*, compromised for R15,000 the claims of the company against the fourth defendant, *M K*, which amounted to R1,61,500. *P* was induced to agree to this compromise in consequence of representations made to him by the friends of *M K* to the effect that *M K* had no available assets, and could not meet his liabilities. In 1878 the first plaintiff, *G J*, alleging that the said compromise had been fraudulently effected, and that the defendant, *M K*, at the time of the compromise, had been and was still possessed of ample property to pay off his liabilities, induced the liquidator of the company to assign to him the company's claim against *M K*, and brought this suit, praying that the compromise with *P* might be declared not binding, and that *M K* might be ordered to pay the plaintiff, as assignee of the *N F Co.*, the sum of R1,61,500 with interest. *Held*, that the assignment to the plaintiff, *G J*, of the claims of the *N F Co.* against *M K* was effected with a view to litigation, and that, under the circumstances, the suit was not maintainable. GOULDAS JAGMOHANDAS v. LAKHMIDAS KHMJI

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 402

23. ——— Party having aspeculative interest in suit. The plaintiffs sued for possession of certain immoveable property, "by avoidance of a spurious deed of gift" executed by one *N*, deceased, in favour of the defendant. *H*, one of the plaintiffs, joined in the suit under an agreement with the other plaintiffs that he should defray the costs of the suit from the Court of first instance up to the Privy Council, and that he should then become proprietor of one-half of the property in suit and be entitled to half the costs. *Held*, that *H* had no right to join in the suit. HAZARI LAL v. JADAUN SINGH

I. L. R. 5 All. 76

24. ——— Sale dependent on success in suit—Absolute sale. *A* sued *V* and *S* to establish his right to attach a certain house in execution of a decree obtained by him in a previous suit. In

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their written statement the defendants alleged that *A* had obtained the decree in question by fraud. Shortly before the present suit *V* had mortgaged the house to *H* for R33,000. About three weeks after the suit had been filed, *H* advanced a further sum of R5,000 to *V* on the same security, and on the same day, 12th December 1881, entered into an agreement with *V* by which *H* agreed to buy the house for R45,000, the sale to be completed immediately after the decision of the present suit. The agreement provided that *V* should defend the suit, but if the result of the suit should be to establish the plaintiff's right to seize the house in execution, then that *H* should be at liberty to cancel the contract of sale. *Held*, that the agreement of 12th December amounted to an absolute sale by *V* to *H* of the equity of redemption of the house in question, and that it was not champertous. AHMEDBHOY HUBIBHOY v. VULLEEBHOY CASSUMBHOY

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 323

25. ——— Agreement to share property the subject of suit—Claim for payment for work done and expenses properly incurred—Agreements not opposed to public policy. The English law of champerty is not in force in India. Agreements made by claimants of property in litigation to share it with others on their obtaining decrees in consideration of funds being supplied by the latter for carrying on their suits are not in themselves opposed to public policy, nor are they necessarily void. But such agreements, when extortionate, are inequitable, and in that case should not receive effect. Although the present suit failed for this last reason, still reasonable compensation, under the claim for general relief for work done and expense properly incurred, could be awarded, as it had been by the Appellate Court below. RAGHUNATH v. NIL KANTH

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 843

S. C. KUNWAR RAMLAL v. NIL KANTH

L. R. 20 I. A. 112

26. ——— Agreement to divide property after litigation, if successful—Furnishing money under such agreement. An agreement to furnish money for litigation on the terms of sharing the property to be recovered thereby is not necessarily void in India, unless accompanied by circumstances which lead to the conclusion that it was not a "*bona fide* one for the acquisition of an interest in the subject-matter of litigation, but an illegitimate transaction got up for the purpose merely of spoil, or of litigation, disturbing the peace of families, and carried on from a corrupt and improper motive." TARACHAND v. SUKLAL

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 559

27. ——— Maintenance—Gambling in litigation—Agreement opposed to public policy—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 23. The judgment of the Privy Council in *Ramcoomar Coondoo v. Chunder Kanto Mookerjee*, L. R. 4 I. A. 23: I. L. R. 2 Calc. 233, shows that, while

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contd.**

the specific English law of maintenance and champerty has not been introduced into India, and while fair agreements to supply funds to carry on litigation in consideration of having a share of the property if recovered should not be regarded as *per se* opposed to public policy, yet such agreement should be carefully watched, and if extortionate and unconscionable, or made not with the *bond fide* object of assisting for a reasonable recompense, a claim believed to be just, but for the purpose of gambling in litigation, or of injuring or oppressing others by encouraging unrighteous suits, should be held contrary to public policy, and not enforced. For the purposes of meeting the expenses of an appeal to the High Court, the appellant, on the advice of his legal adviser, executed a bond for R25,000 in consideration of the obligee agreeing to defray such expenses. The obligor agreed to pay the R25,000 within one year from his recovering possession of the property in suit; and at the request of the obligor's pleader, the obligee advanced R3,700, which was applied to the expenses of the appeal. The High Court dismissed the appeal; and in a deed executed by the obligor in favour of the obligee and others for the purpose of defraying the expenses of a further appeal to the Privy Council, he admitted his liability under the former bond. The Privy Council decreed his appeal, and he obtained possession of the property in suit, but declined to pay the R25,000, upon which the obligee sued upon the bond. It was found that, apart from the moneys borrowed by the obligor from time to time, he was without even the means of subsistence; that he executed the bond with his eyes open and perfectly understood his position and the effect of both the instruments executed by him; that no fraud or improper pressure appeared to have been applied to him; that his legal advisers had acted honestly and to the best of their ability in his interest; that there was nothing to show that, having regard to the risks of the litigation, he could have obtained the assistance necessary for the prosecution of his appeal on better terms than those contained in the bond; that without such assistance he could not have appealed to the High Court; and that the obligee gave him such assistance upon his application. *Held*, also, that the obligee could not, under the circumstances, have considered both that the obligor's claim was a just one and reasonably likely to succeed, and that the R25,000 was a reasonable recompense in the event of success for the advance of R3,700; and the bond was therefore a gambling in litigation, which it would be contrary to public policy to enforce. The Court gave the plaintiff a decree for the R3,700 actually advanced, with simple interest at 20 per cent. per annum from the date of the bond to the date of the decree, with costs in proportion, and interest at 6 per cent. per annum on the R3,700, interests and costs, from the date of the decree until payment.

CHUNNI KUAR v. RUP SINGH

I. L. R. 11 All. 57

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contd.**

See LOKE INDAR SINGH v. RUP SINGH

I. L. R. 11 All. 118

and HUSAIN BAKSH v. RAHMAT HUSAIN

I. L. R. 11 All. 128

28. ————— *Bond fide litigation—Absence of corrupt motive—Inadequacy of price.* In consideration of a loan of R30 made by plaintiff to defendant to enable defendant to recover from strangers certain land, defendant sold to plaintiff a portion of the said land, the value of which was about R100. The District Court held that the transaction was champertous, and dismissed a suit by plaintiff to enforce his rights. *Held*, that the inadequacy of the price was not of itself sufficient to invalidate the transaction.

GURUSAMI v. SUBBARAYA

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 118

29. ————— *Purchase for an inadequate consideration—Speculative suit not necessarily champertous.* A suit having been dismissed on the ground that a sale upon which it was based had been made for a consideration so inadequate as to support the belief that it was in the nature of champerty:—*Held*, that the elements required to bring the case within the authorities on the law of champertous transactions in this country were wanting. It was not a case in which an improper interest had been acquired in the unrighteous litigation of other people. The fact that a suit may be speculative does not render it champertous.

SIVA RAMAYYA v. ELLAMMA

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 310

30. ————— *Mortgage—Equity of redemption, assignment of—Suit on such assignment—Public policy, Assignment not opposed to.* The plaintiff sued, as the assignee of the equity of redemption, for account and redemption, alleging that the lands in dispute had been mortgaged to the defendant in 1844 by the ancestor of his (the plaintiff's) assignor. The defendant admitted the mortgage, but set up an unregistered *bedavapatra* (release) of the equity of redemption dated 1865, alleged to have been passed to him by the father of the plaintiff's assignor for a consideration of R800. He also contended that the plaintiff's assignment was champertous, and made with the view of depriving him of the property. The Court of first instance held that the assignment was "a gambling transaction and entered into with the object of gaining the spoils of an unrighteous litigation, and null and void as opposed to public policy," and that the release set up by the defendant could not be given in proof for want of registration, and, therefore, rejected the plaintiff's claim. On appeal to the High Court, *Held*, reversing the decree of the lower Court, that, although the transaction might not be a praiseworthy one *in foro conscientiae*, it could not be regarded by a Civil Court as one entered into "with the object of gaining the spoils of an unrighteous litigation." The equity

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of redemption was an interest in the land which it was open to any one to purchase, however speculative the transaction might be under the special circumstances of the case. **GOPAL RAM-CHANDRA v. GANGARAM ANANDISHEET**

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 72

31.

Maintenance—

Public policy, conveyance opposed to—Prayer for general relief—Hindu Law—Hindu widow, alienation by—Legal necessity—Family debts—Marriage expenses—Costs of litigation. Although the English law relating to champerty has not been extended to India, a conveyance of property tending to foster gambling in litigation is void, as being unconscionable, speculative, and opposed to public policy. *Ram Coomar Coondoo v. Chunder Canto Mookerjee*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 233, and *Fischer v. Kamala Naicker*, 8 Moo. I. A. 170, referred to. A suit to set aside alienations of property made by three Hindu widows in favour of the defendants was instituted by the plaintiffs A, B, and C. The plaint stated that B and C were the reversioners to the widows and that they had conveyed their rights to A. It was prayed that possession of the property might be given to A, and there was a general prayer "for such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require." The lower Court dismissed the claim of A, but relying upon the prayer for general relief made a decree in favour of B and C. *Held*, that the plaintiffs B and C were entitled to no relief in the suit. *Held*, further, that a prayer for general relief is limited by the facts alleged and by the prayer for express relief. *Cargill v. Bower*, L. R. 19 Ch. D. 502; *Hiralal Mullick v. Matilal Mullick*, 5 B. L. R. 682, and *Jugul Kishore Lal Singh Deo v. Kartic Chunder Chattopadhyaya*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 116, followed. Amongst cases of legal necessity authorizing a Hindu widow to alienate properties inherited from a male, are (i) family debts not incurred by her, (ii) debts incurred by her for marriage ceremonies, and (iii) debts incurred by her for costs of litigation. *Ram Coomar Mitter v. Ichamoyi Dasi*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 36; *Amjad Ali v. Moniram Kalita*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 52, and *Hurry Mohun Rai v. Gonesh Chunder Doss*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 323, followed. **DEBI DYAL SAHOO v. BHAN PERTAB SINGH** (1904) . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 433
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 408

32.

Agreement opposed

to public policy—Inadequacy of price for property to be recovered by suit—Hindu law—Alienation by widow—Ratification of transactions not carried out by real heir of property—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 196—Real owner joining in later transactions—Legal necessity—Portion of consideration of deeds of sale justified by necessity—Form of decree for possession and mesne profits, where deeds were held invalid. There is no law in force in India similar in its effect to the English Law of Champerty and Maintenance so as to render void an agreement which would, were such English law applicable,

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be considered champertous. *Ram Coomar Coondoo v. Chunder Canto Mookerjee*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 233, L. R. 4 I. A. 23; *Kunwar Ram Lal v. Nil Kanth*, L. R. 20 I. A. 112, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 343; *Achal Ram v. Kuzim Husain Khan*, I. L. R. 27 All. 27, L. R. 32 I. A. 113, followed. An assignment of property said to be worth three lakhs, by persons claiming to be the next reversioners on the death of a female owner, for a consideration of Rs52,600, of which sum Rs600 was paid at the time of the execution of the deed and the balance payable in portion to the success of a suit by the assignee and assignors to recover the property, for the prosecution of which suit the assignee was to supply the funds. *Held*, not to be a transaction contrary to public policy and void on that ground by reason of the provision for payment of the purchase money. Whether it was an unfair and unconscionable bargain by reason of the inadequacy of the price was a question between the assignors and assignee, which it was unnecessary to decide in a suit in which the assignors did not repudiate the transaction, but asked that effect be given to it and for that purpose joined the assignee as plaintiff in the suit. A person, who claims title under conveyances from a Hindu female heir with a limited interest, and who seeks to enforce that title against reversioners is always subject to the burden of proving not only the genuineness of his conveyances, but the full comprehension by the limited owner of the nature of the alienations she was making, and also that those alienations were justified by necessity, or at least that the alienee did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself of the existence of such necessity. And this burden lies the more heavily on one who comes into Court with the case that he did not take from a limited owner, but from one, whose title he alleges to have been adverse to that owner. The defendant's title to the property in suit depended on an alienation made in his favour by one of three Hindu ladies, who was not the heir of the last male owner, and on two subsequent deeds of sale, which it was sought to set aside in this suit, in which the real owner had joined. *Held*, with reference to the earlier transactions, that the onus on the defendant had not been discharged, and that there was no satisfactory evidence that they had been authorized in any way by the real owner. Now could she ratify them under s. 196 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) by becoming a party to the later transactions; it would be a serious extension of the law, as hitherto applied, to hold that a woman with a limited interest could by acts *ex post facto* charge upon the estate, which she represents, obligations not originally binding upon it. Though the deeds of sale were therefore invalid, the consideration being for the most part not justified by legal necessity, yet as to certain sums in both deeds as to which such necessity was established, it was held that the first Court had rightly made the decree for possession conditional on the payment by the plaintiff of such sums to the defendant. As the deeds were void, as

CHARGE—contd.

subsequent proceedings where
two distinct charges framed—
contd.

See MORTGAGE . . . 9 C. W. N. 1001
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 729
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 92

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—IN-
CUMBRANCES . . . 6 C. W. N. 834

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 5.
9 C. W. N. 697

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, ss. 82,
100 . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 166

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT (IV OF
1882), s. 88 . . . I. L. R. 29 All. 205

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 100.
9 C. W. N. 865
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 397

See TRUST . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 578

1. FORM OF CHARGE.

1. ——— Act XIII of 1865, s. 3—*Duty of committing Magistrate or Justice of the Peace.* A Justice of the Peace or Magistrate committing a prisoner for trial before the High Court was bound, under s. 3 of Act XIII of 1865, to frame and send up with the depositions a specific charge against the prisoner. *REG. v. JEETARAM SHAW*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 404

2. ——— Discretion of Magistrate—*Charge under Ch. XIV, Criminal Procedure Code, 1861.* The course taken by a Magistrate before preparing a charge under Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure must depend upon the circumstances of each case, and the Magistrate should exercise his discretion in the matter. *ANONYMOUS CASE*

3 Mad. Ap. 2

3. ——— Reference to section of Code under which charge is made—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 234, 237.* A charge should be so framed as to refer to the section of the Penal Code under which the offence charged is punishable, as required by ss. 234 and 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *QUEEN v. DURZOOLLA*

9 W. R. Cr. 33

4. ——— Sufficiency of charge. One count charging each specific offence, and describing it with a reasonable degree of certainty, is sufficient. *QUEEN v. BABOOLUN HIJRAH*

5 W. R. Cr. 7

5. ——— Several offences under same section—*Amendment of charge.* Where several offences are charged under the same section, the committing Magistrate should frame the charge so as to contain a separate head for each offence. *QUEEN v. KALARAM SINGH*

7 W. R. Cr. 8

6. ——— Indictment—*Penal Code, s. 161.* An indictment will not be invalidated in consequence of the charge not notifying the specific section. Under s. 161, it is necessary to show that the offence, the instigation of which is the subject

CHARGE—contd.**1. FORM OF CHARGE—contd.**

of the charge, has been committed. *QUEEN v. NOTABUR NUNDY*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 43

7. ——— Specific allegation in charge of absence of exceptions in Penal Code—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 439.* *MARKBY, J.* Although ss. 235 and 237 of Act XXV of 1861 have been repealed, it may still be inferred from *illus. (a), s. 439* of the present Criminal Procedure Code, that it is unnecessary specifically to allege in a charge the absence of all general and some at least of the other exceptions mentioned in the Penal Code. The operation of the illustration, however, is strictly confined to the statement of the offence in the charge. *In the matter of the petition of SHIBO PROSAD PANDAH*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 124

3 C. L. R. 122

8. ——— Unnecessary allegations in charge. Unnecessary allegations in a charge may be rejected as surplusage. *REG. v. CASSIDY*

4 Bom. Cr. 17

9. ——— Want of care in framing charge. Observations by *STUART, C.J.*, on the careless manner in which the charge in this case was framed. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. BALDEO*

I. L. R. 3 All. 322

10. ——— Omission to prepare charge. *Held*, that the omission to prepare a charge did not vitiate the proceedings; and conviction upheld. *REG. v. KARBHAI RAVA BHAI*

5 Bom. Cr. 40

11. ——— Charge prepared after defence. It is an irregularity to prepare the charge against a prisoner after his defence has been recorded. *QUEEN v. CHOTEY LAL*

3 N. W. 271

12. ——— Penal Code, s. 75—*Trial of prisoner of offence under Ch. XII or XVII after previous conviction.* If a prisoner is to be tried for an offence punishable under s. 75 of the Indian Penal Code, a separate charge under that section must be framed and recorded. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DORASAMI*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 284

13. ——— Form as to time and place of offence. In a case in which the charge did not contain such particulars as to time and place as were reasonably sufficient to give notice to the accused of the matter with which he was charged, the accused was acquitted by the High Court. *QUEEN v. UDI T SINGH*

25 W. R. Cr. 46

14. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 222, 223—Particulars to be inserted in charge.* A committing Magistrate is bound, under ss. 222 and 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), to insert in the heads of charge sufficient particulars of time, place, person, and circumstance, as will give each of the prisoners notice of the matter with which he is charged. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. FAKIRAPA*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 491

15. ——— Defect in charge—*Omission of word "dishonestly" in charge and record of conviction.*

CHARGE—*contd.*1. FORM OF CHARGE—*contd.*

The omission of the word "dishonestly," both in the charge and in the record of the conviction, is not a ground for reversal of conviction and sentence where an accused person has fully understood the nature of the offence with which he is charged, and had not been prejudiced by the omission. Conviction and sentence recorded by a Magistrate, and reversed by the Sessions Judge upon this ground, restored by the High Court, on appeal directed by Government under s. 272, Criminal Procedure Code. *QUEEN v. RAKHMA*
10 Bom. 373

16. ——— Charge alleging previous conviction—*Former sentence.* A charge alleging a previous conviction need not show the extent of the former punishment. Revised form of charge stated. *ANONYMOUS* . . . 4 Mad. Ap. 11

17. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 439.* Under s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, if it is intended to prove a previous conviction against an accused person for the purpose of enhancing the punishment, it is necessary to state the fact of that previous punishment in the charge. If it is omitted, it may be added to the charge at any time previous to the sentence being passed, but not after. *QUEEN v. RAJCOOMAR BOSE* . . . 19 W. R. Cr. 41

18. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1872, s. 439.* The fact of previous convictions should, under Act X of 1872, s. 439, be stated in the charge when it is intended to prove them for the purpose of enhancing punishment. *QUEEN v. ESAN CHUNDER DEY* . . . 21 W. R. Cr. 40

19. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 439.* Under s. 439, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, a charge of having committed the offence after a previous conviction therefor should contain an allegation that the offence has been committed after a previous conviction. A statement in a Court that at the time when the prisoner committed the offence (no offence being specifically mentioned in the Court) he had been previously convicted of offences punishable under Ch. XVII of the Penal Code is not a sufficient compliance with the provisions of s. 439. *QUEEN v. JAKIR* . . . 22 W. R. Cr. 39

20. ——— Cheating—*Form of indictment.* In an indictment for cheating under the Penal Code, it is necessary to state that the property was the property of the party defrauded. *QUEEN v. WILLANS* . . . 1 Mad. 31: 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 94

21. ——— *Act XVIII of 1862, s. 41—Defect in charge.* An indictment defective in not stating that the property obtained was the property of the person defrauded is defective for uncertainty, and must be objected to, if at all, before the jury is sworn. *QUEEN v. WILLANS*
1 Mad. 31: 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 94

22. ——— Criminal breach of trust—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1869, s. 242—Offence*

CHARGE—*contd.*1. FORM OF CHARGE—*contd.*

under Bom. Reg. XVII of 1827, s. 16. In order to make an alternative charge of two or more offences regular under s. 242 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the offences specified in such alternative charge must all be offences against the Penal Code. Therefore, a charge against a prisoner either of "criminal breach of trust" under s. 409 of the Penal Code or of "undue exaction of money" under s. 16 of Regulation XVII of 1827 is irregular. *REG. v. AGAM DULLA* . . . 8 Bom. Cr. 115

23. ——— *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 409—Conviction for criminal breach of trust on general deficiency in account.* An accused person may be charged with criminal breach of trust in respect of a general deficiency, and it is not necessary in all cases to charge the accused with the embezzlement of a particular sum received on a certain date from some particular person. *Reg. v. Jones, 8 C. & P. 288, Reg. v. Chapman, 1 C. & K. 119, Reg. v. Wolstenholme, 11 Cox. C. C. 313, and Queen v. Lambert, 2 Cox. C. C. 309, referred to. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KELLIE*
I. L. R. 17 All. 153

24. ——— *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 409—Conviction for criminal breach of trust on a general deficiency in accounts.* Held, that a person accused under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code might be legally convicted of the offence defined in the section on proof of a general deficiency in his accounts, and that it was not necessary that the receipt of, and non-accounting for, specific items should be charged and proved against him. *Queen-Empress v. Kellie, I. L. R. 17 All. 153, approved. BUDDHU v. BABU LAL*
I. L. R. 18 All. 116

25. ——— *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 408—Form of indictment—Practice.* Where the first two counts of an indictment charged the prisoner under s. 408 of the Penal Code with criminal breach of trust in respect of two sums of money, viz., Rs 23-7 and Rs 50, respectively, and the third and last count charged him with criminal breach of trust in respect of a sum of Rs 9,168-6, which last-mentioned sum, as appeared from the depositions, represented a general deficiency in the prisoner's account:—Held, that the third count must be struck out. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PURSOTAM DASS MORARJEE*
I. L. R. 24 Cal. 193

26. ——— Criminal misappropriation—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 234—Charge and trial for criminal misappropriation in respect of a general deficiency in accounts without proof of individual defalcations.* Held, that, having regard to s. 234, Criminal Procedure Code, an accused person cannot be charged with, and tried at the same time for, criminal misappropriation of a sum which is not the subject of a single act of misappropriation, but represents a general deficiency, consisting of a lengthened series of separate defalcations. Where there have been separate acts

CHARGE—contd.**1. FORM OF CHARGE—contd.**

of misappropriation, the accused cannot be tried at the same time for more than three of such acts committed within a year; but when it may be properly inferred from the evidence that there has been but one act of misappropriation, although the sum misappropriated may represent the aggregate of sums received by the accused at different times, he may be charged and tried at one trial in respect of the aggregate sum, or if there be three such acts occurring within a year, then in respect of all of them. *Rex v. Grove*, 1 Moo. C. C. 447, *Reg. v. Lloyd Jones*, 8 C. & P. 288, *Reg. v. Chapman*, 1 C. & K. 119, *Reg. v. Lambert*, 2 Cox. 309, *Queen v. Balls*, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 328, referred to. *In re Chettee*, 15 W. R. Cr. 5, *Queen v. Counsel*, unreported, *Queen-Empress v. Shama Churn Sen*, unreported, *Queen-Empress v. Pursotam Das Morarjee*, I. L. R. 24 Cal. 193, *Queen-Empress v. DeSilva*, unreported, approved of. *Queen-Empress v. Kellie*, I. L. R. 17 All. 153 and *Buddhu v. Babu Lal*, I. L. R. 18 All. 116, dissented from. **EKRAM ALI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS** 2 C. W. N. 341

27. ———— Defamation—Penal Code, s. 499. In framing a charge of defamation under Act XXV of 1861, it is not necessary to negative the exceptions contained in s. 499 of the Penal Code. **REG. v. KIKABHAI PARBADAS** 9 Bom. 451

28. ———— False evidence—Form of charge. In cases of giving false evidence, a separate charge against each prisoner must be framed, and separate trial held of each charge. **ANONYMOUS** 3 Mad. Ap. 32

QUEEN v. BHAIRI MISSEER 7 W. R. Cr. 5

QUEEN v. KUREEM 11 W. R. Cr. 16

29. ———— Trial on charge of perjury. A person accused of perjury is entitled to have the specific charge made against him tried quite independently of a like charge against another person. **REG. v. BHAVANISKAR HARIBHAI** 5 Bom. Cr. 55

QUEEN v. KHOOB LALL 9 W. R. Cr. 66

QUEEN v. RUTTEE RAM 2 N. W. 21

30. ———— Several charges. The Court of Sessions must find judicially whether all, or if not all, which, of the particular charges of perjury, where there is more than one charge, is made out against each prisoner. **QUEEN v. KHOOB LALL** 9 W. R. Cr. 66

31. ———— Penal Code, s. 193. Six persons were charged in the same charge as follows: "That you, on or about the — day of June —, at Tajpur, committed the offence of voluntarily giving false evidence in the stage of a judicial proceeding, and that you have thereby committed an offence under s. 193 of the Penal Code." *Held*, that the charge was bad and defective: *first*, as it charged a number of persons jointly with giving false evidence; *second*, as it did not show what statement the accused persons made; *third*, as it did not mention the day and year when the

CHARGE—contd.**1. FORM OF CHARGE—contd.**

offence was committed; *fourth*, as it did not indicate the Court or officer before whom the false evidence was given. **QUEEN v. MAHARAJ MISSEER** 7 B. L. R. Ap. 66

16 W. R. Cr. 47

32. ———— Penal Code, s. 193. A charge under s. 193, Penal Code, should specify not only the judicial proceeding in the course of which the prisoner is accused of having made the false statement, but the particular stage of the proceeding in which the statement is made. **QUEEN v. FATIK BISWAS** 1 B. L. R. A. Cr. 13

S. C. QUEEN v. FUTTEALI BISWAS 10 W. R. Cr. 37

33. ———— Contradictory statements—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 242. S. 242, Act XXV of 1861, pointed out how the charge is to be drawn up in a case in which it is doubtful which of two statements is made by the accused is false. **QUEEN v. KALA KHAN** 12 W. R. Cr. 23

34. ———— Penal Code, s. 193. In prosecutions for giving false evidence under s. 193 of the Penal Code, the case of each person accused should be separately enquired into, and, if committed for trial, separately tried. It is wholly erroneous to include them in one joint charge. **EMPRESS OF INDIA v. NIAZ ALI I. L. R. 5 All. 17**

35. ———— Several false statements—Aggregate charge. The making of any number of false statements in the same deposition is one aggregate case of giving false evidence. Charges of false evidence cannot be multiplied according to the number of false statements contained in the depositions. **ANONYMOUS** 6 Mad. Ap. 27

36. ———— Precise words of statement. Charges of perjury ought to be based strictly upon the exact words which are used by the person who is charged, and no evidence which does not profess to give the exact words can alone be a safe foundation for a conviction. **QUEEN v. MUNGU L Doss** 23 W. R. Cr. 28

37. ———— False verification of plaint—Separate charges. A person who is called upon to answer to a charge of giving false evidence should know exactly what is the false evidence imputed to him. A charge "that he on or about the 15th April 1871 gave false evidence" is not sufficiently specific. Although the verification of plaints containing false statements is punishable according to the provisions of the law for the time being in force for the punishment of giving or fabricating false evidence, still it is not quite the same thing as giving false evidence. Three separate offences should not be lumped together in a single charge, but each offence should form a separate head of charge, with reference to which

CHARGE—contd.**1. FORM OF CHARGE—contd.**

there should be a distinct finding and a distinct sentence. *QUEEN v. SHEO CHURUN*

8 N. W. 314

38. ————— *Substance of evidence—Penal Code, s. 193.* The alleged false evidence, and not its assumed substance and import, should be set forth in a charge under s. 193 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. JAMURHA* . 7 N. W. 137

39. ————— *Penal Code, s. 193.* In charges of false evidence under s. 193, Penal Code, the charge should specifically state what words or expressions the accused is charged with having uttered, and in what respect they are supposed to be false. *QUEEN v. DOWLUT*

8 W. R. Cr. 95

40. ————— *Penal Code, s. 193—Preciseness of charge.* In framing a charge for giving false evidence under s. 193 of the Penal Code, the charge should be precise; and where the accused is charged with giving false evidence on three different occasions, each occasion should form the subject of a distinct head in the charge. *QUEEN v. FEODAR ROY* 9 W. R. Cr. 14

QUEEN v. ADHYA THAKOOR 17 W. R. Cr. 33

QUEEN v. BOODHUN AHIR 17 W. R. Cr. 32

QUEEN v. SOONDER MOHOOREE 9 W. R. Cr. 25

41. ————— *Several charges—Separate assertion of falseness.* Charges of perjury should contain a distinct assertion with regard to each statement intended to be characterised as perjury: that it was made; that it is untrue in fact; that the accused knew it to be so when he made it; and the investigation of the Court should be directed to each of those points singly. *QUEEN v. KALICHURN LAHOREE* 9 W. R. Cr. 54

42. ————— *Falsification of documents—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 477 A—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 222 (2), 234—Criminal breach of trust by public servant—Acquittal—Framing new charge—General falsification of accounts for a period extending over two years.* The alteration in the law by s. 222 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) does not apply to a charge under s. 477A of the Penal Code (falsification of accounts). It applies only to criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MATI LAL LAHIRI* I. L. R. 26 Calc. 560

3 C. W. N. 412

43. ————— *Forgery—Using false document—Abetment of forgery.* When a Civil Court sends a prisoner before a Magistrate on a charge of forgery, it is competent to the Magistrate to commit the prisoner for trial on a charge either of forgery or of using as genuine a false document or of abetting forgery. *QUEEN v. MOHESH CHUNDER ACHARJEE* 6 W. R. Cr. 20

44. ————— *Omission to specify precise offence—Penal Code, s. 467.* The prisoner

CHARGE—contd.**1. FORM OF CHARGE—contd.**

was charged, under s. 471 of the Penal Code, with fraudulently using as genuine a forged document, and, having been tried before a Sessions Judge and jury, was convicted of that offence. The Sessions Judge, considering the forged document to be of the nature of those specified in s. 467, sentenced the prisoner to ten years' transportation. On appeal, the High Court held that the charge should have distinctly set forth the offence as that of using a forged document of the nature of those specified in s. 467, and that, that not having been done, the trial by jury was illegal. The conviction and sentence were therefore annulled, and it was directed that the prisoner should be retried. *REG. v. GANGARAM MALJI* 6 Bom. Cr. 43

45. ————— *House trespass—Penal Code, s. 451.* A charge under s. 451 must charge the accused with committing house-trespass with intent to commit some specific offence punishable with imprisonment. *QUEEN v. MEHAR DOWALIA* 16 W. R. Cr. 63

46. ————— *Hurt—Causing hurt—Penal Code, s. 324.* The charge and finding in a case of causing hurt, under s. 324 of the Penal Code, need not contain a negation that the hurt was caused on grave and sudden provocation. *ANONYMOUS* 4 Mad. Ap. 5

47. ————— *Illegal gratification—Vagueness of charge.* A charge of attempting to obtain a gratification as a reward for influencing a public servant in exercise of his public functions is illegal as disclosing no legal offence, when it omits to state the person or persons for whom the gratification was obtained, or the public servant to be influenced in the exercise of his public functions. *QUEEN v. SETULCHUNDER BAGCHEE* 3 W. R. Cr. 69

48. ————— *Information of offence, omission to give.* A charge should distinctly set forth the particular offence in respect of which the accused either omitted to give information or gave information which he knew to be false; and it should appear precisely what his duty was in the matter. *QUEEN v. MOOSTEROO* 8 W. R. Cr. 37

49. ————— *Master and Servant—Liability of servant for leaving employer's service without warning.* Where a legislative enactment renders a servant punishable who leaves his employer's service without due warning, a charge under such an enactment will not be sustainable, unless it aver not only that the accused left his employer's service without giving the required warning, but also without lawful excuse. *VITHORA MALHARI v. CORFIELD* 3 Bom. Ap. 1

50. ————— *Mischief—Mischief by setting fire to house.* In a case of mischief by fire with intent to cause the destruction of a dwelling-house, the charge should lay the intent as an intent to cause the destruction, not of a house simply, but of a house used as a human dwelling. *QUEEN v. DURBARRO POLIE* 8 W. R. 30

CHARGE—*contd.*1. FORM OF CHARGE—*contd.*

51. ———— **Murder—Penal Code, s. 302**
—*Objections to charge.* A charge under s. 302 of the Penal Code need not set out at length all the facts necessary to constitute the offence of murder, and negative all the exceptions contained in s. 300, which defines the crime of murder. Technical objections to criminal charges, particularly on the ground of the want of a sufficient specification of details, should be taken before the conclusion of the trial, when the Judge may, if necessary, amend the charge, and not afterwards, unless it appear that some failure of justice has been caused by the irregularity complained of. **GOVERNMENT v. RAMASAWMY 5 W. R. Rec. Ref. 1**

52. ———— **Penal Code, s. 300.** A prisoner was charged with "causing the death of A by inflicting a wound on him with a "chheni" with the intention of causing bodily injury, such as was sufficient, in the course of nature, to cause death, or which he knew to be likely to cause death." *Held*, that the charge was defective and inexact as regarded the second and third clauses of the definition of murder in s. 300 of the Penal Code. With reference to the second clause, it should have run "likely to cause the death of A, the person to whom the harm was caused." With reference to the third clause, it should have said "ordinary course of nature." **EMPRESS v. SAMIR-UDDIN I. L. R. 8 Calc. 211 : 10 C. L. R. 11**

53. ———— **Public safety, offence affecting—Plying unsafe vessel—Penal Code, ss. 282-336.** Boatmen who ply an unseaworthy vessel whereby the lives of passengers for hire are endangered should be charged under s. 282, and not under s. 336, of the Penal Code. **REG. v. KHODA JAGTA 1 Bom. 137**

54. ———— **Rioting—Separate charges against members of rival parties.** Where there is riot and fight between two factions, the members of each party should be committed for trial separately, and not all together. **QUEEN v. DURZOOLLA 9 W. R. Cr. 38**

QUEEN v. BAZU

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 750 : 8 W. R. Cr. 47

55. ———— **Common object not declared in the charge.** A conviction for rioting, based upon a charge, which does not specify the common object of the assembly charged with rioting, is improper. **CHUNDER COOMAR SEN v. QUEEN-EMPRESS 3 C. W. N. 605**

TAFAZZAL AHMED CHOWDHRY v. QUEEN-EMPRESS I. L. R. 26 Calc. 630

56. ———— **Defect in charge—Unlawful assembly—Common object, effect of not stating in charge—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 147.** Where certain accused persons were convicted of rioting, and it appeared that the charge did not specify any common object, and that neither the judgment of the Original Court nor that of the Sessions Judge in appeal found what was the

CHARGE—*contd.*1. FORM OF CHARGE—*contd.*

common object which made the assembly of which the prisoners were members an unlawful one: *Held*, that these defects did not vitiate the proceedings, there being ample evidence on the record to prove what the common object of the assembly was, and to justify the conviction for the offence of which the lower Courts had found the accused guilty. **BASIRADDI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS I. L. R. 21 Calc. 827**

57. ———— **Alternative charge—Common object—Unlawful assembly—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 236.** Fourteen accused were charged with rioting armed with deadly weapons, and with murder and causing grievous hurt during such riot. The common object alleged by the prosecution was to compel the payment of certain money by one of the persons of the opposite party. Some of the accused, who admitted their presence at the scene of the occurrence, stated that they had been attacked on account of an allegation being made that one of the opposite party had enticed away another's wife, and that they had merely acted in self-defence. On the close of the case for the prosecution, the Sessions Judge, considering that possibly the common object alleged by the prosecution might be considered not to have been proved, amended the charge and added an alternative common object to it, namely, that the object of the assembly was to punish one of the opposite side for enticing away another's wife. There was no evidence on the record to prove the alternative common object, it being based solely on a portion of the statements of some of the accused. *Held*, that, if the Sessions Judge was of opinion that there were grounds for charging the accused with a common object other than that alleged by the prosecution, his proper course was not to amend the charge, but to add a separate count or counts to the charge upon which a separate verdict could be taken. S. 236 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only authorizes a charge in the alternative when it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, and not where there may be a doubt as to the facts which constitute one of the elements of the offence. **WAFADAR KHAN v. QUEEN-EMPRESS I. L. R. 21 Calc. 955**

58. ———— **Stolen property, receiving—Penal Code, s. 411.** A charge, under s. 411 of the Penal Code, of dishonestly receiving stolen property should state that the articles found in possession of the accused were the property of A, B, the owner thereof. **REG. v. SIDDU BIN BALNATH 1 Bom. 95**

59. ———— **Unlawful assembly and theft—Cutting and carrying away crops in disputed land—Penal Code, ss. 143, 379.** Observations of the Court as to the proper framing of the charge in cases of unlawful assembly with the object of committing theft by cutting crops. **JAGAT CHANDRA ROY v. RAKHAL CHANDRA ROY 4 C. W. N. 190**

CHARGE—*contd.*1. FORM OF CHARGE—*contd.*

60. ——— Whipping Act. When an accused person is liable to be punished under the Whipping Act, 1864, the charge must state the liability, and the judgment should set out the grounds thereof when that punishment is imposed. *BADYA v. QUEEN* . . . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 158

61. ——— False evidence and perjury—*Offences committed by a person before the Court of Session—Committal of such person by Court of Session for trial before itself—Proceedings to be drawn up on day of committal—Charges of perjury and forgery—Specific statement as to such charges—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 195 and 477—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 193, 466 and 471.* If a Court of Session proceeds to take action under s. 477 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it must, in the first instance, frame a charge so as to enable the accused to know the exact nature of the offence he is alleged to have committed. A charge is a precise formulation of the specific accusation made against a person, who is entitled to know its nature at the earliest stage. After the accusation has been formulated in the shape of a charge, the Sessions Court may then either commit the accused for trial before itself upon the charge so framed, or admit him to bail for the same purpose. *R* was examined as a witness by the Sessions Judge in a case. On the 15th of February the Sessions Judge delivered judgment in that case, and on the same day, purporting to act under s. 477 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had *R* arrested and committed to jail on charges under ss. 193, 466 and 471 of the Penal Code. The 25th of February was fixed for commencing the preliminary inquiry. No proceeding was drawn up or charge framed on the 15th. On the 16th of February an order was recorded by the Sessions Judge as follows:—"In the course of the Sessions trial decided yesterday, I came to the opinion, for reasons stated in my judgment then delivered, that *R* has committed offences under ss. 193, 466 and 471 of the Penal Code, and that it is my duty to hold an inquiry preliminary to committing him to the High Court to be tried for those offences. *R* was yesterday arrested and committed to jail. There was then no time, owing to the lateness of the hour, to draw up this formal proceeding. He will be produced before me, as directed in the warrant, on the 25th of February, when evidence will be taken." *Held*, that the proceeding of the 16th of February contained no particulars of the statements made and acts done by *R* upon which perjury and forgery were charged against him, and was not in any sense a charge or order of commitment, and was not warranted by law. *REILY v. KING-EMPEROR* (1961)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 434; s. c. 5 C. W. N. 609

62. ——— Forgery—Charges, misjoinder of—*Defective charge—Appeal—Trial by jury—Forgery—Using as genuine a forged document—Cheating—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 423—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 417, 467, 468, 471, 511, and 109—Indian Registration Act (III of*

CHARGE—*contd.*1. FORM OF CHARGE—*concl.*

1877), s. 82. It was alleged by the prosecution that the accused had forged the registration endorsement and stamp on the back of a *kabala* by which he had sold certain lands to *D*, and that he had produced before a Sub-Registrar a forged mortgage-deed, whereby he purported to mortgage to *D* the identical lands sold under the *kabala*; it was also alleged that the accused had produced the said mortgage-deed before the Secretary of a Loan Office in order to induce that office to grant him a loan. The accused was tried in one trial on charges under ss. 467, 468 and 109 of the Penal Code with regard to the alleged forgery of the *kabala*; under s. 82 of the Registration Act, and ss. 467, 109 and s. 471 of the Penal Code with regard to the mortgage-deed, and also on charges under ss. 471 and 511 of the Penal Code with reference to the attempt to cheat the Loan Office. The accused was convicted under ss. 467, 109, 417, 511 and 471 of the Penal Code. *Held*, on appeal, (i) that, as the alleged forgery of the *kabala* and the presentation of the forged mortgage-deed to the Secretary of the Loan Office could not be said to be parts of the same transaction, there had been a misjoinder of charges; (ii) that the charge to the jury was defective, inasmuch as it did not show what the facts of the case were, what the evidence adduced was, or what was the case for the accused; and (iii) that, inasmuch as the evidence on the record showed that there was a case which ought to be investigated by a jury, the accused should be retried. *BIRENDRA LAL BHADURI v. EMPEROR* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 822; s. c. 7 C. W. N. 639

63. ——— Rioting—*Omission to set out the common object of an unlawful assembly—Prejudice to the accused—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 221, sub-s. 2, and s. 225.* In all cases in which there is a charge under s. 147 of the Penal Code, the common object ought to be stated. But the omission to set out the common object does not necessarily make the conviction bad. It is necessary to see whether or not the accused has been misled by the omission and the omission has caused a failure of justice. In a case under s. 147 of the Penal Code in which the facts were very simple and there were distinct findings by the lower Court as to the part which each of the accused took in the rioting: *Held*, the accused were not prejudiced by the omission to set out in the charge the common object of the assembly. *BUDHU v. LACHMINIA* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 599

2. ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF CHARGE.

1. ——— Power to alter charge—*Alteration after verdict.* On a trial by jury, the Sessions Judge has no power to alter the charge after the delivery of the verdict. *REG. v. ALI VALAD FAKEER MUHAMMAD* . . . 5 Bom. Cr. 9

CHARGE—*contd.*2. ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF CHARGE—*contd.*

2. — Altering charge after plea of guilty. When an accused pleads guilty to a charge already framed, the Sessions Judge has no power to alter the charge upon the evidence on the record. Upon a charge of murder the accused pleaded "guilty;" the Sessions Judge, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, reduced the charge to homicide not amounting to murder. *Held*, that the proceeding was illegal. *QUEEN v. GOBARDHAN BHUYAN*

4 B. L. R. Ap. 101: 13 W. R. Cr. 55

3. — Indictment, amendment of. The indictment may be amended at any stage of the trial. *QUEEN v. WILLANS*

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 94: 1 Mad. 31

4. — Form of amendments made in charge. Amendments in a charge ought to be made formally, and should appear on the face of the record. *QUEEN v. FEODAR ROY*

9 W. R. Cr. 14

5. — Formal defects—*Act XVIII of 1862, s. 41. Semble*: The latter part of s. 41 of Act XVIII of 1862 only gave power to amend where the defect was formal. *QUEEN v. WILLANS*

1 Mad. 31: 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 94

6. — Amendment which may prejudice accused—*Amendment of charge—Receiving stolen goods—Act XVIII of 1862, s. 1.* The Court, under s. 1 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (XVIII of 1862), had power to order the amendment of a charge involving a change in the ownership of stolen property, provided such amendment did not prejudice the accused in his defence upon the merits. Where it is doubtful whether an amendment of a charge will or will not prejudice the accused in his defence upon the merits, the amendment ought not to be made. Where the accused was charged with receiving stolen goods from the wife of the prosecutor, the property in the goods being laid in the prosecutor and the charges were amended by laying the property in the prosecutor jointly with his mother, it was held that such amendment ought not to have been made. *REG. v. GOVINDAS HARIDAS*

6 Bom. Cr. 76

7. — Omission of count in charge—*Defect in charge—Power of Appellate Court.* The omission of a count in the charge is simply a defect in the charge, and the Appellate Court may confirm a conviction under a different section of the Penal Code from that upon which the prisoner was tried and convicted, provided the prisoner has not been prejudiced or injured by the substitution of one section for another. *ANONYMOUS*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 46

8. — Omission to prove separate charge for separate offence. The omission of the Magistrate to frame the charge so as to contain a separate head for each offence may be remedied by

CHARGE—*contd.*2. ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF CHARGE—*contd.*

the Sessions Judge exercising the powers of amendment contained in s. 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861. *QUEEN v. KALARAM SINGH*

7 W. R. Cr. 8

9. — Evidence not supporting charge—*Alteration of charge—Order to Magistrate to re-commit.* When the Judge finds that the facts proved do not support the charge as laid, he should alter the charge, and not order the Magistrate to re-commit the accused. *REG. v. BAPU PARRAT*

7 Bom. Cr. 81

10. — Alteration of proceedings—*Prejudice to accused—Necessity to try de novo.* When a Magistrate, under s. 256 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, stopped proceedings under Ch. XIV and proceeded under Ch. XII of the Code, it was not necessary for him to make an enquiry *de novo* under Ch. XII, the amended charges on which the commitment was made not being so materially different from those on which proceedings were commenced as to prejudice the accused. *QUEEN v. AMEERUDDIN*

1 N. W. Ed. 1873, 307

11. — Alteration of charge to another cognizable offence—*Alteration of charge from culpable homicide to s. 154, Penal Code.* The prisoner, who was charged with culpable homicide not amounting to murder, was tried for that offence, and, there being no sufficient proof to convict on that charge, was tried by the Sessions Judge for not having used lawful means in preventing the riot (s. 154), and was punished for that offence. *Held*, that the Sessions Judge was competent to alter the charge and to try the prisoner for any offence coming under any one of the sections of the Code. *GOVERNMENT v. THACOOR Doss*

1 Agra Cr. 13

12. — Adding new charges—*Power to alter and amend charge.* Although a Sessions Judge has power to alter or amend a charge, he cannot add an entirely new charge, which is not even cognate to the charge on which an accused person has been committed for trial. *QUEEN v. WARIS ALI*

3 N. W. 337

13. — Omission to give notice of charge. Where a person is arrested, and certain charges are entered against him in the police book, he should not, on the day of trial, be called upon to meet other charges without previous intimation being given to him of the additional charges. *In the matter of the petition of RADOINATH SHAHA. EMPRESS v. RADOINATH SHAHA*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 195

14. — Conviction on different charge from that of which notice was given to accused. Where a police officer who had been called on to answer to a charge of bribery which was not sustained by the evidence was found guilty of violation of duty under s. 29, Act V of 1861, of

CHARGE—*contd.*2. ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF CHARGE—*contd.*

which offence the officer trying the case found sufficient evidence in the course of the trial :—*Held*, that an accused person called on to answer to a specific charge cannot be convicted on an entirely different charge without previous notice of the offence imputed to him and opportunity being afforded him of meeting the accusation. *In the matter of the petition of GIRISH CHUNDER NUNDEE* 26 W. R. Cr. 8

15. ——— Amendment of charge by Sessions Judge after commitment by Magistrate—*Reasons of Magistrate for committing case in certain way.* Where a Magistrate gives reasons for committing a case for trial in a certain way, the Sessions Judge must either accept the charges as framed or frame others himself : he is not authorized by the Criminal Procedure Code to insist on a re-drawing of the charge by the Magistrate, unless he specifies the charge which he wishes to be sent up. *In the matter of the petition of RAMDHONE ACHARJEE* 25 W. R. Cr. 17

16. ——— Power of Sessions Judge—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 446.* Where an accused person is committed to take his trial on specific charges before the Sessions Court, the Judge has no power under s. 446 of Act X of 1872 to expunge a charge before calling upon the accused to plead to it. *EMPRESS v. PORESHOLLAH SHRIKH* 7 C. L. R. 143

17. ——— *Charge, alteration of.* On the 8th August 1884 a Magistrate of the second class began an enquiry in a case in which several persons were accused of rioting and of voluntarily causing grievous hurt. On the 6th September the powers of a Magistrate of the first class were conferred on the Magistrate by an order of Government, which was communicated to him on the 8th September. On the 9th September, the case for the prosecution having closed, the Magistrate framed charges against each of the accused under ss. 323 and 325 of the Penal Code, recorded the statements of the accused and the evidence for the defence, and on the 10th September convicted the accused on all the charges, passing upon each of them, in respect of each charge, sentences which he could pass as a Magistrate of the first class, but could not have passed as a Magistrate of the second class. On appeal the Sessions Judge, on the ground that the prisoners had committed the offence described in s. 148 of the Penal Code, held that the sentences passed by the Magistrate were illegal, as being inconsistent with the provisions of s. 71, paragraphs 2 and 4; and he accordingly reduced the sentences of imprisonment which the Magistrate had passed to the maximum of imprisonment which the Magistrate could have inflicted under s. 148. *Held* by the Full Bench (PETHERAM, C.J., and BRODHURST, J., dissenting), that the sentences passed by the Magistrate were legal. *Per PETHERAM, C.J.*, that the Judge in this case had no power

CHARGE—*contd.*2. ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF CHARGE—*contd.*

to alter the charge or to frame a new charge in any way. *Per BRODHURST, J.*, that the sentences passed by the Magistrate were as a whole illegal, and that a Court of Appeal is not competent to alter the finding of a Magistrate so as to convict an accused person of an offence which the Court of which the order is on appeal was not competent to try. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PERSHAD*

I. L. R. 7 All. 414

18. ——— Addition of charge at trial—*Meaning of the word "charge" in Criminal Procedure Code (X of 1882)—Altering charge—Substitution of charge—Omission to read and explain charge to prisoner—Person committed "without a charge" under s. 226 of Criminal Procedure Code—Meaning of the word "alter" in s. 227—Meaning of the words "return of verdict" in s. 227—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 226, 227, 228-230, 236, 237, 537—Practice—Procedure—Right to begin.* A was tried on a charge (i) of murder, (ii) of abetting B to commit the said murder. The jury, having considered their verdict, were asked by the Clerk of the Crown if they were agreed. The foreman replied that they were, and that their verdict was guilty, and when further asked, he said "guilty of abetment—of abetment generally." On the application of counsel for the prosecution, a charge was then added of "abetment of murder committed by some person or persons unknown." The additional charge was read aloud to the jury, but was not specially explained to the prisoner, nor was he called upon to plead to it. Counsel for the prisoner was asked by the Judge if he desired to have a new trial on the charge as amended, but he declined. The three charges (*i.e.*, the two original charges and the additional charge) were then read to the jury, who after deliberation returned a verdict of "not guilty" on charges Nos. 1 and 2, and of "guilty" on charge No. 3, *viz.*, of abetment of murder by a certain person or persons unknown. On the application of counsel for the prisoner, the following points were reserved : (i) whether, under the circumstances, the Court had power to add a new charge; (ii) whether the verdict returned on the new charge was valid, the prisoner not having been called on to plead to it. *Held* (SCOTT, J., *dissentiente*), that the Judge was wrong in framing a new charge in addition to the original charges. The error, however, was one of form and not of substance, and under s. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), the Court declined to interfere with the conviction. *Held*, also, that having regard to ss. 228, 229, and 230 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the charge of abetment of murder by B might have been changed into one of abetment generally. *Held*, also, that, in any case, the conviction was good under ss. 236 and 237 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was doubtful whether the evidence would establish the offence of murder, abetment of murder by B, or abetment of murder by some one unknown. Even if there had

CHARGE—*contd.*2. ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF
CHARGE—*contd.*

been no charge properly framed, the Judge might, under s. 237, have accepted the verdict returned by the jury and entered it on the record. The fact that the Judge framed a charge which, *ex hypothesi*, was beyond his authority, and accepted a verdict on that charge, did not affect the legality of the conviction. *Held*, that the omission to read and explain the charge to the prisoner did not, under the circumstances, prejudice the prisoner, and was, therefore, immaterial. In the Criminal Procedure Code generally the word "charge" is used as the statement of a specific offence, and not as indicating the entire series of offences of which a prisoner is accused. There is nothing in the Code to indicate that the word is to have a different construction in ss. 226 and 227 from what it has in other sections. The words "without a charge" in s. 226 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882) will properly apply not only to a case in which there is no charge at all, but also to a case in which there is no charge of such an offence as the Sessions Judge or Clerk of the Crown may think the prisoner ought to be tried for. If the word "alter" in s. 227 is to be taken to include "addition," as it does in s. 226, the addition permitted must be an addition to some specific charge in the nature of an alteration, and not the addition of a new charge. The words "return of the verdict" in s. 227 mean the return of the final verdict which the Judge is bound to record. *Per* SCOTT, J. The test of the admissibility of proposed amendments to a charge is whether such amendment will prejudice the prisoner. The word "charge" is used in the Code both as indicating the whole series of counts or heads of charge, and also as indicating a charge of one specific offence. In s. 227 it is used in the former sense. The word "alter" in s. 227 must be taken to be equivalent to the words "add to or otherwise alter" which are used in s. 226, and consequently the addition of the new "head of charge" is an alteration within the meaning of s. 227. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. APPA SUBHANA MENDRE*
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 200

19. ——— Alteration or amendment of charge—*Addition of charge at trial—Altering charge—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 227. Held*, that on a trial upon charges under ss. 467 and 471 of the Penal Code the Court had power, under s. 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to add a charge under s. 193 of the Penal Code, upon which the prisoner had not been committed for trial. *Queen-Empress v. Appa Subhara Mendre, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 200*, dissented from. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GORDON*
I. L. R. 9 All. 525

20. ——— Addition of charge triable by any Magistrate—*Power of Sessions Judge to add charge and try it—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 226, 236, 237, 537.* Three persons were jointly committed for trial before the Court of Session, two of them being charged with culpable homicide not amounting to murder of J, and the third

CHARGE—*contd.*2. ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF
CHARGE—*contd.*

with abetment of the offence. At the trial, the Sessions Judge added a charge against all the accused of causing hurt to C, and convicted them upon both the original charges and the added charge. The assault upon C took place either at the same time as or immediately after the attack which resulted in the death of J. *Held*, that the case did not come within the terms of s. 226 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the adding of the charge was an irregularity which was not covered by ss. 236 and 237, those sections having no application to such a state of things; but that, inasmuch as the Sessions Judge was addressed by the pleader who appeared for the accused, and heard all the objections raised and witnesses might have been called for the defence upon the added charge, the provisions of s. 537 were applicable to the case. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KHARGA* . I. L. R. 8 All. 665

21. ——— Power of Sessions Judge to withdraw a charge framed by him—*Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 226, 227.* The word "alter" in s. 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code includes withdrawal by a Sessions Judge of a charge added by him to the charge on which the commitment had been made. *DWARKA LAL v. MAHADEO RAI* . I. L. R. 12 All. 551

22. ——— Vagueness of charge—*Penal Code, s. 217.* The accused was charged under s. 217 of the Penal Code; but the charge did not distinctly state what the direction of the law was which he disobeyed, and how he disobeyed it. *Held*, that, when the accused has been convicted on a charge expressed in vague terms, the prosecution on appeal should be limited to the particular sense in which the charge has been understood at the trial. *EMPRESS v. BABAN KHAN*
I. L. R. 2 Bom. 142

23. ——— Conviction for an offence different from that with which accused is charged—*Extradition—Lex fori—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 227, 238—Penal Code, ss. 395, 398, 379—Dacoity—Theft.* The accused were subjects of His Highness the Gaekwar of Baroda. They were extradited for committing dacoity in British India. The Magistrate, who held a preliminary inquiry into the matter, committed the accused to the Sessions Court on a charge under s. 398 of the Penal Code (XLV of 1860). The Sessions Judge amended the charge to one under s. 395 on the ground that, as the accused had been extradited on a charge under s. 395, they could be tried and convicted only under that section, and no other. At the end of the trial, the Sessions Judge, finding that the accused were guilty of theft, but not of dacoity, acquitted them. *Held*, reversing the order of acquittal, that it was competent to the Sessions Judge to alter the charge under s. 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882) and under s. 238 to convict the accused of the minor offence, which the evidence established. *Held*, also,

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that the Code of Criminal Procedure was applicable as *lex fori*. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KHODA UMA*
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 369

24. ——— Power of Appellate Court to alter charge or finding—*Prejudice to the accused—Necessity for a re-trial on the altered charge—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 236, 237, 238, and 423.* The accused gave his pleader a copy of a document which had been falsified by an interpolation being made in it for the purpose of its being used in the trial of his suit. *Held*, that he was guilty not of an attempt to commit an offence under s. 471 of the Penal Code, but of the offence itself. If the prosecution establishes certain acts constituting an offence and the Court misapplies the law by charging and convicting an accused person for an offence other than that for which he should have been properly charged, and if, notwithstanding such error, the accused has by his defence endeavoured to meet the accusation of the commission of these acts, then the Appellate Court may alter the charge or finding and convict him for an offence which those acts properly constitute, provided the accused be not prejudiced by the alteration in the finding. Such an error is one of form rather than of substance, and the alteration by an Appellate Court of the charge or finding would not necessitate a re-trial expressly on a charge of that offence. *LALA OJHA v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . I. L. R. 26 Cal. 863
3 C. W. N. 653

25. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 423 (b)—Alteration of finding under ss. 109, 211, Penal Code, to one under s. 193.* Where an accused was convicted under ss. 109, 211, Penal Code, and the Judge referred the case to the High Court recommending that a conviction under s. 193, Penal Code, with an enhanced sentence, should be substituted for the conviction and sentence under ss. 109, 211 : *Held*, that, in proceedings taken on a charge of abetment of an offence under s. 211, it would be improper to convict the accused of intentionally giving false evidence, as the two offences are entirely of a different character, and in making a defence on a charge of the first-named offence, the accused could not be regarded as pleading to a charge of intentionally giving false evidence in regard to some particular statement. To substitute a conviction for the latter offence for one for the former offence would be in effect to alter the charge to one for a different offence without the accused having an opportunity of pleading to it. *MONORANJAN CHOWDHRY v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* 3 C. W. N. 367

26. ——— Conviction of offence of different character, legality of—*Charge of theft—Conviction of being member of unlawful assembly—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 423—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 143 and 379.* The accused were convicted of

CHARGE—contd.**2. ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF CHARGE—contd.**

theft : that was the only charge which they were called upon to answer. In appeal the District Magistrate held that no theft had been committed, but he convicted the accused of being members of an unlawful assembly. *Held*, that on the trial the accused were called upon to answer only a charge of theft, they were never called upon to answer any other charge, and they therefore could not fairly be convicted on their appeal of an offence of an entirely different character. It is on the proceedings taken before the Magistrate that the facts constituting an offence for which a trial is held are made known to the accused, and the law is applied by the Magistrate to the facts established, so as to constitute the charge which the accused is called upon to answer. It therefore cannot be said that sufficient notice was given to the accused, because mention of s. 147 of the Penal Code (rioting) together with theft was made in the final report of the police as the offences considered to have been established ; and that the accused must have been made acquainted with such report. *JATU SINGH v. MAHABIR SINGH* . I. L. R. 27 Cal. 660

27. ——— Conviction of rioting with the common object of theft—*Finding by Appellate Court of different common object—Legality of conviction on such finding—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 147 and 379—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 423.* The accused were convicted by a Magistrate of theft of mangoes and also of rioting, the common object of the unlawful assembly being the forcibly taking away of mangoes belonging to the complainant. On appeal the Sessions Judge not only found that the common object was not the taking of the mangoes, but that the dispute between the parties was as to certain land. He, however, dismissed the appeal, and confirmed the conviction. *Held*, that, as the accused were convicted on a different finding of fact from that to which they were called upon to plead and to defend themselves at the trial, they were entitled to an acquittal. *RAHIMUDDIN v. ASGAR ALI* . I. L. R. 27 Cal. 990

28. ——— Adding new charge at close of case for defence—*Prejudice.* A Sessions Judge is empowered, under the Code of Criminal Procedure to add a charge at any time before judgment is delivered, but the provisions of ss. 227, 228 and 229 of the Code make it obligatory upon him to exercise a sound and wise discretion in so doing ; and a Sessions Judge, in adding a new and a grave charge of dacoity at a late stage of the trial, after the conclusion of the case for the defence, and in continuing the trial without any adjournment, does not exercise such a sound and wise discretion. *KING-EMPEROR v. MATHURA THAKUR (1901)*
6 C. W. N. 72

29. ——— Addition to or alteration of—*Indictment, subject-matter of—Cheating—Property—Money—Criminal Procedure Code*

CHARGE—contd.**2. ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF CHARGE—contd.**

(*Act V of 1898*), ss. 226, 227—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)*, s. 420. The Sessions Court is not a Court of original jurisdiction, and though vested with large powers for amending and adding to charges can only do so with reference to the immediate subject of the prosecution and committal, and not with regard to matter not covered by the indictment. The accused was put upon his trial before the Sessions Court on charges under ss. 471 and 411 of the Penal Code. Upon motion to the High Court it was held that a previous acquittal covered the charge under s. 471, and that the accused could be tried only under s. 411. When the case came to trial the Sessions Judge amended the charge to one under s. 411:—*Held*, that the Judge had full power under the law to amend the charge, and that the High Court did not intend to fetter his discretion. The word "property" in s. 420 of the Penal Code includes money. *BIRENDRA LAL BHADURI v. EMPEROR* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 22

3. EXPLANATION OF CHARGE TO ACCUSED.

1. ———— **Precise nature of charge—**When arraigning an accused, and before receiving his plea, the Court should be careful to ensure the explanation of the charge in a manner sufficiently explicit to enable the accused to understand thoroughly the nature of the charge to which he is called upon to plead. *EMPRESS v. VALMILEE. VALMILEE v. EMPRESS* . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 826

2. ———— **Exact nature of offence charged—Contents of charge—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882)**, s. 221.—An accused is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy the exact nature of the charge brought against him, and unless he has this knowledge, he must be seriously prejudiced in his defence. This is true in all cases, but it is more especially true in cases where it is sought to implicate him for acts not committed by himself, but by others with whom he was in company. *BEHARI MAHTON v. QUREN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 108

3. ———— **Omission to explain charge—Criminal Procedure Code**, s. 271—*Murder*. At a trial before a Sessions Court a charge was read out to the prisoners to the effect that they at a certain place on a certain date committed murder by causing the death of *M*, and that they had thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 302 of the Penal Code and within the cognizance of the Court of Sessions: The prisoners pleaded guilty, and were convicted on their plea. The charge was not explained to the prisoners. In answer to questions put by the Court, prisoners stated that they had killed *M*, and that they made the admissions of their own accord and not on the persuasion of any one. *Held*, that the conviction must be quashed and a new trial ordered. *AIYAVU v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . I. L. R. 9 Mad. 61

CHARGE—concl.**3. EXPLANATION OF CHARGE TO ACCUSED—concl.**

4. ———— **Omission to explain charge when amended—Criminal Procedure Code**, 1872, s. 445. A prisoner charged with dacoity and riot and acquitted cannot be convicted of house-trespass, under s. 452 of the Penal Code, unless the charge was amended by the addition of the charge under s. 452, and was read out or explained to him, and he was called on to plead to it under s. 445 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *QUEEN v. SALAMUT ALI* 23 W. R. Cr. 59

4. CHARGE OR LIEN ON DEBT.

1. ———— **Lien—Assignment—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)**, s. 107. The mere fact that parties have described a transaction as a "lien" or "charge" cannot deprive it of its real nature if in substance the transaction was in the first instance an assignment. Where a creditor purports to create a lien or charge on the debt due to him in favour of another person, the words lien or charge have no meaning except as giving the latter a right to recover the debt from the debtor. The transaction is in reality one whereby the owner of what in English Law is called a *chose in action* transfers it to another. *ARDESIR BEJONJI Surti v. SIRDAR ALI KHAN* (1908) . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 610

2. ———— **Equity in favour of a person paying off a subsisting charge on property**. Where there is a subsisting charge on certain property paid off by the person in possession, it is equitable that when the plaintiff reclaims the estate, credit should be given to that person for the payment of the mortgage which the plaintiff would have had to meet. *Mahomed Shumsool v. Shewukram*, L. R. 2 I. A. 17; *Lomba Gumaji v. Vishwanath Amrit*, (1893) P. J. 301, and *Ranu v. Kedu*, (1894) P. J. 39, followed. *ASHIDBAI v. ABDULLA* (1906)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 271

CHARGE-SHEET, COPY OF.

See ACCUSED PERSON, RIGHT OF.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 14

CHARGE TO JURY.

Col.

1. SUMMING UP IN GENERAL CASES	1465
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23 W. R. Cr. 32

See JURY, TRIAL BY.

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See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE I. L. R. 26 Mad. 38

CHARGE TO JURY—*contd.*

— recording of.

See MISDIRECTION.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 698

1. SUMMING UP IN GENERAL CASES.

1. ——— Mode of summing up evidence—*Duty of Judge*. In charging a jury, a Judge is not bound to do more than lay carefully and plainly before them the evidence as recorded by him, noting discrepancies and inconsistencies, and pointing out generally the way in which it is favourable or unfavourable to accused. *QUEEN v. CHUNDER KUMAR MUZOOMDAR*

25 W. R. Cr. 54

2. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 298—Duty of Judge when the jury are uncertain as to the offence committed*. A jury, after retiring, returned to the box, and, after unanimously finding both prisoners not guilty of the charges framed against them, stated to the Judge that they thought an offence had been committed by one of the prisoners, but were uncertain as to the section of the Penal Code applicable to his case; the Judge thereupon made over to them a copy of the Penal Code, leaving them to decide under what section the offence fell. *Held*, that he had failed in his duty, and that he should have asked the jury what doubts they had as to the crime which had been committed, and should have explained to them the law and informed them what offence the facts would prove against the prisoner if they believed those facts. *JASPETH SINGH v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 164

3. ——— *Omission to point out legal bearings—Reading evidence to jury in important cases*. On a trial by jury a Sessions Judge in summing up should give a full and detailed statement of the evidence on both sides; he should point out the legal bearing of it, and what weight the jury ought to attach to its several parts. His omission to do so, if the accused is thereby prejudiced, amounts to such an error in law as would justify a Court of Appeal in setting aside the verdict. No general rule can be laid down as to when a prisoner is prejudiced by a defective summing up, but in general, if the finding of the jury in such a case is one that an Appeal Court would set aside if the trial had taken place with the aid of assessors, the Court will interfere and set the verdict aside. In capital cases and all cases of a serious or complicated nature, the Judge ought to read over the evidence *in extenso* to the jury. *REG. v. FATTECHAND VASTACHAND* . 5 Bom. Cr. 85

4. ——— *Duty of Judge in charging jury*. In delivering a charge to the jury it is the duty of the Sessions Judge to call the attention of the jury to the facts and then to leave it to them to consider whether, from the facts, they conclude that a particular criminal act was done, and if they so conclude, then to direct them that the case comes within a particular section of the Code. *SRI PROSAD MISSER v. EMPRESS*

4 C. W. N. 193

CHARGE TO JURY—*contd.*1. SUMMING UP IN GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

5. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 255*. In this case the Court was of opinion that the Judge's charge to the jury was not a summing up for the prosecution and defence such as is prescribed by s. 255, Act XXV of 1861. Principles for guidance of a Judge in charging a jury laid down. *QUEEN v. RAJ-COOMAR BOSE*

10 B. L. R. Ap. 36: 19 W. R. Cr. 71

6. ——— *Explaining the law*. In charging a jury it is incumbent on the Judge to explain the law to them in order to assist them in applying the law to the facts of the case. Mere reference to sections of the Penal Code defining the offences is not sufficient. *ABBAS PEADA v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 736

2 C. W. N. 484

SRI PROSAD MISSER v. EMPRESS

4 C. W. N. 193

7. ——— *Law bearing on case—Presumption of innocence*. A Judge's charge to the jury should consist only of a summing up of all the evidence, and a showing how the law applies to it. Where facts are as consistent with a prisoner's innocence as with his guilt, innocence must be presumed; and criminal intent or knowledge is not necessarily imputable to every man who acts contrary to the provisions of the law. *QUEEN v. NOBOKRISTO GHOSE* . 8 W. R. Cr. 87

8. ——— *Charge when there is no evidence*. Where there is no evidence against a prisoner, the Judge ought to charge the jury for an acquittal, and not leave the jury to say whether the prisoner is guilty or not. *QUEEN v. GREEDHARY MANJEE* . 7 W. R. Cr. 39

9. ——— Where a summing up of a Judge to a jury points out to the jury the principal features of the evidence as regards both the case of the Crown and the defence of the prisoners, it complies with the requisition of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *QUEEN v. SHEPPARD*

13 W. R. Cr. 23

10. ——— *Omission to sum up evidence—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 379*. Where the provisions of s. 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, were neglected, and the Judge did not sum up the evidence at all, a new trial was ordered. *Queen v. Elahi Bax, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 359: 5 W. R. Cr. 80*, considered. *QUEEN v. SHAMSHERE BEG* . 9 W. R. Cr. 51

11. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 379*. Under s. 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Judge should sum up the evidence on both sides before requiring the jury to deliver their verdict. Under s. 439, however, the High Court thought it unnecessary to set aside a conviction in a case in which this was not done. *QUEEN v. SITWA alias SITARAM*

14 W. R. Cr. 66

CHARGE TO JURY—contd.**1. SUMMING UP IN GENERAL CASES—contd.**

See *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. IMAM ALI KHAN*
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 252

12. ———— **Reasons for Judge's opinion on evidence.** It is the duty of a Sessions Judge to give a summing up of the evidence as recorded before him, and to state his own reasons for considering a prisoner guilty. *QUEEN v. NAWAB KHAN* 7 W. R. Cr. 25

13. ———— **Statement of Judge's own opinion.** A Sessions Judge in summing up is bound to advise a jury on questions of fact, and may tell the jury the impression which the evidence has made upon his own mind. *QUEEN v. DWARKANATH SEN* 13 W. R. Cr. 34

14. ———— A Judge may give the jury his opinion of the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, if he shows them clearly that the decision rests with them. *QUEEN v. ABDOL JULEEL* W. R. 1864, Cr. 5

15. ———— A Judge in directing a jury should confine himself to a general commentary on the evidence and a statement of the legal offence proved, should such evidence be credited. He should not give a positive opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused person. *QUEEN v. BHARUT CHUNDER* . 1 W. R. Cr. 2
QUEEN v. GUNGA BISHEN . 1 W. R. Cr. 26

16. ———— **Judge's opinion as to certain portion of evidence.** It is open to a Judge in charging the jury to express his opinion as to the effect of a certain portion of the evidence; but he should always be careful to add that it is for the jury to form their own opinion. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BEPIN BISWAS* . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 970

17. ———— **Expression of opinion by Judge upon questions of fact—Charge to the jury, form of.** Sub-s. (2) of s. 298 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows a Judge to express to the jury his own opinion upon any questions of fact, provided that he leaves the decision upon the questions of fact entirely to the jury. The tendency of the charge as a whole ought to be to give a correct direction to the mind of the jury. *Queen v. Gagalul*, 6 B. L. R. Ap. 50; 12 W. R. Cr. 80, referred to. *RAHAMAT ALI v. EMPRESS*
4 C. W. N. 196

18. ———— **Bare statements of prisoners—Evidence taken before Magistrate.** Bare statements of prisoners are not admissible in, and ought not to be alluded to by the Judge as, evidence. Nor is evidence taken before the Magistrate, unless contradictory of the evidence of the same witnesses as given before the Sessions Court, evidence in the trial or proper to be put to the jury. *QUEEN v. BIREO SINGH* 7 W. R. Cr. 103

19. ———— **Evidence of person not having knowledge from his own observation.** The evidence of a person stating before the jury upon oath facts which he does not know of his own observation, facts which constitute

CHARGE TO JURY—contd.**1. SUMMING UP IN GENERAL CASES—contd.**

the substance of the charge against a prisoner, and which the jury themselves have to enquire into and arrive at as their verdict, ought not to be allowed to go to the jury, and still less so when the person does not orally depose before the jury, but his evidence is presented to them in the form of a written deposition. *QUEEN v. RAMGOPAL DHUR*
10 W. R. Cr. 57

20. ———— **Different trials for same crime—Fresh charge to jury.** When different trials are held at different times and against different prisoners in respect of the same crime, a new charge to each jury should be delivered in each case. It is not sufficient to read over to the second jury the charge delivered to the first. *QUEEN v. MAHADBO*
W. R. 1864, Cr. 15

21. ———— **Sessions Judge—Jury—Summing up—Defective direction—Contentions placed before the Jury—Judge should not omit pointedly to call attention of the jury to matters of prime importance, especially if they favour the accused.** A Sessions Judge, in summing up, is entitled to have regard to the elaboration and skill with which the rival contentions have been placed before the jury by the advocates on both sides, but he should not in doing so omit pointedly to call the attention of the jury to matters of prime importance, especially if they favour the accused, merely because they have been discussed by the advocate. *EMPEROR v. MALGOWDA BASGOWDA* (1902) I. L. R. 27 Bom. 644

22. ———— **Jury—Heads of charge—Contents of, and time of recording heads of charge—Misdirection of Jury—Omission to read whole of the depositions of witnesses—Omission to direct Jury to draw a "presumption" against the prosecution, when certain witnesses were not called—Direction in rioting cases—Oral proof of statements by witnesses to the police—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 162, 297, and 367—Circular Orders of the High Court, Chap. I, Order 59—Evidence Act (I of 1872) s. 114, Ill. (g) and s. 157—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 141 and 303.** It is not necessary that the heads of charge to the jury should be reduced to writing before delivery of the charge, but they ought to be written as soon as possible thereafter and when the facts are fresh in the Judge's mind. The heads of charge should represent with absolute accuracy the substance of the charge, and be such as to enable the High Court on appeal to see distinctly, whether the case was fairly and properly placed before the jury. *Circular Orders of the High Court, Chap. I, Order 59*, referred to. It is not incumbent on the Judge to read the whole of the depositions of the witnesses to the jury. It is enough that references have been made to them so as to sufficiently attract their attention to them. It is not necessary that the Judge should direct the jury, in so many words, that the omission of the prosecution to call certain witnesses raised a "presumption" under

CHARGE TO JURY—contd.**1. SUMMING UP IN GENERAL CASES—
concl'd.**

the Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 114, Ill. (g), that their evidence would be unfavourable to the Crown, if he has pointed out that the jury might properly draw any inference they pleased from such omission. S. 141 of the Penal Code is sufficiently explained to the jury, if the Judge has told them that, if five persons go in a body with the common object of murdering a man, and if he is killed in the prosecution of the common object, then, no matter who struck the fatal blow, all are equally guilty of murder under ss. 302 of the Penal Code. S. 162 of the present Criminal Procedure Code prohibits the use of the record of the statement of a witness taken under s. 161 as evidence, but does not override the general provisions of the Evidence Act as to proof of such statement by oral evidence, and such statement is admissible under s. 157 of the Act in corroboration of the evidence of the witness given at the trial. The proviso to s. 162 of the present Code is confined to, and is for the benefit of, the accused. *Queen-Empress v. Bhairab Chunder Chuckerbutty*, 2 C. W. N. 702, distinguished. *Emperor v. Narayan Raghunath Patki*, I. L. R. 32 Bom. 111, per Beaman, J., dissented from. *Reg. v. Uttamchand Kapurchand*, 11 Bom. H. C. 120. and *Empress v. Kali Churn Chunari*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 154, referred to. *FANINDRA NATH BANERJEE v. EMPEROR* (1908) . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 281

2. MISDIRECTION.

1. *Misdirection.* In giving a warning to a jury not to disbelieve a mass of otherwise consistent evidence, because in one or two minor and immaterial points the witnesses made different statements, a Judge exercises a wise discretion, and affords no ground for the objection of misdirection to the jury. *QUEEN v. BUSTEE KHAN* 1 W. R. Cr. 17

2. *Omission to direct on important point.* In considering whether a Judge has misdirected the jury, the tenor and general effect of the whole summing up should be looked at, and if, upon the whole summing up, the Court is of opinion that substantially the proper direction has been given to the jury, it will not interfere, though the Judge has omitted to direct the jury expressly on some important point. *REG. v. PESTANJI DINSHA* 10 Bom. 75

3. *Omission to aid jury as to facts—Finding on fact by Judge.* A summing up to the jury in which the Sessions Judge gave no aid to the jury in the arrangement of the facts which were spoken to by the witnesses, and himself found facts which he should have put to the jury, was pronounced defective, and a verdict founded thereon was set aside and the prisoner ordered to be released. *QUEEN v. RAM GOPAL DHUR* 10 W. R. Cr. 7

4. *Omission to call attention of jury to evidence of witnesses for defence.*

CHARGE TO JURY—contd.**2. MISDIRECTION—contd.**

In summing up a case to the jury, the Judge omitted to call their attention to the evidence of the witnesses for the defence. This evidence appeared to the High Court to be untrustworthy. *Held*, that the summing up was not defective on account of this omission on the part of the Judge. *In the matter of the petition of ROCHIA MOHATO. EMPRESS v. ROCHIA MOHATO*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 42; 8 C. L. R. 273

5. *Judge stating what facts are proved—Erroneous view of law—Evidence Act, s. 103—Onus of proof—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 537.* It is the province of the jury, and not of the Judge, to say what facts are or are not proved. Where a Judge in giving charge to the jury, after stating certain facts, said: "Hence the reasons given" (in the deed for its execution) "turn out to be false": *Held*, that the Judge should have left it to the jury to form their own conclusion. When there has been a material misdirection in a charge to a jury, it is not covered by s. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Judge, in stating to the jury that under s. 103 of the Evidence Act the onus may be said to lie on the accused, to show that the deed in respect of which he was charged with forgery was genuine, took an erroneous view of the law and misdirected the jury. *Empress v. Dhunno Kazi*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 121, followed. *SADHU SHEIKH v. EMPRESS* . 4 C. W. N. 576

6. *Duty of Judge—Omission to explain law as bearing on the facts.* Per FIELD, J. It is the duty of a Judge to give a direction upon the law to the jury so far as to make them understand the law as bearing upon the facts; and if he does not give them an explanation of the law sufficiently comprehensive to enable them to decide the particular issue, it is a misdirection. *In the matter of the petition of JHUBBOO MAHTON. EMPRESS v. JHUBBOO MAHTON*
I. L. R. 8 Calc. 739; 12 C. L. R. 233

7. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 297, 423 (d)—Effect of omission to explain the law to jury—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 143, 147, 380, 395—Practice.* In a trial by jury, the accused were charged with offences under the Penal Code. The Judge, while charging the jury, omitted to explain the law by which they were to be guided. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts except one, and the Judge, agreeing with the verdict, convicted the accused. *Held*, that the omission to explain the law to the jury amounted to a misdirection vitiating the verdict within the meaning of s. 423 (d), Criminal Procedure Code. *Wajadar Khan v. Queen Empress*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 955, relied upon. Some statements should appear in the record of a trial by jury to show that the law bearing upon the charges has been explained to the jury. *BIRU MANDAL v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 561

CHARGE TO JURY—*contd.*2. MISDIRECTION—*contd.*

8. ————— *Case under cl. 26, Letters Patent, 1865—Charge to jury, misunderstanding of.* Mere misunderstanding on the part of bystanders in Court, or counsel engaged in a case, of expressions used by a Judge in charging a jury (where it appears that the expressions used by the Judge were such as ought to have been understood by any reasonable man, having regard to what was proved in the case, and what was said to the jury afterwards), will not constitute misdirection. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SHIB CHUNDER MITTER*
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1079

9. ————— *Omission to point out weakness of evidence for prosecution—Error of law.* The omission of a Judge to point out to the jury the weakness of the evidence against the accused and the possibility of other persons being the guilty parties does not amount to a positive misdirection. In a case where there was some evidence to go to the jury, and no error in law was committed, the Court cannot interfere. *QUEEN v. CHOONEE* 5 W. R. Cr. 13

10. ————— *Omission to call attention to fact in favour of accused.* Three persons, who were attacked and wounded in an affray, informed the police on the same day that the persons who had attacked them were A, B, and C. Eighteen days afterwards the same complainants gave to the Magistrate enquiring into the case the names of four other persons who, they said, with the three persons first accused, formed the attacking party. The seven accused were tried jointly for the offence before the Additional Recorder of Rangoon and a jury. In his charge to the jury the Additional Recorder omitted to call their attention to the fact that four out of the seven accused had not been mentioned by the prosecutors until after eighteen days had passed over. The prisoners were convicted. *Held*, that the Additional Recorder misdirected the jury; that under the circumstances the misdirection prejudiced the four persons last accused; and that the verdict must be set aside as far as they were concerned. *LEIU TU v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* I. L. R. 11 Calc. 10

11. ————— *Omission to state the defence of accused, whether a misdirection.* Where the charge to the jury places prominently before the jury all the circumstances that go against the accused, but does not call their attention to any of those that are in their favour, and especially when it omits to tell the jury what the defence of the accused is, there has been a misdirection sufficient to vitiate the trial. *LEIU TU v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 10, referred to. *RAHAMAT ALI v. EMPRESS* 4 C. W. N. 196

12. ————— *Admission of inadmissible evidence—Prejudice to prisoner—Re-trial.* Where a Judge in his charge to the jury admitted, as receivable evidence, a hearsay statement against the accused, and also an anonymous letter which was put in without an attempt to show how or

CHARGE TO JURY—*contd.*2. MISDIRECTION—*contd.*

by whom it was sent, it was held that the jury had been misdirected and the accused prejudiced. The High Court on this, not being able to say positively, on a perusal of the evidence, that the accused was innocent, did not dispose of the case, but ordered a new trial. *QUEEN v. CHUNDER KOOMAR MOZOOMDAR* 24 W. R. Cr. 77

13. ————— *Erroneous direction as to corroboration of accomplice's evidence.* *Held*, in a case of murder, that the Judge had not given a proper direction to the jury in telling them that it was for them to consider whether the evidence of the accomplice was strictly corroborated as to the prisoners; that it was not enough that the evidence should disclose a state of facts consistent with the possibility of the truth of the accomplice's story; and that the Judge ought to have gone through the history of the crime as detailed by the accomplices, to point out any independent evidence proving facts showing that the prisoners were or must have been present at or cognizant of the murder. *QUEEN v. KAROO* . . . 6 W. R. Cr. 44
QUEEN v. KHOTUB SHEIKH . . 6 W. R. Cr. 17

14. ————— *Erroneous direction where evidence of accomplice is uncorroborated.* *Held*, that, where the evidence of an accomplice is uncorroborated, the correct practice requires a Sessions Judge not merely to tell the jury that it is unusual to convict on such evidence, but that he should also tell them that it is unsafe, and contrary both to prudence and practice, to do so; yet that his omission to state this does not amount to an error in law. *Reg. v. Inam*, 3 Bom. Cr. 57, commented on. *REG. v. GANU BIN DHARAJI*
6 Bom. Cr. 57

15. ————— *Erroneous direction where evidence of approver is uncorroborated.* Conviction and sentence set aside (*GLOVER, J.*, dissenting) as to two of the prisoners on the ground that there was a misdirection to the jury, because the Judge in summing up omitted to advise the jury not to convict upon the uncorroborated evidence of an approver, and because he treated as corroborative that which was no corroboration in law. *QUEEN v. NAWAB JAN* 8 W. R. Cr. 19

16. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 297—Evidence of accomplice—Corroboration.* A Judge should caution a jury not to accept the evidence of an approver unless it is corroborated: the omission to do so amounts to misdirection. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ARUMUGA*
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 196

17. ————— *Corroboration—Improper reception of evidence—Accomplice—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 114, ill. (b), 133—Criminal Procedure Code (X of 1882), ss. 337, 364—Letters Patent of 1865, s. 26—Review.* Case in which, upon review, a certificate having been granted by the Advocate-General under s. 26 of the Letters Patent, a conviction was quashed on the ground of improper reception of evidence and misdirection.

CHARGE TO JURY—*contd.*2. MISDIRECTION—*contd.*

The accused being upon his trial at the Sessions for murder, the two principal witnesses for the prosecution were *G* and *M*, to whom pardons were tendered by the committing Magistrate under s. 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and who had accepted the pardons. The Judge read to the jury statements (which had not been admitted in evidence) by *G* and *M* purporting to have been taken under s. 364. *Held*, that the improper reception of such evidence constituted a decision erroneous in point of law calculated to prejudice the prisoner. The Judge further charged the jury that they were not to convict upon the evidence of *G* if satisfied that he was an accomplice and uncorroborated, but coupled the direction with a strong expression of opinion that *G* was not an accomplice. *Held*, that this constituted a misdirection in fact, though not in form, calculated seriously to prejudice the prisoner's case. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. O'HARA*

I. L. R. 17 Cal. 642

18. ———— *Omission to tell jury that evidence is inadmissible—Material error.* *Held* (WARDEN, J., *dissentiente*), that the omission of the Sessions Judge to tell the jury that the statement of one prisoner is not evidence against his fellow-prisoner is a material error, and one fatal to the trial, notwithstanding that the Sessions Judge dealt with the evidence against each of the prisoners separately. *REG. v. MIYA VALAD DAUD*

6 Bom. Cr. 10

19. ———— *Confession of accused—Subsequently retracted—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 103—Search by police of stolen property.* It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a confession made and subsequently retracted by a prisoner cannot be accepted as evidence of his guilt without independent corroborative evidence. A jury should be asked with reference to such confessions, not whether they were corroborated by independent evidence, but whether, having regard to the circumstances under which they were made and retracted and all the circumstances connected with them, it was more probable that the original confessions or the statements retracting them were true. Criminal Procedure Code, s. 103, does not justify the view that the persons called upon to witness a search are to be selected by any person other than the officer conducting the search. If the Sessions Judge considers that the evidence of an Inspector of Police is necessary, he ought not to animadvert on his absence in charging the jury; but he should intimate his opinion to the Public Prosecutor and give him the opportunity of calling that official. It is wrong for a Judge in charging the jury to say that a head constable committed a breach of the police regulations in conducting a search with a loose shirt on, without examining him on the matter and taking evidence as to whether or not his body was examined, before he began the search. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMAN* I. L. R. 21 Mad. 83

CHARGE TO JURY—*contd.*2. MISDIRECTION—*contd.*

20. ———— *Retracted confessions—Misdirection as to admissibility of such confessions without corroborative evidence—Error in mode of treating evidence.* The accused were tried for murder. The Sessions Judge in his charge to the jury discussed the evidence generally, describing it as very poor evidence which, standing alone, amounted to nothing. He also told the jury that, as regards retracted confessions, "the law is that you are to look for corroboration in independent evidence." If that supplies such corroboration that you can confidently say, "the confessions must be absolutely true, you can act upon them, otherwise not." *Held*, that the charge was defective. The Sessions Judge ought to have summed up the evidence to the jury calling their attention to the material parts of it, and leaving them to form their own opinion on it, instead of treating it generally. *Held*, also, that the Judge had misdirected the jury, as there is no rule of law that a retracted confession cannot be treated as evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars by independent reliable evidence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GANGIA*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 316

21. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 342—Consideration of document purporting to be proved by statement of accused under that section.* A gap in the evidence for the prosecution cannot be filled up by any statement made by the accused in his examination under s. 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is a misdirection to ask the jury to consider a document, purporting to be proved by such a statement, as evidence against the accused. *BASANTA KUMAR GHATTAK v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 26 Cal. 49

22. ———— *Acquittal—Verdict and order of acquittal—Appeal against acquittal.* In a charge, against an Inspector of Salt and Abkari, of extortion and bribery, in a Court of Session, the first witness for the prosecution deposed that, when he complained to the accused of delays which were taking place in weighing salt, the accused told him he ought to make the customary present of R100 or R50, according to the amount of salt to be weighed. The witness stated that he had refused to pay the bribe at that time, but that on the following day, when the accused stated that the weighing would only be properly proceeded with if the present were made, he consented, and the accused agreed to send his peon (who was charged with abetment) for the money. According to the witness, the peon came to the shop and was paid R50 by his accountant by his order and in his presence, and in the presence of two other persons who were in the employment of the witness. The prosecution evidence, if true, only showed that these two other persons had witnessed the transactions without taking any part in it. The accountant and the other two persons were called and gave evidence, as second, third and fourth

CHARGE TO JURY—contd.**2. MISDIRECTION—contd.**

witnesses respectively, for the prosecution. Some entries in account books were relied on in support of the oral evidence of the witnesses, but they were challenged by the accused as false entries and they were, in fact, discredited by the High Court. The writer of them was called as the fifth prosecution witness, and they had been made after the alleged transaction was over. The Sessions Judge, in his charge to the jury, warned them against accepting the evidence of accomplices without corroboration in material particulars. He said that the first and second witnesses were certainly accomplices, and that the third, fourth and fifth witnesses had put themselves practically in the same position as accomplices and that their evidence also required corroboration before the jury could act on it. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty, and the Sessions Judge acquitted the accused. Upon an appeal being preferred by the Public Prosecutor against the acquittal on the ground of misdirection: *Held*, that the description of the third, fourth and fifth witnesses was a misdirection. **EMPEROR v. SMITHER (1902) . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 1**

23. ——— Approver's evidence—Duty of Judge—Corroboration—Retrial—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 297, 298 and 337. A Sessions Judge, in laying the evidence of an approver before the jury, stated in his charge: "If you think that the approver's story is worthy of credit in itself, you have to consider whether it has been corroborated on material points," and then, after describing what in his opinion were "the points of corroboration," told the jury that "the above are the points on which the evidence has been corroborated, and that corroboration is full and complete, if you believe it. You have to consider these points and decide whether the approver has been corroborated in material points, and, if you find that to be so, then you have in his story sufficient evidence to connect all three accused with the crime." *Held*, that this was not a proper way to place the case before the jury. The Sessions Judge should have told the jury that, although the law permitted them to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, it was not the practice of our Courts, which have consistently held that it was not safe or proper to convict on such evidence without some corroboration sufficient to connect each of the accused with the offence committed. With this caution, the Sessions Judge should have laid before the jury the evidence corroborating the statement of the accomplice. The nature of the corroborative evidence must be confirmatory of some of the leading circumstances of the story of the approver as against the particular prisoner. Circumstances, under which a new trial should or should not be ordered on account of a defective summing up with reference to the weight of evidence, pointed out. *Elakee Buksh*, 5 W. R. Cr. 80; *Queen v. Nawab Jan*, 8 W. R. Cr. 19; *The Queen v. Kalla-Chand Doss*, 11 W. R. Cr. 21; and *Palavasam* (1863) *Weir* 535,

CHARGE TO JURY—contd.**2. MISDIRECTION—contd.**

referred to. **JAMIRUDDI MASALLI v. EMPEROR (1902) . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 782; s. c. 6 C. W. N. 553**

24. ——— Inadmissible evidence—Sessions Judge—Inadmissible evidence—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 418, 423 (2). Where a charge to the jury by the Sessions Judge is, upon the whole, favourable to the accused, and most of the points of importance in favour of the accused are more or less dealt with in the charge, the mere fact that some of the points are not so amplified as they might have been does not amount to a misdirection. Before the High Court can interfere with the verdict of a jury on the ground that the evidence of accused's confession was wrongly admitted, it must be satisfied, *first*, that the verdict is erroneous; *secondly*, that the erroneousness was caused either by the Judge's misdirection to the jury as to that evidence or by a misunderstanding on their part of the law as to it as laid down by the Judge. Where material evidence, which ought not to be admitted, is admitted, and the jury are placed in possession of it, there is an error in law in the trial under s. 418 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), and there is a misdirection of law when the Judge tells the jury that it is evidence which they can consider and on which they can, if they think proper, convict the accused. The fact that, after putting the jury in possession of the inadmissible evidence, the Judge in his charge goes on also to point out circumstances which would justify the jury in disbelieving the wrongly admitted evidence, does not make the misdirection less a misdirection. Where evidence which the law says shall not be admitted is let in with other evidence legally admissible, and where the former is of a material character, it would be mere speculative refinement to hold that the jury must have, in convicting the accused, relied upon the latter and rejected the former. **EMPEROR v. WAMAN SHIVRAM DAMLE (1903) . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 626**

25. ——— Explanation of law—Duty of Judge to explain law—Law explained in addresses by pleaders on both sides to jury—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 297 and 298—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 147, 149, 323, 325 and 304. Where a Sessions Judge, in charging a jury under s. 297 of the Code of Criminal Procedure said: "The accused are charged with offences under ss. 147, 323 with 149, 325 with 149, and 304 with 149. The law bearing on the case has been placed before you more than once in the addresses delivered by the learned pleaders on either side. I need not go into detail as to the law, therefore." *Held*, that it was immaterial how much or how often the jury may have been addressed by the pleaders on both sides upon the law. The responsibility of laying down the law for the guidance of the jury rested entirely with the Judge, and a verdict arrived at by the jury in the absence of any such direction

CHARGE TO JURY—contd.**2. MISDIRECTION—contd.**

on the law by which they should be guided could not be accepted as a valid verdict in the case. *Held*, further, that although the common object of the unlawful assembly is stated in the charge, the Sessions Judge ought, in commenting upon the provisions of s. 149 of the Penal Code, to draw the attention of the jury expressly to the common object. *MANGAN DAS v. EMPEROR* (1902) I. L. R. 29 Calc. 379; s. c. 6 C. W. N. 292

26. ————— *Misdirection—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 297, 537—Judge bound to state all the elements of offences and deal with evidence, differentiating evidence against each of the accused—Failure to do so not a mere irregularity.* Under s. 297 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judge must explain to the jury all the essential elements of the offence with which the prisoner is charged. An omission to do so is not a mere irregularity within the meaning of s. 537. It is a failure to comply with an express provision of the law and will vitiate the conviction. The Judge should also point out to the jury the evidence against each of the accused and the circumstances which distinguish the cases of some of the accused from that of the others. *Mangan Das v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 379, referred to and followed. *MARI VALAYAN v. EMPEROR* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 44

27. ————— *Charge to jury—Misdirection to the Jury.* The omission by the Judge in his charge to the jury to mention the fact of the original witnesses named in the first information having been abandoned by the prosecution, of two of them having given evidence for the defence, and of the witnesses actually examined for the prosecution being entirely new witnesses, is a sufficient misdirection to justify the setting aside of the conviction. *DASARATH MANDAL v. EMPEROR* (1907) I. L. R. 34 Calc. 325

28. ————— *Trial by Jury—Misdirection—Expression of opinion by Judge on facts—Omission to point out material evidence—Charge, heads of—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 325.* An expression of opinion by the Judge on the facts without telling the jury that they are at liberty to form their own opinion in regard thereto, and also without cautioning them to give the accused the benefit of a reasonable doubt, amounts to a misdirection. Where the medical opinion was that the injuries of the deceased were not, in the case of a man in ordinary health, dangerous to life: *Held*, that the Judge should have specially called the attention of the jury to such opinion. Where the accused were charged under ss. 147, 148, 149, 150 of the Indian Penal Code: *Held*, that they could not be convicted under s. 325 of the Penal Code as they had not been called upon to meet such a charge, and it was not minor to, or included in, a charge under s. 149 of the Code. *Ram Sarup Rai v. Emperor*, 6 C. W. N. 98, followed. It is not only desirable but necessary that the charge

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should be recorded in an intelligible form and with sufficient fulness to satisfy the Appellate Court that all points of law arising in the case were clearly and correctly explained to the jury. The omission to instruct the jury as to their verdict, if they found that there was no unlawful assembly but that hurt was caused by any one or more of the accused, is a serious misdirection. *PANCHU DAS v. EMPEROR* (1907)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 698; 11 C. W. N. 686

3. SPECIAL CASES.

1. ————— *Alibi, proof of—Erroneous direction as to admissibility of document.* Upon a plea of alibi by the prisoners that they had left Patna on the 12th April 1869, and reached Port Canning on the 20th of the same month, and were not at Patna on the 30th May, the prosecutor adduced in evidence a written statement engrossed on two pieces of stamp paper, one bearing the endorsement of a stamp-vendor as sold on the 13th, and the other on the 18th April, filed on the 20th April, and alleged to bear the verification of the prisoners. No evidence was adduced to prove that the prisoners had signed it. The Judge drew the attention of the jurors to this document, and adverted to it in these terms: "If the written statement was drawn up on an earlier date than the date it bears, it could not have been prepared earlier than the day on which the principal stamp was bought,—i.e., 18th." *Held*, that the document should not have been received in evidence, and that there was a misdirection which contributed materially towards the jury finding the prisoner guilty. *QUEEN v. GAJRAJ* . 3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 43

2. ————— *Belonging to gang of thieves—Penal Code, s. 401—Proof of association.* In the trial of prisoners for the offences of belonging to a gang of persons associated for the purpose of habitually committing theft or robbery (s. 401, Penal Code), the Judge should, in his charge, put clearly to the jury—(i) the necessity of the proof of association; (ii) the need of proving that that association was for the purpose of habitual theft; and that habit is to be proved by an aggregate of acts. *SERIRAM VENKATASAMI v. QUEEN*

6 Mad. 120

See *MANKURA PASI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 139

3. ————— *Culpable homicide—Provocation.* In charging a jury on the point of provocation in a case of culpable homicide, a Judge should tell the jury that to bring the case within the exception to s. 300, Penal Code, the prisoner must have been deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation; that there ought to have been sufficient cause for such loss of self-control; and that the provocation was not wilfully occasioned by the prisoner as an excuse for doing harm. *QUEEN v. GUNESH LUSHKAR* . 9 W. R. Cr. 72

CHARGE TO JURY—*contd.*3. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

4. _____ *Penal Code, s. 304.*
In his charge to the jury the Judge should draw a distinction between the two classes of culpable homicide mentioned in s. 304 of the Penal Code, and direct them to find specially under which, if either, the prisoner was guilty. *QUEEN v. KALICHARAN DASS*

6 B. L. R. Ap. 86 : 15 W. R. Cr. 17

QUEEN v. AMIR KHAN

6 B. L. R. Ap. 87 note : 12 W. R. Cr. 35

5. _____ *Dacoity—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 423—Setting aside verdict of the jury—Power of Appellate Court to deal with the case—Charge under Penal Code, ss. 395, 412.*
It is the duty of the Judge to call the attention of the jury to the different elements constituting the offence and to deal with the evidence by which it is proposed to make the accused liable. Failure to do so amounts to misdirection. *Queen-Empress v. Baiya Somya, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 369*, followed. Statements by some of the accused persons which do not amount to a confession, and which do not in any way incriminate them, are not admissible in evidence against any persons other than those making them. Omission to direct the jury that in dealing with the evidence against the accused other than those making the statements they are not to take into consideration such statements also amounts to misdirection. If the verdict of the jury is set aside on any of the grounds mentioned in cl. (d) of s. 423 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), then there is no restriction on the powers of the Appellate Court to deal with a case of which it has complete seizin in any of the manners provided in that section. The law nowhere lays down that, when the verdict of the jury is set aside, the Court must necessarily direct a new trial. *Wajadar Khan v. Queen-Empress, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 955*, dissented from. The course adopted in *Queen-Empress v. O'Hara, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 642*, *Regina v. Naoroji Dadabhai, 9 Bom. H. C. 358*, and *Queen-Empress v. Haribole Chunder Ghose, I. L. R. 1 Calc. 207*, followed. *TAJU PRAMANIK v. QUEEN-EMPRESS . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 711*
2 C. W. N. 369

6. _____ *False charge—Penal Code, s. 211—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), ss. 418, 423, 437—Misdirection to the jury.*
The accused was convicted by the Sessions Judge of Nadia and a jury under s. 211, Penal Code, for having brought a false charge of dacoity. The charge concluded with these words :—"I now leave the case in your hands. If you believe the charge of dacoity to be false, then you should find the prisoner guilty under s. 211, Penal Code, otherwise you should acquit him." *Held*, that the charge was erroneous and defective. *Held*, further, that the Judge was in error in not putting before the jury all the elements which constitute the offence under s. 211 of the Indian Penal Code. *Held*, also, that the Judge should, in the operative part of the charge, instead of directing as he did, have pro-

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minently placed before the jury one of the most essential elements of the charge under s. 211, namely, that in instituting the false charge of dacoity there was no just or lawful ground for the charge, and the jury should have been asked to say whether the charge was false and whether in instituting that charge there was no just or lawful ground. *TOMIJ PRAMANICK v. EMPRESS*

1 C. W. N. 301

7. _____ *False evidence—Misdirection.*
Where *O* disposed that he and *R* were four days in company at *M*, and the Judge charged the jury that if they found that *R* was not in company with *O* during those four days at *M*, but was at *S*, it did not matter where *O* was, because it was clear that he could not have been in company with *R* at *M*, and must therefore have given false evidence when he said that he was during those four days in such company at *M* : *Held* by the majority of the Court (*SETON-KARR, J.*, dissenting), that there had been no misdirection. *QUEEN v. RAM MONI SEIN*

7 W. R. Cr. 105

8. _____ *Misdirection.*
There is no misdirection, in a case of false evidence, in a Judge pointing out to the jury the contrast between the evidence for the prosecution and the course followed by the prisoner (namely, a simple denial of the charge, coupled with a refusal to examine the witnesses in attendance), so long as the Judge leaves it to the jury to decide between the opposing statements and to credit whichever they thought most worthy of belief. *QUEEN v. SEETANATH GHOSAL . 2 W. R. Cr. 60*

9. _____ *Duty of Judge.*
Duty of Judge in charging a jury in a case of giving false evidence and abetment of false evidence discussed. *JUGUT MOHINEE DASSEE v. MADHU SUDAN DUTT . 10 C. L. R. 4*

10. _____ *Forgery—Misdirection.* Where accused was charged under s. 471 of the Penal Code with having, in a suit brought against them by the vendee of their sister to recover possession of certain property acquired by her by right of inheritance from her father, fraudulently and dishonestly used a forged document as genuine, knowing or having reason to believe it to be a forged document, it appeared that the accused were in possession of the property, and that the document in question purported to be a deed of gift from their father. It was proved that the endorsement of registration which appeared on the document was a forgery. In his charge to the jury the Sessions Judge omitted to deal with the fact of the accused being in possession of the property. He also directed that the registration endorsement having been proved to be a forgery, it was for the accused persons to establish the genuineness of the document. *Held*, that the Sessions Judge, in omitting to deal with the fact of the possession of the accused, and in throwing the onus of proving the genuineness of the document upon them, had misdirected the jury. *KHOORSHEED KAZI v. EMPRESS . 8 C. L. R. 542*

CHARGE TO JURY—*contd.*3. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

11. ———— **Kidnapping—Judge aiding jury with his own opinion.** Where a Sessions Judge left the jury to decide upon the age of a girl who had been kidnapped, merely aiding them with his own opinion in which they expressed their concurrence: —*Held*, that there was no misdirection to the jury. **QUEEN v. SHAMA KHANKEE . 7 W. R. Cr. 22**

12. ———— **What amounts to misdirection—Penal Code, s. 466—Question of intention.** In a trial with a jury under s. 366 of the Penal Code, the Judge on the question of intent charged the jury in the following words:—"It remains only to consider the question of intent. The charge was that the girl was kidnapped in order that she might be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse. As to this, it is sufficient to say that no other inference is possible under the circumstances. When a man carries off a young girl at night from her father's house, the presumption is that he did so with the intent indicated above. It would be open to him, if he had admitted the kidnapping, to prove that he had some other object, but no other object is apparent on the face of the facts." *Held*, that this amounted to a misdirection of the jury. The question of intent was a pure question of fact, but the way in which it had been put to the jury left them no option but adopt the view taken by the Judge. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HUGHES**

I. L. R. 14 All. 25

13. ———— **Murder—Distinction between murder and culpable homicide.** When a prisoner is on his trial by a jury upon a charge of murder, it is the duty of the Judge to point out to the jury accurately the difference between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and to direct the attention of the jury to the evidence, and to leave them to find the facts and say (under the direction of the Judge as regards the law) of what offence the prisoner is guilty. **QUEEN v. SHAMSHERE BEG . 9 W. R. Cr. 51**

14. ———— **Possession of forged document—Penal Code, ss. 474, 475—Possession of forged documents bearing counterfeit marks—Ingredients of the offence.** To support a charge under s. 474 of the Penal Code, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove (i) that the documents in respect of which the charge is brought are forged; (ii) that the accused knew them to be forged; (iii) that he was in possession of them; (iv) that he intended that they should be fraudulently or dishonestly used as genuine; and (v) that each of the documents is of the description mentioned in s. 466 or s. 467 of the Penal Code. To support a charge under the latter part of s. 475 of the Penal Code it is necessary for the prosecution to prove (1) that the accused was in possession of the papers referred to in the charge; (2) that the devices or marks were counterfeited on them; (3) that the marks were such as are used for the purpose of authenticating any document described in s. 467; and (4) that the accused intended that the marks should be used for the purpose of giving the appearance of authenticity

CHARGE TO JURY—*contd.*3. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

to documents either then forged or thereafter to be forged. The accused was charged with being in possession of forged documents, an offence punishable under ss. 474 and 475 of the Penal Code. In his summing up, the Sessions Judge, after stating that the documents were admitted by the defence to be forgeries, told the jury that the only issue they had to decide was whether the forged documents were in the possession of the accused, and whether the nature of one, at all events, of the documents was such as to connect them with the accused, being the kind of document he would be likely to have in his house and he alone; and that, if they found this issue in the affirmative, they must return a verdict of guilty. *Held*, that the charge to the jury was defective and misleading, and insufficiently complied with the requirements of s. 297 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. **QUEEN EMPRESS v. ABAJI RAMCHANDRA**

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 165

15. ———— **Private defence, right of—Penal Code, s. 100, cls. 1, 2, and 6—Misdirection.** *Held*, that it was no misdirection on the part of the Judge in not calling the attention of the jury to cls. 1 and 2 of s. 100 of the Penal Code, when he particularly called their attention to cl. 6 of that section. **QUEEN v. MOOKHTARAM MUNDLE**

17 W. R. Cr. 45

16. ———— **Rape—Erroneous verdict owing to misdirection—Failure of justice—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 418, 423 (d), and 537.** On a charge of rape the Judge in his charge to the jury said: "You will observe that this sexual intercourse was against the girl's will and without her consent, etc.," instead of saying as he ought to have done, "you will have to determine upon the evidence in this case whether the intercourse was against the girl's will, etc.," and the charge went on in the same style of stating to the jury what had been proved instead of leaving it to them to decide what in their opinion was proved. In the concluding sentence of the charge the Judge said: "You have seen the witnesses, and I have no doubt that you will return a just verdict." *Held*, that such a charge amounted to a clear misdirection, and that the verdict was erroneous owing to such misdirection. Even the concluding sentence did not satisfy the requirements of a proper charge. The provisions in s. 423 (d) and s. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code do not require that the Court is to go through the facts and find for itself whether the verdict is actually erroneous upon the facts. **ALI FAKIR v. QUEEN-EMPRESS**

I. L. R. 25 Cal. 230

17. ———— **Rioting—Unlawful assembly—Common object—Verdict of jury—Alternative common object—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 303.** Fourteen accused were charged with rioting armed with deadly weapons, and with murder and causing grievous hurt during such riot. The common object alleged by the prosecution was to compel the payment of certain money by one of the

CHARGE TO JURY—*contd.*3. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

persons of the opposite party. Some of the accused who admitted their presence at the scene of the occurrence stated that they had been attacked on account of an allegation being made that one of the opposite party had enticed away another's wife, and that they had merely acted in self-defence. The case was tried before a jury, and on the close of the case for the prosecution the Sessions Judge, considering that possibly the common object alleged by the prosecution might be considered not to have been proved, amended the charge and added an alternative common object to it, *viz.*, that the object of the assembly was to punish one of the opposite party for enticing away another's wife. There was no evidence on the record to prove the alternative common object, it being based solely on a portion of the statements of some of the accused, and the Sessions Judge put it to the jury that it was an inference that could possibly be drawn from the evidence, but it was for them to draw that inference or not. The jury convicted all the accused without specifying which common object they relied on, and were not asked, under s. 303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, any questions for the purpose of ascertaining what their verdict was based on. *Held*, that the Judge had misdirected the jury, and that the verdict of the jury leaving it uncertain what was the common object which actuated the accused, was bad in law, and that the conviction must be set aside and the case re-tried. *Held*, further, that it was unfair to use a part of the statements of some of the accused put forward in their defence as justifying the use of force by them in repelling the attack of the opposite party, for the purpose of showing a common object as against them, and that the statements should have been taken in their entirety and could not in any event be used as against the rest of the accused. *WAFADAR KHAN v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* I. L. R. 21 Cal. 955

18. ——— Stolen property, retaining of—*Penal Code, s. 411*. The accused were charged with retaining stolen property under s. 411 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860). The Sessions Judge in his charge to the jury merely directed them to find whether the property was stolen, and whether it was retained by the accused. *Held*, that the charge was defective, and amounted to a misdirection. The Sessions Judge should have directed the jury to find (i) whether the property was stolen; (ii) whether it was dishonestly retained; and (iii) whether the accused knew or had reason to believe the same to be stolen property. Unless these questions were found by the jury in the affirmative, the accused could not legally be convicted of an offence under s. 411 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BALYA SOMYA* I. L. R. 15 Bom. 369

19. ——— Unlawful assembly—*Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 225, 537*—Omission to state correctly common object of unlawful assembly—*Prejudice to accused*. Re-

CHARGE TO JURY—*contd.*3. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

gard being had to the provisions of s. 225 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the omission by a Judge to correctly state the common object of an unlawful assembly, in the charge to a jury, does not vitiate the trial, if such omission has not in any way prejudiced the accused in their defence. *Sabir v. Queen-Empress, I. L. R. 22 Cal. 276*, and *Behari Mahton v. Queen Empress, I. L. R. 11 Cal. 106*, distinguished. *RAHAMAT ALI v. EMPRESS* 4 C. W. N. 196

20. ——— Unsoundness of mind—*Misdirection—Criminal Procedure Code, 1871, s. 425*. A Sessions Judge in his charge to the jury told them that in his judgment the accused was at the time of his trial exhibiting symptoms of unsoundness of mind, and he directed them to find whether the accused was insane at the time he committed the offence. *Held*, that the issue as to whether the accused was of unsound mind at the time of the trial and incapable of properly making his defence was a preliminary issue to that put by the Sessions Judge, and should, under s. 425 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, have been first submitted to the jury. *QUEEN v. DOORJODHUN SHAMONTO alias DEEJOBOR* 19 W. R. Cr. 26

21. ——— Question of fact—*Proof of previous conviction*. The question of proof of previous conviction is one of fact which ought to go to the jury, and must be determined by a jury. *QUEEN v. ESAN CHUNDER DEY* 21 W. R. Cr. 40

22. ——— Question of law and fact—*Competency of child to give evidence—Evidence Act, II of 1855, s. 14*. Whether or not a child was competent to give evidence within the meaning of s. 14, Act II of 1855, was a question for the Judge to decide, and not for the jury, the amount of credit to be given to the statement being all that fell within the province of the jury. The error, however, in leaving the first question to the jury held to be no misdirection. *QUEEN v. HOSSSEINEE* 8 W. R. Cr. 60

23. ——— Recommendation to mercy. A Judge ought not to introduce into his direction to the jury any question as to recommending a prisoner to mercy, but should leave that entirely to the jury. *QUEEN v. DASSEE MOSULMANY* 14 W. R. Cr. 46

24. ——— Stolen property—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 395, 411—Charges of dacoity and receiving stolen property—Possession of stolen property—Misdirection*. On the trial of an accused before a Judge and jury at a Court of Session for dacoity and receiving stolen property, the Judge, in his charge to the jury, directed them that the fact of a stolen shirt having been found in possession of the accused two months after the dacoity was sufficient to justify them in convicting the accused of the dacoity. *Held*, on appeal, that this was a misdirection. Whether the possession of the stolen property was recent enough to warrant a

CHARGE TO JURY—concl'd.**3. SPECIAL CASES—concl'd.**

conviction for the substantive offence was a matter entirely for the jury, and should not have been put to them in the positive way which the Judge adopted. *GUZZALA HANUMAN v. EMPEROR* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 467

CHARGE UPON IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 298

Registration Act (III of 1877), ss. 17, 21, 49 and 80.—*Power-of-attorney purporting to create charge on immoveable property—Non-compliance with provisions of Registration Act—Charge.* Where A executed a power-of-attorney in favour of B purporting to create a charge generally on immoveable property, but the instrument did not sufficiently describe the parcels of property and was moreover stamped and registered as a power-of-attorney and entered in Book IV: *Held*, that the instrument did not operate as a charge. *Najibulla Mulla v. Nufr Mistri*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 196, referred to. *INDRA BIBEE v. JAIN SARDAR AHIRI* (1907)

12 C. W. N. 316

s.c. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 854

CHARITABLE BEQUEST.

See CHARITIES.

See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION OF WILL—BEQUESTS FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 5

See WILL—CONSTRUCTION.

6 C. W. N. 321

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 632

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 532

8 C. W. N. 274, 653

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 583

CHARITABLE ENDOWMENT.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

8 C. W. N. 545

CHARITABLE INSTITUTION.

— suit relating to—

See COSTS—TAXATION OF COSTS.

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 301

See RIGHT OF SUIT—SUBSCRIPTIONS, SUITS FOR . . . 10 C. L. R. 197

See TRUSTS ACT, s. 34.

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 443

CHARITABLE INTENTION.

See WILL . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 261

CHARITABLE SOCIETY.

See ACT XXI OF 1860, s. 20.

CHARITABLE TRUST.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 517

CHARITABLE TRUST—cont'd.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 134 (1871, ART. 134).

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 269

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—ENDOWMENT.

10 C. W. N. 449

See RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY.

12 Bom. 323

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CHARITIES AND TRUSTS.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—INTEREST TO SUPPORT RIGHT . . . 6 C. L. R. 58

See TRUST . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 551

1. ————— *The Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act (XXVIII of 1866), s. 34—Non-applicability to Charitable Trusts—Indian Trusts Act (II of 1882), ss. 1, 2—Statute of Frauds (29 Ch. II, C. 3), s. 7—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1852), s. 539—"Further or other relief", meaning of—Parsis—Conversion among Indian Zoroastrians—Juddins—Convert not entitled to certain religious and charitable institutions of Parsis.* The Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act (XXVIII of 1866) does not apply to Charitable Trusts. Section 2 of the Indian Trusts Act (II of 1882) expressly repeals amongst other sections s. 34 of the Trustees and Mortgagees Act. The Indian Trusts Act was made applicable to the Bombay Presidency in 1891, and since then at all events s. 34 has ceased to have any force. The saving clause in s. 1 of the Indian Trusts Act does not affect the repealing section which immediately follows and there is no saving or exception in favour of Charitable Trusts or of Trustees of properties dedicated to charity. S. 7 of the Statute of Frauds is wholly repealed by s. 2 of the Indian Trusts Act. S. 7 of the Statute of Frauds was mainly intended to regulate procedure. It never applied to India at any time; even if it did the Indian Evidence Act entirely superseded it:—*Held by DAVAR, J.*, that s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, is very limited in its scope and operation. It contemplates the institution of a suit to "obtain a decree" for reliefs which are strictly confined to five heads. The first branch of the suit clearly falls under the provisions of the section, for the plaintiffs have obtained a decree under three of the five provisions of the section, viz., (a) the appointment of new trustees, (b) vesting trust property in the trustees, and (c) settling a scheme. But the reliefs asked for in the second branch of the case, namely, the ascertainment and declaration of what are the trusts, the rectification of the trust-deeds, a declaration that the defendants have either wrongly declared the trust in the deeds or wrongly interpreted the trusts therein, do not fall under any of the five heads mentioned in the section. The words "further or other relief" that follow must necessarily be construed to refer to reliefs *ejusdem generis* and not to reliefs wholly outside those specifically defined under these five heads. A suit brought not

CHARITABLE TRUST—contd.

to establish a public right in respect of a public trust, but to remedy a particular infringement of an individual right is not within s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882. S. 539 contemplates a suit either in the name of the Advocate-General at the instance of relators, or a suit in the name of parties "having an interest in the trust" with the consent of the Advocate-General. The "interest" of the parties here contemplated must be the "interest" that is threatened or infringed. A well-established and ancient usage prevailing amongst a community must override such of the tenets of its religion as are shown to have fallen into desuetude and conflict with ancient usage prevailing in the community. *Peshotam Hormasji Dustoor v. Meherbai*, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 302, and *Bai Shirinbai v. Kharshedji*, 22 Bom. 430, followed. Although the conversions of Juddins is permissible amongst Zoroastrians, such conversions are entirely unknown to the Zoroastrian community in India; and far from being customary or usual for it to convert a Juddin, the Zoroastrian community of India has never attempted, encouraged or permitted the conversion of Juddins to Zoroastrianism. Even if an entire alien—a Juddin—is duly admitted into the Zoroastrian religion after satisfying all conditions and undergoing all necessary ceremonies, he or she would not, as a matter of right, be entitled to the use and benefits of the funds and institutions under the defendants' management and control; these were founded and endowed only for the members of the Parsi community; and the Parsi community consists of Parsis who are descended from the original Persian emigrants, and who are born of both Zoroastrian parents, and who profess the Zoroastrian religion, the Iranis from Persia professing the Zoroastrian religion, who came to India either temporarily or permanently, and the children of Parsi fathers by alien mothers who have been duly and properly admitted into the religion. *Held per BEAMAN, J.*, that the decision of a suit under section 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, is not only binding on the parties to it, but to all persons affected by it. The expression "such further or other relief" in the section means such further or other relief as, from the nature of the introductory words and the exemplificatory cases, appears to the Court to be appropriate in such a suit, e.g., removing fraudulent trustees, restraining a breach of trust, and so forth. Any extension or limitation of the scope of a trust so as to exclude those who were intended to be included or to include those who were intended to be excluded, is a breach of trust. The Zoroastrian religion does admit and enjoin conversion. The Indian Zoroastrian while theoretically adhering to their ancient religion and consistently avowing its principal tenets, including, of course, the merit of conversion as a theological dogma, erected about themselves real caste barriers, and gradually fell under the influence of the caste idea, till, in modern popular language, it has found current expression in the term Parsi,

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which now seems to have as distinctly a caste meaning and as essentially a caste connotation as that used to denominate any other great Indian caste. In the Zoroastrian community, while the religion and its ritual purity are still the main-spring of the communal life, they are so intimately bound up with the exclusiveness and the purity of the tribe or caste, that they have become practically identical. It is therefore fairly accurate to describe the Indian Zoroastrians as Parsis—thereby implying a caste, or communal, or tribal organisation. Conversion, in the abstract at any rate, and as a theoretical religious tenet, was perfectly familiar to the Parsi community, not only in the remote past but in our own time. It was not the intention of the founders of the trusts in question to extend their benefits to any one who was not in the most rigid caste-sense Parsi, that is, born into the community of the Indian Zoroastrians and born of an Indian Zoroastrian father. *SIR DINSHA MANEKJI PETIT v. SIR JAMSETJI JIJIBHAI* (1908). I. L. R. 33 Bom. 509

CHARITIES.

See ADVOCATE GENERAL.

4 Moo. I. A. 190

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 28 All. 603

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CHARITIES AND TRUSTS.

See SUPREME COURT, MADRAS.

4 Moo. I. A. 190

Will—Gift to charitable purpose—Unnecessary and useless object—Cy-pres doctrine—Trust incapable of being carried out at testator's death—Diversion of funds to useful and beneficial purpose—Power of Court. On the authority of *In re Campden Charities*, L. R. 18 Ch. D. 310, and of other cases it is clear that when, under altered circumstances, through lapse of time or through other causes, it appears to the Court that the charity provided by the donor could not be carried out literally in terms of his directions with any benefit whatever to the objects of his benefaction, the Court ought not to hesitate to give its sanction to a scheme, which will carry out the charitable intentions of the donor to be gathered from the instrument establishing the charity, as nearly as possible to the original intentions of such donor. Each case in which an application is made to divert charity funds into other channels *cy-pres* must necessarily depend upon its own facts and circumstances and upon the evidence adduced before the Court. *In the matter of HORMUSJI FRAMJI WARDEN* (1907). I. L. R. 32 Bom. 214

CHARTER ACT (24 AND 25 VICT., CAP. 104).

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882), s. 380.

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 602

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (V OF 1898) . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 575

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 909

See HIGH COURTS CHARTER ACT.

See LETTERS PATENT.

ss. 1, 9, 13, 14—

See SPECIAL TRIBUNAL.

13 C. W. N. 605

s. 14—

See COPYRIGHT . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 571

See COPYRIGHT ACT, s. 6.

10 C. W. N. 134

s. 15—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 380.

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 602

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 68

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 287

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT V OF 1898), ss. 203, 437, 439.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1282

See HIGH COURTS CHARTER ACT.

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 994

See LETTERS PATENT FOR BOMBAY HIGH COURT, CL. 13 . 10 C. W. N. 185

See POSSESSION . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 33

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 68

See TRANSFER OF SUIT.

I. L. R. 28 All. 246

1. ——— Charter Act, s. 15—Order of remand—Judgment—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 584—Second appeal—Ground. A judgment of a Judge of the High Court sitting singly and remanding a case after dealing with the whole case and setting aside the judgment and the decree of the lower Court is a "judgment" within the meaning of s. 15 of the Charter Act. *RAI BENODE BEHARI BOSE v. RAI PASUPATI NATH BOSE* (1907) . 13 C. W. N. 105

2. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 145 and 435 (3)—High Courts powers of revision. Held, that s. 15 of the Charter Act, 24 & 25 Vict., Cap. CIV, does not override s. 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so as to enable the High Court in the exercise of its powers of superintendence to interfere with an order passed by a Court having jurisdiction under Chap. XII of the Code, interference with which in revision is excluded by s. 435 (3). *Hurbullubh Narain Singh v. Luchmeswar Prosad Singh*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 188, and *Mahadeo Kunwar v. Bisu*, I. L. R. 25 All. 537, referred to.

CHARTER ACT (24 AND 25 VICT., CAP. 104)—concl'd.

s. 15—concl'd.

MAHARAJ TEWARI v. HAR CHARAN RAI (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 144

3. ——— and Letters Patent, cls. 28, 29—Power of High Court to order stay of proceedings initiated under s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court has power, under s. 15 of the High Courts Act, and under clauses 28, 29 of the Letters Patent, to stay proceedings, when action under s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is taken by a Court subject to its powers of superintendence. Where a Court, in a Civil suit, finds a document to be a forgery and, while an appeal against its decision is pending, takes proceedings in the Criminal Courts under s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court will direct further proceedings in the Criminal Court to be stayed, if, on a consideration of the circumstances, it is satisfied that such proceedings are oppressive and will prevent the party from conducting his appeal. In the matter of the *Petition of Ram Prasad Hazra*, B. L. R. F. B. 426, distinguished. *JOGIAH v. EMPEROR* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 510

CHARTER-PARTY.

See BILL OF LADING.

Bourke O. C. 100, 171, 309

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 313

See CONTRACT . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 573

See DAMAGES—REMOVEDNESS OF DAMAGE

6 B. L. R. Ap. 20

See GUARANTEE . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 412

See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—BREACH OF AGREEMENT

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 5

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—LIABILITY OF AGENTS . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 71

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 584

1. ——— Nomination of ship's agents by freighters—Right of Agents to sue on charter party—Ships "going seeking," meaning of. A charter-party made between the defendants (the owners of *The Seaforth*) and *H & Co.* (the freighters) provided that the owners should employ at the ports of discharge the consignee nominated by the freighters to transact the ship business there inwards and outwards on the customary terms, not exceeding 2½ per cent. on amount of freight payable inwards, and 5 per cent. outwards. *H & Co.* nominated the plaintiffs to transact the ship's business in Bombay (a port of discharge) with the knowledge and consent of the master of *The Seaforth*, and the plaintiffs accepted and acted under such nomination. The defendants refused to pay the plaintiff's commission on the outward freight of *The Seaforth* on the ground that, under the circumstances under which such freight was procured, the plaintiffs were not under the charter-party entitled to receive commission on it. Held, that the plaintiffs were sufficiently within the com-

CHARTER-PARTY—contd.

sideration of the charter-party to maintain a suit for the breach of such clauses of it as were inserted for their benefit. Meaning of the mercantile expression of ship "going seeking" discussed. *BLACKWALL & Co. v. JONES & Co.*

7 Bom. O. C. 144

2. ——— Right to retain cargo for amount of bill for freight dishonoured. *M* chartered a ship to load a cargo at Cardiff and proceed therewith to Madras, the freight to be paid in London on unloading and right delivery of the cargo; one-third by *M*'s acceptance at three months from the sailing of the ship (the same to be returned if the cargo were not duly delivered), and the remainder by like bill at three months from the date of delivery in London of the certificate of right delivery of the cargo. The charter-party provided for payment of a commission on the contract, ship lost or not lost, that the £150 should be advanced in cash at the port of discharge on account of the freight against the captain's draft on *M*. The cargo was loaded accordingly, a bill of lading was given for the same, and the ship sailed from Cardiff on the 8th October 1863, *M* having consigned the cargo to *A & Co.*, who carried on business at Madras. On the same day the owners drew a bill on *M* at three months for £261 *ls. 10d.*, being one-third of the freight. On the 10th October 1863, the general agents in London of *A. & Co.* advanced to *M*, on *A & Co.*'s account and out of their funds, £700, received as security for such advance the bill of lading blank, and endorsed and forwarded the bill to *A & Co.* On the 29th October 1863, *M* accepted the bill for £261 *ls. 10d.*, and in the following December he suspended payment, and the bill was protested. On the 14th January 1864, the ship arrived at Madras, and thereupon *A & Co.*, as holders of the bill of lading, applied for the delivery of the cargo, and offered to advance the £150 in cash pursuant to the charter-party, but the captain claimed to retain the cargo for the value of the dishonoured bill and the balance of freight due. *Held*, that the terms of the contract were at variance with the right of lien so claimed, and that it was not suspended by the bill, nor revived by the freighters' insolvency. *ARBUTHNOT v. DAIGRE*. 2 Mad. 88

See also *BJORCK v. MADRAS RAILWAY COMPANY*. . . 2 Mad. 102 note

3. ——— Freight—Bill of lading—Liability of master where quantity signed for is more than cargo shipped. The plaintiff chartered a ship of which he was master, to one *C H C*, of Calcutta, under a charter-party, by which it was agreed that the ship (which was then at Melbourne) should proceed to certain ports and there load a cargo for Calcutta, "the cargo to be delivered to the charterer at Calcutta, on being paid freight at and after the rate of the lump sum of £1,150 for the full reach of the ship; the said freight to be paid on the unloading and right delivery of the cargo as customary, less any advances that may have been made." On the arrival of the ship at Calcutta, *C H C* re-

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quested the plaintiff to deliver the cargo to the defendants as his agents, which the plaintiff agreed to do on having payment of the freight guaranteed by the defendants. The defendants were *bond fide* holders of the bills of lading which had been signed by the plaintiff in respect of the cargo. They sent to the agents of the plaintiff in Calcutta the following letter: "As it will be necessary for us for the protection of our interests to get delivery of the cargo, and as we do not care about further trouble in the matter, we agree to guarantee payment of the balance of freight due on the charter-party, less any claims for short delivery," etc. On unloading there was found to be a deficiency in quantity between the goods mentioned in the bills of lading and those actually shipped and delivered. *Held*, that, notwithstanding this, the plaintiff was entitled to the whole of the freight specified in the charter-party, and was justified in keeping the cargo until the freight was paid. *DODS v. STEWART*

8 B. L. R. 340 : 17 W. R. 49

4. ——— Conditions precedent—"Now on her passage"—Breach of warranty—Principal and agent—Undisclosed principal. The plaintiffs entered into a contract of charter-party with the defendants, whereby it was agreed between them and the defendants, acting for the owners, "that the steamer *Atholl*, now on her passage to Calcutta, being tight, staunch, and strong, etc., shall receive on board from the charterers a complete cargo of merchandise, to consist of 700 tons dead weight, and being so laden shall therewith proceed to London with liberty to call for any legal purpose at any intermediate port or ports; freight to be paid on the above cargo on right delivery of the same at and after the rate of £4-2-6 per ton; charters to have the option of cancelling the charter-party, if the steamer has not arrived in Calcutta on 15th April 1871." The defendants signed the charter-party as "agents of steamer *Atholl*." The steamer was not, at the time the charter-party was entered into, on her way to Calcutta, being then in the port of London, and she did not start for some days after the date of the charter-party. She touched at Madras and Colombo on her way, and did not arrive in Calcutta until 11th April. Rates of freight having declined since the middle of March, at which time, it was alleged, the steamer ought to have arrived, the plaintiff sued the defendants for damages. *Held* the defendants were liable. The statement in the charter-party that the steamer was on her passage to Calcutta was a condition precedent. *SCHILLER v. FINLAY*

8 B. L. R. 544

5. ——— Ship unable to enter port or lie there without previous lightening—"Safe port or as near thereunto as she may safely get always afloat"—Rights of parties. Where a vessel is chartered to load a full and complete cargo, and, being so loaded, to proceed therewith to a "safe port or so near thereunto as she

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may safely get, and deliver the same always afloat," the master is not bound to sign bills of lading for or to sail to, a port where the vessel cannot, by reason of her draught of water, lie and discharge "always afloat" without being previously lightened, even if the cost of the requisite lightening would, by the charter-party, fall on the charterers. By the terms of a charter-party a vessel was to take in a full cargo at Bombay, and therewith proceed to a "safe port in the Mediterranean (Spanish ports excluded), as ordered on signing bills of lading, or so near thereunto as she may safely get, and deliver the same to the said charterers or their assignees always afloat." Marseilles was at first named as the port of discharge, but subsequently the vessel was ordered to Cette, a French port a little to the west of Marseilles; and bills of lading, made out for Cette, were tendered to the master for signature. The master refused to sign the bills of lading or sail for Cette. The vessel's draught of water when loaded was such that she could not have entered or lain afloat in Cette harbour without discharging a portion of her cargo. The cost of lightening the vessel by lighters outside the harbour would, under the charter-party, fall on the charterers, and they were willing to incur the expenses necessary for that purpose. Held, that it was no breach of the charter-party by the master to refuse to sail to Cette, or to sign bills of lading for that port. *GRAHAM & Co. v. MERVANJI NUSSERVANJI* . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 539

6. ——— **Principal and agent—Charter-party signed by agents for master and owner—Parties to suit—Liability of master—Liability of Agents—Master of ship, the agent of charterer, to sign bill of lading—Right of master to recover from charterers sums paid by master as damages for short delivery of cargo—Appropriation of payments—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 69, 230, 235.** By a charter-party, dated 20th September 1880, *F, M & Co.*, as agents for master and owner, let the steam-ship *Hutton* to *E*, for a term of not less than three and not more than four months, for the sum of R15,000 per month, payable in advance. By subsequent agreement the term was extended to 30th March 1881, and the charterer was to pay at the rate of R18,000 a month for the extended time. On 27th February 1881, the ship being about to proceed on her last voyage to Calcutta, and thence to Bombay, *E*, finding himself unable to pay more than R6,000 out of the sum of R18,000, which was then due as hire for the month ending 9th March 1881, requested the plaintiff to pay *F, M & Co.* on his behalf the remaining R12,000. The plaintiffs did so in consideration of an agreement, whereby *E* assigned to them all the freight payable to *E* and all benefits under the said charter-party in respect of the then intended voyage of the *Hutton*. It was also agreed between the plaintiffs and *E* that the said ship should be consigned to the plaintiffs at Calcutta and also to them at Bombay, and that the plaintiffs should receive all the freight, passage-money, etc., to be recovered for the said voyage, the plaintiffs charg-

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ing two per cent. commission on the gross value of the freight shipped in Calcutta and two per cent. on the amount of freight collected by them in Bombay, and interest on the said sum of R12,000 at the rate of nine per cent. per annum. Due notice of this agreement was given to *F, M & Co.* On the 11th March, *E*, being unable to pay the R6,000, requested the plaintiffs to pay that sum to *F, M & Co.* on his behalf, which the plaintiffs did,—*E* agreeing that the said payment should be on the same terms as those on which the R12,000 had been paid. The ship, having proceeded to Calcutta, returned with cargo to Bombay, where she arrived on 2nd April 1881. *F, M & Co.*, as agents for master and owner, refused to allow the plaintiffs to collect the freight payable in Bombay and collected it themselves. The plaintiffs brought his suit, in the first instance, against the owner and the master of the *Hutton* (first and second defendants), praying for an account of the moneys received by the defendants or their agents in respect of the freight, and for payment of the balance found due after deducting the sums properly payable to the defendants for hire of the ship and for R400 damages sustained by the plaintiffs by reason of the wrongful act of the defendants, whereby the plaintiffs had been deprived of the two per cent. commission. The plaintiffs alleged that the balance due to them would be about R9,500. The first defendant did not appear. The second defendant (the master) contended that he was not liable; that *F, M & Co.* had been especially appointed as agents of the owner; that they were not his (the master's) agents; and that they had no authority to sign the charter-party for him. He admitted that the sum of R12,000 had been paid to *F, M & Co.* by the plaintiffs as agents for the owner; but as to the R6,000, he denied that it had been paid to *F, M & Co.* on his account or on account of the owner. He further alleged that there was a large sum due by *E* in respect of hire of the ship and other proper claims against him under the charter-party, and that the defendants were, therefore, justified in refusing the demands of the plaintiffs as assignees of *E* until the whole of their claims against *E* were liquidated. He alleged that *F, M & Co.* had received the freight of the ship, amounting to R20,426, and he claimed a lien on this sum in respect of the sum of R19,282, due for hire and other charges on the said ship, and R605 for money paid for short delivery of goods. The plaintiffs subsequently made *F, M & Co.* defendants to the suit. In their written statement, *F, M & Co.* stated that they had signed the charter party as agents only and not as principals, and they contended that the plaintiffs could not proceed simultaneously against the first defendant and the second defendant, but must elect to proceed separately against either; and, further, that the plaintiffs could not proceed simultaneously against themselves (*F, M & Co.*) and the second defendant, but should elect to proceed separately against either. They admitted the receipt of the R12,000 as agents for the first defendant, and

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not as agents of the second defendant. As to the Rs. 6,000, they alleged that it had been paid to them, not on account of the *Hutton*, but in respect of claims which they had against *E* in connection with the *Clan Gordon*, another ship which had been chartered by *E*. They admitted the receipt of the freight of the *Hutton*, amounting to Rs. 20,426, but claimed a lien on this sum in respect of hire and other proper charges due under the charter-party. *Held*, that the second defendant (the master) was not liable on the charter-party. He had given no authority to *F, M & Co.* to sign it as his agents; and his conduct in acting under the charter-party, being referable to his character of, and duty as, master, did not amount to ratification. But inasmuch as he claimed to deduct from the freight received in Bombay sums which were paid either by him or to *F, M & Co.* for him, he was so far a proper party to the suit. *Held*, also, that, under s. 230 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), *F, M & Co.* were not liable as principals on the charter-party, as they appeared on the face of the charter-party to have signed merely as agents. But they were liable, under s. 235 of the Contract Act, for having untruly represented themselves to be the authorized agents of the master to enter on his behalf into the contract therein contained. Their liability was limited to the amount which could have been recovered from the master if he had really been their principal. No difference was made in their liability by the fact that the owner was also liable. As to the Rs. 6,000,—*Held*, on the evidence that the plaintiffs at the time of the payment had specifically appropriated this sum to the hire then due for the *Hutton*. *Held*, further, that the charter-party was one of the class known as "*locatio navis et operarum magistri*"; that under such a charter-party the master would, as between owner and charterer, sign bills of lading as agent of the charterer; that as between the owner and the charterer the latter was liable to defray the damages for non-performance of the contracts contained in the bills of lading, including damages for short delivery of cargo; and that, such being the liability of *E* as charterer, the plaintiffs as his assignees were bound by all the equities affecting him, so that the defendants might set off as against the plaintiffs whatever the owner of the *Hutton* might have set off against *E* if he had been the plaintiff. The second defendant (the master) alleged that he had paid in Bombay certain sums of money to consignees as damages for short delivery of cargo, and he claimed credit for such payments as against the plaintiffs. *Held*, that he had no power to bind *E* by making such payments on his behalf in Bombay, where both *E* and the plaintiffs were residents, without the consent either of *E* or of the plaintiffs. In order to establish these charges against *E* and his assignees (the plaintiffs), it was necessary for the defendants to prove either that they were in fact due, in which case the master would be justified in paying them under s. 69 of the Contract Act, or that their correctness had been admitted by *E* or his agents.

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The defendants having failed to produce the required proof, the claim of the second defendant was disallowed. *HASONBHAY VISRAM v. CLAPHAM*
I. L. R. 7 Bom. 15

7. ———— *Misdescription of tonnage of ship—Misrepresentation in contract—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 10, 13, 14, 18, 19—Condition precedent.* The defendants in Bombay chartered a ship from the plaintiffs, which was described in the charter-party as of the measurement of about 2,700—2,800 tons nett register. The ship had never been in Bombay, and was wholly unknown to the defendants. Evidence was given that in the negotiations for the charter-party the plaintiffs stated to the defendants that the ship was certainly not more than 2,800 tonnage register. She, however, turned out to be of the registered tonnage of 3,045 tons, and the defendants refused to accept her in fulfilment of the charter-party. *Held*, by PARSONS, J., that the defendants were entitled to treat the contract as void by reason of the erroneous statement of the plaintiffs with regard to the size of the ship. (Contract Act, IX of 1872, ss. 10, 13, 14, 18, 19.) *Held*, on appeal by SARGENT, C.J., and FARRAN, J., (i) that the representation in the charter-party as to the tonnage of the vessel was intended to be a substantive part of the contract between the parties; (ii) that the statement in the contract was a condition precedent of which the defendants were entitled to avail themselves whether or no they would have suffered loss had they accepted the ship; (iii) that the facts justified the defendants in repudiating the contract. *OCEANIC STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY v. SOONDERDAS DHURUMSEY*
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 389

Affirming the decision in s. c.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 241

8. ———— *Optional clause—Choice of ports to load cargo—Election of port.* The plaintiff chartered the defendants' ship to proceed from Bombay to Jedda and thence carry a cargo of pilgrims to Calcutta. The charter-party contained the following clause:—"Owners to have the option of requiring the charterer to ship salt at Ras Rawayah or at Aden to fill up the lower holds of the steamer, at a lump sum of Rs. 12,000, payable before delivery at the port of discharge. Rs. 2,000 to be deposited by the charterer on account of the above freight, out of which Rs. 1,500 to be paid here (Bombay) 48 hours before sailing, and Rs. 500 before departure of the steamer from Jedda." Before the ship left Bombay, the plaintiff was called upon to pay and paid the Rs. 1,500 advance freight. On the ship's arrival at Jedda, the plaintiff was required by the defendants' agent to name the port where he intended to load the salt, and pay the Rs. 500 named in the charter-party. The plaintiff, in reply, named Aden and paid the Rs. 500, which the defendants' agent acknowledged as received "for filling up salt to go to Aden." This was on the 22nd July. The

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captain, however, believing that the plaintiff would not find salt at Aden for Calcutta, refused to sail to Aden to load the salt, unless the expense of going there and returning to Jedda for the pilgrims was guaranteed by the plaintiff, which the plaintiff refused to do. Subsequently, on the 20th July, the captain, on the instructions of the defendants, informed the plaintiff that the choice of the port to load salt was with the defendants, and that they named Ras Rawaya as the port where the plaintiff was required to load his salt, and refused to go to Aden. The plaintiff refused to go to Ras Rawaya. There was, to the defendants' knowledge, no salt at Ras Rawaya. There was plenty of salt at Aden, though none offering for Calcutta, owing to the prices ruling at the latter port. The captain refusing to load the pilgrims unless the balance of the Rs12,000 salt freight was paid in advance, the plaintiff paid it, and brought this suit to recover the whole of the said sum. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed (i) because by the true construction of the contract the choice of the port must be taken to be with the plaintiff, who had to do all that was necessary to provide the salt; the option given by the contract to the owners being as to whether they should require salt to be loaded or not; and (ii) because, if the election of the port was with the defendants, they, through their agent at Jedda, conclusively determined their election in favour of Aden at latest on the 22nd July when they accepted the Rs500 "for filling up salt to go to Aden." **ABDUL RAHMAN ALLARAKHIA v. HASANBHAY VISRAM . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 501**

9. ————— *Mistake in date—Mistake mutual or unilateral—Rectification or rescission of contract.* The plaintiffs required a steamer to sail from Jedda "fifteen days after the Haj," in order to convey pilgrims returning to Bombay. They chartered a steamer from the defendants in June 1891 for that purpose. The defendants chartered their steamers by English dates. The date inserted in the charter-party was "the 10th August 1892 (fifteen days after the Haj)." "The 10th August 1892" was given or accepted by the plaintiffs in the belief that it corresponded with the fifteenth day after the Haj. The defendants had no belief on the subject, and contracted only with respect to the English date. The 19th July 1892, and not the 10th August 1892, in fact corresponded with the fifteenth day after the Haj. On finding out the mistake in March 1892, the plaintiff brought this suit for rectification of the charter-party by the insertion of the correct date, the 19th July 1892, instead of the erroneous date, the 10th August 1892. Meanwhile the defendants had let all their steamers, and could not give the plaintiff one for the 19th July 1892. *Held*, that the agreement was one for the 10th August 1892, and that, as that date was a matter materially inducing the agreement, there could be no rectification, but only cancellation, even if both parties were under a mistake. *Held*, further, that the mistake was not mutual, but on the plaintiffs' part only; and, therefore, there could be no

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rectification. A plaintiff seeking rectification must show that there was an actual concluded contract antecedent to the instrument sought to be rectified and that such contract is inaccurately represented in the instrument. **ABDUL RAHMAN ALLARAKHIA v. BOMBAY AND PERSIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY I. L. R. 16 Bom. 561**

10. ————— *Bill of lading—Freight—Rate of freight in charter-party—Contract by sub-charterer with shipper for freight at lower rate—Refusal by captain to sign bills of lading at lower rate than rate in charter-party—Payment by shipper of difference under protest.* On 3rd March 1898, **K D & Co.**, a firm of freight jobbers in Bombay, contracted to provide the plaintiffs with freight for 3,000 tons of cargo to Liverpool at 16s. 6d. per ton in a steamer to be subsequently named, and on the same day handed to the plaintiffs three shipping orders addressed to the captain of the ship, the name of which was to be afterwards inserted. In these shipping orders the higher and lower rate clause was as follows: "Bill of lading if required at lower or higher rate, difference payable here as customary." This clause the plaintiffs struck out from each of the shipping orders according to their usual practice. On 11th May 1898, the defendants chartered the steamship *Paddington* of which they were also the owners agents in Bombay, and on the 12th May assigned a half share of their interest under the charter-party to **K D & Co.** By the charter-party a full and complete cargo was to be loaded, and the freight was to be £1-10 per ton. The captain, however, was authorized to sign clean bills of lading at any rate of freight required by the charterers without prejudice to the charter-party, but at not less than the chartered rate, unless the difference was paid in cash before sailing. **K D & Co.** having thus sub-chartered the *Paddington*, declared that steamer to the plaintiffs for 2,747 tons of cargo under their contract of the 3rd March 1898 and the name of the steamer was then entered in the shipping orders for that amount of cargo. The plaintiffs thereupon commenced to load a cargo of wheat. By the 21st June, 2,100 tons had been put on board; mate's receipts were given to the plaintiffs and bills of lading were prepared by them, stating the rate of freight to be 16s. 6d. per ton as per the shipping orders, and were presented for signature to the captain. He refused to sign them unless the difference between 16s. 6d. and the chartered rate, viz., £1-10, was paid to him as provided in the charter-party. The plaintiffs thereupon refused to ship any more cargo, and demanded the return of the cargo already shipped on board the *Paddington*. On the 24th June the *Paddington* sailed from Bombay, the captain having previously authorized the defendants to sign bills of lading for him after his departure, provided they were in accordance with the charter-party. After some delay the plaintiffs on the 29th June accepted bills of lading for the 2,100 tons at £1-10, and paid under protest the difference between that

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rate and their contract rate (16s. 6d.) and certain other sums, for which the defendants as agents for the owners claimed a lien. The plaintiffs now sued to recover from the defendants the amount so paid under protest. The defendants contended that as agents for owners they were justified in refusing to give bills of lading until the sums due and for which they claimed a lien were paid. *Held*, that the defendants had no lien for the sums paid, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the amount claimed. *Per CANDY, J.* The plaintiffs were entitled upon demand to have the said 2,100 tons re-delivered to them by the captain. On 29th June the plaintiffs were entitled to clean bills of lading at 30s., and the sum paid by them under protest in order to obtain such bills of lading was recoverable by them. Under the circumstances, the defendants had no lien for freight and demurrage. *Per STARLING, J.* The captain was justified in refusing to re-deliver the said 2,100 tons. The plaintiffs were entitled to clean bills of lading at 30s., and there was no lien for freight and demurrage in respect of which the plaintiffs had paid under protest the sum claimed by defendants. *RALLI BROTHERS v. CHABILDAS LALLUBHAI*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 551

11. ——— Power to sublet—
Sub-charter—Goods shipped under sub-charter and bills of lading authorized by time charter—Liability of such goods for lien given by time charter—Notice of time charter—"Without prejudice to this charter," meaning of—Form, construction, and effect of bills of lading—Lien for hire of vessel. A vessel was chartered by a firm of merchants in Bombay for six months from 20th August 1898 at a rate of freight, which came to R18,000 a month, payable in advance. By the charter-party the charterers had the option of subletting the vessel, and it was provided that bills of lading were to be signed at any rate of freight the charterers or their agents might direct "without prejudice to this charter," and that the owner was to have "a lien upon all cargoes for freight for charter money due under the charter." On 26th August the vessel was sublet by the charterers to the plaintiff for a sound voyage from Saigon to Réunion and back from Mauritius to Bombay. The vessel completed the voyage and on 2nd February 1899 arrived at Bombay with sugar put on board by the plaintiff as sub-charterer, at Mauritius, for which he had received bills of lading from the Captain, who signed them without obtaining payment of the month's freight then due under the time charter. The freight on the sugar was prepaid at Mauritius by the plaintiff's agents, so that on the arrival of the vessel at Bombay nothing remained to be paid by the plaintiff to the shipowner in respect of the bills of lading freight. Delivery of the sugar was, however, refused, the shipowner claiming a lien on it for the R18,000 due under the time charter. In a suit against the owner and the Captain of the vessel to recover the sugar, or its value and damages for its detention, the defendants relied on the lien under the time charter, and alleged that the Cap-

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tain had been induced to sign the bills of lading as he did by misrepresentations of the plaintiff's agent. It was found that the plaintiff knew of the time charter, and the amount of and terms as to the freight, but that there had been no misrepresentation as alleged. *Held*, that the Captain was authorized by the time charter to sign the bills of lading and therefore the shipowner had contracted with the plaintiff to carry the sugar on the terms of the bills of lading. *Colvin v. Newberry, 1 Cl. & Fin. 283*, and *Small v. Moates, 9 Bing. 574*, distinguished. The bills of lading were not mere receipts for the goods shipped; they entitled the plaintiff to delivery of the sugar on payment of the freight due on them, notwithstanding that he had notice of the time charter. Such notice had not the effect of incorporating into the bills of lading any terms inconsistent with them and which the Captain was not bound to embody in them. *Fry v. Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, L. R. 1. C. P. 689*, and *Gardner v. Trechman, 15 Q. B. D. 154* followed. The words in the time charter "without prejudice to this charter," meant no more than that the rights of the shipowner against the time charterer, and *vice versa*, were to be preserved. *Hansen v. Harrold Brothers, 1 Q. B. 612*, followed. Those words did not override or limit the power of the Captain to issue bills of lading at different rates of freight, or entitle the shipowner to a lien on the goods of persons, who had come under no contract with him conferring a lien for the freight, payable under the time charter. A right to seize one person's goods for another person's debt must be clearly and distinctly conferred before a Court of Justice can be expected to recognize it. *Held*, therefore (affirming the decision of the High Court on appeal), that the claim of the ship-owner to the lien provided by the time charter could not be supported. He was, however, entitled to the benefit of any lien, which the time charterer had on the goods of the plaintiff under the sub-charter. *TURNER v. GOLAM MAHOMED (1904)* . . . **I. L. R. 28 Bom. 573**
s. c. L. R. 31 I. A. 222

CHAUKIDAR.

See CHOWKIDAR.

See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.

6 C. W. N. 337

See PENAL CODE (ACT No. XLV OF 1860).

s. 223 . . . I. L. R. 29 All. 377

CHAUKIDARI ACT (BENG. ACT VI OF 1870).

See VILLAGE CHAUKIDARS ACT, 1870.

s. 39, cl. 12.

See RESCUE FROM LAWFUL CUSTODY.

I. L. R. 35 Cal. 361

s. 48—Transfer of resumed land—
Right of zamindar within whose estate lands geographically situate—Right of zamindar with whom settlement made under Reg. VIII of 1793, s. 41. S.

CHAUKIDARI ACT (BENG. ACT VI OF 1870)—*contd.***s. 48—*concl'd.***

48 of Bengal Act VI of 1870 does not require that *chowkidari chakran* lands should be transferred to the zamindar of the estate within which they are geographically situated, but to the zamindar of the estate to which the lands appertain and of which they form a part and parcel. *PRATAP NARAIN MUKERJEE v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1906) 10 C. W. N. 637

s. c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 390

ss. 48, 49, 50, 51, 58, 61, 70—*Chaukidari Chakran land, settlement of—Collector's order, validity of—Evidence—Civil Cases—Presumption—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 114 (e)—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 14—Suit to set aside an act or order—Ultra vires.* Plaintiff sued for possession of certain lands on the ground that they had been transferred to him by the Collector under ss. 48 and 50 of the *Chaukidari Act*. There was nothing to show that any commission was appointed under s. 58 or that any report was submitted under s. 61 of the Act. It was found that the lands were not *chaukidari chakran* and were not part of the plaintiff's estate. *Held* (PARGITER, J., dissenting), that the defendant was entitled to question the Collector's right to make the transfer; there is no presumption, merely because of the Collector's action under ss. 48 to 50 of the Act, that there was a prior valid resumption, that the Government acted under s. 58 or that a report was submitted under s. 61 on all the points indicated in it. *Per* WOODROFFE, J. The meaning of s. 114 (e) of the Evidence Act is that, if an official act is proved to have been done, it will be presumed to have been regularly done. It does not raise any presumption that an act was done, of which there is no evidence and the proof of which is essential to the plaintiff's case. An order of the Collector under s. 50 of the *Chaukidari Act* transferring the land to a person other than the person within whose estate it lies is *ultra vires* and a nullity. It is not necessary to sue to set aside an order which is an absolute nullity and Art. 14 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act does not apply. *Bejoy Chand Mahatab Bahadur v. Kristo Mohini Dasi*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 626, followed. *Surannanna Devappa Hegde v. Secretary of State for India*, I. L. R. 24 Bom. 435; *Shivaji Yesji Chawan v. The Collector of Ratnagiri*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 429; *Nagu v. Salu*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 424; *Faki Gulam Mohidin v. Sajnak*, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 244, referred to. *NARENDRA LAL KHAN v. JOGI HARI* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 107

s. 50—*Resumption and transfer to zamindar—Chowkidari land, if part of estate—Purchaser of estate at revenue sale—Title to chowkidari land—Regulation VIII of 1793, s. 41.* When *chowkidari chakran* land is resumed and transferred to the zamindar under s. 50 of Bengal Act VI of 1870, such land becomes detached from the parent estate, and the zamindar holds it under a different title from his other *malguzari* lands. A purchaser of the parent estate at a revenue sale acquires no title in the

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resumed *chowkidari* land. S. 41 of Reg. VIII of 1793 has been impliedly repealed in districts or parts of districts to which Bengal Act VI of 1870 has been made applicable. *KASHIM SHEIK v. PROSUNNO KUMAR MUKERJEE* (1906) . . . 10 C. W. N. 598

s. c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 596

1. s. 51—*Chaukidari chakran lands—Resumption by Government—Suit for possession—Specific performance of contract, suit for.* Where some of the *patnidars* and the *dur-patnidar* brought a suit, making the remaining *patnidar* a defendant, to recover possession of *chakran* lands found to be a part of the *patni*. *Held*, that this was not an action for specific performance of contract, but for possession of *chakran* lands included in the *patni*. *Ranjit Singh v. Radha Charan Chandra*, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 564, dissented from. *Kazi Newas Khoda v. Ram Jadu Dey*, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 109, and *Huri Narain Mazumdar v. Mokund Lal Mondol*, 4 C. W. N. 814, referred to. *BANWARI MUKUNDA DEB v. BIDHU SUNDAR THAKUR* (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 346

s. c. 12 C. W. N. 459

2. Right created by the *Chaukidar*, effect of. The orders "subject to all contracts heretofore made in which such land may be situated" in s. 51 of Bengal Act VI of 1870, refer to contracts in the nature of *patnis* or *mukararis* created by the zamindar himself in respect of the village in which the *chaukidar's* land or any portion of it is situate and do not reserve the rights created by the *chaukidar*, whose land is resumed, in favour of a third person. *KRISHNA KINKAR DUTT v. BHAGWAN DAS* (1907)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 185

s. c. 12 C. W. N. 161

s. 55—

—*Revenue Sale Law (Act XI of 1859), ss. 5, 6—Jurisdiction of Collector to sell for three years' assessment—Irregularities.* Where a sale was held for the arrears of *chaukidari* assessment for three years by a Collector under s. 55 of the *Chaukidari Act* and a notice was served under s. 6 of Act XI of 1859: *Held*, that it was a mere irregularity which did not render the sale a nullity. *JOTINDRA MOHON TAGORE v. JOGENDRA NATH ROY* (1907)

11 C. W. N. 1107

CHAUKIDARI CHAKRAN LANDS.

See CHAUKIDARI ACT (BENGAL ACT VI OF 1870).

See VILLAGE CHAUKIDARS Act, 1870.

1. Resumption of—*Patni* lease—*Ejectment of former tenant.* When under the terms of a *patni* lease, the *patnidar* is entitled to all resumed lands, and certain *chowkidari chakran* land within the *patni* is resumed by Government and made over to the zamindar, the zamindar cannot, by allowing the old *chowkidar* to remain on the land and accepting rent from

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him, protect the latter from ejectment at the instance of the patnidar. *Binad Lal Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 708, and *Hari Narain Mozumdar v. Mukund Lal Mundal*, 4 C. W. N. 814, distinguished. *UPENDRA NARAIN BHATTACHARJEE v. PROTAP CHANDER PARDHAN* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 703
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 320

2. ————— *Right of occupancy—Ejectment—Tenant-at-will—Act X of 1859*, s. 6. A right of occupancy may be acquired by a tenant even in chowkidari chakran lands under s. 6 of Act X of 1859. *Thakoorani Dassee v. Bisheshur Mookerjee*, B. L. R. Sup. 202 : 3 W. R., Act X, 29; *Hyder Buksh v. Bhoopendra Deb Koomar*, 15 W. R. 231; *Hurry Ram v. Nursing Lal*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 129; and *Audhore Chunder Bhakadoor v. Kristo Churn*, 6 Leg. Comp. 15, referred to. *RAM KUMAR BHATTACHARJEE v. RAM NEWAJ RAJGURU* (1904) . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1021
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 860

3. ————— *Resumption—Transfer to zamindar—Right acquired in land—Settlement by a person not having any right—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 181, if applies*. Where chaukidari chakran lands, which had been resumed, were settled upon tenants by a person, who had no right to deal with the lands, and the tenants, with whom the settlement had been made, set up a title as against the real owner on the ground that they had acquired a *bond fide* right from one whom they *bond fide* believed to have a right to let them into possession and were consequently occupancy or non-occupancy raiyats. *Held*, that the tenants did not acquire any right and the case of *Binad Lal Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 798, did not apply. *HARINGTON and BODILLY, JJ.* Chaukidari chakran lands, when resumed and transferred to the zamindar, become his *zerait* lands. *MOOKERJEE, J.* Upon such transfer, the lands are at the zamindar's disposal to be dealt with by him as *mal* or *zerait*, at his option. Applicability of s. 181 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to such lands considered. *JONAB ALI v. RAKIBUDDIN MALLIK* (1905)
9 C. W. N. 571

4. ————— *Person entitled to settlement—Estate or tenure within which lands are situate—Bengal Act VI of 1870, s. 48*. Where chaukidari chakran lands had, although situated geographically within the ambit of one estate, been allotted at the time of the permanent settlement to another estate in pursuance of, and in accordance with, the provisions of s. 41 of Regulation VIII of 1793, and were transferred by the Collector in pursuance of Bengal Act VI of 1870. *Held*, that on a true construction of s. 48 of the Act, it is not the geographical situation of the land that is to be looked into, but the transfer is to be made to the zamindar of the estate to which the lands appertain and of which they form a part and

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parcel. *PRATAP NARAIN MUKERJEE v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1906) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 390
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 637

5. ————— *Resumption by Collector and transfer of land to the proprietor of the estate—Effect of such transfer—Village Chaukidari Act (Bengal Act VI of 1870), ss. 48, 50 and 51—Regulation VIII of 1793, s. 41*. The effect of resumption of chaukidari chakran lands by the Collector of the District under the provisions of Bengal Act VI of 1870, and subsequent transfer of these lands to the proprietor of the estate, is to separate them from the parent estate, and to grant a new title in respect of them to the proprietor of the estate. S. 41 of Regulation VIII of 1793 has been by implication repealed in parts of districts to which Bengal Act VI of 1870 has been made applicable. *KASHIM SHEIK v. PRASANNA KUMAR MUKERJEE* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 596
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 598

6. ————— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch II, Arts. 113, 142, 144—Chaukidari chakran lands—Resumption by Government—Putni lease—Suit by putnidar for possession of the chakran lands—Village Chaukidari Act (Bengal Act VI of 1870), ss. 48, 51*. By virtue of a *putni* lease granted by the defendant landlord in 1854, the plaintiff was entitled to the chaukidari chakran lands of the mehal, which were subsequently resumed by Government, and not made over to the zamindar till 1899. Upon a suit by the putnidar to recover possession of the chakran lands, the defendant contended that the suit was barred by limitation under Art. 113, Sch. II, of the Limitation Act. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the lands were not in possession of the plaintiffs nor in that of the defendant, until they were made over to the latter by Government, the suit was one for the specific performance of the contract of 1854, and the period of limitation applicable would therefore be that prescribed by Art. 113, and not Art. 142 or Art. 144 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act. *RANJIT SINGH v. RADHA CHARAN CHANDRA* (1907)
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 564

7. ————— *Resumption by Government—Putni lease—Right of putnidar in the resumed lands—Bengal Act VI of 1870, s. 51*. By a *putni* lease the zamindar transferred all the lands appertaining to an estate to the putnidar for an annual rental. Subsequently the Collector resumed all the chaukidari chakran lands situate within the said estate, under Bengal Act VI of 1870, and transferred them to the zamindar of the estate, who again settled the lands with some tenants. The putnidar brought a suit for recovery of possession of those lands on the ground that he was entitled to them under the terms of the *putni* lease. *Held*, that the putnidar was entitled to the possession of the disputed lands on condition of his paying the additional revenue assessed thereon by Government. *Kashim Sheik v. Prasanna Kumar Mukerjee*, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 596, distinguished. *Per*

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MOOKERJEE, J. Under s. 41 of Reg. VIII of 1793 the chaukidari chakran lands must be taken to form a part of the parent estate, in which they are situated. *Jay Kishen Mookerjee v. The Collector of East Burdwan*, 10 Moo. I. A. 16, and *Jonab Ali v. Rakibuddin Mallik*, I. C. L. J. 303, referred to. Even if the effect of the resumption proceedings under Bengal Act VI of 1870 was to create a new title in the zemindar, the rights of the putnidar would be protected by s. 51 of the Act. *Kazi Newaz Khoda v. Ram Jadu Dey* (1906)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 109

8. ———— *Resumption and transfer to zemindar—Recovery of same by putnidar—Suit for specific performance, if necessary.* Where chakran lands were included in the *patni patta* granted by the zemindars to the plaintiffs before the resumption thereof under the Chowkidari Act: *Held*, that upon resumption and transfer of the lands to the zemindars the remedy of the *patnidars* was to bring a suit for recovery of possession and not a suit for specific performance of a contract. *Ranjit Singh v. Radha Charan Chandra*, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 564, not followed. *Kazi Newaz Khoda v. Ram Jadu Dey*, 11 C. W. N. 201; s. c. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 109; *Hari Narain Mozumdar v. Mukund Lal Mundul*, 4 C. W. N. 310, referred to. *Bunwari Mukunda Deb v. Bidhu Sundar Thakur* (1908)

12 C. W. N. 459
s. c. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 346

CHAUKIDARI REGISTER.

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 32 (2).

13 C. W. N. 71

See PARTITION . 12 C. W. N. 640

CHEATING.

See BANKERS . I. L. R. 16 All. 88

See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL CASES.

1 Mad. 31 : 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 94

See FORGERY . 21 W. R. Cr. 41

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 380

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 27

I. L. R. 15 All. 210

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 726

See FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL CASES—
FORGERY . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 822

See PENAL CODE, ss. 415 to 420.

See PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860),
ss. 280, 420 . I. L. R. 29 All. 141

See PENAL CODE, ss. 415, 417, 419, 420,
511 . 9 C. W. N. 807, 1006
I. L. R. 27 All. 302, 561

1. ———— *Want of dishonest intention—Penal Code, s. 415.* To induce a son to pay his father's debts, by acting merely on his fear of consequences to his father, is not cheating. To

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describe these consequences as more serious than they were likely to be, may be to deceive but is not cheating, if done without any fraudulent or dishonest intention. *QUEEN v. RAJCOOMAR BANERJEE*
W. R. 1864, Cr. 25

2. ———— *Dishonest intention at time of taking money.* The mere taking money one day, and dishonestly running away without paying the next day, is not necessarily cheating. There must be an intention to deceive and defraud at the time of taking the money, and the subsequent conduct of the prisoner would only be evidence to show the previous dishonest intention. *QUEEN v. HERRAMUN HULWYE*

5 W. R. Cr. 5 : 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 97

3. ———— *Giving false information—Penal Code, s. 415.* A person attempted to obtain his recruitment in the police of a district by giving certain information which he knew to be false to the District Superintendent of Police. *Held*, that he had not committed the offence of "cheating" within the meaning of s. 415 of the Penal Code. *EMPRESS v. DWARKA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 6 All. 97

4. ———— *Passenger by railway—Penal Code, s. 417—Railway Act, 1854.* A passenger by railway travelling in a carriage of higher class than that for which he had paid fare is not guilty of cheating under s. 417 of the Indian Penal Code, but is indictable under the Railway Act XVIII of 1854. *REG. v. DAYABHAI PARJARAM*

1 Bom. 140

5. ———— *Unlawful entry to exhibition—Penal Code, s. 415.* Where the accused secretly entered an exhibition building without having purchased a ticket, and was there apprehended, it was held that such act did not amount to the offence of cheating under s. 415 of the Penal Code. *REG. v. MAHERVANJI BEJANJI*

6 Bom. Cr. 6

6. ———— *Intention to cheat—Penal Code, s. 417.* To justify a conviction for the offence of cheating, there must be some evidence of an intention to cheat at the time when the promise (the omission to perform which completes the offence of cheating) is made. *REG. v. HARGOVAN-DAS*

9 Bom. 448

7. ———— *False representation in application to Collector.* The defendant was convicted of cheating. He applied to the tahsildar for a specified quantity of land on *cowle* tenure free of tax for five years, and falsely represented that the land was waste land. *Held*, a good conviction. *ANONYMOUS*

6 Mad Ap. 12

8. ———— *Attempting to commit breach of trust—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 455, 456—Framing incorrect document.* Where a person was charged by an Assistant Sessions Judge with (i) attempting to commit criminal breach of trust as a public servant, (ii) framing as a public servant an incorrect document to cause an

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injury, (iii) framing as a public servant an incorrect document to save a person from punishment, and was acquitted on the ground that he was not a public servant, though the Judge found that he framed the document with a fraudulent intent:—The High Court *held*, that the Judge ought to have convicted him of attempting to cheat under ss. 455 and 456 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and, as the facts which he would have had to meet on that charge were the same as he had to meet on the charge of criminal breach of trust, allowed the objection urged at the hearing, though not distinctly taken in their appeal by the Government, and ordered a re-trial of the accused. *REG. v. RAMAJIRAV JIVBAJIRAV* **12 Bom. 1**

9. ———— **Proof necessary for offence of cheating.** A contractor in the Public Works Department, who was charged with cheating in respect of a sum of money which he received on account for work which, it was alleged, he had not then finished, was acquitted on the evidence, because it was not proved (i) that there was a false pretence made use of by accused, (ii) that he knew he was making use of a false pretence or that he intended to defraud, (iii) that the Public Works Department were deceived by the pretence on account of their belief in its truth, and (iv) that the accused received the money with the intention of causing wrongful loss to the Government. *QUEEN v. KALIPUDDO PORAMANICK* **23 W. R. Cr. 43**

10. ———— **Obtaining property on false pretence—Penal Code, s. 415.** A person hiring certain property for use at a wedding, paying a portion of the hire, and giving a written promise to pay the balance of the hire, and to restore the property after the wedding, he being well aware that there was to be no wedding, and intending, when he got the property, to apply for its attachment in a civil suit in respect of an alleged claim, is guilty of cheating. *QUEEN v. KADIR BUX* **3 N. W. 16**

11. ———— **Obtaining money on false pretences—Taking money on promise to return jewels.** The prisoners received a Government promissory note, promising to return certain jewels pledged to them, but not intending to do so, and they subsequently claimed to retain the note for another debt alleged to be due to them by the sender. *Held*, that they were guilty of cheating. *QUEEN v. SHEODURSHUN DASS* **3 N. W. 17**

12. ———— **Wrongful gain or loss—Penal Code, s. 415 and ss. 23 and 24.** A person who purchased rice from a famine relief officer at a certain rate (16 seers to the rupee) on condition that he should sell it at a seer the rupee less was convicted of cheating under s. 420 of the Penal Code because he did not sell it at the rate agreed on, but at 12 seers to the rupee. *Held*, that, as within the meaning of ss. 23 and 24 of the Penal Code there had been no wrongful gain or wrongful loss to any one, no offence had been committed under s. 415 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. LAL MAHOMED* **22 W. R. Cr. 82**

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13. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 269, 417, and 420—Communicating syphilis by the act of sexual intercourse.** A prostitute, who, while suffering from syphilis, communicates the disease to a person who has sexual intercourse with her, is not liable to punishment under s. 268 of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) "for a negligent act and one likely to spread infection of any disease dangerous to life." *Semble*: She may be charged with cheating under s. 417 or 420, if the intercourse was induced by any misrepresentation on her part. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAKHMA*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 59

14. ———— **Attempt to cheat—Penal Code, ss. 417, 463, 464, 465, 511—Forgery—False document—Fraudulent entry in a book of account.** Prisoner was requested to make an entry in a book of account belonging to the complainant, to the effect that he was indebted to the complainant in a certain sum found due on a settlement of accounts: instead of making this entry as requested, prisoner entered in a language not known to complainant that this sum had been paid to complainant. He was convicted of forgery under s. 465 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the offence was not forgery, but an attempt to cheat. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KUNJU NAYAR* **I. L. R. 12 Mad. 114**

15. ———— **Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 415, 420—Deception—Dishonesty—"Wrongful loss"—"Wrongful gain."** The accused by making a false representation that he was an employee of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation obtained rupees ten as subscription from the Health Officer of that Corporation towards the funds of a charitable society. The money was duly made over by the accused to the charity, but he was subsequently charged with the offence of 'cheating' and was convicted under s. 420 of the Penal Code, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and fine. *Held*, that the conviction and sentence should be set aside, there being no such deception in this case as to cause "wrongful loss" or "wrongful gain." *ASHUTOSH MALLICK v. EMPEROR* (1905)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 50

16. ———— **Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 415—Including in a bill an article not supplied—Payment of the bill in part—Intention to defraud.** The fact that a trader, in a statement of his account, included, amongst other articles delivered, an article which the complainant alleged she had returned, does not amount to cheating unless it is proved that he had intentionally done so with an intention to defraud, and had obtained a payment of the whole bill or of the bill in part including the price of that article. *BAIJ NATH RAM MARWARI v. BURGESS* (1900)

5 C. W. N. 255

17. ———— **Cheating by personation—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 415, 419—Personation—Minors.** On an application by the *karta* of a joint Hindu family, in his representative character, to withdraw certain surplus sale-

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proceeds standing to their credit in the Treasury, the Collector directed him either to file a power-of-attorney or to cause all the other members to appear and admit his authority to sign on their behalf. They all appeared in person before the sheristadar, except two minors, who were personated by other persons, and signed receipts for the money and caused the personators to sign in the names of the minors. Thereupon the Collector, after inspecting the signatures, issued a bill in their favour for the amount due, which they withdrew. *Held*, that upon the facts the offence of cheating was not made out. *Reg. v. Longhurst*, unreported, *In re Loothy Bewa*, 11 W. R. Cr. 24, referred to. *BABURAM RAI v. EMPEROR* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 775

18. ————— *Deception—False representation—Conduct—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 415.* To constitute the offence of cheating under s. 415 of the Penal Code, it is not necessary that the deception should be by express words, but it may be by conduct, or implied in the nature of the transaction itself. *Queen v. Sheodurshum Dass*, 3 All. H. C. 17, referred to. *KHODA BUX v. BAKHYA MUNDARI* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 941

19. ————— *Evidence—Obtaining by false representation money as pretended security for appointment to office—Admissibility of proof of previous and subsequent similar but unconnected transactions as evidence of dishonest intention on the occasion in question—Part of a systematic series of similar fraudulent transactions—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 14, Expt. (1), Illus. (o); 15, Illus. (a).* On a charge against the accused of cheating by falsely representing that he was the *dewan* of an estate and could procure for the complainant appointment to the vacant post of manager to the estate, and thereby obtaining a sum of money as a pretended security deposit, evidence of instances of similar but unconnected transactions with other persons, before and after the date of the offence charged, is admissible under ss. 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act not to establish the *factum* of the offence but to prove that the transaction in issue was one of a systematic series of frauds, and that the intention of the accused on the particular occasion in question was dishonest and fraudulent. Explanation (1) and Illus. (o) to s. 14 of the Evidence Act render facts showing the existence of a state of mind relevant only if they establish that such state of mind existed in reference to the particular matter in issue. Section 15 is an application of the general rule laid down in s. 14, and the words of the section as well as of Illus. (a) show that it is not necessary that all the acts should form parts of one transaction, but that they should be parts of a series of similar occurrences. *Reg. v. Holt*, Bell C. C. 280, discussed and distinguished. *Queen v. Francis*, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 128, *Reg. v. Rhodes*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 77, *Reg. v. Ollis*, [1900] 2 Q. B. 758, *Rex v. Wyatt*, [1904] 1 K. B. 188, *Rex v. Bond*, [1906] 2 K. B. 389, *Makin v. Att.-Gen. for New South Wales*, [1894] A. C. 57, and *Queen-Empress v. Vajiram*, I. L. R. 16

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Bom. 414, followed. *EMPEROR v. DEBENDRA PROSAD* (1909) . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 573

CHEATING BY PERSONATION.

See PENAL CODE, ss. 416, 419.

1. ————— *Passing off girl for marriage as of high caste—Penal Code, ss. 373, 415, 416, 419.* Where two girls were brought by the prisoners on speculation, taken to a foreign and distant district, palmed off as women of much higher caste than they really were and married to two Rajputs after receiving the usual bonus:—*Held*, that the prisoners could not be convicted under s. 373 of the Penal Code, but of cheating and false personation under ss. 415 and 416. *QUEEN v. DABEE SINGH* 7 W. R. Cr. 55

2. ————— *Penal Code, s. 416.* Where the accused represented to the prosecutor that a girl was a Brahmin, and thereby induced him to part with his money in consideration of the marriage of the girl to his brother, when the girl really was of the Sudra caste, it was held that he was guilty of cheating by false personation under s. 416 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. MOHIM CHUNDER SIL* . . . 16 W. R. Cr. 42

3. ————— *False representation as to personality—Penal Code, s. 416.* Where a person represented a girl to be the daughter of one woman, when she was within his knowledge the daughter of another woman:—*Held*, that he was guilty of cheating by personation under s. 416 of the Penal Code, and that it was unnecessary to bring in s. 109 relating to abetment. *QUEEN v. DHUNPUT OJHAH* . . . 7 W. R. Cr. 51

4. ————— *Penal Code, ss. 415, 419, 463—Forgery.* A falsely represented himself to be B at a University examination, got a hall-ticket under B's name, and headed and signed answer papers to questions with B's name. *Held*, that A committed the offences of forgery and cheating by personation. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. APPASAMI* . . . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 151

5. ————— *Cheating by personation—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 415, 419—Registration of false divorce—Bengal Act I of 1876.* To constitute the offence of cheating under s. 415 of the Penal Code, the damage or harm caused, or likely to be caused, to the person deceived in mind, body, reputation, or property must be the necessary consequence of the act done by reason of the deceit practised, or must be necessarily likely to follow therefrom. Where, therefore, certain persons were charged under s. 419 of the Penal Code, one with personating another person before a Registrar, and the others with abetting such personation and causing the Registrar to register a divorce under the provisions of Bengal Act I of 1876 with the wife of the personated person, and where the lower Courts convicted the accused under that section, holding that, as such registrations were voluntary and a source of gain to the Registrar, harm was caused to the Registrar in mind and reputation by registering

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false divorces as well as by losing his fees in the future through persons being less likely to avail themselves of his services, and that therefore an offence under the section had been committed:—*Held*, that the possibilities contemplated by the lower Courts were too remote; that the facts did not constitute an offence under the section, and that the conviction must therefore be set aside. *MOJEE v. QUEEN-EMPRESS. SABA NASHY v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 606

CHEMICAL EXAMINER, REPORT OF—

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—CHEMICAL EXAMINER . 6 B. L. R. Ap. 122
6 Bom. Cr. 75
6 Mad. Ap. 11
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1026

CHEQUE.

See BILL OF EXCHANGE.
I. L. R. 31 Calc. 249

See STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. I, ART. 11.
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 432

entry of, in pass-book—

See BANKER AND CUSTOMER.
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 499

payment of—

See BANKER AND CUSTOMER.
L. R. 18 I. A. 111

taken in payment, dishonour of—

See BILL OF EXCHANGE 7 B. L. R. 441

taken in payment of rent.

See TENDER . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 572

Bill of Exchange—Payment on a forged cheque—Principal and Agent—Negligence—Banker, liability of. When a banker makes a payment on a forged cheque, he cannot make the customer liable, except on the ground of negligence imputable to the customer. *Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253*, distinguished. *Scholfield v. Earl of Londsborough, [1896] A. C. 514*, referred to. *BHAGWAN DASS v. CREET (1904)*
I. L. R. 31 Calc. 249

CHERRA POONJEE RAJ.

See FOREIGN STATE.
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 17

CHIEF JUDGE OF SMALL CAUSE COURT, BOMBAY.

decision of, as to compensation for land.

See APPEAL—BOMBAY ACTS—BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT.
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 184

CHIEF JUSTICE, POWER OF—

Refusal by Bench of Judges to hear affidavits in support of application for transfer of trial to another district—Application to the Chief Justice to appoint another Bench to hear and determine case—Interlocutory order in criminal matters, finality of—High Court Charter Act (24 & 25 Vic., c. 104), s. 14. Where a rule had been obtained on behalf of a prisoner, calling on the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be transferred for trial to some other Court of Session than that in which it was then pending, on the ground that such strong feeling and prejudice existed in the district against the accused as to render it unlikely that he would get a fair trial, a Division Bench of the High Court, duly constituted, consisting of two Judges, refused to allow the affidavits in support of the application to be read and discharged the rule. Subsequently, an application was made to the Chief Justice to appoint another Bench of the High Court to hear and determine the rule on the ground that it had not been heard, and that consequently the order passed by the Bench discharging it was null and void. *Held*, that the Chief Justice, having once appointed a Bench under s. 14 of the Charter Act (24 & 25 Vic., c. 104) to hear any particular case, has no power to interfere when the case has been disposed of by that Bench. *Held*, also that the refusal of the Bench to hear the affidavits read, if an error at all, was simply one of law in the course of dealing with a matter clearly within their jurisdiction; and that, therefore, the decision could not be treated as a nullity, or its legality questioned by the Chief Justice. *Held*, further, that whether the judgment had been signed or not, previous to the application being made to the Chief Justice, an interlocutory order of such a nature in a criminal matter is not final, but may be reviewed or reconsidered, or a similar application may be entertained as often as the Court in its discretion may think proper. *In the matter of the petition of ABDUL SOBAN.*
I. L. R. 8 Calc. 63

CHIEF PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATE.

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.
7 C. W. N. 527

CHILD.

See CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.
See MARRIAGE ACT, s. 68.
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 230

detention of female, for unlawful purpose.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1898, s. 551 . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 487

evidence of—

See OATHS ACT, s. 13.
I. L. R. 16 Bom. 359
I. L. R. 16 Mad. 105

paternity of—

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 112.
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 111

CHILD-WIFE.

See HURT—GRIEVOUS HURT.
I. L. R. 18 Calc. 49

CHILD WITNESS.

See WITNESS . 11 C. W. N. 51

CHILDREN.

See ABANDONMENT OF CHILDREN.
16 W. R. Cr. 12
I. L. R. 18 All. 364
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 662

See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION
OF WILLS—GIFTS TO A CLASS.
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 571

access to—

See DIVORCE ACT, s. 41 5 B. L. R. 71

custody of—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882,
s. 551 . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 487

See CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.
See DIVORCE ACT, s. 41. 6 B. L. R. 318

See HINDU LAW—GUARDIAN.

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—CHILD-
REN BY DIFFERENT WIVES.
5 C. W. N. 602

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—ILLEGI-
TIMATE CHILDREN.

See ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN.
See MAHOMEDAN LAW—DIVORCE.
I. L. R. 2 All. 71

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—GUARDIAN.

See MAINTENANCE, ORDER OF CRIMINAL
COURT AS TO . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 461
I. L. R. 25 All. 165

See MAJORITY ACT, 1875.
I. L. R. 9 Mad. 391

See MINOR—CUSTODY OF MINORS.

proof of age, and order of birth
of—

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 32.
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 265

CHITFUND.

See COMPANIES ACT, s. 4.
I. L. R. 29 Mad. 477

**CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS ACT
(XXII OF 1860).**

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—
CALCUTTA—CRIMINAL.
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 654

CHOSE IN ACTION.

See ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSE IN ACTION.
See INSOLVENT DEBTORS ACT, s. 23.
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 406

CHOTA NAGPORE.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—UNDER-
TENURES, SALE OF . 10 C. L. R. 78

**CHOTA NAGPORE INCUMBERED
ESTATES ACTS (BENG. VI OF 1876
AND V OF 1884).**

See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE—SPECIAL
CASES . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 223
I. L. R. 16 I. A. 221

See STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 609

ss. 2, 3 (c), 4-12—*Meaning of the words "holder" and "heir"—Capacity to mortgage.* The words "holder" and "his heir" are used throughout the Chota Nagpore Incumbered Estates Act in the sense of the holder of the property at the time of the determination of the debts and liabilities under s. 8 of the Act and his heir. The word "heir" in the Act always applies to the person who is the holder's heir at the time of such determination of the debts and liabilities, and to no other heir, nor to the heir's heir. The estate of *F* came under management under the Chota Nagpore Incumbered Estates Act in 1880. He had several sons, of whom *B* was the eldest and *J* the next in age. *F* died in 1884, and, according to the custom of the family, *B* succeeded him to the estate, and on *B* dying in 1892 without leaving a male issue, *J* succeeded him. On the 8th June 1894, *J* mortgaged a village which had been granted to him by his father for his maintenance, and which never came under the management of the Incumbered Estates. *Held*, that there was nothing in s. 3, cl. (c), of the said Act to incapacitate *J* from mortgaging the property. The object of Act VI of 1876 explained. *KOKA MAHTON v. MANKI JAGAR NATH SAHI.*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 462
4 C. W. N. 158

s. 3.

See JURISDICTION.
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1065

See KHORPOSH GRANT.
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 363

Grant by a disqualified proprietor—Ratification. An owner of an estate granted a *khorphosh* lease in respect of a portion of his estate when such estate was under the management of an officer under the Chota Nagpur Incumbered Estates Act: *Held*, that although he was incompetent to grant such a lease at the time of grant, yet subsequently when he ratified it after the disability ceased, it became a valid grant. *ROY v. RAM JEWAN* (1905) . 10 C. W. N. 149
s. c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 363

ss. 3, 7, and Act V of 1884—*Deo Estate Act, IX of 1886, s. 1, cl. 4—"Debts and liabilities," meaning of—Process including summons.* The Chota Nagpore Incumbered Estates Act, VI of 1876, as amended by Act V of 1884 (which by Act IX of 1886 is applied to the Deo estate in the district of Gaya, subject to certain modifications) is intended to afford relief to holders of land in Chota

CHOTA NAGPORE INCUMBERED ESTATES ACTS (BENG. VI OF 1876 AND V OF 1884)—*concl'd.*

ss. 3, 7—*concl'd.*

Nagpore (and in the Deo estate) in respect of all debts and liabilities to which they were (immediately before the publication of the vesting order) subject, or with which their property was (at the time of the publication of the vesting order) charged, other than debts due or liabilities incurred to Government. The effect of the second portion of s. 3 is to bar all suits instituted after the vesting order is made and whilst it is in force. S. 7 of the Act applies *mutatis mutandis* to create a bar in respect of the debts dealt with in s. 1, cl. 4, of the Deo Estate Act, 1886. The result of ss. 3 and 7 of Act VI of 1876, when read with regard to the whole scope of the Act, is that suits or proceedings to enforce such debts or liabilities as are contemplated by the Act, that is, other than debts due or liabilities incurred to Government are, if pending at the time of the vesting order, barred; if instituted after it, in respect of such debts and liabilities, null and void in their inception. *KAMESHAR PRASAD v. BHIKHAN NARAIN SINGH. BHIKHAN NARAIN SINGH v. KAMESHAR PRASAD* I. L. R. 20 Calc. 609

ss. 7, 12, 17, 18.

See LEASE . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 675

s. 10—Jurisdiction—Lease of land lying outside Chota Nagpur—Question of law taken for the first time in second appeal. Where a certain estate in the district of Manbhum was taken charge of under the Chota Nagpur Incumbered Estates Act, and thereupon the manager proceeded to cancel under that Act a lease of land lying in the district of Bankura: *Held*, that the Act had no application inasmuch as the Act applies only to land in Chota Nagpur. The High Court allowed this question to be raised for the first time in second appeal. *AJODHYA NATH CHOWDHURY v. KESHUB CHANDRA MUKERJEE* (1907)

11 C. W. N. 1127

s. 16.

See PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—PLAINTIFFS I. L. R. 28 Calc. 171

CHOTA NAGPORE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROCEDURE ACT (BENG. I OF 1879).

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—EJECTMENT—NOTICE TO QUIT . 4 C. W. N. 792

See SECOND APPEAL.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 378
s. c. 10 C. W. N. 28

1. **s. 37—Suit by Assignee from auction purchaser of permanent tenure to recover from landlord, if possessory suit—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 133, 142.—Exclusion of time, if must be asked in plaint—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 50.** A suit by a transferee from a purchaser of a permanent tenure

CHOTA NAGPORE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROCEDURE ACT (BENG. I OF 1879)—*cont'd.*

s. 37—*concl'd.*

at a rent sale to recover possession of the tenure from the landlord, who denied the title of the plaintiff, on the ground that on the death of the previous tenant, the land reverted to himself, was not a possessory suit to which the provisions of s. 37 of the Chota Nagpur Landlord and Tenant Procedure Act could apply. Art. 138 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act refers more to questions between the auction purchaser and the judgment-debtor, and the present case fell under Art. 142 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act. The special limitation provided in s. 42 of the Chota Nagpur Landlord and Tenant Procedure Act did not apply to this case. The period during which a suit was prosecuted *bona fide* in a Court without jurisdiction was properly excluded in computing the period of limitation, although the plaintiff in his plaint did not expressly ask for an extension of time on that ground. *Jogeshwar Roy v. Rajnarain Mitra*, 8 C. W. N. 168; s. c. I. L. R. 31 Calc. 195, distinguished. *RAGHU NATH BHAGAT v. SAMAD SHAH* (1908) 12 C. W. N. 617

2. *Appeal in ejectment suits.* There is no prohibition in s. 37 of Act I of 1879 against an appeal in ejectment suits in Chota Nagpore. *RAMJAN KHAN v. RAMAN CHAMAR* 11 C. L. R. 480

PIRAJ NATH SAH DEO v. MURA MUNDA.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 249
1 C. W. N. 181

(*Contra*) *KHEDA MAHTO v. BUDDUN MAHTO.*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 508

s. 39.

See APPEAL—BENGAL ACTS—CHOTA NAGPORE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROCEDURE ACT . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 249
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 508

ss. 44A, 62, 66, 67 and 77—Previous suit for rent struck off under s. 62—Whether subsequent suit within six months maintainable. *Held*, by *CASPERSZ J.*, that s. 62 of the Chota Nagpore Landlord and Tenant Procedure Act is not controlled by s. 44A of the said Act. When a rent suit is dismissed under the first clause of s. 77 read with s. 62 of the Act, another suit for the same rent is maintainable within the period of six months. *Held*, by *COXE, J.*, that such a suit is not maintainable by virtue of s. 44A of the Act. *KARMA URAON v. BARAIK DEBI DAYAL SINGH* (1908) I. L. R. 36 Calc. 115

s. 88.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—DECREE TO BE EXECUTED AFTER APPEAL OR REVIEW . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 467

s. 123.

See s. 164 13 C. W. N. 111

**CHOTA NAGPORE LANDLORD AND
TENANT PROCEDURE ACT (BENG. I
OF 1879)—*contd.***

ss. 123, 125—*Landlord and tenant—Decree for consolidated rent of several tenures, whether bind tenures—Decree whether obtained against sole recorded tenant—Onus—Right of auction-purchaser of share in tenure.* A decree for the consolidated rent of several tenures held by the same tenants does not bind the tenures or any of them. Where a tenure was sought to be sold in execution of a decree for rent obtained against one of the tenants, after the shares of the other tenants had passed by auction sale to a stranger on the allegation that the tenant against whom it had been obtained was the sole recorded tenant of the landlord: *Held*, that whether this was so or not was a matter specially within the knowledge of the landlord and the *onus* was on him to prove it. *BAIKANTA NATH ROY v. THAKUR DEBENDRA NATH SAHI* (1906) . . . 11 C. W. N. 676

1. s. 124—*Jaghir tenure—Sale in execution of a decree for rent—Right, title, and interest of registered "ilakadar"—Joint holders.* Where a suit was brought for the recovery of arrears of rent due in respect of a jaghir tenure, the joint property of four brothers governed by the Mitakshara law, the arrears having accrued during the lifetime of their father, and a decree was obtained against the eldest brother, who was the sole registered ilakadar, or person held responsible in the zamindar's book, it was *held* that the decree related to the arrears due in respect of the whole tenure and not merely of the judgment-debtor's individual interest, and that a sale of his right, title, and interest under s. 124 of Bengal Act I of 1879 would, under the circumstances of the case and by the incidents attaching to such tenure, include the right, title, and interest of any person claiming jointly with him, and whose interest was inseparably united with his. *MODHUSUDUN NATH TEWARI v. HIRU RAM PANDEY* . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 396
2 C. W. N. 94

2. *Jaghir and under-tenures—Decree for arrears of rent.* No decree for arrears of rent can be made against any person other than the actual tenant, or some one who may be security for him, and consequently there can be no decree for rent against persons holding subordinate interest in a jaghir tenure which have been created by the jaghirdar. *PERTAB UDAI NATH SAHI DEV v. PARDHAN MOKAND SING*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 399
2 C. W. N. 96

ss. 135, 136, 137, 144.

See LIMITATION . . . 9 C. W. N. 956

ss. 137 and 144.

See APPEAL—BENGAL ACTS—CHOTA NAGPORE LANDLORD AND TENANT PROCEDURE ACT . . . 1 C. W. N. 341

**CHOTA NAGPORE LANDLORD AND
TENANT PROCEDURE ACT (BENG.
I OF 1879)—*concl'd.***

s. 146.

See BENGAL ACT VI OF 1862, s. 20.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 425

s. 164—*Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act (I of 1879, B. C.) as amended by Act V of 1905, B. C., s. 164—Record-of-rights—Land recorded as mundari khuntkati tenancy—Entry, suit to correct, if lies—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 103B—Presumption if applies in a suit to correct entry.* Where a purchaser under the provisions of s. 123 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act of certain tenures of which a record-of-rights had been prepared, sued to have a declaration that certain entries in the record with regard to a *mundari khuntkattidari* tenancy were incorrect. *Held*, that the provisions of s. 164 of the Act (I of 1879 as amended by Act V of 1905) applied. That the object of these provisions was to make the entries irrebuttable and the Legislature intended to preclude suits of this nature. The word "particulars" in s. 164 have a very wide application and cover entries declaring that the tenants have to pay certain rents named in the record-of-rights to a person other than the plaintiff. There is no limitation as to the nature of the suit to which the provisions of s. 103B apply. The presumption as to the correctness of the entries in the record-of-rights will operate even in a suit to declare the entries incorrect. *TOKI SAHU v. TOSI MUNDA* (1908) . . . 13 C. W. N. 111

CHOTA NAGPORE RAJ.

*See HINDU LAW—ALIENATION—RES-
TRAIKT ON ALIENATION.*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 461

**CHOTA NAGPORE TENURES ACT
(BENGAL ACT II OF 1869).**

*See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCEL-
LANEOUS DOCUMENTS—REGISTERS.*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 91

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 112

Powers of Special Commissioner.
The scope and object of Bengal Act II of 1869 is to determine the quantity of lands of certain specified descriptions within villages to which the Special Commissioner named under the Act may have been appointed. Nothing in the Act empowers an officer so appointed to determine a question of disputed boundary between two villages, and to oust the Civil Courts of their ordinary jurisdiction in determining the rights of parties under conflicting titles as proprietors of such villages. *SHAM CHUNDER ADHICARY v. SOBIN BHOOPAL SING* . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 397
10 C. L. R. 419

**"CHOWDHRI," SUIT FOR DECLARA-
TION AS.**

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR.

I. L. R. 29 All. 683

CHOWKIDAR.

See CHAUKIDAR.

See CONFESSION—CONFESSION TO POLICE OFFICERS . . . 2 C. W. N. 71

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 7 (1859, s. 1, CL. 2) . . . 18 W. R. 298

— village—

See BENGAL REGULATION XX OF 1817, s. 21 . . . 18 W. R. 298

See CHAUKIDARI ACT.

See VILLAGE CHAUKIDARS ACT.

CHOWKIDARI TAX.

See CESS . . . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 680

CHRISTIANS.

— in Salsette—

See SALSETTE, LAW APPLICABLE IN. I. L. R. 19 Bom. 680

— native—

See CONVERTS . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 53

— right of, under trust.

See TRUST . . . 8 C. W. N. 918

CHUDASAMA GAMETI GARASIAS.

See HINDU LAW—ADOPTION—WHO MAY OR MAY NOT ADOPT.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 492

CHUR LANDS.

See ACCRETION—CHUR OR ISLAND IN NAVIGABLE RIVER.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 444

See LIMITATION . . . 9 C. W. N. 111

See ONUS OF PROOF—LIMITATION AND ADVERSE POSSESSION.

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 36

See POSSESSION . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 33

1. — Possession of chur lands—

Title—Evidence. The cultivation of chur lands, like that of waste or jungle lands, carries no *prima facie* character of usurpation or wrong; and the claimant against a purchaser, *bona fide* and without notice, in possession, must strictly prove his title.

EKOWRI SING v. HIRALAL SEAL

2 B. L. R. P. C. 4 : 11 W. R. P. C. 2
12 Moo. I. A. 136

2. — Suit for chur lands

Survey—Possession—Title. In a suit regarding a chur claimed by defendant as having formed on the bank of the river adjacent to his village, and by plaintiff on the ground that the bed of the river belonged to his village, the Court upheld the state of matters existing at the time when a survey had been made, on the ground that the survey had been made at the time when neither of the present

CHUR LANDS—concl'd.

parties held any right in the land, but when both villages belonged to the same proprietor; and that it was some evidence of possession at that time, not only of the julkur, but of the right of property in the river, and possession under these circumstances was some evidence of title. MOHINEE MOHUN DASS v. ASSANOOLLAH 17 W. R. 73

3. — Evidence as to position of—
Local investigation—Maps. In a dispute as to the position of chur lands, where the change in the course of a river threw doubt upon their position, the judgment of the Court of first instance, given after local investigation, was upheld against the decision of the High Court founded on inspection of the maps and on the arguments adduced before it. SARAT SUNDARI DEBI v. PROSONNO COOMAR TAGORE . . . 6 B. L. R. 677 : 15 W. R. P. C. 20
13 Moo. I. A. 607

CHURCH.

— Roman Catholic Church—*Powers of dharmakartas or headmen—Closing church—Appointment of priest.* The appointment of a committee of headmen or dharmakartas in a Roman Catholic Church by the Bishop to assist the Vicar in the secular affairs of the church gives the members of such committee no right to close the church or oust the Vicar, and still less to appoint a priest not under the discipline of land obedience to the Church of Rome. MARIAN PILLAI v. BISHOP OF MYLAPORE. I. L. R. 17 Mad. 447

CIRCULAR ORDER BY JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER OF PUNJAB.

See INDIAN COUNCILS ACT.
12 B. L. R. 167 : 18 W. R. 389

CIRCULAR ORDER 41 OF 1866.

See LOCAL INVESTIGATION.
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 718

— 25 of 1870.

See LOCAL INVESTIGATION.
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 718

— 10th July 1874.

See BENGAL RENT ACT, 1869, s. 58.
I. L. R. 3 Calc. 547 : 1 C. L. R. 149

CIRCULAR ORDER OF HIGH COURT (CRIMINAL).

— No. 9 of 6th September 1869.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—COMMITMENT TO SESSIONS COURT.
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 429

CIRCULAR ORDERS OF THE HIGH COURT, CHAP. 1, ORDER 59.

See CHARGE . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 281

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

See MURDER . . . 11 C. W. N. 1085

CITATION.

See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 87
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 164

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—PROBATE.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 528

CITATION ON MINOR.

See PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT
(V OF 1881) . . . 12 C. W. N. 6

**CITY OF BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT
(BOM. ACT III OF 1888), s. 354.**

See BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT.

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 334

CIVIL COURT.

See AGRA TENANCY ACT.

I. L. R. 27 All. 372

See BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION ACT.

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 19

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 21,
476 . . . 8 C. W. N. 73, 586

See FOREST ACT.

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 480

See JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 601

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT.

See LAND REGISTRATION ACT (VII OF
1876) . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 120

See MADRAS FOREST ACT, s. 4.

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 193

See PROVIDENT FUNDS ACT.

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 259

_____ duty of Magistrate to uphold
decision of.

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL
COURT AS TO—DECISION OF MAGISTRATE
AS TO POSSESSION . . . 7 C. W. N. 118

_____ inherent powers of.

See GUARDIAN AD LITEM.

I. L. R. 29 All. 640

_____ jurisdiction of.

See N.-W. P. LAND REVENUE ACT, XIX
OF 1873, s. 241.

_____ jurisdiction of—rent suit.

See TANK . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 937

_____ powers of muktear to practise in—
Rules of High Court.

See MUKTEAR . . . 8 C. W. N. 401

_____ Civil and Revenue
Courts—Jurisdiction—Suit by usufructuary mort-
gagee of an occupancy holding for possession of the
property mortgaged to him. Held, that a suit
brought by the usufructuary mortgagee of an

CIVIL COURT—concl'd.

occupancy holding for possession of the property
mortgaged to him was rightly brought in a Civil
and not in a Revenue Court. *Khiali Ram v. Nathu
Ram*, I. L. R. 15 All. 219, and *Brij Mohan v.
Algu*, I. L. R. 26 All. 78, referred to. *Gaura
Kunwar Dwarka Prasad*, S. A. No. 438 of 1900,
decided on the 15th January 1901, discussed.
BINDESHRI RAI v. SADHO CHARAN RAI (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 591

CIVIL COURTS ACT (XII OF 1887).

See BENGAL, AGRA AND ASSAM CIVIL
COURTS ACT, 1887.

See BENGAL, N. W. PROVINCES AND ASSAM
CIVIL COURTS ACT, 1887.

_____ s. 9.

See JURISDICTION . . . 13 C. W. N. 493

_____ s. 13.

See DECREE . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 974

_____ s. 13—Civil Courts Act (XII of 1878),
s. 13—Subordinate Judges having same local juris-
diction—No assignment of business by District Judge
—Effect—Concurrent jurisdiction. Where no order
has been made by a District Judge under s. 13 of the
Civil Courts Act assigning to each of two or more
Subordinate Judges having the same local juris-
diction the particular business to be done by each,
the Subordinate Judges must be taken to have
concurrent jurisdiction. An application for exe-
cution was made and registered in the office of the
Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum and then for-
warded by post to the Subordinate Judge of Singh-
bhum sitting at Purulia. Held, that the Subor-
dinate Judge had jurisdiction to entertain the ap-
plication. *CHATURBHUI MARWARI v. A. W.
WALKER* (1908) . . . 13 C. W. N. 265

_____ ss. 15, 18 and 19—Suits Valuation
Act (VII of 1887), ss. 9 and 21—Valuation suit—
Suit for restitution of conjugal rights—Jurisdiction.
A suit for restitution of conjugal rights is not a suit
which is of necessity excluded from the jurisdiction
of a Munsif. The value of such a suit, is, as a rule,
the value, which the plaintiff chooses to put upon
it, provided that the suit be not unwarrantably
undervalued or overvalued from improper motives.
Aklemannessa Bibi v. Mahomed Hatem, I. L. R. 31
Calc. 849, dissented from. *Golam Rahman v.
Fatima Bibi*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 232, *Mowla Newaz v.
Majid-un-nissa Bibi*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 378, *Shire v.
Shire*, 5 Moo. P. C. 81, and *D'Orliac v. D'Orliac*, 24
Moo. P. C. 374, distinguished. *Shedion Ram v.
Tulshi Ram*, I. L. R. 15 All. 378, *Jag Lal v. Hur
Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 10 All. 524, *Mahabir Singh v.
Behari Lal*, I. L. R. 13 All. 320, *Madho Das v.
Ramji Pathak*, I. L. R. 16 All. 286 and *Lakshman
Bhatkar v. Babaji Bhatkar*, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 31,
referred to. *ZAIR HUSAIN KHAN v. KHURSHED
JAN* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 545

_____ s. 17—Jurisdiction—Proceeding in
relation to a case—Appeal—Transfer of a district

CIVIL COURTS ACT (XII OF 1887)
—concl'd.

s. 17—concl'd.

from one judicial division to another. Where a certain area is transferred by a Government notification from the jurisdiction of one District Judge, into the jurisdiction of a different District Judge, an appeal preferred after the date on which the notification takes effect must be received and entertained by the District Judge into whose jurisdiction the area from which the appeal comes has been transferred. *Allah Dei Begam v. Kesri Mal*, I. L. R. 28 All. 93. *Semble*: That s. 8 of the Act cannot be applied to the case of a fixed deposit in a bank, such not being a "security" within the meaning of s. 3 (2). *GULRAJI KUNWARI v. JAGDEO PRASAD* (1906). . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 477

ss. 18, 19, 21—

See RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS.
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 352

CIVIL COURTS' JURISDICTION TO
REVIEW ASSESSMENT.

See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT (BENGAL
ACT III OF 1884).

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 859

CIVIL AND REVENUE COURTS.

See ACT IX OF 1872, s. 69.

See ACT XIX OF 1873, ss. 132, 241.

I. L. R. 31 All. 41

See N.-W. P. LAND REVENUE ACT (III
OF 1901), s. 233 (k).

I. L. R. 31 All. 330

CIVIL JURISDICTION.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT V
OF 1898) . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 909

CIVIL LITIGATION.

—pendency of.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 195.
13 C. W. N. 398

CIVIL NATURE, SUIT OF.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 387

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877).

See APPEAL, PROBATE, COURT-FEE, PRAC-
TICE, ATTACHMENT, HINDU LAW.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 51

I. L. R. 26 All. 234

8 C. W. N. 665, 672

See BHOOTAN DUARS ACT.

4 C. W. N. 287

See DECREE, PENAL CODE, LIMITATION.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 228, 373,
385, 428, 822

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—concl'd.

See MORTGAGE. . . I. L. R. 28 All. 418.

See SALE . . . 8 C. W. N. 186

See SUIT, HINDU LAW, COURT-FEE, INSOL-
VENCY ORDER, DECREE, MORTGAGE.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 75, 150,

262, 839, 1057

8 C. W. N. 365, 468

473, 609, 672, 676

s. 2.

See s. 102 . . . 8 C. W. N. 310

See AGRA TENANCY ACT.

I. L. R. 27 All. 21

I. L. R. 27 All. 31

See APPEAL . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 584

See APPEAL—DECREES.

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

—“decree,” definition of.

See APPEAL.

DECREES: . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 81

ORDERS . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 342

See REMAND—CASES OF APPEAL AFTER RE-
MAND . . . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 518

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS
SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 60

—“district,” definition of (second
part).

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 23 All. 56

—“foreign Court”.

See FOREIGN COURT, JUDGMENT OF.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 509

—“public officer.”

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACH-
MENT—SALARY.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 402

See PUBLIC OFFICER.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 809

s. 2 (Civil Procedure Code,
1859, s. 356).

1. ——— Decree, definition of—Orders
in a suit or in execution of decree—Per JACKSON,
J. The word “decree,” as defined in Act X of
1877, does not include “orders,” either original
or appellate, upon matters arising in the course
of a suit or in execution of a decree. *RUNJIT SINGH
v. MEHERBAN KOER*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 662: 2 C. L. R. 391

2. ——— The definition of
“decree” in s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code means
that, where the proceeding of the Court finally dis-

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 2—*contd.*

poses of the suit, so long as it remains upon the record, it is a "decree." *WILLIAMS v. BROWN.*

I. L. R. 8 All. 108

3. ——— Judicial proceeding—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 333, 522, 526, 531.* The term "judicial proceeding," as used in s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877), must be understood to mean a judicial proceeding of the same nature as a suit, or such proceedings as are referred to in ss. 333, 522, 526 and 531 of the Code. The definition given in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872) is not applicable. *DALPATBHAI BHAGUBHAI v. AMARSANG KHEMABHAI.*

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 553

4. ——— and ss. 53, 54—*Rejection of plaint.* The words "rejecting the plaint" in s. 2 are not limited to the cases provided for in ss. 53, 54. *BENI RAM BHUTT v. RAM LAL DHUBRI*

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 189

5. ——— Signed—Stamped. The expression "person referred to" in s. 2 of Act X of 1877 means person referred to in the subsequent sections of the Code as being required to sign or verify certain documents, and it is not a condition precedent to such person being able to use a stamp that he should be unable to write his name. *MAHARAJA OF BENARES v. DEBI DAYAL NOMA*

I. L. R. 3 All. 575

6. ——— Public officer—Official trustee. The official trustee is a "public officer" within the definition given in s. 2, Act X of 1877. *SHAHUNSHAH BEGUM v. FERGUSON*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 499

7. ——— Subordinate Court—Collector's Court—*Bengal Civil Courts Act, 1871, s. 15.* A Collector's Court, although it exercises certain powers under the Civil Procedure Code, is not a Civil Court within the meaning of s. 15 of Act VI of 1871, nor is it subordinate to a District Court within the meaning of Act X of 1877, s. 2. *In the matter of BODRU ROHMAN*

3 C. L. R. 508

8. ——— An order determining any question referred to in s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, is a "decree" under s. 2 of that Code. *KHRODE SUNDARI DEBI v. JANENDRA NATH PAL CHAUDHURI (1901)*

6 C. W. N. 283

9. ——— Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 211—*Mesne profits—Future mesne profits.* *Held*, by the Full Bench (PRINSEP, J., dissenting), that an order dismissing, for default, an appeal from a decree is a "decree" within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Jagannath Singh v. Budhan, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 115*, and *Anwar Ali v. Jaffer Ali, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 827*, overruled. *Ramchandra Pandurang Naik v. Madhav Purushottam Naik, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 23*, referred to.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 2—*contd.*

RADHA NATH SINGH v. CHANDI CHARAN SINGH (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 660 : s. c. 7 C. W. N. 486

10. ——— Decree—*Settled accounts, order directing re-opening of—Attorney and client—Settlement of untaxed bills, when liable to be reopened—Fiduciary relationship—Onus of showing good faith—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 16—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 111—Independent advice, opportunity to obtain—Promissory note, assignment of, without endorsement.* Plaintiff, a solicitor, had advanced various sums of money to a client from time to time on a mortgage bond and three further charges. The consideration for the third further charge was not paid in cash, but was made up of (i) amounts due to the plaintiff on several promissory notes in plaintiff's favour, (ii) certain promissory notes executed by the client in favour of a third party, which the plaintiff is said to have "taken up," (iii) balance of amount due as interest on the mortgage and two further charges, and (iv) a certain amount stated to have been found due to the plaintiff as costs for acting for him in various suits upon a settlement made of amounts due under various taxed and untaxed bills, a large remission having been allowed in consideration of all the bills not being taxed. In a suit by the plaintiff against the heirs of his deceased client to realise the amounts due on the mortgage and the three further charges the plaintiff obtained a decree on the first three bonds, but the 4th bond was ordered to be re-opened, and it was directed that the plaintiff "do get all his bills of costs up to the 3rd August 1903 taxed by the Taxing Officer of the High Court, and then refile the bills in this Court, that then a Commissioner be appointed to take accounts in the light of the observations in this case: that after the Commissioner's report is received and the parties are heard thereon, a final decree will be drawn up under s. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act": *Held*, that this order was a decree. The fact that the Subordinate Judge intended hereafter to adjust the equities arising out of the contract, did not in any way do away with his adjudication that the contract, as it stood, was not binding on the defendants. *Coverji Luddha v. Morarji Punja, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 183*, distinguished and doubted. *Rahimbhoy Habibhoy v. C. A. Turner, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 155*; *s. c. L. R. 18 I. A. 68*, referred to. As between attorney and client, the existence of fiduciary relationship alone, or the fact that certain bills of costs were not taxed, but were settled out of Court by execution of a deed, will not justify a Court in re-opening accounts settled, on which the bond is based, unless sufficient grounds of suspicion exist, or the bills are *prima facie* shewn to be extortionate. *Lambert v. Still, [1894] 1 Ch. 73*, followed. *Lawless v. Mansfield, 1 Drury & Warren 557*, distinguished and explained. S. 16 of the Contract Act only presumes undue

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 2—*concl.*

influence by a person in a position to dominate the will of another when the contract appears on the face of it to be unconscionable. To prove "good faith" of a transaction in which one party stands in a fiduciary relationship to the other, it is certainly not necessary to prove that all the accounts on which the contract is based are correct. Under the practice obtaining on the Original Side of the High Court, taxation of bills of solicitors is deemed to be optional with the client, and bills of costs are not infrequently adjusted without taxation. The case of *Monohur Doss v. Romanath Low*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 473, was decided on the special circumstances of that case and does not lay down any general rule of law. An attorney may be bound under certain circumstances to advise his client to take independent advice. It is not his business to see that the attorney selected by his client fulfils his duties to his client and is not guilty of any remissness or negligence. If he sends his client to another attorney and is ready to comply with all reasonable demands for information, he cannot be expected to do more, or to be responsible for another's omissions. If the parties to a promissory note agree that on the promisor executing a bond for the amount due in favour of a third person, the promisee would cancel the note, this arrangement would be a perfectly valid contract, whether the third party paid any money to the promisee or not. Although a negotiable instrument can only be assigned by endorsement, that does not prevent any arrangement not to negotiate the note, but to put an end to it. *SHAMULDHONE DUTT v. SUSILA BALA DEBI* (1908) . . . 12 C. W. N. 1102

ss. 2, 39.

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 609

ss. 2, 103, 556, 558, 584, 588 (27)

—*Order dismissing suit or appeal for default under s. 102 or s. 556 respectively not a decree, and not appealable under s. 584.* A decision dismissing a suit or appeal for default of plaintiff's or appellant's appearance under ss. 102 and 556 of the Code of Civil Procedure respectively is not a 'decree' within the meaning of the definition in s. 2 of the Code; and such decision in a suit or appeal is not appealable under the general provisions of s. 540 or 584 of the Code. *Radha Nath Singh v. Chandli Charan Singh*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 660, and *Ablakh v. Bhagirathi*, I. L. R. 9 All. 427, dissented from. The plaintiff or appellant has ample remedies provided in such cases by ss. 103 and 588, and the Legislature could not have intended that appellants should, in addition, have the power of appealing under s. 584 of the Code. *DAKSHINAMOORTHY PILLAI v. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF TRICHINOPOLY* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 157

ss. 2, 244.

See ACT II OF 1901, ss. 176, 177 AND 193.

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 2, 244—*concl.*

—*"Decree"* —*Appeal* —*Contempt of Court—Order directing refund of moneys realized in defiance of Court's order—Revision.* Where a Court orders the refund of moneys improperly realized in defiance of subsisting orders of attachment, it can only order the refund of moneys actually collected, it is not competent to direct a refund of moneys recovered as costs of litigation. *Held*, also, that an order passed in the exercise of the inherent powers of a Court to punish for contempt is not a decree, and no appeal lies therefrom. In this case the Court dealt with what purported to be a memorandum of appeal as an application in revision under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *GODU RAM v. SURAJ MAL* (1905) I. L. R. 27 All. 380

s. 3.

See APPEAL—RIGHT OF APPEAL, EFFECT OF REPEAL ON.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EFFECT OF CHANGE OF LAW PENDING EXECUTION.

1. —Effect of repeal of Civil Procedure Code, 1859—General Clauses Consolidation Act, I of 1863, s. 6—"Proceedings"—Procedure. In all suits instituted before Act X of 1877 came into force, in which an appeal lay to the High Court under Act VIII of 1859, an appeal still lies notwithstanding the repeal of that Act by Act X of 1877. *Per GARTH, C.J.* A suit is a "judicial proceeding," and the words "any proceedings" in s. 6 of Act I of 1863 include all proceedings in a suit from the date of its institution to its final disposal, and therefore include proceedings in appeal. The word "procedure" in s. 3, Act X of 1877, has not the same meaning as the word "proceedings" in the above-mentioned section. The proceedings in a suit instituted before Act X of 1877 came into force, including a special appeal if the old Code allowed one, go on to the end of the suit, notwithstanding the repeal of the old Code. The "procedure"—that is to say, the machinery by which those proceedings are conducted—is, after decree to be that provided by the new Code. *RUNJIT SINGH, v. MEHERBAN KOER*. I. L. R. 3 Calc. 662

BURKAT HOSSEIN v. MAJIDDOONISSA.

3 C. L. R. 208

NADIR HOSSEIN v. BISSEN CHAND BASSARAT.

3 C. L. R. 437

2. —Suit instituted before, but appeal brought after, repeal of Act VIII of 1859—Effect of repeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 556, 558, and 588—Appeal. Where a suit had been instituted under Act VIII of 1859, but decided at a time when Act X of 1877 had come into operation, and an appeal was presented against such decision, s. 3 of Act X of 1877 distinctly indicates that such an appeal is to be governed by the law of

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 3—*contd.*

procedure in force at the date of the presentation of the appeal. Where, therefore, an appeal presented when Act X of 1877 was in force has been dismissed under s. 556 of that Act, the appellant may apply for its re-admission under s. 558; and if such re-admission is refused, he is entitled to an appeal under s. 588 (*v.*) *ELAHI BUKSH v. MARACHOW*

**I. L. R. 4 Calc. 825
3 C. L. R. 593**

3. ———— Decree, meaning of. The effect of the proviso to s. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1877 taken in connection with the definition of the word "decree" in s. 2 is that in all suits pending when that Code came into force, the practice and procedure to be followed down to the final result of such suits (*i.e.*, when nothing remains to be done but to execute the decree or to appeal from it) are the same as previously existed, but that in all subsequent proceedings in execution of the decree, or in appeal from it, the practice and procedure provided by the Civil Procedure Code of 1877 are to be observed. The word "decree" in s. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1877, means an order final in its nature, and does not include an interlocutory order, such as an order of reference to take accounts, although such order may, in general, be properly termed a "decree" and, therefore, a suit which has been referred by the Court to the Commissioner to take accounts is still in a stage "prior to decree" within the meaning of s. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1877. *RUSTOMJI BURJORJI v. KESSOWJI NAIK*. **I. L. R. 3 Bom. 161**

4. ———— Effect of change of law on proceedings already commenced—Attachment—Enforcement of decree—Political pension. On the 28th of September 1877, *i.e.*, three days before the new Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877) came into operation, an application was made for the enforcement of a money decree by attachment (*inter alia*) of a political pension enjoyed by the defendants. Under s. 216 of the former Code (Act VIII of 1859), a notice was issued on the same day to the defendants, calling upon them to show cause why the decree should not be executed. The defendants accordingly appeared on the day fixed at which date the new Code had come into force, and contended that, under s. 266, cl. (g), of the new Code, the pension was no longer attachable. *Held*, that all proceedings commenced and pending when Act X of 1877 became law were, under the General Clauses Act (I of 1868), s. 6, to be governed by the Code theretofore in force, the general rule of construction contained in that section not being affected or varied by ss. 1 and 3 of Act X of 1877; and that a *bona fide* application for enforcement of a decree in a particular way, coupled with an order of the Court in furtherance of that object, as much constitutes a proceeding in execution commenced and pending as the actual issue of a warrant of attachment. *VIDYARAM v. CHANDRASHEKHARAM*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 163

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 3—*concl'd.*

5. ———— Effect of repeal of Civil Procedure Code, 1877—Proceedings commenced before repeal. Cl. 3 of s. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882) provides that nothing in that Code shall apply to any proceedings after decree that had been commenced and were still pending on the 1st June 1882. In case of any question connected with proceedings commenced prior to that date, the applicability of the Code of 1882 depends on whether the new proceeding subsequent to that date, out of which the question has immediately arisen, is so intimately connected with the proceedings prior to that date as to be regarded as part of them. A decree was passed in 1876 by which the suit was referred to the Commissioner to take accounts. On the 21st June 1882, the Commissioner, in the course of taking the said accounts, issued a warrant ordering the defendants to show cause why they should not give inspection of certain books. *Held*, that the question as to inspection was so intimately connected with the taking of the accounts that it should be regarded as part of the same proceedings, and as these had commenced and were still pending on the 1st June 1882, the question whether the order refusing inspection was appealable or not was (under s. 3 of Act XIV of 1882) to be determined by the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII) of 1859, and not by the Code of 1882. *RUSTOMJI BURJORJI v. KESSOWJI NAIK*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 287

s. 5.

See LOCAL GOVERNMENT, POWER OF.

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 112

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—MISCELLANEOUS CASES. **I. L. R. 2 Bom. 641**

s. 6 (1859, s. 383).

See DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF AKYAB.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 94

s. 8—*Per Curiam.* The Court of an Additional District Judge is a Court under the District Judge's administrative control and the District Judge is competent to make over to the Additional District Judge an appeal, which he had withdrawn from a Subordinate Judge to whose file it had at first been transferred. *Bidyamoyee Debya Chowdhurani v. Surya Kant Acharya*, 9 C. W. N. 705; *s. c.* **I. L. R. 22 Calc. 875**, commented on. *RAKHAI CHUNDER TEWARY v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1906). **10 C. W. N. 841**

ss. 10, 539—Public religious trust—Advocate-General, consent of—S. 529 not applicable in case of infringement of an individual right, or as against strangers, alienees from trustee and trespassers—Trustee de son tort—Meaning of phrases "direction of the Court is necessary for the administration," and "such further or other relief" in s. 539—Nature of relief—S. 539 not mandatory or

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

ss. 10, 539—contd.

restrictive but enabling, permissive and cumulative—*Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863), s. 14.* On an application to dismiss a suit on the ground that it was one coming within the purview of s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code and was not maintainable, the consent of the Advocate-General to its institution not having been previously obtained: *Held*, that to bring a case within the purview of s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, the suit must be a representative one brought for the benefit of the public and to enforce a public right in respect of an express or constructive trust upon a cause of action alleging a breach of such trust or necessity for directions as to its administration against a trustee of such express or constructive trust and whether such trustee be *so de jure* or *de son tort* and for the particular relief mentioned. *Subbayya v. Krishna, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 186*, followed. *Jugal Kishore v. Lakshman Das Raghu Nath Dass, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 659*, referred to. Suits brought not to establish a public right, but to remedy a particular infringement of an individual right, are not within the section. *Vishwanath v. Rambhat, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 152*; *Manijan Bibi v. Khadem Hossain, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 273*, 9 C. W. N. 151; *Miya Valiulla v. Sayed Bavai, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 496*; *Naoraji Maneckji v. Duster Kharsedji, I. L. R. 28 Bom. 20*; *Gyana v. Kandasami, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 375*, followed. *Jawakra v. Akbar Hussain, I. L. R. 7 All. 178*; *Anandray v. Shankar, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 323*; *Venkata Chalapati v. Subbarayudu, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 293*; *Kalidas Jivram v. Gor Porjaram, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 309*; *Vengamutha v. Pandaveswara, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 151*; *Subbarayadu v. Asanali Sheriff, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 100*, referred to. As against strangers such as aliens or from the trustee and mere trespassers holding adversely to the trust, the section does not apply. *Kazi Hossain v. Sagun Balkrishna, I. L. R. 24 Bom. 170*; *Lakshman Das Parashram v. Gunpatrar Krishna, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 365*; *Sheoratan Kunwari v. Ram Pargash, I. L. R. 18 All. 227*; *Hussein Begum v. The Collector of Moradabad, I. L. R. 20 All. 46*; *Budh Sing Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy, 2 C. L. J. 431*; *Augustine v. Medlycott, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 241*; *Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Srinivasa Swami, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 81*; *Shri Dhundiraj Ganesh Deb. v. Ganesh, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 721*; *Muhammad Abdulla Khan v. Kallu, I. L. R. 21 All. 187*, followed. *Sajedur Raja Chowdhury v. Gaur Mohon Das Baisnav, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 418*, dissented from. Meaning of the phrases "direction of the Court is necessary for the administration" and "such further or other relief" in s. 539 explained. *Budh Singh Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy, 2 C. L. J. 431*, and *Jamaluddin v. Mujtaba Hussain, I. L. R. 25 All. 631*, followed. S. 539 is not mandatory, but enabling and permissive, cumulative and not restrictive in its effect, and does not affect any right of suit, which may exist independently of it. If therefore a suit is one, which would have been maintainable prior to the enactment of the cor-

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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ss. 10, 539—concl'd.

responding section in the Code of 1877, it may now be instituted independently of the provisions of s. 539, even though it be upon such a cause of action and for such relief as is mentioned in it. *Sathapayyar v. Periasami, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 1*; *Thakersey Dewraj v. Hurbhum Nursey, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 432*; *Subbayya v. Krishna, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 197*; *Sajedur Raja Chowdhury v. Gaur Mohon Das Baisnav, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 418*; *Nellaiyappa Pillai v. Thangama Nachiyar, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 406*, followed. *Tricum Das Mulj v. Khimji Vullabha Das, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 626*; *Lutifunnissa Bibi v. Narirun Bibi, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 33*; *Sayad Hossain Mian v. Collector of Karia, I. L. R. 21 Bom. 48*, *Sajedur Raja v. Baidyanath Deb, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 397*, dissented from. *Neti Rama Jogiah v. Venkatacharulu, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 50*, distinguished. *Kalee Charn v. Golabi, 2 C. L. R. 128*; *Ganapati v. Savithri, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 15*, *Sheoratan Kunwari v. Ram Pargash, I. L. R. 18 All. 227*, *Rangasami v. Varadappa, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 465*, and *Raghubardail v. Kesho Ramanuj, I. L. R. 11 All. 13*, referred to. Scope and history of the section discussed and explained. **BUDDREE DAS MUKIM v. CHOONI LAL JOHURRY (1906)**

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 788
s. c. 10 C. W. N. 581

s. 11.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, ss. 101 to 111A. . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 28

See BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT.
I. L. R. 31 Bom. 604

See DECREE . . . 8 C. W. N. 473

See EVIDENCE . . . 13 C. W. N. 501

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—CALCUTTA—CIVIL. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 369

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—CASTE . . . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 174

See MAINTENANCE, SUIT FOR.
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 479

See RIGHT OF SUIT.
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 252;
7 C. W. N. 353

1. ——— Suit for right to property or to an office—Suit relating to religious rights and ceremonies—Suit by a worshipper to have idol located in a particular temple—Jurisdiction. Suits as to religious rites and ceremonies, which involve no question of the right to property or to an office, are not suits of a civil nature within the meaning of s. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code and are not within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. *Vasudev v. Vamnaji, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 80*, approved. A suit by a worshipper of an idol, not based on any right to the property in the idol or to an office against its custodians to locate it in a particular temple instead of in another, there being no allegation that the plaintiff is prevented from worshipping the idol at the

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latter temple, is not cognizable by a Civil Court. *Jagannath Churn v. Akali Dassia*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 463, distinguished. *O. Nagiah Bathudu v. Muthacharry*, 11 M. L. J. 215, referred to. *LOKE NATH MISRA v. DASARATHI TEWARI* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 102

2. ——— *Suits of a civil nature—Right to property or to an office—Jurisdiction of Civil Courts—Suits for declaration of right to recite texts—Maintainability.* A suit is not cognizable in a Civil Court, where the subject of the plaintiff's claim is confined to rights in religious ceremonies without a claim to any office or any emolument. A right to recite sacred texts in a temple is a matter of ritual or ceremony in a religious matter with which a Civil Court has nothing to do. *SUBBARAYA MUDALIAR v. VEDENTACHARIA* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 23

3. ——— *Right of suit of worshipper—Idol, location of—Religious ceremony.* A suit not based upon any right to the property in idols or to an office, but upon the plaintiff's supposed right as worshipper to insist on the observance of a ceremonial regulation relating to the particular temple, in which the idol should be ordinarily located, is not a suit of a civil nature and not maintainable in a Civil Court. *LOKE NATH MISRA v. DASARATHI TEWARI* (1905)

10 C. W. N. 505

4. ——— *Suit of a civil nature—Administration suit—Estate belonging to a living Hindu debtor—Competency to entertain the suit.* A Civil Court cannot entertain a suit brought to administer the estate belonging to a living Hindu debtor. *Bai Meherbai v. Maganchand*, I. L. R. 29 Bom. 98, explained. *GANGARAM KEVAL v. NAGINDAS KHUSHALDAS* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 381

5. ——— *Sankaracharya of Sharada Math, plaintiff—Shankaracharya of Dholka, defendant—Dispute as to precedence or privilege between purely religious functionaries—Jurisdiction of Civil Courts.* The Plaintiff, Shankaracharya of the Sharada Math at Dwarka in Gujarát, sued the defendant, Shankaracharya of the Jyotir Math at Dholka in the same province for (i) a declaration that the defendant was not entitled to the style, title and dignities of a Shankaracharya and that he was not entitled to call for or receive any offerings from the people in Gujarát in his assumed capacity of a Shankaracharya of the Jyotir Math or a branch of that Math; (ii) for an account of the money received by the defendant as a Shankaracharya in Gujarát with a decree for payment to the plaintiff of the sum found to have been so received by the defendant; and (iii) for an injunction restraining the defendant from styling himself a Shankaracharya in Gujarát and from claiming and receiving offerings in Gujarát as Shankaracharya of the

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Jyotir Math or a branch of that Math. The lower Court made a declaration that the defendant was not entitled to call himself a Shankaracharya of the Jyotir Math or of a branch of it at Dholka and an injunction against the defendant so styling himself and claiming or receiving offerings. The claim for an account and recovery of offerings received by the defendant was not allowed as the offerings might or might not have been made to the plaintiff. On appeal by the defendant: *Held*, dismissing the suit, that to decide disputes as to precedence or privilege between purely religious functionaries is no part of the business of the Civil Courts, nor will they grant injunctions to prevent preachers from preaching where they like under any title they please provided no office or property is disturbed or interfered with. For interference with mere dignity no suit can be maintained. For voluntary offerings received no suit will lie. *Sri Sunkur Bharti Swami v. Sidha Lingayah Charanti*, 3 Moo. I. A. 198; *Sangapa v. Gangapa*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 476, and *Rama v. Shivram*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 116, referred to. *Boyter v. Dodsworth*, 6 T. R. 681, followed. *MADHUSUDAN PARVAT v. SHRI. SHAHKARACHARYA* (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 278

6. ——— ss. 11, 206, 623—*Right of suit—Suit to rectify mistake in decree.* A suit lies on a Civil Court to rectify a mistake in a decree. The present plaintiff's predecessor, who was a defendant in a previous mortgage suit, claimed a certain property, which was described in the plaint in that suit as property No. 4, but which was by mistake stated in the written statement as property No. 3. The property, which was released, was stated in the judgment and the decree in that suit as property No. 3. The plaintiff brought the present suit to rectify the mistake. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable. *JOGESWAR ATHA v. GANGA BISHNU GHATTACK* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 473

s. 12—

See *BENGAL TENANCY ACT*, ss. 101 to 111A

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 28

See *RENT, SUIT FOR*

7 C. W. N. 720

See *RES JUDICATA—MATTERS IN ISSUE.*

I. L. R. Calc. 602

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 256

I. L. R. 11 All. 148

7. ——— *Necessity of instituting suit within proper time.* S. 12 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) only provides that no suit shall be tried if the same issues are involved in a previously instituted suit. It does not dispense with the institution of a suit within the proper time when the law requires such institution. *NEMAGAUDA v. PARESHA*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 640

s. 13.

See *BENGAL TENANCY ACT*, s. 51.

6 C. W. N. 589

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See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 109.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 336;
9 C. W. N. 610

See CONSENT DECREE. 13 C. W. N. 1197

See ESTOPPEL—ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 318
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 357
7 B. L. R. 673
I. L. R. 14 All. 64

See HINDU LAW. I. L. R. 29 All. 331

See JURISDICTION. I. L. R. 36 Calc. 193

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 2, SCH. II.

ART. 118. I. L. R. 28 All. 727;
10 C. W. N. 1065;
L. R. 33 I. A. 156

See MORTGAGE. 12 C. W. N. 515

See REGULATION III OF 1891.

12 C. W. N. 1095

See RENT SUIT. 9 C. W. N. 466, 469

See RES JUDICATA.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—FRAUD.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 395

1. ———— *Res judicata*—Previous suit in Munsif's Court in ordinary jurisdiction—Subsequent suit on Small Cause Court side. A decision in a previous suit in a District Munsif's Court in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction may operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit between the same parties on the Small Cause side of the Court—SIMHADRI APPA ROW v. RAMACHANDRUDU (1904) . . . I. L. R. 27 Mad. 63

2. ———— *Res judicata* between co-defendants—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 56, 81, 82—Marshalling between purchasers of mortgaged property—Rule of inverse order—Rate of contribution—Equity. S. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code does not preclude the decision upon any issue from operating as *res judicata* merely because the issue is raised as between co-defendants, if the matter involved was directly and substantially in issue in a former suit and the other necessary conditions are satisfied. The words "between the same parties" in s. 13 qualify not only the words "former suit," but the whole expression "in issue in a former suit." Gokul Mandar v. Pudmanund Singh, 6 C. W. N. xlviii 825: s. c. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 707; Cottingham v. Earl of Shrewsbury, 3 Hare's Rep. 627; Ram Chandra Narayan v. Narayan Mahadev, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 216; Sheikh Koorshed v. Nubee Fatima, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 551, referred to. Four parcels of property, A, B, C, D, were mortgaged by the owner. Subsequently the plaintiff-appellant purchased in July 1888 the properties A, B, at an execution sale subject to the said mortgage, and the respondents-defendants first party, the properties C and D at a private sale in January 1888. The mortgagee later

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on brought a suit in which the said purchasers were co-defendants, and obtained a mortgage decree, which directed the sale of the properties A and B to satisfy the mortgage-debt. The debt was completely satisfied out of the sale-proceeds. It was found by the Court that the said respondents bought without express notice of the said mortgage, which had been registered. In a suit for contribution by the plaintiff-appellant against the said respondents-defendants first party: *Held*, that the decree in the mortgage suit did not operate as *res judicata* on the issue of contribution in the latter. Kabi Krishna Tagore v. The Secretary of State for India, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 173; Jagatjit Singh v. Sarbajit Singh, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 159, referred to. *Held*, further, that the respondents were not entitled to throw the whole of the mortgage-debt on the properties A, B, the rate of inverse order not holding good in such a case. That the plaintiff-appellant was entitled to contribution, and that the properties in the hands of the purchasers should contribute to the mortgage-debt in proportion to their respective values. Lala Dilwar Sahay v. Dewan Balakiram, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 253, distinguished. MANGNIRAM v. SYED MUHAMMAD MEHDI HOSSEIN KHAN (1904). I. L. R. 31 Calc. 95 s. c. 8 C. W. N. 30

3. ———— *Res judicata*—Decision of a Rent Court on a question of title. *Held*, that when an Assistant Collector hears a suit for profits, or for rent, or any other suit, which under the Rent Act he is competent to hear, although it may be necessary for him for the purposes of that suit to decide every question, whether of title or otherwise, which may be raised before him, his decision of such question cannot operate as *res judicata* in respect of any suit which may afterwards be brought in a Civil Court in which the proprietary title to the land out of which such profits or rents may arise is in issue. ASHRAF-UN-NISSA v. ALI AHMAD (1904) . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 601

4. ———— *Decision on a question of law not res judicata when the object-matter of the subsequent suit is different*—Hindu law—Trustee of Charitable Trust has no power to appoint a co-trustee in place of a deceased trustee. The provisions of the Indian Trust Act do not apply to charitable trusts. In the absence of provision in the instrument creating such trust or of some statutory provision, a trustee, as such, has no power to appoint any person as trustee either in his own place or to act jointly with him. A decision on a question of law in a previous suit is not *res judicata* in a subsequent suit between the same parties, when the object-matter of the two suits are different. *Quere*: Whether such a decision can be *res judicata* against a party, who could not have prosecuted an appeal against it. Parthasaradi v. Chinna Krishna, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 304; Venku v. Mehulinga, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 392; Chamantal v. Bapubhui, I. L. R. 22

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Bom. 669; Vishnu v. Ramling, I. L. R. 26 Bom. 25, 30, referred to and followed. Gopu Kolan-Davelu Chetty v. Sami Royar (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 517

5. ————— *Res judicata—Erroneous decision in a former suit—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 67, 179—Interest.* Where in a previous suit for rent the Court erroneously held that interest exceeding 12 per cent. per annum was not recoverable from a permanent tenure-holder in a permanently settled area, although the *kabuliat* stipulated for the payment of such interest: *Held*, that in a subsequent suit for rent the erroneous decision in the former suit would not operate as *res judicata*. *ALIMUNNISSA CHOWDHRAIN v. SHYAMA CHARAN RAY (1905)* . . . 9 C. W. N. 466

6. ————— *Res judicata—Erroneous decision in a former suit—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 67, 74, 179—Mokurari lease—Abwab—Illegal cesses, stipulation to pay.* Where the plaintiff in a suit for recovery of rent claimed certain cesses, which the defendant had stipulated to pay in his *kabuliat* and which the defendant said he was not liable to pay, inasmuch as in a previous suit for recovery of rent of a previous period it had been held that the same was not recoverable according to law: *Held*, that the present claim was barred by the rule of *res judicata*. *PADMANAND SINGH v. RADHA SINGH (1905)*

9 C. W. N. 469

7. ————— *Res judicata—Matters in issue.* A plea of *res judicata* taken on the ground that the questions in issue in the suit were formerly in issue in probate proceedings cannot be given effect to, when the said proceedings are not in evidence and there is thus no sufficient evidence to support the plea. A judgment passed in the previous proceedings showing what the Judge understood to have been the questions for decision in those proceedings, is not enough to support such a plea. The Court cannot give effect to the plea, unless it can say for itself that the matters in issue in the suit were in issue in the previous proceedings. *MIRZA KURRATULAIN BAHADUR v. NAWAB NUZHAT-UD-DOWLA ABBAS HOSSEIN KHAN (1905)*

9 C. W. N. 938

s. c. L. R. 32 I. A. 244

8. ————— *Auction-purchaser—Revenue sale.* An auction-purchaser at a revenue sale cannot be considered to be the successor in interest of the defaulting proprietor so as to be bound by a judgment passed in a suit previous to the sale to which the defaulting proprietor was a party. *Kanta Proshad Hajari v. Secretary of State for India in Council, 8 C. W. N. 676; Moonshi Buzlool Rahman v. Prandhone Dutt, 8 W. R. 222; Radhagobind Koer v. Rakhaldas Mukherji, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 82, referred to.* But a decree which was obtained on consent against a defaulting proprietor for possession of a plot of land is admissible in a suit where

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the purchaser is a party, to show how possession was obtained, although that arrangement may not be binding upon the purchaser. *Peari Mohun Mukherji v. Drobomoyi Debta, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 745, relied upon. GOKUL CHANDRA DAS v. HARASUNDARI DAS (1905)* 9 C. W. N. 383

9. ————— *Res judicata—Question directly and substantially in issue—Omission to raise ground of defence in former suit.* *H*, an Oudh talukdar, executed a deed of gift in 1859 by which he purported to give to *R* (the only son of his elder son who was dead) the whole taluk with the exception of a few villages. In 1871 a suit brought by *H* against *R* to have it declared that notwithstanding the deed of gift the proprietary right in the taluk was vested in him was settled by a compromise by the terms of which various portions of the taluk were to be held for life by *H*, *R* and *D*, the mother of *R*, and on the expiration of those three lives, *L* (the younger son of *H*) and his heirs were to succeed to the whole of the estate. This compromise was embodied in a decree of Court. In 1876 *H* and *L* brought a suit against *R* and his wife to cancel a deed conveying a portion of the taluk to the latter as being in excess of the powers of alienation given to *R* by the compromise of 1871. The defendants in that suit did not contest the validity of the compromise, but upheld the alienation as valid, and asserted that *L* had no such interest in the property as entitled him to sue, and issues were raised on those points. The Court held that *L* was "a certain remainderman under the terms of the agreement," that he "or his representatives will certainly inherit the estate some time or other," and that he was entitled to sue; that the alienation was void as against *H* as being in excess of the power reserved by the compromise to *R*, who was held only entitled to alienate for his life; but that no right had yet accrued to *H* and *L* to disturb the possession of *R*'s wife. In 1889 after the deaths of *H*, *D* and *L*, a portion of the taluk was attached by creditors of *R* and sold in execution of the decree without limit of title. In a suit brought by the son of *L* in 1896 against *R*, his judgment creditors, and the purchaser at the sale to have it declared that the plaintiff was entitled as the immediate reversioner to an absolute estate in the portion sold on the death of *R*, and that after *R*'s death the sale would be inoperative as against him, the defendant *R* set up the defence that he had by virtue of the deed of gift of 1859 an absolute title, which was not displaced by the effect of the compromise and the decree embodying it. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee (confirming the decision of the Judicial Commissioners of Oudh) that the decision in the suit of 1876, as having established between *R* and *L* (the father and predecessor in title of the plaintiff) that *R* had only a life interest in the taluk, and that *L* (and therefore also the plaintiff as his heir) had a vested interest in remainder, was *res*

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judicata in the present suit. **RAMPAL SINGH v. RAM PRASAD SINGH** (1905). I. L. R. 27 All. 37
I. L. R. 32 I. A. 17

10. *Res judicata*—*Pro formâ defendant*. The plaintiff sued Nathu Mal and Mathri to recover possession of certain mortgaged property alleging that the mortgage had been discharged by payment of half the amount due to the persons, whom he made defendants and half to Malhi Kunwar and others as representatives of one Mitter Sen. The defendants, 1st party, pleaded that they were entitled to the whole of the mortgage money, and that payment of one-half to the representatives of Mitter Sen was no payment as against them. Malhi Kunwar and others were made defendants to the suit, and in the end it was held that the defendants, 1st party, were entitled to the whole of the mortgage money, and a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff on payment of Rs 997 to Nathu Mal and Mathri. The Court in that suit exempted the defendants Malhi Kunwar and others, holding that they had no interest in the property in suit. Subsequently the plaintiff sued Malhi Kunwar and others to recover from them the money paid on account of the mortgage. *Held*, that the decision in the former suit did not render the question of payment to the present defendants *res judicata*. **Brojo Behari Mitter v. Kedar Nath Majumdar**, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 580, approved. **MALHI KUNWAR v. IMAM-UD-DIN** (1905). I. L. R. 27 All. 59

11. *Res judicata*—*Execution of decree—Application dismissed for want of jurisdiction—No appeal from order of dismissal—Subsequent application barred*. A Munsif, as a Court executing a decree, dismissed an application for execution, holding that owing to certain proceedings in insolvency, which had taken place at the instance of the judgment-debtor in the Court of the District Judge, he (the Munsif) had no jurisdiction to entertain it. No appeal was preferred against the order of the Munsif dismissing this application for execution, and the Munsif's order became final. *Held*, that a further application by the same decree-holder in the same Court to execute the same decree against the same judgment-debtor was barred by s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. **NABI MUHAMMAD v. JWALA PRASAD** (1905).

I. L. R. 27 All. 148

12. *Res judicata*—*Estoppel—Suit in Civil Court for ejectment of defendant as trespasser—Effect of previous litigation in Revenue Courts*. Plaintiffs applied to a Rent Court to eject defendant, alleging that he was their tenant, but their application was ultimately rejected on the finding that defendant was either the owner or a rent-free tenant of many years' standing. Again plaintiffs applied for enhancement of rent in respect of the same land from which they had previously sought to eject defendant, but were again defeated on the finding that the defendant was in adverse

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possession. Subsequently plaintiffs sued in the Civil Court to eject defendant as a trespasser. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were not debarred from having recourse to the Civil Court. **Baldeo Singh v. Imdad Ali**, I. L. R. 15 All. 189, distinguished. **MAHESH PRASAD v. RANJOR SINGH** (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 163

13. *Res judicata* in *rent suits—Incidental or collateral issues—Adjudication upon title to the land in rent suits, when res judicata in a subsequent title suit*. Where in a suit for rent the defendant denies the relationship of landlord and tenant and either sets up the title of a third person to the land for which rent is claimed, or pleads that she is not in occupation of the land or that the tenancy which existed has expired, the only material issue to be decided in the suit is whether the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted between the parties for the period covered by the suit, and the issue, if any, raised as to the title to the land is an incidental or collateral issue not necessary for the decision of the suit: therefore the adjudication on this latter issue cannot operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit between the parties for the establishment of title to the land. **Srihari Banerjee v. Kshitish Chandra Roy Bahadur**, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 569, **Run Bahadur v. Lucho Koer**, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 301, and **Dwarka Nath Roy v. Ram Chand Aich**, 3 O. W. N. 266: s.c. I. L. R. 26 Calc. 428, referred to. But where in a rent suit, the alleged tenant denies the plaintiff's title to the land and sets up his own title to the same the issue as to the title to the land becomes a substantial issue in the suit, and the decision of the Court on the question of title becomes *res judicata* in a subsequent suit between the parties for establishment of title to the land. **Raj Krissen Mukerjee v. Radhamadhab Halder**, 21 W. R. 349, **Radhamadhab Halder v. Monohur Mukerjee**, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 756; and **Kasibwar Mukhopadhyaya v. Mohendra Nath Bhandari**, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 136, referred to. Where in a suit brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for rent in respect of an alleged *jama* of Rs 7, the defendant pleaded that he did not hold any separate *jama* of Rs 7 under the plaintiff, but that the lands covered by the suit were included in a *jama* of Rs 33 and odd, which they held under the plaintiff, and the Court held that the defendant did not hold any separate *jama* of Rs 7 under the plaintiff and the lands of the alleged *jama* were included in the defendant's *jama* of Rs 33 odd: *Held*, that the decision that the lands were included within the defendant's *jama* of Rs 33 odd, was not necessary for the decision of the suit, and consequently could not be *res judicata* in a subsequent suit brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for the declaration of his title to those lands and for *khas* possession thereof. **SAHADEB DHALI v. RAM RUDRA HALDAR** (1906). 10 C. W. N. 820

14. *Res judicata*—*Decrees in cross-suits on same facts—Appeal against*

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one decree only—Decree unappealed no bar to the decision of the appeal. Where cross-suits between the same parties on the same facts were tried together and judgment was given on the same day, but separate decrees were passed and an appeal was preferred against one of the decrees alone: *Held*, that the decree unappealed did not operate as a bar under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to preclude the Appellate Court from dealing with the decree appealed against. The doctrine of *res judicata* has no application when the very object of the appeal, in substance, if not in form, is to get rid of the decision, which is pleaded in bar. *Abdul Majid v. Jew Narain Matho*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 233, followed. *PANCHANANDA VELAN v. VAITHINATHA SASTRIAL* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 333

15. ————— *Res judicata*—‘Of competent jurisdiction,’ meaning of—Decision against which no second appeal allowed, no bar to suit open to second appeal. The words ‘of jurisdiction competent’ in s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure admit of the provisions of law relating to appealability being considered in giving effect to the principle of estoppel, which ought to be so applied that, so far as possible, Courts of higher jurisdiction are not tied down by the decisions of inferior Courts. A decision in a previous suit of a small cause nature, in which no second appeal is allowed by law, is no bar to a subsequent suit, in the same Court, which not being of a small cause nature is opened to second appeal. *Subbammal v. Huddleston*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 273, overruled. *Ahmed v. Moidin*, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 444, overruled. *Raja Simhadri Appa Row v. Ramachandrudu*, I. L. R. 27 Mad. 63, overruled. *Namasivayya Gurukkal v. Kadir Ammal*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 161, followed. *Mussamut Edun v. Mussamut Bechun*, 8 W. R. 175, referred to. *Misir Ragho-bardial v. Sheo Baksh Singh*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 439, referred to. *AVANASI GOUNDEN v. NACHAMMAL* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 195

16. ————— *Res judicata*. To support a plea of *res judicata* it must appear from inspection of the record that the person whose interest it is sought to bind was in some way a party to the suit. A mortgagor of an undivided share may redeem the entirety, if the mortgagee does not object and may be compelled to do so, if required by the mortgagee. Therefore, the fact that a suit for redemption of the entire property instituted by such a person was dismissed cannot affect the right of a co-sharer, who was not a party to that suit. In a suit for redemption it was ordered that the mortgagor should recover possession on depositing the mortgage money in the Government Treasury. The money was deposited, but before it could be made over to the mortgagee, the Sepoy Mutiny broke out and the Treasury was looted. *Held*, that the decree having become incapable of execution owing to *vis major*, a fresh suit for redemption was required to give effect to the rights of the parties and do justice between

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them; and such a suit was not barred under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *CHAUDHURI AHMED BAKSH v. SETH RAGHUBER DYAL* (1905).

10 C. W. N. 115

17. ————— *Res judicata*—Award of committee of taluqdars appointed under s. 3 of the Oudh Estates Act (I of 1869)—Question of adoption—Claim in former suit as adopted son—Estoppel—Evidence and proof of adoption—Evidence of adoption where lapse of time precludes proof—Presumption as to probability from conduct of parties. In a suit by the appellant against the respondent for a share in certain family property the question was whether the respondent had been in 1853 validly adopted into another family. *Held*, that the committee of taluqdars appointed under s. 33 of Act I of 1869 (Oudh Estates Act) to decide on claims for maintenance is not such a Court as is described by s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), and their award refusing the respondent maintenance in his own family on the ground that he had been adopted into another was therefore not *res judicata* in the present suit. The committee had no jurisdiction to decide the question of adoption, and the affirmation of their award by the Financial Commissioner could not give judicial validity to their decision on a point outside their jurisdiction. The fact that the respondent had in 1879 on the death of his alleged adoptive mother claimed to succeed her as the adopted son of her deceased husband, and so secure the succession to which the predecessor in title of the appellant was then entitled, though he did not oppose the respondent's claim, did not estop the respondent from denying the alleged adoption in this suit. To establish the fact of a valid adoption it was essential for the appellant to show that it was made by the direction of the deceased husband of the adoptive mother, and that the respondent's father had given him in adoption. In the absence of proof, which the lapse of time made impossible, it was incumbent on the appellant, before any presumption that those conditions were fulfilled was justified, to establish an initial probability that the adoption was likely to have been validly made, and that the conduct of the parties cognizant of the facts had at least been consistent with such an hypothesis. But the evidence rather showed the contrary; and no weight could be given to the statements of the respondent, as they fell short of founding an estoppel, and as he had asserted or denied the adoption just as it suited his purpose throughout the whole of the protracted litigation between the members of the family. *HARSHANKAR PARTAB SINGH v. RAGHURAJ SINGH* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 519
L. R. 34 I. A. 125

18. ————— *Dekkhan Agri-culturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879), s. 20*—Suit on a promissory note—Issue as to payment by instalments

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—*Finding in the negative—Extension of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879) to the District—Application for Instalments—Res judicata.* In a suit instituted in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Ahmedabad on a promissory note an issue was raised as to whether the amount sued for should be made payable by instalments and the finding was in the negative. The suit was decreed on the 21st July 1905. The Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879) was extended to the Ahmedabad District on the 15th August 1905. Thereupon the defendant having applied for payment by instalments the application was dismissed on the ground that the question of instalments was *res judicata*. Held, that s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) was not applicable. S. 20 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879) contemplates that even when a decree has been passed which does not allow of instalments, the Court should have power to allow instalments in execution. *BAI DIWALI v. PATEL GIRDHAR* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 39

19. ————— *Res judicata—*
Question of right to receive a recurring payment—Civil and Revenue Courts—Revenue Court deciding a question of title. The plaintiffs sued to recover their share of an annuity chargeable on a 7½ biswa share of a certain village for the years 1309, 1310 and 1311 Fasli. In a previous suit between the same parties in respect of the years 1306, 1307 and 1308, the plaintiffs' right to receive the annuity had been admitted by the defendant, and a decree passed accordingly which had been affirmed by the High Court. Held, that the fact that the two suits related to different years did not prevent the judgment in the former operating as *res judicata* in the latter. *Chandi Prasad v. Mahendra Singh*, I. L. R. 24 All. 112, followed. Neither did the fact that the first decision was that of a Court of Revenue make any difference. Either the suit was wrongly brought in a Revenue Court, a defect which was cured by its coming to a Civil Court in appeal; or the Revenue Court deciding a question of title might be regarded *quoad hoc* as a Civil Court. *Salig Dube v. Deoki Dube*, All. Weekly Notes (1907) 1, referred to. *DWARKA DAS v. AKHAY SINGH* (1908) I. L. R. 30 All. 470

20. ————— *Res judicata—*
Suit. The decision, in a former suit, of questions not absolutely necessary for the determination of that suit, cannot be regarded as *res judicata* between the same parties in a later suit. *POORENDA NATH SEN v. HEMANGINI DASSEE* (1908)

12 C. W. N. 1002

21. ————— *Debutter estate—*
Representation in suit by person acting under the authority of shebait—Res judicata—Identity of subject-matter not essential—Judgment in previous suit—Admissibility—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s.

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 13—contd.

13. A decision obtained in a suit instituted in his own name by a person who was in possession of, and had authority to represent the debutter estate under an *arpannama* from the *shebait* and who in fact did represent the debutter estate is binding on a succeeding *shebait*, on the principle in the case of *Prosunno Kumari v. Golab Chand*, L. R. 2 I. A. 145; *Gora Chand v. Makhun Lal*, 11 C. W. N. 489; s. c. 6 C. L. J. 404; *Venkayya v. Suramma*, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 235; *Radhabai v. Anantnar*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 198, referred to. For purposes of *res judicata* it is not essential that the subject-matter of litigation should be identical with the subject-matter of the previous suit. *Raja of Pittapur v. Raja Rao Buchi*, L. R. 12 I. A. 16; *Balkishan v. Kishan Lal*, I. L. R. 11 All. 148; *Moni Roy Rajbunsee v. Kcoer*, 25 W. R. 392, referred to. The scope of the former litigation and the question raised and decided therein must be determined by reference not merely to the decree, but also to the judgment, and if need be, to the pleadings. *Kurratulain v. Peara Saheb*, 9 C. W. N. 938; s. c. L. R. 32 I. A. 244, referred to. Held, that the previous judgment relied on in this case did not operate as *res judicata*, but was admissible in evidence, if not under s. 13 of the Evidence Act, in proof of all the facts found therein, at least to the extent indicated by GEIDT, J., in *Abinash Chandra v. Paresb Nath*, 9 C. W. N. 402. *RANJIT SINHA v. BASUNTA KUMAR GHOSE* (1908)

12 C. W. N. 739

22. ————— *Res judicata.*
In order to establish the plea of *res judicata* the Court, which decided the former suit, must have been such a Court as would have been competent to try and decide not only the particular matter in issue in the subsequent suit, but also the subsequent suit itself in which the issue is subsequently raised. It is the competency of the original Court which decided the former suit that must be looked to and not that of the Appellate Court in which the suit was ultimately decided on appeal. *Bhugwandutt Chowdhurani v. Forbes*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 78, distinguished. *Toponidhee Dhirj Gir Gosain v. Sreeputty Sahame*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 832, and *Pathumav v. Salimamma*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 83, not followed. *Rai Churan Ghose v. Kumud Mohon Dutt Choudhury*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 571, and *Ram Gopal Mazumdar v. Prasanna Kumar Sanial*, 10 C. W. N. 529, referred to. *SHIBU ROUT v. BABAN ROUT* (1908) 12 C. W. N. 359
s. c. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 353

23. ————— *Res judicata—*
Suit. Where after a remand by a higher Court, an issue was raised and accepted by the parties, and the decision became final owing to the abandonment of an appeal. *Quære.* Whether the decision was *res judicata* in a subsequent suit notwithstanding that the raising of the issue on remand in the previous suit might have been open to objection. *TIRBU-*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 13—*contd.*WAN BAHADUR SINGH v. RAMESWAR BAKSH SINGH
(1906) I. L. R. 28 All. 727
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 1065

L. R. 33 I. A. 156

24. ————— *Res judicata*—
Two suits decided by same judgment—*Appeal in one suit, if barred by decision in the other suit*—“*Former suit*,” what is—*Hearing two suits together*—*Irregularity*. A Mahomedan died leaving two widows. Each of them brought a suit for the recovery of her dower from the estate of the husband making the other a party defendant. One of the widows, *M*, having claimed certain houses to be her exclusive property, and the other *J*, denying it, an issue was raised in each of the suits as to whether those houses belonged to the estate of the husband so as to be liable for the dowers claimed or were the separate property of *M*. The two suits were, with the consent of the parties, tried together and decided by one and the same judgment, though two separate decrees were made, the Court holding that the houses were *M*'s separate property. *J* appealed only from the decree in her suit, and it was contended on behalf of *M*, that the judgment in her suit not having been appealed from became final, and was a bar to the trial of the issue as to the ownership of the houses in the appeal preferred by *J* in her suit. *Held per GHOSE, C. J.*, agreeing with *HARRINGTON, J.* (*RAMPINI, J., contra*), that there was no separate judgment in *M*'s suit to operate as a bar by way of *res judicata* to the trial of the appeal in *J*'s suit. *Abdul Majid v. Jeunarain Mahto, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 233*, relied on. *Balkishan v. Kishanlal, I. L. R. 11 All. 148*; *Gururajammah v. Venkata Krishnama, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 350*, referred to. The two suits ought not to have been heard together. The proper procedure indicated. *MARIAMNESSA BIBEE v. JOYNAB BIBEE* (1906). I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1101
s. c. 10 C. W. N. 934
25. ————— *One of two joint decree-holders recovering the whole amount liable to the other for his share*. Although a payment to one of two joint decree-holders of the whole decretal amount does not, even when certified, absolve the judgment-debtor from liability to the other decree-holder such decree-holder is not bound to proceed against the judgment-debtor in execution, but may sue to recover his share from the other decree-holder. *SOMASUNDARAM PILLAI v. KRISHNASAMY NAIDU* (1905) I. L. R. 29 Mad. 183
26. ————— *Res judicata must be based on the grounds stated in the judgment*. A plea of *res judicata* must be based on the grounds of the decision actually stated in the judgment; and where such grounds are unequivocally stated, but do not justify the decision, it is not proper or competent to substitute something else quite different which will justify it to enable one of the parties to found a plea of *res judicata*. *JALASUTRAM LAKSHMINARAIN v. BOMMADEVERA VENKATA NARASIMHA NAIDU* (1905) I. L. R. 29 Mad. 42

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 13—*concl.*

27. ————— *Res judicata*—
Point taken in defence but not considered—*Adverse decision against defendant*—*Effect*—*Lessee taking a superior tenure from lessors' landlord, if trustee for lessor*—*Lessee, mukhtear of lessor*—*Lease for building, fixing no term, if permanent lease*—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 106*. *Semble*: Where the decision in a former suit is necessarily inconsistent with a defence which was taken but not considered, the decision must be construed as deciding the point against the defendant. *MOHIM CHANDRA SARKAR v. ANIL BANDHU ADHIKARY* (1909)
13 C. W. N. 513
28. ————— *Res judicata*—
Suit for sale on a mortgage—*Compromise by which mortgagee accepted a simple money decree*—*Second suit for sale barred*. A suit for sale on mortgage was compromised on the terms that the mortgagee should accept a simple money decree for the amount of the mortgage debt, and such a decree was accordingly passed. This decree not being satisfied, the mortgagee again sued for sale of the mortgaged property. *Held*, that the suit was barred. *Shibu Bera v. Chandra Mohan Jana, I. L. R. 26 All. 223*, followed. *Bhola Nath v. Muhammad Sadiq, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 849*, and *Madho Prasad v. Baij Nath, Weekly Notes, (1905) 152*, distinguished. *PIARI LAL v. NAND RAM* (1908)
I. L. R. 31 All. 19
29. ————— *Res judicata*—
Plea of res judicata can prevail even where its effect is to sanction what is illegal—*Bhagdadi and Naraddadi Tenures Act (Bom. Act V of 1862), s. 3*. A plea of estoppel by *res judicata* can prevail even where the result of giving effect to it will be to sanction what is illegal in the sense of being prohibited by statute. *CHHAGANLAL v. BAI HARKHA* (1909)
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 479

s. 13, Expl. II—

See RES JUDICATA.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 223

1. ————— *Res judicata*—
Mortgage—Sale of mortgaged property—*Suit by purchaser for redemption*—*Mortgagee entitled to pre-empt*—*Claim to pre-empt not put forward in redemption suit*—*Subsequent suit for pre-emption*. The owner of a certain share in a village mortgaged three-quarters of that share to *R. C.*, and afterwards sold the entire share to *D. P.* *D. P.*, the purchaser, sued the mortgagee, *R. C.*, for redemption, and obtained a decree. Subsequently *R. C.*, who was a co-sharer in the village, brought a suit for pre-emption of the share against *D. P.* and the original mortgagor. *Held*, that the fact that *R. C.* had not advanced his claim to pre-empt as a defence to *D. P.*'s suit for redemption did not have the effect of making *R. C.*'s claim in his suit for pre-emption *res judicata*. *Baldeo Sahai v. Bateshar Singh, I. L. R. 1 All. 75*; *Jadu Lal v. Ram Gholam,*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 13, Expl. II—*contd.*

I. L. R. 1 All. 316 ; Narain Dat v. Bhairo Bukshpal, I. L. R. 3 All. 189 ; and Pulandar Singh v. Jwala Singh, I. L. R. 20 All. 516, overruled. Srimut Rajah Mootoo Vijaya Raganadha Bodha Gooroo Sawmy Periya Odaya Taver v. Katama Natchiar, 11 Moo. I. A. 50, and Deekinandan v. Sri Ram, I. L. R. 12 All. 234, referred to. RAM CHAND V. DURGA PARSAD (1904) . I. L. R. 26 All. 61

2. ————— *Res judicata*—*Matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack in a former suit.* The plaintiffs sued for their share by right of inheritance in the assets of a deceased Mahomedan, the defendant being the widow of the propositus. In that suit the widow pleaded that she was in possession of the property claimed in virtue of a deed of gift from her late husband, and also that she had a lien on it for unpaid dower. The latter defence was accepted by the Court, and the plaintiffs' suit dismissed. The plaintiffs then brought a second suit against the widow, in which they offered to redeem the dower-debt and claimed possession after such redemption. *Held*, that this second suit was not barred by s. 13, expl. II, of the Code of Civil Procedure. *ZINAT-UN-NISSA v. RAJAN (1905) I. L. R. 27 All. 142*

3. ————— A suit for assessment of additional rent on the same additional area, which formed the subject-matter of a previous suit, is barred as the decision in the previous suit operates as *res judicata*. *RADHA KISHORE MANIKYA v. UMED ALI (1903) 12 C. W. N. 904*

4. ————— *Res judicata*—*Matter which should have been made a ground of defence in previous suit—Subject-matter, if must be identical—Rent suit—Ex-parte decree—Plea of payment not raised—Claim of set-off in subsequent rent suit.* In a suit for rent, the defendant claimed a set-off for a certain sum which he said he had paid on account of previous arrears of rent, but for which no credit had been given by the plaintiffs in a suit for the rent of that period. That suit had been heard *ex parte* and decreed in the plaintiffs' favour. *Held*, that the plea of payment now raised should have been made a ground of defence in the previous suit and the defendant was precluded from claiming a set-off in regard to it by Expl. II of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Kailash Mondul v. Baroda Sundari Dasya, 1 C. W. N. 565 ; s. c. I. L. R. 24 Calc. 711 ; Rajendra-nath Ghose v. Tarangini Dasi, 1 C. L. J. 248, considered. Srigopal v. Pirthi Singh, I. L. R. 20 All. 110, followed. Semble: per RYVES, J. The Privy Council in Srigopal v. Pirthi Singh, 6 C. W. N. 889 : s. c. I. L. R. 24 All. 429, has by implication overruled the decision in Kailash Mondul v. Baroda Sundari Dasya, 1 C. W. N. 565 : s. c. I. L. R. 24 Calc. 711. JAMADAR SINGH v. SERAZUDDIN AHAMAD CHOWDHURY (1908) . 12 C. W. N. 862 s. c. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 979*

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 13, Expl. II—*contd.*

5. ————— *Res judicata*—*Property not included in the former suit—Right as heir decided in the former suit with respect to other property—The decision does not bar the second suit.* K brought a suit against A and others to recover some property as heir of one S, praying for a partition of the properties specified in the plaint and for allotment to him of S's share therein. A denied K's heirship and asserted himself to be heir of S. It was decided that A was the heir of S and the suit was dismissed. A then brought another suit against K to establish his right as S's heir to property not included in the plaint in the first suit. The lower appellate Court negatived the claim upon the ground that as A failed to make the omission by K to include the property in dispute in the previous suit for partition a ground of defence, A's right to the property was in the second suit barred under Expl. II to s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). On appeal to the High Court: *Held*, that A's right to maintain the suit was not barred by *res judicata*. Expl. II to s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) must be read in conjunction with and as part and parcel of the leading provisions of the section itself. According to those provisions, several conditions are necessary to constitute a matter *res judicata*. Two of these conditions are: (i) that the matter must have been in the former suit directly and substantially in issue; and (ii) that it must have been heard and finally decided in that suit. The explanation does no more than lay down that, if a matter, which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence in the former suit, is not made such a ground, it shall be dealt with as falling within the first of the above-mentioned conditions. That is, the omission shall have the same effect given to it as it would have had, if it had been made a ground of defence. But to constitute *res judicata*, a second condition is necessary—it must have been finally decided, and if the former suit went off on a preliminary ground not calling for adjudication on other grounds of defences whether raised or not, those grounds remain undecided. The same effect must be given to a matter, which might and ought to have been, but has not been, made a ground of defence in the former suit, as must be given to it if it had been made a ground of defence in the former suit. *ABDULLAKHAN v. KHANMIA (1908) I. L. R. 32 Bom. 315*

6. ————— *Res judicata*—*Successive purchase of the same land at two execution sales—Suit to set aside one such sale—Purchaser's defence—Whether he is bound to set up title acquired at the other sale—Ground of defence which "ought to" have been taken.* A purchased village S in execution of a decree obtained by him against C in the Small Cause Court. Subsequently A through B instituted a mortgage suit against C and in execution of the decree obtained therein purchased some lands in the same

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 13, Expl. II—*concl.*

village *S. C* instituted two suits, one to set aside the sale in execution of the Small Cause Court decree and the other to set aside the decree and sale in the mortgage suit. The latter suit was dismissed for default, but the former succeeded. In this suit, *A* did not set up as a ground of his defence the title obtained by him at the mortgage sale. *Held*, that *A* was not bound to do so, and a suit by *A* to recover the lands in village *S* purchased at the mortgage sale is not *res judicata* under Expl. II of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Per* BRETT, J. Expl. II of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code refers to the title litigated in the former suit as distinguished from the relief claimed. When several independent grounds of action are available, a party is not bound to unite them all in one suit though he is bound to bring before the Court all grounds of attack available to him with reference to the title which is made the ground of action. This rule equally applies to the converse case of a defendant, when pleading in his defence. *Pittapur Raja v. Venkata Mahipati Surya*, L. R. 12 I. A. 116, and *Ramaswami Aiyar v. Vithinathi Aiyar*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 760, relied on. *MOHABIR TEWARI v. PURBHOO NATH CHOWBAY* (1907) 12 C. W. N. 292

7. ——— and s. 42—*Res judicata*—*Person claiming property as heir of another might and ought to set up all the kinds of relationship in one suit.* On the question whether a person, who sued to recover property as the reversionary heir of the deceased on an alleged relationship to the deceased is, when such suit is dismissed, debarred by s. 13, Expl. II of the Civil Procedure Code, from bringing another suit for the same property as reversionary heir under a different kind of relationship: *Held* by WALLIS and MILLER, JJ. (Chief Justice, dissenting), that such subsequent suit was barred. *Per* Sir ARNOLD WHITE, C.J. The question whether a matter "ought" to have been made a ground of attack within the meaning of s. 13, Expl. II of the Civil Procedure Code, will depend on the facts of each case. Where the two different kinds of heirship, under which a person claims property, cannot co-exist, he is not bound, in a suit based on one kind of heirship to join the other in the alternative, when the former, if proved, will necessarily negative the latter. It cannot be said that a part "might and ought" to have claimed alternatively in the view that the ground of title set up was false or that he would be unable to prove it. *Per* WALLIS, J. The question of what "ought" to be made a ground of attack under s. 13, Expl. II, must be determined by the provisions of s. 42 of the Civil Procedure Code. The first question to be considered in such cases is whether the provisions of s. 42 required the plaintiff to join in the former suit the ground of attack in the subsequent suit. Where a person claims as heir, the "matter" within the meaning of s. 42 is his heirship, and he is bound to include in one suit all the different grounds on which he

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 13, Expl. II and s. 42—*concl.*

bases his heirship "as far as practicable." It will not be practicable to join in one suit the different grounds only when the evidence in support of one ground will be destructive of the other. *Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vythinaatha Ayyar*, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 760, followed. MILLER, J. The construction of the word "ought" in s. 13, Expl. II of the Code of Civil Procedure, must to a great extent depend on considerations of hardship and inconvenience caused to the parties. There is no hardship or inconvenience requiring a plaintiff suing as heir to state all the facts on which he bases his heirship, even though it may result in the presentation of an alternative case, while great inconvenience and hardship may be caused to the defendant by allowing the plaintiff to keep a ground in reserve. *Muthumadeva Naik v. Sivattamuthumadeva Naik*, 7 Mad. H. C. 160, approved. *MASILAMANIA PILLAI v. TIRUVENGADAM PILLAI* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 385

s. 13, Expl. III.

See MESNE PROFITS. ***

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 118

s. 13, Expl. VI—

See FOREIGN COURT, JUDGMENT OF.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 641

1. ——— ss. 13 and 43—*Partition*—*Suit for possession of a portion of a house alleged to have been partitioned in proceedings before a Court of Revenue—Subsequent suit for partition of the same house in a Civil Court.* As the result of partition proceedings in a Court of Revenue, the sites of certain houses were partitioned. The plaintiffs believing that the buildings themselves had been partitioned, brought a suit for recovery of their share in the houses alleging a dispossession from that share by the defendants. But they were defeated in this suit upon the ground that the supposed partition of the houses by a Court of Revenue never could have taken place. Upon a second suit brought by the plaintiffs in a Civil Court asking for partition of the house property: It was held that neither s. 13 nor s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure was a bar to the suit. *BALBHADDAR NATH v. RAM LAL* (1904) . I. L. R. 26 All. 501

2. ——— *Suit for land in wrongful possession of defendants—Former suit to recover money alleged to be due on mortgage by sale—Maintainability.* Plaintiffs sued to recover possession of land which, they alleged, was in the wrongful possession of the defendants. In a former suit plaintiffs had sued certain defendants (two of whom were defendants in the present suit) to recover money alleged to be due under a mortgage by sale of the land. That suit was dismissed on the ground that the alleged mortgage was an usufructuary mortgage, which contained no covenant to pay, and that, in consequence, no suit for the money or for

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

ss. 13 and 43—*contd.*

the sale of the land could be maintained. In the present suit, plaintiffs claimed as mortgagees and complained that the two defendants, though let into possession as tenants, refused to surrender the land and were setting up a title. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by s. 43 or by s. 13, expl. II, of the Code. The rights, which were the subject of litigation in the former suit, were totally different from those now claimed. *Arunachalam Chetti v. Meyappa Chetti*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 91, commented on. *Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vythinatha Ayyar*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 769, approved and followed. *VEERANA PILLAI v. MUTHUKUMARA ASARY* (1904)

[I. L. R. 27 Mad. 102]

3. *Former suit to redeem kanam, no bar to subsequent suit based on the kanam and title, so far as the latter is based on title.* A previous suit to redeem four out of six items of land mortgaged under a kanam deed on the ground that the kanam was split up by a subsequent demise, and which suit was dismissed on the ground that such demise was not valid, will be a bar to a subsequent suit to redeem under the same kanam, so far as such suit is based on the kanam. S. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure will be a direct bar to any claim on the demise and ss. 13 and 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure will bar a claim on the original kanam, as an alternative claim on it might have been made in the prior suit. But where in the subsequent suit the plaintiff relies as well on his title, such title is a distinct cause of action, and neither s. 13 nor s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure will bar his claim on such title. A claim on a kanam is a claim arising *ex contractu*, while a claim on title against a trespasser is founded on tort. *Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vythinatha Ayyar*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 769, followed. *Rangasami Pillai v. Krishna Pillai*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 269, dissented from. *Per Boddam, J.* Estoppel by judgment cannot be avoided by suing on a new form of claim or on a ground of relief which might have been, but was not raised in the former suit, if such claim or ground arises out of and depends on the same right or title as that which was directly in question in the former suit. *Chinniya Mudali v. Venkatachella Pillai*, 3 M. H. C. R. 320; *Muthumadeva Naik v. Sevattamuthumadeva Naik*, 7 M. H. C. 160, referred to and approved. *PARAMBATH MANAKKAL v. PUTHENGATIL MUSANUT* (1905). I. L. R. 28 Mad. 406

4. *Res judicata—Usufructuary mortgage—Suit for possession of mortgaged property—Tender of mortgage money—Deposit in Court—Redemption decree—Second suit to recover mesne profits from the date of deposit to the date of recovery of possession of mortgaged property—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 62, 83—Position of mortgagee in possession after the tender or deposit of mortgage money.* In 1884 the plaintiffs executed a usufructuary mortgage in favour of the defendant and placed him in possession of the property. In 1901 the plaintiffs tendered the

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

ss. 13 and 43—*concl.*

amount of the principal to the defendant, but it was not accepted. The plaintiffs in consequence filed a suit, under s. 62 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), to recover possession of the mortgaged property, and at the same time under s. 83 of the Act deposited the amount of the principal in Court as the amount payable on the mortgage. The Court passed a decree for possession. In 1904 the plaintiff filed another suit to recover mesne profits from the defendant from the date of the deposit to the date when he recovered possession of the mortgaged property from the defendant in execution of the redemption decree in the previous suit. The claim was disallowed on the ground of *res judicata*. *Held*, that the plaintiffs having failed to ask for mesne profits in the previous suit, his present claim was barred either under s. 13 or 43 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). The profits derived by a mortgagee after a proper tender made or after the amount due has been deposited in Court are profits for which he has to account to the mortgagor in virtue of a liability tacked on, so to say, by the statute to the mortgage contract; and as such a claim to them by the mortgagor is one arising from and connected with his right to redeem or recover possession of the property. From the date of the tender or of the deposit, as the case may be, the mortgagee continues as mortgagee but with a statutory liability to account for the profits received by him from that date. He is not then a mere trespasser but a mortgagee still, holding the property as a kind of trustee for the mortgagor and as such accountable to the latter for the profits. *RUKMINIBAI v. VENKATESH* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 527

ss. 13, 102 and 103—*Joint Hindu Family—Partition—Suit for partition dismissed for default—Fresh suit not barred.* Where a suit for partition was dismissed for default and a fresh suit was instituted: *Held*, that the right to enforce partition is a legal incident of a joint tenancy, and as long as such tenancy subsists so long may any of the joint tenants apply to the Court for partition of the joint property. *Nasrat-ullah v. Mujib-ullah*, I. L. R. 13 All. 309, followed. *BISHESHAR DAS v. RAM PRASAD* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 627

ss. 13, 103, 396—*Partition suit—Preliminary decree—Execution struck off for default—Fresh suit, if lies.* A previous suit for partition brought by the plaintiffs having been compromised, an *amin* was appointed to effect a partition in terms of the compromise. Subsequently the parties not appearing, the execution proceedings then pending were dismissed for default. *Held*, that a fresh suit for partition is not barred by s. 13 or s. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Nasratullah v. Mujibullah*, I. L. R. 13 All. 309, 313, followed. *Soni v. Munshi*, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 94, distinguished. S. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code has no application

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 13, 103, 396—*concl'd.*to execution proceedings. MADON MOHON MONDUL
v. BAIKANTA NATH MONDUL (1906)

10 C. W. N. 839

ss. 13, 106—*Res judicata*—*Suit dismissed in defendant's absence on plaintiff's failure to adduce evidence—Fresh suit, if barred.* S. 13 is no bar to a fresh suit, when the previous suit was dismissed in the defendant's absence on the failure of the plaintiff to adduce evidence. *Radha Prasad Singh v. Lal Sahab Rai*, I. L. R. 13 All. 53, referred to. *DOMA RAM v. RAGHU NATH PANDIT* (1905)

10 C. W. N. 40

ss. 13, 244—*Indian Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 282—Administrator, decree against—Execution sale—Suit by subsequent administratrix to set aside decree and sale—Fraud or collusion—Rateable distribution—Res judicata—Procedure in creditor's suit against estate of deceased—Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 7—Appeal.* A decree on an award having been passed against an administrator at the instance of a creditor of the estate represented by the administrator, certain property referred to in the award was purchased by the decree-holder in execution proceedings with the sanction of the Court. Afterwards an administratrix, appointed in the place of the administrator, having brought a suit to set aside the decree and the subsequent sale in execution on the ground that under s. 282 of the Succession Act (X of 1865) the decree-holder was entitled only to a rateable distribution among the creditors of the estate. *Held*, that, in the absence of fraud or collusion, the decree and the subsequent sale in execution could not be set aside. *Held*, further, that according to ss. 244 and 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) the decree having been executed, the execution bound the parties and all persons claiming through them, and that the question was, therefore, *res judicata*. *Per CHANDAVARKAR, J.* The position of an executor or administrator, as the case may be, of a deceased person, as such person's legal representative in whom all the property of the deceased vests as such by virtue of s. 179 of the Succession Act, may be said to be similar to that of the seba of an idol. *Prosunno v. Golab*, L. R. 2 I. A. 145, referred to and applied. A creditor's action against the estate of a deceased person should be treated as an administration suit. A preliminary objection was taken that no appeal lay to the High Court on the ground that the suit had been valued at Rs 640 and was one for a declaration, the prayer for possession being merely consequential. *Held*, overruling the objection, that the suit fell within the scope of s. 7, cl. v, of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), and that the real value of the property being more than Rs 5,000, an appeal lay to the High Court. *BAI MEHRBAI v. MAGAN-CHAND* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 96

ss. 13, 244, 278, 283—*Execution of decree—Legal representative of judgment-debtor alleging possession as trustee—Objection—Defence*

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raised in separate suit. Held, that though a legal representative of a judgment-debtor who alleges that the property sought to be sold in execution was not the property of the judgment-debtor, but was property possessed by the legal representative as trustee for others, may file an objection under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, there is nothing to compel the filing of such an objection, and it is open to the legal representative to raise the defence in a subsequent suit brought by the auction-purchaser for possession. *Seih Chand Mal v. Durga Dei*, I. L. R. 12 All. 133, and *Syed Ali Sajjad v. Bhajan Singh*, All. Weekly Notes, (1906) 157, referred to. *INDOMATI v. JAGESHAR* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 644

ss. 13, 283—*Order 'in investigation' under s. 283, what is—Payment of decretal amount more than one year after order, effect of—Decision on question of mixed law and fact res judicata—Voluntary payments not recoverable.* A claim to attached property by A was dismissed by the following order:—"The sale seems collusive. Claim rejected." The order was apparently made on a consideration of the sale-deed alone and there was nothing to show that any evidence was gone into. More than a year after the order B, claiming the properties under a sale by A subsequent to the order, paid the decretal amount and the attachment was raised. In a suit by A to redeem the lands on the strength of his title under the sale dealt with by the order: *Held*, that as the order on the claim by A purported to be made on the merits, it was valid as one made after 'an investigation' of the claim within the meaning of the word as used in the Code: *Held*, further, that the order was conclusive between A and the defendants and that the payment of the decree-debt by B having been made more than a year after the date of the order, did not relieve A from the obligation to bring a suit within a year to set aside the order. A judgment in a previous suit between the same parties not based on a misapprehension as to a general rule of law, but deciding a question of mixed law and fact is binding as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit. *Sardhari Lal v. Ambika Pershad*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 521, followed. *Umesh Chunder Roy v. Raj Bulubh Sen*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 279, distinguished. *Krishna Prosad Roy v. Bippin Behary Roy*, I. L. R. 31 Calc. 228, distinguished. *Gopal Purshotam v. Bai Divali*, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 241, distinguished. *Parthasaradi v. Chinna Krishna*, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 304, 309, distinguished. *KOYYANA CHITTEMMMA v. DOOSY GAVARAMMA* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 225

ss. 13, 373—*Adducing of partial evidence in case—Subsequent default by plaintiff—Dismissal of suit—Subsequent suit by defendant—Issues in former suit, if res judicata—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 49 and 116—Recovery of property under registered deed of release.* Where a plaintiff appears in a suit and goes into

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evidence, but before the evidence is closed makes default and the case is dismissed, matters directly and substantially in issue in the suit are *res judicata* in a subsequent suit between the same parties. *Jagatjit Sinha v. Sarabjit*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 159; *Kali Krishna Tagore v. Secretary of State*, L. R. 15 I. A. 186; s. c. I. L. R. 16 Calc. 173; *Sri Raja, etc., etc., Kantaiyamma v. Sri Raja, etc., etc., Gopal Rao*, 2 C. W. N. 337; s. c. L. R. 25 I. A. 102, distinguished. *Rungrav Ratji v. Sidhi Mahomed, etc.*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 482; *Muhammad Salim v. Nabian Bibi*, I. L. R. 8 All. 283; *Mofzooddeen v. Shaikh Amodeen*, 23 W. R. 58; *Robert Watson & Co. v. Collector of Rajshahye*, 13 Moo. I. A. 160; and *Kartick Chandra Pal v. Sirdhar Mandal*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 563, referred to. A instituted a suit against B to set aside a registered deed of release executed by him in B's favour in 1896, alleging same to have been a *benami* transaction and to have it declared that properties mentioned in the deed belonged to him. On the case being called on A's evidence was partially gone into. On the next day of hearing, A made default and his counsel stated that he had no instructions. On that, the Court dismissed the case without delivering judgment. Subsequently B instituted this suit in 1900 to recover certain properties, covered by the deed, which he alleged remained in A's possession and which A had failed to make over to him. A raised the defence that the property belonged to him and that the deed being *benami*, was inoperative. Held, that A was precluded from raising the above defence, as those issues were *res judicata*. Held, further, on the construction of the Deed of Release, that the suit was not barred as Art. 116, and not Art. 49, Sch. II, of the Limitation Act applied. ROMA NATH DASS v. MOHESH CHUNDER PAL (1905)

9 C. W. N. 679

ss. 13, 562—

See RES JUDICATA.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 203

s. 15 (1859, s. 6, first paragraph).

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION
OF . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 230

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 155

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 367

See RENT, SUIT FOR—BY WHAT COURT
TRIABLE . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 453

s. 16 (1859, s. 5).

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDICTION—DWELLING, CARRYING ON BUSINESS, ETC.

See JURISDICTION—SUITS FOR LAND.

1. s. 16 (d)—*Jurisdiction—Immoveable property—Decree for sale on a mortgage.* Held, that a suit for a declaration that the plaintiffs were the persons in reality beneficially interested in a

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decree for sale on mortgage, although the decree did not run in their names, was not a suit "for the determination of any other right to or interest in immoveable property" within the meaning of s. 16 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Abdul Majid v. Muhammad Faiz-ullah*, I. L. R. 13 All. 89, and *Gous Mahomed v. Khawas Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 450, referred to. AHMAD KHAN v. ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN (1904) . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 603

2. Suit for determination of any right to or interest in immoveable property—*Suit for the recovery of purchase-money under contract for the sale of land—Jurisdiction.* A suit for the recovery of unpaid purchase-money under a contract for the sale of land is a suit "for the determination of any right to or interest in immoveable property" within the meaning of s. 16, cl. (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. *John Young v. Mangalapilly Ramaiya*, 3 Mad. H. C. 125, and *Maharaj Yashwant Roy Holkar v. Dadabhai Cursetji Ashburner*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 353, referred to and distinguished. MATURI SUBBAYYA v. KOTA KRISHNAYYA (1905) . . . I. L. R. 28 Mad. 227

ss. 16, 16A.

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURTS, 1865,
CL. 12 . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 293

s. 16A.

See JURISDICTION—SUITS FOR LAND—
PROPERTY IN DIFFERENT DISTRICTS.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 449

ss. 16 and 19—*Misjoinder of parties—Multifariousness—Suit by heir to recover property from co-heir and transferee from him—Property situate in different districts—Compromise of part of claim—Jurisdiction.* The plaintiff sued as heiress of her father to recover from the brother and from certain transferees from him her share in the property of her deceased father. The suit was brought in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Bareilly. Part of the property claimed was situated in the Bareilly district and part in the district of Bara Banki in Oudh. During the course of the suit a compromise was arrived at regarding the Bareilly property and the suit proceeded with reference to the property in Oudh alone. Held, (i) that the plaintiff had properly impleaded her brother and the transferees from him as co-defendants in one suit, and (ii), that there being no fraud or improper motive alleged with reference either to the compromise or to the filing of the suit in the Court at Bareilly, the Court was not by reason of the compromise divested of jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit in respect of the property situate in Oudh. *Ram Raji v. Dhup Narain*, All. Weekly Notes, (1885) 125, overruled. *Indar Kuar v. Gur Prasad*, I. L. R. 11 All. 33; *Mazhar Ali Khan v. Sajjad Hussain Khan*, I. L. R. 24 All. 358; *Parbati Kunwar v. Mahmud Fatima*, I. L. R. 29 All. 267; *Ishan Chunder Hazra v. Rameswar Mondul*, I. L.

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R. 24 Calc. 831; and *Nundo Kumar Nasker v. Banomali Gayan*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 871, referred to. *Ganeshi Lal v. Khairati Singh*, I. L. R. 16 All. 279, distinguished. *Khatija v. Ismail*, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 380, followed. *KUBRA JAN v. RAM BALI* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 560

s. 17.

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—CALCUTTA—CIVIL. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 369

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDICTION—CAUSE OF ACTION—
BREACH OF CONTRACT.

7 C. W. N. 912

COMPROMISE. I. L. R. 25 All. 48

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 544

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURTS, 1865,
CL. 12. I. L. R. 24 Mad. 293

See RENT, SUIT FOR—BY WHAT COURT
TRIABLE. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 453

See RIGHT OF SUIT—FRAUD.

7 C. W. N. 353

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—
JURISDICTION—DWELLING OR CARRY-
ING ON BUSINESS.

6 Bom. A. C. 131, 258

3 Mad. 374

18 W. R. 312

1. ———— "Place where the contract was made"—*Jurisdiction*. Plaintiff, who resided at Kumool, filed a suit in the District Court of Kumool against the defendants, who resided in Madras, for damages. Plaintiff had been consigning goods for sale to the defendants as commission agents and he now complained that they had sold his goods at rates unnecessarily low. The contract of agency had been concluded by postal communications between plaintiff and defendants. *Held*, that suit was one arising out of contract within the meaning of s. 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that within the meaning of explanation III to that section the cause of action arose at the place where the contract was made, *i.e.*, at Madras, and that clause (iii) of the explanation was inapplicable to the suit, inasmuch as the amount claimed was one payable not in performance of the contract, but as damages for its breach. Under the Indian Contract Act, where the proposal and acceptance are made by letters, the contract is made at the time when and at the place where the letter of acceptance is posted, though the contract is voidable at the instance of the acceptor by communication of his revocation before the acceptance has come to the knowledge of the proposer. *KAMISSETTI SUBBIAH v. KATHA VENKATASAWMY* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 355

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 17—*concl'd.*

2. ———— cl. (c)—*One of the defendants not residing within the jurisdiction of the Court—Leave given after institution of the suit*. Where one out of three defendants did not reside within the jurisdiction of the Court and leave to sue was given after the institution of the suit: *Held*, that under s. 17, clause (c) of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), it was not necessary that leave of the Court must have been first given. The leave, though subsequent, was good. *NARAYAN v. SECRETARY OF STATE* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 570

3. ———— Expls. II and III—*Jurisdiction—Place where contract was made—Promissory note, dated and signed within the jurisdiction of one Court, and sealed and countersigned elsewhere*. A negotiable promissory note, drawn on behalf of a Company, was signed by the Secretaries and Treasurers and dated at Bellary. The note was then sent to another place, where the Agent countersigned and affixed the seal to it and posted it, addressed to the payee at Madras, who received it there. A suit was subsequently brought on the note in the Court at Bellary: *Held*, that the Court had jurisdiction. A statement of the place of execution is not essential to the validity of a negotiable promissory note, nor are the parties precluded from dating it at a place different from that at which it is actually made, if, for any purpose of theirs, they consider it necessary to do so. Where, therefore, a negotiable note is dated with reference to a specified place, and the justice of the case does not necessitate a different conclusion, the parties should be presumed to have agreed to that place being taken to be the place of the contract. *Winter v. Round*, 1 Mad. H. C. 202, referred to. *MEENAKSHI GINNING AND PRESSING COMPANY, LD. v. MYLE SREERAMULU NAIDU* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 19

s. 17, Expl. III—

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDICTION—CAUSE OF ACTION—GENERAL
CASES. I. L. R. 25 Bom. 528

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 223

s. 17, Expl. III, cl. (2).

See CONTRACT. I. L. R. 32 Calc. 884

Jurisdiction—Suits arising out of Contract—Cause of Action—Place, where the offer is accepted—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 8, 10 and 25. A owed B a sum of money for which A gave B at Midnapore a cheque drawn on a firm in Calcutta, in favour of C. B took the cheque to C at Purulia and received the amount. C presented the cheque at Calcutta, where it was dishonoured. On a suit brought by the representatives of C at Purulia against A for the recovery of the amount paid, the defence was that the Purulia Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. *Held*, that the contract, on which the suit

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was brought, was completed as soon as the consideration was paid, and as this was done at Purulia, the contract was made at that place within the meaning of s. 17, Expl. III, cl. (2) of the Civil Procedure Code, and therefore the Purulia Court had jurisdiction. *SITARAM MARWARI v. THOMPSON* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 884

ss. 17 and 20—*Suit against several defendants—Some defendants residing outside the jurisdiction of Court—Objection—Earliest opportunity—Acquiescence in the institution of the suit.* Plaintiff filed a suit against three defendants in the Court at Sirsi. Defendant 1 lived within the jurisdiction of that Court and defendants 2 and 3 lived within the jurisdiction of the Court at Barsi. Plaintiff did not apply under s. 17 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) for leave to sue defendants 2 and 3; on the other hand, these defendants, though they had taken an objection in their written statement that the Court had no jurisdiction, did not apply under s. 20 of the Code. The Sirsi Court allowed the claim against defendants 2 and 3, who did not reside within its jurisdiction. On appeal by defendant 3, the District Judge set aside the decree on the ground of want of jurisdiction and ordered that the plaint be returned for presentation to the proper Court. The plaintiff having appealed against the said order: *Held*, reversing the order, that defendants 2 and 3 not having made any application under s. 20 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), they must be deemed to have acquiesced in the institution of the suit and the suit could not now be said to have been improperly instituted against them in the Sirsi Court. *RAMAPPA v. GANPAT* (1905)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 81

ss. 17, 20, 57, 622.

See PRACTICE . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 146

s. 19 (1859, parts of ss. 11 and 12).

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—TRANSFER OF DECREE FOR EXECUTION AND POWER OF COURT AS TO EXECUTION OUT OF ITS JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 661

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 639

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 871

s. 20.

See *ante*, s. 8.

ss. 20, 24.

See PRACTICE . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 541

1. ss. 20, 111—*Set-off—Different transaction—Power of High Court to restrain suit in Presidency Small Cause Court—Amount claimed in Small Cause Court suit admitted in High Court suit.* A filed this suit against B to recover Rs. 421-15-3 alleged to be due on account stated on account of business dealings. He admitted a debt of

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R621-14-3 due by him to B on a different account. B, on the same day as A's suit was filed, instituted a suit in the Presidency Small Cause Court to recover the said R621-14-3. *Held*, B should treat the sum of R621-14-3 as an admitted set-off and, if plaintiff failed in his suit, B would have a right to ask for judgment for that sum. *Held*, further, that this Court had jurisdiction to restrain the Presidency Small Cause Court from proceeding with B's suit. *R. S. HART v. A. W. GROSSER* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 748

2. *Set-off—Same transaction—Mortgage-decree—Purchase of decree, free from incumbrance—Right of purchaser to compel vendor to pay off attaching creditor—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 55, sub-s. 1, cl. (g), sub-s. 5, cl. (b), principles of, application of—Payment by purchaser to protect his interest—Payment for vendor's benefit—Right to refund—Suit on deposit receipt—Admissibility of evidence to prove object of deposit—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 92.* Defendant executed an *amanati* receipt in favour of the two plaintiffs, the contents of which were as follows: "That you keep in deposit with me Rs. 7,774-5-10 in order to pay off debts due to your Calcutta creditors on account of your joint business as well as to meet the expenses of your joint law suit. I shall return the said deposit money to you when you both will . . . jointly demand payment from me of the said money in deposit. . . ." (The rest of it provides for the payment of interest at a certain rate from the date of demand.) The amount mentioned in the receipt represented the unpaid balance of the purchase-money of a mortgage decree sold by the plaintiffs to the defendant, on the same day, free of incumbrance. The decree, however, had been already attached by some creditors of the plaintiffs. In a suit brought by the plaintiffs on the basis of the *amanati* receipt, to recover the amount of deposit with interest, the defendant claimed to set off a sum of Rs. 289-12-5 paid by him to release the decree from attachment, the payment having been made at a time when a second mortgagee of the property covered by the decree applied for execution of a decree obtained on his mortgage by sale of the property. In support of his claim the defendant adduced evidence to prove (i) that the deposit was made as a security for the release of the decree from attachment, and (ii), further, that there was an oral agreement between the parties that on plaintiffs failing to pay off the attaching creditors, the defendant would be at liberty to make the payment out of the deposit. *Held*, that as it was established that the receipt embodied the real contract between the parties with regard to the deposit, the evidence offered to prove a separate agreement empowering defendant to pay off the attaching creditors, was not admissible. But s. 92 of the Evidence Act would not bar evidence to prove the object for which the deposit was made or to explain the meaning of the first sentence in the

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ss. 20, 111—*concl'd.*

receipt, and this evidence prove that the defendant was to pay the money to the plaintiffs when called on and that the plaintiffs were then to pay off the claim with the money. *Held*, nevertheless, that the defendant was entitled to the set-off claimed—(i) because, having the right to compel the plaintiffs to pay off the claim of the attaching creditors, defendant had been forced to pay it off himself in order to save his own interests under the purchased decree from the second mortgagee. *James Hills v. Woomamoyee Burmonee*, 15 W. R. 545, referred to; (ii) because, the payment was made on the plaintiffs' behalf and they had the benefit of it; and (iii) because, the claim for repayment of the deposit and the payment made to release the decree were so connected together as to form parts of the same transaction. *KHETSIDAS AGARWALA v. SHIB NARAYAN MURDA* (1905) . 9 C. W. N. 178

ss. 22, 23—*Withdrawal by District Judge of a suit—Re-transfer of the same—Powers of District Judge.* When once the District Judge withdraws a suit to his own file for trial, he is not competent to re-transfer it again to the Court from which the case has been withdrawn. *RAM-CHARITTAR RAY v. BIDHATA RAY* (1906)

10 C. W. N. 902

s. 24 (1859, s. 13).

See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASE—GENERAL CASES . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 60

I. L. R. 2 All. 241
I. L. R. 3 All. 568

s. 25.

See BENGAL, AGRA AND ASSAM CIVIL COURTS ACT, s. 21.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 875

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—TRANSFER OF DECREE FOR EXECUTION, ETC.

Marsh. 195

I. L. R. 1 All. 180

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 680

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 309

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 61

See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASE—GENERAL CASES . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 304, 356

I. L. R. 25 All. 183

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 595

ss. 25, 191 (2)—*Transfer by District Judge to his own file of case partly heard by Subordinate Judge—Jurisdiction.* A District Judge has jurisdiction under s. 25 and s. 191, sub-s. (2) of the Civil Procedure Code to transfer to his own file a case pending in the Court of a Subordinate Judge, which the latter has already heard in part. *Kishori Mohun Sett v. Gul Muhammad Saha*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 177; *Palani Sami v. Thondama*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 595; *Biḍyamoyee v. Surya Kant Acharya*, 9 C. W. N. 705, referred to. *MAHADEO PRASAD SAHU v. GAJADHAR PERSAD SAHU* (1905)

10 C. W. N. 12

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s. 26.

See MISJOINDER . . . I. L. R. 8 Mad. 361.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 119

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 833

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 259

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 647

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 662

s. 26, Expl. V.—*Res judicata*—'Right to relief' under s. 26 in previous suit essential to bar under explanation V of s. 13. Where some co-sharers sued to recover the whole property joining as a defendant a sharer, who refused to join as plaintiff and who remained *ex parte* and a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiffs awarding to them their shares alone, such suit must be considered to have been brought by the plaintiffs for their shares alone and the defendant sharer or his representative cannot as a plaintiff in a subsequent suit against a co-defendant in the prior suit rely on the judgment as a bar under s. 13, explanation V of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the ground that the plaintiffs in the previous suit claimed a relief common to them and the defendant co-sharer. *Chandru v. Kunhamed*, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 324, overruled. *Latchanna v. Saravayya*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 164, not followed. A right to relief can be said to be 'claimed in common' under expl. V to s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, only as between parties, who would be benefited by such relief, if granted and who have such an interest in the relief claimed that they could join as co-plaintiffs under s. 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A suit cannot be maintained by one person on behalf of others standing in the same relation with him in the subject of the action, unless the relief sought by him is beneficial to those whom he seeks to represent and such others are necessarily interested in the relief sought. *Gopalayyan v. Raghupati Ayyan* alias *Aiyavayyan*, 3 Mad. H. C. 217; *Nabin Chandra Mazumdar v. Muktasundari Devi*, L. R. 7 I. A. 33; *Surender Nath Pal Chowdhry v. Brojo Nath Pal Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 352, referred to and followed. *Madhavan v. Keshavan*, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 191, distinguished. *SOMASUNDARA MUDALI v. KULANDAIVELU PILLAI* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 457

ss. 26, 28—*The words 'same matter' in s. 28 wider than the words 'same cause of action' in s. 26*—*Suit sustainable against several defendants, if in respect of 'same matter,' although in respect of several causes of action.* The words 'same matter' in s. 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure have a wider scope than the words 'same cause of action' in s. 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and a suit against several defendants is not bad for misjoinder, if the suit, although in respect of different causes of action against different defendants, is in respect of the same matter. The English decisions on the scope of order XVI, rule 4, are not applicable to cases of joinder of defendants under s. 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Muthappa Chetty v. Muthu Palani Chetty*, I. L. R. 27 Mad. 80, not followed. A suit by the transferee of a mort-

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ss. 26, 28—*concl'd.*

gage for sale against the mortgagor, in which is also included a claim for damages against the transferor, the original mortgagee, if it should appear that any portion of the mortgage debt had been discharged by the mortgagor before the transfer and so was not recoverable from the mortgagor, is a suit in respect of the 'same matter' within s. 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and is not bad for misjoinder. *AIYATHURAI RAVUTHAN v. SANTHU MEERA RAVUTHAN* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 252

ss. 26, 31—*Misjoinder of causes of action*—"Cause of action," meaning of. The qualification implied in the words "in respect of the same cause of action" in s. 26, would be satisfied, if the facts, which constituted the infringement of the right of the several plaintiffs, were the same. Where a suit for recovery of possession was brought by four plaintiffs jointly and it was stated that plaintiff No. 4 had purchased a ten annas share of the properties from the other three plaintiffs. *Held*, that the suit was not bad for misjoinder of causes of action. *SUNDAR JHA v. BANSMAN JHA* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 367
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 508

ss. 26, 31, 45, 53.

See MISJOINDER . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 367

ss. 26-41, Ch. III (1859, s. 73).

See PARTIES.

ss. 26, 53—*Amendment of plaint*—*Amendment may be allowed when such amendment does not raise a case essentially different from that first set up*—*Misjoinder of parties and causes of action*. Where in a suit brought by four members of a Hindu family against the widow of a fifth to recover the property of the deceased by right of survivorship, the plaint contained the further allegation that one of the plaintiffs was the adopted son of the deceased, and the defendant pleaded division and also denied the adoption, it is open to the Court on finding the adoption proved, to pass a decree in favour of the adopted son alone, even in the absence of a prayer in favour of such adopted son, without trying the question of division between the plaintiffs and the husband of the defendant. Such a course in no way contravenes the provisions of s. 53 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the object of the proviso to that section is only to prohibit amendments, which involve the trial of issues substantially different from those raised by the original pleadings. Where the finding on one of the issues negatives any right in the defendant to hold the properties on the case set up by such defendant, it is not open to such defendant to insist on the trial of other issues, which can only affect the rights of the plaintiffs *inter se* and probably other rights of the defendant and plaintiffs not in issue in the suit. *Semble*: A plaint will not be bad as contravening s. 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

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ss. 26, 53—*concl'd.*

because it prays for a decree in favour of all the plaintiffs on certain allegations, or in the alternative, in favour of one of them, if other allegations should be proved. *Subrahmanyam v. Venkamma*, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 627, referred to. *LAKSHMAKKA v. NAGI REDDI* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 28 Mad. 500

ss. 26, 179, 180—*Practice*—"Plaintiff," meaning of—*Judicature Acts*, 36 and 37 Vict., ch. 66, s. 100—*Right to begin*—*Some of defendants supporting plaintiff's case*—*Order in which to address the Court*. The word "plaintiff" means "every person asking relief against another person." The plaintiff and such of the defendants as support the plaintiff's case, wholly or in part, must address the Court and call their evidence in the first place, and then following the words of s. 180 of the Civil Procedure Code the other party, namely, the persons opposed to the plaintiff's case and that of the other defendants supporting the plaintiff, must address the Court and call their evidence. *Haji Bibi v. Sultan Mahomed Khan* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 599

s. 27.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 22.

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 400

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 413

See PARTIES—*ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS*

—*PLAINTIFFS* . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 370

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 400

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 413

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 677

See PARTIES, *SUBSTITUTION OF*.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 419

See PARTNERSHIP—*SUITS RESPECTING*

PARTNERSHIPS . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 157

See TRADE MARK . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 433

ss. 27 and 53—*Suit instituted by wrong person by mistake*—*Amendment*—*Administration*—*Grant of letters of administration by suppression of will appointing no executors, effect of*—*Sale by such administrator, effect of*—*Executors by implication*. G, although he had taken out letters of administration with copy of the will annexed to the estate of a deceased person, instituted a suit in his personal capacity for a declaration that the sale of certain property belonging to the estate, by a person who had previously obtained grant of letters of administration to the same estate by suppressing the will, such grant having been revoked after the sale was invalid and for a declaration of his own title to the property as devisee: *Held*, that leave should be granted under s. 27 of the Civil Procedure Code to amend the plaint by describing the plaintiff as suing as administrator. S. 27 is applicable to cases where actions have been brought by the wrong person by mistake, whether such mistake is one of law or of fact. *Seshamma v. Chennappa*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 467; *Duckett v. Gover*, 6 Ch. D. 82,

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OF 1887 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 27 and 53—*concl'd.*

referred to. Such amendment is not obnoxious to the proviso in s. 53 of the Civil Procedure Code. The clause in the will providing that "Purusottum Das and Musammatt Binda Bibee shall remain trustees, that is guardians and next friends" makes no appointment of executors either expressly or by implication. *Seshamma v. Chenappa*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 467, referred to. A grant of letters of administration obtained by suppressing a will containing no appointment of executors is not void *ab initio*, and a sale of property by an administrator, who has obtained a grant of administration under such circumstances to a purchaser, who was ignorant of the suppression of the will, is valid, although the grant was revoked after the sale. The defence of purchase for valuable consideration without notice is available against a claim based on an equitable title though not against one based on a legal title. *Boxall v. Boxall*, 27 Ch. D. 220, followed. *Ellis v. Ellis*, 1 Ch. 613, referred to. GOPAL DAS AGARWALLAH v. BUDREE DASS SUREKA (1906) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 657 s.c. 10 C. W. N. 662

s. 28.

See MISJOINDER. I. L. R. 26 Bom. 259

See MULTIFARIOUSNESS.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 257

See PLAINT—FORM AND CONTENTS OF
PLAINT—CAUSE OF ACTION.

6 C. W. N. 585

1. s. 28—*Misjoinder of parties—Claim in the alternative against debtors and agent of plaintiff.* The plaintiff, in a suit to recover money from certain persons alleged to have borrowed money from his agent, is entitled when the alleged debtors deny the loan, to make his agent a co-defendant, and pray for a decree in the alternative against such agent. Such claims are made in respect of the same matter within the meaning of s. 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Muthappa Chetty v. Muthu Palani Chetty*, I. L. R. 27 Mad. 80, distinguished. MEYAPPA CHETTI v. PERIANNAN CHETTI (1905) I. L. R. 29 Mad. 50

2. *Misjoinder of parties and causes of action—"In respect of the same matter," meaning of—Practice.* The plaintiff sued two sets of defendants to recover from either the one or the other a sum of money for the rent of his godown. The plaintiff agreed to let a godown to defendants 1—6 from 1st May 1906. At the date of the agreement the godown was in the possession of Messrs. N. and Co. Defendants 1—6 alleged that they did not get possession of the premises in terms of this agreement; that only one compartment out of three was given to them on the 22nd May; that they did not get possession of the other two compartments and in consequence they had to hire other premises. Messrs. N. and Co. pleaded that there was an oral agreement with the plaintiff that they should occupy the godown till the end of May 1906; that

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they gave up possession of one compartment of the godown before the 22nd May 1906, and on the 22nd May they gave up possession of the remaining portion to the plaintiff and the first set of defendants. The defendants all pleaded that the suit as framed was bad by reason of misjoinder of parties and of causes of action. *Held*, disallowing the objection, that the suit was properly constituted. The most convenient way to try all the questions arising between the plaintiff and the defendants and the two sets of defendants *inter se* would be by one suit where all the three parties are before the Court as parties. The subject-matter in respect of which the plaintiff seeks relief is the rent of his godown. It is the same matter as regards both sets of defendants, and both sets of defendants are interested in the adjudication of the questions involved in the suit. The general principle governing the joinder of defendants would seem to be that there must be a cause of action in which all the defendants are more or less interested, although the relief against them may vary, but that separate causes of action against separate defendants quite unconnected are not involving any common question of law or fact cannot safely be joined in one action. The object of s. 28 seems to be to avoid multiplicity of suits if it could be done without embarrassment to any of the defendants. *Madan Mohun Lal v. Holloway*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 555, followed; *Sadler v. Great Western Railway Company*, [1896] A. C. 450, distinguished. *Mowji Monji v. Kuvverji Nanaji* (1907) I. L. R. 31 Bom. 516

3. *Lands situate at different villages and in possession of different persons under different titles—One suit to recover possession of the lands—Misjoinder of parties or causes of action—Interlocutory judgments against different defendants—Final judgment for possession to be reserved till the conclusion of the trial.* The plaintiff, one of the reversionary heirs, sued to recover possession of a moiety of certain lands which were situate at different villages and in possession of different persons who were alienees by sale, mortgage or lease from the widow of the last male holder. In the lower Courts the suit was dismissed for misjoinder of parties or causes of action. *Held*, on second appeal, that though the lands were situate in several different villages, provided the venue for the trial is the same, the right of the plaintiff to have her claim tried in one suit is the same as if the different holdings were all in the same village. It is never any bar to a suit in ejectment that many persons are in possession. The only possible objections were on the ground of inconvenience. The difficulties arising from variety of defences can be cured by the successive trial of the issues separately affecting different defendants. Following the English practice interlocutory judgments may, if the plaintiff succeeds, be given against different defendants as their cases are disposed of, final judgment for possession of the whole property

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 28—*concl'd.*

being reserved till the conclusion of the trial of the whole case. *Ishan Chunder Hazra v. Rameswar Mondol*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 831 and *Nundo Kumar Nasker v. Banomali Gayan*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 871, approved. *Sami Chetti v. Ammani Achy*, 7 Mad. H. C. R. 260, *Vasudeva Shanbhaga v. Kuleadi Narnapai*, 7 Mad. H. C. R. 290, *Mahomed v. Krishnan*, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 106, and *Parbati Kunwar v. Mahmud Fatima*, I. L. R. 29 All. 267, referred to. *Kachar Bhoj Vajja v. Bai Rathore*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 289, distinguished. *UMABAI v. VITHAL* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 293

4. ————— *Misjoinder of parties*—No adverse interests as between the parties—*Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 119*—*Adoption*—*Suit to declare validity of adoption*—*Interference with adopted son, nature of*. Plaintiff 1, the daughter of Ningangavda, and plaintiff 2, the adopted son of Ningangavda, together brought a suit against the defendants to recover possession of Ningangavda's property. The right alleged in plaintiff 1 was that she had been living with plaintiff 2, in the house of which possession had been given to the first defendant under a decree of the Mamlatdar. The plaint contained no averment asking for relief in favour of plaintiff 1 in the event of plaintiff 2's adoption being found not proved. On an objection having been raised as to misjoinder of parties: *Held*, that the suit was not bad for misjoinder of parties, since plaintiff 1, beyond alleging in the plaint that she was Ningangavda's daughter, did not set up her right to recover the property as Ningangavda's daughter, but claimed it with plaintiff 2, on the ground that the latter was Ningangavda's son, and that she lived with him. *Fakirapa v. Rudrapa*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 119, followed, and *Lingammal v. Chinna*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 239, distinguished. *NINGAWA v. RAMAPPA* (1904) . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 94

ss. 28, 46, 53, 578—*Misjoinder of causes of action*—*Relief* "in respect of the same matter"—*Partners*—*Suit by one of two partners against the other partner and third party*—No allegation of collusion—*Maintainability*. A suit was brought in which the following reliefs (as the High Court found) were claimed:—As against first defendant, damages for his breach of contract as an agent of the firm in which first plaintiff and third defendant were partners: and as against third defendant for dissolution of partnership and for damages. First defendant had been sent to conduct the firm's business, as its agent, at S, and on his failure to carry out instructions and to render accounts, it was agreed that the third defendant should proceed to S, receive the accounts and collect the firm's assets, and that the firm should be wound up in six months. Third defendant, it was alleged, went to S but acted in collusion with first defendant, wound up the business and collected the firm's assets at S, but failed to render an account thereof or to give first plaintiff his share in them. The other parties to the suit were allimpleaded as undivided sons.

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On its being contended that the case fell within s. 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that, inasmuch as first plaintiff was not in a position to know whether first defendant had or had not handed over the firm's assets to third defendant, he was entitled to sue them jointly or in the alternative: *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable, the plaint alleging two distinct causes of action as against defendants Nos. 1 and 3 respectively. Even if the words "in respect of the same matter" in s. 28, warranted a different construction being placed upon that section than that which the English Courts have placed on the corresponding rule 4 of order XVI, it could not be said that the right to relief alleged to exist against first defendant was "in respect of the same matter" as the right to relief alleged to exist as against third defendant. *Held*, also, that there was a further objection to the plaint in that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue in his own name in respect of first defendant's breach of contract with the firm, the cause of action not being based on any allegation of collusion by first defendant with third defendant. Such a misjoinder was not a mere irregularity as would be condoned under s. 578. A case like the present, in which separate causes of action were alleged against the two defendants, did not come within s. 46, which empowers a Court to order that the suit be confined to such of the causes of action as may be conveniently disposed of in one suit. The power given to the Court by s. 53 to return a plaint for amendment is only discretionary, and where the Court does not return a plaint, which is bad for misjoinder of parties or of causes of action, the defendant is not precluded from raising the objection at the hearing of the suit or on appeal. *MUTHAPPA CHETTY v. MUTHU PALANI CHETTY* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 27 Mad. 80

s. 30.

See PARTIES—*Suits by some of a class as representatives of class*.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 399

See RIGHT TO USE OF WATER.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 100

See RIGHT OF SUIT—*CHARITIES*.

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 32

I. L. R. 7 All. 178

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 432

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 33

I. L. R. 11 All. 18

————— *misjoinder of causes of action*—

See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 577

1. ————— *Gujarat Talukdars' Act (Bombay Act VI of 1888), s. 12*—*Representative order*—*Partition suit*—"Known co-sharers"—*All persons interested*—*Parties*. It is a general rule that all persons interested ought to be made parties to a suit, howsoever numerous they may be, so that the

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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s. 30—*concl.*

Court may be enabled to do complete justice by deciding upon and settling the rights of all persons interested and that the orders of the Court may be safely executed by those who are compelled to obey them and future litigations may be prevented. This rule, no doubt, yields to the exigencies of particular cases and there are well established qualifications to it, such as the power of the Court under s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) to make a representative order. *CHUDASAMA SURSANJI v. PARTAPSANG KHENGARJI* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 209

2. ———— Notice—Suit—
Notice, service of—Dismissal of suit. It is the duty of the Court, to cause service of the notices or advertisements to be published as required by s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). If a plaintiff omits to move the Court for that purpose, his suit should not be dismissed on account of the failure of the Court to perform the duties imposed upon it by that section. *MUKH LAL SINGH v. JAGDEO TEWARI* (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1021

ss. 30, 539.

See CAUSE OF ACTION.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 905

Suit by three persons on behalf of members of a sect, validity of. The plaintiffs, for themselves and members of the Satchasi community of Chatra, instituted a suit to obtain a declaration of their right to take part in the management of the worship of the goddess Sitala celebrated at their village, and to have joint possession with the defendants of two plots of land, on which the worship of the goddess was carried out. Objection was taken that the suit was not maintainable under s. 30 of the Code and that the suit should have been brought under s. 539 of the Code. *Held*, that the requirements of s. 30 of the Code were fully complied with. *Per WOODROFFE, J.* In a case of this nature it is open for two persons to sue with permission under s. 539, or one or more persons to sue on behalf of the rest with permission under s. 30, or for all interested to join in suing. *Rai Badree Dass v. Chuni Lal*, 10 C. W. N. 581, followed. *Subbaya v. Krishna*, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 186. *Sajedur Raja v. Baidynath Deb*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 397, *Adamson v. Arumugam*, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 463, referred to. A suit may be instituted under s. 30 of the Code on behalf of a defined class of the general public whether all the members of such class are or are not capable of being so accurately ascertained that notices could be, if required, served upon each and all of them. *MONMOTHO NATH DAS v. HARISH CHANDRA DAS* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 905
s. c. 10 C. W. N. 866

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 31.

See MISJOINDER. I. L. R. 14 Calc. 435
I. L. R. 16 Bom. 119
I. L. R. 24 All. 358

See MULTIFARIOUSNESS.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 949
I. L. R. 14 Mad. 103
I. L. R. 16 All. 279
I. L. R. 18 All. 131, 219

See TRADE MARK.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 433

s. 32.

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 100
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 489

See DIVORCE ACT (IV OF 1869), ss. 7, 11, 45. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 489, 490

See LAND ACQUISITION ACT (I OF 1894), ss. 30 AND 53. I. L. R. 25 All. 133

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 22.

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 400
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 12

See PARTIES—ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 483, 582
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 519

See PARTIES—

PARTIES TO SUITS—LEGACY, SUIT
FOR I. L. R. 26 Bom. 301

SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—DE-
FENDANTS. 7 C. W. N. 529

See RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT, s. 5.
8 C. W. N. 404

See TRADE MARK. I. L. R. 25 Bom. 433

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 85.

Civil Court—Jurisdiction—Suit against Administrator-General. A suit against the Administrator-General as representing the estate of a deceased private individual must be brought in the District Court and not in the Court of a Subordinate Judge, by virtue of s. 32 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act (XIV of 1869). *ANTONE v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BOMBAY* (1904)
I. L. R. 28 Bom. 529

s. 33.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 22.

6 C. W. N. 218

s. 34.

See LIMITATION ACT.

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—LEGACY, SUIT FOR. I. L. R. 26 Bom. 301

Non-joinder of parties—Objection not taken at the earliest opportunity—Limitation. An objection as to the non-joinder of parties alleged to be necessary ought to be raised by the defendant at the earliest opportunity; where this is not done

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 34—*contd.*

and the parties omitted are in consequence not added until after the expiry of the period of limitation for a suit against them, the defendant will not be permitted to take advantage of the bar of limitation. *Pateshri Partap Narain Singh v. Rudranarain Singh*, I. L. R. 26 All. 528, and *Guruvayya Gouda v. Dattatraya Anant*, I. L. R. 28 Bom. 11, followed. *Shamrauli Singh v. Kishan Prasad*, I. L. R. 29 All. 311, distinguished. *HAZARI MAL v. BHAWANI RAM* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 30 All. 538

s. 36 (1859, s. 16).

See ADVOCATE . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 617

See LUNATIC . . . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 242

See PLEADER—APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE . . . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 105
I. L. R. 9 All. 613
I. L. R. 16 All. 240

ss. 36, 37—

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 179—NATURE OF APPLICATION—IRREGULAR AND DEFECTIVE APPLICATIONS.
I. L. R. 23 All. 499

s. 37 (1859, s. 17).

See LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT, s. 32.
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 556

See SUMMONS, SERVICE OF.

1. s. 37—*Execution of decree—Limitation—Application to certify payment out of Court—Application signed by general attorney, decree-holder being within the jurisdiction—"Recognized agent."* Held, that an application under s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure to certify an adjustment of a decree made out of Court, although an application to the Court to take a step in aid of execution of the decree, is not an application made in accordance with law, if it is made by the general attorney of the decree-holder at a time when the decree-holder himself is residing within the jurisdiction of the Court executing the decree. *Murari Lal v. Umrao Singh*, I. L. R. 23 All. 469, referred to. *Luchman Bibi v. Patni Ram*, I. L. R. 1 All. 510, distinguished. *KASUMRI v. BENI PRASAD* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 19

2. Meaning of the term "resident"—Powers of a general attorney during a merely temporary absence of his principal. The term "resident" as used in s. 37 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, must be construed liberally. A party "not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court" may include a person who, though originally residing within, is temporarily absent from the limits of the Court's jurisdiction. *Ramchandra v. Keshavi*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 100. *DAMODAR DASS v. INAYAT HUSSAIN* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 135

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

ss. 37, 38, 417, 432 (1859, s. 17, cl. 2).

1. Recognized agent—*Gomastah*. A recognized agent under cl. 2, s. 17, Act VIII of 1859, cannot prosecute or defend a suit in his own name. A gomastah of a firm ceases to be a recognized agent under cl. 2, s. 17, Act VIII of 1859, when the business of the firm ceased before the institution of the suit. *MOKHA HARAKRAS JOSHI v. BISESWAR DOSS* . . . 5 B. L. R. Ap. 11
13 W. R. 344

2. Filing and verification of plaint. Held, that an agent of a party residing within the jurisdiction of the Court, not being an authorized agent as contemplated by cl. 1, s. 17, Act VIII of 1859, was not competent to appear as plaintiff on behalf of his principal, and to file and verify the plaint as required by s. 27 of that enactment. *THORNHILL v. TAYLOR* . . . 1 Agra 115

3. Presentation of plaint—*Munim of firm—Partner*. The munim of a firm is not, for the purpose of presenting a plaint, the recognized agent (under s. 17 of the Civil Procedure Code) of a partner who is present within the jurisdiction. The munim and such partner should join in presenting the plaint or appointing a pleader. The partner's not so joining is not a ground on which an Appellate Court should reverse the decree of a lower Court, unless the irregularity affects the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. *BISANDAS VALAD MAGNIRAM v. LAKH-MICHAND KISANCHAND* . . . 6 Bom. A. C. 150

4. Ground for dismissing suit. Where a lower Appellate Court threw out a case on the ground that the plaint had not been filed by a recognized agent within the meaning of s. 17, Act VIII of 1859, though that point had been disposed of by the Court of first instance:—Held, that the case should not have been thrown out on such a technical objection not affecting the merits of the case. *MANNOO DOS-SEE v. ISHAN CHUNDER BONNERJEA* . . . 15 W. R. 245

5. *Munim of firm being wound up*. The munim of a firm which has ceased to carry on business, who is engaged in collecting the assets of such firm and otherwise winding up its affairs, is a recognized agent of the owner of such firm within the meaning of s. 17, cl. 2, of the Civil Procedure Code, and can, on behalf of his absent principal, maintain or defend a suit brought in respect of the business of the firm whose affairs he is engaged in winding up. *TUKAJI MAHARAJ HALKAR v. PITAMBARDAS NARANGI* 9 Bom. 427

6. Mooktear. A mere mooktear, unless specially authorised, is not the recognized agent of the judgment-debtor on whom notice can be rightly served within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code. *KRISTO CHUNDER GOOPTO v. FUZUL ALI KHAN* . . . 17 W. R. 389

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 37, 38, 417, 432—*concl'd.*

7. ———— *Authority of the Political Agent appointed by Government as manager of the estate of a minor Chief to sue in respect of the Chief's property in British territory.* A suit was brought by the Political Agent, Southern Maratha Country, as administrator of the estate of the Chief of Mudhol who was described in the plaint as being nineteen years of age, to eject the defendants from certain lands, belonging to the Chief situated in the Satara District. The defendants raised a preliminary objection to the institution of the suit by the Political Agent on the ground (among others) that he was not a recognized agent within the meaning of s. 37 of the Civil Procedure Code: *Held*, that the Political Agent was not a "recognized agent" of the Chief of Mudhol within the meaning of s. 37, cl. (c), of the Code of Civil Procedure. *VENKATRAV RAJE GHORPADE v. MADHARAV RAMCHANDRA*. I. L. R. 11 Bom. 53

8. ———— *Agent's right to execute decree obtained by him as agent—Waiver—Execution of decree.* P filed a suit in the second class Subordinate Judge's Court at Mahad. As P resided at Thana, outside the jurisdiction of the Mahad Court, she authorized her agent, under a general power-of-attorney, to conduct the suit on her behalf. The agent carried on the litigation up to a final decree passed by the High Court on appeal in P's favour. The agent then sought to execute the decree. The Court at Mahad passed an order upon his darkhast granting only partial execution. Against this order the Agent filed an appeal in the District Court at Thana. Then, for the first time, the judgment-debtors challenged the agent's right to represent P, who was residing within the District Court's jurisdiction. This objection prevailed, and the appeal was dismissed. *Held*, that the agent could not be prevented from executing the decree which he had obtained as agent. No objection had been taken to the agent's right to represent P at any stage of the litigation prior to the final decree. That objection must, therefore, be deemed to have been virtually waived, and could not be raised after the defendants had had their chance of success in the litigations. *PARVATIPAI v. VINAYEK PANDURANG*. I. L. R. 12 Bom. 68

ss. 38 and 35 (1859, s. 17 and s. 115)—*Application by representatives for execution of decree—Authority to appear.* *Held*, that, where one of several representatives of a deceased judgment-creditor applies for the execution of a decree, the general powers-of-attorney contemplated by s. 17, cl. 1, of Act VIII of 1859 are not necessary, but it is sufficient if the applicant is authorized under s. 115 to act for the other representatives. *AMBARAM HARIVALLABHDAS v. HIMAT SING KALIANJI*

2 Bom. 109 : 2nd. Ed. 103

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 39.

See ADVOCATE . I. L. R. 9 All. 617

See PLEADER—APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE . S. W. R. 92

I. L. R. 9 All. 613

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 135

I. L. R. 16 All. 240

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 198, 293

5 C. W. N. 816

s. 40.

See COMMISSION—CIVIL CASES.

6 C. W. N. 927

s. 42.

See RES JUDICATA—MATTERS IN ISSUE.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 760

s. 43 (1859, s. 7).

See MAHOMEDAN LAW.

I. L. R. 31 All. 557

See ONUS OF PROOF—RELINQUISHMENT OF PORTION OF CLAIM. 19 W. R. 429

See RELINQUISHMENT OF, OR OMISSION TO SUE FOR, PORTION OF CLAIM.

See RES JUDICATA—MATTERS IN ISSUE.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 760

See SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, s. 9.

I. L. R. 24 All. 501

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 99.

I. L. R. 26 All. 223

1. ———— s. 43—*Cause of action—Splitting of cause of action—Suit to recover exclusive possession of land—Suit to obtain a share by partition of land—Certificate of sale relied upon in both suits.* The plaintiff in execution of a decree obtained by him, purchased at a Court-sale the right, title and interest of his judgment-debtors, Rajaram and Sitaram, in certain lands; and, on the 12th November, 1886, he obtained a sale certificate in respect of all the properties so purchased. In 1891 he brought a suit (No. 519 of 1891) against the heirs of Sitaram, then deceased, for possession of certain of the lands included in the sale certificate, of which they were in exclusive possession, and he obtained a decree. In the next year, 1892, he brought another suit (No. 518 of 1892) against the heirs of Rajaram, then deceased, and another person, for possession of other lands included in the sale certificate, of which they were in exclusive possession, and he again obtained a decree. In both the above suits he based his claim on the sale certificate showing his title as purchaser. The remainder of the lands included in the sale certificate were held by the heirs of Rajaram and Sitaram jointly with other members of the family who were coparceners with them, and in 1897 the plaintiff filed this suit to recover by partition the shares of the heirs of Rajaram and of Sitaram in these lands, basing his claim upon the sale certificate. The lower Courts

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 43—*contd.*

rejected the claim on the preliminary ground that the suit was barred by the provisions of s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Held* by CHANDAVARKAR and ASTON, JJ. (CROWE, J., dissenting) reversing the decree and remanding the case, that the suit was not barred by s. 43. That section does not apply where the cause of action is different. The title on which the former suits were based was exclusive ownership, while that on which the present suit was based was joint ownership. A person who has succeeded in recovering one property under one title is not debarred from suing to recover another property under another title. The certificate of sale is not the title; it is merely the title-deed. *NARAYAN BHAGWAN GANDHI v. SHAMBAO LAXUMA* (1903) . . . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 379

2. ———— *Revenue—Sale—Incumbrances.* The purchaser at a revenue sale brought a suit to annul incumbrances against certain co-sharer under-tenure-holders and got a decree. Subsequently he leased the property to plaintiff, who brought a second suit to annul incumbrances against the remaining co-sharers. *Held*, that the second suit was not barred by s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. *SHUBADRA DASIA v. CHANDRA KUMAR NAG* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 54

3. ———— *Suit on muchilika for rent for fasli 1305—Previous suit on different muchilika for rent for fasli 1306—Maintainability.* Plaintiff, the inamdar of a village, sued to recover from defendant, one of his mirasidars, arrears of melvaram due for fasli 1305, under a registered muchilika. On its being pleaded in defence that plaintiff had already filed a suit in respect of fasli 1306: *Held*, that the present suit was barred by s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though there were separate muchilikas for the faslis 1306 and 1305, yet there was but one cause of action, namely, the non-payment of rent by a tenant to his landlord. *SHANMUGAM PILLAI v. SYED GULAM GHOUSE* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 116

4. ———— *Suit for money paid on a contract—Breach of contract and failure of consideration—Previous suit for specific performance dismissed—Maintainability of present suit.* Plaintiff had paid the defendants a sum of money on a contract under which defendants undertook to renew a kanom, and had previously sued the defendants unsuccessfully for specific performance of that contract. Plaintiff now sued to recover the money. On its being contended that the suit was barred by s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure: *Held*, that the suit was one for money paid on an existing consideration which had since failed; that this right of action was different from the right on which the suit for specific performance had been brought, and that

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 43—*contd.*

s. 43 did not apply. *PARANGODAN NAIR v. PERUM-TODUKA ILLOT CHATA* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 380

5. ———— *Earlier suit on an adjusted account—Subsequent suit on a mortgage—Distinct causes of action—Relief not claimed in the earlier suit.* A plaintiff omitted to claim relief in a suit on an adjusted account, which he subsequently claimed in a suit based upon a mortgage. *Held*, that the causes of action for the two suits being distinct, the omission to claim the relief in the earlier suit did not operate as a bar to the subsequent suit under s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *HANSRAJ LAKHMIDAS v. LALJI ANANDJI* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 447

6. ———— *Partition—Suit for possession of a portion of a house alleged to have been partitioned in proceedings before a Court of Revenue—Subsequent suit for partition of the same house in a Civil Court.* As the result of partition proceedings in a Court of Revenue, the sites of certain houses were partitioned. The plaintiffs, believing that the buildings themselves had been partitioned, brought a suit for recovery of their share in the houses alleging a dispossession from that share by the defendants. But they were defeated in this suit upon the ground that the supposed partition of the houses by a Court of Revenue never could have taken place. Upon a second suit brought by the plaintiffs in a Civil Court asking for partition of the house property, it was held that neither s. 13 nor s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure was a bar to the suit. *BALBHADDAR NATH v. RAM LAL* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 501

7. ———— *Suit to recover fees for medical attendance—Fees partly secured by a promissory note—Separate suits upon the promissory note and for the unsecured balance—Latter suit barred.* A, a doctor, agreed with B to accompany B to Hardwar as his medical attendant on a fee of Rs 100 a day. After seven days B gave A a promissory note for Rs 700 representing seven days' fees. B, who was a vakil, also promised to assist A professionally in certain litigation. B, however, died before he could fulfil his agreement to render professional services. A sued B's son upon the promissory note first, and subsequently in a separate suit for the balance of his fees for attendance at Hardwar, under the alleged agreement and for fees for later attendance at Benares. *Held*, that the second suit was barred by the provisions of s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure so far as the fees for attendance at Hardwar were concerned, though not in respect of the other fees claimed. *PREONATH MUKERJI v. BISHNATH PRASAD* (1906) . . . I. L. E. 29 All. 256

8. ———— *Usufructuary mortgage—Suit for redemption—Subsequent suit to recover surplus profits—Limitation Act (XV of*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 43—contd.

1877), *Sch. II, Art. 105—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 92*. In a suit for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage the mortgagor is bound to claim for surplus profits, if any, payable by the mortgagee. S. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a bar to the recovery of such profits by means of a separate suit. Art. 105 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act, 1877, applies to a case where the mortgagor gets possession otherwise than by means of a suit for redemption. *Vinayak Shivrao Dighe v. Dattatraya Gopal*, I. L. R. 26 Bom. 661; *Rukhminibai v. Venkatesh*, I. L. R. 31 Bom. 527; *Satyabadi Behara v. Harabati*, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 223; *Kashi v. Bazrang Prasad*, I. L. R. 30 All. 36, and *Balaji v. Tamanganda*, 6 Bom. H. C. 97, referred to. *RAM DIN v. BHUP SINGH* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 30 All. 225

9. ———— *Suit for land, no bar to subsequent suit for mesne profits*. A suit for possession of lands is no bar under s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code to a subsequent suit for mesne profits of such land accruing prior to the institution of the former suit. *Tirupati v. Narasimha*, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 210, followed. *Venkoba v. Subbanna*, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 151, not followed. *GUTTA SARANNA v. MAGANTI RAMINEDU* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 405

10. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 43—Cause of action—Whether same for a suit for specific performance of a contract to reconvey land and for the mesne profits of the property—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 19*. A suit for specific performance of a contract to reconvey a certain plot of land after its breach, and the claim for mesne profits of the property to which the plaintiff is entitled in consequence of the delay on the defendant's part to execute the reconveyance, are based on the same cause of action. A plaintiff instituted a suit for the specific performance of a contract to reconvey a plot of land, in which he did not claim mesne-profits to which he was entitled in consequence of the defendant's delay in performing the contract; subsequently to the decree for specific performance he brought another suit for the mesne-profits; *Held*, that the plaintiff's suit for mesne-profits that accrued due before the institution of the suit for specific performance was barred under s. 43, Civil Procedure Code. *GANESH RAM PAL v. MOHESH RAM PAL* (1909)

13 C. W. N. 669

11. ———— *Suit for possession, no bar to subsequent suit for arrears of rent*. A suit to eject a tenant holding under a lease is not a bar under s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure to a subsequent suit to recover arrears of rent under the terms of the lease. The claim for rent is a distinct cause of action from that for the recovery of possession—the former arising when the rent accrues due and the latter when the

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 43—contd.

tenancy determines. S. 43 requires only the joinder of claims arising out of the same cause of action and not claims arising out of any obligation created by the contract which creates the obligation on which the cause of action is based. *SUBRAYA CHETTI v. RATHNAVELU CHETTI* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 380

12. ———— *s. 43 and s. 13, Expl. II—Suit on one mortgage no bar to subsequent suit on another mortgage of same property*. A suit brought by A against B on an alleged mortgage which was dismissed, is no bar to another suit by A against B on another mortgage in respect of the same properties under ss. 43 and 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Rangasami Pillai v. Krishna Pillai*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 259, overruled. *Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vyithinatha Ayyar*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 760, followed. *Veerana Pillai v. Muthukumara Asary*, I. L. R. 27 Mad. 102, followed. *THRIKAIKAT MADATHIL RAMAN v. THIRUTHIYIL KRISHNEN NAIR* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 153

ss. 43, 111.

See *SUIT, MAINTAINABILITY* *OF*.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 654

1. ———— *ss. 43, 373—Suit—Omission of part of claim—Withdrawal without leave—Fresh suit for claim omitted, if barred—Leave to withdraw on condition—Non-fulfilment of condition—Effect*. If a plaintiff withdraws from a suit without the leave of the Court, s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code is a bar to his instituting a fresh suit in respect of any portion of the claim which he may have omitted to include in his previous suit. The same consequences follow when a plaintiff is allowed to withdraw with liberty to bring a fresh suit on condition of paying the defendants' costs within a certain time and fails to pay such costs within that time. *HARE NATH DAS v. HOSSAIN ALI* (1905)

10 C. W. N. 8

2. ———— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 106—Suit for division of alleged partnership assets—Separate suits for property at different places*. The plaintiff sued for possession of one-half of certain property in the Moradabad district, alleging that it had been purchased out of the profits of a partnership subsisting between himself and the defendant. Other similar property in Naini Tal was mentioned in the plaint, but the plaintiff said he would bring a separate suit in respect of that property. The first suit was withdrawn, but without permission being granted to bring a fresh suit. Subsequently a second suit was brought in Naini Tal respecting the property there. The plaintiff alleged himself to be in possession of this property, but it was found that he was not. *Held*, that the second suit was barred by the operation of s. 43 as well as of s. 373 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as also, on the finding that the partnership had been dissolved more than three years before suit, by Art. 106 of the second schedule to the

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 43, 373—*concl'd.*

Limitation Act. *NIJAZ AHMAD v. ABDUL HAMID*
(1908) I. L. R. 30 All. 279

s. 44.

See HINDU LAW.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 262 ;
L. R. 31 I. A. 10 ;
8 C. W. N. 146

See JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.

7 C. W. N. 353
I. L. R. 24 All. 358
I. L. R. 25 All. 229

1. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 44, Rule a, 622—Suit to recover immovable property and for declaration of right of way—Joinder if illegal—“Immovable property” —Interference by High Court in revision.* A right of way is immovable property, and there is nothing in s. 44 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), repugnant to the interpretation of the term immovable property as including a right of way. *Fadu Jhala v. Gour Mohun Jhala, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 544; Mangaldas v. Jewinram, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 673; Maharana Futteh Sangji Jaswant Sangji v. Dessai Kullian-raiji Hekoomutraiji, 21 W. R. 178, and Kristodhone Mitter v. Nandaram Dasse, I. L. R. 35 Calc. 589, referred to.* Provided that no danger of injustice arises, the section should be liberally construed. Where a plaintiff sued for recovery of possession of two adjacent plots of land and for declaration of his right of way over the road between them, and it appeared that the witnesses who would prove acts of dispossession of the plots of land and the closing of the right of way would be probably identical and that nothing could be gained by compelling the plaintiff to bring two suits for the redress of what really appeared to be one wrong: *Held*, that the High Court would not interfere under s. 622 of the Code to set aside the orders of the lower Courts allowing the plaintiff to proceed with the suit. *BEJOY CHANDRA NAG v. BUNKU BEHARI MAZUMDER (1909)*

13 C. W. N. 451

2. ———— *Rule (b)—Meaning of the rule—Claim by an heir “as such.”* H brought a suit against M and others, the executors of I, in which two causes of action were united. One was in respect of property in the possession of the defendants which the plaintiff claimed by right of inheritance to her father E. S., and A., his widow. The other claim was in respect of money alleged to have been paid by the plaintiff to I. and invested by him on her behalf. The defendants contended that there was a misjoinder of causes of action: *Held per BATTY, J., following Ashabai v. Haji Tyeb Haji Rahimtulla, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 399, that there was a misjoinder within the meaning of s. 44 (b) of the Civil Procedure Code. The plaintiff appealed. Held (reversing*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 44—*concl'd.*

the decision of the lower Court), that the first of the two causes of action above set out was not a claim by an heir as such. *Ashabai v. Haji Tyeb Haji Rahimtulla, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 399, not followed. Per JENKINS, C.J.* Those to whom rule (b) of s. 44 of the Code relates have the common characteristic that they owe their legal condition to the death of another. But there are others of whom this can be predicated as, for instance, legatees or next-of-kin, who are not named in rule (b)(i). Executors, administrators, and heirs have the characteristic in common, not shared by legatees and next-of-kin, namely, that not only do they acquire title from the deceased, but they may represent him. In this is to be found the clue to the meaning of the rule. *HAFIZABOO v. MAHOMED CASSUM (1906)*

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 105

ss. 44, 45.

See PARTIES I. L. R. 33 Calc. 425

s. 45.

See AGRA TENANCY ACT.

I. L. R. 29 All. 18

See JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 601

See MULTIFARIOUSNESS.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 257

See RENT, SUIT FOR 5 C. W. N. 880

—*Misjoinder of causes of action—Multifariousness—Property claimed under one title from defendants professing to hold under various titles.* The plaintiff sued as heirs of their father to recover various portions of their father's estate from the hands of different alienees. *Held*, that the fact that the defendants set up different titles to the various portions held by them would not make the suit bad for multifariousness. The plaintiffs had one cause of action, namely, the right on the death of their father to recover their shares of his property. *Ganeshi Lal v. Khairati Singh, I. L. R. 16 All. 279, distinguished. Ishun Chunder Hazra v. Rameswar Mondol, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 831, Nundo Kunwar Nasker v. Bonomuli Gayan, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 871, Indar Kuar v. Gur Prasad, I. L. R. 11 All. 33, and Mazhar Ali Khan v. Sajjad Husain Khan, I. L. R. 24 All. 358, referred to. PARBATI KUNWAR v. MAHAMUD FATIMA (1907)*

I. L. R. 29 All. 267

s. 48;

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 4.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 330

ss. 48, 230, 234.

ACT, SCH. II, ART. 180.

I. L. R. 38 Calc. 543

ss. 49-54 (1859, ss. 26-32).

See PLAINT.

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 50.

See PLAINT—

FORM AND CONTENTS OF PLAINT—
CAUSE OF ACTION ;

6 C. W. N. 585

AMENDMENT OF PLAINT.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 699

Suit by person claiming under Will—Probate—Mofussil of Bombay Presidency. There is no law at present in force in the mofussil which obliges a person claiming under a will to obtain probate of the will, or otherwise establish his right as executor, administrator, or legatee before he can sue in respect to any property which he claims under the will. In any suit or proceeding instituted by him, it is for the Court in which the suit or proceeding is pending to determine, for the purposes of such suit or proceeding, whether the will is genuine and valid, and confers upon the plaintiff or applicant the right which he claims. BHAGVANSANG v. BECHARIDAS . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 73

But see now Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881).

s. 52—*Suit—Wrong party.* S. 27 of the Civil Procedure Code is applicable in cases where by *bonâ fide* mistake, whether of law or fact, actions have been brought in the name of a wrong person. *Seshamma v. Chennappa*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 467 ; *Duckett v. Gover*, 6 Ch. D. 82, referred to. GOPAL DAS AGARWALA v. BUDREE DAS SUREKA (1906) . 10 C. W. N. 662

s. c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 657

s. 53 (1859, ss. 29 and 32).

See APPELLATE COURT—

EXERCISE OF POWERS—SPECIAL

CASES—PLAINT, AMENDMENT OF.

5 C. W. N. 273

INTERFERENCE WITH, AND POWER TO

VARY, ORDER OF LOWER COURT.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 516

See PLAINT—

AMENDMENT OF PLAINT.

REJECTION OF PLAINT.

s. 53—*Plaint—Misjoinder of causes of action—Misjoinder discovered after framing of issues—Amendment of plaint.* One Baij Nath sues as adopted son of Hira Lal, deceased, to recover the estate left by Hira Lal. With him was joined as plaintiff a daughter of Hira Lal, who prayed that, if the adoption were not proved, she might recover the estate for herself and her two sisters. Objection was taken that the suit was bad for misjoinder, but notwithstanding this, issues were framed. Subsequently the Court ordered the plaintiffs to amend the plaint, having elected which of them should continue the suit. Held, that, whilst there was undoubtedly a misjoinder of parties and causes of action, the order passed by the Court was

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 53—*concl'd.*

erroneous, inasmuch as after the framing of issues the plaint could only be amended by the Court itself. *Baij Nath v. Chhowaro* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 218

s. 54 (1859, ss. 31, 32).

See post, s. 424 . I. L. R. 25 All. 187

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 4.

I. L. R. 15 All. 65

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 41

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 319

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 330

See PLAINT—REJECTION OF PLAINT.

See PLAINT—RETURN OF PLAINT.

1. ———— *Plaint insufficiently stamped—Power of Court to grant time for making good the deficiency—Limitation.* When a Court fixes a time under cl. (a) or cl. (b) of s. 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it must be a time within limitation. S. 54 does not give a Court any power to extend the ordinarily prescribed period of limitation for suits *Moti Shahu v. Chhatra Das*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 780, and *Yakut-un-nissa Bibi v. Kishoree Mohon Roy*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 747, discussed. JAINTI PRASAD v. BACHHU SINGH . I. L. R. 15 All. 65

2. ———— cls. (a) and (b) and ss. 582 and 683—*Original and Appellate jurisdiction of High Court.* Cls. (a) and (b) of s. 54 of the Civil Procedure Code which are declared by s. 638 to be inapplicable to the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court are also inapplicable to its appellate jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provisions of s. 582. *Balkaran Rai v. Gobind Nath Tiwari*.

I. L. R. 12 All. 129

3. ———— *Rejection of plaint—Costs of appeal when the appellant did not present his case in the proper light to the Court of first instance.* If a plaint be presented upon insufficient stamp and the deficit Court-fee be not put in within the time allowed by the Court, the Court ought to reject the plaint. But if on the date on which the deficit Court-fee is ultimately put in, the suit of the plaintiff be not barred by limitation the plaint may be regarded as if it was presented for the first time on that date, and the suit ought to be proceeded with. *Brahmoyi Dasi v. Andi Si*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 376, referred to. As the plaintiff (appellant) did not present the matter to the Munsif in the proper light, it was ordered that he should pay the costs of the respondent in the High Court, although the appeal was decided in his favour. HARA KUMAR PAL CHOWDHURY v. SHAIKH SAFATULLAH (1905)

9 C. W. N. 844

4. ———— *Rejection of plaint—Procedure—Plaint not to be rejected in part.* Held, that under s. 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure a Court cannot reject a plaint in part. *Bachubans Puri v. Jyotis Swarupa* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 325

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 54, cl. (b)—

See PLAINT, REJECTION OF.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 20

See LIMITATION ACT, s. 4.

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 305

— ss. 55, 562, 566—

See BURDEN OF PROOF.

I. L. R. 29 All. 184

— s. 56 (1859, s. 36),

See APPEAL—ACTS—ACT XXVI OF 1867.

6 B. L. R. Ap. 11, 12

7 B. L. R. 663, 664 note

— s. 57 (1859, s. 30, Act XXIII
of 1861, s. 3).

See PLAINT—RETURN OF PLAINT.

— s. 59 (1859, s. 39).

See PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.

— s. 59—*High Court Rule 162—Practice—Inspection of documents not referred to in the plaint—Right of defendant to inspect last documents before filing his written statement.* S. 59 of the Civil Procedure Code requires a plaintiff to annex to his plaint a list of documents on which he intends to rely at the hearing. It has heretofore been the practice not to order inspection of documents other than those referred to in the plaint or relied on in the list annexed to the plaint till after the written statement is filed. This is not an inflexible rule in all cases, for there may be many cases where it would be imperative to order the plaintiffs to produce and give inspection to the defendant before he has filed his written statement of a document or documents, which they may not have mentioned in their plaint or enumerated in the list of documents annexed thereto. *KHETSIDAS v. NAROTUNDAS* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 152

— ss. 59, 62, 63.

See APPEAL . . . 13 C. W. N. 797

— s. 63 (1859, s. 39, para. 4).

See PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 377

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 373

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 971

— ss. 66 and 67 (1859, s. 42)—*Order or personal appearance—Hearing ex-parte.* An order may be made for an *ex-parte* hearing on proof of service of summons issued under s. 42, Act VIII of 1859. *KISTODHONE DUTT v. NILMONEY SINGH* Cor. 3

— ss. 68, 69, 96, 100, 101, 112 and 113—*Practice—Ex-parte decree—Suit set down for hearing before the date fixed in the summons—High Court Rules Nos. 111 and 112.* It is not open to a plaintiff to obtain an *ex-parte* decree before the

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— ss. 68, 69, 96, 100, 101, 112 and 113—*concl'd.*

returnable date mentioned in the summons. *DHIRAJLAL v. HORMUSJI* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 534

— s. 69 (1859, s. 45)—*Allowance of time for appearing and answering.* Under s. 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a defendant in a suit is entitled to "sufficient time to enable him to appear and answer in person or by pleader". What may be "sufficient time" in a particular case can only be determined by considering the peculiar circumstances of the case. Where the time allowed is manifestly insufficient, an Appellate Court will interfere. *KHADAR BHI v. RAHIMAN BHI*.

3 Mad. 167

— ss. 73, 75, 82, 622—*Substituted service can only be made when defendant keeps out of the way or where the summons cannot be served in the ordinary way.* Whenever it is practicable, the service of summons must be in person under ss. 73 and 75 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and it is only when reasonable grounds exist for believing that the defendant is keeping out of the way to avoid service, or that for other reasons it cannot be served in the ordinary way, that substituted service should be ordered. *Subramania Pillai v. Subramania Ayyar*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 419, followed. *Sankaralinga Mudali v. Ratnasabhapati Mudali*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 325, distinguished. *ABRAHAM PILLAI v. SMITH* (1906) . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 324

— s. 74.

See post, s. 80 . . . 13 C. W. N. 490

— ss. 74 and 76—*Effect on those sections of s. 443 of Code of Civil Procedure—Service of summons on minors.* Ss. 74 and 76 of the Code of Civil Procedure are controlled by s. 443 of the said Code. *JATINDRA MOHAN PODDAR v. SRINATH ROY* . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 267

— ss. 75-89.

See PROCESS, SERVICE OF.

See SUMMONS, SERVICE OF.

— s. 80.

See SUMMONS, SERVICE OF.

I. L. R. 24 All. 302

1. — s. 80—*Appeal—Respondent—Service of notice—Failure to carry out the requirements of the Code (Act XIV of 1882).* A bailiff, who was deputed to serve notice of an appeal on the respondent, affixed a copy of the notice on the outer door of the respondent's house under s. 80 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), and reported as follows—"The respondent was not found, his adult undivided son having refused to receive copy of the notice, it was affixed to the front door of his house." *Held*, that the service of the notice was not proper. The report was merely a statement that the respondent

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.

s. 80—concl'd.

could not be found and the serving officer was not shown to have carried out the requirements of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Rajendro Nath Sanyal v. Jan Meah*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 101, and *Sakina v. Gauri Sahai*, I. L. R. 24 All. 302, referred to. *SAKHARAM v. PADMAKAR* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 623

2. Summons—Service on defendants, members of partnership firm—Service on manager—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 74, 80—“Unless the Court otherwise directs.” In a suit instituted against a partnership firm, all the members whereof were non-residents at the place in which the business was carried on, service of summons could not be made according to the provision of s. 80 of Act XIV of 1882, on the refusal of the manager of the firm to accept service, by affixing a copy of the summons on the outer door of the house in which the business was located. S. 80 contemplates that the persons sought to be served should be residing at the house. But service so effected was properly made in accordance with s. 74 of the Act, which contemplates service on the person having management of the business “unless the Court otherwise directs.” These words do not imply that in such a case the peon must go back to the Court and secure an order from it expressly authorising service in one of the ways mentioned in the proviso to s. 74. *AKHOY KUMAR SAHA v. NAGENDRA LAL CHOWDHURY* (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 490

ss. 82, 174.

See COURT FEES ACT, s. 28.

See PENAL CODE, SS. 225B AND 353.

s. 87—Prisoner's Testimony Act (XV of 1869), ss. 15 and 16—Act XV of 1869, s. 16—Signature of Jailor—Judicial Notice. The Court will take judicial notice of the signature of the jailor under s. 16, Act XV of 1869, Prisoners' Testimony Act. *TAMOR SING v. KALIDAS ROY* 4 B. L. R. O. C. 51

ss. 88, 90—Execution—Mortgage decree—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 88, 90—Recovery of balance due on mortgage—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 230—Decree for payment of money—Limitation—Continuation of previous application for execution. A combined decree under ss. 88 and 90 of the Transfer of Property Act is contrary to the procedure prescribed by that Act. When such a decree is passed and the decree-holder proceeds to execute it for the realization of the balance after the mortgaged property has been sold, the provisions of s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code shall apply, and an application for execution after the expiry of twelve years from the commencement of proceedings against the person and other property of the judgment-debtor will be barred. *Kartie Nath Pandey v. Juggernath Ram Marwary*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 285,

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ss. 88, 90—concl'd.

explained. *Fazil Howladar v. Krisna Bundhoo Ray*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 580, referred to. *Jadunath Prasad v. Jagmohan Das*, I. L. R. 25 All. 541, dissented from. *CHANDI CHARAN ROY CHOWDHRY v. AMBICA CHARAN DUTTA* (1904) I. L. R. 31 Calc. 792

s. 89—

See SUMMONS, SERVICE OF.

I. L. R. 23 All. 99

ss. 89, 104—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 258—Preliminary mortgage decree—Payment before decree absolute—Adjustment of decree—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 173A. A Court to which an application is made under s. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act has full power to ascertain what balance of the mortgage-debt is really outstanding at the time of the application and to make the order absolute for the realisation of that amount only. S. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply to an application made under s. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, that section not having been made applicable by any rule issued by the High Court under s. 104 of the Transfer of Property Act; consequently Art. 173A of Sch. II of the Limitation Act does not apply to the case of any payment made before a decree absolute is made. Any question that arises as to an order absolute for sale is not a question relating to the execution of the decree. *Kedar Nath Raut v. Kali Churn Ram*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 703; *Tiluck Singh v. Parsotein Prasad*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 924; *Akikunnissa Bibee v. Boop Lal Das*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 133; and *Ajudhia Persad v. Buldeo Singh*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 818, relied on. *HATEM ALI KHUNDAKAR v. ABDUL GAFFUR KHAN* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 102

1. ss. 97 (Act XXIII of 1861, s. 5)—Default in depositing allowance for notice to defendant—Dismissal of suit. Where the Court of first instance ordered a co-defendant to be joined in the suit, but the plaintiff failed to pay the allowance necessary for the purpose of causing a notice to be served on such co-defendant, who accordingly did not appear at the hearing:—*Held*, that the proper course for the Court to have adopted was to dismiss the suit under s. 5 of Act XXIII of 1861. *Semble*: The provisions contained in the first portion of s. 5 of Act XXIII of 1861 are imperative. *ABAS v. IBRAHIMJI*

5 Bom. A. C. 119

2. Default in depositing allowance for notice to respondent. A notice to a respondent having been returned unserved, owing to the omission on the part of the appellant to deposit the requisite talabana in the proper Court, the default under ss. 5 and 6, Act XXIII of 1861, was held to be in no way excused by the facts of its having been committed by an ignorant karpardaz or man of business, whom appellant chose to employ

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

_____ s. 97 (Act XXIII of 1861, s. 5)—
concl'd.

rather than a vakil. PRAN CHUNDER ROY v.
JUGGESSUR MOOKERJEE . . . 11 W. R. 417

_____ ss. 97, 98.

See APPEAL—DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE.
I. L. R. 10 Mad. 270

_____ Default in appearance of part-
ies. A District Munsif struck a case off the
file of his Court on neither party appearing. *Held*,
that the order to strike off the case was illegal.
ALWAR v. SESHANMIAL . . I. L. R. 10 Mad. 270

1. _____ ss. 98, 99, (1859, s. 110)—Res-
toration of case struck off by mistake as
being compromised. It is incidental to every
Court of Justice to be able, in its discretion, to
restore to its files any case which it has itself
removed therefrom undetermined. DEEN DYAL
PARAMANICK v. RAM COOMAR CHOWDHRY
9 W. R. 283

2. _____ Default in appearance—
Inability to attend. The affidavit of a party alleg-
ing inability to attend from illness is not enough
to satisfy the Court, but for this purpose there
must be a medical certificate, or the affidavits of
third parties. DHUNSOOK DOSS v. HURRY BABOO
Bourke O. C. 115

3. _____ Case struck out for
default in appearance. Where a case had been
struck out for non-attendance of the parties, an
order was made for its restoration on an affidavit
that the absence of the parties was owing to an
understanding between them for an adjournment,
and that the plaintiff had a case on the merits.
The order was made apparently under s. 119.
DAMOODUR DOSS v. CHOONEE BIBEE
Cor. 120, 123: 2 Hyde 216

4. _____ Practice. When
a case has been struck out in consequence of the
non-appearance of the plaintiff, the Court will
grant a fresh summons. PEARY MOHUN DOSS v.
PARBUTTY CHURN MOOKERJEE
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 40

5. _____ Dismissal for de-
fault in appearance—Non-appearance of plaintiff—
Fresh suit. When a suit is dismissed for default of
the plaintiff, and no appearance has been entered
by the defendant, the plaintiff can, under s. 110,
Act VIII of 1859, bring a fresh suit after a lapse
of thirty days, if it be not otherwise barred by lapse
of time. NABADWIP CHANDRA SIKKAR v. KALINATH
PAL . . . 3 B. L. R. Ap. 130

See POGHA MAHTON v. GOOROO BABOO.
24 W. R. 114

6. _____ Default in appearance—Act
XXIII of 1861, s. 33—Proceedings in execu-
tion of decree. The provisions of s. 110 of Act VIII
of 1859 are properly applicable under s. 33 of Act

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

_____ ss. 98, 99—*concl'd.*

XXIII of 1861 to proceedings in execution of decree.
RAJPAL v. CHOORAMUN . . . 4 N. W. 10

See SEETUL PERSHAD v. MAHOMED KUREEM
KHAN . . . 5 N. W. 164

1. _____ s. 99 (1859, s. 110: Act
XXIII of 1861, s. 7)—Failure of plaintiff to pay
Court-fee for issue of summons—Non-appearance
of defendant—Act VIII of 1859, s. 110—Act XXIII
of 1861, ss. 5, 7—*Fresh suit.* Where the plaintiff
in a suit failed to deposit talabana required for the
purpose of issuing summonses to certain persons
whom it was proposed to make defendants in addi-
tion to the original defendants in such suit, and
the Court on that ground irregularly dismissed such
suit as against such original defendants by an order
purporting to be made under s. 110 of Act VIII
of 1859 on a day previous to that fixed for the
hearing of such suit: *Held*, that such order of
dismissal did not preclude the plaintiff from institut-
ing a fresh suit. GULAB DAI v. JIWAN RAM
I. L. R. 2 All. 318

2. _____ and s. 97 (Act XXXIII of
1861, s. 7 and s. 5)—Neglect to deposit talab-
ana for application to execute decree. A decree-
holder having allowed the term of three years to
run within a very few days of expiry before apply-
ing for execution, and then, though allowed five
days to pay talabana, having neglected to do so,
his application was found to be not *bonâ fide*. *Held*,
that s. 7, Act XXIII of 1861, did not apply to the
case, that section applying only to suits dismissed
under the provisions of s. 5 of that Act. TARUCH
CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. HURO CHUNDER
CHUCKERBUTTY . . . 15 W. R. 473

3. _____ and s. 98—Application that Ap-
pellant be required to give Security—Order directing
appellant to show cause—Absence of Counsel to
support application—Dismissal of application—
Application to restore case to register—Civil Pro-
cedure Code, s. 647. A petition was made under s.
549 of the Civil Procedure Code, praying that an ap-
pellant might be required to give security for the
costs of the appeal. The ground upon which the
petition was based was that the appellant was
not pecuniarily in a position to pay the costs of the
appeal if it should be dismissed. An order was
passed directing the appellant to show cause why
the prayer of the petitioner should not be granted.
When the petition came on for hearing, no one
appeared to support it or to show cause against it,
and it was accordingly rejected. An application
was subsequently made on behalf of the petitioner
praying that the case might be restored to the
register on the ground that counsel for the petitioner
was absent on the occasion of the hearing for
fifteen minutes only, and that, as no one on behalf
of the appellant had appeared to show cause, the
petition should have been granted, and the
absence of petitioner's counsel was immaterial.

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s. 99—*concl'd.*

Held, that the matter was dealt with by s. 93 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that s. 647 of the Code, prescribing that the procedure laid down for suits should be followed as far as it could be made applicable in proceedings other than suits, made s. 99 the rule by which the Court was to be guided. *Held*, also, that, although no general rule could be laid down that the absence of counsel, when a case has been called on, should be treated as by itself a sufficient reason for restoring to the register either a regular suit, or an appeal, or a miscellaneous application, but each case of the kind must be dealt with according to its own particular circumstances, in the present case, taking the circumstances into consideration, an absence of counsel for fifteen minutes was not enough to preclude the Court from restoring the petition to the register. *LACKMI CHAND v. GUTTO BAI*

I. L. R. 7 All. 542

4. *Practice—Costs—Appeal from order as to costs—Dismissal of suit for non-appearance—Restoration of suit to file on application of plaintiff—Order that plaintiff should pay the general costs of suit.* A Judge, when restoring a suit to the file under s. 99 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), has no jurisdiction to pass at that time any order as to the general costs of the suit. *KRISHNA VITHAL POOLE v. GANESH BHASKAR TILAK* (1901)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 201

5. *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43—Sale of mortgagee property in execution of money decree held by mortgagee—Sale set aside—Subsequent suit for sale on the mortgage.* Where a mortgagee had brought the mortgaged property to sale in execution of a simple money decree held by him against the mortgager, and such sale was set aside with regard to the provisions of s. 99 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it was *held* that the mortgagee was not debarred from subsequently bringing a suit for sale on his mortgage, notwithstanding s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Azim-ulla v. Nuzm-un-nissa*, **I. L. R. 16 All. 415**, and *Govind Hari Dev. v. Parashram Mahadev Joshi*, **I. L. R. 25 Bom. 161**, referred to. *BHOLA NATH v. MUHAMMAD SADIQ* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 223

s. 99A.

See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY—DISCHARGE OF SURETY . **I. L. R. 14 Bom. 267**

See SUMMONS, SERVICE OF.

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 500

Suit for profits—Previous suit dismissed, because one of the defendants not summoned. A suit for profits for the years 1301 and 1302 Fasli, brought by the present plaintiffs against the appellant and two other defendants, was dismissed owing to the plaintiff's failure to cause one of the defendants to be summoned. The

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 99A—*concl'd.*

plaintiffs now sued the same defendants for profits for the years 1302, 1303 and 1304 Fasli. *Held*, that it was open to the plaintiffs, subject to the law of limitation, to bring the present suit and that the case was governed by the principle embodied in s. 99A of the Code of Civil Procedure. *SITA RAM SINGH v. POKHPAL SINGH* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 749

1. *s. 100—Procedure where plaintiff appears but defendant does not—Hearing ex-parte.* When the plaintiff in a suit appears at the hearing and the defendant does not appear, the proper procedure to follow is that prescribed by s. 100 of Act X of 1877, whether the defendant has been summoned only to appear and answer the claim, or has in addition been summoned to attend and give evidence. It is not necessary, before proceeding to hear and determine a suit *ex-parte* under s. 100, that all the process prescribed by law for compelling the attendance of the defendant as witness should be exhausted. It is sufficient that due service of the summons upon the defendant is proved. If such proof is not given, the courses to be adopted are one or other of those mentioned in cls. (b) and (c) of s. 100, according to the circumstances of the case. *TARUCK NATH MULLICK v. JEAMAT NOSYA*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 353

2. *Dismissal of suit for default—Application to restore suit—Failure to serve notice of application—Second application for issue of notice—Practice—Procedure—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 607—Costs.* A suit having been dismissed for plaintiff's default, he applied for the restoration of the suit to the file, and a notice was issued to the defendant to show cause why the suit should not be restored. The notice was returned unserved owing to plaintiff's neglect to point out the defendant to the serving officer. The plaintiff having applied for a fresh notice, the Subordinate Judge rejected the application. *Held*, that the Subordinate Judge had no power to reject the plaintiff's application for a fresh notice. S. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), which by s. 647 is made applicable to such a proceeding, only enabled him to order a fresh notice to issue, and, if he thought proper, to order plaintiff to pay the costs occasioned by the necessary postponement. *LALLUBHAI BHAJERAM v. BAI MAGANGAVRI* . **I. L. R. 18 Bom. 59**

3. *s. 100, para. 2, and s. 101 (1859, s. 111)—Non-appearance of defendant—Adjourned hearing—Costs.* A case had been placed on the undefended board in consequence of the non-appearance of the defendant, and the hearing had been adjourned at the instance of the plaintiff to a subsequent day. On that day the defendant appeared, and it was contended that he could not be heard until he had shown good cause for his previous non-appearance, or at least that the Court would put him on terms. The Court held that the

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s. 100—concl'd.

defendant was entitled to appear as a right, and an application that he should pay the costs of a postponement was refused. The costs were ordered to be costs in the cause. *NEWTON v. KURNEEDHONE*
9 B. L. R. Ap. 15

4. **s. 100, para. 3 (1859, s. 113)—**
Adjournment for defendant to produce evidence where he appears, although proper notice not given. Where, if defendant had not appeared, the Court would have been bound, under s. 113, Act VIII of 1859, to adjourn the hearing to a future day on the ground that sufficient time had not been given to him to appear and answer to the suit, it was held that his appearing ought not to put him in a worse position, and that it was a reasonable request made on his behalf by his vakil that time should be given to him to produce such evidence as he could in support of his case. *ABDOOL KUREEM v. AWLAD*
18 W. R. 141

5. **Service of summons on defendant residing out of British India.** S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not limited in its application to defendants residing within British India. *FAKHR-UD-DIN v. GHAFUR-UD-DIN* (1900) . . . I. L. R. 23 All. 99

6. **ss. 100, 108, 157, 158, 622—**
Adjourned hearing—Ex-parte decree—Revival of case. Where a suit was decreed *ex parte* on the adjourned day of hearing after taking evidence in the case: *Held*, that the order was passed under s. 100 read with s. 157 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, further, that the order could be set aside on an application under s. 108, Civil Procedure Code. *Mariannissa v. Ramkalpa Gorain*, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 235, and *Cooke v. Equitable Coal Company*, 8 C. W. N. 621, followed in principle. *Sitara Begam v. Tulsi Singh*, I. L. R. 23 All. 462, distinguished. *NAGENDRA KUMAR BASU v. NABIN MANDAL* (1908)
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 189

s. 101.

See post, s. 108 . . . 6 C. W. N. 109

s. 102.

See APPEAL—DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE.
I. L. R. 8 All. 20
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 736

s. 102—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 102, 103, 538—Order under s. 102, whether a decree and appealable as such. An order under s. 102 of the Civil Procedure Code dismissing a suit is as much a decree as an order under any other section deciding a suit. The order comes within the definition of a decree and is appealable as such. *Ablakh and another v. Bhagirathi*, I. L. R. 9 All. 427; *Partab Rai v. Ram Kishen*, All. W. N. (1883) 171; and *Radha Nath Singh v. Chandu Charan Singh*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 660, referred to.

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 102—concl'd.

GOSTO BEHARY SARDAR v. HARI MOHAN ADAK (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 313

ss. 102, 103 (1859, s. 114).

See APPEAL—DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE
I. L. R. 3 All. 292
I. L. R. 9 All. 427

See DISMISSAL FOR DEFAULT.
I. L. R. 30 Mad. 274

See DISMISSAL OF SUIT.
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 235

1. **Dismissal of former suit for default.** The plaintiff bought from *L* an estate which *L* had purchased from *G*. *L* sued *G* for confirmation of possession, and that suit was dismissed for default. The plaintiff's purchase was made pending that suit. In a suit for possession on the allegation of dispossession: *Held*, that the plaintiff's suit was not, under s. 114 of Act VIII of 1859, barred by the former decision against *L*. *MAHABIR PRASAD v. LALA RAM*
5 B. L. R. 327 note: 11 W. R. 193

2. **First hearing of suit—Non-appearance—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 110, 111, and 114.** *Semble*: S. 114 as well as ss. 110 and 111 of the Code have reference only to the first hearing of the suit, which may be either on the day named in the summons or on a subsequent day to which such hearing may have been adjourned. *COMALAMMAL v. RUNGASWAMY IYENGAR*
4 Mad. 56

3. **Abandonment of proceedings under s. 269, Act VIII of 1859.** The abandonment of proceedings taken under s. 269, Civil Procedure Code, 1859, does not amount to dismissal in default under s. 114, and is no bar to plaintiff's bringing afresh suit. *FUTTEH ALI v. KUREEM ALI* . . . 10 W. R. 61

4. **Case in execution of decree.** The judgment-debtors having appeared and raised objections to the execution of a decree, the Court after investigation proceeded to pass judgment in the absence of the decree-holder. *Held*, that the action of the Court was taken under s. 114, Code of Civil Procedure, and that the decree-holder had no right of appeal, but if aggrieved might apply for a rehearing. *KALEE KRISTO THAKOOR v. MAHOMED KADAR* . . . 12 W. R. 428

5. **Dismissal for default—Party interested refused relief.** *S* sued to establish his claim to certain property, as the next heir of its former owner, on the death of whose grandmother the property had been taken possession of by defendant, *P*, and obtained a decree. Upon this *P* appealed, and while the case was under appeal, *S* sold his rights to *H*, who on application to the Court was made a party to the suit. The case was then remanded for further enquiry to the first Court

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which dismissed the claim on account of default of both plaintiff and defendant. *H* then applied for opportunity to show that he had not been in default, but his application was rejected on the ground that he was no party to the suit. He then appealed, but the Judge also ruled that he was no party. *Held*, that, when the case was remanded for re-trial, some date should have been fixed for the re-hearing, which would have given the parties opportunity to appear and take measures to carry on the suit, and that the Judge's decision must be set aside, *H* having been in reality a party to the suit. *HARADHUN CHUCKERBUTTY v. PRATAB NARAIN CHOWDEY*

14 W. R. 401

6. ——— Non-attendance of plaintiff. The dismissal of a suit for the plaintiff's non-attendance is a highly penal matter, and the punishment ought not to be inflicted unless after a distinct order to attend, and upon proof that the plaintiff has deliberately disobeyed the Court's order. *PEARSEE MOHUN BOSE v. HURISH CHUNDER GHOSE*

17 W. R. 141

7. ——— Order striking off suit. An order made in a suit "number kharij or struck off" is not a passing of judgment against the plaintiff by default under s. 114, Act VIII of 1859, precluding him from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. *KHOOB LALL SINGH v. TOOLSEE SINGH*

17 W. R. 219

8. ——— Suit struck off for default—*Appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 114, 119.* In a case struck off for default, if the order has been properly made under Act VIII of 1859, s. 114, the remedy is by motion under s. 119, if improperly made it is open to appeal. *ULUCK MONEE CHOWDHAIN v. PANCH COOMAR CHUNDER CHOWDHRY*

21 W. R. 124

9. ——— Identity of causes of action in two suits, notwithstanding difference of relief claimed. To a suit brought in 1883, for redemption of a mortgage made in 1853, of villages in Oudh, subsequently included in the mortgagee's talukhdari estate and sanad, the defence was that the mortgagor having brought a suit in 1864 to redeem, and not having appeared at the hearing, in person or by pleader, judgment was passed, the mortgagee having appeared to defend against the plaintiff under s. 114 of Act VIII of 1859. *Held*, that, although the plaintiff, who had claimed in the prior suit the under-proprietary right in virtue of a sub-settlement, claimed in the present suit the superior proprietary right, the difference in the mode of relief claimed did not affect the identity of the cause of action, which was in both cases the refusal of the right to redeem; and that, under s. 114 of the Act, the judgment of 1864 was final. *SHANKAR BAKSH v. DAYA SHANKAR*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 422

L. R. 15 I. A. 66

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 102, 103—*contd.*

10. ——— Dismissal of suit for default—*Difference in causes of action—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 13, 102, 103.* The dismissal of a suit in terms of s. 102, Civil Procedure Code, is not intended to operate in favour of the defendant as *res judicata*. When read with s. 103, it precludes a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action, referring, irrespectively of the defence or the relief prayed, entirely to the grounds, or alleged *media*, on which the plaintiff asks the Court to decide in his favour. Brother's sons, as nearest agnates of a deceased proprietor, sued for a decree, declaring that a gift, before then made by the widow in favour of her daughter's son, of the estate of her late husband, would not operate against their right of succession on her death. A prior suit, before the date of the gift, brought by two of the plaintiffs for a declaratory decree and an injunction restraining the widow from alienating the same estate, had been dismissed under the provisions of ss. 102 and 103 (Act X of 1877), Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that the causes of action in the two suits were not identical, and the fresh suit was not precluded by s. 103, the gift having afforded the new ground of claim, which also had subsequently arisen. *CHAND KOUR v. PARTAB SINGH*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 98

L. R. 15 I. A. 156

11. ——— Dismissal of suit for non-appearance of plaintiff—*Application under s. 103 to set aside order of dismissal—Appearance, what amounts to—Ex-parte decree.* When the plaintiff's suit came on for hearing, his counsel applied for a postponement. This application was refused and the plaintiff's counsel, not being further instructed, left the Court. The suit was then dismissed for want of prosecution. Subsequently the plaintiff made an application, under s. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), for an order to set the dismissal aside. *Held*, refusing the application, that the above circumstances amounted to an appearance on the part of the plaintiff. *RAMPERTAB MULL v. JAKEERAM AGUR-WALLAH*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 991

12. ——— Suit brought by next friend of minor and struck off for default of appearance—*Gross negligence on the part of next friend—English rule of law—Law of equity and good conscience—Civil Procedure Code, s. 103.* Gross negligence on the part of a next friend in the conduct of a suit brought on behalf of a person under disability prevents the effect of the bar contained in s. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code to the institution of a fresh suit by such person when the disability has ceased. Where a suit for certain property was brought on behalf of two minors by their next friend, and owing to the gross want of care and diligence on the part of the next friend, the suit as struck off under s. 102 for default of appearance: *Held*, in a suit afterwards brought by the same plaintiffs on attaining their majority,

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 102, 103—*contd.*

that the suit was not barred by s. 103 of the Code. The English rule of law on this point as being the law of equity and good conscience was applied by the Court to this case, in the absence of any statutory provision. *LALLA SHEO CHURN LAL v. RAMNANDAN DOBEY* . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 8

See *HANMANTAPPA v. JIVUBAI*.

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 547

13. — *Appearance of party—Appearance by pleader or recognized agent—Appearance only for purpose of applying for adjournment—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 100—Presidency Small Cause Court Act (XV of 1882), s. 38—Dismissal for default—Remedy of plaintiff.* A suit and cross-suit between the same parties were on the board of a Judge of the Small Cause Court for hearing on the 23rd April 1898. On that day *A*, the counsel who was instructed for the defendants in the first suit and for the plaintiffs in the second, was unable to attend, and *B*, another counsel, held his brief and appeared on his behalf and applied for two months' adjournment of both suits. The *munim* of his clients was then in Court. *B* was unable to state what was the defence, if any, to the claim of the plaintiffs in the first suit. The adjournment was refused, and *B* said he withdrew from the case. Both suits were then and there disposed of, the claim of the plaintiffs in the first suit being decreed, the second suit being dismissed for non-appearance. On the 7th May following, an application was made for a re-hearing of both suits. The Court, regarding the decrees as *ex-parte* decrees, granted a rule for a new trial, which was made absolute. On appeal to the Full Court, the matter was referred to the High Court. *Held*, that under the circumstances the suits were to be considered as having been disposed of under ss. 100 and 102 of the Civil Procedure Code respectively, and that, whether or not they, or either of them, fell within the category of contested suits as defined by s. 38 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, the remedy under s. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code was open to the plaintiffs in the cross-suit. Where on the day fixed for hearing a party is present in person merely for the purpose of applying for an adjournment which is refused, he must be taken to have "appeared" within the meaning of Chap. VII of the Civil Procedure Code. The party has appeared in person. The purpose for which he appeared, or the action which he took on appearance, are immaterial. But where the party is absent and an application for adjournment is made on his behalf by a pleader who has no other instructions, and whose functions are at an end when the adjournment is refused, in that case the party has not appeared within the meaning of the Chapter. Where the pleader who applies for an adjournment is accompanied by a recognized agent of the party, but the latter neither makes any application nor does any act, the question is whether he intends to appear, and in fact

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does appear for the party in the exercise of his powers under s. 36 of the Civil Procedure Code. That section is merely permissive and enabling. If the recognized agent, although able to do so, does not think proper to conduct the case on behalf of his principal, his mere presence in Court is not an "appearance" in the suit. An appearance may be made by a pleader or a recognized agent, but the concurrence of the pleader or agent is essential. As soon as he ceases to intend to represent the principal the latter is unrepresented. S. 38 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act does not preclude a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed for default from applying under s. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code to have the order of dismissal set aside. There is no inconsistency between the two sections. A plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed for default has two separate remedies under different enactments. If he chooses to apply for a new trial under s. 38, he must do so within eight days. If he professes to apply for an order setting aside the dismissal under s. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code, he can do so within thirty days (Limitation Act, XV of 1877, Sch. II, Art. 163). *SOONDERLAL v. GOORPRASAD* . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 414

14. — *Dismissal of the suit for non-appearance of plaintiff or of the Official Assignee—Insolvency Act (11 & 12 Vic., c. 21), s. 7—Whether s. 370 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to a case where there has not been a completed bankruptcy or insolvency—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 102, 103, 157, 370.* S. 370 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to a case where there has been only an application to declare the plaintiff to a suit an insolvent and a vesting order made, but the proceedings are subsequently annulled, and the party is not declared either a bankrupt or an insolvent; therefore, in such a case, where a suit has been dismissed for the non-appearance of the plaintiff or the Official Assignee on the date fixed for hearing, s. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code applies. *AMRITA LAL MUKERJEE v. RAKHALI DASSI DEBI* . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 217
4 C. W. N. 294

15. — *Order dismissing a suit for default of appearance—Civil Procedure Code, s. 137—Application for restoration of suit—What constitutes an "Appearance."* In construing an order alleged by one side and denied by the other to be an order under s. 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order will be considered as an order under s. 102, if apart from the mere description which the Court gives of its action, and apart from the actual fact of the plaintiff's appearance or non-appearance, the real meaning and substance of the Court's action is, that it dismisses the suit on the view, whether right or wrong, that the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear. Where, his suit having been dismissed for default of appearance

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under s. 102 of the Code, the plaintiff applies for its restoration, the defendant cannot contest the application *in limine* as one which cannot be entertained at all under s. 103 by showing that at the time of the dismissal there was an appearance by the plaintiff in fact or in law; but as an answer to the application on the merits, the defendant can raise the contention that the plaintiff was not prevented from appearing because in fact he did appear. It is not an "appearance" within the meaning of s. 102 of the Code when the plaintiff is represented only by a pleader who is without instructions enabling him to proceed with the case, and who is merely instructed to apply for an adjournment. *Shankar Dat Dube v. Radha Krishna*, I. L. R. 20 All. 195, and *Soonderlal v. Goorprasad*, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 414, approved. *Mahomed Azeem-ool-lah v. Ali Buksh*, 5 N. W. 74, *Kashi Parshad v. Devi Das*, 7 N. W. 77, and *Kanahi Lal v. Naubat Rai*, I. L. R. 3 All. 519, referred to. *LALTA PRASAD v. NAND KISHORE* . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 68

16. — *Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), ss. 12, 18, 31, 53—Apportionment—Reference to Court—Dismissal for default—Fresh suit if maintainable—Rights of persons not parties to the reference—Construction of Statute—Special jurisdiction.* Certain persons, who were parties in a land acquisition proceeding, being dissatisfied with the apportionment of the compensation money made by the Collector, obtained a reference to the Court under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, but as they did not appear at the hearing of the same it was struck off. *Held*, that a suit instituted by the same persons in the Civil Court for the apportionment of the compensation money was barred by ss. 102 and 103, Civil Procedure Code. Ss. 102 and 103, Civil Procedure Code, apply to proceedings before the Court to which a reference is made under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, owing to the operation of s. 647, Civil Procedure Code, which is made applicable to such proceeding by s. 53 of the Land Acquisition Act. Persons, who were not parties in the land acquisition proceeding, were not debarred from instituting a suit for apportionment in the Civil Court. *STEPHEN J. Quare*: Whether persons who were before the Collector, but not before the Court to which reference was made under s. 18, Land Acquisition Act, would be debarred from instituting such a suit. *MUKERJEE, J.* An objection as to the measurement of the land or the amount of the compensation payable therefor must be determined exclusively by a reference to the Civil Court under s. 18, cl. (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. But a question as to the persons to whom compensation is payable or its apportionment among the persons interested may be determined either under a reference as contemplated by s. 18, cl. (1) of the Act or by a suit at the instance of a person lawfully entitled to it as against another, who has drawn the compensation money. When, however, a party has once

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availed himself of a reference to the Court under s. 18, Land Acquisition Act, he cannot again ask for an opportunity to litigate the same matter in the ordinary Court. *Sri Punnabati Dai v. Padmanund Singh*, 7 C. W. N. 533; *Raja Nilmoni Sing v. Ram Bandhu Rai*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 388, 393; *Harmut Jan Bibi v. Padma Lochun*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 33, referred to. *BHANDI SINGH v. RAMADHIN ROY* (1905) . . . 10 C. W. N. 991

17. — *Suit dismissed owing to absence of Counsel—Plaintiff present with his witnesses—Rule allowing costs of two Counsel—Junior Counsel should return brief if neither Counsel able to be present—Practice.* Sections 102 and 103 of the Civil Procedure Code do not apply when the plaintiff is present in Court. Notwithstanding the non-appearance of the plaintiff's counsel the Court can under s. 117 of the Code ask the plaintiff questions relating to the suit and can examine his witnesses or suggest that he should instruct some other counsel to examine the witnesses. The rule of allowing the costs of two counsel on each side in taxation was introduced by the Judges in order to obviate the dislocation of the business which might result from cases being called on at the same time in two or more Courts in which the same counsel was engaged. This rule has always been supplemented by the unwritten rule of the Bar that one or other counsel must return his brief in good time if there is a chance of neither being able to attend when the case is called on, and that in case of dispute it is the duty of the junior to return the brief or to make arrangement for some other counsel to attend until he can come in. *ESMAIL EBRAHIM v. HAJI JAN MAHOMED* (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 475

s. 103 (1859, ss. 114, 119).

See RES JUDICATA—JUDGMENTS ON PRELIMINARY POINTS.

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 426

See SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, s. 9.

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 217

1. — *Suit by purchaser of mortgaged land against mortgagee for redemption—Subsequent suit by purchaser against vendor and mortgagee for possession—Cause of action.* In 1879 the plaintiff purchased from one B (defendant No. 1) the land in question in the suit, which was then in the possession of one R (defendant No. 2) as mortgagee. B undertook to pay off the mortgage, but failed to do so. In 1881 the plaintiff brought a suit for redemption against R, which was dismissed for non-appearance of the plaintiff under s. 102 of the Civil Procedure Code (X of 1877). He subsequently filed the present suit against B and R to recover possession of the land. The defendant pleaded that the suit was barred under the provisions of s. 103 of the Civil Proce-

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1887)—contd.**

— s. 103 (1859, ss. 114, 119)—*concl'd.*

dure Code. *Held*, that the cause of action in the two suits was different, and that the present suit was not barred. **RAMCHANDRA JIVAJI TILVE v. KHATAL MAMOMED GORI**. I. L. R. 10 Bom. 28

2. — **Sufficient cause for non-appearance of plaintiff when suit called on for hearing**—*Application to set aside order of dismissal made under s. 102.* The plaintiff duly attended the Court on the day fixed for the hearing of his case, and waited for some time, as the Judge happened to be sitting on that day at first in the Appeal Court. Believing that when the Judge took his seat in his own Court, a part-heard case would be proceeded with and would occupy some time, the plaintiff left the Court house and went to assist his employer, who had sent for him to explain some matters connected with a mercantile transaction. The plaintiff returned to the Court in about half an hour, and found that in his absence his suit had been called on for hearing and dismissed under s. 102 of the Civil Procedure Code. On application under s. 103 to set aside the order of dismissal:—*Held*, refusing the application, that the above circumstances did not amount to "sufficient cause" for his non-appearance when his suit was called on for hearing. He was not taken unawares. He was under no compulsion to leave the Court, nor was his absence due to any weighty cause. He accepted the risk of the case being called on in his absence. **MUNILAL DHUNJI v. GULAM HUSEIN VAZEER**. I. L. R. 13 Bom. 12

3. — **Adjournment for defendant—Default by plaintiff—Dismissal of suit—Application to restore suit—Civil Procedure Code, s. 158.** Where a suit was adjourned on the application of the defendant, and on the day to which the case was adjourned the plaintiff was absent and the suit was dismissed for default by an order purporting to be passed under s. 158 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882:—*Held*, that s. 158 was not applicable to the circumstances, and that the plaintiff was entitled to apply under s. 103 to have dismissal set aside. **VENKATA RAMAYA APPARAU v. ANUMUKONDA RANGAYA NAYUDU**. I. L. R. 7 Mad. 41

4. — **Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), ss. 30, 53 and 54—Reference to Civil Court for apportionment of Compensation.** S. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to a reference under s. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, the party at whose instance the reference was obtained occupying the position of the plaintiff, and his opponents that of defendants. **Ezra v. The Secretary of State**, 7 C. W. N. 249: I. L. R. 30 Calc. 36; **Kishan Chand v. Jagannath Prasad and Ganesh Prasad**, I. L. R. 25 All. 133, approved. **BEHARY LAL SUR v. NANDA LAL GOSWAMI** (1907). 11 C. W. N. 430

— ss. 103 and 108—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 103, 108 and*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— ss. 103 and 108—*concl'd.*

558—**Application to restore—Prevention by sufficient cause from appearing—Power of Court to restore where sufficient cause not shown.** The affirmative provisions in ss. 103, 108 and 558 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that a plaintiff or appellant (as the case may be) may prove that he was "prevented by sufficient cause" from appearing or attending when his suit or appeal was called on and dismissed, do not imply the negative, namely, that an application for restoration cannot be granted unless sufficient cause is shown. The effect of the enactments is that, if sufficient cause is shown, restoration is made obligatory on the Courts, there being no discretion in the matter; whereas in other cases the merits of the applicant's case will form an important element for consideration when the Court is asked to exercise its discretion. **SOMAYYA v. SUBBAMMA** (1903). I. L. R. 26 Mad. 599

— ss. 103, 120, 155—**Restoration of suit—Limitation—Dismissal of suit—Adjournment—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 163—Notice of motion—"Sufficient cause"—Practice.** Where a suit is dismissed for want of prosecution an application for its restoration must be made within 30 days of such dismissal; and a notice that the application would be made on a future date does not prevent limitation from running: **Khetter Mohan Sing v. Kassy Nath Sett**, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 899. Where the long vacation intervenes to save limitation, the matter must be mentioned on the first day after the re-opening of the Court, that is, the first day on which the Courts sits. *Semble*: An appearance by counsel on the calling on of a case merely to ask for an adjournment is not such an appearance in the suit as will necessarily render ss. 102 and 103 of the Civil Procedure Code inapplicable. **HINGA BIBEE v. MUNNA BIBEE AND OTHERS** (1904). I. L. R. 31 Calc. 150 s.c. 8 C. W. N. 97

— ss. 103, 311—**Default—Dismissal of application for default—Revival—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 103, 318, 588, 647.** There is no appeal against an order rejecting an application under s. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code for reviving an application under s. 311 of the Code which has been dismissed for non-appearance of the judgment-debtor. **Ningappa v. Gangawa**, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 433; **Raja v. Srinivasa**, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 388; and **Hureenath Koondo v. Modhoo Soodun Saha**, 19 W. R. 22, followed. **JUNG BAHADUR v. MAHADEO PROSAD** (1904). I. L. R. 31 Calc. 207 s.c. 8 C. W. N. 160

— s. 104—

See APPEAL—EX-PARTE CASES.

I. L. R. 23 All. 99

— ss. 106, 108, 622—**Ex-parte decree—Appearance—Pleader only instructed to ask for adjournment—Adjournment, refusal of—Retirement of pleader from case—Decree passed,**

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 106, 108, 122—*conclld.*

whether ex parte—Restoration of case—High Court interference by, in revision—Jurisdiction. Where an application by a defendant's pleader for adjournment for the purpose of the issue of warrants against certain witnesses and to have certain records sent for having been refused, the pleader retired from the case which then proceeded and a decree was passed: *Held*, that the decree was an *ex parte* decree. Where a pleader is only instructed to make an application, practically for an adjournment, and when that application is refused he leaves the Court and takes no part in the hearing of the case, the decree passed cannot be regarded as other than an *ex parte* decree. *Watson & Co. v. Ambica Dassi*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 529, dissented from. *Jonardan Doby v. Ramdhon Singh*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 738, relied on. There is nothing in s. 106 of the Civil Procedure Code, which conflicts with or limits the operation of s. 108 and the application of the latter section is not limited to the case of a sole defendant, who has not appeared or where there are more defendants than one and none of them has appeared. *Quere*: Whether the case fell under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, or was a fit one for interference under that section. *G. P. COOKE v. THE EQUITABLE COAL CO., LD.* (1904) 3 C. W. N. 621

s. 108 (1859, s. 119).

See ante, ss. 103 AND 108.*See* APPEAL—EX-PARTE CASES.5 C. W. N. 153
I. L. R. 24 All. 302
I. L. R. 25 All. 280*See* EX-PARTE DECREE.

I. L. R. 29 All. 623

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 164 (1871), ART. 157; ACT VIII OF 1859 s. 119).*See* PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT I. L. R. 31 Bom. 45*See* RIGHT OF SUIT—

DECREES; I. L. R. 28 Calc. 475

FRAUD; I. L. R. 29 Calc. 395

1. ——— Cases in Appeal. S. 119, Act VIII of 1859, did not apply to cases in appeal. ANONYMOUS CASE . . . 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 63

RAM LAL CHOWDHRY v. SURDAREE JAH.
W. R., 1864, Mis. 21

OMDA BEBEE v. ACOWRIE SINGH 7 W. R. 425

2. ——— A party to a suit against whom a judgment *ex parte* has been passed in regular appeal cannot prefer a special appeal from that judgment. He must first proceed under s. 119 of the Civil Procedure Code to get rid of the *ex parte* judgment against him. *DEVAPPA SETTI v. RAMANADHA BHATT* 3 Mad. 109

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 108 (1859, s. 119)—*contd.*But *see* CHINNAPPA CHETTI v. NADARAJA PILLAI
6 Mad. 1

3. ——— Suits for rent—*Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 34.* S. 119 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859) was made applicable to rent suits under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 by the provisions of s. 34 of the latter Act. *DRABAMAYI GUPTIA v. TARRACHARAN SEN*
7 B. L. R. 207: 16 W. R. 17

4. ——— Decree under s. 148, Civil Procedure Code. S. 119 of Act VIII of 1859 did not empower a Judge to set aside a decree passed under s. 148 of the same Act. *COMALAMAL v. RAMASAWMY IYENGAR* . . . 4 Mad. 56

5. ——— Validity of Attachment. The effect of granting an application under s. 119 of Act VIII of 1859 is to declare that there has not been yet a valid decree in the suit, and thereby any attachment that has issued in execution of the decree which has been set aside becomes invalid. *LALA JAGAT NARAYAN v. TULSI RAM*
1 B. L. R. A. C. 17

6. ——— Effect of order under s. 101 against a defendant and not appealed from on his right to apply to set aside *ex parte* decree. The fact that an order under s. 101 has been made against a defendant and has not been appealed against is no objection to an application being made by him under s. 108. *SANKARALINGA MUDALI v. RATNASABHAPATI MUDALI*
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 324

7. ——— *Ex parte* decree—*Satisfaction of the decree—Application by defendant to set aside decree after satisfaction of decree.* The fact that an *ex parte* decree had been satisfied does not disentitle a defendant from applying to the Court to set it aside under s. 108 of the Civil Procedure Code. *ZENDOOAL NANDLAL v. KISHORILAL MEHTEHAI* I. L. R. 23 Bom. 716

8. ——— Ground for setting aside decree—*Property wrongly attached.* In an application to have an *ex parte* decree set aside a judgment-debtor is entitled to say the property attached is not his. *SOOKH MOYEE DOSSEE v. NURMOODA DOSSEE* . . . 15 W. R. 210

See RADHA BENODE CHOWDHRY v. DEGUMBUREE DOSSEE B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 947

SHIB CHUNDER BHADOORY v. LUKHEE DEBIA CHOWDHURANI 6 W. R. Mis. 51

But he must prove the allegation. *KALEE PROSAD v. DIGUMBER CHATTERJEE* . 25 W. R. 72
in which case the proof was held to be insufficient.

9. ——— *Fraudulent personation.* Where a party applies, under s. 119, Code of Civil Procedure, to have an *ex parte* decree set aside, on the allegation that the decree was obtained upon a petition of confession of judgment put in by a person fraudulently employed to personate him,

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the Court is bound to enquire into the truth of the allegation and, if it be established, the decree may be set aside. *KOROONAMOYEE DASSEE v. NOBO KISHORE SEIN* . . . 6 W. R. Mis. 36

10. ———— *Ex parte decree*
—*Setting aside ex parte decree on condition of finding surety.* An *ex parte* decree was set aside on condition that the defendant should find a surety, who would be responsible for any amount that might be found due from the defendant by any decree to be subsequently made in the suit. *Held*, that, under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a Court has jurisdiction to set aside an *ex parte* decree on these terms. *SONATUN SHAHA v. DINO NATH SHAHA* . . . I. L. R. 26 Cal. 222
3 C. W. N. 228

11. ———— *Appearance—Appearance by pleader—Ex parte decision.* An appearance in person or by pleader, without putting in any answer or written statement, is an appearance within the meaning of s. 119 of Act VIII of 1859, and the judgment pronounced thereafter is not an *ex parte* judgment, and therefore an appeal will lie. *GOLUCKBUR v. BISHONATH GEEREE* . Marsh. 32
JANKEE RAM DOSS v. CHUNDRABUTTY DEBIA
7 W. R. 295

12. ———— *Appearance by pleader—Ex parte hearing.* *Held*, that the hearing of a suit in which a pleader was duly appointed on behalf of the defendant, but not instructed to answer, or instructed not to answer at all, was an "*ex parte* hearing," and that no appeal lay from a judgment passed in such suit. *BEHIMACHARYA BIN VYANAKACHARYA v. FAKIRAPPA BIN ANNANDAPPA*
4 Bom. A. C. 206

13. ———— *Appearance by pleader.* Where a defendant appears in person or by pleader, the fact that the defendant is not prepared to put in a written statement does not warrant the trial of a suit *ex parte*. *SIVARAJADHANI NILAKANTHAM PILLAI v. CUPPA GANTULU RAMIAH PANTULU* . . . 2 Mad. 311

14. ———— *Appearance by pleader.* When a duly authorized *vakil* of the defendant under a *vakalatnamah* filed in Court appears for his client on the day fixed, and the case comes on for hearing, the decree passed on such hearing is not an *ex parte* decree, even though the pleader be not sufficiently instructed to proceed with the case. *DHAN BHAGUT v. RAMESH DUTT SINGH* . . . 20 W. R. 53

15. ———— *Decree ex parte—Pleader retained in suit, but not instructed.* A party defendant retained a pleader to defend the suit against him, and the pleader filed a *vakalatnamah* and did certain acts for the defendant. However, when the suit came on for hearing, the pleader came into Court, and stated that he had no instructions and could not go on with the case, practically that

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he had retired from the case. The Court proceeded with the suit, and made a decree in favour of the plaintiff. *Held*, that this decree was a decree *ex parte* within the meaning of s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Bhaqwan Dai v. Hira*, I. L. R. 19 All. 355, and *Jonardan Dobey v. Ramdhone Singh*, I. L. R. 23 Cal. 738, referred to. *Zain-ul-Abdin Khan v. Ahmad Raza Khan*, I. L. R. 2 All. 67 : L. R. 5 I. A. 233, distinguished. *SHANKAR DAT DUBE v. RADHA KRISHNA*
I. L. R. 20 All. 195

16. ———— *Sufficient cause for non-appearance—Absence of counsel or attorney.* On an application made under s. 119 of Act VIII of 1859 to set aside a judgment by default: *Held*, that the words "prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing" should be read so as to include the case of the absence of the plaintiff's counsel or attorney, when such absence has been caused by a *bonâ fide* mistake. Under such circumstances, a judgment by default under s. 114 was set aside upon payment by the attorney of the plaintiff of the costs of the hearing. *ORIENTAL FINANCE CORPORATION v. MERCANTILE CREDIT AND FINANCE CORPORATION*
2 Bom. 282 : 2nd. Ed. 267

17. ———— *Absence of pleader.* Where, in the absence of a plaintiff's pleader, the case was decided, it was held to have been decided *ex parte*, and his proper course was held to be an application for review, not a special appeal. *BEEJOY GOBIND SIRCAR v. RADHA BENODE MISSEER*.
10 W. R. 348

18. ———— *Filing written statement—Ex parte case.* Where a defendant entered appearance and filed a written statement, the case cannot be *ex parte*, though the defendant does not appear in person at the hearing; and the defendant's *vakil* is entitled to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses. *PAKARTAR v. JAKIRAM BHOKATH*
11 W. R. 5

19. ———— *Written statement, tender of—Ex parte decree—Appeal—Appearance of defendant.* The Court of first instance refused to receive the defendant's written statement because it had been tendered after the day on which the Court had ordered it to be filed, and the delay had not been satisfactorily explained. The Court, however, framed the issues in the presence of the defendant's pleader, who was also allowed to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses. The Court made a decree in favour of the plaintiff. In appeal the District Judge held that the decree of the first Court was *ex parte* under s. 119 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that, therefore, no appeal lay. *Held* by the High Court, in special appeal, that the decree of the first Court was not *ex parte* under the circumstances. *RAGHAPA BIN HANMAPA v. PARAPA BIN SHIVAPA* . . . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 217

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 108 (1859, s. 119)—*contd.*

20. — **Non-appearance at adjourned hearing, after former appearance—*Ex parte* judgment—*Appeal.*** The provision in s. 119 of Act VIII of 1859 that “no appeal shall lie from a judgment passed *ex parte* against a defendant who has not appeared” must be understood to apply to the case of a defendant who has not appeared at all, and not to the case of a defendant who, having once appeared, fails to appear on a subsequent day to which the hearing of the cause has been adjourned. *ZAIN-UL-ABDIN KHAN v. AHMAD RAZA KHAN*

I. L. R. 2 All. 67 : L. R. 5 I. A. 233

KALEE CHURN DUTT v. MODHOO SOODUN GHOSE
6 W. R. 86

21. — ***Ex parte* decree—*Defendant not appearing at an adjourned hearing—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 119 and 147—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 108 and 157.*** S. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) applies to every case in which a decree is passed *ex parte* against a defendant either under s. 100 by reason of his non-appearance at the first hearing, or under s. 157 by reason of his non-appearance at an adjourned hearing. *Zain-ul-Abdin Khan v. Ahmad Raza Khan*, I. L. R. 2 All. 67 : L. R. 5 I. A. 233, distinguished. *Sital Hari Banerjee v. Heera Lal Chatterjee*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 269, overruled. *JONARDAN DOBEY v. RAMDHONE SINGH*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 738

22. — ***Presidency Court of Small Causes—Adjourned hearing—Ex parte decree—Civil Procedure Code, s. 157.*** A defendant is entitled to avail himself of s. 108 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) where an *ex parte* decree is passed against him at an adjourned hearing. *HILDRETH v. SAYAJI PIRAJI*

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 380

23. — ***Ex parte* decree—*Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882), s. 37—New trial—Parties, non-appearance of—Civil Procedure Code, s. 157.*** There is a distinction made by the Code of Civil Procedure between cases decided *ex parte* in the absence of one of the parties after first hearing, and cases decided in the absence of one of the parties at an adjourned hearing. Chap. VII of the Code relates to the appearance of parties and the consequence of their non-appearance at first hearings, whereas Ch. XIII, of which s. 157 forms a part, contains the procedure for the trial of a suit on an adjournment after the first hearing. Where, therefore, a defendant put in an appearance in the Small Cause Court at the first hearing, and the case was adjourned to a later date for hearing, on which date the case was heard in his absence and a decree given against him:—*Held*, that such a decree was not made *ex parte* so as to enable the defendant to obtain benefit of s. 108 of the Code, but that his only

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 108 (1859, s. 119)—*contd.*

remedy was under s. 37 of Act XV of 1882. *SITAL HARI BANERJEE v. HEERA LAL CHATTERJEE*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 269

24. — ***Revival of suit after dismissal under s. 157—Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887), s. 17.*** Where a suit has been dismissed under s. 157, Civil Procedure Code, s. 108, will apply and the suit may be revived. The expression “a decree passed *ex parte* in s. 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act must be read with s. 108 of the Civil Procedure Code, and does not include cases dismissed for default. *Sital Hari Banerjee v. Heera Lal Chatterjee*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 269, referred to. *Tonuda Dobey v. Ramdhone Singh*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 738, followed. *JAMINA BIBI v. SERI CHAND BHAGAT* . 2 C. W. N. 693

25. — ***Appeal from ex parte decree.*** A suit was postponed on the application of the defendant's pleader, but on his applying for further adjournment at the time fixed for hearing, the application was refused; the Court tried the case, the defendant not appearing and not being represented, and gave a decree for the plaintiff. An appeal was allowed, and the case was sent back for re-trial. *AMRITNATH JHA v. ROY DHUNPUT SINGH* . 8 B. L. R. 44 : 15 W. R. 503

26. — ***Re-hearing granted after expiration of time limited for application—Ex parte decree.*** The plaintiff obtained an *ex parte* decree on the 5th July 1873, of which he took out execution on the 9th August. On the 11th of November, the defendant applied for and obtained a re-hearing under s. 119, Act VIII of 1859. On the rehearing his suit was dismissed by both the lower Courts on the merits. *Held*, on a special appeal to the High Court, that, although s. 119 provides that an order for re-hearing shall be final, it is final only in the sense that it is not by itself open to appeal, and that the plaintiff was not precluded by that section from raising the objection that the order for re-hearing was made after the time limited therein, and therefore ought to be set aside as made without jurisdiction. *RUNGLALL MISSEER v. TOKHUN MISSEER*

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 114 : 25 W. R. 304

27. — ***Suit, adjournment of hearing of—“Appearance” of defendant—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 108, 157.*** A Munsif, before whom a suit was pending, fixed, by way of adjournment, a particular date for its disposal. Upon the date so fixed, it was necessary to take evidence upon issues of fact which had previously been settled. The plaintiffs appeared on that day. The defendants did not appear, but there was in Court a pleader who had been instructed by the two principal defendants at the outset, and who had filed his vakalatnama. There was nothing to show that he had ever received any other instructions whatever, either as to the facts of the case or the conduct of

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 108 (1859, s. 119)—*contd.*

the defence, or that the defendants had done anything beyond giving the pleader the instructions above referred to. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs gave their evidence, and the Munsif decreed the claim. *Held*, that, under the circumstances stated, the defendant's pleader must be taken not to have been in Court on the date fixed for the purpose of defending the suit on behalf of the defendants, inasmuch as, upon that part of the case, he had not been instructed; that it was therefore a fair inference that the defendants did not appear, and the case was disposed of under s. 157 of the Civil Procedure Code; and that, under these circumstances, the provisions of s. 108 were applicable, and the decree was an *ex parte* decision, which it was open to the Munsif to reconsider. *Hira Dai v. Hira Lal*, I. L. R. 7 All. 538, followed. *RAMTAHAL RAM v. RAMESHAR RAM*

I. L. R. 8 All. 140

28. ———— *Ex parte decree*—*"Appearance," What constitutes—Civil Procedure Code, s. 100.* A summons was issued to a defendant in a civil suit. The serving officer, being unable to find either the defendant or any person empowered to accept service for him at the address given, affixed a copy of the summons to the outer door of the defendant's house, and returned the original to Court. On the day notified in the summons, the case was called on, and, upon its being called on, a pleader presented himself in Court with a power-of-attorney, executed not by the defendant himself, but by a third person on his behalf, and stated that the defendant had no notice of the time fixed for the hearing of the case, and prayed for an adjournment to a date upon which a proper answer to the claim could be filed. The application was refused, but the case was adjourned to the day following. On that date, no one appeared for the defendant, and a decree was passed against him. *Held*, that there was no appearance on behalf of the defendant within the meaning of s. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the decree passed on the adjourned date was therefore an *ex parte* decree. *Hira Dai v. Hira Lal*, I. L. R. 7 All. 538, and *Ram Tahal Ram v. Rameshar Ram*, I. L. R. 8 All. 140, referred to. *Fazal Ahmad v. Bahadur Singh*, *Weekly Notes*, All. (1893) 25, *Ganga Dass v. Indarman*, *Weekly Notes* (1893) 208, and *Zain-ul-Abdin Khan v. Ahmad Raza Khan*, I. L. R. 2 All. 67 : L. R. 5 I. A. 233, distinguished. *CHAUDHRI RAJ KUMAR v. JUGAL KISHORE*. I. L. R. 18 All. 241

29. ———— Absence of defendant on adjourned hearing—*Non-appearance.* Section 119, Act VIII of 1859, does not apply to defendant who is only absent on an adjourned hearing. It relates only to one who has never appeared. *GORACHAND GOSWAMI v. RAGHU MANDAL*. 3 B. L. R. Ap. 121 : 12 W. R. 169

30. ———— Non-appearance of defendant after filing written statement. A

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 108 (1859, s. 119)—*contd.*

defendant filed a written statement in a suit, and, when the case was called on for final disposal, an application was made by counsel on his behalf for an adjournment; but the application was refused, and no one appearing for him, the case was proceeded with, and a judgment was obtained by the plaintiff. The defendant afterwards applied for an order setting aside the judgment on the ground that he was prevented from appearing when the suit was called on. *Held*, that the application was within s. 119 of Act VIII of 1859, and the Court had no power in granting the order to impose terms as under s. 111. *ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL OF BENGAL v. LALA DYARAM DOSS*. 6 B. L. R. 688

DOYAL MISTREE v. KUPPOOR CHAND.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 318 : 3 C. L. R. 482

31. ———— Default in appearance after adjournment. The parties to a suit appeared on the day fixed for the first hearing. On the application of defendant's vakil, the hearing of the suit was adjourned in order to enable them to obtain certain documents from the Collector's office, and afterwards put in written statements. This they failed to do on the day to which the hearing was adjourned, and when the suit came on for final hearing, they were still in default, and also failed to appear in person or by vakil. A decree was given for the plaintiff. *Held*, that the decree of the original Court was not an *ex parte* decree under s. 147 of the Code of Civil Procedure for non-appearance, but a decree under s. 148, and was therefore appealable. *RANGASAMY MUDELLIAR v. SIRANGAN.* THANDRAYA GOUNDEN v. SITHAIYAN

4 Mad. 254

32. ———— Absence at adjourned hearing—*Putting in written statement.* A mere formal appearance in Court with no further action than the putting in a written statement does not prevent a decision in the absence of the defendant from being regarded as an *ex parte* decision under the Civil Procedure Code. *PURUS RAM v. JUYUN-TEE PERSHAD*. 1 N. W., Ed. 1873, 154

33. ———— Failure of defendant to file affidavit of documents, defence struck out in consequence and decree made *ex parte*—*Application to set aside the decree under s. 108—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 136.* Where the defendants had entered appearance and filed their written statements, but their defence had been struck out under s. 136 of the Civil Procedure Code for failure to file their affidavit of documents and the suit had been placed in the undefended list of cases and a decree made therein, and the defendants subsequently sought to set aside that decree under s. 108, Civil Procedure Code :—*Held*, that the wording of s. 108, Civil Procedure Code, as well as its position in the Act, shows that its operation is limited to decrees made *ex parte* under the provisions of Ch. VII, and does not govern other decrees made *ex parte* unless where it has been extended

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to those decrees by other provisions of the Code. *Held*, also, that whatever may be the effect of the words "and to be placed in the same position as if he had not appeared and answered" in s. 136, it does not intend to introduce into the class of cases dealt with by s. 108 a new class of cases of an entirely different character, and the decree in the suit was not an *ex parte* decree within the meaning of s. 108. *Choonee Lal v. Chaman Lal*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 139, *Mullins v. Howell*, 11 Ch. D. 767, referred to. *Assanulla Joo v. Abdul Aziz*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 923, distinguished. *KESHARIA ACCOMAR SREE-SUNGJEE v. POTOAH SETT* . 2 C. W. N. 676

34. — *Ex parte* decree against one defendant—*Right to re-open the whole case*—Act X of 1859, s. 58. When a suit has been decreed against several defendants, and one of them, who was not present at the hearing, obtains a rehearing and files a written statement in which for the first time the objection is taken that the suit could not have been proceeded with, inasmuch as plaintiff had improperly joined two distinct causes of action against two different individuals, the Court is not justified in re-opening the whole case. S. 119, Act VIII of 1859, does not contemplate the setting aside of that portion of the decree in such a case which refers to the other defendants. S. 58, Act X of 1859, treated as an authority by analogy in such a case; and s. 119, Act VIII of 1859, interpreted. *HURO KRISHNO DASS v. MOTECHAND BABOO* 8 W. R. 260

See, however, NISTARINEE DOSSEE v. DEBNATH BOSE 20 W. R. 286

and *BROJONATH SURMAH CHUCKERBUTTY v. ANUND MOYEE DEBIA CHOWDHRAIN*

7 W. R. 237

35. — *Effect of a decree set aside at the instance of some only of several defendants against whom the decree passed was ex parte*—*Meaning of the words "the decree."* The words "the decree" in s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure mean the whole decree made in the suit. Therefore, in a case where a decree has been passed *ex parte* against some only of several defendants, the effect of its being set aside on their application under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that the whole decree made in the suit is set aside, notwithstanding that some of the defendants had entered appearance at the original hearing. *MAHOMED HAMIDULLA v. TOHURENNISSA BIBI*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 155

1 C. W. N. 652

DOYAMOYI DASI v. SARAT CHANDER MOJUMDAR

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 175

1 C. W. N. 656

36. — *Effect of setting aside ex parte decree and re-opening the case*—*Ex parte* decree against one defendant—*Application by co-defendant to set aside decree*—*Civil Procedure*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

—s. 108 (1859, s. 119)—contd.

Code, s. 106. Where a decree is set aside on the application of a defendant against whom it was passed *ex parte*, the case is not re-opened as against a co-defendant who had appeared and defended the suit. *MANAKU v. SITARAM ATMARAM VAGH*

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 142

37. — *Sufficient cause for non-appearance*—*Mistake.* On appeal from the rejection of an application made, under s. 119 of Act VIII of 1859, to set aside a judgment for default:—*Held*, that, in order to satisfy the Court "that the plaintiff was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing," it was enough to show that there had been a *bond fide* mistake, which was not unreasonable. *HARDATRAI SHRIKISANDAS v. VICTORIA FINANCE AND BULLION ASSOCIATION*

3 Bom. C. C. 60

38. — *Non-appearance of one of several defendants*—*Ex parte* decree. In a case in which one of many defendants, who was made a party to the suit, did not appear, and a decree for possession was passed without any such special orders regarding that defendant as might have been passed under s. 116, Act VIII of 1859:—*Held*, that no *ex parte* judgment was passed against her, and she could not re-open the suit under s. 119, Code of Civil Procedure. *SHEELABUTTY DEBIA v. TARINEE CHURN CHUCKERBUTTY* . 9 W. R. 597

39. — *Right of party who has not come in to take benefit of order of dismissal of suit.* A suit having been decreed against a number of defendants, some of whom did not appear, one (R) of the latter applied for a new trial under s. 119, Act VIII of 1859, and the case was remanded by the Judge to the Sudder Ameen. On the last day of the new trial, another (K) of the defendants, against whom judgment had been given *ex parte*, tendered a written statement, in which it was alleged that summons had not been duly served upon her. The statement was received, and the suit was dismissed *in toto*. In appeal, the Principal Sudder Ameen reversed that part of the decree which related to K, on the ground that she had presented no petition in conformity with s. 119 of the Code. *Held*, that K was properly before the Sudder Ameen's Court and was entitled to the benefit of the order of dismissal, and that the Principal Sudder Ameen went on too narrow a ground, and should have tried the case on its merits. *KOORONAMOYEE DEBIA v. NUBOKISHEN MOOKERJEE* 11 W. R. 18

40. — *Effect of a decree set aside at the instance of some only of several defendants against whom the decree was ex parte*—*Decree upheld on appeal by the other defendants by District Court and High Court.* Where a decree had been made by a Munsif against several defendants, only two of whom appeared and these two appealed from the decree both to the Subordinate Judge and to the High Court, the decree being

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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upheld in both Courts; and the defendants, who had not appeared nor been parties to the appeals, applied to the Munsif and got the decree (*ex parte* as against them) set aside altogether and the Munsif made an order allowing the suit *de novo*:—It was held that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to set aside the decree as against the two defendants who had appeared; it was not an *ex parte* decree as against them, nor was it a decree of the Munsif's Court, but of a superior Court. S. 108 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates the case of a Court setting aside its own decree, and not that of another and a higher tribunal. *Mahomed Hamidulla v. Tohurennissa Bibee*, I. L. R. 25 Cal. 155, distinguished. MONOMOHINI CHOWDHRAIN v. NARA NARAYAN ROY CHOWDHRY . . . 4 C. W. N. 456

41. ———— Decree obtained on document afterwards alleged to be forged—*Ex parte* decree. *W* obtained a decree against *D* and others, founded upon a solehnamah said to have been put in by them. Certain property belonging to *D* was attached in execution, and a notice of sale proclaimed. Thereupon *D* came into Court alleging that she had never had notice of the original suit, and that the solehnamah put in, as far as she was concerned, was a cheat and a forgery, and asked for an enquiry and to be relieved from the execution. Held, that the decree was not an *ex parte* decree, and could not therefore be disturbed by a resort to the provisions of s. 119, Act VIII of 1859. HEMMO MOYEE DAYEE v. WATSON & Co. . 14 W. R. 297

42. ———— Insufficient reason for non-appearance—*Ex parte* decision. Where defendants, summoned under s. 41 of Act VIII of 1859, did not appear on the day fixed for them to appear and answer, and, their reasons for non-attendance not being considered sufficient, they were not allowed to appear in the case: Held, that the lower Appellate Court was right in refusing to hear an appeal from that decision. JOY PROKASH SINGH v. MEGHRAJ SINGH . . 12 W. R. 207

43. ———— Ground for setting aside *ex parte* decree—Order for Review. Where after an *ex parte* decree defendant appeared earlier than fifteen days after service of process, and swore that no summons had been served on him in the case which led to the *ex parte* decree, and that the contract under which the case had been decreed against him had been broken by the plaintiff himself, it was held that good and sufficient cause was shown for defendant's previous non-appearance, and a *prima facie* case had been made out to lead to the conclusion that there had been failure of justice. Held, that, as this evidence was given in the presence of the mooktears on both sides, the Court's order that the case should be entered on the register of cases was a proper order admitting the review. ANUND MOYEE DASSEE v. ANUND SOONDUR MOZOOMDAR . . 13 W. R. 237

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 108 (1859, s. 119)—*contd.*

44. ———— Defendant showing no sufficient cause for non-appearance—*Appearance by vakil*—*Ex parte* case. One of several defendants in a suit did not enter appearance until nearly a month after the date fixed for the first hearing, when he applied by a vakil for leave to be heard in answer, under the last part of s. 111, Code of Civil Procedure. In the absence of good and sufficient cause for previous non-appearance, his application was rejected and an *ex parte* judgment given against him. After this he applied, at the instance of the Appellate Court, for a re-hearing on the ground that the summons had not been duly served upon him. This application was rejected and the order of rejection was upheld on appeal. In special appeal he contended that the case did not fall within s. 119, and that he was entitled to have the regular appeal previously preferred determined upon the record as it stood, notwithstanding his prayer had been rejected under s. 113. Held, that the mere fact of the special appellant having appeared by a vakil in the way mentioned above could not be taken as an appearance within the meaning of s. 119, and was not sufficient to prevent the Court from passing a judgment *ex parte* against him. MAHOMED HOSSEIN v. MUNTOZUL HUG . 18 W. R. 400

45. ———— Cause for non-appearance at adjourned hearing—*Appearance at first hearing*. Where a defendant was prevented by the fraud of the plaintiff from appearing on the last day of hearing, the suit was held to have been decided *ex parte*, notwithstanding that the defendant had been represented on the first day of hearing; and the first Court was held to have done right in restoring the case to the file under Act VIII of 1859, s. 119. DEENO PAROYE v. CHINTA MONEE CHOWDHRY . 18 W. R. 457

46. ———— Prevention from appearing by sufficient cause—*Ex parte* decree against minors. An *ex parte* decree having been granted in a suit against *A*, personally and as guardian of her infant sons, the infants subsequently applied, under s. 119 of Act VIII of 1859, to set aside the decree on the ground that the summons had not been duly served upon *A*, and the application was dismissed. On appeal to the High Court: Held, that, although, so far as the decrees made *A* personally liable, the Court had no power to interfere, yet, as the infants were not responsible for their non-appearances, it might be said that they had been prevented by "sufficient cause from appearing" and that the decrees might be set aside under s. 119 of Act VIII of 1859 (Act X of 1877, s. 108) as against them. KESHO PERSHAD v. HIRDOY NARAIN . . . 6 C. L. R. 69

47. ———— Dismissal for default of prosecution—*Absence of witnesses*. The plaintiff's witnesses not being present on the day fixed for the hearing of the plaintiff's suit, it was dismissed

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 108 (1859, s. 119)—*contd.*

for default of prosecution under s. 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and was afterwards re-admitted under s. 119. *Held*, that, the default not being of the nature described in s. 114, the suit was wrongly dismissed under that section, and for the same reason that the suit was improperly dismissed under that section, it was also improperly re-admitted under s. 119. *MAHOMED AZEEMOOLLA v. ALI BUKSH* 5 N. W. 75

See also *RAM SUNDAR SINGH v. RAM BANDHAN SINGH* 7 N. W. 126

48. ——— Dismissal for default of case in execution of decree—*Appeal*. The remedy, when a case in execution of a decree is disposed of in the absence of the judgment-debtor, is that provided by s. 119 of Act VIII of 1859, and not an appeal. *SHEETUL PERSHAD v. MAHOMED KUREEM KHAN* 5 N. W. 164

RAJPAL v. CHOORAMUN 4 N. W. 10

49. ——— Decree *ex parte*—Death of judgment-debtor—Application by legal representative to have the decree set aside. *Held*, that, where a defendant against whom a decree has been passed *ex parte* for default of appearance dies, his legal representative is not competent to apply under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an order to set the *ex parte* decree aside. *JANKI PRASAD v. SUKHRANI*

I. L. R. 21 All. 274

50. ——— Procedure on grant of new trial of *ex parte* case. Where the lower Appellate Court admitted an application under s. 119 for re-trial of a case which had been decided *ex parte* by the Munsif, it was held to have done right in sending for the record, in order that the case as a suit should be heard and tried by the Appellate Court; the object of the law being that a suit should assume a complete form and go to a full trial and not be divided between different Courts. *KHOOB LALL SAHOO v. KADIR BUKSH*

15 W. R. 431

51. ——— *Ex parte* decree passed on appeal—*Procedure*. *M* sued *A* and others on a bond-debt, and obtained a decree against *A* alone. He appealed to the District Judge, who passed a decree declaring all parties to be liable jointly. On the decree-holder taking out execution, two of the defendants applied to the Subordinate Judge under Act VIII of 1859, s. 119; and their application being rejected, they applied to the District Judge, who referred them to the High Court. *Held*, that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction, but the proper course for the parties was to apply to the District Judge under s. 119. *ZIMUTUNNISSA BIBEE v. MUDDUN MOHAN PAL* 22 W. R. 537

52. ——— “Appearance” of defendant under Civil Procedure Code, ss. 100, 101—*Ex parte* decree. The first hearing of a suit was fixed for the 12th December 1883, on which day the

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 108 (1859, s. 119)—*contd.*

defendant did not appear, and the case was adjourned to the 18th December, and, as the defendant did not then appear, a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff. A vakalatnama had been previously filed on the defendant's part, and he had also objected to an application filed by the plaintiff for attachment of the defendant's property before judgment. *Held*, that these acts on the defendant's part did not constitute an “appearance” by him within the meaning of s. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, which referred to an appearance in answer to a summons to appear and answer the claim on a day specified, issued under s. 64; that the decree was therefore *ex parte* within the meaning of ss. 100 and 108, and an appeal consequently lay to the High Court under s. 588, cl. (9), from an order rejecting an application to set the decree aside. *Zain-ul-Abidin Khan v. Ahmad Raza Khan*, I. L. R. 2 All. 67; *L. R. 5 I. A. 233*, distinguished. *Administrator General of Bengal v. Dyaram Das*, 6 B. L. R. 688, *Bhimacharya v. Fakirappa*, 4 Bom. 206, and *Bibee Haloo v. Atwaro*, 7 W. R. 81, referred to. *Per MAHMOOD, J.* That the Court on the 18th December seemed to have acted under s. 157 of the Civil Procedure Code, and, choosing the first of the alternative courses allowed by that section, acted under Ch. VII of the Code, and passed an *ex parte* decree under the provisions of s. 100 of that Chapter. *HIRA DAI v. HIRA LAL*
I. L. R. 7 All. 538

53. ——— Reversal of Judge's order by High Court—*Appeal*. A suit having been decreed *ex parte*, defendant applied for a revival thereof, under s. 119, Code of Civil Procedure. The application having been rejected, defendant appealed, and the first Court was directed to enquire whether there was sufficient cause for the non-appearance of the defendant. This was done, and the defendant was allowed to defend the suit. The plaintiff then appealed to the Judge, who reversed the last order. Both parties then went back to the Munsif, who, on 26th April 1887, recorded a proceeding that the original *ex parte* order was to stand. In the meantime the defendant appealed to the High Court, which reversed the Judge's order. *Held*, that the effect of the High Court's order was to render valid the Munsif's order admitting the defendant to defend the suit, and that no application for review was necessary on the part of the defendant. *Held*, that the High Court's order, being a final decision by way of appeal on a question which arose in the suit, could not be interfered with, except by the Privy Council. *NUBO KRISTO MOOKERJEE v. NADIAR CHUND HATTEE*
12 W. R. 374

54. ——— Whether an auction-purchaser is a necessary party to an application to set aside an *ex parte* decree. An auction-purchaser of property sold in execution of an *ex parte* decree is not a necessary party

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 108 (1859, s. 119)—*contd.*

to an application made by the judgment-debtor to set aside the said decree, inasmuch as the auction-purchaser does not come under the description of "opposite party" in s. 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *JATINDRA MOHAN PODDAR v. SRINATH ROY* **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 267**

55. ———— Death of judgment-debtor

—*Application by judgment-debtor to have the ex parte decree set aside.* Held, that where a defendant, against whom a decree has been passed *ex parte*, dies, his legal representative is competent to apply under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an order to set aside the *ex parte* decree. *Janki Prasad v. Sukrani*, **I. L. R. 21 All. 274**, dissented from. *GANODA PRASAD ROY v. SHIB NARAIN MUKERJEE* (1901) . **I. L. R. 29 Calc. 33**

56. ———— Different defendants—Ex-

parte decree against two defendants—*Application by one defendant only to set aside the decree—Defence peculiar to that defendant—Order of Court setting aside entire decree as against both—Validity.* First defendant had executed a promissory note in plaintiff's favour. Plaintiff now sued first defendant on the note, as the maker, and he joined the first defendant's nephew as second defendant on the ground that the note was for a debt binding on the family, including second defendant. Neither defendant appeared, and the District Munsif passed a decree *ex parte* against both. Later, the second defendant alone applied under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the *ex parte* decree might be set aside. The Munsif accordingly set it aside *in toto* as against both defendants. When appealing against the final decree, plaintiff took the objection that the order was contrary to law, and claimed that the decree should not have been set aside as against first defendant, and asked to have it restored. Held, that the decree should be restored as against first defendant; whatever doubt might exist in a case in which the decree sought to be set aside under s. 108 proceeds on a ground common to the applicant and another defendant who has not applied under that section, the decree should not have been set aside *in toto* in a case like this, where the defence of the second defendant was peculiar to him. *Mahomed Hamidulla v. Tohurenissa Bibi*, **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 155**, commented on. *GOPALA CHETTI v. SUBBIEE* (1903) . **I. L. R. 26 Mad. 604**

57. ———— Civil Procedure

Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 101—Ex-parte decree, setting aside of, when divisible—Binding effect of such decree against two sets of defendants having a separate defence—Appeal. When an *ex parte* decree is divisible, it is, though in form a single decree, equivalent to two decrees; and when, on an application by one set of defendants who had a separate defence, it is set aside under s. 108, Civil Procedure Code, it remains still a good and binding decree against the other set of defendants. *M* brought a suit for recovery of possession and declaration of raiyati title

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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— s. 108 (1859, s. 119)—*contd.*

against *B* and dur-raiyati title against *A*. *B* and *A* set up separate defences. *M* obtained an *ex parte* decree, which was set aside at the instance of *A*, who disputed both the raiyati and dur-raiyati title. The suit, which was restored and re-heard only with reference to *A*, was decreed. Both *B* and *A* preferred appeals to the lower Appellate Court, which dismissed *M*'s suit. Held, that the *ex parte* decree of the first Court was divisible, and the decree, though in form a single decree, was equivalent to two decrees, one against *B* and the other against *A*, and it remained a good and binding decree as against *B*; also that *B* was no party to the re-hearing, and the first Court had no jurisdiction to retry the case as against him, and the appeal as against that decree to the lower Appellate Court was not competent. *MOHIN CHANDRA GUHA v. ANNADA CHARAN DUTT* (1901) . **6 C. W. N. 109**

58. ———— Sufficient cause—

Non-appearance of a guardian of a minor in a suit, whether a good and sufficient cause—Ex parte decree, setting aside of, against one of several defendants, effect of, as to the decree against other defendants. The simple fact that a guardian did not appear in a suit is not a good and sufficient cause, within the meaning of s. 108, Civil Procedure Code, for setting aside an *ex parte* decree passed against a minor. There are different considerations which bear upon the matter, the question always being whether, in what the guardian did, he acted in the best interest of his ward. *Kesho Pershad v. Hirday Narain*, **6 C. L. R. 69**, explained. In a case where an *ex-parte* decree was set aside against one of the defendants, and the Subordinate Judge set aside the decree against others who did not appear and one of whom made an application to set aside the *ex parte* decree: Held, that this was rightly done. *Mahomed Hamidulla v. Tohurenissa*, **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 155**, approved. *AJODHYA PERSHAD SINGH v. SHEO PERSHAD SAHU* (1900)

5 C. W. N. 58

59. ———— Different judgment-debtors

—*Decree ex parte—Decree set aside as against one only of the joint judgment-debtors—Fresh decree ultimately passed at variance with the decree standing against the other judgment-debtor—Application for order absolute for sale under s. 89 of Act IV of 1882—Practice.* A mortgagee sued his mortgagors (three in number) for sale of the mortgaged property, and obtained a decree for payment of Rs. 2,270, or, in default, for sale. One of the judgment-debtors, as against whom the decree was *ex parte*, applied under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and got the decree set aside as against himself. Subsequently, whilst the decree against the other two mortgagors became final, the third mortgagor succeeded in proving that the amount of the mortgage-debt was only Rs. 1,556-15-0, and a decree was passed against him accordingly. On application by the decree-holder for an order absolute for

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sale, the Court, under these circumstances, directed that an order absolute under s. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) should issue, for the sale of all the mortgaged property, but that the property belonging exclusively to that judgment-debtor who had successfully objected should not be sold, unless and until the mortgaged property belonging to the others had been sold and had failed to realize a sum sufficient to satisfy the smaller decree. *SHAIIDA HUSAIN v. HUB HUSAIN* (1902)

I. L. R. 25 All. 42

60. ——— Minor defendant—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 108, 443—Guardian ad litem—Minor defendant not properly represented—Ex parte decree against minor—Application to set aside decree—How far the granting of such application should affect parties other than the applicant.* A suit claiming payment of money alleged by the plaintiffs to be due on a balance of account was filed against three defendants, viz., Bhura Mal, Musammatt Gayatri, the daughter-in-law, and Jamma Das, the son of Bhura Mal. The second and third defendants being minors, Bhura Mal was named as their guardian, and a notice was issued to him under Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, calling upon him to state whether he was willing to act as guardian *ad litem* to the minor defendants; Bhura Mal was also duly served with a summons in the suit. Bhura Mal entered no appearance, but the Court nevertheless, though no order had been made appointing any one as guardian *ad litem* for the minors, fixed a date for hearing of the suit. Upon that date none of the defendants appeared, and the Court passed an *ex parte* decree against all three. On execution of this decree being taken out by the plaintiffs, applications were made on behalf of the minor defendants under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the decree. *Held* by the Full Bench, that, there having been no appointment of Bhura Mal as guardian *ad litem* of the minor defendants in the manner prescribed by s. 443 of the Code of Civil Procedure (mere notice to Bhura Mal of the proposal to appoint him being quite insufficient), the minors were entitled to have the decree set aside as against them. *Suresh Chunder Wum Chowdhry v. Jugut Chunder Deb*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 204, and *Kesho Pershad v. Hirday Narain*, 6 C. L. R. 69, referred to by ATKMAN, J. On the question whether the decree should be set aside as regards Bhura Mal also, it was *held* by STANLEY, C.J., that, where an order is made under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the decree set aside is primarily the whole decree, and the suit to be proceeded with is the whole suit; though, where a decree passed against several defendants consists in reality of separate decrees against each, it may be that the decree can be set aside in part. When a decree is one and indivisible, it must be set aside in its entirety. *Mahomed Hamidulla v. Tohurenissa Bibi*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 155, and *Ajodhya Pershad Singh v. Sheo Pershad Sahu*, 5 C. W. N. 58, referred to.

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Manakukom Pedru v. Sitaram Atmaram Vagh, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 142, not followed. *Per* BURKITT, J. On the facts of the particular case, the *ex parte* decree ought to be set aside as against all the defendants. *Per* ATKMAN, J. S. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure primarily applies so far only as the particular defendant, who seeks to get an *ex parte* decree against him set aside, is concerned. *Huro Krishno Doss v. Motee Chand Baboo*, 8 W. R. C. R. 260, referred to. Though under certain circumstances, it may be necessary in the interests of justice that the whole decree should be re-opened. Thus, when the decree is one and indivisible, it must be set aside as a whole or not at all, although the application to set aside the decree may be the application of only one of the defendants. *Dookhee Khan v. Rajessuree Ramee*, 15 W. R. C. R. 371, and *Monomohini Chowdhurani v. Nara Narayan Roy Chaudhri*, 4 C. W. N. 456, referred to. The following cases were also considered in the judgment of ATKMAN, J.: *Doorga Persaud Ghose v. Greeshchunder Bose*, 1 W. R. C. R. 222; *Brojonath Sarma Chuckerbutty v. Anund Moyee Debia Chowdhurain*, 7 W. R. C. R. 237; *Manakukom Pedru v. Sitaram Atmaram Vagh*, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 142; *Mahomed Hamidulla v. Tohurenissa Bibi*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 155. *BHURA MAL v. HAR KISHAN DAS* (1902)

I. L. R. 24 All. 383

61. ——— Sale, setting aside of—*Ex parte decree, application to set aside—Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887), s. 17—Deposit.* Where a deposit was made under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code, within proper time for setting aside the sale and subsequently an application was made to the Court praying that the money deposited might be retained in Court pending the hearing of an application, which had been made under s. 108, Civil Procedure Code, to set aside the decree: *Held*, that the sale ought to have been set aside and the lower Court was wrong in refusing to set aside the sale. *Mussamat Shakoti v. Jotindra Mohan Tagore*, 1 C. W. N. 132, distinguished. Where having already made a deposit under s. 310A, Civil Procedure Code, the defendant made a further application to set aside an *ex parte* decree of a Small Cause Court: *Held*, that there was a sufficient compliance with s. 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and no further deposit was necessary. *HANOOMAN SINGH v. LUCHMAN SAHOO* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 355

62. ——— Suit to set aside decree on the ground of fraud—*Sole question raised already disposed of in proceedings under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure.* In a suit to set aside a decree upon the ground of fraud, the sole fraud alleged was with respect to service of summons on the defendant. This question had already been gone into and decided by two Courts adversely to the defendant upon application made by him under

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s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable. *Radha Raman Shaha v. Pran Nath Roy*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 175, and *Khagendra Nath Mahata v. Pran Nath Roy*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 395, distinguished. *PURAN CHAND v. SHEODAT ROY* (1906) . I. L. R. 29 All. 212

63. *Decree ex parte—Application to set aside decree—Right of representative to continue proceedings initiated by defendant.* Where proceedings under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been initiated by the defendant, the legal representative of the defendant is entitled to continue such proceedings. *Janki Prasad v. Sukhrani*, I. L. R. 21 All. 274, distinguished. *Ganoda Prasad Roy v. Shib Narain Mukerjee*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 33, referred to. *BETI JEO v. SHAM BIHARI LAL* (1907) . I. L. R. 29 All. 574

64. *Ex parte decree—Execution against more defendants than one—Application by the other defendants to set aside the decree—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 164.* When a decree is passed against more defendants than one, and the decree is executed against some of the defendants only, that is not a process for enforcing the judgment as against the other defendants, within the meaning of Art. 164, Sch. II of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). *Ravji Ramchandra v. Ramji Bhikaji* (1888), P. J. 56, followed. *HANMANT v. SHANKAR* (1907) . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 303

65. *Section applies to a defendant, who has filed a written statement.* A defendant, who had filed a written statement, but had not appeared at the hearing is entitled to apply under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the decree passed against him. *MUNIAPPAN CHETTI v. BALAYAN CHETTI* (1908) . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 505

66. *Setting aside ex parte decree—Power of Court—Decree to be set aside only so far as it affects applicant.* On an application under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure by one of several defendants, against all of whom a decree *ex parte* had been passed, the Court ought not to set aside any part of the decree, which does not affect the defendant applying, but only affects those defendants, who have not applied. When a decree *ex parte* had been passed against three defendants personally and against *devasam* property of which they were alleged to be managers, and one of the defendants applied to have the *ex parte* decree set aside, the Court can set aside only such part of the decree as affected the applicant (i.e.,) the decree against the *devasam* property and the personal decree against the applicant. *Per MUNRO, J.* The object of s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that a successful applicant should be placed in exactly the same position as if no decree had been passed in the suit and the decree must be set aside so far as is necessary to

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achieve this object and no further. The decree ought to be set aside only in respect of matters to which the applicant could have taken objection in the suit itself. *Per ABDUR RAHIM, J.* S. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure *prima facie* means that the decree, so far as it gives any relief to the plaintiff against the defendant, who is able to establish that he was prevented for a sufficient cause from appearing at the time of hearing, is to be set aside and not against other defendants in the suit, who have not shown good cause for not appearing. The decree against the latter cannot be set aside, except to the extent to which it is inseparable from the decree against the successful applicants. *VALIA PANGA ACHAN v. MARUTHA VEERA KAVUNDAN* (1908) . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 454

67. *Hearing of application under, during pendency of appeal.* Where after preferring an application for setting aside an *ex parte* decree under s. 108 of the Civil Procedure Code, the defendant preferred an appeal against the decree: *Held*, that the first Court had jurisdiction to hear the application during the pendency of the appeal. *Lucas v. Stephen*, 9 W. R. 301, and *Ramanadhan Chetti v. Narayan Chetti*, I. L. R. 27 Mad. 602, referred to. *Bharat Chandra Mazumdar v. Ram Ganga Sen*, B. L. R. F. B. 362, and *Maxwell v. Martin*, 35 W. Va. 384; 14 S. E. 7, relied on. *SARAT CHANDRA DHAL v. DAMODAR MANNA* (1908) . I. L. R. 31 C. W. N. 885

68. *In an appeal against the final decree, the propriety of the preliminary decree may also be questioned.* The dismissal for default of an application under s. 108, Civil Procedure Code, to set aside an *ex parte* preliminary decree, is no bar to the decree being questioned in an appeal preferred against the final decree. The refusal of an application under s. 108, Civil Procedure Code, is no bar to the trial in a subsequent proceeding of a question which the refusal of the application has not determined. *Radha Raman v. Pran Nath*, 5 C. W. N. 757: s. c. I. L. R. 28 Calc. 475, *Khagendra v. Pran Nath*, 6 C. W. N. 473: s. c. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 395, relied on. Where on the failure of arbitrators to submit their award on the day fixed the Court proceeded to try the suit, and passed a decree *ex parte* against the defendants: *Held*, that the dismissal of the defendant's application under s. 108, Civil Procedure Code, for default was no bar to the Appellate Court setting aside the *ex parte* decree on the defendant's appeal, on the ground that the suit should not have been tried on a date on which it had not been fixed for hearing. *GOLAP SINGH v. INDRA COOMAR HAZRA* (1909) . I. L. R. 31 C. W. N. 493

69. *Ex parte decree—Application to set aside, if may be heard pending appeal by the defendant.* The mere fact that an appeal has been preferred from an *ex parte* decree

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and is pending does not preclude a defendant against whom the decree was passed from applying under s. 108 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) for an order to set it aside. *Sarat Chandra Dhal v. Damodar Manna*, 12 C. W. N. 885, affirmed. *DAMODAR MANNA v. SARAT CHANDRA DHAL* (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 846

ss. 108, 157—*Suit part-heard—Adjourned hearing—Withdrawal of defendant's Counsel—Decree—Remedy.* At an adjourned hearing of a part-heard suit, the plaintiff having closed his case, and the case of the defendant having been partially entered into, counsel for the defendant applied for a further adjournment which was refused, and thereupon he withdrew from the case. In his absence the Court passed judgment on the merits of the case. An application to have the decree set aside as an *ex parte* decree was dismissed on the ground that under the circumstances of the case an application under s. 108 combined with s. 157 of the Civil Procedure Code could not lie. *KADER KHAN v. JUGGESWAR PRASAD SINGH* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1023

ss. 108, 234, 368—*Death of defendant after ex parte decree—Application by representatives of the defendant to be brought on record.* S. 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure only applies to the case of a defendant, who dies before a decree is passed. Where, therefore, a defendant dies after a decree *ex parte* has been passed against him, his representatives cannot apply to set aside the *ex parte* decree, unless the plaintiff had brought them on the record as representatives under s. 234 of the Code of Civil Procedure. S. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies only to the defendant against whom the *ex parte* decree is passed. *SAMBASIVA CHETTI v. VEERA PERUMAL MUDALI* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 36

ss. 108, 540.

See EX PARTE DECREE.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 54

ss. 108, 560, 582—*Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch II, Arts. 164, 169—Art. 164 applies when unserved defendant seeks under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside whole proceedings after appeal.* After an appeal is filed against the decree of a lower Court, the power to set aside the original decree on an application under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure becomes vested in the Appellate Court by virtue of s. 582 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Ramanadhan Chetti v. Narayanan Chetti*, I. L. R. 27 Mad. 602, referred to. An application to the Appellate Court by a defendant, who was not duly served with summons in the lower Court and who has not appealed to set aside the original decree under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure is, for purposes of limitation, governed by Art. 64 and not

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ss. 108, 560, 582—*concl'd.*

Art. 169 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act. *SANKARA BHATTA v. SUBRAYA BHATTA* (1907)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 535

ss. 110-116.

See WRITTEN STATEMENT.

s. 111 (1859, s. 121).

See SET-OFF.

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY TOWNS—JURISDICTION—SET-OFF.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 419

1. *Set-off—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 111, 246—Suit for rent—Interest—Damages—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) ss. 67, 68.* In a suit for rent due on a mokurari tenure held by the defendant, the defence was that he was entitled to set off against the plaintiff's claim a certain sum due to him on a decree passed by the Privy Council between the same parties. *Held*, that the set-off pleaded by the defendant could be entertained under s. 111 of the Civil Procedure Code, the decree of the Privy Council not being under execution and s. 246 of the Code being inapplicable to the case. *Held* also, having regard to the pendency of the above decree against the plaintiff and the fact that during the years in suit defendant had paid considerable sums of money to the plaintiff as rent, that the plaintiff was entitled only to the ordinary rate of interest at 12 per cent. per annum from the end of each quarter in which the instalment fell due and not to damages. *BEARATH PRASAD SAHI v. RAMESHWAR KOER* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 118

2. *Set-off—Mortgage—Equitable set-off—Court-fee, if necessary, on written statement claiming set-off.* Where the suit was not one for recovery of money, but was only one for the enforcement of a mortgage security, the right to sue for a personal decree having been barred by limitation, when the suit was brought: *Held*, the case did not come under s. 111 of the Civil Procedure Code and no set-off could be claimed. That an equitable set-off can be claimed when it arises out of the same transaction as that upon which the suit is based. *Stephen Clark v. Buthnavaloo*, 2 Mad. H. C. 298; *Bhagbat Panda v. Bamdeb Panda*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 557; and *Chisholm v. Gopal Chandra Surma*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 711, referred to. That the set-off claimed in the present suit was based upon a separate transaction and could not therefore be allowed. *Per BANERJEE, J.* That a written statement in which a set-off is claimed is not chargeable with Court-fee as on a plaint. *Amir-zama v. Nathu Mal*, I. L. R. 8 All. 396; *Bai Shri Majirajbai v. Narotam Hangovan*, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 672; and *Chennappa v. Raghunatha*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 29, dissented from. *FAKIR CHAND DUTTA v. GIBBORNE & Co.* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 174

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*cont'd.*

s. 111, 111 (d).

See SET-OFF—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1066

ss. 111, 146, 561, 566—*Suit for relief inconsistent with order—Set-off claimed in written statement—Omission to frame issue—Company—Liquidation—Companies Act (VI of 1882), ss. 149, 214—Meaning of "legally recoverable."* Held, that it was essential to the right decision of the suit, that appropriate issues should be framed and tried with a view to determining the validity of Lakshmishanker's claim to set off the Rs. 57,930. On issues having been framed and sent down for trial, the lower Court found that Lakshmishanker had lent the moneys referred to in his written statement and held that he was entitled to set-off the same against the sum of Rs. 41,891-2-0 for which the Appellate Court had held him liable. The plaintiff appealed. Held, that s. 111 of the Civil Procedure Code applied and that the amount due to Lakshmishanker must be set off against the plaintiff Company's demand. *Ince Hall Rolling Mills Company v. Douglas Forge Company*, 8 Q. B. D. 179, and *Ex parte Pelly*, 21 Ch. D. 492, distinguished. *Per JENKINS, C.J.* In my opinion the words legally recoverable in s. 111 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, have no reference to the ability of the debtor to pay the demand in full: and a sum is legally recoverable though in the result the creditor must be satisfied with a dividend. *AHMEDABAD ADVANCE SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY v. LAKSHMISHANKER* (1904)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 173

ss. 111 and 216—*Set-off—Cross-claim in the nature of set-off.* Plaintiffs as brokers for the sale of indigo seed sued defendants to recover the amount alleged to be due to them by the defendants as commission on account of certain sales of indigo seed made by them on behalf of the defendants. Held, that the Court might properly take into consideration by way of an equitable set-off the loss occasioned by the plaintiffs to the defendants through the plaintiffs' negligence in not carrying out the defendants' instruction respecting the selling of the seed. *Niaz Gul Khan v. Durga Prasad*, I. L. R. 15 All. 9, followed. *NAND RAM v. RAM PRASAD* (1905) I. L. R. 27 All. 145

ss. 118, 119 (1859, s. 125)—*Non-appearance of defendant—Appearance by pleader.* Where defendants summoned under s. 41, Act VIII of 1859, did not appear on the day fixed for them to appear and answer, and their reasons for non-attendance not having been considered sufficient, they were not allowed to appear in the case: Held, that the Court of first instance was justified in disposing of the case in their absence, and that s. 125, Act VIII of 1859, contemplates a case in which a party who has appeared at the proper time afterwards appears by pleader. *JOY PROKASH SINGH v. MEGHBAJ SINGH* 12 W. R. 207

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*cont'd.*

s. 120.

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—NON-APPEARANCE OF PLAINTIFF.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 392

1. Dismissal of suit on inability to answer material questions. The plaintiff's mooktear being unable to answer certain questions necessary for the statement of the proper issues, the plaintiff was called upon either to appear personally and reply to the Court's queries, or to send some one who could reply. Having done neither: Held, that the lower Court was competent to dismiss the suit under s. 127, Act VIII of 1859. *NILMONEE SINGH DEO v. RAM HUREE MISSER*

2 W. R. 161

2. Inability of pleader to answer material questions.—*Materiality of absent witnesses.* Instead of dismissing plaintiff's suit on account of his pleader's inability on the day of trial to prove which of his absent witnesses, against whom he had applied for further processes to be issued, were material, the proper course for the Judge was to allow the plaintiff a certain time to produce evidence upon this point, upon payment by him of all the costs of adjournment. *PEARRE MOHUN BOSE v. HURISH CHUNDER GHOSE*

17 W. R. 141

3. Refusal of a plaintiff to attend as a witness. A plaintiff who was represented by a pleader was summoned at the instance of a defendant to attend the Court and to give evidence on his behalf on the day fixed for final hearing. The plaintiff refused to attend on the ground that he was a person of rank and was exempted from personal appearance in the Courts of a Native State. The first Court, considering the personal appearance of the plaintiff necessary, issued an order under s. 120 of the Civil Procedure Code that he should attend, and, on his failure to do so, passed a decree against him. On appeal, the Judge reversed the decree and remanded the case for trial. Held, confirming the order of remand, that the order and decree of the first Court were alike illegal, as the plaintiff having appeared by a pleader, the Court had no power to issue an order under s. 120, unless the pleader had refused or was unable to answer a material question. *SATU v. HANMANTRAO GOPALRAV NIMBALKAR*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 318

ss. 121-127.

See INTERROGATORIES.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 840

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 420

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 117

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—INTERROGATORIES.

ss. 129-136.

See INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS.

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ss. 129-136—*concl'd.*

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—INSPECTION
AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.

s. 130.

See INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 230

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—INSPECTION
AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 424

s. 136.

See APPEAL—EX PARTE CASES.

I. L. R. 7 All. 159

See CONTEMPT OF COURT.

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 1, 5

See INTERROGATORIES.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 420

Exercise of powers given by section. The powers given to the Court by s. 136 of Act X of 1877 should not be exercised except in extreme cases. SHAM KISHORE MUNDLE v. SHOSHI BHOOSAN BISWAS

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 707 : 5 C. L. R. 509

1. s. 137 (1859, s. 138)—*Application for production of documents in another case—Discretion of Court.* Per NORMAN, C.J. When a proper application was made to a Judge under s. 138, Act VIII of 1859, to send for, from the records of his own Court, papers which would be evidence in the case before the Court, the Judge had no discretion in the matter, but the section must be treated as giving a power which the Judge was bound to exercise,—the principle being that where a statute conferred an authority to do a judicial act in a certain case, it was imperative on those authorized to exercise the authority when the case arose. Per KEMP, J. It was in the discretion of the Court to send for them or not. Per STEER, J. Though the Judge was not bound to send for them, it would be unfair not to do so. RUGHONATH BOSE v. OOMED ALI . . . W. R. F. B. 177

2. Papers specially mentioned—*Production of record.* Under s. 138, a Court was not bound to send for the whole record, but only for such papers as might be specially mentioned in the application. JANAKEE BEEBEE v. HABEEBUL HOSSEIN . . . W. R. 1864, 272

3. Decision on document sent for from record of another case. A Judge may send for and inspect any document filed with any record in his Court, and there is nothing in the Code of Procedure to prevent his basing his decision, wholly or mainly, on such document. BUNWAREE LALL v. KISTO BEHARY ROY . . . 1 W. R. 63

4. Admissibility of documents from record of another case. *Held*, that a Civil Court which inspects the records of

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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another case under s. 138 of Act VIII of 1859 can only use as evidence such documents as are otherwise unobjectionable and admissible for or against either of the parties to the suit. NARAPPA BIN APPA HEGDI v. GAPAYA BIN KAPAYA . . . 2 Bom. 361 : 2nd Ed. 341

5. Objection of Judge to send for record in another case. A Judge was not bound, under s. 138, Act VIII of 1859, upon the application of any of the parties to a suit, to send for the record of any other suit. HEERAMUN ROY v. TAHOUR ENAM . . . 7 W. R. 109

CORAAH v. GOOROO CHURN GHOSE . . . 18 W. R. 13

6. Omission to summon Registrar. In a suit on a registered bond in which defendant asked the Court to send for the registration books, with a view to prove the non-existence of the bond at the time it purported to be certified :—*Held*, that, as defendant had failed to summon the Deputy Registrar, it was not necessary for the Judge to use the discretion given in s. 138, Act VIII of 1859. MONMOHINEE DABEE v. SREEDHAMA CHURN RANNA . . . 14 W. R. 302

7. Records from Court of Wards. Where records from a Government office are required as evidence, it is for the Court to send for them ; but papers required from a Court of Wards, which is not a Government office, must be obtained by the party who needs them, by means of a summons on the proper officer. SOBBEE JHA v. SHOSHEENAUTH JHA . . . 15 W. R. 150

8. Public record—*Cazee's book.* A cazee's book is not strictly an official record. Before a document could be inspected under the provisions of s. 138, Code of Civil Procedure, which applied to Appellate as well as Original Courts, the Court was bound to see whether it came under the description of a public record. JUGGERNATH SAHOO v. MAHOMED HOSSEIN . . . 15 W. R. 173

9. Sending records sent for by another Court—*Discretion of Court.* A Court had no discretion to refuse to send records which had been sent for by another Civil Court under s. 138 of Act VIII of 1859. *In the matter of* GOLAP COOMARY DASSEE v. SOONDUR NARAIN DEO . . . 4 C. L. R. 36

ss. 138 and 139 (1859, s. 128).

1. Documentary evidence. Parties are required to have with them in Court, at the first hearing of the suit, all their documentary evidence, but need not file it then unless it is called for. MAHBUB HOSSEIN v. PATASU KUMARI . . . 1 B. L. R. A. C. 120 : 10 W. R. 179

2. Filing documents with plaint—*Translation of document.* By s. 128 of Act VIII of 1859, it was not necessary to file with the plaint all the documents that the plaintiff intended

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 138 and 139 (1859, s. 128)—*contd.*

to give in evidence. A document which is to be given in evidence need not be translated previous to the hearing of the case. *KAMEENEE DOSSEE v. HURROMONEY DOSSEE*

Bourke O. C. 91 : Cor. 151

3. Documents produced, but not filed. This section applies to documents which have been produced at the filing of the plaint, but not filed, and in this way is not incompatible with s. 39. *PREMSOOKH CHUNDER v. RAJKRISTO MITTER* 1 Hyde 145

4. Exhibits. Documents produced in Court under s. 128, Act VIII of 1859, become, upon and by reason of their production, exhibits in the case. *RAOJEE GUNESH v. RAO JALEE PERSHAD* 8 W. R. 91

5. Right to adduce fresh documentary evidence after issues settled—*Ground for rejecting or admitting.* Under s. 128, Act VIII of 1859, the parties, though not entitled as of right to adduce fresh documentary evidence after the issues in the case are settled, may yet tender such evidence, stating the grounds upon which it was not tendered at an earlier stage; and the Judge may receive or reject such evidence, but the grounds on which he acts should be stated on the record. *WATSON & Co. v. KUNHYA BAHADOOR* 9 W. R. 294

6. Documents not filed with record owing to mistake of Court's officers. A Civil Court is bound to receive as evidence authenticated documents named in the plaint, and filed by the plaintiff's pleader on the day appointed for fixing issues, even though, through inadvertence of the amlah, they were not made part of the record. *RAM RUNJUN CHUCKERBUTTY v. ANUND COOMAR MOOKERJEE* 15 W. R. 323

7. Documentary evidence, production of. A party is bound, under Act VIII of 1859, s. 128, to be prepared at all points with his documentary evidence, and, as soon as the Court has framed the issues which it thinks proper to lay down, at once to tender (if called upon) the documentary evidence bearing thereon. The words "first hearing in the suit" are defined by s. 139, and do not mean the first hearing on the issue. *GOUR HUREE CHOWDERY v. PRAN HUREE LAHA* 21 W. R. 42

8. The main object of s. 128 was to prevent parties from manufacturing evidence pending the trial, to meet unexpected exigencies, and not to shut out true, good, and valuable evidence, merely because the party had, without good and assignable cause, abstained from bringing it before the Court at the first hearing. *IKRAM HOSSEIN v. RAM LOCHUN DUTT* 23 W. R. 29

9. Production of documents. S. 138 of the Civil Procedure Code was

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 138 and 139 (1859, s. 128)—*concl.*

enacted to prevent fraud by the late production of suspicious documents, and not to shut out formal evidence beyond suspicion, such as certified copies of public documents like records of Government. *Ikram v. Ram Lochun*, 23 W. R. 29, followed. *RANCHHOD HIRABHAI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 173

ss. 139, 584—Documents not mentioned in list filed with plaint—Discretion of Court in excluding—Certified copies of public documents or records of judicial proceedings—Erroneous exclusion—Second appeal. When a plaintiff seeks to produce documents at the trial, which he had failed to mention in the list annexed to the plaint, the Court has clearly a discretion under s. 139 of the Civil Procedure Code whether to receive or reject them. But in exercising this discretion the Court has to bear in mind that the section was enacted to prevent fraud by the late production of suspicious documents and not to shut out formal evidence beyond suspicion such as certified copies of public documents or records of judicial proceedings. *Syed Ikram Hossein v. Ram Lochun Dutt*, 23 W. R. 29, and *Ranchhod Hirabhai v. Secretary of State* I. L. R. 23 Bom. 173, relied on. When a Subordinate Court has refused in the erroneous exercise of its discretion to receive documentary evidence, which ought to have been accepted, the High Court has ample power to interfere under s. 584 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Moni Lal Bandopadhyaya v. Khiroda Dasi*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 740; *Devidas Jagjivan v. Pirjada Begam*, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 377, and *Minakshi v. Velu*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 373, followed. Unless called upon by the Court, it is not obligatory on the plaintiff to produce documents on which he relies, but which he has not filed with the plaint at the first hearing when issues are framed. *Mahbub Hossein v. Patasu Kumari*, 1 B. L. R. 120, and *Gour Huree Chowdhury v. Pranhuree Laha*, 21 W. R. 42, followed. *TALEWAR SINGH v. BHAGWAN DAS* (1907) 12 C. W. N. 312

s. 140 (1859, s. 129).

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CHARTER ACT, s. 15 . . . 18 W. R. 511

1. Opportunity for Court to inspect evidence. A Court cannot be said to have received documents as admissible in evidence when, for want of time to inspect and consider them, it orders them to be filed; nor would it be wrong in law in rejecting or returning them after proper inspection; the object of s. 129, Act VIII of 1859, being that papers should be produced in a regular manner, and inspected by a Court at its convenience. *SOODUKHINA CHOWDERY v. RAJ MOHUN BOSE* 11 W. R. 350

2. Reception on record of irrelevant and inadmissible documents. Attention drawn to the neglected provision of the

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 140 (1859, s. 129)—*concl'd.*

Code of Civil Procedure, 1859 (s. 129), which prohibits Courts from receiving on the record of a case, without restriction and without discrimination, documents which are either irrelevant or inadmissible. *ISSUR CHUNDER GHOSE v. RUSSEK LAL MUNDUL* 11 W. R. 576

3. ——— Admission and rejection of documents. At the stage of a suit referred to in Act VIII of 1859, ss. 128, 129, and 132, the Court ought to sort the documents tendered into two classes: those relevant and admissible, and those irrelevant and inadmissible; and to reject *in limine* all documents which are evidently such as cannot be used as evidence in the suit. The admission of a document at this stage does not imply that it is evidence, but merely declares that it may, if properly treated, be used as evidence in the suit, and filing it as a part of the record does not confer any authority on such document or operate to dispense with any proof of genuineness. Courts of first instance ought to specify what portions of the documentary evidence on the record they have accepted, and what portions they have refused to listen to. All the proceedings of the parties in respect of the use of documentary evidence are matters to be recorded on the proceedings of the Court by the Judge's own note. *TUMEEZODDY v. BUSARUT* 21 W. R. 76

——— s. 141 (1859, s. 132)—*Production of documents—Endorsement.* Exhibits produced in Court ought to be endorsed with the name of the person who produces them as required by s. 132 of Act VIII of 1859. *BISRAM SINGH alias BISEEN SINGH v. INDURJEET KONWAR* 6 W. R. 1

ss. 141A, 142A.

See STAMP ACT (II OF 1899), SCH. I, ART. 24 I. L. R. 26 Bom. 522

s. 142A.

See APPELLATE COURT—EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL. I. L. R. 14 All. 356

s. 143.

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION 7 C. W. N. 461

See WRITTEN STATEMENT.

11 C. W. N. 871

ss. 146, 153 (1859, ss. 139, 144).

See ISSUES.

s. 153—*Joint debtors—Suit against several joint debtors—Judgment against one joint debtor who admits claim does not bar suit against others—Contract Act (IX of 182), s. 43—Partners—Practice—Procedure.* In an action against two alleged partners, which came on as a short

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 153—*concl'd.*

cause, one of the defendants admitted the claim, and judgment was therefore passed against him for the amount claimed. The second defendant denied his partnership with the first defendant and his liability to the plaintiffs, and on his application the case as against him was transferred to the list of long causes, and postponed. He then filed a supplemental written statement, in which he pleaded that the cause of action alleged in the plaint was joint; that it had become merged in the judgment recovered against the first defendant, and that further proceedings in the suit were therefore barred. A preliminary issue on this point was raised and argued. *Held*, that the suit should proceed. In an action commenced against several joint debtors, judgment recovered against one of them who admits the claim does not bar the further prosecution of the suit against the others. *DICK v. DHUNJI JAITHA* (1901) I. L. R. 25 Bom. 378

1. ——— ss. 154, 155 (1859, s. 145)—

Power of Sitting Judge—Practice. When the issues are framed and the plaintiff and defendant are ready and willing to proceed, the sitting Judge has power under s. 145 to proceed to the hearing and final disposal of the case. *ANONYMOUS*

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 14

2. ——— Procedure where day is fixed for settlement of issues. When a day is fixed for the settlement of issues in a case, the Court ought not to proceed to dispose finally of the case except with reference to the specific circumstances detailed in s. 145, Act VIII of 1859. *JEEAWAN v. GOOLAB KHAN*

1 N. W. 97 : Ed. 1873, 147

3. ——— Adjournment of case—*Necessity of further evidence.* Although a case may have been set down for final disposal, if it be a case in which further evidence is required, the Judge is bound, under s. 145, Act VIII of 1859, to adjourn the case unless he is satisfied that the plaintiff has, without sufficient cause, failed to produce his evidence. *AMEER ALI v. RAM BAHADOOR SINGH*

7 W. R. 84

4. ——— Disposal of suit at first hearing. A Judge cannot dispose of a suit at the first hearing if a party appears and objects to the adoption of that procedure. *KRISHABHUPATI v. RAMAMURTHI* I. L. R. 16 Mad. 198

5. ——— Non-production of evidence at proper time. The great object of the Procedure Code in requiring a day to be fixed for the hearing of a case and all the evidence to be adduced on that day is that parties may thus be confronted with each other, and the whole evidence on either side be at one and the same time before the Court. Where a party fails to produce his documents at the proper time, a Court commits no error in law in refusing to send for them subsequently, if not

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 154, 155 (1859, s. 154)—*concl'd.*

satisfied that they are necessary for the ends of justice. *SOBBEE JHA v. SHOSHEENATH JHA*

15 W. R. 150

1. s. 156 (1859, s. 146)—*Adjournment of case—Sufficient cause—Suit not fixed for hearing.* Without defining what is the right mode of exercising the discretion vested in the Judge with regard to adjournments, the High Court held that the Judge ought, under s. 146 of the Code, to have granted an adjournment in this case when it was applied for, on the first day after the Judge's return to the district that the applicant really had an opportunity of appearing before the Judge, in order to enable the applicant to file his documents and produce his witnesses; s. 147, Act VIII of 1859, not applying to a case where no day has been fixed for the hearing of the case. *SEETA-
RAM SAHOO v. GOLAM SAHOO BAHADUR*

18 W. R. 325

2. *Ground for adjournment—Medical certificate.* Where defendant had known for some time previously that his case was coming on and what evidence was necessary, a medical certificate, to the effect that he was confined to his bed by lumbago, was held to be no sufficient ground for adjournment. *ELIAS v. JORAWAR MULL*

24 W. R. 202

3. and s. 157 — *Application for restoration of suit—Adjournment—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 156, 157, 102, 103.* *Semle:* Ss. 146 and 157 of the Civil Procedure Code do not apply to an adjournment which is not made at the instance of the parties, but which is necessitated by the rules of Court which regulate the disposition of its own business. *TOOLSAY MONEY DASSEE v. PROSAD MONEY DASSEE*

2 C. W. N. 490

ss. 156, 389, 390.

See COMMISSION . I. L. R. 36 Cal. 566

s. 157.

See ante, s. 108 I. L. R. 21 Cal. 269

I. L. R. 23 Cal. 733

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 380

2 C. W. N. 693

ss. 157, 158.

See APPEAL—DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE.

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 270

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 736

I. L. R. 19 All. 355

I. L. R. 25 All. 194

s. 158 (1859, s. 148).

See RES JUDICATA—JUDGMENTS ON PRELIMINARY POINTS.

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 510

I. L. R. 15 All. 49

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 131, 466

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 158 (1859, s. 148)—*contd.*

1. *Remand by Appellate Court.* The terms of s. 148, Act VIII of 1859, do not prevent an Appellate Court, on good and sufficient cause shown, from remanding a case disposed of thereunder, in order that justice may be done between the parties. *LOCHUN MUNDUL v. WUZEER PARAMANICK*

13 W. R. 464

2. *Fresh evidence.*—When a case is remanded by an Appellate Court under s. 148, Act VIII of 1859, with a direction that it shall be proceeded with, the Court of first instance has no authority to receive new evidence, nor the lower Appellate Court to decide thereupon. *PADMA LOCHUN v. SIRDAR KHAN*

3 B. L. R. Ap. 91

S. C. PUDDO LOCHUN v. SIRDAR KHAN

12 W. R. 23

3. *Dismissal of suit for insufficient Court fee on plaint.* The Court of first instance, being of opinion that the plaint bore an insufficient Court-fee, and the plaintiff, not making good the deficiency, dismissed the suit after recording evidence, but without entering into the merits. On appeal the lower Appellate Court held that the Court-fee was sufficient, and remanded the case for trial on the merits. *Held*, that s. 158 of the Civil Procedure Code was not applicable to the case. *MUHAMMAD SADIK v. MUHAMMAD JAN*

I. L. R. 11 All. 91

4. *Adjournment for final disposal—Dismissal of suit after adjournment—Non-appearance of plaintiff.* In a suit, issues having been settled, the final hearing of the suit was adjourned to a fixed date for final disposal. On that date plaintiff did not appear, and the suit was dismissed under s. 148 of Act VIII of 1859. *Held*, that as this was not a case which had been adjourned in favour of either party to enable him to "produce his proofs or cause the attendance of his witnesses," the order was not one which could properly be made. *RYALL v. SHERMAN*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 287

5. *Dismissal of suit after adjournment.* The first hearing of a suit took place on the 16th November, when issues were settled, and the final hearing of the suit was fixed for the 22nd January following. On the 22nd of January, the plaintiff changed her vakil, and applied by the new vakil for a summons for a witness, and on the 23rd the new vakil stating that owing to the absence of his witnesses he was not prepared to go on with the case, the Judge dismissed the suit. *Held*, that, under s. 148 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Judge was justified in dismissing the suit. *COMALAMMAL v. RANGASAWMY IYENGAR*

4 Mad. 56

6. *The first hearing of a suit was fixed for the 10th July 1867. Neither of the parties nor their vakils appeared. Thereupon the Court dismissed the suit under s. 148 of*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 158 (1859, s. 148)—*contd.*

the Civil Procedure Code, but afterwards, upon the application of the plaintiff's vakil restored it to the file for hearing under s. 119. Plaintiff obtained further adjournments to produce witnesses, the last being an adjournment to the 28th September. On that day the vakils of both parties appeared, but no witnesses, and the Court again dismissed the suit under s. 148 for failure to produce witnesses. On the 22nd of October the suit was again, under s. 119, restored to the file on the application of the plaintiff's vakil, and a decision was afterwards come to for the plaintiff upon the merits. On appeal the last-mentioned decree was reversed, and the decree passed under s. 148 (whether the first or second decree was not specified) upheld, upon the ground that, as s. 119 was inapplicable to a decree passed under s. 148, the Court of first instance had acted without jurisdiction in restoring the suit to the file. *Held*, on special appeal, reversing the decision of the lower Appellate Court, that the first decree of dismissal being a decree which might have been made under s. 147, was one to which s. 119 might be applied. That the second decree of dismissal was one to which s. 148 alone applied, consequently one subject only to review or to an appeal, and the proceeding had in October 1867, being substantially an application for review, was one which the Court had power to grant. *AMBALAVANA PADEIYATCHI v. SABBAMANIA PADEIYATCHI* . 6 Mad. 262

7. ——— *Application for Succession Certificate—Order for costs of adjournment against opposing party—Effect of non-compliance with such order.* A widow applied for a succession certificate to her late husband. The application was opposed by his brother, who claimed to have been undivided from him. The matter came on for hearing, but was adjourned on his application, he being ordered to pay the costs. He failed to pay the costs, and the certificate was issued to the widow. *Held*, that s. 158 of the Civil Procedure Code was inapplicable to the case in the absence of a specific order making the payment of costs a condition precedent to the hearing of the evidence of the party in default. *VIRABHADARAPPA CHETTI v. CHINNAMMA* . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 403

8. ——— *Refusal to allow examination of defendant as a witness—Dismissal in default of other evidence.* The Court of first instance refused to grant plaintiff's application to be allowed to examine second defendant as a witness on her behalf, thinking the grounds of such application insufficient for the exercise of its discretion under s. 162 of the Civil Procedure Code. On the adjourned date of hearing, plaintiff failed to produce any other witness, and the suit was dismissed under s. 148. On regular appeal, the Civil Judge considered that the Court of first instance ought not to have refused plaintiff's application, but held that the refusal was a final order not open to question in appeal. On special appeal:—*Held*, that the Civil Judge was wrong on the latter point; that if the

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 158 (1859, s. 148)—*concl'd.*

plaintiff had been prevented from examining the second defendant on sufficient grounds, she had not committed default under s. 148; that the decree on the finding of the Civil Court was not maintainable without enabling plaintiff to examine second defendant; and that that finding was conclusive in the special appeal. The decrees of both the lower Courts were consequently set aside and the case remanded. *LATCHMANA RAU SAIB v. ROGUNATHA RAU*

6 Mad. 299

9. ——— *Dismissal of suit for non-attendance of witnesses.* The plaintiff, upon whose application the Court of first instance adjourned the hearing of the suit, failed to cause the attendance of his witnesses on the day fixed for the further hearing, and the Court of first instance threw out the suit, stating that it did so under s. 119, Act VIII of 1859. Both parties to the suit were represented on that day by their pleaders. The Court of first instance subsequently entertained and rejected an application under s. 119 for a re-hearing. The lower Appellate Court admitted and allowed an appeal against the order of the Court of first instance. Both the orders of the lower Courts were reversed, it being held that the Court of first instance must be regarded as having acted under s. 148 of the Code. *KASHEE PERSHAD v. DEBI DAS* . 7 N. W. 77

10. ——— *Adjournment for process to enforce attendance of witnesses.* Where adjournments are made by a Court, in order to give effect to its processes for compelling the attendance of the witnesses, being thus made as much on its own motion at the instance of the defendant as at the instance of the plaintiff, the case cannot be said to come under Act VIII of 1859, s. 148, which contemplates a case where a party has obtained time to produce his witnesses and has failed to do so. *PEARSEE MOHUN BERA v. SHAMA CHURN MYTEE* . 19 W. R. 34

11. ——— *Procedure—Order for plaintiff to pay the cost of preparation of a Map—Non-compliance of plaintiff with order—Dismissal of suit.* A Court has no power to dismiss summarily a plaintiff's suit merely because the plaintiff has omitted to comply with an order of the Court directing him, within a certain time, to pay in a sum of money as the cost of preparing a map considered by the Court to be necessary to the decision of the suit. If an order of this kind is not complied with, it is the duty of the Court to go on and decide the suit on such materials as it has before it. *SITARA BEGAM v. TULSY SINGH* (1901)

I. L. R. 23 All. 462

s. 159 (1859, s. 149).

See WITNESS CIVIL CASES—SUMMONING AND ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES.

3 C. L. R. 569

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 308

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 86

I. L. R. 16 All. 218

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 162.

See WITNESS—CIVIL CASES—SUMMONING
AND ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 200

s. 168 (1859, s. 159).

See WITNESS—CIVIL CASES—DEFAULTING
WITNESSES.

ss. 174, 175 (1859, s. 168).

See WITNESS—CIVIL CASES—DEFAULTING
WITNESSES.

1. s. 177 (1859, ss. 126, 170) —
Order of Court requiring party to attend,
disobedience to—*Subsequent decree in his
favour.* The plaintiff was ordered to attend and
give evidence under s. 170, Act VIII of 1859, but
failed to do so. The Court, however, being satisfied
with the evidence in support of his case, gave a
decree in his favour. *Held*, that the decree was
valid. *BISSONATH MOJOOMDHUR v. KHETTUR
CHUNDER SEN* . . . Marsh. 467

2. Defendant *bonâ fide* requiring
evidence of plaintiff—*Non-attendance
of plaintiff.* A defendant, who *bonâ fide* and for
a substantial reason requires the evidence of the
plaintiff to be taken, ought not, in ordinary circum-
stances, to have a decree made against him until that
evidence has been given. *ROY DHUNPUT SINGH v.
PREM BIBEE* . . . 24 W. R. 72

3. Appearance of some of se-
veral plaintiffs. S. 170, Act VIII of 1859,
authorized dismissal for default only against the
plaintiff who failed or refused to attend, not against
the plaintiffs who appeared. *PROSUNNO COOMAR
SHAH v. GOOROO PERSHAD ROY* . . . 1 W. R. 25

BINODE RAM SEIN v. BROHMO MOYEE DEBIA
1 W. R. 168

4. Claim barred by limitation
—*Defendant not appearing.* S. 170, Act VIII
of 1859, was not intended to empower a Court
to decree a claim which on the face of it is barred by
limitation, simply because the defendants had been
summoned and did not appear. *DOORGA DUTT
SINGH v. KALIKA SOOKUL. GIREEDHARRE SINGH
v. KALIKA SOOKUL* . . . 7 W. R. 46

5. Non-attendance of witness.
The discretion which a Court had, under
s. 170 of Act VIII of 1859, of passing judgment
against a party for non-compliance with the Court's
order to attend and give evidence or produce docu-
ments in a suit was not confined to cases where the
party summoning him could not prove his case
otherwise than by the evidence of such other party,
or where the fact to be proved was solely and
exclusively within the knowledge of such other
party. *KASHINATH SHAHA v. DWARKANATH
SIRKAR* . . . 9 B. L. R. 215 : 17 W. R. 550

*ISHAN CHANDRA GHOSE v. HARISH CHANDRA
BANERJEE* 9 B. L. R. 218 note : 12 W. R. 369

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 177 (1859, ss. 126, 170)—*contd.*

6. In a suit for contri-
bution in respect of Government revenue, the de-
fendants, co-sharers, were, on the application of the
plaintiff, ordered to attend to give evidence, but
they failed to appear. The Principal Sudder
Ameen thereupon dismissed the suit on the ground
that, as the plaintiff's case had not been established,
he was not entitled to a decree simply by reason of
the defendants' failure to enter appearance. *Held*,
that the suit should not have been dismissed. In a
case where a party summoned to attend as a witness
refuses to attend and give evidence, and the party
who requires the evidence is unable to make out his
case without it, his suit should not be dismissed for
want of proof, when the points on which he fails
depend upon matters of fact which may reasonably
be presumed to be peculiarly in the knowledge of the
defaulting parties, as, for instance, in the present
case, the extent of their own shares, and the amount
they had paid on account of revenue. *HEMANGINI
DASI v. RAMNIDHI KUNDU*

1 B. L. R. S. N. 10 : 10 W. R. 158

7. Default of defendant to
attend—*Examination of parties to the suit.*
When a plaintiff alleges that the defendant has
a personal knowledge of the matters in dispute and
the defendant denies that he has such knowledge,
the Court, before exercising the discretion of
decreting the suit as upon default, should be satis-
fied on evidence as to the existence of such know-
ledge on the part of the defendant. *LAITH NARAIN
DEO v. BOLAKEE CHOWDHRY* . . . W. R. 1864, 24

8. Dismissal of suit on plaintiff's
non-appearance when summoned as wit-
ness by defendant. A Court is not bound
to dismiss a case on account of the non-appear-
ance of a plaintiff summoned by the defend-
ant to attend as a witness, when the defendant did
not petition for attachment or other legal
process to be made by the Court to compel the
plaintiff's appearance. *BUSTEE NARAIN ROY v.
SHAM SOONDER NUNDEE* . . . 2 W. R., Act X, 43

9. Applicability to rent suits.
S. 170 was applicable to the procedure in
suits under the Bengal Rent Act. *CHUNDER
MOHUN MOJOOMDAR v. KETOORAM BOSE*
4 W. R., Act X, 18

SOOPUN KHAN v. HURO PERSHAD PAUL

4 W. R., Act X, 50

Also s. 166. *SOOPUN KHAN v. HURO PERSHAD
PAUL* . . . 4 W. R., Act X, 50

10. Failure of defendant to
appear—*Discretion of Court.* S. 170 was
discretionary. Under it, the first Court might
decide against a defendant, on the ground of his
failure to appear even without going into the plain-
tiff's evidence, and the lower Appellate Court was
equally within the law in going into the whole case
on its merits. *GOPAL LAL BOSE v. KALEENATH
MOOKERJEE* . . . 5 W. R. 89

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 177 (1859, ss. 126, 170)—*contd.*

RAJCHUNDER GHOSE v. KOYLASH CHUNDER
BANERJEE 6 W. R., Act X, 86

11. ——— Wilful default. The stringent provisions of s. 170, Act VIII of 1859, ought to be applied only in the case of contumacious litigants. DATA HURRUKMAN PYNE v. OODOY CHAND PYNE 6 W. R. 247

THAKOOR LALL MISSEER v. BROMOMYEE DABEE
15 W. R. 253

But not to plaintiffs on whose part there is no proof of cognizance of the issue of a commission for their examination, or no proof of wilful default. DATA HURRUKMAN PYNE v. OODOY CHAND PYNE

6 W. R. 247

12. ——— Defendant as witness for plaintiff refusing to produce documents. In a suit to recover the balance due on a partnership transaction, the first defendant, who was examined as a witness for the plaintiff, refused to produce certain accounts relating to the partnership which he was directed to produce by the Civil Judge. Thereupon, judgment was given against the defendant under s. 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On appeal, the High Court, holding that the accounts were relevant and material evidence in the suit, and that the Civil Judge was justified in requiring the first defendant to produce them, and being satisfied that the accounts were in possession or control of the first defendant, affirmed the judgment of the Civil Judge. KATAKAM VENKAIYA v. BHUPALAM PEDDA MULLASAPPAH 4 Mad. 142

13. ——— Waiver of default by Court. The provisions of s. 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure ought to be exercised with the most temperate discretion. Where the Court might have treated one of the defendants as in default, and passed judgment against him under the above section, but instead of doing so passed over the default and made an order adjourning the further hearing of the suit, and on the day to which the hearing was adjourned disposed of the suit under s. 170: *Held*, that the Court by its own act was not in a position to treat the defendant as in default. PUDIYAR VASUDAVAN NAMBU DRIPAD v. KAYAKA KOVILAGATHA VALIA RANY 4 Mad. 231

14. ——— Order to one plaintiff in suit to attend and give evidence. The Civil Judge, on appeal, reversing the decree of the District Munsif, dismissed a suit brought by two plaintiffs under s. 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the first plaintiff had without lawful excuse failed to comply with the order of the Court requiring his attendance to give evidence. There was no order or summons to the first plaintiff to attend to give evidence in this suit, but a summons was issued to the plaintiff to attend to give evidence in another suit to which the second plaintiff was no party, and which was heard together with this appeal. *Held* (reversing the decision of the

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 177 (1859, ss. 126, 170)—*contd.*

Sessions Judge), that non-compliance with the summons to give evidence in the other appeal was not enough to warrant the exercise of the power in this case. S. 170 requires that there should be a failure to comply with an order to attend to give evidence in the particular suit. ARUNACHELLA MUDALY v. VENCATACHELLA MUDALY 5 Mad. 269

15. ——— Discretion in enforcing penalty under the section. In a case which Act VIII of 1859, s. 170, is provided to meet, the Court ought not to take everything for granted against the party in fault, but to require the other party to prove his case so far as he can without the desired evidence, to consider well the effect of the default or refusal with reference to the rules of evidence, and to hear what evidence the defaulting party adduces before imposing upon him the penalty of default. MAHOMED AMIDOOLLA v. DURBESH SHAIKH 24 W. R. 314

16. ——— Non-attendance of defendant when cited as a witness. The non-attendance of defendant when cited as a witness to give evidence is not alone sufficient to justify the decision of the suit against him under s. 170 of the Civil Procedure Code. His absence may be an unfavourable circumstance, but the Court will not always be disposed to attach to it such weight as to regard it as justifying a decree in the plaintiff's favour. ROOP NARAIN MISSEER v. KASHEE RAM SING TIMBIRAM 2 N. W. 67

BHALLY MAHOMED BUKSHEE v. NOBIN CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY 15 W. R. 269

17. ——— Proceedings in execution of decree. A Court may avail itself in an execution case of the power given by s. 170, Act VIII of 1859, to summon a party to give evidence; and on his failing to comply with that order, to pass judgment against him. DESHAN HOSEIN v. KHODIJA 8 W. R. 64

18. ——— Notice to attend, failure to comply with. To render a person liable, to the penalty prescribed by s. 170, Act VIII of 1859, it must be shown that notice had been duly served on him, and that he had failed to comply with the requisition contained in that notice. GOORODASS ROY v. GREEDHUR SEIN 11 W. R. 110

19. ——— Default of defendant to give evidence. Where a plaintiff has not given any evidence in support of his case, he is not entitled to a decree merely on the default of the defendant to give evidence. DAMOODUR BHOOSHUN v. RUGHO NATH PANJA 12 W. R. 242

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20. ——— Default of plaintiff to appear—*Reasons for summoning witness.* In a suit for the right of pre-emption on the ground that plaintiff was a shafee khalit, defendant, who alleged

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 177 (1859, ss. 126, 170)—*contd.*

that plaintiff was only a benami shareholder, offered to establish his case on the deposition of the plaintiff alone. The latter not appearing on summons, the suit was decreed against him under s. 170, Code of Civil Procedure. On this he appealed, and the Judge ordered the Munsif to give him further time to appear. This was granted, and then extended again and again by the Munsif, who, on the plaintiff failing to appear again, gave a decree against him under the same law as before. The case was then appealed to the Judge, who ordered the case to be tried on its merits, remarking that the presence of the plaintiff was not necessary. *Held*, that, as the plaintiff's liability to appear and give evidence had been already determined by a competent Court and never denied by himself, he could not take advantage of a technical objection to show that he was not bound to come because the formalities of the law had not been observed or his evidence shown to be necessary. **JHOMUCK SINGH v. JEEYUN LALL** 12 W. R. 359

21. ——— Failure to produce evidence. In a suit by the patnidar for rent due under a dar-patni, defendant was summoned to produce the dar-patni pottah and a bynamah which he had produced on a former occasion in a different suit. On his representing that they were lost, plaintiff put in a certified copy of the bynamah obtained from the office of the Registrar of Deeds. *Held*, that, as the defendant failed to produce the bynamah or to prove that it was out of his power to do so, the Judge might have passed judgment against him at once under s. 170, Act VIII of 1859. **TARA CHAND BANERJEE v. BOISTUB CHURN BHUDRO** 16 W. R. 196

22. ——— Defendant not appearing when summoned by plaintiff. Where the plaintiff gave no evidence at all in support of her case, it was *held* not just to put in force against the defendant, who, when summoned to appear and give evidence, deliberately declined to do so, the stringent provisions of s. 170, Act VIII of 1859. The exercise of the discretion conferred by that section must be reasonable and judicial. **ALEH AHMED SAJJADANUSHEEN v. NUSSEBUN** 17 W. R. 563

23. ——— Refusal to answer material questions—*Dismissal of suit*. A judgment passed against a plaintiff, under s. 126 of Act VIII of 1859, was reversed by the High Court in special appeal, as there was nothing on the record to show that the party refused to answer any material question relating to the suit. **KRISHNAJI NIMKAR v. VISHNU NIMKAR** 2 Bom. 360 : 2nd Ed. 340

24. ——— Discretion of Court to summon party as witness. Where the law allows a discretion to any Court, it presumes that such discretion will be soundly and properly exercised; and where it is shown that the discretion was not so exercised, the omission will be a ground for

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 177 (1859, ss. 126, 170)—*conclld.*

interference by the superior Court. Accordingly, the Subordinate Judge's order under s. 170 was set aside on the ground that he had not exercised his discretion at all, inasmuch as he had ignored the fact that plaintiff had given very substantial reasons for his inability to attend and give evidence when summoned to do so; and as the Subordinate Judge had held substantially that there was sufficient evidence to prove plaintiff's claim, plaintiff was entitled to a decree, his failure to give evidence notwithstanding. **ISHAN CHUNDER SEN v. ONATH NATH DEB. COWELL v. ISHAN CHUNDER SEN** 18 W. R. 16

25. ——— Default of party to appear when summoned as witness—*Willingness to attend—Lawful excuse*. A defendant's saying that he was willing to attend when he did not attend and showed no reason why he could not, is no lawful excuse for his non-attendance when summoned to attend. What is or is not a lawful excuse must depend on the circumstances of each case. **DOORGA DUTT SINGH v. JHENGOOR JHA** 18 W. R. 63

26. ——— Refusal of applicant for certificate to attend. The appellant, having applied to the Judge for a certificate to collect the debts of one R, whose adopted son he claimed to be, referred in evidence to an ikramamah of adoption of which he filed a copy procured from the kazi's books, alleging that the original had been made away with by an agent who had been bought over by his opponent. In the course of re-trial of the case on remand, the Judge required the petitioner to attend for the purpose of examination, and, as after being warned he did not do so and assigned no good cause for his absence, upheld his former decision, and rejected the application. *Held*, that the Judge exercised the powers conferred by s. 170, Civil Procedure Code, and that it was a proper exercise of discretion to take the course which he did take at that stage of the proceedings. **SEETARAM SAHOO v. SHEO GOLAM SAHOO** 19 W. R. 183

27. ——— Receipt of order to attend—*Non-attendance—Materiality of evidence*. A Court is not justified, under either s. 127 or s. 170 of Act VIII of 1859, in imposing penal consequences upon a party who fails to appear, by passing a verdict against him, unless it is clearly made manifest, first, that he had been ordered or directed to attend and wilfully refused to obey the order or direction; and, secondly, that the evidence which he was required to give was really material to the matter in suit. *Quære*: Whether the party must be proved, by other evidence, to have personally received notice of the order before the penal provisions are applied. **RAJ CHOOKUN DUSWANDI v. BUSJEET TEWAREE** 20 W. R. 165

See OBHOY CHURN MOOKERJEE v. PHAREE DOSSIA 22 W. R. 270

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 179.

See RIGHT TO BEGIN . 7 C. L. R. 274
9 C. L. R. 1
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 287
I. L. R. 9 All. 61
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 454

1. _____ s. 189—*Recording the substance of evidence.* Where a Judge of a Small Cause Court in recording the evidence did not give the substance of the evidence of each witness, but merely a short abstract of the whole evidence. *Held*, that this was not a compliance with the provisions of s. 189 of the Civil Procedure Code. *AMRITA SHAHA v. PANCHKORI SHAHA* (1905) . 9 C. W. N. 418

2. _____ *Recording the substance of evidence.* Case in which it was *held*, setting aside the judgment and decree of a Small Cause Court Judge and directing a new trial, that the evidence was not recorded in accordance with s. 189 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Amrita Shaha v. Panchkori Shaha*, 9 C. W. N. 418, followed. *CHE-THRU GOPE v. SRI CHARAN BHAGAT* (1905)
9 C. W. N. 420

s. 191.

See JUDGE—POWER OF JUDGE.

I. L. R. 8 All. 35, 576

See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASE—GENERAL CASES . . . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 595

_____ and s. 198—*Hearing of suit—Power of Judge to deal with evidence taken down by his predecessor.* A Subordinate Judge, having taken all the evidence in a suit before him, and having completed the hearing of the suit except for the arguments of counsel on both sides, was removed, and the case came on for hearing before his successor. The new Subordinate Judge took up the case from the point at which it had been left by his predecessor, and proceeded to judgment and decree. *Held*, that the only power given by the Civil Procedure Code in such cases is to allow the evidence taken at the first trial to be used as evidence at the second trial, and not to allow the two hearings to be linked together and virtually made one; that the Subordinate Judge should have fixed a day for the entire hearing of the suit before himself, and should first have heard the opening statement on behalf of the plaintiff, the evidence produced by both sides, and the arguments on behalf of both, and then finally decided the case which he had himself heard and tried; that he might, in accordance with the provisions of s. 191 of the Civil Procedure Code, have allowed the depositions which had been taken before his predecessor to be put in; and that in neglecting to take this course, and in deciding the case upon materials which were never before him, his action was illegal, and the judgment and decree were nullities. *JAGRAM DAS v. NARAIN LAL* . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 857

_____ s. 198—*Judgment to be pronounced in open Court or on some future day—Notice to the*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 198—*concl.*

parties or their pleaders or recognized agents—Practice in the Mofussil Courts strongly disapproved of. S. 198 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) provides that "the Court, after evidence has been duly taken and the parties have been duly heard either in person or by their respective pleaders or recognized agents, shall pronounce judgment in open Court either at once or on some future day, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders. Failure to observe the provisions of s. 198 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), and the not uncommon practice in the Mofussil Courts to omit to pronounce judgment in open Court, strongly disapproved of. *BAI DAHI v. HARGOVANDAS* (1906)
I. L. R. 30 Bom. 455

s. 199.

See JUDGMENT . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 293

1. _____ *Suit against a Magistrate to recover damages—Judgment written by a Judge after his transfer.* An objection having been raised to the legality of a judgment on the ground that the Judge wrote it after he had been transferred. *Held*, that s. 199 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) furnished a complete answer. *GIRJASHANKAR v. GOPALJI* (1905) . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 241

2. _____ *Judgment—Judgment written after transfer of the Judge from the place where the case was heard, if valid.* The judgment, referred to in s. 199 of the Civil Procedure Code, which can be pronounced by a Judge's successor, may be written after he has ceased to exercise jurisdiction in the place, where the cause of action in the suit to which the judgment relates, arose, owing to his transfer or proceeding on leave. *Mutty Lal Sen v. Deshkar Roy*, 19 W. R. 1, held inapplicable; *Parbutty v. Higgin*, 17 W. R. 475, and *Sundar Kuar v. Chandreshwar Parsad Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 293, followed. *SATYENDRA NATH RAY CHAUDHURI v. KASTURA KUMARI GHATVALIN* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 756

_____ s. 202—*Procedure—Court not competent to alter judgment after delivery.* Where a District Judge wrote and delivered a judgment in a civil appeal, but suspended the issue of his decree pending the production by the plaintiff of a certificate of succession: *Held*, that it was not competent to the Judge to cancel the judgment already delivered and to pronounce a second judgment inconsistent therewith. *KISHAN KUNWAR v. GANGA PRASAD* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 153

_____ s. 203, paras. (1), (2)—*Court invested with Small Cause Court powers—Decision—Reasons—Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887), ss. 17 and 32.* The judgment of a Court invested with Small Cause Court powers need not contain more than the points for determination and the decision thereupon; the practice and procedure of such Courts being deter-

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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— s. 203, paras. (1), (2)—*concl'd.*

mined in the matter of judgments by paragraph (1) of s. 203 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Ramchandra v. Ganesb*, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 382, dissented from. *NARAYAN v. BHAGU* (1907) I. L. R. 31 Bom. 314

— s. 204—*Form of decree—Findings on issues not essential to the determination of a suit or appeal not to form part of the decree.* *Held*, that although it is advisable that in appealable cases a Court should record its findings upon important issues in a suit or appeal other than the issue or issues upon the determination of which the decree is based, the findings on such issue or issues ought not to form part of the Court's decree. *Tarakant Bannerjee v. Puddomoney Dossee*, 5 W. R. P. C. 63, and *Keam v. Crawford*, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 41, 42, referred to. *BALDEO SINGH v. DHARAM KUNVAR* (1904) I. L. R. 26 All. 234

— ss. 204, 562, 574—*Dismissal of a suit on some one of the issues—Jurisdiction of Court to determine other issues.* In a suit for ejectment the main issues in the case related to the validity of the plaintiff's lease and the character of the defendants' holding. The first Court *held* that the plaintiff's lease was not valid, but instead of dismissing the suit on that one point entered into the merits and found on the evidence that the defendants had a permanent right and could not be ejected on a notice to quit. The lower Appellate Court affirmed the first Court's judgment on all the points. The High Court reversing the finding on the first point *held* that the plaintiff's lease was valid. *Per RAMPINI, J.* That the case should be remanded for the determination of the nature of defendants' tenancy, inasmuch as the lower Courts had no jurisdiction to determine such issues after having *held* on the first issue that the suit was not maintainable: *Held*, by *MACLEAN, C.J.* (agreeing with *MITRA, J.*), that the lower Courts had jurisdiction and very properly exercised that jurisdiction in deciding all the issues, and it was not necessary to remand the case, there being the finding of fact that the defendant's rights were permanent. *ISMAIL KHAN MAHOMET v. HARI CHARAN PAL* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 60

— s. 206.

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 22
I. L. R. 7 All. 276, 411, 606
I. L. R. 11 All. 314
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 177

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES
IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—APPEAL-
ABLE ORDERS. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 679

See DECREE—ALTERATION OR AMEND-
MENT OF DECREE. 7 C. W. N. 880;
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 25, 646

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 206—*concl'd.*

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.
178 I. L. R. 4 All. 23
I. L. R. 10 Mad. 51
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 284
I. L. R. 9 All. 364
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 259
I. L. R. 17 All. 39

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622.

I. L. R. 2 All. 276
I. L. R. 7 All. 411, 875, 876
I. L. R. 8 All. 519
I. L. R. 10 Mad. 51
I. L. R. 16 Mad. 424
5 C. W. N. 192

1. ————— *Decree affirmed on appeal—Amendment by Original Court—Effect—Appeal—Jurisdiction—Revision.* When a decree, after being affirmed on appeal, is amended by the Original Court under s. 206 of the Civil Procedure Code, and no step is taken to set aside the amended decree, the amended decree will be binding between the parties and its validity cannot be challenged in execution proceedings on the ground that the Original Court had no jurisdiction to make the amendment. *Sem- ble*: The amended decree is a decree between the parties within the meaning of the Code and as such is appealable. *MENAT ALI v. AMDAR ALI* (1905)
9 C. W. N. 605

2. ————— *Execution of decree—Limitation—Amendment of decree—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), ss. 19, 20 and 21, Sch. II, Art. 179—Part payment by one of several judgment-debtors.* An order granting an application under s. 206 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not an order passed upon review of judgment within the meaning of Art. 179 of the second Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, and has not the effect of extending the period of limitation for execution of the decree. *Daya Kishan v. Nanhi Begam*, I. L. R. 20 All. 804; *Tarsi Ram v. Man Singh*, I. L. R. 8 All. 492, and *Kallu Rai v. Fakiman*, I. L. R. 13 All. 124, followed. *Kishan Sahai v. The Collector of Allahabad*, I. L. R. 4 All. 137, referred to. *Kali Prosunno Basu Roy v. Lall Mohan Guha Roy*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 258, dissented from. A payment made by one of several persons jointly liable under a decree, otherwise than as agent of his co-judgment-debtors, cannot operate to save limitation as against any of the judgment-debtors other than the person making the payment. *AHSAN-UL-LAH v. DAKKHINI DIN* (1905) I. L. R. 27 All. 575

— ss. 206, 622—*Judgment—Decree—Addition to the decree not warranted by the judgment—Jurisdiction—Revision.* Proceedings under s. 206 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) terminate in an order, and such an order can be dealt with in revision under s. 622 of the Civil Pro-

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

ss. 206, 622—*concl'd.*

cedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). The order under s. 206 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) is beyond jurisdiction if it makes an addition to the decree not warranted by the judgment. *BAI SHRI VAKTUBA v. AGARSANGJI* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 447

s. 209 (XXIII of 1861, s. 10).

See INTEREST, OMISSION TO STIPULATE FOR, ETC. . I. L. R. 3 Mad. 125
I. L. R. 12 Calc. 569

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—MORTGAGE . . . 6 C. W. N. 769

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 89 .
13 C. W. N. 744

Interest—Discretion of Court. S. 209 of the Civil Procedure Code leaves it to the discretion of the Court to allow or disallow interest on the amount decreed, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree. *PEARY MOHUN MUKERJEE v. NARENDRA NATH MUKERJEE* (1905)
9 C. W. N. 422
s.c. I. L. R. 32 Calc. 582

ss. 209, 211, 212.

See COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870), s. 11.
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1232

s. 210 (1859, s. 194).

See DECREE—ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF DECREE . . . 2 Hay 68, 95
4 Bom. A. C. 77
I. L. R. 2 All. 129, 320, 649
I. L. R. 7 Mad. 152
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 143
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 348

See INTEREST, OMISSION TO STIPULATE FOR, ETC.—CONTRACTS . . . 1 Agra 270
I. L. R. 3 Bom. 202
I. L. R. 4 Bom. 96

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 179—ORDER FOR PAYMENT AT SPECIFIED DATES . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 152
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 143
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 348

Power of High Court to make its money-decrees payable by instalments. Under s. 210 of the Civil Procedure Code this Court has the power to make its money-decrees payable by instalments. *Per CURIAM.* The general impression prevailing in the minds of money-lenders in Bombay, as echoed in the plaintiff's affidavit, that in all cases they can defeat the provisions of the Code as to payment by instalments and get a decree for immediate payment by avoiding the Small Causes Court and coming to this Court, is erroneous and needs to be corrected. *POMA DONGRA v. WILLIAM GILLESPIE* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 348

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 211—

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—MESNE PROFITS.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 506

See MESNE PROFITS—

RIGHT TO, AND LIABILITY FOR;
I. L. R. 24 All. 376

ASSESSMENT IN EXECUTION, AND
SUITS FOR MESNE PROFITS;
6 C. W. N. 672

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1017

MODE OF ASSESSMENT AND CALCULATION
6 C. W. N. 732

I. L. R. 23 All. 252

See ONUS OF PROOF—MESNE PROFITS.

5 C. W. N. 720

See SHEBAIT . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 691

1. *Court-fees—Set-off claimed in a written statement.* Where in a suit for rent the question was as to whether defendant was entitled to claim a deduction on account of payment made by him for cesses payable by the plaintiff on account of years previous to those for which rent was claimed. *Held*, that the payment cannot be treated as part payment of the rents sued for, but as an antecedent debt. The claim was, therefore, in the nature of a set-off and Court-fees must be paid for the same. *Dictum of BANERJEE, J., in Fakir Chandra Dutta v. Gisborne & Co., 3 C. W. N. 174, not followed. GUISE v. ANANTA RAM RATHI* (1905) . . . 10 C. W. N. 199

2. *Mesne profits—Assessment—Zerail land—Possession before trespass, character of—Assessment upon produce—Net produce to be considered—Customary and competition rent land—Principles for assessing mesne profits discussed.* The character of possession before trespass should be ascertained, because such possession is a fair index of intention as to the mode of occupation if there were no trespass. The character of the land and its use for a long series of years indicating that the plaintiff, if he had been in possession, would have used the land for cultivating it himself with ordinary food crops. *Held*, that mesne profits should be assessed on the basis of produce and not rent. If the defendant used the land to suit his own fancy, if he did not use it in the most advantageous way, if he took the risk of cultivating it with indigo on the chance of getting high profits by manufacturing indigo, or if he adopted the more comfortable use of the land by letting it to tenants and was satisfied with a comparatively small income, the plaintiff ought not to be a loser thereby. He must not suffer for the indolent or speculative conduct of a trespasser. *Iyatulla Bhuyan v. Chandra Mohan Banerjee, 12 C. W. N. 285; s. c. 7 C. L. J. 197; Gopal Chandra v. Bhuban Mohan, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 536; Surja Pershad v. Reid, 6 C. W. N. 409; Liji Sahay v. Walker, 6 C. W. N. 732, referred to.* The difficulties of ascertaining mesn profits on

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 211—*concl'd.*

the basis of produce adverted to. The net and not the gross produce is the true measure of damages. The resultant net produce after taking into account the cost of production and the risks of the agriculturist differs very little from competition or rack rent. Assuming complete freedom of competition, the rent paid by a tenant-at-will would practically coincide with the whole net produce of any given peace of land. Customary rent paid by most of the raiyats in a village tends to keep down the rent of *zerait* lands. *LACHMI NARAYAN v. MAZHAR HASSAN* (1908) . . . 12 C. W. N. 650

3. ————— Mesne profits—*Khamar land—Interest.* In determining the amount of mesne profits payable in respect of *khamar* land, 5 per cent. on the value of the actual produce was held to be a sufficient allowance to meet the costs of supervision and any other incidental charges for which a proprietor, who is not an ordinary cultivator of his *khamar* land, may be liable. Principles upon which mesne profits of *khamar* land should be assessed discussed. Interest as forming a part of the mesne profits or damages cannot be allowed for any period subsequent to that limited by s. 211. Interest at 6 per cent. and not 12 per cent. was allowed on mesne profits after possession was delivered. *IJATULLA BHUYAN v. CHANDRA MOHAN BANERJEE* (1908) . . . 12 C. W. N. 285

ss. 211, 559.

See MESNE PROFITS.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 329

s. 212 (1859, s. 197)—*Suit and decree for possession—Assessment of mesne profits—Execution of decree.* Where a decree is made under s. 197 of Act VIII of 1859, proceedings taken after the original decree for possession for the purpose of determining the amount of mesne profits are in effect proceedings in continuation of the original suit, and until those proceedings are brought to a close, and an assessment of the mesne profits come to, it cannot be said that a decree for any specific amount of money exists. The working of s. 197 is quite consistent with the view that, where a decree for possession is given, and an enquiry as to the amount of mesne profits is reserved, the decree for possession of the land is only a partial decree in the suit, and that there is to be a further enquiry and a further decree in respect of mesne profits. The words "for the execution of the decree" refer only to the execution of the decree for the land, and cannot refer to execution of that which has not then taken the form of a decree. *DILDAR HOSSEIN v. MUJEEDUNNISSA*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 629

See KRISHNAN v. NILAKANDAN.

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 137

ss. 212, 244, 312.

See LIMITATION. I. L. R. 32 Calc. 175

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 214.

See PRE-EMPTION.

s. 215A.

See APPEAL—DECREES.

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 73

1. ————— Order staying proceedings—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 215 A, and s. 515—Preliminary order—Appellate Court, power of, to stay proceedings.* When an appeal is pending in the High Court against a preliminary order made by a Subordinate Court under s. 215A of the Civil Procedure Code, the High Court having seisin of the appeal can, apart from the question whether the case falls within s. 545 of the Code, make an order staying the carrying out of such order pending the hearing of the appeal. *BAL-KISHEN SAHU v. KHUGNU* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 722

2. ————— Principal and Agent—*Suit for an account—Form of decree.* In a suit by a principal against an agent for an account, on the fact of agency being established it is the duty of the Court to direct an account to be taken of the defendant's dealings as agent. When once the plaintiff has shown that the defendant is an accounting party, it is then for the defendant to prove the amount of his receipts and disbursements. *Hurronath Roy Bahadoor v. Krishna Coomarr Bultshi, L. R. 13 I. A. 123, and Ram Das v. Bhagwat Das, Weekly Notes, (1905) 1*, referred to. *RAGHUNATH v. GANPATJI* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 374

ss. 219, 220, 221, 222 (1859, s. 187).

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES.

s. 220.

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—DIVORCE.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 84

Costs—Discretion of Court—*Grounds for depriving successful plaintiff—Misconduct—Suit filed after admission of indebtedness by defendant.* The discretion given to the Court under s. 220 of the Code Civil of Procedure is one which is to be exercised with reference to a general principle. Where a plaintiff comes to enforce a legal right and there has been no misconduct on his part, no omission or neglect, which would induce the Court to deprive him of his costs, that Court has no discretion and cannot take away that plaintiff's right to costs. The fact that a defendant has, previously to a suit being filed, admitted that the money sued for was due to the plaintiff is not a ground for depriving the plaintiff of his costs. *KUPPUSWAMY CHETTY v. ZAMINDAR OF KALAHASTI* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 27 Mad. 341

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 223 (1859, ss. 285, 286).

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—TRANSFER
OF DECREE FOR EXECUTION, ETC.

5 C. W. N. 150
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 238
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 258

Execution of decree—Decree of Court of Small Causes transferred for execution to a Munsif—Appeal. A decree of a Court of Small Causes was transferred for execution under s. 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the Munsif's Court because the decree-holder sought in execution to bring to sale immovable property of the judgment-debtor. *Held*, that an order in execution of such decree passed by the Munsif was appealable to the District Judge. *ATWARI v. MAIKU LAL* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 All. 1

ss. 223, 229, 229B.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 576

ss. 223, 258, 649—

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 537

ss. 223, 234—*Rent decree—Application for transfer of decree—Order rejecting application, if appealable—Question relating to execution of decree—Step in aid of execution—Tenure in arrears, decree if to be executed by sale of—Personal execution—Jurisdiction.* An application for the transfer of a decree for execution under s. 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an application which involves a question relating to the execution of a decree, and as such comes within s. 244 of the Code. An appeal therefore lies against an order rejecting such an application. *Nilmony Singh Deo v. Biressur Banerjee*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 744, distinguished. *Suja Hossein v. Monohur Das*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 244, followed. *BHABANI CHARAN DUTT v. PRATAP CHANDRA GHOSH* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 575

ss. 223, 311, 312.

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT
(BENGAL ACT I OF 1895), s. 21.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 451

ss. 223 and 649.

See DECREE . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 974

s. 224 (1859, s. 285), cl. (c)—*Meaning of the words "a copy of any order for the execution of the decree. The words "a copy of any order for the execution of the decree" in s. 224, cl. (c), of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), mean a copy of any subsisting order.* *HATHIBHAI NAHANSI v. PATEL BECHAR PRAGJI*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 371

ss. 224 and 320—*Notification No. 671 of the 30th August 1880—Execution transferred*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 224 and 320—*conclld.*

to Collector—Private sale—Subsequent sale held by Collector—Remedy of purchasers at private sales. Execution of a decree for sale of ancestral property was transferred under the provisions of s. 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the Collector. Whilst the execution proceedings were pending before the Collector, the judgment-debtor privately sold the property, and the purchasers paid over the price to the decree-holder, and such payment was certified to the Civil Court, which passed the decree. The decree-holder, however, took no steps to withdraw the execution proceedings from the hands of the Collector, and accordingly the Collector in due course sold the property. *Held*, that under such circumstances the remedy of the first purchasers, i.e., the purchasers by private sale, was by application under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not by suit, and that such application lay to the Civil Court and not to the Collector. *Mathura Dass v. Lachman Ram*, I. L. R. 24 All. 239, referred to. *SHADHU CHAUDHRI v. ARHENANDAN PRASAD* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 101

ss. 225, 228, 244, 588—*Decree—*

Decree passed without jurisdiction—Jurisdiction—Appeal—Practice. When a decree passed by one Court is sent for execution to another, the latter Court is entitled to go into the question whether the first Court had jurisdiction to pass the decree, and if that Court declines to become the executing Court, the order so passed is not an order either under s. 244 or s. 588 of the Civil Procedure Code, and cannot be appealed against. *BHAGWANTAPPA v. VISHWANATH* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 378

s. 229 (1859, s. 284).

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—TRANSFER
OF DECREE FOR EXECUTION, ETC.

Cooch Behar—Court of the Dewan Ahilkar—Jurisdiction. It not being shown that the Court of Dewan Ahilkar of Cooch Behar is a Court within the British territories, or a Court established by the Governor General in a foreign State:—*Held* the Judge of Rajshahye had no jurisdiction under s. 284, Act VIII of 1859, to execute a decree of that Court. *JADAB CHANDRA TOI PARAMANIK v. DINANATH DAS*

4 B. L. R. A. C. 134: 13 W. R. 154

s. 229A.

See TRIBUTARY MAHALS OF ORISSA.

6 C. W. N. 573

ss. 229A, 229B.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—DECREES
OF COURTS OF NATIVE STATES.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 216

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—FOREIGN
COURT . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 400

s. 230.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.

11 C. W. N. 440

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 230—*concl'd.*See EXECUTION OF DECREE—APPLICATION
FOR EXECUTION, AND POWERS OF
COURT . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 541

1. ————— Commencement of
period of limitation under s. 230 (a), Civil Procedure
Code, for application to execute portion of decree not
appealed against. In the case of a decree for the
payment of money or the delivery of property, the
period of limitation for an application to execute a
portion of the decree which has not been appealed
against runs, under s. 230 (a) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, from the date of the decree on appeal.
Muthu v. Chellappa, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 479, dissented
from. *KRISTNAMA CHARIAR v. MANJAMMAL*
(1902) . . . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 91

2. ————— Execution of decree
—Decree on appeal modifying the first decree. A
decree for payment of money was modified on
appeal. *Held*, that the decree to be executed
being the decree made on appeal, the twelve
years mentioned in s. 230 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure would run from the date of the appellate decree.
MAHOMED MEHDI BELLA v. MOHINI KANTA SAHA
CHOWDHRY (1907) . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 874

ss. 230 and 231 (1859, s. 207).

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—APPLICATION
FOR EXECUTION, AND POWERS OF COURTS.
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 400
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 631See EXECUTION OF DECREE—JOINT
DECREES, EXECUTION OF AND LIABILITY
UNDER.See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.
179 (1871, s. 167; 1859, s. 20)—JOINT
DECREES.See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.
180 . . . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 504
I. L. R. 6 Bom. 258
I. L. R. 7 Mad. 540
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 551
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 921
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 244

1. ————— Application of section.
S. 230 does not apply to decrees made by the High
Courts. *MAYABHAI v. TRIBHUVANDAS*
I. L. R. 6 Bom. 258

2. ————— Effect of section—Decree of
High Court—Revivor—Limitation Act, 1877, Sch. II,
Art. 180. S. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1882, does not affect the period of limitation pre-
scribed by Art. 180 of Sch. II of the Limitation
Act, 1877. *GANAPATHI v. BALASUNDARA*
I. L. R. 7 Mad. 540

3. ————— Date of the passing of the
Code—Date of its coming into force. The date

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 230 and 231 (1859, s. 207)—*contd.*

referred to in the last paragraph of s. 230 of the
Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877) as the date
of "the passing of" that Act *held* to be the 30th
March 1877, the date when that Act received the
assent of the Governor General, and not the 1st Octo-
ber 1877, the date of the coming into force of that
Act. *DAMODAR DAS HARI DAS v. UTTAMCHAND*
SAVIACHAND . . . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 214

4. ————— Law in force immediately
before passing of the Code—Civil Proce-
dure Code, 1877, as amended by Act XII of
1879—Execution of decree—Limitation. In the
last paragraph of s. 230 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, Act XIV of 1882, the words "the law in force
immediately before the passing of this Code" refer
to and include Act X of 1877, as amended by Act
XII of 1879. *Musharraf Begum v. Ghalib Ali*, I.
L. R. 6 All. 189, dissented from. *GOLUCK*
CHANDRA MYTEE v. HARAPRIAH DERI
I. L. R. 12 Calc. 559

5. ————— Limitation—
Twelve years' rule prior to that Code—Civil Pro-
cedure Code (Act X of 1877). In s. 230 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, the words "law in
force" include the Civil Procedure Code, 1877, as
well as the Limitation Act then in force. *Held*,
therefore, where an application for execution of a
decree of 1872 had been made and granted in
January 1882 and under s. 230 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1877, further execution became barred,
before the date on which the Civil Procedure Code,
1882, came into force, that no application within
three years from such date could be granted under
s. 230 of that Code. *KOLLU SHETTATI v. MANJAYA*
I. L. R. 9 Mad. 454

6. ————— Execution of de-
cree—Act X of 1877 (Civil Procedure Code), s. 230.
The holder of a decree applied for execution under
s. 230 of Act X of 1877, and the application was
granted. Within three years after the passing of
Act XIV of 1882, by which Act X of 1877 was re-
pealed, he applied, for the first time, under s. 230
of the former Act, for execution of the decree.
At the time this application was made more than
twelve years had elapsed from the date of the decree.
Held, by *STRAIGHT, BROADHURST, and TYRRELL,*
JJ., that the application might be granted, it being
the first made under s. 230 of Act XIV of 1882, and
the first made after the expiration of twelve years
from the date of the decree, and not being barred
by the last paragraph of s. 230 of that Act, read in
conjunction with the third paragraph of s. 230 of
Act X of 1877, the "law in force" mentioned in
the last paragraph of s. 230 of Act XIV of 1882
referring to the law of limitation in force at the time
the Act was passed, and not to the third paragraph
of s. 230 of Act X of 1877. *Held* by *STUART, C.J.,*
and *OLDFIELD, J.*, that the application should not
be granted, the effect of the last paragraph of s.
230 of Act XIV of 1882 being to bar any proceedings.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 230 and 231 (1859, s. 207)—*contd.*

to enforce a decree under that Act which would have been barred under s. 230 of Act X of 1877 if taken thereunder, on the ground that the period of twelve years had elapsed from the date specified in that section. *Musharraff Begum v. Ghalib Ali* I. L. R. 6 All. 189

7. ———— *Revival of barred decrees—Twelve years old decree—Act X of 1877 (Civil Procedure Code), s. 230.* Where an application was made under s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1877, as amended by Act XII of 1879, for execution of a decree more than twelve years old, and the application was granted:—*Held*, that a subsequent application for execution of the decree, under s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, should have been refused, since the decree had been once allowed the benefit of the three years' grace under the last paragraph of s. 230 of the Code of 1877, and then became dead or unexecutable. *Held*, that there is nothing in the Code of 1882 to justify the conclusion that it was intended to revive decrees which had become dead before it became law, and that here the decree-holders' right having already become dead before the enactment of the present Code, the passing of that Code could not bring that right into existence again. *Musharraff Begum v. Ghalib Ali*, I. L. R. 6 All. 189, distinguished. *Bhawani Das v. Daulat Ram*

I. L. R. 6 All. 388

8. ———— *Former application for execution under Act VIII of 1859.* An application under Act VIII of 1859 for execution of a decree was rejected by the District Judge on the ground that the judgment-creditor had withdrawn from the former application. This order was reversed on appeal, and the case was sent back for disposal on its merits. The Judge then *held* that Act X of 1877, which had just come into force, applied, and, on the ground that the decree-holder had failed to get execution upon his former application, dismissed the petition. The Judge referred the case to the High Court upon the question whether he was, under the circumstances, at liberty to grant the application. *Held*, that he was. The application should have been dealt with under the law which was in force at the time execution was sought. The effect of the provisions of s. 230 of Act X of 1877, considered. *Byraddi Subbaredhi v. Dassuppa Raju* I. L. R. 1 Mad. 403

9. ———— *Effect of striking off execution proceedings—Procedure.* A decree was obtained on the 10th July 1858, and applications to execute it were made in June 1862 and January 1866. The last application prior to the coming into operation of the Civil Procedure Code of 1877 was on the 10th January 1876. This proceeding was struck off. The decree-holder on the 13th June 1879 again applied for execution; the decree was transferred to S for execution, where, on objection that it was more than twelve years old,

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 230 and 231 (1859, s. 207)—*contd.*

and therefore barred by s. 230 of Act X of 1877, the execution proceedings were again struck off on the 17th January 1880. This order was appealed against, and eventually, on the 25th April 1881, the application was re-admitted. In June 1881 an application was made to the S Court for transfer of the case for execution to D, which was granted, and the case transferred; but no steps having been taken by the decree-holder in the D Court, it was struck off by that Court on the 19th August 1881. On the 4th March 1882 (the judgment-debtor having died meanwhile), an application was made to the D Court to restore the proceedings for execution against his representative. Notices were issued, and the 2nd June was eventually fixed for the hearing. On that day no one was present on behalf of the decree-holder (whose pleader had died in the meantime), and the case was again struck off. On the 11th July 1882, application was made to restore the proceedings, notices were issued, and a day fixed for hearing, and after numerous adjournments the objections of the judgment-debtor were overruled on the 5th March 1883, and execution of the decree granted. On appeal the Judge found that the execution proceedings had been continuous throughout, and that there had been no unreasonable delay in the prosecution of the execution proceedings. *Held*, that execution of the decree was not barred by s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Biswa Sonan Chunder Gossyamy v. Binanda Chunder Dibingar Adhikar Gossyamy*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 416

10. ———— The clause of s. 230 of Act X of 1877, which prohibits a subsequent application for execution, only applies where the previous application has been made under that section, and not where such previous application has been made under Act VIII of 1859. *Ashoo-tosh Dutt v. Doorga Churn Chatterjee*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 504 : 8 C. L. R. 23

11. ———— *Execution of decree.* *Held*, that the words "the last preceding application" in the third clause of s. 230 of Act X of 1877 mean an application under that section, and not an application under Act VIII of 1859. *Ram Kishen v. Sedhu* I. L. R. 2 All. 275

12. ———— *Former application for execution under Act X of 1877—Execution of decree—Twelve years old decree—Statutes, construction of—General words—Retrospective effect.* The holder of a decree bearing date the 15th June 1872 applied for execution thereof on the 9th February 1855, the previous application being dated the 27th November 1883. *Held*, that the application for execution was not barred by s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Musharraff Begum v. Ghalib Ali*, I. L. R. 6 All. 189, followed. *Goluck Chandra Mytee v. Harapriah Debi*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 559. *Bhawani Das v. Daulat Ram*, I. L. R. 6 All. 388.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 230 and 231 (1859, s. 207)—*contd.*

and *Sreenath Goocho v. Yusoof Khan*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 556, referred to. *Tufail Ahmad v. Sadhu Saran Singh*, All. Weekly Notes (1885), 193, discussed and dissented from by MAHMOOD, J. Per MAHMOOD, J. The rule of construction being that a limited meaning can only be given to general words in a statute where the statute itself justifies such limitation, the words "any decree" in the proviso to s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code must not be construed as confined to such decrees as would be barred on the date of the Code coming into force, inasmuch as no reason for so restricting the meaning of those words can be found in the Code or is suggested by the legislative policy upon which clauses such as the proviso in question are based. This policy is to prevent a sudden disturbance of existing rights in consequence of new legislation; but it is beyond its object and scope to revive rights or remedies which have already expired before the new Act comes into operation, and although the Legislature may revive such rights or remedies, it can only do so by express words to that effect. *JOKHU RAM v. RAM DIN*. I. L. R. 8 All. 419

13. — "Decree for payment of money"—*Decree for sale of hypothecated property in a suit on a mortgage.* A decree for sale of hypothecated property made in a suit for sale upon a mortgage bond is not a "decree for the payment of money" within the meaning of s. 230 of Act XIV of 1882. *Fateh Chana v. Muhammad Bukhsh*, I. L. R. 16 All. 259, distinguished. *RAM CHARAN BHAGAT v. SHEOBARAT RAI* I. L. R. 16 All. 418

14. — *Decree for sale of hypothecated property, which also made the defendant personally liable in case of insufficiency—Mortgage decree.* A decree which directs the realization of the decretal amount from the hypothecated property, and, if insufficient, makes the defendant remain personally liable, is a mortgage decree and not a "decree for the payment of money" within the meaning of s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Ram Charan Bhagat v. Sheobarat Rai*, I. L. R. 16 All. 418, followed. *Hart v. Tara Prasanna Mukherjee*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 713, distinguished. *Jogemaya Dasi v. Thackomoni Dasi*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 473, referred to. *FAZIL HOWLADAR v. KRISHNA BUNDHOO ROY*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 580
2 C. W. N. 118

15. — *Decree for sale of mortgage property making the defendant personally liable in case of insufficiency—Mortgage decree—Limitation Act (XV of 1879), Sch. II, Art. 179, cl. 4—Step in aid of execution—Application for time—Application to review the order striking off the execution case and to restore it to file.* A decree which directs the realization of the decretal amount by sale, in the first instance, of the mortgaged properties and afterwards from the persons and other properties of the defendants, is a mortgage decree,

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 230 and 231 (1859, s. 207)—*contd.*

and not "a decree for the payment of money" within the meaning of s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Ram Charan Bhagat v. Sheobarat Rai*, I. L. R. 16 All. 418, and *Fazil Howladar v. Krishna Bhundoo Roy*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 580, referred to and followed. *Kommachi Kather v. Pakker*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 107, dissented from. *Fakeer Buksh v. Chutterdharee Chowdhry*, 14 W. R. 209; 12 B. L. R. 315 note, and *Purmessuree Dossee v. Nabin Chunder Tarun*, 24 W. R. 305, distinguished. KARTICK NATH PANDEY v. JUGGERNATH RAM MARWARI

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 285

16. — *Hypothecation decree—Construction of document.* A decree was passed on the 5th March 1884, based on a compromise between the parties. The decree was for the payment of certain sums of money by instalments, and further went on to declare that "The property in the bond remains hypothecated as before. The defendant have no power to transfer it. If any other person brings to sale the hypothecated property in satisfaction of the debt due by the defendants, the plaintiff shall have power to take out execution of the decree without waiting for the instalments, and to cause the hypothecated property to be sold by auction." Held, that this was not a simple decree for the payment of money such as would come within the purview of s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Janki Prasad v. Baldeo Narain*, I. L. R. 3 All. 216, distinguished. *Chandra Nath Dey v. Burroda Shoodury Ghose*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 813, and *Lal Behary Singh v. Habibur Rahman*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 166, referred to. PAHALWAN SINGH v. NARAIN DAS I. L. R. 22 All. 401

17. — *Due diligence in execution—Execution of decree—Limitation.* The concluding clause of s. 230 of Act X of 1877 refers to the question of limitation, not that of due diligence. Where, therefore, the decree-holder had not on the last preceding application under s. 230 of Act X of 1877 used due diligence to procure complete satisfaction of the decree, and Act X of 1877 had not been in force three years: Held, that the provisions of the third clause of s. 230 of Act X of 1877 were applicable to a subsequent application under that section. SOHAN LAL v. KARIM BAKHSI

I. L. R. 2 All. 281

18. — *Application for execution not made under the Civil Procedure Code, 1882—Decree—Application for execution—Limitation.* On the 1st June 1880, several decree-holders applied to the Subordinate Civil Court of Parner for execution of their decrees. They had taken out execution several times previously, the date of their last preceding applications being 1st June 1877. The Subordinate Judge was of opinion that the applications were barred under the last clause of s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act X of 1877. On his referring the cases to the High

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

—ss. 230 and 231 (1859, s. 207)—*contd.*

Court:—*Held*, that the applications were not barred inasmuch as the previous applications for execution had not been made under s. 230 of Act X of 1877, that Act not being then in force. **ANANDRAV CHIMUJI v. THAKAR CHAND**

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 245

19. — On the 3rd June 1879, an application was made for execution of a decree passed in 1836, and upon that application certain property was attached. On the 23rd October following, the proceedings were struck off, an order, however, being made at the same time that the attachment should continue. On the 31st December 1880, the decree-holder applied that the property under attachment should be sold. The last preceding application for execution previous to the 3rd June 1879 was made on the 8th August 1877. It was objected that the proceedings upon the applications of the 31st December 1880 and 3rd June 1879 were barred under s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that these proceedings were not barred, inasmuch as the previous application had not been made under s. 230 of the Code. **Anand-rav Chimuji Avati v. Thakar Chand**, **I. L. R. 5 Bom. 245**, followed. *Held*, also, that the application of 3rd December 1880 could not be treated as a fresh application for execution within the meaning of the third paragraph of the section referred to. **PANAUL HUQ v. KISHEN MUN DABEE**

9 C. L. R. 297

20. — Application for execution of decree—*Limitation*. *R N* and others obtained a simple money decree against *R S* and another on the 24th of February 1881. On the 2nd of May 1892, previous applications for execution having been unsuccessful, the decree-holders made an application for execution in consequence of which certain property of the judgment-debtors was attached. That application was subsequently struck off by the Court, the attachment being maintained. On the 7th of March 1893, a further application for execution was made. *Held*, that, whether the application of the 7th of March 1893 was or was not merely a continuation of the former application of the 2nd of May 1892, execution of the decree was barred by the rule prescribed by s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure. **RAM NEWAZ v. RAM CHARAN**

I. L. R. 18 All. 49

21. — Granting of application for execution of decree. An application for execution of a decree, which was more than twelve years old, having been made on the 14th August 1880 under s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order was made for the attachment of the moveable property of the judgment-debtor. No moveable property having been found, the Court was asked to attach his immoveable property, but refusing to do so, struck off the proceedings. The application for execution having been renewed on the 13th September 1880, it was *held* that the

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

—ss. 230 and 231 (1859, s. 207)—*contd.*

former application for execution must be treated as having been granted within the meaning of s. 230 of the Code, and consequently that the further application was barred under that section, the decree being more than twelve years old. **AFRANNESSA CHOWDHURANI v. SAHRAFUTULLAH CHOWDHURY**

9 C. L. R. 321

22. — *Issue of notice to debtor*. Where an application to execute a decree of 1862 was made under s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877, on the 14th of December 1877 and a notice was issued to the judgment-debtor under s. 248, but no further steps were taken:—*Held*, that a subsequent application made within three years from that date was not affected by the twelve years' rule, as the last preceding application had not been granted within the meaning of s. 230. **CHENGAYA v. APPASAMI AYYAR**

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 172

23. — *Transfer of decree—Due diligence*. The transferee of a decree applied, while an application by the original holder of such decree to execute it was pending, to be allowed to execute it. The Court, in accordance with s. 232 of Act X of 1877, directed notice of the transferee's application to be given to the transferor and the judgment-debtor. The transferee failed to pay the Court-fee leviable for the issue of such notice, and the Court dismissed his application. The transferee subsequently made a second application to be allowed to execute the decree. *Held*, that such application could not be rejected, with reference to s. 230 of Act X of 1877, on the ground that due diligence had not been used on the former application to procure complete satisfaction of the decree, because such application had not been granted; and, therefore, the question whether "on the last preceding application" due diligence was used to procure such satisfaction did not arise. **SADIK ALI KHAN v. MUHAMMAD HUSAIN KHAN**

I. L. R. 2 All. 384

24. — *Passing of the Act—Meaning of the expression "granted" in s. 230*. Under s. 230 of Act X of 1877, an application for execution is said to be "granted" when it is made regularly and formally. The expression "granted" is equivalent to the expression "admitted" as used in s. 245. Where, therefore, an application for execution under s. 230 of Act X of 1877 is not "granted," a subsequent regular and formal application under the same section may be allowed if made within time. **DEWAN ALI v. SOROSIBALA DABEE**

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 297: 10 C. L. R. 111

25. — *Meaning of "granted"*. Under s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code, after a decree is twelve years old, there is a prohibition against its being executed more than once,—i.e., an application for execution should not be granted if a previous application has been allowed under the provisions of that section. The

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 230 and 231 (1859, s. 207)—*contd.*

mere filing of a petition with the result that the application contained in it is subsequently struck off is not "granting" an application within the meaning of s. 230 of the Code; and ss. 245, 248, and 249 show that there is a broad distinction between admitting an application for the purpose of issuing notice to the other side and of hearing the objections that may be urged, and a decision of the Court as provided in s. 249. In 1865 a decree was passed for a sum of money payable by yearly instalments for a period of sixteen years. Down to March 1877, various amounts were paid on account of the decree. In that month an application was made for execution of the decree, the result being an arrangement for liquidation of the amount then due, which was confirmed by the Court. A second application for execution was made on the 9th March 1881, the decree then being more than twelve years old. All that was done with reference to this application was that notice to appear was issued to the judgment-debtor's representatives, and subsequently a petition was filed notifying that an arrangement had been effected, under which a certain sum had been paid by one of the said representatives in satisfaction of the claim against him, and that the other had agreed to pay the balance by yearly instalments. Upon this the application for execution was struck off. On the 5th March 1883, another application for execution was made, notice to appear was issued, and after this notice a petition was put in intimating that an arrangement had been come to, and praying that execution might be postponed, whereupon the application was struck off. Again, on the 31st March 1884, the decree-holder applied once more for execution of the decree. *Held*, that neither the previous application of the 9th March 1881 nor that of the 5th March 1883 could properly be said to have been "granted" within the meaning of s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code, and, under these circumstances, the decree, though twelve years old and upwards was not barred by that section, and the application for execution should be allowed. *PARAGA KUAR v. BHAGWAN DIN*. I. L. R. 8 All. 301

26. ————— *Twelve years old decree—Meaning of "granted."* A decree passed in April 1872 was kept alive by various applications for execution up to 1883. In February and December of that year two such applications were made, but the proceedings on both occasions terminated in the applications being struck off without any money being realized under the decree. In November 1884, the decree-holder again applied for execution, the application being the first made after the decree had become twelve years old, and being made within three years from the passing of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882. *Held*, that the application must be entertained in accordance with the ruling of the Full Bench in *Musharraf Begum v. Ghalib Ali*, I. L. R. 6 All. 189, *Tufail*

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 230 and 231 (1859, s. 207)—*contd.*

Ahmad v. Sadho Saran Singh, All. Weekly Notes (1885), 193, dissented from. *Jokhu Ram v. Ram Din*, I. L. R. 8 All. 419, referred to. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*, that the previous execution-proceedings, initiated by the applications of February and December 1883, having terminated in those applications being struck off, it could not be said that the applications were "granted" within the meaning of s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Paraga Kuar v. Bhagwan Din*, I. L. R. 8 All. 301, referred to. *RAMADHAR v. RAM DAYAL*. I. L. R. 8 All. 536

27. ————— *Application for execution of decree—Limitation—Subsequent application to execute the same decree—"Granted," meaning of—Civil Procedure Code, s. 235.* The "subsequent application to execute the same decree" mentioned in s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure means a substantive application for execution in the form prescribed by s. 235 of the Code. Hence, where an application for execution in accordance with s. 235 of the Code has been made within the period of limitation prescribed by s. 230 and has been granted, that is, execution has been ordered in accordance with the prayer of the decree-holder's application, the right of the decree-holder to obtain execution will not necessarily be defeated if, by reason of objections on the part of the judgment-debtor or action taken by the Court or other cause for which the decree-holder is not responsible, final completion of the proceedings in execution initiated by the application under s. 235 above referred to cannot be obtained within the period limited by s. 230. Further applications of the decree-holder to the Court executing the decree to go on from the point where the execution proceedings had been arrested and complete execution of his decree would be applications merely ancillary to the substantive application under s. 235, and would not be obnoxious to the bar of s. 230. *Delhi and London Bank v. Reilly*, Weekly Notes, All. (1893), 124, overruled. *RAHIM ALI KHAN v. PUHL CHAND*. I. L. R. 18 All. 482

28. ————— *Application to transfer decree for execution—"Granting" application, meaning of—Issue of process.* An application to the Court which passed a decree for a certificate to allow execution to be taken out in another Court is not an application for the execution of the decree within the terms of s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The "granting" of an application under that section includes the issue of process for execution of the decree. *NILMONEY SINGH DEO v. BIRESSUR BANERJEE*. I. L. R. 16 Calc. 744

29. ————— *Execution of decree—Limitation.* The term "application to execute a decree" in the third paragraph of s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure means any application to execute a decree. It is not confined to the last application preceding the expiry of the period of

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twelve years from either of the points of time mentioned in cl. (a) or cl. (b) of the same paragraph of the section abovementioned. *Paraga Kuar v. Bhagwan Din*, I. L. R. 8 All. 301, distinguished. *Ramadhur v. Ram Dayal*, I. L. R. 8 All. 536, referred to. *TILSHAK RAI v. PARBATI*
I. L. R. 15 All. 198

30. ———— *Order passed more than twelve years from decree on application passed within time.* The terms of s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provide that no subsequent application to execute the same decree shall be granted after the expiry of twelve years from the date of the decree, do not render invalid an order passed after twelve years from the date of a decree, granting an application for execution made before the twelve years' term had expired. *SENRA DISAI VENRA JAGATH VIRARAMA DIKKER VIJAYA SETHARAYAR v. ANNASAMI AYYAR*
I. L. R. 6 Mad. 359

31. ———— *Second application for execution of decree—Failure to satisfy decree on first application.* In execution of a decree passed more than twelve years before the date of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), certain judgment-creditors applied for the attachment and sale of certain specified property belonging to their judgment-debtor, previous to the date on which the three years allowed for such execution under s. 230 would have expired. Subsequently, after the three years had elapsed, they filed a fresh application praying that certain other property of their judgment-debtor might be attached and sold in lieu of that specified in their former application, and that the latter might be released. *Held*, that execution of the decree was barred by limitation. *Per PRINSEP, J.* Under s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code, it was intended by the Legislature that a decree-holder seeking to execute a decree passed more than twelve years before should have one opportunity to execute that decree, and that if he fails to satisfy it on that application, any further application becomes barred. *SREENATH GOORO v. YUSOOF KHAN*
I. L. R. 7 Calc. 556: 9 C. L. R. 334

32. ———— *Decree—Execution—Decree more than twelve years old—Limitation.* An application for execution of a decree obtained against the judgment-debtor in 1870 was presented by the applicant on the 26th January 1885. Several previous applications for execution had been made, and the last two, *viz.*, on the 29th July 1881 and 29th June 1882, had been granted. The judgment-debtor was arrested and brought before the Court. He contended that execution of the decree was barred. Both the lower Courts were of opinion that the decree was not barred, and allowed execution to issue. On appeal by the judgment-debtor to the High Court:—*Held*, that the application for execution was too late. As there had been an application made and granted

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on the 29th July 1881 under the Code of 1877, and twelve years from the date of the decree would have elapsed before June 1885, the application in question was barred, and was not saved by the concluding clause of s. 230 of the Code (Act XIV of 1882). *MOTICHAND v. KRISHNARAV GANESH*
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 524

33. ———— *Execution-proceedings—Limitation.* An application was made in 1886 for execution of a decree dated 1873. In the interval, *viz.*, in October 1879, the judgment-debtor was arrested on an application in execution by the decree-holder, but execution was not proceeded with further. *Held*, that an application made in 1886 was time-barred under s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *PATUMMA v. MUSE BEARI*
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 132

34. ———— *Finality of order made in execution proceedings—Decree payable by instalments.* In 1868 a decree was obtained for R1,100, which provided that the amount should be paid in instalments, the first instalment being R200 to be paid at the end of the first year, and that the other instalments should be R100 at the end of each subsequent year, and that in the event of failure to carry this out, and 2½ months after the falling due of the instalment, the whole amount should be exigible in a lump sum with interest at 8 annas per cent. per mensem. In 1877 the decree-holder applied for execution of the decree, asserting that R600 had been paid up to that time by five instalments, one of R200 and four of R100 each, and that default had been made in payment of the fifth instalment of R100, and he asked to recover the whole amount due on the decree. No order was passed on this application, and eventually the case was struck off. In 1880 the decree-holder again applied for execution of the decree, upon the same grounds as those upon which the previous application was based. Notice was issued and served and a warrant issued for the arrest of the judgment-debtor, but eventually the case was struck off. In 1883 the decree-holder on the same grounds made another application for execution. It was contended by the judgment-debtor that execution was barred by s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code, inasmuch as no instalments had been paid, and even if they had been paid, they could not be recognized, not having been certified. *Held*, that the proper time from which to reckon the limitation of twelve years was the fifth year from the date of the bond, the whole claim from the beginning and the order passed in 1880 having gone upon that basis, that the Court could not go behind that order, and that consequently the decree-holder was within time and might take out execution. *KANJI MAL v. KANHIA LAL*
I. L. R. 7 All. 373

35. ———— *Interlocutory decree.* A decree for possession and wasilat having been made in 1854, it was, by an order in January

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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ss. 230 and 231 (1859, s. 207)—*contd.*

1881, directed upon the report of an Ameen that the decree-holder should recover a particular sum for wasilat. On the 14th March 1881 the decree-holder filed a petition praying that certain properties of the debtor might be attached and sold and the proceeds applied in payment of the wasilat. *Held*, that, under s. 230 of Act X of 1877, the application of 14th March 1881 was not barred. The decree of 1854, so far as the wasilat was concerned, might be taken to be merely interlocutory, and did not become final until January 1881. *BARODA SUN-DARI DABIA v. FERGUSSON* . I. L. R. 17

36. ———— **Order directing payment of money at a certain date—Decree payable by instalments—Execution of decree.** The parties to a decree presented a petition to the Court executing the decree, stating that it had been agreed between them that the amount of the decree should be paid by ten monthly instalments of Rs500 each. The Court made an order directing that such petition should be filed. *Held*, that this order did not amount to one directing payment of money to be made at a certain date, which would give a fresh period of limitation under s. 230 (b) of the Civil Procedure Code. *BAL CHAND v. RAGHUNATH DAS* . I. L. R. 4 All. 155

37. ———— **Limitation—Execution of decree.** A judgment-debtor, on being arrested in execution of a decree, presented a petition asking for fifteen days' time to pay the amount of the decree, and the decree holders consenting, the Court made an order in the terms, "Let the petition be filed." *Held*, that this order did not amount to one directing payment of money to be made at a certain date within the meaning of s. 230, cl. (b), of the Civil Procedure Code. *Bal Chand v. Raghunath Das*, I. L. R. 4 All. 155, followed. *JOGOBUNDHOO DAS v. HARI RAWOOT* . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 16

38. ———— **Obstruction to execution of decree—Fraud.** The respondent, as plaintiff in a small cause suit in 1867, obtained a decree against the husband of the petitioner, since deceased. The decree was kept alive till 13th December 1876, when the decree-holder brought a suit to set aside certain alienations made by the judgment-debtor and alleged to be fictitious and fraudulent. Having succeeded in the suit and in rendering the property alienated available for attachment under his decree, the respondent again applied for execution in 1879, but not against the property fictitiously alienated. Lastly, the respondent applied on September 28th, 1880—more than twelve years after decree—for execution against certain immoveable property of the judgment-debtor, other than the property fictitiously alienated, in the petitioner's possession. *Held*, that, having regard to the fraud of the judgment-debtor, the application was not barred by s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *VISALATCHI AMMAL v. SIVASANKARA TAKER* . I. L. R. 4 Mad. 292

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 230 and 231 (1859, s. 207)—*concl.*

39. ———— **Evading service of warrants—Staying execution—Fraud.** A judgment-debtor, who, though able to pay his judgment-debt, dishonestly evades payment for more than twelve years by eluding service of warrants and making applications to the Court (which had the effect for the time of staying execution), is guilty of fraud within the meaning of s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *PATTAKARA ANNAMALAI GOUNDAN v. RANGASAMI CHETTI* . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 385

40. ———— **Decree, prevention of execution of, by fraud.** A judgment-debtor, on seeing the Court's bailiff approach his house to attach his property, left the verandah, went inside the house, chained the door, and refused to open it when called on to do so by the bailiff. *Held*, that the conduct of the judgment-debtor amounted to a prevention, by fraud, of the execution of the decree within the meaning of s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882. *BHAGU JETHA v. MALEK BAWASAHEB* . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 318

41. ———— **Execution of decree prevented by "fraud or force" of judgment-debtor—Period of limitation.** Where a judgment-debtor, knowing that a warrant of attachment had been issued against his moveable property, locked up his house and so prevented the moveable property therein from being attached:—*Held*, that his action amounted to "fraud" within the meaning of s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In order to obtain the benefit of the proviso in that section, it is not necessary that a judgment-creditor should prove that the fraud of the judgment-debtor continued so as to prevent execution of the decree at any time. "Fraud" or "force" on the part of a judgment-debtor gives a new starting point for the period of limitation, and an application for the execution of a decree may be granted at any time within twelve years after the date on which a judgment-debtor has by "fraud" or "force" prevented execution of a decree. *VENKAYYA v. RAGHAVA CHARLU* . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 230

ss. 230, 258, 295—**Decree for sale with personal remedy for balance unsatisfied governed by s. 258, even before sale of mortgage property—S. 258 applicable even to decrees for sale alone, but not to receipt by mortgagee in possession—Mortgage decrees under s. 88 of the Transfer of Property Act.** A decree directing the sale of mortgaged properties in default of payment of money is a decree for money, whether there is a direction to pay personally or not and whether the remedy against the property is exhausted or not. Such decrees will be money decrees under ss. 230, 258 and 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure, although they will not be so under ss. 220 and 222 of the Code. *Kommachi Kather v. Pakker*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 107, and *Hard v. Tara Prasanna Mukherji*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 718, referred to and approved. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relat-

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ss. 230, 258, 295—*cont'd.*

ing to execution of decrees apply with a few exceptions to mortgage decrees under the Transfer of Property Act. There is a conflict between the provisions of s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. *Mallikarjunada Setti v. Lingamurti Pantulu*, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 244, referred to and approved. Receipts by a mortgagee in possession after decree though payments to the mortgagee under s. 20 of the Limitation Act will not be "moneys payable under the decree" within the meaning of s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure and consequently the provisions of that section will not apply to such receipts. *Mallikarjuna Sastri v. Narasimha Rao*, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 412, overruled. *VAIDHINADASAMY AYYAR v. SOMASUNDRAM PILLAI* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 473

ss. 230, 269, 272, 295, 489, 490.

See ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 639

Attachment before Judgment, effect of—Realization in execution—Priority—S. 490, effect of. The object and effect of an attachment before judgment is simply to safeguard the property attached so as to enable the plaintiff to realise the amount of his decree if he should get one. Though he has a security he has no charge on the property, which remains that of the defendant available for other decree-holders. Nor does a decree following such attachment constitute a plaintiff a secured creditor, but the latter must, as any other creditor, apply for execution from which application he is not exempted by s. 490 of the Civil Procedure Code. In short, a plaintiff decree-holder, who has attached, before judgment, has not by reason of such attachment or process incidental thereto any right to be treated preferentially to other judgment-creditors. There must be realization in execution to give right of priority. *Pallongi v. Jordan*, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 400, referred to. *SEWDUTT ROY v. SREE CANTO MAITY* (1906)

10 C. W. N. 634
s.c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 639

ss. 230, 295—*Mortgage Decree—Decree for money—Application for execution—Limitation.* Where a decree directs a defendant to pay money to the plaintiff and in default the property mortgaged is to be sold and the balance, if any, is to be realised from the other properties of the defendants:—*Held*, that this was a 'decree for money' within the meaning of s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Kommachi Kather v. Pakker*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 107, followed. *Kartick Nath Pandey v. Juggernath Ram Marwari*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 285, differed from. An application for attachment of certain property cannot be treated as an application to execute a decree, which directs the sale of that property. *Jogemaya Dassi v. Thacomoni Dassi*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 472, approved. *ABDULLA SAHIB v. OOSMAN SAHIB* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 224

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s. 231.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ss. 7 AND 8, AND SCH. II, ART. 179.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 431

Act V of 1881, s. 92—*Execution of decree—One of several joint decree-holders not competent to give a discharge for the full amount of the decree—Executors. Held*, that one out of several joint decree-holders is not competent to give a valid discharge for the amount of the joint decree, and his position in this respect is not affected by the fact that he and his fellow decree-holders are co-executors. *Tamman Singh v. Lachmin Kunwari*, I. L. R. 26 All. 318, and *Moti Ram v. Hannu Prasad*, I. L. R. 26 All. 334, followed. *LACHMAN DAS v. CHATURBHUI DAS* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 252

ss. 231, 235, 260—*Perpetual Injunction—Wilful disobedience—Application for execution—Notice to judgment-debtor, if obligatory—Notice to absent decree-holder—Prayer—Relief.* On the 30th March 1889, two persons D and N obtained a decree for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from erecting pucca buildings on a parcel of land. On the 16th March 1904, D applied for execution of the decree against one of the judgment-debtors, who had erected a pucca building on the 17th and the 18th February 1904 and the only relief asked for was the demolition of the building. The lower Courts ordered, under s. 260 of the Civil Procedure Code, for the attachment of the judgment-debtor's property for one year. *Held*, that no notice to the judgment-debtor calling upon him to obey the decree was necessary under s. 260 of the Civil Procedure Code. That the lower Courts were right in allowing the decree-holder to execute his decree by attachment, although he had applied merely for the demolition of the house. The serving of a notice on the judgment-debtor, when a decree-holder asks for relief under s. 260 of the Civil Procedure Code, is left to the discretion of the Court in consideration of the circumstances of each case. The judgment-debtor in this case having acted deliberately in defiance of the Court's order could not claim to be allowed an opportunity to undo what he had done. *Per MOOKERJEE, J.*—Where there is no possibility of the absent decree-holder being prejudiced by reason of an order for execution made on the application of the other decree-holder, it is not obligatory upon the Court to issue a notice upon him. *DURGA DAS NANDI v. DEORAJ AGARWALA* (1905)

10 C. W. N. 297
s.c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 306

ss. 231, 260.

See DECREE . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 306

s. 232 (1859, s. 208).

See ASSIGNMENT OF DECREE.

12 C. W. N. 625

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 232 (1859, s. 208)—*contd.*See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION
BY AND AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES.

20 W. R. 51

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 327

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 371

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 371

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.
180 . . . 7 C. W. N. 793

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 979

See STEP IN AID OF EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 541

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 131.

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 502

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 197,
CL. (4) . . . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 234

1. ——— Assignment of decree. S. 208, Act VIII of 1859, put a party, to whom a decree is transferred, into the position of the original decree-holder, and entitled him to have the decree executed, as if application were made by the original decree-holder. SHAMANUND SURMA *v.* SHUMBEHO CHUNDER DASS . . . 7 W. R. 205

2. ——— Certificate, necessity of. Under s. 208, Act VIII of 1859, it was not essential that a certificate should in every instance be obtained by a representative before he can be allowed to apply for execution. GOPAL SINGH DEB *v.* GOPALCHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY . . . 7 W. R. 393

3. ——— Power of Court to which decree has been transmitted. The assignee of a decree should apply to the Court which passed the decree, and not to the Court to which the decree had been forwarded under s. 285, Act VIII of 1859, for execution, for the purpose of being substituted in the place of the original decree-holder. The word "Court" in s. 208, Act VIII of 1859, did not include the Court to which a decree has been transferred for execution. SHEO NARAYAN SING *v.* HARBANS LAL . . . 5 B. L. R. 497 : 14 W. R. 65

4. ——— Right of Assignee. A person claiming to be the assignee of a decree should apply for recognition of his title to the Court which pronounced the decree, and for leave under s. 208 of the Civil Procedure Code to have his name substituted in lieu of that of the plaintiff. ISMAIL VALAD AHMED BARUCHA *v.* KASSAM VALAD AZAM DUPLI . . . 9 Bom. 46

FRAMJI RUSTAMJI *v.* RATANSHA PESTANJI . . . 9 Bom. 49BALKISHOON *v.* MAHOMED TAZAM ALLEE . . . 4 N. W. 90KADIR BUKSH *v.* ELAHI BUKSH . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 283See AMAR CHUNDRA BANERJEE *v.* GURU PRO-
SUNNO MUKERJEE . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 488CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 232 (1859, s. 208) — *contd.*

5. ——— Appeal—Assignee of decree. Under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, no appeal lay from an order passed under s. 208, Act VIII of 1859, substituting the assignee of a decree in place of the original decree-holder. MEGH NARAYAN SINGH *v.* RADHA PRASAD SINGH . . . 4 B. L. R. A. C. 200 : 13 W. R. 224

Ses *contra*, FRAMJI RUSTAJI *v.* RATANSHA
PESTANJI . . . 9 Bom. 49

6. ——— Right of Assignee. Where *S* obtained a decree for possession against *D P*, the person in possession, and subsequently in a suit brought by *J P* claiming the property against *S*, a decree was passed in the terms of a compromise, whereby *S* consented that *J P* should execute his decree:—*Held*, that *J P* was entitled, under s. 208, Civil Procedure Code, to recover possession in execution of *S*'s decree from *D P*, although *D P* had not been made a party to the second suit. DOORGA PERSHAD SINGH *v.* LALLA JUGGUN-
NATH PERSHAD . . . 1 N. W. 34 : Ed. 1873, 31

7. ——— Cross-decrees. Where a party who assigned over a decree was liable under a cross-decree for a considerable sum to the judgment-debtor:—*Held*, that, until the respective liabilities of the two parties had been settled, the Court was justified in refusing to allow one of them to assign the decree to a third party. JODOONATH ROY *v.* RAM BUKSH CHULUNGE . . . 8 W. R. 202

8. ——— Recognition of Transfer by Court. A Court charged with the execution of a decree has no other discretion with regard to noticing a transfer thereof than that which is given to it by s. 208, which only applies to cases where the transferee can and does come forward to claim execution for himself, instead of the original decree-holder. BEARUT CHUNDER ROY *v.* NAZIR ALY KHAN . . . 10 W. R. 354

9. ——— Recognition of Transfer by Court. A party to a suit can enforce any decree he may get as a matter of right; but an assignee of such decree can only do so after obtaining the Court's permission, which depends entirely on the Court's discretion. An assignee, therefore, is not in the same position as the original decree-holder, and is not entitled to have the same privileges. SHAMA PUDDO DUTT *v.* NOBIN CHUN-
DER BOSE . . . 15 W. R. 283

10. ——— Right of Assignee to execute it—Omission to make formal application to execute it—Error not affecting the merits of case. Where there has been an assignment of a decree pending proceedings in execution taken by the decree-holder, there is nothing in the Code which debars the Court from recognizing the transferee as the person to go on with the execution, even if he has omitted to make a formal application for execution, such omission being merely an error of

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procedure, and not an error affecting the merits of the case. *DWAR BAKSH SIKKAR v. FATIK JAH*
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 250

11. *Purchasers of share in decree. Quære:* Can the purchasers of a share in a decree be added upon the record under Act VIII of 1859, s. 208, as co-decree-holders? *SEETAPUT ROY v. ALI HOSSEIN* . 24 W. R. 11

12. *Transfer of portion of decree—Execution of decree by transferee of portion of decree.* No legislative prohibition exists to the transfer of a portion of a decree; and provided that the whole decree is executed, and the rights of all parties interested are cared for, there is no objection to the transferee being allowed to carry on the execution-proceedings. *Seetaput Roy v. Ali Hossein*, 24 W. R. 11, dissented from. *KISHORE CHAND BHAKAT v. GIBBORNE & Co.*
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 341

13. *Assignment of decree by one of two decree-holders valid.* There is no prohibition in law against one of several decree-holders assigning his interest under the decree. *Held*, that the assignee is entitled to execute under s. 232, unless the judgment-debtor can show that such a proceeding is prejudicial to his interest. *MUTHUNARAYANA REDDI v. BALAKRISHNA REDDI*
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 306

14. *Execution of decree by assignee of decree-holder—Execution of mortgage decree by purchaser of portion of mortgaged property.* A decree having been obtained upon a mortgage against two judgment-debtors, the joint owners of a certain mehal, which was subject to the mortgage, and which was declared by the Court to be subject to the decree, in the event of default being made in payment of the mortgage-money, the 8-anna share of one of the debtors was, before execution had been taken out, sold at auction under Bengal Act VII of 1868 and purchased by the appellant. Subsequently, the decree-holder having attempted to execute the decree against the share so purchased, the appellant, in order to protect the share which he had bought, purchased the decree himself and proceeded to execute it against the remaining share in the hands of the judgment-debtors. *Held*, that the appellant, as the transferee of the original decree-holder, was entitled to execute the decree personally against the judgment-debtors, and also, in the event of their making default in paying the amount due under the decree, to proceed against the share of the mehal still in their hands; and, further, that if by reason of it being necessary to sell the remaining share of the judgment-debtors any equity should arise between them and the appellant to have the decretal money distributed over the whole property mentioned by the decree, that equity must be enforced by an independent suit. *NAFER CHUNDER MUNDUL v. BAIKANTO NATH ROY* . 4 C. L. R. 156

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 232 (1859, s. 208)—*contd.*

15. *Execution of mortgage decree by Assignee—Separate suit.* By a deed, dated 2nd July 1876, Y mortgaged properties Nos. 1 and 2 to A, and subsequently by separate deeds he again mortgaged the same properties respectively to B and C. C afterwards purchased Y's equity of redemption in property No. 2, and on the 19th November 1880 A obtained a mortgage decree against Y, which he sold to B, who now sought to execute it. C was merely benamidar for B. *Held*, that, on B consenting to allow property No. 2 to be first sold free of all incumbrances, it was necessary for B to proceed by regular suit. *YAKOOB ALI CHOWDHRY v. RAM DOOLAL* . 13 C. L. R. 272

16. *Application of transferee of decree for execution disallowed—Suit by transferee for decretal amount—Declaratory decree.* The transferee of a decree for costs, associating with him the transferor, made an application under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code to be allowed to execute the decree. The application was opposed by the judgment-debtor and was rejected, and the Court referred the transferee to a regular suit. After taking various proceedings ineffectually, he instituted a suit for the recovery of the sum to which he was entitled as costs under the decree transferred to him. *Held*, that the plaintiff, as the holder of the decree by assignment, could only recover the amount under it by executing the decree, and not by a separate suit; but that he was entitled to have a decree declaring that the assignment to him of the decree-holder's rights under the decree was valid, and gave him a right to execute it, and that the Court's order under s. 232, which disallowed the execution, was an improper one, a suit for this relief being maintainable; for, there being no appeal from orders under s. 232, there would otherwise be no remedy; and that, looking at the plaint and the issues on which the parties were divided, and the fact that the Court which refused the plaintiff's application for execution referred him to a regular suit, this relief might properly be given in the present suit. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*, that the suit was maintainable, inasmuch as the present plaintiff never having been accepted on the record as holder of the decree, the questions which were disposed of by the Court executing the decree, as between the plaintiff and the judgment-debtor, could not be regarded as questions within s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *RAM BAKHSH v. PANNA LAL* . I. L. R. 7 All. 457

17. *Application for execution by beneficial holder of decree—Application dismissed—Suit for declaration of applicant's right to execute the decree.* *Held*, that, where an application under s. 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure by a person alleging himself to be beneficially entitled under a decree to execute such decree has been rejected, it is still competent to the applicant (no appeal lying from the order under s.

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232 rejecting his application) to bring a separate suit for a declaration that he is the person entitled to execute the decree. *Ram Bakhsh v. Panna Lal, I. L. R. 7 All. 457*, and *Halodhar Shaha v. Harogobind Das Koibarto, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 105*, referred to. *SHEORAJ SINGH v. AMIN-UD-DIN-KHAN*

I. L. R. 20 All. 539

18. *Transfer in writing—Right to execution of decree.* The transferee of a decree is not entitled to have execution as of right like the original decree-holder; if, however, the transfer be by assignment, and in writing, s. 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act XIV of 1882, enables the transferee to apply for, and the Court to proceed to, execution in the manner therein provided. *JAVERMAL HIRACHAND v. UMAJI HAYABATI*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 179

19. *Assignee of decree under oral assignment—Right to execute decree—Plea of fraud raised in execution-proceedings.* An assignee of a decree under an oral assignment has no *locus standi* at all to apply for execution of a decree, but as regards one who claims to be an assignee in writing or by operation of law, the Court has a discretion under s. 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), whether to recognize such assignment or not. When an assignee of a decree applied for execution, and the judgment-debtors contended that the decree sought to be executed had been obtained by fraud and was, therefore, a nullity and incapable of execution:—*Held*, that it was not open to the judgment-debtors to raise the defence of fraud in the course of the execution-proceedings. *PARVATA v. DIGAMBAR*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 307

20. *Joint decree—Purchase of decree by creditor of one of several judgment-debtors—Probability of decree being executed against another judgment-debtor—Ground for refusing execution to purchaser.* A decree for damages and costs having been obtained against *P* and *C*, *A*, to whom *P* was indebted and was about to assign property as security, in order to prevent *P* being adjudicated an insolvent and with a view to execute the decree against *C* if possible, purchased the decree. *A* applied, under s. 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for leave to execute the decree. This application was rejected by *KERNAN, J.*, on the ground that the decree was certain to be executed against *C*, and not against *P*, under whose orders and for whose benefit *C* acted when he infringed the right of, and became liable in damages to, the plaintiff in the suit. *Held* on appeal, that the benefit likely to be gained by *P* by this transaction was no sufficient ground for refusing leave to *A* to execute the decree. *AGRA BANK v. CRIPPS*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 455

21. *Joint decree—Transfer of a money decree to one of several co-judgment-debtors.* Certain property was mortgaged by

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A to *B*. Subsequently, this property was purchased by *C* at a sale held in execution of a decree obtained by a third person against *A*; *B* then brought a suit on his mortgage-bond against *A* and *C*, and obtained a decree for the sale of the mortgaged properties, and also a personal decree against *A*; *B* assigned his rights under this decree to *C*, who applied for execution under s. 232 of the Code. *A* objected to execution issuing, relying on prov. (b) to s. 232. *Held*, that prov. (b) to s. 232 applies only to decrees for money personally due by two or more persons; and that the decree obtained by *B* against *A* and *C* not being a personal decree against *C* (he having been made a defendant only by reason that he had purchased the mortgaged property subject to the mortgage debt), *C* as assignee of *B* was entitled to take out execution. *LALLA BHAGUN PERSHAD v. HOLLOWAY*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 393

22. *Bengal Tenancy Act, s. 148 (h)—Decree for arrears of rent, assignment of—Execution of decree by assignee.* The fact that an assignment of a decree for arrears of rent was made before the Tenancy Act will not protect from the provisions of s. 148 (h) an assignee who proceeds to execution afterwards; but execution cannot be refused where, before that Act came into operation, the assignment had been recognized by a Court of execution under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code. *KOLASH CHUNDER ROY v. JONO NATH ROY*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 380

23. *Execution of a decree of the Agent for Sardars—Rights of transferee of a decree.* *A* in 1839 obtained a decree against *B*, a sardar, in the Court of the Agent for Sardars. The decree was executed in the Agent's Court until *B*'s death in 1868. *B*'s status as a sardar under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Agent did not descend to his sons, and the decree was transferred to the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge at Ahmednagar for execution. The case went up twice to the High Court, under whose orders the execution was for several years continued in favour of *A*'s representatives against the estate of *B*'s sons. In 1885, one of *A*'s representatives assigned his interest under the decree to *C* and *D*. Thereupon the transferees *C* and *D* applied to the First Class Subordinate Judge at Ahmednagar to have their names substituted in the place of the transferor in the execution-proceedings. The Subordinate Judge rejected this application, on the ground that he could not recognize the transfer of the decree either under s. 372 or 232 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, reversing the order of the lower Court, that the assignment of the decree-holder's rights to execution in this case was one approved by the law as contained in s. 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The transferee of a decree gains by the transfer the rights of the transferor. *VISHNU SAKHARAM NAGARKAR v. KRISHNARAO MALHAR*

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24. *Certificate of administration under Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827, s. 7—Holder of such certificate—Right to execute decree as transferee.* A holder of a certificate of administration granted under s. 7 of Regulation VIII of 1827 is a transferee by law of a decree obtained by the deceased with the meaning of s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code, and is competent to apply for execution of such a decree. *KHANDERAV RAYAJIRAV v. GANESH SHASTRI*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 368

25. *Transfer of decree—Notice of transfer—Transferee's rights—Legal representative of a deceased judgment-debtor.* The transferee of a decree stands in the same position for getting execution as the transferor. If a decree is transferred by assignment after the death of the judgment-debtor, notice of the transfer, as required by s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code, may be served on the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor. The death of the judgment-debtor does not render the transferred decree incapable of execution. *KHUSHROBHAI NASARVANJI v. HORMAZSHA PHIROZSHA*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 727

26. *Assignee of decree, execution by—Execution by Assignee—Cross-decrees—Discretionary power of Court under s. 232 of Act XIV of 1882.* The discretion given to a Court under s. 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to allowing execution of decrees by assignees must be exercised reasonably. The mere fact of the existence of a cross claim against the assignor of a decree by his judgment-debtor is no reason for refusing issue of execution on the application of the assignee. *KRISHNA MOHINI DOSSEE v. KEDARNATH CHUCKERBUTTY*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 446

27. *Transfer of decree by operation of law—Representative of original decree-holder—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244—Right to appeal against order refusing execution.* *R* died in May 1859, leaving his property to his executors in trust for the appellant *P*, and he directed that the property should be assigned by them to the appellant as soon as he came of age. In August 1868, the executors filed this suit against *L* as manager of certain landed property belonging to the Hallai Bhattia caste, and known as Mahajan Wadi, to recover certain loans made by them as executors to him as manager of the said Wadi. On the 11th May 1870, while this suit was pending, the executors assigned all the property of their testator to the appellant *P*. By the deed of assignment they assigned to him (*inter alia*) "all moveable property, debts, claims, and things in action whatsoever vested in them as such executors." No steps were taken, subsequently to this assignment, to make the assignee, *P*, a party to the suit, which proceeded without amendment. On the 23rd January 1873, a decree was passed for the plaintiffs on the record for Rs. 1,272-13-5, and it was declared that the said

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sum should be a first charge on the rents and income of the said Wadi. Subsequently to this decree, *L* opened an account in the name of the appellant *P*, and from time to time made payments to him on account of the decree. The last of these payments was made on the 19th November 1884. None of these payments were certified to the Court. In 1885 the respondent *V* was appointed to the office of manager of the Hallai Bhattia caste in the place of *L*, the original defendant in the suit. On the 4th January 1886, his attorneys wrote to the appellant's attorneys offering to pay the appellant the balance due to him under the decree. Subsequently, however, he refused to make any payment to the appellant, whereupon the appellant applied for execution of the decree against him as manager of the said Wadi. He claimed to be a transferee of the decree under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code. His application was refused by the Judge in chambers. *Held*, that the appellant was a transferee of the decree within the meaning of s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code. The decree had been transferred to him "by operation of law." As such, he was entitled to sue out execution, and was to be regarded as the representative of the original decree-holder within the meaning of cl. (c) of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code and had a right of appeal against the order of the Judge in chambers refusing execution. *PURMANANDAS JIWANDAS v. VALLABDAS WALLJI*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 506

28. *Transfer of decree—Representatives of intermediate transferee—Omission to give notice of application for substitution of names—Title of assignee.* The holder of a decree for the sale of mortgaged property having transferred the same to *M* by registered instrument, *M* transferred the decree to other persons, and the co-transferees applied under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code to have their names substituted for those of the original decree-holders. The judgment-debtor opposed the application on the ground that *M*'s name had not been substituted for the names of the original decree-holders who had transferred to him. It appeared that no notice had been issued to *M* under s. 232 of the Code, that he was dead, and that his legal representative had not been cited as required by law. The application was allowed by the Courts below. *Held*, that, even assuming that the judgment-debtor had a *locus standi* to raise the objection that notice had not been issued to the applicant's transferor, he had no possible interest in the question, and could not be prejudiced by the passing of the order; that it was not necessary to cite the representatives of the transferor; and that the order not being one upon which execution of the decree could issue, but merely for a transfer of names, the objection that the transferor had not been cited under s. 232 was not a substantial one. *Held*, that it could not be said that where a decree has been assigned by one assignor to

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another, the substitution of his name on the record in lieu of that of the original decree-holder was a condition precedent to the assignor's passing title under the assignment. *GULZARI LAL v. DAYA RAM*
I. L. R. 9 All. 46

29. ————— *Transfer of decree for execution by operation of law—Right of procedure—Execution under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 and Act VIII of 1885.* Upon the death of the full owner the mother took out probate of a will in which she was appointed executrix. The will was afterwards disputed by the minor son of the testator, and probate was revoked; but while the mother was in possession of the estate as executrix, she sued and obtained a decree for rent under Bengal Act VIII of 1869. Upon the application of the minor for the execution of the decree:—*Held*, that the minor was in a position to execute the decree, his succession to the estate of his father being a succession or transfer by operation of law within the meaning of s. 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, also, that the mode in which the decree was executed under the old Rent Act, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, was, in so far as it was a right at all that belonged to the judgment-creditor, not a private right, but a mere right of procedure, and the execution was, therefore, to be governed by Act VIII of 1885. *UMA-SOONDURY DASSY v. BROJONATH BHUTTACHARJEE*
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 847

See *SATHURAYAR v. SHANMUGAM PILLAI*

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 353

30. ————— *Transfer of decree—Benami transfer.* If a decree is transferred to one as benamider for the actual purchaser, the latter is entitled to execute the decree, and his right course is to apply under Civil Procedure Code, s. 232. *MANIKKAM v. TATAYYA*
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 388

31. ————— *Insolvency—Composition with creditors—Assignment of insolvent's estate to surety—Adjudication set aside, effect of, on previous decree.* Suit by official assignee on a debt due to O B S pending the latter's insolvency. Plea by defendant that he has paid to the insolvent overruled on the ground that payment to insolvent pending insolvency cannot bind the official assignee, and decree made. Subsequently the insolvent entered into a composition with his creditors, and executed an assignment of his estate, effects, and assets in favour of B in consideration of B's becoming surety to the creditors for the payment of the composition. Accordingly, an order was made setting aside the adjudication and giving liberty to the official assignee to make over to the insolvent his estate and effects. B now applied for execution of the decree in this suit against the defendant. *Held*, that the order setting aside the adjudication did not have the effect of annulling the decree in any way. It

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operated in passing the benefit under the decree from the official assignee as representing the creditors to the present applicant, and made the latter by operation of law an assignee under s. 232, Civil Procedure Code. It was *held* to be unnecessary to consider whether there was in fact, pending the insolvency, a payment to the insolvent in discharge of the claim. *MILLER v. ABINASH CHUNDER DUTT*
4 C. W. N. 785

32. ————— *Sale of decree-holder's interest under a decree—Right of vendee when execution is refused—Right of suit.* The assignee for value of a decree obtained by two persons, of whom one was a minor, applied for execution of the decree, but his application was refused under Civil Procedure Code, s. 232. He now sued to recover from his assignor the sum paid by him for the assignment. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. *RAMASAMI v. BASAVAPPA*
I. L. R. 16 Mad. 325

33. ————— *Assignment of decree—Order refusing to recognize transferee of decree—Appeal.* An order passed under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code, refusing to recognize the transferee of a decree, may, for purposes of appeal, be regarded as an order passed under s. 244, and is therefore appealable. *Virasami Routh v. Bodi Naikan*, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 384 note, followed. *SUBBUTHAYAMMAL v. CHIDAMBARAM ASARI* (1901)
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 383

34. ————— *Decree, transmission of—Execution—Assignee of Decree—Notice.* In an application by an assignee of a decree, for transmission of the decree and for notice to issue under s. 232 of Civil Procedure Code: *Held*, that such application can only be treated as one for execution. *NANDO LAL v. CHUTTERPUT SING* (1902)
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 235

35. ————— *Transfer of decree for execution—Execution of decree—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 232 and 295—Sale of decree, and transfer for execution to another Court—Application by transferees for rateable distribution of assets—Court to which such application should be made.* A decree was transferred for execution from Mirzapur to Gorakhpur; the decree-holder also sold his interest in the decree. The transferees thereupon made an application for execution in the Gorakhpur Court, and prayed for a rateable share of the assets which might be realized in execution of a decree held by one Bindesri against the same judgment-debtor. Upon this application the following order was passed:—“The judgment-debtors and the transferors both received notice, but none of them put in an appearance, and no objections were filed. As the prayer in this case is to be allowed a rateable share of the assets in Bindesri Prasad's case, let this case be put with that case.” *Held*, (i) that the Court to which the decree was transferred for execution had no power to entertain

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the transferees' application for a rateable share in the assets; such application could only be entertained by the Court which passed the decree; (ii) that the order passed by the Gorakhpur Court could not operate as *res judicata* so as to prevent the judgment-debtors from questioning the right of the transferees to make an application for execution to that Court; and (iii) that the order passed by the executing Court was appealable as an order under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Badri Narain v. Jai Kishen Das*, I. L. R. 16 All. 483, and *Amar Chandra Banerjee v. Guru Prosunno Mukerjee*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 488, referred to. *TAMESHAR PRASAD v. THAKUR PRASAD* (1903)

I. L. R. 25 All. 443

36. ———— *Execution of decree—Order allowed to become final—Subsequent regular suit.* Held, that no suit will lie to establish a right to execute decree when an order dismissing an application under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code has been allowed to become final. *Budhan Singh v. Saliq Ram*, 1 All. L. J. 61, approved. *Sheoraj Singh v. Amin-uddin Khan*, I. L. R. 20 All. 539, distinguished. *AMANAT-ULLAH KHAN v. SARDHA PRASAD* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 613

37. ———— *Execution—Execution of money-decree—Transfer of the decree to one judgment-debtor—Execution of the decree by one judgment-debtor against his co-judgment-debtor allowed where the decree is passed against them as legal representative of the deceased relations and against the property of the deceased—Direction in the decree that the personal liability of the judgment-debtors be determined in execution proceedings does not make the decree a money-decree.* C obtained a decree against P as the legal representative of A and against S as the legal representative of L. It directed, among other things, that C should recover R22,748 and costs from the property of A and L; that C was entitled to get back from the possession of P and S, as heirs respectively of A and L, all books of account, bonds and other papers belonging to C's father; and that "it will be decided during the execution proceedings as to how far the heir defendants are personally liable in this suit." C died after he had obtained this decree leaving P as his heir, to whom the decree was transferred by operation of law. P then applied for execution of the decree against S. The Subordinate Judge rejected the application on the ground that P was precluded by the proviso to s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code from executing the decree against his co-judgment-debtor S. Held, (i) that there was nothing in the decree which saddled P and S with any personal liability to pay money, either jointly or severally; the amount of R22,748 and costs which was recoverable under the decree was made payable not by P and S, but out of the property of A and L; (ii) that, although by reason of the direction in the decree that the question of the personal liability of P and S should be deter-

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mined in execution proceedings, there might be subsequently, when that liability had been determined, a decree for money against them; until then it was a mere contingency, which would not make the decree as for money against P and S; (iii) that therefore P was entitled to execute the decree against the estate of L in the hands of S. In s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) the phrase "a decree for money against several persons" means a personal decree for the payment of money by two or more defendants jointly. Clause (b) of the proviso to the section does not extend to a decree which may become a decree for money against several persons on determination by the Court. It applies only where in the decree there is a distinct order upon the defendants personally to pay the money. *PANACHAND v. SUNDARABAI* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 308

38. ———— *Execution, application for, where to be made—Transfer for jurisdiction—"Court, which passed the decree."* The expression "the Court which passed the decree" in s. 232 includes the Court, which by reason of a transfer of jurisdiction has jurisdiction in respect of the subject-matter of this suit. *UDIT NARAIN CHOWDHURY v. MATTHURA PERSHAD MAHATA* (1908) 12 C. W. N. 859

39. ———— cl. (b)—*Decree directing separate amounts with separate sets of proportionate costs to be recovered against defendants—Transfer of the decree in writing to one of the defendants—Application by the transferee to recover the amount due by the other defendant.* A decree directed that a certain sum with proportionate costs be recovered against N and a certain other sum with proportionate costs be recovered against A. Subsequently A took a transfer of the decree in writing and applied for execution of the decree against N to the extent of the sum decreed against him. The application having been rejected under s. 232, clause (b) of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882): Held, reversing the order, that s. 232, clause (b), of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) was not applicable. Though the direct on against N and the separate direction against A were contained on one and the same piece of paper and were passed in the same suit, still for all that they were decrees for separate sums of money and might equally well have been passed in separate suits. The fact of their being on one piece of paper cannot control the matter. *ANANT VINAYAK v. NAGAPPA SUBRAYA* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 135

ss. 232, 233—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 99—Transferee decree-holder cannot bring to sale property which the decree-holder could not bring to sale under s. 99 of the Transfer of Property Act.* A transferee decree-holder is only entitled, under s. 233 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to execute the decree in the same manner and subject to the same conditions, as if the application were made by the original decree-holder, and, under s. 233, he holds the decree subject to any

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equities, which the judgment-debtor might have enforced against the original decree-holder. A transferee decree-holder cannot in execution bring to sale property, which the original decree-holder is prohibited from bringing to sale by s. 99 of the Transfer of Property Act. *Chhagan Guman v. Lakshman Dagdu*, 9 Bom. L. R. 728, approved and followed. *Chundra Nath Dey v. Burroda Shoondury Ghose*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 813, approved. *Banh Bal v. Manni Lal*, I. L. R. 27 All. 450, dissented from. *JIVARATHNAM MUDALIAR v. SRINIVASA MUDALIAR* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 33

1. — ss. 232, 244—*Power of Court, discretionary.* Where the right of a party applying for execution as transferee is *sub judice*, it is not obligatory on the Court, under the last clause of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to stay execution, until the question has been determined by separate suit. The Court may in its discretion either stay execution or dismiss the application. *VAKULA-BHARANA v. RANGAIYAN CHETTY* (1905)
I. L. R. 28 Mad. 357

2. — *Transferee decree-holder—Mesne profits and costs not included in transfer—Suit to enforce right under transfer—Maintainability—Plaint treated as application in execution.* A decree had been passed against the present defendant in a previous suit for the surrender of possession of certain lands and also for mesne profits and costs. The interest of the decree-holders in these lands was then sold in execution of a decree, which had been passed against them, and was purchased by the present plaintiff. The present plaintiff applied for execution of the original decree and to be placed in possession of the property he had purchased. The petition was rejected, and he now sued to obtain possession of the properties he had purchased. On the question being raised whether the suit was barred by s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure:—*Held*, that plaintiff was entitled to relief. He was not a transferee of all that had been decreed in the original suit, inasmuch as the right to mesne profits and costs had not passed to him. If, for that reason, he was not entitled to be recognised as the transferee of the decree, and to execute it as such, he was entitled to enforce his right by suit. Assuming, however, that no separate suit lay, and that he should have proceeded by way of execution, the case was one in which the plaintiff should be treated as an application for execution. *Sutaput Roy v. Syed Alli Hossein*, 24 W. R. 11, referred to. *PASUPATHI AYYAR v. KOTHANDA RAMA AYYAR* (1905)
I. L. R. 28 Mad. 64

ss. 232, 365, 366.

See LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877), SCH. II, ART. 179.

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s. 233.

See SET-OFF—CROSS-DECREES.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 428

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT (IV OF 1882), s. 99 . I. L. R. 27 All. 450

s. 234 (1859, s. 210).

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION BY AND AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES.

6 C. W. N. 223

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 283

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 961

See HINDU LAW. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 676

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 429

See REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PERSON . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1044

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—DECREES AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES.

1. — Execution of decree against representative—*Claim by personal representative of judgment-debtor.* Where it was sought to execute a decree obtained against a person who had died since the date of the decree, by attaching certain immoveable property in the possession of the personal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor, and such personal representative claimed to hold the property not in her representative character, but in her own right:—*Held*, that her claim was not a claim under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, but that the case came under ss. 210 and 211. *AMEERUNNISSA KHATOON v. MOZUFFER HOSSEIN CHOWDHRY* . . . 12 B. L. R. 65

MAHOMED MOZUFFER HOSSAIN CHOWDHRY v. AMEERUNNISSA KHATOON . . . 20 W. R. 280

2. — Where, during proceedings in execution of a decree, the judgment-debtor dies, the transferee of his property should be put on the record in place of the deceased, or a regular suit should be brought against him. He should not be treated as a claimant under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859. *SHURFUN BIBEY v. COLLECTOR OF SARUN*
12 B. L. R. 66 note : 10 W. R. 199

3. — Execution of decree passed against deceased person. When a decree has been passed against a deceased person, execution of such decree cannot be had under the Civil Procedure Code against his legal representative. *In the matter of the petition of GIRENDRONATH TAGORE* . . . 14 B. L. R. 334 note

S. C. GIRENDRONATH TAGORE v. HIRONATH ROY
10 W. R. 455

4. — Property of deceased debtor claimed by heir as self-acquired. Where an application is made and granted under s. 210, Act VIII of 1859, and property is attached

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 234 (1859, s. 210)—*contd.*

which is claimed by the heir as his self-acquired property, the Court should proceed under s. 203 without requiring any fresh application to be made under that section. *RAM CHAND CHUCKERBUTTY v. MADHUE NARAIN ROY* . . . **I. C. L. R. 359**

5. — *Liability of son as representative of father for his debts.* As the entire interest in an impartible zamindari passes upon the death of the father to the son, there is nothing in the estate itself which can be attached as assets of the father under a decree against him, or which can be made available in execution of the decree against his son as his representative. Though a son is bound under Hindu law to pay his father's just debts from any property he may possess, yet, when he is made a party to a decree as representative of his deceased father for the purpose of executing it, his liability is limited to the amount of assets of the deceased which may have come to his hands and have not been duly disposed of. *ZAMINDAR OF SIVAGIRI v. ALWAR AYYANGAR. SANGILI VIRAPANDIA CHUNNTA THAMBIAR v. ALWAR AYYANGAR* . . . **I. L. R. 3 Mad. 42**

6. — *Decree against Karnavan—Tarwad property in hands of Successors—Share of deceased father of joint family—Assets.* In a suit by the trustees to remove the defendant from the management of certain temples, a decree for mesne profits was passed against the defendant, who was the karnavan of a Malabar tarwad. *Held*, that the tarwad property in the hands of the deceased defendant's successor was not assets of the deceased in the hands of his successor liable to satisfy the decree under s. 234 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877. The share of a deceased father in an undivided Hindu family passes by survivorship to the sons, and is not assets in their hands to satisfy a decree against the father under s. 234 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877. *RAVI VARMA v. KOMAN*

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 223

7. — *Decree obtained against father executed against his sons as his representatives.* In an undivided Hindu family, although the interests of the sons in the ancestral estate are liable to satisfy the father's debt, the holder of a money-decree against the father, who has not attached the ancestral estate before the death of the father, cannot execute the decree against the ancestral property as assets in the hands of the representatives of the judgment-debtor under s. 234 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877. *Zamindar of Sivagiri v. Alwar Ayyangar, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 42, followed. HANUMANTHA v. HANUMAYYA* . **I. L. R. 5 Mad. 232**

8. — *Decree for Maintenance obtained against father.* A decree for maintenance against a Hindu directing an annual payment to be made by him to the decree-holder

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 234 (1859, s. 210)—*contd.*

during her life-time can be executed after the death of the judgment-debtor against his sons to the extent of the assets of the deceased taken by them, but such assets do not include the share of the father in the family property. *KARPAKAMBAL v. SUBBAYAN* . . . **I. L. R. 5 Mad. 234**

9. — *Liability of son for father's debt—Decree against zamindari directing sale of land—Execution against son of zamindar.* A suit having been brought against the holder of an impartible zamindari upon a promissory note, a decree was passed by consent, whereby certain land was directed to be sold in the event of the debt not being paid in a certain way. After the death of the zamindar execution proceedings were taken against his son to obtain a sale of the said land. *Held*, that the decree could be executed against the son. *ZAMINDAR OF SIVAGIRI v. TIRUVENGADA*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 339

10. — *Personal decree by one partner against another for dissolution and for a definite sum of money—Death of judgment-debtor—Right of decree-holder to execute—Joinder of undivided brother of deceased—Legality—Hindu Law.* Petitioner had obtained a decree against his three partners dissolving the partnership and ordering the first defendant to pay him a definite sum of money. Before the decree was executed, first defendant died, and petitioner now sought to execute it, under s. 234 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against the widow and undivided brother of first defendant, who had been joined as defendants as the legal representatives of the deceased. The first defendant had not been sued in a representative capacity as managing member of his family, nor was it shown that the business was a family business. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the decree was purely *in personam* against the first defendant, and not a decree against any property represented by him, or one winding up the affairs of the partnership and providing for payment of its debts and for distributing the surplus according to the shares of the partners, petitioner was not entitled to execute it as against the brother by attaching and bringing to sale joint family property, which had come to him by survivorship, whether it was ordinary family property or property acquired for the family by the partnership trade. *Held*, further, that execution should proceed only against the widow, who alone was the legal representative of the first defendant, and the brother's name should be removed from the record. Execution should be granted, under s. 234, against the widow as the legal representative of the deceased first defendant. If the deceased had left any separate property, it could be attached, even in the hands of the fifth defendant just as it might be attached, if it were found in the hands of any stranger. *VEERAPPA CHETTIAR v. RAMASWAMI AYYAR (1904)*

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 106

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 234 (1859, s. 210)—*conclld.*

11. "Legal Representative," meaning of—Decree against life holder—Execution against estate, when allowable—Holding a life estate with power to litigate on behalf of estate—Representation by agreement of parties and representation in law—Difference—Practice—Analogous Appeals, hearing of. *J*, a Hindu widow, adopted *B* as her son under an anumati-patra of her husband, which provided that she was to hold and manage the properties left by him during her lifetime. Disputes arose between *J* and *B* as regards her right to hold the properties after the adoption, and were ultimately settled by *B* executing in *J*'s favour an ekarnama, which provided, *inter alia*, that *J* was to possess and enjoy the estate without power of alienation during her lifetime, with liberty to carry on litigations in her own name. *Held*, that *J* did not hold a Hindu widow's estate, but an estate created by the ekarnama. That a decree recovered by the respondents against *J* for possession, with mesne profits and costs, of some lands, which *J* had been holding as an accretion to the estate, could, after *J*'s death, be executed against *B*'s widow, who succeeded to the estate on *J*'s death as *B*'s heiress, although *B* was no party to the suit—*J* having defended the suit in the interest of the estate and under the authority of the ekarnama, which bound *B* and his heirs. Execution was prayed to recover only the costs awarded by the decree. *Held*, that the lower Court had rightly substituted *B*'s widow in the place of *J* and execution ought to proceed against her. The meaning of "legal representative" in s. 234 of the Code of Civil Procedure discussed. *Per* BRETT, *J.*—The term "legal representative" has been used in s. 234 of the Code of Civil Procedure to meet the circumstances of a certain event, *viz.*, the passing of the property, the subject of the litigation, on the death of the deceased judgment-debtor to her successor and to include such successor either to her estate or to the property in suit. *Per* WOODROFFE, *J.*—The term "legal representative" is not limited to administrators, executors and heirs, and must, on the authorities be held to include any person, who in law represents the estate of a deceased judgment-debtor. *Quære*: Whether the principle of representation, which exists by law in the case of decrees against Hindu widows and co-parceners, can be extended to cases, such as the present, of agreement and conveyance between parties. Where of two analogous appeals, the preparation of the paper-book of one was delayed by the appellant till long after the other was heard and decided by a Division Bench against the appellant, and at the hearing of it before another Division Bench, the Court was asked to differ from that decision and to refer the case to a Full Bench, the Court disapproved of the course adopted by the appellant, as an attempt to introduce a very undesirable precedent. *DINAMONT CHAUDHURANI v. ELAHADUT KHAN* (1904)

S C. W. N. 843

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

ss. 234, 244—

See HINDU LAW I. L. R. 34 Calc. 642

ss. 234, 244, 252—*Hindu Law—Mitakshara—Liability of sons to pay father's debt—Money decree—Appeal by some of the parties to a decree—Decree in appeal final—Execution—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 179.* A money decree obtained against the father of an undivided Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law can be executed after his death against his sons to the extent of the ancestral property that has come to their hands even if the debt has been incurred for the sole purposes of the father provided that it is not tainted with immorality or illegality and if the son against whom the decree is sought to be executed as representative of his father takes the objection that the debts are tainted with immorality, he can do so under section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Umed Hathising v. Goman Bhatiji*, I. L. R. 20 Bom. 385, followed. There is no substantial distinction, in regard to questions arising in execution, between the position of legal representatives added as parties to the suit before decree and legal representatives brought in after decree. All questions between them and the decree-holder relating to execution must alike be disposed of under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). Where some of the parties to a decree appeal against it, the decree in appeal is the final decree for the purpose of execution with respect to all the parties. *SHIVRAM v. SAKHARAM* (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 39

ss. 234, 244, 248, 578—*Application to execute decree against Representative to be made to Court, which passed decree—Application to Court executing decree not an irregularity, which can be cured under s. 578—Construction of statute.* On a reference as to whether an application under s. 234 of the Code of Civil Procedure to bring the legal representatives of a deceased judgment-debtor on the record can be made to the Court to which the decree had been transferred for execution:—*Held* by the Full Bench, that, where a decree of one Court had been transferred to another Court for execution, an application by the decree-holder under s. 234 to execute the decree against the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor must be made to the Court which passed the decree and not to the Court executing the same. *Hirachand Harjirandas v. Kasturchand Kasidas*, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 224, approved. *Seth Shapurji Nana Bhui v. Shankar Dat Dube*, I. L. R. 17 All. 431, approved. *Sham Lal Pal v. Modhu Sudan Sircar*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 553, not followed. *Per* SIR ARNOLD WHITE, C.J.—The provisions of ss. 234 and 244 (c) are not irreconcilable. The last paragraph of s. 244 only applies when a question arises as to who is a 'representative' of a party for the purpose of that section and ought not to be construed as cutting down the power given to the Court which passed

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 234, 244, 248, 578—*concl'd.*

the decree by the express words of s. 234. There is no difficulty in reconciling ss. 234 and 248 : they can be construed together and due effect given to the provisions of each. The word 'representative' in s. 244 has a much wider meaning than the words 'legal representative' in s. 234. An order under s. 234 is not made in exercise of the powers 'in executing a decree,' but as a preliminary step towards those powers being exercised by the Court to which the decree has been transferred, s. 234 contemplates the making of an order. The legislature in enacting s. 244 (c) were not distinguishing cases, where a decree had been transferred for execution, between the powers to be exercised by the Court which passed the decree and the powers to be exercised by the Court to which the decree has been transferred respectively, and effect must be given to the express provisions of s. 234. A statute ought to be construed so that, if it can be prevented, no clause, section or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant. *The Queen v. Bishop of Oxford, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 245.* Per DAVIES J.—There is a direct and irreconcilable conflict between the provision in the first paragraph of s. 234 and that in cl. (c), s. 244, read with the last paragraph of that section. *By the Divisional Bench.*—An application under s. 234 made to the Court to which the decree is transferred for execution cannot, when objection is taken by the other party to its being entertained, be treated as a mere irregularity under s. 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *SWAMINATHA AYYAR v. VAIDYANATHA SASTRI (1905)* . . . I. L. R. 28 Mad. 46

ss. 234, 372—*Legal Representative, execution against—Transferee, after money decree against a company, of such company's properties with liabilities cannot be proceeded against as a legal representative.* B sued A & Co., the proprietors of a rice mill, for moneys due in respect of contracts connected with the said mill and obtained a money decree against A & Co. While the suit was pending A & Co. sold the business with all its assets and liabilities to another company C, of which A & Co. were managing agents and the suit was defended by A & Co. on behalf of C, but the fact was not brought to the notice of the Court. After decree A & Co. became insolvent and B sought execution against C as the legal representative of A & Co. *Held*, that B was not so entitled. Neither s. 234 nor s. 372 of the Civil Procedure Code (supposing the latter applicable to execution) authorised such a proceeding. *Harish Chandra Tewary v. Chandapore Company, Ltd., I. L. R. 30 Calc. 961*, followed. The fact that A & Co., after the transfer of the business, defended the suit on behalf of C, made no difference as the decree was merely a personal decree against A & Co. and did not profess to bind the properties of C. *ARBUTHNOT'S INDUSTRIALS v. MUTHU CHETTIER (1908)*

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 464

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s. 235 (1859, s. 212).

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See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH II, ART. 179—NATURE OF APPLICATIONS—IRREGULAR AND DEFECTIVE APPLICATIONS.
I. L. R. 6 Mad. 250
I. L. R. 16 Mad. 142
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 217
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 594
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 818
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 76
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 34
2 C. W. N. 536

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—EXECUTION OF DECREE, APPLICATION FOR.
9 W. R. 362
11 W. R. 271
16 W. R. 25

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT.
I. L. R. 31 Bom. 244

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, SS. 88 AND 89.

1. ——— Application for execution of decree—*Adjustment of decree.* Under s. 235 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, the decree-holder of the party who applies for execution is bound to state in his application any adjustment between the parties after decree, whether such adjustment has or has not been previously certified to the Court. *Panpayya v. Narasannah, I. L. R. 2 Mad. 216*, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BAPUJI DAYARAM* . . . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 288

2. ——— *Execution of decree—Application for execution verified by general attorney of decree-holder.* *Held*, that an application for execution of a decree, which is verified by the general attorney of the decree-holder, who has satisfied the executing Court that he is acquainted with the facts of the case, is properly verified within the meaning of s. 235 of the Code of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding that his principal may be residing within the jurisdiction of the Court. *Murari Lal v. Umrao Singh, I. L. R. 23 All. 499*, distinguished. *BAKAR SAJJAD v. UDIT NARAIN SINGH (1904)*
I. L. R. 26 All. 154

s. 236 (1859, s. 214)—*Investigation of title—Execution of decree.* Neither s. 214, Act VIII of 1859, nor s. 15, Act XXIII of 1861, contemplated any enquiry before the Court, whether the property belongs to the judgment-debtor or not. *SUBJAN BIBEE v. SARIUTULLA*
3 B. L. R. A. C. 413 : 12 W. R. 329

ss. 237 and 578—*Execution of decree—Application for attachment—Omission to verify inventory of property sought to be attached—Irre-*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 237 and 578—*concl'd.*

gularity. Held, that the omission in an application in execution for attachment of immoveable property to verify the inventory of the property sought to be attached in the manner prescribed by s. 237 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an irregularity only and does not vitiate the application. *Basdeo v. John Smidt*, I. L. R. 22 All. 55, followed. *NASIR-UN-NISSA v. GHAFUR-UD-DIN* (1905)
I. L. R. 28 All. 244

s. 239 (1859, s. 290).

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OF DECREE FOR EXECUTION, ETC.

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 736

21 W. R. 141, 219

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 916; 11 C. L. R. 348

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 65

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 456

ss. 241, 244 (c), 290, 311, 312 and 588—*Order setting aside a sale—Fraud, allegation of—Non-compliance with the provisions of s. 290 of the Code of Civil Procedure—Limitation—Date of sale.* Where an application is made to set aside a sale, the main basis of which is fraud, such an application comes under s. 241 of the Civil Procedure Code; and a second appeal lies to the High Court against an order passed by the Court of first instance setting aside a sale on the ground of fraud, although the lower Appellate Court found that there was no fraud in the case. *Umakanta Roy v. Dino Nath Sanyal*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 4, distinguished. *Bhuban Mohun Pal v. Nunda Lal Dey*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 234, and *Hira Lal Ghose v. Chandra Kanta Ghose*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 539, followed. Mere non-compliance with the provisions of s. 220 of the Civil Procedure Code in conducting a sale does not *ipso facto* make the sale a nullity; therefore limitation would run in such a case from the date of the sale. *Gobind Lal Roy v. Ram Janan Misser*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 70; *L. R. 21 I. A. 165*, and *Tasaduk Rasul Khan v. Ahmad Husain*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 66; *L. R. 20 I. A. 176*, referred to. *KOKIL SINGH v. EDUL SINGH* (1904). I. L. R. 31 Calc. 385

s. 243 (1859, s. 290).

See APPEAL—ORDERS . . . 11 Bom. 151

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 214; 12 C. L. R. 53

I. L. R. 10 All. 389

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EXECUTION . . . 8 W. R. 202

I. L. R. 7 All. 73

6 N. W. 181

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s. 244 (Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11).

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I. L. R. 12 Calc. 610

I. L. R. 9 All. 46, 64

I. L. R. 12 All. 61

I. L. R. 16 All. 129

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 26

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 34

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 725

1 C. W. N. 374

11 C. W. N. 239, 861

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EXECUTION OF DECREES;

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I. L. R. 28 Calc. 73

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I. L. R. 26 Mad. 264

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I. L. R. 32 Calc. 332

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6 C. W. N. 190

7 C. W. N. 591

See CERTIFICATE . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 691

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 84

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 258

3 Mad. 138

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 203

8 W. R. 449

9 W. R. 210

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22 W. R. 298

4 Bom. A. C. 76

1 N. W. 155

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I. L. R. 15 Calc. 187

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6 C. W. N. 63

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7 C. W. N. 158

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I. L. R. 2 Calc. 327

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 371

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 371

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 58

6 C. W. N. 223

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I. L. R. 28 Calc. 734

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6 C. W. N. 663

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See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
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9 C. W. N. 989See OCCUPANCY HOLDING.
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13 C. W. N. 98See POSSESSION—SUITS FOR POSSESSION.
7 C. W. N. 607See POWER OF COURT.
12 C. W. N. 1027See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT (BENGAL ACT I OF 1895), ss. 10, 17, 21.
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 813

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5 C. W. N. 559

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11 C. W. N. 1011See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
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5 C. W. N. 265SETTING ASIDE SALE—GENERAL
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9 C. W. N. 577;
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c. 21) . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 419See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—
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I. L. R. 29 Calc. 682IRREGULARITY
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 142

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE.

1. _____ Meaning of section. S. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates that there must be some question in controversy and conflict in execution, which has been brought to a final determination and conclusion, so as to be binding upon the parties to the proceedings, and which must relate in terms to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree. *HULAS RAI v. PIRTHI SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 500

—*Su* _____ Proceeding in execution *Sem it—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 12.* a *suble*. That a proceeding under s. 244 is not *Civ*uit within the meaning of s. 12 of the Code of *N*il Procedure. *VENKATA CHANDRAPPA NAYAVARU v. VENKATARAMA REDDI*
I. L. R. 22 Mad. 256

3. _____ Question raised for first time in execution. *Held*, that a question raised for the first time between the parties to a decree at the time of its execution, although not expressly reserved in that decree for determination at the time of its execution, may be enquired into and determined by the Court executing the decree under s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861. *JANOJI BANAJI v. VYANKATESH SHRINIVAS*
2 Bom. 393: 2nd Ed. 371

4. _____ Decree subsequently modified, question as to execution of. Where it is contended that the decree that has been executed is not the decree that was passed between the parties, but a decree modified by a subsequent decretal order, s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, does not apply, the question not being one relating to the execution of the decree and between the parties to the suit. *UMBIKA CHURN CHUCKERBUTTY v. DWARKANATH GHOSE* . . . 8 W. R. 506

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—*contd.*

5. — Suit to enforce liability imposed by decree of Civil Court in mofussil. A suit does not lie to enforce a liability specifically imposed by the decree of a Civil Court in the mofussil, the right of suit in such case being taken away by s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861. *SANJEEVIAH v. NANJIAH* 4 Mad. 453

6. — Transfer of decree for execution—*Procedure of Court passing and Court executing transferred decree—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 243, 545.* The provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code govern equally the procedure of the Court which passed the decree, when executing such decree, and the Court to which the decree is sent for execution. *Cooke v. Hiseeba Beebee, 6 N. W. 181*, referred to. *GHAZIDIN v. FAKIR BAKSH* I. L. R. 7 All. 73

7. — Question after Court has executed decree and become *functus officio*—*Review.* Where a judgment-debtor pending the execution proceedings, was granted permission to examine the state of the accounts, but failed to do so, and then made a fresh application to the Court for the same purpose after the execution proceedings had been struck off, and the decree declared to be satisfied: *Held*, that the question must be determined with reference to the provisions of s. 647 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the only course open to the judgment-debtor would have been to apply for a review of the order which declared the decree to be satisfied and struck off the execution proceedings. *Held*, also, that the words, "the following question shall be determined by order of the Court executing the decree," of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be interpreted to mean the Court executing the decree at the time when the application is made, and that they do not include the Court which has executed the decree, and has, therefore, become *functus officio*. *FAKARUDDIN MAHOMED AHSAN v. OFFICIAL TRUSTEE OF BENGAL* . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 538

8. — Suit brought under circumstances where the proper remedy was by application under s. 244—*Discretion of Court to treat the plaint as an application under s. 244.* Where certain judgment-debtors, whose property had been sold in execution of a decree, brought a suit to have the sale in execution set aside under circumstances in which their proper remedy in law, if any, was by means of an application under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was *held* that it was not an improper exercise of the discretion of the Court in which such suit was brought to treat the plaint as an application under s. 244 of the Code. *Biri Mahata v. Shyama Churn Khawas, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 483*, followed. *Mayan*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

Pathuti v. Pakuran, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 347, referred to. *JHAMMAN LAL v. KEWAL RAM*
I. L. R. 22 All. 121

9. — Applications made by judgment-debtor—*Applicability of section.* The provision in s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure that questions arising between the parties to the suit and relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree shall be determined by order of the Court executing the decree relates not only to proceedings initiated by the decree-holder, but also to applications made by the judgment-debtor. *ERUSAPPA MUDALIAR v. COMMERCIAL AND LAND MORTGAGE BANK* . . . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 377

10. — Loss or destruction of decree—*Regular suit.* A decree passed for money was lost or destroyed: the decree-holder, on suing out execution, was referred to a regular suit. *Held*, that the existence of the decree and of its terms might have been enquired into in the execution department, and that the order of the Court, to which application for execution was made, could not confer jurisdiction on a Court to entertain such a suit. *RANJEET v. CHOONEE LALL* . 1 Agra 78

11. — Suit to remove buildings found on land for which decree is given. Where in execution of a decree for land the plaintiff found that buildings had been erected by the defendant on the land alleged by him to be comprised in the decree, and an application to the Court executing the decree was refused on the ground that the decree was silent as to the demolition of the buildings: *Held*, that his remedy was an appeal against that order, and not a fresh suit to get the buildings removed. *RADHA GOBIND SHAHA v. BROJENDER COOMAR ROY CHOWDHRY*
7 W. R. 372

12. — Question of title between decree-holder and third person—*Separate suit.* The plaintiffs in a suit for money obtained a decree against all the defendants except P, and among them K. On appeal, the Court of first appeal gave them a decree against P. In execution of this decree, they attached and were paid, as belonging to P, certain money deposited in the Government Treasury in K's name. On appeal by P, the Court of second appeal reversed this decree, and restored the decree of the first Court dismissing the suit as regards P. P thereupon applied in execution of his decree for a refund of the money. The plaintiffs objected on the ground that the money belonged to K. *Held*, that the Court executing P's decree was not competent to decide the question whether the money belonged to P or to K, such question not being one between P and them only, but involving and raising a question of title between him and K as to their conflicting

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

claims, *inter se*, to the money. *PUSAI v. MAHADEO PRASAD* . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 12

13. ——— Alleged fraudulent execution of decree—*Separate suit*. Certain property in the 24-Pergunnahs having been seized and sold in execution of a decree of the High Court, application was successfully made to the District Judge to set aside the proceedings, on the ground that the execution was fraudulent and not warranted by the decree. *Held*, that the Judge had no right to entertain such an application, or to re-open, at the instance of a third party, execution proceedings which had come to an end. The question could only be determined in a regular suit. *LUCHMEEPUT SINGH v. ADOYTO CHURN MULLICK*

24 W. R. 452

See JOGENARAIN SINGH v. BHUGBANO
2 W. R. Mis. 13

14. ——— *Suit to set aside sale—Fraud—Sale under Act X of 1859—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11*. B obtained an *ex parte* decree for arrears of rent against S under Act X of 1859, and in execution of that decree brought the tenure to sale. At the sale the tenure was purchased by N. S then brought a suit against B and N to set aside the sale on the ground that the rent-decree and all execution-proceedings taken thereunder were fraudulent, and alleging that B was the actual purchaser in the name of N. An objection was taken that the suit would not lie, and that the questions in the suit were such as could have been determined, and were determined, by the Court executing the decree:—*Held*, that neither s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code nor the corresponding s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 had any application to proceedings in execution of a decree under Act X of 1859, and that the suit, being one to set aside the sale on the ground of fraud, was maintainable. *Saroda Churn Chuckerbutty v. Mahomed Isuf Meah*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 376, distinguished. *BROJO GOPAL SARKAR v. BUSIR-UNNISSA BIBI* . . . I. L. R. 15 Calc 179

15. ——— Question as to whether purchase-money has been paid within time—*Conditional decree*. The plaintiff in a suit to enforce a right of pre-emption obtained a decree to the effect mentioned in s. 214 of the Civil Procedure Code. On payment by him of the purchase-money into Court, the defendants objected, in the execution department, to such payment, on the ground that it had not been made within time. The Court which made the decree disallowed the objection. The defendants appealed from the order disallowing the objection: they had previously appealed from the decree. The Appellate Court heard both appeals together, and, holding that the purchase-money had not been paid into Court within

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

time, reversed the decree and allowed the objection. The plaintiff preferred a second appeal to the High Court from the Appellate Court's decree, which was admitted. He also preferred an appeal from the appellate order allowing the objection, but this appeal was rejected as being beyond time, and such order became final. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the question whether the plaintiff had paid the purchase-money into Court within time was not one relating to the execution of the decree within the meaning of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, but was one which should be decided in the suit itself, and therefore the proceedings in the execution department touching that question were ill-founded, such order was not a bar to the hearing of the second appeal preferred by the plaintiff. *MUHAMMAD ALI v. DEBI DIN RAI* . . . I. L. R. 4 All. 420

16. ——— Suit to set aside order in execution of decree. Where the object of the suit was to set aside orders passed in the miscellaneous department relating to execution of decree:—*Held*, that such suit was untenable; s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, having distinctly prohibited all remedy by separate suit and the remedy provided being an appeal from the order complained of. *AMRIT KOONWAR v. LUCHMEE NARAIN*

1 Agra 93

17. ——— Regular suit to set aside summary order—*Application in summary suit*. A person who, in the course of executing a decree, had been turned out of possession by an order under s. 269, Act VIII of 1859, and who was compelled to pay the costs of that order, brought a regular suit for its reversal and obtained a decree, which was silent as to the cost of the summary order in consequence of the plaintiff not having demanded them; subsequently the plaintiff made an application in the summary suit that the costs of the summary order should be repaid to her. *Held*, that the Court had no power to entertain it under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861. *TOYBOON v. MAHOMED WAJID* . . . 2 C. L. R. 504

18. ——— Resistance to execution as being cultivators—*Decree for limited possession—Separate suit*. In a suit to recover possession of land, the defendants resisted execution on the ground that they were cultivators, and that the decree only authorized the plaintiff to recover possession as proprietor. The objection was overruled, and the defendants were ejected. They then sued to set aside the order made in the execution proceedings and to recover possession. *Held*, that the suit was barred under s. 244, cl. (c), of the Civil Procedure Code. *NAJHAN v. MAHOMED TAKI KHAN alias PEER BUX KHAN*
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 872 : 12 C. L. R. 571

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

— s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

19. ———— *Liability of property for debts—Separate suit—Debts of father.* Whether property seized by a judgment-creditor in the hands of his deceased judgment-creditor's son is held by the son under such circumstances as render him liable for his father's debts is a question which cannot be tried in execution proceedings, but must form the subject of an independent suit. *RAMANOOGR SINGH v. KISHEN KISHORE NARAIN SINGH* 23 W. R. 265

20. ———— *Liability of son for father's debt—Suit against son to enforce decree against father—Limitation—Suit to recover money charged on land by decree.* A suit for money having been brought against the holder of an impartible zamindari, a decree was passed in 1867 by consent to the effect that the zamindar undertook to pay a certain sum by yearly instalments and hypothecated certain lands as security. A memorandum of this decree was registered under s. 42 of Act XX of 1866. The last instalment fell due in February 1870. The decree was kept alive against the zamindar up to his death in 1873. Upon the death of the zamindar, proceedings in execution were taken against his son, who succeeded to the zamindari, but were set aside on appeal. In January 1882 a suit was brought against the son to recover the amount of the last instalment due by his father under the decree of 1867. *Held*, that the suit was neither barred by the provisions of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure nor by limitation. *ARUNACHALA v. ZAMINDAR OF SIVAGIRI* . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 328

21. ———— *Hindu law—Obligation of son to pay debt of deceased father—Nature of obligation.* D obtained a decree against the father of A and R, Hindus, on a hypothecation-bond, whereby certain land was pledged as security for repayment of a loan. The decree declared the land liable to be sold for repayment of the debt. The judgment-debtor having died before the decree was executed, A and R were made parties to the proceedings in execution and the land was attached. A and R objected to the attachment on the ground that their shares in the land were not liable to be sold in execution of the decree, as they were not parties to the suit. This objection was allowed, and D brought a suit for a declaration that the property was liable to be sold. That suit was dismissed, on the ground that a suit for a declaration would not lie. D then sued to recover from A and R the balance due under the decree against their father after crediting the amount recovered by the sale of their father's share. It was objected that the suit was barred by s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that the duty of a son under Hindu law to pay his father's debts out of his own share of ancestral

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

— s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

estate is not a matter which can be decided under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The questions contemplated by s. 244 are those which relate to the enforcement of the obligation created by the decree. The obligation to pay the father's debts out of the son's share of the ancestral state is not an obligation created by a decree against the father. *ARIABUDRA v. DORASAMI* . I. L. R. 11 Mad. 413

22. ———— *Suit against sons of a deceased judgment-debtor—Decree for money against father to be discharged by instalments—Separate suit—Liability of son for father's debt.* A personal decree on a mortgage was passed against a Hindu (the mortgagor) and his two sons on 19th October 1877. The decree provided for payment of the secured debt in various instalments by May 1895. The mortgagor died in 1883, having discharged part of the debt. The decree-holder having attached certain family property in execution, the mortgagor's two younger sons, who had not been born at the date of the above decree, objected that their shares were not liable to attachment. This objection prevailed, the Court expressing the opinion that the matter in controversy should be determined in a regular suit. The other defendants in the suit of 1877 had both died in the interval, one of them leaving infant sons. The decree-holder (in whose sole name the mortgage stood) now sued the sons of the mortgagor and their infant nephews for payment out of the family property of all unpaid instalments, and objection was taken that the question whether ancestral property is liable or not for the father's debt in the present suit was one which related to the execution of the decree in the former suit, and that the order whereby the attachment was raised was an order under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and no fresh suit could be brought. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not precluded from maintaining the suit against the sons of the mortgagor by Civil Procedure Code, s. 244. *RAMAYYA v. VENKATARATNAM* . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 122

23. ———— *Execution of decree against son in Hindu joint family as representative of his father—Question as to legality of debt for which decree was obtained.* Where a son, against whom a decree which has been obtained by his father in a joint undivided Hindu family is sought to be executed as representative of his father, takes the objection that the debts are tainted with immorality, he can do so under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Ariabudra v. Dorasami*, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 413, and *Lachmi Narayan v. Kunjilal*, I. L. R. 16 All. 449, not followed. *UMED HATHISING v. GOMAN BHAIJI*

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 385

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

24. ——— Mode of redeeming mortgaged lands in execution of former decree. A mortgagee was put into possession of the mortgaged property, under a decree obtained by him against the mortgagor, to the effect that the mortgagee should remain in possession until the mortgage debt was paid. The mortgagor subsequently paid into Court the money due under the mortgage decree, and applied to be restored to the possession of the mortgaged property. Both the lower Courts granted the mortgagor's application. On special appeal: *Held* (following the decision of the Full Bench in *Ravji Shivram Joshi v. Kaluram Malukchand*, 12 Bom. 161), that such an application was not the proper mode for the mortgagor to redeem the property and to recover possession from the mortgagee, the previous decree for possession having been fully executed when the mortgagee was put into possession. *RAMCHANDRA BALLAL v. BABA ESGONDA* . . . 12 Bom. 163

25. ——— Application for further execution by taking an account. An application to the Court passing a decree for possession in favour of the heirs of a mortgagee, for further execution thereof, by taking an account is not the proper mode for the mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged lands and to recover possession thereof. The proper course for a mortgagor who seeks for an account and redemption, or for redemption alone, is to bring an independent suit for that purpose. *Janoji v. Vyankatesh*, 2 Bom. 371, overruled. *RAVJI SHIVRAM JOSHI v. KALURAM*

12 Bom. 160

26. ——— Question as to amount received under mortgage—*Attempt to obtain redemption of a usufructuary mortgage by means of an application in execution.* Certain mortgagees held a mortgage which, in its inception, was a simple mortgage, but which was to become a usufructuary mortgage upon non-payment of the mortgage debt by a certain date. The mortgage debt was not paid within the time limited. The mortgagee sued on the covenant in their bond and obtained a decree for possession, declaring them entitled to remain in possession until the mortgage debt was satisfied from the usufruct. Some time after the mortgagees had got possession under this decree, the mortgagors applied, ostensibly under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for recovery of possession of the mortgaged property and for payment of a large sum of money, which they alleged the mortgagees to have collected as profits in excess of what was due under the mortgage. *Held*, that such an application would not lie. If the allegation of the mortgagors were true, their proper remedy was by suit for redemption, and not by application in the execution department. *Ravji Shivram Joshi v. Kaluram*,

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

12 Bom. 160, *Ram Chandra Ballal v. Baba Esgonda*, 12 Bom. 163, and *Narsinha Manohar v. Bhagvant-rav*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 327, referred to. *HAR PRASAD v. SHEO RAM* . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 506

27. ——— *Usufructuary mortgage.* In a suit for possession under an usufructuary mortgage, plaintiff obtained a decree which was afterwards authoritatively interpreted to mean that he was to get possession of the property in order to repay himself out of the profits, keeping the usual accounts, and, after satisfaction of his claim, restore the property. *Held*, that, under the terms of the decree, he was in effect required to certify, for the information both of the Court and of the judgment-debtors, the amounts received and outstanding; and that the Court executing the decree was bound to require from him, from time to time, a statement of the amount received, and could deal with the matter under Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11. *GOLAM RUSOOL KHAN v. KISHEN MOHUN SHAHA* . . . 23 W. R. 156

28. ——— Property attached in execution, after satisfaction of decree from other sources—*Separate suit.* An elephant having been attached in execution, it was released on the claim of one P, upon S standing surety. It was finally declared to be the property of the judgment-debtors; but the decree having been satisfied from other sources, it was ordered that the elephant be returned to the judgment-debtors. It was then demanded from the surety; but he objecting, the claimant (P) was served with notice to produce it. This not having been done within the period fixed, the Munsif ordered that it should be demanded from the surety, and (on his failure to produce its stipulated price) should be realized by attachment and sale of his property. *Held*, that, the decree having been executed, the Munsif's subsequent proceedings as to the elephant were illegal, and that the right to it was open to a suit. *JUGGUT CHUNDER BHADOOREE v. SHIB CHUNDR A BHADOOREE* . . . 16 W. R. 269

29. ——— Execution of pottah by decree-holder in favour of judgment-debtor—*Limiting decree for possession.* Where a decree-holder, declared to be entitled to possession of certain land, subsequently to decree executed a pottah in favour of his judgment-debtor, who was then in possession, and afterwards took out execution under his decree:—*Held*, on an objection by the judgment-debtor, that, under these circumstances, he was not entitled to possession; that satisfaction of the decree not having been entered up, such objection could not be dealt with under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *BABA MAHOMED v. WEBB* . . . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 786 : 8. C. L. R. 36

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

30. ——— *Powers of Court in executing decree.* The validity of a decree of which execution is sought cannot be disputed in execution proceedings under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). CHINTAMAN VITHOBA v. CHINTAMAN BAJAJI DEV

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 475

31. ——— *Question as to validity of mortgage decree for sale on mortgage.* Held, that, when a decree for the sale of specific mortgaged property is being executed, it is not open to persons made parties to the execution proceedings as legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor to contend in those proceedings that the mortgagor was not competent to make the mortgage, and that the decree was one which ought not to have been passed. CHINTAMAN VITHOBA v. CHINTAMAN BAJAJI DEV, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 475, Seth Chand Mal v. Durga Dei, I. L. R. 12 All. 313, Sanwal Das v. Bismillah Begum, I. L. R. 19 All. 480, and Lochan Singh v. Sant Chandar Mukerji, Weekly Notes (1889) 24, referred to. LILADHAR v. CHATURBHUJ

I. L. R. 21 All. 277

32. ——— *Question as to authority to consent to decree—Validity of decree made by consent.* In proceedings for execution of a decree one of the judgment-debtors opposed the application for execution under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code on the ground that the person who was said to have consented to the decree had no authority to consent to it. Held, that this was a question which could not be raised in execution. SUDINDRA v. BUDAN, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 80, approved. DHANI RAM MAHTA v. LUCHMESWAR SINGH

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 639

33. ——— *Question as to whether debt was properly contracted—Execution of decree against endowed property.* B obtained a decree on a settlement of accounts made with V as trustee of a muth. V's title as trustee having subsequently been negatived by decree and the title of S declared, B applied to execute the decree against the property of the muth and to have S substituted as party to the suit in place of V. The application was rejected by the Munsif, but on appeal the District Judge made S a party and reserved for determination in execution proceedings the question whether the debt was contracted for the benefit of the muth. Held, that S was properly made a party, but that it was not open to him to raise this question in execution proceedings. SUDINDRA v. BUDAN

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 80

34. ——— *Decree for sale on a mortgage—Powers of Court executing decree—Joint Hindu family—Objection by son that his interest in the property mortgaged is not saleable in execution of a decree obtained against his father.*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

Held, that it is not open to a son in a joint Hindu family, who has been made a party as the legal representative of his father to proceedings in execution of a mortgage decree against his father, to raise an objection in those execution proceedings that the decree against the father is not binding on him in his personal capacity by reason of his not having been made a party to the suit in which the decree was passed. BHAWANI PRASAD v. KALLU, I. L. R. 17 All. 537, referred to. SANWAL DASS v. BISMILLAH BEGUM, I. L. R. 19 All. 480, and LILADHAR v. CHATURBHUJ, I. L. R. 21 All. 277, approved. LOCHAN SINGH v. SANT CHANDAR MUKERJI, Weekly Notes (1899) 24, not followed. HIRA LAL SAHU v. PARAMESWAR RAI

I. L. R. 21 All. 356

35. ——— *Right to maintenance—Maintenance payable by instalments under decree.* Where the holder of a decree for maintenance is opposed in execution by the heirs of her judgment-debtors, the questions arising between them cannot be determined in execution, but must be tried in a regular suit. *Quere:* If the original judgment-debtor were alive, could the decree-holder enforce her claim for maintenance by execution without a fresh suit for each instalment unpaid? PREMOMO BIBI v. DASSOO DEBIA

10 W. R. 93

36. ——— *Monthly allowance payable under decree—Cause of action—Separate suit on failure to pay.* Where by a decree the plaintiff's right to a monthly allowance was declared:—Held, that any failure on the part of the person bound to pay by the terms of the decree would constitute a good cause of action; and a fresh suit brought on the assertion of payment being withheld would not be affected by the provisions of s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861. NAWAZISH ALY BEG v. VILAY-TEE KHANUM

2 Agra 23

37. ——— *Claim for damages for injury to goods wrongly attached—Separate suit.* A claim for damages for injury to certain goods belonging to plaintiff, but attached by the defendant in execution of a decree held by him against the plaintiff, pending such attachment, through the alleged negligence of the defendant, is a matter which should be determined by a separate suit, and not by the Court executing the decree under which the goods are attached. LUCHMAN DASS v. HEERA LAL

3 N. W. 187

38. ——— *Question of Liability for wrongful execution—Separate suit.* Where property attached in execution of a decree is found by the Court executing the decree to have been wrongly seized, the question of the legal liability of the plaintiff for the loss sustained can only be determined by a separate suit, and an order adjudging such liability passed in execution of the

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

decree will be set aside as illegal. *WRIGHT v. SEETA RAM* 2 *Agra* 105

39. ———— Damages for injury to goods under attachment—*Separate suit*. A claim for damages in respect of injury sustained by goods while under attachment in execution of a decree which was afterwards set aside is not a matter to be disposed of under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, but must be made the subject of a separate suit. *KASHEE KISHORE ROY CHOWDHRY v. NOOR KHAN* 7 *W. R.* 45

40. ———— Damage done by removal of crops for possession of which decree had been obtained. By the terms of a decree passed by the District Munsif, the plaintiff was declared entitled to the possession of certain land, together with the crops upon it. The plaintiff asked for execution of the decree in respect of the land and the crops, which he alleged had been unlawfully taken away by the defendants, and possession of the land was given to the plaintiff, but it was referred to a separate suit for the damage sustained by him by reason of the removal of the crop. *Held*, that no separate suit could be maintained, but the plaintiff's remedy was by a proceeding in execution under s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 (Civil Procedure Code). *SUNGARA NARAYANA PILLAY v. SANDIRA PILLAY* 6 *Mad.* 18

41. ———— Land wrongly given to defendant in another suit—*Separate suit*. The plaintiff sued to recover certain land of which the defendant obtained possession in execution of a decree in a former suit, in which the plaintiff was a defendant, although it was not part of the land mentioned in the plaint or decree in the former suit. *Held*, that the plaintiff's suit could not be maintained, and that his only remedy for the wrongful dispossession was a proceeding under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861. *MUTTUVELU PILLAI v. VITHILINGA PILLAI* 5 *Mad.* 185

42. ———— Objection to claim to portion of the land—*Decree altering possession of land*. Where a decree directed certain land to be taken from first defendant and put into plaintiff's possession for a term, and a claim was put in by second defendant's assignees to part of the land :—*Held*, that an objection by first defendant to the claim was a matter to be determined in execution proceedings, and not by separate suit. *RAHIMAN KHAN SAMOJI SAHIB v. PATCHA MIYAH* I. L. R. 4 *Mad.* 285

43. ———— Land taken in excess of decree—*Separate suit—Cause of action*. Where a party who has obtained a decree for land takes possession by his own act, and not by the act of the officer of Court, of more land than the decree gives

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

him : *Held*, that a suit will lie to recover back possession of any land taken in excess of the decree. *MUDUN MOHUN SINGH v. KANYEE DOSS CHUCKERBUTTY* 12 *B. L. R.* 201

SHURUT SOONDUREE DEBEE v. PURES NARAIN ROY 12 *W. R.* 85

44. ———— *Cause of dispossession*. It should be distinctly found in such a case how the dispossession occurred, whether through the Court or by the act of the defendant himself. *SURUT SOONDARY DABEE v. ONVAR NARAIN PERSHAD DEX* 12 *B. L. R.* 207 note

S. C. SHURUT SOONDUREE DEBEE v. PURES NARAIN ROY 12 *W. R.* 85

45. ———— *Separate suit*. In execution of a decree for the recovery of certain lands from the plaintiff within specified boundaries, the defendant took possession of land as being covered by the decree, the possession being given him by an officer of Court. Thereafter the plaintiff preferred a complaint that the defendant had taken illegal possession, as the land was not covered by the decree ; but the Court rejected his application. The plaintiff then brought a suit to recover possession of the lands, which he alleged had been wrongfully taken under the defendant's decree. *Held*, that the suit would not lie. The matter was a question arising between the parties relating to the execution of the decree under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, and should therefore have been the subject of an application to the Court which made the decree. *JOGENDBO NARAIN COOMAR v. SURNOMOYE* 12 *B. L. R.* 203 note : 14 *W. R.* 39

See KISHEN SOONDER ROY v. PROSUNNONATH BHUTTACHARJEE *W. R.* 1864, 208

And *MAHOMED IBRAHIM v. LALLA JUSSODALAL* *W. R.* 1864, 247

46. ———— *Suit for property wrongly taken in execution of decree—Right of suit—Question of jurisdiction*. Under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), no separate suit will lie for the recovery of lands taken by the decree-holder in excess of the terms of his decree, if the decree-holder has been put in possession of such lands by the officer of the Court executing the decree. *Mudhun Mohun Singh v. Kanye Doss Chuckerbutty*, 12 *B. L. R.* 201, referred to. But where the suit has been instituted in the Court which had jurisdiction to execute the decree, the plaint may be regarded as an application to that Court for determining the question whether the lands are covered by the decree, and the suit does not, therefore, fail for want of jurisdiction. *Purmessuree Pershad Narain Singh v. Jankee Koorer*, 19 *W. R.* 90, and *Azizuddin Hossein v. Ramanujra Roy*,

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 605, referred to and followed. *Held*, also, that in such a case it is incumbent upon the defendant to raise the plea of jurisdiction in the Court of first instance, the question being not a pure question of law, but a question which would depend upon facts. *BIRU MAHATA v. SHYAMA CHURN KHAWAS* . . . *I. L. R. 22 Calc. 483*

47. ————— *Question whether lands were included in decree—Act VIII of 1859, s. 387—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11.* The father of the defendant in 1853 obtained a decree against the father of the plaintiff and other persons for partition of village lands. The decree directed that in effecting the partition certain dhara lands then occupied by the plaintiff's father were not to be included. Application for execution of that decree was made in 1861, but the execution-proceedings remained pending until 1882. On the 12th December 1882, the decree was executed, and the defendant (his father being then dead) was put into possession of the lands now in dispute as being part of the lands to which he was entitled under the decree. The plaintiff objected that these lands were not subject to partition under the decree, and he applied for an order that they should be delivered back to him. His application was rejected, and he thereupon brought the present suit to recover the lands from the defendant. The Court of first instance was of opinion that the question raised in the suit related to the execution of the decree made in 1853, and under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) could not be raised again by a separate suit. The plaintiff appealed to the Assistant Judge, who reversed the lower Court's decree. On appeal by the defendant to the High Court:—*Held*, reversing the decree of the lower Appellate Court, that the plaintiff's suit should be dismissed. The question whether the dhara lands received by the defendant in execution of the decree of 1853 were included in that decree was a question relating to the execution of the decree within the meaning of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act XIV of 1882, which barred a separate suit. *RAGHUNATH GANESH v. MULNA AMAD*

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 449

48. ————— *Decree wrongly executed—Trespass, suit for.* Where, in execution of a decree, something is done which is not ordered by the decree, as making breaches in a *bund* which were thought by the nazir necessary for the protection of the *bund*, a suit will lie for trespass committed thereby. It is not a question arising in execution of a decree under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861. *RASH BEHARY LALL v. WAJAN*

*12 B. L. R. 208 note: 11 W. R. 516*See also *SUBJAN BIBI v. SARIATULLA**3 B. L. R. A. C. 413: 12 W. R. 329*CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

49. ————— *Suit by judgment-debtor to set aside sale—Fresh suit—Civil Procedure Code, s. 244.* A judgment-debtor sued the decree-holder for recovery of possession of certain land which had been sold in execution of the decree and to set aside the sale, on the ground that the land was not liable, under s. 9 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, to sale in execution of decree. *Held*, that the question at issue between the parties was clearly one relating to the execution and satisfaction of the decree, and that the suit was therefore barred by the provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *JANKI SINGH v. ABLAK SINGH* . . . *I. L. R. 6 All. 393*

50. ————— *Retention by the Court of property not the subject-matter of a decree in the course of its execution—Dismissal of petition for delivery of possession—Appeal from order of dismissal.* A decree having been passed awarding to a plaintiff in a suit a moiety of certain jewels which were stored in family boxes in the possession of the defendant, the boxes containing the jewels were taken possession of by an officer of the District Court, and a division was effected by a commissioner appointed for that purpose by that Court. After the division, certain jewels remained, which had been set aside by the commissioner as not forming part of the subject-matter of the decree, and these continued in the custody of the District Court. The defendant thereupon presented a petition to the District Court praying that the jewels so remaining undivided might be returned to him. Plaintiff resisted the application, but both parties were agreed that the said remaining jewels were not part of the subject-matter of the suit, and were not dealt with by the decree. The petition was dismissed, whereupon the petitioner appealed. On objection being taken that no appeal lay against the order of dismissal on the ground that, since the jewels in question were not part of the subject-matter of the suit and were not dealt with in the decree, the question was not one relating to the execution of a decree and was not governed by s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure:—*Held*, that the question as to what should be done with the boxes and their contents arose between the parties to the suit, and related to the execution of the decree; that the order was passed under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that consequently an appeal lay. *Per MICHELL, J.*—The property having been interfered with in the course of the execution of a decree, the question involved was one "relating to the execution of the decree." The general words in the section should be construed liberally. *Muttuvellu Pillai v. Vythilinga Pillai*, 5 *Mad. 185*, and *Madhan Mohan Singh v. Kangu Doss Chuckerbutty*, 12 *B. L. R. 201*, referred to. *APPA RAO v. VENKATA-RAMANAYAMMA* . . . *I. L. R. 23 Mad. 55*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

— s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

51. — Crops misappropriated while in possession under decree afterwards set aside on appeal—*Separate suit for value of crops.* The defendant obtained a decree in a suit brought against the plaintiff for arrears of rent and for ejectment, in execution of which he evicted the plaintiff from his holding and, after getting possession thereof, carried away certain crops which were then standing on the land. The plaintiff appealed from the decree obtained by the defendant, and on appeal it was set aside on the plaintiff depositing the rent due, and the plaintiff recovered possession of his tenure. *Held*, that a suit for the value of the crops carried away by the defendant, while in possession under his decree, was not barred by s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861. *SHURNOMYEE v. PATARRI SIKKAR* . . . I. L. R. 4 Cal. 625

52. — *Decree for Costs—Sale of immoveable property in execution—Reversal of decree on appeal—Suit for recovery of mesne profits—Suit for value of crops wrongly appropriated—Right of suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 583.* A brought a suit against B for compensation, but it was struck off, and B obtained a decree for costs. A appealed, but pending the appeal B executed his decree, and, in execution thereof, purchased a certain immoveable property of A, and took delivery of possession. The Appellate Court remanded the case for retrial on the merits, and a decree was passed by the Court of first instance in A's favour, which was confirmed on appeal, and he got back his property. A then brought a suit for the value of crops wrongfully appropriated by B during the period he was in possession. It was contended on second appeal that such a suit was barred by the provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that the question to be decided in this suit did not relate to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the original decree within the meaning of s. 244, because it did not arise at all until that decree had ceased to exist, and such a suit was not barred by the provisions of that section. *Lati Koer v. Sobhadra Koer*, I. L. R. 3 Cal. 720, *Mookoond Lal Pal Chowdhry v. Mahomed Sami Meah*, I. L. R. 14 Cal. 484, *Hameeda v. Bhudhun*, 20 W. R. 238, *Bamasoondree Dabee v. Tarinee Kant Lahooree*, 20 W. R. 415, *Duljeet Gorain v. Rewal Gorain*, 22 W. R. 435, *Ram Roop Singh v. Sheo Golam Singh*, 25 W. R. 327, *Ram Ghulam v. Dwarka Rai*, I. L. R. 7 All. 170, referred to. *Mothoora Pershad Singh v. Shumbhoo Geer*, 19 W. R. 413, distinguished. *COFFIN v. KARBARI RAWAT*

I. L. R. 22 Cal. 501

53. — Suit for restoration of property where decree is reversed. Where a person obtains possession of property under a decree which is subsequently reversed, a

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

— s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

claim for the restoration of the property need not, under Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11, be the subject of a separate suit, but may be enforced in a miscellaneous proceeding. *NAGINDAS DEVCHAND v. NATHA PITAMBER* . . . 10 Bom. 297

54. — Failure to execute decree—*Suit after omission to execute decree.* Plaintiff's father purchased a house on the 11th June 1854 at a sale made under a decree against G D, but was not put into possession of it; accordingly in 1866 he obtained a decree for possession, which, however, was never executed. The defendant in 1870 obtained possession of the house by another sale made in execution of another decree against G D. The present suit was instituted by plaintiff in 1871. *Held*, that not only was the remedy on the cause of action, which accrued in 1854, and the decree of 1866, barred, but also that Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11, prevented the plaintiff from bringing a new suit on the fresh cause of action accruing to him under the decree of 1866, as that section "took away from the parties to the suit the right to raise by a fresh suit any question as to their rights and liabilities under the decree." *Runganasary v. Shappani*, 5 Mad. 375, followed. *KISAN NANDRAM v. ANANDRAM BACHAJI* . . . 10 Bom. 433

55. — Suit for possession after failure of attempt to execute decree giving possession—*Separate suit.* The ancestors of the plaintiff brought a suit in 1821 before the Registrar of the Adawlut Court to eject the defendant's grandfather from a piece of ground. The Registrar found that the defendant was a tenant under the plaintiff at a monthly rent, and the Court decreed that defendant should remain in possession so long as he should continue to pay the rent regularly, and that in default of payment the plaintiff should be placed in possession. An attempt to obtain possession in execution of that decree in 1861 failed, and the plaintiff brought a suit to recover possession with arrears of rent. *Held*, that s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 precluded the plaintiff from maintaining the suit. *RUNGANSARY v. SHAPPANI ASARY* . . . 5 Mad. 375

56. — Execution of decree raising question of mismanagement of property after rejection of application to be put into possession—*Declaratory decree.* In a partition suit brought by the plaintiff a decree was passed in 1882, which provided (*inter alia*) that the defendant should manage certain devasthan lands and apply the income thereof to devasthan purposes, and that, if he failed to manage the lands properly, or alienated them by sale or mortgage, the plaintiff and his younger brother should enjoy the lands and apply the proceeds towards the maintenance of the devasthan. In execution of this decree, plaintiff

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

presented an application on the 28th November 1894, paying that he should be put in management of the devasthan lands on the ground that the defendant was guilty of mismanagement and misapplication of the devasthan property. This application was rejected by the Court of first instance on the ground that the question of mismanagement did not fall within s. 244, cl. (c), of the Code of Civil Procedure. This order was confirmed on appeal on the ground that the decree was a declaratory decree, and therefore incapable of execution. *Held*, on second appeal, that the decree was not declaratory only, and that it could be enforced in execution under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *MADHAVRAO v. RAMRAO*
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 267

57. ——— Suit for possession which might have been had under decree—*Separate suit*. A suit will not lie for possession of land of which the plaintiff should have been, but was not, put in substantial possession in execution of decree. His remedy is to further execute his decree. *KISTO GOBIND KUR v. GUNGA PERSHAD SURMAH*
25 W. R. 372

LOLIT COOMAR BOSE v. ISHAN CHUNDER CHUCK-ERBUTTY 10 C. L. R. 258

58. ——— *Separate suit*—*New cause of action*. A plaintiff who has obtained a decree declaring him entitled to the possession of immoveable property must, under s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, proceed by execution of the said decree, and not otherwise; if he neglect to do so till he is time-barred, he cannot, any the more on that account, bring another suit for possession of the same property, whether founded on the old decree in his favour or on the continued occupation of the said property by the defendant. *NASRUDIN v. VENKATESH PRABHU*
I. L. R. 5 Bom. 382

59. ——— *Formal possession under decree*—*Separate suit for actual possession*—*Cause of action*—*Execution of decree*—*Civil Procedure Code, Act XIV of 1882, ss. 244, cl. (c), 263, 264*. In 1877 the plaintiff sued the defendant for possession of certain properties and obtained a decree; in execution of this decree, the plaintiff, on 12th of July 1879, obtained formal possession of the properties sued for. The defendant continued to remain in actual possession and occupation of a portion of the premises, and refused to give up possession of the same to the plaintiff, who served him with a two months' notice to quit in June 1881. The plaintiff did not evict the defendant in execution of the decree obtained by him against the defendant, but instituted a fresh suit for that purpose. *Held*, that such a suit would lie. *Semble*: That the delivery of formal possession in execution

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

of a decree for possession gives a cause of action against a defendant who remains in occupation of the premises which may be enforced in a regular suit. *SHAMA CHABAN CHATTERJI v. MADHUB CHUNDRAMOOKERJEE* . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 93

60. ——— *Order absolute for sale*—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 88*—*Question arising as to the order absolute for sale*. When an order absolute for sale of mortgaged property has been made, any question that arises as to that order absolute for sale is not a question relating to the execution of the decree within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Ajudhia Pershad v. Baldeo Singh*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 818, *Tiluck Singh v. Persotein Proshad*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 924, *Tara Prosad Roy v. Bhobodeb Roy*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 931, and *Ranbir Singh v. Drigpal*, I. L. R. 16 All. 23, followed. *Kedar Nath v. Lalji Sahai*, I. L. R. 12 All. 61, *Oudh Behari Lal v. Nageshar Lal*, I. L. R. 13 All. 278, dissented from. *AKIKUN-NISSA BIBEE v. ROOP LAL DAS*
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 133

61. ——— *Question as to title raised and decided in execution proceedings*—*Omission to appeal*—*Fresh suit brought to establish title*. The defendant obtained a decree against the plaintiff as representative of his (the plaintiff's) deceased uncle, and in execution he attached the property in dispute. The plaintiff objected to the attachment, but his objection was disallowed, and the property was sold. The plaintiff did not appeal against the order disallowing his objection, but filed the present suit to establish his right. Both the lower Courts allowed the plaintiff's claim. On appeal by the defendant to the High Court:—*Held*, reversing the decree of the Courts below, that the plaintiff's suit was not maintainable. The question raised in the present suit was one which ought to have been taken in the execution proceedings in the former suit under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882); and having been, as a fact, raised and decided against the plaintiff, he could not bring a separate suit. *NIMBA HARISHET v. SITARAM PARJI*
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 458

62. ——— *Omission to oppose execution of decree*—*Suit to set aside illegal sale*. A suit will lie to set aside a sale made in contravention of the terms of s. 64, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, the judgment-debtor not being bound to oppose the sale in the proceedings in execution. *BAMA SOONDUREE DOSSEE v. MUDHOO SOODUN BISWAS* 25 W. R. 156

63. ——— *Claim to have sale set aside as fraudulent*—*Suit by judgment-debtor against judgment-creditor and purchaser to set aside fraudulent sale*. A judgment-debtor who

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

claims to have a sale of his land set aside on the ground of fraud committed by the judgment-creditor, who procured a sale without advertisement, and purchased the property without leave of the Court, is debarred from bringing a suit to set aside the sale, inasmuch as the question is one arising between the parties to the suit and relates to the execution of the decree within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877. *VIRARAGHAVA AYYANGAR v. VENKATA CHARYAR*

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 217

64. *Application to set aside sale—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 294.* An application under s. 294 of the Civil Procedure Code to have a sale set aside on the ground that the purchaser took nothing by his purchase, inasmuch as he was the holder of the decree in execution of which the property was sold, is a matter in execution falling under s. 244 of the Code. *Viraraghava Ayyangar v. Venkata Charyar, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 217*, followed. *CHINTAMANRAV NATU v. VITHABAI*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 588

GENU v. SAKHARAM . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 271

65. *Sale in execution, the judgment-debtor being ignorant of the execution proceedings through the fraud of the decree-holder—Setting aside proceedings in execution—Separate suit.* In 1879 *D* obtained a decree against *S*. *S* gave security for the satisfaction of the decree, whereupon *D* agreed not to take proceedings in execution. In breach of this agreement, *D* in the same year applied for execution, and sold certain immoveable property belonging to *S*, of which *K* became the purchaser. *K* did not apply for possession until 1883, in which year he applied for and obtained possession of the property. *S* alleged that he then for the first time became aware of the sale, and that by the fraud of *L* and *K* he had been kept in ignorance of the execution proceedings taken by *D* in breach of the above-mentioned agreement, and within thirty days after *K* obtained possession, he (*S*) applied for a reversal of the orders which had been passed in the aforesaid fraudulent proceedings. The Subordinate Judge held that the application was barred, and referred the applicant to a separate suit to set aside the sale. On application to the High Court:—*Held*, on the authority of *Paranjpe v. Kanade, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 143*, that a separate suit would not lie, and that the relief sought by *S* could only be obtained, at all events as against *D*, by an application under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882. *SAKHARAM GOVIND KALE v. DAMODAR AKHARAM*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 468

66. *Sale in execution of decree for arrears of rent—Fraud—Suit to set aside a sale on the ground of fraud—Decree—Questions arising between the parties or their represent-*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

atives—Right of suit—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 311, 312, 314-316. *Held* by the Full Bench—*PETHERAM, C.J., PRINSEP, TOTTENHAM, and PIGOT, J.J.* (*GHOSE, J.*, dissenting)—that when circumstances affecting the validity of a sale in execution have been brought about by the fraud of one of the parties to the suit, and give rise to a question between these parties such as, apart from fraud, would be within the provisions of s. 244, a suit will not lie to impeach the validity of the sale on the ground of such fraud. *Saroda Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Mahomed Isuf Meah, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 376*, *Viraraghava Ayyangar v. Venkata Charyar, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 217*, *Paranjpe v. Kanade, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 143*, and *Sakharam Govind Kale v. Damodar Akharam Gujar, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 468*, approved. *Gobind Chandra Majumdar v. Uma Churn Sen, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 679*, dissented from in part. *Held*, that in such a case the judgment-debtor is entitled, whether the sale has been confirmed or not, to make, as against the person guilty of the fraud or accessory thereto, such application (if any) under s. 311 as he may be entitled to make, his time for making it being computed from the time when the fraud first became known to him. *Held*, further, that in cases in which the decree or the purchase is made benami, s. 244 does not apply, and a suit may be held to lie to set aside the sale. *Per GHOSE, J.*—An objection under s. 311, or upon the ground of fraud raised by the judgment-debtor after the sale has been confirmed under s. 312, cannot be dealt with under s. 244. In such a case the judgment-debtor is entitled upon the ground of fraud to bring a suit to set aside the sale, or at all events to have it declared that the sale passed no title to the purchaser, or that the purchaser is a trustee for him. There is no special provision in the Code for setting aside a sale on the ground of fraud when it has once been confirmed. *MOHENDRO NARAIN CHATURAJ v. GOPAL MONDUL*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 769

67. *Suit to set aside sale on ground of fraud—Sale in execution of mortgage-decree directing the sale of the mortgaged property under ss. 88 and 89 of the Transfer of Property Act—Decree nisi not absolute—Right of suit—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 311 and 312.* Where a suit to set aside a sale in execution of a decree was brought on the ground that by the fraud of the judgment-creditor the proclamation of sale had not been duly made, and the facts were that the sale was not an ordinary sale of attached property in execution of a decree, but a sale in execution of a mortgage-decree which directed the sale of the mortgaged property in accordance with the provisions of ss. 88 and 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, but that there was no such decree in existence, as only a decree *nisi* and not a decree absolute directing the sale had been

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

— s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

made, and it was contended that, until a decree absolute was made for the sale, the right to redeem existed, and that the suit might be regarded as a suit to redeem :—*Held*, that there was nothing in these facts to distinguish the case from the Full Bench case of *Mohendro Narain Chaturaj v. Gopal Mondul*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 769, and that the suit was therefore not maintainable. An order directing a sale in such a case would be sufficient authority under s. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act even if the order did not take the form of a decree such as is prescribed for a decree absolute in the case of a suit for foreclosure. SIVA PERSHAD MAITY v. NUNDO LALL KAR MAHAPATRA

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 139

68. — *Application to set aside sale on ground of fraud—Question between decree-holder or auction-purchaser and judgment-debtor.* Where a judgment-debtor applies to have an execution-sale set aside alleging circumstances which, if found in his favour, would amount to fraud on the part of the decree-holder or the auction-purchaser, the case comes within s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683, *Chand Monie Dasya v. Santamonee Dasya*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 707, and *Nemai Chand Kanji v. Denonath Kanji*, 2 C. W. N. 691, referred to. ROJONIKANT BAGCHI v. HOSSEIN UDDIN AHMED . 4 C. W. N. 538

69. — *Sale in execution of decree for arrears of rent—Fraud—Suit to set aside sale on ground of fraud—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 311—Right of suit.* A and B were two tenants whose names were registered in the landlord's sherista. B died, leaving C, D, and E, his sons and heirs, but no application for mutation of names in the sherista was made. Disputes as to rent having arisen, A and C proceeded to make deposits in Court in respect thereof, and the landlord instituted a suit against A, joining C as a party defendant to recover the amount of rent he claimed, and obtained an *ex parte* decree, which, *inter alia*, directed that it should be satisfied out of the amount so deposited in Court. That amount, according to the landlord's case proving insufficient to satisfy his demands, he proceeded to execute the decree and brought the holding to sale and purchased it himself. A and C then applied under s. 311 of the Code to have the sale set aside, alleging that the decree had been fraudulently executed, the sale-proclamation suppressed, and that the decree was incapable of execution in the manner adopted, and contending that it could only be executed against the amounts so deposited in Court, which were more than ample to satisfy the full amount justly due under it. That application was unsuccessful. A, C, D, and E then instituted a suit to have the sale set aside on the ground of fraud. *Held*, as regards A and C, follow-

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

— s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

ing the decision in *Mohendro Narain Chaturaj v. Gopal Mondul*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 769, that the questions as to the propriety of the execution of the rent-decree by sale, and as to the suppression of the sale proclamation, were questions which could and ought to have been decided under s. 244, and that, so far as they were concerned, the suit would not lie. *Held*, however, as regards D and E, that as they were not parties to the rent-suit or proceedings had therein, and although, as heirs of a deceased tenant who had not got their names registered in the landlord's sherista, they might not be able to question the decree obtained for arrears of rent, they were not thereby precluded from contesting a sale on the ground that it had been fraudulently obtained under colour of such a decree, and that it was competent to them, at any rate, to sue for a declaration that the sale in question did not in any way affect their rights. JAGAN NATH GORAI v. WATSON & Co.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 341

70. — *Suit to have an execution-sale of land set aside—Purchaser at sale sought to be set aside—Fraud, allegation of.* Where questions are raised between the parties to a decree relating to its execution, discharge, or satisfaction, the fact that the purchaser at a judicial sale, who is no party to the decree of which the execution is in question, is interested and concerned in the result, has never been held to prevent the application of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, limiting the disposal of these matters to the Court executing the decree. The plaintiffs, in a suit to have the judicial sale of a zamindari set aside, alleged that the decree-holder, in part satisfaction of his decree, had received, from them and other co-sharers, in the zamindari, their proportionate amounts of the debt decreed, and had agreed that their shares should be exempt from the execution sale about to take place; that the sale took place, subject to that exemption; that the decree-holder, however, with whom some of the co-sharers and the purchasers colluded, fraudulently had the sale set aside, revived the attachment, and caused a second sale, at which all the shares in the zamindari were sold. *Held*, that the question, besides that the charge of fraud was not sufficiently specific, was determinable, in virtue of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, only by order of the Court executing the decree. PROSUNNO KUMAR SANYAL v. KALI DAS SANYAL

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683
I. L. R. 19 I. A. 166

71. — *Question "arising between the parties to the suit"—Sale of property by the Collector as ancestral property—Suit to set aside sale on the ground that property was not ancestral.* Certain property of a judgment-debtor having been sold by the Collector under s. 320 of the Code

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

of Civil Procedure as being ancestral property, the judgment-debtor sued the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser to have the sale set aside upon the two main grounds that the property was not ancestral, and therefore could not legally be sold by the Collector, and that the real purchaser at the auction sale was the decree-holder himself who had not obtained the leave of the Court to bid. *Held*, that the questions thus raised were questions arising between the parties to the suit within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the suit would not lie. *Basti Ram v. Fattu*, I. L. R. 8 All. 146, and *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683, referred to. **DAULAT SINGH v. JUGAL KISHORE**

I. L. R. 22 All. 108

See DHANI RAM v. CHATURBHUI.

I. L. R. 22 All. 86

72. ——— Application to set aside sale on the ground of fraud in a case where a third party is the auction-purchaser—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 311. The decision in the case of *Mohendro Narain Chaturaj v. Gopal Mondul*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 769, has been in effect overruled by the decision of the Privy Council in the case of *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683 : I. L. R. 19 I. A. 166. An application to set aside a sale on the ground of fraud would come under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code notwithstanding that the purchase was made by a person who was a third party. *Saadatmand Khan v. Phul Kuar*, I. L. R. 20 All. 412, distinguished. **BHUBON MOHUN PAL v. NUNDA LAL DEY** . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 324
3 C. W. N. 399

See HIRA LAL GHOSE v. CHANDRA KANTA GHOSE
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 539
3 C. W. N. 408

73. ——— Suit to set aside a sale on the ground that the decree was obtained by fraud, whether maintainable, where third party is the auction-purchaser. A suit to set aside an execution sale on the ground of fraud is not maintainable under the provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, even in a case where the real or nominal auction-purchaser is a person who was not a party to the original suit. *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683 : I. L. R. 19 I. A. 166, followed. **MOTI LAL CHAKRABUTTY v. RUSSICK CHANDRA BAIRAGI**

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 326 note
3 C. W. N. 395

RAM NARAIN TEWARI v. SHEW BHUNJAN ROY
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 197

and **NEMAI CHAND KANJIV. DENO NATH KANJIV.**
2 C. W. N. 691

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

74. ——— Question as to transfer of decree—Purchaser of the decree from the decree-holder—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 232—Application by transferee of decree—Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888). The word "representative" as used in s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when used with reference to a decree-holder, includes the purchaser of the decree from the decree-holder by an assignment in writing. *Ishan Chunder Sircar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 62, and *Badri Narain v. Jai Kishen Das*, I. L. R. 16 All. 483, referred to. The Court executing a decree which has been so transferred can go into the disputed question of the transfer of the decree under the provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code as amended by Act VII of 1888. **DWAR BUKSH SIRKAR v. FATIK JALI** . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 250
3 C. W. N. 222

GANGA DAS SEAL v. YAKUB ALI DOBASHI

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 670

75. ——— Order refusing to confirm a sale in execution of ex parte decree set aside. An order refusing to confirm a sale on the ground that there was no subsisting decree at the date when the confirmation of the sale is applied for is one under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, the question raised being one relating to the execution or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of that section. *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683, referred to. **DOYAMOYI DAS v. SARAT CHUNDER MAJUMDAR**

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 175
1 C. W. N. 656

76. ——— Effect of satisfaction of decree. Where a decree has been satisfied, it prevents an application under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, there being no decree then existing. *RASH BEHARY MONDAL v. RAKHAL CHARAN MANDAL* . . . 1 C. W. N. 708

77. ——— Application to set aside sale in execution of an ex parte decree subsequently set aside under s. 108, Civil Procedure Code. Where a property was sold in execution of an ex parte decree and purchased by the decree-holder and the decree was subsequently set aside under s. 108, Civil Procedure Code :—*Held*, that it is competent to a Court under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, to go into the question and to set aside the sale as bad. *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683, and *Mohendro Narain Chaturaj v. Gopal Mondul*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 769, relied on. **BENI PERSHAD KOERI v. LAKHI RAI** . . . 3 C. W. N. 6

78. ——— Claim to have sale set aside as being under barred decree—*Separate suit*. A separate suit will not lie to have

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

set aside a sale made in execution of decree barred at the time of execution; the invalidity should be declared in proceedings in execution as provided in s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861. *NOJABUT ALI CHOWDHRY v. MOHA BUSSEEROOLLAH CHOWDHRY*

11 B. L. R. 42 : 20 W. R. 5

See *GOLAM ASGAR v. LAKHMAN DEBI*

5 B. L. R. 68 : 13 W. R. 273

and *ZAMEER SIRDAR v. ASSEEMOODDEEN SIRDAR*

23 W. R. 257

URDUB CHURN DEBTA v. SOOKDEB DEBTA

24 W. R. 45

79. ——— Claim to set aside sale as wrongly made—Decree for sale of land—Objections by representative of deceased judgment-debtor in his own right disallowed—Order reversed on appeal—Claim under s. 278 rejected. *S* mortgaged four parcels of land to *M*. *M* obtained a decree against *S* directing the sale of the lands mortgaged. *S* died, and *K* was brought in as his representative under s. 234 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *M* applied for execution against the lands mortgaged as assets of *S*. *K* objected to the sale of three parcels on the ground that one parcel belonged to himself (*K*) and two to the family to which *S* belonged, and of which *K* was the manager. The District Munsif investigated these questions under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and directed that execution should proceed against all four parcels. The District Court on appeal reversed the order of the Munsif, on the ground that he had no power to decide these questions under s. 244, and that the proper course was for *M* to attach the properties and for *K* to make a claim. This course was adopted and *K*'s claim was rejected, and the four parcels were sold and bought by *V*. *K* thereupon brought a suit against *M* and *V* to cancel the sales to *V*. *Held*, that, by virtue of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the suit would not lie. *KURIYALI v. MAYAN* I. L. R. 7 Mad. 255

80. ——— Sale in execution of an *ex parte* decree and purchase by the decree-holder—Confirmation of the sale—Subsequent setting aside of the *ex parte* decree—Application by a subsequent purchaser in execution of another decree to set aside the sale on the ground that the *ex parte* decree had been set aside. Certain immoveable properties were sold in execution of an *ex parte* decree, and were purchased by the decree-holder himself. After the confirmation of the sale, the decree was set aside under s. 108 of the Civil Procedure Code at the instance of some of the defendants in the original suit. On an application under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code having been made by a prior purchaser of the said properties in execution of another decree, to set aside the sale held in execution of the *ex parte* decree, the defence was that the application

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could not come under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that the sale could not be set aside, as it had been confirmed. *Held*, that the case was one under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that, the *ex parte* decree having been set aside, the sale could not stand, inasmuch as the decree-holder himself was the purchaser. *Doyamoyi Dasi v. Sarat Chunder Mozomdar*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 175, *Beni Pershad Koeri v. Lakhi Rai*, 3 C. W. N. 6, *Durga Charan Mandal v. Kali Prasanno Sarkar*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 727, *Zainal-ud-din Khan v. Mahamed Asghar Ali*, L. R. 15 I. A. 12 : I. L. R. 10 All. 166, and *Minal Kumari Bibee v. Jagat Sattani Bibee*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 220, referred to. *SET UMEDMAL v. SRINATH ROY* I. L. R. 27 Calc. 810 4 C. W. N. 692

81. ——— Restitution of amount paid under decree—Reversal of decree—Interest—Fresh suit. In a suit for redemption of a mortgage, a decree was passed for possession by redemption on the plaintiff paying the sum of Rs. 43,625-7-0, the amount of the mortgage-debt. Prior to the institution of the suit, the defendant had taken proceedings in the Judge's Court to foreclose the mortgage, and the plaintiff paid the above-mentioned sum into that Court for the defendant, who took it. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court from the decree directing him to pay Rs. 43,625-7-0 as the mortgage-debt, and obtained a decree by which the decree of the first Court was modified, and the amount payable on redemption was reduced to Rs. 22,155. The plaintiff then took out execution of the decree to recover from the defendant the difference between the two sums with interest. *Held*, that the effect of the Appellate Court's decree was to direct restitution of any sum paid under the first Court's decree which was disallowed by the Appellate Court's decree, and that the question was clearly one for determination by the Court executing the decree, and not by separate suit, being expressly provided for by s. 583 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, also, that the decree-holder was entitled to restitution of the amount with interest. *Roger v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris*, L. R. 3 P. C. 465, referred to. *Ram Ghulam v. Dwarka Rai*, I. L. R. 7 All. 170, distinguished by *MAHMOOD, J. JASWANT SINGH v. DIP SINGH* I. L. R. 7 All. 432

82. ——— Question arising after sale—Question as to interest taken by purchaser. *Per MAHMOOD, J.* The scope of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code is limited to matters connected with the execution of the decree between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor, and covers all the questions which may arise between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor relating to the execution, etc., of the decree. Questions that may

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arise after the sale are not, strictly speaking, questions relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree, within the meaning of cl. (3), s. 244; but as soon as there has been a sale, the execution of the decree, so far as the decree-holder is concerned, is over, and the question whether the purchaser has purchased anything by the sale is not a question as to the execution of the decree-holder's decree. *RAMCHHAIBAR MISR v. BECHU BHAGAT* . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 641

83. ——— Refund of purchase-money—*Separate suit—Adjudication of judgment-debtor as bankrupt and order not to deal with property.* A sale, on the 4th March 1871, of certain property sold in execution of a decree obtained by A having been confirmed on the 5th May 1878, notice was, on the 31st May, received that the judgment-debtor had been adjudicated a bankrupt in London, and an application was made to the Court to abstain from dealing with his property. All proceedings were thereupon stayed, and on the 8th of July 1878 the purchaser applied to the Court for a refund by the present plaintiffs, who were the administrators of A, of his purchase-money, and on the 19th of the same month an order was made for such refund. The amount was refunded without protest by the plaintiffs, who then sued the purchaser and the original judgment-debtor to recover the amount paid by them. *Held*, that the suit would not lie, but that the question was one to be determined under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Court executing the decree. *SOLANO v. ARMEIDA* . . . 10 C. L. R. 573

84. ——— Compromise as to possession after decree—*Procedure.* B sued his brother C for possession of certain lands. B and C came to an amicable settlement, one of the terms of which was that C, during his life, should retain possession of certain of the lands, and that, after his death, they should pass to B. A decree was given in accordance with the terms of the compromise. On C's death, his widow refused to put B in possession of the lands. B sought to obtain possession of the lands with mesne profits by executing the decree under the compromise against C's widow. *Held*, that he ought to proceed by regular suit. *TARA MANI DAS v. RADHA JIBAN MUSTAFI*
6 B. L. R. Ap. 142: 14 W. R. 485

85. ——— Agreement to give time—*Suit on agreement.* The parties to a decree presented a petition to the Court executing the decree, in which they stated that they had agreed that the principal amount of the decree was to be paid within eight years; that a sum of Rs50 was to be paid annually as interest on the principal amount; and that upon default of payment of the interest the whole amount due should be realized

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—*contd.*

by execution of the decree. On this petition being presented, the Court struck the case off its file. *Held*, that, upon default being made, the decree-holder's remedy was by execution of the decree, and not by suit to enforce the terms of the agreement. *CHAMPAT RAI v. PITAMBAR DAS*

I. L. R. 6 All. 16

86. ——— Compromise of decree—*Effect of compromise—Mode of enforcing agreement of compromise—Right of suit.* A decree for partition having been compromised by an agreement made by the parties, and communicated to the Court which passed the decree:—*Held*, that the effect of the decree was extinguished by the agreement, which could only be enforced by a fresh suit, and not by an application for execution of the former decree. *HARI RAGHUNATH JOSHI v. KRISHNAJI ANANT JOSHI* . . . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 546

87. ——— Contract superseding decree—*Separate suit.* In the course of proceedings in execution of a decree, by which a simple mortgage of immoveable property was enforced, the judgment-debtor made an application to the Court executing the decree, dated in April 1877, stating that the decree had been partially satisfied by the sale of a part of the mortgaged property; that the decree-holder had remitted a portion of the decree; that the balance should be paid by a certain date; and that a certain banker had given a note of hand for the payment of interest on the balance at a certain rate. The judgment-debtor then stated as follows: "So long as the petitioner does not pay the money to the decree-holder,—i.e., during the term fixed above,—the banker shall pay interest to the decree-holder; the decree-holder shall not have power to take out execution within the said term, but after the expiry thereof he shall be at liberty to realize his money together with interest from the petitioner and his property by executing the decree: excepting the property sold, all the property mortgaged and attached under the decree shall continue so mortgaged and attached: the decree-holder's pleader has affixed his signature at the foot of this petition showing that he consents to it: the petitioner therefore prays that the case may be struck off as partially executed." The decree-holder subsequently sued the judgment-debtor to recover the balance of the decree, claiming under the arrangement set forth in the petition of April 1877, as a contract superseding the decree. *Held*, having regard to the terms of that petition, that no new contract superseding the decree was either intended or effected, and the suit was consequently not maintainable. *Billings v. Uncovenanted Service Bank*, I. L. R. 3 All. 781, distinguished. *Ganga v. Murli Dhar*, I. L. R. 4 All. 240; S. A. No. 25 of 1882, Weekly Notes, All. (1883) 93.

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and *Champat Rai v. Pitambar Das*, 1 L. R. 6 All. 16, followed. *MAKUND RAM v. MAKUND RAM*
I. L. R. 6 All. 228

88. ———— *Compromise effected by fraud—Separate suit—Practice—Power of Court to vacate any judgment or order procured by fraud.* The plaintiff held two decrees against the defendant for Rs. 490-1-6 and applied for execution. The defendant, by misrepresentation, induced the plaintiff to receive Rs. 900 only in full satisfaction of those decrees and to withdraw the application. The plaintiff on discovering the misrepresentation, brought this suit to recover the difference. *Held*, that the suit was barred by s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 (which corresponds with s. 244 of Act X of 1877), the question between the parties being a question relating to the execution of a decree. It is always competent to any Court to vacate any judgment or order, if it be proved that such judgment or order was obtained by manifest fraud; and in the case of orders made in execution, s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 excludes all other remedy. *PARANJPE v. KANADE*. I. L. R. 6 Bom. 148

89. ———— *Refund of proceeds of sale on ground of compromise.* When a refund is claimed of the proceeds of an execution sale on the ground that the decree has been satisfied by compromise, the matter ought to be tried under Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11, and not by regular suit. *VELAYET HOSSEIN v. WULEE AHMED*
23 W. R. 207

90. ———— *Compromise for larger amount than that claimed—Refusal of execution for larger amount—Suit for amount of compromise.* The parties to a suit agreed upon a compromise, the result of which was that the plaintiff obtained by the decree a greater quantity of land than he had originally claimed, and a decree was drawn up in accordance with the compromise. In the execution proceedings, the defendant raised an objection that the plaintiff could not have execution for a greater quantity of land than he had claimed originally, and the Court executing the decree allowed the objection. No appeal from the Court's order was made, but the plaintiff brought a suit to recover possession of the larger amount of land mentioned in the compromise. *Held*, that the order of the Court executing the decree was erroneous in law, and might properly be reconsidered upon an application for review; but that the present suit came within s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and therefore could not be maintained. *MOHIBULLAH v. IMAMI*. I. L. R. 9 All. 229

91. ———— *Refund of money wrongly realized under decree—Execution of decree—Separate suit.* Moneys realized as due under a decree, if unduly realized, are recoverable by

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application to the Court executing the decree, and not by separate suit. The opinion of *STUART, C.J.*, in *Agra Savings Bank v. Sri Ram Mitter*, 1 L. R. 1 All. 388, differed from. *Haromohini Chowdhrair v. Dhanmani Chowdhrair*, 1 B. L. R. A. C. 138, and *Ekowri Singh v. Bijayanath Chattapadhyaya*, 4 B. L. R. A. C. 111, distinguished. *PARTAP SINGH v. BENI RAM*. I. L. R. 2 All. 61

TAJ v. GUNGAPERSHAD. 2 Agra 45

92. ———— *Decree subsequently reversed or modified.* When money has been taken in execution of a decree which is subsequently reversed or modified, no fresh suit will lie for its recovery: the matter must be enquired into by the Court which passed the decree as a question arising between the parties relating to the execution of such decree. *SALIGRAM SINGH v. GOBIND SAHAI*
4 B. L. R. Ap. 64

NURSING CHUNDER SEIN v. BIDYA DHUREE DOSSEE. 2 W. R. 275

JADOO NATH GOSSAIN v. NOBO KISHEN CHATTERJEE. 4 W. R. 66

93. ———— *Suit for money paid under decree afterwards reversed.* In a suit of 1867 the present defendant obtained a decree for possession of a certain village and mesne profits for one year. Pending an appeal against that decree, execution was stayed on the present plaintiff depositing a note for Rs. 15,000 as security. The decree was affirmed on appeal, and the present defendant had the note sold in execution, and drew out of the proceeds a sum for mesne profits for subsequent years; but an appeal was preferred in the execution-proceedings to the High Court, which set aside the execution so far as concerned the mesne profits for the years subsequent to that to which the original decree related. The present plaintiff thereupon attached and sold the village to recover the balance: before that amount was paid to the present plaintiff, the present defendant brought a suit against him in the District Court, and there obtained a decree for mesne profits for the subsequent years, and in execution drew the amount of the decree out of Court. In second appeal, however, the High Court, on 26th September 1881, reversed the decree of the District Court, whereupon the present plaintiff applied for restitution under Civil Procedure Code, s. 583, which application was ultimately disallowed. The present suit was brought to recover the amount to which that application related. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, s. 244. *NARAYANA v. NARAYANA* I. L. R. 13 Mad. 437

94. ———— *Excess sum retained by decree-holder after satisfying decree—Separate suit.* Suit brought to recover the amount

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*— s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

to which plaintiff was entitled under a decree passed in favour of himself and defendant as co-plaintiffs in a former suit. It appeared that defendant purchased the property sold in execution of the decree, and that the price for which the sale took place was sufficient to satisfy the decree. Instead of paying the purchase-money into Court, defendant, with the knowledge and assent of plaintiff, retained the whole sum upon the understanding that he should give the Court a receipt for himself and on behalf of plaintiff, and afterwards pay to plaintiff his portion of the amount decreed. Accordingly, defendant presented a petition to that effect, and obtained a certificate confirming the sale. Defendant having failed to pay plaintiff his portion, the present suit was brought. Upon these facts it was held, in special appeal, that the decree was satisfied by sale of the judgment-debtor's property, and that the execution proceedings were completely at an end, the defendant having been, by the assent of the plaintiff, made his agent for the acknowledgment of the satisfaction of the decree. No subsequent application under the decree could have been entertained by the Court which executed it. Therefore plaintiff's claim was not a matter determinable under s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861. *RAMANADAN CHETTI v. KUNNAPPU CHETTI* . 6 Mad. 304

KRISTO CHUNDER GOOPTO v. RAMSOONDUR SEIN
17 W. R. 14

95. — Suit to recover sum paid in excess under decree—*Separate suit*. Sums paid in execution in excess of what was due under the decree can only be recovered by application to the Court which executed the decree, not by a separate suit. *KASHEE KISHORE ROY CHOWDHRY v. KISHEN CHUNDER SANDYAL* . 15 W. R. 160

96. — Money paid in excess under decree—*Decree reduced on appeal—Separate suit*. A judgment-creditor having caused certain property of his judgment-debtor to be sold in execution, the proceeds realized did not amount to the full judgment-debt. Afterwards the judgment-debt was reduced in appeal to a sum far below the amount realized in execution, and the judgment-debtor brought a suit to recover the excess moneys. Held, with reference to Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11, that the suit did not lie, but that the Court which charged with the execution of the decree had full jurisdiction to determine the question and order a refund. *MOTHOORA PERSHAD SINGH v. SHAMBHOO GEER* . 19 W. R. 413

97. — *Separate suit—Limitation*. In execution of a decree, the property of the judgment-debtor was sold, and on an account being taken, a certain sum therein appearing to be due was paid in December 1868 to the decree-holders. Subsequently, on the application of the

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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judgment-debtor, the account was re-opened, and had been overdrawn by the decree-holders. In 1876 the judgment-debtor applied to the Court which executed the decree for an order for the repayment of the amount overdrawn. Held, that, while the application was not barred by any provisions of the Limitation Act, IX of 1871, the English doctrine of laches did not apply in this country; and, further, that the application had been presented in the proper Court, as required by s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 (corresponding with s. 244 of Act X of 1877). *ALLI HOSSEIN v. MUZHUR HOSSEIN* . 4 C. L. R. 577

98. — *Application by judgment-debtors to recover surplus from decree-holders*. Where by a sale in execution the decree as it stood at the time when execution was taken out had been fully satisfied, but the decree was afterwards amended at the instance of the judgment-debtors, and in consequence of the amendment the decree-holders were found to have realized more from the judgment-debtors than they were entitled to, it was held that it was competent to the judgment-debtors by application under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure to recover such surplus from the decree-holders. *DHAN KUNWAR v. MAHTAB SING*
I. L. R. 22 All. 79

99. — Money paid in excess by mistake—*Satisfaction of decree of Small Cause Court—Damages, suit for*. Where the plaintiff sued defendant in a Civil Court for recovery of a sum alleged to have been paid by plaintiff to defendant under a mistake, in excess of the sum due in satisfaction of a decree of the Small Cause Court:—Held by *STUART, C.J.* (*PEARSON, J.*, dissenting), that such a suit was in the nature of one for damages cognizable by the Court of Small Causes, and was not barred by the terms of s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, the question involved in the claim not being one which could properly arise in execution proceedings, which must be confined to matters embraced in the decree passed between the parties to the suit. *AGRA SAVINGS BANK v. SRI RAM MITTER*
I. L. R. 1 All. 388

100. — Value of elephant accepted in satisfaction of decree but not delivered—*Separate suit*. The plaintiff held a decree against the defendants, and agreed to take an elephant in satisfaction, the defendants promising, if satisfaction were entered up, to be responsible for the value of the elephant, should it be claimed and recovered by any other person. It was so claimed and recovered, and the plaintiff sued for its value. Held, that the suit was not barred by s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861. *MUTHRA CHOWDREY v. SHEORUTTUN MULL* . 6 N. W. 126

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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— s. 244—*contd.*

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—*contd.*

101. — Part satisfaction of decree not certified to the Court—*Suit to recover money so paid after execution of entire decree*—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 206.* A, a judgment-debtor, paid to B, the decree-holder, a sum of money by way of compromise, in full satisfaction of the decree. B failed to certify this payment to the Court, and afterwards executed her decree for the full amount. In a suit by A against B for recovery of the amount previously paid out of Court in satisfaction of the decree:—*Held*, that, notwithstanding s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, the suit was maintainable. *GUNAMANI DAS v. PRANKISHORI DAS*

5 B. L. R. 223; 13 W. R. F. B. 69

Overruling *ALUNGA BEEBEE v. GOOROO CHURN ROY* . . . 3 W. R. S. C. C. Ref. 3

102. — Money paid in satisfaction of decree out of Court—*Civil Procedure Code (VIII of 1859), s. 206.* N, having obtained a decree in a suit against K, requested him to discharge certain sums due on outstanding bonds which N had given to third parties, promising to credit the sums so paid to the amount due under the aforesaid decree. K paid as requested, but N took out execution in full of the decree; and the Court refused to recognize the payments made by K out of Court. In a suit by K for the money paid as aforesaid:—*Held*, that the payments not having been made directly in adjustment of a decree, the suit was not barred within the rule laid down in *Arunachella Pillai v. Appavu Pillai*, 3 Mad. 188. *KUNHI MOIDIN KUTTI v. RAMEN UNNI*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 203

103. — Satisfaction or part satisfaction out of Court, but not certified—*Subsequent execution of decree for full amount*—*Suit for money previously paid*—*Civil Procedure Code (X of 1877), s. 258*—*Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 161.* A suit for the recovery of money paid to a judgment-creditor out of Court in satisfaction of a decree, but not certified, is barred by s. 244 (c) of Act X of 1877, and by the last paragraph of s. 258 as amended by Act XII of 1879. *PATANKAR v. DEVJI* . . . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 146

104. — Part satisfaction of decree out of Court—*Separate suit.* Questions as to part satisfaction of a decree cannot, according to s. 244, cl. (c), of Act X of 1877, be raised in a separate suit. That section alludes to parties to the decree or their representatives, but it is not on that account open to a plaintiff to evade the section by adding an unnecessary party to the suit. *KRISTO MOHINEE DOSSEE v. KALIPROSONNO GHOSE*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 402

105. — Satisfaction of decree out of Court—*Suit for damages against decree-holder for execution of decree after satisfaction*—

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

— s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 258. A decree-holder who, although he has settled with his judgment-debtor out of Court, yet nevertheless sues out execution against him, will be liable to an action for damages at the hands of the judgment-debtor. Ss. 244 and 258 of Act X of 1877 have made no change in the law in this respect. *GUNI KHAN v. KOONJO BEHARY SEIN* . . . 3 C. L. R. 414

106. — *Remedy of judgment-debtor, on creditor failing to certify*—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 258.* In 1878 a decree-holder, having received certain grain from the judgment-debtor in satisfaction of the decree, failed to certify satisfaction of the decree to the Court in accordance with the provisions of s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877, and executed the decree nevertheless. In a suit for damages against the decree-holder:—*Held*, that the judgment-debtor's remedy for the wrong suffered was not taken away by the provisions of ss. 244 and 258 of the Code. *VIRARAGHAVA v. SUBBAKKA* I. L. R. 5 Mad. 397

107. — *Agreement not to execute decree*—*Breach of contract*—*Suit to recover damages.* The provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code are no bar to a suit to recover damages for breach of a contract not to execute a decree. *HANMANT SANTAYA PRABHU v. SUBBABHAT* . . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 394

108. — *Suit to recover money paid*—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 258.* In 1879 a judgment-debtor paid R103 to S, who promised to pay the same to the judgment-creditor and to get the latter to certify satisfaction of the decree to the Court. The money was paid to the judgment-creditor, who not only did not certify satisfaction of the decree, but executed it and again collected the amount from the judgment-debtor. *Held*, following *Viraraghava v. Subbakka*, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 397, that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877 (prior to amendment), did not debar the judgment-debtor from suing either S on his express promise or the judgment-creditor to recover the amount paid by S to the latter. *MUSUTTI v. SHEKHARAN* . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 41

109. — *Separate suit*—*Adjustment of decree*—*Assignment of decree*—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 258.* M, who held a decree against S for possession of certain immovable property and costs, assigned such decree to S by way of sale, agreeing to deliver the same to him on payment of the balance of the purchase-money. He subsequently applied for execution of the decree against S, claiming the costs which it awarded. S thereupon paid the amount of such costs into Court, and, having obtained stay of execution, sued M for such decree, claiming by virtue of such assignment. The lower Court held that the suit was barred by the

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

provision of s. 244 of Act X of 1877, and also, treating such assignment as an uncertified adjustment of such decree, that it was barred by the terms of the last paragraph of s. 253 of that Act. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by anything in either of those sections. The words "any Court" in the last paragraph of s. 258 refer to proceedings in execution and to the Court or Courts executing a decree. *SITA RAM v. MAHIPAL*

I. L. R. 3 All. 533

110. — *Separate suit—Adjustment of decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 253.* S, alleging that a money-decree against him held by G had been adjusted out of Court by a payment in cash and the delivery of certain property, and that M had, notwithstanding such adjustment, applied for execution of such decree and recovered the amount thereof, as the Court executing such decree had refused to determine whether it had been satisfied, on the ground that such adjustment had not been certified, sued M for the money which he had paid him out of Court. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by the provisions of s. 244 of Act X of 1877 or of s. 258 of that Act. The last paragraph of s. 258 means that the Court executing the decree shall not recognize an uncertified payment or adjustment out of Court. It does not prohibit a suit for money paid to a decree-holder out of Court, and the payment of which, not being certified, could not be recognized, and which the decree-holder had not returned, but had misappropriated by taking out execution of the decree a second time and securing the amount in full through the Court. *SHADI v. GANGA SAHAI*

I. L. R. 3 All. 538

111. — *Question as to adjustment between decree-holder and third party.* Certain immovable property having been attached in execution of a decree for money, dated in 1879, directing the sale of such property, T, who had purchased such property in 1880, objected to the attachment. His objection having been disallowed, he sued to establish his right to the property and for the removal of the attachment. He claimed on the ground, amongst others, that the decree of 1879 had been wholly adjusted. The alleged adjustment had not been certified under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that the provisions of that section did not debar the Courts trying the suit from determining, as between T and the decree-holder, whether the decree of 1879 had been adjusted or not. *Sita Ram v. Mahipal*, I. L. R. 3 All. 533, and *Shadi v. Ganga Sahai*, I. L. R. 3 All. 533, followed. *TEGH SINGH v. AMIN CHAND* . I. L. R. 5 All. 269

112. — *Fraud—Setting aside sale in execution of decree—Cause of action—Right of suit.* A obtained a money-decree against B and others jointly for Rs. 112, and, in consideration

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

of a payment of Rs. 25 made by B, agreed to release B from all liability under the decree. This payment was not certified to the Court, and 4 afterwards in execution of the decree had certain immovable property belonging to B put up for sale, and this property he purchased himself. *Held*, that a suit would lie by B to set aside the sale and to recover the property from A. *ISHAN CHUNDER BANDO-PADHYA v. INDRO NARAIN GOSSAMI*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 788; 12 C. L. R. 391

113. — *Fraud—Cause of action—Regular suit—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 258.* The holder of a money-decree agreed to accept, in satisfaction of the amount thereof, a part payment in cash and a lease of certain lands for five years rent-free. The judgment-debtor made the payment, and gave the lease agreed on. Afterwards the decree-holder executed the decree against the judgment-debtor, and then the judgment-debtor brought the present suit for a declaration that the money-decree was satisfied and for damages against the decree-holder. *Held*, that such a suit would lie. *Gunamani Dasi v. Prankishori Dasi*, 5 B. L. R. 223, *Viraraghava Reddi v. Subbaka*, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 397, *Musutti v. Shekharan*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 41, *Sita Ram v. Mahipal*, I. L. R. 3 All. 533, *Shadi v. Ganga Sahai*, I. L. R. 3 All. 533, and *Ishan Chunder Bandopadhyaya v. Indro Narain Gossami*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 788, followed. *Patankar v. Devji*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 146, not followed. *POROMANAND KHASNABISH v. KHEPOO PARAMANICK*
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 354

114. — *Separate suit to enforce agreement to adjust—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 258.* Under ss. 244, cl. (c), and 258 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), no compromise of a decree which has not been duly certified under the provisions of the last-mentioned section can be recognized by any Court, and a separate suit to enforce such compromise is not maintainable. *HORMASJI DORABJI VANIA v. BURJORJI JAMSETJI VANIA* . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 155

ABDUL RAHMAN v. KHAJA KHAKE ARUTH. LONDON, BOMBAY, AND MEDITERRANEAN BANK v. PESTANJI DHUNJIBHOY . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 155

115. — *Suit to set aside a sale on the ground of an adjustment of the decree out of Court—Adjustment not certified—Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 258.* *Held*, that no separate suit would lie to set aside a sale held in execution of a decree on the ground that the decree had been adjusted out of Court when, in fact, no such adjustment of the decree had been certified in the manner provided by s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Shadi v. Ganga Sahai*, I. L. R. 3 All. 533, and *Kalyan Singh v. Kamta Prasad*, I. L. R. 13 All. 339, distinguished. *Ishan Chunder Bandopadhyaya*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

v. Indro Narain Gossami, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 788, and *Pat Dasi v. Sharup Chund Mala*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 376, not followed. *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683, *Azizan v. Matuk Lal Sahu*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 437, and *Bairagulu v. Bapanna*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 302, referred to. *JAIKARAN BHARTI v. RAGHUNATH SINGH*

I. L. R. 20 All. 254

116. *Adjustment of decree—Suit to recover instalments due under a mortgage made in adjustment of a decree.* A suit will not lie to enforce an uncertified agreement of adjustment of a decree against a judgment-debtor the consideration for which is that it shall operate in satisfaction of the decree, as there is, in that case, no consideration which the Court can recognize, and therefore no valid consideration for the judgment-debtor's agreement. The plaintiff was the assignee of a decree obtained by one O K against the defendants on the 5th May 1883. By that decree O K was declared entitled to recover R9,961-5-6, with interest at nine per cent. from the defendant; and payment was ordered to be made to him of the said sum by weekly instalments of R200. In order to secure the payment of the said instalments, the defendants were required to execute a mortgage to O K of certain property with power to him to sell the same, and to execute the decree for the whole amount, in case of default for six months. O K assigned the decree to the plaintiff in the present suit, and subsequently to the assignment (*viz.*, on the 21st July 1883) the defendants executed to the plaintiff the mortgage on which the present suit was brought. The mortgage-deed, after reciting the above facts, stated that the defendants had agreed to satisfy the amount of the decree, and it contained a covenant by the defendants that they would pay R9,961-5-6 with interest at six per cent. by monthly instalments of R400 from the 21st August 1883. The mortgage, therefore, differed from the decree both with regard to the instalments and the rate of interest. The plaintiff sued to recover the sum of R4,207, being the amount of instalments due to him under the said mortgage. *Held*, that the suit would not lie, as the mortgage was an adjustment of the decree, and had not been certified to the Court, as required by s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code. *ABDUL RAHMAN v. KHOJA KHAKI ARUTH*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 6

117. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 257 A and 258—Adjustment of decrees more than three years old—Reference to High Court under s. 617 of a question arising under these sections.* On the 22nd March 1886, the appellant presented an application to a Subordinate Judge, praying that the adjustment of certain decrees, dated the 28th March 1867 and 11th July 1871, might be certified, and a sanction granted to a *sankhat*, dated

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

18th March 1880, passed to him by the defendant in satisfaction of the said decrees and in substitution of two bonds, dated February 1879. The Subordinate Judge, being of opinion that the application could not be granted, inasmuch as the execution of the decrees was then barred by limitation, referred the case to the High Court under s. 617 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that the question could not be referred under s. 617 of the Civil Procedure Code, as the order applied for to the Subordinate Judge was appealable under s. 2 of the Code. The question raised by the application related to the satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code. *RANGJI v. BHANJI HARJIVAN*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 57

118. *Judgment-debtor as part-purchaser of a decree, suit by.* H D and R D owned a 6-anna share in certain decrees. The other decree-holders subsequently sold their 10-anna share to H S and S M, two of the judgment-debtors. H D and R D then proceeded to execute the decrees, and in satisfaction thereof were allowed to receive upon giving security under s. 231 of the Code, the full 16-anna share of the decretal amount from H S and S M, notwithstanding the objection of the latter on the ground of their purchase. Thereupon H S and S M brought a suit for declaration of their right of purchase and the recovery of a 10-anna share of the money in the hands of H D and R D. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief sought for. *Held*, also, that the provisions of s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code did not affect the suit, which was brought, not upon the allegation that the decrees were satisfied by the plaintiffs' purchase, but, on the contrary, was founded upon the proposition that the decrees were not so satisfied. *Abdul Rahiman v. Khoja Khaki Aruth*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 6, referred to. *Held*, further, that the claim was not within the words "relating to the execution of the decree" in s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, inasmuch as it did not raise any question in respect to the furtherance of, or hinderance to, or the manner of carrying out, the execution of the decrees. *HARAGOBIND DAS KOIBURTO v. ISSURI DASI*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 187

119. *Suit for declaration of satisfaction of a decree—Satisfaction of decree out of Court—Civil Procedure Code, s. 258.* A judgment-debtor, alleging that he had entered into an agreement with the decree-holder in satisfaction of his decree, and that the latter had, in breach of such agreement, procured the issue of a warrant of attachment, now sued for a declaration that the decree had been satisfied, and prayed also for the cancellation of the warrant of attachment. *Held*, with regard to the provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, that the suit was not maintainable. *BAIRAGULU v. BAPANNA*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 302

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 244—contd.

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.

120. — Agreement not to execute a decree—Suit to restrain execution—Agreement not to execute regarded as satisfaction of decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 257 (a), 258. *M* and *A* were partners, and as such were indebted to *H*. *A* died, and subsequently the debt was settled between *H* on one side and *M* and *A*'s widow, as guardian of her minor sons, on the other. For a moiety of the debt a bond was passed by *M* to *H* and for the other moiety by the widow of *A*. *H* filed a suit against *M*, and got a decree, which was satisfied. *H* then sued the widow on her bond. The Court allowed her objection that she was not competent to give a bond binding her sons personally, and of its own accord made *M* a defendant and passed a decree against *M* and *A*'s estate. *H* assigned this decree to *R*, who applied for execution against *M*. *M* thereupon filed this suit against *H* and *R*, praying for an injunction against the execution of the said decree and for damages against *H*. He alleged that during the pendency of the suit in which the said decree had been passed, *H* had agreed that he would not obtain a decree against him, and that, if such a decree were passed, he would not execute it. The lower Appeal Court rejected the plaint, holding that there was no cause of action against the defendant *H*. On appeal to the High Court, it having been urged that the question was one which could be decided in execution, and that, under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, the present suit would not lie :—*Held*, that the words "relating to execution" in s. 244 must be restricted to "the contents of the order made, or to how far it has been carried out," and do not, therefore, include an agreement not to execute the decree. It being further contended that the agreement raised a question as to the "satisfaction" of the decree, and was, therefore, void without the sanction of the Court : *Held*, that the satisfaction contemplated by s. 244 must have arisen out of some transactions between the parties subsequent to the decree. *MUKUND HARSHET v. HARIDAS KHEMJI* . . . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 23

121. — Adjustment of decree out of Court—Instalment bond. A kistbundi or instalment bond was executed by way of adjustment of a decree, but this was not certified to the Court in accordance with the provisions of ss. 257A and 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that a Court executing the decree was not competent to take cognizance of the kistbundi under s. 244 of the Code, and that the decree must be executed, notwithstanding the adjustment. *Jhabar Mahomed v. Modan Sonahar*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 671, explained and distinguished. *RAM DOYAL BANERJEE v. RAM HARI PAL* . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 32

122. — Separate suit—Uncertified adjustment—Agreement not to execute

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 244—contd.

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.

decree—Suit by judgment-debtor to stay execution—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 258. The defendant in January 1887 obtained a decree against the plaintiff, which he partially executed, and thereupon an adjustment of account took place between the plaintiff and defendant, in which a certain sum was found due by the plaintiff to the defendant, for which sum the plaintiff gave a bond to the defendant in consideration of which the defendant agreed to exonerate the plaintiff from liability for the balance due under the decree. This satisfaction of the decree was not certified to the Court. On 12th March 1890 the defendant applied for further execution of the decree. In a suit for a declaration that the defendant had no right to execute the decree, and for an injunction to restrain him from executing it, it was contended that the suit was barred by s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held* by *PIGOT* and *MACPHERSON, JJ.* (*BANERJEE, J.*, dissenting), that s. 244 is not limited by s. 258, and that the suit was not maintainable. Where a decree is satisfied by an agreement out of Court, and such satisfaction is not certified to the Court, a subsequent suit on the agreement is not maintainable if the object of the suit is to restrain the decree-holder from executing his decree in contravention of the agreement. *Per PIGOT, J.*—S. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code does not absolutely bar a suit, but prohibits in a separate suit between the same parties to a decree any relief being granted which interferes with the conduct of the execution-proceedings by the Court executing the decree. *Per BANERJEE, J.*—A suit on the agreement was maintainable. S. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, having enacted that an uncertified adjustment cannot be recognized as an adjustment of the decree by any Court executing the decree, implies that it may be recognized as such by a Court trying the matter as a regular suit. *AZIZAN v. MATUK LAL SAHU* . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 437

123. — Question as to payment to decree-holder out of Court—Separate suit—*Res judicata*—Civil Procedure Code (1877), s. 258. An order under s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure is appealable under s. 244 ; no separate suit lies since the question is *res judicata* between the parties. *GURUVAYYA v. VUDAYAPPA* . . . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 26

124. — Question as to satisfaction of decree between transferee of decree and judgment-debtor—Civil Procedure Code, s. 258. On an application for execution of a decree being presented by a transferee decree-holder, the judgment-debtor opposed, alleging in his petition that he had transferred certain immoveable property to the petitioner in consideration of his paying the judgment-debt to the original decree-holder, and that the petitioner had discharged the debt, but

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

subsequently having got the decree transferred to himself, instead of entering up satisfaction of the decree, fraudulently applied for execution. Satisfaction had not been entered up under s. 258, Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that there must be an inquiry into the truth of the judgment-debtor's allegations, and, if proved, the petition for execution must be dismissed, and, further, that s. 258, Civil Procedure Code, was inapplicable to the present case, since that section applies only to the case of parties who stand in the relation of judgment-debtor and judgment-creditor at the date of the transaction. *RAMA AYYAN v. SREENIVASA PATTAR*
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 230

125. ———— *Uncertified adjustment of decree—Separate suit—Suit by judgment-debtors to recover back their property, which the decree-holder obtained possession of, in execution of his decree, whether maintainable.* One *M* obtained a decree for possession of a jote and for mesne profits against the plaintiffs. Subsequently, by a registered ekramamah, the decree-holder having received from the judgment-debtors (the plaintiffs) the amount due on account of mesne profits, and also a further consideration of R166, relinquished an 8-anna share of the jote in favour of them. The remaining 8-anna share of the jote was also sold by the decree-holder by a registered kobala to the judgment-debtor. The heirs of the decree-holder on his death applied for execution of the decree, but, notwithstanding the judgment-debtor's objection that the decree could not be executed, it having been satisfied by virtue of the aforesaid ekramamah and kobala, they obtained possession of the jote; the adjustment, not having been certified, was not taken into account by the Court executing the decree. On a regular suit by the judgment-debtors for a declaration of title to, as well as for the recovery of, possession of the jote, the defence mainly was that under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no separate suit would lie. *Held*, that such a suit was maintainable, and that s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure was no bar to it. *Azizan v. Matuk Lall Sahu*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 437, distinguished. *ISWAR CHANDRA DUTT v. HARIS CHANDRA DUTT*
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 718
2 C. W. N. 247

126. ———— *Adjustment out of Court—Subsequent execution by decree-holders—Suit to recover money paid on adjustment.* It was agreed between a decree-holder and the judgment-debtors that the former should accept R200 which was paid in full satisfaction of the decree, and should certify the adjustment to the Court, and that an attachment already placed on the judgment-debtor's property should be raised. The decree-holder accepted the money, but did not carry out

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

his part of the agreement, and more than two years later applied for execution which was ordered to issue, the judgment-debtor's objections being dismissed as out of time. The judgment-debtors now sued in a Small Cause Court to recover the money paid to satisfy the decree. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. *PERIATAMBI UDAYAN v. VELLAYA GOUNDAN* . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 409

127. ———— *Agreement before decree by the decree-holder not to recover costs which the decree might award—Question to be determined in execution and not by a separate suit.* *D* and *H* obtained a decree on an award with costs against *S* and *L*. When they applied for its execution against *L* in order to recover his half share of the costs, he pleaded that before the proceedings had commenced, the plaintiffs had entered into an agreement with him that none of the costs which might be awarded by the Court should be recovered from him. *Held*, that the existence and validity of such an agreement ought to be determined in execution under the provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and not in a separate suit. *LALDAS NARANDAS v. KISHORDAS DEVIDAS*
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 463

128. ———— *Question as to amount of security on stay of execution pending appeal.* The question as to the amount of security to be given by a defendant against whom a decree has been passed, when a stay of execution is granted pending appeal, is a question relating to the execution of the decree as contemplated by s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *ISHWAGAR v. CHUDASAMA MANABHAI* . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 30

129. ———— *Claim to attached property—Question to be decided in execution—Liability of property to be sold in execution.* The question whether property is liable to be sold in execution of a decree is one to be determined under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Chowdhry Wahid Ali v. Jumae*, 11 B. L. R. 149 : 18 W. R. 185, followed in principle. *MUNGESHUR KUAR v. JUMOONA PERSHAD* . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 603

130. ———— *Question as to legality of purchase by judgment-debtors of right of some of decree-holders.* Disputes as to the legality of the purchase by judgment-debtors of the rights of some of the decree-holders in the property to which the decree relates, and the extent of the share acquired under the purchase, are questions falling within the purview of cl. (c) of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and must be determined by order of the Court executing the decree. *KHUDAI v. SHEO DYAL*
I. L. R. 10 All. 570

131. ———— *Separate suit—Auction-purchaser not a representative of either party to a*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

suit—Sale in execution of property belonging to a person other than the judgment-debtor. In execution of a decree on a mortgage, certain property was sold, which the plaintiff in this suit claimed as his own under sale to himself by the sons of the judgment-debtor. He applied to the Court to have the sale set aside, but, failing in his application, he sued both the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser for a declaration of his title to the property in question. The Assistant Judge held, on appeal, that the suit was not maintainable, on the ground that, the greater part of the property being included in the decree, the question of title ought to have been settled in execution-proceedings under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and not by a separate suit. *Held*, reversing the decision of the Assistant Judge that s. 244 did not bar the present suit. It could not apply, except as regards property affected by the decree, and a part of the property claimed by the plaintiff was not included in the decree. Moreover, the question in the present suit did not arise between the parties to the former suit, or their representatives. *SHIVRAM CHINTAMAN v. JIVU*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 34

132. — *Separate suit*
disallowance of objection to execution. In execution of a decree, the defendant, who was sued as the representative of her deceased brother, objected under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the attachment of certain lands to which she set up independent title. The objection was disallowed, and the land was sold. She then sued the execution-purchaser to set aside the Court-sale, and obtained a decree, against which no appeal was preferred. She now sued for possession. *Held*, that the suit lay notwithstanding the order under s. 244. *KERLILAMMA v. KELAPPAN* . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 228

133. — *Objection raising*
question of title between party added as representative, and the person whom he represents—Order disallowing objection. *G* brought a suit against *I* for the establishment of her rights as purchaser of certain immoveable properties sold in execution of a decree obtained against *I*, and for possession of the same. After the settlement of issues, but before the suit was finally disposed of, *I* died, and his brother *J* was made defendant as his legal representative. *J* consented to the suit being tried on the defence raised by *I* and upon issues already settled. The suit was decreed, it being held that *G* was the purchaser. In execution of this decree, under which *G* sought to obtain possession, *J* objected that he was entitled to a half share of some, and to the entire sixteen annas of the other, properties, and that his brother *I* had no right whatever in the same. This objection was disallowed by the Court executing the decree on the ground that it had not been

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

raised in the original suit, and that, as the decree has been passed in the presence of *J*, he was not entitled now to urge it. Thereupon *J* brought a suit against *G* to establish his rights. *Held*, that the order passed in the execution proceedings disallowing *J*'s objection was no bar to the suit under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Kanai Lal Khan v. Shashi Bhushan Biswas*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 777 : 8 C. L. R. 117, followed. *GOURMONI DABEE v. JUGUT CHANDRA AUDHIKARI*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 57

134. — *Right of a*
mortgagee to the benefit of s. 310A—Appeal against order adverse to mortgagee. A mortgagee, being a party to a suit, objected that the mortgaged premises had been attached and sold in execution of the decree and applied to have the sale set aside on payment being made by him under Civil Procedure Code, s. 310A. The purchaser was the decree-holder. The application having been refused by the Courts of first instance and first appeal, the applicant appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that the appeal was maintainable, the question being one between the appellant and the purchaser (also a party to the suit), and the appellant was entitled to the relief sought. *SRINIVASA AYYANGAR v. AYYATHORAI PILLAI* . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 416

135. — *Claims to attached property—Questions arising between the parties or their representatives—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 278-283.* *Held* by the Full Bench :—An objection taken by a person who has become the representative of the judgment-debtor in the course of the execution of a decree to the effect that the property attached in satisfaction thereof is his own property, and not held by him as such representative, is a matter cognizable only under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and is not the proper subject-matter of a separate suit by a party against whom an adverse order may have been passed under ss. 280 and 281 as provided by s. 283. *Held*, by the majority of the Full Bench (*PRINSEP, O'KINEALY, and GHOSE, JJ.*), that ss. 278 to 283 of the Civil Procedure Code do not cover the case of any contest between parties to the suit or their representatives on the record of the suit in regard to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree. The effect of the decision between such parties is that the right to enforce or oppose execution is determined under s. 244, subject to the result of such appeal as is allowed by law. *Per PRINSEP and O'KINEALY, JJ.*—S. 244 should be liberally construed to prevent litigation. *PUNCHANUN BUNDOPADHYA v. RABIA BIBI*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 711

136. — *Claim by legal*
representative to property as his own independently

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

— s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

of deceased judgment-debtor—*Jus tertii*—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 234, 278, 283.* Held by the Full Bench (TYRRELL, J., dissenting), that where a judgment-debtor dies after the passing of the decree, and his legal representatives are brought on the record in execution proceedings to represent him in respect of the decree, questions which they raise as to property which they say does not belong to his assets in their hands, and as such is not capable of being taken in execution, are questions which under s. 244 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code must be determined in the execution department, and not by separate suit. There is no distinction in this respect between the position of legal representatives added to the suit before, and those added after, the decree. Under the last paragraph of s. 234, the Court executing the decree may try and determine the question whether property in the legal representative's hands formed part of the deceased judgment-debtor's estate, and finds this fact for the purpose of bringing the property to sale in execution and giving the auction-purchaser a good title under the sale; and the Court's order is subject to appeal, but not a separate suit under s. 283. Where the legal representative asserts that the property is his own, and has not come to him from the deceased judgment-debtor, he cannot set up a *jus tertii*, so as to come in under s. 278 and the following sections of the Code. He can only do so where he opposes execution against any particular property on the ground that, although it is vested in him, it is vested in him not beneficially by reason of his being the representative of the judgment-debtor, but as trustee or executor of someone else. In that case either party may have the question of *jus tertii* determined in a separate suit. *Rajrup Singh v. Ramgolam Roy*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 1, approved. *Abdul Rahman v. Muhammad Yar*, I. L. R. 4 All. 190, and *Awadh Kuari v. Raktu Tiwari*, I. L. R. 6 All. 109, overruled. *Bahori Lal v. Gauri, Sahai* I. L. R. 8 All. 626, distinguished. Held, by TYRRELL, J. (*contra*), that where the legal representative of a deceased party to the decree appears, not in his capacity of legal representative contesting a question arising between the parties and relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree, but in his personal character independent of the suit and decree, and prefers a claim under s. 278 on the ground that the decree has no operation against certain property attached, for reasons personal to the objector and antagonistic to all the parties and their representatives as such the objector is not debarred from bringing a separate suit by the mere accident that he is a legal representative in the execution proceedings. SETH CHAND MAL v. DURGA DEI . . . I. L. R. 12 All. 313

137. ——— Application to
execute decree against alleged representative of

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

— s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

deceased judgment-debtor—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 234.* In the case of an application under s. 234 of the Code of Civil Procedure to execute a decree against a person alleged to be the representative of a deceased judgment-debtor, it is for the Court which passed the decree to decide whether the person against whom execution is sought is or is not such representative, but it is for the Court executing the decree to decide to what extent such person is liable as such representative. *Srihary Mundul v. Murari Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 257. SETH SHAPURJI NANABHI v. SHANKER DAT DUBE

I. L. R. 17 All. 431

138. ——— Decree for sale
on a mortgage—*Mode of intervention of third party claiming an interest by succession in the property decreed to be sold—Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 278—Right of suit.* Two heirs of a Mahomedan woman took possession on her death of certain immoveable property left by her to the exclusion of the third heir, their sister. They mortgaged that property. The mortgagee brought a suit, and obtained a decree for sale. After decree, one of the mortgagors died, and his sister was brought upon the record as his representative. The property was sold, and subsequently the sister brought a suit against the auction-purchaser for recovery of her share in the mortgaged property. Held, that s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply, and that the suit was maintainable. *Deefholts v. Peters*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 631, and *Seth Chand Mal v. Durga Dei*, I. L. R. 12 All. 313, referred to. SANWAL DAS v. BISMILLAH BEGAM . I. L. R. 19 All. 480

139. ——— Question as to
whether property belongs to judgment-debtor or not
—*Grounds of objection to attachment of property—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 278 to 283.* Where the question is whether the property in dispute belongs to the judgment-debtor or to his estate or not, and the question is raised in a proceeding in execution between parties to the suit or their representatives, it matters not on what grounds the objection is taken to the property being made the subject of execution, and the question is one to be determined in execution, and s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure bars a separate suit. *Abidunissa Khatoon v. Amirunissa Khatoon*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 327 : I. L. R. 41 A. 66, followed. UPENDRA BHATTA v. RANGANATHA BHATTA . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 399

140. ——— Claim to attached
property—*Order in execution proceedings—Separate suit to declare property not liable to attachment.* In execution of a decree passed against the plaintiff, certain property in his possession was attached. Thereupon he laid claim to the property on the ground that it was service vatan. This claim was rejected. The plaintiff then filed a regular suit

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

for a declaration that the property was not liable to attachment and sale. *Held*, that the suit was barred under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court which originally rejected the plaintiff's claim in the execution proceedings had jurisdiction to investigate the claim under cl. (c) of s. 244 of the Code. **TRIMBAK RAMRAO DESHPANDE v. GOVINDA**
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 328

141. ———— *Claim to attached property—Scope of s. 244 and questions with which it deals.* S. 244 presupposes that the questions with which it deals are such as can be finally determined in the execution proceedings. If they cannot, it has no application. The Court should look to the substance of the objection, and not to the accident that it is put forward by one person rather than another. **Upendra Bhatta v. Ranganatha Bhatta**, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 399, considered. **Punchanun Bandopadhyaya v. Rabia Bibi**, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 711, and **Murigeysa v. Hayat Saheb**, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 237, referred to. **RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR v. LEVVAI MARAKAYAR** . . . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 195

142. ———— *Questions arising between the decree-holder and the representatives of the judgment-debtor—Claims to attached property where representative judgment-debtor claims to hold the attached property as trustee of third party—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 278-283.* The plaintiffs sued for a declaration that certain property was liable to be attached in execution of a decree obtained by them in suit No. 591 of 1888 against the estates of one G, deceased, who had been the head of a *math* situate in the Dharwar District. The property had been attached in execution, but the defendant, who was G's successor in office, had obtained the removal of the attachment on the ground that the property belonged to the *math* and not to G personally, and was not, therefore, liable to satisfy the decree. The plaintiffs thereupon brought this suit. The lower Appellate Court passed a decree for the plaintiffs and granted the declaration. On second appeal it was contended that under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code the question ought to have been decided in execution of the decree in suit No. 591 of 1888, and that a separate suit would not lie. *Held* on the merits, that the decree of the lower Appeal Court should be reversed and the suit dismissed. *Per* **RANADE, J.**—Where the representative of a judgment-debtor puts forward a personal claim to property which is attached as assets of the judgment-debtor in his hands, the investigation of the claim must be made in execution under the provisions of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But where he asserts that he holds the property in trust for, or on behalf of, or as manager of some third person or body of persons, or of a religious charity or institution, the claim must be investigated under the provisions of ss. 278 to

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

283, and the order passed therein cannot be challenged by an appeal, but must form the subject of a separate suit. *Per* **PARSONS, J.**—Ss. 278 to 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure have no reference to any claim preferred or objection made by any person who is on the record as a party to the suit. Whenever a question arises between the representative of a judgment-debtor on the record (whether originally sued as such or added before or after decree) and the decree-holder as to whether property in the hands of the representative was of the assets of the deceased or not, that question must be determined by order of the Court executing the decree under the provisions of s. 244. **MURIGEYA v. HAYAT SAHEB** . . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 237

143. ———— *Possession in execution of decree after sale—Question arising between the parties or their representatives—Separate suit—Appeal.* Proceedings for the delivery of possession to the auction-purchaser, after sale in execution of a decree, are proceedings in execution of the decree; and when the application for possession is resisted by the legal representative of the judgment-debtor on the allegation that portions of the property belonged to him and not to the judgment-debtor, the question raised comes under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and must be decided under that section, and not by a separate suit. **MADHUSUDAN DAS v. GOBINDA PRIA CHOWDHURANI**
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 34
4 C. W. N. 417

144. ———— *Claim to property attached in execution of decree—"Parties to the suit"—Subsequent suit by a defendant who had been exonerated in a former suit—Maintainability of such suit.* A family consisted of plaintiff's father, first defendant's father and second defendant's grandfather. Plaintiff's brother died, leaving a widow. Plaintiff's father then died and also left a widow (plaintiff's mother), him surviving. The brother's widow brought a suit for maintenance against the representatives of the first and second defendants' branches of the family, plaintiff's mother being joined as third defendant. A decree was passed against the two first-mentioned defendants, but plaintiff's mother was exonerated on the ground that, being a female, she was not liable. In execution of the decree, certain lands were brought to sale and purchased by the brother's widow, who transferred them to another person. At the death of plaintiff's mother, which occurred subsequently, the said lands would have vested in the plaintiff, who now brought this suit claiming that the sales referred to were not binding on her (plaintiff), inasmuch as her mother had not been a party to the decree under which they had taken place. *Held*, that, where a party defendant in a

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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— s. 244—*contd.*

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suit is exonerated from such suit, the suit being dismissed against him, and decree passed against a co-defendant in the suit, and in execution of that decree property belonging to, and in the possession of, the defendant who was so exonerated from the suit is attached and sold, the latter is not entitled to maintain a suit for recovery of possession of the property, and the question of his claim to, and to recover possession of, the property is a question falling within s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, so as to debar him from maintaining such suit. *Gadicherla China Seetayya v. Gadicherla Seetayya*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 45, explained. RAMASWAMI SASTRULU v. KAMESWARAMMA

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 361

See *GADICHERLA CHINA SEETAYYA v. GADICHERLA SEETAYYA* . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 45

145. ——— *Parties to suit—Alteration of decree by Court executing decree.* The plaintiff purchased a one-gunda share in estate No. 831 and obtained a decree for possession against the defendants. While the plaintiff's suit was pending, and before he took out execution under the said decree, partition proceedings took place. By the partition-proceedings the defendant's interest in the estate No. 831 was converted into a smaller estate, No. 2218, in lieu of their share of the whole estate. The plaintiff then brought a separate suit to have it declared that the defendants' interest in estate No. 831 had passed to estate No. 2218. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. The required transformation of the defendants' interest could not be effected without altering the decree which was given in the former suit. The question that arose in the suit, although it was one between the same parties as those in the former suit, could not be regarded as a question relating to the execution of the decree in the former suit, and therefore the Court in execution proceedings had no authority to make the necessary alteration in the decree. *KRISHNA ROY v. JAWAHIR SINGH* . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 260

146. ——— *Order cancelling an execution-sale of land—Subsequent suit for possession brought by judgment-debtor.* A decree-holder attached land of his judgment-debtor and brought it to sale and himself became the purchaser in execution of his decree. The purchase having been made without the permission of the Court, the sale was set aside on the application of the judgment-debtor, who now sued to recover possession of the land. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable under Civil Procedure Code, s. 244. *VIRARAGHAVA v. VENKATA* I. L. R. 16 Mad. 287

147. ——— *Purchaser of land sold in execution—Confirmation of sale—Objection of unsaleability.* A judgment-debtor having died

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 244—*contd.*

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—*contd.***

before the decree was executed, his sons were brought on to the record as his representatives. Ancestral property of the judgment-debtor was then brought to sale in execution and purchased by the decree-holder, and the sale to him was confirmed. Subsequently the judgment-debtor's sons objected, under Civil Procedure Code, s. 244, that the property which had been brought to sale was not liable to be sold in execution. *Held*, that the objection was rightly made under s. 244, and a separate suit was not necessary for the purpose of an adjudication on it. *KRISHNAN v. ARUNACHALAM*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 447

148. ——— *Question of validity of sale of an occupancy holding not transferable by custom in execution of a decree for arrears of rent obtained by a co-sharer landlord—Bengal Tenancy Act (VII of 1885), ss. 22, 65, 73, and 188.* An occupancy holding which is not transferable by custom, as also the interest of the judgment-debtor in the said holding, are not saleable in execution of a decree for rent obtained by only some of several co-sharer landlords. *Bhiram Ali Shaik Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 355, referred to. A judgment-debtor, whose occupancy holding, which was not transferable by custom, had been sold in execution of a decree for rent obtained by some of the co-sharer landlords, objected to the application made by the auction-purchaser after the confirmation of the sale for delivery of possession of the said holding, on the ground that the sale was illegal. *Held*, that the confirmation of sale was no bar to the application that was made by the judgment-debtor to have it declared that in execution of such a decree the holding could not be sold, the question being one which related to the execution, discharge, and satisfaction of the decree. *Basti Ram v. Fathu*, I. L. R. 8 All. 146, referred to. *DURGA CHARAN MANDAL v. KALI PRASANNA SARKAR* . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 727
3 C. W. N. 586

149. ——— *Sale by mortgagee in execution of decree—Sale contrary to provisions of s. 99, Transfer of Property Act.* Property subject to a mortgage having been sold by the mortgagee as holder of a decree against the mortgagors, a separate suit was brought by the mortgagors to set aside the sale as being in contravention of s. 99 of the Transfer of Property Act. On objection being taken that the suit was not maintainable, the matter being one for determination in execution proceeding under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure—*Held*, (i) that, although the sale was contrary to the provisions of s. 99 of the Transfer of Property Act, that section being for the benefit only of a particular class of persons, namely, those concerned with a right to redeem mortgage property, such a sale was

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—*contd.*

not void, but voidable; (ii) that the question, being one arising between the parties to the suit wherein the sale was made and relating to execution, could not be raised and decided in a suit, but should be raised and tried only in execution proceedings taken under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the sale set aside if such relief were not, for any reason, barred; (iii) that the sale having been confirmed, such confirmation was final, and precluded the mortgagors from seeking the relief to which they would otherwise have been entitled; and (iv) that, notwithstanding such sale and confirmation, the mortgagors might not be precluded from suing to redeem the mortgaged property on payment of the amount given credit for by the mortgagee in respect of the sale. *MAYAN PATHUTI v. PAKURAN*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 347

150. ———— *Question of saleability of occupancy holding in execution of decree—Transferability of occupancy holding according to custom or usage.* When an application is made to execute a decree for money by the attachment and sale of an occupancy holding, the judgment-debtor is entitled, under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, to raise the question as to whether the holding is saleable according to custom or usage, and to have that question determined by the Court executing the decree. *MAJED HOSSEN v. RAGHUBUR CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 27 Cal. 187

151. ———— *Question for Court executing decree—Question between decree-holder and judgment-debtor as to saleability or otherwise of an occupancy holding.* Under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, the question as to the saleability or otherwise of an occupancy holding between the decree-holder and judgment-debtor can be determined in the execution proceeding. *Durga Charan Mandal v. Kali Prasanna Sarkar*, I. L. R. 26 Cal. 727, and *Bhiram Ali Shaik Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha*, I. L. R. 24 Cal. 355, referred to. *GAHAR KHALIPA BIPARI v. KASHIMUDDI JAMADAR*

I. L. R. 27 Cal. 415

4 C. W. N. 557

152. ———— *Suit for administration in respect of barred decree—Mortgage decree—Transfer to High Court for execution—Application for execution by sale—Civil Procedure Code (1882), ss. 227 and 230—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 67 and 99—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 122, 179, and 180.* On the 29th September 1882, a decree was obtained against the defendant's husband in a suit on a mortgage by the latter, dated the 6th April 1880. On the 27th July 1883, an order was made for transfer of the decree to the High Court for execution. On the 8th April 1886, the mortgagee applied to the High Court for

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—*contd.*

execution by attachment of the mortgaged properties, and in the same year an order for attachment was made. The mortgagee died in April 1892, and on the 20th August 1894, the plaintiff (his widow and administratrix) applied to the High Court for an order absolute for sale of the mortgaged properties under s. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act. On the 5th January 1895, the application was refused on the ground that the mortgaged properties were outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The plaintiff then instituted the present suit, in which she sought (*inter alia*) administration of the estate of the mortgagor (who had died before the mortgage suit was filed), and asked for the sale of such properties as might be found subject to such mortgage. *Held* (affirming the decision of *SALE, J.*), that the suit was not maintainable by reason of the provisions of ss. 230 and 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, the questions arising in the suit being such as should have been determined in execution of the decree, and not by a separate suit. *JOGEMAYA DASSI v. THACKOMONI DASSI*

I. L. R. 24 Cal. 473

153. ———— *Question as to the appointment of a manager of the property of a religious institution—Right of appeal.* A decree of the High Court declared its holder entitled as the Pandara Sannadhi, or religious chief, of an *adhinam*, to see that a competent person, from among the Tambirans who had received initiation at that institution, was appointed to fill the then vacant office of Tambiran, managing certain maths. The decree directed that the Pandara should name a Tambiran of his *adhinam* for the office, whom, after inquiry as to his fitness, the subordinate Court should appoint. If that Court found him unfit, it was to appoint a Tambiran of that *adhinam* upon its own selection. In execution the Pandara named a Tambiran for the office, but died before the inquiry as to his fitness. His successor, as head of the *adhinam*, petitioned to withdraw the nomination, naming another Tambiran. The subordinate Court made an order disallowing the withdrawal, and, after inquiry as to the fitness of the first named Tambiran, appointed him to the office. The High Court, on the Pandara's appeal, decided the first nomination had been competently withdrawn, and directed an inquiry as to the fitness of the person secondly named, finding on the evidence that the first-named was not fit. *Held*, on the appeal of the Tambiran first-named, that the question as to his right was one that had arisen between the parties to the suit, and related to the execution of the decree within the meaning of s. 244, sub-s. (c), Civil Procedure Code, and that he could appeal from the order made. *PONNAMBALA*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*TAMBIAN V. SIVAGNANA DESIKA GNANA SAM-
BANDHA PANDARA SANNADHII. L. R. 17 Mad. 343
L. R. 21 I. A. 71

154. ———— *Second suit for Restitution of Conjugal Rights—Decree in former suit not executed—Subsequent voluntary cohabitation followed again by desertion—Satisfaction of decree—Cause of action—Husband and Wife.* Plaintiff obtained a decree against his wife for restitution of conjugal rights in 1885 which was never executed. In 1887, however, she returned to his house, and stayed with him for two months. She afterwards deserted him again. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a second suit for restitution of conjugal rights. *Held*, that the suit was not barred either under s. 13 or s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A second withdrawal from cohabitation constitutes a fresh cause of action. KESHAVLAL GIRDHARLAL V. BAI PARVATI . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 327

155. ———— *Objection by representative of party to the suit to the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree.* S. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies as well to a dispute arising between the parties contemplated by that section in relation to the execution of a decree after it has been executed, as it would to a dispute between such parties relating to the execution of a decree before it had been executed. It is competent to the Court charged with the execution of a decree to consider the question as to whether the Court which passed the decree had jurisdiction to pass it, unless the decree itself precludes that question. *Muhammad Salaiman Khan v. Fatima*, I. L. R. 11 All. 314, and *Musa Haji Ahmed v. Purmanand Nursey*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 219, referred to. *IMDAD ALI v. JAGAN LAL* . . . I. L. R. 17 All. 478

156. ———— *Suit for Mesne Profits subsequent to partition—Right of suit—Decree in suit for partition not giving mesne profits.* Where a decree for partition is silent about mesne profits subsequent to the institution of the suit, a party is at liberty to assert his right to such profits by a separate suit. S. 244, para. 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, expressly reserves such a right of suit. BHIVRAV V. SITARAM

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 532

157. ———— *Suit for Contribution against joint judgment-debtor.* S. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to a suit brought by one of two joint judgment-debtors who has been compelled to satisfy the decree in full against the other joint judgment-debtor for contribution, the liability being one which could not have been decided in execution of decree. *RAM SARAN PANDE v. JANKI PANDE*

I. L. R. 8 All. 106

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

158. ———— *Decree incapable of execution by reason of events subsequent to decree—Decree giving an option to the parties.* A partition suit brought by a son against his father was referred to arbitration. On the 9th January 1890, the award was published, and, on the 27th March 1890, the defendants moved for and obtained a decree in terms of the award. By this decree it was ordered that, in satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim, the defendant should pay to him Rs. 1,05,000 in the manner therein stated, *viz.*, Rs. 40,000 to be paid forthwith, and the balance of Rs. 65,000 to be paid "upon the plaintiff delivering to the defendant certain specified property, which included two vessels or buglows, called respectively the *Nasri* and *Sambuk*." In no event was defendant to be required to pay the Rs. 65,000 before the 15th November 1890. At the date of the decree the vessel *Sambuk* was at sea on a voyage, and, on the 8th June 1890, while still on the voyage she was lost. On the 15th November 1890, the plaintiff's attorneys demanded payment of the balance of Rs. 65,000. They offered to deliver the other properties specified in the decree, but stated that the vessel *Sambuk* had been lost. They offered to pay its value, which they estimated at Rs. 1,000. The defendants, however, demanded the delivery of the buglow, which they stated to be worth a very large sum. The defendant having, under the circumstances, refused to pay the Rs. 65,000 the plaintiff applied for execution of the decree, which was refused. He then obtained a rule calling on the defendant to show cause why the decree of the 27th March should not be amended or rectified by stating therein the amount of money to be paid to the defendant as an alternative, if delivery of the vessel *Sambuk* could not be made, such delivery having become impossible. That rule was discharged. The plaintiffs then took out a summons calling on the defendant to show cause why an order should be made, under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, directing the plaintiffs to pay to the first defendant, in lieu of the delivery of the vessel *Sambuk*, such sum of money as might be fixed by the Court as the value of or compensation for the loss of the vessel *Sambuk* in the decree mentioned, and why an order should not be made that on payment of such sum and delivery of the other properties mentioned in the decree which the plaintiffs were to deliver under the decree to the first defendant on payment by the latter to them of Rs. 65,000 the first defendant should pay to the plaintiffs Rs. 65,000 and interest thereon from the 15th day of November 1890, mentioned in the said decree, and, in the event on its being held that the first defendant was not bound to pay the said sum of Rs. 65,000, then why an order should not be made that the property mentioned in the decree which the plaintiffs were to hand over to the first

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

defendant on payment of Rs65,000 should not be retained, used, and appropriated, absolutely by the plaintiffs for their own use and benefit, freed and discharged of all claims on the part of the first defendant, and why the first defendant should not be directed to withdraw the claim made by him to a debt of Rs22,000, or thereabouts, mentioned in an affidavit of one Ahmed bin Essa Khaliffa, and why such further or other order as to the Court might seem fit and the justice of the case may require should not be made in the premises and in relation to the properties mentioned in the decree which were to be delivered over by the plaintiffs to the first defendant on receiving from him Rs65,000, and why in the alternative this suit should not be restored and placed on the board for trial. It was contended by the plaintiff that the questions raised in the summons were questions arising in execution to be dealt with by a Judge in chambers under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that a fresh suit was not necessary. *Held*, dismissing the summons, that the application was not one in execution of a decree, nor was the question one arising in the course of execution, but that the decree having become incapable of execution, the summons asked the Judge to decide what were the rights of the parties in consequence of its non-execution. *Held*, also (as to the part of the summons asking for restoration of the suit), that the matters in issue in the suit had been fully heard and determined, and the rights of all parties had been settled by the decree, and consequently there was nothing further to be tried. The Court could not in this suit, after passing a decree, proceed to ascertain the rights of the parties under a state of facts quite different from those which appeared in the pleadings and arising subsequently to the decree. **AHMED BIN SHAIK ESSA KHALIFFA v. ESSA BIN KHALIFFA**
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 495

159. ——— Application of section S. 224, Civil Procedure Code, does not apply to the case of execution proceedings held under the Public Demand Recovery Act. *Ram Tarak Hazra v. Mosahohali Khan*, 6 C. W. N. 246; and *Janki Das v. Ram Golam Sahu*, 6 C. W. N. 331, relied upon. **RAMRUP SAHAY v. KHUSHAL MISSEER** (1902)
6 C. W. N. 630

160. ——— Adjustment of decree—*Adjustment of decree, not out of Court, but by another decree superseding the earlier one, effect of.* If a decree is adjusted by compromise out of Court, the adjustment has to be notified to the Court; and, if it is not so notified, it would be ineffectual; but an adjustment of a decree, effected not out of Court but by another decree, itself as binding as the earlier one and superseding the earlier decree, can be given effect to. *Ram Doyal Banerjee v. Ram Hari Pal*,

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 32, distinguished. **BASUDEB GIRI v. BROJO MOHAN JANA** (1902)

7 C. W. N. 54

161. ——— *Compromise—Sale in execution of decree—Suit to set aside compromise and sale.* In execution of a money decree, the decree-holders attached and brought to sale the interest of their judgment-debtor in a certain village, and themselves purchased it. An objection to the sale was raised by the judgment-debtor; and, while such objection was pending, the judgment-debtor's son is said to have entered into a compromise, whereby it was agreed that the decree-holders should take the village in full satisfaction of their decree, though it had, in fact, been sold for only about three-quarters of the decretal amount, and that the sale should be confirmed on those terms. The judgment-debtor subsequently filed a suit against the decree-holders, asking for a declaration that the said compromise and the confirmation of sale were clusive and invalid, and were null and void, and ineffectual as against the plaintiff. *Held*, that such a suit was barred by the operation of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Prosunno Coomar Sanyal v. Kasi Das Sanyal*, L. R. 19 I. A. 166, referred to. **ADHAR SINGH v. SHEO PRASAD** (1898)

I. L. R. 23 All. 209

162. ——— *Contract in derogation of decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244.* The Court executing a decree cannot go behind it or question its validity. *Chintaman Bin Vithoba v. Chintaman Bajaji Deb*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 475; *Dhani Ram Mahata v. Luchmeswar Singh*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 639; *Mukund Harshet v. Haridas Khemji*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 23, relied upon. A contract made between the parties to a suit, in derogation of a decree which may be passed in future, cannot form the subject of an inquiry under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, in a proceeding for the execution of the decree; an agreement not to execute a decree, if effect is sought to be given to it in execution proceedings, must be a transaction between the parties subsequent to the decree. Questions under s. 244, cl. (c), relating to the execution of a decree and arising between the parties to a suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives, must be such as have reference to matters arising subsequent to the passing of the decree, and not antecedent to it. **CHHOTI NARAIN SINGH v. RAMESHWAR KOER** (1902)
6 C. W. N. 796

163. ——— *Fraud—Allegation of fraud in application for setting aside sale.* No second appeal lies from an order setting aside a sale under s. 312, Civil Procedure Code, although an allegation of fraud is made in the application for setting aside the sale when no attempt is made to substantiate

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

the allegation. *Rajoni Kant Bagchi v. Hossain Uddin Ahmed*, 4 C. W. N. 538, discussed and explained. *Nava Kumar Roy v. Golam Chunder Dey*, 1. L. R. 18 Calc. 422; *Abhoya Dassi v. Pudmo Luchun Mondol*, 1. L. R. 22 Calc. 802; and *Dawanayagam Pillai v. Rangasami Ayar*, 1. L. R. 19 Mad. 29, followed. *UMAKANTA ROY v. DINO NATH SANYAL* (1900)

1. L. R. 28 Calc. 4; s. c. 5 C. W. N. 124

164. — *Auction-purchaser.* When a judgment-debtor applies to have an execution-sale set aside, alleging fraud on the part of the auction-purchaser, who happens to be his agent, and such application is opposed by the decree-holder, the question to be determined must be investigated under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, although no fraud may be alleged as against the decree-holder himself. The fact that the judgment-debtor may be entitled to equitable relief against the auction-purchaser, by a regular suit for reconveyance of the property acquired by fraud, does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of fraud under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code. In determining whether an application to set aside a sale comes within the scope of s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, or not, the point to be considered is, whether there is a contest regarding the validity of the sale between the parties to the suit. *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, 1. L. R. 19 Calc. 683; *Hira Lal Ghosh v. Chunder Kant Ghosh*, 3 C. W. N. 403; *Kumbalinga v. Ariaputra*, 1. L. R. 18 Mad. 436; and *Nemai Chand Kanji v. Deno Nath Kanji*, 2 C. W. N. 691, referred to. *ADHAR MANI DASSI v. MONMOTHA NATH BOSE* (1901)

6 C. W. N. 279

165. — *Fraud by decree-holder—Confirmation of sale.* A judgment-debtor is entitled, by an application under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, to have an execution-sale of his properties set aside if he alleges and proves fraud on the part of the decree-holder, though no fraud is alleged or proved against the auction-purchaser, who is a stranger to the suit. *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, 1. L. R. 19 Calc. 683; *Nemai Chand Kanji v. Deno Nath Kanji*, 2 C. W. N. 691; *Hira Lal Ghosh v. Chunder Kant Ghose*, 3 C. W. N. 403; and *Durga Charan v. Chandra Nath*, 4 C. W. N. 541, followed. When, during the pendency of an application under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, to set aside an execution-sale, the sale is confirmed, such confirmation is no bar to the maintenance of the application, even though the auction-purchaser is a stranger to the suit. The decision of the Privy Council in *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, 1. L. R. 19 Calc. 683, must be taken to have overruled in effect the Full Bench case of *Mohendra Narain Chaturaj*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

v. Gopal Mondul, 1. L. R. 17 Calc. 769. *Bhuban Mohan Pal v. Rajah Peary Mohun Mukerjee*, 3 C. W. N. 399, followed. *KHIRODE SUNDARI DEBI v. JNANENDRA NATH PAL CHAUDHURI* (1901)

6 C. W. N. 283

166. — *Execution of decree—Suit for cancellation on the ground of fraud in a sale held in execution of a decree—Proper remedy by application.* Certain judgment-debtors brought a suit against the decree-holders and the auction-purchaser for cancellation of a sale held in execution of a decree, upon the allegation that the sale in question had been brought about by fraud, the decree having in fact been previously satisfied. Held, that such a suit would not lie, the plaintiffs' remedy being by application under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Prosunno Coomar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, 1. L. R. 19 I. A. 166; *Dhani Ram v. Chaturbhuj*, 1. L. R. 22 All. 86; *Darlat Singh v. Jugal Kishore*, 1. L. R. 22 All. 108; *Bhuban Mohan Pal v. Nunda Lal Dey*, 1. L. R. 26 Calc. 324; and *Moti Lal Chakraborty v. Russick Chandra Bairagi*, 1. L. R. 26 Calc. 326, referred to. *MATHURA DAS v. LACHMAN RAM* (1902) . 1. L. R. 24 All. 239

167. — *Improvements—Execution proceedings—Question raised as to whether improvements attached in execution were property of deceased judgment-debtor or of his representatives in their own right.* A question as to whether improvements on land attached in execution of a decree are property of a deceased judgment-debtor which has come to the hands of his representatives as such, or belong to the representatives in their own right, can be and ought to be decided under s. 244 (c), and not by separate suit. *VENGAPAYAN v. KARIMANAKAL PARVATI* (1902) . 1. L. R. 26 Mad. 501

168. — *Leave to bid at sale—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 244, 294—Procedure—Suit to set aside sale in execution on the ground that the real purchasers were the decree-holders who had not obtained leave to bid—Proper remedy by application.* The plaintiff sued to set aside a sale of certain property in execution of a decree against him, on the grounds that the sale proceedings had been secretly brought about without the knowledge of the plaintiff, and that the certified auction purchasers were benamidars for the decree-holders, who had not obtained permission to purchase. Held, that, under the above circumstances, the plaintiff's remedy was not by suit, but by application under s. 244 and the last clause of s. 294 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Viraraghava Ayyangar v. Venkatacharyar*, 1. L. R. 5 Mad. 217; *Viraraghava v. Venkata*, 1. L. R. 16 Mad. 287; *Chintamanrav Natu v. Vilhabai*, 1. L. R. 11 Bom. 588; *Genu v. Sakharam*, 1. L. R. 22 Bom. 271; *Subbarayudu v. Kotayya*, 1. L. R. 15 Mad. 339; *Mahomed Gazez*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

Chowdhry v. Ram Loll Sen, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 751; *Mohendro Narain Chaturaj v. Gopal Mondul*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 769; *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683; and *Bhubon Mohun Pal v. Nunda Lal Dey*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 324, referred to. *DURGA KUNWAR v. BALWANT SINGH* (1901) . . . I. L. R. 23 All. 478

169. ——— **Mistake—Civil Procedure Code** (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 578, 623—*Execution proceedings, re-opening of—Mistake in calculating amount due—Jurisdiction*. Where the Court passed an order in an execution case, stating that the case had been disposed of by reason of both sides having represented to the Court that the decree had been satisfied: *Held*, that an application to allow the execution proceedings to be re-opened was maintainable under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, on the ground that the decree-holder had acted under a mistake of calculation in fixing the amount that was due. *Fakaruddin Mahomed Ahsan v. The Official Trustee of Bengal*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 538, distinguished. Where such an application was made by the decree-holder, referring to both ss. 244 and 623, Civil Procedure Code, and the first Court thought that the latter section was inapplicable, and re-opened the proceedings under s. 244: *Held*, that, even if s. 623 only was applicable, the order of the first Court could not, having regard to s. 578, Civil Procedure Code, be interfered with in appeal. *NILRATAN KHANNOORISH v. RAM RUTON CHATTERJI* (1901) . . . 5 C. W. N. 627

170. ——— **Mortgage—Purchase of mortgaged property by mortgagee—Application by purchaser to recover possession as against defendants who held possession under prior sale based on prior mortgage—Question raised whether purchaser could recover possession without first paying to defendants amount of prior mortgage—“Execution and enforcement of decree”—Appeal**. A mortgagee obtained a decree directing the sale of property in the possession of certain defendants, subject to a prior charge thereon. At the sale in execution of that decree, the mortgagee purchased the property. He now sought to recover possession of it from the defendants, the question raised being whether, under the terms of the decree, he was entitled to be put into possession without paying the amount of the prior charge, the defendants so dispossessed being at liberty to bring a separate suit to enforce the charge. *Held*, that the question thus raised between the decree-holder (purchaser) and the defendants related, within the meaning of s. 244 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code, to the execution or enforcement of the decree against these defendants, and an appeal lay from an order passed thereon. *Per MOORE, J.*—Even if the purchaser had not been also the decree-holder, he would have been a representative of a judgment-debtor. *Per BHA-*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

SHYAM AYYANGAR, J.—The order was not the less an order under s. 244, because it was also passed under ss. 318 and 334 of the Code. *KASINATHA AYYAR v. UTHUMANSA ROWTHAN* (1901) . . . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 529

171. ——— **Second Appeal—Civil Procedure Code** (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244 and 588—*Decree, execution of—Order absolute for foreclosure*. When an order absolute for foreclosure of mortgaged property has been made, any question that arises afterwards as to that order absolute is not a question relating to the execution of a decree, within the meaning of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore no second appeal lies from an order disposing of such a question. *Akikunnissa Bibee v. Roop Lal Dass*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 133, referred to. *TARA PADO GHOSE v. KAMINI DASSI* (1901) . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 644

172. ——— **Civil Procedure Code** (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 258—*Decree—Order—Appeal—Mortgage decree, question regarding satisfaction of, when no application for execution pending*. Where a Court deals with a question relating to the discharge or satisfaction of a decree, it may be said to be executing the decree in the sense of s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, although no formal application for execution may have been made to it; and an order passed by the Court is a decree, and is appealable. *RAM KAMLESSURI PERSHAD SINGH v. SUKHAN SINGH* (1902) . . . 7 C. W. N. 172

173. ——— **Parties—Execution of decree—Party to suit in which the decree was passed—Party against whom no decree was passed not precluded from bringing a suit**. S. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure presupposes a decree enforceable by the decree-holder against the person between whom and the decree-holder the question referred to therein arises. It has no application to questions arising between the decree-holder and persons against whom there is no decree to be executed. Where, therefore, certain persons had intervened in a suit as defendants, and the suit was disposed of without any decision of the claim set up by them, and without any decree being passed affecting them, it was *held* that they (or their assignee) were not precluded from bringing a suit to have released from attachment the property claimed by them in the former suit, but as to their title, to which there had been no adjudication. *Chowdhry Waked Ali v. Jumae*, 11 B. L. R. P. C. 149, followed. *Nagamuthu v. Savarimuthu*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 226; *Gour Kishore Chowdhry v. Mahomed Hassim Chowdhry*, 10 W. R. C. R. 191; *Kameshwar Pershad v. Run Bahadur Singh*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 458; *Mashi-ullah v. Kifayti*, *Weekly Notes* (1893) 67; *Jangi Nath v. Phundo*, I. L. R. 11 All. 74; and *Mukarab Husain v.*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

Hurmat-un-nissa, I. L. R. 18 All. 52, approved. *Ramaswami Sastrulu v. Kamesuaramma*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 361; *Sankaravadivammal v. Kumarasamy*, I. L. R. 8 Mal. 473; *Vibhudapriya Thirthasami v. Vidianidhi Thirthasami*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 131; and *Gouri v. Vigneshwar*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 49, dissented from. *Basti Ram v. Fattu*, I. L. R. 8 All. 142; *Dhani Ram v. Chaturbhuj*, Weekly Notes (1899) 184; and *Gadicherla China Seetayya v. Gadicherla Seetayya*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 45, referred to. *KALKA PRASAD v. BASANT RAM* (1901)
I. L. R. 23 All. 346

174. ———— **Recovery of land—Proceedings taken by a purchaser under s. 318, relating to the discharge or satisfaction of decree—Subsequent proceedings to recover same land from same judgment-debtor—Maintainability.** The decree-holder in a previous suit became the purchaser of certain property which was sold in execution of his decree. He applied, under s. 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for delivery of the property purchased, but his application was rejected as being barred by limitation. He now brought the present suit to recover possession of the land from the present defendant, who was the judgment-debtor in the previous suit. On the objection being taken that the suit was barred by s. 244:—*Held*, that proceedings taken by the purchaser to obtain possession of the property purchased related to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, within the meaning of s. 244, and that the suit must be dismissed. *KAT-TAYAT PATHUMAYI v. RAMAN MENON* (1902)
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 740

175. ———— **Recovery of money—Execution of decree—Question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree—Application to recover proceeds of sale from decree-holder after sale has been set aside.** *Held*, that an application to recover from a decree-holder the proceeds of a sale in execution, such sale having been set aside, is an application which falls within s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. S. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies as well to a dispute arising between the parties after the decree has been executed as it does to a dispute arising between them previous to execution. *Imdad Ali v. Jagan Lal*, I. L. R. 17 All. 478; *Dhan Kunwar v. Mahtab Singh*, I. L. R. 22 All. 79; and *Partab Singh v. Beni Ram*, I. L. R. 2 All. 61, referred to. *Ramchhaibar Misar v. Bechu Bhagat*, I. L. R. 7 All. 641, distinguished. *COLLECTOR OF JAUNPUR v. BITHAL DAS* (1902)
I. L. R. 24 All. 291

176. ———— **Execution of decree—Application to recover money realized in execution of a decree subsequently set aside.** In execution of a decree obtained *ex parte*, the decree-holders realized from their judgment-debtor some Rs. 1,300. The judgment-debtor applied, under

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to have the decree set aside. His application was at first dismissed, but on appeal the *ex parte* decree was set aside. The suit was re-heard, and was ultimately dismissed. Thereupon the successful defendant applied to the Court which had executed the decree against him for restitution of the money realized in execution of that decree. *Held*, that the defendant's proper remedy was that which he had sought, namely, by application in execution, and not by separate suit. *Dhan Kunwar v. Mahtab Singh*, I. L. R. 22 All. 79, followed. *SARAN v. BHAGWAN* (1903) . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 441

177. ———— **Release of property—Malabar law—Suit against karnavan as manager of tarwad—Attachment of tarwad property under decree—Subsequent order of release—Suit to cancel order of release barred by s. 244 of Civil Procedure Code.** Plaintiff in a suit obtained a decree against the karnavan of defendants, as senior member and manager of the tarwad, and attached tarwad property in execution thereof. Objection was then raised by defendants that the property was not liable under the decree, and the property was ordered to be released. Upon a suit being brought by plaintiff against the defendants for the cancellation of the last-mentioned order: *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable, by reason of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *KAMAL KUTTI v. IBRAHY* (1901) . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 658

178. ———— **Cause of Action—Dispossession—Symbolical possession—Right of suit.** Delivery of formal possession in execution of a decree for possession gives a cause of action against a defendant, who remains in occupation of the premises, which may be enforced in a regular suit. The defendant, who remains in actual occupation notwithstanding execution, must be regarded as a trespasser who commits a fresh act of dispossession, and this gives a fresh cause of action. *Shama Charan Chatterji v. Madhab Chandra Mookerjee*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 93, followed. *Madhu Sudan Das v. Gobinda Priya*, 4 C. W. N. 419; s. c. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 34; *Azizuddin v. Ramanugra*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 605, referred to. *HASSAN RAJA CHAUDRY v. KAILAS CHANDRA SINGHA* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 49

179. ———— **Agreement previous to decree.** A obtained a decree for khas possession of certain land by ousting B. In execution thereof B pleaded that there was an agreement between him and the decree-holder, previous to the decree that he should not be ousted from the land and that permanent rights over the same would be granted to him by the decree-holder. *Held*, that such a question could not be gone into under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. Cases can only be enquired into under s. 244 when the existence of a

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

decree which is susceptible and capable of execution is conceded, and it does not apply to a case where the object is to impugn the decree itself or to set up a case inconsistent with the decree, which it is sought to execute. *Laldas Narandas v. Kishordas Devidas*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 463, dissented from. *Benode Lal Pakrashi v. Brojendro Kumar Saha*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 310, and *Chhoti Narain Singh v. Rameswar Koer*, 6 C. W. N. 796, followed. *HASSAN ALI v. GAUZI ALI MIR* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 179

180. — and s. 258—*Separate suit—Uncertified adjustment suit for staying execution and declaration of satisfaction—Injunction—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 56.* Where a decree is alleged to be satisfied by an agreement out of Court, but satisfaction is not certified to the Court, a subsequent suit on the agreement is not maintainable for a declaration that the amount payable under the decree has been paid and satisfied and for an injunction restraining the decree-holder from executing the decree. S. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) is a bar to such suit; s. 258 of the Code does not restrict the operation of s. 244. *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 633; *Azizan v. Matuk Lal Sahu*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 437; and *Bairagulu v. Bapanna*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 302, followed. *Per HILL, J.*—The prayer for injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding with the execution of the decree conflicts with the provisions of s. 56 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877). *DENO BUNDO NUNDY v. HARI MATI DASI* (1904) I. L. R. 31 Calc. 480 s. c. 9 C. W. N. 395

181. — and s. 278—*Claim as by shebait—Decree for personal debt—Appeal.* A claim to attached property preferred by the judgment-debtor in the capacity of a shebait to a Hindu deity, when the decree was obtained against him for his personal debt, comes within s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and not under s. 278. When such a claim was investigated summarily as a proceeding under s. 278 and the lower Appellate Court held that no appeal lay: *Held*, that the proceedings of the first Court under s. 278 of the Civil Procedure Code were null and void and without jurisdiction, and the first Court was directed to conduct the proceedings in the manner directed by s. 244. *Panchanan Banerjee v. Rabia Bibi*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 711, referred to. The investigation having been held in the first Court as a proceeding under s. 278, the High Court passed the order in exercise of its revisional powers, although the matter came before it in second appeal. *BEG RAJ MARWARI AND GOBERDHAN MARWARI v. KUNDALI DEBYA* (1902) 8 C. W. N. 353

182. — Attachment of decree held by the judgment-debtor against a third party

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

—*Objection by judgment-debtor under the attached decree—Objection disallowed—Appeal.* Mewa Lal and another held a money decree against Ram Singh. In execution thereof they attached a mortgage decree held by Ram Singh against one Ishri Dat. They next applied for the sale of the mortgage decree, which they had attached in execution of their own money decree. To this Ishri Dat objected that the decree had been already satisfied. His objection was disallowed, and on appeal by Ishri Dat from the order disallowing the objection, it was held that no appeal would lie. *ISHRI DAT v. MEWA LAL* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 136

183. — *Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 282—Execution sale—Suit by subsequent administratrix to set aside decree and sale—Fraud or collusion—Rateable distribution—Res judicata—Procedure in creditor's suit against estate of deceased.* A decree on an award having been passed against an administrator at the instance of a creditor of the estate represented by the administrator, certain property referred to in the award was purchased by the decree-holder in execution proceedings with the sanction of the Court. Afterwards an administratrix appointed in the place of the administrator, having brought a suit to set aside the decree and the subsequent sale in execution on the ground that under s. 282 of the Succession Act (X of 1865) the decree-holder was entitled only to a rateable distribution among the creditors of the estate. *Held*, that in the absence of fraud or collusion the decree and the subsequent sale in execution could not be set aside. *Held*, further, that according to ss. 244 and 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) the decree having been executed the execution bound the parties and all persons claiming through them, and that the question was, therefore, *res judicata*. *Per CHANDAVARKAR, J.*—“The position of an executor or administrator, as the case may be, of a deceased person, as such person's legal representative, in whom all the property of the deceased vests as such by virtue of s. 179 of the Succession Act, may be said to be similar to that of the sebait of an idol.” *Prosunno v. Golab*, L. R. 21 A. 145, referred to and applied. A creditor's action against the estate of a deceased person should be treated as an administration suit. *BAI MEHERBAI v. MAGANCHAND* (1905) I. L. R. 29 Bom. 96

184. — “Representative” of judgment-debtor—*Rent-decree against recorded tenant—Transferee of portion of occupancy holding before decree—Right to apply to set aside decree on ground of fraud—Right to set aside sale on ground of irregularity, s. 311—“Person, whose immoveable property has been sold”—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 173—Purchase by judgment-debtor in auction-purchaser's name—Application to set aside.*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

Where the landlord of an occupancy holding obtains a decree for rent against his registered tenant, an unregistered transferee of the tenant, into whose hands a portion of the holding has previously passed is bound by the decree and is therefore a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. Principle of Full Bench case, *Ishan Chandra Sarkar v. Beni Madhab Sarkar*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 62, applied. *Katu Shaha v. Bhagabati Debya*, 6 C. W. N. 127; and *Sarada Dasee v. Sarada Prosad Bose*, *Mis. Ap.* 398 of 1903 (unreported), not followed. Such a transferee can apply to set aside a sale held in execution of the decree as a "person whose immoveable property has been sold" within the meaning of s. 311 of the Civil Procedure Code. He can also apply under s. 173 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to set aside the sale on the ground that the holding has been purchased by the judgment-debtor in the name of the auction-purchaser. *ASGAR ALI v. ASABODDIN KAZI* (1905). 9 C. W. N. 134

185. *Representative—Purchaser of a putni tenure bound by rent decree against recorded tenant—Landlord and tenant.* A person, who acquires a *putni* tenure at a sale in execution of a decree for money against the *putnidar*, but who did not get his name registered in the landlord's office, is bound by the decree for rent against the recorded tenant and is therefore a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Ishan Chandra Sarkar v. Beni Madhab Sarkar*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 62; and *Asgar Ali v. Asaboddin*, 9 C. W. N. 134, followed. *Umed Rasul Saha v. Anath Bundhu Choudhry*, 6 C. W. N. 128; and *Kameshwar Persad v. Run Bahadur Singh*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 458, not followed. *SURENDRA NARAIN SINGH v. GORI SUNDARI DAS* (1905). I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1031

9 C. W. N. 824

186. *Application in execution—Person entitled to represent estate—Representative of party to decree—Purchaser from judgment-debtor.* Plaintiffs in a suit obtained a decree for the sale of mortgaged lands, which had belonged to S, deceased. The defendants to that suit were a person whom S was alleged to have adopted, and the two widows of S's father, who would represent the estate, if the adoption failed. One widow died after suit. After her death part of the mortgaged property was put up for sale and purchased by plaintiffs, who applied for an order for delivery of possession. D, the nearest reversioner to S, objected, and claimed to be in possession in his own right. He contended that S had been adopted only in conjunction with the widow, who had died, and that in consequence his reversionary interest had fallen into possession at her death, the surviving widow having no rights. In the alternative he

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.*

claimed also as a purchaser from the surviving widow under a release deed executed by her after the mortgage decree and before the sale. The Subordinate Judge refused to make an order for delivery of possession, and the plaintiffs appealed to the High Court, when a preliminary objection was raised that no appeal lay: *Held*, that an appeal lay. If the inheritance passed to D on the widow's death, he would be the person entitled to represent the estate, and the present question related to execution and should be dealt with under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If D relied on the release from the surviving widow, he was a representative of one of the parties to the decree and the same result followed. *Kasinatha Ayyar v. Uthumansa Rowihan*, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 529, discussed. *SIVARAMA SASTRIAL v. SOMASUNDARA MUDALI* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 119

187. *Execution of decree—Decree passed ex parte against father and son on promissory note signed by father alone—Application in execution for arrest of son—Objection to arrest on ground that decree was wrongly passed against son—Maintainability.* A judgment-creditor sued a Hindu father and his son on a promissory note signed only by the father. Neither defendant appeared nor defended the suit and a decree was passed against both. The father died and the judgment-debtor made the present application in execution and asked for the arrest and imprisonment of the son. The latter asked the Court to direct that he was not liable to arrest under the decree: *Held*, that the decree had not been passed without jurisdiction and the judgment-debtor was precluded, in execution proceedings, from impeaching the decree, which had been passed without opposition, and which had not been set aside. If a decree is passed by a Civil Court which had absolutely no jurisdiction to pass it, even a party to the proceeding may impeach it as a nullity, though it has not been set aside in appeal or otherwise. This was not such a case as the District Munsif was competent to pass a personal decree against the present judgment-debtor, if the evidence required to establish the personal liability had been then produced. The fact that a decree had been passed in the absence of such evidence would not make it a decree passed without jurisdiction. *Sardarmal v. Aravajal Subhapatthy*, I. L. R. 21 Bom. 205, and *Gomatham Alamelu v. Komundur Krishnamacharlu*, I. L. R. 27 Mad. 118, approved. *RANGASAMY NAIKEN v. THEUPATI NAIKEN* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 26

188. *Question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree—Parties to the suit or their representatives.* A decree-holder in a suit purchased land at a Court auction, which was held in execution of his decree. He

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 244—*contd.*

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.***

made an application for delivery of possession, which was dismissed. His heirs, after his death, made further applications, which were also dismissed. The heirs then sold the land to the present plaintiffs, who thereupon brought the present suit to recover possession of the land: *Held*, (i) that the right of the plaintiffs to recover possession of the land was a question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree; (ii) that the question arose between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives; and (iii) that the suit was not maintainable, having regard to s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *SANDHU TARAGANAR v. HUSSAIN SAHIB* (1905) I. L. R. 28 Mad. 87

189. — *Surety becoming liable for decree in a suit—Decree for plaintiff—Execution orders against surety—Suit by surety for declaration of non-liability as to portion of decretal amount—Maintainability—Proceeding in execution.* The property of a defendant in another suit having been attached before judgment, the present plaintiff became surety for any sum that might be decreed. A decree was passed and an order was made for its execution against the present plaintiff, and that order was not appealed against. Prior to execution plaintiff brought the present suit against the decree-holders in the previous suit, for a declaration that they were not entitled to execute a portion of their decree as against him: *Held*, that the suit did not lie, the matter being one to be litigated only in execution proceedings. The surety should be treated as a party to the suit, and as the question raised was one relating to the execution of a decree, s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied and the suit was barred. *LINGA REDDY v. HUSSAIN REDDY* (1905) I. L. R. 28 Mad. 117

190. — *Alteration of decree after execution—Application for refund of money realized in execution—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 178.* A decree for sale under s. 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as drawn up, allowed a very high rate of interest to the decree-holder, and the amount due under this decree as it stood was realized by sale of the mortgaged property. Subsequently, on the judgment-debtor's application, the decree was amended so as greatly to reduce the rate of interest and thereby a refund became due to the judgment-debtors. *Held*, that the judgment-debtors' application for a refund was not an application in execution, but an application under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the limitation applicable was that prescribed by Art. 178 of the second Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1877, and began to run from the date of the amendment of the decree. *HARNAM CHANDAR v. MUHAMMAD YAR KHAN* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 485

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 244—*contd.*

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*contd.***

191. — *Execution of decree—Sale in execution set aside and purchase money returned—Sale confirmed on appeal—Suit by decree-holder to recover purchase money.* A sale held in execution of a decree for money was set aside on application by the judgment-debtor under s. 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the purchase money was returned. On appeal, however, the order setting aside the sale was reversed and the sale confirmed in favour of the original purchaser. The purchaser, however, did not pay the sale price, and the decree-holder accordingly sued him for its recovery. *Held*, that the suit did not lie, but the matter was one governed by s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Gulzari Mal v. Madho Ram*, I. L. R. 26 All. 447, followed. *RAHIM-U-DIN v. RAM LAL* (1905) I. L. R. 27 All. 155

192. — *Execution of decree—Questions in execution—Mortgage by conditional sale—Decree for foreclosure—Payment by puisne mortgagee defendant in prior mortgagee's suit for foreclosure—Application by such puisne mortgagee for decree absolute for foreclosure—Transfer of Property Act, ss. 74 and 86—Form of decree.* In a suit brought by the respondent as prior mortgagee for foreclosure of a mortgage by conditional sale, in which the appellant, a second mortgagee of the same property, was a defendant, a decree was passed for foreclosure and allowing six months for redemption, and a similar decree was made in a suit brought by the respondent and the appellant as second mortgagees. Eventually, as the mortgagors (the other defendants) made no payment to secure redemption, and in order to prevent a decree absolute for foreclosure against himself, the appellant paid into Court the sum due under the decree in the first suit, and it was drawn out by the prior mortgagee. The appellant then made an application to the Court in that suit that, as he had by his payment become, under s. 74 of the Transfer of Property Act, the representative of the prior mortgagee, a decree absolute for foreclosure might be passed in his favour. The Court *held* that he was entitled to bring a suit for foreclosure, but that "he had not acquired the status of a decree-holder" and that "while he was a defendant he could not execute the decree as a decree-holder" and the application was dismissed. *Held* by the Judicial Committee (reversing the decision of the High Court), that a subsequent suit brought by the appellant for foreclosure was not barred by s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, the questions between the parties not being such as could have been determined by the Court in execution of the decree in the former suits. That decree (which appeared to be a transcript of the form of order given in s. 86 of the Transfer of Property Act) did not provide for the exercise by the puisne incumbrancer of their

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—*contd.*

successive rights of redemption, or for working out the rights of the parties in the event of a puisne incumbrancer, in front of the mortgagor, redeeming the mortgaged property. An appropriate decree for that purpose in use in the English Courts given in Seton on Decrees, 6th Edition, Vol. III, p. 1979, referred to. *GOPI NARAIN KHAUNA v. BANSIDHAR* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 27 All. 325

193. ———— *Execution of decree—Sale in execution—Application to set aside sale on the ground of fraud.* An application to set aside on the ground of fraud a sale held in execution of a decree can be made under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure even after the sale has been confirmed. *Moti Lal Chakrabutty v. Russick Chundra Bairagi*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 326, footnote, and *Durga Charan Mandal v. Kali Prasanna Sarkar*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 727, followed. *Prosanno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683, referred to. *WAHID-UN-NISSA v. GIRDHARI* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 702

194. ———— *Mortgage—Satisfaction by mortgagor of decree for sale on a prior mortgage with money borrowed on the security of a subsequent mortgage of the same property—Rights of subsequent mortgagee.* A decree for sale and an order absolute for sale had been passed against a mortgagor. The mortgagor then borrowed more money on a mortgage of several villages, including those previously mortgaged, and applied a portion of such money in satisfying the previous decree for sale. The subsequent mortgagee then brought a suit upon her mortgage, in which she sought to bring to sale the villages, which were the subject of the previous mortgage and decree. *Held*, that she could do so. S. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply, and there was no reason why the plaintiff should be driven to recover part of her loan by executing the previous decree and the remainder by suit on her mortgage. *Bansi Dhar v. Gaya Prasad*, I. L. R. 24 All. 179, distinguished. *TUFAIL FATMA v. BITOLA* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 27 All. 400

195. ———— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 178—Appeal—Order refusing application for appointment of commissioner to effect division of property by metes and bounds in partition suit.* The parties to a suit for partition entered into a compromise, which was recorded by the Court and by which their respective shares in the family property were agreed upon. An application was subsequently made for the appointment of a commissioner to effect an actual division of the property, but the Subordinate Judge dismissed it on the ground that the right to claim further relief in the matter had become barred by limitation. This order was reversed on appeal and the case was remanded by the District Judge for disposal according to law. An appeal was then preferred to the High

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—*contd.*

Court against the order of remand, when it was contended that no appeal lay to the District Judge against the order of the Subordinate Judge: *Held*, that an appeal lay. The order of the Subordinate Judge on the face of it purported to decide a question to be dealt with under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure and was therefore a decree within the meaning of that term in the Code, and that the party against whom it was passed was entitled to appeal therefrom. Even if there was no decree to be executed, and the Subordinate Judge erroneously supposed the matter to be one in execution and *held* the application to be barred, such usurpation of jurisdiction could not make the order passed in consequence thereof less appealable than would have been the case had the order been passed in execution proceedings under a decree duly passed. *Harris Chunder Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Debia*, L. R. 10 I. A. 4, and *Abdul Rahiman Saheb v. Ganapathi Bhatta*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 517, followed. Such an application is not an application of the description contemplated by Art. 178. *LATCHMANAN CHETTY v. RAMANATHAN CHETTY* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 127

196. ———— *Auction-sale, reversal of—Refund of purchase money, suit for.* The right of an auction-purchaser to a refund of the purchase money where the auction-sale has been set aside for irregularity, is not a question arising between the parties to the suit or their representatives and relating to the decree, within the meaning of s. 244 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code: a separate suit for refund of such purchase money is therefore maintainable. *JOTINDRA MOHUN TAGORE v. MAHOMED BASIR CHOWDHRY* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 332

197. ———— *Execution of decree—Death of judgment-debtor pending execution proceedings—Questions arising between representatives of judgment-debtor and decree-holder.* Where a judgment-debtor died after the passing of a decree and his legal representatives are brought on the record in execution proceedings to represent him in respect to the decree, questions which they raise as to property which they say does not belong to his assets in their hands, and as such is not capable of being taken in execution, are questions which, under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, must be determined in the execution department and not by separate suit. *Sekh Chand Mal v. Durga Dei*, I. L. R. 12 All. 313, and *Punchanun Bundopadhyay v. Rabia Bibi*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 711, followed. *KALI CHARAN v. JEWAT DUBE* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 51

198. ———— *Madras Salt Act (IV of 1889), ss. 16 (a), 18 and 27—No compensation under s. 18 when license cancelled under s. 27.* Where a license has been cancelled under s. 27 of

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 244—contd.

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—contd.**

the Madras Salt Act IV of 1889, the licensee is not entitled to compensation under s. 18 of the Act, but only to the value of the proprietary right under s. 18 (a) of the Act. Where such licensee has obtained a decree for possession of salt pans in default of payment of proper compensation, it is competent to the Court in execution proceedings to determine the amount so payable; and no separate suit need be brought to determine such amount. COLLECTOR OF CHINGLEPUT FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA *v.* SUBRAYA MUDALIAR (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 181

199. — s. 244 (c)—*Application to set aside sale on the ground of fraud—Previous suit with similar object dismissed—Procedure—Estoppel.* S. 144 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code governs a case in which a person seeks to set aside an auction sale on the ground of fraud and on the ground that the decree-holder himself held a mortgage on the property brought to sale. This plea had been urged successfully by the appellant in a regular suit brought by the present respondent, but the former now pleaded that the remedy should be by suit and not by execution proceedings. *Per* AIKMAN, J.—The appellant cannot be allowed to go behind the issue decided in the course of the previous litigation. GAYA PRASAD MISR *v.* RANDEIR SINGH (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 681

200. — and s. 246.—*Person attaching decree representative of decree-holder under s. 244—Decree directing sale of property for money due is a decree for money within the meaning of s. 246.* One, who attaches a decree, is a representative of the decree-holder for the purposes of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure and an appeal lies from orders in execution proceedings disposing of questions arising between him and the judgment-debtor, relating to the execution of the decree. *Sah Mandlull v. Kanagasabapathi*, I. L. R. 16 Mad. 0, followed. A decree directing the plaintiff to recover the decreed amount by sale of properties, but not directing payment by the defendant is essentially a decree for money. The provisions as to set-off, in s. 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure, will apply to such decrees. *Vaidhinathasamy Ayyar v. Soma-sundaram Pillai*, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 476, followed. KRISHNAN *v.* VENKATAPATHI CHETTI (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 318

201. — and ss 273, 311—*Sale, setting aside—Irregularity—Jurisdiction.* When a Court, in which an application for execution was pending, received an order from another Court under s. 273 of the Civil Procedure Code, for attaching the decree and returned the order with

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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— s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

an intimation that it did not contain information as to the amount of the decree and subsequently held the sale. *Held*, that the sale was invalid and was accordingly set aside. That it was not a mere irregularity as the Court had no jurisdiction to hold the sale. MANIK LAL SEAL *v.* BONOMALI MUKERJEE (1905) . 10 C. W. N. 193

202. — and s. 311—*Execution of decree—Property sold as non-ancestral after inquiry by Court and notice to judgment-debtors—Plea that property was in fact ancestral, barred.* Where after an inquiry as to the nature of the property, of which the judgment-debtors had notice, a Court in execution of a decree caused certain immoveable property to be sold by auction as non-ancestral, the judgment-debtors standing by and neglecting to supply the Court with any information as to the nature of the property sold, it was *held* that it was not competent to the judgment-debtors subsequently to seek to have the sale set aside upon the ground that the property was ancestral and ought to have been dealt with in the manner provided by law in respect of such property. *Shirin Begum v. Agha Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 18 All. 141, followed. *Arunachellam Chetti v. Arunachellam Chetti*, I. L. R. 15 I. A. 171, referred to. *Sukhdeo Rai v. Sheo Ghulam*, I. L. R. 4 All. 332, not followed. BEHARI SINGH *v.* MUKAT SINGH (1905) I. L. R. 28 All. 273

203. — and s. 318.—*Purchaser of undivided share must sue for partition by separate suit—S. 244 no bar to such suit.* The purchaser at a Court sale of the share of an undivided member of a joint Hindu family acquires only a right to sue for partition and for delivery of what may be allotted as the share of such undivided member. The Court cannot on a mere application for execution by such purchaser enforce his right by an order for partition. No such order can be made under s. 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the dismissal by the Court of an application by the purchaser under s. 318 cannot be a bar to a suit by the purchaser for partition. S. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure is no bar to such suit. YELUMALAI CHETTI *v.* SRINIVASA CHETTI (1906) . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 294

204. — and s. 583—*Execution of decree—Review of judgment—Recovery of mesne profits for period between decree of High Court in appeal and decree in review—separate suit—Application in execution.* Where M. D., defendant in a partition suit, was deprived by the High Court of a house allotted to him by the first Court and subsequently the High Court acting under Chapter XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, set aside its decree and M. D., having recovered possession of the house, applied under s. 583 of the Code

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

for mesne profits, *held* that s. 583 had no application, the order entitling *M. D.* to restitution having been passed under Chapter XLVII, and not in appeal under Chapter XLI. *Held*, further, that it was not necessary for *M. D.* to bring a separate suit, that one of his remedies was by "summary process," i.e., by an application under s. 244, and that the present application might be deemed to be one under that section. *Shama Purshad Roy Chowdhry v. Hurro Purshad Roy Chowdhry*, 10 *Moo. I. A.* 203, referred to. *Hurro Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Shoorodhonee Debia*, 9 *W. R.* 402, *Saran v. Bhagwan*, *I. L. R.* 25 *All.* 441, and *Harnam Chandra v. Muhammad Yar Khan*, *I. L. R.* 27 *All.* 485, followed. *Semle*: That the lower Court would have an inherent right to order restitution of what had been declared to have been improperly taken. *Mookoond Lal Pal Chowdhry v. Mahomed Sami Meah*, *I. L. R.* 14 *Calc.* 484, and *Raja Singh v. Koldip Singh*, *I. L. R.* 21 *Calc.* 989, referred to. *Held*, also, that the applicant having been guilty of gross laches in not applying for review for many years should get mesne profits only from the date of the High Court's decree in review. *COLLECTOR OF MEERUT v. KALKA PRASAD* (1906). *I. L. R.* 28 *All.* 665

205. — and s. 622. — *Execution of decree—Question not relating to the execution of the decree—Appeal—Revision—Practice—Exercise of High Court's revisional jurisdiction.* The plaintiff in a suit for an injunction obtained a decree prohibiting the defendant from obstructing him in building within a certain area, and also giving costs. This decree was executed for the cases awarded. Subsequently the judgment-debtor applied to the executing Court, asking that the decree-holder should be ordered to demolish certain structures, which he had erected beyond the limits prescribed by the decree, and obtained an order as prayed. *Held*, that no appeal would lie from such an order. *Held*, also, that the High Court is competent, of its own motion, to call for the record of a civil case and pass such orders as it thinks fit, and the exercise of its powers of revision on the civil side will not invariably (though such is ordinarily the case) be confined to matters in respect of which no other remedy is opened to the party aggrieved. *Mahomed Foyez Chowdhry v. Goluck Dass*, 7 *O. L. R.* 191, distinguished. *The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Jillo*, *I. L. R.* 21 *All.* 133, and *Guise v. Jaisraj*, *I. L. R.* 15 *All.* 405, referred to. *DEBI DAS v. EJAZ HUSSAIN* (1905). *I. L. R.* 28 *All.* 72

206. — and s. 253^b. — *Decree against Surety—Execution against Surety—Practice and Procedure.* The provisions of s. 253 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) do not permit the execution of a decree against the surety, who

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

has become liable for the performance of the decree passed prior to his entering into the obligation. *Venkapa Naik v. Basalingapa*, *I. L. R.* 12 *Bom.* 411, explained. *LAKSHMAN v. GOPAL* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 *Bom.* 506

207. — and s. 258. — *Uncertified judgment cannot be taken notice of by Court.* An adjustment of a decree out of Court, which is not certified to the Court cannot, under s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure, be pleaded as a bar to execution. *Pariatambi Udayan v. Vellaya Goundan*, *I. L. R.* 21 *Mad.* 409, followed. *Ramayyar v. Ramayyar*, *I. L. R.* 21 *Mad.* 356, referred to. *GANAPATHY AYYAR v. CHENGA REDDI* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 *Mad.* 312

208. — and ss. 258, 462. — *Adjustment of decree by guardian without leave under s. 462 cannot be certified under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code.* The provisions of s. 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to compromises after decree and no adjustment by compromise of a decree by the guardian of a minor can be certified under s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure when the guardian had not applied for leave to enter into the compromise under s. 462 of the Code. *ARUNA-CHELLAM CHETTY v. RAMANADHAN CHETTY* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 *Mad.* 309

209. — and s. 260. — *Decree for Perpetual Injunction, execution of—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 178—Application in time if within three years of breach complained of—Court executing decree, powers of—Cannot go behind decree.* Where a perpetual injunction has been granted, on each successive breach of it the decree may be enforced under s. 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure by an application made within three years of such breach under Art. 178, Sch. II of the Limitation Act. The decree-holder is not bound to take action in respect of every petty infringement, and the injunction does not by his inaction become inoperative after three years from the date of the first petty breach so as to disentitle him to take action where a serious breach is afterwards committed. Where the terms of a decree are clear, the executing Court is bound to give effect to it and cannot read into it limitations gathered from a reference to the records of the suit. *VENKATACHALLAM CHETTY v. VEERAPPA PILLAI* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 *Mad.* 314

210. — and ss. 264, 411. — *Court-fees—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), s. 309—Suit in formā pauperis—Successful petitioner—Charge by Government for Court-fees—Crown debt, priority of.* The plaintiff instituted a suit in formā pauperis against the defendant and obtained a decree. The decree directed that the property in suit should be conveyed to the plaintiff, and the

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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— s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

taxing officer was to certify the amount of Court-fees that would have been payable by the plaintiff, had she not sued in *forma pauperis*, and to tax the plaintiff's other costs of suit. It was also ordered and decreed that the defendants should pay the amount of Court-fees to be certified by the Government Solicitor, which should form a first charge on the property conveyed. Thereafter the plaintiff applied for attachment of other premises belonging to the defendants and obtained an order for sale. The sale-proceeds were ordered to be paid into Court, which amounted to R999-1-8. The plaintiff's attorney then without notice to the Government Solicitor or defendants, made an application for payment to him of the amounts realised in execution from the defendants. The Government Solicitor then presented a petition asking that the amount of Court-fees certified as due and payable by the defendant to the Government Solicitor in terms of the decree be paid in the first instance and in precedence to all claims. *Held*, that Court-fees form a Crown debt and under ordinary circumstances the principle would apply that the Crown would be entitled to precedence in payment of this debt over all creditors. *The Secretary of State v. The Bombay Landing and Shipping Company, Ltd.*, 5 Bom. H. C. (O. C. J.) 23, *Gunput Pataya v. The Collector of Kanara*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 7, referred to. S. 411 of the Civil Procedure Code is an enabling section, and though it indicates the manner in which the Crown may proceed to realise the debt, it does not preclude the Crown or its representatives from urging its prerogative and insisting on its rights to precedence over all other creditors. *Gulzari Lal v. Collector of Bareilly*, I. L. R. 1 All. 596; *The Collector of Moradabad v. Muhammad Daim*, I. L. R. 2 All. 196; *Ramdas v. The Secretary of State*, I. L. R. 18 All. 419; and *Bell v. The Municipal Commissioner*, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 457. The Government Solicitor is entitled to precedence over all creditors and it is not necessary for him to attach the fund before claiming payment. *GAYANODA BALA DASSEE v. BUTTO KRISTO BAIRAGEE* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1040
s. c. 10 C. W. N. 857

211. — *Judgment-debtor's Death*—Suit for administration by judgment-creditor against executor—*Mal-administration*. Certain persons, who had obtained a decree against a person, since deceased, failed to realize the decretal amount by executing the decree against the executrix of the judgment-debtor. They then instituted a suit against the executrix charging her with mal-administration and asking for administration of the judgment-debtor's estate. *Held*, that the suit involved a much wider question than one merely relating to the execution of the decree,

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

and was not barred by s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Jogemaya Dassi v. Thackomoni Dassi*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 473, referred to. *Khushdobhai v. Hormazsha*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 727, followed. *SARATMANI DEBI v. BATTAKRISHNA BANERJEE* (1908).
I. L. R. 35. Calc. 1100
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I. L. R. 31 Mad. 37

213. — *Decree for possession of immoveable property—Sale of property decreed—Right to execute decree.* If a decree-holder holding a decree for possession of immoveable property sells a portion of such property, the sale does not, without express provision to that effect, give the purchaser any right to execute the decree himself. *Ram Sahai v. Gaya*, I. L. R. 7 All. 107, referred to. *HANSRAJ PAL v. MUKHRAJ KUNWAR* (1908).
I. L. R. 30 All. 28

214. — *Execution of decree—Purchase at auction-sale by decree-holder—Suit by decree-holder to obtain possession of property so purchased.* Where the decree-holder himself purchases property at auction-sale in execution of his own decree, but fails to obtain possession, his remedy is by application under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure: he cannot bring a separate suit for possession. *Seru Mohan Bania v. Bhagoban Din Pande*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 602, and *Kishori Mohan Roy Chowdhry v. Chunder Nath Pal*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 644, distinguished. *Madhu Sudan Das v. Govinda Pria Chowdhurani*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 34; *Kattayat Pathumayi v. Raman Menon*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 740, and *Kalian Singh v. Thakur Das*, *Weekly Notes*, (1906) 87, followed. *Prosunno Coomarr Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, L. R. 19 I. A. 169,

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

for mesne profits, *held* that s. 583 had no application, the order entitling *M. D.* to restitution having been passed under Chapter XLVII, and not in appeal under Chapter XLI. *Held*, further, that it was not necessary for *M. D.* to bring a separate suit, that one of his remedies was by "summary process," i.e., by an application under s. 244, and that the present application might be deemed to be one under that section. *Shama Purshad Roy Chowdhry v. Hurro Purshad Roy Chowdhry*, 10 Moo. I. A. 203, referred to. *Hurro Chander Roy Chowdhry v. Shoorodhoney Debia*, 9 W. R. 402, *Saran v. Bhagwan*, I. L. R. 25 All. 441, and *Harnam Chandra v. Muhammad Yar Khan*, I. L. R. 27 All. 485, followed. *Semle*: That the lower Court would have an inherent right to order restitution of what had been declared to have been improperly taken. *Mookoond Lal Pal Chowdhry v. Mahomed Sami Meah*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 484, and *Raja Singh v. Kooldip Singh*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 989, referred to. *Held*, also, that the applicant having been guilty of gross laches in not applying for review for many years should get mesne profits only from the date of the High Court's decree in review. *COLLECTOR OF MEERUT v. KALKA PRASAD* (1906). I. L. R. 28 All. 665

205. — and s. 622. — *Execution of decree—Question not relating to the execution of the decree—Appeal—Revision—Practice—Exercise of High Court's revisional jurisdiction.* The plaintiff in a suit for an injunction obtained a decree prohibiting the defendant from obstructing him in building within a certain area, and also giving costs. This decree was executed for the cases awarded. Subsequently the judgment-debtor applied to the executing Court, asking that the decree-holder should be ordered to demolish certain structures, which he had erected beyond the limits prescribed by the decree, and obtained an order as prayed. *Held*, that no appeal would lie from such an order. *Held*, also, that the High Court is competent, of its own motion, to call for the record of a civil case and pass such orders as it thinks fit, and the exercise of its powers of revision on the civil side will not invariably (though such is ordinarily the case) be confined to matters in respect of which no other remedy is opened to the party aggrieved. *Mahomed Foyez Chowdhry v. Goluck Dass*, 7 C. L. R. 191, distinguished. *The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Jillo*, I. L. R. 21 All. 133, and *Guise v. Jaisraj*, I. L. R. 15 All. 405, referred to. *DEBI DAS v. EJAZ HUSSAIN* (1905). I. L. R. 28 All. 72

206. — and s. 253. — *Decree against Surety—Execution against Surety—Practice and Procedure.* The provisions of s. 253 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) do not permit the execution of a decree against the surety, who

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

has become liable for the performance of the decree passed prior to his entering into the obligation. *Venkapa Naik v. Basalingapa*, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 411, explained. *LAKSHMAN v. GOPAL* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 506

207. — and s. 258. — *Uncertified judgment cannot be taken notice of by Court.* An adjustment of a decree out of Court, which is not certified to the Court cannot, under s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure, be pleaded as a bar to execution. *Pariatambi Udayan v. Vellaya Goundan*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 409, followed. *Ramayyar v. Ramayyar*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 356, referred to. *GANAPATHY AYYAR v. CHENGA REDDI* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 312

208. — and ss. 258, 462. — *Adjustment of decree by guardian without leave under s. 462 cannot be certified under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code.* The provisions of s. 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to compromises after decree and no adjustment by compromise of a decree by the guardian of a minor can be certified under s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure when the guardian had not applied for leave to enter into the compromise under s. 462 of the Code. *ARUNACHELLAM CHETTY v. RAMANADHAN CHETTY* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 309

209. — and s. 260. — *Decree for Perpetual Injunction, execution of—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 178—Application in time if within three years of breach complained of—Court executing decree, powers of—Cannot go behind decree.* Where a perpetual injunction has been granted, on each successive breach of it the decree may be enforced under s. 260 of the Code of Civil Procedure by an application made within three years of such breach under Art. 178, Sch. II of the Limitation Act. The decree-holder is not bound to take action in respect of every petty infringement, and the injunction does not by his inaction become inoperative after three years from the date of the first petty breach so as to disentitle him to take action where a serious breach is afterwards committed. Where the terms of a decree are clear, the executing Court is bound to give effect to it and cannot read into it limitations gathered from a reference to the records of the suit. *VENKATACHALLAM CHETTY v. VEERAPPA PILLAI* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 314

210. — and ss. 264, 411. — *Court-fees—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), s. 309—Suit in forma pauperis—Successful petitioner—Charge by Government for Court-fees—Crown debt, priority of.* The plaintiff instituted a suit in *forma pauperis* against the defendant and obtained a decree. The decree directed that the property in suit should be conveyed to the plaintiff, and the

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

taxing officer was to certify the amount of Court-fees that would have been payable by the plaintiff, had she not sued in *forma pauperis*, and to tax the plaintiff's other costs of suit. It was also ordered and decreed that the defendants should pay the amount of Court-fees to be certified by the Government Solicitor, which should form a first charge on the property conveyed. Thereafter the plaintiff applied for attachment of other premises belonging to the defendants and obtained an order for sale. The sale-proceeds were ordered to be paid into Court, which amounted to R999-1-8. The plaintiff's attorney then without notice to the Government Solicitor or defendants, made an application for payment to him of the amounts realised in execution from the defendants. The Government Solicitor then presented a petition asking that the amount of Court-fees certified as due and payable by the defendant to the Government Solicitor in terms of the decree be paid in the first instance and in precedence to all claims. *Held*, that Court-fees form a Crown debt and under ordinary circumstances the principle would apply that the Crown would be entitled to precedence in payment of this debt over all creditors. *The Secretary of State v. The Bombay Landing and Shipping Company, Ltd.*, 5 Bom. H. C. (O. C. J.) 23, *Gunput Pataya v. The Collector of Kanara*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 7, referred to. S. 411 of the Civil Procedure Code is an enabling section, and though it indicates the manner in which the Crown may proceed to realise the debt, it does not preclude the Crown or its representatives from urging its prerogative and insisting on its rights to precedence over all other creditors. *Gulzari Lal v. Collector of Bareilly*, I. L. R. 1 All. 596; *The Collector of Moradabad v. Muhammad Daim*, I. L. R. 2 All. 196; *Ramdas v. The Secretary of State*, I. L. R. 18 All. 419; and *Bell v. The Municipal Commissioner*, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 457. The Government Solicitor is entitled to precedence over all creditors and it is not necessary for him to attach the fund before claiming payment. *GAYANODA BALA DASSEE v. BUTTO KRISTO BAIKAGEE* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1040
s. c. 10 C. W. N. 857

211. — Judgment-debtor's Death—Suit for administration by judgment-creditor against executor—Mal-administration. Certain persons, who had obtained a decree against a person, since deceased, failed to realize the decretal amount by executing the decree against the executrix of the judgment-debtor. They then instituted a suit against the executrix charging her with mal-administration and asking for administration of the judgment-debtor's estate. *Held*, that the suit involved a much wider question than one merely relating to the execution of the decree,

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 244—contd.

**1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—contd.**

and was not barred by s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Jogemaya Dassi v. Thackomoni Dassi*, I. L. R. 24 Cal. 473, referred to. *Khushdobhai v. Hormazsha*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 727, followed. *SARATMANI DEBI v. BATA KRISHNA BANERJEE* (1908).
I. L. R. 35. Calc. 1100
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I. L. R. 30 All. 28

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

— s. 244—*contd.*

1. QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE
—*concl'd.*

referred to. SHEO NARAIN *v.* NUR MUHAMMAD
(1908) I. L. R. 30 All. 72

215. ———— *Question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree—Contest between the holder of a decree for an undivided share of joint property and an auction-purchaser pendente lite.* One Wilayati Begam obtained a decree for possession of a share in certain joint and undivided zamindari property, and this decree was executed so far as might be by delivery of formal possession. While the suit in which this decree was passed was pending, one Raghunath Das obtained a simple money decree against another co-sharer in the zamindari and in execution thereof brought the property to sale and it was purchased by Nand Kishore. Nand Kishore got possession. Wilayati Begam applied for mutation of names in her favour, but was resisted by Nand Kishore, and accordingly instituted a suit against Nand Kishore praying for a declaration of her title as against him. *Held*, that such a suit was not obnoxious to the prohibition contained in s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Gulzari Lal v. Madho Ram*, I. L. R. 6 All. 447, distinguished. *Jagan Nath v. Milap Chand*, I. L. R. 28 All. 722, and *Kino v. Rudkin*, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 160, referred to. WILAYATI BEGAM *v.* NAND KISHORE (1908)
I. L. R. 30 All. 231

216. ———— *Jurisdiction of Court to entertain separate suit in respect of matters falling within s. 244—Time for objecting to the maintainability of such suit.* Where matter which ought to be decided in execution under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure is tried in a separate suit by the Court executing the decree, such Court does not act without jurisdiction, as the section does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court but only prescribes the form of procedure. *Purmessuree Pershad Narain Singh v. Jankee Koor*, 19 W. R. 90, *Pasupathy Ayyar v. Kothanda Rama Ayyar*, I. L. R. 28 M. d. 64, referred to. The objection should be taken in the Original Court. *VENKATA-KRISHNAMA CHARLU v. KRISHNA RAO* (1909)
I. L. R. 32 Mad. 425

2. PARTIES TO SUIT.

1. ———— *Representative of decree-holder—"Parties to suit," meaning of.* The words in s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, "questions arising between the parties to the suit" cannot be limited to questions arising between those who were parties to the suit at the date of the decree, but after decree the representative of a decree-holder, or the representative of a defendant against whom an execution is sought under ss. 210 and 216 of the Code, become parties to the suit for the purpose of execution, and questions arising be-

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

— s. 244—*contd.*

2. PARTIES TO SUIT—*contd.*

tween the parties to the suit within the meaning of s. 11 of the amending Act. *BUDDU RAMAIA v. VENKAIYA* 3 Mad. 263

2. ———— *Separate suit.*

R having obtained a decree for money against *K*, the karnavan of the defendants, *K* died, and the defendants were made parties to the suit as representatives of *K*. Tarwad property was then attached by *R*, and the defendants having objected, the Court raised the attachment. *R* sued for a declaration that the property released was liable to be sold. *Held*, that the suit was barred by s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *RAVUNNI MENON v. KUNJU NAYAR*. I. L. R. 10 Mad. 117

3. ———— *Transfer of decree by operation of law—Representative of original decree-holder—Right to appeal against order refusing execution.* *R* died in May 1859, leaving his property to his executors in trust for the appellant *P*, and he directed that the property should be assigned by them to the appellant as soon as he came of age. In August 1868, the executors filed this suit against *L* as manager of certain landed property belonging to the Hallai Bhattia caste, and known as Mahajan Wadi to recover certain loans made by them as executors to him as manager of the said Wadi. On the 11th May 1870, while this suit was pending, the executors assigned all the property of their testator to the appellant *P*. By the deed of assignment they assigned to him, *inter alia*, "all moveable property, debts, claims, and things in action whatsoever vested in them as such executors." No steps were taken, subsequently to this assignment, to make the assignee *P* a party to the suit, which proceeded without amendment. On the 23rd January 1873, a decree was passed for the plaintiffs on the record for Rs. 1,272-13-5, and it was declared that the said sum should be a first charge on the rents and income of the said Wadi. Subsequently to this decree, *L* opened an account in the name of the appellant *P*, and from time to time made payments to him on account of the decree. The last of these payments was made on the 19th November 1884. None of these payments were certified to the Court. In 1885 the respondent *P* was appointed to the office of manager of the Hallai Bhattia caste in the place of *L*, the original defendant in the suit. On the 4th January 1886, his attorneys wrote to the appellant's attorneys offering to pay the appellant the balance due to him under the decree. Subsequently, however, he refused to make any payment to the appellant, whereupon the appellant applied for execution of the decree against him as manager of the said Wadi. He claimed to be a transferee of the decree under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). His application was refused by the Judge in chambers. *Held*, that the appellant was a transferee of the decree within the mean-

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*2. PARTIES TO SUIT—*contd.*

ing of s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code. The decree had been transferred to him "by operation of law." As such, he was entitled to sue out execution, and was to be regarded as the representative of the original decree-holder within the meaning of cl. (c) of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and had a right of appeal against the order of the Judge in chambers refusing execution. PURMANANDAS JIWANDAS v. VALLABDAS WALLJI

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 506

4. *Representatives of transferor of decree—Application for substitution of names by transferees—Non-registration of transfer.* The holders of a decree for the sale of mortgaged property transferred the same to M by instruments which were registered at a place where a small portion only of the property was situate. Subsequently, M transferred the decree to other persons, and the co-transferors applied under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code to have their names substituted for those of the original decree-holders. The judgment-debtor opposed the application on the grounds that his name had not been substituted for those of the original decree-holders, who had transferred to him, and that the transfers to M were inoperative, as the instruments of transfer had not been registered at the place where the substantial portion of the mortgaged property was situate, in accordance with s. 20 of the Registration Act of 1877. It appeared that no notice had been issued to M under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code, that he was dead, and that his legal representatives had not been cited as required by law. The application was allowed by the Courts below. *Held*, that the matter involved questions arising between the parties to the decree, or their representatives, within the meaning of s. 244 (c) of the Code, and that the order allowing the application was therefore a decree within the definition of s. 2, and was appealable as such. GULZARI LAL v. DAYA RAM

I. L. R. 9 All. 46

5. *Representative of decree-holder—Attachment of decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 232, 273.* A person attaching a decree is a representative of the decree-holder within the meaning of that term as used in s. 244, cl. (c), of the Civil Procedure Code, and in every case is entitled to enforce execution of the decree which he has attached. When the decree attached has been passed by the same Court as the decree in execution of which it has been attached, the Court has jurisdiction to execute the attached decree on the application of the attaching creditor. PEARY MOHUN CHOWDERY v. ROMESH CHUNDER NUNDY

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 371

6. *Question relating to execution of decree—Representatives.* K and M were brothers alleged to be joint in food, dwelling

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*2. PARTIES TO SUIT—*contd.*

and business. In a suit which was brought against K, and which was unsuccessfully defended by him on behalf of himself and the joint family, a decree for costs was passed against him. K died after decree, and the decree-holder in execution had K's sons put on the record as his representatives. Certain property was attached in execution, and the sons objected that the property in question had come to them as the self-acquired property of their uncle M, who had died after K, and that they had inherited no property from their father K. Their objection was followed by the Court executing the decree, and the property was ordered to be released from attachment. In a suit brought by the assignee of the decree-holder against the sons of K to establish his right to proceed against the property in question in execution of the decree against K: *Held*, that the question of the liability of the property to be taken in execution in the hands of the defendant was a "question arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives, and relating to the execution, etc., of the decree" within the meaning of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that the suit was consequently not maintainable. The cases as to the position of representatives added to the suit either before or after decree referred to and discussed. RAJRUP SINGH v. RAMGOLAM ROY

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 1

7. *Representatives of judgment-debtors—Question of liability of property to be sold.* *Held*, that the question whether a person alleged to be a representative of a deceased party to a suit is such representative, and also the question whether property against which execution is sought in the hands of the representative of a deceased party was in fact the property of such deceased party and not the separate property of the representative, are questions to be decided under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not by separate suit. *Rajrup Singh v. Ramgolum Roy*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 1, *Chowdry Wahed Ali v. Jumae*, 11 B. L. R. 149, and *Seth Chand Mal v. Durga Dei*, I. L. R. 12 All. 313, referred to. BENI PRASAD KUNWAR v. LUKHNA KUNWAR

I. L. R. 21 All. 323

8. *"Party"—"Representative of a party"—Auction-purchaser—Order in summary inquiry.* A purchaser at a Court-sale is not a party, or the representative of a party, within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). He is, therefore, not bound by any order in the miscellaneous inquiry under s. 280, 281, or 282 of the Code. Nor is he bound by the specifications contained in the proclamation of sale of the claims of intervenors. Certain property was attached in execution of a decree. The defendants intervened, and objected to the attachment, on the ground that they held the pro-

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*2. PARTIES TO SUIT—*contd.*

party on permanent tenancy. Their objection was allowed, and the Court made an order, directing the property to be sold, subject to the defendants' rights. In the proclamation of sale, however, it was stated that the Court did not guarantee the title of the intervenors. The plaintiff purchased the property at the Court-sale. He then sued to eject the defendants. The defendants pleaded that the plaintiff had purchased, subject to their rights as permanent tenants. Both the lower Courts rejected the plaintiff's claim on the ground that he was bound by the order in the miscellaneous inquiry, which had become conclusive by reason of his having omitted to sue within one year from the date of the order. *Held*, reversing the lower Court's decision, that the order in the miscellaneous inquiry was not binding on the plaintiff as an auction-purchaser. **VISHVANATH CHARDU NAIK v. SUBRAYA SHIVAPA SHETTY**

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 290

9. ———— *Purchaser of rights of Hindu widow—Representative.* After the death of a childless Hindu widow, a lessee from her of property which had belonged to her husband obtained against her vendees of part of the same property a decree for damages for wrongfully keeping him out of possession. The effect of the decision was to decree the claim against the estate of the widow, and to exempt from liability the judgment-debtors personally and the property which they had purchased. In execution of the decree, the said property was sold, and was purchased by the decree-holder; one of the judgment-debtors had died during the execution proceedings, and her son was duly impleaded as her representative, and he raised no objection to the attachment and sale. Subsequently this son sold his rights and interests in the property; and his vendee sued the decree-holder to recover possession on the ground that, the decree being limited to the estate of the childless Hindu widow, the defendant as purchaser could not acquire by the sale any rights superior to those of the widow; that those rights had expired upon her death, and left nothing to be sold, and that on her death the property devolved upon the plaintiff's vendor, and had thence passed to the plaintiff. *Held*, that the plaintiff's vendor was a party to the suit within the meaning of s. 244 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code, and that he not having objected to the sale in execution of the decree, neither he nor the plaintiff could go behind that sale or claim the property upon any title which he might have asserted in the execution proceedings; and that the suit was barred by s. 244. **Ram Ghulam v. Hazaru Kuar**, I. L. R. 7 All. 547, followed. **Bahori Lal v. Gauri Sahai**, I. L. R. 8 All. 626, distinguished. **Mulmantri v. Ashjak Ahmad**, I. L. R. 9 All. 605, **Roop Lal Dass v. Bekani Meah**, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 437, and **Ravunni Menon v. Kunju**

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*2. PARTIES TO SUIT—*contd.*

Nayar, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 117, referred to. **RA GHUBAR DIAL v. HAMID JAN**

I. L. R. 12 All. 78

10. ———— *Execution of decree—Transferee of decree—Representative of party to suit—Appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 232, 540, and 588.* A person who, within the meaning of s. 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is a transferee of a decree is a representative within the meaning of s. 244, *quâ* the decree, of the party to the suit under whom he, immediately or by mesne assignment in writing, or by operation of law, has derived title to the decree in the suit. It is the assignment in writing from the decree-holder, and not the recognition by a Court of him as a representative, which makes such transferee a representative of a party to the suit. A Court upon the application of such a transferee for execution of a decree may wrongly decide that he is not a transferee within the meaning of s. 232, or that, although he is a transferee within the meaning of that section, he is not a representative of a party to the suit, or that by reason of limitation he is not entitled to obtain execution of the decree, and if the Court has so decided, it has determined a question or questions mentioned or referred to in s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, but not specified in s. 588, and an appeal lies under s. 540 of that Act. **Purmanandas Jivandas v. Vallabji Wallji**, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 506, and **Gulzari Lal v. Dayaram**, I. L. R. 9 All. 46, approved. **Ram Bakhsh v. Panna Lal**, I. L. R. 7 All. 457, considered. **Halodhar Shaha v. Harogobind Das Koiburto**, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 105, **Sambasiva v. Srinivasa**, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 511, **Raman v. Muppil Nayar**, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 478, and **Vilayati Begam v. Intizar Begam**, *Weekly Notes*, All. (1803) 166, referred to. **BADRI NARAIN v. JAI KISHEN DAS**

I. L. R. 16 All. 483

11. ———— *“Representative” of party—Purchaser of the decree from the decree-holder—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2, 232—Decree-holder—Application by transferee of decree—Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888)—Second appeal.* The word “representative” as used in s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when used with reference to a decree-holder, includes the purchaser of the decree from the decree-holder by an assignment in writing. **Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar**, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 62, and **Badri Narain v. Jai Kishen Das**, I. L. R. 16 All. 483, referred to. The Court executing a decree which has been so transferred can go into the disputed question of the transfer of the decree under the provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code as amended by Act VII of 1888. **DWAR BUKSH SIKKAR v. FATIK JALI**

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 250
3 C. W. N. 222.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*2. PARTIES TO SUIT—*contd.*

12. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 232, 244, cl. (c)—Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888)—Application by transferee from legal representative of decree-holder—Question—Legal representative—Meaning of the terms “transferee” and “representative”—Administrator of estate.* Any person who at the time of the execution of a decree is a transferee within the meaning of s. 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a representative of the decree-holder within the meaning of s. 244, cl. (c), of the Code; and the term representatives in that section includes subsequent transferees as well as those who purchased directly from the person who obtained the decree. *Dwar Buksh Sirkar v. Fatik Jali, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 250, and Badri Narain v. Jai Kishen Das, I. L. R. 16 All. 383, followed. GANGA DAS SEAL v. YAKUB ALI DOBASHI*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 670

13. ———— *Party unnecessarily added to suit—Separate suit.* S. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code alludes to parties to the decree or their representatives, but it is not on that account open to a plaintiff to evade the section by adding an unnecessary party to the suit. *KRISTO MOHIN-EE DASSEE v. KALIPROSONNO GHOSE*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 402

14. ———— *Purchaser of decree—Rights of purchaser.* The words “party to a suit” in s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, include the heirs, assignees, and representatives of such party, and consequently give the purchaser of a decree all the rights of appeal, etc., which his vendor had. *HURO LALL DASS v. SOOJAWUT ALI*

8 W. R. 197
TARA CHAND HAJRAH v. DOORGA CHURN HAJRAH

10 W. R. 205

15. ———— *Petitioner, position of when petition struck off—Stranger.* In a suit brought by *M* against *K* and others, certain lands belonging to *G* were included, and *G* was made a defendant; these lands, however, were released from the claim and *K* excluded from the decree obtained by plaintiff against the other defendants. In execution, however, *M* had them measured as a part of the decreed lands; and *G*'s petition of objection under s. 230 of Act VIII of 1859 having been struck off the file, *G* brought a suit to have his title established. *Held*, that, though as a “party to the suit” brought by *M*, *G* would have been bound by s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, to seek his remedy in the execution department, yet, as he was released from the operation of the decree, he must be considered a stranger and permitted to bring his present action. *GOUR KRISHORE CHOWDHRY v. MAHOMED HASSIM CHOWDHRY*

10 W. R. 191

16. ———— *Party on record though wrongly—Rights of appeal.* A party who

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*2. PARTIES TO SUIT—*contd.*

has been put upon the record, whether rightly or wrongly, is so far a party to the suit that he has a right of appeal under Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11. *BHUGGOBUTTY KOWAR v. MONEY*

2 C. L. R. 545

17. ———— *Applicability of section to application made by judgment-debtor as well as to those by decree-holder.* The provision in s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure that questions arising between the parties to the suit and relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree shall be determined by order of the Court executing the decree, relates not only to proceedings initiated by the decree-holder, but also to applications made by the judgment-debtor. *ERUSAPPA MUDALIAR v. COMMERCIAL AND LAND MORTGAGE BANK*

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 377

18. ———— *Person obstructing the decree-holder at the instigation of the judgment-debtor—Suit by the person so obstructing.* *Held*, that a person who, at the instigation of the judgment-debtor, obstructed the decree-holder in obtaining possession of property is not a party to the suit within the meaning of s. 244; so orders passed against him under ss. 329 and 332 do not bar a suit. *Mohendro Narain Chatturaj v. Gopal Mondul, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 769, referred to. BISHEN DYAL SINGH v. SAGRO SINGH*

2 C. W. N. 511

19. ———— *Claimant in execution Proceedings—Separate suit—Suit for Damages for Tort—Party to suit.* *A* sold to *B* certain logs of timber, and 95 logs were delivered to *B* in part performance of the contract. *C* brought a suit against *A* and *B*, claiming the logs under another title. Pending this suit, *C* entered into an agreement with *D*, selling him the logs in the event of being successful in his suit. The judgment of the Court of first instance was in *C*'s favour, and under such judgment *D* obtained possession of the logs in suit. This judgment was on appeal reversed. *B* then brought a suit in the nature of an action of trover against *C* and *D* for the logs and damages. The Court, without entering into the merits, dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not maintainable, as the same relief would have been obtained under the provisions of s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861. *Held* by the Judicial Committee, reversing such judgment, that there had been a miscarriage, as that section did not apply, the suit by *B* against *C* and *D* being to recover damages for a tort alleged to have been committed by *C* and *D*, and that the latter was not a party to the original suit or bound by the judgment in that suit. *AGA SYED ABDOL HOSSANI v. LENAINE*

13 Moo. I. A. 69

20. ———— *Transferee of Judgment-debtor—Suit brought by decree-holder to question alienation by judgment-debtor.* *Held*, that

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*— s. 244—*contd.*2. PARTIES TO SUIT—*contd.*

s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, does not apply to suits brought by a decree-holder to question an alienation made by the judgment-debtor, inasmuch as the transferee was not a party to the former suit, and only questions between the parties to the suit must of necessity be determined in the execution department. *SURUBSOOKH v. USGUR ALLY KHAN*

2 *Agra, Pt. II, 180*

21. — Representative of deceased person—*Execution of decree—Party—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 201, 209—Representative.* In a former suit for possession of immoveable property against *J* and her father, and subsequently revived against *J* as the representative of her father, possession and mesne profits were decreed against *J* in her representative capacity, while as against her in her individual capacity the suit was dismissed. The decree-holder, after obtaining possession, attached and sold, in satisfaction of his decree for mesne profits, *J*'s private property, notwithstanding her objections, and himself became the purchaser, but never obtained possession. This sale, ordered on the 8th October 1863, was confirmed by the Judge on 15th March 1864. The present suit was brought by *J* for confirmation of her possession of her private property by cancellation of the execution sale. *Held* (MACPHERSON and GLOVER, JJ., dissenting), that such suit was maintainable, and that *J* in her individual capacity was not a party to the suit in which execution issued within the meaning of s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861. *WAHED ALI v. JUMAYEE*

2 *B. L. R. F. B. 73*11 *W. R. F. B. 1**POOTER BEGUM v. INDURJEET KOOPER*12 *W. R. 201*

In the same case on appeal the decree of the High Court was affirmed under the circumstances of the case, but held (contrary to the opinion of the majority of the Full Bench),—Where a decree against a person in a representative capacity has been properly passed, and proceedings have been taken under it to obtain execution against the party in his representative character, he is a party to the suit with respect to any question which may arise between him and the other parties relating to the execution of the decree within the meaning of Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11. *CHOWDRY WAHED ALI v. JUMAYEE* . 11 *B. L. R. P. C. 149 : 18 W. R. 185*

OSEEMUNNISSA KHATOON v. AMEEROONNISSA KHATOON 20 *W. R. 162*

22. — Representative—*Assignee of auction-purchaser.* The expression "representative of a party" in the last paragraph of s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, does not mean the representative of a party to the execution proceedings, but it means the representative of a party to the suit. An application by the assignee of an auction-

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*— s. 244—*contd.*2. PARTIES TO SUIT—*contd.*

purchaser to be placed on the record cannot be dealt with under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, and no appeal or second appeal lies from an order refusing such application. *SREENATH GHOSE v. ROMA NATH SANTRA* 3 *C. W. N. 276*

23. — Assignee of decree—*Indirect assignment.* *A*, a decree-holder, applied for execution of his decree, but was opposed by *B*, the judgment-debtor, on the ground that *A* had sold his decree to a third party, from whom it had passed to *B*'s son. *Held*, that this was a question arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, and relating to the execution of the decree, and might be determined by the Court executing the decree, under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861. *RAMDHAN RAKHIT v. PANCHANAN CHUCKERBUTTY* . 1 *B. L. R. S. N. 9 : 10 W. R. 144*

24. — Separate suit—*Questions for Court executing decree.* Three out of six decree-holders sold their share in the decree to *A* who thereafter made an application to the Court under s. 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This application was dismissed on the ground that *A*'s purchase was made benami for some of the judgment-debtors. In a subsequent suit brought by *A* and the persons who were said to be the real purchasers, it was contended that a separate suit was barred under the provisions of s. 244, cl. (c), of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that *A* was not a party to the suit in which the decree was passed, nor the representative of any such party, and that the suit was not barred. *HALODHAR SHAHA v. HAROGOBIND DAS KOIBURTO* . 1 *L. R. 12 Calc. 105*

25. — *Suit for declaration that the defendant is a mere benamidar for plaintiff.* A suit brought by *A* to obtain a declaration that a decree originally obtained by *B* against *C* and another which had been purchased in the name of *D* had really been purchased by the plaintiff for his own benefit, was held not to be barred by s. 244, cl. (c), of the Civil Procedure Code, as the question raised was not one arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, but one that arose between two parties, each of whom claimed to be the representative of one of the parties to the suit, viz., *B*, the party in whose favour the decree was passed. *GOUR MOHUN GOULI v. DINONATH KARMOKAR*

1 *L. R. 25 Calc. 49*2 *C. W. N. 76*

26. — *Application for execution by beneficial holder of decree—Application dismissed—Suit for declaration of applicant's right to execute the decree—Civil Procedure Code, s. 232.* *Held*, that where an application under s. 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure by a person alleging himself to be beneficially entitled under a decree to execute such decree has been rejected, it is still

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 244—contd.

2. PARTIES TO SUIT—contd.

competent to the applicant (no appeal lying from the order under s. 232 rejecting his application) to bring a separate suit for a declaration that he is the person entitled to execute the decree. *Ram Baksh v. Panna Lal*, I. L. R. 7 All. 457, and *Haldhar Shaha v. Harogobind Das Koiburto*, I. L. R. 12 Cal. 105, referred to. *SHEORAJ SINGH v. AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN* . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 539

27. ————— Execution of decree
—Regular suit. The assignee of a decree applied for execution; his application was dismissed, and he was never brought on to the record as decree-holder. He now sued for the cancellation of the order refusing execution and for a declaration of his right to execution. *Held*, that the suit was not precluded by Civil Procedure Code, s. 244. *RAMAN v. MUPPIL NAYAR* I. L. R. 14 Mad. 478

28. ————— Questions relating to execution—Separate suit. A plaintiff, alleging that her husband (deceased) had advanced money on the security of land belonging to a family of four Hindus, sued them to enforce his lien and obtained a decree. The representatives of one of the defendants only appealed, and the decree was reversed as regarded them. The decree was executed as against the other defendants by the attachment and sale of their shares of the land, and the plaintiff became the purchaser. The successful appellants obstructed her in her attempts to obtain possession and she now sued them for partition of the three-quarters share purchased by her. *Held*, that the suit was not precluded by Civil Procedure Code, s. 244. *NAGANUTHU v. SAVARIMUTHU*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 226

29. ————— "Judgment-debtor"
—Question of right to possession—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 332 and 335. T's predecessor in interest had a mortgage on certain land and was made a party to a partition-suit, in which a share in the land was allotted to a member of the family, subject to a proportionate share of T's mortgage and also subject to a proportionate share of a certain decree debt. The then plaintiff got his share of the property made over to him. After the date of the decree, i.e., the decree in the partition suit, T purchased the equity of redemption in the mortgaged property from certain members of the family. In a subsequent execution of the partition decree, part of the land was sold for money due as costs and mesne profits by T's vendors of the equity of redemption, and T was ejected. T objected under s. 332 of the Code, but the Court refused to order redelivery. In a suit brought by T for possession: *Held*, that T was not a judgment-debtor within the meaning of ss. 244, 332, and 335, Civil Procedure Code, and that the suit was not barred by the provisions of s. 244. *Nagamuthu v.*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 244—contd.

2. PARTIES TO SUIT—contd.

Savarimuthu, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 226, followed. *VASUDEVA UPADYAYA v. VISVARAJA TIRTHASAMI*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 331

See *VIBHUDAPRIYA THIRTHASAMI v. VIDIANIDHI THIRTHASAMI* . . . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 131

where these two last-mentioned cases were distinguished.

30. ————— Rival decree-holders—
Right of action—Act VIII of 1859, s. 270. A regular suit will lie at the instance of one decree-holder against another for a refund of money that has been erroneously paid away to the latter contrary to the provisions of s. 270 of Act VIII of 1859. *GOGARAM v. KARTICK CHUNDER SINGH*
B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 1022 : 9 W. R. 515

See *GOKOOL DASS v. GUNGESHER SINGH*

3 N. W. 164

31. ————— Claim for rateable distribution by creditor rejected—Sum detained in Court, pending application to High Court—Application rejected—Interest on sum detained claimed in execution—Procedure. In execution of a decree by R S, another creditor claimed a rateable share of the proceeds realized. His claim was rejected. Pending an application to the High Court under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside this order, the share claimed by S was detained in Court at his request. The High Court rejected the application of S, and R took out execution for the costs incurred therein and for interest on the sum detained in Court at the request of S. *Held*, that the interest could not be awarded to R in execution of the decree for costs, S and R being rival creditors and S not being a party to the suit. *SANJIVI v. RAMASAMI*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 494

32. ————— Co-defendants—Separate suit—Order to refund purchase-money. A judgment-debtor, alleging that his right as occupancy tenant of certain land had been sold in execution of the decree, sued the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser to set aside the sale as illegal under s. 9 of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act. The Court of first instance decreed the claim, and ordered the defendant decree-holder to refund the purchase-money. *Held*, that, as between the defendant decree-holder and the plaintiff, the question at issue was one arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed and relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree and was, therefore, under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, to be determined by the Court executing the decree, and not by separate suit. *Janki Singh v. Ablakh Singh*, I. L. R. 6 All. 393, followed. *Held*, also, that apart from this consideration, it was beyond the lower Court's powers to make an order directing the decree-holder to re-

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*2. PARTIES TO SUIT—*contd.*

fund the purchase-money, that being a matter between two co-defendants which was not raised and could not be decided in the present suit. *RAM GOPAL v. KHIALI RAM* . I. L. R. 6 All. 448

33. ——— Claimant to attached property—*Suit to set aside sale in execution.* A decree-holder took out execution against *A* and *B*. When *B*'s property was attached his widow, *C*, came forward and laid claim to it on the part of her minor son, urging that, as *B* was not liable under the decree, his property could not be sold. The objection was disallowed and the property was sold. *Held*, that s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, did not prevent *C* from suing to set aside that sale and recover *B*'s property on the ground that *B* was not liable under the decree. *ISSAN CHUNDER DASS v. CHUNDRO BODONEE* . 7 W. R. 361

34. ——— Attaching creditors—*Suit for refund of money wrongly paid to him.* A suit will lie by a prior attaching creditor to compel a decree-holder, whose attachment is subsequent in date, to refund money obtained by him under an order of the Judge of a subordinate Court, in contravention of the provisions of s. 270, Code of Civil Procedure; but it must be a suit to set aside the Judge's order. *WOOMA MOYEE BURMONYA v. RAM BUKHSH CHETLANGEE* . 16 W. R. 11

35. ——— Party wrongly appearing on record—*Suit for money paid in execution of decree—Parties appearing on decree not parties to suit.* *S* sued *K* for possession of certain land, and *H*, claiming to be owner of the property, asked leave to come in and defend the suit; but his application was refused. The suit was dismissed, and *S* appealed, naming *H* as a respondent, and a notice in the usual form was served on *H*. He, however, did not appear, and the decree of the first Court being reversed, a decree, in which *H* was included, was given for possession. *H* subsequently brought a suit to have his title to the property declared making *S* a defendant, and obtained a decree declaring his title. Pending *H*'s suit, *S* took proceedings in execution of the decree to recover a sum awarded her either as costs or mense profits, whereupon *H*, to prevent a sale of the property, deposited the amount in Court, and *S* received it on account of her decree. In a suit brought by *H* against *S* to recover the amount so paid: *Held*, the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The judgment in the first suit having been set aside by the proceedings in the second suit, there was no bar to the suit by reason of the money having been paid in execution of the process of the Court. *H* was not a party to the first suit so as to make the question one between the parties, and relating to the execution of the decree. *SHEROKUMARI DEBI v. SHITARAM HAYDRA* . 13 B. L. R. Ap. 17

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 244—*contd.*2. PARTIES TO SUIT—*contd.*

36. ——— Party alleged to have been wrongly substituted in execution proceedings—*Estoppel.* *A*, executrix to the estate of her husband, executed a mortgage-bond, partly for money due on bonds executed by her husband in his life-time and partly for payment of Government revenue due from the estate. She then adopted a son, *B*, under authority granted by the will of her husband. After the adoption, a suit was brought on the mortgage-bond against *A*, and a decree was passed in terms of a compromise for payment by instalments, the mortgaged property remaining hypothecated as before. Default was made in payment of the instalments, and the decree-holder applied for execution of the decree from time to time and obtained partial satisfaction. In the meantime, the Court of Wards took the management of the estate from *A*, and in the course of execution proceedings the original decree-holder died, and on an application for execution in August 1888, *N*, then a minor, was substituted as decree-holder, and *B* was substituted as judgment-debtor in the place of *A*. The present application for execution was made in July 1893, the minor *N* being represented by a sub-manager under the Court of Wards. It was decided against *N*, and *N* then appealed. An objection was raised that, assuming the liability of the estate of *B*, such liability could not be enforced in execution of this decree, as the order for substitution was unauthorized by law and a mere nullity, and *B* being neither a party, nor representative of a party, to the suit, the present appeal would not lie under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that the Court had power to make a substitution of this kind, and that *B* had been rightly substituted. *Hari Saran Moitra v. Bhubaneswari Debi*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 40 : L. R. 15 I. A. 195, referred to. *Held*, also, that *B* was precluded by the previous proceedings from questioning the order of substitution. *Mungul Pershad Ditchit v. Girja Kant Lahiri*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 51 : L. R. 8 I. A. 123, and *Ram Kirpal v. Rup Kuari*, I. L. R. 6 All. 269 : L. R. 11 I. A. 37, referred to. *Dhuronidhur Sen v. Agra Bank*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 380 : I. L. R. 5 Calc. 86, distinguished. *NORENDRA NATH PAHARI v. BHUPENDRA NARAIN ROY* . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 374

37. ——— Party refusing to compromise—*Decree on compromise—Execution against party to suit, not party to compromise—Resistance to execution—Procedure.* In a suit for partition a compromise was entered into by all the parties except *S*, and a decree obtained on the terms thereof. In execution *S* was dispossessed and presented a petition to the Court, objecting that the decree was not binding on her. The petition was rejected. *Held*, that the objection raised by *S* ought to have been investigated under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that *S* was entitled to

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 244—*contd.*

2. PARTIES TO SUIT—*contd.*

appeal against the order rejecting the petition.
SANKARAVADIVAMMAL v. KUMARASANYA

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 473

38. ——— Plaintiff suing in a character separate from that in which decree was passed against him—*Separate suit not barred.* A judgment-debtor, upon the attachment of certain land in execution of decrees passed against him personally by the Revenue Court, instituted a suit for a declaration and establishment of his right to such land, not as his own property, but as wakf, of which he was mutawalli or trustee. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the plaintiff was not suing in his own right, but in his capacity as custodian, trustee, or manager of the wakf property, and he must therefore be taken to fill a character separate from that in which the decrees were passed against him by the Revenue Court, his suit was not barred by the provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. **Madho Prakash Singh v. Murli Manohar, I. L. R. 5 All. 406**, and **Shankar Dial v. Amir Haidar, I. L. R. 2 All. 752**, referred to. **NATH MAL DAS v. TAJAMMUL HUSAIN** . . . **I. L. R. 7 All. 36**

39. ——— Auction-purchaser at sale in execution—*Suit to recover purchase money on reversal of decree under which sale in execution took place—Separate suit—Party to proceedings in execution.* G instituted a suit against H, C, and P, which was dismissed with costs, but an appeal was preferred. Pending the appeal, however, C took out execution of the decree for costs, and brought to sale a house belonging to G, of which H became the purchaser, paid the purchase money and got possession. Subsequently the decision dismissing the suit was reversed on appeal, and the defendants in that suit were ordered to pay a certain sum to G with costs. G then applied for restitution of her house which had been sold under the decree reversed, and eventually obtained an unconditional order for possession, H being left to any remedy open to him in respect of the purchase money. G having obtained possession of the house, H brought a suit against her to recover the purchase-money. *Held*, that, notwithstanding s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, he was entitled in this suit to recover the purchase money, as money received to his use, the consideration for it having failed. H was not, in his character as an auction-purchaser, a party to the execution proceedings, and for the purpose of the suit was to be treated as a third person. **HIRA LAL CHATTERJEE v. GOURMONEY DEBI** . . . **I. L. R. 13 Calc. 326**

40. ——— Representative of party to suit—*Auction-purchaser who was also assignee of decree.* In a suit for sale upon a mortgage the plaintiff, having obtained a decree, assigned the same, and the assignee brought the property

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 244—*contd.*

2. PARTIES TO SUIT—*contd.*

decreed to be sold to sale and purchased it himself and obtained possession. A usufructuary mortgagee of the property who had been a party to the suit, and in whose favour the decree was, in so far that it declared his right to continue in possession, applied to be restored to possession, and obtained an order in his favour. Thereupon the assignee auction-purchaser, applied in revision to have the order restoring the usufructuary mortgagee to possession set aside. *Held*, that the auction-purchaser, though he happened also to be the assignee of the decree, was not a representative of a party to the suit within the meaning of s. 244. **SABHAJIT v. SRI GOPAL** . . **I. L. R. 17 All. 222**

41. ——— Purchaser at auction-sale. Where a decree-holder, who had obtained a decree and order under ss. 88, 89 of the Transfer of Property Act over certain property, proceeded to attach it in execution of his decree: *Held*, that a third party who had bought the rights and interests of the judgment-debtors at an auction-sale held in consequence of a money-decree was not a legal representative of the judgment-debtors so as to entitle him to be heard under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure at the execution proceedings. **Sabhajit v. Sri Gopal, I. L. R. 17 All. 222**, followed. **Prosonno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683**, distinguished. **MAHABIR PRASAD v. PARTAB CHAND** . . **I. L. R. 22 All. 450**

42. ——— Decree—*Fraud*—*Question relating to the execution of the decree between parties to the suit—Auction-purchaser a third party.* An application was made by the judgment-debtor against the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser, who was a third party, to have a sale set aside on the ground of irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale, as also on the ground of fraud. The Court of first instance rejected the application, and refused to set aside the sale. On appeal to the Subordinate Judge, he reversed the decision of the first Court. On a second appeal to the High Court by the auction-purchaser an objection was taken that no second appeal lay at his instance. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the application was under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, a second appeal would lie. The question of a right to a second appeal does not turn upon who may happen to be the appellant, but upon whether or not the case is one within s. 244 of the Code. **HIRA LAL GHOSE v. CHUNDRA KANTO GHOSE**

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 539
3 C. W. N. 403

See **BRUBON MOHUN PAL v. NANDA LAL DEY**
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 324
3 C. W. N. 399

and **MOTI LAL CHAKRABUTTY v. RUSSIK CHANDRA BAIRAGI** . . **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 326 note**
3 C. W. N. 395

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43. ———— *Application to set aside sale on the ground of fraud.* Where a judgment-debtor applies to have an execution sale set aside and alleges circumstances which, if found in his favour, would amount to fraud on the part of the decree-holder or auction-purchaser, the application comes under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, although the question is one between the judgment-debtor and the auction-purchaser, who was not the decree-holder. *Prosonno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683, referred to. *NEMAI CHAND KANJI v. DENONATH KANJI*

2 C. W. N. 691

ROJONI KANT BAGCHI v. HOSSANI UDDIN AHMED
4 C. W. N. 538

44. ———— *Purchaser from some of the judgment-debtors of property not affected by decree—Representative of judgment-debtor.* Certain persons, claiming by right of inheritance to C, sued B, N, A, K, and others for possession of certain immoveable property, and obtained a decree dated in August 1876 for possession of the same. In the course of the litigation which ended in that decree, Z purchased certain immoveable property from B, N, A, and K. Z was subsequently dispossessed of such property in execution of the decree of August 1876. He thereupon sued the holders of that decree for possession of the same, alleging that his vendors had inherited the same from D, that it was not affected by that decree, and that he had been improperly dispossessed of it in execution of that decree. *Held*, by the Court that the plaintiff not being the representative of any of the parties to the suit in which that decree was passed in the sense of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, but being, if his allegations were true, a purchaser from certain of the judgment-debtors of property not affected by that decree, the suit was not barred by the provisions of that section. *Partab Singh v. Beni Ram*, I. L. R. 2 All. 61, distinguished. Observations by STUART, C.J., on his judgment in *Agra Savings Bank v. Sri Ram Mitter*, I. L. R. 1 All. 388, and on the judgment of the Full Bench in *Partab Singh v. Beni Ram* referring to that judgment. *ZANKI LALL v. JAWAHIR SINGH*

I. L. R. 5 All. 94

45. ———— *Party to suit in representative character.* In 1875 a decree was passed against N as representative of L, who died pending the suit, declaring N liable to the extent of the assets of L which might have come to the hands of N. In 1879 the decree-holder applied for execution of the decree, and, without proof that any of the assets of L had come to the hands of N, obtained an order and attached lands belonging to N. N objected to the attachment, but the Munsif without investigation, rejected his claim and directed N to bring a regular suit. The land was sold and

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purchased by A B. N, after an abortive attempt to obtain a review of the Munsif's order from his successor, brought a suit in 1880 against the decree-holder and A B to recover the land. *Held*, that, as N was a party to the former suit of 1875 within the meaning of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1877, the suit would not lie. *ARUNDADHI v. NATE-SHA* I. L. R. 5 Mad. 391

46. ———— *Sale of Property in execution of decree obtained by second mortgagee for sale of property—Holder of prior decree enforcing first mortgage—Execution of decree—Fresh suit—Meaning of "representative" of judgment-debtor.* A decree enforcing a first mortgage of certain property not being satisfied, the property was sold in execution of a decree of a later date enforcing a second mortgage of the property. *Per STUART, C.J.*, that the decree enforcing the first mortgage could not be executed against the property, but the holder of such decree was bound to bring a fresh suit against the purchaser of the property to enforce his decree. *Per STRAIGHT, BRODHURST, and TYRRELL, JJ.*, that a fresh suit was the most convenient and expeditious remedy. *Per OLDFIELD, J.*, that the purchaser not being the "representative" of the judgment-debtor, within the meaning of s. 244 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code, the holder of such decree must bring a fresh suit to enforce it. *JAGTA NARAIN v. JAGRUP* I. L. R. 5 All. 452

47. ———— *Transfer of Interest pending suit—Lis pendens—Application to bring transferee upon the record.* A decree of the High Court, giving possession of certain shares in a bank to the plaintiff, R, was reversed on appeal by the Privy Council. The defendant then applied to the Court of first instance to order restitution of the shares, which had been realized by the plaintiff. Upon being ordered to produce the shares, R made an application to the Court, professedly under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, in which he alleged that, pending the appeal to the Privy Council, he had transferred the shares to G, his counsel in the case, who had failed to restore them, and he prayed "that the said person might be brought upon the record, and that execution for recovery of the said shares might be given against him." The Court passed an order upon this application, calling on G to show cause why he should not be called upon to restore the shares made over to him by R, and he thereupon filed an answer denying that he was the custodian of the shares and alleging that he was their purchaser for value. The Court passed an order directing that G's name should be placed on the record, so that the decree might be executed against him. *Held*, that the question being one between two judgment-debtors *inter se*, and not between the parties arrayed against each other as decree-holders of the one part and judgment-

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debtors or their representatives on the other, the provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code were not applicable to the case; that *G* could not be regarded as a "representative" of *R* within the meaning of that section. *RAYNOR v. MUSSOORIE BANK* . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 681

48. ————— *Decree on bond against representatives of obligor.* Where certain property was attached in execution of a decree passed upon a bond against the legal representatives of the obligor, and the judgment-debtors objected to the attachment on the ground that the property was not part of the obligor's estate and liable to be taken in execution of the decree, but was property which they could claim in their own right: *Held*, that the matter in dispute was one between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed and relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and was therefore to be determined in the execution department, and not by regular suit. *Chowdry Wahed Ali v. Jumace*, 11 B. L. R. 149, *Shankar Dial v. Amir Haidar*, I. L. R. 2 All. 752, and *Nath Mal Dass v. Tajammul Husain*, I. L. R. 7 All. 36, referred to. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*—That the turning point upon which the application of the rule contained in s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code barring adjudication in a regular suit depends, is whether the judgment-debtor, in raising objections to execution of decree against any property, pleads what may analogically be called a *ius tertii*, or a right which, although he represents it, belongs to a title totally separate from that which he personally holds in such property. *Kanai Lal Khan v. Sashi Bhushon Biswas*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 777, dissented from. *RAM GHULAM v. HAZARU KOER* . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 547

49. ————— *Party to suit—Representative.* Where, certain property having been attached in execution of a decree, the representative of the judgment-debtor objected that the property had been acquired by himself and not inherited from the judgment-debtor, and was therefore not liable in execution: *Held*, that the question was one which must be decided in the execution department, under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Ram Ghulam v. Hazaru Koer*, I. L. R. 7 All. 547, referred to. *SITA RAM v. BHAGWAN DAS* . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 733

50. ————— *Official Assignee—Attachment of property—Judgment-debtor declared an insolvent—Claim by Official Assignee to attached property—Appeal from order disallowing claim—Stat. 11 & 12 Vic., c. 21, ss. 7, 49—"Representative" of judgment-debtor.* A decree-holder, having attached the property of his judgment-debtors in execution of the decree, obtained an order for sale of the attached property. Prior to sale, the

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judgment-debtors made an application to be declared insolvents, and obtained an order under Stat. 11 & 12 Vic., c. 21, s. 7, by which their property was vested in the Official Assignee. An application was then made by the Official Assignee to the Court in which the execution of the decree was pending for the release of the property from attachment, and that the property might be made over to him. The Court dismissed the application. On appeal, the District Judge reversed the first Court's order. *Held*, that the matter did not come before the Court of first instance under s. 49 of Stat. 11 & 12 Vic., c. 21, inasmuch as that section refers to cases where the insolvent's schedule has been filed, and to debt or demands admitted therein, and, in the present case, no schedule had been filed at the time of the Official Assignee's application; and the Court could therefore only entertain the application under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to the execution of decrees. *Held*, that the Official Assignee could not be held to be a representative of the judgment-debtors within the meaning of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and his application was not one relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree. *Held*, that the Court of first instance had only jurisdiction in the matter under s. 278 of the Code, and disposed of it under that section, and that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. *KASHI PRASAD v. MILLER* . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 752

51. ————— *Execution of decree—"Representative" of judgment-debtor.* The word "representative" as used in cl. (c), s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, means any person who succeeds to the right of any of the parties to the suit after the decree is passed. A Hindu widow mortgaged certain properties, and afterwards by an *ikrarnamah* made them over to *B*, the next heir. The *ikrarnamah* contained a condition that *B* was to be liable for the widow's debts. Subsequently the mortgagee brought a suit against the widow on the mortgage and joined *B* as a party on the ground that he was in possession of the mortgaged properties. That suit resulted in a money decree being passed on appeal by the High Court against the widow personally, the property in the hands of *B* being held not to be liable. The case was taken on appeal to the Privy Council, and pending the hearing of that appeal, the widow died, and *B* was brought on the record as her legal representative. The decree of the High Court was ultimately confirmed by the Privy Council. In execution of the decree, it was sought to make *B* liable to satisfy the amount out of the properties which he had obtained under the *ikrarnamah*, the mortgagee not having been aware of the conditions of that document before the decree of the High Court. *Held*, that, so far as these properties were concerned, he was

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not the legal representative of the widow, as he inherited them as heir-at-law of her husband, and that his title to them under the ikrarnamah was not that of a "representative" within the meaning of cl. (c) of s. 244. *Held*, further, that the question of *B*'s liability under the ikrarnamah did not fall within the scope of the provisions of cl. (c) of s. 244, as being a question to be decided between the "parties" to the suit, as, although *B* was a party to the suit, the only claim against him was that the property in his hands was liable as having been previously hypothecated; and as the suit was dismissed, so far as that claim was concerned, it was not a question relating to the execution of the decree. *KAMESHWAR PERSHAD v. RUN BAHADUR SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 12 Cal. 458

52. ———— *Representative of a party to the suit—Second mortgagee taking a mortgage during the pendency of a suit on the first mortgage.* *Held*, that a second mortgagee who takes his mortgage during the pendency of a suit on the first mortgage is a representative of the mortgagor within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Madho Das v. Ramji Patak*, I. L. R. 16 All. 286, referred to. *SHEO NARAIN v. CHUNNI LAL* . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 243

53. ———— *Person who had acquired interest in property sold before the judgment-debtor became liable under the decree—Application to set aside sale—Civil Procedure Code, s. 310.* Where an application to have a sale set aside under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code is made by a person who has acquired an interest in the property sold before the judgment-debtor became liable under the decree, such person is not a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code. *BUNGSHI DHAR HALDAR v. KEDARNATH MONDAL* . . . 1 C. W. N. 114

54. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 278-283—Question of Court executing decree—Separate suit—"Representative" of judgment-debtor.* The decree-holder under a decree for enforcement of lien against the zamindari rights and interests of *K* applied for execution by attachment and sale of certain shares, one of which was recorded in the khewat in the name of *K*, and two others in the name of *B*, his brother's widow. The shares having been attached, the judgment-debtor died, and *J*, his brother, and *L*, his son, were substituted as his representatives. In execution of the decree, only the share which had stood recorded in the name of the deceased judgment-debtor, and which was in possession of *J* and *L* as his representatives, was sold; and the decree-holder then applied for sale of the other shares which had been attached. To this *B* objected under s. 281 of the Civil Procedure Code, claiming to be owner of the shares in question. Before the hearing of her objection she

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died, and *L* applied to have his name brought upon the record in her place for the purpose of supporting the objections. An order having been passed disallowing the objections which had been filed by *B*, *L* applied to the High Court. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the decree-holder to the hearing of the appeal on the ground that, as the first Court's order related to *L*'s claim as the heir of *B* to have the shares entered in her name released from attachment, it must be regarded as passed under s. 281 of the Civil Procedure Code, and as conclusive, subject to *L*'s bringing a suit to establish his right. On the other side it was contended that, *L* being the representative of the deceased judgment-debtor *K*, the first Court's order must be regarded as passed under s. 244 of the Code, and the appeal would therefore lie. *Held*, that the preliminary objection must prevail, and the first Court's order must be regarded as passed under s. 281, and not under s. 244 of the Code, inasmuch as *L*'s claim, which was rejected by it, was nothing more than to come in as *B*'s representative for the purpose of supporting her objections; and it was in right of a third person, whose interest he asserted to have passed to him, that he prayed admission to the proceedings, and his character was wholly distinct from that he filled as the legal representative of his deceased father. Because *L* happened, for the purpose of the execution proceeding, to be his father's legal representative, and to be liable to satisfy the decree to the extent of any assets which might have come to his hands, it did not follow that any rights claimed by him through a third person must be dealt with, and could only be dealt with, between him and the decree-holder in the execution proceedings. *Wahed Ali v. Jumae*, 11 B. L. R. 149, *Ram Ghulam v. Hazaru Kuar*, I. L. R. 7 All. 547, *Sita Ram v. Bhagwan Das*, I. L. R. 7 All. 733, *Shankar Dial v. Amir Haidar*, I. L. R. 2 All. 752, *Nath Mal Das v. Tajammul Husain*, I. L. R. 7 All. 36, and *Kanai Lal Khan v. Sashi Bhuson Biswas*, I. L. R. 6 Cal. 777, referred to. *BAHORI LAL v. GAURI SAHAI* . . . I. L. R. 8 All. 626

55. ———— *Suit by representative against purchaser—Separate suit—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 266, 316.* The provisions of s. 244 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code prohibit not only a suit between parties and their representatives but also a suit by a party or his representatives, against a purchaser at a sale in execution of the decree, the object of which is to determine a question which properly arises between the parties or their representatives, and relates to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree. A judgment-debtor, whose occupancy tenure had been sold in execution of a decree for money, sued the purchaser for recovery of the property, on the ground that the sale of occupancy rights in execution of decree was illegal and void, being in contravention of the provi-

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sions of s. 9 of Act XII of 1881 (North-Western Provinces Rent Act). *Held* by the Full Bench, that the question involved in the suit was one of the nature referred to in s. 244 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code as determinable only by order of the Court executing the decree, and that the suit was therefore not maintainable. *Narain v. Puran*, *Weekly Notes*, *All.* (1883) 218, referred to. *BASTI RAM v. FATTU*, *I. L. R.* 8 *All.* 146

See *DURGA CHARAN MANDAL v. KALI PRASANNA SARKAR*, *I. L. R.* 26 *Calc.* 727

56. *Representatives of judgment-debtor.* *Held*, that proceedings in execution of a decree taken against the plaintiff's father and elder brother on previous occasions did not bind the plaintiff under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, the plaintiffs not having been parties to them within the meaning of that section. *KRISHNAJI v. VITHALRAV*, *I. L. R.* 12 *Bom.* 80

57. *Decree passed against representative of debtor—Attachment of property as belonging to debtor—Objection to attachment by judgment-debtor setting up an independent title—Appeal from order disallowing objection—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 2, 283.* The decree-holders, in execution of a simple money-decree passed against the legal representative of their debtor, and which provided that it was to be enforced against the debtor's property, attached and sought to bring to sale a house as coming within the scope of the decree. The judgment-debtors objected to the attachment and proposed sale on the ground that the house was their own private property and not the property of the debtor within the meaning of the decree, having been validly transferred to them during the debtor's life-time. The objection was disallowed by the court of first instance. *Held*, that s. 283 of the Civil Procedure Code had no application, that the case fell within s. 244, and that an appeal could lie from the first Court's order. *Ram Ghulam v. Hazaru Kuar*, *I. L. R.* 7 *All.* 547, and *Sita Ram v. Bhagwan Das*, *I. L. R.* 7 *All.* 733, followed. *Shankar Dial v. Amir Haidar*, *I. L. R.* 2 *All.* 752. *Abdul Rahaman v. Muhammad Yar*, *I. L. R.* 4 *All.* 190. *Awadh Kuari v. Roktu Tiwari*, *I. L. R.* 6 *All.* 109. *Chowdhry Wahed Ali v. Jumae*, 11 *B. L. R.* 149. *Ameeroonnissa Khatoon v. Meer Mahomed*, 20 *W. R.* 280, and *Kuriyali v. Mayan*, *I. L. R.* 7 *Mad.* 255, referred to. *MUL-MANTRI v. ASHFAK AHMAD*, *I. L. R.* 9 *All.* 605

58. *Issue raised in form of objection by defendant in separate suit.* S. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code bars a suit brought for the determination of certain questions specified therein, but does not bar the trial of any issue involved in those questions if the issue is raised at the instance of a defendant in a suit brought against him. *Basti Ram v. Fattu*, *I. L. R.*

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8 *All.* 146, distinguished. *BHIRAM ALI SHAIK SHIKDAR v. GOPI KANTH SHAHA*

I. L. R. 24 *Calc.* 355
1 *C. W. N.* 396

59. *Question for Court executing decree—Plea taken by defendant in separate suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Res judicata.* When an issue arising out of the execution of a decree has not been raised and determined under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, there is nothing in that section to prevent a defendant in a separate suit subsequently brought from raising that issue in that suit. *Bhiram Ali Shaik Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha*, *I. L. R.* 24 *Calc.* 355, followed. *NIL KAMAL MUKERJEE v. JAHNABI CHOWDHURANI*, *I. L. R.* 26 *Calc.* 946

60. *Party to suit—Question in execution of decree—Right of suit—Minor defendant objecting to sale in mortgage suit, but withdrawing his defence.* In a suit brought upon a mortgage bond after the death of the executant, who was the widow of the last full owner of the properties mortgaged, the present plaintiff, who was a minor at that time, appeared, represented by the manager under the Court of Wards and denied the widow's right to mortgage the properties in dispute. He subsequently withdrew his defence, but remained a party on the record, and a decree was made in his presence. At an execution proceeding taken against the minor son of the alleged adopted son of the last full owner without any notice to the present plaintiff, some of the mortgaged properties were sold. In a suit by him (the plaintiff) for recovery of possession of the said properties, the defence was that the suit was not maintainable by virtue of the provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the plaintiff was a party to the suit in which the decree was passed, his remedy if he could object to the sale, was by an application under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and not by a separate suit. *RAM CHANDRA MUKERJEE v. RANJIT SINGH*, *I. L. R.* 27 *Calc.* 242
4 *C. W. N.* 405

61. *Suit by decree-holder and judgment-debtor against auction-purchaser to set aside sale alleging an uncertified adjustment of the decree prior to sale.* The provisions of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure disallowing a separate suit to determine questions arising between the parties to the suit in which a decree has been passed and bearing upon the execution thereof, operate not only to prohibit a suit between the parties and their representatives, but also a suit by a party or his representative against an auction-purchaser in execution of the decree, the object of which suit is to determine a question which properly arose between the parties or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction

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of the decree. *Basti Ram v. Fattu*, I. L. R. 8 All. 146, and *Prosonno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683, referred to. *DHANI RAM v. CHATURBHUI* . I. L. R. 22 All. 86

See *DAULAT SINGH v. JUGAL KISHORE*
I. L. R. 22 All. 108

62. ————— *Deceased judgment-debtor—Execution against a person not the legal representative.* The defendants, along with one N and C, had brought a suit against one A in the Civil Court at Peshawar in the Punjab, and obtained a decree, on the 23rd July 1878 for Rs. 3,05,545-12-0. In 1881 application for transfer of the decree to the Court at Moradabad for execution was made, and it was granted, but no steps were taken thereupon. On the 12th June 1883 A died. On the 30th April 1884, the defendants again applied to the Court at Peshawar, treating their judgment-debtor as being then alive, for a fresh certificate to execute their decree in the Moradabad district, and obtained it. On the 20th August 1885, they made an application to the District Judge of Moradabad for execution of their decree, and in it it was stated that the application was "for execution against Adjudhia Prasad and after his death against Angan Lal, the own brother, and Durga Kuar, widow, and Lachman Prasad and others, sons of Adjudhia Prasad, residents of Kundarki, and the said Angan Lal, at present residing at Umballa and employed in the Commissariat-Transport Department, judgment-debtors." It was further stated that "the judgment-debtor was dead, and his heirs are living and in possession of his estate, and Angan Lal himself has realized Rs. 9,637-4-9 due to the deceased judgment-debtor from the Commissariat Department of Calcutta and appropriated the same; therefore to that extent the person of the said Angan Lal was liable." Notification of this application was issued to Angan Lal as also to the other persons named therein. Angan Lal objected to the application as against him, stating that, although he was the brother of A, deceased, yet he always lived separate and carried on business separately; and that there was no connection or partnership between him and the deceased judgment-debtor, and that he had no property of the deceased in his possession. Further, that as A left issue, it was wrong to call him an heir to A, and take out execution process against him. In reply to these objections, the judgment-creditors (defendants) did not contend that Angan Lal was the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor, but treated him as a person in possession of a sum of money belonging to the deceased, and, therefore, liable to the extent of the sum so received by him. The Subordinate Judge, holding that Angan Lal was the brother of the deceased and had realized the amount of the Commissariat Office, which he failed to prove that he paid to the deceased, ordered execution to proceed

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s. 244—*contd.*

2. PARTIES TO SUIT—*contd.*

against him. Angan Lal then instituted this suit to set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge. It was contended that the proceedings of the Subordinate Judge were held under s. 244 of the Code, and therefore, no separate suit would lie. *Held*, that the contention must fail, as the Subordinate Judge never treated the proceedings in execution against Angan Lal upon the footing that he was the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor. *Mahomed Aga Ali Khan v. Balmukund*, L. R. 3 I. A. 241, and *Nadir Hossain v. Bipen Chand Bassarat*, 3 C. L. R. 437, were referred to. *ANGAN LAL v. GUDAR MAL* . I. L. R. 10 All. 479

63. ————— *Representative of party to suit—Mortgagee under a conditional sale-deed who has become owner in pursuance thereof.* A person who becomes owner, by process of law, of property mortgaged to him by a deed of conditional sale must be considered as the representative of his mortgagor within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *JANKI PRASAD v. ULFAT ALI* . I. L. R. 16 All. 284

64. ————— *Representatives of judgment-debtor—Death of party to suit before final decree in appeal—Subsequent proceedings in execution taken against representatives of such party.* A decree was given to the defendant (then plaintiff) in 1856 for possession of land and mesne profits against numerous defendants, including one Dawan Rai. Some of the judgment-debtors, including Dawan Rai appealed to the Sadr Diwani Adalat, but before the decree of the Sadr Diwani Adalat was passed, Dawan Rai died. No application was made to put any representative of Dawan Rai on the record; but in 1881 (the amount of the mesne profits payable under the decree having been finally determined in 1877), certain persons were made parties, as representatives of Dawan Rai, to various proceedings in execution of the decree for mesne profits, which ended in the sale of certain property which had been of Dawan Rai in his life-time. Subsequently the said representatives of Dawan Rai brought a suit to recover the property sold as above described on the ground that they were no parties to the decree under execution. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to bring such a suit, and it was not barred by the provisions of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *BENI PRASAD KUNWAR v. MUKHTESAR RAI* . I. L. R. 21 All. 316

65. ————— *Representative of judgment-debtor—Purchaser at execution-sale—Private purchase—Purchase pendente lite.* The defendants Nos. 2, 3, and 4 were, together with one M, the owners of certain immoveable property, including two mehals, Olipore and Ekdhala, subject to a mortgage, on which the mortgagee obtained a decree on 30th July 1875. Whilst that suit was pending, one K D took out execution of a money-decree which

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he had obtained in 1871 against defendant No. 3, and put up for sale the mehal Olipore, which was purchased by the father of the plaintiff A, who eventually obtained possession of it through the Court. The plaintiff B purchased privately the mehal Ekdhala from the mortgagors and from M, some time after the date of the decree on the mortgage. That decree was in course of execution when the mortgagee died, and his estate came into the hands of the Administrator-General, who, on 13th August 1878, sold the decree to G, defendant No. 1. After this sale, several applications were made to have the name of G substituted for that of the original decree-holder, but in none of these applications was any further step taken towards execution of the decree, or any order made for substitution of the name of G, until 18th July 1885, when, after notice to the defendants under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code, G's name was substituted as decree-holder, and execution was taken out against the mortgaged property including Olipore and Ekdhala. The plaintiffs each claimed the mehal they had respectively purchased, but their claims were disallowed. In suits brought by the plaintiffs for a declaration of their right to hold the properties free of the mortgage, the Court found that G was only a benamidar so far as his purchase of the mortgage-decree was concerned. *Held*, that plaintiff A, being the purchaser at a public sale in execution of a decree, was not the representative of the judgment-debtors, the mortgagors, within the meaning of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code; but the case was different with respect to plaintiff B, who claimed by private purchase, and must be considered the representative of the judgment-debtors within the meaning of that section. *Dinendronath Sannyal v. Raj Coomar Ghose*, L. R. 8 I. A. 65 : I. L. R. 7 Calc. 107, *Anundmoyee Dossee v. Dhonendro Chunder Mookerjee*, 14 Moo. I. A. 101 : 8 B. L. R. 122, and *Lalla Prabhulal v. Mylne*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 401, referred to. *GOUR SUNDAR LAHIRI v. HEM CHUNDER CHOWDHURY*. *GOUR SUNDAR LAHIRI v. HAFIZ MOHAMED ALI KHAN* . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 355

66. ———— *Representative of party to suit—Representative of judgment-debtor—Purchaser of property attached under a simple money-decree.* A purchaser by private sale of immoveable property from a judgment-debtor is not a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the decree against the judgment-debtor is a simple money-decree and creates no charge upon specific property. *MADHO DAS v. RAMJI PATAK*
I. L. R. 16 All. 286

67. ———— *Representative of judgment-debtor—Purchaser at execution-sale—Purchaser's right to be heard in support of his objections to the sale.* The term "representatives," as used in s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when taken

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with reference to the judgment-debtor, does not mean only his legal representative, that is, his heir, executor, or administrator, but it means his representative in interest, and includes a purchaser of his interest, who, so far as such interest is concerned, is bound by the decree. There is no reason for excluding from its signification an execution-purchaser of the judgment-debtor's interest. *Held*, therefore, by the Full Bench, that the cases of *Gour Sundar Lahiri v. Hem Chunder Chowdhury*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 355, and *Narain Acharjee v. Gregory*, 8 W. R. 304, so far as they decide that a purchaser at an auction-sale of the equity of redemption in mortgaged properties cannot come in in execution proceedings under a decree upon the mortgage as a representative of the judgment-debtor under s. 244 of the Code are not rightly decided. *ISHAN CHUNDER SIKKAR v. BENI MADHUB SIKKAR*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 62
1 C. W. N. 86

68. ———— *Representative of a party to the suit—Purchaser of property under attachment in execution of a decree—Objection to execution under Civil Procedure Code, s. 278.* The purchaser of property which is under attachment in execution of a decree is a representative of the judgment-debtor under that decree within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Madho Das v. Ramji Patak*, I. L. R. 16 All. 286, referred to. A person to whom s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies cannot avoid the application of that section by filing his objection to execution under s. 278. *Shankar Dat Dube v. Harman & Co.*, I. L. R. 17 All. 245, and *Imdad Ali v. Jagan Lal*, I. L. R. 17 All. 478, referred to. *LALJI MAL v. NAND KISHORE* . I. L. R. 19 All. 332

69. ———— *Representative of a party to the suit—Purchaser of property under attachment in execution of a decree.* *Held*, that the purchaser of property which is at the time of the purchase under attachment in execution of a decree is a representative of the judgment-debtor vendor within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Lalji Mal v. Nand Kishore*, I. L. R. 19 All. 332, followed. *Madho Das v. Ramji Patak*, I. L. R. 16 All. 286, explained. *GUR PRASAD v. RAM LAL* . I. L. R. 21 All. 20

70. ———— *Order in execution of decree—Surplus of sale-proceeds.* One S P executed four mortgages of a certain mouzah. The first mortgagee got a decree on his mortgage, and in execution thereof caused the mouzah to be sold. The sale realized more than enough to satisfy his decree. The third mortgagee also obtained a decree on his mortgage, and sold the same to defendant No. 2, who in the course of the execution of the decree of the first mortgagee applied under s. 295 of the Civil Procedure Code for

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payment to him of the surplus sale-proceeds and obtained an order for the payment. The plaintiff, as purchaser of the equity of redemption of *S P*, brought the present suit to set aside the aforesaid order and to recover the surplus sale-proceeds from defendant No. 2. The Subordinate Judge held that defendant No. 2 was a benamidar for defendant No. 1, that the plaintiff made good his title to the surplus sale-proceeds and gave him a decree. On appeal by defendant No. 2: *Held*, that the order under s. 295 in favour of defendant No. 2 was one coming under s. 244, cl. (c), and that the present suit was not maintainable. *Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 62*, referred to. *Held*, further, that the fact of the sale-proceeds being realized in execution of the decree, not of the third, but of first mortgagee, made no difference, inasmuch as the two execution cases were amalgamated and disposed of simultaneously. *HURDWAR SINGH v. BHAWANT PERSHAD . 2 C. W. N. 429*

71. ——— Application by Collector in pauper suit—Civil Procedure Code, s. 411—Recovery of Court-fees by Government. *Held*, that a Collector applying on behalf of Government, under s. 411 of the Civil Procedure Code, for recovery of Court-fees by attachment of a sum of money payable under a decree to a plaintiff suing *in forma pauperis*, might be deemed to have been a party to the suit in which the decree was passed, within the meaning of s. 244 (c) of the Code, and that an appeal would, therefore, lie from an order granting such application. *JANKI v. COLLECTOR OF ALLAHABAD . I. L. R. 9 All. 64*

72. ——— Civil Procedure Code, s. 291—Sale in execution of decree—Tender of debt by transferee of property—Separate suit. *Held*, that the assignees of a purchaser from a judgment-debtor of property the subject-matter of a decree for enforcement of hypothecation were entitled to come in and protect the property from sale in execution of the decree by tendering the debt and costs under s. 291 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that the executing Court was bound to accept the money and stop the sale. *Held*, also, where the executing Court had refused to accept the money, and the sale had taken place, that a suit by the assignees to set aside the sale and for a declaration of their right to come in under s. 291, was not barred by s. 244 of the Code. *BEHARI LAL v. GANPAT RAI I. L. R. 10 All. 1*

73. ——— Money paid into Court by Pre-emptor—Suit for pre-emption dismissed on appeal—Suit for refund of money paid into Court. A suit for pre-emption was decreed conditionally on the plaintiff paying Rs. 1,595, which the Court determined was the amount of the sale-consideration. He paid the amount to the vendees, and the payment was certified under s. 253 of the Civil

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Procedure Code. Subsequently the decree was modified on appeal by increasing the amount of sale-consideration to Rs. 1,995, which the plaintiff was required to pay as the condition of pre-emption. He never paid the difference between the amount fixed by the first Court and the sum fixed as the true price by the Appellate Court, and the suit consequently stood dismissed. He then assigned to the plaintiff in the suit his right to recover the amount, Rs. 1,595, from the vendees, who, after unsuccessful application made to the Court of first instance, under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, to recover the amount, instituted this suit. *Held*, that the assignee was a representative of the plaintiff in the pre-emption suit within the meaning of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the suit was therefore barred under the provisions of that section. *ISHUR DAS v. KOJI RAM*

I. L. R. 10 All. 354

74. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 293, 306—Liability of defaulting purchaser—Appeal from order under s. 293—Re-sale. At a sale in execution of a decree a decree-holder, who had obtained leave to bid, was alleged to have made a bid through his agent of Rs. 90,000, but he shortly afterwards repudiated the bid and did not pay the deposit. The property was put up for sale again on the following day under s. 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and was in due course knocked down for a smaller sum. The judgment-debtor filed a petition under s. 293 to recover from the decree-holder the loss by resale; the petition was rejected. On appeal: *Held*, that the question at issue was one arising between the parties to the suit, and that an appeal lay against the order rejecting the petition. *VALLABHAN v. PANGUNNI*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 454

75. ——— Application by Purchaser to set aside sale or for compensation for deficiency in area of land—Purchaser adverse in interest to judgment-debtor. A purchaser at an execution sale of immoveable property held by the Sheriff applied to set aside the sale or for compensation on the ground of deficiency in the area of the land sold. *Held*, that, as the interest of the purchaser was adverse to the interest of the judgment-debtor, the former was not the representative in interest of the latter, and therefore, even if the Civil Procedure Code was applicable at all, s. 244 of that Code did not apply. *Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 62*, applied. *RAM NARAIN v. DWARKA NATH KHETTRY*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 264
4 C. W. N. 13

76. ——— Decree against Mortgagor for mortgage-money, and directing sale of mortgaged property as against him and a third

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party—Attachment of other property in possession of third party as that of the mortgagor—Claim by third party to ownership of such property—Suit by decree-holder to establish mortgagor's right to property. In a suit upon a hypothecation bond a third party was made defendant, as she claimed the hypothecated property. The mortgagee obtained a decree for recovery of the amount of the bond, and for enforcement of the mortgage. In execution of the decree, the debt not being satisfied by sale of the mortgaged property, the decree-holder caused certain other immovable property in the possession of the third party to be attached. She objected to the attachment on the ground that this property was her own, and was not liable to sale in execution of the decree. The objection was allowed, and the decree-holder then sued for a declaration that the property belonged to the mortgagor, judgment-debtor, and was liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree. *Held*, that, as no claim in the former suit was made against the objector personally, or in a representative character, but, as regards her, the only claim was virtually for a declaration that she was not entitled to the hypothecated property, the decree affected her only so far as it negated her alleged interest in that property, and, so far as it was sought to be enforced against other property, she was a stranger to that suit, and her objection must be taken to have been decided under ss. 278 and 280 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the present suit was rightly brought under s. 283 and was not barred by s. 244. *Kameshwar Pershad v. Run Bahadur Singh*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 458, referred to. *Mulmantri v. Ashfaq Ahmad*, I. L. R. 9 All. 605, and *Nimba Harishet v. Sitaram Paruji*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 458, distinguished. *JANGI NATH v. PHUNDO* . I. L. R. 11 All. 74

77. *Persons made parties to suit but exempted from operation of decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 278—Objection to attachment.* *Held*, that persons who had originally been made parties to a suit, but had been expressly exempted from the operation of the decree, were not "parties to the suit" within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure with regard to an objection taken by them in respect of the attachment of their property by the decree-holder; but that such objection must be considered to be an objection under s. 278 of the Code. *Jangi Nath v. Phundo*, I. L. R. 11 All. 74, referred to. *MUKARRAB HUSAIN v. HURMAT-UN-NISSA* I. L. R. 18 All. 52

78. *Defendant exonerated from a suit.* A defendant, who had been exonerated from a suit, is not a party within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code, s. 244 (c), and a suit by the plaintiff for contribution for his share of the costs of execution is not barred under that section. *GADICHERLA CHINA SEETAYYA v. GADI-*

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CHERLA SEETAYYA . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 45
See RAMASAMI SASTRALU v. KAMESWARANMA
I. L. R. 23 Mad. 361

where the above case is explained.

79. *Parties to the suit in which the decree was passed—Dismissal of application for sale of property of next friend in suit in forma pauperis—Appeal against order of dismissal—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 411, 412.* An order having been made, in a decree dismissing a suit against the next friend of a minor plaintiff, to pay the Court-fee due to Government in respect of the suit, the Collector attached the property belonging to the said next friend with view to bringing it to sale. While the attachment was subsisting, the next friend died, and his son was thereupon brought upon the record. An application for an order for sale of the property of the son, as the legal representative of his father, having been dismissed, the Collector appealed against the order of dismissal. *Held*, that the Collector was not a party to the suit in which the decree was passed within the meaning of s. 244 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that he had, therefore, no right of appeal; also, that in proceedings relating to the enforcement of an order under s. 412 against a next friend, the next friend cannot be considered to be a party to the suit, and that, in consequence, there is no appeal under s. 244 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure from an order passed in such proceedings. *COLLECTOR OF TRICHINOPOLY v. SIVARAMAKRISHNA SASTRIGAL* I. L. R. 23 Mad. 73

80. *Defendants exempted from decree—Appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, cl. (c), 278, 280, 283—Execution of decree—Defendants exempted from decree—Questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree—Claim or objection to attached property.* Defendants, who are exempted from the operation of a decree, are not parties to the suit, within the meaning of s. 244, cl. (c), of the Civil Procedure Code, and there is therefore no appeal from an order disallowing a claim preferred by them to properties attached in execution of the decree. *RAM PERSHAD v. JAGANNATH RAM* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 134 : s.c. 6 C. W. N. 10

81. *Party suit against whom was dismissed—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 278, 280, 283—Parties—Party against whom a suit is dismissed preferring a claim—Claim—Attachment—Right of suit.* When a suit is dismissed against one of the parties but decreed against the rest, that party cannot be regarded as a party to the suit in relation to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, within the meaning of s. 244, Civil Procedure Code. So when a party against whom a suit is dismissed prefers a claim to property which is attached by the decree-

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holder as being the property of the defendant against whom the suit has been decreed: *Held*, that ss. 278 and 280, and not s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, apply to the case. *Punchanun Bandopadhyaya v. Rabia Bibi*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 711; *Ram Prosad Pandey v. Jagannath Ram Marwari*, 6 C. W. N. 10; *Kameshwar Pershad v. Run Bahadur Singh*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 458; *Kalka Prasad v. Basant Ram*, I. L. R. 23 All. 346, referred to. *KAHIM- UDDIN SARKAR v. LALL MEAH* (1902)

6 C. W. N. 727
s.c. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 696

82. ———— *Purchaser—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 244, 305—Execution of decree—Representative of a party to the suit—Purchaser under a private sale sanctioned by the Court under s. 305. Held*, that a purchaser from a voluntary seller who has sold with the consent and authority of the Court under s. 305 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of s. 244, cl. (c). *GOBARDHAN RAI v. BISHAN PRASAD* (1900) . I. L. R. 23 All. 116

83. ———— *Purchaser—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 310A—Purchase of interest in a tenure from the judgment-debtor, whether a legal representative—Purchase prior to decree—Rent decree. When a person purchases a tenure from the judgment-debtor who was recorded tenant, prior to a decree obtained for arrears of rent, he is not the representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of s. 244, cl. (c), Civil Procedure Code, and has therefore no locus standi to apply in the course of execution proceedings to have the sale set aside. Kameshwar Pershad v. Run Bahadur Singh, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 458, and Ishan Chunder Sarkar v. Beni Madhub Sarkar, 1 C. W. N. 36, relied upon. KALU SAHA v. BHAGABATI DEBYA* (1901) . 6 C. W. N. 127

84. ———— *Purchasers, at a private sale, of interests of mortgagors—Locus standi of such purchasers to make application under s. 244—Representative of parties to suit—Annulment of possession—Confirmation of possession of such purchasers. The purchasers at a private sale of the interests of the mortgagors, decree-holders in a suit brought to set aside the mortgage-decree and the sale in execution thereof, had at the instance of mortgagees, are to be regarded as representatives of certain of the parties to that suit within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ishan Chunder Sarkar v. Beni Madhub Sarkar, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 62, followed. BASUDEB GIRI v. BROJO MOHAN JANA* (1902) . 7 C. W. N. 54

85. ———— *Representatives—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 276—Decree—Execution—Attachment—Judgment-debtor, representative of—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 42 (d) and (g)—Declaratory suit—Cause of action—*

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Receiver. Property was attached in execution of a decree against the judgment-debtor and placed in charge of a Receiver appointed by the Court. While the attachment was pending, the judgment-debtor granted a lease of the property to M, who thereupon set up a right to hold possession of the property and to pay to the Receiver only the rent due from him under the lease. Held, that M was a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that a declaration that the lease was invalid and inoperative as against the decree-holder must be sought for under that section and not by a separate suit. *Semble*: That the decree-holder was, in the circumstances, entitled to such a declaration. MATHEWSON v. GOBARDHAN TRIBEDI (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 492: s.c. 5 C. W. N. 654

86. ———— *Addition by appellant of parties to record as representatives of deceased respondent—Dismissal of appeal—Application by some representatives in execution—Dispute among representatives as to whether some of them had been wrongly brought on—Question determinable in execution. A plaintiff having obtained a decree in a suit, the defendant appealed, and while that appeal was pending plaintiff died. Defendant thereupon brought several persons on the record by an application to the Court under s. 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure, alleging them to be the representatives of the plaintiff. The appeal was unsuccessful, and some of the persons who had been brought on the record by defendant, as representatives of plaintiff, made an application in execution, in which the other representatives, similarly brought on, were not joined, on the ground that they were not, in fact, representatives. Those other representatives, however, claimed to be entitled to join in the execution proceedings. The Munsif stayed the application under the last clause of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and directed the parties to decide their rights by separate suit. This order was appealed against, when the District Judge set it aside and directed the Munsif to determine the question and then proceed with the execution. Held*, that the order was wrong. The Munsif had no jurisdiction in execution to re-open the question as to whether certain persons brought on the record as representatives of the deceased plaintiff, and as such made respondents in the appeal, had been properly joined as parties or not. VENKATACHALA REDDI v. VENKATARAMA REDDI (1901)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 665

87. ———— *Determination of question whether party applying for execution is Representative of decree-holder—Appeal. The effect of the last clause of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to give the right of appeal against an order determining whether a party applying for*

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execution is or is not the representative of the decree-holder. *KRISHNAMA CHARIAR v. APPASAMI MUDALIAR* (1901) . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 545

88. s. 244 (c)—*Execution of decree—Representative of party to the suit in which the decree was passed—Auction-purchaser at sale in execution of simple money decree against judgment-debtor.* Held, that an auction-purchaser at a sale held in execution of a simple money-decree against a judgment-debtor, whose property has been ordered to be sold at the suit of mortgagees in a mortgage-suit, is a "representative" of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of s. 244 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no distinction between the case of a purchaser, who purchases by private agreement from a judgment-debtor whose property is the subject-matter of a suit for sale at the instance of a mortgagee and that of a purchaser, who purchases at a judicial sale in execution of a simple money decree against such judgment-debtor. *Basti Ram v. Fattu*, I. L. R. 8 All. 146; *Madho Das v. Ramji Patak*, I. L. R. 16 All. 286; *Lalji Mal v. Nand Kishore*, I. L. R. 19 All. 332; *Gur Prasad v. Ram Lal*, I. L. R. 21 All. 20; *Dhan Ram v. Chaturbhuj*, I. L. R. 22 All. 86; *Daulat Singh v. Jugal Kishore*, I. L. R. 22 All. 108; *Mathura Das v. Lachman Ram*, I. L. R. 24 All. 239; *Sakhram Govind Kule v. Damodur Akaram Gujar*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 468; *Kuriyali v. Mayan*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 255; *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683; *Bhubon Mohun Pal v. Nunda Lal Dey*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 324; and *Moti Lal Chakerbutty v. Russick Chandra Bairagi*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 326, referred to. *Sabhaijit v. Sri Gopal*, I. L. R. 17 All. 222, not followed. The term "representative" as used in s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when taken with reference to the judgment-debtor, does not mean only his legal representative, that is, his heir, executor or administrator, but it means his representative in interest and includes a purchaser of his interest who, so far as such interest is concerned, is bound by the decree. *Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 62, approved. *Per BANERJI, J.*—Every purchaser of the judgment-debtor's interest, who is bound by the decree, is a representative of the judgment-debtor, within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whether he is a purchaser under a private sale from the judgment-debtor or a purchaser at a compulsory sale held in execution of a decree obtained against the judgment-debtor. *Madho Das v. Ramji Patak*, I. L. R. 16 All. 286; *Gobardhan Rai v. Bishan Prasad*, I. L. R. 23 All. 116; *Jaqal Narain v. Jagrup*, I. L. R. 5 All. 452; *Radha Madhub Haldar v. Monohur Mukerji*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 756, and *Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 62, referred to. *GULZARI LAL v. MADHO RAM* (1904) . I. L. R. 26 All. 44

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89. *Representative of judgment-debtor—Rent-decree against recorded tenant—Transferee of portion of occupancy holding before decree.* Where the landlord of an occupancy holding obtains a decree for rent against his recorded tenant, an unregistered transferee of the tenant, into whose hands a portion of the holding had previously passed, is bound by the decree and is therefore a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Principle of Full Bench case—Ishan Chandra Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 62, applied. *Azgar Ali v. Asabod-din Kazi*, 9 C. W. N. 134, followed. *GORI NATH CHATTOPADHYA v. SAJANI KANTA SINGH* (1905) 10 C. W. N. 240

90. *Execution, pending appeal, of decree reversed on appeal—Restitution—Right to claim restitution—Party—Representative—Transferee of decree passed on appeal—Decree—Execution.* S. 553 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be read with s. 244 of the Code, and under the conjoint operation of the two sections, the assignee of the decree of the Appellate Court, which reversed the decree appealed against, being the representative, within the meaning of s. 244, of the party in whose favour the appellate decree is passed, is entitled to obtain restitution by applying for execution of the appellate decree. *JAMINI NATH ROY v. DHARMA DAS SUR* (1906) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 857

91. *Rival decree-holders—Order distributing surplus proceeds of a putni sale—Appeal—Representative of judgment-debtor—Attaching creditor.* Where the surplus sale-proceeds of a putni sale having been attached by two judgment-creditors of the putnidar on different dates the District Judge made an order for the rateable distribution of the sale-proceeds amongst them, and one of them appealed against that order, the judgment-debtor himself remaining indifferent: Held, that no appeal lay, an attaching creditor of the judgment-debtor not being his representative within the meaning of s. 244, Civil Procedure Code. S. 244, Civil Procedure Code, does not apply when the question concerns two rival decree-holders. *RAM CHUNDER v. HAMIRAN* (1906) 11 C. W. N. 433

92. *Auction Purchaser not a representative of decree-holder when the question is the right of such purchaser to possession against judgment-debtor.* The purchaser at an auction sale, held in execution of a decree, is not the representative of the decree-holder, when the question to be decided is the right of such auction-purchaser to possession as against the judgment-debtor. S. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure is no bar to a separate suit by the auction-purchaser for possession

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s. 244—contd.

2. PARTIES TO SUIT—contd.

of the purchased property from the judgment-debtor. *Kishory Mohun Roy Chowdhry v. Chunder Nath Pal*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 644, followed. *Manickka Odayan v. Rajagopala Pillai*, I. L. R. 30 Mad. 507, doubted. *Sandhu Taragunur v. Hussain Sahib*, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 87, considered. *Obiter*: The purchaser from a decree-holder is, but the purchaser at a Court sale is not, a representative of the decree-holder for the purposes of s. 244. *KRISHNA SATAPASTI v. SARASVATULA SAMBASIVA ROW* (1908) I. L. R. 31 Mad. 177

93. ————— *Official Assignee*
—Disallowance of claim of Official Assignee to have proceeds of sale in execution of decree against insolvent judgment-debtor paid to him—*Appeal*. Held, that the Official Assignee not being the representative of an insolvent judgment-debtor, no appeal would lie against the disallowance of his claim to have the proceeds of a sale in execution of a decree against an insolvent judgment-debtor paid over to him. *Kashi Prasad v. Miller*, I. L. R. 7 All. 752; *Sardarmal v. Aravayal Sabhapathy*, I. L. R. 21 Bom. 205, and *Chandmull v. Ranee Soondery Dossee*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 259, referred to. *OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE v. HAZARI LAL* (1908) I. L. R. 30 All. 486

94. ————— *Occupancy Holding*
—Unregistered Transferee—Auction-purchaser of his interest, if bound by rent-decree against registered tenant—Right to apply to set aside sale as fraudulent—*Locus standi*. A purchaser in execution of a decree against an unregistered transferee of an occupancy holding as well as the unregistered transferee himself are bound by a decree for rent subsequently obtained against the registered tenant. The purchaser is therefore a representative of the judgment-debtor within the provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code and may apply to set aside a sale held in execution of the rent decree on the ground of fraud. *Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 62, followed. *Azgarali v. Asaboddin Kazi*, 9 C. W. N. 134, *Gopi Nath Chattopadhyaya v. Sajani Kanta Singh*, 10 C. W. N. 240, referred to. *HARADHAN RAKHIT v. GIRIS CHANDRA MUKERJEE* (1908) 13 C. W. N. 98

95. ————— *Execution of decree*
—Jurisdiction of Court executing a decree—Suit by representative of mortgagor judgment-debtor for declaration of invalidity of mortgage. Held, that when a decree for sale of specific mortgaged property is being executed, it is not open to persons made parties to the execution proceedings as legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor to contend in those proceedings that the mortgagor was not competent to make the mortgage and that the decree was one which ought not to have been made. A separate suit, therefore, on the part of such persons seeking a declaration that the

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mortgagor was not competent to make the mortgage in question will not be barred under the provisions of section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Lalidhar v. Chaturbhuj*, I. L. R. 21 All. 277, followed. *JAGAR NATH SINGH v. SHEO GHULAM* (1908) I. L. R. 31 All. 45

96. ————— *Execution of Decree*
—Parties to suits—Minor, representation of, in suits
—Appointment of "Married woman" to be guardian ad litem contrary to section 457 of Civil Procedure Code—Suit by minor to set aside decrees and sales in execution—Separate suit—Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), s. 53. The words "parties to the suit" in s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) mean persons who have been properly made parties in accordance with the provisions of the Code. Where contrary to the provisions of s. 457 of the Code a minor had been represented throughout certain litigation by a married woman, her sister and guardian of her person, who was appointed her guardian ad litem: Held, that the minor had not been properly represented in the litigation, and that a suit by her to set aside decrees and sales which had taken place in execution of them, and as to which she alleged fraud and breach of trust, was not barred by s. 244. S. 53 of the Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890) does not give a married woman who is guardian of the person of a minor a preference to the appointment of guardian ad litem of such minor. That section leaves s. 457 of the Civil Procedure Code untouched, the effect of the two sections read together being that a proper guardian of the person of the minor may, if properly qualified, be preferred as the guardian ad litem. *RASHID-UNNISA v. MUHAMMAD ISMAIL KHAN* (1909) I. L. R. 31 All. 572

s. 244, cl. (c)—

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 265

See PRACTICE

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 5

s. 244 (e)—

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 26

ss. 244, 258—Execution of decree—Uncertified Payment out of Court—Subsequent execution by decree-holder—Suit to recover sum paid out of Court. A judgment-debtor made a part payment of what was due under the decree against him to the decree-holder, but such payment was not certified in the manner required by s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the decree-holder in consequence was able to take out execution and get the amount paid twice over. Held, that a suit by the judgment-debtor to recover the amount paid out of Court to the decree-holder was not barred either by s. 244 or by s. 258 of the Code. *Shadi v. Ganga Sahai*,

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ss. 244, 258—concl'd.

I. L. R. 3 All. 538, and Periatambi Udayan v. Vellaya Goundan, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 409, followed. GENDO v. NIHAL KUNWAR (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 464

ss. 244, 278—

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.

*I. L. R. 30 Mad. 215
8 C. W. N. 353*

ss. 244, 278—Wakf Property—

When judgment-debtor objects as trustee, claim falls within s. 278 and the order on such claim is not appealable—Decree directing sale of Wakf property valid. When the judgment-debtor or his representative objects to the attachment and sale of property in execution on the ground that he holds the property in trust for some third person or a charitable institution, the claim must be investigated under the provisions of ss. 278—283 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not under s. 244. An order passed on such claim must be challenged by a regular suit and not by appeal. A decree directing the sale of wakf property may, in certain circumstances, be valid. Such a decree is not against public policy and is not necessarily ultra vires. BUDRUDEEN SAHIB v. ABDUL RAHIM SAHIB (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 125

ss. 244, 278, 283—Debutter property—Appeal—Claim—Right of suit—Estoppel. In execution of a decree obtained by the defendant against the plaintiff's father, the plaintiff as legal representative of his father preferred a claim to a property attached on the ground that it was not the personal property of his father but that it was debutter property; the claim being disallowed he preferred an appeal which was dismissed upon the defendant's objection that it was an order not under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, but upon an application under s. 278. *Held*, that in a regular suit by the plaintiff for declaration that the property is debutter defendant is estopped from raising the question that it was barred by s. 244, Civil Procedure Code. *HARA DHAN KALIA v. PURNA CHANDRA MONDAL (1906)* . *11 C. W. N. 145*

ss. 244, 291—Mortgage-Decree—Sale—Stay—Right of auction-purchaser before confirmation of sale to deposit decretal amount and costs—Representative of judgment-debtor—Inchoate title—Right to redeem—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 91. A first mortgagee obtained a decree on his mortgage in the presence of the second mortgagee. When he proceeded to sell the mortgaged properties, an auction-purchaser of the properties at a sale held in execution of a decree obtained on the second mortgage—which sale, however, had not yet been confirmed by Court—deposited the decretal amount under s. 291, Civil Procedure Code, and prayed that the sale might be stopped. *Held*, that the auction-purchaser was a representative of the judgment-debtor, second

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ss. 244, 291—concl'd.

mortgagee, within the meaning of s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, and he was entitled to make the deposit. *Ishan Chandra Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 62, followed. Hara Sankar Prosad v. Shew Govind Shaw, 4 C. W. N. 317; I. L. R. 27 Calc. 966, referred to. RADHA KISEN MARWARI v. HEM CHANDRA BOSE (1907)* *11 C. W. N. 495*

ss. 244, 291, 311—

See WAIVER . *11 C. W. N. 848*

ss. 244, 294—Confirmation of Sale no bar to set aside sale in contravention of s. 294—Plaint or written statement in Court executing decree may be treated as application under s. 244—Burden of proof in suit to set aside sale. The holder of a mortgage decree brought the mortgaged property to sale in execution. He applied to the Court for permission to bid at the sale, and the Court granted him permission, fixing an amount as the minimum at which he was to bid. The decree-holder purchased the property at sale by Court in the name of a third party for a sum far less than the minimum fixed by the Court and less than the principal amount secured by the mortgage. The sale was confirmed and possession delivered to the purchaser, but actual possession remained with certain parties who had purchased the property from the original mortgagor. In a suit brought by the decree-holder and auction-purchaser, as plaintiffs in the Court which executed the decree, against the original mortgagor, and the purchasers from them as defendants, the defendants who discovered the fraud of plaintiffs subsequent to the confirmation of sale, contended that the sale to plaintiffs was fraudulent and contrary to the provisions of s. 294 of the Code of Civil Procedure:—*Held*, (1) that the confirmation of the sale was no bar to enforcing the right of defendants to set aside the sale, the fraud having been discovered only after such confirmation. *Held*, also, *per MILLER and SANKARAN-NAIR, JJ. (ABDUR RAHIM, J., dissenting)*, that it was open to the defendants to have the sale set aside in the suit by way of answer to the plaintiff's claim. *Per ABDUR RAHIM, J.*—The sale cannot be set aside except on an application by defendants under ss. 294 and 244, Civil Procedure Code, to the Court executing the decree. *Per SANKARAN-NAIR, J.*—A plaint in a suit, in the Court executing the decree may be treated as an application under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. So also a written statement, containing an answer to the plaintiff's claim may be treated as an application under s. 244. Where a decree-holder purchases property in contravention of s. 294, the judgment-debtor, seeking to set aside the sale, need not prove or allege fraud or that the property was sold at an undervalue. In such a case, and especially where the purchase money is less than the amount advanced on the land, it is for the decree-holder to

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show that the sale should be upheld. *Per MILLER and ABDUR RAHIM, JJ.*—The bare fact that the sale was in contravention of s. 294 is not sufficient to set aside the sale as fraudulent. It must be shown that loss resulted to some one in consequence. *Mahomed Gazeer Chowdhry v. Ram Loll Sen, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 757, followed. Biram Ali Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 355, followed. THATHU NAICK v. KONDU REDDI (1909)*

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 242

ss. 244, 295, 622—Rateable distribution—*Different judgment-debtors—Appeal against order under s. 295, if lies—Jurisdiction of High Court to interfere under s. 622.* An order under s. 295 of the Civil Procedure Code passed as between parties who are not the same as in the decree in execution of which assets were realized under s. 295, is not a decree under s. 244, and no appeal lies against the order, and the order of the District Judge on appeal, setting aside the order of the Munsif, is without jurisdiction. *Held, further, that when an order is wholly without jurisdiction, the High Court should interfere under s. 622. Gonesh Das Bagria v. Shiva Lakshman Bhakat, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 583, not applicable. Ramasamy Chettiar v. Orr, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 176, followed. Dayaram Jagjivan v. Govardhandas Dayaram, I. L. R. 28 Bom. 458, distinguished. Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kalidas Sanyal, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683; L. R. 19 I. A. 166, referred to. JAGADISH CHANDRA SHAHA v. KRIPA NATH SHAHA (1908)*

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 130

ss. 244, 310A—*Appeal lies under s. 244 against an order rejecting an application under s. 310A by a Transferee of judgment-debtor after Court sale.* The question of setting aside a sale in execution under s. 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure is a question relating to the execution of the decree within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure even when the proceeds of such sale are sufficient to satisfy the decree, and the auction-purchaser is a person other than the decree-holder. *Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Ayyathurai Pillai, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 416, followed.* The auction-purchaser at a Court sale is the representative of the decree-holder for the purposes of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Sandru Tarangar v. Hussain Sahib, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 87, followed. Bashir-ud-din v. Jhori Singh, I. L. R. 19 All. 140, and Mammod v. Locke, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 487, not followed.* The transferee acquiring an interest in the property of the judgment-debtor after such property had been sold in execution, has a right to apply under s. 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Huzari Ram v. Bodai Ram, 1 C. W. N. 279, dissented from. Erode Manikkoth Krishnan Nair v. Puttedeth Chembakkoseri Krishnan Nair, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 365, followed.* An appeal lies under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure against an order passed on an application by such transferee

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to set aside the sale under s. 310A. *MANICKA ODAYAN v. RAJAGOPALA PILLAI (1907)*

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 507

ss. 244, 310A, 311—*Decree—Execution—Sale at Court auction—Application to set aside sale on the ground of fraud—Appeal lies from orders passed under s. 310A when they also fall under s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, 1882.* Within a month of the sale at a Court auction, the judgment-debtor applied to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground that owing to conspiracy among the villagers (including the decree-holder) the sale was at an undervalue. A week later, but within the month allowed, he again applied to the Court to set aside the sale under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), depositing the amount as required by the section. The Subordinate Judge rejected the second application on the ground that it did not lie as the judgment-debtor had already applied to set aside the sale on the ground of irregularity under s. 311 of the Code. This order was on appeal reversed by the District Judge. On appeal to the High Court, it was contended, *first*, that the order passed by the Subordinate Judge was not appealable; and, *second*, that the second application could not be granted because the judgment-debtor had already applied to set aside the sale under s. 311 of the Code. *Held, (i) that the order passed by the Subordinate Judge was appealable. Pita v. Chunnial, 31 Bom. 207, followed; (ii) that the allegation in the first application being that the sale had been brought about by the fraud of the residents of the village where the lands were situate and where the decree-holder resided, the application must be regarded as an application under s. 244 and not under s. 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882. Decree of the District Judge confirmed. Golam Ahad Chowdhry v. Judhister Chundra Shaha, 30 Calc. 142, followed. HARIHAR KANTA v. RAMA PANDU (1909)*

I. L. R. 36 Bom. 698

ss. 244, 311.

See EXECUTION . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 422

See SALE . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 336

See SETTING ASIDE SALE.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 226

ss. 244, 312, 424.

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT (BENGAL ACT I OF 1895) (AS AMENDED BY BENGAL ACT I OF 1897), ss. 3, 19, CL. (2), AND 20 . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 130

ss. 244, 318—*Execution of decree—Procedure—Appeal—Dispute between two judgment-debtors as to right to property sold in execution.* In execution of a decree against K and J certain property of the judgment-debtors was sold, and was purchased by G P and this sale was confirmed.

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G P then applied under s. 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure asking that *J* might be substituted for the applicant and possession given to her. To this application *K* objected, on the ground that she, at some time prior to the execution of the decree and sale of the property, had given a certain sum of money to *J* and that *J* had misappropriated this money and had purchased with it the property which was sold in execution of the decree. *Held*, that no question was raised falling within the purview of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure and no appeal would lie from the order allowing the auction-purchaser's application under s. 318.

KASTURA KUNWAR v. GAYA PRASAD (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All. 207

ss. 244, 318, 319—*Execution of decree—Sale in execution—Purchase by decree-holder, but possession not given—Remedies open to decree-holder, auction-purchaser—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 138.* A decree-holder, whether holding a decree for sale on a mortgage or a simple money decree, who purchases at a sale held in execution of such decree property belonging to his judgment-debtor, is in the same position as would be any other purchaser at an auction sale held in execution of a decree. *Sabhaiji v. Sri Gopal*, I. L. R. 17 All. 222, and *Mahabir Pershad Singh v. Macnaghten*, I. L. R. 16 Cal. 682, referred to. If after confirmation of a sale in his favour the auction-purchaser fails to obtain from the judgment-debtor possession of the property purchased, he may claim possession not only by an application under s. 318 or s. 319 of the Code of Civil Procedure but also by suit: s. 244 of the Code is not a bar to such suit and does not apply to such an application. *Raynor v. The Mussoorie Bank, Limited*, I. L. R. 7 All. 681, *Magan Lal v. Doshi Mulji*, I. L. R. 25 Bom. 631, and *Gulzari Lal v. Madho Ram*, I. L. R. 26 All. 447, referred to. *Kalian Singh v. Thakur Das*, *Weekly Notes*, (1886) 87: s. c. 3 A. L. J., 234, and *Sheo Narain v. Nur Muhammad*, I. L. R. 30 All. 72, overruled. *Madhusudan Das v. Gobinda Pria Chowdhurani*, I. L. R. 27 Cal. 34, and *Kattayat Pathumayi v. Raman Menon*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 740, dissented from. *Mahomed Mosraf v. Habib Mia*, 6 C. L. J. 749, followed. *Seru Mohan Bamia v. Bhagoban Din Pandey*, I. L. R. 9 Cal. 602, *Kishori Mohun Roy Chowdhry v. Chunder Nath Pal*, I. L. R. 14 Cal. 624, and *Sandhu v. Hussain*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 87, referred to. *Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Cal. 683, distinguished. No appeal will lie from an order under s. 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Narain Singh v. Pargash*, *Weekly Notes*, (1886) 45, *Dhunda v. Durga*, *Weekly Notes*, (1893) 122, *Ghulam Shabbir v. Dwarka Prasad*, I. L. R. 18 All. 36, *Babu Luchmee Narain v. Baboo Bhairon Prasad*, N.-W. P., H. C. Rep. 1866, Misc. Ap. 5, *Bhimlal Das v. Ganeshi Koer*, 1 C. W. N. 658, and *Mahomed Mosraf v. Habib Mia*, 6 C. L. J. 749, referred to. An application under s. 318 of the Code is not an

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application for execution or to take a step in aid of execution. The opinion of *Knox, J.*, in *Kesri Narain v. Abul Hasan*, I. L. R. 26 All. 365, and *Moti Lal v. Mukund Singh*, I. L. R. 19 All. 477, dissented from. So held by *BANERJI, J.* (*AIKMAN* and *GRIFFIN, JJ.*, concurring). *STANLEY, C. J.*, *contra* (*KNOX, J.*, concurring). Where after sale held in execution of a decree and confirmation of such sale the auction-purchaser fails to get possession of the property purchased, proceedings on the part of the purchaser in order to obtain possession are still proceedings relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Moti Lal v. Makund Singh*, I. L. R. 19 All. 477, *Muttia v. Appasami*, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 504, *Sariatoola Molla v. Raj Kumar Roy*, I. L. R. 27 Cal. 709, *Kattayat Pathumayi v. Raman Menon*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 740, *Har Din Singh v. Lachman Singh*, I. L. R. 25 All. 343, *Kasinatha Ayyar v. Uthumansa Rowthan*, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 529, *Ram Narain Sahoo v. Bandi Pershad*, I. L. R. 31 Cal. 737, *Sandhu Taraganar v. Hussain Sahib*, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 87, and *Sheo Narain v. Nur Muhammad*, I. L. R. 30 All. 72, referred to. And if the decree-holder has become the auction-purchaser he does not thereby lose his character of decree-holder so as to make any questions thereafter arising between himself and the judgment-debtor other than questions between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed. *Mahabir Pershad Singh v. Macnaghten*, I. L. R. 16 Cal. 682, *Veraraghava v. Venkata*, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 217, and *Muttia v. Appasami*, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 504, referred to. *BHAGWATI v. BANWARI LAL* (1908) I. L. R. 31 All. 82

ss. 244, 331—

See PARTIES . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 72

ss. 244, 372 and 647—*Decree for an Injunction to protect land—Sale of the land—Subsequent suit by the purchaser for an injunction—Execution of the former decree cannot lie.* A obtained an injunction against B restraining him from obstructing A in the exercise of his right of way to his (A's land) over B's land. A subsequently sold his land to C. B similarly obstructed C. C then brought a suit against B for an injunction in terms similar to that formerly obtained by A. B contended that C's remedy, if any, was by way of execution of the decree obtained by A. *Held*, that as the injunction did not run with the land, there was in the circumstances of the case, no bar to the plaintiff's suit. *JAMSETJI MANEKJI v. HARI DAYAL* (1907) I. L. R. 32 Bom. 181

ss. 244, 545—*Execution of Decree—Order refusing Stay—Appeal—Deliberate exercise of discretion by lower Court.* An order refusing to stay execution of a decree under s. 545 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), is not appealable. *Musaji Abdullah v. Damodardas*, I. L. R.

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ss. 244, 545—*concl'd.*

12 Bom. 279, doubted. Courts of appeal should not lightly interfere with a discretion deliberately exercised by a lower Court. *RAMCHANDRA v. BALMUKUND* (1905). I. L. R. 29 Bom. 71

1. ss. 244, 583—*Possession of property taken without intervention of Court—Decree reversed on appeal—Suit for restitution—Discretion of Court.* In a suit for redemption the plaintiff obtained a decree and took possession of the property in suit without the intervention of the Court. The decree, however, having been reversed on appeal, the defendant brought a regular suit to recover possession of the mortgaged property. *Held*, that a regular suit was precluded by the provisions of ss. 244 and 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but the Court of first instance would have exercised a proper discretion if it had treated the plaint as an application under s. 583 of the Code. *Dhan Kunwar v. Mahitab Singh*, I. L. R. 22 All. 79, and *Saran v. Bhagwan*, I. L. R. 25 All. 441, referred to. *SHEODIHAL SARDH v. BHAWANI* (1907). I. L. R. 29 All. 348

2. Decree *ex parte*—*Sale under—Decree set aside—Second decree satisfied—Suit for possession by judgment-debtor not barred.* K, obtained an *ex parte* decree for sale on a mortgage and in execution thereof caused the mortgaged property to be sold and purchased it himself. The *ex parte* decree was subsequently set aside and another decree was obtained after contest. That decree was satisfied before the property could be sold a second time. As K continued in possession a suit was brought against him to recover possession. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by the provisions of s. 244 or s. 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. *GRIDEHARI LAL v. KHUSHALI RAM* (1909). I. L. R. 31 All. 364

3. Sale in execution of a decree—*Possession given to purchaser who was the decree-holder—Setting aside sale for irregularity—Satisfaction of decree and restoration of property to mortgagor—Remedy for recovery of mesne profits and interest—Application in execution proceedings—Separate suit—Right of purchaser to interest on purchase money.* Under a mortgage decree obtained by the appellant against the respondents the mortgaged property was, in February 1901, put up for sale in default of payment and purchased by the decree-holder who had obtained leave to bid. The purchase money was not paid but was set off by the appellant against the amount due under the decree, which gave no future interest. Possession was given to the appellant in December 1901. In September 1903 the sale was set aside for irregularity and in March 1904 the respondents paid to the appellant the amount due under the decree and possession of the property was restored to them. *Held* (affirming the decisions of the Courts in India), that the respondents were entitled by ss. 583 and 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure to recover mesne

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ss. 244, 583—*concl'd.*

profits and interest thereon in the execution proceedings, and were not obliged to have recourse to a separate suit for the purpose, the delay and expense of which their Lordships would not at this stage of the proceedings have been disposed to permit. *Held*, also, that the appellant was not entitled to interest on his purchase money which had not been actually paid, but was set off against what was due on the decree. The sale was set aside for his fault and it was out of the question that he should be allowed to make a profit at the expense of the respondents out of his own error, and so in effect recover interest not allowed him by the decree. *PRAG NARAIN v. KAMAKHIA SINGH* (1909). I. L. R. 31 All. 551

s. 245 (Act XXIII of 1861, s. 15).

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—APPLICATION FOR EXECUTION AND POWERS OF COURT, ETC.

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 479

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 631

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 67

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 179—NATURE OF APPLICATION—IRREGULAR AND DEFECTIVE APPLICATIONS.

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 124

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 631

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 594

2 C. W. N 556

I. L. R. 20 All. 478

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 180 . . . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 101

1. Investigation of title—*Execution of decree—Act VIII of 1859, s. 214.* Neither s. 214, Act VIII of 1859, nor s. 15, Act XXIII of 1861, contemplated any enquiry before the Court, whether the property belongs to the judgment-debtor or not. *SUBJAN BIBI v. SARIATULLA*. 3 B. L. R. A. C. 413: 12 W. R. 329

2. Filing decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 215.* S. 15, Act XXIII of 1861 (Act VIII of 1859, s. 215), did not make it essential that the decree itself should be filed, but only required certain particulars specified in s. 215, Act VIII of 1859, on which the Judge is empowered to pass orders for execution. *SUFUR ALI v. MOHESH CHUNDER KAUG*. 4 W. R. Mis. 16

3. Irregularity in application for execution—*Procedure.* S. 15, Act XXIII of 1861, did not authorize a Judge to reject an application for the execution of a decree on the ground of an irregularity in form. Where the application is irregular, the Judge should either return it immediately to the applicant for correction, or with his consent cause the necessary correction to be made. *CHOWDHRY PURLADH MAHAPATTAR v. CHOWDHRY JONARDON MAHAPATTAR*. 6 W. R. Mis. 15

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 245—*concl'd.*

4. Application in terms of decree—Decree needing correction. Under s. 15, Act XXIII of 1861, if an application for execution corresponds with the terms of a decree, it should be admitted. If the decree needs correction, the Court executing cannot correct it; but it is for the defendant to apply to the Court which made the decree. *BISHESHUR ROY CHOWDHRY v. BISHESHUR BOSE*
8 W. R. 277

s. 245B.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—DECREES OF COURTS OF NATIVE STATES.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 216

s. 245, cl. (c)—Mortgage—Decree for sale—Jurisdiction. A judgment-debtor against whom a decree for sale has been passed as the legal representative of the mortgagor, is not entitled to object, in the execution proceedings, to the property being sold on the ground that it was not the property of the mortgagor. S. 244 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply to a case, where the judgment-debtor tries to set aside the effect of a decree. *Sanwal Das v. Bismilla Begam*, I. L. R. 19 All. 480; *Liladhar v. Chaturbhuj*, I. L. R. 21 All. 277; and *Hiralal Sahu v. Parmeshwar Rai*, I. L. R. 21 All. 356, followed. *Ram Chandra Mukerjee v. Ranjit Singh*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 242, distinguished. *Khetrapal Singh Roy v. Shyama Prosad Barmam* (1905) I. L. R. 32 Calc. 265

s. 246 (1859, ss. 209, 247).

See SET-OFF—CROSS-DECREES.

I. L. R. 24 All. 481
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 428

Not applicable where both the decrees are not before the Court for execution. S. 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies only where both the decrees which are sought to be set off, against each other are before the Court for execution. *Chajmal Das v. Lal Dharam Singh*, I. L. R. 24 All. 481, followed. *Sinnu Pandaram v. Santhoji Row*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 428, distinguished. *Ponnusamy Nadar v. Doraismy Ayyar* (1909) I. L. R. 32 Mad. 336

s. 247—

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY.

5 C. W. N. 497

s. 248 (1859, s. 216).

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION BY AND AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 636
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 224
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 558
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 314

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—NOTICE OF EXECUTION.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 248—*concl'd.*

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 179 (1871, ART. 167; 1859, s. 20)—NOTICE OF EXECUTION.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II—

ART. 179—NOTICE OF EXECUTION:

6 C. W. N. 656

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 622

7 C. W. N. 793

ART. 180

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 504

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 551

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 921

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 244

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 979

1. Execution of decree—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 179 (5)—Date of issuing notice. Held, that the expression "the date of issuing notice under the Code of Civil Procedure, s. 248," as used in Art. 179 (5) of the second schedule to the Limitation Act, 1877, means the date upon which the Court passes an order for issue of a notice under s. 248, not the date upon which such notice actually issues. *JUMAI KANJAR v. ABDUL KARIM KHAN* (1908)

I. L. R. 30. All. 536

2. Practice—Notice—Application for transmission of decree—Execution—Court which should issue notice—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 223 and 248. The notice under s. 248 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be served by the Court to which the decree is transmitted for execution and not necessarily by the Court which passed it and to which an application is made for transmission under s. 223 of the Code. The Court has a discretion whether or not it will issue a notice before ordering transmission. Ordinarily, in a case like the present, it should be left to the Court, to which the decree is to be transmitted, to issue the notice. *SREENATH ROY v. ROMESH CHANDRA ACHARYA CHAUDHURI* (1908)

12 C.W.N. 897

1. s. 249 (1859, s. 217)—Dismissal for non-appearance when no day was fixed for hearing. Against an application for execution of a decree after notice under s. 216, Act VIII of 1859, the judgment-debtor presented by his pleader certain grounds of objection, and the petition was ordered to be placed on the record. No day for hearing was fixed, but the case was called on, and, on account of the absence of his pleader, the objections of the judgment-debtor were disallowed. Held, that, notwithstanding the absence of the pleader, the Judge should have taken the objections into consideration and passed an order under s. 217. *RAJBALLAB SHAHA v. RAMSADAY GHOSE*

5 B. L. R. Ap. 65; 14 W. R. 155

2. Petition under section, requisites of. A petition under s. 217, Act VIII of 1859, is not required to be verified. *GOPAL CHUNDER v. JUGUT INDUR BUNWAREE GOBIND*

8 W. R. 200

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 251 (1859, s. 22).

See PENAL CODE, s. 186.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 596

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CIVIL CASES.

6 C. W. N. 845

See WARRANT OF EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 7 All. 506

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 18

Penal Code, ss. 149, 353

Criminal force by members of an unlawful assembly to deter public servant from discharge of duty. S. 251 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the Court to specify in a warrant execution for decree the day on or before which the warrant must be executed. A Commissioner attempting to give possession under a time-expired warrant has no authority to go upon land in the possession of the party, who resists the execution. *ABINASH CHANDRA ADITYA v. ANANDA CHANDRA PAL* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 424

s. 252 (1859, s. 203).

See REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PERSON . . .

6 B. L. R. Ap. 100

14 W. R. 431

2 Mad. 336

2 C. L. R. 139

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 142

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 259

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 446

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 309

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 792

s. 253 (1859, s. 204).

See LIMITATION ACT.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 50

See SURETY.

1. Decree—Execution

Surety—Notice to the surety—Court executing the decree can give the notice. The intention of s. 253 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) is that, when a person has made himself liable as a surety for the performance of a decree passed against another, he must have notice in writing that the decree is going to be executed against him. It is immaterial whether such notice is given by the Court which passes the decree or the Court to which it is sent for execution. *LAKSHMISHANKAR v. RAGHUMAL* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 29

2. Decree—Execution

Stay of execution on furnishing security—Execution against surety—Surety's liability—Erroneous decision upon a point of law—Res judicata. The execution of a decree passed in plaintiff's favour was stayed pending appeal by the defendant on his furnishing security. Afterwards the plaintiff having proceeded in execution against the defendant and the surety, the Court allowed the plaintiff's claim against the surety. In a subsequent execution proceeding the plaintiff having presented a *darkhast* for further execution against the surety, the Court passed an

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order allowing the claim. The order was confirmed in appeal. On second appeal by the surety : *Held*, dismissing the second appeal, that it was not open to the surety to re-open the question as to his liability, he having accepted the finding as to his liability in the prior execution proceeding and having abandoned the point in the lower Appellate Court in the present proceeding. *Per Beaman, J. :*—An erroneous decision upon a point of law may yet as between the parties to it, but no further, be a sufficient *res judicata* to preclude them from re-agitating it. The conflict between *Lakshman v. Gopal*, I. L. R. 30 Bom. 506, and *Venkapa Naik v. Baslingappa*, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 411, indicated. *WAMAN v. HARI* (1906) . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 128

s. 254 (1859, ss. 201, 204).

See ATTACHMENT—ATTACHMENT OF PERSON . . .

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 583

8 W. R. 282

s. 257—*Practice—Order for payment of costs of day—Payment into Court or to party.* Where a party to a suit was directed by the High Court to pay the costs of the day, and his solicitor paid the money into Court under s. 257 of the Code of Civil Procedure :—*Held*, that section was not applicable, as the order was not a decree. *SHANKS v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 120

s. 257A.

See COMPROMISE—COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 11 All. 228

1. Agreement modifying decree
—Agreement to pay by instalments—Guarantee to indemnify surety who pays judgment-debt. The provisions of s. 257A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877, apply only as between parties to the decree. *YELLA v. MUNISAMI*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 101

2. Arrangement to pay decree by instalment. The decree-holder and judgment-debtor of a decree filed a petition (*sulehnama*) in the Court executing the decree, praying that the Court would sanction an arrangement providing for the payment of the decree by instalments, and enhancing the rate of interest made payable by the decree. The Court sanctioned the arrangement. *Held*, that the *sulehnama* was within s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code, and the decree might be executed in accordance with its provisions. *SITA RAM v. DASRATH DASS*

I. L. R. 5 All. 492

3. Bond for satisfaction of judgment-debt without sanction of Court. G, the father of the plaintiff, obtained two decrees : one against the defendant A and his father, and the other against A's father alone, and in satisfaction of these decrees obtained a bond without the sanction of the Court, and brought a suit to recover the sum

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due under the said bond. *Held*, that the bond was void under the second clause of s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). **GANESH SHIVRAM v. ABDULA BEG . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 538**

4. *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 88, 89, and 94—Agreement for payment by instalments with enhanced interest—Execution of decree for sale.* A decree for sale under s. 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, can only be executed for the amount decreed or found on an account being taken to be due, and the order for sale cannot, except with regard to any additional costs which may be provided for by an order under s. 94, extend in any way the liability of the judgment-debtor or his property under the decree. *Sita Ram v. Dasrath Das, I. L. R. 5 All. 492*, distinguished. **KASHI PRASAD v. SHEO SAHAI I. L. R. 19 All. 186**

5. *Agreement or adjusting satisfying decree—Mortgage-bond in satisfaction of decree—Sanction of mortgage by Court—Sufficiency of sanction.* Where mortgage-bonds were passed for debts due on decrees, and the execution of the bonds (which had been sanctioned by the Court) and the amounts for which they were passed were certified to the Court, and the Court recorded the adjustment without objection, and the decrees by reason of such adjustment became incapable of execution:—*Held*, that sufficient had been done by the Court to satisfy the requirements of s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), although no formal sanction had been recorded. **KRISHNA RAMAYA NAIK v. VASUDEV VENKATESH PAI. VASUDEV VENKATESH PAI v. MHASTI I. L. R. 21 Bom. 808**

6. *Judgment-debt—Sanction of Court—Contract void—Principal—Surety.* An agreement entered into to pay interest not awarded by a decree in addition to the sum decreed without the sanction of the Court which passed the decree is void under s. 257A of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act XIV of 1882, so far as it operates in satisfaction of the judgment-debt. When the void part of an agreement can be properly separated from the rest, the latter does not become invalid; but where the parties themselves treat debts—void as well as valid—as a lump sum, the Court will regard the contract as an integral one and wholly void, upon which neither the principal nor the sureties can be sued. **DAVLATSING v. PANDU I. L. R. 9 Bom. 176**

7. *Adjustment of decree out of Court—Instalment-bond—Consideration—Execution of decree.* The provisions of s. 257A of Act XIV of 1882 are intended to prevent binding agreements between judgment-debtors and judgment-creditors for extending the time for enforcing decrees by execution, without consideration, and without the sanction of the Court, and are not intended to prevent the parties from entering into a

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fresh contract for the payment of the judgment-debt by instalments or otherwise. **JHABAR MAHOMED v. MODAN SONAHAR I. L. R. 11 Calc. 671**

8. *Compromise—Civil Procedure Code, s. 210.* The parties to a decree for money, dated the 14th July 1871, entered into a compromise whereby, in lieu of a portion of the decretal money, the decree-holder was placed in possession of certain property, and the remainder of the decretal money was to be paid by fixed annual instalments, and, in case of default in the payment of any instalment, it was agreed that the entire amount should become immediately realizable by execution of the decree. On the 11th December 1882, the decree-holder, alleging default in payment of the instalments, applied for the execution of compromise. *Held*, that such an agreement could not be treated as an instalment decree and, as such, capable of execution. *Debi Rai v. Gokal Prasad, I. L. R. 3 All. 585*, followed. **RAMLAKHAN RAI v. BAKHTAUR RAI I. L. R. 6 All. 623**

9. *Adjustment of decree out of Court—Instalment-bond—Consideration—Execution of decree—Right of suit.* An instalment-bond executed by a judgment-debtor in favour of the decree-holder and in consideration of the benefit of the decree being given up is not void as an agreement falling under s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code. Such an agreement is void only as far as it affects the right to execute the decree, and may be the foundation of a fresh suit. *Sellam-ayyan v. Muthan, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 61*, *Jhabar Mahomed v. Modan Sonahar, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 671*, and *Hukum Chand Oswal v. Tahorunnessa Bibi, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 504*, followed. **JUJI KAMTI v. ANNAI BHATTA I. L. R. 17. Mad. 382**

10. *Settlement of decree without sanction by giving promissory note payable on demand—Note renewed from time to time—Suit on note.* On the 4th December 1889, the plaintiffs obtained a decree against the defendants for Rs 941. The decree was made payable in eight days, *i.e.*, on or before the 12th December 1889. On the 9th December 1889, *i.e.*, before the decree was capable of execution, it was settled by the defendants' paying Rs 600 in cash and passing a promissory note for Rs 341 payable on demand and carrying interest at 3 per cent. per mensem. The decree was satisfied and handed over to defendants, and plaintiffs also endorsed the summons to that effect. That compromise was not sanctioned by the Court. On the 9th November 1892, and again on the 4th November 1895, the plaintiffs made up their account with defendants and obtained new promissory notes from them for the amount found due in renewal of the note passed in 1889. The present suit was brought on the note passed on the 4th November 1895, which was for Rs 15, and carried interest at 3 per cent. per mensem. *Held*, that the note sued on fell within the purview of s. 257A of the

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Civil Procedure Code, and was void and unenforceable under the provisions of that section. The consideration for the note given in 1889 was the agreement of the plaintiffs to accept it in satisfaction of the decretal balance due to them. If that agreement was void, the note given for the void consideration was void also. The note was not in fact the agreement, but was given in performance of the agreement. **HEERA NEMA v. PESTONJI DOS-SABHOY** . . . **I. L. R. 22 Bom. 693**

11. *Havala or undertaking by a third party to pay decreed debt for the judgment-debtor—Agreement incorporating the havala in substitution of the decree, capable of execution at the date of the agreement—Suit on such agreement.* The plaintiff obtained a money-decree against the defendant **H P**, and, in execution thereof, attached his property. Thereupon, at **H P**'s request, five persons gave a havala or oral undertaking to pay the amount of the decree, and the attachment was removed. It appeared that some payment was made under the havala. Subsequently **H P** and the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 executed a bond to the plaintiff reciting the havala, the payment thereunder, and agreeing to pay the amount of the decree with interest. Neither the havala nor the bond was brought to the notice of the Court for sanction, and the decree, which was capable of execution, was then destroyed. The plaintiff now sued to recover the debt due under the bond. The District Judge was of opinion that the part of the bond which contained a promise to pay interest was void, but that in respect of the principal amount of the decree it was not void. On reference to the High Court:—**Held**, that the whole bond was void. The havala was an agreement such as is contemplated in para. 1 of s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code, and was void for want of the sanction of the Court under that section. The bond, regarded as one in consideration of the havala, or as an agreement for satisfaction of the decree, was also void under para. 2 of the same sections for a similar reason. **VISHNU VISHWANATH v. HUR PATEL** . . . **I. L. R. 12 Bom. 499**

12. *Agreement extending time of payment under decree without sanction of Court—Application for such sanction after the decree was barred.* The decree in a redemption suit directed that the lands mortgaged should be allowed to be redeemed on payment of **R30-7-0** by the plaintiff to the defendant. The decree was subsequently modified by substituting **R91-2-6** for **R30-7-0**. On the 3rd October 1885, the parties entered into an agreement whereby (*inter alia*) the time to pay the decreed debt was extended to five years from that date, but no sanction of the Court was obtained. On the 18th February 1888, the parties applied to the Court to sanction the agreement of 1885. On reference to the High Court:—**Held**, that the agreement in question required the Court's sanction under s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code, for want of which it was void, so far as it related to the judg-

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ment-debt, and that the sanction could not be given at the date it was applied for. **NARU KOLI v. CHIMA BHOSLE** . . . **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 54**

13. *Agreement for or to give, time for satisfaction of judgment-debt—Agreement without sanction of Court—Illegal contract—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 23—Consideration.* The plaintiff obtained a decree against the defendant, under which the judgment-debtor was liable to pay the amount by instalments with interest at 4 per cent. Eventually, the defendant failing to pay, the plaintiff accepted a bond executed jointly by the defendant and **T**, his father, by which they both became liable for the amount of the decree with interest at 18½ per cent. In a suit on the bond it was contended that the bond was void under s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code, as being an agreement to give time for the satisfaction of the judgment-debt made for no consideration, and without the sanction of the Court, and also, without such sanction providing for payment of a sum in excess of the amount due under the decree; that it was void within the meaning of s. 23 of the Contract Act as being forbidden by, or of a nature to, defeat the provisions of s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code; and that, consequently, the suit on it was not maintainable. **Held**, that s. 257A of the Code was not applicable. That section was framed to prohibit the enforcement of an agreement of the kind mentioned therein if made without the sanction of the Court in execution of the decree, but was not intended to take away the right of parties of entering into a fresh contract, either for payment of the judgment-debt, to give time for such payment, or for the payment of a larger sum than may be covered by the decree if it be for a proper consideration. In this case the consideration for the bond was a lawful consideration; it could not be said that because satisfaction of the decree was not certified to the Court, there was no consideration. **Held**, also, that the bond was not void under s. 23 of the Contract Act. *Semble*: The words "any law" in that section refer to some substantive law, and not to an adjective law, such as the Procedure Code is. **HUKUM CHAND OSWAL v. TAHAR-UNNESSA BIBI** . . . **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 504**

14. *Agreement not to execute decree—Execution—Breach of contract—Suit to recover damages.* The provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code are no bar to a suit to recover damages for breach of a contract not to execute a decree. **HANMANT SANTAYA PRABHU v. SUBBABHAT** . . . **I. L. R. 23 Bom. 394**

15. *Adjustment of a decree barred by limitation.* The plaintiff's father had in his life-time obtained a decree against the first defendant and two other persons. This decree having been partly satisfied, the first defendant and his son, who was no party to the decree, executed a bond for the amount still remaining due. At the

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date of this bond the decree was barred by limitation. No sanction for the bond was obtained under s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code. The adjustment was secured under s. 258. The plaintiff now sued upon the bond. On reference to the High Court : *Held*, that the bond did not require the sanction of the Court under s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code. That section relates to judgment-debts which are still enforceable. *SHRIPATRAV v. GOVIND NARAYAN* . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 390

16. *Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888), s. 27—Adjustment of a decree, suit upon—Agreement to extend time for enforcing decree by execution.* On the 16th July 1886, S obtained a decree against K for Rs 15 with costs. On the next day K paid Rs 200 in part satisfaction of the decree, and induced K to accept a bond by which he (S) gave up the costs, and by which K was to pay the balance of the decree with interest at the end of eight months. S sued upon the bond. K contended that the bond was void under s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code, and that the suit would not lie. *Held*, that the suit would lie. Since the amendment made in s. 258 by Act VII of 1888 such payments or adjustments may be recognized by a Civil Court, except when executing the decree, and, therefore, a suit based upon such a payment or adjustment should be admitted. The concluding clause of s. 258 has no direct bearing on s. 257A, as it relates to a different subject-matter. *Quære*: Whether s. 257A relates exclusively to agreements to extend the time for enforcing decrees by execution, as ruled by the Calcutta High Court, or is applicable to all agreements according to the view taken by the Bombay High Court? *Jhabar Mahomed v. Modan Sonahar*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 671, *Madhavav Anant v. Chilu*, P. J. (1881) 315, *Ganesh Shivram v. Abdullabeg*, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 538, *Pandurang Ramchandra v. Narayan*, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 300, and *Davlatsing v. Pandu*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 176, referred to. *SWAMIRAO NARAYAN DESHPANDE v. KASHINATH KRISHNA MUTALIK DESAI* . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 419

17. *Agreement to give time for the satisfaction of a judgment-debt—Agreement not enforceable without sanction by the Court.* S. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code, when it provides that "every agreement to give time for the satisfaction of a judgment-debt shall be void" unless made for consideration and with the sanction of the Court, etc., does not make such agreements illegal, in the sense prohibited by law. It only prevents such agreements being enforced in a Court of Law. Where such an agreement to give time, never sanctioned by the Court as required by s. 257A, formed part of the consideration for a bond, and had actually been enjoyed by the obligee of the bond :—*Held*, that such consideration, not being in its nature illegal, and not having as a fact failed, there was no reason why the obligor should not enforce

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the terms of the bond. *BANK OF BENGAL v. VYABHOY GANGJI* . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 618

18. *Alteration of decree.* *Per EDGE, C.J.*—An agreement sanctioned under s. 257A cannot be treated, without anything more, as a decree of the Court, and cannot operate as an order under s. 210, though an order under s. 210 would operate as a sanction under s. 257A. *GANDHARAP SINGH v. SHEODARSHAN SINGH* . I. L. R. 12 All. 571

19. *Agreement sanctioned by Court executing decree—Enforcement of agreement in execution.* An agreement, which has received the sanction of the Court of execution under s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code, that money due under it should be realized as in execution of decree rather than by recourse to a separate suit, may be enforced in execution, the Court which would try the regular suit brought upon such an agreement being the same Court which would execute the decree to enforce its own terms. *Sadasiva Pillai v. Ramalinga Pillai*, 5 B. L. R. 383; 24 W. R. 193, relied on. *THAKOOR DYAL SINGH v. SARJU PERSHAD MISSER* . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 22

20. *Agreement between a judgment-creditor and a person other than judgment-debtor—Postponement of execution.* The provisions of s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code do not include within their scope an agreement between a judgment-creditor and a person other than the judgment-debtor whereby such person, in consideration of the postponement of the execution of the decree against the judgment-debtor, undertakes to pay to the judgment-creditor a certain sum of money. Such agreements are, therefore, enforceable, although made without the sanction of the Court. *KESU SHIVRAM MARWADI v. GENU BABAJI POWAR* . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 502

21. *Decree, adjustment of, by strangers—Consideration—Bond on such adjustment.* P having obtained a decree against B, the son of the latter gave the son of the former an instalment bond for the judgment-debt without the sanction of the Court. In a suit by P's son to recover the debt on the bond :—*Held*, that the suit would lie. S. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code applies only to agreements between the parties to the suit or decree. *RAMJI PANDU v. MAHOMED WALLI* . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 671

22. *Adjustment of decree out of Court—Agreement not certified to Court—Res judicata—Suit to enforce agreement or for damages for breach of it.* A decree for partition of family property was passed in favour of two plaintiffs. One of the plaintiffs having died before execution, a question arose between the survivor and one of the defendants as to the devolution of his interest, and the decision was in favour of the surviving plaintiff. The contending parties made an arrangement, according to which some of the land

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 257A—*contd.*

representing the share of the deceased plaintiff should be given to the defendant. This agreement was not certified to the Court, and the decree was executed at the instance of the surviving plaintiff who subsequently refused to give effect to the arrangement. The then defendant now sued in the alternative for possession of the land awarded to him or for damages. *Held*, (i) that the plaintiff's claim for the land was not maintainable; (ii) that the claim for damages for breach of the agreement was maintainable. **KRISHNASAMI AYYANGAR v. RANGA AYYANGAR** . I. L. R. 20 Mad. 369

23. ———— *Agreement for satisfaction of judgment-debt.* A money-decree was passed against a zamindar by the High Court in 1883, and it was transferred to the District Court for execution. The decree-holder attached and prepared to bring to sale certain villages of the judgment-debtor. These villages were included in a mortgage subsequently executed by the judgment-debtor in favour of third parties. Both before and after the mortgage the decree-holder received from the zamindar certain sums in consideration of his agreeing to postponements of the sale; also it was agreed between them at a date subsequent to the mortgage that interest should be computed at a higher rate than that provided by the decree. Subsequently the decree-holder sought to bring the land to sale, and in computing the amount then due gave credit for none of the sums so received and calculated interest at the enhanced rate. The mortgagee objected that the computation was erroneous in both these respects, and the District Judge upheld his objection. The judgment-debtor took no part in the contest. *Held*, that the District Court, not being the Court which passed the decree, had no power to sanction the agreements under s. 257A, and that the decision was right. **PARAMANANDA DAS v. MAHADEER DOSSJI**
I. L. R. 20 Mad. 378

24. ———— *Agreement to give time to the judgment-debtor—Agreement not sanctioned by the Court.* A judgment-debtor asked for time to pay the decretal amount. The decree-holders agreed to give time on condition that the judgment-debtor gave them a hundi for Rs. 1,500, that sum representing a portion of the decree-holder's claim which had been dismissed as barred by limitation. The judgment-debtor gave the hundi, but the sanction of the Court was not obtained to the transaction. In a suit by the decree-holders to recover the money secured by the hundi given under the circumstances mentioned above, it was *held* that the transaction was one contemplated by s. 257A of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that, as it had not been made with the sanction of the Court, it could not be enforced, and the suit should be dismissed. **Hukum Chand Oswal v. Taharunnessa Bibi**, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 504, dissented from. **DAN BAHADUR SINGH v. ANANDI PRASAD**
I. L. R. 18 All. 435

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 257A—*contd.*

25. ———— *Agreement as to payment of decretal money—Void agreement.* An agreement between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor for the satisfaction of a decree by which any sum in excess of the decretal amount is payable, and which has not been sanctioned by the Court which passed the decree, cannot be made the basis of a subsequent suit. **Dan Bahadur Singh v. Anandi Prasad**, I. L. R. 18 All. 435, **Ganesh Shivram v. Abdulla Beg**, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 538, **Darlatsing v. Pandu**, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 176, **Vishnu Vishwanath v. Hurr Patel**, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 499, and **Narayan Deshpande v. Kashinath Krishna Mutalik Desai**, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 419, referred to. **DALU MALWAHI v. PALAKDHARI SINGH**
I. L. R. 18 All. 479

26. ———— *Want of sanction of Court to agreements for satisfaction of decree.* Agreements for the satisfaction of a judgment-debt not sanctioned under s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code are void; but, if sanctioned, they may be carried out in execution. **DURGA PRASAD BANERJEE v. LALIT MOHUN SINGH ROY**
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 86

27. ———— *Agreement for satisfaction of judgment-debt—Agreement in satisfaction of judgment-debt, suit to enforce—Previous sanction of Court.* S. 257A, Civil Procedure Code, is a bar only to execution proceedings in respect of agreements therein mentioned, and does not prohibit their enforcement by separate suit. **HURKISSEN DASS SEROWGEE v. NIBARAN CHANDER BANERJEE** (1901) 6 C. W. N. 27

28. ———— *Execution of decree—Agreement which supersedes the operation of the decree, not within the terms of s. 257A.* *Held*, that an agreement whereby a decree is adjusted, and so rendered unenforceable, is not within the purview of s. 257A of the Code of Civil Procedure. **Ram Ghulam v. Janki Rai**, I. L. R. 7 All. 124; **Jhabar Mahomed v. Moan Sonahar**, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 671; **Hukum Chand Oswal v. Taharunnessa Bibi**, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 504; **Juji Kamti v. Annai Bhatta**, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 382; **Tukaram v. Anantbhat**, I. L. R. 25 Bom. 252; **Venkata Subramania Ayyar v. Koran Kannan Ahmod**, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 19; and **Hurkissen Dass Serowgee v. Nibaran Chander Banerjee**, 6 C. W. N. 27, referred to. **Heera Nema v. Pestanji Dossabhoy**, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 693, and **Dhanram Ragho v. Ganpat Sadashiv**, I. L. R. 27 Bom. 96, dissented from. **Dhan Bahadur Singh v. Anandi Prasad**, I. L. R. 18 All. 435; and **Dalu Malwahi v. Palakdhari Singh**, I. L. R. 18 All. 479, distinguished. **LALJI SINGH v. GAYA SINGH** (F.B. 1903) I. L. R. 25 All. 317

29. ———— *Agreement to give time—Decree—Mortgage—Amount of decree included in the mortgage—Satisfaction.* The agreement to which the first paragraph of s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1892) relates is one which suspends

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 257A—*contd.*

and does not destroy the rights of execution consequent on a decree. Where a mortgage-bond was given for an amount which included a sum due under a decree, and made the whole amount payable in instalments, it was contended, under s. 257A of Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), that the bond was void to the extent of the sum due under the decree, being an agreement to give time for the satisfaction of a judgment-debt, and that in respect of that sum no suit would lie. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable. The mortgage-bond did not suspend the right to execute the decree, but it put an end to the remedy on the decree and substituted the mortgage-bond. It was the actual and present satisfaction of the judgment, and therefore was not an agreement to give time for the satisfaction of a judgment-debt, and did not fall within s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code. *TUKARAM v. ANANTBHAT* (1900)

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 252

30. ——— Agreement to give time for the satisfaction of a judgment-debt. The test as to whether s. 257A of the Code of Civil Procedure operates to render an agreement void is whether the parties agree that the judgment-debt, *qua* judgment-debt, shall be put an end to. If so, the section does not render the agreement void. If not, it does. After a decree had been passed in favour of a plaintiff in a suit, the defendant gave plaintiff a bond by which he undertook to pay plaintiff, by instalments, the amount still due to him under the decree, after giving credit for a payment which had already been made on account. The bond gave plaintiff a twofold remedy in case of default,—*first*, a right to sue for the balance, and *secondly*, a right to recover the balance by executing the decree. The sanction of the Court was not obtained. Plaintiff received instalments, in pursuance of the terms of the bond, for some time, but defendant subsequently ceased to make any further payments. Plaintiff thereupon brought this suit on the bond to recover the balance which still remained unpaid, when it was pleaded in defence that the bond was void under s. 257A of the Code of Civil Procedure: *Held*, that the effect of the bond was to keep alive the relation of judgment-creditor and judgment-debtor by the express agreement of the parties, the debt being enforceable as a judgment-debt. *Held*, also, that, on its true construction, the bond was an agreement to give time for the satisfaction of a judgment-debt, and, as the sanction of the Court had not been obtained, was void. And that the agreement was none the less void because one of the parties to it (the legal representative of one of the judgment-debtors) had not been one of the parties to the suit in which the decree was obtained. *Juji Kamti v. Annai Bhatta*, **I. L. R. 17 Mad. 382**, and *Hukum Chand Oswal v. Taharunnessa Bibi*, **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 504**, commented on. *VENKATA SUBRAMANIA AYYAR v. KORAN KANNAN AHMOD* (1902) . . . **I. L. R. 26 Mad. 19**

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 257A—*contd.*

31. ——— Unsanctioned mortgage
—*Decree—Satisfaction of decree by a mortgage without sanction of Court—Mortgage bond void.* The plaintiff was the holder of a decree against the defendant for R2,370. On the 28th November 1895, the plaintiff advanced to the defendant R59, and, in consideration of this advance and of the amount already due by the defendant to the plaintiff under the decree, the defendant mortgaged certain property to the plaintiff. The mortgage bond provided for payment of interest on the mortgage debt at the rate of 10½ per cent. per annum. The plaintiff subsequently sued on the mortgage to recover the principal and interest. *Held* (dismissing the plaintiff's suit), that the mortgage was void under s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), no sanction having been obtained. *Heera Nema v. Pestonji Dossabhoy*, **I. L. R. 22 Bom. 693**, followed. *DHANRAM RAGHO v. GANPAT SADASHIV* (1902)

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 96

32. ——— Decree—Satisfaction—Sanction of Court—Agreement to pay less than decretal amount—Void condition in a bond. On the 4th October 1897 plaintiff obtained a money decree against defendant for R529-10-0. In full satisfaction of this decree, defendant, on the 3rd June 1898, executed a mortgage-bond, agreeing to pay R500 within three months from the date of the bond, and in case the sum were not so paid then to pay interest at R1½ per cent. per mensem, until payment. *Held*, that, so far as the bond provided for the payment of R500, it was valid, as it was for the payment of a sum less than the decretal amount, and therefore did not fall within the meaning of paragraph 2 of s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Held*, further, that the agreement to pay interest was void under paragraph 2 of s. 257A of the Code. *Held*, also, that, as the agreement to pay interest after the expiration of three months was a separate agreement, it did not affect the right to sue for recovery of the R500. *BHAGCHAND v. RADHAKISHAN* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 62

33. ——— Decree—Satisfaction—Sanction of the Court—Hindu law—Father's debts—Son's liability to pay. The plaintiff obtained a decree against N for R350. In satisfaction of this decree, N and his son A, who were living as members of a joint Hindu family, passed two bonds, the one for R251 and the other for R99. Both the bonds provided for the payment of interest and no sanction of the Court was obtained to this arrangement. *Held*, (i) that the whole agreement was void, as the provision regarding interest carried the sum beyond the decretal amount. The consideration for each bond was the payment of principal with interest, and it existed from the very commencement and formed the basis of the whole contract; (ii) that the bonds were void against N, as well as

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 257A—contd.

against A, since N and his son A being members of a joint Hindu family, the son was as much liable as his father under the decree. *Per CURIAM*: "The true test, it appears to us, of the application of s. 257A is—is it a judgment-debt as to the person executing the agreement, in the sense that it is binding upon him, as if he were bound by the decree. Under Hindu law, the pious obligation of a son to pay his father's debts exists, whether the father is living or dead. The mere fact that a father is alive, when the decree against him is sought to be executed, does not absolve the son from his liability and entitle him to say that satisfaction of the decree shall not be obtained by selling his interest in the family property. When, however, the decretal debt is tainted by illegality or immorality, the son can contend that the decree is not binding upon him and establish the contention in a separate suit." *GOVIND v. SAKHARAM* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 383

34. Evidence Act

(I of 1872), s. 92—*Execution of decree—Agreement—Khata—Decision on a point not raised by the defendant.* It is not open to a Judge to decide a case in defendant's favour on a point not raised by him with the result that, if the decision be upheld, it will cast upon the defendant a far higher liability than if he had made the order, which the plaintiff had asked for. In an execution proceeding the parties arrived at an agreement in satisfaction of the decree. The agreement was in the form of a khata. Subsequently the plaintiff brought a suit on the khata and claimed interest on the amount in suit. A question having arisen in the suit as to whether the khata sued on was enforceable: *Held*, allowing the claim for the principal amount only, that if there was an agreement to pay interest, then either it was a part of the agreement embodied in the khata, or was a separable agreement. If it was a part of the agreement to be embodied in the khata, then under s. 92 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) evidence of it was not admissible. If it was a separate agreement, then it would not vitiate the agreement embodied in the khata, which apart from the separate oral agreement could not be open to objection under s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Bhagchand v. Radhakisan*, I. L. R. 28 Bom. 62, followed. *RAICHAND v. NARAN* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 310

35. Agreement to give

time on condition of payment of higher rate of interest—Sanction of Court not accorded—Non-execution of judgment-debt—Separate suit to recover enhanced interest, maintainability of. It is only when the judgment-debt is extinguished and a new contract made that an agreement giving time for the satisfaction of the judgment-debt, not sanctioned by the Court, can be enforced. Where, therefore, the judgment-debtors filed an application before the Court executing the decree for a postponement of

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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s. 257A—concl.

the sale, as they had agreed to pay interest at a rate higher than the decretal rate, but the sanction of the Court was not accorded to such payment. *Held*, that, as the agreement contained in the petition did not put an end to the plaintiff's claim on their previous decree and substitute something else in its place, it was void under s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code, and that no separate suit would lie to recover the enhanced interest under the agreement. *Hurkissen Dass Serowjee v. Nibaran Chander Banerjee*, 6 C. W. N. 27, distinguished. *Venkata Subramania Ayyar v. Koran Kannan*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 19, and *Lalji Singh v. Gaya Singh*, I. L. R. 25 All. 317, followed. *GOPAL SAHU v. BRIJ KISHORE PERSHAD* (1905)

**I. L. R. 32 Calc. 917
s.c. 9 C. W. N. 1004**

36. Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 2, cl. (g), 23 and 124—Mortgage-bond—Consideration made up of several items—Decretal debt one of the items—Sanction of the Court not obtained—Effect on the bond. N. G. sued to redeem a mortgage. The consideration for the mortgage consisted, *inter alia*, of an amount due under a decree. The decree did not provide for interest, whereas interest was chargeable on the decretal amount included in the mortgage. The lower Appellate Court held that as the agreement had not been sanctioned under s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) the whole mortgage bond was void. *Held*, reversing the decree of the lower Court, that though the provision in the mortgage bond regarding the decretal amount could not be enforced, the remaining provisions were good and enforceable at law. *BHAGABAI v. NARAYAN* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 552

37. Agreement out of Court, to pay rent decree by instalments on hypothecation of property, if illegal—Suit to enforce such agreement, if maintainable. A suit lies to enforce an agreement embodied in an instalment-bond executed, without the sanction of the Court, in favour of the decree-holder, hypothecating certain property for payment of a decretal amount. *Lalji Singh v. Gaya Singh*, I. L. R. 25 All. 317, referred to. *Held*, further, that the provision as to giving time to execute the decree is not illegal, though it may be incapable of enforcement, as the agreement was not made with the sanction of the Court. *Juji Kamti v. Annai Bhatta*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 382, referred to. *BELCHAMBERS v. SARAT CHANDRA GHOSH* (1908)

**I. L. R. 35 Calc. 870
s.c. 12 C. W. N. 674**

s. 258 (1859, s. 206).

See ante, ss. 88 AND 89.

See s. 244 (ACT XXIII OF 1861, s. 11)—
QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION DECREE.

7 C. W. N. 172

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 258—contd.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 179 (1871,
ART. 167)—ORDER FOR PAYMENT
AT SPECIFIED DATES

- I. L. R. 2 All. 291
- I. L. R. 4 All. 316
- I. L. R. 7 All. 327
- I. L. R. 12 All. 569
- I. L. R. 21 Calc. 542
- I. L. R. 19 Mad. 162

See MORTGAGE—SALE OF MORTGAGED
PROPERTY—PURCHASERS.

- I. L. R. 24 Mad. 412

See PENAL CODE, s. 210.

- I. L. R. 16 Calc. 126
- I. L. R. 10 Bom. 288

1. Adjustment of decree—
Beng. Reg. VII of 1799, decrees under. S. 206 of
Act VIII of 1859 did not apply to decrees under
Regulation VII of 1799. *GOPAL CHANDRA DEY v.*
PEMU BIBI . . . 1 B. L. R. A. C. 76

2. Enquiry by Court
as to satisfaction out of Court—Proceedings in
execution of decree. Act VIII of 1859, s. 206,
applied only to proceedings which were taken while
the decree was in execution, and did not preclude
the Court, before putting the decree in execution
from enquiring if it has been satisfied out of Court.
OBHOY CHURN MOOKERJEE v. PEAREE DOSSIA
22 W. R. 270

3. Inquiry as to
satisfaction of decree between judgment-debtor and
transferee of decree. On an application for execution
of a decree being presented by a transferee decree-
holder, the judgment-debtor opposed, alleging in
his petition that he had transferred certain immove-
able property to the petitioner in consideration of his
paying the judgment-debt to the original decree-
holder, and that the petitioner had discharged the
debt, but subsequently, having got the decree
transferred to himself instead of entering up
satisfaction of the decree, fraudulently applied for
execution. Satisfaction had not been entered up
under s. 258, Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that
s. 258, Civil Procedure Code, was inapplicable to the
case, since that section applies only to the case of
parties who stand in the relation of judgment-
debtor and judgment-creditor at the date of the
transaction. *RAMA AYYAN v. SREENIVASA PATTAR*
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 230

4. Decree-holder
—Execution of decree—General Clauses Consoli-
dation Act. Regard being had to the General
Clauses Consolidation Act (I of 1868), the word
“decree-holder” in s. 258 of the Civil Procedure
Code, 1882, should be read in the plural. *TARRUCK*
CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE v. DINENDRO NATH
SANYAL . . . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 831
12 C. L. R. 566

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 258—contd.

5. Money decree.
S. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1877, deals with
the adjustment of any decree, and not merely with
the adjustment of a money decree. *BABA MOHA-*
MED v. WEBB
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 786 : 8 C. L. R. 36

6. Civil Procedure
Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888), s. 27—Changes
of law relating to procedure—Adjustment or satisfac-
tion of decrees. The change effected in the language
of s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of
1882) by s. 27 of the amending Act (VII of 1888),
by which uncertified adjustments can now be
recognized by other Courts than the Court executing
the decree, applies to adjustments previous to the
amending Act. Changes of law relating to proce-
dure have retrospective effect. *BALKRISHNA PAN-*
DHARINATH v. BAPU YESAJI
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 204

7. Execution of decree
—Money decree—Limitation Act (XV of 1877),
Sch. II, Art. 173A. S. 258, Civil Procedure Code,
1882, refers only to the execution of decrees under
which money is payable, and is not applicable to
decrees for possession of immoveable property.
SANKARAN NAMBIAR v. KANARA KURUP
I. L. R. 22 Mad. 182

8. Adjustment out of
Court. According to s. 206, Act VIII of 1859,
no adjustments made out of Court were admissible
by the Court in execution. *MOTEE LALL v. RAM*
DASS . . . W. R. 1864, Mis. 38

BHYA BROOPNATH SAHEE v. KUNWAN

7 W. R. 134
GUNGA GOBIND GOOPTOO v. MAKHUN LALL
HATTEE . . . 9 W. R. 362

9. Letter from Decree-
holder to Vakil. A letter from a decree-holder
to his vakil to put in an acknowledgment into
Court is not a settlement out of Court certified to
the Court in the manner required by s. 206, Act VIII
of 1859, to warrant further investigation in the
matter. *THAKOOR LAL MISSREE v. KANYE LAL*
TWAREE . . . 7 W. R. 510

10. Voluntary adjust-
ments. Where a judgment-debtor pays the amount
decreed to the officer of the Court under the author-
ity and pressure of the Court's process, he is
entitled to protection; the latter clause of s. 206,
Act VIII of 1859, relating not to such payments
but to voluntary adjustment. *BIDHOO BEEBEE*
v. KESHUB CHUNDER . . . 9 W. R. 462

11. Adjustment out
of Court. Where several of the acts required to be
done in execution of a decree are such as can be done
through a Court, and where all of them are acts the
doing of which may be certified to the Court by the
person in whose favour the decree was made, the
policy of s. 206 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 258—*contd.*

exclude the reception of evidence upon the point, or any question arising out of evidence before the Court. No adjustment can be recognized unless made through the Court or certified by the person in whose favour the decree was made. **DWAREANATH DASS BISWAS v. UNNODACHURN DASS**

8 W. R. 319

12. *Adjustment out of Court—Decree-holder becoming purchaser.* A decree-holder, who was not barred by lapse of time in seeking to execute his decree, was opposed by the judgment-debtor, on the ground that the decree had been seized and sold by the Deputy Collector in execution of the decree of that functionary's Court, and that he himself (the judgment-debtor) had become the purchaser thereof. *Held*, that these proceedings amounted to an adjustment out of Court, which, under s. 206, Act VIII of 1859, could not be recognized by the Court, unless certified to by the judgment-creditor himself. **BHARUT CHUNDER ROY v. NAZIR ALI KHAN**

10 W. R. 354

13. *Adjustment out of Court—Sufficiency of certificate of payment.* A petition signed and filed in Court by a judgment-creditor certifying payment of the amount due to him by his judgment-debtor is a sufficient certificate of payment under the decree in the terms of s. 206, Code of Civil Procedure. **SAADOULLAH SHAIKH v. KALEECHURN**

12 W. R. 358

14. *Adjustment out of Court—Duty of execution-creditor—Presumption.* K, an execution-creditor of C, applied to the Court by which the decree was passed, and caused C to be imprisoned under it. C then entered into a compromise upon certain terms with K for the adjustment of the decree, and K, thereupon, but without certifying the terms of such adjustment to the Court, petitioned for the release of C who was accordingly released. Subsequently K again applied to the Court to compel satisfaction of the whole amount of the decree against C. This application was opposed by C on the ground that an adjustment of the decree had taken place between him and K. The Judge, however, refused to enter into the question of the adjustment, as the terms of it had not been certified to the Court under s. 206 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that the Judge was in error; that it was the duty of K, on applying for the release of C, to certify the adjustment to the Court; that it would be unjust to allow him to take advantage of his own omission to do so; and that, not having done so, the presumption against him was that the decree had been satisfied in full; but that, under the circumstances, it would be the most equitable course to direct the Judge to enquire into the terms of the adjustment. Case remanded for that purpose. **CHANGO VALAD DUVHA MAHAJAN v. KALURAM NARAYANDAS**

4 Bom. A. C. 120

15. *Adjustment out of Courts—Compromise.* H sued B to recover pos-

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 258—*contd.*

session of a certain house. B answered that the house was his own; that H having fraudulently got possession of it, he (B) had filed a suit to recover possession; that a decree was passed in his favour in the lower Court, which, however, was reversed on appeal; that, pending a special appeal, a compromise had been entered into between him and H, in pursuance of which he (B) was put in possession of the house. The terms of this compromise were not certified to the Court under s. 206 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that this compromise, having been effected after the decree in favour of B had been reversed, did not come within the meaning of s. 206, and was, therefore, a good defence to the suit of H. **HARI SADASHIV DIKSHIT v. BAPU BULVANT**

5 Bom. A. C. 78

16. *Adjustment made out of Court—Payment into Court.* Under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 206, a debtor under a money decree can at any time bring the amount of his debt into Court to be paid to the judgment-creditor; and by analogy any other person against whom a decree is made for the delivery of moveable or immoveable property has an equal right to relieve himself from further vexation by making satisfaction with the knowledge of the Court in such mode as the circumstances of the special case admit of. By the same section all adjustments of decrees, whatever be the nature of the subject of those decrees, must be made with the knowledge of the Court. *Quære* (by MARKBY, J.): Where a party simply acts in obedience to a decree, is he debarred from showing that he has done so by the words "no adjustment of a decree, in part or in whole, shall be recognized by the Court, unless such adjustment be made through the Court, or be certified to the Court by the person in whose favour the decree has been made or to whom it has been transferred?" **RAJ LUCKHEE CHOWDHRAIN v. TEWARREE CHOWDHRY**

18 W. R. 520

17. *Splitting decree into shares—Payments by judgment-debtor.* Payments by a judgment-debtor in satisfaction of a decree which is afterwards split up into shares, if made through the Court, and while the decree is entire, ought to be taken into account and set off as in satisfaction of the whole decree. **BHYRUB NATH SHAHA v. KUNHYA LAL ROY**

20 W. R. 131

18. *Suit on kistbundi—Adjustment through Court.* The suing on a kistbundi in Court does not necessarily make it the instrument of a public adjustment through the Court, within the meaning of s. 206, Act VIII of 1859. **MUDDON MOHUN MITTER v. PRER BUKSHUN**

7 W. R. 485

19. *Part payments not certified to Court.* *Quære*: Whether part payments under a decree may not be proved,

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although they have not been made through the Court, or certified to the Court under s. 206 of Act VIII of 1859. **BHUBONESWARI DEBI v. DINANATH SANDYAL** 2 B. L. R. A. C. 320: 11 W. R. 232

20. ———— *Bond payable by instalments—Execution of decree—Limitation.* A judgment-creditor is entitled to prove payments made according to the terms of a kistbundi, for the purpose of showing that his right to sue out execution under the kistbundi was not barred by limitation. **BHUBONESWARI DEBI v. DINANATH SANDYAL** 2 B. L. R. A. C. 320: 11 W. R. 232

BISHTO CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. WOOMANATH ROY CHOWDHRY . . . 15 W. R. 459

21. ———— *Decree payable by instalments—Execution of decree—Limitation.* Where a creditor has obtained a decree for money payable by instalments, the whole amount to become due on failure by the debtor to pay one of the instalments, he is upon failure entitled, notwithstanding s. 206 of Act VIII of 1859, to come into Court and certify to the Court and prove payment of the earlier instalments, to show that execution of his decree is not barred. **FAKIR CHAND BOSE v. MADAN MOHAN GHOSE**

4 B. L. R. F. B. 130: 13 W. R. F. B. 40

JUGGUT MOHINEE DOSSEE v. MADHUB CHUNDER KUR . . . 15 W. R. 66

22. ———— *Payment not certified to Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), s. 206—Decree payable by instalments.* A decree dated 22nd Cheyt 1295 (18th April 1882) provided "that the defendants do pay the decretal money as per instalments given below, otherwise the plaintiff will have the power to cancel the instalments and realize the entire amount." The first instalment was made payable on 30th Cheyt 1295 (26th April 1888), and the other six instalments on the 30th of the months of Magh and Bysack in the three following years. In an application made on 9th February 1892, for execution of the decree, the decree-holder stated that only the first instalment had been paid, and asked for execution for the amount remaining due under the decree, and the judgment-debtors denied having paid any of the instalments. Payment, even if made, had not been certified to the Court. *Held*, that, although under the provisions of s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, the payment in question, if made, could not be recognized as a payment or adjustment of the decree, yet it was competent to the decree-holder to prove such payment for the purpose of showing that the execution of the decree was not barred. There is no material difference in this respect between s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) and s. 206 of the old Code (Act VIII of 1859), on which the case of *Fakir Chand Bose v. Madan Mohan Ghose*, 4 B. L. R. F. B. 130, was decided. **HURRI PERSHAD CHOWDHRY v. NASIB SINGH** . . . I. L. R. 21. Calc. 542

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23. ———— *Limitation.* The Court cannot recognize any arrangement between the parties enlarging the period of limitation allowed by law for the execution of decrees or which alters the terms of the decree. **KRISHNA KAMAL SING v. HIRU SIRDAR** . . . 4 B. L. R. F. B. 101

KISTO KOMUL SINGH v. HUREE SIRDAR
13 W. R. F. B. 44

MEHEROONNISSA v. ROUSHAN JEHAN
17 W. R. 396

RAM RUNJUN CHUCKERBUTTY v. JOWHURUJUMAH KHAN . . . 23 W. R. 129

24. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 302—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), ss. 19 and 20—Execution transferred to Collector—Acknowledgment in the Court of the Collector of part payment of decretal money.* Where, after a decree had been sent to the Collector for execution under the provisions of s. 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the decree-holder and judgment-debtor joined in an application to the Collector in which they stated, on the one hand, that the decree-holder had received Rs. 2,900 in part payment of the decretal amount, and, on the other, that there was a certain balance due from the judgment-debtor under the decree, and that arrangements had been made between the parties for the payment of such balance: *Held*, that the above application was properly made to the Collector as being, within the meaning of s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree," and that the application was a valid acknowledgment for all purposes and sufficient under ss. 19 and 20 of the Limitation Act, 1877, to save limitation in respect of the execution of the decree. **MUHAMMAD SAID KHAN v. PAYAG SAHU I. L. R. 16 All. 228**

25. ———— *Uncertified payment of part of decretal amount—Plea of limitation raised by judgment-debtor.* S. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not debar a decree-holder from giving evidence of uncertified payments made to him out of Court in partial satisfaction of the decree by the judgment-debtor where the judgment-debtor has, in answer to an application for execution of the decree against him, put forward a plea of limitation. *Fakir Chand Bose v. Madan Mohan Ghose*, 4 B. L. R. F. B. 130; *Purmananddas Jiwan-das v. Vallabdas Wallji*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 506, *Sham Lal v. Kanahia Lal*, I. L. R. 4 All. 316, *Zahur Khan v. Bakhtawar*, I. L. R. 7 All. 327, and *Hurri Pershad Chowdhry v. Nasib Singh*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 542, referred to. **KISHAN SINGH v. AMAN SINGH** . . . I. L. R. 17 All. 42

26. ———— *Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888), s. 27—Payment not certified to Court—Proof of such payment for the purpose of determining the question of limitation.* Under s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by Act VII of 1888), as there is no time

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fixed within which the decree-holder is bound to certify a payment made out of Court, such payment may be certified at any time. And although such payment, until certified, cannot be recognized by a Court executing a decree as a payment or adjustment of the decree, it is still open to the Court to take evidence about the payment in order to determine whether an application for execution is barred by limitation. *Harri Pershad Chowdhry v. Nasib Singh*, 1. L. R. 21 Cal. 542, followed. *TUKA-RAM v. BABAJI* . . . 1. L. R. 21 Bom. 122

27. ————— *Kistbundi—Execution of decree.* Where a decree had been obtained for a certain sum of money without interest and afterwards a kistbundi was filed, by which the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor agreed that the amount of the decree should be paid by instalments with interest, and the judgment-debtor had, by his conduct for several years, treated the kistbundi as if it were a decree: *Held*, that, under the circumstances of the case, the judgment-debtor could not afterwards object that the kistbundi could not be executed as a decree, and that a fresh suit should be brought upon the kistbundi; but the decree-holder was entitled to take proceedings on the kistbundi as if it were part of the original decree. *DINONATH SEN v. GURU CHURN PAL*
14 B. L. R. 287 : 21 W. R. 310

JANKEE v. SREENATH ROY CHOWDERY
5 W. R. Mis. 19

28. ————— *Kistbundi.* There is no procedure under Act VIII of 1859 under which execution can be taken out upon a kistbundi filed in Court after decree which has not been incorporated with the decree. *MADHUB CHUNDER DHUNPUT v. MADHUB LALL KHAN*
14 B. L. R. 288 note : 15 W. R. 542

29. ————— *Kistbundi.* Where a decree was obtained for a sum of money, and afterwards by an arrangement between the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder it was agreed that the decree should be payable by instalments with interest at a very high rate, and payments had subsequently been made of large sums of money in the terms of the arrangement and a balance remained due: *Held*, that the decree-holder could not recover in execution of the decree any sum beyond what was stated in the decree. *KANHYALAL PUNDIT v. COLLECTOR OF CUTTACK*
14 B. L. R. 291 note : 16 W. R. 275

DWARKNATH SADHOO KHAN v. DOORGA CHURN SAHA . . . 6. W. R., S. C. C. Ref., 1

30. ————— *Bond given in satisfaction—Default in paying.* Where a judgment-debtor executed a kistbundi or instalment bond, providing for the satisfaction of the decree which had been obtained against him, and subsequently failed to pay according to the terms of the kistbundi: *Held*, that the decree-holder could

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enforce his claim under the terms of the kistbundi by proceeding in execution, and need not file a fresh suit. *TARIF BISWAS v. KALIDAS BANERJEE*
2. B. L. R. A. C. 223 : 11 W. R. 86

31. ————— *Release without consideration—Adjustment otherwise than through the Court.* A had obtained a decree against B, C, and D in execution of which the sheriff attached certain property belonging to B, C, and D, who were carrying on business in partnership. The property was sold, and the proceeds paid into Court, and by order of Court A received a sum in part satisfaction of his decree. Subsequently A, at the request of B, and without receiving any consideration, gave him a letter in Bengali purporting to be a release to him of the remainder of his decree, but such adjustment was not made through the Court. A afterwards applied for execution of his decree against B, C, and D, but his application was refused, the Court treating the letter as a release. A appealed. *Held*, on appeal, that the letter was not a release; there was no consideration for it. The adjustment of the decree should have been made through the Court or certified to it in accordance with s. 206, Act VIII of 1859. *BHUBHUN MOHAN BONNERJEE v. SADU CHARAN SARKAR*
6 B. L. R. 339 : 15 W. R. O. C. 5

32. ————— *Agreement between parties for payment of decree by instalments—Subsequent application for execution.* C obtained a decree against N for payment of a certain sum of money. Various applications were made to execute the decree, and on one of them, in September 1869, the sum of Rs. 1,000 was paid. Subsequently, on December 16th, 1870, it was arranged, upon a petition of N and the consent of C, that a further payment of Rs. 1,000 should be made, and that the balance of the debt should be paid with interest at the rate of 1 per cent. per month by monthly instalments of Rs. 125. In May 1872, C applied for execution for recovery of the balance due on the decree, deducting the amount received under the arrangement. *Held*, that he was not entitled to execution in supersession of the agreement. *CHUNDER NATH MISSEER v. GOURIE KOMUL BHUTTACHARJEE*
10 B. L. R. Ap. 28 : 19 W. R. 155

33. ————— *Kistbundi, effect of, on decree.* A kistbundi, or arrangement to pay by instalments the amount of a decree obtained upon a bond, does not effect an extinction of the original debt or the mortgagee's lien upon property mortgaged to him by the bond. *RAMCHURN LALL v. KOONDUN KOOMAREE* . 14 B. L. R. 428 note

RAM CHURN LALL v. RUGHOOBEER SINGH
11 W. R. 481

34. ————— *Kistbundi—Postpone-petition—Execution of decree.* Plaintiff sued in the Munsif's Court of Ellore for recovery of certain moneys claimed as due under a "postpone-petition." In execution of a decree in a former suit

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s. 258—*contd.*

between the same parties a petition was presented by them to the Munsif's Court, stating an arrangement between them for the payment of the amount decreed by instalments with a provision that in default of payment, "the Court may, on the application of the plaintiff issue a warrant and collect the amount, with costs of the petition, from the produce of my share of the aghaharam lands which are held liable by the razinama decree of this suit, from the said lands from my other property and from myself, and pay the same to plaintiff." The petition concluded thus: "We, both the parties, present this postpone-petition with our free will and consent, and pray for its being enforced according to its terms. *Held*, on second appeal, by the Full Court affirming the decree of both the lower Courts, that, as it was clear that no intention existed between the parties to create new rights enforceable by suit in supersession of those acquired or declared by the decree, a suit on the "postpone-petition" was not maintainable. *DARBHA VENKAMMA v. RAMA SUBBARAYADU*. I. L. R. 1 Mad. 387

See DEBI RAI v. GOKUL PRASAD

I. L. R. 3 All. 585

and *GANGA v. MURLIDHAR*

I. L. R. 4 All. 240

35. *Kistbundi, substitution of, for decree—Consent of parties—Execution of decree.* The consent of parties cannot give jurisdiction, nor can it alter the nature of the decree. An agreement introducing fresh parties cannot be substituted for the decree or become capable of execution as if it was the original decree. *BHOOPENDRONATH CHOWDHRY v. KALEE PROSUNNO GHOSE*. . . 24 W. R. 205

36. *Instalment Bond intended to revive barred decree.* An instalment-bond by a judgment-debtor acknowledging a balance to be due under the decree, but executed without consideration, and after the decree is barred by limitation, cannot either revive a decree or be legally binding on his representatives. *HEERA LALL MOOKERJEE v. ROY DHUNPAT SINGH*

24 W. R. 282

37. *Agreement to pay by Instalments—Enforcing kistbundi or instalment-bond by execution.* An agreement between the parties to a decree to reduce its amount or to give time for his payment, or that the amount shall be paid by instalments, does not amount to a varying of the decree itself. A having obtained against B a decree for the payment of money, a kistbundi was inserted in the decree, by which it was arranged that the amount of the decree should be paid by instalments of Rs. 5,000. A considerable remission was allowed to the judgment-debtor, and some reduction was made in the amount of interest payable. The kistbundi contained an express proviso that in default of payment of three consecutive kists the

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whole amount due under the bond was to become at once realizable; and it also provided that in case of default the amounts due were to be recovered by execution, to which the judgment-debtor was to make no objection. Certain instalments having fallen due, the judgment-creditor sought to enforce the kistbundi by execution. *Held*, that he was entitled to do so; that he was not bound to bring regular suit; and that a provision in the bond by which payment might be enforced against property which could not have been attached and sold in execution of the decree did not prevent the decree-holder from proceeding by execution so long as he did not seek to enforce that provision. *AMEER-UNNISSA KHATOON v. MEER MAHOMED HOSSEIN*

2 C. L. R. 143

38. *Agreement to pay by Instalments—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 258.* A decree passed against the defendant in a suit, dated 13th March 1877, directed "that the plaintiff should recover the decree-money by instalments, agreeably to the term of the deed of compromise, and he, in case of default, should recover in a lump sum." The compromise mentioned in the decree provided that the amount in dispute should be paid in ten instalments, from 1284 to 1294 Fusli, the first to be paid on the 27th May 1877 (1284 Fusli), and the remaining nine instalments on Jaith Purnamashi of each succeeding Fusli year. On the 1st September 1883, the decree-holder applied for execution of the decree, alleging that the first four instalments had been paid, but not any of the succeeding instalments, and they claimed to recover under the terms of the decree, the fifth and all the remaining instalments in a lump sum. The judgment-debtors contended that the application was barred by limitation, as they had not paid a single instalment, and more than three years had elapsed from the date of the first default; and that, even if the first four instalments had been paid, such payments could not be recognized by the Court as they had not been certified. *Held*, that recognition of such instalments was not barred by the terms of s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Sham Lal v. Kankhia Lal*, I. L. R. 4 All. 316, and *Fakir Chand Bose v. Madan Mohun Ghose*, 4 B. L. R. F. B. 130, followed. *ZAHUR KHAN v. BAKHTAWAR*. . . I. L. R. 7 All. 327

39. *Contract superseding Decree—Civil Procedure Code, s. 258—Certification.* In the course of proceedings in execution of a decree, dated the 14th June 1878, the parties, on the 11th January 1881, entered into an agreement, which was registered, and filed in the Court executing the decree. The deed recited that the decree was under execution, and that a mortgage bond, dated the 1st December 1873, in favour of the judgment-debtor by a third party, had been attached and advertised for sale, and that the decree-holder and judgment-debtor had arranged the following method of satisfying the decree: that the

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judgment-debtor should make over the said bond to the decree-holder, in order that he might bring a suit thereon at his own expense against the obligor, and realize the amount secured by the bond, and out of the amount realized satisfy the decree under execution with costs and future interest, together with all costs of the suit to be brought against the obligor, and together with a sum due by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder under a note of hand for Rs250 with interest; and other details which need not be stated. On the same day that this deed was executed, the decree-holder filed a petition in the Court, to the effect that under the agreement an arrangement had been made for payment of the judgment-debt, by which the judgment-debtor made over to him the bond advertised for sale in order that the petitioner should file a suit under it at his own cost against the obligor, and realize the debt due under the decree in execution with interest and costs; and he prayed that the sale to be held that day might be postponed, and the application for execution struck off for the present, and the previous attachment maintained, and stating that after realization of the amount entered in the bond advertised for sale, an application for execution would be duly filed. On this the order was that the execution case be struck off the file and the attachment maintained. On the 24th December 1883, the decree-holder applied for execution of the decree, alleging that the judgment-debtor had failed to make over the bond to him according to the agreement. The judgment-debtor objected that the decree was no longer capable of execution, having been superseded by the agreement of the 11th January 1881, and that the application was barred by limitation, the previous application being dated the 9th November 1880. *Per* OLDFIELD, J.—That the agreement of the 11th January 1881 did not contemplate, and had not the effect of, cancelling the decree and substituting for it a new contract, inasmuch as the deed contained nothing to the effect that the decree was superseded, and all it did was to provide means by which the decree, together with another small sum due by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder, might be satisfied without having recourse to the sale of the bond attached, and the effect would be that, on realization satisfaction would be certified in whole or in part to the Court executing the decree. Further, if the arrangement was to be regarded as within the meaning of an adjustment of the decree under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, it could only be recognized by the Court when certified by the decree-holder or judgment-debtor; and in this case the only certification which was made was by the decree-holder, by his petition of the 11th January 1881, which was in respect of a temporary arrangement under which the decree remained in force. *Per* MAHMOOD, J.—That the agreement of the 11th January 1881 was intended by the parties as a performance of the obligation created by the decree, by substituting a fresh obligation founded upon contract, but that the

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deed could not be regarded as such an adjustment of the decree as satisfied the requirements of s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, because the creditors, whilst admitting the creation of a separate contract, took care to say that the decree was to be kept alive, and the attachment thereunder was to subsist; and that, therefore, the certification of the adjustment was inadequate and could not be recognized in executing the decree. *FATEH MUHAMMAD v. GOPAL DAS* . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 424

40. ————— *Adjustment by parties out of Court—Subsequent application for execution of decree—Refusal to certify payment to Court.* When a decree has been adjusted between the parties by a contract binding upon them, a Court is not bound to issue process of execution on the original decree in violation of the terms of the contract, although the decree-holder refuses to certify the adjustment of the decree under s. 206 of the Procedure Code, especially where the Court executing the decree is the Court to which the parties would go for the purpose of enforcing the contract. *KRISHNAJI KESAVA PUNDIT v. SUBBARAYA TAKKER* 7 Mad. 387

41. ————— *Certifying part payment of decree—"To show cause," meaning of.* In determining under s. 258 of Act XIV of 1882 whether or no the cause shown by the decree-holder is sufficient, it is incumbent upon the Court to investigate and decide any questions of fact upon which the parties may not be agreed. In such an investigation evidence may be given either orally or by affidavit. The term "to show cause" does not mean merely to allege causes, nor even to make out that there is room for argument, both to allege cause and to prove it to the satisfaction of the Court. *RUNG LALL v. HEM NARAIN GIR*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 166

42. ————— *Power of Court to examine parties as to satisfaction of decree made out of Court.* A Court executing decrees, whilst giving effect to s. 206 of Act VIII of 1859, should also take reasonable care that its process is not about to be abused for fraudulent purposes. It may, by examining the judgment-debtor and others having knowledge, inform itself of the position of the decree, and whether it has or has not been satisfied. This, however, is merely an enquiry to inform the Court and it need not frame and decide an issue. *PARRECHUT v. RUGHO GOORDEO* . . . 2 N. W. 48

43. ————— *Payment out of Court—Power of Court to go into question of satisfaction of decree.* If a judgment-debtor, after receiving notice that the right, title, and interest of the decree-holders in the decree has been attached, pays the decree-holders the money due under the decree, the payment is not a valid payment and the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree is competent to enter into that question, and to determine whether the alleged satisfaction is binding

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upon the auction-purchaser of the attached right, title, and interest above mentioned. **BYJNATH-SAHOO v. DOOLAR CHAND SAHOO** 24 W. R. 245

44. *Injunction to restrain execution after agreement out of Court not to execute.* Where a decree-holder agrees for a good consideration not to enforce his decree, the Court may legitimately, on the suit of the opposite party, issue an injunction against the former not to do what he has agreed not to do, Act VIII of 1859, s. 206, notwithstanding. **NUBO KISHEN MOOKERJEE v. DEBNATH ROY CHOWDHRY** 22 W. R. 194

45. *Refusal to certify to Court.* Where a payment alleged to have been made in satisfaction of a decree is not certified to the Court executing the decree, the Court is bound to proceed as if such payment had never been made. If such payment has in fact been made to the judgment-creditor and he dishonestly refuses to certify it to the Court when called upon to do so, he can be made liable to refund it in an action. **MAHOMED KAZEM JOWHURRY v. KATOO BEBEE**

20 W. R. 150

46. *Contract to certify satisfaction of decree, breach of—Suit for damages.* The provision in s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1882, which forbids any Court to recognize a payment under, or an adjustment of, a decree unless certified to the Court executing the decree, does not debar a suit for damages for a breach of a contract to certify. **MALLAMA v. VENKAPPA**

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 277

47. *Act XII of 1879, s. 36—Suit to recover money paid out of Court in satisfaction of decree.* The provisions of s. 206 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859) only prevent the Court executing the decree from recognizing a payment made out of Court, and do not bar a suit for the refund of such payment. *G* held a decree against *D*, who satisfied it out of Court, and obtained a receipt from *G* to the effect that it was satisfied. Notwithstanding this, *G* executed the decree and recovered the amount of it through the Court, although *D* pleaded satisfaction in the execution proceedings and produced the receipt. In a suit brought by *D* against *G* for refund of the money received by *G* out of Court, the defendant contended that the suit was not maintainable. *Held*, that it was maintainable according to the law as it stood before the passing of Act XII of 1879. **Gunamani Dasi v. Prankishori Dasi**, 5 B. L. R. 223, and **Gulawad v. Rahimtulla**, 4 Bom. A. C. 76, followed. *Quere*: Whether such a suit is maintainable under s. 36 of Act XII of 1879, which has been substituted for s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877). **DAVLATA v. GANESH SHASTRI**

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 295

48. *Suit for money paid in execution of decree after payment not through the Court.* Plaintiff owed defendant a judgment-

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debt. He paid the debt, but not through the Court. Defendant then fraudulently applied to the Court to execute the decree, and the Court, being debarred by s. 206 of the Code of Civil Procedure from recognizing payments made otherwise than through it, executed the decree by making the plaintiff pay again the sum decreed. Plaintiff sued to recover the amount overpaid. *Held*, by the majority of the Court (SCOTLAND, C.J., and INNES, J., dissenting), that such a suit is not maintainable. **ANUNACHEELA PILLAI v. APPAYA PILLAI**

3 Mad. 188

KUNHI MOIDIN KUTTI v. RAMEN UNNI

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 203

49. *Payments made into Court in execution of decree.* S. 206, Act VIII of 1859, does not bar a suit brought to recover money paid into the Collectorate as Government revenue, although the person on whose behalf the money was paid had an Act X decree against the person paying the money, as the entire amount of the decree was eventually recovered by taking out execution of the whole decree. **MOHIMA CHUNDER GHOSE v. NOBINCHUNDER ADHIKAREE**

8 W. R. 449

50. *Part satisfaction of decree not certified to the Court—Suit to recover money so paid after execution of entire decree—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11.* *A*, a judgment-debtor, paid to *B*, the decree-holder, a sum of money by way of compromise in full satisfaction of the decree. *B* failed to certify this payment to the Court, and afterwards executed her decree for the full amount. In a suit by *A* against *B* for recovery of the amount previously paid out of Court in satisfaction of the decree: *Held*, that, notwithstanding s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, the suit was maintainable. **GUNAMANI DASI v. PRANKISHORI DASI**

5 B. L. R. 223 : 13 W. R. F. B. 69

Overruling **ALUNGA BEBEE v. GOOROO CHURN ROY** . . . 3 W. R., S. C. C. Ref., 3

BHUGOBAN TANTEE v. GOBIND CHUNDER ROY

9 W. R. 210

where it was held that a suit would lie for damages for breach of contract in not certifying the payments.

51. *Suit to enforce adjustment under contract.* A suit to enforce a contract by which a dispute was adjusted between a decree-holder and judgment-debtor is not barred by Act VIII of 1859, s. 206. **NUJBEENI MULLICK v. ERFAN MOLLAH** . . . 22 W. R. 298

52. *Rejection of objection that decree had been satisfied out of Court—Suit to recover thing given in satisfaction.* *Held*, that the rejection, under s. 206 of Act VIII of 1859, of a defendant's objection in a mofussil Small Cause Court to the execution of a decree, on the ground

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that it had been adjusted out of Court, did not bar his right to bring a suit against the execution-creditor to recover the thing alleged to have been given in satisfaction of the decree. *GULAWAD CHANDABHAI v. RAHIMTULLA JAMALBHAI*

4 Bom. A. C. 76

53. *Suit for breach of contract in not certifying payment to Court.* A suit will, notwithstanding s. 206 of Act VIII of 1859, lie for damages for an alleged breach of contract in not certifying to the Court a payment of money in satisfaction of a decree, made out of and not through the Court, in consequence of which the same was fraudulently recovered a second time by the person omitting to certify the said payment. *MOTEE LALL MOOKERJEE v. KANDHAI LALL*

**1 N. W. 155 : Ed. 1873, 237
Agra F. B., Ed. 1874, 185**

54. *Uncertified adjustment out of Court with a decree-holder—Subsequent execution—Fraud of decree-holder—Power of Court to refuse to confirm sale and to set it aside.* An adjustment was made out of Court between a decree-holder and a judgment-debtor in August 1893, but it was not certified to the Court. The decree-holder falsely stated to the judgment-debtor's agent that the requisite petition certifying the adjustment had been presented, but nevertheless he proceeded with execution, applied for and obtained leave to bid at the Court-sale and himself purchased the property in September. The judgment-debtor preferred petitions in September and November, praying that the sale be set aside. *Held*, that the judgment-debtor was entitled to prove the adjustment, and to have the sale set aside. *RAMAYYAR v. RAMAYYAR*

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 356

55. *Satisfaction of decree not certified—Fraudulent execution—Charge under Penal Code, s. 210—Proof of payment.* S. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that no payment or adjustment of a decree not certified to the Court, as in the said section provided, shall be recognized by any Court, does not debar a Criminal Court from recognizing such payment where the decree-holder is charged with fraudulently executing a satisfied decree. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PILLALA*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 101

56. *Fraudulent execution of decree—Duty of the decree-holder to inform the Court of private adjustment or satisfaction of a decree—Construction of Penal Code, ss. 193, 210, 406.* The rule of civil procedure contained in the last clause of s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)—that uncertified adjustments of a decree are not to be recognized by "any Court"—does not affect the substantive criminal law. The words "any Court" in that clause have no application to a Criminal Court investigating a charge of fraudulently executing a decree under s. 210 of the Penal

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 258—*contd.*

Code. Those words do not bar any criminal remedy which an injured judgment-debtor may have against a fraudulent decree-holder, whether by a prosecution under ss. 193, 210, 406, or any other section of the Penal Code. In s. 210 of the Penal Code the word "satisfied" is to be understood in its ordinary meaning, and not as referring to decrees, the satisfaction of which has been certified to the Court. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BAPUJI DAYARAM*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 288

57. *Adjustment of decree without certifying—Proof of payment of decree otherwise than by certificate—Fraudulent execution of decree after adjustment.* Where a decree has been satisfied out of Court, and the payment has not been recorded in accordance with s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is nevertheless open to the *quondam* judgment-debtor when suing to have a sale made by the *quondam* decree-holder after satisfaction of the decree set aside, to prove the payment of the decretal money otherwise than by a certificate under that section. *PAT DASI v. SHARUP CHAND MALA*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 376

But see *MOTHURA MOHUN GHOSH MONDUL v. AKKOY KUMAR MITTER* . **I. L. R. 15 Calc. 557**

***58.** *Suit to recover instalments due under a mortgage made in adjustment of a decree.* Under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, no Court can recognize an uncertified adjustment of a decree for any judicial purpose whatever. *Pattankar v. Devji*, **I. L. R. 6 Bom. 146**, overruled. A suit will not lie to enforce an uncertified agreement of adjustment of a decree against a judgment-debtor, the consideration for which is, that it shall operate in satisfaction of the decree; as there is, in that case, no consideration which the Court can recognize, and therefore no valid consideration for the judgment-debtor's agreement. The plaintiff was the assignee of a decree obtained by one *O K* against the defendants on the 5th May 1883. By that decree, *O K* was declared entitled to recover ₹9,961-5-6, with interest at nine per cent. from the defendants; and payment was ordered to be made to him of the said sum by weekly instalments of ₹200. In order to secure the payment of the said instalments, the defendants were required to execute a mortgage to *O K* of certain property, with power to him to sell the same and to execute the decree for the whole amount, in case of default, for six months. *O K* assigned the decree to the plaintiff in the present suit, and subsequently to the assignment (*viz.*, on the 21st July 1883) the defendants executed to the plaintiff the mortgage on which the present suit was brought. The mortgage-deed, after reciting the above facts, stated that the defendants had agreed to satisfy the amount of the decree, and it contained a covenant by the defendants that they would pay ₹9,961-5-6, with interest at six per cent. by monthly instalments of ₹400 from the 21st August 1883. The mortgage, therefore, differed from the decree, both with regard

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 258—*contd.*

to the instalments and the rate of interest. The plaintiff sued to recover the sum of R4,207, being the amount of instalments due to him under the said mortgage. *Held*, that the suit would not lie, as the mortgage was an adjustment of the decree, and had not been certified to the Court as required by s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code. **ABDUL RAHIMAN v. KHOJA KHAKI ARUTH**

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 6

59. *Payment made towards decree, but uncertified—Effect of such payments on limitation for application for execution of decree.* Where certain payments had been made on account of a decree, but such payments had not been certified to the Court under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, it was *held*, following *Fakir Chand Bose v. Madan Mohan Ghose*, 4 B. L. R. F. B. 130, that such payments, although not certified to the Court, were effectual to prevent the appellant's application for execution from being barred by limitation. It would, however, be necessary for the appellant to certify these payments. **PURMANANDAS JIWANDAS v. VALLABDAS WALLJI**

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 506

60. *Sanction of Court to agreements for satisfaction of decree—Payments by judgment-debtor under void agreement—Effect of uncertified payments to decree-holder.* A sum paid under an agreement void under s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be acknowledged or recognized in execution of a decree under s. 258 of the Code, unless it has been certified within the proper time. Agreements for the satisfaction of a judgment-debt not sanctioned under s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code are void; but, if sanctioned, they may be carried out in execution. **DURGA PRASAD BANERJEE v. LALIT MOHUN SINGH ROY**

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 86

61. *Payment made by defendant in satisfaction of decree not certified—Subsequent reversal of decree on appeal—Application by defendant for refund of money paid in satisfaction.* The plaintiff obtained a decree against the defendant for R60 and costs, R29-10-1, against which the defendant immediately appealed. Shortly afterwards the defendant sent R70 to the plaintiff's wakil, intimating by a letter that the remittance was in part payment of the decree, and that an arrangement would be made to pay the balance. The plaintiff did not take out execution of the decree, but the part payment was not certified to the Court. On appeal the decree was reversed, and the defendant applied for the refund of the amount which he had paid to the plaintiff. The Court of first instance granted the application. The plaintiff appealed and the Appellate Court reversed the order, holding that, under the provisions of s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, the payment made by the defendant, not having been certified, could not be recovered. *Held* by the High Court, that the defendant was entitled to recover the amount paid

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 258—*contd.*

to the plaintiff. The decree having been reversed on appeal, the payment, whether certified to the Court or not, could only be regarded as made without consideration, and the defendant was entitled to have it restored. The Court accordingly, under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, discharged the order of the lower Appellate Court and restored the order of the Court of first instance. **VASUDEV GOVIND v. VISHNU VITHAL**

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 724

62. *Judgment-debtor as part-purchaser of a decree, suit by.* *H D* and *R D* owned a 6-anna share in certain decrees. The other decree-holders subsequently sold their 10-anna share to *H S* and *S M*, two of the judgment-debtors, *H D* and *R D*, then proceeded to execute the decrees and in satisfaction thereof were allowed to receive, upon giving security under s. 231 of the Code, the full 16-anna share of the decretal amount from *H S* and *S M*, notwithstanding the objection of the latter on the ground of their purchase. Thereupon *H S* and *S M* brought a suit for declaration of their right of purchase and the recovery of a 10-anna share of the money in the hands of *H D* and *R D*. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief sought for. *Held*, also, that the provisions of s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code did not affect the suit, which was brought, not upon the allegation that the decrees were satisfied by the plaintiff's purchase, but, on the contrary, was founded upon the proposition that the decrees were not so satisfied. *Abdul Rahiman v. Khoja Khaki Aruth*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 6, referred to. *Held*, further, that the claim was not within the words "relating to the execution of the decree" in s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, inasmuch as it did not raise any question in respect to the furtherance of, or hindrance to, or the manner of carrying out, the execution of the decrees. **HARAGOBIND DAS KOIBURTO v. ISSURI DAS**

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 187

63. *Mortgage in satisfaction of decree—Adjustment not certified.* In a suit brought by a Hindu to recover certain land, defendant pleaded that he held the same under a mortgage granted to him by plaintiff's mother and guardian in satisfaction of a decree obtained against plaintiff's deceased father. Plaintiff contended that, as the mortgage was in adjustment of a decree, and the adjustment had not been certified to the Court, the mortgage could not be recognized by virtue of s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that, as there had been no certified adjustment of the decree, the mortgage could not prevail against plaintiff's claim. *Abdul Rahiman v. Khoja Khaki Aruth*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 6, followed, and *Mallamma v. Venkappa*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 277, distinguished. **THIRUMALAI v. SUNDARA**

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 469

64. *Purchase by mortgagee holding decree for sale of portion of mort-*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 258—contd.

gaged property, subject to mortgage—Right of mortgagor to redeem. A mortgagee having obtained a decree against his mortgagor for the sale of the mortgaged property, a portion of the latter was subsequently sold, subject to the said decree, in execution of a money-decree obtained by a third party against the mortgagor. The mortgagee purchased the portion so sold, whereupon the mortgagor presented a petition under s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure, claiming that the mortgagee was bound to discharge his mortgage debt and should be called upon to certify satisfaction of his decree. *Held*, that petitioner was not entitled to the relief prayed for, but only to proceed upon the footing that the portion of the mortgaged property which had been purchased by the mortgagee remained, notwithstanding such purchase, redeemable by petitioner, together with the remainder of the property. *Quære*: Whether the subject-matter of the petition was an "adjustment" of the decree within the meaning of s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *ERUSAPPA MUDALIAR v. COMMERCIAL AND LAND MORTGAGE BANK* . . . **I. L. R. 23 Mad. 377**

65. *Decree—Satisfaction of decree out of Court—Payment uncertified—Suit to recover money paid in satisfaction of decree.* The plaintiff had been a surety for the defendant on a bond for R50 passed to G by the defendant. G obtained a decree against the plaintiff on this bond, and the plaintiff satisfied the decree by paying G R38 in full satisfaction. The payment was made out of Court, and was not certified to the Court. The plaintiff now sued the defendant to recover the money so paid by him to G. He called G as a witness, who acknowledged he had received R38 from the plaintiff in full satisfaction of the decree. *Held*, that the last clause of s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply to such a case, and that the payment made by the plaintiff to G might be proved. *BALAJI LAKSHMAN v. DADA JOTI* . . . **I. L. R. 12 Bom. 235**

66. *Omission to certify satisfaction of decree—Suit to enforce mortgage.* In 1877 M executed a mortgage to S in consideration of a sum paid in cash and a debt due by M to S under a decree. S did not certify satisfaction of the decree to the Court under s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure, nor was this stipulated for in the instrument of mortgage. *Held*, in a suit to enforce the mortgage, that s. 258 was no bar to the plaintiff's right to recover. *SELLAMAYYAN v. MUTHAN* . . . **I. L. R. 2 Mad. 611**

67. *Decree, adjustment or satisfaction of—Adjustment after attachment—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 273.* A decree being attached as directed by s. 273 of the Civil Procedure Code, its adjustment subsequent to such attachment cannot be recognized by the Court. *GOPAL NANASHET v. JOHARIMAL. DADA BALSHET v. JOHARIMAL* . . . **I. L. R. 16 Bom. 522**

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 258—contd.

68. *Adjustment or satisfaction of decree—Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888), s. 27—Recognition of adjustment by a Civil Court, except in execution.* Where under a bond a decree was adjusted by making a small deduction, and by providing for the payment of the balance as part of the entire amount of the bond: *Held*, that since the amendment made in s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code by s. 27 of Act VII of 1888 (Act amending the Civil Procedure Code of 1882), such adjustment may be recognized by a Civil Court, except in execution. *GHANASHAM LAKSHMANDAS v. KASHIRAM NARORA* . . . **I. L. R. 16 Bom. 589**

69. *Decree payable by instalments—Limitation—Waiver by decree-holder—Payment out of Court—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 179 (6).* An application for execution of a decree payable by instalments was resisted by the judgment-debtor as barred by limitation on the ground that nothing had been paid under the decree, and that the application was made more than three years after the first instalment fell due. The decree-holder pleaded that he had waived the default in payment of the first instalment by accepting such payment shortly afterwards, and that the application was in time, having been made within three years from the date when the second instalment was due. *Held*, that the decree-holder could not raise this plea, as the payment in question had not been certified to the Court executing the decree, and therefore could not, under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, be recognized. *Sham Lal v. Kanahia Lal, I. L. R. 4 All. 316, and Zahur Husain v. Bakhtawar, I. L. R. 7 All. 317, not followed.* *MITTHU LAL v. KHAIRATI LAL* . . . **I. L. R. 12 All. 569**

70. *Execution of decree—Attachment—Previous assignment in satisfaction of decree of third party—Suit by assignee to establish right to attached property.* Where a regular suit under s. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure was brought to establish the plaintiff's right to certain attached property on the allegation that the property attached had been transferred to him in satisfaction of a decree held by him against the judgment-debtor: *Held*, that it was not necessary that such transfer should be certified under the provisions of s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The prohibition to take cognizance of adjustments and payments referred to in s. 258 above-mentioned relates only to the Court executing the decree. *KALYAN SINGH v. KAMTA PRASAD* . . . **I. L. R. 13 All. 339**

71. *Landlord and Tenant—Mirasi tenure declared in decree—Subsequent payment of rent by defendants not a payment under decree, but under the tenure—Payment not certified to Court.* The plaintiff sued the defendants to recover possession of certain land. The defendants pleaded they were mirasi tenants and entitled

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 258—*contd.*

to possession as long as they paid the rent. The suit was compromised, and by a consent decree it was declared that the defendants held by mirasi tenure, and they were directed to pay rent "as before," or in default the plaintiff should take possession. The plaintiff afterwards applied in execution for possession, alleging that the rent had not been paid. The defendants pleaded that it had been paid, and the plaintiff rejoined that, even if it had been paid, the Court could not recognize the payment, as it had not been certified under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, the rent, when paid, was to be deemed as paid under the mirasi tenure and not under the decree, and, therefore, s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply, and payment need not be certified. *KEDARI v. GAJAI*

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 690

72. ————— *Execution of decree—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 20—"Debt."* *Held*, that for the purpose of deciding whether or not an application for execution is barred by limitation, it is competent to the executing Court to take into consideration a payment made out of Court by the judgment-debtor in part satisfaction of the decree, although such payment may not have been certified in the manner provided for by s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Kishan Singh v. Aman Singh*, I. L. R. 17 All. 42, and *Tukaram v. Babaji*, I. L. R. 21 Bom. 122, followed. *Mithu Lal v. Khairati Lal*, I. L. R. 12 All. 569, overruled. *Held*, also, that the word "debt" as used in s. 20 of the Limitation Act, 1877, includes a judgment-debt. *Ramhit Rai v. Saigur Rai*, I. L. R. 3 All. 247; *Janki Prasad v. Ghulam Ali*, I. L. R. 5 All. 201; *Muhammad Said Khan v. Payag Sahai*, I. L. R. 16 All. 228; *Billings v. The Uncovenanted Service Bank*, I. L. R. 3 All. 781; *Heera Lal Mookhopadhyaya v. Dhunput Singh*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 500; and *Shripatray v. Govind Narayan*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 390, referred to. *Kally Prosonno Hazra v. Heera Lal Mundle*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 468; *Mungol Prashad Dicit v. Shama Kanto Lahory Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 708, and *Kader Buksh Sarkar v. Gour Kishore Roy Chowdhry*, 6 C. W. N. 766, not followed. *ROSHAN SINGH v. MATA DIN* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 36

73. ————— *Execution of decree—Satisfaction of entire decree certified by one only of two joint decree-holders—Such certificate not binding on the other.* *Held*, that one of two or more joint decree-holders is not competent, without being authorized by the other or others, to certify, under s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure, satisfaction by payment out of Court, of the entire decree. *Balgobind v. Bhawanee Deen Sahoo*, I. L. R. 25 All. 498; *Mussamat Bibee Budhun v. Mussamat Hafezah*, 4 C. L. R. 70; *Mahima Chandra Roy v. Pyari Mohan Chowdhry*, 2 B. L. R. App. 43; *Sultan Moideen v. Savalayammal*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 343; *Tarruck Chunder Bhuttacharjee v.*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 258—*contd.*

Divendro Nath Sanyal, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 331; and *Tamman Singh v. Lachmin Kunwari*, I. L. R. 26 All. 318, referred to. *Ranee Nyna Koor v. Doolee Chund*, 22 W. R. 77, not followed. *MOTI RAM v. HANNU PRASAD* (1904) . I. L. R. 26 All. 334

74. ————— *Judgment-creditor receiving payment and not certifying under s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure liable in damages though he has not executed and received the decree amount.* The law casts on a decree-holder receiving payment out of Court the duty of certifying such payment in satisfaction of the decree under s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment-debtor has a cause of action against the decree-holder, when the latter having received the decree amount not only does not certify, but actually takes out execution. It is not necessary that money should have been actually recovered in execution. *Viraraghava Reddi v. Subbakta*, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 387, referred to. *MEDAI KALIANI ANNI, In the matter of* (1907)

I. L. R. 30. Mad. 545

75. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 258—Satisfaction of decree not certified owing to decree-holders' fraud—Application after time to have certified.* S. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code prevents an executing Court from taking cognizance of an uncertified adjustment of a decree. *Dinobandhu Nundy v. Harimati Dassee*, 8 C. W. N. 395; s. c. I. L. R. 31 Calc. 480, explained. *Ramdoyal v. Ram Hari*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 32 and *Bairgulu v. Bapanna*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 302, followed. Where, however, the judgment-debtors complained that the decree-holder had by fraud kept them in ignorance till within a month of their application of the fact that the satisfaction of the decree had not been certified. *Held*, that the matter could be investigated under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Prasanna Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683, followed. *GADADHAR PANDA v. SHYAM CHURN NAIK* (1908)

12 C. W. N. 485

76. ————— *Agreement discharging one of several defendants on adjustment must be certified.* Where after a decree is passed against several defendants, the decree-holder enters into an agreement with some of the defendants, by which the latter are discharged from liability under the decree, such agreement is an adjustment in part of the decree and must be certified to the Court under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code. *MAHOMED KHAN BAHADUR v. MAHOMED MUNAWAR SAHIB* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 467

ss. 259, 260 (1859, s. 200).

See RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS.

1. ————— *Decree for performance of a particular act—A decree had been obtained that "the defendants do, within six weeks after the service upon them of this decree, remove the obstruction and reopen the pathway or lane*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1852 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 259, 260—*contd.*

leading from the north-west end of the plaintiff's house, northwards to a public road, as the same existed before the commencement of the suit and as described in the plaint." *Held*, that this was a decree for the performance of a particular act on the part of the defendants, and must be executed under the provisions of s. 200, Act VIII of 1859,—i.e., by imprisonment of the party or attachment of his property, or by both: therefore, an order for execution of the decree by causing the obstruction to be removed was set aside as illegal. *BHOOBUN MOHUN MUNDUL v. NOBIN CHUNDER BULLUB*

10 B. L. R. Ap. 12 : 18 W. R. 282

2. ———— Execution of decree

for restitution of conjugal rights. A, who had been directed by a decree to refrain from preventing her daughter returning to her husband, after the date of the decree permitted her daughter, who was of age, to reside in her house. *Held*, that such conduct on the part of A was no such evidence of interference with her daughter's return as would justify the execution of the decree against her, under the provisions of s. 200 of Act VIII of 1859. *AJNASI KUAR v. SURAJ PRASAD* . I. L. R. 1 All. 501

3. ———— Decree for possession of wife—Enforcing execution of decree. Where there has been a decree in favour of an applicant for special possession of his wife, and application made for execution, the process under the ordinary sections will not be enforced. *AKBARALLY v. HOSSAIN ALLY* 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 101 : 5 W. R. Mis. 29

4. ———— Decree ordering wife to return to husband—Enforcing decree under a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against wife. *Quære*: Whether, under the present procedure, the Court can enforce its order upon a wife to return to her husband's by giving her over bodily into her husband's hands. Such disobedience would seem to fall within s. 200 of the Code, and to be enforceable only by imprisonment, or attachment of property, or both. *JUDONATH BOSE v. SHUMSOON-NISSA BEGUM. BUZLOOR RUHEEM v. SHUMSOON-NISSA BEGUM*

8 W. R. P. C. 3 : 11 Moo. I. A. 551

5. ———— Opportunity of, and refusal to, obey decree—Enforcing execution of decree. No order for enforcing a decree by imprisonment under s. 200 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be made until the defendant has had an opportunity of obeying the decree, or has contumaciously refused to obey it. *UMED KIKI v. NAGINDAS NOROTAMDAS* . 7 Bom. O. C. 122

6. ———— Decree for joint possession and management of property—Attachment for disobedience to decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 260. By a decree relating to certain joint property belonging to the plaintiff and defendant, but which had previously been held in the sole name of the defendant, it was directed

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1852 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 259, 260—*concl'd.*

that the plaintiff and defendant should jointly manage the property, and that the names of both should appear in all papers connected with such property. The plaintiff subsequently applied to have his name registered in the Collectorate, but was opposed by the defendant, who, it appeared, also allowed the amlahs of the estate to continue to use his sole name. *Held*, that the Court had, under the circumstances, jurisdiction under s. 260 of the Civil Procedure Code to attach the defendant's property until he had obeyed the decree by having the joint names of himself and the plaintiff inserted in all documents belonging to the estate. *GOURI PRASAD MOITRA v. BHOLA NATH SANYAL* 8 C. L. R. 487

s. 260.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—APPLICATION FOR EXECUTION AND POWERS OF COURT. I. L. R. 19 Bom. 84

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—MODE OF EXECUTION—DECLARATORY DECREES. I. L. R. 21 Calc. 784 I. R. 21 I. A. 89

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—MODE OF EXECUTION—REMOVAL OF BUILDINGS. I. L. R. 8 Calc. 174 9 C. L. R. 453

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION BY AND AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES. I. L. R. 26 Bom. 283

Execution of decree—Attachment of future salary of private servant. Where a decree-holder applied on the 18th November 1907, for attachment of the judgment-debtor's salary for November and the succeeding months, the judgment-debtor being a lawyer's clerk: *Held*, that the unearned salary of a private servant in whole or in part was not liable to attachment in advance. *Holmes v. Millage*, [1893] I. Q. B. 557, and *Ayyavayyar v. Virasami*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 393, referred to and followed. *Harshankar v. Baijnath*, I. L. R. 23 All. 164, distinguished. *DEVI PRASAD v. LEWIS* (1909) I. L. R. 31 All. 304

ss. 261, 262.

See REGISTRAR OF HIGH COURT.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 330

s. 263 (1859, s. 223).

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—MODE OF EXECUTION—POSSESSION.

s. 264 (1859, s. 224).

See POSSESSION—NATURE OF POSSESSION.

s. 265 (1859, s. 225).

See COLLECTOR . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 662 I. L. R. 12 Bom. 371

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 265—*contd.*See EXECUTION OF DECREE—MODE OF
EXECUTION—PARTITION.

I. L. R. 6 All. 452

See PARTITION.

1. *Partition by Collector—Objections to the partition—Court's jurisdiction to hear the objections.* Where a decree is sent to the Collector for execution under s. 265 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), and the Controller contravenes the decretal command of the Court or otherwise acts *ultra vires*, his action is subject to the control and correction of the Court which passed the decree and sent it to him for execution. *Dev Gopal v. Vasudev*, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 371, and *Ganoi v. Dhondur*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 450, followed. *PURUSHOTTAM BHASKAR v. BALKRISHNA PANDURANG* (1904). I. L. R. 28 Bom. 238

2. *United Provinces Land Revenue Act (III of 1901), s. 107—Partition—Execution of Civil Court decree for partition of revenue-paying property.* A decree of a Civil Court for partition is subject to the provisions of s. 107 of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act and cannot be fully executed, until the decree-holder's name is recorded in the revenue papers. *TULSI DAS v. SHEO NARAIN* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 375

s. 266 (1859, s. 205).

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT.

See MARRIED WOMAN, PROPERTY OF.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 378

See MELWARAM.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 279

1. *House—Sale in execution—Exemption from liability to attachment or sale—Facts to be taken to exist, which are proved.* A certain house was sold in execution of a decree. Subsequently the purchaser having brought a suit to recover possession of the house, the defendant, that is the judgment-debtor under the decree, contended that, inasmuch as he was an agriculturist and the house was occupied by him, the materials of it could not be sold having regard to cl. (c) of s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Held*, that the judgment-debtor having never suggested, much less proved, in the execution proceedings that cl. (c) of s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) had application to the case, the house was liable to be attached and sold and it was not open to him to contend that the Court had no jurisdiction to order the sale of the house by reason of cl. (c). Only those facts can be taken to exist which are proved. In the absence of proof the exemption from liability to attachment or sale does not exist for the purposes of execution proceedings. "Strangers to a suit are justified in believing that the Court has done that which by

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 266—*contd.*

the direction of the Code it ought to do." *Malkarjun v. Narhari*, I. L. R. 25 Bom. 337, applied. *Gurupadapa v. Irappa*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 553, and *Vasanji Haribhai v. Lallu Akhu*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 285, distinguished. *PANDURANG BALAJI v. KRISHNAJI GOVIND* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 125

2. *Attachment—Debt—Monthly allowance, if "debt"—Contingent and existing debt—Debt payable in future—Attachment of part already accrued due.* A monthly allowance given in payment of an antecedent debt and acknowledged by the debtor as such, is attachable in execution—being a debt accruing due and actually existing with a right to payment on and after the first of the following month. The decree-holder applied on the 21st December for the issue of a prohibitory order in respect of a half of the allowance for the month of December, and the order was issued on the 23rd December. *Held*, that the attachment was validly made, inasmuch as three weeks of the December allowance had already become an existing debt, though payable on a future date. *Hari-das Acharjia v. Barada Kishore Acharjia*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 38; *Tuffuzzool Hossein Khan v. Rughoonath Pershad*, 14 Moo. I. A. 40, referred to. *DAMBAR KOERI v. RAI SHAM KISSEN DAS* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 703

3. *Attachment—Annuity—Future Maintenance.* An annuity given by a will is not a right to future maintenance within the meaning of s. 266 of the Civil Procedure Code, and can be attached in execution of a decree. *GOPAL LAL SEAL v. MARSDEN* (1906)

10 C. W. N. 1102

4. *Execution of Decree—Attachment—Right to attach Profits not yet due.* *Held*, that a mere right to receive profits, the profits in question not having yet accrued due, is not susceptible of attachment in execution of a decree. *Hari Das Acharjia Chowdhry v. Baroda Kishore Acharjia Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 38; *Uday Kumari Ghatwalin v. Hari Ram Shaha*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 483, *Syud Tuffuzzool Hossein Khan v. Rughoonath Pershad*, 14 Moo. I. A. 40; *Jones v. Thompson*, 27 L. J. Q. B. D. 234, and *Webb v. Stenton*, 11 Q. B. D. 518, referred to. *SHEER SINGH v. SRI RAM* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 246

5. *Attachable interest—Hindu law—Right of Residence of Widow in family house is personal and cannot be attached in execution.* The right of a widow under the Hindu Law, to reside in her husband's family house is a purely personal right and cannot be transferred. Such right cannot be attached in execution under s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *SALAKSHI v. LAKSHMAYEE* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 500

6. *Execution of decree—Attachment—Mortgage—Right of mortgagor in respect of money promised, but not paid.* Where

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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— s. 266—*concl'd.*

money promised as a loan by a mortgagee is not advanced in full, the mortgagor is only entitled to recover, if anything, damages for non-payment of the balance; he cannot sue for specific performance of the agreement to lend the full sum promised, and the non-payment of a portion of the loan does not constitute a debt, which can be the subject of attachment and sale under s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *The South African Territories Company, Limited, v. Wallington*, [1898] A. C. 309, referred to. *PHUL CHAND v. CHAND MAL* (1908)
I. L. R. 30 All. 252

— s. 266 (g) See Act No. XXXIII of 1871, s. 11 . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 382

7. — s. 266 (k)—*Execution of decree—Attachment—Contingent right—Right of pre-emptor under a conditional decree for pre-emption.* Held, that the interest in the pre-empted property of a successful pre-emptor who has not yet paid the pre-emptive price fixed by his decree is an interest the attachment of which is prohibited by s. 266 (k) of the Code of Civil Procedure. *GORAKH SINGH v. SIDH GOPAL* (1906) . I. L. R. 28 All. 383

— ss. 266-276.

See ATTACHMENT.

— s. 268 (1859, ss. 234, 236, 239, 241).

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—

DEBTS . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 305

SALARY . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 713

See INSOLVENCY—CLAIMS OF ATTACHING CREDITORS AND OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 673

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 15.

I. L. R. 13 All. 76

I. L. R. 14 All. 162

I. L. R. 17 All. 198

I. L. R. 22 I. A. 31

1. — Attachment and sale of bonds. Under the provisions of s. 268 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877), bonds cannot be sold till the end of six months from the date of attachment. *NURSING DAS RAGHUNATH DAS v. TULSIRAM BIN DOULATRAM*
I. L. R. 2 Bom. 558

2. — Decree—Salary of Railway Servant—Disbursing officer outside the Jurisdiction of the Court—Prohibitory order—Jurisdiction. The judgment-debtor, a railway servant, resided within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court at Bhusaval, which passed the decree. The disbursing officer of the Railway Company resided at Bombay, outside its jurisdiction, but the salary was every month paid to the judgment-debtor at Bhusaval by the disbursing

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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— s. 268 (1859, ss. 234, 236, 239, 241)—*concl'd.*

officer through his subordinate. The Court at Bhusaval issued to the disbursing officer a prohibitory order under s. 268 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) against the salary of the judgment-debtor. Held, that the Court at Bhusaval had no jurisdiction to attach the salary of the judgment-debtor by a prohibitory order issued to the disbursing officer under s. 268 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Abdul Gufur v. W. J. Albym*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 713, followed. *SAYADKHAN v. B. S. DAVIS* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 198

3. — Mortgage debt—

Attachment—Copy of order not affixed in Court-house—Illegality. A mortgage-debt was attached but no copy of the attachment order was affixed in the Court-house as required by s. 268 of the Civil Procedure Code: Held, that the plaintiff, who took an assignment of the mortgage-bond four days after the order of attachment, acquired a valid title, the attachment being ineffectual. *SATYA CHARAN MUKERJEE v. MADHUB CHANDER KARMOKAR* (1905) . . . 9 C. W. N. 693

— ss. 268, 278, 281—*Suit to establish right to or present possession of property—Attachment of debt not secured by negotiable instrument—Claim by third party—Application of Art. 11 to order disallowing claim—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 278-282—“Possession” not restricted to mere tangible or physical possession.* When a debt, which is not secured by a negotiable instrument is attached under s. 268 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a claim may be preferred by a third party and may be investigated under s. 278. An order passed on such a claim disallowing it, is subject to the operation of s. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Art. 11 of the second Schedule to the Limitation Act. The words “possessed” (in s. 279) and “possession” (in ss. 280 and 281 of the Code of Civil Procedure) are not used in a restricted sense as relating to a mere tangible or physical possession. They include constructive possession or possession in law, of debts and other intangible property. *Basavayya v. Syed Abbas Sahab*, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 20, dissented from. *CHIDAMBARA PATTAR v. RAMASAMY PATTAR* (1904)
I. L. R. 27 Mad. 67

— s. 269—*Attachment—Causing Court-seal to be affixed on door of warehouse—“Actual seizure”—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 29.* A judgment-creditor obtained a warrant of attachment, which was executed by affixing it to the outer door of a warehouse, in which goods belonging to his judgment-debtors were stored. The door was not broken open nor was physical possession taken of the goods inside. Held, that this, in effect, was actual seizure, within the meaning of s. 269 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the suit was, in consequence, barred under Art. 29 of

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 269—*contd.*

Sch. II of the Limitation Act. *MULTAN CHAND KANYALAL v. BANK OF MADRAS* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 346

1. _____ s. 272—Court of Justice—*Deputy Collector's Court*. The Court of a Deputy Collector was a Court of Justice within the meaning of s. 237, Act VIII of 1859. *COWIE v. ELIAS*
10 W. R. 43

2. _____ Application for money deposited in Court—*Question for Court executing decree—Separate suit*. The plaintiffs, having obtained decrees on certain hundis against K and P, applied under Act VIII of 1859, s. 237, for payment of certain moneys which had been deposited in Court in a suit in which one D was the plaintiff, and which had been attached by them. The ground of their application was that D had recovered a decree on certain hundis which had been fraudulently transferred to him by K and P. The Munsif holding that the question of the ownership of the decree could not be determined in the miscellaneous department referred the applicants to regular suits. These were accordingly instituted, and the transfer to D declared to be fraudulent and colourable. *Held*, that the question of the title of the plaintiffs as against D to have their debt paid out of the money in deposit, ought to have been decided in the Court in which the money was in deposit. The Munsif was in error in directing the applicants to a regular suit. *DEBEE PERSHAD v. GUJADHUR RAM*
20 W. R. 73

s. 273.

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—DECREES I. L. R. 2 All. 290
I. L. R. 6 Mad. 418
I. L. R. 10 Bom. 444
I. L. R. 16 Bom. 522
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 111
I. L. R. 21 All. 405

DECREES . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 556
6 C. W. N. 5

MESNE PROFITS.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 341

See SALE . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1104

1. _____ Attachment of decree for foreclosure—*Procedure—Execution of decree*. Where on application to a Court, which was not the Court which passed it a decree for foreclosure was attached by a creditor of the decree-holder, it was *held*, that it was not competent to the Court, which passed the decree, to follow up the attachment by substituting the name of the attaching creditor in place of that of the decree-holder. *BARHMA DIN v. BAJI LAL* (1904)
I. L. R. 26 All. 91

2. _____ Execution of decree—Attachment—*Decree for money—Decree for sale of mortgaged property*. A decree for the sale of immo-

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 273—*conclld.*

veable property under s. 88 of the Transfer of Property Act is not a decree for the payment of money or a decree for money, and is therefore liable to attachment and sale under the penultimate clause of s. 273 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Takiya Begam v. Straj-ud-daula*, *Weekly Notes* (1885) 123, overruled. *Abdullah v. Doctor Oosman*, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 244, dissented from. *Sultan Kuar v. Gulzari Lal*, I. L. R. 2 All. 290; *Ram Charan Bhagat v. Sheobarat Rai*, I. L. R. 16 All. 418; *Barhma Din v. Baji Lal*, I. L. R. 26 All. 91; *Shiam Sundar v. Muhammad Ihtisham Ali*, I. L. R. 27 All. 501; *Jogul Kishore v. Cheda Lal*, *Weekly Notes* (1893) 684; *Gopal Nana Shet v. Johari Mal valad Jitaji*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 522; *MacNaughten v. Surja Prasad Misra*, 4 C. W. N. xxxv, and *Baij Nath v. Binoyendro Nath*, 6 C. W. N. 5, referred to. *DELHI AND LONDON BANK v. PARTAB SINGH* (1906)
I. L. R. 28 All. 771

s. 274 (1859, s. 235).

See ATTACHMENT—MODE OF ATTACHMENT AND IRREGULARITIES IN ATTACHMENT.

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—DEBTS I. L. R. 26 Bom. 305

See PROCESS, SERVICE OF.

1 B. L. R. S. N. 20

10 W. R. 264

10 B. L. R. Ap. 12

s. 275 (1859, s. 245)—Tender of amount of decree—*Stay of execution*. Under s. 245 of Act VIII of 1859, the mere tender of money before the Judge is not sufficient to entitle the judgment-debtor to have the sale of his property stayed, and the law contemplates that payments should be made in accordance with the rules and forms of Courts. *HIRONAUTH ROY v. INDOOBOSHUN DEB ROY*
2 Hay 302

s. 276 (1859, s. 240).

See ante, s. 244—PARTIES TO SUIT.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 492

See ATTACHMENT—ALIENATION DURING ATTACHMENT . I. L. R. 23 All. 114

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 497

See EASEMENT . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 889

See MORTGAGE—SALE OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY—RIGHTS OF MORTGAGEES
6 C. W. N. 209

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—DISTRIBUTION OF SALE-PROCEEDS.

I. L. R. 25 All. 431

ss. 276, 295—"Assets realised by sale or otherwise in execution of a decree," what are. The words "assets realised by sale or otherwise in execution of a decree" in s. 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure mean that the assets must be realised by some process of Court in execution and can

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 276, 295—*concl'd.*

apply only to a sale by the Court and not to a private sale by the judgment-debtor of properties attached. The assets are not realised by the attachment but by the sale. The realisation must be by sale by the Court in execution or by one of the other remedies prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact that the money is paid into Court in satisfaction of the attaching creditor's debt does not make such money assets realised under s. 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Gopal Dai v. Chunni Lal*, I. L. R. 8 All. 67, and *Purshotamdass Tribhovandass v. Mahanant Surajbharthi Haribharthi*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 588, referred to and approved. *Lakshmi v. Kuttunni*, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 57, and *Sorabji Edulji Warden v. Govind Ramji F. N. Wadia*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 91, referred to. *Manilal Umedram v. Namabhai Maneklal*, I. L. R. 28 Bom. 264, distinguished. *Sew Bux Bogla v. Shib Chunder Sen*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 225, and *Prosonomoyi Dassi v. Sree nath Roy*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 809, approved. An attachment ceases to be operative from the moment money is paid into Court or at the latest from the time satisfaction is entered. *Kunhi Moossa v. Makki*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 432. *VIBUDHA-PRIYA TIRTHASWAMI v. YUSUF SAHIB* (1905)
I. L. R. 28 Mad. 380

ss. 276 and 305—*Execution of decree—*

Attachment—Private sale pending attachment—Suit by vendee for recovery of possession. A judgment-debtor having executed a sale-deed of his house pending attachment in execution of a decree and the vendee having subsequently brought a suit to recover possession of the house, the lower Court dismissed the suit holding that s. 305 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) furnished an answer to the suit. *Held*, reversing the decree, that the sale was a private alienation and it operated to convey to the plaintiff the interest of the vendor in the property the deed purported to pass. But to prevent frauds on decree-holders, it is provided by s. 276 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) that "when an attachment has been made by actual seizure or by written order duly intimated and made known in the manner aforesaid, any private alienation of the property attached, whether by sale, gift, mortgage or otherwise . . . during the continuance of the attachment shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment". The sale, if made during the continuance of the attachment, would be void to the extent indicated in the section. S. 305 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) is an enabling section and qualifies the prohibition contained in s. 276; but on compliance with the conditions of that section a private alienation, notwithstanding s. 276, becomes absolute even against all claims enforceable under the attachment. If it did not become absolute under s. 305, then it would not be operative against claims enforceable under the attachment, but to that extent would be defeasible. *SHIVLINGAPPA v. CHANBASAPPA* (1905)
I. L. R. 30 Bom. 337

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 278 (1859, s. 246).

See ante, s. 244—PARTIES TO SUIT.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 134

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 170.

13 C. W. N. 650

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 382

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 765

See CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 555

See COURT FEES ACT, SCH. II, ART. 17,

CL. I. I. L. R. 4 Bom. 515, 535

15 B. L. R. Ap. 1

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 162

I. L. R. 2 All. 63

I. L. R. 6 All. 341, 466

See ESTOPPEL—ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT.

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 302

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 506

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 673

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 17

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 566

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 11.

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 5

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 13.*See* ONUS OF PROOF—CLAIMS TO ATTACHED PROPERTY.

1. *Execution of decree—Decree for sale on a mortgage—Prior mortgagee not entitled to intervene in execution proceedings.* In a suit for sale on a mortgage, the plaintiff obtained a decree and an order absolute for sale of the mortgaged property. A person who had not been a party to the suit intervened, alleging himself to be a prior mortgagee and objected to the sale and the sale was stopped. *Held*, that the prior mortgagee, if he were one, was not entitled to intervene in these execution proceedings and that the order allowing his objection was passed without jurisdiction and was a proper subject for revision. *HUKAM SINGH v. RAGHUBIR SARAN* (1905)
I. L. R. 27 All. 700

2. *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 65, 170—Plaintiff also a landlord at the date of the suit and decree for arrears of rent—Sale Tenure—Claim.* If at the time when a suit for arrears of rent is instituted and a decree made the plaintiff is still the landlord, the fact that he has subsequently sold his interest in the property does not prevent him from obtaining the benefit of s. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and executing the decree against it. The suit having been instituted and the decree passed under this Act s. 170 of the Bengal Tenancy Act excludes the operation of s. 278 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Hem Chandra Bhunjo v. Mon Mohini Dassi*, 3 C. W. N. 604, overruled. *KHETRA PAL SINGH v. KRISHNARMOYI DASSI* (1906)
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 568

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

ss. 278, 280, 622—*Execution of decree—Order—Appeal—Order passed without jurisdiction—Grounds for non-interference in extraordinary jurisdiction.* An order passed under s. 280 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) is not appealable. Where the order of the lower Appellate Court was passed without jurisdiction, the High Court declined to interfere under the extraordinary jurisdiction (s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act XIV of 1882) on the ground that the plaintiff, to whom relief was granted by the lower Appellate Court, would, if the application were allowed, be obliged to bring a suit to establish the right which he claimed to the property in dispute after the expiry of the period of limitation within which he was entitled to bring that suit. *DAYARAM v GOVARDHANDAS* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 458

ss. 278, 281, 283.

See LIMITATION. I. L. R. 23 Calc. 537

ss. 278, 282, 283, and 287—*Money-decree—Execution—Attachment and sale of property mortgaged with possession to a third person—Auction-purchase by judgment-creditor with leave of Court subject to mortgage—Suit by judgment-creditor prior to confirmation of sale and satisfaction of decree for a declaration that the mortgage was fraudulent and without consideration—Purchase—Equity of redemption—Estoppel binding upon judgment-debtor.* Plaintiffs obtained a money-decree against their debtor and in execution attached the debtor's immoveable property which was already mortgaged with possession to a third person. At the auction-sale the plaintiffs themselves purchased the property with the leave of the Court subject to the mortgage. Before the sale was confirmed and the decree was satisfied the plaintiffs having brought a suit for a declaration that the mortgage was fraudulent and without consideration it was contended that the plaintiffs were no longer judgment-creditors but purchasers and that what was attached and sold was equity of redemption, therefore, the purchasers could not claim more than they bought. *Held*, that, as the suit was brought before the confirmation of the sale and the satisfaction of the decree, the plaintiffs were judgment-creditors and not purchasers. *Held*, further, that the plaintiffs under their purchase were not purchasers of merely the equity of redemption and were not bound by estoppels which would have bound the judgment-debtor. There is nothing to prevent such a purchaser from benefiting by the clearance of any claim upon the property even if he has himself to sue to procure it. He may alike displace a fraudulent and redeem an honest mortgage. *GANESH v. PURSHOTTAM* (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 311

ss. 278-283.

See CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY.

See TITLE. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 823

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

ss. 278-283—*concl'd.*

1. *Limitation Act, 1877, Sch. II, Art. 12—Suit to establish right to property sold in execution—Limitation—Sale without decision as to rights of intervenor.* When an intervenor claims a share of attached property the Court should define the respective shares of the debtor and the intervenor, and sell the debtor's definite share only. If the Court omits to do so, and sells the attached property subject to the intervenor's claim, this is no valid order under ss. 280, 281 or 282 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the limitation of one year for a suit under s. 283 of the Code does not apply. *Manohar Khan v. Troyluckonath Ghose*, 4 W. R. 35, followed. *UDIT NARAIN SINGH v. MURTAZA KHAN* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 464

2. *Execution of decree—Suit against successful claimant for declaration that certain property belongs to the judgment-debtor—Judgment-debtor not a necessary party.* Where a decree-holder brings a suit against a successful claimant to establish that certain property belongs to his judgment-debtor and that he is entitled to bring it to sale in execution of his decree the only person against whom he claims relief is the successful claimant. To such a suit the judgment-debtor is not a necessary party. *GHASI RAM v. MANGAL CHAND* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 41

3. *Execution of decree—Attachment—Objection allowed—Suit by decree-holder decreed—Previous attachment whether subsisting.* *Held*, that the lien of an attaching creditor over the property attached dated from the attachment and was not destroyed or affected by an order of release which was in effect set aside by a subsequent decree in a regular suit. *Mahomed Warris v. Pitambar Sen*, 21 W. R. 435, *Bonomali v. Prosunno*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 829, *Ram Chandra v. Mudeswar*, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1158, *Lalu v. Kashi*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 400, and *Bank of Upper India v. Sheo Prasad*, *Weekly Notes*, (1897) 134, followed. *ALI AHMAD KHAN v. BANSIDHAR* (1909)

I. L. R. 31 All. 367

ss. 278, 622.

See JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 667

s. 279.

See CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 555

s. 280 (1859, s. 246).

See CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY.

See MITAKSHARA.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1158

See ante, s. 244—PARTIES TO SUIT.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 134

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—JURISDICTION—CLAIMS TO PROPERTY SEIZED IN EXECUTION.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 281 (1859, s. 246).

See CLAIMS TO ATTACHED PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 20

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.
II.

s. 282.

See CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 555

s. 283 (1859, s. 246).

See CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY.

See CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872).

I. L. R. 30 All. 167

See COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870).

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 202

See ESTOPPEL—ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT.

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 302

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 673

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 506

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 17

See LIMITATION ACT, XV OF 1877, SCH. II,
ART. II.

See LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877).

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 163

See LIS PENDENS . I. L. R. 23 All. 60

See ONUS OF PROOF—CLAIM TO ATTACHED
PROPERTY.

See ante, s. 244—PARTIES TO SUIT.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 134

See RIGHT OF SUIT—EXECUTION OF
DECREE.See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—
JURISDICTION—CLAIMS TO PROPERTY
SEIZED IN EXECUTION.

See VALUATION OF SUIT.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 202

1. *Relief "in respect of the same matter"—Joinder of causes of action and parties—Suit against purchasers of different items at invalid sale.* Where the validity of a sale of land for arrears of rent is in question, it is for the landlord, who seeks to avail himself of the special procedure by way of distressed provided for by the Act, to show that the requirements of the Act have been complied with. Insufficient notice of sale is not a mere irregularity curable under ss. 36 and 40 of the Rent Recovery Act. The provisions of s. 36 cannot be imported into s. 40 so as to make the former applicable to a sale of land distrained for arrears of rent. S. 36 introduces an exception to the general rule that, *prima facie*, non-compliance with the requirements of the Act will vitiate a sale; and this exception is expressly limited to the case of moveable property. The provision in s. 18 as to the length of notice is that in fixing the day of sale not less than seven days must be allowed. If a notice be published

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on the 16th announcing that a sale will take place on the 22nd, the sale will be bad, even though it may take place, in fact, on the 23rd. A suit against a number of purchasers of different items of land distrained and subsequently sold under the Rent Recovery Act for a declaration that the sale was invalid for want of proper notice is not bad for misjoinder of parties and of causes of action. Though, in a sense, every item sold constitutes a separate sale, the "matter" is the same, the sale being of distrained property, under the same notification and in respect of the same arrears. The proceedings, in which the various items are sold are one and the ground, on which the validity of the sale is impugned, is the same in each case. The same defect vitiates the whole proceedings and is the common ground of attack. The cause of action, namely, the wrongful sale, is the same as against all the defendants. When a suit is brought under s. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the attachment (and not the making of the order) constitutes the cause of action; and different purchasers of the attached property may be properly joined as defendants in the same suit. *DORASAMY PILLAI v. MUTHUSAMY MOOPPAN* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 94

2. *Execution of decree*

—*Suit by purchaser of the rights of a person, who had unsuccessfully filed an objection under s. 278.* A person who had filed an objection under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the sale of certain immoveable property in execution of a decree, after his objection had been disallowed, sold his interest in the property. *Held*, that there was nothing to prevent the purchaser of such interest from bringing a suit under s. 283 of the Code. The right conferred by s. 283 is not to a personal right confined to the original claimant. *GANESH PRASAD v. KASHI NATH TIWARI* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 89

3. *Execution of decree*

—*Suit for declaration that property is liable to attachment and sale—Valuation of suit.* A decree-holder holding a decree from a Court of Small Causes, which has been transferred to a Munsif for execution, attached certain property as that of the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor's wife objected under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the property was hers. This objection prevailed, and the property was released from attachment. The decree-holder then filed a regular suit against the objector and the judgment-debtor to have it declared that the property was liable to attachment and sale in execution of her decree. *Held*, that the proper valuation of such suit for the purposes of jurisdiction was the amount of the decree under execution and not the value of the property attached. *Dwarka Das v. Kameshar Prasad*, I. L. R. 17 All. 69, explained. *DHAN DEVI v. ZAMURRAD BEGAM* (1905) . I. L. R. 27 All. 440

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 'ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 283—*contd.*

4. ———— *Suit brought under s. 283 not liable to dismissal because no further relief asked—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 42.* The special right conferred by s. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure on a claimant, whose claim is rejected, to sue for a declaration of his title in so far as it is affected by the order passed against him is not controlled by the proviso to s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act; and the plaintiff in such a suit is not bound to ask for any further relief to which he may be entitled. *Kunhi-amma v. Kunhunni*, I. L. R. 16 Mad. 140, overruled. *Ambu v. Kettilamma*, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 23, followed. *KRISTNAM SOORAYA v. PATHMA BEE* (1905) I. L. R. 29 Mad. 151

5. ———— *Limitation Act (Act XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 11—Order dismissing claim for default not an order made after investigation and need not be set aside within one year under Art. 11 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act.* An order dismissing a claim presented under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure for default is not an order made after investigation within the meaning of that section and is not conclusive under s. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Art 11, Sch. II, of the Limitation Act does not apply to such orders; and the party against whom the order is made can maintain a suit to establish his right within the ordinary period of limitation applicable to such suit, although he has not had the order set aside within one year. *Koyanna Chittemma v. Doosy Gavaramma*, I. L. R. 29 Mad. 225, referred to. *Sarat Chandra Bisu v. Tarini Prosad Pal Chowdry*, 11 C. W. N. 487, approved. *SARALA SUBBA RAU v. KAMSALA TIM-MAYYA* (1907) I. L. R. 31 Mad. 5

6. ———— *Suit for declaration of title by person whose objections to execution have been disallowed—Burden of Proof.* Held, that a party intervening in the execution department, and failing in his objections to an attachment, and consequently being obliged to bring a suit under s. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure, must give *prima facie* evidence to establish the genuineness of the document upon which he relies. *Tulshi Rai v. Ram Das*, *Weekly Notes* (1887) 71, *Afzal Begam v. Muhammad Obaidat-ullah Khan*, *Weekly Notes* (1899) 220, *Ram Nath v. Bindrabam*, I. L. R. 18 All. 369, and *Govind Atmaram v. Santai*, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 270, followed. *Suba Bibi v. Balgobind Das*, I. L. R. 3 All. 178, discussed. *NANNHI JAN v. BHURI* (1908) I. L. R. 30 All. 321

7. ———— *Official Assignee of insolvent judgment-debtor not a necessary party to such suit—Decree in such suit cannot declare property liable to be attached, but only that it is the property of the judgment-debtor.* S. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives a statutory right of suit to the unsuccessful party in claim-proceedings and when the property of the insolvent judgment-debtor, which was attached in execution, had vested in the

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 283—*concll.*

Official Assignee during the pendency of such claim-proceedings, the latter is not a necessary party to such suit. The decree in such suit should, where property had so vested, only declare the property attached to belong to the judgment-debtor and ought not to declare it liable to attachment. *ANNAPURANI AMMAL v. SUBRAMANIAN CHETTIAR* (1908) I. L. R. 31 Mad. 347

ss. 284, 285.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE.
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 836

s. 285.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—INVALID SALES—WANT OF JURISDICTION I. L. R. 29 Calc. 773

1. ———— *Execution of decree—Sale by Court of lower grade in ignorance of attachment by Court of higher grade—Sale invalid.* Where the same property has been attached by two Courts of different grades, a sale effected by the Court of lower grade is not the less invalid, because it was effected in ignorance of the attachment imposed by the Court of higher grade. *Badri Prasad v. Saran Lal*, I. L. R. 4 All. 359, and *Lal Balkishen v. Narain Das*, I. L. R. 18 All. 341, followed. *CHIRANJI LAL v. JAWAHIR MAL* (1904) I. L. R. 26 All. 538

2. ———— *Execution of decree—Sale by Court of lower grade of property attached by a Court of higher grade—Sale invalid.* Where the same property is under attachment by two Courts of different grades, a sale effected by the Court of lower grade is a nullity, whether such sale was effected in ignorance of the attachment imposed by the Court of higher grade or not, and consequently a purchaser at such sale has no *locus standi* to sue for a declaration that a subsequent sale held in pursuance of the attachment imposed by the Court of higher grade is not valid. *Chiranjil Lal v. Jawahir Mal*, *Weekly Notes* (1904) 95, followed. *HAR PRASAD v. JAGAN LAL* (1905) I. L. R. 27 All. 56

3. ———— ss. 285, 490—*Attachment before judgment—Execution of decree—Sale by Munsif under Small Cause Court decree pending attachment by Subordinate Judge—Sale a nullity—Jurisdiction.* Certain immoveable property had been attached before judgment by the Subordinate Judge, and a decree was passed thereafter. The same property was sold in execution of a Small Cause decree by the Munsif to whom that decree had been transferred for execution. Held, that a re-attachment by the Subordinate Judge was unnecessary and that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to sell the property while under attachment by a higher Court and the sale was a nullity. *Har Prasad v. Jagan Lal*, I. L. R. 27 All. 56, followed. *DURPATI BIBI v. RAM RACH PAL* (1909) I. L. R. 31 All. 527

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

ss. 286 and 296 (1859, s. 248)—
Construction of. In s. 248, Act VIII of 1859,
the words "whom the Court may appoint" apply
not only to the words "any other person," but also
the officers of the Court. In the absence of the
Subordinate Judge it is not competent to the Judge,
because he is a superior officer, to perform the duties
required by s. 248. *JUDONATH ROY v. RAM
BUKSE CHATTERJEE* . . . 12 W. R. 238

s. 287—

See APPEAL—EXECUTION OF DECREES—
QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 617

See MORTGAGE—SALE OF MORTGAGED
PROPERTY—RIGHTS OF MORTGAGEES.
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 599

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY
5 C. W. N. 497

SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.
6 C. W. N. 44, 836

1. *Proceedings relating
to proclamation of sale—"Order"—Appeal.* None
of the proceedings of a Court under s. 287 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and the rules framed
thereunder in relation to the proclamation of sale is
an "order" within s. 244 and as such appealable
as a "decree." *Sivasami Naickar v. Rainasami
Naickar*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 568, and *Ganga Prosad v.
Raj Coomar Singh*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 617, dissented
from. Proceedings under s. 287 are in themselves
administrative and not judicial, but if and when a
sale does take place and it has to be judicially
confirmed, objections may be taken to the confirma-
tion of the sale on any of the grounds mentioned in
s. 311 of the Code, some of which may relate to
the contents of the proclamation. *SIVAGAMI ACHI
v. SUBRAHMANY AYYAR* (1904)
I. L. R. 27 Mad. 259

2. *Sale-proclamation—
Statement of value of property in—Investigation.*
The law does not require the court executing a
decree to enter in the sale-proclamation the value of
the property to be sold, but only that it shall
enter "any other thing which it considers material
for the purchaser to know in order to judge of the
nature and value of the property." So where the
judgment-debtor objected to the statement in
the sale-proclamation as regards the estimated
annual income of the property and its estimated
value and urged that the same was higher than
what was stated therein: *Held*, that there was no
law requiring the Court to make an investigation
by recording evidence and come to a decision.
*RAI KASHI PERSAD SINGH v. BABU DULEEP
NARAIN SAHU* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 264

3. *Sale proclamation,
statement in, of value of properties to be sold—
Appeal—Application for execution of decree of*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 877)—*contd.*s. 287—*contd.*

*Appellate Court, whether an application in
continuation of application to execute the decree
of the lower court.* A judgment-debtor has the
right to have as nearly as may reasonably
be a just and true valuation placed upon his
property before it is sold; he has also the right
to have the property to be sold described in
the sale-proclamation with reasonable accuracy.
Saadatmand Khan v. Phul Kuar, L. R. 25 I. A. 146,
and *Aruna Chellam Chetti v. Aruna Chellam Chetti*,
L. R. 15 I. A. 171, replied upon. An appeal lies
against an order refusing an application made by a
judgment-debtor objecting that the valuation of
the properties contained in the sale-proclamation
was incorrect and in many instances grossly inade-
quate and that the properties were misdescribed in
such a manner as to render their identifica-
tion by intending purchasers extremely difficult.
Where the sale-proclamation was published on the
14th November and the judgment-debtors made
an application on the following day for transfer
of the execution proceedings to another district:
Held, that the fact that he did not object to the
statement in the sale-proclamation as to the value of
the property advertised for sale when he made his
application on the 15th, did not disentitle him to
raise the said objection which he subsequently raised
on the 3rd December. Pending the hearing of an
appeal, the decree-holder took out execution of a
mortgage decree; the judgment-debtor made an
objection to the validity of the sale-proclamation
on the ground that the statement therein as to
the value of the property was incorrect and the
Court overruled the objection. The Appellate
Court altered the decree and extended the period of
redemption; the decree-holder then made an appli-
cation to execute the decree of the Appellate Court.
Held, that the application to execute the decree
of the Appellate Court was not a continuation of
the former application and the lower Court
was in error in declining to enter into the
question as to the value of the property as stated
in the sale-proclamation. *RAMESSUR PRASHAD
NARAIN SINGH v. RAI SHAM KRISHN* (1904)
8 C. W. N. 257

4. *Execution of
decree—Question of saleability of property in
execution—Property described in decree as a
permanent tenancy—Estoppel—Duty of Court
executing decree.* In execution of a decree on
a compromise for payment of a certain sum
of money and in default thereof for the sale of
certain properties therein specified, application
was made to sell certain fields described in the decree
as held by the judgment-debtor on a permanent
tenure. The judgment-debtor objected that the
properties were not saleable, being held by an occu-
pancy tenure. *Held*, that this objection was not
open to the judgment-debtor, inasmuch as it was
one which he might have raised in the suit in which
the decree was passed, but did not. But the

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 287—*concl'd.*

statement as to tenure contained in the decree was not binding on third persons. *Per BURKITT, J.*—It would be the duty of the court executing the decree, should it have reason to believe that the property, the sale of which was asked for, was held by occupancy tenure, to notify that fact in the proclamation of sale as a warning to prospective bidders. *Ram Janam Ram v. Remeshar Rai, Weekly Notes, 1892, p. 5, followed. BASDEO PRASAD v. JUTHAN RAM (1905) I. L. R. 27 All. 684*

5. s. 287, cl. (c)—*Execution sale—Sale-proclamation—Statement of value—Enquiry as to approximate value when to be made.* It cannot be laid down generally that in no case should any enquiry be made as to the value of the judgment-debtor's property to be sold before issuing the sale-proclamation. *Kashi Pershad Singh v. Jamuna Pershad Sahu, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 922, commented on.* Where the decree-holder stated the value of the property to be Rs. 15,000, but the judgment-debtor objected that the value was Rs. 1,50,000 and the Court adopted the former valuation without any inquiry: *Held*, that in the face of the discrepancy in the value as stated by the decree-holder on the one hand and the judgment-debtor on the other, an enquiry as to the approximate value of the property was obviously necessary and should be held. *SURENDRA MOHAN TAGORE v. HURRUK CHAND (1907) 12 C. W. N. 542*

6. s. 287, cl. (e)—*Execution—Proclamation of sale—Value of property—Executing Court—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 67, 99—Right of mortgagee to bring mortgaged property to sale—Decree for interest—Legality of decree.* S. 287, cl. (e), of the Civil Procedure Code, does not require the executing Court to make an investigation, on the application of the judgment-debtor, into the question of the value of the property to be sold, to record evidence and to come to a decision on the point. *Sadatmand Khan v. Phul Kuar, I. L. R. 20 All. 412, L. R. 25 I. A. 146, and Sivasami Naickar v. Ratnasami Naickar, I. L. R. 23 Mal. 568, distinguished.* S. 99 of the Transfer of Property Act does not prevent a mortgagee from bringing the mortgaged property to sale in execution of a decree for interest only obtained in accordance with the terms of the mortgage bond. The executing Court cannot call the legality of a decree in question. *Maharaja of Bharatpur v. Rani Kanno Dei, I. L. R. 23 All. 181, followed. KASHI PERSHAD SINGH v. JAMUNA PERSHAD SAHU (1904) I. L. R. 31 Calc. 922*

ss. 287-320.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE.

ss. 287, 289 and 290 (1859, s. 249).

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 287, 289 and 290—*concl'd.*

1. Part of an estate.—The "part of an estate," in s. 249, Act VIII of 1859, meant the aliquot part of an estate. *KALLYPROSONNO BOSE v. DINONATH MULLICK*

11 B. L. R. 56 : 19 W. R. 434

2. Proclamation under. The object of the proclamation under s. 249 is to give notice to intending purchasers, not to the judgment-debtors. *LAEK RAM v. MOHESH DAS*

12 W. R. 488

s. 290 (1859, s. 249, last para.)

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
BIDDERS. I. L. R. 14 Mad. 235See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.

ss. 290, 291, 244, 311, 312—

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 29 All. 196

s. 291.

See MORTGAGE—EVIDENCE.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.

6 C. W. N. 42, 44, 48

1. Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 90—*Execution of decree—Payment into Court of decretal money and costs—Stay of sale.* Where the sale of mortgaged property has been directed by an order absolute under s. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it is open to the person holding the equity of redemption in such property to pay into Court at any time before the sale the amount of the decretal debt and costs, and thereupon the execution proceedings will cease. It is not necessary that the person holding the equity of redemption should wait, until the property is actually put up for sale. *Raja Ram Singhji v. Chunni Lal, I. L. R. 19 All. 205, and Harjas Rai v. Rameshar, I. L. R. 20 All. 354, followed. Bibijan Bibi v. Suchi Bewah, I. L. R. 31 Calc. 863, referred to. MISRI LAL v. MITHU LAL (1905)*

I. L. R. 28 All. 28

2. Sale in execution stayed—*Omission to issue fresh proclamation—Sale after confirmation cannot be impeached by suit.* Where a sale in execution of the appellant's property was stayed and a fresh proclamation was not issued as directed by s. 291 of the Civil Procedure Code: *Held*, that as the omission to issue it had involved no loss to the appellants, and the sale had been in consequence confirmed, it was not competent for them under the clear provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to impeach the sale by regular suit. *GAJRAJMATI TEORAIN v. AKBAR HUSAIN (1906)*

I. L. R. 29 All. 196

s.c. I. R. 34 I. A. 37

ss. 291 and 311—*Direct evidence, how far necessary—Sale—Price.* Although there may

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 291 and 311—*concl'd.*

not be direct evidence connecting an alleged material irregularity in the publication or conduct of a sale with the inadequacy of price at such a sale as cause and effect, yet in order to enable the Court to set aside a sale under s. 311 of the Civil Procedure Code, there must be evidence of circumstances, which will warrant the necessary or at least reasonable inference that the inadequacy of price at the sale was the result of the irregularity complained of. *MAHABIR PERSHAD SINGH v. DHANUKDHARI SINGH* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 815

s. 293.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—

RE-SALES . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 575

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 337

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 535

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 454

I. L. R. 19 All. 22

2 C. W. N. 411

ss. 293, 306.—*Execution of decree*

—*Sale in execution—Non-payment by purchaser of deposit required by law—Fresh sale—Claim by auction-purchaser for difference of price on re-sale.* Certain immoveable property was put up to auction in execution of a decree and purchased by A B, but the purchaser did not at once make the deposit required by s. 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the property was subsequently—but not “forthwith”—put up again to auction and sold for a considerably less sum to the decree-holder. *Held*, that the first sale was not merely irregular, but no sale at all, and that the decree-holder was not entitled to claim against the first purchase under s. 293 of the Code, compensation for the loss resulting on the second sale. *Intizam Ali Khan v. Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 5 All. 316, followed. *AMIR BEGAM v. BANK OF UPPER INDIA* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 273

ss. 293, 307, 308 (1859, s. 254).

See APPEAL—SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE

I. L. R. 1 All. 181

I. L. R. 13 All. 564

I. L. R. 14 All. 201

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—RE-SALE

3 W. R. 3

6 W. R. Mis. 82, 126

7 W. R. 110

I. L. R. 1 All. 181

s. 294.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—

SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.

6 B. L. R. Ap. 37: 14 W. R. 405

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 303

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 130, 575

5 C. L. R. 181

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 757

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 731

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 498

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 588

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 271

4 C. W. N. 474

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 294—*concl'd.*

INVALID SALES—FRAUD.

5 C. W. N. 265

SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.

I. L. R. 23 All. 478

I. L. R. 24 All. 108

Execution of decree—Decree-holder bidding for property with permission—Right to set-off amount due to decree-holder against purchase money. The first paragraph of s. 294 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) requires the permission of the Court to enable the holder of a decree to bid for property. If he gets that permission and gets it without qualification, then the amount due on the mortgage may, if he so desires, be set off. But it may be one of the terms on which the permission to bid is granted that there should not be this right of set-off. In such a case no set-off can be directed. *HAZARIMAL v. NAMDEV* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 379

s. 295 (1859, ss. 270, 271).

See INSOLVENCY—CLAIMS OF ATTACHING CREDITORS AND OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE.

6 C. W. N. 577

See MORTGAGE . . . 9 C. W. N. 989

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—DISTRIBUTION OF SALE-PROCEEDS.

SETTING ASIDE SALE—GENERAL

CASES . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 548

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—JURISDICTION—SALE-PROCEEDS.

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 250

1. ——— Rateable distribution—*Realization of Assets—Interpretation.* A certain sum of money, which was deposited in a Bank in the joint names of the Collector and a judgment-debtor, and which belonged to the judgment-debtor, was sent by the Collector in the form of a cheque to the Court at the request of the Court to which the judgment-creditor had applied for the payment of his decretal amount out of the said money. After the cheque was received by the Court and converted into cash, the judgment-creditor contended that the money was not liable to rateable distribution under s. 295 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), between certain other judgment-creditors of the judgment-debtor, because the money did not fall within the description of assets dealt with in that section, that is, it could not be said that those assets had been realized, and if they had been realized they had not been realized in execution of a decree inasmuch as the money had not been attached in the Bank. *Held*, that s. 295 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) applied, and that the money was liable to rateable distribution between the several judgment-creditors. S. 295 provides that whenever assets are realized by sale or otherwise in execution

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 295—*contd.*

of a decree, the consequences prescribed in the section shall follow. *Prima facie* the word "realized" means "converted into cash or into a form whereby it becomes available for immediate distribution" and there is nothing in the word itself which requires that that process should take place as the result of any ulterior proceeding in the course of execution. *MANILAL UMEDRAM v. NANABHAI MANEKALAL* (1904). . . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 264

2. *Limitation Act* (XV of 1877), Art. 179, cl. (4)—*Application to take some step in aid of execution—Order for Rateable Distribution—Application to withdraw money to be found due upon such distribution—Ministerial order—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 295.* Where, upon application made by a decree-holder, an order for rateable distribution was passed under s. 295 of the Civil Procedure Code without fixing the amounts due to the several decree-holders, and then on a later date the decree-holder applied for an order to withdraw the moneys to which he was entitled upon such distribution: *Held*, that the order applied for was not a merely ministerial order, but a judicial order to be passed after considering the claims of rival decree-holders. The application therefore was an application to take some step in aid of execution within Art. 179, cl. (4), Sch. II of the Limitation Act. *Hem Chandra Chowdari v. Brojo Sundari Debee*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 89; *Fazal Imam v. Metta Singh*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 549; *Ganga Pershad Bhowmik v. Debi Sundari Debee*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 227, and *Ananda Mohan Roy v. Hara Sundari*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 196, distinguished. *Saritoola Molla v. Raj Coomarr Roy*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 709, referred to. *BAIJ NATH PROSAD v. GHANSHYAM DASS* (1904). . . 8 C. W. N. 382

3. *Assets—Rateable Distribution—First decree against three judgment-debtors—Subsequent decree against only one of them.* S. 295 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) governs, where the first decree is against three judgment-debtors and the decree on which the petitioner relies is against one of those three. *Nimbaji v. Vadia Venkati*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 683, not followed. *CHHOTALAL v. NABIBHAI* (1905)
I. L. R. 29 Bom. 528

4. *Execution of decree—Suit for refund of assets wrongly distributed.* *D* held a simple money decree against *S*. *P* held a decree under s. 90 of the Transfer of Property Act against *S*, personally and as representative of *R*, the original decree for sale having been passed against *S* and *R* jointly. *D* realized in execution of his decree a sum of Rs. 1,100 by sale of property belonging to *S* alone. *Held*, that *P* was entitled to a rateable distribution of the assets so realized under the provisions of s. 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Gonesh Das Bagria v. Shiva Lakshman*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 295—*concl'd.*

Bhakat, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 583, followed. *GATTI LAL v. BIR BAHADUR SAHAI* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 158

s. 295, prov. (c)—

*See MORTGAGE—SALE OF MORTGAGED
PROPERTY—RIGHTS OF MORTGAGEES.*

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 953

ss. 295, 490, 648—*Right to Rateable Distribution of creditor attaching before judgment—"Realization" of assets—Attachment before judgment, if property outside jurisdiction.* Under s. 490 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with s. 273, the property of a judgment-debtor attached before judgment is brought into Court by stress of the attachment, and, where a decree follows the judgment, the creditor will be entitled, without a fresh attachment, to rateable distribution out of the proceeds of sale of such property under s. 295. The fact that, subsequent to realisation, he applies for attachment of the amount, will not affect his right, as no such attachment was necessary. The operation of s. 295 is not confined to cases where the property actually sold and realised belongs to the judgment-debtor. It is also applicable where the attached property is a decree in favour of the judgment-debtor against others, and the money is realised in execution of such decree by the sale of property belonging to such others. *Semble*: Under s. 648 of the Code of Civil Procedure, property outside the jurisdiction of a Court, in which a suit is pending, can be attached by such Court in anticipation of its judgment. *Ram Pertab Jhowar v. Madho Rai*, 7 C. W. N. 216, referred to. *Srinivasa Aiyangar v. Seetharama Ayyar*, I. L. R. 19 Mad. 72, distinguished. *AMARA VEERAYYA v. ANNAMALA CHETTY* (1908). . . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 502

ss. 295, 622—*Interference of High Court on revision against an order under s. 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure.* The High Court will not, as a general rule, interfere by way of revision under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when the party has a remedy elsewhere than in the High Court. The High Court will however interfere, where the right of the party is clear and where the result of non-interference will be only to multiply proceedings by driving the party to a suit, in which there can be no defence. A Court, which has found that a party is entitled to rateable distribution under s. 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has no discretionary power to refuse such relief; and in refusing to grant it such Court declines a jurisdiction vested in it by law. *SREE KRISHNA DOSS v. CHANDOOK CHAND* (1908)
I. L. R. 32 Mad. 334

s. 296—*Execution of decree—Application for rateable distribution of assets—Notice of such application to other decree-holders unnecessary.* *Held*, that it is nowhere provided by law

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 296—*concl'd.*

either that an application for rateable distribution of assets realized in execution of a decree cannot be made in the course of execution proceedings taken by the applicant himself, but must be made in the course of execution proceedings initiated by some other decree-holder, or that notice of such an application having been made must of necessity be given to the other decree-holders. *CHUNI LAL v. JUGAL KISHORE* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 27 All. 132

ss. 304 to 319—**!!**

Ss. 304 to 319 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to all sales of immoveable property. *KRISHNAJI v. MAHADEV VINAYAK* (1906)

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 104

s. 305—

See ante, s. 244—PARTIES TO SUIT.

I. L. R. 23 All. 116

See MORTGAGE—SALE OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY—PURCHASERS.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 379

s. 306 (1859, s. 253).

See SALE . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 323

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.

I. L. R. 5 All. 316

5 C. L. R. 181

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 33

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 227

ss. 306 and 311—*Execution of decree—Sale in execution—Non-payment of required portion of the purchase-money at date of sale—Irregularity.* Held, that the fact that an auction-purchaser at a sale held in execution of a decree did not pay the 25 per cent. of the purchase-money required by s. 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure at the time of the sale was a mere irregularity, which would not affect the validity of the sale, unless it could be shown that substantial injury was thereby caused to the judgment-debtor. *Intizam Ali Khan v. Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 5 All. 316, declared to be no longer law. *AHMAD BAKHSI v. LALTA PRASAD* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 238

s. 307.

See PAYMENT INTO COURT.

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 415

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 535

Vacation—Holiday—Days on which the office is open—Office day—Payment of purchase-money for property bought at Court-sale. The time during which a Court is closed for the vacation is not a holiday within the meaning of s. 307 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). Days on which the office is open, and the purchase-money for property bought at a Court-sale could have been paid, are office days. *MOTIRAM RAGHUNATH v. BHIVRAJ* . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 745

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 307, 308 (1859, s. 254).

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—RE-SALE.

s. 310 (Act XXIII of 1861, s. 14).

See PRE-EMPTION.

s. 310A.

See ante, s. 244—PARTIES TO SUIT.

6 C. W. N. 127

See APPEAL—

EXECUTION OF DECREE—QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 418

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 19 All. 140

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885) . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 543

See DEPOSIT IN COURT.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 107

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EFFECT OF CHANGE OF LAW PENDING EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 940

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 767

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 477

See MORTGAGE I. L. R. 31 Calc. 975

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—SETTING ASIDE SALE—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 393, 396 note

1 C. W. N. 114

2 C. W. N. 127

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 1, 459

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—

DISTRIBUTION OF SALE PROCEEDS.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 262

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 158

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 286

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 723

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 682

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 216, 609

1 C. W. N. 695, 703

3 C. W. N. 283

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 449

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 73

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 416

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 181, 450

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 682, 958

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 703

1 C. W. N. 135, 279

2 C. W. N. 353

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 40

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 73

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622.

6 C. W. N. 57

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 310A—*contd.*

See UNDER-RAIYAT. 11 C. W. N. 742

1. _____ Act (Local) No. III of 1901 (Land Revenue Act), ss. 39, 210, 211—Act (Local) No. II of 1901 (Agra Tenancy Act), s. 159—*Appeal—Jurisdiction*. Two decrees were obtained in the Revenue Court, one was for costs resulting in proceedings under s. 39 of the Land Revenue Act, and the other was passed under s. 159 of the Agra Tenancy Act. The decrees were consolidated and one sale was held on account of both of them. The judgment-debtor applied to the Assistant Collector, offering to pay in the sum decreed under s. 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. The application was rejected by the Assistant Collector, and the auction-purchaser obtained formal possession over the house sold. On appeal by the judgment-debtor, the Collector set aside the order of the Assistant Collector and extended the time for payment. The money was paid in and the sale set aside. The Board of Revenue rejected the application for revision made by the auction-purchaser, who thereupon brought a suit for confirmation of the sale in the Civil Court. *Held*, that whether the sale was held under Act No. III of 1901 in which case appeals from orders passed in execution would lie to the Collector, Commissioner and the Board of Revenue under ss. 210 and 211, or the order passed on the application under s. 310A was one passed under Act No. II of 1901, the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to it. Whether or not an appeal lay to the Collector from the orders of the Assistant Collector, the Board undoubtedly had the power of revision. CHHA-KAURI KHAN v. PIR BAKHSH KHAN (1909)

I. L. R. 31 All. 279

2. _____ Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 89—*Sale held in pursuance of a decree under s. 89*. The appellant obtained an order absolute under s. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, caused the property to be sold and purchased it himself. The judgment-debtor made an application under s. 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the sale. *Held*, that in the absence of special rules framed by the High Court for carrying out orders under chapter IV of Act IV of 1882, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applied and the application by the judgment-debtor could be entertained under s. 310A. THAN CHAND v. JAGGANNATH (1909)

I. L. R. 31 All. 346

3. _____ "Person, whose immovable property has been sold"—*Purchaser or share in occupancy holding*. The purchaser of a share of an occupancy holding transferable by custom can apply under s. 310 of the Civil Procedure Code, as being a person whose immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent due in respect of the holding. JANARDHAN GANGULI v. KALI KRISTO THAKUR, I. L. R. 23 Calc.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 310A—*contd.*

393, followed. KULDIP SINGH v. GILLANDERS ARBUTHNOT, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 615, distinguished. BENODINI DASSI v. PEARY MOHAN HALDAR (1904)

8 C. W. N. 55

4. _____ Sale in execution, making deposit to set aside—"Person whose immovable property has been sold"—*Purchaser of portion of occupancy holding—Locus standi*. Whether a purchaser of a portion of an occupancy holding has a valid interest as against the landlord or not, he has such an interest in the holding as against the tenant as entitles him to make a deposit under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code, in order to have a sale of the holding in execution set aside. KUNJA BEHARI MONDAL v. SAMBHU CHANDRA ROY (1904)

8 C. W. N. 232

5. _____ Chap. XIX—*Attachment—Private sale—Application to set aside sale—Sale under attachment*. S. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) is applicable to a purchaser subsequent to attachment and prior to sale under the attachment. Where there has been a subsequent sale following on the attachment, a person answering this description is one whose immovable property has been sold under Chapter XIX of the Code. MULCHAND v. GOVIND (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 575

6. _____ Person acquiring interest in property after Court sale, within a month, can apply under s. 310A. Where property is sold in execution of a decree, a person acquiring an interest in such property from the judgment-debtor within a month after such sale, is entitled to maintain an application under s. 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure. HAZARI RAM v. BADAI RAM AND NANDO LAL, 1 C. W. N. 279, dissented from. APPAYA SHETTI v. KUNHATI PEARI (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 214

7. _____ Contract Act (IV of 1872), s. 72—*Voluntary payment—Property of third person sold in execution—His remedy—Right to recover money erroneously deposited under s. 310A*. When property belonging to A was sold in execution of a decree against B and A had the sale set aside by making a deposit under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code: *Held*, that A has no right to sue the decree-holder for recovery of the amount of the deposit money paid to him. DULICHAND v. RAM KISSAN SINGH, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 648; JUDGE NARAIN SINGH v. RAJA SINGH, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 656, referred to. A was not bound to apply under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside the sale, nor had he the right to do so. KUNJA BEHARI SINGHA v. BHOPENDRA KUMAR DUTT (1907)

12 C. W. N. 151

8. _____ Application to set aside rent sale—Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act (Bengal Act I of 1897), s. 54—Bengal General Clauses Act (Bengal Act I of 1899), s. 8, cl. (c)—

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 310A—*contd.*

Right accrued previous to, but application after, repeal. A raiyati holding having been sold on the 7th May 1907 in execution of a rent-decree, an under-raiyat applied to have the sale set aside under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code on the 23rd May following. *Held*, that the application could not be entertained, the Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act I of 1907 having come into operation on the 22nd May 1907. S. 54 of the amending Act by enacting that s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code shall not apply to a tenure or holding attached in execution of a decree for arrears due thereon, does not repeal any portion of the Bengal Tenancy Act within the meaning of sub-s. (c) of s. 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act. *ASIRUDDI MONDOL v. MUKHODAMOYEE DASSI* (1908) . . . 12 C. W. N. 434

9. *Decree attached by two persons—Sale by one attaching creditor—Deposit to set aside sale—Title to deposit.* Defendant No. 1 obtained two decrees against defendant No. 2; plaintiffs also obtained a decree against defendant No. 2, who had obtained a decree against a third person. Defendant No. 1 attached that decree and was substituted for defendant No. 2 on the 16th July 1904; plaintiffs also attached that decree and were substituted in place of defendant No. 2 on the 18th November 1904. Then at the instance of defendant No. 1 (in execution of the attached decree) properties were sold and the sale was set aside by a deposit under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that upon the terms of s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code, both plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 were entitled to the money deposited. *UPENDRA NATH SAHU v. HARI DAS MUKHERJEE* (1908) . . . 12 C. W. N. 800

10. *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 310A—Rent sale, if may be set aside on deposit.* In a case from Chittagong (East Bengal), *Held*, that s. 310A, Civil Procedure Code, applied to a sale under the Bengal Tenancy Act. Where a sale under the Bengal Tenancy Act was set aside under s. 310A, Civil Procedure Code, at the instance of a private purchaser who had purchased the holding before the sale: *Held*, that having regard to the current rulings, the order of the lower Court setting aside the sale should not be set aside. *Pareesh Nath Singha v. Nobogopal Chattopadhyaya*, 5 C. W. N. 821 : I. L. R. 29 Calc. 1, referred to. *Ali Miah v. Mukhodamooyee Dassi*, 12 C. W. N. 434 : s. c. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 543, followed. *ALI MIAH v. RAMJAN KHAN* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 224

11. *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 310A—Sale of the immovable property in execution—Deposit by Stranger in the name of judgment-debtor, to set aside sale—Order setting aside sale reversed on appeal—Right of decree-holder to attach the deposit money.* Where property belonging to the defendant No. 2 having been sold in execution of a decree, he entered

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 310A—*concl.*

into an agreement with defendant No. 1 under which the latter deposited the decretal amount under s. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code in the name of defendant No. 2, the latter agreeing that if the sale was set aside he should sell the property to defendant No. 1; and the sale was set aside and the sale by defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 was also effected as agreed. *Held*, that on the Appellate Court setting aside the order under s. 310A and confirming the sale, it was not open to the decree-holder to attach the money deposited as defendant No. 2's money, and defendant No. 1 was entitled to withdraw the same from Court. *SOBHA RAM DASS v. MOHESHWAR SARMA* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 100

ss. 310A, 244 (c)—*Execution of decree—Order refusing to accept a deposit tendered under s. 310A—Appeal.* *Held*, that an order refusing to accept a deposit tendered under the provisions of s. 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure is an order falling within the purview of s. 244 (c) of the Code and is appealable as such. *Gulzari Lal v. Madho Ram*, I. L. R. 26 All. 447, and *Phul Chand Ram v. Nursingh Pershad Misser*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 73, referred to. *Bashir-ud-din v. Jhori Singh*, I. L. R. 19 All. 140, not followed. *IMTIAZI BEGAM v. DHUMAN BEGAM* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 275

ss. 310A, 244 and 588—*Question relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree—Auction purchaser representative of judgment-debtor, not of decree-holder.* A purchaser at an auction sale in execution of a decree is the representative of the judgment-debtor, not of the decree-holder. *Manickka Onayan v. Rajagopala Pillai*, I. L. R. 30 Mad. 507, dissented from. Where therefore a judgment-debtor's application under s. 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure had been allowed, it was *held* that no appeal by the auction-purchaser would lie, inasmuch as no appeal was given by s. 588, nor did the case fall within the purview of s. 244 of the Code. *Bashir-ud-din v. Jhori Singh*, I. L. R. 19 All. 140, followed. *Kuber Singh v. Sahib Lal*, I. L. R. 27 All. 263; *Gulzari Lal v. Madho Ram*, I. L. R. 26 All. 447; *Maganlal Mulji v. Doshi Mulji*, I. L. R. 25 Bom. 631, and *Raynor v. The Mussoorie Bank, Limited*, I. L. R. 7 All. 681, referred to. *Imtiaz Begam v. Dhuman Begam*, I. L. R. 29 All. 275, dissented from. *ANANDI KUNWARI v. AJUDHIA NATH* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 379

ss. 310A, 588—*Appeal—No appeal from an order setting aside a sale under s. 310A.* *Held*, that no appeal lies from an order under s. 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure setting aside a sale, whether the auction-purchaser is the decree-holder or an outsider. *Mendai Lal v. Bhujja Singh*, All. Weekly Notes (1895) 140, referred to. *KUBER SINGH v. SHIB LAL* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 263

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 310A and 622—*Execution of decree—Application to set aside sale—Who have a right to apply—Revision.* A mortgagee sued for sale on his mortgage impleading besides the mortgagee two persons, who claimed a title to the mortgaged property adverse to the mortgagee. In that suit it was decided that the property, the subject of the mortgage in suit, belonged to the mortgagor and not to the other defendants. The plaintiff mortgagee obtained a decree for sale and caused the mortgaged property to be sold by auction. The defendants, other than the mortgagor, applied to have this sale set aside under s. 310A of the Code of Civil Procedure, but their application was rejected and they then sought in revision to get this order reversed. *Held*, by BANERJI, J.—That the defendants applicants were not entitled to make an application under s. 310A of the Code, they not being judgment-debtors, whose property had been sold. *Per* RICHARDS, J.—Whether or not applicants were entitled to make the application which they did make (and they possibly were so entitled), the Court below did not fail to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law nor did it act in the exercise of that jurisdiction illegally. Its order was, therefore, not open to revision. *Rajah Amir Hasan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh*, L. R. 11 I. A. 237, referred to. *RAM SINGH v. SALIG RAM* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 84

s. 311—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, ss. 174, 591.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—FRAUD.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 395

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 296

INVALID SALES—FRAUD.

5 C. W. N. 265

SETTING ASIDE SALE—

GENERAL CASES:

6 C. W. N. 5

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 548, 682

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 244

IRREGULARITY.

SUBSTANTIAL INJURY;

7 C. W. N. 439

1. Sale proclamation—*Service, if should be in every part of the property—Value statement of, if material—“Property.”* The statement of the sale-proclamation of a value, which proves to be inadequate, is an irregularity, but not a material irregularity. Such statements are made without much consideration and it is well known that purchasers do not take serious notice of any statement in the sale proclamation as to the value of the property to be sold. S. 274 of the Civil Procedure Code does not require that the sale proclamation should be served in each of the villages comprised in the property to be sold. The word “property” in that section evidently refers to each

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 311—*concl.*

“lot” to be sold separately from the rest. Though it is a sound rule to follow, *viz.*, to serve a separate proclamation in each of the villages embraced in the same process, when they are at such a distance from one another that there is no moral certainty of communication to a person interested in the one of what is publicly done in the other, the fact that the processes were not served in each does not necessarily constitute an infringement of the provisions of s. 274 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Tripura Sundari v. Durga Churn Pal*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 74 referred to. *Pedro Antonio v. Jalbhoy Adeshir* I. L. R. 12 Bom. 363, commented on. *ABDUL KASHIM v. BENODE LAL DHONE* (1907)

12 C. W. N. 757

2. *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 311—Representative of judgment-debtor—Rent decree—Sale—Occupancy holding—Transferee of holding if may apply to set aside sale, when holding not transferable.* When an occupancy holding is sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent obtained against the raiyat, a person who claims to have purchased the holding from the latter cannot apply as the representative of the judgment-debtor to have the sale set aside under s. 244 or 311 of the Civil Procedure Code, if the holding be not transferable by custom or usage. *Nissa Bibi v. Radha Kishore Manikya*, 11 C. W. N. 312, followed. *PROSUNNO KUMAR MIDDAR v. BAMA CHURN MONDAL* (1909)

13 C. W. N. 652

ss. 311, 312 (1859, ss. 256, 257).

See DECREE.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—

SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 4

1. The word “disallowed” in s. 312 of the Civil Procedure Code has no reference to an order passed on an appeal, but refers to the disallowance of the objection by the Court before which the proceedings under s. 311 are taken. *MAHOMED HOSSEIN v. PURUNDUR MAHTO*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 287

2. *Execution, steps in aid of—Sale, confirmation of—Limitation.* An application by a decree-holder, who has purchased a property in execution of his own decree, for confirmation of the sale, is not an application to take some steps in aid of execution of the decree. *UMESH CHANDRA DAS v. SHIB NARAIN MANDAL* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1011

ss. 311, 312, 313—*Execution of decree—Sale in execution—Objection subsequently taken by the judgment-debtor that the property sold was not legally saleable—Estoppel.* *Held*, that judgment-debtor who might have raised objections to a sale in execution of a decree against him, but who has refrained from doing so, and who

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 311, 312, 313—*concl'd.*

might have appealed against the order for sale, has no right, after the sale has been carried out, to prefer an objection that the property sold was not legally saleable. *Ramchhaibar Misr v. Bechu Bhagat*, I. L. R. 7 All. 641, and *Durga Charan Mandal v. Kali Prasanna Sarkar*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 727, followed. *UMED v. JAS RAM* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 612

ss. 311, 312, 244 (c)—*Decree—Execution of decree—Sale—Absence of notice to judgment-debtor—Application to set aside sale on grounds of absence of notice and property sold at under-value—Dismissal of application—Second appeal—“Publishing or conducting” sales, meaning of.* Certain property was sold in execution of a decree against the applicant. He applied to the Court seeking to have the sale set aside on the ground that no notice had been issued to the applicant under s. 248 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, and that in consequence the property was sold at an undervalue. The Court of first instance dismissed the application; and the dismissal was upheld by the lower Appellate Court. On second appeal, a preliminary objection was taken that the order dismissing the application fell under s. 312 of the Code and was not appealable. *Held*, that the application did not fall under s. 311 and the order dismissing the same did not come within s. 312 of the Code. *Held*, further, that the order fell under s. 244 (c) of the Code and was appealable as a decree. The question involved was “a question relating to the satisfaction of the decree” within the meaning of the clause. The non-issue of a notice to a party concerned is not a material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sales, within the meaning of s. 311 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). It is rather an irregularity in proceedings which are anterior to the publishing or the conduct of the sale. The words “publishing or conducting” in s. 311 of the Code refer respectively to the proclamation of sale under s. 287 and to the action of the officer by whom the sale was held. The sale took place eight years after the decree. *Held*, that, as no notice was issued to the appellant, the order of both the lower Courts must be reversed and the sale set aside. *PARASHRAM v. BALMUKUND* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 572

s. 312 (1859, s. 257).

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 179.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE . . . 11 W. R. 297

12 W. R. 41

I. L. R. 3 All. 112, 206, 554, 701

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 1, 9

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 216

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 40

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 312—*concl'd.*

appeal from order under—

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—GENERAL CASES.
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 548

1. Letters Patent, 1865, ss. 15 and 36. Cls. 15 and 36 of the Letters Patent of the High Court must be treated as qualifying s. 257 of Act VIII of 1859. *ROY NANDIPAT MAHATA v. URQUHART*

4 B. L. R. A. C. 181: 13 W. R. 209

2. Application of. S. 257, Act VIII of 1859, applied only to sales held after that Act came into operation. *ABDOOL HYD v. LALLA NOWAH ROY* . . . 1 W. R. 204

s. 313.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—INVALID SALES—WANT OF SALEABLE INTEREST.

ss. 313 and 315—*Execution of decree—Sale in execution of property to part of which only the judgment-debtor had a title—Rights of purchaser—Contribution.* In execution of a decree for sale on a mortgage part of the mortgaged property was sold by auction, but after the sale it was found that the judgment-debtor had no title to about two-thirds of the property sold. The auction purchaser then sued the representatives of the mortgagee for contribution as against the remainder of the mortgaged property. *Held*, that the suit would not lie. An auction-purchaser has, in the absence of fraud, no remedy, unless the judgment-debtor has no saleable interest at all in the property sold as his, and then only under ss. 313 and 315 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but these sections do not apply, when the title of the judgment-debtor to part only of the property sold is defective. *Santo Chandra Mukerji v. Nain Sukh*, I. L. R. 23 All. 355, followed. *MUHAMMAD RAHMAT-ULLAH v. BACHHO* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 27 All. 537

s. 315 (1859, s. 258).

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—RIGHTS OF PURCHASERS—RECOVERY OF PURCHASE-MONEY.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—

JOINT PROPERTY;

I. L. R. 23 All. 355

SETTING ASIDE SALE—RIGHTS OF PURCHASERS—RECOVERY OF PURCHASE-MONEY.

5 C. W. N. 240

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—JURISDICTION—PURCHASE-MONEY.

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 269

See RIGHT OF SUIT—SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE . . . 7 C. W. N. 105

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 315—*concl'd.*

1. ———— **Right of suit—Parties.** S. 315 is only an enabling section and not prohibitive of an independent action in a Civil Court. A suit was brought by an auction-purchaser for the recovery of purchase-money from the decree-holders who had received it, on the ground that the judgment-debtor had no title to the property sold: *Held*, that the suit was not barred by the provisions of s. 315 of the Civil Procedure Code. That the judgment-debtor was not a necessary party. *SURENDRA NATH GHOSE v. BENI MADHAB MISRA* (1906) . . . 10 C. W. N. 274

2. ———— **Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 313, 315—Sale set aside, judgment-debtor having no saleable interest—Suit for refund of purchase-money—Maintainability—Doctrine of Caveat emptor—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 62.** When a sale of immoveable property in execution of a decree is set aside on the ground that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property sold, a suit by the purchaser to recover the purchase-money is maintainable. *Sowdaminee Chowdhrair v. Kishen Kishore Poddar*, 12 W. R. (F. B.) 8, and *Dorab Ally Khan v. Executors of Khajah Moheooodeen*, I. L. R. 3 Cal. 806, have no application to cases arising under the Civil Procedure Code of 1882. S. 315 of the Code of 1882 is no bar to a suit by the purchaser to recover his purchase-money. *Hari Doyal Singh Roy v. Sheikh Samsuddin*, 5 C. W. N. 24, and *Nityanund Roy v. Juggat Chandra Guha*, 7 C. W. N. 105, followed. *Sundara Gopalan v. Venkatarada Ayyangar*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 223, not followed. Such a suit would be governed by Art. 62 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act of 1877. *Hanuman Kamat v. Hanuman Mandar*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 123, relied on. *RAM KUMAR SHAHA v. RAM GOUR SHAHA* (1909) . . . I. L. R. 37 Cal. 67
13 C. W. N. 1080

s. 316 (1859, s. 259)½

See ATTACHMENT OF DECREE.

11 C. W. N. 158

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 17 (1866, 1871, s. 17) . . . I. L. R. 3 Mad. 37

10 Bom. 435

12 Bom. 247

7 C. L. R. 115

21 W. R. 349

11 Bom. 213

I. L. R. 2 All. 392

I. L. R. 5 All. 84, 568

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 226

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 82

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 155

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 377

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—

INVALID SALES—DECREES BARRED BY
LIMITATION . . . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 91

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 376

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 316—*concl'd.*

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—

ERRORS IN DESCRIPTION OF PRO-
PERTY SOLD;

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 334

PURCHASERS, TITLE OF.

I. L. R. 24 All. 475

——— **Certificate of sale, Application for—Court Fees Act, 1870, s. 6.** An application by an auction-purchaser for a certificate of sale need bear no stamp, since by s. 316 of the Civil Procedure Code it is not even required to be in writing. *HIRA AMBAIDAS v. TEKCHAND AMBAIDAS* . . . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 670

s. 317—

See BENAMI TRANSACTION—CERTIFIED
PURCHASERS—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE,
s. 317.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
ERRORS IN DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY
SOLD . . . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 334

1. ———— **Benamidar—Transfer of Property Act, s. 43—Suit by mortgagee for sale on a mortgage alleging that the purchaser of part of the mortgaged property held benami for the mortgagor.** One Ram Sahai mortgaged a house, representing himself to be the owner thereof, to Ram Narain and others. As a matter of fact, part of the house did not belong to Ram Sahai, but to one Jaswant Singh. In execution of a money decree against Jaswant Singh, the portion of the house which belonged to him was sold by auction, and it was purchased by Musammam Mohanian, the wife of Ram Sahai. The mortgagees brought a suit for sale on their mortgage, alleging, as to the portion of the house purchased by Mohanian, that it was purchased benami for, and was really the property of, their mortgagor, Ram Sahai. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the plaintiffs claimed as representatives of the alleged beneficial owner, they were precluded by the provisions of s. 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure from suing for the sale of the portion of the house purchased by Mohanian. *Uncovenanted Service Bank, Ltd. v. Abdul Bari*, I. L. R. 18 All. 461; *Delhi and London Bank Ltd. v. Chaudhri Partab Bhaskar*, I. L. R. 21 All. 29; and *Kishan Lal v. Garuruddhwaja Prasad Singh*, I. L. R. 21 All. 238, referred to. *RAM NARAIN v. MOHANIAN* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 82

2. ———— **Execution of decree—Suit based on the ground that the certified purchaser is not the real purchaser—Benamidar.** One Habib Alam in execution of a decree for money against Masud Alam attached and brought to sale the one-third share of Masud Alam in certain house property, and it was purchased by Aziz Alam, the son of the judgment-debtor. Subsequently the same property was again attached and sold at the instance of Habib Alam, and this time was purchased by Khuda

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 317—*concl'd.*

Bakhsh. Khuda Bakhsh was obstructed in obtaining possession of the property, and thereupon brought a suit for possession to which he made Masud Alam and others, alleged to be co-parceners in the property, parties defendants, but not the auction-purchaser Aziz Alam. Aziz Alam was, however, added as a defendant under s. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that to these facts s. 317 of the Code was applicable and the suit must be dismissed. *KHUDA BAKHSH v. AZIZ ALAM* (1905) I. L. R. 27 All. 194

3. — *Execution of Decree—Sale in execution—Suit by Certified Purchaser against real purchaser—Plea that the purchase was benami for the defendant.* *Held*, that s. 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not debar a person in possession of property purchased at an auction sale held in execution of a decree, when sued for the rents and profits of such property by the certified purchaser, from setting up as a defence to the suit that the certified purchaser was only a benamidar on his behalf. *Bishan Dial v. Ghazi-ud-din*, I. L. R. 23 All. 175, discussed. *GHAZI-UD-DIN v. BISHAN DIAL* (1905) I. L. R. 27 All. 443

4. — *Certified Purchaser—Interpretation.* The expression "certified purchaser" in 317 s. of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) includes the person standing in the shoes of the Court purchaser. *HARI GOVIND v. RAMCHANDRA* (1906) I. L. R. 31 Bom. 61

5. — *Joint Decree—Purchase at sale in execution by one decree-holder—Suit for declaration that property purchased was joint.* In execution of a joint decree on a mortgage one of the decree-holders obtained leave to bid at the auction sale and purchased the mortgaged property for the exact amount of the decree, namely, the mortgage debt, interest and costs. Satisfaction of the decree was entered up and a purchaser took possession of the property. *Held*, that s. 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not preclude the other joint decree-holder from suing for a declaration that the property so purchased was the joint property of himself and the actual purchaser. *Bodh Singh Doodhooia v. Ganesh Chunder Sen*, 12 B. L. R. 317, referred to. *ACHHIBAR DUBE v. TAPASI DUBE* (1907) I. L. R. 29 All. 557

6. — *When applicable—Purchase made by a member of joint Hindu family—Plea that purchase was made on behalf of family.* When property is purchased at a Court sale in the name of one of the members of a Hindu family which is alleged to be a joint family and it is alleged that the purchase was made on behalf of the family: *Held*, that s. 317 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, has no application to such a case. The object of s. 317 is to check *benami* purchases. *HARI SINGH v. SHEE SINGH* (1909)

I. L. R. 31 All. 282

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 318.

See **BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 13.**

7 C. W. N. 591

See **EXECUTION OF DECREE.**

I. L. R. 29 All. 463

See **RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO EXECUTION OF DECREE.**

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 710

See **SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT (I OF 1877).**
12 C. W. N. 694

1. — *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 178—Execution of decree—Limitation—Terminus a quo.* Although the grant of a certificate is a necessary preliminary to an application under s. 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such application will be barred under Art. 178 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act, 1877, if not made within three years of the date of the certificate, that is to say, the date of the confirmation of sale. *Basappa v. Marya*, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 433, and *Kashinath Trimbak Joshi v. Duming Zuran*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 223, dissented from. *Petition of Kishen Singh*, All. Weekly Notes (1883) 262, referred to. *RANJIT SINGH v. BALDEO SINGH* (1908) I. L. R. 30 All. 390

2. — *Limitation Act, Act XV of 1877, Sch. II, Arts. 178, 179—Application under s. 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure not an application for execution and falls within Art. 178, Sch. II of the Limitation Act.* An application by a decree-holder, under s. 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to be put in possession of property purchased, by him at sale in execution is not an application for execution of the decree and, for purposes of limitation, falls within article 178 and not within article 179 of schedule II of the Limitation Act. Such application is barred when presented more than three years after the grant of a certificate of sale. *Muttia Appasami*, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 504, considered. *SULTAN SAHIB MARAKAYAR v. CHIDAMBARAM CHETTIAR* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 136

ss. 318 and 335—Execution of decree—Sale—Auction-purchaser obstructed by a third party—No application under s. 335 presented within 30 days, but fresh application under s. 318—Application barred—Limitation Act (XV of 1877) Sch. II, Art. 167. Certain purchasers at a sale of immoveable property in execution of a decree applied under s. 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure for delivery of possession of the property purchased, but resistance was offered, according to the amin, by some third persons to their being put into possession. The purchasers did not thereupon make any application for an enquiry under s. 335 of the Code, but after the expiry of the period of limitation for such an application, put in a fresh application for delivery of possession. *Held* by *AKMAN, J.* (KNOX, J., *dubitante*), that no such application would lie, but

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 318 and 335—*concl'd.*

the auction-purchaser must bring a separate suit to determine his right to the property. *Muttia v. Appasami*, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 504, and *Narain Das v. Hazari Lal*, I. L. R. 18 All. 233, distinguished. *Vinaykrav Amrit v. Devrao Govind*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 473, followed. *KESRI NARAIN v. ABUL HASAN* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 365

s. 319.

See EXECUTION . . . 13 C. W. N. 694

See SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT (I OF 1877), s. 9
12 C. W. N. 694

s. 320.

See COLLECTOR . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 478
I. L. R. 9 All. 43
I. L. R. 16 All. 1See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION
BY COLLECTOR . I. L. R. 25 All. 167
I. L. R. 30 All. 192See EXECUTION OF DECREE—TRANSFER OF
DECREE FOR EXECUTION AND POWER
OF COURT, ETC. I. L. R. 7 Bom. 332
I. L. R. 7 All. 407
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 301
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 478See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II,
ART. 14 . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 467

See RULES MADE UNDER ACTS.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 322
I. L. R. 12 All. 564
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 531

Execution of decree—Property to be sold ancestral in part only—Transfer of decree to Collector—Notification (Local Government) No. 671, dated August 31st, 1880. Held, that where the Civil Court is satisfied that the land which is ordered to be sold or any portion of it is ancestral, it should transfer the decree for execution to the Collector so far as regards ancestral land only. AHMAD GHAS KHAN v. LALTA PRASAD (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 631

ss. 320, 310A, 244—*Execution of decree—Sale by Collector—Application to Court by judgment-debtor to set aside sale—Refusal by the Court—Appeal—Collector's power—Rules 16 and 17 of the Local Rules and Orders made under enactments applicable to Bombay.* A decree having been transferred to the Collector for execution under s. 320 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), he sold certain properties. Thereupon the judgment-debtor applied to the Court for the setting aside of the sale under s. 310A of the Code. The Court refused to set aside the sale on the ground that there was another decree-holder who had taken action under s. 295 of the Code, and that it was incumbent on the judgment-debtor to pay into Court a sum sufficient to answer his claim. On appeal by the judgment-debtor, the Judge

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 320, 310A, 244—*concl'd.*

dismissed the appeal on the ground that no appeal lay. *Held*, on second appeal by the judgment-debtor, that the order was appealable. An appeal lies from an order under s. 310A of the Code where the case falls under s. 244 (c). *Murtidhar v. Anandrac*, I. L. R. 25 Bom. 418, qualified. A question under s. 310A of the Code may be one relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree or to the stay of execution thereof. "When a question has arisen as to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, the fact that the purchaser, who is no party to the suit, is interested in the result, has never been held a bar to the application of the section, i.e., s. 244." *Prosunno Coomar Sanyal v. Kasi Das Sanyal*, L. R. 19 I. A. 166, applied. S. 310A of the Code applies even if the execution proceedings be referred to the Collector, who has no power to set aside a sale under the provisions of the Code. There is nothing in the section which precludes the Court from setting aside the sale merely because it had been confirmed. As s. 310A prescribes that the Court shall pass an order setting aside the sale whenever its provisions are complied with, the order refusing to set aside the sale reversed. *PITA v. CHUNILAL* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 207

ss. 320, 323.

See GUJARAT TALUKDARS ACT.

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 443

ss. 320, 325A—*Ancestral Property—Execution of decree—Property taken under management by the Collector—Disabilities of the proprietor pending term of management.* In pursuance of the power conferred upon him by rules framed by Government under s. 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Collector sanctioned a lease of certain zamindari property of the judgment-debtor for a period of seventeen years, the lease being executed in the name of the judgment-debtor but with the permission of the Collector. *Held*, that the disabilities imposed by the first paragraph of s. 325A of the Code affected the judgment-debtor during the pendency of such leases. *Semle*: that such disabilities continued so long as any of the debts for the satisfaction of which the judgment-debtor's property was taken under management by the Collector remained unpaid. *GANGA PRASAD v. GANGA BAKHSH SINGH* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 29 All. 415

s. 322 (a), (b) and (d).

See MADRAS COURT OF WARDS REGU-
LATION . . . I. L. R. 28 Mad. 489

ss. 322, 322A, and 322B.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION
BY COLLECTOR . I. L. R. 18 All. 313
I. L. R. 20 All. 428

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

ss. 325A, 326—Execution of decree—*Limitation—Execution as to immoveable property of judgment-debtor stayed by reason of such property being in charge of the Collector.* The plaintiffs obtained in 1874 a decree for money against the defendant. In 1879, by an order under s. 326 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the immoveable property of the judgment-debtor was placed under the management of the Collector. Before this order was made, and during the period when the judgment-debtor's property was in charge of the Collector, various applications for execution were made by the decree-holders. Finally, in 1896, about ten years after the last preceding application, the decree-holders applied for execution of their decree shortly after the property had been released by the Collector. *Held*, that, as regards the immoveable property of the judgment-debtors, against which execution was sought, the application was not barred by limitation, inasmuch as the decree-holders had no remedy by execution against that property until the Collector's management had ceased. *GIRDHAR DAS v. HAR SHANKAR PRASAD*. . . **I. L. R. 20 All 383**

s. 326 (1859, s. 244).

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION BY COLLECTOR. **I. L. R. 18 All. 313**

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—STAY OF EXECUTION. **I. L. R. 2 All. 856**
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 290

1. Arrangement leaving property in execution in possession of judgment-debtor—*Act VIII of 1859, s. 244.* S. 244 of Act VIII of 1859 admits only of a temporary alienation of land, and not of an arrangement by which possession is left with the judgment-debtor subject to a payment by yearly instalments. *KASHEE LAL v. AMBER JAN*. . . **2 N. W. 347**

2. Arrangement for instalments extending over twelve years—Where a Collector recommended that the lands of a judgment-debtor should be exempted from auction sale, and that the judgment-debt should be satisfied by money instalments extending over a period of twelve years, and the Judge, on the matter being referred to the Civil Courts for sanction and approval, in sending the proceedings to the Munsif, intimated that the arrangement was a proper one, and the Munsif in his order referred to this opinion of the Judge: *Held*, that the recommendation of the Collector should have been dealt with by the Court executing the decree in the exercise of its own judgment, and not in deference to the opinion expressed by the Judge, who exceeded his jurisdiction in interfering in the matter. The arrangement proposed by the Collector was not one which could be proposed or accepted under the terms of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *MUTTRA PERSHAD v. RAMPERSHAD*. . . **6 N. W. 39**

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 328 (1859, s. 226).

See post, s. 331. . . **13 C. W. N. 724**

See JUDICIAL PROCEEDING, OFFENCE IN THE COURSE OF **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 367**

See RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO EXECUTION OF DECREE.

ss. 328-335.

See RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO EXECUTION OF DECREE.

s. 331.

See RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO EXECUTION OF DECREE.

1. ———— *Execution of Decree—Resistance or obstruction by person other than the judgment-debtor—Investigation of claim—Nature of investigation.* A Court investigating, under the provisions of s. 331 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a claim to property sought to be taken in execution of a decree is not confined to the mere question of possession, but is bound to decide on the title to the property in dispute. *Moulakhan v. Gorikhanvi*, **I. L. R. 14 Bom. 627**; *Bapujirao v. Fatesing Shahaji Bhosle*, **I. L. R. 22 Bom. 967**, and *Rucha Rai v. Purnmeshur Dyal*, **2 All. H. C. 252**, followed. *MAHIP RAI v. DWARKA RAI* (1905). **I. L. R. 27 All. 453**

2. ———— Chap. XIX, prov. H—*Decree for possession—Execution of decree—Obstruction—Application for removal of obstruction numbered and registered as suit—Adverse possession—Limitation.* On the 1st June 1889 defendant's husband Vishnu sold certain land to Vithal and passed to him a rent-note the period of which expired on the 20th March 1890. Subsequent to the expiry of that period, Vishnu, and after his death his widow, the defendant, continued in possession. Afterwards the plaintiffs, to whom the land had been sold, having obtained a decree for possession against the sons of Vishnu, Vishnu's widow, Kashibai, caused obstruction to delivery of possession in execution of the decree. The plaintiffs, thereupon, on the 22nd January 1902, applied for the removal of the obstruction and the Court, on the 26th July 1902, ordered that their application be numbered and registered as a suit between the decree-holders as plaintiffs and the claimant as defendant under s. 331 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Chapter XIX, prov. H. *Held*, reversing the decree of the lower Appellate Court, that the suit was not time-barred. The claimant was not entitled as against the decree-holders to count the time up to the 26th of July 1902, when the application was numbered as a suit, as the period of his adverse possession; for it had ended prior to the 20th March 1890, by reason of the proceedings under prov. H of Chapter XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, initiated on the 22nd of January, 1902. *KRISHNAJI v. KASHIBAI* (1906). . . **I. L. R. 30 Bom. 115**

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*concl'd.*s. 331—*concl'd.*

3. *Decree for delivery of possession of immovable property—Obstruction to delivery by the third party in good faith—His remedy.* S. 331 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates an application by the decree-holder; and a third party resisting the delivery of possession of property to a decree-holder cannot apply for the investigation of his claim under this section, but may do so under s. 332 of the Code, after he has been dispossessed. *SUKHAN SINGH v. BAIJ NATH GOENKA* (1907) . . . 12 C. W. N. 115

4. *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 328, 331, 335, 562, 622—Resistance to execution—Limitation—Appeal.* A decree-holder who is resisted in the execution of a decree for ejectment may apply for possession again and if again resisted may complain against the second resistance. Where an application under s. 328, Civil Procedure Code, was resisted and the opposite party put in a written statement and the application was ultimately dismissed on the preliminary ground of limitation: *Held*, that the order cannot be considered merely as an order refusing to register a plaint but has the same force as a decree and is subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as a decree, and an order by the District Judge on appeal reversing the order of the first Court on the preliminary point and remanding the application for trial on the merits is an order under s. 562, Civil Procedure Code, and an appeal lies to the High Court against such an order. *BARANAGORE JUTE FACTORY CO., LD. v. RAJ KUMAR RAI* (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 724

s. 332 (1859, s. 230).

See ONUS OF PROOF—POSSESSION AND PROOF OF TITLE.

See RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO EXECUTION OF DECREE.

application under—

See COURT-FEES—ACT XXVI OF 1867.

4 B. L. R. F. B. 94

Order rejecting application under—

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

2 B. L. R. A. C. 303 note

W. R., 1864, Mis. 24

1 W. R. 140

5 Mad. 183

13 W. R. 264

21 W. R. 39

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 127

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 392

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 830

s. 335—

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877—

s. 7 AND SCH. II, ART. 11.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 730

SCH. II, ART. 11.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 146

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*cont'd.*s. 335—*cont'd.*

See RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO EXECUTION OF DECREE.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—MORTGAGED PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 25

1. *Resistance to purchaser by person other than judgment-debtor—Order intended to become final, unless suit instituted—Refusal by Court to make order—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 11—Suit by person against whom order relating to possession is passed.* The order contemplated by s. 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure (when a purchaser has been resisted by any person other than the judgment-debtor) is one which will become final and conclusive, unless the party, against whom it is passed, institutes a suit (within a year, under Art. 11 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act) and obtains an adjudication in his favour. If the Court declines to pass an order under s. 335, deeming it best that the purchaser should be referred to a separate suit to enforce his purchase, Art. 11 has no application. *MEERU-DIN SAHIB v. RAHISA BIBI* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 25

2. *Execution—Possession by receipt of rent—Tenant—Sale—Decree—Objection to sale—Dispossession of third party in execution—Claimant to possession by receipt of rent from judgment-debtor—High Court.* An application under s. 335 of the Civil Procedure Code, so far as it may purport to be made on behalf of the judgment-debtor, cannot be entertained. The term 'possession' in s. 335 of the Civil Procedure Code is not restricted merely to tangible or physical possession, but includes constructive possession or possession in law by receipt of rent or otherwise; a person alleging that he was in possession through his tenant, who had been ousted from the land by the delivery of possession to the purchaser, is entitled to make an application under that section. *Kisori Lal Gossami v. Lala Shib Lal*, 1 C. W. N. 343, and *Ibrahim Mullick v. Ramjadu Rakshit*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 710, discussed. But a person alleging that he was in possession by receipt of rent from the judgment-debtor cannot get any relief under s. 335 of the Civil Procedure Code. When a Court, upon an erroneous view of the scope of a section of the Code, applies it to a case to which it has no application, it acts without jurisdiction. *Shivanathaji v. Joma Kashinath*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 341; *Nusserwanji v. Meer Mynodeen*, 6 Moo. I. A. 134, and *Jagadanund Singh v. Amrit Lal Sircar*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 767, referred to. An order based upon and inseparably connected with another order, which is made without jurisdiction, and having the effect of making a section of the Code practically inoperative, is one made in the illegal exercise of jurisdiction. *Mohunt Bhagwan Ramanuj*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 335—*contd.*

Das v. Khettermoni Dassi, 1 C. W. N. 647, referred to. *BRAJABALA DEVI v. GURUDAS MUNDLE* (1906)
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 487

3. ———— *Dismissal for default—Limitation Act (XV of 1877) Sch. II, Art. II.* An application under s. 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure was dismissed for default, on the petitioner applying to withdraw his petition for want of evidence, the opposite party being present. In a suit by the petitioner for possession of the property, the subject of the above application, the defendants pleaded limitation under Art. 11 of Sch. II to the Limitation Act. *Held*, that there was no enquiry within the meaning of s. 335, and that consequently the order made was not conclusive and the suit was not barred by the special limitation of one year. It is a condition precedent to passing an order under s. 335, so as to make it conclusive unless a suit is brought within one year, that the Court shall enquire into the matters of resistance, etc. *SARAT CHANDRA BISU v. TARINI PRASAD PAL CHOWDERY*
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 491

4. ———— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. II—Purchasers at Court-sale—Obstruction to delivery of possession—Obstructor manager of joint family consisting of minors—Partition between obstructor and minors—Allotment of the property to the share of minors—Withdrawal of the obstructor by default without notice to minors—Design on the part of the obstructor—Order awarding possession to purchasers—Suit by minors to recover possession—Limitation.* Certain purchasers of lands at a Court-sale applied to be put in possession of the property, but the delivery of possession was obstructed by one V who was the manager of a joint family consisting of himself and his two minor step-brothers. While the obstruction proceedings were pending a *farkhat* or settlement on partition had been arrived at between the obstructor and his two minor step-brothers and the lands had fallen to the share of the minors. V thereupon designedly withdrew from the obstruction-proceedings by allowing them to be dismissed for default, without giving notice of his abandonment to the minors, and an order was passed awarding possession to the purchasers in the absence of any appearance by V. The order was passed on the 6th August 1898. The *farkhat* or settlement on partition, which for its validity required the sanction of the Court, had never received that sanction and it was subsequently set aside at the instance of the plaintiffs. In the year 1903 the plaintiffs, that is, the step-brothers of V, to whom the lands had been allotted, brought a suit to recover possession of the lands. Both the lower Courts held the suit to be barred under Art. 11, Sch. II of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). *Held*, on second appeal by plaintiff, that the suit was not time-barred under Art. 11, Sch. II of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) as the minors were not "efficiently represented."

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 335—*concl'd.*

Padmakovinayak Joshi v. Mahadev Krishna Joshi, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 21, followed. The withdrawal of V by default from the obstruction-proceedings was designed by him (as appeared from the circumstances) in order to deprive the minors of an opportunity of being heard. The minors had no opportunity of protecting their interest, which V had abandoned without notice to them or to any one on their behalf. *SHIDAPA v. VENKAJI* (1908)
I. L. R. 32 Bom. 404

ss. 335, 344.

See MORTGAGE. I. L. R. 31 Calc. 737

s. 336.

See ATTACHMENT—ATTACHMENT OF PERSON. I. L. R. 7 Calc. 19
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 527
I. L. R. 8 Mad. 276, 503
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 85
I. L. R. 9 Mad. 99

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—TRANSFER OF DECREE FOR EXECUTION.
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 258

See INSOLVENCY—INSOLVENT DEBTORS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 724

See SURETY—LIABILITY OF SURETY.
I. L. R. 13 All. 100
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 757
I. L. R. 15 Calc. 171
I. L. R. 16 All. 37
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 210
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 560, 637
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 366

DISCHARGE OF SURETY.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 366

——— *Insolvency—Security for filing application by judgment-debtor to be declared insolvent.* The petitioner gave security for one Aziz, who had been arrested in execution of a decree. He deposited a sum of money in Court on condition if an application which was to be made by Aziz within a time specified to be declared insolvent was rejected on any ground whatever, the amount deposited would be paid to the decree-holder. The judgment-debtor duly presented his application for a declaration of insolvency, but before any order could be passed on it he died. *Held*, that the condition of the security was not fulfilled, and the decree-holder was not entitled to the money deposited by the surety. *Krishnan Nayar v. Itinan Nayar*, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 637, referred to. *ASHIQ ALI v. MOTI LAL* (1907)
I. L. R. 29 All. 466

s. 337—

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CIVIL CASES.
6 C. W. N. 84

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 337A.

See APPEAL—DECREEES.

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 39

See ARREST—CIVIL ARREST.

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 731, 961

2 C. W. N. 588

s. 339 (1859, s. 276).

See SUBSISTENCE MONEY.

s. 341 (1859, s. 278).

See ARREST—CIVIL ARREST.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 652

See ATTACHMENT—ATTACHMENT OF PERSON . . .

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 106

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 21, 503

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 652

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 874

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 128

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—CONTEMPTS
GENERALLY . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 655

See SUBSISTENCE MONEY.

1. Release of judgment-debtor—*Confinement in Court-house.* Where the warrant of committal to jail has been made out, the discharge of the defendant whilst in confinement in the Court-house, for non-payment of the instalment of subsistence allowance, is a discharge from jail within the meaning of s. 341 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act XIV of 1882. *IMAPA SHANBHOG v. MANESHVAR KASHI* . . . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 181

2. Decree—Execution—Arrest—Non-payment of subsistence-money—Discharge—Re-arrest. The discharge of a judgment-debtor before imprisonment on account of the non-payment of the subsistence-money for the debtor is no bar to the debtor being re-arrested. *SUBBA v. VENKATA* . . . I. L. R. 8 Mad. 21

3. Execution of decree—Arrest of judgment-debtor—Non-payment of subsistence money—Re-arrest of judgment-debtor not barred. A judgment-debtor was arrested in execution of a decree against him, but was liberated owing to non-payment by the decree-holder of subsistence money for the debtor. *Held*, that such arrest was no bar to the re-arresting of the judgment-debtor in execution of the same decree. *Subba v. Venkata*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 21, followed. *HABIB-UL-RAHMAN v. RAM SAHAI* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 317

s. 342 (1859, s. 278).

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—CONTEMPTS
GENERALLY . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 655See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EFFECT OF
CHANGE OF LAW PENDING EXECUTION.
I. L. R. 2 Bom. 148See IMPRISONMENT . . . 5 C. W. N. 145
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 141

See SUBSISTENCE MONEY.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 344 (1859, ss. 273, 280).

See APPEAL—ORDERS—ORDER REFUSING
APPLICATION TO BE DECLARED INSOL-
VENT . . . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 604See INSOLVENCY—INSOLVENT DEBTORS
UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 25 All. 204

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 724

ss. 344-360 (Ch. XX).

See DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF AKYAB.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 94

See INSOLVENCY—INSOLVENT DEBTORS
UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

s. 345.

See APPEAL—ORDERS—ORDER REFUSING
APPLICATION TO BE DECLARED INSOL-
VENT . . . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 604

s. 347.

See INSOLVENCY—INSOLVENT DEBTORS
UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

5 C. W. N. 91

s. 349.

See ATTACHMENT—ATTACHMENT OF PER-
SON . . . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 451

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 652

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 503

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 46

See SECURITY BOND.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 688

See SURETY—LIABILITY OF SURETY.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 637

s. 350 (1859, s. 281).

See INSOLVENCY—INSOLVENT DEBTORS
UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

5 C. W. N. 90, 91

s. 351 (1859, s. 281).

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 219

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 888

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 168; 7 C. L. R. 282

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 719; 6 C. L. R. 135

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 136

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 89

I. L. R. 23 All. 56

See INSOLVENCY—INSOLVENT DEBTORS
UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

5 C. W. N. 91

s. 351 (d)—Insolvency—"Any other act of bad faith." One *H. L.*, being the servant of a trading firm, misapplied moneys of the firm. The firm obtained a decree against him for the refund of some nine hundred and odd rupees, and in execution thereof caused *H. L.* to be arrested. *H. L.* filed a petition praying for a declaration of insolvency.

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 351 (d)—*concl'd.*

Held, that the application must fail, the misappropriation by *H. L.* of the money of his employers amounting to an act of bad faith regarding the matter of the application within the meaning of s. 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure, cl. (d). *Gopal Das v. Bihari Lal*, I. L. R. 17 All. 218, followed. *GAYA DIN v. HIRA LAL* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 A. 517

ss. 351 and 352.

See PRE-EMPTION I. L. R. 27 All. 670

Rule of Damdupat when applicable—Damdupat, if applicable, in insolvency proceedings—Practice. The rule of *Damdapat* exists only so long as the contractual relation of debtor and creditor exists, but not when the contractual relation has come to an end by reason of a decree. Proof of a claim in insolvency amounts to a decree and the rule of *Damdapat* would not apply to a claim so proved. Moreover, the uniform practice of this Court has been not to apply the rule of *Damdapat* in insolvency proceedings. In the matter of *HARI LALL MALICK* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1269
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 884

ss. 351, 355, 357—Insolvency of judgment-debtor—Receiver appointed, but no order of discharge. Application by creditor to execute decree by arrest of insolvent—Maintainability. *S* applied to the Court of a District Munsif to be declared an insolvent. After notice to his creditors amongst whom was the present petitioner, the holder of a decree against *S*, the District Munsif passed an order declaring *S* insolvent. A receiver was appointed to take charge of the insolvent's properties and he was put in possession of all of them excepting two items, one of which was not included in the schedule. The receiver realised assets and made distributions among the creditors entitled, but no order was passed by the Court either discharging or refusing to discharge the insolvent. The present petitioner then applied to the Court for the arrest of the insolvent in execution of his decree: *Held*, that in the circumstances the insolvent could not be arrested. If an insolvent prevents the receiver from obtaining possession of his properties or if it subsequently transpires that he has committed some act of bad faith, then the Court may refuse his discharge, under s. 355 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Semble*: That in such a case it might be open to creditors to apply to execute their decrees. *PANANGUPALLI SEETHARAMAYA v. NANDURI EAMACHEN-DRUDU* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 152

s. 353.

See INSOLVENCY—INSOLVENT DEBTORS
UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

C. W. N. 91

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 357.

See INSOLVENCY—INSOLVENT DEBTORS
UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE—EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 407

Insolvency—Execution of decree—Limitation. S. 357 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides a limitation of its own and in substitution for the limitation provided for the execution of decrees by the Limitation Act, 1877. *LALMAN v. GOPI NATH* . I. L. R. 19 All. 144

s. 359.

See IMPRISONMENT, NATURE OF.

11 C. W. N. 740

s. 361

See ABATEMENT OF SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 597

I. L. R. 25 All. 27

s. 362.

See ABATEMENT OF SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 25 All. 27

See LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE.

11 C. W. N. 186

Parties—Death of sole appellant—All representatives not brought upon the record—Abatement of appeal. The sole appellant, a Muhammadan, died pending the appeal, leaving him surviving a widow, two sons and two daughters. The two sons applied to have themselves brought on to the record as appellants, but did not ask that their mother and sisters should be made parties to the appeal. An application to that effect made by the respondents was not acted upon by the lower Appellate Court. *Held*, that it was the duty of the sons to have brought upon the record, either as appellants or respondents, the other representatives of their father, and, as they had not done so, the appeal abated. *Ghamandi Lal v. Amir Begum*, I. L. R. 16 All. 211, followed. *HAIDAR HUSAIN v. ABDUL AHAD* (1907) . I. L. R. 30 All. 117

ss. 363, 582.

See APPEAL, ABATEMENT OF.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 487

Death of respondent pending appeal—Suit for accounts of partnership—Application for substitution of representative made out of time—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 175 (c)—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 363, 582—Act VII of 1888, s. 66. A respondent to whom a sum of money was due under the decree of the first Court, died pending an appeal to the High Court, and an application to have a representative substituted for him on the record was not made within six months after his death, and no sufficient cause was shown for the delay. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee, that the

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 363, 582—*concl.*

nature of the suit being such that the cause of action did not survive against the remaining respondents alone, the appeal abated under s. 363 (as amended by s. 66 of Act VII of 1888) and s. 582 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) and had been rightly dismissed by the High Court on that ground. *RAJ CHUNDER SEN v. GANGADAS SEAL and RAMGHATI DHUR v. RAJ CHUNDER SEN* (1904) **I. L. R. 31 Calc. 487**
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 442
L. R. 31 I. A. 71

s. 364 (1859, s. 101).

See LIMITATION—QUESTION OF LIMITATION . . . **I. L. R. 12 Calc. 642**

See PARTIES—ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—DEFENDANTS. **I. L. R. 12 Calc. 642**

s. 365 (1859, ss. 102, 377).

See ABATEMENT OF SUIT.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION BY AND AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ARTS. 171, 171A, 171B.

See PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—PLAINTIFFS.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 162
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 224

APPELLANTS.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 317

s. 365—*Death of sole Plaintiff—Claim of one of the defendants to continue the suit as plaintiff—Abatement of suit.* The original plaintiff sued for redemption of a mortgage executed by her father. She claimed as the only unmarried daughter of three, arraying as defendants, besides the mortgagee her surviving married sister and the minor children of the second sister, deceased. During the pendency of the suit the plaintiff died. *Held*, that the claim being personal to the plaintiff, the suit abated and that the surviving sister could not be permitted to carry on the suit in substitution for the original plaintiff. *BALAK PURI v. DURGA* (1907) . . . **I. L. R. 30 All. 49**

s. 367 (1859, s. 103).

See PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—PLAINTIFFS . **I. L. R. 27 Bom. 162**

1. ——— Legal Representative—*Dispute as to claim to represent deceased plaintiff. Per Curiam* (SHEPHERD and BEST, JJ.). A dispute within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code, s. 367, need not be between persons claiming to represent the deceased plaintiff. *SUBBAYYA v. SAMINADAYYAR* **I. L. R. 18 Mad. 496**

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 367 (1859, s. 103)—*concl.*

2. ——— *Dispute as to who is the Legal Representative of a deceased plaintiff—Order admitting a person to be legal representative for the purpose of prosecuting the suit—Effect of such order.* S. 367 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the Court in a case where a dispute arises as to who is the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff, to appoint a legal representative for the purpose of prosecuting the suit, but the appointment of such legal representative is not a determination of any issue, which is properly raised in the suit, and particularly (as, for example, in a suit for partition of family property) such a vital issue as whether the deceased plaintiff was joint with or separate from the rest of his family. *PARSOTAM RAO v. JANKI BAI* (1906) . **I. L. R. 28 All. 109**

3. ——— ss. 367, 588 (18)—*Dispute as to who is the Legal Representative of a deceased appellant—Appeal. Held*, on a construction of s. 367 of the Code of Civil Procedure that a dispute as to who is the legal representative of a deceased appellant is not confined to the case of rival claimants to represent the deceased. *Subbaya v. Saminadaiyyar*, **I. L. R. 18 Mad. 496**, followed. *HANWANT SINGH v. RAM GOPAL SINGH* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 348

s. 368 (1859, s. 104).

See ABATEMENT OF SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 23 All. 22
I. L. R. 26 Bom. 203

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 25 All. 206

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ARTS. 171, 171A, 171B. **I. L. R. 6 Bom. 26**

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 694**I. L. R. 7 All. 734****I. L. R. 7 Bom. 373****I. L. R. 10 Bom. 663****I. L. R. 9 All. 118****I. L. R. 10 All. 260, 264**

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 175C . . . **I. L. R. 16 Bom. 27**

See PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—RESPONDENTS . **I. L. R. 4 Bom. 654**

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 56**I. L. R. 8 Mad. 300****I. L. R. 11 Calc. 684****I. L. R. 9 Bom. 151****I. L. R. 9 All. 447****I. L. R. 10 All. 223****I. L. R. 11 All. 408****7 C. W. N. 529****I. L. R. 26 Mad. 230**

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—PARTIES.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 609

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 368—concl'd.

Appeal by Guardian, abatement of—Laches of guardian, effect of—Application on behalf of minors to restore appeal—Right to apply joint and not several—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 7. Where two majors and the guardian of two minors jointly preferred an appeal in which they were jointly interested, and on the death of the sole respondent the appeal was allowed to abate under s. 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the minor appellants cannot, on the application of another guardian, have the appeal restored and proceeded with. *Per DAVIES, J.*—The order of abatement under s. 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure is absolute. The minors being bound by the acts of their guardian, there was no appeal pending and the application could not be treated as an application under s. 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure to which the provisions of s. 7 of the Limitation Act might be applied, as s. 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates an appeal pending. Even if it could be so considered, the application would be barred as the minors were interested jointly with others who laboured under no disability. *Periasami v. Krishna Ayyan, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 431*, followed. *Per SUBRAHMANYA AYYAR, J.*—On the death of the respondent, the right to have his representatives added as parties vested jointly and not severally in the appellants, whatever may be the nature of their interests in the subject matter of the appeal. *Periasami v. Krishna Ayyan, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 431*, followed. *PARU v. VARIAN-GATTIL RAMAN MENON (1905)*

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 359

ss. 368, 582—

See APPEAL, ABATEMENT OF.

11 C. W. N. 504

1. ss. 368, 582, 587—*Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 175 (c), 178—Art. 175 (c) applies to applications made in second appeals as well as first appeals.* S. 587 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorises an application to bring in a plaintiff respondent in second appeals and extends to such appeals the provisions of ss. 368 and 582 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such applications, however, are really made under ss. 368 and 582 and for the purposes of limitation fall under Art. 175 (c) of Sch. II of the Limitation Act and not under Art. 178. *VAKALAGADDA NARASIMHAM v. VAHIZULLA SAHIB (1905)*

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 498

2. *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 175 C—Application to bring on to the record the heirs of a deceased respondent—Limitation.* Held, that Art. 175C of the second schedule to the Indian Limitation Act applies as well to appeals from appellate decrees as to appeals from original decrees. *Susya Pillai v. Aiyakannu Pillai, I. L. R. 29 Mad. 529*, dissented from. *Vakkalagadda Narasimham v. Vahizulla Sahib, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 498*, followed. *MADHUBAN DAS v. NARAYN DAS (1907) I. L. R. 29 All. 535*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 371.

See APPEAL .

13 C. W. N. 388

Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 175—Applications for Abatement and Revival heard together—Form of order of revival. An application for abatement and an application for revival of a suit were set down for hearing together. The latter was made after six months of the plaintiff's death. Held, that on the Courts being satisfied that the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause from continuing the suit, the proper order to pass was to declare the suit to have abated and then at once pass an order under s. 371 of the Civil Procedure Code setting aside the abatement and reviving the suit. *RAM PROTAP CHOWDRY v. LAL CHAND (1905)*

9 C. W. N. 369

ss. 371, 582.

See LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 418

s. 372—

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 24 All. 342, 532

See ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSE IN ACTION.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 252

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 961

See INSOLVENCY—CLAIMS OF ATTACHING CREDITORS AND OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 406

See LIMITATION ACT . **9 C. W. N. 383**

See PARTIES—

ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—

RESPONDENTS ;

I. L. R. 23 All. 331

SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—
PLAINTIFFS.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 171

See PLAINTIFF, SUBSTITUTION OF.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 612

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—PARTIES.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 609

1. Construction of. *Per PONTIFEX, J.*—The words "pending the suit" in s. 372 relate to a suit in which no final order has been made. *GOCOL CHUNDER GOSSAMEE v. ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL OF BENGAL*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 726 ; 5 C. L. R. 569

2. Meaning of "other cases" in s. 372—*Mortgage decree—Order absolute for sale—Death of decree-holder—Pending suit—Application for substitution by legal representatives of a decree-holder, if under s. 372 of Civil Procedure Code.* The words "other cases" in s. 372 of the Civil Procedure Code mean cases other than those specifically mentioned in the previous sections in

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 372—*concl'd.*

Chapter XXI. If therefore the preceding sections, though they may have dealt with the event of death, have dealt so with particular cases only, other cases will fall under s. 372. S. 365 of the Civil Procedure Code refers to death only as occurring before decree. A mortgage suit, even after a decree has been made and an order absolute for sale passed, is a *pending* suit until the sale actually takes place, and an application made before sale by the legal representative of the deceased decree-holder for substitution would fall within s. 372 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Chunni Lal v. Abdul Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 23 All. 331, 334, referred to. *Panna Lal v. Aghore Nath Neogy*, unreported, decided by SALE, J. on 10th May, 1893, followed. *Bhugwan Das Khetry v. Nilkanto Ganguly* (1905) . 9 C. W. N. 171

s. 373 (1859, s. 97).

See APPEAL—DECREEES.

- I. L. R. 8 All. 82
- I. L. R. 18 Calc. 322
- I. L. R. 15 All. 169
- I. L. R. 16 All. 19
- I. L. R. 17 All. 97
- I. L. R. 27 Calc. 362
- 4 C. W. N. 41

See APPEAL—OBJECTIONS BY RESPONDENT—WITHDRAWAL OF APPEAL.

- I. L. R. 23 All. 130

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—APPLICATION FOR EXECUTION AND POWER OF COURT.

- I. L. R. 18 Calc. 462, 515, 635
- I. L. R. 15 Mad. 240
- I. L. R. 12 All. 179, 392
- I. L. R. 15 Bom. 370
- I. L. R. 17 All. 106
- L. R. 22 I. A. 44

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURTS, 1865, CL. 12. I. L. R. 24 Mad. 293

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 57 . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 429

See WITHDRAWAL OF SUIT.

- 7 C. W. N. 186
- I. L. R. 23 All. 219
- I. L. R. 29 Calc. 239

1. ———— Suit—Withdrawal of suit—Costs, a condition precedent to bringing a fresh suit—Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Order 26—Statement contrary to proprietary interest—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 32, cl. 3—Landlord, statement of. Where a suit has been withdrawn under s. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code with liberty to bring a fresh suit on payment of costs, a subsequent suit in respect of the same cause of action is not *ab initio* void, if the costs are not paid before its institution. Subsequent payment of costs cures the irregularity. A statement by a landlord, who is dead, that there was a tenant on the land is a statement against his proprietary

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 373 (1859, s. 97)—*contd.*

interests and admissible under cl. 3, s. 32 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872). *ABDUL AZIZ MOLLA v. EBRAHIM MOLLA* (1904) I. L. R. 31 Calc. 965

2. ———— Court has power to extend Time for Payment of Costs. Where a party has been permitted to withdraw from a suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit, if he should pay costs within a named date under s. 373 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court has power to extend the time for payment, when it is absolutely impossible for the party to pay such costs on or before the day so fixed. *PERIA MUTHIRIAN v. KARAPPANNA MUTHIRIAN* (1906) . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 370

3. ———— Limitation—Suit—Leave to withdraw—Ultra vires—Fresh suit—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 14. An order giving leave to withdraw a suit and file a fresh suit on the same cause of action, on the ground that leave under cl. 12 of the Charter to institute it was granted by the Registrar, was held to be *ultra vires*, and the order was regarded as one only directing the plaintiff to be returned to the plaintiff. *Robert Watson & Co. v. Rajshai*, 13 Moo. I. A. 160, followed. S. 373 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply except to cases where the suit is properly pending in a Court in which the leave was granted. A plaint was filed well within the period of limitation, but leave to institute it under cl. 12 of the Charter was obtained from the Registrar. Under the practice laid down by the Court, it was by leave withdrawn and, on the same cause, a fresh suit, with proper leave, was then and there instituted, but on a date when, under the usual circumstances, the suit would be barred by limitation. Held, that the leave to withdraw was not granted under s. 373 of the Code of Civil Procedure; that, therefore, s. 374 of the Code could not operate as a bar to the fresh suit and that under s. 14 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) it was not barred by limitation. *RAMDEO v. GONESHNARAIN* (1908) . 12 C. W. N. 912

4. ———— Act X of 1859—Suit for Rent—Withdrawal of suit. The provisions of s. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) have no application to suits instituted under Act X of 1859, which is a complete Code by itself. *Nilmoni Singh Deo v. Taranath Mukherjee*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 295; *Sadai Naik v. Serai Naik*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 532, discussed and distinguished. *Mokunda Bullav Kar v. Bhagaban Chunder Das*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 514; *Radha Madhab Santra v. Lukhi Narain Roy Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 428; *Nagendra Nath Mullick v. Mathura Mohun Parhi*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 368; *Hare Krishna Mahanti v. Bishun Chandra Mahanti*, 7 C. L. J. 426, referred to. *GOLAM MAHOMED v. SHIBENDRA PADA BANERJEE* (1908) . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 990
s. c. 12 C. W. N. 893

5. ———— Withdrawal from suit—Application for withdrawal with liberty to bring

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

ss. 373 (1859, s. 97)—*concl'd.*

fresh suit—Costs. S. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) contemplates a withdrawal, not of the suit, but from the suit, and such a withdrawal may be either with or without liberty to bring a fresh suit. If a party desires to withdraw from the suit with such liberty, then he must apply to the Court for permission to so withdraw. Where a plaintiff does not desire to withdraw from the suit, unless with liberty to bring a fresh suit, and the Court considers that such liberty ought not to be granted, the proper course is simply to dismiss the application. *MAHANT BIHARIDASJI v. PARSHOTAMDAS* (1908) . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 345

ss. 373, 374.

See JURISDICTION I. L. R. 35 Calc. 924

Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 14—Cause of like nature—Withdrawal of a suit with permission to bring another—Limitation. On the 15th April 1898, two plaintiffs, a father and son, filed a suit against two defendants to recover damages for an assault which took place on the 7th April 1898. The defendants pleaded misjoinder of parties and of causes of action. On the 14th November 1901, the High Court on appeal gave effect to this plea of the defendants, but under s. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code gave leave to one of the plaintiffs, whose name was struck out, to file, if so advised, a fresh suit in respect of his own cause of action. The plaintiff, whose name was so struck out, filed this suit on the 13th February 1902. *Held*, that the second suit was barred by limitation, for when a suit is withdrawn under s. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code, with permission to bring a fresh suit, the effect of s. 374 of the Code is that limitation is to apply to the second suit as if it was the first. *Held*, also, that s. 14 of the Limitation Act did not apply to such a case. *Krishnaji Lakshman v. Vital Ravji*, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 625, followed. *VARAJLAL v. SHOMESHWAR* (1905) . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 219

ss. 373, 412—*Pauper—Suit—Withdrawal of a suit with permission to bring fresh suit—Failure in the suit—Adjudication Court-fees, payment of.* Where a pauper plaintiff withdraws a suit with permission to bring a fresh suit he is liable to pay to Government the Court-fees which would have been paid by him, if he had not been permitted to sue as a pauper. The words "if the plaintiff fails in the suit" in s. 412 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) apply to the withdrawal of a suit under the provisions of s. 373 of the Code. *SECRETARY OF STATE v. NARAYAN BALKRISHNA* (1905) . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 102

ss. 373, 525.

See AWARD I. L. R. 31 Calc. 516

Application to file an Award—Arbitration without intervention of Court—Withdrawal of such application. When an appli-

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

ss. 373, 525—*concl'd.*

cation has been made under s. 525 of the Civil Procedure Code to have a certain award filed in Court, which had been made without the intervention of the Court, the applicant is at liberty, at any stage of the hearing prior to the delivery of judgment and preparation of the decree, to withdraw the application under s. 373 of the Code. *GAURI SHANKER v. MAIDA KOER* (1904) 3 I. L. R. 31 Calc. 516

ss. 373 and 582—*Partition suit—*

Decree based on an agreement—Appeal by plaintiff—Application for withdrawal of suit—Decree dismissing appeal—Appeal. A decree for partition was passed in the original Court based in part on an agreement to which the plaintiff and some of the defendants were parties. The plaintiff appealed and subsequently purported to withdraw from the suit. The Judge in appeal passed a decree dismissing the appeal, but determining that the effect of the withdrawal was to set aside the decree passed by the first Court. Some of the defendants preferred a second appeal. *Held*, that when in a partition suit defendants have by concession of the plaintiff acquired rights which otherwise could not have existed, it is not open to the plaintiff, who has made that concession, afterwards to annul its effect by withdrawing from the suit in the Appellate Court. A question having arisen as to whether or not the decree of the lower Appellate Court was appealable under ss. 373 and 582 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882): *Held*, that ss. 373 and 582 of the Civil Procedure Code do not support the conclusion that rights actually vested by the decree of the first Court can afterwards be annulled by the plaintiff withdrawing of his own free will and without permission of the Court. The result of the adjudication was that there was a formal expression of an adjudication by the lower Appellate Court upon a right claimed by the defendants (appellants in second appeal) and thus there was a decree within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code from which an appeal would lie. *SATYABHAMABAI v. GANESH BALKRISHNA* (1905) . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 13

ss. 373 and 622—*Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879)—Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908), s. 115—Redemption suit—Sale really a mortgage—S. 10A of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879) not applicable—Oral evidence inadmissible—Application for withdrawal of suit—Suit allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to bring a fresh suit—Material Irregularity.* Under the provisions of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879) the plaintiffs brought a redemption suit alleging that the document, though in the form of a sale-deed, was really a mortgage. The suit was not governed by s. 10A of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879). The defendant contended that oral evidence was not admissible to prove that the sale-deed was really a mortgage. After the issues

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 373 and 622—*concl'd.*

were framed the plaintiffs applied for withdrawal of the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit on the grounds that the different High Courts held different views as to the admissibility or otherwise of oral evidence and that s. 10A of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879) was not applicable. The Court passed an order for the withdrawal of the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit. *Held*, that the Court acted with material irregularity in passing the order. The Court should not allow a suit to be withdrawn after the parties are ready for trial if such withdrawal may operate to the prejudice of the defendant. A plaintiff cannot be allowed to withdraw a suit in order that he may wait and see if the law is not altered at some future date in such a way as to enable him to obtain a decree against the defendant who is ready for trial and prepared to resist the claim and certain of success on the law in force. *MAHIPATI v. NATHU* (1909) **I. L. R. 33 Bom. 722**

s. 374 (1859, s. 97).

See *LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 179—NATURE OF APPLICATION—GENERALLY.* **I. L. R. 6 Bom. 681**

I. L. R. 7 All. 359

25 W. R. 106

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 62

I. L. R. 10 All. 71

See *WITHDRAWAL OF SUIT.*

s. 375 (1859, s. 98).

See *APPEAL—DECREES* **5 C. W. N. 877**

See *ARBITRATION—REFERENCE OR SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION.*

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 326

7 C. W. N. 180

See *COMPROMISE.*

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 421, 478

See *COMPROMISE—COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.*

See *COMPROMISE DECREE.*

13 C. W. N. 217

See *HINDU LAW* **I. L. R. 31 Mad. 236**

See *PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—AFFIDAVITS.*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 304

See *PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—CONSENT DECREE* **5 C. L. R. 464**

See *RIGHT OF WORSHIP.*

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 236

See *SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE—SPECIAL CASES* **I. L. R. 13 Mad. 316**

1. _____ *Probate of Will by consent whether legal—Compromise.* No grant of probate can be made merely on the consent of parties. The Court must itself be satisfied by

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 375 (1859, s. 98)—*contd.*

admissible evidence that a will propounded is the will of the testator. *SRIMATI MONMOHINI GUHA v. BANGA CHANDRA DAS* (1904) . **8 C. W. N. 197**

2. _____ *Consent Decree—*

Status of landlord and tenant—Forfeiture clause—

Suit to enforce forfeiture—Relief against forfeiture.

When a plaintiff is seeking to enforce by original suit a right to forfeiture contained in a consent decree (passed under s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code in accordance with a lawful agreement recorded under that section), whereby the status of landlord and tenant is established between the plaintiff and defendant, the Court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction is not precluded from granting such relief against forfeiture as it might have granted, had the status arisen from contract or custom. *Per JENKINS, C.J.*—As under s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) the decree was to be in accordance with the agreement, it cannot have altered the relations of the parties as they existed under the agreement. And as it was an incident of those relations that the right of forfeiture was subject to relief, that incident must still apply when those relations are established by a decree passed in accordance with the agreement. *Per BEAMAN, J.*—The difference between a consent decree declaring the agreement of parties, and the agreement of parties themselves, when the one or the other is sought to be afterwards enforced, goes no further than this, that in the former case it would not be open to a party to question the accuracy of the decree, as expressing what at the time was the contract which had been made. *Shirekuli Timapa Hegda v. Mahablya, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 435*, dissented from. *KRISHNABAI v. HARI GOVIND* (1906) **I. L. R. 31 Bom. 15**

3. _____ *"Lawful Agreement or Compromise"—"Relates to the suit"—Compromise in a suit for money by which the agreed amount is charged on property is lawful and the relief by way of charge "relates to the suit." The language of s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure is wide and general and does not preclude parties from setting their disputes on such lawful terms as they might agree to without being restricted to such relief as one only of the parties had chosen to claim in the plaint. In a suit for money, where the plaint prays for a simple money decree, an agreement, by which the parties agree that the amount decreed according to the compromise should be a charge on certain properties, is "lawful" and "relates to the suit" so as to be embodied in the decree. *JOTI KURUVETAPPA v. IZARI SIRUSAPPA* (1907)*

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 478

4. _____ *Consent Decree—*

Matters outside the scope of suit, if may be embodied—

Terms introduced as consideration for relief given—

Registration—Registration Act (III of 1877), s. 17 (i)—Hypothecation clause in consent-decree—

Whether mortgage or charge—Transfer of Property

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 375 (1859, s. 98)—*contd.*

Act (IV of 1882), ss. 58, 100. In a suit for recovery of money due on bahi-khata accounts a decree was made upon a petition of compromise for the payment by the defendants of a certain sum by instalments. The decree further declared that certain immoveable properties specified in the petition of compromise "shall be hypothecated for the realisation of the money and that the defendants shall not be able to create any incumbrance on the same." *Held*, that having regard to cl. (1) of s. 17 of the Registration Act the latter clause, even if it amounted to the mortgage, would not require registration. *Bindesri Naik v. Ganga Saran Sahu*, 2 C. W. N. 129; s. c. L. R. 25 I. A. 9; I. L. R. 20 All. 171; *Pranal Annee v. Lakshmi Annee*, 3 C. W. N. 485; s. c. L. R. 26 I. A. 101; I. L. R. 22 Mad. 508, followed. *Raghubans Mani Singh v. Mahabir Singh*, I. L. R. 28 All. 78; *Patha Muthammal v. Esup Rowther*, I. L. R. 29 Mad. 365; *Gupta Narain Das v. Bijoya Sundari Debya*, 2 C. W. N. 663, referred to. That the hypothecation of immoveable property was the consideration for the time allowed for payment of the sum decreed by instalments, and thus formed an integral and necessary part of the adjustment of the claim in the suit; and the Court did not act contrary to the provisions of s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code, in inserting this clause in the consent decree. *Birbhadra v. Rath Kalpataru Panda*, 1 C. L. J. 388; *Gurdeo v. Singh Chandrikah Singh*, 5 C. L. J. 611, distinguished. *Raghubans Mani Singh v. Mahabir Singh*, I. L. R. 28 All. 78; *Gupta Narain Das v. Bejoya Sundari Debya*, 2 C. W. N. 663; *Purna Chandra Sarkar v. Nilmadhub Nandi*, 57 C. W. N. 485, relied on. *Held*, further, on the construction of the hypothecation clause, that it merely created a charge within the meaning of s. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act and not a mortgage within s. 58. *Tancred v. Delagoa Bay and East Africa Railway Co.*, 23 Q. B. D. 239; *Burlinson v. Hall*, 12 Q. B. D. 347, relied on. The question whether any particular term of a petition of compromise incorporated in a compromise decree relates to the suit or is covered by its subject matter must be decided from the frame of the suit, the relief claimed and the relief allowed by the decree on adjustment by lawful agreement. The mutual connection of the different parts of the relief granted by a consent decree is an important element for consideration in each case in deciding whether any portion of the relief is within the scope of the suit. No hard and fast rule can be laid down and each case must be governed by its own facts. *GOBINDA CHANDRA PAUL v. DWARKA NATH PAUL* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 867
s. c. 12 C. W. N. 849

5. ———— *Compromise—Allegation of compromise by one party denied by the other—Court if must receive proof of same—Agreement, if may be verbal—Court-fee.* Where, in the course of a suit, one party alleges that the dis-

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 375 (1859, s. 98)—*contd.*

pute has been compromised and prays for a decree on the basis of such compromise, whilst the other party denies that there has been a completed agreement to compromise, the proper course for the Court is to take evidence as to whether a compromise was really made between the parties or not. There is nothing in s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), which requires the agreement or compromise mentioned therein to be written. It may be written or verbal. *GAJENDRA CHANDRA BURMA v. BINDUBASHINI* (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 1023

6. ———— *Suit for Administration—Reference to Commissioner—Parties agreeing orally to submit to Commissioner's decision—Commissioner's award—Adjustment of suits, what is—Written submission necessary.* The parties to an arbitration suit consented to it being referred to the Commissioner to take the usual accounts and to determine their respective shares. In the usual course, the matter came before the Assistant Commissioner for taking accounts, and a large mass of accounts, objections and surcharges were filed by the various parties. On appearing before the Assistant Commissioner the parties came to an understanding that the matter in dispute should be left to be decided by the Assistant Commissioner in a summary manner without going into formal evidence beyond the accounts, objections and surcharges filed before him. The 1st and 6th defendants with their attorney were present at this meeting and after their attorney had agreed to the above course suggested by the Assistant Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner himself explained to the 1st and 6th defendants in turn his proposal and told them that whatever award he made would be binding on them. To this they agreed, the 1st defendant even saying he would take one rupee if that was the sum awarded to him. It was also agreed that the Assistant Commissioner should draw up his findings in the form of a consent decree to be taken by the parties as that would save the parties a large sum in costs. At another meeting before the Assistant Commissioner the latter recorded his findings and then proceeded to draw up the consent decree embodying these findings therein but the defendants 1 and 6 refused to be bound by his decision. Upon application being made by the plaintiff that an adjustment of the suit might be recorded under s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code on the basis of the Assistant Commissioner's decision: *Held*, that there had been no adjustment of the suit. There had been no written submission to arbitration as provided by s. 4 of the Indian Arbitration Act, and, consequently, there had been no legal and valid reference to arbitration and the Assistant Commissioner's award (for it really was an award and nothing else) had no legal foundation, and could therefore have no legal consequences. As there had been no reference to arbitration and no award, there could be

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

———— s. 375 (1859, s. 98)—*concl'd.*

no adjustment to give effect to under s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Samibai v. Premji Praggi*, I. L. R. 20 Bom. 304 and *Pragdas v. Girdhardas*, I. L. R. 26 Bom. 76, considered and distinguished. *RUKHANBAI v. ADAMJI SHAIK RAJBHAI* (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 69

———— ss. 377, 379.

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—PAYMENT
OUT OF MONEY DEPOSITED IN COURT.

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 766

———— s. 380 (1859, ss. 34, 35).

See SECURITY FOR COSTS—SUITS.

1. ————— s. 380—*Appeal lies from order under s. 380, directing a woman to deposit security for costs—Such order is a judgment under Letters Patent, cl. 15—"Suit for money," what is.* An appeal lies against an order passed by a Judge sitting on the Original Side of the High Court requiring security from a woman under s. 380 of the Civil Procedure Code. Such an order is a judgment within the meaning of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. *Seshagiri Row v. Askur Jung Aftab Dowlah*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 502, followed. Suits, which are not exclusively for money, but which will result in a decree for money on the relief sought, come within the purview of s. 380 of the Civil Procedure Code. *SONABAI v. TRIBHOWANDAS* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 602

2. ————— ss. 380, 410—*Pauper Plaintiff, if can be required to furnish security for defendant's costs.* The provisions of s. 380 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot apply to the case of a person to whom permission has been granted under s. 410 of the Code to sue as a pauper, as the effect of an order requiring such a person to furnish security for the defendant's costs would be to render nugatory the order under s. 410. In making an order under s. 380 of the Civil Procedure Code against a plaintiff who had been permitted to sue as a pauper, the Court acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity. *Nusseeroodeen Biswas v. Ujjul Biswas*, 17 W. R. 68, relied on. *HAFIZAN v. ABDUL KARIM* (1907)

12 C. W. N. 163

———— s. 381—

See RE JUDICATA—CAUSES OF ACTION.
I. L. R. 26 Bom. 687

———— ss. 382, 384, 385 (1859, s. 175).

See COMMISSION—CIVIL CASES.

1 Hyde 68
20 W. R. 253

———— ss. 383, 386—*Power of Courts to issue commission—Cases enumerated in sections exhaustive—Court may prevent abuse of its process.* The present appellants obtained a decree against the late head of a mutt, and, in execution thereof

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

———— ss. 383, 386—*concl'd.*

attached certain gold and silver articles. The respondent, the present head of the mutt, who had been made a party to the execution proceedings as the representative of the deceased, contended that the attached articles were not liable to be sold in execution of the decree as they were not assets of the deceased, but property belonging to the mutt. The appellants thereupon applied to the Subordinate Judge to summon the respondent as a witness for the appellants. The respondent, who resided within the jurisdiction of the Court, then applied to the Subordinate Judge to take his evidence on commission stating that he was unable, of his own personal knowledge, to give any evidence material to the questions at issue, and alleging that the appellants were insisting on his appearance in Court to put pressure upon him to relinquish or compromise his claim, as it was considered derogatory to a person in his position to appear in a Court as a witness. The Subordinate Judge refused to issue a commission. On a revision petition being filed, a single Judge of the High Court set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge and ordered the respondent to be examined on commission. On an appeal being preferred under Art. 15 of the Letters Patent: *Held*, that an appeal lay. *Held*, also, that the issue of commissions for the examination of witnesses by the Courts of this country is governed solely by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and s. 386 is exhaustive, and provides for all the cases in which the Legislature intended that it should be competent to a Court to issue a commission for the examination of witnesses resident within its jurisdiction. *Held*, further, that a litigant's privilege of taking out summonses to witnesses is subject to the control of the tribunal, which is called upon to enforce their attendance, though such control will be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. This control is an instance of the authority of every Court of competent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its process. In the present case, the appellant's application was not *bond fide*, and the respondent's attendance in Court was required not for the purpose of obtaining material evidence but from other motives, and the order for the issue of a commission was therefore rightly made. *VEERABADRAN CHETTY v. NATARAJA DESILKAR* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 28

———— ss. 386, 622.

See HIGH COURT—POWERS OF SUPERINTENDENCE . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 60

———— s. 387—

See COMMISSION—CIVIL CASES.

7 C. W. N. 806

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—COMMISSION
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 934

———— ss. 387, 391 (1859, s. 177)—*Act VIII of 1859, s. 177—Native Prince or State in*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 387, 391 (1859, s. 177)—*concl'd.*
alliance—Kingdom of Ava. The kingdom of Ava was not the territory of a Native Prince or State in alliance with the British Government, within the meaning of s. 177 of Act VIII of 1859. *AGA MOHAMMED JAFFER TEHRANI v. MIRZA NAZIRULLA*

2 B. L. R. A. C. 73: 10 W. R. 385

ss. 389, 390 (1859, s. 179).

See COMMISSION—CIVIL CASES.

2 B. L. R. A. C. 73

5 B. L. R. 252

8 B. L. R. Ap. 102

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 591

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 28

ss. 389, 390—*Evidence taken on Commission, when evidence in suit—Meaning of "forming part of the record" in s. 389, Civil Procedure Code.* Evidence taken on commission does not become evidence in the suit until the same has been tendered and read as evidence in the suit by the party in whose behalf it has been taken. *Dwarka Nath v. Gunga Dayi*, 8 B. L. R. 102, Appendix; *Nistarini v. Nundo Lal*, 3 C. W. N. cccxxix, dissented from. *Kusum Kumari v. Satya Ranjan*, 7 C. W. N. 786, followed. *HEMANTA KUMARI v. BANKU BEHARI SIKDAR* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 794

ss. 392, 393, 398, 399 (1859, s. 180).

See AMEEN.

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—REPORTS OF AMEEN AND OTHER OFFICERS.

See LOCAL INVESTIGATION.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—COSTS.

I. L. R. 4. Mad. 399

ss. 394, 395 (1859, s. 181).

See ACCOUNT, SUIT FOR.

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 754

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 654

See APPEAL—DECREES.

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 209, 273, 275

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 463

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 73

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 279

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 725

1 C. W. N. 374

See COMMISSIONER FOR TAKING ACCOUNTS.

6 Bom. A. C. 149

1 Mad. 1, 418

3 N. W. 217

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 259

19 W. R. 14

L. R. 11 A. 346

5 C. W. N. 692

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—MODE OF EXECUTION—PARTITION.

I. L. R. 19 All. 194

See PARTITION.

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 395—*Limitation Act, Sch. II, Art. 11—Suit by person against whom order relating to possession is passed.* The order contemplated by s. 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure (when a purchaser has been resisted by any person other than the judgment-debtor) is one which will become final and conclusive, unless the party against whom it is passed institutes a suit (within a year, under Art. 11 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act) and obtains an adjudication in his favour. If the Court declines to pass an order under s. 335, deeming it best that the purchaser should be referred to a separate suit to enforce his purchase, Art. 11 has no application. *MEERUDIN SAHIB v. RAHISA BIBI* (1904)
I. L. R. 27 Mad. 25

s. 396—

See PARTITION—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

5 C. W. N. 128

1. Stamp Act (II of 1899), s. 2 (15)—*Decree for partition—Commissioner's report—Decree in accordance—Final Order—Instrument of partition—Stamp.* A decree for partition passed in accordance with a Commissioner's report under s. 396 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) is a final order for effecting a partition passed by a Civil Court and must therefore be stamped as an instrument of partition under s. 2 (15) of the Stamp Act (II of 1899). *BALARAM v. RAMKRISHNA* (1905)
I. L. R. 29 Bom. 366

2. *Suit for partition of immoveable property—Commissioner appointed to make partition—Court not competent to modify Commissioner's report.* Where in a suit for partition of immoveable property a Commissioner has been appointed under s. 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure to ascertain the shares of the parties, the Court, when passing its final decree, must either accept or reject the report of the Commissioner *in toto*, but is not competent to modify it. *Shah Muhammad Khan v. Hanwant Singh*, All. Weekly Notes (1898) 45. *JANKI PRASED v. GAURI SHAHAI* (1905)
I. L. R. 28 All. 75

3. *Partition—Commission to make partition—Issue of commission to one person only.* A Court issuing under s. 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure a commission to make partition of immoveable property not paying revenue to Government cannot legally issue such commission to one commissioner only. *PER RICHARDS, J.*—But there is nothing to prevent the parties to partition proceedings agreeing that one commissioner only should be appointed; nor does it follow that all the partitions that have been made are invalid by reason of the fact that only one commissioner has been appointed. *MULCHAND v. MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN* (1906)
I. L. R. 29 All. 235

4. *Appointment of Commissioner discretionary—Decree, finality of—Conduct of Parties.* It is not obligatory on the

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 396—*concl'd.*

Court, in every case in which a decree is made for the partition of immoveables not paying revenue to Government, to appoint a Commissioner under s. 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and such a decree is not, in all cases, to be considered pending till action is taken under s. 396. Where such a decree, not followed by action under s. 396, is treated by the Court and the parties as a final decree in execution proceedings it is not open to a party subsequently to contend that the decree had not become final. **KRISHNA-MACHARIAR v. KUPPAMMAL (1908)**

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 540

ss. 397, 649, Ch. XXV—Commission—Additional Costs, order for, not entered in decree—If enforceable. When after the issue of a commission under Chapter XXV of the Civil Procedure Code, it is found that the work is in excess of the amount paid in for the costs of the commission and that the party at whose instance the commission was issued is not willing to pay, the only way in which the additional costs can be realised is by making the amount costs of the suit and entering the same in the decree. An order for depositing additional costs, when not entered in the decree, cannot be enforced. **TADHIN PROSHAD SINGH v. SARDAR COOMAR NARAYAN SINGH (1906)**

10 C. W. N. 234

s. 399—

See COMMISSION—CIVIL CASES.

7 C. W. N. 806

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—COMMISSION.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 934

s. 401—Application to file a suit in *forma pauperis*—“Other than his necessary wearing apparel and the subject-matter of the suit”—Construction. The applicant applied for leave to file a suit in *forma pauperis* alleging that after her husband's death, her husband's brother possessed himself of her property including the ornaments that she ordinarily was accustomed to wear. She sued to recover these ornaments. The Subordinate Judge rejected her application on the ground that she must have had these ornaments, which she had been accustomed to wear. *Held*, that the Subordinate Judge had failed to perceive that the point he had to consider was whether the applicant at the time at which the application was made was possessed of sufficient means to enable her to pay the fees prescribed by law for the plaint. The words “other than his necessary wearing apparel and the subject-matter of the suit” in the explanation to s. 401 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, do not qualify that part of the explanation which requires that the person should not be possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law, but only the condition that the applicant is not entitled to property worth Rs. 100. **KRISHNABAI v. MANOHAR (1906)**

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 593

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 401-415 (1859, ss. 297-310).

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 4.

See PAUPER SUIT.

ss. 402 407, 409, 622—Pauper Suit—Maintainability. An application was made by a person for permission to sue as a pauper. The suit was for construction of a will and other reliefs; the plaint contained certain allegations upon which the plaintiff had a right to sue. The lower Court was satisfied that the applicant was a pauper, but rejected the application on the ground that he had no right to sue expressing its opinion upon the merits of the suit itself. *Held*, that the lower Court applied to the matter before him a course of enquiry which was entirely foreign to the enquiry, which he was called upon to make under s. 407, Civil Procedure Code. **Debo Das v. Mohunt Ram Sahay, 2 C. W. N. 474**, followed. The applicant was accordingly directed to be allowed to sue *in forma pauperis*. **GOPAL CHANDRA NEOGY v. BIGOO MISTRY (1904)** . **8 C. W. N. 70**

s. 403.

See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASES—GENERAL CASES . **I. L. R. 24 All. 356**

s. 407.

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—POWER TO GRANT SANCTION.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 656

Application for leave to sue in *forma pauperis*—Grounds for dismissing. Where application is made for leave to sue *in forma pauperis*, the Court is not bound to give the leave, if the allegations made by the petitioner are such that, if true, they would show a good cause of action. **SANKARARAMA AYYAR v. SUBRAMANIA AYYAR (1904)**

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 120

ss. 407, 408, 409—Suit in *forma pauperis*. Sub-s. (c) of s. 407 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not refer solely to a question of jurisdiction. Under it, an applicant must make out that he has a good subsisting *prima facie* cause of action capable of enforcement. **Kamrakh Nath v. Sundar Nath, I. L. R. 20 All. 299**, followed. S. 409, which provides that “the Court shall also hear any argument which the parties may desire to offer on the question whether on the face of the application and of the evidence the applicant is or is not subject to any of the prohibitions specified in s. 407,” enables the parties to argue the question, if they so desire, but does not preclude the Courts, if no argument is offered, from considering that question. **AMIRTHAN v. ALWAR MANIKRAM (1904)** . **I. L. R. 27 Mad. 37**

s. 410.

See HINDU LAW. I. L. R. 30 All. 95

ss. 410, 413.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 4.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 427

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

1. _____ s. 411—*Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), s. 309—Suit in formâ pauperis—Successful petitioner—Charge of Government for Court-fees—Crown-debt, priority of.* S. 411 of the Civil Procedure Code is an enabling section. Though it indicates the manner in which the Crown may proceed to realise Court-fees of a successful *pauper* plaintiff, which form a Crown-debt, it does not preclude the Crown or its representative from urging its prerogative and insisting on its right to precedence over all other creditors. A successful *pauper* plaintiff attached and sold for her costs certain property, other than the property in suit, belonging to the judgment-creditor. The sale-proceeds were paid into Court. The plaintiff's solicitor applied to have his costs paid out of the sale-proceeds. The Government Solicitor also applied to have his certified Court-fees paid to him out of the fund in Court: *Held*, that the Government Solicitor was entitled to precedence and that it was not necessary for him to attach the fund before getting payment. *Secretary of State v. The Bombay Landing and Shipping Co., Ltd.*, 5 Bom. H. C. 23 (O. C. J.); *Gunpat Putaya v. The Collector of Kanara*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 7; *Gulzuri Lal v. Collector of Bareilly*, I. L. R. 1 All. 596; *The Collector of Moradabad v. Muhammad Daim*, I. L. R. 2 All. 196; *Ramdas v. The Secretary of State*, I. L. R. 18 All. 419; and *Bell v. The Municipal Commissioners*, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 457, referred to. **GAYANODA BALA DASEE v. BUTTO KRISHNA DASS BAIKAGEE (1906)**

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1040
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 857

2. _____ *Suit in formâ pauperis—Court-fee—Property of defendant sold to realize court-fee—Property sold subject to a mortgage—Rights of mortgagee.* *Held*, that the sale subject to a mortgage of property belonging to the defendant in suit brought in *formâ pauperis* for the purpose of realizing the court-fee payable to Government by the plaintiff, does not preclude the mortgagee from bringing to sale the same property in execution of a decree for sale as his mortgage. *The Collector of Moradabad v. Muhammad Daim Khan*, I. L. R. 2 All. 196, overruled. *Gunpat Putaya v. The Collector of Kanara*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 7, distinguished. **DOST MUHAMMAD KHAN v. MANI RAM (1907)**

I. L. R. 29 All. 537

_____ ss. 411, 412—*Plaintiff permitted to sue as a Pauper—Compromise—Withdrawal by plaintiff without permission—Success—Failure.* If a plaintiff, who has been permitted to sue as a pauper, withdraw from the suit without permission under s. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) as the result of a compromise by which he obtained a substantial part of the relief claimed, he does not succeed in the suit within the meaning of s. 411. but he fails in the suit within the meaning of s. 412 of the Civil Procedure Code. **SECRETARY OF STATE v. BHAGIRATHI BAI (1906)**

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 10

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

_____ s. 416.

See SECRETARY OF STATE.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 18

_____ s. 417 (1859, s. 17).

See ante, ss. 37, 38.

_____ s. 418 (1859, s. 26).

See PLAINT—FORM AND CONTENTS OF PLAINT.

_____ s. 424.

See BOMBAY CITY IMPROVEMENT ACT.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 424

See COLLECTOR . I. L. R. 3 All. 20

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 317

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 343

See COURT OF WARDS.

12 C. W. N. 1065

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—GOVERNMENT . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 271

See PUBLIC OFFICER.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 395

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 809

See SECRETARY OF STATE.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 189

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 754, 778

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 170

See TRESPASS . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 28

1. _____ *Suit against public officer—Notice of action, form of.* In a suit against the Deputy Magistrate of A and the Deputy Magistrate of B for damages for having in bad faith and maliciously caused the plaintiff to be confined in hajut, the plaintiff served a notice under s. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code on the defendants, to the effect that the Deputy Magistrate, acting in concert with the intention of oppressing the plaintiff, had wilfully, improperly, and illegally kept him in hajut and thereby caused him injury: *Held*, that the notice sufficiently stated the cause of action within the terms of s. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code, it not being necessary that a notice under that section should be read with the strictness with which a plaint should be read in regard to the statement of the cause of action. **PARBUTTI CHURUN MOZOOMDAR v. NOBIN CHUNDER SEN**

13 C. L. R. 195

2. _____ *Suit against an officer of Government—Bombay Civil Courts (Act XIV of 1869), s. 32—Suit ex contractu—Notice of suit* S. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), which requires notice to be given to a public officer two months before the institution of a suit against him, does not apply where the suit is one *ex contractu*. *Shahunshah Begum v. Fergusson*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 499, and *Maneklal v. Municipal*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 424—*contd.*

Commissioner for the City of Bombay, I. L. R. 19 Bom. 407, referred to. RAJMAL MANIKCHAND v. HANMANT ANYABA I. L. R. 20 Bom. 697

3. ——— Suit against public officer in respect of acts done by him in his official capacity—*Notice of suit—Suit for damages against a Public Officer—Trespass—Misjoinder of causes of action—Amendment of plaint.* The plaintiff sued the defendant, a public officer, to recover damages for two distinct acts (*viz.*, wrongful arrest and trespass) alleged to have been illegally and maliciously done by the defendant on two different occasions, and claimed one lump sum as damages for both the acts; no permission to amend the plaint was asked for in the lower Court. On the 21st of October 1895, the plaintiff instituted this suit, having on the 18th of September 1895 served the defendant with a notice under s. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Held*, that the former act (*viz.*, the plaintiff's arrest) was an act done by the defendant in his official capacity and was clearly of the kind contemplated by s. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code under which two months' notice to the defendant would be necessary previous to the institution of the suit; and that the suit was rightly dismissed by the lower Court for want of such notice. *Shahunshah Begum v. Fergusson, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 499, distinguished. Quere:* Whether the latter act (*viz.*, the trespass into the plaintiff's house), on the allegations in the plaint, was an act done by the Magistrate in his official capacity, and whether a notice under s. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code would be necessary previous to suing for damages for such an act. *Held*, further, that as the two acts were mixed up together in the plaint and one lump sum claimed as damages for both, and as no permission to amend the plaint was asked for in the lower Court so as to convert the suit into one for damages with reference to the trespass only, the plaint ought not to be allowed to be amended on appeal to the High Court. *JOGENDRA NATH ROY v. PRICE I. L. R. 24 Calc. 584*

4. ——— Suit against the Secretary of State for India in Council—*Notice—Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act VII of 1880), ss. 8, 9, 20—Sale for default in payment of costs of realizing Government Revenue.* S. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that "No suit shall be instituted against the Secretary of State in Council, or against a public officer in respect of an act purporting to be done by him in his official capacity until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been, in the case of the Secretary of State in Council, delivered to, or left at the office of, a Secretary to the Local Government or the Collector of the District," etc. The plaintiff had instituted a suit against the Secretary of State for India in Council to set aside a certain sale of the plaintiff's property (possession of which had been given to the purchaser), but had

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 424—*contd.*

not given him the notice prescribed by s. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code. The first Court (*AMEER ALI, J.*) gave the plaintiff a decree. *Held* on appeal (reversing the decision of *AMEER ALI, J.*), that whether or not the works "in respect of an act purporting to be done by him in his official capacity" relate only to a public officer and not to the Secretary of State, no suit whatever is maintainable against the Secretary of State, unless the notice prescribed by s. 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been given; and that therefore the present suit could not be maintained. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL v. RAJLUCKI DEBI*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 239

5. ——— Suit against Secretary of State and others—*Notice previous to suing Secretary of State for India in Council or Public Officer—Notice by two out of three joint owners of land—"Cause of action."* Three joint owners of land sued to recover a sum of money paid as water-rates, which they alleged had been illegally levied from them by the Government in respect of *fasli* 1302 and 1303. Notice of suit had been given by only two of the plaintiffs, and that notice omitted to state the imposition of the rate for *fasli* 1303 as a cause of action, as at the date of its being given the rate for *fasli* 1303 had not been levied. On its being contended that the notice was invalid and that the suit founded thereon was unsustainable: *Held*, that the notice was not invalid on the ground that it proceeded from only two out of three of the joint owners. The object of the notice required by s. 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to give the defendant an opportunity for settling the claim, if so advised, without litigation; and that object had been fully attained by two out of three plaintiffs giving the notice. *Held*, also, that the notice was not invalid by reason of the fact that the collection of rate for *fasli* 1303 had not been stated as a cause of action. The collection of a further sum for a subsequent *fasli*, after notice of the suit had been given, was not a fresh cause of action requiring a further notice under s. 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The term "cause of action," in s. 424, should not be construed in a narrow sense, the object of the section being merely to inform the defendant substantially of the ground of complaint. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL v. PERUMAL PILLAI (1900).*

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 279

6. ——— Suit against Secretary of State in Council—*Notice—Death of intending plaintiff before institution of suit—Notice already served not available to representatives of original intending plaintiff—Rejection of plaint—Civil Procedure Code, s. 54.* Where a person, apparently intending to institute a suit against the Secretary of State in Council, served a notice, in the manner prescribed by s. 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure, of his intention to institute such a suit, but

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 424—*contd.*

died before the suit was instituted, it was held that the notice served under s. 424 did not enure for the benefit of the representatives of the person who had served it and entitle them to institute a suit without giving fresh notice. *Held*, also, that the language of s. 424 is imperative, and absolutely debars a Court from entertaining a suit instituted without compliance with the provisions of the section. A Court cannot under such circumstances stay proceedings and allow time to the plaintiff to serve the requisite notice, but its only course is to reject the plaint under s. 54 (c) of the Code. *Rendal v. Blair*, L. R. 45 Ch. D. 139, distinguished. *BACHCHU SINGH v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL* (1902)

I. L. R. 25 All. 187

7. ———— *Plaint, amendment of—Damages, suit for.* S. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code relates to the institution of a suit against the Secretary of State. There is nothing in the law to show that in case of any amendment, necessitated by alleged discovery of facts previously unknown to the plaintiff, the Secretary of State should have a further notice of two months. No notice of action is required against the Sub-Collector, who is joined in the action with the Secretary of State, inasmuch as he is not sued for any act done by him independently of the Government. *EZRA v. SECRETARY OF STATE* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 36 : s.c. 7 C. W. N. 249

8. ———— *Suit against Administrator-General, if notice necessary—Administrator-General, if public officer—Administrator-General's Act (II of 1874 and V of 1902).* All estates in the hands of the Administrator-General are held by him as Administrator-General, i.e., as a public officer, and in any suit instituted against him in respect of any act purporting to be done by him in his official capacity he is entitled to notice under s. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code. The phrase "cause of action" in s. 424, Civil Procedure Code, should not be too narrowly construed, the object of the section being merely to inform the defendant of the ground of complaint. *Secretary of State v. Perumal Pillai*, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 279, and *Bachhu Singh v. Secretary of State*, I. L. R. 25 All. 187, 191, followed. The portion of s. 424, Civil Procedure Code, relating to the notice containing a statement that such notice has been left and delivered in the manner prescribed by the section, is separable from the earlier portion, which deals with the delivery of the notice two months before suit. It is only when notice is not given that the suit is liable to be dismissed. The suit, however, may be proceeded with, if notice has been given in the manner prescribed, and subsequently the plaint is amended in order to state that fact. *BHOLARAM CHOWDHURY v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL* (1904)

S C. W. N. 913

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877) *contd.*s. 424—*concl'd.*

9. ———— *Police Act (V of 1861), s. 42—Suit against Police Officer for Damages for wrongful Confinement—Notice—Action of Police officer, malicious.* One Panna Lal brought a suit against a Sub-Inspector of Police claiming damages for wrongful confinement and other matters. It was found that the Sub-Inspector did not purport to act in good faith in pursuance of the law, but that he took advantage of his position as a Police officer to commit illegal and tortious acts maliciously and without cause. *Held*, that under these circumstances the defendant was not entitled to receive notice of suit either under s. 42 of the Police Act, 1861, or under s. 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the plaintiff's suit was not liable to dismissal for lack of such notice. *Shahebzadee Shahunshah Begum v. Fergusson*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 499 and *Jogendra Nath Roy, Bahadur v. Price*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 584, referred to. *MUHAMMAD SADDIQ AHMAD v. PANNA LAL* (1904) I. L. R. 26 All. 220

10. ———— *Suit against Public Officer—Suit to recover articles seized by police during a search.* The plaintiff sued to recover from the defendant three account books which he alleged that the defendant, a Sub-Inspector of Police, had seized during a search, apparently in pursuance of the provisions of s. 165 of the Code of Civil Procedure, of the plaintiff's house. *Held*, that the defendant, if he seized the books, which was denied, did so in his capacity as a Police officer and that the suit was not maintainable in the absence of the notice prescribed by s. 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Muhammad Saddiq Ahmad v. Panna Lal*, I. L. R. 26 All. 220, distinguished. *Jogendra Nath Roy, Bahadur v. Price*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 584, referred to. *BAKHAWAR MAL v. ABDUL LATIF* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 567

s. 430.

See PLAINT—VERIFICATION AND SIGNATURE . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 103

s. 431.

See FOREIGN COURT, JUDGMENT OF.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 222

L. R. 21 I. A. 171

See FOREIGN STATE.

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 17

1. ———— s. 432 (1859, s. 17, para. 4)—*Suit by independent Prince in Court in British India—Recognized Agent for institution of suit—Civil Procedure Code, s. 37—Signature and Verification of Plaintiff.* S. 432 of the Civil Procedure Code does not prevent the institution by an independent Prince of a suit in a Court in British India in his own name, and through a recognized agent other than one appointed under that section.

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

_____ s. 432 (1859, s. 17, para. 4)—*concl'd.*
BEER CHUNDER MANIKYA v. ISHAN CHUNDER
BURDHUN . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 136

MAHARAJA OF BHARTPUR v. KACHERU
I. L. R. 19 All. 510

2. _____ Suit by Ruling Chief—*Applicability of s. 432 to suits in Revenue Courts—Plaint—Signature of plaintiff by an unauthorized agent who subsequently becomes empowered to sign.* Held, that s. 432 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to suits filed in a Court of Revenue under the provisions of Act XII of 1881 (the N. W. Provinces Rent Act 1881). Held, also, that where the plaintiff in a suit filed in a Court of Revenue on behalf of a Ruling Chief was signed by a person who at the time of signing had not been specially appointed by the Government for such purpose under s. 432 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but was so appointed before the period of limitation in respect of such suit had expired, the plaintiff was a valid plaintiff for all purposes. *Basdeo v. John Smidt, I. L. R. 22 All. 55*, referred to. *Marghub Ahmad v. Nihal Ahmad, All. Weekly Notes (1899) 55*, distinguished. *MAHARAJA OF REWAH v. SWAMI SARAN (1903)*

I. L. R. 25. All. 635

_____ ss. 432, 433.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—
FOREIGN AND NATIVE RULERS.

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 415

_____ s. 433.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—
FOREIGN AND NATIVE RULERS.

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 535

3 C. L. R. 417

25 W. R. 404, 407

12 C. L. R. 473

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 415

See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT
—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 494

_____ *Suit against a ruling Chief—Permission to sue granted in absence of the necessary conditions precedent—Jurisdiction.* A suit for the recovery of arrears of salary was brought in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Agra against the Maharaja of Jaipur. The plaintiff obtained the consent of the Governor General in Council to the institution of the suit, granted ostensibly in accordance with the provisions of s. 433 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but in fact none of the conditions enumerated in cl. (2) of the section existed. Held, that the suit was not maintainable. *MAHARAJA OF JAIPUR v. LALJI SAHAI (1907)*

I. L. R. 29 All. 379

_____ s. 434.

See FOREIGN COURT, JUDGMENT OF.

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 292

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 546

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 222

L. R. 21 I. A. 171

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

_____ s. 435 (1859, s. 26, para. 6, and
s. 28, para. 2).

See PLAINT—VERIFICATION AND SIG-
NATURE . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 60

L. R. 20 I. A. 139

I. L. R. 16 All. 420

5 C. W. N. 91

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 103

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—MIS-
CELLANEOUS CASES.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 139

_____ s. 435—*Plaint in suit by Corporation—Verification by "principal officer"—Personal knowledge of verifier, if necessary—Amendment—Rejection.* S. 435 of the Civil Procedure Code does not require a "principal officer" of a Corporation to verify a plaintiff from actual personal knowledge. The section shows that a verifier may depose upon his information and belief. Where in such a case the verifier deposed from information and belief: Held, that even if it were held that the plaintiff was not properly verified, it should not have been rejected, but leave should have been granted to amend it. *PORT CANNING AND LAND IMPROVEMENT CO., LD., v. DHARANIDHAR SARDAR (1905)*

9 C. W. N. 608

_____ ss. 435, 436; Ch. XXIX.

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—
BILL OF EXCHANGE.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 446

_____ s. 437.

See HINDU LAW.

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 236

See PARTIES—

PARTIES TO SUITS—MORTGAGES, SUITS
CONCERNING 6 C. W. N. 488

SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—PLAINT-
IFFS . 7 C. W. N. 817

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 682

1. _____ s. 440—*Guardian of Minor*
"appointed by an authority competent in this
behalf," meaning of—*Powers of a Hindu father*
to appoint a testamentary guardian to his minor
son—Indian Succession Act, s. 47, not applicable
to the will of a Hindu. Assuming that a Hindu
father has power to appoint a testamentary
guardian, it is not by virtue of any statute; for
s. 47 of the Indian Succession Act does not apply
to the will of a Hindu. If, therefore, the power
exists, it must be under Hindu Law as distinct from
statute. It would not be in accordance with the
ordinary use of language to speak of a father,
whose power (if any) rests on the General Hindu Law
as "an authority competent in that behalf." It
is clear that s. 440 of the Civil Procedure Code does

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 440—*concl'd.*

not apply to all guardians, for it would be impossible to suggest that it applies to natural guardians.
BUDHILAL v. MORARJI (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 413

2. *Minor suing through next friend other than certificated guardian—Permission of Court presumed—Procedure.* A minor who had a certificated guardian living instituted a suit through a next friend other than the guardian. On the application of the next friend notice was sent to the certificated guardian, but he showed no cause, and the suit continued. *Held*, that under the circumstances, although no formal order had been recorded permitting the next friend to act on the minor's behalf, it must be presumed that the intention of the Court had been to grant such permission, and the suit ought not to be defeated solely upon the ground that no formal permission had been recorded. *SRIDHAR RAO v. RAM LAL* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 All. 7

ss. 440 464.

See MINOR.

s. 443.

See *ante*, s. 108 . I. L. R. 24 All. 383

See COMPROMISE—CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 613

See MINOR—REPRESENTATION OF MINOR IN SUITS . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1021

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 298

1. *Effect of section on ss. 74 and 76 of the Code of Civil Procedure—Service of summons on a Minor.* Ss. 74 and 76 of the Code of Civil Procedure are controlled by s. 443 of that Code. *JATINDRA MOHAN PODDAR v. SRINATH ROY.*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 267

2. *Guardian ad litem—Procedure—Appointment of guardian ad litem invalid—Effect of invalidity on decree passed against Minor Defendant.* The provisions of s. 443 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the appointment of a guardian ad litem for a minor defendant are imperative, and where those provisions are not substantially complied with, the minor is not properly represented, and any decree which may be passed against him is a nullity. *Khirajmal v. Daim*, L. R. 32 I. A. 23, followed. *Walian v. Banke Behari Prasad Singh*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1021, distinguished. *HANUMAN PRASAD v. MUHAMMAD ISHAQ* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 137

3. *Guardian ad litem—Appointment of guardian ad litem other than certificated guardian.* *Held* that the appointment, apparently by an oversight, as guardian ad litem to a minor defendant of a person other than

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 443—*concl'd.*

the certificated guardian amounted to no more than an irregularity and would not of itself vitiate either a decree passed in a suit or a sale consequent upon such decree. *DAMMAR SINGH v. PIRBHU SINGH* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 290

s. 444.

See GUARDIAN AD LITEM.

I. L. R. 29 All. 675

ss. 446, 462—*Next friend—Interest adverse to Minor.* A suit relating to the estate of the person of an infant and for his benefit has the effect of making him a ward of Court, and no act can be done affecting the property of the minor, unless under the express or implied direction of the Court itself. Where a suit, which was being conducted on behalf of a minor, was withdrawn without leave being asked for or given to bring another suit, the order passed on the petition for withdrawal was set aside by the High Court on revision, and the suit restored to the file of the lower Court for disposal according to law. Where a Court finds that a next friend does not do his duty in relation to a suit, it is its duty not to permit him to prejudice the interests of the minor, but to adjourn the suit in order that some one interested in the minor may apply on behalf of the minor for the removal of the next friend and for the appointment of a new next friend, or in order that the minor plaintiff himself may, on coming of age, elect to proceed with the suit or withdraw from it. *DORASWAMI PILLAI v. THUNGASAMI PILLAI* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 377

s. 447.

See GUARDIAN AD LITEM.

I. L. R. 30 All. 105

s. 457.

See *ante*, s. 244 . 13 C. W. N. 1182

See GUARDIAN AD LITEM.

I. L. R. 29 All. 728

I. L. R. 30 All. 105

See MINOR—REPRESENTATION OF MINORS IN SUITS . I. L. R. 23 All. 459

Guardian ad litem—Appointment of Married Woman—Compromise by guardian, validity of. The appointment of a married woman as guardian ad litem in a suit instituted against a minor is a mere irregularity, and a compromise by such guardian under proper advice when sanctioned by the Court cannot be set aside on any ground which would be insufficient to set aside a compromise between persons *sui juris*. *Mussummat Bibi Walian v. Banke Behari Pershad Singh*, L. R. 30 I. A. 182, and *Brooke v. Lord Mostyn*, 2 DeG. J. & S. 373, 416, referred to and followed. *KACHAYI KUTTALI HAJI v. UDUMPUMTHALA KUNHI PUTHA* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 58

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

_____ s. 461—*Joint Mitakshara Family—Minor—Next Friend—Minor's money in Court—Managing Member of Mitakshara Family—Withdrawal of Money from Court.* The managing member of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara school, who is also appointed guardian *ad litem* of his minor brother for the purpose of a rent suit, in which both the brothers obtained a decree for arrears of rent against their tenant, is exempt from the restrictions imposed by s. 461 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Sham Kuar v. Mahanunda Sahoy*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 361; *Appovier v. Rama Subba Aiyar*, 11 Moo. I. A. 75; *Garibulla v. Khalak Singh*, I. L. R. 25 All. 407; I. L. R. 30 I. A. 165; and *Kathusheri Pishareth v. Vallotil Manakel Narayanan*, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 234, referred to. *HARIHAR PERSHAD SINGH v. MATHURA LAL* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 561
s.c. 12 C. W. N. 598

_____ s. 462.

See ARBITRATION—REFERENCE OR SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 326

See COMPROMISE—COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 109
7 C. W. N. 90

See MINOR—REPRESENTATION OF MINOR IN SUITS

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 298
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 735

1. _____ *Compromise of Suit to which Minor is a party defendant—Leave of Court to make compromise not obtained—Requisites for setting aside compromise so made—Form of decree setting it aside.* In a suit to set aside a compromise of a suit on the ground that one of the defendants was a minor, and that leave of the Court to enter into it had not been obtained under s. 462 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), in order to show that the exigencies of the provisions of the section had been complied with there ought to be evidence that the attention of the Court was directly called to the fact that a minor was a party to the compromise; and it ought to be shown on petition, or in some way not open to doubt, that the leave of the Court was obtained. The fact that the minor was so described, and as appearing by a guardian, and that the compromise was before the Court, are not sufficient. Under the circumstances of the case the decree was limited to a declaration that the compromise and decree based on it were not binding on the minor and that he was remitted to his original rights. *MANOHAR LAL v. JADUNATH SINGH* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 585
s.c. I. L. R. 33 I. A. 128
10 C. W. N. 898

2. _____ *Minor Defendant—Compromise by Guardian on his behalf—Sanction of Court, if must be express—Suit to set aside compromise-decree—Presumption that Court considered compromise to be beneficial to the minor.* Where a

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*_____ s. 462—*concl'd.*

Judge by his order permitted the guardian *ad litem* of a minor defendant to "file a petition admitting the plaintiff's claim on behalf of the minor," and in another case permitted him to "file *solenam* on behalf of the minor." *Held*, that there was no express sanction to the compromise as required under s. 462 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Ram Churn Raha v. Mungul Sirkar*, 16 W. R. 232, *Sharat Chunder Ghose v. Kartik Chunder Mitter*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 810, *Lala Majlis Sakai v. Narain Bibi*, 7 C. W. N. 90, *Virupakshappa v. Shidappa*, I. L. R. 26 Bom. 109, *Kalavati v. Chedi Lal*, I. L. R. 17 All. 531, *Govindasami v. Alagiri Sami*, I. L. R. 29 Mad. 104, relied on. *Held*, further, that as the record showed that the guardian had neglected the minor's interest and that the Court without making enquiry as to the propriety of the compromise in the minor's interest had passed decrees, they should be set aside. Where the permission is given to compromise and not merely to file a petition of compromise, it must be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that it gave due consideration to the matter. *Midnapur Zemindari Co., Ltd. v. Gobinda Mahto*, 8 C. L. J. 31, referred to. *Aman Singh v. Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 20 All. 93, approved. *KANUNGOE KRISHN PROSAD RAY BHRO MOSBAR v. ROMESH CHUNDER MUNDUL* (1908) . . . 13 C. W. N. 163

_____ ss. 462 and 506 *et seq.*—*Guardian and minor—Arbitration—Authority of guardian to agree to a reference to arbitration on behalf of a minor.* *Semle*: That s. 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to proceedings under Chapter XXXVII of the Code. A minor party therefore will be bound by the consent of his guardian to refer the matters in dispute to arbitration, if there is no fraud or gross negligence although the Court has not under the provisions of s. 462 sanctioned the agreement to refer. *Sheo Nath Saran v. Sukh Lal Singh*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 229, and *Chengal Reddi v. Venkata Reddi*, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 483, followed. *HARDEO SAHAI v. GAURI SHANKER* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 35

_____ s. 463.

See LUNATIC I. L. R. 24 Mad. 504

_____ *Provisions of, not exhaustive—Lunatic not adjudged as such, suit by next friend of—Landlord and tenant—Non-transferable holding, usufructuary mortgage of—Ejectment—Transfer.* The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are not exhaustive. A lunatic may sue through his next friend even though not adjudged a lunatic under any law. *Jonnagadla v. Thatiparthi*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 380, dissented from. *RASIK LAL DUTT v. BIDHU MUKHI DAS* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1094
s. c. 10 C. W. N. 719

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

ss. 473 (c), 588 (23)—*Decree—Order—Appeal—Interpleader suit.* *Held*, that an adjudication upon the claims of defendants in an interpleader suit is a decree and appealable as such under s. 540 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not under s. 588 of the Code. *MAHARAJ SINGH v. CHITTAR MAL* (1907) . I. L. R. 30 All. 22

s. 483 (1859, s. 81).

See ATTACHMENT—ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT . 7 C. W. N. 216

See ATTACHMENT—LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL ATTACHMENT.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 486

L. R. 17 I. A. 17

See INSOLVENCY—CLAIMS OF ATTACHING CREDITORS AND OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 473

ss. 483, 491, 561—*Where attachment made on insufficient grounds, party injured can recover general damages—A memorandum of objections under s. 561, if not moved, ought to be dismissed.* An order of attachment under s. 483 of the Code of Civil Procedure, found by the Court under s. 491, to have been made on insufficient grounds, must necessarily cause damage to the credit and reputation of the party against whom the order is made; and such party is entitled, in a suit for damages, to general damages for loss of credit and reputation where the attachment is obtained maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. *Quere*: Whether in such a suit malice and want of reasonable and probable cause must be proved. The Court has jurisdiction over a memorandum of objections presented under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure although it is not stamped or moved by the respondent at the hearing of the appeal, and where it is not so stamped or moved, the proper order is to dismiss it, with or without costs, at the discretion of the Court. *KUMARASAMIA PILLAI v. UDAYAR NADAN* (1908) . I. L. R. 32 Mad. 170

ss. 484-487 (1859, s. 83).

See ATTACHMENT—ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT

ss. 485, 486.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 15.

I. L. R. 14 All. 162

I. L. R. 17 All. 198

L. R. 22 I. A. 31

s. 489 (1859, s. 89).

See ATTACHMENT—ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT . *Bourke O. C.* 139

6 Mad. 135

1 N. W. 172

2 N. W. 365

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 531

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 491 (1859, s. 88).

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 34 Mad. 62

See COMPENSATION—CIVIL CASES.

3 W. R. Mis. 28

6 W. R. Mis. 24

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 717

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—JURISDICTION—ATTACHMENT.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 504

ss. 491 and 588—*Attachment before Judgment—Compensation for unnecessary attachment—Appeal.* *Held*, that no appeal will lie from an order under s. 491 of the Code of Civil Procedure granting compensation to a person against whom an attachment has been obtained upon insufficient grounds. *Narasinga Bhakshi v. Govinda Bhakshi*, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 62, followed. *LOK NATH v. AMIR SINGH* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 81

s. 492 (1859, s. 92).

See INJUNCTION—UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE . I. L. R. 25 All. 431

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 357

1. ——— *Execution of decree—Temporary Injunction—"Wrongfully sold."* In execution of a simple money decree against one Mohan Lal, the decree-holder, Rai Krishn Chand, attached certain property as belonging to his judgment-debtor. To this attachment one Musammat Chando Bibi objected and her objection was sustained. The decree-holder thereupon brought a suit, as provided by s. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against the judgment-debtor and Musammat Chando Bibi, and in this suit obtained a decree from the Court of first instance. Musammat Chando Bibi appealed to the High Court and, pending the appeal, applied for an injunction against Rai Krishn Chand under s. 492 of the Code. *Held*, that such an injunction could not under the circumstances be granted, inasmuch as it was impossible to say that the attached property was in danger of being "wrongfully" sold in execution of a decree within the meaning of s. 492. *Kirpa Dayal v. Rani Kishori*, I. L. R. 10 All. 80, overruled. *CHANDO BIBI*, *In the matter of the petition of* (1904) . I. L. R. 26 All. 311

2. ——— *Execution of Decree—Application to a Civil Court for stay of sale in execution of a decree of a Revenue Court.* The Revenue Courts are Courts of Civil Judicature within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code, in that their decrees when transferred in the regular Courts are to be treated in all respects as if they were passed by a Court of Civil Judicature. *Held*, therefore, that an application under s. 492 of the Code of Civil Procedure for stay of sale in execution of a decree of a Revenue Court in a suit under s. 93 of Act XII of 1881, can be entertained by a Civil

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

_____ s. 492 (1859, s. 92)—*concl'd.*

Court. *Onkar Singh v. Bhup Singh*, I. L. R. 16 All. 496, dissented from. *RAM LOCHAN SINGH v. BENI PRASAD KUMRI* (1908)

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 252

_____ ss. 492, 493.

See INJUNCTION.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 97, 101

_____ s. 493.

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—CONTEMPT
GENERALLY I. L. R. 26 Mad. 494

See INJUNCTION—UNDER CIVIL PROCE-
DURE CODE I. L. R. 27 Bom. 357
26 Mad. 168

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS
SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 447

_____ *Temporary Injunction*
—“Other injury.” The words “or other injury”
in s. 493 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not
include acts of trespass upon property. *DARAB*
KUAR v. GOMTI KUAR. I. L. R. 22 All. 449

_____ s. 500.

See AWARD.

_____ s. 501.

See CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—PAYMENT
OF JOINT DEBT BY ONE DEBTOR.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 688

_____ *Right of suit—Ss. 501, 583—Decree*
not containing an order for adjustment of accounts
—*Execution—Separate suit, if necessary.* Plaintiff
was put into possession of the property in suit under
s. 501, Civil Procedure Code, and the suit was dis-
missed, but no order was passed under the latter
part of that section to enable the defendant to
recover what he had lost during the period of dis-
possession by the plaintiff. Defendant sought to
obtain mesne profits in execution of the decree.
Held, that a separate suit was not necessary. *Held*,
also, that, when a decree does not expressly direct
an adjustment of accounts in the terms of s. 501,
such adjustment can be ordered in execution, if it
be shown from the nature of the decree that it could
and should have contained such an order and
is imperfect without it. *Ununt Ram Hazrah v.*
Kuralee Pershad Mistree, 23 W. R. 441; *Huro*
Chandra Roy v. Sooradhini Debia, B. L. R. Sup.
Vol. 985; *Lati Koer v. Subadra Koer*, I. L. R. 3
Calc. 721; *Mookond Lal Pal v. Mahomed Sami*
Meah, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 484; and *Raja Singh v.*
Kooldip Singh, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 989, referred to.
RADHEY SINGH v. MANGNI RAM (1902)

6 C. W. N. 710

_____ s. 502—*Application for Money to be*
delivered to party to suit—Money deposited in

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

_____ s. 502—*contd.*

another Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction in another
suit—Jurisdiction of Court to make order. A suit
was instituted in the Subordinate Court of Masu-
lipatam by the Medur Rancee to recover the Medur
estate. The Rancee was the natural mother of
N, who died. The defendant claimed to have
adopted N. Money was, in pursuance of an order
of the High Court, paid into the Subordinate Court
of Masulipatam to the credit of the suit. The
plaintiff died, and A and B were brought on the
record as plaintiffs. The suit was subsequently
heard and dismissed and an appeal was lodged.
The defendant then died, and C was made respon-
dent in the appeal (which was still pending when the
present judgment was delivered). The conten-
tion of C, as respondent in that appeal, was that he
was entitled to the Medur estate jointly with A and
B (the appellants). C then instituted a suit in
the District Court of Godavari against A and B for
partition of the Medur estate (and also of the
Nidadavole estate). The contention of C in this
suit was also that he was entitled jointly with A
and B. At a subsequent date, the District Court
of Godavari made an order, on the application of
A, in the suit pending in that Court, for payment
to A (on security being furnished) of one-third of the
money, which had been paid into the Subordinate
Court of Masulipatam as aforesaid to the credit of
the suit in that Court. *Held* (SUBRAHMANTIA
AYYAR, J., dissenting), that the District Judge had
no jurisdiction to make the order. Though C was
at the most, according to his own case, only entitled
to one-third of the properties in question and
though it was part of his case that A was entitled
to one-third and the parties to the suit were the
same, such a state of things did not give jurisdic-
tion to the District Court of Godavari to deal with
money, which had been paid into another Court
of co-ordinate jurisdiction, in another suit, under
the orders of the High Court. S. 5(2) of the Code
of Civil Procedure would seem to apply only when
the party making the admission holds the property
or other thing, which the party in whose favour the
order is made seeks to have delivered to him. But
even if that section was intended to apply to a case
where the property is not so held by the party mak-
ing the admission, it would not cover a case where
the money was held by another Court to the credit
of another suit. *Per* SUBRAHMANTIA AYYAR, J.—(i)
The District Court had power to direct the payment
notwithstanding that the money was not held by
any of the parties to the suit, provided the order was
otherwise sustainable. (ii) Inasmuch as the District
Court had the power, it was not precluded from
directing the payment by the mere fact that the
fund out of which the payment was to be made
was in the custody of another Court of co-ordinate
jurisdiction (namely the Subordinate Court of
Masulipatam), without reference to the circum-
stances of the litigation in connection with which
the money had come into the custody of that Court

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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_____ s. 502—*conclld.*

and to the rights possessed by the parties in that fund. An order by the District Judge under s. 502 would be binding on the other parties to the litigation; and the Subordinate Court at Masulipatam would give effect to it as no real conflict could arise, in consequence, between the process of the two Courts in the matter. *PARTHASARADHI APPA ROW v. RUNGIAH APPA ROW* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 168

_____ s. 503 (1859, s. 243).

See APPEAL—MANAGEMENT OF ATTACHED PROPERTY.

See APPEAL—RECEIVERS.

See MANAGER OF ATTACHED PROPERTY.

See RECEIVER . 5 C. W. N. 223
7 C. W. N. 452
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 696

1. _____ *Order refusing to accept nomination of appointment of Receiver.* Where a District Judge receives a report from the Subordinate Court recommending the appointment of a Receiver and on that report and recommendation he refuses to make the appointment, his order must be taken as an order made under s. 503 of the Civil Procedure Code, and is appealable under cl. 24 of s. 588 of the Code. *KHAGENDRA NARAIN SINGH v. SHASHADHAR JHA* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 495
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 608

2. _____ *Receiver—Appointment of new Receiver in place of original Receiver—Civil proceedings instituted by original Receiver and pending at date of appointment of new Receiver—Necessity for making new Receiver a party.* When a Receiver appointed under s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure institutes civil proceedings and is then replaced by another Receiver, it is necessary that the new Receiver should be made a party to those proceedings. Observations on the mode and circumstances in which a new Receiver will be made a party. *AKULA PARADESI v. DHELLI JAGANNADHA ROW* (1905)
I. L. R. 28 Mad. 157

3. _____ *Receiver—Appointment of Receiver to realize amount of decrees.* Where a decree-holder had in execution of his decree attached two decrees held by the judgment-debtor against third parties, it was *held*, that s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure gave power to the Court to appoint a Receiver to realize the amounts of the attached decrees where it appeared that by so doing the interests of both decree-holder and judgment-debtor would be better protected. *PARTAP SINGH v. DELHI AND LONDON BANK* (1908)
I. L. R. 30 All. 393

_____ ss. 503, cl. (b), 588, cl. (24).

See RECEIVER . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 713

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

_____ ss. 503, cl. (f) and 588, cl. (24).

See RECEIVER . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 568

_____ ss. 503, 505.

See RECEIVER . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 305

_____ ss. 503, 505 and 588—*Recommendation by Subordinate Judge of a person to be appointed receiver—Refusal by District Judge—Appeal.* A Subordinate Judge recommended to the District Judge that a certain person be appointed receiver and in case of the recommendation not being accepted, the Nazir of his Court should be appointed. The District Judge refused to authorize the Subordinate Judge to appoint either of the persons so recommended. Against the order of the District Judge an appeal was preferred to the High Court. *Held*, that no appeal lay. The District Judge's order was passed under s. 505 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) and not under s. 503. It was therefore an order which was not appealable not being specified in the list of orders in s. 588. *Birajan Kooer v. Ram Churn Lall Mahata*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 719, followed. *BAI MANI v. KHMCHAND* (1908) I. L. R. 33 Bom. 104

_____ s. 505.

See APPEAL—RECEIVERS.

See RECEIVER.

_____ s. 506 (1859, s. 313).

See APPEAL—ARBITRATION.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 47

See APPELLATE COURT—EXERCISE OF POWERS IN VARIOUS CASES—SPECIAL CASES—ARBITRATION, REFERENCE TO.

See ARBITRATION—REFERENCE OR SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION.

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 136

1 Mad. 106

2 N. W. 419

1 Agra Rev. 49, 63

1 B. L. R. S. N. 11: 10 W. R. 171

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 629

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 61

4 C. W. N. 92

7 C. W. N. 180, 343

I. L. R. 24 All. 229

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 303

I. L. R. 29 All. 423

11 C. W. N. 1152

See COMPROMISE—COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 218

1. _____ *Arbitration—Authority of pleader to agree to reference.* A vakalatnamah in general terms is wholly insufficient to enable a pleader to apply for an order of reference to arbitration on behalf of his client under s. 506 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where, however, a reference was made on such authority and an

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 506 (1859, s. 313)—*concl'd.*

award followed and a decree based on such award without any objection taken to the authority of the pleader to apply for a reference, the High Court refused to set aside such decree in revision. *RAM-JIAWAN RAM v. KALI CHARAN SINGH* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 429

2. ——— *Arbitration—Reference made orally, but reduced to writing by the Court—Irregularity.* Where both parties to a pending suit consented to a reference to arbitration and an order of reference was then and there made by the Court in the presence of the parties, though not upon a written application, it was held, that it was not open to the Court, having regard to the provisions of s. 510 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to supersede that reference, the arbitrator not having declined to act. *Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynodeen Khan*, 6 Moo. I. A. 134, distinguished. *Shama Sundram Iyer v. Abdul Latif*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 61, and *Luzumbai v. Hajee Widina Cassum*, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 629, followed. *ABDUL HAMID v. RIAZ-UD-DIN* (1907)

I. L. R. 30 All. 32

— ss. 506 to 526 (Ch. XXVII).

See APPEAL—ARBITRATION.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 167

See ARBITRATION.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 793

1. ——— s. 508—*Arbitration—Order of reference not fixing a period within which the award is to be made—Appeal.* Where an order of reference to arbitration made by a Court omits to fix a date for the delivery of the award, such omission is not a mere irregularity, but is a defect fatal to the order and to all subsequent proceedings founded thereon. *Chuha Mal v. Hari Ram*, I. L. R. 8 All. 548, followed. *Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar*, L. R. 18 I. A. 55, referred to. *LACHMAN DAS v. ABPAKASH* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 169

2. ——— s. 508, et seq.—*Arbitration—Award—Award set aside—Court not empowered to make a second reference on the same submission.* The parties to a suit pending in the Court of a Munsif referred the matters in dispute between them to arbitration. An award was made and delivered: but it was afterwards discovered that one of the plaintiffs had died before the termination of the arbitration proceedings, and the Munsif accordingly set aside the award. Held, that the Munsif had no power to make a second order on the same agreement of the parties again referring to arbitration the matters in dispute between them. *PACHKUARI RAM v. NAND RAI* (1908). **I. L. R. 30 All. 505**

— ss. 508, 514 and 521—*Arbitration—Award—Delivery of award within the time fixed by the Court.* The time fixed by the Court for the

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— ss. 508, 514 and 521—*concl'd.*

delivery of an award in a case pending before it was the 16th of April 1900. The award was actually completed and signed and made over to a peon of the Court on the 16th April; but, as it was received by the peon after Court hours, it did not in fact reach the hands of the Court until the next day, the 17th of April. Held, that the award was within time. *Behari Das v. Kalian Das*, I. L. R. 8 All. 543; *Chuha Mal v. Hari Ram*, I. L. R. 8 All. 548; *Raja Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar*, I. L. R. 13 All. 300; *Umersey Premji v. Shamji Kangi*, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 119; and *Arumugam Chetti v. Arumachalam Chetti*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 22, referred to. *SITA RAM v. BHAWANI DIN RAM* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 105

— ss. 508, 514, 516 and 621—*Arbitration—Award—Validity of award made, but not reaching the Court within the time limited.* In the case of an arbitration made under the order of a Court it is sufficient if the award be made, that is completed and signed by the arbitrators, within the period limited under s. 508 of the Code of Civil Procedure; it is not necessary to the validity of such award that it should actually reach the hands of the Court within such period. *Arumugam Chetti v. Arumachalam Chetti*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 22, and *Umersey Premji v. Shamji Kangi*, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 119, followed. *Raja Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar*, I. L. R. 13 All. 300, referred to. *Behari Das v. Kalian Das*, I. L. R. 8 All. 543, dissented from. *ASAD-UL-LAH v. MUHAMMAD NUR* (1905) **I. L. R. 27 All. 459**

— ss. 510, 514.

See ARBITRATION—REVOCATION OF, OR
WITHDRAWAL FROM, ARBITRATION.

I. L. R. 24 All. 312

— ss. 520, 521 and 526—*Arbitration—Award—Allegations against the award—Refusal to file the award—Objections must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court.* It is not sufficient merely to allege a cause or ground against the filing of an award such as is indicated in ss. 520 and 521 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), but the cause or the ground must also be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. *Dandekar v. Dandekars*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 663, followed. *Venkatesh Khandoo v. Chanagavda*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 674, and *Tejpur v. Mahomed Jamal*, I. L. R. 20 Bom. 596, distinguished. *DHANJIBHAI GIRDHARBHAI v. MATHURBHAI GHELABHAI* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 287

— ss. 520, 522—*Appeal against decree on fresh award made after order of remittal under s. 520 of the Civil Procedure.* Where the Court remits an award under s. 520 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the arbitrators submit a fresh award, and the Court passes a decree in accordance with such revised award under s. 522 of the Code

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 520, 522—*conclld.*

of Civil Procedure, no appeal lies against such decree on the ground that the order of remittal under s. 520 was wrong and that the original award ought to have been accepted and acted upon. *SUBBIAH IYER v. SUBRAMANIA AIYAR* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 479

1. ss. 520, 525 and 526—Arbitration—Application to file a Private Award—Award in excess of powers of arbitrator—Court not competent to remit award. A Court to which an application is made under s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure to file an award made without the intervention of a Court has no power to amend the award or to remit it for reconsideration, but only possesses the power to file and enforce it or to reject the application. *Alarakhia Shibji v. Jehangir Hormasji*, 10 Bom. H. C. 391; *Jwala Singh v. Narain Das*, I. L. R. 3 All. 541; *Mana Vikrama v. Mallichery Kristnan Nambudri*, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 68, and *Dandekar v. Dandekars*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 663, referred to. *MUSTAFA KHAN v. PHULJA BIBI* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 526

2. Order to file or refusing an application to file an award appealable—Award determining matters not referred cannot be filed. An order made on an application under s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure to file an award, whether such prayer is granted or refused, is a decree and appealable as such. *Ponnusami Mudali v. Mandisundara Mudali*, I. L. R. 27 Mad. 255, followed. Where an award determines matters not referred to arbitration, the Court, under ss. 520 and 526 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is bound to refuse to file the award. *THIRUVENGADATHIENGAR v. VAIDINATHA AYYAR* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 303

s. 521.

See ARBITRATION—AWARDS—VALIDITY OF AWARDS, AND GROUNDS FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE.

Order setting aside award under s. 521 can be questioned on appeal against the final decree. Where a Court sets aside an award of arbitrators on application under s. 521 of the Civil Procedure Code, and decides on the merits the Court of appeal can, on appeal from the final decree, inquire into the propriety or otherwise of the order setting aside the award. *Ganga Persad v. Kura*, I. L. R. 28 All. 408, not followed. *ACHUTHAYYA v. THIMMAYYA* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 345

ss. 521, 522.

See APPEAL . I. L. R. 29 All. 457

See ARBITRATION—AWARD.

I. L. R. 29 All. 426

See AWARD—SECOND APPEAL.

**I. L. R. 28 Bom. 287
8 C W. N.**

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 521, 522—*conclld.*

1. Allegations of arbitrator's misconduct—Decree following award—Appeal from the decree. The plaintiff filed a suit for the dissolution and winding up of a partnership. The matters in dispute were referred to arbitration by an order of the Court; an award was made; an application was made by the appellant to set aside the award on the ground of alleged misconduct of the arbitrator; the application was refused; judgment was given according to the award; upon the judgment so given a decree was passed. From this decree the appellants preferred an appeal. *Held*, unless it is shown that the award is illegal *ab initio* or in other words where there is no award in law, no appeal lies from a decree following a judgment given according to an award. *Nandram Daluram v. Nemchand Jadavchand*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 357, approved. *Kali Prosanno Ghose v. Rajani Kant Chatterjee*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 141, referred to. *WALJI MATHURADAS v. EBJI UMERSEY* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 285

2. Arbitration—Award—Decree on award made without allowing time to file objections—Appeal. An appeal will lie from a decree passed in accordance with an award if such decree has been passed without allowing to the parties the time prescribed by law for filing objections to the award. *Ibrahim Ali v. Mohsin Ali*, I. L. R. 18 All. 422, and *Maharajah Joymungul Singh Bahadur v. Mohun Ram Marwaree*, 23 W. R. 429, followed. *NAJM-UD-DIN AHMAD v. PUECH* (1907) . I. L. R. 29 All. 584

3. ss. 521, 588—Award—Objections to award—Award set aside—Appeal. *Held*, that no appeal lies from an order under s. 521 of the Code of Civil Procedure setting aside an award. *Shyama Charan Pramank v. Prothad Durwan*, 8 C. W. N. 390, followed. *Naurang Singh v. Sadopal Singh*, I. L. R. 10 All. 8, overruled. *Pureshnath Dey v. Nabin Chunder Dutt*, 12 W. R. 93, and *Rughoobur Dyal v. Maina Koer*, 12 C. L. R. 564, referred to. *GANGA PARSHAD v. KURA* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 408

s. 522 (1859, s. 325).

See APPEAL—ARBITRATION.

See ARBITRATION—AWARDS.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 167

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 47

1. No appeal from a decree on an award except on the grounds mentioned in the section. Under section 522 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882, no appeal lies against a decree passed in accordance with an award, except on the grounds stated in the section. No appeal will lie on the ground that the award is void *ab initio*. *Chairman of the Purnea Municipality v. Siva Sankar Roy*, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 899, followed. *Indur Subbarami Reddy v. Kandadai Rajamannar Ayyangar*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 47, not

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

_____ s. 522 (1859, s. 325)—*concl'd.*

followed. *KANAKKU NAGALINGA NAIK v. NAGALINGA NAIK* (1909) . I. L. R. 32 Mad. 510

2. _____ *Award on a reference not agreed to by all the parties to the suit, validity of—Court's decree on such award—Right of appeal from.* An award on a reference under s. 506 of the Civil Procedure Code, not agreed to by all the parties to the suit, is invalid in law. Both an appeal and a second appeal lie from a decree passed upon such an award. *PARSIDH NARAIN SINGH v. GHANSHYAM NARAIN SINGH* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 873

3. _____ *Arbitration—Invalid reference and award—Appeal from decree passed in accordance with such award.* Where there is no valid reference to arbitration and no valid award, the decree passed in accordance therewith cannot be maintained, and an appeal lies against such decree. *Nagai Puran v. Hera Singh*, 6 A. L. J. 333, referred to. *SHIB LAL v. CHATARBHUJ* (1909) . I. L. R. 31 All. 450

4. _____ ss. 522, 526—*Private Arbitration—Award made a rule of Court—Appeal.* When an award made in a private arbitration has been made a rule of Court and a decree passed thereon, no appeal will lie except so far as the decree is in excess of or not in accordance with the award. In this respect there is no difference between a decree based upon a private award and a decree based upon an award made through the intervention of the Court. *Mustafa Khan v. Phulja Bibi*, I. L. R. 27 All. 526, distinguished. *BAHADUR SINGH v. NEGI PURAN SINGH* (1908) I. L. R. 30 All. 151

_____ s. 523.

See ARBITRATION—REFERENCE OR SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION.

7 C. W. N. 180

See COMPROMISE—COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 218

See LIMITATION ACT, s. 21.

_____ ss. 523, 361—*Agreement for arbitration filed in Court—Death of one of the parties—Application by legal representative to be brought on record.* Where matters in difference have been submitted to arbitration, the submission is, under the law in force in British India, not revocable without just and sufficient cause, even where the submission has not been made a rule of Court. And where the submission has been made a rule of Court and has become the subject of a suit, it can only be revoked by leave of the Court upon good cause being shown. The policy of the Indian Legislature has been not to follow the English common law with regard to references to arbitration. Such contracts are not revocable, in India, at the will of either party, nor will the authority of

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

_____ ss. 523, 361—*concl'd.*

an arbitrator necessarily be revoked by the death of one of the parties to the arbitration. The question whether a legal representative of a deceased party is or is not entitled to enforce the contract to refer depends upon whether the right dealt with in the reference is merely of a personal nature or is one which survives to the legal representative. Where it is one that survives, the proceedings before the arbitrators do not, under s. 361, abate by reason of the death of a party. As the right to have partition of joint family property is one which survives to an adopted son, an agreement to refer the partition of such property to arbitrators is not put an end to by the death of a party to it, and if there is any dispute as to who is the legal representative, the Court should (at any rate where the agreement has been filed in Court) proceed under s. 367 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *PERUMALLA SATYANARAYANA v. PERUMALLA VENKATA RANGAYYA* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 112

_____ s. 525.

See ARBITRATION—

REFERENCE OR SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 326

AWARDS—VALIDITY OF AWARDS.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 278

PRIVATE ARBITRATION.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 31

See LEASE—CONSTRUCTION—PROVISION FOR RENEWAL.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 831

1. _____ *Award—Order rejecting application to file award made out of Court—Appeal.* Held, that no appeal will lie from an order refusing to file an award made between the parties without the intervention of a Court. *Bhola v. Gobind Dayal*, I. L. R. 6 All. 186, followed. *Ghulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 167, distinguished. *KATIK RAM v. BABU LAL* (1904) . I. L. R. 26 All. 205

2. _____ *Arbitration—"The matter to which the award relates"—Jurisdiction.* The words "the matter to which the award relates" in s. 525 of the Civil Procedure Code were not intended by the Legislature to refer to the precise amount of the precise matter awarded to one party or the other by the arbitrator; they refer to the subject matter of the arbitration, and not the matter actually awarded by the arbitrator. *NARSING DAS v. AJODHYA PRASAD SUTUL* (1904) . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 203

3. _____ *Reference to arbitration—Award—Question whether the matter had been referred and an award had been made—Question which the Court can and ought to decide.* When all

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 525—*concl'd.*

application is made under s. 525 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) to file an award as an award made in the matter which had been referred to arbitration, the question, if raised, whether the matter had been referred and an award had been made thereon, is one which the Court, to which the aforesaid application has been made, can and ought to decide. *Samal Nathu v. Jaishanker*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 254, explained. The principle of *stare decisis* is of undoubted value in its bearing on the law of property, but the doctrine is not of the same importance in the department of procedure when the practice of one Court is to be brought into conformity with the settled practice of other Courts and the plain terms of the Code. *MANILAL HARGOVANDAS v. VANMALIDAS AMRATLAL* (1905) . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 621

4. _____ Award—Order rejecting application to file award made out of Court—Appeal. Held, that no appeal will lie from an order refusing to file an award made between the parties without the intervention of a Court. *Bhola v. Gabind Dayal*, I. L. R. 6 All. 186, and *Katik Ram v. Babu Lal*, All. Weekly Notes (1903) 234, followed. *Ghulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 167, distinguished. *Muhammad Newaz Khan, v. Alam Khan*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 414, referred to. *BASANT LAL v. KUNJI LAL* (1905) I. L. R. 28 All. 21

5. _____ Arbitration—Validity of reference disputed—Jurisdiction of Court to decide as to validity of reference—Civil Procedure Code, s. 622. Held, that upon an application made to it under s. 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court has jurisdiction to and is bound to enquire into the question whether the parties had or had not referred the matter in question to arbitration. *Amrit Ram v. Dasrat Ram*, I. L. R. 17 All. 21; *Mahomed Wahid-ud-din v. Hakimian*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 757, and *Manilal Hargovandas v. Vanmalidas Amratlal*, I. L. R. 29 Bom. 621, referred to. *GANESH SINGH v. KASHI SINGH* (1906) I. L. R. 28 All. 621

ss. 525, 526 (1859, s. 327).

See ARBITRATION—PRIVATE ARBITRATION*

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—JURISDICTION—ARBITRATION.

3 N. W. 117

7 N. W. 329

1 B. L. R. A. C. 43 : 10 W. R. 85

10 Bom. 54

5 Mad. 128

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 344

ss. 525, 526—Arbitration—Private Award—Decree—Legality of award—Appeal—S. 522, if applies. When an application under s. 525 of the Civil Procedure Code, to file a private award is allowed and a decree drawn up in accordance therewith, no appeal lies from such a decree,

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*cont'd.***

ss. 525, 526—*concl'd.*

though an appeal would lie from an order refusing to file the award. *Ghulam Gilani v. Muhammad Ahmed*, 6 C. W. N. 226 : s.c. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 167; *L. R. 29 I. A. 51*, referred to. *Kali Prosanna Ghose v. Rajani Kanta*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 141, and *Mahomed Wahid-ud-din v. Hakimian*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 757, in so far as they decided that a decree made in accordance with an award is appealable on the ground that there is no valid and legal award have been overruled by the Privy Council in *Ghulam Jilani v. Muhammad Ahmed*, 6 C. W. N. 226 : s.c. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 167, *L. R. 29 I. A. 51*. Per MOOKERJEE, J., *Quære* : Whether an appeal against a decree made in accordance with an award under s. 526 of the Civil Procedure Code, is barred even in cases where the cause shown against the award has denied the submission to arbitration or the genuineness of the award. *Husannana v. Linganna*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 423, referred to. *CHINTAMONEY ADITYA v. HALADHUR MAITI* (1906) 10 C. W. N. 601

ss. 525, 540, 620—Application to file an Award—Registration as a suit—Award set aside—Application for revision—Maintainability—Right of appeal from order setting aside award. An application was made to file an award in a District Munsif's court and was registered as a suit. The defendant appeared, and the District Munsif took evidence, whereupon he refused to file the award and set it aside, being of opinion that the arbitrators had been guilty of misconduct in making the award. The applicant filed a civil revision petition in the High Court. Held, (i), that the order refusing to file the award and setting it aside was a decree, and (ii), that an appeal lay against that decree. *PONNUSMIA MUDALI v. MANDI SUNDARA MUDALI* (1904) I. L. R. 27 Mad. 255

s. 526—Private Award—Application to file—Objection under s. 520—Matters left undetermined—Disallowance of objection—Decree directing award to be filed—Appeal—S. 522, when applies—Practice—Mofussil Courts—Original Side—Revision, power of, of High Court—Exercise suo motu. Per CURIAM (RAMPINI and PRATT, JJ., *contra*). An appeal lies from an order passed under s. 526 of the Civil Procedure Code merely directing the filing of an award made on a submission to arbitration without the intervention of a Court of Justice. Upon an application under s. 525, to have a private award filed, the opposite party objected that the arbitrator had left undetermined certain matters referred to him for decision. The objection was overruled and the award was ordered to be filed and a formal decree was drawn up containing the following direction : "It is ordered that the arbitration award in this case be filed in Court." This decree was set aside on appeal, the lower Appellate Court holding the objection to be a valid one. Held per CURIAM (MACLEAN, C. J., and SALE, J., *contra*), that

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 526—*contd.*

no appeal lay from the decree of the first Court and the lower Appellate Court had no authority to interfere with it. *Per* MACLEAN, C.J., and GHOSE, J.—When an award has been ordered to be filed under s. 526, the party in whose favour it is, must proceed to obtain a judgment and consequent decree under s. 522, and if that decree is according to the award, then there is no appeal from it. *Per* GHOSE, RAMPINI and PRATT, JJ.—The decree in this case was substantially a decree in accordance with an award as contemplated by s. 526 read with s. 522. *Per* SALE, J.—No decree expressly incorporating the terms of the award is required to be drawn up in pursuance of the order to file the award made under s. 526, nor is the clause restricting the right of appeal in the case of a decree made under s. 522, applicable to an order to file an award made under s. 526. *Per* RAMPINI and PRATT, JJ.—No appeal lies from an order directing an award to be filed under s. 526, except when the decree is in excess of, or not in accordance with, the award, although an order refusing to file the award is appealable. *Per* MACLEAN, C. J.—An order directing as well as one refusing the filing of an award stand on the same footing as regards appealability. *Ghulam Jilani v. Muhammed Ahmed*, 6 C. W. N. 226 : s.c. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 167 : L. R. 29 I. A. 51, considered. *Per* CURIAM—The High Court can interfere under s. 622 of its own motion and in the absence of an application under that section. *JANOKEY NATH GUHA ROY v. BROJO LAL GUHA ROY* (1906) . . . 10 C. W. N. 609
s.c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 757

s. 527—Case stated under Indian Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 78—Will—Appointment by general Bequest—Power created subsequently to the will. A general power of appointment may be well exercised by a will executed previously to the creation of the power and that too by a mere residuary gift. *DINSHAW SORABJI v. DINSHAW SORABJI* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 472

ss. 532, 538 (Ch. XXXIX).

See DECREE—FORM OF DECREE—BILL OF EXCHANGE . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 804

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, Sch. II, ART. 159 . . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 573

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, SUMMARY PROCEDURE ON.

See PROMISSORY NOTE—ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS ON, PROMISSORY NOTES.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 368
5 C. W. N. 259

s. 539.

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—ENDOWMENT I. L. R. 26 Mad. 450
I. L. R. 5 Mad. 383
I. L. R. 14 Mad. 1
I. L. R. 18 All. 227

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 539—*contd.*

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CIVIL CASES . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 327

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CHARITIES AND TRUSTS . I. L. R. 24 All. 631
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 273

See RIGHT OF SUIT—INTEREST TO SUPPORT SUIT . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 157

1. ——— Atash Behram (Parsi Fire Temple)—Parsi Community of Udwada—Trust—Suit—Capacity to hold property—Mandatory Injunction—Trespasser. In this country a fluctuating body of persons, such as a village community, is capable of owning property. It is opposed to the notions of the Parsi community that the Iran Shah (sacred fire) should be regarded as capable of, or the subject of, ownership; but even if there be difficulty or doubt as to its ownership, it is obvious that there must be some one entitled to protect from improper invasion the temple property, and those who can predicate of themselves that they have exercised the management, authority and supervision, as alleged in the plaint, are so entitled. The Parsi inhabitants of Udwada, as the Anjuman (that is a constituted council or assembly to which all questions regarding their peculiar customs are referred) of that town, are vested with the control, management and supervision of the Atash Behram at that place and all that appertains to it. A suit for the vindication of the right of management, which is vested in, and actually being exercised by, the plaintiffs and those they represent at the date of the obstruction does not fall within s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) merely because those, who cause the obstruction, happen to have been nominated trustees. A mandatory injunction should not be granted against a trespasser compelling him to come on the land on which he had trespassed to remove an encroachment made thereon by him. *NAVROJI MANEKJI WADIA v. DASTUR KHARSEDJI MANCHERJI* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 20

2. ——— Trust—Suit relating to a public charity—Sanction granted to prospective plaintiff “and another”—Sanction, a condition precedent to the institution of the suit. Held, that the “consent in writing” of the Advocate General or other officer appointed by the Local Government for the purpose required by s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be a specific permission given to two or more persons by name: a permission given to one applicant by name “and another” is not a sufficient compliance with the terms of the section. Held, also, that the “consent in writing” required by this section is a condition precedent to the institution of the suit to which such consent relates. If therefore no valid consent is given before the institution of the suit, the mistake cannot subsequently be rectified, unless by means of withdrawal of the suit with permission to

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 539—contd.

institute a fresh suit. *Ramayyangaar v. Krishnayangaar*, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 185, dissented from. *Rendall v. Blair*, L. R. 45 Ch. D. 139, distinguished. In the present case, where the suit had not been instituted until eight or more years after the consent of the Legal Remembrancer had been obtained, permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to sue again was, in the discretion of the Court, refused. *GOPAL DEI v. KANNO DEI* (1904)
I. L. R. 26 All. 162

3. *Public Trust—Sanction of the Advocate-General, when necessary, under the Civil Procedure Code.* S. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates the existence of a dispute of such a public nature that the intervention of the Advocate-General is necessary to decide if and by whom a suit should be brought to establish a public right. *Sajedur Raja v. Gour Mohun Das*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 418, 425, referred to. *MONIJAN BIBEE v. KHADEM HOSSEIN* (1905)
9 C. W. N. 151

4. *Suit by an Individual to establish a common right to a public religious Trust—Other persons associated as co-plaintiff—If such suit falls within s. 30 or s. 539—Ss. 539 and 30 if mutually exclusive—S. 539, construction of.* The words of s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplate the existence of persons, other than those permitted to sue, who may be affected. The existence of such other persons or the joinder of some of them as co-plaintiffs does not take away the right of an individual to sue under that section provided his rights, as contemplated in that section, have been infringed. The Chinese community of Calcutta are divided into two classes, the Puntis and the Hakalus. The Puntis being excluded from the Chinese temple and cemetery, five of them, after obtaining the sanction of the Advocate-General under s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, instituted this suit for a declaration that the temple and cemetery were public religious and charitable trusts for the benefit of the said community and as such, the Puntis, including the plaintiffs, were entitled to the benefits thereof. Objection was taken that the suit, as framed, was not maintainable as it fell within s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code and not under s. 539. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable. *MACMOCHI v. LEE CHIN* (1905)
9 C. W. N. 594

5. *‘Under the Trust’ meaning of—Power of appointing additional trustees or controlling body.* Under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court in sanctioning a scheme may provide for the appointment of additional or new trustees, though such appointment may not be in conformity with the original constitution of the trust or with the rules in force in respect to it. The words ‘under the trust’ in s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure have no reference to such original constitution or the rules. The Court of

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 539—contd.

Chancery in England has always exercised such powers, and in the absence of express words restricting the powers of Courts in this country, the Legislature must be presumed to have conferred similar powers upon them by s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 612, and *Annoji v. Narayan*, I. L. R. 21 Bom. 556, followed. A scheme framed by the Court may be liable to variation for good cause shown. *Re Browne’s Hospital v. Stamford*, 60 Law Times 288, referred to. The directions in a scheme framed under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be enforced in execution of application by persons interested. *Damojarbhat v. Bhogtilal*, I. L. R. 24 Bom. 45, followed. *PRAYAG DOSS JI VARU MAHANT v. TIRUMALA SRIRANGACHARAVARU* (1905)
I. L. R. 28 Mad. 319

6. *Public Trusts—Sanction of the Advocate-General—S. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, if mandatory or permissive—Its scope—Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863), s. 14—Demurrer.* To bring a case within the purview of s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code the suit must be a representative one brought for the benefit of the public and to enforce a public right in respect of an express or constructive public trust upon a cause of action alleging a breach of such trust or necessity for directions as to its administration against a trustee of such express or constructive trust and whether such trustee be *so de jure* or *de son tort* and for the particular relief mentioned. Suits brought not to establish a public right, but to remedy a particular infringement of an individual right are not within the section. As against strangers, such as alienees from the trustee and mere trespassers holding adversely to the trust, the section does not apply. Meaning of the phrases “direction of the Court is necessary for the administration” and “such further or other relief” in s. 539 explained. S. 539 is not mandatory but enabling and permissive, cumulative and not restrictive in its effect and does not affect any right of suit which may exist independently of it. If therefore a suit is one which would have been maintainable prior to the enactment of the corresponding section in the Code of 1877 it may now be instituted independently of the provisions of s. 530, even though it be upon such a cause of action and for such relief as is mentioned in it. Scope and history of the section discussed and explained. *BUDEEDAS MUKIM BAHADUR v. CHUNI LAL JOHURRY* (1906)
10 C. W. N. 581
s.c. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 789

7. *Public Charitable or Religious Trust—Suit for Administration of Trust—Nature of decree which may be passed in such suit.* *Per STANLEY, C.J.*—In a suit under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is competent to the Court to determine of what the trust properties

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 539—contd.

Consist or find that particular alienations thereof cannot be maintained, provided all proper parties are represented before it. If transferees or mortgagees, who have been impleaded in a suit instituted under s. 539, do not accept the findings of the Court in that suit, it may be necessary for the trustee appointed by the Court to institute a suit for recovery of possession. And, *semble*, that in such a suit it is competent also to the Court to direct a trustee, who is being removed from the trusteeship, to make over the trust property to the new trustee or trustees. *Sajedur Raja Chowdhury v. Gour Mohun Das Baishnav*, I. L. R. 24 Cal. 418, followed. *Per BURKITT, J.*—In a suit under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is not competent to the Court to pass a decree for recovery of possession of the trust property from alienees. All that plaintiffs in such a suit can obtain is a decree appointing a trustee or trustees, declaring what properties are affected by the trust and directing the trustee to bring those properties into possession. If the trustee appointed by the Court is resisted in his attempts to get possession of the trust property, he must then bring a suit for possession in the proper Court on payment of the full Court-fee for such a suit. *GHAZAFFAR HUSAIN KHAN v. YAWAR HUSAIN* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 112

8. *Suit relating to Public Charity—Suit filed by only one plaintiff with the consent of the Advocate-General—Amendment of plaint by subsequent addition of second plaintiff—Consent of the Advocate-General to the amendment—Suit defective in a material particular.* A suit relating to a public charity was instituted by one plaintiff only with the consent of the Advocate General under s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). The defendant having objected to the institution of the suit by one plaintiff, the plaint was amended by the addition of the second plaintiff and the Advocate-General consented to the amendment. *Held*, dismissing the suit in appeal, that the suit was defective in a material particular. The suit was bad at its institution and its amendment by adding a second plaintiff did not better it. *DARVES HAJI MAHAMAD v. JAINUDIN* (1906) . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 603

9. *Applicability of section—Suit brought by the whole body of persons authorised to administer the Trust.* *Held*, that s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to a case where the suit is instituted by the whole body of persons who are legally authorized to administer the trust to which it relates. *Rai Budree Das Mukim Bahadur v. Chuni Lal Johur-ry*, 10 C. W. N. 581, followed. *RAM DAS v. BADRI NARAIN* (1906) . I. L. R. 29 All. 27

10. *Suit by Advocate-General at instance of Relators dismissed—No appeal by Advocate-General—Appeal by Relators—Maintainability.* A suit having been brought by

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1867)—contd.**

s. 539—concl'd.

the Advocate-General he is the proper party to appeal and not the relators. The relators are not parties to the suit and as relators they have no right to step in when the Advocate-General, who was plaintiff, has not thought fit to appeal against the dismissal of the suit. *JAN MAHOMED v. SYED NURUDIN* (1907)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 155

11. *Religious or Charitable Trusts—"Further or other relief," meaning of.* *Held*, by DAVAR, J.:—S. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, is very limited in its scope and operation. It contemplates the institution of a suit to "obtain a decree" for reliefs which are strictly confined to five heads. The first branch of the suit clearly falls under the provisions of the section, for the plaintiffs have obtained a decree under three of the five provisions of the section, *viz.*, (a) the appointment of new trustees, (b) vesting trust property in the trustees, and (c) settling a scheme. But the reliefs asked for in the second branch of the case, namely, the ascertainment and declaration of what are the trusts, the rectification of the trust deeds, a declaration that the defendants have either wrongly declared the trust in the deeds or wrongly interpreted the trusts therein, do not fall under any of the five heads mentioned in the section. The words "further or other relief" that follow, must necessarily be construed to refer to reliefs *ejusdem generis* and not to reliefs wholly outside those specifically defined under these five heads. A suit brought not to establish a public right in respect of a public trust, but to remedy a particular infringement of an individual right is not within s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882. S. 539 contemplates a suit either in the name of the Advocate-General at the instance of relators, or a suit in the name of parties "having an interest in the trust" with the consent of the Advocate-General. The "interest" of the parties here contemplated must be the "interest" that is threatened or infringed. *Held* by BEAMAN, J.:—The decision of a suit, under s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, is not only binding on the parties to it, but to all persons affected by it. The expression "such further or other relief" in the section means such further or other relief as, from the nature of the introductory words and the exemplificatory cases, appears to the Court to be appropriate in such a suit, *e.g.*, removing fraudulent trustees, restraining a breach of trust, and so forth. Any extension or limitation of the scope of a trust, so as to exclude those who were intended to be included or to include those who were intended to be excluded, is a breach of trust. *DINSHA MANEKJI PETIT v. JAMSETJI JIJIBHAI* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 509

ss. 539, 582.

See RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENT ACT, SECOND
APPEAL . . . 8 C. W. N. 404

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

_____ s. 540 (1859, s. 332; Act XXIII
of 1861, s. 23).

See APPEAL—COSTS.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 676
I. L. R. 13 All. 290

See APPEAL—DECREES.

I. L. R. 2 All. 497
I. L. R. 3 All. 75
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 252
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 73
I. L. R. 22 Mad. 299
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 81

See APPEAL—EX-PARTE CASES.

See MADRAS GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, s. 8.
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 39

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT (IV of
1882).

ss. 88 AND 89;

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 244

s. 89 . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 651

_____ ss. 540, 623—*Practice—Review petition followed by appeal—Decision of review petition during pendency of appeal—Position and power of Court of first instance after an appeal has been filed against its decree.* A plaintiff sued by an agent, who compromised the suit, one of the terms of the compromise being that the agent should withdraw the suit. The agent failed to do this, whereupon the defendant brought the compromise to the notice of the Court and the suit was dismissed on 10th September 1901. Plaintiff on the succeeding day applied for a review (alleging fraud and collusion on the part of his agent) and on 13th December 1901 preferred an appeal to the High Court against the decree dismissing the suit. While that appeal was pending, namely on 17th March 1902, the Subordinate Judge heard and allowed the review petition, set aside the decree and restored the suit to the file. *Held*, that the order was *ultra vires*. A pending appeal without annulling the judgment appealed against leaves it subsisting as a valid adjudication governing the rights of the parties, but the further litigation and all matters connected with it are transferred to and placed under the control of the Appellate Court. The power of the inferior Court in any way to deal with the litigation is completely in abeyance except to carry out the decree which it is the duty of the Court to do, as s. 545 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the execution of the decree is not stayed by the mere fact that an appeal has been preferred against it. *Held*, also, that an appeal lay against the order of the Subordinate Judge. RAM-ANADHAN CHETTI v. NARAYANAN CHETTI (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 602

_____ s. 542.

See LIMITATION, PLEA OF.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 941

1. _____ s. 543 (1859, s. 336)—*Time allow for correction Memorandum of appeal.*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

_____ s. 543 (1859, s. 336)—*concl'd.*

Where under the provisions of s. 336, ACT VIII of 1859, a memorandum of appeal is returned for the purpose of being corrected, the Appellate Court should specify a time for such correction. JAGANNATH v. LALMAN . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 260

2. _____ *Practice—Rejection of Memorandum of Appeal.* Whenever a memorandum of appeal is rejected under the discretionary power vested in the Court, a judicial order to that effect and the reasons for the same ought to be recorded. LALLA JUGSEB SAHOY v. KASSENATH SEIN . . . 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 121

3. _____ *Rejection of Appeal, time for.* The time for rejecting an appeal is when it is presented and not after it has once been admitted. GOOPTEE BULLUB ROY v. GOLUCK PROSHAD BOSE . . . W. R. 1864, 135

_____ s. 544.

See ABATEMENT OF SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 25 All. 27

1. _____ s. 544 (1859, s. 337)—*Alteration of decree on appeal by one party—Appeal by one party—Reversal of decree against all.* Power of the Court of appeal under s. 337 of Act VIII of 1859 to reverse the whole of the decree of the Court below upon the appeal of one only of the parties against whom the decree was passed. JADUMANI DASI v. FADU BIBI 7. B. L. R. Ap. 28

SREEMUNJUREE DOSEE v. POORUSUTTUN DOSS

9. W. R. 499

2. _____ *Decree on ground not common to all parties.* A decree against several defendants one of whom alone appeals cannot be reversed as against the rest when it did not proceed on ground common to all. DOYAMOYEE DOSSEE v. ESHUR CHUNDER MUTTYLOLL 1 W. R. 203

WOOMESH CHUNDER BOSE v. MATUNGINEE DEBIA

2 W. R. 170

ABDOOL ALI v. BANOO . . . 2 W. R. 287

BOYDONATH SURMAH v. OJAN BIBEE

11 W. R. 238

KOOLADA PERSHAD MISREE v. GOURA CHAND MISREE . . . 17 W. R. 353

CHUNDER MONEE DOSSEE v. MODHOO DEY

23 W. R. 166

Aliter when it does. CHUNDER KULLA DOSSEE v. JOTENDRA MOHUN TAGORE . 6 W. R. 104

KRITARTHO MOYEE DEBIA v. KHETTERNATH SIRCAR . . . 9. W. R. 472

BADUL SINGH v. CHUTTERDHAREE SINGH

9 W. R. 558

RUNG LAL GOSSAIN v. GOWREE MUNDUL

10 W. R. 285

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 544 (1859, s. 337)—*contd.*DOORGA CHURN DOSS v. MAHOMED ABBAS BHO-
YAN 14 W. R. 121SREESTEE DHUR CHUCKERBUTTY v. SREENATH
BISWAS 18 W. R. 332

3. ———— *Appeal by one De-
fendant in respect of portion of decree.* One of
several defendants who appeals in respect only of
the sum decreed against her is not entitled to take
advantage of s. 337, Act VIII of 1859, and question
the full amount claimed. SHEEROO COOMAREE
DABEE v. MAHATAB CHUND . . . W. R. 1864, 380

4. ———— *Right to benefit
by decree on appeal by one defendant—Decree of Pri-
vacy Council.* A plaint having been dismissed by
the first Court which decreed that the costs of all the
defendants who had filed answers were to be borne
by the plaintiff, the plaintiff appealed to the High
Court which reversed the decree. One of the de-
fendants then appealed to the Privy Council which
reversed the decree of the High Court and restored
that of the Zillah Court. *Held*, that the decree of
the first Court by being restored as it was made
was reaffirmed in its integrity and the defendants
generally were entitled to execute it though only
one had appealed to the Privy Council. LUCH-
MEEPUT SINGH v. KHOOBUNNISSA . . 14 W. R. 280

5. ———— *Altering decree
against defendant on co-defendant's appeal.* It was
considered under the circumstances of this case not
consistent with the principles of equity and good
conscience to refuse a clearly proved right on the
technical ground that on one co-defendant's appeal
no decision adverse to another co-defendant can
be come to. OODOY SINGH v. PALUCK SINGH
16 W. R. 271

6. ———— *Pro forma Defend-
ants.* Appeal by *pro forma* defendants by making
the real defendants, who did not appear, respon-
dents as between themselves, cannot open out that
portion of the case which, as between the plaintiff
and the non-appealing defendants, has not been
appealed against. GUDADHUR BANERJEE v. MON-
MOHINEE DOSSEA 7 W. R. 366

KHEMUNKUREE DOSSEE v. NILAMBUR MUNDUL
2 W. R. 227

7. ———— *Opening whole
appeal by one defendant.* One of two defendants
may appeal as respects the whole, and not half, of
the property in dispute, in the absence of proof that
they owned the property in two equal shares.
KATYANEY CHOWDERAIN v. MADHUB NARAIN ROY
CHOWDERY 4 W. R. 68

8. ———— *Appeal by one De-
fendant—Reversal of whole decree.* Where one of
several defendants appeals not against the whole de-
cree but only against that portion of it which affects
him, and his defence in the lower Court is not a de-
fence common to the other defendants, the decree

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 544 (1859, s. 337)—*contd.*of the lower Court cannot be reversed in favour of
those defendants who have not appealed. RAM
CHUNDER PAUL v. OMORA CHURN DEB
18 W. R. 26NAKUR CHUNDER SAHA v. JUDOO NATH CHUCK-
ERBUTTY 24 W. R. 389

9. ———— *Limitation as af-
fecting those who do not appeal.* Where a decree
for possession of certain property is made against
three persons jointly, one of whom appeals against
the decree only so far as it affects himself and not
against the whole decree, and the decree does not
relate to property in respect to which the defendants
have a common interest and a common defence so
that an appeal by one would imperil the whole decree,
then the fact of one defendant having appealed will
not prevent limitation running in favour of the
others, against the execution of the decree. HUR
PROSHAD ROY v. ENAYET HOSSEIN 2 C. L. R. 471

10. ———— *Application of,
to ex parte decrees—Decree on ground common to all
parties.* S. 337, Act VIII of 1859, applies as well to
ex parte decrees as to other decrees, the only ques-
tion being whether the decision of the lower Court
proceeded on a ground common to all the defend-
ants. SREENATH CHOWDHRY v. GREY
13 W. R. 114

11. ———— *Case disposed of
under s. 116, Civil Procedure Code, 1859—Ex parte
decree—Decree on ground common to all parties.*
Where parties who have been made co-defendants do
not appear, and the Court deals with the case under
s. 116, Civil Procedure Code, the decree given is not
in the nature of an *ex parte* decree even as against
the absent defendants; and proceeding as it does
on a ground common to all the defendants, the
decision may, under s. 337, be modified in appeal
even in favour of defendants not before the Appel-
late Court. DOORGA CHURN SETT v. SHAMANUND
GOSSAIN 12 W. R. 376

12. ———— *Decree on ground
common to all parties.* S. 337, Civil Procedure Code,
does not empower an Appellate Court to exercise
the power with which it invests such Court when it
finds that the ground on which it proposes to base its
own decision is common to all the defendants, but
only when it finds that the decision of the lower Court
has proceeded on such common ground. PROTAB
CHUNDER DUTT v. KOORBANISSA BIBEE
14 W. R. 130

13. ———— *Power of Appel-
late Court to make decree in respect of parties who
have not appealed.* The Court of Appeal has power
under s. 337 of Act VIII of 1859 (corresponding with
s. 544 of Act X of 1877) to draw up what would be
a fair decree as regards all the parties to a suit al-
though some of them may not have appealed. JOY-
KISTO COWAR v. NITYANUND NUNDY
I. L. R. 3 Calc. 738 : 2 C. L. R. 440

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 544 (1859, s. 337)—*contd.*

14. *Common Defence*
—*Appeal by one defendant.* In a suit in which the defence of the two defendants was a common one to the extent of denying that the plaintiff had any such mokurari raiyati title as he alleged, and the first Court's decision went on the ground that the plaintiff had a title against both: *Held*, that Act VIII of 1859, s. 337, was applicable, and one defendant alone might appeal. *MAHOMED SAEFOOLLAH v. ANWAR ALI* 21 W. R. 112

15. *Reversal in one suit where two suits have been erroneously brought instead of one—Effect of reversal on other suit on appeal by one defendant.* Two suits brought by different parties claiming different interests in a certain share to set aside the sale of that share having been dismissed, one of the plaintiffs appealed and the sale was set aside. *Held*, that the decision must be considered as setting the sale aside as to the whole of that share, although the other parties did not appeal. *NAGAR v. SHURUTOOLLAH* 20 W. R. 77

16. *Appeal by Alienee of Hindu Widow—Suit by Reversioner.* In a suit by the reversioners against a Hindu widow and her patnidar impugning the act of the widow in granting the patni as an act of waste prejudicial to their interests and claiming to set aside the patni as invalid and obtain immediate possession, a decree was granted against both defendants. *Held*, that under s. 337 of the Civil Procedure Code, the patnidar had such an interest as would entitle him to appeal against that part of the decree which regarded the rights of the widow as well as that part which affected himself. *HURRY KISSEN DOSS v. LALL SOONDER DOSS* 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 32

LALL SOONDER DOSS v. HURRY KISSEN DOSS
Marsh. 113 : 1 Hay 339

17. *Power of Appellate Court to reverse decision as regards person not party to the appeal.* In a suit against A and B for the recovery of the possession of property, the Court gave a decree against A and in favour of B. The plaintiff appealed from that part of the decision which was in B's favour. *Held*, that the Judge on appeal had no jurisdiction to reverse the decision of the Court below against A, he being no party to the appeal. *HURRO CHUNDER ROY v. LALLCHUND BANERJEE* Marsh. 256 : 2 Hay 48

LALLA RAMSURUN LALL v. LOKEBAS KOOR
18 W. R. 39

18. *Original Decree making liable one defendant out of several.* In a suit by A against B and C in which a decree was given against B alone: *Held*, that C could not be made liable either on the appeal of B or on the cross-appeal of A to B's appeal. *GREESH CHUNDER SINGH v. GOURMOHUN BANERJEE* 7 W. R. 49

19. *Reversal of Decree on appeal by one defendant.* A and B were sued

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 544 (1859, s. 337)—*contd.*

on a joint liability to pay rent. A did not defend, B did and a decree passed against both. B appealed. *Held*, that it was competent to the Judge on appeal to reverse the decree, on the ground that there was no joint liability, but that B occupied a separate estate at a separate rent. *LUKHEE KANT SEIN v. RAMDEYAL DOSS*

Marsh. 281; 2 Hay 288

20. *Main ground of decree affecting all defendants.* The plaintiff sued on a mortgage bond executed by the first defendant. The second defendant, who claimed the property under a mortgage from the first defendant, was admitted a defendant on his own application, but afterwards excluded from the suit. Before this was done he had incurred certain costs, which, by the Munsif's decree, he was ordered to bear himself. Upon appeal by the first defendant, the Civil Judge found that the mortgage bond sued upon was not proved, dismissed the suit, and ordered the plaintiff to pay all costs, those of the second defendant included. *Held*, that under s. 337 of the Civil Procedure Code, it was competent to the Civil Judge so to modify the Munsif's decree, as the main ground of the whole decision—*viz.*, the validity of the mortgage bond—affected all the defendants in common, and the appeal of the first defendant and the decision of the Appellate Court had reference to that common ground. *YERRABALU VIRARAGAVA REDDI v. ABDUL KHADIR* 4 Mad. 26

21. *Suit on Bond—Appeal by one of several Defendants.* In a suit for recovery of Rs 300 due on a bond, the defendants denied the execution of the bond and the receipt of the consideration. The Court of first instance decreed the suit, which on appeal by one of the defendants was dismissed. *Held*, that under s. 337, Act VIII of 1859, the Judge had no power, on appeal by one defendant, to set aside a decree against the other. *SRIRAM GHATAK v. BRAJAMOHAN GHOSAL*
3 B. L. R. App. 41; 11 W. R. 449

RUGGHOONAUTH NEWGY v. SUDHAMOYEE DABEA
Marsh. 106; 1 Hay 183

22. *Any ground common to all the plaintiffs or to all the defendants—Appellate Court, Power of.* S. 544 of the Civil Procedure Code presupposes a common ground of decision affecting property in which both those who have appealed and those who have not appealed have an interest direct or indirect. Thus a District Judge has no power under this section to reverse the decree of a lower Court given for a plaintiff in favour of a defendant who did not appeal, and in respect to property in which the other defendants who did appeal disclaim all interest. *Sriram Ghatak v. Braja Mohan Ghosal*, 3 B. L. R. App. 41, and *Appa Rao v. Ratnam*, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 249, cited and followed. *Seshadri v. Krishnan*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 192, and *Nag-*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 544 (1859, s. 337)—*contd.**amma v. Subba, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 197*, distinguished.
HUSSAIN v. MADAN KHAN I. L. R. 17 Mad. 265

23. *Intervenor—Parties—Appeal—Decree set aside on appeal by one defendant.* *D C S*, the zamindar, brought a suit against *B*, a raiyat, for recovery of arrears of rent valued below Rs. 100. *B* set up in defence that the rent was not payable to *D C S* but to *N C A*, the mokuridar. *N C A* who claimed under a mokurari title, and alleged that he was in receipt of the rent from the raiyats, was made a party under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859. The Munsif passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal by *N C A*, which was heard and decided by the Subordinate Judge on reference by the District Judge, the decree of the first Court was reversed, and the suit dismissed. On appeal to the High Court: *Held*, that *N C A* was properly made a defendant to the suit, and that he could prefer an appeal from the decree of the Court of first instance and that the Court of Appeal could, on his appeal, set aside the whole decree. *DAYAL CHAND SAHOY v. NABIN CHANDRA ADHIKARI* . 8 B. L. R. 180 ; 16 W. R. 235

24. *Suit against Agent and Surety.* In a suit for collection papers and moneys against a gomastah and his surety, a decree was given against the gomastah, and the surety was absolved from liability. Plaintiff appealed to make the surety liable and the Judge on appeal dismissed the claim against both defendants. *Held*, that, as the decision of the first Court did not proceed on a ground common to the two defendants, the Judge was wrong in reversing it as against the gomastah. *RAM MOHINEE DEBIA v. JABED SIRCAR* . 6 W. R., Act X, 82

25. *Substantial Change in Suit—Alteration or reversal of decree where only some defendants are made parties.* Where a suit at the time of institution within the jurisdiction of the Court in which it is brought has undergone a substantial change and become a suit which by law requires the order of a superior tribunal for its hearing in the original Court and such order has not been obtained, plaintiff cannot subsequently on appeal be allowed to revert to the original form of the suit for the purpose of upholding the lower Court's judgment as far as regards the original defendant; so that in an appeal to which only the original defendants were made parties, the Court refused to reverse or alter the decree. *BULDEO DASS v. BULDEO DASS* . 3 N. W. 199

26. *Persons not Parties to proceedings in appeal not bound by the result of those proceedings.* Decrees in three separate suits for the partition of a certain estate having been referred to the Collector of Ratnagiri for execution under the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 265, *B* and *R* (brothers of the first appellant), who were parties to the suits, objected to the Collector's

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877) *contd.*s. 544 (1859, s. 337)—*contd.*

mode of partition, and applied to the Court to set aside the Collector's scheme, and to direct a fresh partition. The Subordinate Judge of Vengurla granted the application and set aside the partition ordered by the Collector. Against this order *V*, who was plaintiff in one of the suits, appealed to the District Court, and in the appeal he made *B* alone the respondent. The District Court reversed the order of the Subordinate Judge, and upheld the order of the Collector. Thereupon *B* preferred a second appeal to the High Court against the decision of the District Court. To this appeal neither *R* nor his brother, the present appellant, was made a party. The High Court having confirmed the decision of the District Court proceedings were taken to carry out the partition according to the Collector's original scheme. The appellant objected on the ground that the Collector's scheme had been set aside by the Subordinate Judge, and that the appellant had not been a party to the proceedings in either of the Appellate Courts. He contended that he was, therefore, not bound by the decisions of the Appellate Courts and that the order of the Subordinate Judge, setting aside the partition ordered by the Collector was still in force so far as he was concerned. He, therefore, applied that the property should be divided in accordance with that order. His application was rejected by the Court of first instance as time-barred, inasmuch as more than a year had elapsed since the date of the order of the Subordinate Judge, and during that time the applicant had taken no steps to enforce the order. On appeal, the Acting District Judge confirmed the order of the lower Court, holding that the order of the Subordinate Judge was no longer in force, having been set aside by the High Court. On second appeal to the High Court: *Held*, that the appellant was not bound by the final decision of the High Court. The original order being in his favour he could not be deprived of the benefit of that order without having the opportunity to defend it. Not having been a party to the proceedings in appeal, he was not affected by the result of those proceedings. Where there are several respondents before the Court of first appeal, though one of them may represent his fellows in a further appeal, he cannot represent a person who was not his co-respondent and against whom, therefore, no decree could have been made on a point common to the two, or on any point at all. *DEV GOPAL SAVANT v. VASUDEV VITHAL SAVANT*

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 371

27. *Appeal on full Court-fee from decree dismissing suit in part—Remand of whole case though no cross-appeal or objections preferred—Dismissal of whole suit on remand—High Court competent in second appeal to consider validity of remand order not specially appealed—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 544, 561.* A plaintiff whose suit had been decreed in part appealed from so much of the first Court's decree as was adverse to him, and stamped his memorandum of appeal with a stamp,

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which would have covered an appeal from the whole decree. The defendant did not appeal or file cross-objections. The lower Appellate Court remanded the whole case to the first Court under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiff not appealing under s. 588 (28) from the order of remand. The first Court then dismissed the whole suit, and on appeal by the plaintiff, the lower Appellate Court confirmed the decree. On a second appeal to the High Court: *Held*, (i) that the High Court was competent to consider the validity or propriety of the order or remand, though it had not been specifically appealed against; (ii) that the order of remand was *ultra vires* so far as it related to that part of the first Court's decree, which was favourable to the plaintiff, the lower Appellate Court not having jurisdiction in the absence of any appeal or objections by the defendant to disturb that part of the decree. *Per MAHMOOD J.*—S. 544 had no application to the case, that section relating only to cases where one or more of the parties arrayed on the same side appealed against a decree passed on a ground common to all, and not to cases where either of two opposite parties appealed from a part of the decree upon a Court-fee sufficient for an appeal from the whole. *Moheshwar Sing v. Bengal Government*, 7 Moo. I. A. 283, *Forbes v. Ameeroonissa Begum*, 10 Moo. I. A. 340, and *Mukkun Lal v. Sree Kishen Sing*, 12 Moo. I. A. 157, referred to. *CHEDA LAL v. BADULLAH*
I. L. R. 11 All. 35

28. — *Appeal by one of several Plaintiffs claiming under a joint right—Decree in such appeal binds other co-plaintiffs, although not parties to the appeal—Procedure.* A and B brought a suit against C, and obtained a decree awarding a part of their claim. B appealed and the Appellate Court reversed the decree and rejected the plaintiff's claim altogether. Subsequently A, who had not joined in the appeal, applied for execution of the original decree. *Held*, that although A had not been a party to the appeal he was bound by the decision of the Appellate Court and was not entitled to take out execution. *BABAJI DHONDSHE v. COLLECTOR OF SALT REVENUE*
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 596

29. — *Power of Appellate Court to alter decree on appeal by one party—Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873—Jurisdiction of Munsif—Suit for partition and mesne profits.* N sued S and others for partition of a share of certain land, and claimed mesne profits from other defendants who were tenants of the land. S obtained a decree by consent for her share and a sum of R99 was decreed to her against the tenants for mesne profits. Against this decree the tenants appealed. The Subordinate Judge finding that the subject-matter of the suit, the land of which partition was claimed, exceeded the jurisdiction of the Munsif, reversed the decree of the Munsif, and directed the plaintiff to be returned

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for presentation in the proper Court. It was contended on appeal to the High Court that the Subordinate Judge could not set aside the decree against the tenants for mesne profits. *Held*, that, as the Munsif's Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for partition, it could make no decree for mesne profits, and, therefore, the Subordinate Judge had power to set it aside. *NAGAMMA v. SUBBA*
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 197

30. — *Appeal—Ground of appeal common to all the Judgment-debtors—Reversal or Modification of the decree as against all on appeal by one only.* S. 544 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not enable an Appellate Court to decide upon a ground which it considers to be common to all the defendants, an appeal preferred by one only of such defendants, and to reverse or modify the decree of the Court below in favour of all the defendants, unless the lower Court has proceeded upon a ground common to all the defendants. It is only when the decree appealed against has proceeded upon a ground common to all the defendants, that is, when the Court below has made a decree against several defendants upon a finding which applies equally to all of them, that under s. 544 any one of the defendants may appeal against the whole decree, and the Appellate Court may reverse or modify that decree in favour of all the defendants. *Protap Chander Dutt v. Koorbanissa Bibee*, 14 W. R. 130, referred to. *PURAN MAL v. KRANT SINGH* I. L. R. 20 All. 8

31. — *Decree proceeding upon ground common to several defendants—Decree upset in appeal, but restored on appeal by one only of the defendants—Execution for costs by other defendants—Decree to be executed when there has been an appeal.* A suit brought against several defendants was dismissed with costs. The plaintiffs appealed, and the case was remanded to the Court of first instance under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure. One of the defendants appealed against the order of remand to the High Court, which set aside the order of remand and restored the decree of the first Court. *Held*, that, the decree of the first Court being restored in its entirety, the defendants, who had not appealed, were entitled to take out execution of that decree for the costs awarded to them by it, notwithstanding that they were not parties to the decree of the High Court. *Muhammad Sulaiman Khan v. Muhammad Yar Khan*, I. L. R. 11 All. 267, distinguished. *Sohrat Singh v. Bridgman*, I. L. R. 4 All. 376, referred to. *MUL CHAND v. RAM RATAN*
I. L. R. 20 All. 493

32. — *Appeal by only some of several defendants—Power of Court as to reversing decree as to all the defendants—Ground not common to all.* S. 544 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not, unless the decree itself proceeds on the ground common to all the defendants, enable an Appellate Court to decide, upon a ground which it

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considers to be common to all the defendants, an appeal preferred by some only of such defendants, and to reverse the decree of the Court below in favour of all the defendants. *Puran Mal v. Krant Singh*, I. L. R. 20 All. 8, referred to. *Chajju v. Umrao Singh* . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 386

33. ———— *Reversal of whole Decree on appeal by one party—Appeal by two persons—Withdrawal of one appellant from appeal.* A decree was passed for the plaintiff in a suit to redeem a kanom brought against various persons most of whom disclaimed all interest. An appeal was preferred by one of the defendants who claimed to be the jenmi of the premises comprised in the kanom and another who held a kanom from him. The first mentioned appellant withdrew from the appeal, which, however, was prosecuted by the other, and the Appellate Court reversed the decree. *Held*, that, since the appellants were the only substantial defendants, the Appellate Court was right in allowing the appeal to proceed. *Srimana Vikraman v. Rayan* . . . I. L. R. 16 Mad. 293

34. ———— *Joint appeal—Appeal—Joint appellant—Presentation of appeal beyond time—Affidavit excusing delay in appealing made by only one of appellants stating reasons personal to himself—Appeal admitted—Variation of decree on a point affecting other appellants but not the appellant who made the affidavit—Variation not allowed—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 5—Practice.* In a partition suit a decree was passed against twenty-four defendants whose interests in the subject-matter of the suit were not identical. Part of the property in suit consisted of a *kulkarni vatan*, one-third share of which (*inter alia*) was given by the decree to the plaintiffs. Eleven of the defendants appealed against the decree, of whom only six (defendants 1 to 6) had an interest in the *kulkarni vatan*. The decree was passed on the 11th April, 1898, and the appeal was not presented until the 7th June, 1898, i.e., beyond the period (thirty days) allowed by the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). The only affidavit excusing the delay was made by defendant 14, who was not interested in the *kulkarni vatan*; and it stated reasons for the delay which were personal to himself, and did not apply to the other appellants. On this affidavit, however, the appeal was admitted, and the lower Appellate Court modified the decree and reduced the one-third share of the *kulkarni vatan* given to the plaintiffs to a one-sixth share. The plaintiffs thereupon appealed to the High Court. *Held* (reversing the decree of the lower Appellate Court and restoring that of the first Court), that the Appellate Court erred in altering the share of the *kulkarni vatan*. Defendant 14 had no interest in the variation of the decree, having no interest in the *kulkarni vatan*, and s. 544 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) did not apply. The variation was only in favour of defendants 1

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
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to 6, who alone were interested in the *vatan*s. They, however, have not excused their delay in presenting the appeal, and it was barred by limitation. *Vishwanath Ramkrishna v. Vasudev Lakshman* (1901) . . . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 699

35. ———— *Appeal by two parties on grounds common to all.* A brought a suit against B, C, D and others, for recovery of possession of certain immoveable property on declaration of title thereto, alleging that he was dispossessed by all the defendants together. B, C and D appeared and contested the suit, mainly on the grounds that it was bad for misjoinder of parties and that the plaintiff had no title to the land in dispute. The Court of first instance decreed the plaintiff's suit. B and C alone preferred an appeal, and the lower Appellate Court allowed it, finding that the plaintiff had not proved the title set up by him. On an objection taken by the plaintiff that, inasmuch as D did not appeal, he could not have the benefit of it: *Held*, that, as the decree appealed against proceeded on grounds common to all the defendants, and regard being had to the terms of the provisions of s. 544 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court below was right in allowing the appeal in favour of D also. *Syed Hossain v. Madan Khan*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 265, dissented from. *Sreeram Ghutuck v. Brojo Mohun Ghosal*, 11 W. R. 449, and *Boyd Nath Surmah v. Ojan Bibee*, 11 W. R. 238, distinguished. *Ram Kamal Shaha v. Ahmad Ali* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 429

36. ———— *Practice—Procedure—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 362, 544, 582—Appeal—Death of joint appellant pending appeal—Legal representatives of deceased appellant not brought on the record—Appeal proceeded with by surviving appellant—Power of Court to hear the appeal and reverse whole decree.* In a suit for partition, the lower Court passed a decree for the plaintiffs. Two of the defendants, who denied the plaintiffs' right and claimed the property as their own, filed a joint appeal. Pending the appeal one of them died, and her representatives were not brought on the record. The surviving appellant, however, proceeded with the appeal, and at the hearing the decree of the lower Court was reversed and the plaintiffs' suit dismissed. The plaintiffs filed a second appeal to the High Court, and contended that the lower Appellate Court ought not to have heard the appeal, inasmuch as it had abated, or at all events that that Court had no power to reverse the lower Court's decree so far as it related to the deceased appellant. *Held*, that, as the two defendants had appealed on grounds common to them both, the lower Appellate Court had power to hear the appeal and to deal with the whole suit under s. 544 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Chintaman Nilkant v. Gangabai* (1903)

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 284

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 544 (1859, s. 337)—*concl'd.*

37. ————— Decree—Appeal.

When one of several plaintiffs, appealing against a decree which proceeded on grounds common to them all, died during the pendency of the appeal and substitution was not made within time: *Held*, that the appellants were not entitled to the benefit of s. 544 of the Civil Procedure Code. *PROTAP CHANDRA CHATTERJEE v. DURGA CHARAN GHOSE* (1905) **9 C. W. N. 1061**

38. ————— Appeal by one of

several defendants—Ground common to all. Plaintiffs sued on a mortgage bond. The defence, which was common to all the defendants, was that the mortgage was a sham. The Subordinate Judge upheld the mortgage bond and decreed in plaintiffs' favour. The fifth defendant, a subsequent mortgagee, alone appealed to the District Judge, who reversed the decree and dismissed the suit. Plaintiffs appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that the decree of the Subordinate Judge proceeded on a ground common to all the defendants and that the decree of the lower Appellate Court enured for the benefit of the defendants who did not appeal. *ANNAMALAY CHETTIAR v. PITCHU AYYAR* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 122

39. ————— Ground common

to all the Defendants—Decree against all defendants may be reversed on appeal by one against the whole decree when such decree has proceeded on a ground common to all. When the decree of the lower Court proceeds on a ground common to all the defendants, the Appellate Court, under s. 544 of the Code of Civil Procedure, may, on appeal by one of the defendants against the whole decree, reverse the decree in so far as it affects other defendants though they have not joined in the appeal. It is enough if any one ground on which the decree appealed against proceeds, is common to all the defendants. *Syed Hussain v. Madhan Khan*, **I. L. R. 17 Mad. 265**, overruled. *Seshadri v. Krishnan*, **I. L. R. 8 Mad. 192**, approved. *DHUTTALOOR SUBBAYYA v. PAIDIGANTAM SUBBAYYA* (1907)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 740

1. ————— ss. 544, 561—Practice—Ap-

peal—Appeal by one defendant making co-defendants and plaintiffs party respondents—No appeal or memorandum of objections filed by plaintiff—Relief granted to plaintiff-respondent in decree of Appellate Court—Appellate Court—Procedure—Jurisdiction. Where a respondent to an appeal fails to give the notice required by s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is not open to the Appellate Court to grant any relief to that respondent, in a case where the granting of such relief is not necessarily incidental to the relief granted to a party who has appealed. *Soira Padmanabh Rangappa v. Narayan Rao bin Vithal Rao*, **I. L. R. 18 Bom. 520**, distinguished. *Hudson v. Basdeo Bajpaye*, **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 109**, referred to. *Rup Jaun Bibee v. Abdul Kadir Bhuyan*, **I. L. R. 31 Calc. 643**, referred

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to and commented on. *KULAIKADA PILLAI v. VISWANATHA PILLAI* (1905).

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 229

2. ————— Appeal—Practice

—Appeal by defendant against plaintiff and other defendants—Objection by plaintiff-respondents when entertainable as against co-respondents. Where it is necessary for the proper decision of an appeal before it, it is competent to an Appellate Court to take into consideration objections filed under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure by one of the respondents, not only as against the appellant, but, it may be, as against the co-respondents with the objector also, and to modify the decree as against them accordingly. *Bishun Churn Roy Chowdhry v. Jogendro Nath Roy*, **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 114**, followed. *Mahomed Ameer v. Prankishore Deb*, **21 W. R. 333**, referred to. *Kalu v. Manni*, **I. L. R. 23 All. 93**, distinguished. *ABDUL GHANI v. MUHAMMAD FASIH* (1906) **I. L. R. 28 All. 95**

ss. 545 (1859, s. 338).

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—STAY OF EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 243, 533

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 734

5 C. W. N. 781

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—INVALID SALES—SALE PENDING APPEAL.

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 98

See SURETY—ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY.

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 71

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 25

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 212

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1060

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 409

I. L. R. 17 All. 99

See SURETY—LIABILITY OF SURETY.

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 654

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 204

1. ————— Execution, stay of—

Appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 108, 545. S. 545 of the Civil Procedure Code has no application where no appeal has been preferred against the decree in the original suit. It is not competent to an Appellate Court to stay proceedings in execution of a decree of a Subordinate Court, merely by reason of an appeal having been preferred against an order of refusal of the Court below to set aside the decree under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Pashupati Nath Bose v. Nanda Lal Bose*, **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 734**; *Brij Coomaree v. Ramrick Dass*, **5 C. W. N. 781**; *Balkishen Sahu v. Mussamat Khugno*, **8 C. W. N. 572**, distinguished. *Mir Sarwar Jan v. Fiazunnessa Khatun* (unreported), followed. *BHAGWAT RAJGOER v. SHEO GOTAM SAHU* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1081

2. ————— Execution of De-

crec—Order refusing Stay—Appeal—Deliberate exer-

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 545 (1859, s. 338)—*concl'd.*

cise of discretion by lower Court. An order refusing to stay execution of a decree under s. 545 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) is not appealable. *Musaji Abdulla v. Damodaradas*, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 279, doubted. *RANCHANDRA v. BALMUKUND* (1905) I. L. R. 29 Bom. 71

3. ———— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 58, 59—Security Bond given under s. 545 of the Civil Procedure Code, mortgaging immoveable property of above ₹100 in value requires registration under ss. 58, 59 of the Transfer of Property Act—Registration Act, s. 17, exception (i), does not apply to the case.* A security bond given to the Court under s. 545 of the Civil Procedure Code was in the following terms: "Until the disposal of my appeal in the District Court I pledge my immoveable property, which is described in the schedule annexed and which is free from all encumbrances such as mortgage, etc., to others, to the Court, for ₹1,382-4-9, which is the amount of the decree due to the plaintiff. If the result of the appeal be against me I hereby bind myself to allow the plaintiff to recover the whole amount of the said decree, which I should pay, by my immoveable property, and, if the said property be insufficient, from me. Until the whole decretal amount is discharged I will not sell or make a gift of the said property to others. I thus execute this security bond." The bond was attested by two witnesses, but was not registered. The order of the Court "Security accepted" was endorsed on it. *Held*, that the security bond amounted to a mortgage within the meaning of s. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act and not being registered was invalid under s. 59 of the Act as a mortgage and did not affect the property. The bond was also compulsorily registrable under s. 17 of the Indian Registration Act. The words "Security accepted" hereby showed that the Court thought the security sufficient. The bond does not derive its validity from these words, and it cannot therefore be brought within s. 17, exception (i) of the Registration Act. *Tokhan Singh v. Girwar Singh*, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 494, followed. *NAGARURU SAMBAYYA v. TANGATUR SUBBAYYA* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 330

4. ———— and s. 546—*Stay of Execution—Power of Appellate Court.* It is not competent to an Appellate Court to stay proceedings in execution of a decree of a subordinate Court merely by reason of an appeal having been preferred against an order of refusal of the Court below to set aside the decree under s. 108 of the Civil Procedure Code. *BHAGWAT RAJ KOER v. SHEO GOLAM SAHU* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 123

— s. 546 (Act XXIII of 1861, s. 36).

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—STAY OF EXECUTION. I. L. R. 25 Bom. 243, 583
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 1037

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OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 546—*concl'd.*

See SURETY—ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY.

I. L. R. 8 All. 639
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 411
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 1
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 212
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 409

1. ———— *Sale, stay of—Court to which application should be made—Jurisdiction—Court which passed the decree—Appellate Court.* An application for stay of sale of immoveable property under the 3rd paragraph of s. 546 of the Civil Procedure Code, must be made to the Court which passed the decree. The Appellate Court, in which the appeal against the decree is pending, has no jurisdiction in this matter. *Gosain Money Puree v. Guru Pershad Singh*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 146, 149, and *In the matter of the petition of Muradun-Nissa*, I. L. R. 15 All. 196, referred to. *KUNJ LAL MARWARI v. BAHITRAM MARWARI* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 381

2. ———— and s. 583—*Appellate Court—Power of Appellate Court to take Security from Respondent, who has executed decree—Power to grant restitution of rights—Execution of decree—Stay of execution—Order of Appellate Court staying execution—Effect of uncommunicated order on subsequent proceedings—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) not exhaustive.* Under the principle indicated by s. 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure a decree of reversal necessarily carries with it the right to restitution of all that has been taken under the erroneous decree, and the Appellate Court, having *seizin* of the appeal, has, as ancillary to its duty to grant restitution, an inherent power in the exercise of which it can, notwithstanding that the decree appealed against has been executed, call upon the respondent to furnish security for the due performance of any decree, which may be made on the appeal. When the Appellate Court has made an unconditional order for stay of execution the operation of the order is not postponed, until it has been communicated to the Subordinate Court or the party intended to be affected by it. The order becomes operative the moment it is made, and suspends the power of the Subordinate Court to carry on further the execution proceedings. Delivery of possession to the decreeholder made by a Subordinate Court after an unconditional order by the Appellate Court for stay of execution, but before such order could be communicated to it, is invalid and cannot stand. *Bessesswari Chowdhurany v. Hurro Sundar Mazundar*, I C. W. N. 226, dissented from. The Code of Civil Procedure binds all Courts so far as it goes. It is not, however, exhaustive and does not affect previously existing powers, unless it takes them away. In matters with which it does not deal, the Court will exercise an inherent jurisdiction to do that justice between the parties, which is warranted under the circumstances and which the necessities of the case require. *Held* by WOODROFFE

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ss. 546, 583—*concl'd.*

J. (MOOKERJEE J., dissenting), that s. 546 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply where the order for execution has been actually carried out.
HUKUM CHAND BOID v. KAMALANAND SINGH (1905)
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 927

1. s. 548 (1859, s. 341)—*Registration of Petition of Appeal.* The registration of a petition of appeal under s. 341, Act VIII of 1859, is a proceeding of a purely ministerial character.
JAFFER HOSSAIN v. MAHOMED AMIR
4 B. L. R. Ap. 103: 13 W. R. 351

2. *Appeal preferred after time—Power of Appellate Court.* Held, by the majority of the Court (GLOVER J., dissenting), that an Appellate Court after admitting and registering an appeal and serving notice on the opposite party has no power at the hearing to reject the appeal upon the ground that it was not preferred within the prescribed period. **BHARUTCHUNDER ROY v. ISSURCHUNDER SIRCAR**
8 W. R. 141

s. 549 (1859, s. 342).

See SECURITY FOR COSTS—APPEALS.

1. Security for Costs—*Non-compliance with order for Security—Appeal rejected—Application to restore Appeal—Application refused.* Held, that no appeal will lie from an order refusing to re-admit an appeal, which had been rejected under s. 549 of the Code of Civil Procedure on account of non-compliance with an order to furnish security for costs. **Lekha v. Bhawna, I. L. R. 18 All. 101**, followed. **Kuar Balwant Singh v. Kuar Doulat Singh, L. R. 13 I. A. 57**, distinguished. **FIROZI BEGAM v. ABDUL LATIF KHAN (1908)**
I. L. R. 30 All. 143

2. *Restoration of Appeal rejected for neglect to give security for Costs.* An appeal, although it may have been rejected by the Appellate Court under s. 549 of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon failure by the appellant to furnish security demanded under that section, may be restored on sufficient grounds at the Court's discretion. The High Court having apparently treated an appeal as though, after rejection of it under the above section, a petition tendering security to the amount demanded and asking restoration of the appeal, was not entertainable and could not be considered: Held, by the Judicial Committee, that restoration was within the Court's discretion, and that there were grounds for it, upon the appellant's giving approved security within such time as the Court might fix. **BALWANT SINGH v. DAULAT SINGH**
I. L. R. 8 All. 315

3. Security for Costs—*Appeal under Letters Patent in case from mofussil—Power of High Court to order appellant to give Security.* A respondent in an appeal preferred under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent against the decision of a single Judge of the High Court in a case from the mofussil,

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cannot apply for an order on the appellant to give security for the costs of an appeal. S. 549 of the Civil Procedure Code applies only to appeals preferred to the High Court from Subordinate Courts subject to its appellate jurisdiction and not to appeals preferred to the High Court, under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, from the judgment of one of its own Judges. Nor does s. 647 apply to appeals under the Letters Patent so as to extend the provisions of s. 549 to such appeals. **SESHA AYYAR v. NAGABATHNA LALA (1904)**
I. L. R. 27 Mad. 121

s. 551.

See APPEAL—DISMISSAL OF APPEAL.

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 548

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 759

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 293

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ADMISSION OR SUMMARY REJECTION OF APPEAL
I. L. R. 15 All. 367
I. L. R. 22 Mad. 293

1. *Hearing of Appeal ex parte.* The plaintiff sued to recover possession of certain immoveable property sold to him by the first defendant, a Hindu widow. The second defendant answered that his father and the first defendant's husband were undivided brothers, and that, as a childless widow, she had no right to sell the property. Both the lower Courts upheld the sale as absolute, on the ground that she was competent to make it as widow of a separate Hindu. The District Judge heard the appeal *ex parte* under s. 551 of the Civil Procedure Code. The High Court, on second appeal, held that the decrees of the lower Courts were unsustainable, as they did not contain the limitation pointed out above, and remanded the case for the trial of the issue, whether there were any such special circumstances as would justify the absolute sale by the first defendant to the plaintiff. The High Court were also of opinion that the District Judge ought not to have disposed of the appeal *ex parte* under s. 551 of Act X of 1837. **GURUNATH NILKANTH v. KRISHNAJI**
I. L. R. 4 Bom. 462

2. *Order of Adjudication—Decree—Judgment.* The order of adjudication made under s. 551 of the Civil Procedure Code is a decree, and the procedure authorized under that section does not dispense with the necessity of drawing up a judgment. **ROYAL REDDI v. LINGA REDDI**
I. L. R. 3 Mad. 1

3. *Effect of Dismissal of Appeal—Amendment of decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 206.* Held, that the dismissal of an appeal under s. 551 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a decree and supersedes the decree of the Court below. The Court, therefore, which has taken action under s. 551 is the only Court, which has jurisdiction to amend the decree under s. 206 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Uma*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 551—*conclld.*

Sundari Devi v. Bindu Bashini Chaudharani, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 759; *Pearry Mohan v. Mohendra Nath*, 4 C. L. J. 566, and *Munisami Naidu v. Munisami Reddi*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 293, followed. *Bapu v. Vajir*, I. L. R. 21 Bom. 548, dissented from. *Rudra Prosad v. Baijnath*, I. L. R. 15 All. 367; *Thakur of Masuda v. The Widows of the Thakur of Nandwara*, I. L. R. 2 All. 819; *Kristnama Chariar v. Mangam-mal*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 91; *Kistokinker Ghose Ray v. Burrodacaunt Singh Roy*, 10 B. L. R. 101; *Akshoy Kumar Nundi v. Chundar Mohan Chaitani*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 250; *Murlidhar v. Tapesri Rai*, *Weekly Notes* (1894) 46; *Royal Reddi v. Linga Reddi*, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 1; *Thakur Takhtsangji v. Bai Sundrabai*, Bom. P. J. (1891) 58, and *Kushal Chintaman v. Supdu Tapiram*, Bom. P. J. (1891) 299, referred to. *ASMA BIBI v. AHMAD HUSAIN* (1908) I. L. R. 30 All. 290

4. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 551, 574—Subordinate Court dismissing Appeal summarily—Discretion to send for Records—Judgment, if must be recorded—Question of sufficiency of Judgment.* There are no grounds for limiting the discretion given by the Legislature to a Court of Appeal to send for the records or not, before proceeding to dismiss an appeal under s. 551 of the Civil Procedure Code. Whether the judgment of a Court of Appeal dismissing an appeal under s. 551 has sufficiently complied with the provisions of s. 574 of the Code must be decided upon the facts of the particular case and no general rule in regard to it can be laid down. *Per COXE, J.*—S. 551 of the Code is not controlled by s. 574. *Per RICHARDSON, J.*—When a subordinate Court dismisses an appeal under s. 551, it is bound under s. 571 to record a judgment and the judgment must be sufficient to meet the requirements of s. 574. But provided it substantially meets the requirements of the law, it is not necessarily defective because it is brief or because it does not repeat or recapitulate all that is contained in the judgment of the Court of first instance. *Rani Deka v. Brojo Nath Saikia*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 97, *Puttapa v. Yellappa*, 5 Bom. L. R. 233, *Rakkhal Chandra Tewary v. Satindra Deo Roy*, 5 C. L. J. 348, *Samin Hassan v. Piran*, I. L. R. 30 All. 319, and *Shaharulla Mondal v. Bangoo Mondal*, 13 C. W. N. 143, referred to. *PACHI DASSI v. BALA DAS* (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 1031

ss. 551, 623—*Decree passed by first Court allowing plaintiff's claim—Appeal by Defendant—Summary dismissal of Appeal—Application by defendant to the first Court for Review—Jurisdiction.* Plaintiff having obtained a decree in the first Court, the defendant appealed, but his appeal was summarily dismissed under s. 551 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). Subsequently the defendant applied to the first Court for review of judgment under s. 623 of the Code on the ground of discovery of new and important evidence. *Held*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 551, 623—*conclld.*

that as the defendant had preferred an appeal and it was dismissed under s. 551 of the Code, his application to the first Court for review of judgment could not be entertained. It is open to the person aggrieved, after an appeal has been preferred, to apply for a review, provided his appeal is withdrawn. As by the cancellation of the order for admission of an appeal it is to be taken that no appeal was admitted, so by withdrawal of the appeal it must be treated as though no appeal was preferred. But when an appeal is actually dismissed, it was in fact preferred and cannot be regarded as not having been preferred. *RAMAPPA v. BHARMA* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 625

s. 553 (1859, s. 345)—*Notice of Appeal—Time for deposit of talabana.* When a notice of appeal is transmitted by the High Court to a Court below, with instructions to make a return within a specified time, the appellant is entitled to the whole of the time allowed, and may deposit his talabana and cause service of the notice any time within the period limited. Where the appellant is denied this liberty by the lower Court, he ought to come before the High Court with a substantial application for orders. *RUNGO DEBEE BOISTOBEE v. HURDE NARAIN OOPADHYA* . . . 11 W. R. 138

s. 556 (1859 s. 346)

See APPEAL—DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE.

I. L. R. 2 All. 616
I. L. R. 3 All. 382, 519
I. L. R. 12 Calc. 605
I. L. R. 16 Bom. 23
I. L. R. 15 All. 359
I. L. R. 24 All. 464
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 267

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, N.-W. P., CL. 10. I. L. R. 14 All. 361
I. L. R. 15 All. 359

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.

3 Mad. 109
6 Mad. 1
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 529
4 C. W. N. 237

1. ————— *Dismissal of Appeal for non-appearance.* Where both parties make default in appearing at the hearing of an appeal, the Court must dismiss the appeal, and not go into the merits and reverse the decree. *MANICKRAM v. ROOPNARAIN SINGH*

Marsh. 5:1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 36

2. ————— *Miscellaneous cases—Notice of Hearing.* S. 346, Act VIII of 1859 (providing for the dismissal of an appeal for default) even if it applies to miscellaneous cases, does not apply to a case in which it is not shown distinctly that the appellant had any notice that his appeal would be heard on the day to which the case was

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 556 (1859, s. 346)—*concl'd.*

adjourned, and on which the Judge disposed of it.
SHIB CHUNDER GOOPTO v. ALLAD MONEE DASSIA
5 W. R. Mis. 22

3. ——— Dismissal on non-appearance of Appellant—Application for re-admission. Where a Judge on the non-appearance of the appellant in person or by pleader, instead of observing the direction of the law, Act VIII of 1859, s. 349, goes into the merits of the case and gives a judgment against the appellant, the appeal must be considered as dismissed for default of the appellant in appearing; and an application for re-admission and rehearing cannot be treated as one for review, but must be entertained under s. 347. **MOHESH CHUNDER BOSE v. THAKOOR DOSS GOSSAMEE** . . . 20 W. R. 425

4. ——— Appearance of Pleader without Instructions. Where the appellant himself does not appear and the pleader appears and states he is not instructed, a judgment of dismissal for default is a proper judgment. **TRILOKE CHUNDER SEN v. AUKHIL CHUNDER SEN**
21 W. R. 65

— ss. 556, 558—

See DISMISSAL FOR DEFAULT.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 403

— Non-attendance of Appellant at hearing of Appeal—Dismissal of Appeal on the merits—Application for Re-admission. In an appeal before an Appellate Court, the appellant did not attend in person or by pleader, and the Court, instead of dismissing the appeal for default, tried and dismissed it upon the merits. Subsequently, the appellant applied to the Court, under s. 558 of the Civil Procedure Code, to re-admit the appeal, explaining her absence when the appeal was called on for hearing. The Court rejected the application on the ground that the appeal had been decided on the merits, and reasons had been recorded for its dismissal which there were no apparent grounds for setting aside. *Held*, that the Court should have dismissed the appeal for default, and it was illegal to try it on the merits, and the judgment was consequently a nullity, the existence of which was no bar to the re-admission of the appeal. **ZAINAB BEGAM v. MANAWAR HUSAIN KHAN** . I. L. R. 8 All. 277

— s. 557.

See APPEAL . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 535

— ss. 557, 582, 588, cl. (6), 622.

See APPEAL . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 344

— s. 558 (1859, s. 347).

See APPEAL—DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE

I. L. R. 24 All. 464

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 589

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 558 (1859, s. 347)—*contd.*

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT,
N.-W. P., CL. 10 I. L. R. 14 All. 361
I. L. R. 15 All. 359

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.
168 . . . 8 W. R. 61
15 W. R. 80
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 339

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622.
I. L. R. 18 All. 119

1. ——— Dismissal of Appeal for Default—Re-admission of Appeal—Ground for re-admission. On an application under s. 558 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the re-admission of an appeal which had been decided *ex parte* against the applicant, it appeared that he had been misled by reason of the appeal having been transferred from the file of one Court to another, no notice of the transfer having been given to him by the pleaders in the case. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, the applicant was entitled to have the appeal re-admitted. **NARAIN SINGH v. BHEURAB CHURN PANDA** . . . 8 C. L. R. 350

2. ——— Dismissal of Appeal for Default—Pleader present but unprepared to go on with case—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 556, 558. Where, when an appeal is called on, the pleader is not absent, but is unprepared to go on with the case, the dismissal is a dismissal for default within s. 556 of Act XIV of 1882, and the appeal can therefore be re-admitted under s. 558. *Buldeo Misser v. Ahmed Hossein*, 15 W. R. 143, followed. **SHIBENDRA NARAIN CHOWDHURI v. KINOO RAM DASS** . . . I. L. R. 12 Calc. 605

3. ——— Dismissal of Appeal for Default—Pleader asking for time to go on with a case—Civil Procedure Code, s. 556. The provisions of ss. 556 and 558 of the Civil Procedure Code do not apply, when the pleader for the appellant not merely informs the Court that he has no instructions, but makes an application for postponement, which is refused, and the appeal is thereupon dismissed. A second appeal does not, therefore, lie in such a case from an order of the first Appellate Court refusing to re-admit an appeal under the provisions of s. 558 of the Code of Civil Procedure. **WATSON & Co. v. AMBICA DASI**
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 529

See RAM CHANDRA PANDURANG v. MADHUB PURUSHOTTAM . . . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 23

4. ——— Dismissal of Appeal for Default of appearance—Civil Procedure Code, s. 556. Where, on an appeal being called on for hearing, the vakil who held brief for the appellant stated that he was unable to argue the case, the fact being that the brief had come into his hands too late for him to prepare himself in the case, and the appeal was in consequence dismissed, it was *held*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 558 (1859, s. 347)—*concl.*

that this was not a dismissal for default of appearance. *Shankar Dat Dube v. Radha Krishna*, I. L. R. 20 All. 195, distinguished. *Ram Chandra Pandurang Naik v. Madhav Purushottam Naik*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 23, referred to. *Shibendra Narain Chowdhuri v. Kinoo Ram Dass*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 605, dissented from. *CHIRANJI LAL v. KUNDAN LAL* . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 294

ss. 558, 560.

See APPEAL . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 510

s. 559.

See PARTIES—ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS
—RESPONDENTS.

1. ————— “Interested in the Result of Appeal”—Where defendants were exonerated and there was no appeal against that portion of the decree, they cannot be brought on the record under s. 559. A party, who is not made a respondent in an appeal, is not “interested in the result of the appeal” within the meaning of s. 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless the decree sought to be obtained against the respondents in the appeal would have the effect of prejudicing him in some way or other. The party sought to be made a respondent in the appeal under s. 559 must be shown to be interested in the result of the appeal before he is brought on the record, and the interest he may acquire as a result of being added as a respondent, will not suffice. Where a defendant has been exonerated and there is no appeal against so much of the decree as exonerates him, no decree can be passed against him in an appeal by any other party as he is not a party to the appeal and cannot be said to be interested in the result of such appeal. *Atma Ram v. Balkishen*, I. L. R. 5 All. 267, followed. *Upendra Lal Mukherjee v. Girindra Nath Mukherjee*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 565, not followed. *SUBRAMANIAN CHETTY v. VEERABADRAN CHETTY* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 442

2. ————— Record—Appeal—Respondent. A respondent should not be placed on the record under s. 559 of the Civil Procedure Code, after the time for appealing against him has expired. *RAM RATAN CHUCKERBUTTY v. JOGESH CHANDRA BHATTACHARYA* (1907) . . . 12 C. W. N. 625

1. ————— s. 560—Appeal *ex parte*—Application for re-hearing. An applicant presenting a petition for the re-hearing of an appeal decided *ex parte* must, at the time of making such application, be prepared to satisfy the Court that the notice of appeal was not duly served upon him, or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from attending when the appeal was called on for hearing. *ANUNDA SHAHA BISWAS alias NYOMUDDIN SHA BISWAS v. KEMA BEBEE* . . . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 548

2. ————— Re-hearing of Appeal—Grounds for re-hearing. When an appeal has been

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 560—*concl.*

heard *ex parte*, a re-hearing cannot be granted by the Court on an application under s. 560 of the Civil Procedure Code, except upon legal evidence produced by the respondent of the facts necessary to entitle him to such re-hearing. *MAHOMED KALUN v. DINOMOYEE DASHYA* . . . 8 C. L. R. 112

3. ————— Re-hearing of Appeal *ex parte*—Absence of Respondent for sufficient cause. S. 560 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to a case in which the respondent has been prevented by sufficient cause from attending when the appeal was called on, whether appearance has been entered for him or not. *ESAB v. KRISHNA NARAIN DEY*

11 C. L. R. 164

4. ————— Re-hearing of an Appeal heard *ex parte*—“Sufficient cause.” Where a party (respondent in an appeal) had received no intimation of the date of hearing of an appeal from his pleader’s clerk, who, owing to his own illness, had been compelled to go home, the papers of the case being with him, and who did not give information to the clients of the day fixed for hearing, and the appeal was heard *ex parte* on the date of hearing: Held, that it was “sufficient cause” within the meaning of s. 560, Civil Procedure Code, for the re-hearing of the appeal. *KAILASH CHUNDER DAS v. RAMA NATH CHAUDHURI* 2 C. W. N. 414

5. ————— Non-appearance of Respondent on appeal—Appearance by Pleader. An appeal from a decree dismissing a suit having been heard and allowed in the absence of the defendant and his pleaders, an application was made under s. 560 of Act X of 1877, on the ground that the defendant had engaged pleaders to appear for him, but that they were unavoidably prevented from appearing. The application was granted, and the appeal having been re-heard, the original decree was reversed. Held, that, although the vakalatnamahs had been filed by the defendant’s pleaders, the defendant could not be said to have appeared in person or by pleader, and that the order made under s. 560 of Act X of 1877 was correct. *Haloo v. Atwaro*, 7 W. R. 81, followed. *SHEO CHURN LALL v. HEERA LALL* . . . 11 C. L. R. 537

6. ————— Re-hearing of Appeal heard *ex parte*—Limitation—Amendment. An application for re-hearing of an appeal presented originally within the period of limitation, but returned for amendment and presented after amendment, after the period of limitation, cannot be rejected as being out of time. *SHAMA PROSAD GHOSE v. TAKI MULLIK* (1901) . . . 5 C. W. N. 816

ss. 560, 588.

See BENGAL RENT ACT (X OF 1859).

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 799

s. 561 (1859, s. 348).

See APPEAL—OBJECTIONS BY RESPONDENT.

I. L. R. 25 All. 628

I. L. R. 23 All. 93, 130

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

_____ s. 561 (1859, s. 348)—*concl'd.*

See BOMBAY CITY IMPROVEMENT ACT.
I. L. R. 29 Bom. 514

See COURT-FEES ACT, 1870, s. 16.
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 24

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 5.
10 Bom. 397
I. L. R. 4 All. 430
I. L. R. 7 Calc. 654
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 631

See PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—OBJECTIONS BY RESPONDENT.
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 922

See RENT RECOVERY ACT, s. 11.

_____ Decree—Respondent. It is not necessary to entitle a respondent to support a decree upon a particular ground under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code, that the ground should have been in express terms decided against him. *SRISH CHANDRA ROY v. MUNGERI BEWA* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 14

_____ ss. 561, 566.

See REMAND . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 996

_____ s. 562 (1859, s. 351).

See *ante*, s. 331.

See *post*, s. 595.

See APPEAL . I. L. R. 29 All. 659

See APPEAL—EX PARTE CASES.

5 C. W. N. 153

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—APPEALABLE ORDERS . I. L. R. 23 All. 629

See HINDU LAW . I. L. R. 30 All. 63

See LETTERS PATENT APPEAL.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1096

See PARTITION I. L. R. 36 Calc. 762

See REMAND—

POWER OF REMAND

I. L. R. 23 All. 167

APPEAL AFTER REMAND

6 C. W. N. 326

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 324

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 518

1. _____ Remand—Appeal Court. Where a Subordinate Court has dealt with the questions arising on the merits of the case, no order of remand can be made by the Appellate Court under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code, but if the Appellate Court is of opinion that there should be a finding upon any particular issue, or further evidence should be taken on any such issue, it may make an order of remand under s. 566 of the Civil Procedure Code. *RAKHIT MAHANTA v. PUDDO BAURI* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 54

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

_____ s. 562 (1859, s. 351)—*contd.*

2. _____ Remand—Preliminary point—Suit decided with reference to some only of several issues framed. Held, that it is competent to an Appellate Court to remand a case under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure where the Court of first instance, having framed issues and recorded all the evidence, has decided the suit with reference to its finding upon one or more of the issues framed by it, leaving other issues undecided. *Sheoambar Singh v. Lallu Singh*, I. L. R. 9 All. 30, foot-note; and *Ramachandra Joishi v. Kazi Hassim*, I. L. R. 16 Mad. 207, followed. *MATA DIN v. JAMNA DAS* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 27 All. 691

3. _____ Limit to Remand—Custom opposed to Statutes, validity of—Rent Recovery Act (VIII of 1865), s. 11—Cultivation by wells constructed at tenants' cost, liability to enhanced rent for—Payment of enhanced rent for a number of years, whether an implied contract to pay—Agreement and contract, difference between—Tenant with right of occupancy, right of, to construct wells without permission of landholder. Ryots with permanent rights of occupancy in a zamindari constructed wells at their own cost without obtaining the permission of the zamindar and cultivated dry lands with garden crops for periods ranging from 1 to 18 years. Suits were brought by the ryots before the Sub-Collector under s. 8 of the Rent Recovery Act to compel the defendant, the zamindar, to grant them proper pattas for fasli 1312, alleging that the pattas tendered were illegal as they charged the higher garden rate for dry lands cultivated by them with the aid of wells constructed at their own cost. The defendant pleaded that he was entitled to the enhanced rate (i) by custom, (ii) by virtue of a contract to be implied from previous payments. No consideration for such a contract was however alleged. The Sub-Collector framed two issues—one as to the existence of the custom set up by the defendant, and another as to whether the previous payments by the plaintiffs operated as an estoppel or evidenced an implied contract to continue to pay the enhanced rates. The Sub-Collector did not record evidence as to custom, holding that such custom, even if proved, could not deprive the plaintiffs of the benefits expressly given by the Act. He also held that any such implied contract as that set up by the defendant would be illegal as opposed to the provisions of the Act. He passed a decree, that the defendant should grant pattas as claimed by the plaintiffs. On appeal, the District Judge held that the payment of rent at the enhanced rate raised a presumption that there was a contract to pay such rent; and that, if there was no contract, express or implied, the rent must be fixed in accordance with the other provisions of s. 11 of the Rent Recovery Act. He reversed the decrees of the Sub-Collector and remanded the cases for retrial under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On appeal to the High Court: Held, *per SUBRAHMANYA AYYAR, J.*, that the order remanding the case was not legal

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 562 (1859, s. 351)—*contd.*

as all the questions raised between the parties and on which they went to trial, had been decided, and the questions so raised were purely questions of law. A custom can be upheld only so far as it is not in conflict with statute law; and a custom to pay enhanced rent for improvements effected by a tenant at his cost is illegal as opposed to the provisions of the Rent Recovery Act. *Fischer v. Kamakshi Pillai*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 136, followed. *Gopalasami Chettiar v. Fischer*, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 328, referred to. It makes no difference whether a tenant constructed wells at his cost prior to, or after the passing of, Act VIII of 1865. In either case no additional rent can be claimed. *Nagasami Kamia Naick v. Iyodi Rama Goundan*, 6 Mad. L. R. 5. Payment for a number of years of enhanced rent may be evidence of an agreement to pay at that rate, but it will not be binding as a contract, unless supported by consideration. *Quære*: Whether, when the enhanced rate had been paid for a large number of years and when the lapse of time is such as to make it unfair to call on the landlord to prove consideration, a lawful origin may not be presumed. *Gann v. Free Fisheries of Whitstable*, 11 H. L. C. 192, 103, referred to. No such presumption can be made when the payments have been only for a period extending from one to eighteen years. Tenants with permanent rights of occupancy are entitled to construct wells without the permission of the landholder; and a custom requiring such permission may be bad, as unreasonable, and is certainly illegal as opposed to the policy of s. 11 of the Rent Recovery Act. *Venkatanarasimha Naidu v. Dandamudi Kotayya*, I. L. R. 30 Mad. 299, referred to. *Held*, per MOORE, J., that the Sub-Collector having disposed of the case on two preliminary issues, the District Judge was right in remanding the cases under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *ARUMUGAM CHETTI v. RAJA JAGAVEERA RAMA VENKATESWARA ETTAPPA* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 444

4. *Remand, order of*
—*Erroneous order made with consent—Appeal—*
Appeal after taking full benefit of order—Election of
remedies—Bar—"Final disposal of suit," when.
An order of remand made with consent will bind the parties though made contrary to the provisions of s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Madhu Sudan Sen v. Kamini Kanta Sen*, 9 C. W. N. 895; s. c. I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1023, referred to. Per MOOKERJEE, J.—An Appellate Court does not act without jurisdiction when it makes an erroneous order of remand, but merely commits an error of law, in making an order of a particular description in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation. Such error may be cured by consent. It cannot be laid down as an inflexible rule of law that under all circumstances the final disposal of a suit must be taken to be the delivery of the judgment. When a litigant has the right to choose

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 562 (1859, s. 351)—*concl'd.*

between two remedies which are not co-existent, but alternative, and adopts one of those remedies, his act at once operates as a bar as regards the other and the bar is final and absolute. After having taken the full benefit of an order of remand it is not open to a party to turn round and appeal against it. *BAIKUNTHA NATH DEY v. SALIMULLA BAHADUR* (1907) . . . 12 C. W. N. 590

5. *Remand—Appeal*
from order of Remand after decision of the suit in
accordance therewith. *Held*, that no appeal will lie from an order of remand passed under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if such appeal is filed after the suit has been decided in compliance with the order of remand and no appeal is preferred from the decree in the suit. *Salig Ram v. Brij Bilas*, I. L. R. 29 All. 659, and *Madhu Sudan Sen v. Kamini Kanta Sen*, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1023, followed. *GULZARI MAL v. KABIR-UN-NISSA* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 191

ss. 562, 578.

See REMAND, ORDER FOR.

11 C. W. N. 380

Remand contrary to the
provisions of s. 562 illegal and not merely irregular—
Failure to appeal against an illegal order of remand
not a waiver of the illegality. The Court of first instance passed a decree in favour of plaintiff on the strength of a plan which was not disputed by the defendant. On appeal, the Appellate Court held that the plan was unsatisfactory and that a proper plan was necessary for a right decision of the suit and remanded the suit for retrial under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No appeal was preferred by plaintiff under s. 588, Civil Procedure Code, against the order of remand and the lower Court again passed a decree in favour of plaintiff which was reversed on appeal. Plaintiff preferred a second appeal to the High Court: *Held*, (i) That the original order of remand was contrary to the provisions of s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the Court of first instance had not decided the suit on a preliminary point within the meaning of the section. (ii) That such order was not merely irregular but illegal and could not be validated by s. 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (iii) That even if such illegal order might be validated by consent or waiver, neither the omission of the plaintiff to appeal under s. 588 nor his acquiescing in the trial on remand amounted to such consent or waiver. *Subramania Ayyar v. King-Emperor*, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 61, referred to. *Manager of the Court of Wards, Kalahasti Estate v. Ramasami Reddi*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 437, referred to. *PALANI CHETTY v. RANGIADOSS NAIDU* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 32 Mad. 83

ss. 562, 588—*Remand, order of—*
Right of Appeal—Appeal after suit finally disposed
of—Order, if may be impugned, in appeal from final

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 562, 588—*concl'd.*

decision—Tenancy—Transferability—Custom. An appeal from an order of remand passed under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be entertained, if presented after the final disposal of the suit. *Jatinga Valley Tea Co. v. Chera Tea Co., I. L. R. 12 Calc. 45*, distinguished. The right of appeal given by s. 588 of the Civil Procedure Code, from orders specified in that section ceases with the disposal of the suit. *Semble*: An order of remand under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code is an order which affects the decision of the suit on the merits, and exception may be taken to the validity of such an order in an appeal from the final decision. *MADHU SUDAN SEN v. KAMINI KANTA SEN (1905)*

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1023
9 C. W. N. 895

— ss. 562, 588 (28)—*Remand—Appeal from order of remand filed after decision of suit in accordance therewith.* Held, that the fact that the suit has been decided by the Court of first instance in compliance with an order of remand made under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is no bar to the filing of an appeal from the order of remand or to the hearing of such an appeal. *Babu Lal v. Ram Kali, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 113*, followed. *Salig Ram v. Brij Bilas, Weekly Notes (1906) 28*, overruled. *Rameshwar Singh v. Sheo Din Singh, I. L. R. 29 All. 659*; *Sheo Nath Singh v. Ram Din Singh, I. L. R. 18 All. 19*, and *Jatinga Valley Tea Company v. Chera Tea Company, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 45*, referred to. *Madhu Sudan Sen v. Kamini Kanta Sen, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1023*, dissented from. *UMAN KUNWARI v. JARBANDHAN (1908)*

I. L. R. 30 All. 479

— ss. 562, 591—*An order of Remand on appeal cannot be reviewed by same Court subsequently—An order of remand not appealed against cannot be objected to in second appeal from the final appellate decree.* A decree was reversed on appeal and the case was remanded for retrial. Against the decree passed at the remanded trial, an appeal was preferred and the Judge of the Appellate Court, who was the successor of the Judge who originally remanded the case, held that the previous order of remand was wrong, and allowed the appeal. Held, on second appeal, that the original order of remand could not be reviewed by the lower Appellate Court, and could not be questioned on the second appeal under s. 591 of the Code of Civil Procedure as such order was not appealed against. *SUBBA LAKSHMANMA v. VENKATARAYADU (1908)*

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 318

— s. 564—*Whether Consent of Parties can validate an illegal Remand under s. 564 of the Civil Procedure Code—Waiver, effect of—Effect of illegal remand by lower Appellate Court on points properly decided.* Where the Court of first instance had framed all the necessary issues and decided all those issues, and the lower Appellate Court, reversing the decision of the Court of first instance on one

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 564—*concl'd.*

of the issues, remanded the case for retrial under s. 564 of the Code of Civil Procedure: *Held*, on second appeal, *per SUBRAHMANYA AYYAR, J.*, that an order of remand, contrary to the provisions of s. 564, is not merely irregular, but illegal; but it is not on that account absolutely void so as to render any consent of the parties of no avail. It can be objected to by a party, if he has not given his consent to such a course, and even a party, who has not consented, may be equitably estopped by subsequent conduct from treating such an order as null and void. Such an order of remand does not necessarily vitiate the decision of the lower Appellate Court on questions properly decided by it, which can be attacked only on grounds legally open to the parties on second appeal. It cannot be treated as void for want of jurisdiction, so as to be incapable of being validated by consent or waiver. *Mohes Chandra Dass v. Jamiruddin Mollah, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 324*, referred to. *Malikarjuna v. Pathaneni, I. L. R. 19 Mad. 479*, referred to. *Subrahmanya Ayyar v. King-Emperor, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 61, 97*, followed. *Per MOORE, J.*—The order of remand was illegal and no consent of parties could make it valid. *MANAGER OF THE COURT OF WARDS, KALAHASTI ESTATE v. RAMASAMI REDDI (1905)*

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 437

— ss. 564, 566.

See REMAND—POWER OF REMAND.

I. L. R. 23 All. 167

1. — s. 566—*Remand—Preliminary point.* When a Court of first instance does not decide a case on a preliminary point, but raises all the issues and goes fully into the matters in issue, it is not open to the Appellate Court to remand the case under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code, but if it thinks that the determination of any particular question is necessary, it may make an order under s. 566 of the Civil Procedure Code. *AMBICA CHURN DAS v. KALA CHANDRA DAS (1906)*

10 C. W. N. 422

2. — *Remand—Return to Remand to be made by the Court originally seized of the case—Jurisdiction.* Held, that when issues are remitted for trial under s. 566 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such issues are trial only by the Court which was originally seized of the case. The principle of *Sabri v. Ganeshi, I. L. R. 14 All. 23*, followed. *ALI SHEER KHAN v. AHMAD-ULLAH KHAN (1907)*

I. L. R. 29 All. 660

— s. 568 (1859, s. 355).

See APPELLATE COURT—EVIDENCE AND
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL.

I. L. R. 23 All. 121

6 C. W. N. 31

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 833

See PRIVY COUNCIL. 13 C. W. N. 830

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 568 (1859, s. 355)—*concll.*

Fresh Evidence admissible when inherent Defect apparent on examining the evidence—Document purporting to be executed by two persons, but signed by only one, are not invalid. The legitimate occasion for the admission of additional evidence by the Appellate Court under s. 568 of the Code of Civil Procedure arises only when on examining the evidence as it stands, some defect becomes apparent. Where fresh evidence is discovered outside the Court, such evidence can be imported into the case on an application under s. 623 of the Code. *Kessowji Issur v. Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company*, I. L. R. 31 Bom. 381, followed. A deed is not invalid because one only of several parties, who purported to execute it, actually signed it. *KRISHNAMA CHARIAR v. NARASINHA CHARIAR* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 114

ss. 568, 623—*Discovery of fresh Evidence—Laches—Negligence—Dismissal of application for Review—Additional evidence on appeal—Evidence taken preliminary to hearing of appeal on the merits—Suit for Damages for injuries on Railway—Appeal decided not on evidence at trial but on observations of Judges at presentation of scene and events of accident on another night than that on which accident occurred.* The legitimate occasion for s. 568 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882) is when on examining the evidence as it stands some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent, and not when a discovery is made outside the Court, of fresh evidence and the application is made to import it: that is the subject of the separate enactment in s. 623. S. 623 exacts very strict conditions, so as to prevent litigants being negligent, and enjoins the Court to require the facts as to the absence of negligence to be strictly proved. Where the defendants, on the day after judgment had been given against them, discovered fresh evidence which with diligence they might under the circumstances have obtained before or during the trial of the suit, and even after such discovery delayed for two weeks before making an application for review of judgment: *Held*, that the application was rightly dismissed. On an appeal on the merits of the case being filed the Appellate Court without recording any reason as required by s. 568 of the Code allowed such further evidence to be taken, not after the appeal on the merits had been heard and the evidence as it stood had been examined by the Judges, but on special and preliminary application: *Held*, that the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to admit the additional evidence, that it was wrongly admitted and must be disregarded. The plaintiff sued the defendants, a Railway Company, for damages for injuries sustained by him when alighting from a carriage which overshot the platform of a station at night, and the evidence on the question of what light there was either natural or artificial, on the night in question being conflicting, it was suggested during

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 568, 623—*concll.*

the hearing of the case on appeal and agreed to by the counsel for the parties that the Judges should visit the scene of the accident under conditions approximating as nearly as possible to those which prevailed when the plaintiff met with his injuries. This was done, and the Judges and the legal advisers of the parties went to the station where a presentation of the scene and events of the accident was gone through by which the Judges were enabled to make a thorough investigation of the material conditions accompanying the accident. They formed their own opinion on the question of the sufficiency or otherwise of the light and gave judgment in accordance with them, reversing the decision of the Court which tried the case: *Held*, that such procedure was illegal. The result of it was that the appeal was decided not on the testimony given at the trial as to what took place on the night of the accident, but by the Judges' observation of what they saw on another night altogether; and the decision based on it was set aside, the judgment of the first Court being restored. *KESSOWJI ISSUR v. GREAT INDIAN PENINSULA RAILWAY COMPANY* (1907) I. L. R. 31 Bom. 381: L. R. 34 I. A. 115

s. 57L.

See PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—
APPELLANTS . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 317

s. 574 (1859, s. 359).

See *ante*, s. 551.

See JUDGMENT—CIVIL CASES—FORM AND
CONTENTS OF JUDGMENT.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

13 C. W. N. 949

1. ———— *Judgment of lower Appellate Court not complying with the requirements of section—Order to be made on Second Appeal.* Where, on second appeal, it is found that the judgment of the lower Appellate Court does not fulfil the requirements of s. 574 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the proper order to be made on second appeal is one setting aside the decree, and remanding the case to the Appellate Court to be disposed of according to law. *Krishna Reddi v. Srinivasa Reddi*, 4 Mad. H. C. 174, not followed. If the Judge of the Court to which the case is remanded is the Judge who heard the appeal in the first instance, he is not bound to re-hear the appeal, if he considers that the case might be properly disposed of without so doing. In such a case his writing a judgment satisfying the requirements of s. 574 will be a sufficient compliance with the order to dispose of the case according to law. But where the Judge of the Court to which the case is remanded is not the Judge who heard the appeal in the first instance, as also in cases where the Judge, though the same, considers such a course necessary for a proper disposal of the case, a re-hearing is necessary for a dis-

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 574 (1859, s. 359)—concl'd.

posai of the case according to law. SARAVANA
PILLAI v. SETHA REDDI (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 469

2. — Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 574, 578, 584—*Appellate Judgment—Omission to state reasons for decision—Defect if curable—Ground of second appeal.* In a suit on a mortgage bond, the defence of the contesting defendant was that the bond was executed by collusion between the plaintiff and certain other defendants who did not appear. The lower Appellate Court recited that the Court of first instance had found that the plaintiff was entitled to no relief, and then concluded as follows:—"The point in dispute is a question of fact and I see no reason to differ from the finding of the lower Court. The appeal is dismissed." Held, that the appellate judgment did not comply with the provisions of s. 574, Civil Procedure Code. The points for determination were set out but the reasons for the decision were not stated. That the facts of the case demanded fuller treatment than they received and the defect was not cured by the provisions of s. 578 of the Code. Defect in the appellate judgment is a ground of second appeal. *Bisvanath Maiti v. Baidyanath Mandul*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 199, distinguished. *SHAHARULLA MONDAL v. BANGOO MONDOL* (1908) . . . **13 C. W. N. 143**

3. — Where the lower Appellate Court in coming to a finding that a certain payment was made on account of interest did not state any reasons for the finding but merely referred to the evidence of certain witnesses on which it relied. Held, that the judgment was not in accordance with law. *SANTISHWAR MAHANTA v. LAKHIKANTA MAHANTA* (1908) . **13 C. W. N. 177**

4. — and s. 551—*Procedure—Appeal summarily dismissed—Court not bound to record a full judgment.* Held, that the provisions of s. 574 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable in their entirety to the case of an appeal dismissed under s. 551 of the Code. *Rami Deka v. Brojo Nath Saikia*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 97, dissented from. *SAMIN HASAN v. PIRAN* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 319

— s. 575 (Act XXIII of 1861, s. 23).

See *LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURTS, 1865*,
CL. 15 . . . **4 B. L. R. A. C. 181**

See *LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURTS, 1865*,
CLS. 15 AND 36.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 548

See *LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURTS, CL.*
36 . . . **I. L. R. 3 Bom. 204**

See *PRE-EMPTION.* **I. L. R. 26 All. 10**

See *REVIEW—GROUND FOR REVIEW.*

I. L. R. 11 All. 176

1. — Act XXIII of 1861,
s. 23—*Judges sitting in Appeal from original civil*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

— s. 575—cont'd.

jurisdiction. S. 23 of Act XXIII of 1861 referred only to the late Sudder Court, and, although this Act formed part of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that s. 23 could not apply to Judges sitting in appeal from the original civil jurisdiction, for this reason, that all the Judges of the Court so sitting in appeal are supposed in law to be equal, whereas s. 23 of Act XXIII of 1861 only contemplated an appeal from a Court of inferior jurisdiction to the late Sudder Court, and had nothing at all to do with the Court of Appeal from the original civil jurisdiction as that Court is now constituted. *GREENWAY v. HOGG* . . . **Bourke A. O. C. 139**

2. — *Difference of opinion between two Judges.* It was held under this section that, if the Judges differed in opinion on points of law and did not state the points on which they differed, there was no determination of the case; so that, if the case were then referred to other Judges for final determination, they would have jurisdiction to go into the whole case. *KHELUT CHUNDER GHOSE v. TARA CHURN KUNDOD CHOWDHEY* . . . **6 W. R. 269**

3. — *Order in Execution of Decree—Appeal—Party to suit. Semble:* S. 23 applied to orders made in execution of decrees, but the right of appeal was given only as between the parties to the suit in which the decree or order was made. *ANNAMALAI CHETTI v. MUTHULINGA PILLAI* . . . **6 Mad. 360**

4. — *Rules made by High Court, N.-W. P.—Reference of Appeal to other Judges of same Court—Composition of Bench hearing referred Appeal—Presence of referring Judges necessary.* The only Bench which can legally deal with an appeal which has been referred under the provisions of s. 575 of the Civil Procedure Code, is one which includes the Judges who first heard the appeal, and whose difference in opinion on a point of law necessitated the reference. *Khelut Chunder Ghose v. Tara Churn Kundoo Chowdhry*, 6 W. R. 269; *Mahomed Akil v. Asad-un-nissa Bibi*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 774, and *Brand v. Hammersmith and City Railway Company*, 36 L. J. Q. B. 137, referred to. The word "judgment" as used in Rule II of the Rules made by the High Court, North-Western Provinces, to regulate references under s. 575 of the Civil Procedure Code, must not be understood in its strict sense, but merely as an expression of opinion containing reasons for a contemplated or proposed judgment. *ROHILKHAND AND KUMAON BANK v. ROW* . . . **I. L. R. 6 All. 468**

5. — *Difference of Opinion between Judges hearing appeal—"Judgment"—Reference to Full Bench after delivery of dissentient judgments on the appeal—Reference ultra vires.* Where a Bench of two Judges hearing an appeal and differing in opinion have delivered judgments on the appeal as judgments of the Court, without any reservation, they are not competent to refer the appeal to

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 575—*contd.*

other Judges of the Court under s. 575 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Rohilkhand and Kumaon Bank v. Row*, I. L. R. 6 All. 468, referred to. *LAL SINGH v. GHANSHAM SINGH* . I. L. R. 9 All. 625

6. ————— *Practice—Appeal—Difference of Opinion on Division Bench regarding preliminary objection as to limitation—Letters Patent, N.-W. P., s. 27.* S. 27 of the Letters Patent for the High Court of the N.-W. Provinces has been superseded in those cases only to which s. 575 of the Civil Procedure Code properly and without straining language applies. There are many cases to which s. 575, even with the aid of s. 647, does not apply; and to these s. 27 of the Letters Patent is still applicable. One of the cases to which s. 575 of the Code does not apply is where a preliminary objection being taken to the hearing of a first appeal before the High Court on the ground that the appeal is time-barred, the Judges of the Division Bench differ in opinion as to whether the appellant has shown sufficient cause, within the meaning of s. 5 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period. The decision of such a preliminary objection is not a "hearing" of the appeal, but precedes the hearing or determines that there is no appeal which the Court can hear or decide. Where such a preliminary objection is allowed, it cannot be said that the Court which, by reason of the Limitation Act, has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal, should nevertheless "affirm" the decree of the Court below. In the case of such a preliminary objection and such a difference of opinion (the Bench being equally divided), the opinion of the senior Judge should, under s. 27 of the Letters Patent, prevail. *Appaji Bhivray v. Chirlal Khubchand*, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 204, and *Gridhariji Maharaj Tickait v. Porushotum Gassami*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 814, distinguished. *HUSAINI BEGAM v. COLLECTOR OF MUZUFFARANGAR* I. L. R. 11 All. 176

7. ————— *Composition of Bench to hear Appeal referred to a third Judge under s. 575 of the Civil Procedure Code—Judges differing in Opinion.* *Quære*: Whether, where there is a difference of opinion between the two Judges of a Divisional Bench who have delivered judgment on the matter of the appeal, the reference to a third Judge under s. 575 of the Civil Procedure Code should be heard by the third Judge sitting separately or by a Bench composed of the third Judge and the two Judges who first heard the appeal and differed in opinion. *Rohilkhand and Kumaon Bank v. Row*, I. L. R. 6 All. 468, referred to. *Per WEIR, J.*—The language of s. 575 does not imply that the appeal must necessarily be heard again at the reference by the two Judges who first heard it and differed. *SUBBAYYA v. KRISHNA*

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 186

8. ————— *Appeal referred owing to a difference of opinion on a point of law.*

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 575—*concl.*

Where, owing to the difference of opinion between two Judges, an appeal was referred to the Chief Justice under Civil Procedure Code, s. 575, and was heard by him sitting with the two other Judges: *Held*, that the whole appeal was open for argument, and not only the point of law on which the Judges had differed in opinion. *SESHADRI AYYANGAR v. NATARAJA AYYAR* . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 179

9. ————— *Decision when Appeal heard by two or more Judges—Letters Patent of 1865, cls. 15, 36.* S. 575 of Act XIV of 1882 does not take away the right of appeal which is given by cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. When the judgment of a lower Court has been confirmed under s. 575 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by reason of one of the Judges of the Appeal Court agreeing upon the facts with the Court below, an appeal will lie against such judgment, notwithstanding the terms of s. 575. *Appaji Bhivray v. Shirlal Khubchand*, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 204, approved. *GRIDHARIJI MAHARAJ TICKAIT v. PORUSHOTUM GOSSAMI* I. L. R. 10 Calc. 814

ss. 577, 578 (1859, s. 350).

See APPELLATE COURT—REJECTION OR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED OR REJECTED BY COURT BELOW.

See APPELLATE COURT—ERRORS AFFECTING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE.

s. 578.

See ante, s. 574.

See APPEAL . . . 13 C. W. N. 797

See APPELLATE COURT—ERRORS AFFECTING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE.

See INSOLVENCY—INSOLVENT DEBTORS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

5 C. W. N. 91

See MINOR—REPRESENTATION OF MINOR IN SUITS . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1021

See MISJOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 780

See PRACTICE . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 396

See REMAND—CASES OF APPEAL AFTER REMAND . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 324

See WITNESS—CIVIL CASES.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 37

1. ————— *Plaint Verification.* Where a plaint on behalf of Government was signed by the Collector and by a pleader, who was not the Government pleader, but who generally acted for Government, and the verification was signed by the Collector and the Government pleader: *Held, per RAMPINI, J.*—That the plaint was properly presented. *Per CURIAM*—That the defects, if any, in the signing and verification of the plaint, were cured by

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 578—*concl.*

s. 578. RAKHAL CHANDRA TEWARY v. SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR INDIA (1906). 10 C. W. N. 841

2.

Irregularity—Disposal of Suit on a Sunday. Held, that the disposing of a civil suit on a Sunday is a mere irregularity which is covered by the provisions of s. 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Ram Das Chakrabati v. The Official Liquidator, Cotton Ginning Company, Limited, Cawnpore*, I. L. R. 9 All. 366, and *Ununt Ram Chatterjee v. Protap Chunder Shiromonee*, 16 W. R. Cr. 230, referred to. SHEORAM TIWARI v. THAKOR PRASAD (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 562

3.

Procedure—Irregularity—Disposal of Suit on a Sunday. Held, that the fact that a suit was decided on a Sunday did not vitiate the decree. *Semle*, that the Lord's Day Act (21 Geo. III, Cap. XLIX) does not apply to India. *Param Shook Doss v. Rasheed Ood Dowlah*, 7 Mad. H. C. 285, referred to. SHEORAM TIWARI v. THAKUR PRASAD (1908). I. L. R. 30 All. 136

ss. 579, 580 (1859, s. 360; Act XXIII of 1861, s. 26).

See DECREE—FORM OF DECREE—COSTS.

— s. 582 (Act XXIII of 1861, s. 37).

See ABATEMENT OF SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 7 All. 693, 734

3 Bom. A. C. 81

12 C. L. R. 45

I. L. R. 11 All. 408

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 203, 597

I. L. R. 23 All. 22

I. L. R. 25 All. 27

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 25 All. 174

See APPELLATE COURT—EXERCISE OF
POWERS IN VARIOUS CASES—SPECIAL
CASES—APPEAL 1 B. L. R. A. C. 155

10 W. R. 160

4 W. R. 109

14 W. R. O. C. 17

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 303

See APPELLATE COURT—EXERCISE OF
POWERS IN VARIOUS CASES—SPECIAL
CASES—ARBITRATION, REFERENCE TO.

See APPELLATE COURT—

INTERFERENCE WITH, AND POWER
TO VARY, ORDER OF LOWER COURT.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 516

EXERCISE OF POWERS—SPECIAL
CASES—PLAINT, AMENDMENT OF.

5 C. W. N. 273

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ARTS.
171, 171A, AND 171B.

See PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES
—RESPONDENTS.

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

— s. 582—*concl.*

See WITHDRAWAL OF SUIT.

Bourke A. O. C. 99

14 W. R. O. C. 17

I. L. R. 8 All. 82

— s. 582A.

See COURT-FEES ACT, s. 28.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 380

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 4.

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 849

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 925

— ss. 582, 587.

See LIMITATION I. L. R. 34 Calc. 1020

— s. 583 (1859, s. 362).

See *ante*, s. 244.

QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 7 All. 432

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 501

I. L. R. 25 All. 441

See APPEAL—EXECUTION OF DECREES—
PARTIES TO SUITS 5 C. W. N. 426

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACH-
MENT—MESNE PROFITS.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 341

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—APPLICATION
FOR EXECUTION, AND POWERS OF
COURT . 5 C. W. N. 287

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 258

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 485

See MESNE PROFITS—ASSESSMENT IN
EXECUTION, AND SUITS FOR.

I. L. R. 7 All. 197

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 261

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 989

I. L. R. 24 All. 361

See PRE-EMPTION—PURCHASE-MONEY.

I. L. R. 10 All. 400

I. L. R. 18 All. 262

See RESTITUTION OF RIGHTS BY MOTION.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 340

I. L. R. 19 All. 136

I. L. R. 20 All. 139, 430

I. L. R. 21 All. 1

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 306

See SURETY—ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY.

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 411

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 1

I. L. R. 17 All. 99

1.

Act VIII of 1859,
s. 362—Application for Execution of Decree. An
application for execution of the decree of an Appel-
late Court should be made to the Court which passes
the first decree in the suit, irrespective of any
previous order referring the case for execution.
RAM JADUB SIRCAR v. AMEERONISSA BIBEE

13 W. R. 27

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 583 (1859, s. 362)—concl'd.

2. ————— *Execution of Decree*
—*Restitution of property sold in execution of a decree afterwards reversed in appeal—Procedure.* In a suit for a declaration that certain property belonged to the defendant judgment-debtor the plaintiff decree-holder obtained a decree and proceeded on the strength thereof to sell the property. In appeal, however, this decree was reversed. The rightful owner of the property sold then applied to the Court for restitution of the property. *Held*, that whether the application could or could not be considered as one falling strictly within the terms of s. 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff was entitled to restitution. *Radhe Singh v. Mangni Ram, 6 C.W.N. 710*, referred to. *SHIAM SUNDAR LAL v. KATSAIR ZAMANI BEGAM (1906)*

I. L. R. 29 All. 143

3. ————— *Restitution—Right to apply not confined to parties to appeal—Rights accruing during litigation.* It is not necessary that a person asking for restitution under s. 583 of the Civil Procedure Code should have been a party to the successful appeal, if the appeal is in effect and substance in favour of such a party. Under s. 583 of the Civil Procedure Code, the parties must be placed in the position they were previously in irrespective of any other rights accruing to any of the parties during the litigation. *GUNGA PROSAD v. BROJO NATH DAS (1907)*

12 C. W. N. 642

ss. 583, 244.—*Restitution due in virtue of the Modification in appeal of the decree of a Rent Court—Procedure.* *Held*, that, although s. 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure might be applied by analogy to proceedings before a Court of Revenue under Act XII of 1881, s. 244 could not be applied to such proceedings. The remedy, therefore, of a person entitled to a refund in consequence of the reversal or modification in appeal of a decree passed under Act XII of 1881 by a Court of Revenue is twofold, both by means of an application in execution and by a separate suit. *Durga Prosad Roy Chowdhry v. Tara Prosad Roy Chowdhry, W. R. P. C. 11*, referred to. *MASHI-ULLAH KHAN v. MAJIB-UN-UNSSA (1904)*

I. L. R. 26 All. 149

s. 584 (1859, s. 372).

See ante, s. 574 . 13 C. W. N. 143

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

8 C. W. N. 774

See SECOND APPEAL.

11 C. W. N. 83, 1028

1. ————— *Decision, interpretation of—Appeal.* By the word "decision" in s. 372 of Act VIII of 1859, was meant the decree and judgment taken together, and not simply the decree unexplained by the judgment. *INDRAJIT KOONWARI v. CHOKOWRI SAHU . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 1*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 584 (1859, s. 372)—cont'd.

2. ————— *Construction of—"May."* The word "may" in Act VIII of 1859, s. 372, does not imply "by some possibility," but means "may not improbably." *RAM CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. KASHEE MOHUN . 21 W. R. 57*

3. ————— *Second Appeal—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 5—Discretion of Court—Extension of time for filing appeal.* *Held*, that no second appeal would lie in a case where the appeal to the Court below was barred by limitation, and that Court in the exercise of its judicial discretion, after careful consideration of the facts and not arbitrarily, refused to act under s. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1877, and dismissed the appeal. *Tulsa Kunwar v. Gajraj Singh, I. L. R. 25 All. 71*, followed. *HAMID ALI v. GAYA DIN (1904)*

I. L. R. 26 All. 327

4. ————— *Second Appeal—Substantial error in procedure—Case not raised by parties, decision upon—Evidence, absence of—Fact, finding of.* When the lower Appellate Court disposed of a suit upon a case not raised by the parties, and to which the evidence had not been directed, there was a substantial error or defect of procedure within the meaning of s. 584 of the Civil Procedure Code. A second appeal also lies, where there was no evidence before the lower Appellate Court upon which it could properly arrive at the conclusion of fact to which it did arrive. *Anangamanjari Chowdhurani v. Tripura Soondari Chowdhurani, L. R. 14 I. A. 101, 110*; and *Musammatt Durgarani Chowdhuran v. Jawahir Singh Chowdhuri, L. R. 17 I. A. 122, 127*, followed. *SHIVABASAVA AMINGAVDA v. SANGAPPA BIN AMINGAVDA (1904)*

8 C. W. N. 865
s.c. L. R. 31 I. A. 154

5. ————— *Second Appeal—Nature of tenancy, if question of law—Tenant-at-will or from year to year—Ejectment, suit for—Notice to quit, reasonable—Suit, if sufficient notice—Bengal Rent Act (X of 1859).* The question as to the nature of a tenancy, *i.e.*, whether the tenants are merely tenants-at-will or whether they are yearly tenants, is a question of law, which can be dealt with by the High Court on second appeal. On the facts of the case the Court held that the defendants were tenants at an annual rent, *i.e.*, yearly tenants and that they were entitled to reasonable notice before they could be ejected and no such notice having been given before the suit was brought, it should be dismissed. *SULATU DASS v. JADU NATH DAS (1904)*

8 C. W. N. 774

6. ————— *Specific Relief—Mandatory Injunction—Discretion of Court—Injunction refused upon unsubstantial grounds.* In a suit by co-sharers for demolition of a building as having been recently erected without their consent on common land by another co-sharer the Court found that the building had been erected as alleged by the plaintiffs, but refused to grant them a man-

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 584 (1859 s. 372)—*concl'd.*

datory injunction upon the ground that "the area was reclaimed by the appellant, defendant, and that others (the plaintiffs included) who have done the same, have been allowed to build on the areas thus reclaimed without any objection, and that no special damage was done." *Held*, that this was not a valid reason for refusing to grant a mandatory injunction; and that such refusal was under the circumstances a good ground of appeal within the meaning of s. 584 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *RAM BAHADUR PAL v. RAM SHANKAR PRASAD PAL* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 688

7. *Power of Court on Second Appeal to examine evidence of usage—Custom—Ryot, right of, to Trees.* A ryot holding lands in a zamindari on a permanent tenure would, as regards land on which a money assessment is paid, be *prima facie* entitled exclusively to the trees thereon. Where the crops are shared between the ryot and zamindar, they will be jointly interested in such trees, but such presumptions may be rebutted by proof of usage or contract to the contrary. *Narayana Ayyangar v. Orr*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 252, followed. Although the provisions of s. 584 of the Code of Civil Procedure disallow a second appeal with reference to findings of fact, yet, the existence or non-existence of a usage having the force of law is unaffected by such disallowance. Consequently, it is the duty of the Court, when it has to pronounce an opinion upon such question to examine the evidence bearing on it, not only as to the sufficiency thereof to establish all the elements (antiquity, uniformity, etc.) required to constitute a valid usage having the force of law, but also the credibility of the evidence relied on and the weight due to it. Custom in India is transcendent law. A custom cannot be established by a few instances or by instances of recent date. Observations on the nature of evidence necessary to support custom. *Eranjoli Vishnu Nambudri v. Eranjoli Krishnan Nambudri*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 3, followed. *Hurry Churn Das v. Nimai Chand Keyal*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 138, not followed. *Bai Shrinbai v. Kharshedji*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 430, not followed. *KAKARLA ABBAYYA v. VENKATA PAPAYYA RAO* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 24

8. A question as to the weight which the lower Appellate Court should have given to certain documents or that the lower Appellate Court misunderstood the result of the first Court's local investigation is no ground of second appeal. *RAI BENODE BEHARI BOSE v. RAI PASUPATI NATH BOSE* (1907)

18 C. W. N. 105

ss. 584, 585—*Second Appeal—Grounds of Appeal—Reversal by High Court on second appeal of lower Appellate Court's decision—"Substantial error or defect of procedure"—Suit to set aside Adoption—Question whether Adoption was real and binding.* In a suit in which the plaintiff prayed that it might be declared that

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*ss. 584, 585—*concl'd.*

the defendant was not her properly and legally adopted son, that the ceremony of adoption did not take place, and that, if it did, it was ineffectual and invalid owing to misrepresentation, coercion and fraud, the first Court found that there was a real adoption binding on the plaintiff. The lower Appellate Court found that though an adoption had taken place it was not, and was not intended to be, a real adoption, but was a sham transaction entered into by collusion for the purpose of deceiving the Government, a case which was not set up by the parties, nor warranted by the evidence. *Held* (affirming the decision of the High Court), that such a disposal of the suit was a "substantial error or defect of procedure" within the meaning of s. 584 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), and that the High Court therefore had jurisdiction to set aside the finding on second appeal. *Anangamanjari Chowdhrami v. Tripura Soondari Chowdhrami*, L. R. 14 I. A. 101, and *Durga Chowdhrami v. Jewahir Singh Chowdhrami*, L. R. 17 I. A. 122, referred to. *SHIVABASAVA v. SANGAPPA* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 1

I. L. R. 31 I. A. 154

ss. 584, 586.

See TORT

9 C. W. N. 495

ss. 584, 591, 623, 629—*When Review granted, no appeal lies against the final decree on grounds other than those mentioned in s. 629—Sufficiency of the reason on which Review granted no ground for appeal against the final decree.* Ss. 584 and 591 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not control s. 629, and do not, where a review is granted and a final decree passed, confer a right of appeal, when such appeal is not based on one of the grounds mentioned in s. 629. Where an application for review of judgment is granted 'for any other sufficient reason' under s. 623 of the Code, the sufficiency or otherwise of the reason is not a good ground of appeal against the order and is not, notwithstanding the general provisions of ss. 584 and 591, a good ground of appeal against the final decree. *GOPALA AIYAR v. RAMASAMI SASTRIAL* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 49

s. 585.

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—

GROUNDS OF APPEAL—QUESTIONS OF

FACT

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 617

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 291

I. L. R. 16 I. A. 233

I. L. R. 15 All. 123

s. 586 (Act XXIII of 1861, s. 27).

See APPEAL—ORDERS I. L. R. 3 All. 18

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 292

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 523

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 734

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 391

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 588—*contd.*

See SECOND APPEAL:

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 212

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—

ORDERS SUBJECT OR NOT TO
APPEAL. I. L. R. 25 Mad. 540

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—
JURISDICTION.

1. *Suit of the nature cognizable by a Court of Small Causes—Appeal.* The plaintiff sued as widow of a deceased Brahman priest to recover from the defendant certain books containing lists of the clients of her late husband and also a sum of Rs 60, on the allegation that the defendant had been entrusted with the books and had realized the money as her agent for the purpose of carrying on the business of her deceased husband, and contrary to the terms of the agency, had not handed over the money, which he had obtained from the clients to her. *Held*, that this was a suit of the nature cognizable by a Court of Small Causes within the meaning of s. 586 of the Code of Civil Procedure. HANS RAJ v. RATNI (1905) I. L. R. 27 All. 200

2. *No Second Appeal where unnecessary prayer for declaration in suit of Small Cause nature.* When all the reliefs which the plaintiff claims in a suit could have been obtained without asking for a declaration, the addition of a prayer for a declaration will not prevent the suit from being of the nature cognisable by a Court of Small Causes within the meaning of s. 586 of the Code of Civil Procedure if without such declaration it is so cognisable. RAMACHENDRAIYAR v. NOORULLA SAHIB (1906) I. L. R. 30 Mad. 101

3. *Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887), Sch I, Art. 31—Suit to recover Profits—Suit of Small Cause Court nature—Second Appeal—High Court.* The plaintiff sued to recover from the defendant a specific sum of money (Rs 120) described in the plaint as his income due to him in respect of his share in certain lands. This right was denied by the defendants in their written statement. The lower Courts dismissed the claim. A second appeal was preferred, but it was objected to on the preliminary ground that no second appeal lay, as the suit was of a nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes. *Held*, that no second appeal lay. The question of title did arise incidentally; but that did not remove the suit from the cognizance of the Court of Small Causes. Damodar Gopal Dikshit v. Chintaman Balkrishna Karve, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 42, and Narayan v. Balaji, I. L. R. 21 Bom. 248, followed. KESRISANG v. NARANSANG (1908) I. L. R. 32 Bom. 560

4. *Small Cause Suit—Character of the Suit—Second Appeal—Framing issues—Exact words of the Legislature relating to issues—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 231—Agent—Undisclosed Principal—Discloses himself*

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 586—*concl.*

Strict construction. In determining whether no second appeal lies under the provisions of s. 586 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) the original character of the suit is to be regarded rather than the character it may subsequently assume by operation of the findings of the Court. Ramchandra Gopal v. Sadashiv Narayan, (1885) P. J. 219, followed. LAKSHMANDAS v. ANNA LANE (1904) I. L. R. 32 Bom. 356

ss. 586, 588.

See REMAND, ORDER OF.

11 C. W. N. 862

s. 587 (1859, ss. 373, 374: Act XXIII of 1861, s. 25).

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—PROCEDURE IN SPECIAL APPEAL 1 Mad. 250

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 419

Agra F. B. 100: Ed. 1874, 75

I. L. R. 9 All. 147

I. L. R. 15 All. 123

1. *Act VIII of 1859, s. 374—Ground of Appeal not taken in Petition.* S. 374 leaves it in the discretion of the Court to admit any new ground of appeal arising out of the proceedings, though it may have been omitted in the petition of special appeal. JOYKISHEN MOOKERJEE v. RAJKISHEN MOOKERJEE. 5 W. R. 147

2. *and s. 567—Appeal from appellate decree—Issue of fact referred to Appellate Court—Objection—Finality of Finding.* A District Court on appeal having reversed the decree of a District Munsif's Court and dismissed the suit upon a preliminary point of law, the High Court, on appeal from the District Court's decree, reversed it and directed the District Court to submit its finding to the High Court upon an issue of fact which had been framed and tried by the District Munsif, but had not been decided by the District Court. Upon the return of the finding upon this issue to the High Court, a memorandum of objections to the finding was presented under s. 567 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that, as the words "as far as may be" in s. 587 (by which the provisions of Ch. XLI are made applicable to appeals from appellate decrees) must be taken to mean "as far as is consistent with the principles on which appeals from appellate decrees are admitted and determined," no objections could be taken to the finding of the District Court under s. 567 of the Code of Civil Procedure. HINDE v. PONNATH BRAYAN

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 52

s. 588 (1859, ss. 363, 364, 365).

See APPEAL. I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1023

EX PARTE CASES.

I. L. R. 25 All. 280

EXECUTION OF DECREES.

ORDERS

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 588 (1859, ss. 363, 364, 365)
—*concl'd.*

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, CL. 15.
I. L. R. 9 Mad. 447
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 422
I. L. R. 20 Mad. 152, 407
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 555

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT,
N.-W. P., CL. 10. I. L. R. 11 All. 375
I. L. R. 14 All. 361
I. L. R. 15 All. 359
I. L. R. 16 All. 443

See PAUPER SUIT—APPEALS.
I. L. R. 23 All. 364

See REMAND—CASES OF APPEAL AFTER
REMAND . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 144
I. L. R. 7 All. 136
I. L. R. 14 Bom. 232
I. L. R. 12 All. 510
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 168
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 422
I. L. R. 18 All. 19
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 324
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 518

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS
SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.

Appeal from Order—
Appeal presented after final disposal of suit—Land-
lord and Tenant—Transfer by Tenant—Yearly ten-
ancy—Transfer of tenancy. The right of appeal
from interlocutory orders ceases with the disposal
of the suit. Where on the plaintiff's appeal a suit
was remanded under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure
Code and on remand the Court of first instance
decided the case in the plaintiff's favour and there
was no appeal from that decision, but the defend-
ant afterwards appealed to the High Court against
the order of remand : *Held*, that the appeal was not
maintainable. *Jatinga Valley Tea Company, Limi-*
ted, v. Cherra Tea Company, Limited, I. L. R. 12
Calc. 45, distinguished. The incident of non-trans-
ferability is common to tenancies from year to year
of homestead lands created before the passing of the
Transfer of Property Act in the absence of a custom
to the contrary. *Hari Nath Karmakar v. Raj*
Chandra Karmakar, 2 C. W. N. 122, followed.
Benee Madhab Banerjee v. Joy Kishen Mookerjee,
12 W. R. 495 : 7 B. L. R. 152, distinguished.
MADHU SUDAN SEN v. KAMINI KANTA SEN (1905)
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1023

s. 588, cls. 18 and 21—

See PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES
—PLAINTIFFS I. L. R. 27 Bom. 162
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 171

s. 588, cl. 24.—*Receiver's Accounts,*
orders in passing Appeal The directions which a
Court gives in passing a Receiver's accounts are
not appealable under cl. 24 of s. 588 of the Civil
Procedure Code. *KESHABATI KUMARI v. MAC-*
GREGOR, (1908) . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 568
s. c. 12 C. W. N. 648

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 588, cl. 27.

See BENGAL RENT ACT (X OF 1859).
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 799

s. 589.

See APPEAL—ORDERS.
I. L. R. 23 All. 56
I. L. R. 27 Bom. 604
I. L. R. 25 All. 174

s. 590.

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 73.
I. L. R. 12 Calc. 629

ss. 590, 591.

See REMAND—CASES OF APPEAL AFTER
REMAND . I. L. R. 7 All. 136
I. L. R. 14 Bom. 232
I. L. R. 12 All. 510
I. L. R. 15 All. 119
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 421
I. L. R. 18 All. 19
I. L. R. 22 All. 366

s. 591.

See *ante*, s. 108.

See APPEAL—

DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE.

I. L. R. 24 All. 464

EX PARTE CASES.

I. L. R. 25 All. 280

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURTS,
1865, CL. 15 . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 555

See PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES
—PLAINTIFFS I. L. R. 27 Bom. 162

s. 592—*Proviso—Pauper Appeal*
—Leave—Reasons for granting leave to be recorded.
In granting leave to appeal as pauper, the Court
should be careful to see that the proviso to s. 592
of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) is
satisfied. The Judge or Bench admitting a pauper
appeal should express and record very briefly the
reasons for granting leave so that the Bench before
whom the appeal ultimately comes may have an
assurance that the leave was properly given.
SAKUBAI v. GANPAT (1904) I. L. R. 28 Bom. 451

ss. 592, 593 (1859, ss. 367, 370).

See PAUPER SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 504
1 N. W. 167; Ed. 1873, 246
17 W. R. 68
I. L. R. 24 All. 172
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 369, 437

s. 594—Meaning of "decree."

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE—LEAVE TO APPEAL
I. L. R. 27 Bom. 415

ss. 594, 595 (a)—

See APPEAL—EX PARTE CASES.
5 C. W. N. 158

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 594 to 616.

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL.

s. 595.

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 618

1. ————— “Final Decree” —

Order of remand—Suit to annul incumbrances—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 167—Notice—Dismissal of suit on the ground of non-service of notice—Appellate Court holding service proved and remanding case. Where a suit to annul incumbrances by the purchasers of a *putni* at a sale for its own arrears was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove the service of notices under s. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, but the High Court on appeal held that the service of notices was proved and remanded the suit for the trial of the other issues in the case: *Held*, that though the order of the High Court was in form an order of remand, it finally decided the cardinal point in the case, *viz.*, whether the notices were properly served or not. The order was therefore a “final decree” within the meaning of s. 595 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Saiyid Muzhar Hossain v. Bodha Bibi*, I. L. R. 17 All. 113; *Ruhimbhoy Habibhoy v. C. A. Turner*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 155, referred to. **ANANDA GOPAL GOSSAIN v. NAFFAR CHANDRA PAL** (1905)

**I. L. R. 35 Calc. 618
s. c. 12 C. W. N. 545**

2. ————— Application for

Leave to appeal to the Privy Council—Limitation—High Court's refusal to admit appeal after period of limitation—“Decree”—“Final Decree passed on appeal,” meaning of. An order of the High Court refusing to admit an appeal after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the Limitation Act is not a “decree passed on appeal” by a High Court under s. 595 of the Civil Procedure Code and there is therefore no jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal therefrom to the Privy Council under clause (a) or (b) of that section. *Sunder Koer v. Chandishwar Prosad Singh*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 679, followed. *KARSONDAS v. GANGABAI* (1907)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 108

ss. 595, 596.

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 963

See LETTERS PATENT, s. 39.

9 C. W. N. 566

ss. 595-608 (Act VI of 1874, s. 4).

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL.

s. 596.

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 400

**1. ————— Privy Council, ap-
peal to—Leave, application for—Appellable Value—**

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 596—*concl.*

Libel suit—Amount of Damages claimed, no test—Practice—Enquiry. The plaintiff in a suit for damages for libel cannot ensure an appeal to the Privy Council by merely placing his damages at a sufficiently high figure. Leave to appeal from an appellate judgment of the High Court dismissing, on the ground of privilege, a suit for damages for libel, was refused in the view that on the finding of the Court of first instance, and not reversed by the Appellate Court, the plaintiff had sustained no substantial damage. Where there is a contest as to the true value of the matter in dispute it has been the invariable practice—a practice sanctioned by the Judicial Committee—to ascertain by evidence and enquiry what the true value is. **AMRITA NATH MITTER v. ABHOY CHARAN GHOSH** (1905)

9 C. W. N. 370

2. ————— Appeal to Privy

Council—Valuation for purposes of Appeal—Suit for partition. For the purposes of valuation within s. 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the value of the subject-matter of the suit, in a suit for partition, is the value of the whole estate, which it is sought to partition and not merely of the particular share, which one of the parties may claim. When the value of the whole estate is over Rs. 10,000, appeal would lie to His Majesty in Council, because the decree appealed from would “involve directly or indirectly some claim or question to or respecting property” of that value, within the meaning of the section. *Semble*: The “value of the matter in dispute in appeal” in such a case is the value of the whole estate and not merely the share claimed by the plaintiff. **LALA BHUGWAT SAHAY v. RAY PASHUPATI NATH BOSE** (1906) **10 C. W. N. 564**

3. ————— Bengal, N.-W. P.

and Assam Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887), s. 21—Suit for Partition—Valuation—Appeal. In a suit for partition, the value of the entire estate, and not the value of the plaintiff's share in it, is the value of the original suit within the meaning of s. 21 of Act XII of 1887. **BIRAJ MOHINI DAS v. CHINTAMONI DAS**. (Footnote.) (1906) **10 C. W. N. 565**

4. ————— Application for

Leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), ss. 5 and 12. *Held*, that neither s. 5 nor s. 12 of the Limitation Act, 1877, applies to applications under s. 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. *Jawahir Lal v. Narain Das*, I. L. R. 1 All. 644. *In the matter of the petition of Sita Ram Kesho*, I. L. R. 15 All. 14; *Moraba Ram Chandra v. Ghanasham Nilkant Nadkarni*, I. L. R. 19 Bom. 301, and *Anderson v. Periasami*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 195, followed. **SHIB SING v. GANDHARF SINGH** (1906) **I. L. R. 28 All. 391**

ss. 596-600.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 177.

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 596-600—*concl'd.*

See PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—
SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL.

6 C. W. N. 362

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 57

s. 601—*Privy Council, appeal to—
Leave to appeal, application for—Certificate, refusal
of—Grounds to be stated.* The High Court in
refusing a certificate for leave to appeal to His
Majesty in Council should state the grounds for
refusing it. VENGANATH SWAROOPATHIL VALIA
NAMBIDI v. CHERAKUNNATH NAMBIYATHAN
AMBUDRIS (1906)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 194

s. c. 10 C. W. N. 545

L. R. 33 I. A. 67

s. 602.

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL.

11 C. W. N. 1104

s. 608.

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, CL. 15.
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 473

See PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—STAY
OF PROCEEDINGS IN INDIA PENDING
APPEAL

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 290

L. R. 4 I. A. 1

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 1

L. R. 21 I. A. 170

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 1

4 C. W. N. 34

I. L. R. 38 Calc. 335

s. 610.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—ORDERS AND
DECREES OF PRIVY COUNCIL.

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 329

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 482

I. L. R. 8 All. 650

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 105

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 960

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 283

2 C. W. N. 89

See SURETY—ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY.

I. L. R. 2 All. 604

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 402

*Execution of decree—
Privy Council—Restoration of property alienated
pending appeal to the Privy Council—Procedure.*
Pending an appeal to His Majesty in Council, certain
property forming part of the subject-matter of
the suit, in which such appeal had been preferred,
was sold by auction in execution of a money decree
against the plaintiff, who held the decree of the
High Court under appeal. The defendant's appeal
to the Privy Council was decreed. *Held*, that the
successful appellant was entitled to recover the
property sold as above mentioned by means of an
application under s. 244 read with s. 610 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, and this right was not
affected by the fact that the auction-purchasers

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 610—*concl'd.*

were not parties to the decree of the Privy Council.
Gulzari Lal v. Madho Ram, I. L. R. 26 All. 447,
followed. *Bhagwati Prasad v. Jamma Prasad*,
I. L. R. 19 All. 136, and *Sadiq Husain v. Latha
Prasad*, I. L. R. 20 All. 139, distinguished.
GARUDHUJ PRASAD SINGH v. BAIJU MAL (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 337

s. 617 (Act XXIII of 1861, s. 28).

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CIVIL
CASES

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 327

*Reference—Reasonable
Doubt—Point clearly decided by the rulings of the
High Court of Presidency.* A reference under s.
617 of the Civil Procedure Code can only be made
when the Judge of the Court entertains a reason-
able doubt. A Judge cannot ordinarily entertain a
reasonable doubt on a point clearly decided by the
rulings of the High Court of his Presidency, unless
the authority of the decision can be questioned by
virtue of anything said or decided in the Privy
Council. BHANAJI v. DE BRITO (1905)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 226

ss. 617, 618, and 619-620.

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY
TOWNS—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—
REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT.

ss. 617, 621.

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY
TOWNS—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
—REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 458

s. 620.

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—REFERENCE
TO HIGH COURT.

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 507

*Review of Judgment—
Appeal from order granting a review—Grounds of
appeal.* When an application for review of judg-
ment has been granted for "any other sufficient
reason," the sufficiency or otherwise of the reason
for granting it is not a ground of appeal within
the meaning of s. 629 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure. *Per* RICHARD, J.—But the fact that the
Court-fee on the plaint, at first held to be inade-
quate, is afterwards found to be sufficient is a good
ground for granting a review of judgment. ALI
AKBAR v. KHURSHED ALI (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 695

s. 622 (Act XXIII of 1861, s. 35).

See *ante*, ss. 44, 331.

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 177

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 57

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 648

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 622—*contd.*

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885) . . . 12 C. W. N. 835

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 153.
9 C. W. N. 492

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT V OF 1898) . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 909

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 439.
8 C. W. N. 73

See DISTRICT REGISTRAR.
I. L. R. 30 Mad. 326

See JURISDICTION.

See LAND ACQUISITION ACT (I OF 1894).
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1104

See LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT (XVIII OF 1879) . . . 12 C. W. N. 381

See LIMITATION ACT, s. 25.

See PRACTICE, GENERAL—VAKIL AND COUNSEL . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 986

See PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT . . . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 138
I. L. R. 31 Calc. 340

See PRIVY COUNCIL . . . 8 C. W. N. 296

See REVISION . . . I. L. R. 30 All. 116

See SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT.
I. L. R. 29 Bom. 213

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622.

1. *Sale of Property to satisfy order for Rateable Distribution—Rate varied on appeal—Application for restitution of property sold—Refusal—Appeal—Revision—Restitution.* Petitioner and counter-petitioners held decrees against the same judgment-debtor. Petitioner having realized a large sum in execution, the District Court held that petitioner and counter-petitioners were each entitled, on a rateable distribution, to about one-half of the entire sum realized. The District Court realized from petitioner the amount ordered to be paid to counter-petitioners, six items of property being attached and sold, counter-petitioners being the purchasers, and the sale being subsequently confirmed. The High Court then decided an appeal, which had meanwhile been pending, the result of which was that counter-petitioners were held to be entitled to much less than they had been awarded by the District Court and had received from petitioner. This sum was also less than what had been realized by the sale of the six items of property. Petitioner, in consequence, applied to the District Court for restitution of the six items of property, which had been sold by the Court and for other relief. The District Court held that the sale could not be set aside as a nullity and that the petitioner was only entitled to receive back the balance, which had been paid

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*s. 622—*contd.*

in excess. On an appeal being preferred to the High Court: *Held*, (i) that no appeal lay from the order of the District Court. The order was not a decree; the parties were not parties to a suit; and the order was not one from which a special right of appeal was allowed by the Code. The right of appeal must not be assumed to exist in every matter which comes under the consideration of a Judge, but must be given by statute or by some authority equivalent to statute. Nor does s. 647 of the Code of Civil Procedure confer any right of appeal not expressly given elsewhere by the Code; (ii) that the High Court had no power to revise the order. The District Court had jurisdiction to decide the matter and had done so, though perhaps wrongly; (iii) that petitioner should have been held entitled to some restitution. The principle which should have been followed was: "The Court in making restitution is bound to restore the parties, so far as they can be restored, to the position, which they were in at the time when the Court, by its erroneous action, had displaced them from it." Inasmuch as the property sold had realized more than what was due under the Court's order, the sale was illegal at any rate in so far as it was unnecessary; and, *semble*, that it was entirely illegal. *PARASURAMA AYYAR v. SESHIER* (1904)
I. L. R. 27 Mad. 504

2. *Execution of decree—Order—Appeal—Order passed without jurisdiction—Grounds for non-interference in extraordinary jurisdiction.* Where the order of the lower Appellate Court was passed without jurisdiction, the High Court declined to interfere under the extraordinary jurisdiction (s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act XIV of 1882) on the ground that the plaintiff, to whom relief was granted by the lower Appellate Court, would, if the application were allowed, be obliged to bring a suit to establish the right which he claimed to the property in dispute, after the expiry of the period of limitation within which he was entitled to bring that suit. *DAYARAM v. GOVERDHANDAS* (1904)
I. L. R. 28 Bom. 458

3. *Liability of Broker—Burden of proof—Decree unsupported by any evidence—Jurisdiction.* A decree, which is unsupported by any evidence, is made without jurisdiction and is liable to be set aside under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Downman v. Williams*, 7 Ad. & E. (N.S.) 103, 111, and *Shields v. Wilkinson*, I. L. R. 9 All. 398, followed. *BISSESSUR DASS v. JOHANN SMIDT* (1006) . . . 10 C. W. N. 14

4. *Revision—Suit.* The ordinary rule is that where an aggrieved party has another remedy available, *e.g.*, by regular suit, the High Court is unwilling to interfere in revision, but even if there be such remedy the High Court may interfere in exceptional cases. *UMATUL MEHDI v. KULSOOM* (1908)
12 C. W. N. 16

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

s. 622—concl'd.

5. ————— *Revisional power of High Courts over Presidency Courts of Small Causes—Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882), s. 69. Where the Judges differ, matter must be referred to High Court.* There is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure or in the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act to exempt Presidency Courts of Small Causes from the revisional powers of the High Court under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. Where the Judges of such Court sitting together in Full Bench to dispose of a suit, take different views on a point affecting the merits of the case, they are bound under s. 69 of the Act to refer the matter to the opinion of the High Court and ought not to deal with the matter finally. Where the order of the Full Bench, on the application of the party for a retrial, fully deals with all the points arising for decision in the suit itself without granting a formal order for retrial, the absence of such formal order is immaterial, and the Judges must be considered to have sat together in the suit within the meaning of s. 69. The substantial effect of the order and not its mere form must be considered. *Seshammal v. Munusamy Mudali*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 358, referred to. *RANGIAH NAIDU v. RANGIAH* (1908)
I. L. R. 31 Mad. 490

6. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 195, 439—Legal Practitioners Act (XVIII of 1879), s. 14—Jurisdiction.* A complaint made by letter by a litigant to the Subordinate Judge charging a pleader with professional misconduct was "filed" by the Subordinate Judge; but on a similar complaint being sent to the District Judge, the District Judge, having inquired into its authenticity, sent it to the Subordinate Judge for inquiry and report. The Subordinate Judge thereupon instituted an inquiry under s. 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act, as a result of which he granted sanction to the pleader to prosecute for perjury one of the witnesses who had appeared before him in the course of the inquiry, and this order was confirmed by the District Judge. *Held*, that the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Subordinate Judge under either s. 195 or s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; nor could it interfere under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the Subordinate Judge, though he possibly mistook the meaning of the District Judge's order addressed to him, had jurisdiction to inquire into the truth of the charge made against the pleader. *MAZHAR HASAN v. SAIYID HASAN* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 38

ss. 622, 623, 626, 629.

See REVISION . I. L. R. 29 All. 468

ss. 622, 629—*Review of Judgment—Revision—Application for revision of an order rejecting an application for review. Semble:* That it was the intention of the Legislature that the Court which originally heard a case should be the Court to decide whether an application to review

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—contd.**

ss. 622, 629—cont'd.

its former judgment should or should not be granted, and where that Court rejects such an application, its decision should not be open either to appeal or to revision by a higher Court. *RAM LAL v. RATAN LAL* (1904) . I. L. R. 26 All. 572

s. 623 (1859, s. 376).

See CONSENT DECREE 13 C. W. N. 1197

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 5 AND
SCH. II, ART. 173.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 485

See REVIEW.

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—NEW
TRIALS . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 699
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 236
I. L. R. 8 Calc. 287
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 297
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 178

1. ————— s. 623—*Ground of Review—Fraud—Mistake.* The ground that fraud was practised upon a party in connection with a petition of compromise upon which a decree was made is a good ground of review under s. 623. A mistake in the matter of copying out the petition of compromise may not by itself fall within the scope of s. 623, but taking it with the other ground stated above it might be a good ground of review. *RASIK CHANDRA CHOWDHURY v. RAJANI RANJAN CHOWDHURY* (1906) . . . 10 C. W. N. 286

2. ————— *Review of Judgment—Effect of order on review—Appeal from original decree.* Where an application for review of judgment is granted, the result is a new decree superseding the original decree, and not merely some amendment thereof. An appeal was filed pending an application for review of judgment in the Court below; the review was granted, and an order passed which purported merely to amend the decree then under appeal. *Held*, that the order for review superseded the original decree; the decree under appeal had ceased to exist and the appeal could not be heard. *Kuar Sen v. Ganga Ram*, All. Weekly Notes (1890) 144, followed. *KANHAIYA LAL v. BALDEO PRASAD* (1906)
I. L. R. 28 All. 240

3. ————— *Jurisdiction of Court to hear Review not taken away by the presentation of an Appeal.* Where an application for review has been presented by a party to a suit and an appeal is afterwards preferred, the Court to which the application for review is made is not thereby deprived of jurisdiction to entertain the application. *Ramanadhan Chetty v. Narayanan Chetty*, I. L. R. 27 Mad. 602, overruled. *CHEENNA REDDI v. PEDDAOBI REDDI* (1909)
I. L. R. 32 Mad. 416

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

ss. 623, 626—*Order in Execution—Decree—Review—Order rejecting Application for Review—Appeal.* An order in execution, being a decree under the Civil Procedure Code, was passed on the 20th November 1902 and a supplementary order as to costs was made on the 20th December following. On the 3rd August 1903 the party aggrieved by the latter order applied under s. 623 of the Civil Procedure Code for a review of judgment. Notice was issued to the opposite party and the application for review was heard with the result that the Judge after disposing of certain technical objections proceeded to deal with the case on the merits, and having done so, he rejected the application for review with costs on the 14th September 1903. Against the said order the applicant having appealed: *Held*, that the order rejecting the application for review was not appealable. The proper procedure would be to appeal from the order of the 20th December 1902 relating to costs. A petition of review involves three stages of procedure. The first stage commences ordinarily with an *ex parte* application under s. 623 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court may then either reject the application at once, or may grant a rule calling on the other side to show cause, why the review should not be granted. In the second stage the rule may either be admitted or rejected and the hearing of the rule may involve to some extent an investigation into the merits. If the rule is discharged then the case ends. If, on the other hand, the rule is made absolute, then the third stage is reached. The case is re-heard on the merits and may result in a repetition of the former decree or some variation of it. Though in one aspect the result is the same whether the rule be discharged or on the re-hearing the original decree be repeated, in law there is a material difference, for in the latter case, the whole matter having been re-opened, there is a fresh decree. In the former case the parties are relegated to and still rest on the old decree. *VADILAL v. FULCHAND* (1905)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 56

ss. 624 and 626C.

See REVIEW—REVIEW BY JUDGE OTHER THAN JUDGE IN ORIGINAL CASE.

s. 626 (1859, s. 378).

See REVIEW.

ss. 626, 629—*Review of Judgment—Rejection of application for review upon the ground of want of jurisdiction—Revision.* S. 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, must be read with s. 626. Where the Court does not consider whether or not there are sufficient grounds for review, but rejects the application on the erroneous view that it has no jurisdiction to entertain it, the order is open to revision. *Ram Lal v. Ratan Lal*, I. L. R. 26 All. 572, distinguished. *Willis v. Jawad Husain*, I. L. R. 29 All. 468, referred to. *AKBAR KHAN v. MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN* (1909)

I. L. R. 31 All. 610

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.***

s. 629 (1859, s. 378).

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 171
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 496
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 788
I. L. R. 18 All. 44
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 3, 734, 984
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 328
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 878
1 C. W. N. 338
4 C. W. N. 39
5 C. W. N. 485

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 5, AND SCH. II, ART. 173 I. L. R. 26 Bom. 485

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 296
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 788
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 496
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 125
I. L. R. 11 All. 383
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 319, 319 note, 878

s. 632.

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, N.-W. P., CL. 10.

I. L. R. 11 All. 375
I. L. R. 14 All. 226
I. L. R. 15 All. 359

s. 640 (1859, s. 21)—

See COMMISSION—CIVIL CASES.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 584

See PARDA-NASHIN WOMEN.

8 W. R. 282
24 W. R. 375
3 C. W. N. 750, 751, 753
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 650, 651 note

See PAUPER SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 24 All. 172

s. 642.

See ARREST—CIVIL ARREST.

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 106
I. L. R. 4 Mad. 317
I. L. R. 4 All. 27
5 C. L. R. 170
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 150

See ATTACHMENT—ATTACHMENT OF PERSON . . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 128

s. 643 (Act XXIII of 1861, ss. 16 and 19).

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 476 . . . I. L. R. 1 Calc. 450
7 Bom. Cr. 29
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 730

See DIVISION BENCH OF HIGH COURT.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 532

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 643—*concl.*

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—NATURE,
FORM, AND SUFFICIENCY OF SANCTION.
I. L. R. 7 All. 871

1. *Act XXIII of 1861, ss. 16 and 19—Power of Civil Court to send case to Magistrate for trial of Perjury and Forgery.* Under ss. 16 and 19, Act XXIII of 1861, Civil Courts had power to refer to Magistrates, or to make commitments to the Sessions, in cases of perjury or forgery, only when they had come to some conclusion in respect of the guilt of the party concerned, or the truth or otherwise of the document or evidence. *In the matter of the petition of HIRONATH ROY* . . . 7 W. R. 482

2. *Fraudulent Execution of Decree—Penal Code, s. 210—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 258.* The fact that the provisions of s. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with does not render a commitment to a Magistrate, under s. 643, for investigation of the offence of fraudulent execution of a decree, illegal. The Civil Court sending up the accused is not debarred from admitting evidence that the decree has been satisfied out of Court. *QUEEN v. MOTURAMAN CHETTI* . . . I. L. R. 4 Mad. 325

s. 644.

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CIVIL CASES.
6 C. W. N. 845

ss. 646A and 646B.

See MUNSIF, JURISDICTION OF.
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 425

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CIVIL
CASES . . . I. L. R. 11 All. 304
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 344
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 249
I. L. R. 24 Bom. 310

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—SMALL
CAUSE COURT SUITS—GENERAL CASES.
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 249

s. 646B.

See JURISDICTION.
I. L. R. 30 Mad. 41

See PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS
ACT (IX OF 1887) 12 C. W. N. 187

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CIVIL
CASES . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 135

s. 647 (Act XXIII of 1861, s. 38).

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—APPLICA-
TION FOR EXECUTION AND POWER OF
COURT.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 462, 515, 635
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 240

I. L. R. 12 All. 179, 392
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 67

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 429
I. L. R. 22 I. A. 44

I. L. R. 17 All. 106 : I. L. R. 20 Bom. 541
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 131

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—*contd.*

s. 647—*concl.*

See APPEAL—EXECUTION OF DECREE—
QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION.
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 428

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—STAY OF
EXECUTION . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 178
I. L. R. 9 All. 36

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—TRANSFER
OF DECREE FOR EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 1 All. 180
I. L. R. 5 Bom. 680
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 61

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CIVIL
CASES . . . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 327

See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASE—GENERAL
CASES . . . I. L. R. 8 Mad. 548
I. L. R. 9 All. 180

provisions of—

See LIS PENDENS . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 393

Criminal Procedure Code, s. 195. S. 647 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not make the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings under s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *RAMA AYYAR v. VENKATACHELLA PADAYACHI* (1907)
I. L. R. 30 Mad. 311

s. 648.

See ATTACHMENT—ATTACHMENT BEFORE
JUDGMENT . . . 7 C. W. N. 216

s. 649 (1859, s. 296).

See COSTS . . . Bourke O. C. 154

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—APPLICATION
FOR EXECUTION AND POWER OF COURT.
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 513
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 162

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—TRANSFER
OF DECREE FOR EXECUTION.
5 C. W. N. 150

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—
CALCUTTA—CIVIL
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 201

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 86.
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 511

See MUNSIF, JURISDICTION OF.
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 445

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
INVALID SALES—WANT OF JURISDIC-
TION . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 699

Decrees—Parties—Judgment-debtors. S. 649 should, if possible, be so construed as to make it convenient to parties to execute their decrees, the decree-holders as well as the judgment-debtors. *UDIT NARAIN CHAUDHURY v. MATHURA PERSHAD MAHATA* (1908)
12 C. W. N. 859

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT XIV
OF 1882 (ACT X OF 1877)—concl'd.**

s. 651—

See APPEAL—OBJECTIONS BY RESPON-
DENT . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 655

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 5 All. 318

See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.

I. L. R. 4 All. 27

I. L. R. 5 All. 318

s. 652.

See HIGH COURT RULES.

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 14

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY
TOWNS—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
—LEAVE TO SUE.

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 236

Sch. IV, Form 109.

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES
—MORTGAGE . 6 C. W. N. 769

Forms 109 and 123.

See INTEREST—OMISSION TO STIPULATE
FOR, OR STIPULATED TIME HAS EXPI-
RED . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 766

1 C. W. N. 550

Sch. IV, Form 113.

See PLAINT—FORM AND CONTENTS OF
PLAINT—NAME OF SUITS GENERALLY.
I. L. R. 7 Calc. 423

Form 115.

See PROBATE—OPPOSITION TO, AND REVO-
CATION OF, GRANT . 5 C. W. N. 383

Forms 125, 126.

See WITNESS—CIVIL CASES—SUMMON-
ING AND ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES.
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 200

Sch. IV, Form 130.

See COMPROMISE.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 561

Forms 132 and 133.

See PARTNERSHIP—PROCEDURE.

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 423

Form 136.

See WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 244

Form 154.

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CIVIL CASES.
6 C. W. N. 845

Form 156.

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—COMMI-
SSION . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 404

Form 157.

See ACCOUNT, SUIT FOR.

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 654

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT V OF
1908).**

ss. 2, 109—Order XLF, Rule 1—

*Practice—Appeal to the King in Council—Order of
Remand—Order, final and interlocutory.* An order
of remand which determines only a part of the
case and leaves other matters still to be determined
is not a 'final order,' within the meaning of s.
109, Code of Civil Procedure. *Saiyid Muzhar
Hosein v. Bodha Bibi*, I. L. R. 17 All. 112, *Stand-
ard Discount Co. v. La Grange*, L. R. 3 C. P. D. 67,
and *Salaman v. Warner*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 734, refer-
red to. *BAIJ NATH DASS v. SOHAN BIBI* (1909)

I. L. R. 31 All. 545

s. 9—Civil Court—Jurisdiction—*Suit
of a civil nature—Suit by Temple committee against
Temple servants for declaration as to their right to have
the services performed.* The plaintiffs, as members of
the committee of management of a temple, received
annually from Government a sum of money for
defraying the expenses of certain kinds of religious
worship in the temple, and it was obligatory upon
them to get the worship performed by the hereditary
officers or servants attached to the temple. Those
officers, owing to quarrels among themselves, failed
to perform the worship, with the result that the
duties owing to the deity were neglected and the
funds in the hands of the plaintiffs remained
undisbursed for the purposes for which they were
held in trust. The plaintiffs, therefore, filed this
suit against the temple servants for a declaration of
the former's right to disburse the funds by getting
the worship performed by a suitable person or
persons of their own choice in the event of the
hereditary officers or servants of the temple
concerned failing to perform it, and for an injunc-
tion to restrain those officers or servants from
obstructing the plaintiffs in the exercise of the right
so declared. It was objected to the suit that it
was not triable by a Civil Court because its prayer
was for a bare declaration of the plaintiffs' right
either to perform by themselves or to get per-
formed certain religious ceremonies in a temple,
and there was no contest as to any right to pro-
perty or to any office. *Held*, that the suit was
of a civil nature. An action would lie against the
plaintiffs by the Advocate-General acting on behalf
of the public to compel them to a due execution
of their particular acts of duty. The obligation
cast on them by the trust, gave them a correspond-
ing right to disburse the funds after getting the
religious worship for which those funds were in-
tended, properly performed. Such a right was not
the less of a civil nature though the funds were to
be appropriated to religious ceremonies. The
Court was not called upon to enter into the
adjudication of any rites or ceremonies as such.
What it had to decide was the right of the trustees
to fulfil the trust unhindered. *TRIMBAK GOPAL
v. KRISHNARAO PANDURANG* (1909)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 387

s. 73—Civil Procedure Code (Act V of
1908), s. 73, o. XXXVIII, rr. 10-11—Four suits
against same. Defendant—Attachment of moveables

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT V OF 1908)—*concl'd.*s. 73—*concl'd.*

before judgment in each suit—Distribution of sale-proceeds amongst decree-holders in three suits—Remedy of decree-holders in remaining suit. Some buffaloes were attached before judgment by the plaintiffs in four different suits against the same defendants each of which ended in a decree. The decree-holders in three of the suits applied for rateable distribution of the proceeds of a sale of the buffaloes which had taken place during the pendency of the suits. Before the moneys were taken out, the decree-holders in the remaining suit applied for execution and a re-distribution of the sale-proceeds. The application having been rejected: *Held*, in revision, that s. 73 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply to the case, and the lower Court was not justified in ordering a distribution of the sale-proceeds amongst the decree-holders in three of the suits in disregard of the order of attachment in the other suit, and the application of the decree-holders in that suit made whilst the money was still in Court, should not have been rejected. *BUTLOO KHAN v. GOMANI SINGH* (1909)

13 C. W. N. 1177

s. 115.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 153.

13 C. W. N. 793

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 476.

13 C. W. N. 1038

O. VI, r. 17—*Amendment of Pleadings*

—Defence of the bar of limitation—Practice as to amendment of plaint. The plaintiffs alleging that in pursuance of a partnership agreement they delivered R4,001 worth of cloth to defendants, sued for an order for the dissolution of the partnership and accounts. The Subordinate Judge found that the plaintiffs did deliver R4,001 worth of cloth to the defendants as alleged; but he came to the conclusion that no partnership was created and held that the suit as framed would not lie. The plaintiffs appealed mainly on the ground that the partnership had been created and that the suit was in order. When the appeal came on for hearing this plea was abandoned; the plaintiffs admitted that the facts stated in their plaint did not constitute a partnership and prayed for leave to amend by adding a prayer for the recovery of the R4,001. At this date the claim for the money was barred by limitation. The lower Appellate Court being of opinion that the plaintiffs had from the first intended to sue only for the recovery of their money, but had been misled by their pleader, allowed the amendment to be made and ultimately allowed the plaintiffs' claim. The defendants in appeal to the High Court contended that the amendment was wrongly allowed. *Held*, that the amendment was rightly allowed. The defence of limitation was a defence to which the defendants were never fairly entitled, and the allowance of the amendment only withdrew from them an advan-

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT V OF 1908)—*concl'd.*O. VI, r. 17—*concl'd.*

tage which they ought never to have received. *Per* BATCHELOR, J.:—Under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, O. VI, r. 17, all amendments ought to be allowed, at any stage of the proceedings, which satisfy the two conditions (a) of not working in justice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. It is merely a particular case of this general rule that where a plaintiff seeks to amend by setting up a fresh claim in respect of a cause of action which since the institution of the suit had become barred by limitation, the amendment must be refused: to allow it would be to cause the defendant an injury which could not be compensated in costs by depriving him of a good defence to the claim. The ultimate test therefore still remains the same: can the amendment be allowed without injustice to the other side, or can it not? *KISANDAS RUPCHAND v. RACHAPPA VITHOBA* (1909)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 644

O. XIV, r. 13.

See PARTITION

13 C. W. N. 630

O. XXII, r. 1.

See RIGHT TO SUE, SURVIVAL OF.

I. L. R. 36 Cal. 799

O. 38, rr. 10, 11.

See *ante*, s. 73

13 C. W. N. 1177

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE AMENDMENT ACT (XII OF 1879).

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882.

s. 27.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 257A.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 419

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 258.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 589

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 204

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 122

s. 30.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REVENUE COURTS—ORDERS OF REVENUE COURTS

I. L. R. 18 All. 437

I. L. R. 20 All. 379

See RULES MADE UNDER ACTS.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 322

I. L. R. 12 All. 564

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE AMEND-
MENT ACT (VII OF 1888).****s. 46.**

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EFFECT OF
CHANGE OF LAW PENDING EXECUTION.
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 323

s. 48.

See APPEAL—OBJECTIONS BY RESPOND-
ENT . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 492

s. 49.

See REMAND—POWER OF REMAND.
I. L. R. 16 Mad. 207

ss. 53, 66.

See ABATEMENT OF SUIT—APPEALS.
I. L. R. 11 All. 408

s. 55.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REV-
ENUE COURTS—ORDERS OF REVENUE
COURTS . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 437
I. L. R. 20 All. 379

ss. 55, 56.

See APPEAL—APPEAL NEWLY GIVEN BY
LAW . . . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 429

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 472

See DISTRICT JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 377

s. 57.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.
177 . . . I. L. R. 15 All. 14

s. 59.

See REVIEW—REVIEW BY JUDGE OTHER
THAN JUDGE IN ORIGINAL CASE.
I. L. R. 16 Bom. 603

s. 60.

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CIVIL
CASES . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 249

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—SMALL
CAUSE COURT SUITS—GENERAL CASES.
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 249

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE AMEND-
MENT ACT (X OF 1888).**

See DISTRICT JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.
I. L. R. 18 Calc. 496

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See APPEAL—ORDERS.
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 472

See DISTRICT JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 377

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE AMEND-
MENT ACT (VI OF 1892).****s. 3.**

See COURT FEES ACT, s. 5.
I. L. R. 15 All. 117

**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE AMEND-
MENT ACT (VI OF 1892)—concl'd.****s. 4.**

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—APPLICATION
FOR EXECUTION AND POWER OF COURT.

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I. L. R. 18 Bom. 429
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 131
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I. L. R. 20 Bom. 198

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OF DECREES FOR EXECUTION AND
POWER OF COURT, ETC.

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 61

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.
179—STEP IN AID OF EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 16 All. 75

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PRELIMINARY POINTS.

I. L. R. 15 All. 49, 84
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 131

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TION FOR EXECUTION AND POWER OF
COURT . . . I. L. R. 17 All. 106
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**CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE AMEND-
MENT ACT (V OF 1894).**

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EFFECT OF
CHANGE OF LAW PENDING EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 940
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 767
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 477

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—SET-
TING ASIDE SALE—GENERAL CASES.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—GENERAL CASES.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 682, 958
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 416
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 703
1 C. W. N. 185, 279
2 C. W. N. 353
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 181, 450

CIVIL AND REVENUE COURTS.

See AGRA TENANCY ACT, ss. 79, 81.

I. L. R. 27 All. 372,

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(II OF 1901), s. 32.

I. L. R. 29 All. 66

See PARTITION . I. L. R. 29 All. 604

CIVIL SUIT.

pendency of—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT V
OF 1898), ss. 145, 192, 529.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 370

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See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 170.

13 C. W. N. 650

See HINDU LAW . 10 C. W. N. 978

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 566

abandonment of part of—

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SUE FOR, PORTION OF CLAIM.

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2 B. L. R. P. C. 98

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I. L. R. 24 Mad. 409

bonâ fide claim of right—

See MISCHIEF . 7 C. W. N. 859

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very—

See RAILWAYS ACT, s. 77.

13 C. W. N. 24

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UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

5 C. W. N. 91

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CLAIMS ON ASSETS.

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 40.

8 B. L. R. 30, 118

13 B. L. R. Ap. 2

12 C. L. R. 165

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 42.

6 B. L. R. Ap. 144

under pending award.

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACH-
MENT—EXPECTANCY 7 B. L. R. 186

CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 170.

3 C. W. N. 386

4 C. W. N. 732, 734

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 382

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 244—
PARTIES TO SUITS . 7 W. R. 361

13 Moo. I. A. 69

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 391

I. L. R. 7 All. 752

I. L. R. 8 All. 626

I. L. R. 9 All. 605

I. L. R. 11 All. 74

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 290

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 52

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 1

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 134

6 C. W. N. 727

CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY—
c o m d.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 244—

QUESTION IN EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 603

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 28

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 711

I. L. R. 12 All. 313

I. L. R. 19 All. 480

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 399

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 328

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 237

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 195

See INSOLVENCY—CLAIMS OF ATTACHING
CREDITORS AND OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 673

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.
11.

See ONUS OF PROOF—CLAIMS TO ATTACH-
ED PROPERTY.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CLAIM TO ATTACHED
PROPERTY.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—GENERAL CASES.

7 C. W. N. 243

consolidation of—

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—ADMIRALTY
COURTS . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 511

3 C. W. N. 67

1. ——— Limitation Act, 1877, s. 7
(1859, s. 11)—Civil Procedure Code, 1877-1882,
ss. 278, 280, 281, 283 (1859, s. 247). The provi-
sions of s. 11 of the Limitation Act, XIV of 1859
(relating to minority, Limitation Act, 1871 and 1877,
s. 7), apply to proceedings under this section.
HURO SOONDUREE CHOWDHRAIN v. ANUND NATH
ROY CHOWHDRY . 3 W. R. 8

2. ——— Act VIII of 1859, s. 246—
Operation of section. The provisions of this section
were prospective, and did not apply to proceedings
in execution under the old procedure. GOKOOL
RAM DEB v. RAM SOONDUR SURMAH
9 W. R. 292

3. ——— S. 246 of Act VIII
of 1859 is in effect the same as s. 283 of Act X of
1877. BAILUR KRISHNA RAU v. LAKSHMANA
SHANBHOGUE . I. L. R. 4 Mad. 302

4. ——— Subject of claim—Money paid
to release Attachment in execution of decree. Money
paid to release an attachment in execution of a
decree cannot be made the subject of a claim under
Act VIII of 1859, s. 246. MOHAMED BEG v. JUG-
GERNAUTH DASS . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 243

5. ——— Money Debt—Civil
Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246. Act VIII of 1859,
s. 246, only applied to immoveable property, or to
specific moveable property, not to a debt due. RAM-
BUTTY KOOR v. KAMESSUR PERSHAD
22 W. R. 86

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contd.

6. ——— Nature of claims—*Claim under Title derived from Judgment-debtor.* There is nothing in s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, which restricts claims under it to title derived from the judgment-debtor, or out of the estate. It comprises all claims or objections to the sale of lands in execution of decrees. *HORISH CHUNDER ROY v BROJO SOONDUR MOZOOMDAR* 6 W. R. 164

7. ——— Claim by intervenor to moveable property. A Court is bound to investigate a claim made by an intervenor under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, to a share of moveable property attached in execution of a decree. *DEANUTH BISWAS v. ISSUR GINE. Ex parte HUR CHUNDER GINE* 14 W. R. 52

ISSUR CHUNDER GANGOOLY v. MOHINI MOHUN DOSS 17 W. R. 74

8. ——— Second trial of claim under same attachment—*Title of Objector as against Debtor in possession.* A Judge has no jurisdiction to try the same objector's claim under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, a second time as against the same attachment, or to re-open a question finally decided on the former occasion. The title of the objector, as compared with that of the debtor in possession, is not a point for adjudication under s. 246. *KEHLAT CHUNDER GHOSE v. BHUGGOBUTTY CHURN MOOKERJEE* 14 W. R. 144

9. ——— Dismissal of claim without adjudication on the merits. But where a claim is dismissed or struck off without any adjudication in either of the modes provided by the section, a fresh claim may be entertained, subject to s. 247. *MOHADEB MUNDUL v. MODHOO MUNDUL* 16 W. R. 59

10. ——— Property seized under decree against person in representative character. Where property is seized as belonging to A, as representative of B, deceased, and A claims the property as his own and denies that it ever belonged to B or B's estate, A's claim is properly dealt with under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859. *DHERAJ MAHATAB CHUND v PEAREE DOSSEE* 6 W. R. Mis. 61

11. ——— Claim to a portion of property attached—*Alienees of Judgment-debtor—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 229, 230.* On the application of a decree-holder of a money-decree for the sale of immoveable property belonging to the judgment-debtor, certain parties objected that they had purchased the rights of the judgment-debtor therein. Subsequently some of the objectors who claimed a 14-anna share in the property compromised with the decree-holder, who then applied that the remaining 2-anna in possession of certain specified parties should be sold. The lower Court ordered that the sale of these 2 annas should not proceed if the objectors who claimed them paid to the decree-holder a sum equal, rateably, to that levied from the 14 annas. *Held* on appeal by the decree-holder against the original judgment-debtor, that the pro-

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contd.

visions of s. 246, and not those of ss. 229 and 230, of Act VIII of 1859 applied to the application, which really sought to enforce a particular remedy against a third party named, and not against the original defendant. *GOVIND PERSHAD v. RAM PURKASH SINGH* 8 W. R. 378

12. ——— Intervenor claiming property attached under decree for rent—*Attachment of Crops—Beng. Act VI of 1862, s. 16.* In a suit by a landlord against his raiyat for rent, in which he attached certain growing crops under s. 16, Bengal Act VI of 1862 (the attachment being before judgment), the claim of an intervenor ought, according to s. 86, Act VIII of 1859, to be investigated in the same manner as a claim to property attached in execution of a decree. The course to be adopted in such a case is that pointed out in s. 246, Act VIII of 1859. *KARTICK CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. MOOKTARAM SIRCAR* 10 W. R. 21

13. ——— Right of purchaser from debtor. *Quære:* Whether a person holding by purchase from the judgment-debtor is in a position to succeed under Act VIII of 1859, s. 246. *WAJID HOSSEIN v. AHMED REZA* 17 W. R. 480

14. ——— Mortgagee in possession of mortgaged premises attached in execution of decree. A mortgagee, in possession of mortgaged premises that have been attached by prohibitory order under s. 235 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in execution of a decree obtained against his mortgagor, is entitled to come in under s. 246 of the Civil Procedure Code, and have the attachment raised. *KASSIRAV SAHEB HOLKAR v. VITHALDAS MANGALYI* 10 Bom. 100

15. ——— Possession, right to—*Question of title—Sale in execution of decree.* When land is attached for sale in execution of a decree, the point of possession is the one which determines its liability to sale or not under s. 246. But in a suit brought to set aside a sale made under that section, it is not the mere possession, but the actual right and title, which determines whether the sale ought or ought not to stand. *WOOMA CHURN CHOWDHRY v. KURRALEE CHURN CHOWDHRY* W. R. 1864, 163

16. ——— Attachment of right, title and interest—*Possession—Right to have property released.* Certain property had been attached in execution of a decree under the 235th section of Act VIII of 1859, which was specified in the schedule annexed to the order of attachment as "the right, title, and interest of R H, deceased, in the hands of B D and W D, his widows." M D claimed the property under the 246th section of Act VIII of 1859, and proved that the property was in his possession, and not in the possession of B D or W D. *Held*, that the property must be released from the attachment. *BINDOBASENY DABEE v. BISSOMOYE DASSEE* 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 3 9

17. ——— Attachment of fractional share of property—*Right to have property re-*

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leased—Claim to share of property. In execution of a decree against *A*, "the moiety or half share of *A*" in certain lands was attached. *M* filed a petition under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859, in which he admitted that *A* had a one-eighth share in the lands, but alleged that *A* had only a one-eighth share, and that a two-eighths share belongs to himself. *M. Held*, that this was a claim to property attached in execution under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859, which the Court under that section was bound to investigate and adjudicate upon. In execution of a decree against *A*, the "right, title, and interest of *A*" in certain lands were attached. *M* filed a petition under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859, in which he admitted that *A* had a one-twentieth share, but alleged that *A* was entitled to no more than a one-twentieth share; and that he, *M*, has a two-twentieths share. *Held*, that, assuming the attachment of *A*'s eighth title and interest to be an irregular attachment under s. 213, *M*, whose lands were included within such attachment, was entitled to come in and claim his own two-twentieths share, and the Court was bound to investigate his claim under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859. *Held*, also, in both cases, that *M* was entitled to have the attachment removed so far as his share was concerned: *Held*, also (*per PHEAR, J.*), that in the first case *M* was entitled to have the attachment removed so far as regards the margin in excess of *A*'s actual share; and that in the second case he was entitled to have the whole attachment discharged. *COWAR RAJKUMAR ROY v. KADAMBINI DEBI* 4 B. L. R. F. B. 175

S.C. RAJCOOMAR ROY v. KADUMBINY DEBI
13 W. R. F. B. 63

18. Possession in trust for judgment-debtor—*Question for decision on claim.* The only question proper to be decided under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, is whether the property attached is in the possession of the judgment-debtor or some person in trust for him, or whether it is in the possession of a third party not in trust for the judgment-debtor. *DHERAJ MARTAB CHAND BAHADOOR v. HURDEO NARAIN SAHOO* 16 W. R. 119

19. Possession, question of—*Question of title to property—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 278, 280, 281—Satisfaction of decree by private sale—Purchaser—Subsequent Attachment.* *A* and *B* attached, in execution of their decree, property of *C* and his two brothers, their judgment-debtors. Subsequently *D* obtained a decree against *C* alone, and on the 11th January 1884 applied for attachment of the one-third share of *C* in the property attached by *A* and *B*, which belonged to *C* and his two brothers jointly. No order was on that date passed on the application. On the 14th January 1884, *E* purchased from *C* his one-third share in the attached properties, and the purchase-money was, by arrangement between the brothers, applied in satisfying the debt due to *A* and *B*. On the 28th January 1884, an order was passed on the application of the 11th January

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1884, granting the attachment asked for by *D*; and on the 23rd April 1884 *E* preferred his claim to the one-third share purchased by him, and which had been since the purchase attached by *D*. The claim was disallowed on the ground that *E* had no title to the property, he having purchased whilst the property was under attachment. *Held*, on appeal, that the Judge should have, in accordance with s. 280 of the Code of Civil Procedure, confined himself to determining whether or not the property was in the possession of *E* on his own account at the time that *D* attached the property. *KOYLASH CHUNDER SEN v. KOYLASH CHUNDER CHAKRABARTI* I. L. R. 10 Cal. 1057

20. Procedure—*Order to release property.* In disposing of a claim under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, if the Court be of opinion that the property attached ought not to be sold, the proper order for the Court to make is a simple order to release the property from attachment. *BYRUB LALL BHUKUT v. ABDOL HOSSEIN* 8 W. R. 93

21. Claim of Purchaser before Attachment. Where a claim is lodged to attached property on the ground of purchase before attachment, and the decree-holder alleges that the claimant is a benamidar for the judgment-debtor, the Court is bound, under Act VIII of 1859, s. 246, to enquire whether the property is or is not in the possession of the party against whom execution is sought, or of some other person in trust for him. *In the matter of HUREHUR MOOKERJEE. HUREHUR MOOKERJEE v. NOBIN CHUNDER DOSS* 20 W. R. 202

22. Suit to set aside order allowing Claim—*Evidence given on claim.* In a suit to set aside a summary award under s. 246, Civil Procedure Code, a Judge is bound to find facts upon the evidence tendered and taken in the case, and not upon any evidence taken in the summary cause. *LEKHRAJ ROY v. MUTTY MADHUB SEN* 14 W. R. 95

23. Property of different sets of defendants—*claim by one set of defendants.* Where a suit resulted in two distinct orders for the payment of costs, one against the first set of defendants and another against the second, and the property of one of the former set was taken in execution of the order against the latter:—*Held*, that the application of the aggrieved defendant for release of his property fell within the provisions of Act VIII of 1859, s. 246. *Held*, also, that the applicant had a right to establish what the law required by any evidence sufficient for the purpose, and that the Court had no power to require from him any particular kind of evidence. *BINODE LALL PAKRASHEE v. GIREEDHUR CHUCKERBUTTY*

22 W. R. 392

24. Refusal of admissible and proper evidence—*Invalid Order.* Where a Judge makes an order under Act VIII of 1859, s. 246, after refusing to receive evidence which it is his duty to

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receive, his order is *ultra vires*. *BHOIHARINEE DABEE v. NILMONEE SINGH DEO BAHADOOR*

24 W. R. 422

25. ——— Order for release from attachment, nature of—*Limited effect of order*. When, under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, property which has been attached is ordered to be released, the order for release is made with reference merely to the particular claimant who has obtained the order. This order is not to be regarded as a general decision (of which all the world can have the benefit) that the property does not belong to the judgment-debtor. *IMAN BANDEE BEGUM v. MAHOMED TUKEE KHAN* . . . 8 W. R. 27

BOOLIROONNISSA BIBEE v. KUREEMOONNISSA KHATOON . . . 21 W. R. 230

26. ——— Decree against party in representative character—*Third party—Execution of decree*. A obtained a decree against B, in her representative character, for a debt contracted by her mother. The decree declared that execution should be taken out against the property of the mother, and not against any part of her (the mother's) deceased husband's estate. In execution A attached and put up to sale certain property as belonging to the mother. B objected to the sale, alleging that the property was not her mother's, but was inherited by her from her father. The Munsif disallowed her objection on the ground that only the right, title and interest of the defendant's mother was put up for sale. On appeal the Judge set aside the Munsif's order. *Held*, that, for the purposes of her objection, B was a third party unconnected with the decree, and that her objection should have been disposed of under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859. S. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 did not apply, and there was no appeal. *HARIS CHANDRA GUPTO v. SHASHI MALA GUPTI*

6 B. L. R. 721 : 15 W. R. 163

27. ——— Claim by representative—*Appeal—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11—Execution of Decree*. In execution of his decree, the decree-holder attached certain property as being that of the judgment-debtor. On this *R*, the son of the judgment-debtor, intervened, stating that he held possession of the property in his own right, and did not inherit it as any part of his mother's assets. The Munsif admitted his claim on the ground that the property was not that of the judgment-debtor. *Held*, that the order was one under s. 246, and no appeal would lie to the Judge. *In re RAINY*.

6 B. L. R. 725 note

S. C. RAINY v. ISHUR CHUNDER BHATTACHARJEE
12 W. R. 333

28. ——— Attachment—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 280—Wakf—Trust property—Jurisdiction of Court under s. 280, Code of Civil Procedure*. The question to be determined under s. 280 of the Civil Procedure Code is the question of possession: the words "possession of the judgment-debtor, or of some person in trust for

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him" refer to cases in which the possession of a claimant as a trustee is of such a character as to be really the possession of the debtor, and not to cases in which very intricate questions of law may arise as to whether or not valid trusts may result in particular instances. *In the matter of the petition of HAMID BAKHUT MOZUMDAR. HAMID BAKHUT MOZUMDAR v. BUKTEAR CHUND MAHTO* . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 617

29. ——— Property attached in possession of same person in trust for the judgment-debtor—*Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 278, 281*. Certain property was attached in the hands of the petitioner (who had preferred a claim under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure) on the ground that he had become a trustee for the judgment-debtor by virtue of an alleged agreement on his part to discharge the decree-holder's debt contained in a *hibanama* by which the judgment-debtor had transferred the property to him. The petitioner having obtained a rule under s. 622 of the Code: *Held*, that, the property having been transferred to the petitioner and being now admittedly his property, the lower Court had acted without jurisdiction in directing execution to issue against the property. *Per AMEER, ALI, J.*—When a claim is preferred under s. 278, what the Court has to see is whether the property, though standing in the name of the claimant or of some other person, is in the possession of the judgment-debtor or not. The mere fact that the judgment-debtor has some beneficial interest in the income would not render the property liable under s. 281. If the claimant satisfies the Court that he has some interest in, or is possessed of, the property attached, and it does not appear that the possession of the claimant was in reality that of the judgment-debtor, the claim must be allowed. *SHEORAJ NANDAN SINGH v. GOPAL SURAN NARAIN SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 290

30. ——— Release of lands as being endowed property—*Appeal*. A decree-holder in execution having attached certain lands, the judgment-debtors objected that the lands were not their property, but held by them as shebait of a religious endowment. The Munsif found that, although the land formed part of some which had been released by Government as appropriated to religious purposes, they were held by the defendants entirely to their own use, and overruled the objection. *Held*, that the order was one under Act VIII of 1859, s. 246, and that no appeal lay to the Judge. *NIMAYE CHURN PUTTEETUNDER v. JOGENDRO NATH BANERJEE* . . . 21 W. R. 365

31. ——— Suit to set aside summary order—*Order releasing attached property*. A regular suit to set aside a summary order is against general principles, and only lies when the power to bring such a suit is expressly conferred, as under s. 246, Code of Civil Procedure. A party who is unsuccessful in his attempt to obtain execution against any particular property has only the remedy

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provided in s. 246, and failing to take advantage of that, his only alternative is to make a fresh application for execution. *SADABURT PERSHAD SAHOO v. LOTF ALI KHAN. PHOOLBAS KOOPER v. LALL JUGGESSUR SAHI. BIKRAMJEET LALL v. PHOOLBAS KOOPER. RAM DHYAN KOONWAR v. PHOOLBAS KOOPER* **14 W. R. 340**

32. ———— *Suit for Reversal of Order under s. 246—Nature of claim in suit.* A party against whom an order has been obtained under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, must, if he sue for its reversal, assert substantially the same right as that which has been contended for in the execution. *COLVIN COWIE v. ELIAS*

2 B. L. R. A. C. 212
11 W. R. 40

33. ———— *Proof of Possession—Title—Act VIII of 1859, s. 15.* In a suit brought under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, for establishment of right :—*Held*, that the plaintiff's failure to prove his possession at the time of the institution of the suit is not sufficient for its dismissal. The question of title should be tried according to the meaning of that section. *S. 246, Act VIII of 1859, distinguished from s. 15. MATHURA PANDEY v. RAM RUCHIA TEWAREE*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 108 : 11 W. R. 482

34. ———— *Suit after rejection of claim—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 278, 283—Damages for wrongful attachment.* Suits under s. 283 of the Code, although they are brought for the purpose of establishing rights which have been negatived in execution-proceedings, are neither described in the Code nor are dealt with in practice as appeals from the orders of lower Courts; they are substantive suits to all intents and purposes, and must be tried like any other suits subject to the ordinary rules of procedure and evidence. There is nothing in the provisions of ss. 278 to 283 of the Code limiting, in a suit under s. 283, a plaintiff's right to compensation for his loss or the defendant's responsibility for his wrongful act; and if the existence of the summary procedure (in ss. 278 to 282) leads to delay, and that delay to further loss, the consequences must fall upon the defendant. *KISHORI MOHUN RAI v. HURSOOK DASS*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 696

35. ———— *Suit to establish Right as Tenant—Right of suit—Declaratory suit.* A plaintiff stated that the plaintiff was proprietor of certain land which was let to one M, and that, whilst M was in possession and before the expiration of his tenancy, a creditor took out execution against him and put up for sale the future profits of the property (wasilat) which would come into the hands of M, alleging that M's interest was not that of a tenant, but of a usufructuary mortgagee. The plaintiff thereupon put in a claim under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, but his claim was rejected; and he then brought a suit under that section for a declaration that M's interest in the property was that of a

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tenant, and not that of a usufructuary mortgagee. It appeared that, on the termination of M's tenancy, the plaintiff let the land to another person. *Held*, that the suit would not lie. *AMJAD ALI v. KUNKU SHAW* **9 B. L. R. Ap. 28 : 17 W. R. 304**

36. ———— *Claim by Mortgagor in execution proceedings in Small Cause Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, and 293—Presidency Towns Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882), s. 37.* An order made upon a claim to attached property filed in the Small Cause Court of Calcutta in a proceeding under s. 278 of the Civil Procedure Code is "an order made in suit" within the meaning of s. 37 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (Act XV of 1882), and is final, subject only to the right to apply for a new trial. *Ismail Solomon Bhamji v. Mahomed Khan, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 296, followed. DENO NATH BATABYAL v. NUFFER CHUNDER NUNDY* **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 778**
3 C. W. N. 590

On appeal **4 C. W. N. 470**

37. ———— *Effect on suit of satisfaction of decree and release of property—Intervenor—Cause of action—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), ss. 246, 247.* Where a person whose property has been attached in execution of a decree against another person, and whose claim under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859 has been rejected, brings a suit under the provisions of s. 247 of Act VIII of 1859, it is no objection to that suit that previously to the filing thereof, the decree (in execution of which the property had been attached) was satisfied by the judgment-debtor and the property released from attachment. *SREEPUTTY MIRDHA v. KARTICK SINGHA*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 10 : 11 C. L. R. 181

38. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 278—Claim to property directed to be sold under a mortgage-decree—Attachment.* Proceedings by way of claim under s. 278 of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable only to cases of money decrees where property has been attached and not to claims preferred to properties directed to be sold under mortgage-decrees. *In the matter of DEEFHOLTS. DEEFHOLTS v. PETERS*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 631

39. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 278, 283—Mortgage decree—Attachment.* If an executing Court does in the case of a mortgage-decree for sale take action under s. 278, Civil Procedure Code, it applies a procedure which is inapplicable, and the statutory bar contained in s. 283, Civil Procedure Code, does not operate to exclude a suit by either party. *Badri Prasad v. Mahamad Yusuf, I. L. R. 1 All. 381, and Nilo Pandurang v. Rama Patloji, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 35, distinguished. Deefholts v. Peters, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 631, referred to. JOY PROKASH SINGH v. ABHOY KUMAR CHUND*

1 C. W. N. 701

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40. _____ *Claim on property ordered to be sold under a mortgage-decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 278 and 287—Stay of sale in execution of decree.* *H* obtained a decree upon a mortgage against *D* in 1891, and applied in execution for the sale of the mortgaged property. On the proclamation of the sale being issued, *K* intervened, alleging that the property had been sold to him by *D* in 1883 at a private sale. The Subordinate Judge allowed his claim, and stopped the sale, being of opinion that he had power, under s. 287 of the Civil Procedure Code, to make this order. *Held*, that the order was made without jurisdiction, and must be discharged. Proceedings by way of claim as provided by s. 278 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) are not applicable where the property is directed to be sold under a mortgage-decree, and s. 287 had no application. *Deefholts v. Peters*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 631, followed. *HIM-ATRAM v. KHUSHAL JETHIRAM GUJAR*

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 98

41. _____ *Order of Attachment—Judgment-debtor declared insolvent—Appointment of receiver—Vesting of insolvent's property in receiver—Objection to attachment—Jurisdiction to entertain objection—Civil Procedure Code, s. 278.* Where property has been made the subject of attachment under Ch. XIX of the Civil Procedure Code, the right of an objector to assert his claim to be the true owner of the property under s. 278, and the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the objection, are not ousted by the mere circumstance that the judgment-debtor has been declared an insolvent, and his property vested in a receiver under Ch. XX. It is the judgment-debtor's property only, not that of the objector, that is thus vested. *PARAS RAM v. KARAM SINGH*

I. L. R. 9 All. 232

42. _____ *Claim to attached property in Calcutta Court of Small Causes—Attachment—Suit in High Court by unsuccessful claimant—Right of suit—Res judicata—Code of Civil Procedure (XIV of 1882), ss. 278, 283—Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882), ss. 9, 23, and 37—Act X of 1888, s. 2.* An order made upon a claim to attached property filed in the Small Cause Court of Calcutta under s. 278 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, is an order in the suit within the meaning of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, s. 37, and is final, subject only to the right to apply for a new trial. Where such a claim has been disallowed, a suit brought under s. 283 of the Civil Procedure Code by the person against whom that order has been passed to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute is not maintainable in any Court. The exclusion by the Small Cause Court, under the powers conferred on it by s. 23 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, of s. 283 of the Civil Procedure Code has not been affected by Act X of 1888. *ISMAIL SOLOMON BEAMJI v. MAHOMED KHAN*

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 296

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43. _____ *Code of Civil Procedure, ss. 278, 280, 283—Investigation of claim to attached property.* The extent to which the "investigation" required by s. 280 should be carried depends upon the circumstances of the case. *SARDHARI LAL v. AMERICA PERSHAD*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 521
I. R. 15 I. A. 123

44. _____ *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 281—Order disallowing claim to attached property.* The effect of an order made under s. 281 of the Civil Procedure Code, disallowing a claim to attached property, is to give the auction-purchaser a title as against the claimant, unless the order is set aside by a suit. *KHUB LAL v. RAM LOCHUN KOER*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 260

45. _____ *Application by third party for Removal of Attachment—Order refusing to Remove Attachment—Omission by th. rd party to bring subsequent suit to establish right to attached property—Subsequent withdrawal of attachment by attaching party, effect of—Subsequent claim to property by the party who had failed to remove attachment—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 278 and 283—Title.* The plaintiff was the assignee of a mortgage-decree, dated the 2nd May 1885. In 1888 he attached the mortgaged property in execution of the decree, whereupon the defendant intervened and applied to have the attachment removed, on the ground that prior to the attachment she had purchased the land under a registered deed of sale, dated the 23rd June 1888. Her application was rejected on the 27th September 1888. Subsequently the judgment-debtors applied and obtained the Court's permission to sell the land by private contract, and, on the 1st November 1888, the plaintiff purchased it and withdrew his application for execution on the 20th November 1888. In 1889 the plaintiff brought this suit against the defendant to obtain the removal of certain portions of a culvert erected by her on the land. The defendant pleaded that she was the owner of the property, having purchased it on the 23rd June 1888. The Subordinate Judge passed a decree for the plaintiff on the ground that, though the plaintiff's sale-deed was not entitled to preference over the defendant's, still, as she had taken no steps to establish her right to the property in a regular suit after application for the removal of the plaintiff's attachment had been rejected, effect could not be given to her purchase. On appeal by the defendant, the decree was reversed, and the plaintiff preferred a second appeal. *Held*, confirming the appellate decree, that when the plaintiff withdrew his attachment on the 20th November 1888, the parties were restored to the *status quo ante*. The object of the claim which was preferred by the defendant was, as contemplated by s. 278 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), to obtain the removal of the attachment, and when that attachment was removed by the judgment-creditor's own act, there was no

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longer an attachment or any proceeding in execution of which the order could operate to the prejudice of the claimant, and therefore there was no necessity for her to bring a suit to set aside the order. The defendant's title to the property, having been acquired on the 23rd June 1888, was superior to the plaintiff's, which was not acquired before November 1888. *GOPAL PURSHOTAM v. BAI DIVALI* . . . **I. L. R. 18 Bom. 241**

46. ———— *Suit to set aside order removing Attachment—Suit for declaration of title—Adverse possession—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 283.* The plaintiff obtained a decree against *I*, and in execution attached the property in dispute. The defendants intervened, and obtained an order for the removal of the attachment on the 11th August 1888. On the 13th August 1889, the plaintiff instituted this suit for a declaration that the property belonged to his judgment-debtor (*I*), and as such was liable to attachment and sale. The defendants pleaded that they had been in possession of the property for more than twelve years prior to the institution of the suit, and that the suit was therefore barred. The Judge rejected the plaintiff's claim. *Held*, reversing the decree, that the suit being brought under s. 283 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), it was a suit to set aside the order of 11th August 1888, directing the removal of the attachment, and should be determined by ascertaining the rights of the parties at the date of that order. As the defendants had not at that date acquired a title to the property by adverse possession for twelve years, the plaintiff was entitled to a decree. *HARISHANKAR JEBHAI v. NARAN KARSAN* . . . **I. L. R. 18 Bom. 260**

47. ———— *Goods consigned to Agent for sale on commission—Equitable Assignment of goods by Consignor—Goods attached by judgment-creditor of consignor—Claim by agent—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 280.* One *P* at Viramgam consigned certain bags of seed to *V H & Co.* at Bombay for sale on commission, and drew hundis against the goods for Rs. 2,000, which, at his request, *V H & Co.* accepted and paid on receiving the railway receipts by post. The goods were to be sold on arrival on *P*'s account and the proceeds credited to him as against the advances made by the payment of the hundis. On the arrival of goods at Bombay, they were attached by *B S & Co.*, who had obtained decrees against *P*. *Held*, that *V H & Co.* were entitled to the goods. They had made specific advances against the goods. *B S & Co.* as attaching creditors occupied the same position as *P* himself and had no better claim to the goods than he had; and if he had attempted to prevent the goods reaching the hands of *V H & Co.* who at his request had made specific advances against them, he would have been restrained by injunction. *Held*, also, that at the date of attachment the goods were in possession of *P* by the railway company "on account of or in trust for" *V H & Co.*, in the sense in which that expression

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is used in s. 280 of the Civil Procedure Code. *VELJI HIRJI v. BHARMAL SHRIPAL*

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 287

48. ———— *Application by person holding claim—Form of application—Circular Order of High Court, Bombay, No. 90 (c)—Court Fees Act, Sch. II, cl. 1.—Notices to judgment-debtor.* A person holding a claim on property ordered to be sold in execution of a decree is required to make the application contemplated in the High Court's Civil Circular No. 90 (c), page 40, of the "Circular Orders." The application must be in writing and bear the proper fee prescribed by Sch. II, No. 1, of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870). The circular does not require any notice to be served on the judgment-debtor. Whether he is bound by the order passed in the proceedings must depend on the facts of each case. *LACHMICHAND HIRACHAND v. TUKARAM* . . . **I. L. R. 16 Bom. 700**

49. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 278 and 283—Suit to have attached property declared not liable to attachment and sale—Suit without bringing claim under s. 278—Right of suit.* The provisions of s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the sections immediately succeeding are not exclusive of the remedy provided by s. 283 of the Code. *Man Kuar v. Tara Singh*, **I. L. R. 7 All. 583**, considered. *SUNDAR SINGH v. GHASI* . . . **I. L. R. 18 All. 410**

50. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 278, et seq.—Effect of order under s. 278.* An order in favour of one of several decree-holders on an objection under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not enure for the benefit of other decree-holders who are not parties to the proceedings under s. 278. *Badri Prasad v. Muhammad Yusuf*, **I. L. R. 1 All. 382**, referred to. *JAGANNATH v. GANESH* . . . **I. L. R. 18 All. 413**

51. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 278, 283—Attachment of same property in execution of decrees obtained by different creditors—Claim made in one suit to attached property under s. 278—Order made under s. 281—Suit by claimant to establish right.* The first and second defendants obtained a decree in suit No. 1548 of 1897 against *R*, described as the owner of the Wahalan Mills, and attached property on the mill premises. Twelve other creditors also brought twelve other similar suits and obtained decrees against other persons who were also described as owners of the Wahalan Mills, and attached the same property. In suit No. 1548 of 1897 *R M* (the present plaintiff), under s. 278 of the Civil Procedure Code, claimed the property. His claim was disallowed and he was ordered to bring a suit under s. 283. No claim or order was made in the case of the other twelve suits. *R M* now sued in pursuance of the above order to recover his property, and he included as defendants not merely those defendants (Nos. 1 and 2) who had been plaintiffs in suit No. 1548 of 1897, but also those who had been plaintiffs in the twelve other suits, and who had attached

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the property in execution of their decrees. It was objected that no suit would lie against the latter, as in their suits no claim had been made to the goods which they had attached, and no order made under s. 281, Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that the suit lay against the defendants (other than Nos. 1 and 2), although no claim had been made or order passed under s. 281 of the Civil Procedure Code. The summary remedy given by s. 278 of the Civil Procedure Code is alternative to the remedy by way of suit. The object of s. 278 is not to deprive a claimant of his remedy by suit, but to give him, if he is diligent, a more speedy and summary remedy. *RAGHUNATH MUKUND v. SAROSH KAMA*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 266

52. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 279, 280, 281—Attachment—Striking off Execution-proceedings—Question of nature of possession in claim suit.* B instituted a suit in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Cuttack, on the 27th of November 1887, against R for possession of the Dakhin Paresh Muth at Puri, with the properties appertaining thereto, and obtained a decree on the 29th April 1889. Execution having been applied for by B, it was stayed, pending the appeal to the High Court, upon R giving security. The decree of the Subordinate Judge's Court was set aside by the High Court, but restored by the Privy Council, and B was put in possession of the Muth with its properties in execution of the last-mentioned decree between the 23rd of April and the 3rd of June 1895. Subsequent to the institution of the above suit, K instituted a suit for recovery of a certain sum of money against R and obtained a decree, and in execution thereof caused the attachment of the immovable properties now in dispute on the 18th September 1890, and the application was dismissed for default, and subsequently, after the institution and dismissal of various proceedings in execution, an order for sale of the properties attached on the 18th of September 1890 was applied for and obtained by K on the 15th of April 1895; B then put in his claim on the 23rd of May 1895, and it was disallowed on the 9th of September following. B moved the High Court under s. 15 of the Charter Act (24 & 25 Vict., c. 104) and s. 622, Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that the striking an execution-proceeding off the file is an act which may admit of different interpretations according to the circumstances under which it is done, and no general rule can be laid down which would govern all cases of that kind; but having regard to the circumstances of the present case, *viz.*, that the Court below had no opportunity of considering the circumstances under which the several execution-proceedings were dismissed, it could not be held that there was no subsisting attachment, and that the order of the Court below was bad in law. *Held*, further, that the lower Court was wrong in holding that the decree obtained by B in the Subordinate Judge's Court did not show that he had an interest in the attached property merely because it was not final, but had been appealed

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against. To reconcile s. 279, Civil Procedure Code, with ss. 280 and 281, the words "some interest" must be taken to imply such interest as would make the possession of the judgment-debtor possession not on his own account but on account of, or in trust for, the claimant. *Held*, also, that it cannot be said that the properties in dispute which were admittedly in the possession of the judgment-debtor at the date of the attachment were in his possession, not as his own property, but on account of the claimant, although the claimant obtained a decree against him, and execution of such decree was stayed upon his giving security. In the sections relating to claims to attached property, what the Code of Civil Procedure provides is a summary investigation into the question of possession, and the question of title is required to be gone into only so far as it may be necessary to determine whether the person in possession holds such possession as agent of, or as trustee for, another. Having regard to the facts that K, the creditor, brought her suit after the institution of the suit by B, the claimant, and also that the money covered by K's decree was borrowed by R for the purpose of paying Government revenue due on account of the properties of the *muth*, the questions that arise are—whether the doctrine of *lis pendens* applies and whether the decree-holder can succeed upon the principle that a debt contracted for legal necessity by a mohunt *de facto* is recoverable from the endowed property in the hands of the mohunt *de jure*? These questions do not come within the scope of an investigation under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to claims to attached property. *BHAGWAN RAMANUJ DAS v. KHETTU MONI DASSI* . . . 1 C. W. N. 617

53. ———— *Co-heirs—Execution of decree—Civil Procedure Code, s. 283—Decree against one only of several co-heirs of deceased debtor—Transfer by judgment-debtor of property belonging to himself and co-heirs—Plea of jus tertii raised by transferees.* The plaintiff obtained a money decree, for a debt due by a deceased Mahomedan, against one only of several heirs of the deceased. In execution of this decree, an attachment was made of certain immovable property formerly of the original debtor; but prior to such attachment the judgment-debtor had by an oral agreement transferred such property to other persons and put them in possession. *Held*, that it was open to the transferees in possession to raise the defence which their transferor could have raised, namely, that only the rights and interests of the judgment-debtor himself were liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree, and not the rights and interests of the co-heirs of the judgment-debtor. *Jafri Begam v. Amir Muhammad Khan*, 1. L. R. 7 All. 822; *Nathmal Das v. Tajammul Husain*, 1. L. R. 7 All. 36; and *Seth Chand Mal v. Durga Dei*, 1. L. R. 12 All. 313, referred to. *DALLU MAL v. HARI DAS* (1901)

I. L. R. 23 All. 263

54. ———— *Interest—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 278, 279, 282—Claim petition*

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—“Some interest” in property attached—Order dismissing claim by mortgagees—*Letters Patent, Art. 15*
—“Judgment”—*Appeal*. An order passed by a Judge sitting on the Original Side of the High Court dismissing a claim preferred under ss. 278 and 282 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the mortgagees of immovable property which has been attached in execution of a decree, is subject to appeal. Art. 15 of the Letters Patent is not restricted by ss. 588 and 591 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Four persons lent money on mortgage, the deed, with the consent of all, being prepared in favour of one of them alone. It, however, specified the amount that each had advanced, and provided that, if the nominal mortgagee should receive any instalments from the mortgagors, the same should be distributed between all the four mortgagees according to the amounts advanced by them. The nominal mortgagee died, leaving a will appointing executors, who had not, however, taken out probate. A judgment-creditor of the mortgagors then caused the property to be attached, whereupon the three other creditors filed a claim petition, asking that the attachment might be declared to be subject to the mortgage. *Held*, that the applicants were competent to prefer the claim and establish, within the meaning of s. 279 of the Code “some interest in” the property attached. If the nominal mortgagee was the agent of the applicants, they had a legal interest in the property attached, and if he was a trustee, they had a beneficial or equitable interest therein. A beneficial interest is as much an interest, within the meaning of s. 279, as a legal interest in the property attached. *SABHAPATHI CHETTI v. NARAYANASAMI CHETTI* (1901) . . . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 555

55. ———— *Party—Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), s. 283—“Party against whom an order has been made.” Plaintiff sued to recover possession of immovable property. The land in question had, on a previous occasion, been attached in execution of a decree against plaintiff, whereupon his younger brother, the present second defendant, had preferred a claim-petition, on which an order was passed holding that plaintiff (then judgment-debtor) and second defendant (then claimant) were jointly entitled to the land. The claim was held to be good to the extent of a moiety of the land, which was accordingly released from attachment, the other moiety being ordered to be sold, the claimant's claim thereto being rejected. Plaintiff satisfied the decree, and the property was not sold. He now sued to recover possession of it. *Held*, that having regard to the terms of the order in the claim proceedings, and to the fact that it had not been proved that plaintiff had actually received notice of them, plaintiff was not a party against whom an order had been made, within the meaning of s. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the order was not conclusive as against him. *Nettétom Perengaryprom v. Tayanbarry Paramesh-*

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waren Nambudri, 4 Mad. H. C. R. 472, doubted.
MOIDIN KUTTI v. KUNHI KUTTI ALI (1902)
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 721

56. ———— *Possession—Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 278
—*Claim—Appeal*. Where property is attached in execution of a decree, and the judgment-debtor objects on the ground that although he is in possession of the same, such possession is not on his account but on account of two idols (or Hindu deities) and the property is *debuttur*, and he has no personal right in it: *Held*, that the objection does not fall under the provisions of s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, but it is a claim under s. 278, and no appeal lies against an order passed in such a case. *Rajrup Singh v. Ram Golam Roy, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 1*; *Punchanun Bundopadhyaya v. Rabia Bibi, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 711*; *Govind v. Gangaji, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 246*; *Shankar Dial v. Amir, I. L. R. 2 All. 752*; *Nathmal Das v. Tajammul Husain, I. L. R. 7 All. 36*; *Roop Lall Dass v. Bekani Meah, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 437*; and *Marigeya v. Hayat Sahab, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 237*, referred to. *BHAJAHARI PAL v. RAM LAL DAS* (1901) . . . 6 C. W. N. 63

57. ———— *Attachment—Claim—Property attached in possession of, and standing in the name of, some person other than the judgment-debtor—Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 278, 280. In an investigation under s. 280 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court has to determine the question of possession merely, and cannot go into the question of title with respect to the property taken in attachment. If the possession of the person holding the property be on his own account, the fact that the judgment-debtor may have a beneficial interest or some title in it cannot be gone into. *Hamid Bukhut Mozumdar v. Buktcar Chand Mahto, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 617*, and *Sheoraj Nandan Singh v. Gopal Suran Singh, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 290*, followed. In a summary investigation under the above section, the Court cannot hold merely on suspicion that the claim is untenable. *Sreeman Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Chukerbutty, 11 Moo. I. A. 28*, and *Moonshee Boozloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonissa Begum, 11 Moo. I. A. 551*, referred to. *MONMOHINEY DASSEE v. RADHA KRISTO DASS* (1902) . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 543.

58. ———— *Right to receive debt—Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 280, 281, 283—*Property in the possession of a judgment-debtor—Attachment of right to receive a debt—Specific Relief Act* (I of 1877), s. 42—*Consequential relief*. First defendant had obtained a decree against second defendant, in execution of which he had attached and sold the second defendant's right to collect rent payable to him in respect of certain properties by tenants for a certain year. A claim had been preferred by plaintiff, objecting to the said attachment on these grounds, under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but had been rejected. Plaintiff now sued for a declaration that the

CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY—
concl'd.

attachment and sale were invalid, on the grounds that the properties belonged to a certain *mutt*, and not to second defendant; that second defendant had been manager of the *mutt*, but had been dismissed, plaintiff replacing him; and that the rents in question were not liable for the debts of second defendant. The plaintiff prayed for no relief consequential to the declaration. *Held*, that the attachment was of a debt in respect of which prohibitory orders had been issued under s. 268 of the Code of Civil Procedure; that the attachment of a right to receive a debt is not properly capable of possession within the meaning of ss. 280 and 281 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that the suit was therefore not one instituted under s. 283 to establish a right to attached property; and that it had been properly dismissed. *Mussamut Rambutty Kooer v. Kamessur Pershad*, 22 W. R. C. R. 36, referred to. *BASAVAYYA v. SYED ABBAS SAHEB* (1900) . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 20

CLERK OF THE COURT.

Functions of—Ministerial officer.
It is not within the province of the Clerk of a Court to issue judicial orders on any subject. He is merely a ministerial officer of the Court, and any act which he is competent to perform must be of that character only, and therefore not one to be judicially dealt with or rescinded by the Court. *GOSHAIN JAG ROOP GEER v. CHINGUN LALL* 2 N. W. 46

CLERK OF SMALL CAUSE COURT.

See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY—LIABILITY OF SURETY . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 87

CLIENT.

— authority of pleader to bind—

See PLEADER, AUTHORITY OF, TO BIND CLIENT.

CLOG ON THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION.

See MORTGAGE . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 482

CLUB.

1. ——— Expulsion of member by committee—*Maxim*, "*Audi alteram partem*," *G*, having been expelled from a club by the committee on the ground that he had published a certain pamphlet which was considered to be a libel by the committee, sued the members of the committee for damages and to have his name replaced on the list of members. It was proved that, in considering *G*'s conduct with reference to the publication of the pamphlet, the committee took into consideration certain letters which *G* had written to certain members of the committee, and that his expulsion was partly for printing the pamphlet and partly for writing the letters. *Held*, that, as the decision of the committee was arrived at *bona fide*, the Court had no right to decide whether the pamphlet was

CLUB—concl'd.

or was not a libel. *Held*, further, that, as *G* had no opportunity of defending himself on the charge of writing the letters, his expulsion was illegal. *GOMPERTZ v. GOLDINGHAM* I. L. R. 9 Mad. 319

2. ——— Suit for price of goods supplied by club to a member—*Right of Suit—Secretary of Club*. An action to recover the price of goods supplied to a member of a non-proprietary club or on his responsibility cannot be brought in the name of the secretary of the club. *MICHAEL v. BRIGGS* . . . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 362

3. ——— Liability of the secretary of a club in respect of a contract entered into for the benefit of the members of the club. *Held*, that the secretary of a club could not, unless he specially accepted a personal liability, be sued personally on a contract entered into on behalf of the members of the club by his predecessor in office; nor could the members of a club collectively be sued through their secretary as their representative. *NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES CLUB v. SADULLAH* I. L. R. 20 All. 497

CO-ACCUSED.

See COMPOUNDING OFFENCE.
7 C. W. N. 176

See JOINDER OF CHARGES.
5 C. W. N. 294

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—ACQUIT-TALS . . . 7 C. W. N. 493, 711

— confession of, if evidence against the other accused—

See CONFESSION . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 446

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 30.
13 C. W. N. 552

COAL.

See LEASE . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 203

COCAINE.

See BOMBAY ABKARI ACT (BOM. ACT V OF 1878), SS. 3 (9), 43, AND 62.
I. L. R. 27 Bom. 551
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 380

CODE.

— essence of—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885), s. 5 (5) . . . 6 C. W. N. 325

CODE NAPOLEON.

See PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW.
9 C. W. N. 394

CO-DEFENDANT.

See INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS.
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 384

See RES JUDICATA—PARTIES—CO-DEFENDANTS.

CODICIL.

See PROBATE—OF WHAT DOCUMENTS GRANTED . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 311

See WILL—FORM OF WILL. I. L. R. 4 Calc. 721

CODIFIED LAW.

See CONTRACT . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 354

— object of—

See STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF. I. L. R. 23 Calc. 563
I. L. R. 23 I. A. 18

COERCION.

See ACCOMPLICE . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 115

See CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872). I. L. R. 32 Bom. 37

See CONTRACT ACT, ss. 15 AND 16. I. L. R. 13 Mad. 214

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 25. I. L. R. 4 All. 352

See DURESS.

COGNIZANCE.

See CRIMINAL COURT. I. L. R. 32 Calc. 783

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1898, ss. 190 TO 199.

COGNIZANCE OF OFFENCE.

Appellate Court can itself try the offender—Cognizance in such cases under s. 190 (b) and not 190 (c)—S. 423 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ought to be read with s. 528 of the Code. The provisions of s. 423 (1) (b) do not preclude an Appellate Court when it reverses the finding and sentence under appeal, from trying the offender itself, if the offence is one ordinarily triable by it. In such cases the Appellate Court takes cognizance under s. 190 (b) and not s. 190 (c). *EMPEROR v. MANIKKA GRAMANI* (1906).

J. L. R. 30 Mad. 228

COHABITATION.

— agreement in consideration of—

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACT—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 2 All. 433

I. L. R. 6 All. 313

I. L. R. 11 I. A. 44

I. L. R. 1 All. 478

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 25.

I. L. R. 3 All. 787

See MARRIAGE . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 232

CO-HEIR.

— liability of—

See CONTRIBUTION. I. L. R. 30 Mad. 526

COIN.

See COUNTERFEITING COIN.

See GAMBLING . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 19

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 283

5 C W. N. 503

COIN—concl.

— certain coin not legal tender—

See STOLEN PROPERTY—DISPOSAL OF, BY THE COURT. . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 702

Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 230—Uttering false Coin—Cheating. A gold mohar of the reign of Shahjahan cannot be deemed to be "coin" within the meaning of s. 230 of the Indian Penal Code as it is not used for the time being as money. *Regina v. Bapu Yadav*, 11 Bom. H. C. 172, followed. *Queen v. Kunj Beharee*, 5 All. H. C. 182, distinguished. *EMPEROR v. KHUSHALI* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All. 141

COINAGE AND PAPER CURRENCY ACT (XXII OF 1899).

— ss. 2, 3—

See LEGAL TENDER.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 305

CO-LESSORS.

See FORFEITURE I. L. R. 35 Calc. 807

COLLATERAL SUCCESSION—

See "HINDU LAW"

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 88

COLLECTOR.

See APPEAL—MEASUREMENT OF LANDS.

See BENGAL DRAINAGE ACT, s. 44.

8 C. W. N. 669

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—DECREES UNDER RENT LAW.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION BY COLLECTOR.

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 820

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 291

8 C. W. N. 545

See LAND ACQUISITION ACT (I OF 1894), s. 3, CL. (c) . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 396

See MADRAS BOUNDARY ACT, ss. 21, 25, 28. I. L. R. 12 Mad. 1

See MADRAS REGULATION VII OF 1817. 8 C. W. N. 545

See MAMLATDARS COURTS ACT.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 86

See MEASUREMENT OF LANDS.

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—GOVERNMENT.

See PARTITION.

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT.

See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT —REVENUE COURTS.

See REVENUE SALE LAW, s. 58.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 393

COLLECTOR—*contd.*

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHERE
SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE.
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 872

as agent of Court of Wards.

See PLEADER—APPOINTMENT AND AP-
PEARANCE . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 135

application by, where not party
to suit.

See PAUPER SUIT—SUITS.
I. L. R. 15. Bom. 77

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See LAND ACQUISITION ACT (1 of 1894).
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 36

certificate of—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 84.
I. L. R. 18 Calc. 271

See HEREDITARY OFFICES ACT, s. 10.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT
AND REVENUE SUITS. BOMBAY.
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 525

See PENSIONS ACT, ss. 3, 6.
I. L. R. 25 All. 73

duty of, when applying for in-
quiry into value of assets for probate or
administration—

See COURT-FEES ACT (VII of 1870), s. 19H.
6 C. W. N. 898

jurisdiction of—

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REVE-
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COURTS.

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jurisdiction of, to hear appeal—

See GRANT—POWER TO GRANT.
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 742

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NUE COURTS—ORDERS OF REVENUE
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See RULES MADE UNDER ACTS.
I. L. R. 12 All. 564
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 322

partition by—

See PARTITION . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 726

power of—

See COURT OF WARDS.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
RE-SALES.

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—POWER
TO GRANT SANCTION . 7 Bom. Cr. 64
I. L. R. 2 All. 533
I. L. R. 10 All. 582
I. L. R. 19 All. 121

COLLECTOR—*contd.*

power of—*concl'd.*

See VILLAGE CHOWKIDARS ACT, ss. 48
AND 64 . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 626

reference by—

See BOMBAY CIVIL COURTS ACT, s. 16.
I. L. R. 16 Bom. 277

See LAND ACQUISITION ACT.

I. L. R. 7 All. 817

I. L. R. 19 All. 339

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—REFERENCE
TO HIGH COURT.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 371

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 806

See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 50.

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 259

sanction of—

See MADRAS ABKARI ACT, s. 24.
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 430

of sea customs, Madras.

See JUDICIAL OFFICERS, LIABILITY OF.
I. L. R. 1 Mad. 89

1. *Duty of Collector—Sale by Government through Collector—Giving possession to purchaser.* When a Collector by order of the Board of Revenue sells a khas mehal as of a specified area and jumma, and borne on the towji under a certain number and name, it is the duty of the Collector to point out and give possession of that which he has professed to sell. *WATSON & Co. v. SHURNOMOYEE*
9 W. R. 259

2. *Position and duties in executing decree of Civil Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 320-325—Execution of decree—Decree transferred to the Collector for execution—Collector's duties and powers in execution—Civil Court's jurisdiction to revise Collector's proceedings in execution.* A decree was transferred to the Collector for execution. The Mamlatdar under the orders of the Collector put up for sale certain immovable property belonging to the judgment-debtors. The sale was confirmed by the Mamlatdar with the sanction of the Collector. Some time afterwards the auction-purchaser applied to the Collector for a certificate of sale, but the Collector refused the certificate and set aside the sale on the ground that the purchaser was a relative of the decree-holder and had really purchased the property on his behalf without the permission of the Court. Against this proceeding of the Collector the purchaser made an application, first to the Subordinate Judge who had transferred the decree to the Collector for execution, and then to the District Court. But both Courts declined to entertain his application on the ground of want of jurisdiction. *Held*, on an application to the High Court, that the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to deal with the application and to revise the Collector's proceedings in execution. *Held*,

COLLECTOR—*contd.*

also, that the Collector, having through his subordinate put up for sale the judgment-debtor's property and confirmed the sale, had in that way completely executed the decree so far as he could, and was so far *functus officio*. His duty was to make a return to the Court of what he had done. After confirmation of the sale, he could not set it aside. *Per WEST, J.*—The Collector, like the Nazir in India, is a ministerial officer when he executes a decree. He, like the Nazir, must carry out the decree of a Civil Court in general subjection to the judicial direction of the Court on whose authority the coercive power exercised by him rests, and which alone can deal judicially with the questions that arise in execution. His proceedings and orders are subject accordingly to revision and correction on the application of a party aggrieved whenever he misconceives the decree or acts illegally in giving effect to it. He is limited strictly to the precise line of activity laid down for him in the Code and the orders under it; and in cases of error or doubt it is the Court that must determine whether he, as its ministerial officer, has or has not transgressed his powers. *Per BIRDWOOD, J.*—A sale made by a Collector under Ch. XIX of the Civil Procedure Code is subject to confirmation by the Civil Court under s. 312. As soon as the Collector has exercised or performed the power or duties conferred or imposed upon him by ss. 321 to 325 of the Code, he is *functus officio*. If he has sold the property or re-sold it under the power given by cl. (c) of s. 325, he has completed the execution of the decree so far as he can legally complete it, and it is then his duty to re-transmit the decree to the Court, under rules prescribed in that behalf by Government under the second paragraph of s. 320. Where the property has been sold or re-sold, the sale or re-sale cannot be set aside by the Collector. Any application for setting it aside must be made to the Civil Court under s. 311 and dealt with by it under s. 312; and if no application is made to the Court, the sale must be confirmed by it under that section. *LALU TRIKAM v. BHAVIA MATHIA*. I. L. R. 11 Bom. 478

See *KESHABDEO v. RADHA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 11 All. 94

MADHO PRASAD v. HANSA KUAR

I. L. R. 5 All. 314

NATHU MAL v. LACHEMI NARAIN

I. L. R. 9 All. 43

3. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 313, 320—Transfer of execution of decree to Collector—Jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain application under s. 313—Rules prescribed by Local Government under s. 320—Notification No. 671 of 1880, dated the 30th August.* Held, that an application under s. 313 of the Civil Procedure Code by the purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree, which had been transferred for execution to the Collector in accordance with the rules prescribed by the Local Government, was entertainable by the Civil Courts, and the Collector had no jurisdiction, under the Code or under Notification No. 671 of 1880, to entertain it. *Madho Prasad v. Hansa Kuar*, I. L.

COLLECTOR—*contd.*

R. 5 All. 314, referred to. *NATHU MAL v. LACHEMI NARAIN*. I. L. R. 9 All. 43

4. ———— *Partition—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 265—Execution—Decree for Partition referred to Collector—Collector bound to partition and deliver over possession to several allottees under decree—Practice.* The duty of the Collector to whom a decree has been referred under s. 265 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) for partition, is not confined to mere division of the lands decreed to be divided, but includes the delivery of the shares to their respective allottees. *PARBHUDAS LAKHMIDAS v. SHANKARBHAI*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 662

5. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 265—Execution of decree—Decree for Partition—Land Revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879), s. 113—Collector's power in executing partition decree—Civil Court's jurisdiction to control Collector's action.* Decrees in three separate suits for the partition of a certain estate having been referred to the Collector of Ratnagiri for execution under the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 265, *B* and *R* (brothers of the first appellant), who were parties to the suits, objected to the Collector's mode of partition, and applied to the Court to set aside the Collector's scheme and to direct a fresh partition. The Subordinate Judge of Vengurla granted the application and set aside the partition ordered by the Collector. Against this order *V*, who was plaintiff in one of the suits, appealed to the District Court, and in the appeal he made *B* alone the respondent. The District Court reversed the order of the Subordinate Judge and upheld the order of the Collector. Thereupon *B* preferred a second appeal to the High Court against the decision of the District Court. To this appeal neither *R* nor his brother, the present appellant, were made parties. The High Court having confirmed the decision of the District Court, proceedings were taken to carry out the partition according to the Collector's original scheme. The appellant objected on the ground that the Collector's scheme had been set aside by the Subordinate Judge, and that he (the appellant) had not been a party to the proceedings in either of the Appellate Courts. He contended that he was therefore not bound by the decisions of the Appellate Courts, and that the order of the Subordinate Judge, setting aside the partition ordered by the Collector, was still in force so far as he was concerned. He therefore applied that the property should be divided in accordance with that order. His application was rejected by the Court of first instance as time-barred, inasmuch as more than a year had elapsed since the date of the order of the Subordinate Judge, and during that time the applicant had taken no steps to enforce the order. On appeal, the Acting District Judge confirmed the order of the lower Court, holding that the order of the Subordinate Judge was no longer in force, having been set aside by the High Court. On second appeal to the High Court: Held, that the appellant could not succeed in the present appeal, the object of which was to

COLLECTOR—*contd.*

revive the order of the Subordinate Judge. That order was one which the Subordinate Judge had no power to make. It involved taking the execution of the decree for partition out of the Collector's hands into his own, in direct contradiction of the law. In case of partition of lands, s. 265 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882) and s. 113 of the Bombay Revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879) place the execution of the decree entirely in the Collector's hands. This does not deprive the Court of judicial control of its decree, as, for instance, if it should appear to have been obtained by fraud or surprise; but in the present case nothing of that kind was relied on. Nor was it asserted that the Collector had acted in bad faith, or contravened the command of the Court, or transgressed the law. What was alleged was that he had made an objectionable partition. This was not a ground on which the Subordinate Judge could interfere. *DEV GOPAL SAVANT v. VASUDEV VITHAL SAVANT* . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 371

6. ———— *Execution of decree for Partition—Collector, power of, to refuse execution—Ultra vires.* The plaintiffs obtained a decree against the defendants for partition and possession of their share in the lands in the village of Kasai. That decree was sent for execution to the Collector. In the meantime, a revision survey had been introduced into the village, under which the designation of some of the lands directed to be partitioned was changed from khoti to dhara lands. The Collector proposed to partition them, as described by the survey; but the plaintiffs having declined the proposal, he refused to partition the lands, and returned unexecuted the decree to the Court. On reference to the High Court:—*Held*, that the Collector had acted *ultra vires*. The plaintiffs were entitled to have the lands partitioned, quite independent of the result of the new survey as regards the character of the lands. The proposal of the Collector was virtually to contravene the command of the Court, which as a purely ministerial officer, it was not in his power to do either directly or indirectly. *GANOJI UTEKAR v. DHONDU* . . . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 450

7. ———— *Partition—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), ss. 3, sub-s. (1), 197—Wajib-ul-urz—Power of Collector on constituting a new mehal by partition to frame a fresh wajib-ul-urz for such mehal.* It is within the implied, though not within the specified, powers of a Collector while constituting new mehals by partition of a previously existing single mehal to frame a new wajib ul-urz for each of the new mehals so constituted. *KEDAR NATH v. RAM DIAL* . . . I. L. R. 15 All. 410

8. ———— *Power of Collector—Officer acting in two capacities—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 168.* A Collector who entertains a charge, under s. 168 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, of an offence against any Court or public servant, should not try the case himself as a Magistrate nor, unless under very exceptional circumstances, give

COLLECTOR—*contd.*

evidence as a witness before himself as Magistrate. *QUEEN v. NEHAL MAHTEE* . . . 9 W. R. Cr. 13

9. ———— *Power to authorize Manager to sue—Beng. Act IV of 1870, s. 11. Quære:* Whether, where the estate and effects of minors are by an order of the Civil Court vested in the Collector, who appointed a manager under Act XL of 1858, the Collector has power, under Bengal Act IV of 1870, s. 11, to give authority to the manager to bring a suit in the Civil Court. The point being a technical one, and no substantial injury having been done, the High Court refused to interfere. *In the matter of KALEE DOSS ROY* . . . 18 W. R. 466

10. ———— *Collector as Manager of a Minor's estate—Act XX of 1864, ss. 11 and 15—Officer of Government—Act XIV of 1869, s. 32—Jurisdiction.* Ss. 11 and 15 of Act XX of 1864, taken together, show that a Collector, when appointed to take charge of the estate of a minor, is so appointed in his capacity as Collector, and therefore as an officer of Government within the meaning of Act XIV of 1869, s. 32. *NARSINGRAO RAMACHANDRA v. LUXUMANRAO* . . . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 318

11. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 424—Collector as Guardian of Ward—Notice in suit to recover money from estate of ward.* In a suit to recover money due on a promissory note executed by the deceased zamindar out of the estate of the deceased and of his son, the defendant, a minor under the Court of Wards, the Collector being appointed guardian *ad litem* of the defendant, pleaded that under s. 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure he was entitled to notice before suit, and the suit was dismissed on the ground of want of notice. *Held* on appeal, that s. 424 was not applicable to the case. *ANANTHARAMAN v. RAMASAMI* . . . I. L. R. 11 Mad. 371

12. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 424—Notice to Collector—Collector joined a party in respect of minor's property administered by him, to protect minor's title.* The plaintiff sued as purchaser at a Court-sale of the interest of defendant No. 1, to redeem and recover possession of the land in dispute, alleging that it had been mortgaged by defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 1 denied the mortgage, and that he had any title to the land, which he said belonged to R, and formed a part of R's desmukhi vatan. R having died, leaving a minor widow, sued as defendant No. 4 in the suit, the estate was administered by the Collector. On the application of the minor's personal guardians, the Collector was joined as a party. The Collector contended on the minor's behalf that the suit having been brought without notice to him as required by s. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), it was not maintainable. The District Judge was of opinion that notice was necessary. He therefore rejected the plaintiff's claim, and ordered the sale to be set aside. On appeal by the plaintiff to the High Court:—*Held*,

COLLECTOR—*contd.*

that notice under s. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) was not necessary. The Collector was made a party not in respect of any alleged illegal act by him, but on the application of the minor's personal guardians, in order to protect the minor's title as set up by the first defendant. *BHAU BALAPA v. NANA*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 343

13. ———— *Suit to cancel Pottah of Government Waste Land, issued by Collector—Power of Collector to cancel pottah granted by him—Standing order—Mistake, pottah granted by.* The plaintiff, having obtained from the Revenue officers of the district a pottah of Government waste land, sued for the cancellation of a pottah for the same land, subsequently granted to other persons by the Collector, who considered that the issue of the plaintiff's pottah was not in accordance with the darkhast rules. *Held*, (i) that it was not competent to the Collector, even if the first pottah was granted by mistake, to issue the second pottah in supersession of that issued to plaintiff; (ii) that it was competent to a Civil Court to pass a decree declaring the second pottah null and void, and the plaintiff was entitled to such a decree. *Kullappa Naik v. Ramanuja Chariyar*, 4 *Mad.* 429, followed.

COLLECTOR OF SALEM *v.* RANGAPPA

I. L. R. 12 *Mad.* 404

14. ———— *Power of Collector as Agent to Court of Wards—Contract Act, s. 25, cl. 3—Promise to pay a time-barred debt—Mad. Reg. V of 1804, s. 17.* A Collector, as agent to the Court of Wards, has no authority to bind a ward of the Court of Wards by a promise under the Contract Act, s. 25, cl. (3), to pay a debt which is barred by limitation. *SUBYANARAYANA v. NARENDRA THATRAZ*

I. L. R. 19 *Mad.* 255

15. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 295 and 320—Execution of decree—Power of Collector to deal with money realized through his Court in execution of a Civil Court's decree—Sale-proceeds, distribution of.* Where a decree has been sent to the Collector for execution under s. 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he holds any money which may be realized in execution of such decree at the disposal of the Civil Court by which the decree has been sent to him for execution, and he is not competent to distribute by such money in contravention of an order from the Civil Court. *TAPESRI LAL v. DEOKINANDAN*

I. L. R. 16 *Al.* 1

16. ———— *Office of Kazi—Hereditary office—Watan—Hereditary Offices Act (Bom. Act III of 1874), s. 9—Grant for public purposes—Resolution of Government—Possession, delivery of.* The office of kazi is not an hereditary office, unless perhaps by special custom of the locality. Where such a custom is not established, property attached to the office is not watan property, and the Collector has no power to make an order with respect to it under s. 9 of the Hereditary Offices Act (Bombay Act III of 1874). *Jamal valad Ahmed v. Jamal valad Jallal*, I. L. R. Bom. 133, and *Daudsha v. Ismatsha*, I. L. R. 3 *Bom.*

COLLECTOR—*contd.*

72, followed. A resolution of Government empowering a Collector to levy full assessment from the person other than the grantee in possession of land granted for public service, does not authorize him to order the delivery of possession of the land to the grantee. *BARA KAKAJI SHET SHIMPI v. NASSARUDDIN*

I. L. R. 18 *Bom.* 103

17. ———— *Collector as Municipal Commissioner—District Magistrate—Act XIV of 1869, s. 32—Bom. Act VI of 1873—Jurisdiction—Acts done in public capacity.* Where the acts complained of by the plaintiff were committed by the Collector of a district, appointed Municipal Commissioner under Act XXVI of 1850, s. 6, in his official capacity of District Magistrate, and before Bombay Act VI of 1873 came into force: *Held*, that the Municipal Commissioner was an officer of Government within the meaning of s. 32 of Act XIV of 1869, and ought to be sued in the Court of the District Judge and not in that of a Subordinate Judge. *Quere*: Whether a suit under Bombay Act VI of 1873 must be commenced in the District Court. *GANGADHAR SHIVKARN v. COLLECTOR OF AHMEDNAGAR*

I. L. R. 1 *Bom.* 628

18. ———— *Decree for sale sent to Collector for execution—Power of Collector to vary decree—Responsibility of Collector to judgment-creditor.* A Collector, to whom a decree for sale of mortgaged property has been transferred for execution under s. 320 of the Civil Procedure Code, is limited to one of the three courses specified in s. 321, and may not depart from them; much less may he do what the Court itself could not do in such a case—allow payment of the debt to be made by instalments. A Collector, to whom a decree has been so transferred for execution, acts ministerially, and, when he delegates his functions to an assistant or a mamlatdar, incurs a risk of having to answer in damages to the person who is by any error or mistake deprived of the fruits of his judgment; and this risk attaches independently of malice or negligence. *MAHADAJI KARANDIKAR v. HARI D. CHIKNE*

I. L. R. 7 *Bom.* 332

19. ———— *Order prohibiting receiving transit duties in British territory for Foreign State—Power of Collector.* *Held*, that it was beyond the power of a Collector to issue an order prohibiting the receiving of transit duties for Holkar's Government in British territory. *REG. v. VITHAL LAKSHUMAN*

5 *Bom. Cr.* 13

20. ———— *Modification of orders of Assistant Collector—Mad. Regs. IX of 1822 and VII of 1828, s. 3—Power of Collector.* The authority of a Collector to modify, confirm, or reverse the decision of the Head Assistant Collector under s. 3 of Regulation VII of 1828 is not confined to cases decided under Regulation IX of 1822 only, and the decision of the Collector under Regulation VII of 1828 is final. *CHUNIA AIYAN v. MAHOMED FIKRUDDIN SAIB*

2 *Mad.* 322

COLLECTOR—*contd.*

21. ————— *Power to set aside decision under Mad. Act VIII of 1865.* A Collector has no power to set aside the decision of a Head Assistant Collector when the latter is exercising the powers conferred on a Collector by Madras Act VIII of 1865. *RAJARAM LALA v. KALIAPPEN* 5 Mad. 129

22. ————— *Objection to register and assess land transferred in accordance with Mad. Reg. XXV of 1802.* A Collector is bound to register and sub-assess a portion of a zamindari transferred in accordance with the provisions of Regulation XXV of 1802, such transfer not being opposed to Hindu or Mahomedan law, or the existing law. *PONNUSAMY TEVAR v. COLLECTOR OF MADURA* 3 Mad. 35

23. ————— *Issue of summons to attend departmental enquiry—Mad. Act III of 1869.* A Collector who, in order to draw up a report for the information of Government, holds a departmental enquiry into the conduct of a tahsildar accused of extortion in the discharge of his executive duties, is authorized, under the provisions of Madras Act III of 1869, to issue summonses for the attendance of persons whose evidence may appear to him necessary for the investigation. *SRINIVASA AYANGAR v. QUEEN* I. L. R. 4 Mad. 393

24. ————— *Power of Collector to transfer suits under the Rent Recovery Act—Mad. Reg. VII of 1828.* The Collector of a district is competent to transfer suits under the Rent Recovery Act filed before an Assistant Collector in his district, to the file of any other Assistant Collector in the same district. *KAILASANATHA v. TIRUVENGADA* I. L. R. 7 Mad. 420

25. ————— *Reference to district panchayat—Mad. Reg. XII of 1816—Village Panchayet—Power of Collector.* A Collector cannot order a reference to a district panchayet under Regulation XII of 1816, unless there has been (i) an enquiry as to whether the parties will submit to the jurisdiction of a village panchayet; (ii) an objection from either party to such reference, and a request in writing by one of the parties that the matter be referred to a district panchayet. *CHIKATI v. PEDDAKIMEDI* I. L. R. 8 Mad. 569

26. ————— *Deputy Collector—Reference of cases to Munsif—Mad. Reg. XII of 1816—Act VII of 1857.* A Deputy Collector, invested by a Collector with all the powers of a Covenanted Assistant, or with the special powers to determine claims under Regulation XII of 1816, is competent to refer cases under that Regulation for disposal to a District Munsif. The authority must be delegated under s. 3, Act VII of 1857. *ANONYMOUS* 4 Mad. Ap. 1

27. ————— *Suit for Resumption—Beng. Reg. II of 1819, s. 30.* Under s. 30, Regulation II of 1819, a Deputy Collector, although authorized to put the case in such a state of preparation as to facilitate the hearing and decision by the Collector, had no authority to pronounce a

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decision himself. *RADHAMADHUB GHOSE v. KHIRUDNATH ROY* 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 84

28. ————— *Suit under Beng. Reg. II of 1819.* A Deputy Collector has no jurisdiction to try a suit under s. 30, Regulation II of 1819, but should return the plaint, and refer the party to the Collector who has jurisdiction. *GOUREEKANT BANERJEE v. LALL MAHOMED MOLLAH* W. R. F. B. 70
Marsh. 265; 2 Hay 107

KALLY DASS BANERJEE v. MUTTY LALL CHUCKERBUTTY Marsh. 483

29. ————— *Act XXII of 1872—Act XIV of 1863, s. 8—Collector in charge of sub-division.* A Deputy Collector, who by virtue of Act XXII of 1872 must be deemed to have been a Deputy Collector in charge of a sub-division within the meaning of Act X of 1859 and Act XIV of 1863, and whose powers for the decision of suits were therefore the powers of a Collector, was transferred to the settlement department, and heard and determined a suit under Act X of 1859 for enhancement of rent. *Held*, that his power continued in him notwithstanding his transfer, and that therefore he did not need to be re-invested under s. 8 of Act XIV of 1863. *GIRDHAREE v. DILSOORH RAI* 5 N. W. 221

30. ————— *Deputy Collector whether a "Court" under Land Acquisition Act—Judicial Officer—Revenue Court—Prosecution for false evidence—Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, s. 476—Penal Code, s. 193.* The expression "the Court" in the Land Acquisition Act does not include a Collector, nor is there any authority given to the Collector to administer an oath or to require a verification. It is a false statement made under a verification that constitutes an offence under s. 193 of the Penal Code, not a verification on oath or solemn affirmation. The Deputy Collector acting under the Land Acquisition Act is not a judicial officer, he cannot properly be regarded as a Revenue Court within the terms of s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, his proceedings under the former Act are not regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, nor is he right in requiring a petition put in before him to be verified in accordance with that Code, so as to make any false statement punishable as perjury. The Deputy Collector is not in a position to pass any final order in the matter of value of the land or the right to claim the price fixed; a party dissatisfied can claim a reference to the Civil Court, whose duty it is to settle the matter in dispute judicially; therefore, to subject parties who claimed the right to such a reference to a criminal prosecution, when the matters on which the Deputy Collector had formed an opinion as a Revenue Officer under the Land Acquisition Act must be submitted to the determination of a Court, is obviously premature and improper, and is almost certain to operate very prejudicially towards them in the trial before the Civil Court of the same matter. *DURGA DAS RUKHIT v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* I. L. R. 27 Calc. 820

COLLECTOR—*concl'd.*

31. Deputy Collector not acting as Settlement Officer—*Act XXII of 1872—Act I of 1874, ss. 7, 8.* The provisions of s. 2 of Act XXII of 1872 applied only to suits in which the proceedings of Deputy Collectors were liable to be set aside for want of jurisdiction, and did not have the effect of reviving decrees passed by them which had been annulled in appeal, or of annulling the decrees in appeal by which those decrees were annulled. Except in the cases of Deputy Collectors employed in making or revising a settlement, Act I of 1874 made no provision for the validation of decrees of Deputy Collectors set aside for want of jurisdiction, or for the invalidation of the decrees of the Appellate Courts which annulled those decrees. *Quere*: Whether the proviso to s. 8 of Act I of 1874, that the provisions of the section should not apply to any case in which the holder of a decree made by an officer employed in making or revising a settlement, and treated as invalid for want of authority in such officer, had, before the passing of the Act, obtained a decree in a competent Court in another suit on the same cause of action, would have applied to a case where the holder of the decree brought another suit, the decree in which was against him. *JEEWA RAM v. ISREE* 6 N. W. 153

32. Deputy Collector acting as Settlement Officer—*Reg. IX of 1825, ss. 5 and 6.* Any Deputy Collector, deputed and authorized under s. 6 of Regulation IX of 1825 to make an enquiry, with the same powers and authority in regard to all lands held free of assessment and for the investigation of all claims touching such lands as by s. 5 of the Regulation were vested in Collectors making settlements prescribed by Regulation VII of 1822, is justified in taking the initiative in cases in which the Government has no interest, as in plots under 50 bighas, with respect to which it has waived its right to resume in favour of the proprietor of the mehal. *BEOLAN MISSEER v. KANHIA LAL* 7 N. W. 302

33. Transfer of case to Assistant Collector to record evidence. A Collector is incompetent to send a case to the Assistant Collector merely to record the evidence therein, and when this is done, all subsequent proceedings will be annulled. *ZAIB-ONNISSA v. ADJOODHYA PERSHAD* 2 N. W. 38

BHOWANEE DUTT SINGH v. BEER SINGH 2 N. W. 196

34. Offence against the Stamp Laws—*Act XVIII of 1869, s. 43.* The Collector being primarily responsible for the prosecution of offences against the Stamp Acts of 1869 and 1879, should not himself try, as a Magistrate, a person accused of an offence against either of those Acts. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. DEOKI NANDAN LAL* I. L. R. 2 All. 806

35. Agent of Court of Wards for disqualified proprietor—*N. W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 204—Public officer—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 2 and 424.* A Col-

COLLECTOR—*concl'd.*

lector, when acting under s. 204 of Act XIX of 1873 as the agent of the Court of Wards in respect of the estate of a disqualified person, is a public officer within the meaning of ss. 2 and 424 of Act X of 1877, and, consequently, when sued for acts done in that capacity, is entitled to the notice of suit required by the latter section. *COLLECTOR OF BILNOR v. MUNUVAR* I. L. R. 3 All. 20

36. Power to set aside sale under s. 311, *Civil Procedure Code, 1882—Rules made by Bombay Government.* Under the rules made by the Local Government of the Bombay Presidency, a Collector has not the power of the Court, under s. 311 of the Civil Procedure Code, to set aside a sale. *NARAYAN v. RASULKHAN* I. L. R. 23 Bom. 531

37. Power of Collector—*Reference by Collector—Jurisdiction of District Court—Land Acquisition Act, s. 55.* A Collector is not competent to refer, nor a District Judge to decide, any question arising under the Land Acquisition Act, s. 55. *RAMALAKSAMI v. COLLECTOR OF KISTNA* I. L. R. 16 Mad. 321

38. Execution of decree—*Partition by Collector—Objections to the partition—Court's jurisdiction to hear the objections.* Where a decree is sent to the Collector for execution under s. 265 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) and the Collector contravenes the decretal command of the Court or otherwise acts *ultra vires*, his action is subject to the control and correction of the Court, which passed the decree and sent it to him for execution. *Dev Gopal v. Vasudev*, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 371, and *Ganoji v. Dhondu*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 450, followed. *PURUSHOTTAM BHASKAR v. BALKRISHNA PANDURANG* (1904) I. L. R. 28 Bom. 238

COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS.

Power of—Counterfeit Trade-mark—False Trade description—Sea Customs Act (VII of 1878), ss. 18, 19A—Merchandise Marks Act (IV of 1889), ss. 10, 11—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 28, 480. It is the duty of the Collector of Customs as representing the Government to stop from being brought into British India, goods coming within the specification mentioned in s. 18 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, as amended by the Merchandise Marks Act, 1889, *inter alia*, goods having applied thereto a counterfeit trade-mark within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code, or a false trade-description within the meaning of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act, 1889. The Collector has power to detain such goods although no regulations have been framed by the Governor-General in Council under s. 19A (2) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, as amended by the Merchandise Marks Act, 1889. *NEMI CHAND v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* I. L. R. 34 Calc. 511

COLLECTOR OF 24-PARGANAS.

See NOTICE, SERVICE OF.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 286

COLLECTOR OF 24-PARGANAS—*concl'd.*

Public Demands Recovery Act (Beng. I of 1895)—Sale of immoveable property—Certificate Officer. The Collector of the 24-Parganas is *ex-officio* Collector of Calcutta. He may, in his capacity of Certificate Officer, sell immoveable property in Calcutta under the Public Demands Recovery Act (Beng. I of 1895). *HARI CHARAN SINGH v. CHANDRA KUMAR DEY* (1907) I. L. R. 34 Calc. 787

COLLISION.

See ACCIDENT.

See JURISDICTION—ADMIRALTY AND VICE-ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION.

10 Bom. 110
1 Hyde 275
4 Bom. O. C. 149

See PENAL CODE, s. 304A.

8 C. W. N. 645

See RAILWAYS ACT, s. 101

8 C. W. N. 645

See SHIP . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 36

See SHIPPING LAW—COLLISION.

— damage done to ship by—

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 36 . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 133

Railways Act (IX of 1890), s. 101—Negligence—Omission to take down line-clear signal. Where in consequence of the omission of a Station Master to take down the line-clear signal, a mixed train was run into the station and a collision took place in which one waggon was derailed, but as the train was moving slowly no person was injured: *Held*, that the omission on the part of the Station Master constituted an offence under s. 101 of the Indian Railways Act. *The Queen v. Manphool*, 5 All. H. C. 240 (Ry. Cas. 710), distinguished. *JOY GOPAL BANERJEE v. EMPEROR* (1906) . 11 C. W. N. 173

COLLUSION.

See DIVORCE . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 874

See DIVORCE ACT, s. 13.

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 651

See FRAUD.

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 9.

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 205

See ONUS OF PROOF—MORTGAGE.

5 C. W. N. 403

See SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, s. 9.

6 C. W. N. 616

COLONIAL COURTS OF ADMIRALTY ACT, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict., c. 27).

See ADMIRALTY OR VICE-ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 402

COLOURABLE IMITATION.

See TRADE-MARK.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 495

COMBINATION.

— of bidders—

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COMMENCEMENT OF ACT.

— issue of orders before—

See BENGAL IRRIGATION ACT, ss. 1, 6.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 487

COMMENSALITY.

See HINDU LAW I. L. R. 31 Calc. 262

COMMISSION.

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1. CIVIL CASES 2051

2. CRIMINAL CASES 2059

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 383 TO 400.

See PRACTICE . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 441

See PRIVY COUNCIL I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1

See PROBATE . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 623

See RECEIVER . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 233

— criminal cases—

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— evidence taken on—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 390.
13 C. W. N. 525

— exclusion of evidence taken on—

See HINDU LAW—ADOPTION—EVIDENCE OF ADOPTION . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 999

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See COURT FEES ACT, s. 20.
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— to examine witness—

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See MAHOMEDAN LAW—WILL.

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— to make partition—

See PARTITION—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.
5 C. W. N. 128

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ING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE.I. L. R. 25 Calc. 807
2 C. W. N. 566See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—SECONDARY
EVIDENCE—NON-PRODUCTION FOR
OTHER CAUSES.

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 939

See PARDANASHIN WOMEN.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 20 : 3 C. L. R. 93
18 W. R. 230I. L. R. 26 Calc. 650, 551 note
3 C. W. N. 750, 751, 753See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—COMMIS-
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on sale of mortgaged property—

See OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE.

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trator General.See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, CL. 15.
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See BROKER . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 124

rule as to rate of—

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s. 27 . . . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 148

to trustees.

See WILL—CONSTRUCTION.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 44

1. CIVIL CASES.

1. ——— Case on peremptory board—

Practice. A commission for the examination of witnesses will be issued, even though the cause is entered upon the peremptory board of the day, if the issuing of such commission is not calculated to prejudice the defendants, or to subject them to loss or inconvenience. *JANSSEN v. DUNDAS*

1 Hyde 269

2. ——— Witness out of jurisdiction—

Power of granting Commission to examine a Party to suit. A commission will be granted merely as a matter of course to examine a material witness who is out of the jurisdiction of the Court, if the witness

COMMISSION—*contd.*1. CIVIL CASES—*contd.*

cannot be brought into Court by its ordinary process. But the commission will not be granted, at the instance of either party, to enable him to give evidence himself under a commission, except under very strong circumstances indeed, such as where he is seriously ill. *DOUCETT v. WISE*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 357

3. ——— Obligation to issue. As to the obligation on the Court to issue a commission, see *per AINSLIE, J.*, in *HARIDAS BAISAKH v. MOZAAM HOSSEIN*

8 B. L. R. Ap. 16 : 15 W. R. 477

4. ——— Non-resident witnesses—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 175.* The Court is invested with discretionary power to grant or to refuse applications made under s. 175, Act VIII of 1859, for the examination by commission of witnesses resident more than 100 miles distant from Calcutta. *BURNEY v. EYRE* . . . 1 Hyde 68

5. ——— Commission to examine witnesses—*Grounds for granting Commission.* A plaintiff applied under s. 640 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), for a commission to issue for the examination of three female witnesses (*P, B* and *A*) at the residence of one of them (*P*). The grounds upon which he based his application were the following:—(i) That *P* had lost her husband ten months previously and was in mourning; that, according to Parsi usage, a widow observed mourning for two or three years, and during that time did not leave her house; (ii) that *B* was fifty-eight years of age and sickly and physically unable to attend the Court; (iii) that *A* was about to go up-country, and could not stay in Bombay until the hearing. *Held*, the circumstances alleged were not such as to justify the issue of a commission. *RUSTOMJI FRAMJI v. BANOOBAI*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 584

6. ——— Application by a defendant (caveator) to examine witnesses on commission—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Ch. XXV—Practice.* Where a defendant (caveator) applied for the issue of a commission to examine witnesses, the Judge, having regard to the circumstances of the case and to the principles laid down in *Berdan v. Greenwoods, L. R. 20 Ch. D. 764, footnote 3*, refused the application. *MOWJI DHARAMSEY v. NEMCHAND NARANJI*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 626

7. ——— Power of Deputy Collector. A Deputy Collector is competent to depute an officer of his Court to take evidence on commission if the place where the witness is examined is within his jurisdiction. *RAM CHAND MOOKERJEE v. KAMINEE DABEA* . . . 10 W. R. 236

8. ——— Examination of infant. The Court will not issue a commission for the examination of an infant of tender years. *In the matter of BEENODEENY DOSSEE*

2 Hyde 152 : Cor. 78

COMMISSION—*contd.*1. CIVIL CASES—*contd.*

9. ——— Witness, servant of party applying—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 175.* An application for the issue of a commission under Act VIII of 1859, s. 175, should be supported by some reason other than the mere distance of place of residence of the witness. If the witness is a stranger, a commission will be right and reasonable, but not if he is a servant of the party applying. *AMRITH NATH JHA v. DHUNPUT SINGH*
20 W. R. 253

10. ——— Notice to opposite party. The issue of a commission for the examination of an absent witness without notice to the opposite party, even if not illegal, is objectionable. *TABUCKNATH MOOKERJEE v. GOURÉE CHURN MOOKERJEE*
3 W. R. 147

11. ——— Witnesses residing out of British territories. Where the application of a party to a suit to have the evidence of witnesses residing beyond the British territories taken under a commission failed, owing to circumstances beyond his control, a subsequent application to have other witnesses examined within the British territories ought to have been complied with. *MULLUK ALI SHAH v. MEHER BANOO*
8 W. R. 448

12. ——— Commission to England to take evidence—*Costs of such Commission—Party and party Taxation, principle of—Onus of proof in respect to item objected to—Production of Vouchers in case of commission to England—Costs of obtaining Transcript of evidence given and of perusing it—Allowances to Witnesses—Commissioner's Fees—Practice.* Where, in a suit in India, a commission to take evidence has been issued to England, the bill of costs with respect to such commission is to be taxed by the Taxing Master of the Court in India, and not in England. It is to be taxed on the same scale and on the same principle as would be adopted in England, and, if the Taxing Master finds any difficulty, he must refer to England for information. Where an item is objected to in taxation, the Taxing Master should reconsider and review his taxation, and in doing so he should throw the onus of proof, as to the necessity of the item, upon such party as, having regard to its particular nature, he considers ought to bear it. As to the production of vouchers in case of commissions to England, no rule can be laid down. Upon objections being brought in, it is in the discretion of the Taxing Master, either on his own motion or on the application of the party objecting, to require vouchers for, or further proof of, all or any of the items objected to, and, failing the production of the vouchers or proof which he may require, to disallow the item. *Quære:* Whether in taxation as between party and party the costs of obtaining a transcript of the evidence given and of perusing it ought to be allowed. Payments made to witnesses are discretionary allowances, and the Court is averse to review such allowances. The Court, in appointing a commissioner to take evidence in England, expects that the fees

COMMISSION—*contd.*1. CIVIL CASES—*contd.*

of such commissioner will not exceed those which the Supreme Court in England would allow to a special examiner or commissioner acting in England under its orders. If the parties desire that higher fees should be allowed to the commissioner whom they name, they should obtain an order from the Judge appointing the commissioner. *GOCULDAS BULABDAS MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. SCOTT*
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 209

13. ——— Examination under commission—*Practice—Counsel.* The examination of witnesses under a commission is of the same nature as an examination in open Court, and should be conducted by counsel and not by attorneys. The return should show on the face of it that the oath was administered to the commissioner as well as to the interpreter. *FRANKRISHNA CHANDRA v. BISSONATH CHANDRA*
8 B. L. R. Ap. 101

14. ——— Examination de bene esse—*Practice—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 175, 179.* A *de bene esse* examination of a witness about to leave the jurisdiction of the Court must be taken by the Court, unless the parties consent to the evidence being taken under a commission. *EDWARDS v. MULLER*
5 B. L. R. 252

15. ——— *Counsel.* An examination *de bene esse*, being on the same footing as the examination of a witness in a cause, can only be conducted by counsel. *HOFFMAN v. FRAMJEE*
Cot. 7

16. ——— Attendance of witnesses for examination. It is the duty of the party obtaining a commission for the examination of witnesses to take such steps as may be necessary to secure the attendance before the commissioner of the witnesses he desires to examine. *LEKHRAJ v. PALEEE RAM*
2 N. W. 310

17. ——— Right of person not joining to cross-examine witnesses. A party who has not joined in a commission is entitled to cross-examine the witnesses who are examined under the commission. *GREGORY v. DOOLEY CHUND*
14 W. R. O. C. 17

18. ——— Commission issued without jurisdiction—*Obligation to execute.* A Magistrate is not bound to execute a commission of a Small Cause Court, directing him to take the evidence of prisoners in jail, in a case in which none of the circumstances existed authorizing that Court to issue the commission. *GOPAL CHUNDER SIRCAR v. KURNODHEAR MOOCHEE*
7 W. R. 349

19. ——— Charge by judicial officer for executing commission—*Commission from Insolvency Court—Taxation of Costs—Counsel's Fees—Practice.* In the course of insolvency proceedings the Official Assignee obtained a rule *nisi* calling on one D, alleged to have been gomastah to the insolvent, to show cause why he should not hand over to the Official Assignee certain goods and moneys claimed as part of the insolvent's estate. D applied

COMMISSION—*contd.*1. CIVIL CASES—*contd.*

for and obtained a commission to issue to the Judge of Agra as commissioner to examine witnesses on his behalf, but the Judge of Agra refused to execute the commission without being paid his fees, which *D* accordingly paid. On the hearing of the rule, it was discharged with costs including costs of the commission. On the taxation of the bill of costs as between party and party, the taxing officer disallowed the sum paid to the Judge of Agra, and allowed certain fees and additional fees to the counsel for *D*. Exceptions were filed by both parties, and eventually the exceptions came on for argument. *Held*, that the Judge of Agra was not bound to execute a commission issuing from the Insolvent Court without making a charge for so doing; the amount of the charge is in the discretion of the taxing officer. As to allowing fees to the counsel for *D*, the taxing officer should consider what was fair and reasonable, regard being had to the nature and circumstances of the case; they are not necessarily to be measured by the amount allowed by the Official Assignee for his counsel. *In re GHASEERAM* . . . 12 B. L. R. Ap. 4

20. ——— Pardanashin women—*Costs*. The Court will not order the costs of a commission to examine a defendant, who is a pardanashin lady, to be paid by her, or order the estimated cost of the commission to be paid into Court, although the application for the commission is made by the lady herself. *MONINDROBHOOSUN BISWAS v. SHOSHEE BHOOSUN BISWAS*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 866

21. ——— Difference between arbitrators and commissioners. Commissioners appointed by the Court are officers of the Court, and act by a majority; therefore, where two of the commissioners were agreed: *Held*, that they had power to make a valid return of the commission, notwithstanding the dissent of the third. *RAJENDRA MATILAL v. RAMNARAIN MATILAL*

3 B. L. R. Ap. 3

22. ——— Evidence taken on commission, admissibility of—*Act VIII of 1859, ss. 177, 176, and 179—Powers of High Court to issue commission*. A commission for the examination of a witness at Mandalay can only issue from the High Court. The consent of parties is not requisite to the admissibility of evidence taken under such commissions, if the examination have been upon oath or affirmation. *AGA MAHOMED JAFFER TEHARANI v. NAZIRULLAH* . . . 2 B. L. R. A. C. 73

10 W. R. 385

23. ——— *Act VIII of 1859, s. 179—Evidence on Record—Use by one party of evidence under a commission issued at the instance of another party*. The evidence of the defendant taken under a commission was allowed to be read on the plaintiff's behalf without the deposition being put in as part of the plaintiff's case, as being

COMMISSION—*contd.*1. CIVIL CASES—*contd.*

part of the record under s. 179, Act VIII of 1859. *DWARKANATH DUTT v. GUNGA DAI*

8 B. L. R. Ap. 102

24. ——— Evidence taken on Commission on behalf of Defendant—*Right of Plaintiff to refer to such evidence as part of record of suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 389 and 390—Act VIII of 1859, s. 179*. Defendant examined a witness on commission. The commission was returned to the Court. The plaintiff in opening his case claimed the right to refer to the evidence taken on commission as part of the record of the suit. Defendant objected, contending that, if plaintiff read it, he must read it as his own evidence. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to refer to the evidence as part of the record. *Dwarkanath Dutt v. Gunga Dai*, 8 B. L. R. Ap. 102, followed. *NISTARINI DASSEE v. NUNDO LAL BOSE*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 591

25. ——— Evidence taken in absence of other side. That the evidence was given in the absence of the other side is not enough to make the deposition of a witness taken on commission inadmissible. *RAM CHAND MOOKERJEE v. KAMINEE DABIA* . . . 10 W. R. 236

26. ——— A Court may legally refuse to hear read in evidence the deposition of a defendant taken by commission where there is no evidence to prove that the defendant was from sickness unable to attend personally at the time of the trial, and the Court declines to dispense with the proof of such circumstance. *PRITHEE BULLUBH PAL SREECHUNDUM MARI SULTAN v. HARA DHUN SHOME* 22 W. R. 331

27. ——— Documents attached to return of Commission. Documents attached to the return of a commission and identified with the documents referred to in the evidence, may be read at the hearing of the suit in which the commission issued, unless they have been objected to on being tendered in evidence before the commissioner. Objections to the admissibility of such documents cannot be taken at the hearing of the suit. *STRUTHERS v. WHEELER* . 6 C. L. R. 109

28. ——— Foreign territory—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 387, 399—Oaths Act (X of 1873), s. 13—Evidence taken by Commission, of foreign subject in foreign territory—Admissibility*. Evidence of a foreign witness taken in foreign territory outside the jurisdiction of this Court under a commission rightly issued under s. 387 of the Civil Procedure Code, and executed in accordance with the provisions of s. 399 of the same, is admissible and s. 13 of the Oaths Act has no application. *KADAMBINI DASSI v. KUMUDINI DASSI (1903)* . . . 7 C. W. N. 806

29. ——— Refusal of admission to commissioner—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 467—Examination on Commission—Notice of issue of commission to a party's pleader—*

COMMISSION—*contd.*1. CIVIL CASES—*contd.*

Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 40—Service—Refusing admission to commission—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) s. 174, Proceedings under. A commission was issued to take the deposition of the defendant in a civil suit, a lady. A notice of the commission was shown to the pleader of the lady and his signature taken thereupon; the notice was not addressed to any particular person. On the day appointed for the commission, the doors of the lady's house were locked, and the commissioner was refused admittance, and consequently the commission could not be executed. Proceedings were thereupon instituted against the lady under s. 174, Indian Penal Code. *Held*, that such proceedings under s. 174, Indian Penal Code, were bad. And that, although notice to the pleader, if properly served, would be effectual for all purposes in relation to the civil suit, it could not render the party liable to punishment under s. 174, Indian Penal Code. And that the notice had not been properly served on the pleader. *Held*, also, that there is no authority to compel a person to allow a commission to be held in his house without his consent. *SARASWATI DEVI v. DURGA CHURN LAHA* (1902) . 6 C. W. N. 927

30. ————— *Power of Courts to issue commission—Cases enumerated in sections exhaustive—Court may prevent abuse of its process.* The present appellants obtained a decree against the late head of a mutt and in execution thereof attached certain gold and silver articles. The respondent, the present head of the mutt, who had been made a party to the execution proceedings as the representative of the deceased, contended that the attached articles were not liable to be sold in execution of the decree as they were not assets of the deceased, but property belonging to the mutt. The appellants thereupon applied to the Subordinate Judge to summon the respondent, as a witness for the appellants. The respondent, who resided within the jurisdiction of the Court, then applied to the Subordinate Judge to take his evidence on commission stating that he was unable, of his own personal knowledge, to give any evidence material to the questions at issue, and alleging that the appellants were insisting on his appearance in Court to put pressure upon him to relinquish or compromise his claim, as it was considered derogatory to a person in his position to appear in a Court as a witness. The Subordinate Judge refused to issue a commission. On a revision petition being filed, a single Judge of the High Court set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge and ordered the respondent to be examined on commission. On an appeal being preferred under Art. 15 of the Letters Patent: *Held*, that an appeal lay. *Held*, also, that the issue of commissions for the examination of witnesses by the Courts of this country is governed solely by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and s. 386 is exhaustive, and provides for all the cases in which the Legislature intended that it should be competent to a Court to issue

COMMISSION—*contd.*1. CIVIL CASES—*contd.*

a commission for the examination of witnesses resident within its jurisdiction. *Held*, further, that a litigant's privilege of taking out summonses to witnesses is subject to the control of the tribunal which is called upon to enforce their attendance, though such control will be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. This control is an instance of the authority of every Court of competent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its process. In the present case the appellant's application was not *bond fide*, and the respondent's attendance in Court was required not for the purpose of obtaining material evidence, but from other motives, and the order for the issue of a commission was therefore rightly made. *VEERABADRAN CHETTY v. NATARAJA DESILKAR* (1905) . I. L. R. 28 Mad. 28

31. ————— *Evidence taken on Commission, when evidence in suit—Meaning of "forming part of the record" in s. 389 of the Civil Procedure Code.* Evidence taken on commission does not become evidence in the suit, until the same has been tendered and read as evidence in the suit by the party, on whose behalf it has been taken. *Dwarka Nath v. Gunga Dayi*, 8 B. L. R. 102 Appendix; *Nistarini v. Nundo Lal*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 591, dissented from. *Kusum Kumari v. Satya Ranjan*, 7 C. W. N. 786, followed. *HEMANTA KUMARI v. BANKU BEHARI SIKDAR* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 794

32. ————— *Evidence—Evidence taken on Commission on behalf of the defendant—Right of the plaintiff to refer to such evidence—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) ss. 389, 390—Practice.* Regard being had to the provisions of ss. 389 and 390 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) as also to the practice of the mofussil Courts, the deposition of a *purdanashin* lady taken on commission, although not tendered by the party on whose behalf it was taken, is yet admissible in evidence and can be referred to by the other side as a part of the record of the case. *Kusum Kumari Roy v. Satya Ranjan Das*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 999, and *Hemanta Kumari v. Banku Behari Sikdar*, 9 C. W. N. 794, distinguished. *Nistarini Dassee v. Nundo Lal Bose*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 591, and *Dwarka Nath Dutt v. Gunga Dayi*, 8 B. L. R. App. 102, referred to. *MAN GOBINDA CHOWDHURI v. SHASHINDRA CHANDRA CHOWDHURI* (1907) . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 28

33. ————— *Practice—Evidence taken on commission when evidence in suit—Practice on the Original Side of the High Court and the Mofussil Courts—When Court may grant time and adjourn hearing—Costs of Adjournment—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 156, 389, 390.* Where a commission was duly executed and returned together with the evidence taken under it to the Court which issued it and formed part of the record of the case under s. 389 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), and where the circumstances mentioned in s. 390

COMMISSION—*contd.*1. CIVIL CASES—*concl'd.*

of the Code, which would exclude the deposition from being read as evidence in the suit, do not exist: *Held*, that regard being had to the practice of the mofussil Courts, which is not only perfectly consistent but also in strict accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, it is not necessary to tender the evidence taken on commission formally at a trial, to make it evidence in the case. *Man Gobindo Chowdhury v. Shashindra Chandra Chowdhuri*, I. L. R. 35 Calc. 28, followed. *Dwarka Nath Dutt v. Gunga Dayi*, 8 B. L. R. App. 102; *Nistarini Dassee v. Nundo Lall Bose*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 591; *Kusum Kumari Roy v. Satya Ranjan Das*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 999, and *Struthers v. Wheeler*, 6 C. L. R. 109, referred to. Where the Court made an order for adjournment conditional upon the immediate payment of costs: *Held*, that although s. 156 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) gives the Court ample discretion as to the particular directions to be given in the matter of costs, an order ought not to be made conditional upon immediate payment of costs, without sufficient opportunity being given to the plaintiff to enable him to carry out the orders of the Court and to produce his evidence. *DEANU RAM MAHTO v. MURLI MAHTO* (1909). I. L. R. 36 Calc. 566

2. CRIMINAL CASES.

1. ——— Evidence of Government servant ordered on service taken by commission previously to departure—*High Courts' Criminal Procedure Act (X of 1875), s. 76*. Where a Government servant who had executed his recognizance to appear and give evidence for the prosecution at a criminal trial to take place in the High Court of Bombay was subsequently ordered to a distant station on the public service and could not, with due regard to the public interest, return Bombay in time for the trial: *Held*, on the application of Government, that his evidence might be taken by commission before his departure from Bombay under the provisions of s. 76 of the High Courts' Criminal Procedure Act (X of 1875). *EMPRESS v. BAL GANGADHAR TILAK*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 285

2. ——— Ground for refusing commission—*Prejudicing prisoner—High Courts' Criminal Procedure Act (X of 1875), s. 76*. The High Court refused to issue a commission in a criminal case on the ground that such a course would be unsatisfactory and dangerous to the interests of the prisoner. *EMPRESS v. COUNSELL*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 896

3. ——— Pardanashin woman—*Examination by Commission—Personal appearance in Court—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 330*. *Semble*: That in criminal cases pardanashin women are not of right exempted from personal attendance at Court. Also that the word "inconvenience" in s. 330 of the Criminal Procedure Code

COMMISSION—*contd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*

(Act X of 1872) empowers the Courts to allow examination by commission in criminal cases where a witness, according to the manners and customs of the country, ought not to appear in public. The complainant in a case of defamation, alleging that she was a pardanashin, applied to be examined by commission. *Held*, that the fact that she was a complainant, and not merely a witness, materially altered her position as regards the question whether she ought not to be exempted from personal appearance in Court, and that, under the circumstances, she ought not to be examined by commission, but ought to attend personally to be examined in Court. Direction to the Magistrate to make such arrangements for the examination of the complainant in Court as should secure her privacy consistent with the recording of her evidence, according to law, in the presence of the accused. Witnesses in criminal cases should not be examined by commission except in extreme cases of delay, expense or inconvenience. *In the matter of the petition of FARID-UN-NISSA*

I. L. R. 5 All. 92

4. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 503—Examination by Commission—Personal appearance in Court*. A Hindu lady having been summoned as a witness on behalf of an accused, applied under s. 503 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be examined by commission on the ground (*inter alia*) that she was a pardanashin, and that her enforced appearance in a Criminal Court would entail a forfeiture of her dignity and position in Hindu society. *Held*, that such application was properly made under the section, and that under the circumstances of the case the order prayed for could be made. *In the matter of the petition of DIN TARINI DEBI*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 775

5. ——— *Examination of pardanashin lady—Code of Criminal Procedure (1882), ss. 6, 7, 503, 504, 505, 506, and 507—Presidency Magistrate, power of*. It is doubtful if a Presidency Magistrate in the Town of Calcutta has power to issue a commission, under ss. 503 to 507 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to examine a witness residing within his own jurisdiction; but there is nothing in the Code to prevent a Presidency Magistrate examining a witness within his jurisdiction at some place other than the Court-house. Where a Presidency Magistrate refused, on the ground of want of jurisdiction, to grant a commission, for the examination of a pardanashin lady, but offered to take her evidence in his Court when cleared for the purpose, or in his private room; and she applied to the High Court for a commission being granted, or for such other order as they might deem proper, the High Court, on revision, directed that, if the lady would take a house or suite of rooms not far from the Magistrate's Court and pay all the costs which the Magistrate deemed reasonable and proper, he should not enforce her attendance in Court, but examine her in the place so appointed, in the

COMMISSION—concl'd.**2. CRIMINAL CASES—concl'd.**

presence of the parties concerned and in the manner in which pardanashin ladies are ordinarily examined. *HEM COOMAREN DASSEE v. QUEEN EMPRESS* . . . **I. L. R. 24 Cal. 551**
1 C. W. N. 333

6. ——— Grounds for granting commission—Inconvenience—Expense. At the trial of a person for an offence under s. 411, Penal Code, the Court of Session, under s. 33 of the Evidence Act, used against the accused the evidence of the owner of the property in respect of which the accused was charged and of his wife taken by commission during the enquiry, and the evidence of the servant of those persons taken at the enquiry, and also the evidence of the owner of the property taken during the trial under a commission issued by the Sessions Judge under s. 503 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The grounds upon which the Sessions Judge admitted the evidence taken during the enquiry, were that the attendance of the witnesses could not be procured without an expense of Rs500, an amount which he considered unreasonable; that the witnesses would be inconvenienced; and that their evidence did not concern the accused personally, having reference only to the identification of the property in respect of which the accused was charged. *Held*, that the Sessions Judge had improperly admitted such evidence. Inconvenience to witnesses is no ground allowed under s. 33 of the Evidence Act, and the question of identification was a most material one, and the evidence of the witnesses in question was of the utmost moment, the whole case resting on it; and as regards the ground of expense, it was impossible to consider the amount unreasonable, considering that the entire case rested on the evidence of those witnesses and that the accused had not cross-examined those whose evidence had been taken by commission, nor, looking at his position, could he arrange for their cross-examination. *Held*, that on these grounds the Sessions Judge was not justified in issuing a commission under s. 503 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *QUEEN EMPRESS v. BURKE*
I. L. R. 6 All. 224

7. ——— Application by prisoner for commission to place out of the jurisdiction. Previously to the trial at the Sessions, the prisoner had applied to the Court for commission to Pondicherry and Mauritius to take evidence on his behalf. The application was refused on the ground that the High Court had no authority to issue a commission in such a case, but the learned Judge (WEST, J.) reserved the question for the full Court. *Held*, that the High Court had no power to issue a commission out of the jurisdiction in a criminal case on an application by the accused. *EMPRESS v. MOORGA CHETTY* . . . **I. L. R. 5 Bom. 338**

8. ——— Evidence taken on commission—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 503—507—Evidence Act, 1872, s. 33—Practice. Evidence taken under commission issuing from the Court of

COMMISSION—concl'd.**2. CRIMINAL CASES—concl'd.**

the Chief Presidency Magistrate during the course of an enquiry before him cannot be used in evidence at the trial before the High Court under s. 507 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Held*, further, that on the facts before the High Court it was also inadmissible under s. 33 of the Evidence Act. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JACOB* . . . **I. L. R. 19 Cal. 113**

9. ——— Evidence taken on Commission, admissibility of, in evidence—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 33—Right and opportunity to cross-examine—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, Ch. XL, ss. 503 and 507—Interrogatories, evidence taken by. Depositions taken on commission in criminal cases, although inadmissible under Ch. XL of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), may be admitted under s. 33 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) if the requirements of the proviso to that section have been complied with. The words "opportunity to cross-examine" in the proviso to s. 33 do not imply that the actual presence of the cross-examining party or his agent before the tribunal taking the evidence is necessary. To make evidence admissible against an accused person under s. 33 of the Evidence Act, the fact that he had full opportunity of cross-examination, if not admitted, must be proved. *Quære*: Whether the opportunity to administer cross-interrogatories under a commission is an "opportunity to cross-examine" within the meaning of the proviso to s. 33 of the Evidence Act so as to render the evidence taken on interrogatories admissible. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMCHANDRA GOVIND HEESHE*
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 749

COMMISSION AGENT.

See CONTRACT—CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. . . . **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 470**

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—COMMISSION AGENTS . . . **I. L. R. 16 Mad. 238**
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 520
I. L. R. 29 Bom. 291

COMMISSION OF PARTITION.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 396.
I. L. R. 29 All. 235

See PARTITION.

Lien of Commissioners, on Return, for fees—. Certain commissioners, who had acted under a commission of partition, refused to give up the return they had made until they were paid their fees. On application to the Court, they were ordered to send in the return. *Held*, that commissioners, under a commission of partition, have no lien on their return thereunder for their fees. *RAJMOHEENY DABEE v. MUDDOOSODUN DEY* . . . **Bourke O. C. 24**

COMMISSION SALE.

— goods remaining with insolvent
on—

See *INSOLVENCY—ORDER AND DEPOSITION.*
I. L. R. 3 Calc. 58

COMMISSIONER.

— award of—

See *NAWAB NAZIM'S DEBTS ACT.*
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 584, 742

— dismissal of suit for non-pay-
ment of fee of—

See *RES JUDICATA—JUDGMENTS ON PRE-
LIMINARY POINTS.*
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 510

— fee of—

See *COMMISSION—CIVIL CASES.*
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 209

— for partition, appointment of—

See *PARTITION—JURISDICTION OF CIVIL
COURT IN SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION.*
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 679

— in insolvency.

See *INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 51.*
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 150
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 973
4 C. W. N. 32

See *INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 73.*
1 B. L. R. O. C. 130
3 B. L. R. Ap. 14
5 B. L. R. 179
15 B. L. R. Ap. 10
9 Bom. 319

— power of—

See *SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE.*
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 677

See *VILLAGE CHOWKIDARS ACT, ss. 48
AND 64 .* I. L. R. 21 Calc. 626

— reference to—

See *LOCAL INVESTIGATION.*
I. L. R. 16 Mad. 350

See *AGREEMENT. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 306*

— suit by, for his costs.

See *RIGHT OF SUIT—COSTS.*
I. L. R. 4 Mad. 399

— under Bengal Act VI of 1870.

See *VILLAGE CHOWKIDARS' ACT, ss. 58, 61.*
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 632

**COMMISSIONER FOR EXAMINING
WITNESS.**

See *SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION.*
11 C. W. N. 909

**COMMISSIONER FOR TAKING AC-
COUNTS.**

See *PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—COMMIS-
SIONER FOR TAKING ACCOUNTS.*

1. — Dismissal of suit on failure
to pay fee—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 394—
Remuneration of Commissioner.* The Code of Civil
Procedure does not authorize the dismissal of a suit
on refusal or failure of a party to deposit the
amount ordered by the Court as remuneration to a
commissioner appointed under s. 394 to examine
accounts. The remuneration of a commissioner
appointed by the Court to examine accounts should,
as a rule, be a definite amount, and not at a monthly
allowance. *RAGAVA CHARIAR v. VEDANTA CHARIAR*
I. L. R. 3 Mad. 259

2. — Enquiry into correctness of
report—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 181—
Power of High Court to examine accounts—Act
XXIII of 1861, s. 37.* An error in the principle on
which an account is taken is not the only ground on
which a Court should enquire into the correctness of
a report of a commissioner appointed under s. 181 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. It is competent to an
Appellate Court, under the powers conferred by
s. 37 of Act XXIII of 1861, to examine the accounts,
even if no exception has been taken to them in the
Court appointing the commissioner. Madras ruling
dissented from. *AHMED VALAD NANHUBHAI v.
KHASAJI VALAD KARIMBHAI .* 6 Bom. A. C. 149

3. — Power of High Court to
deal with Commissioner's report—*Civil
Procedure Code, 1859, s. 181.* Where a commis-
sioner appointed under s. 181 of Act VIII of 1859 to
investigate the state of accounts between a debtor
and creditor made his report on which the judg-
ment appealed against was founded, the High Court
on regular appeal refused to take a fresh account.
SARAPU VENKADESAN v. MALAI ISVARAIYYA
1 Mad. 1

4. — Objection not taken
in Court below—*Error in taking account.* The
Appellate Court will not enter into the details of
the account of a commissioner appointed under
s. 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A party
cannot be heard in the Appellate Court upon items
to which he took no objection in the Court below.
But where there has been error in the principle
upon which such account has been taken, the
Appellate Court will correct such error, if excepted
to in the Court below. *VENKATA REDDI v. VENKA-
TARAMAIYA. CHINNAMALLAIYA v. VENKATARA-
MAIYA .* 1 Mad. 418

5. — Effect of Commissioner's Re-
port. Although a commissioner's report should
have very great weight attached to it, it is not ab-
solutely binding. *Venkata Reddi v. Venkata
Ramaia, 1 Mad. 418,* dissented from. *KANKA-
TALA CHELLAMAIYA v. POLESSETTI PAPAIYA*
8 Mad. 36

6. — Swearing or affirming com-
missioner—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 181.*
There is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure

COMMISSIONER FOR TAKING ACCOUNTS—*concl.*

making it necessary that a commissioner appointed to take accounts should be sworn or affirmed. **NURSINGH DASS v. NARAIN DASS . 3 N. W. 217**

7. Investigation of accounts—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 181—Taking depositions of witnesses.* Where the plaintiff had filed his khatta-books in Court and did not allege that they had been falsified, he should have balanced the account himself, and the lower Court should not have deputed an ameen, under s. 181 of Act VIII of 1859, to investigate the accounts. Such an investigation does not include or allow the taking of the depositions of witnesses; and such depositions are not legally admissible as evidence in the case. **CHAND RAM v. BROJO GOBIND DOSS**

19 W. R. 14

8. Power of Court to deal with facts found by commissioner—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 181—Reference to examine accounts.* In a suit for an account, it was ordered by consent of parties that the case should be referred to a commissioner to take accounts, who in taking them was to decide upon all questions of fact, whether as to the delivery of certain merchandise or the value of such merchandise delivered or otherwise, with full powers for the purposes of the investigation; and that, if questions of law should arise and could not be settled or disposed of before the commissioner, they were to be submitted to the Court. *Held*, that this reference was different from the ordinary reference to a commissioner to examine accounts under s. 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Quære*: Whether it would be competent to the Court to re-open a question of account against a clear finding upon a question of fact relating to the account, and made by the commissioner under the evidence properly before him. **WATSON v. AGA MEHEDDEE SHERAZEE . L. R. 1 I. A. 346**

9. Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 394, 396—Report of a Commissioner—Order confirming the report, appeal from—Appeal Court, power of, to deal with findings of fact by the commissioner. *Held*, per PRINSEP and HILL, JJ. (MACLEAN, C.J., dissenting)—In an appeal from a judgment and order confirming the report of a commissioner appointed under s. 394, Civil Procedure Code, it is open to the Court of Appeal to deal with the report on matters of fact, and its powers are not limited to questions of principle when examining such report. **Ahmed Nanu Bhai v. Kharap Karim Bhai, 6 Bom. H. C. 149**, and **Kankatala v. Polsheth, 6 Mad. H. C. 36**, referred to. The Court, whether of first instance or of appeal, must be satisfied with the proceedings of a Commissioner before it accepts them, and the fact that the judgment of the first Court is in affirmance of the report of a commissioner does not affect the powers of the Court of Appeal. **Moung Tha Hnyeen v. Moung Pan Nyo, 4 C. W. N. 808**, distinguished. **Watson v. Aga Meheddee Sherazee, L. R. 1 I. A. 346**, referred to. *Per* PRINSEP, J.—The report of a

COMMISSIONER FOR TAKING ACCOUNTS—*concl.*

commissioner requires affirmance by an order of Court, to make it operative, and cannot be regarded as a judgment of a Court. *Per* HILL, J.—Under s. 395, Civil Procedure Code, the report of a commissioner, if accepted by the Court, is only evidence in the suit of facts found by him, but is not a decision, nor can it be treated on the same footing as the verdict of a jury. **Mackintosh v. Great Western Ry. Co., 4 Giff. 683**, and **Moung Tha Hnyeen v. Moung Pan Nyo, 4 C. W. N. 808**, distinguished. **Baroness Wenlock v. River Dee Company, 19 Q. B. D. 155**, referred to. *Per* MACLEAN, C.J.—If there has been a fair investigation of the matter by the Registrar, and his finding has been confirmed by the Judge of first instance, the Court of Appeal ought not to interfere except on the strong ground of manifest error or manifest abuse. It should not interfere merely on the ground that if the matter was *res integra* it would have been disposed of attach more weight to this or that particular piece of evidence. **Mackintosh v. Great Western Ry. Co., 4 Giff. 683**, and **Moung Tha Hnyeen v. Moung Pan Nyo, 4 C. W. N. 808**, referred to. **CHETTY v. MAHOMED ESSA SAHEB (1901) . 5 C. W. N. 692**

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE.

See BOMBAY CITY POLICE ACT.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 480

COMMISSIONERS OF REVENUE AND CIRCUIT.

The law relating to Commissioners of Revenue and Circuit reviewed. *In re* PARBHU NARAYAN SINGH

3 B. L. R. A. C. 370 : s. c. 12 W. R. 323

COMMITMENT.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 215.

9 C. W. N. 829

See PARDON, WITHDRAWAL OF.

I. L. R. 29 All. 24

— in absence of accused.

See ACCUSED PERSON. **5 C. W. N. 110**

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 477

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
COMMITMENT TO SESSIONS COURT.

— irregularity in—

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 402

— power of Coroner to commit to High Court.

See CORONER. **7 C. W. N. 889**

COMMITMENT—*contd.*

power of Sessions Judge or District Magistrate to order—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 436.

5 C. W. N. 574

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—COMMITMENTS . . . 7 C. W. N. 327

See REVISION, CRIMINAL CASES—DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED 7 C. W. N. 77

trial without—

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 50

1. Discretion as to commitment—*Proper exercise of discretion.* The power of commitment given to a Court of Session by s. 435, Code of Criminal Procedure, must be exercised judicially upon the evidence before the Court, and such Court ought not to order a commitment, unless the evidence appear to it sufficient for a conviction within the terms of s. 226. *QUEEN v. SHAMA-SUNKER BISWAS* . . . 10 W. R. Cr. 25

2. Discretion of Sessions Judge to commit discharged person. A Sessions Judge has a discretion to order or not to order the commitment to the Sessions Court of any accused person discharged by the Magistrate, with which the High Court will not interfere. *QUEEN v. SHEETARAM CROWDHRY* . . . 2 W. R. Cr. 44

3. Discharge of accused on withdrawal of prosecution after commitment—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 214, 215 (1872, s. 197)—Commitment on a charge of adultery.* A Magistrate having committed a person for trial by the Court of Session on a charge of adultery, immediately afterwards, on the representation of the prosecutor that he wished to withdraw from the prosecution, discharged the accused. *Held*, that the order of discharge was bad, as under ss. 196 and 197, Explanation, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, a commitment once made can be quashed by the High Court only. *EMPRESS v. JANGBI*

I. L. R. 4 All. 150

4. Commitment after order of discharge—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 197.* A Magistrate, after examining four witnesses for the prosecution, discharged the accused under s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872. Subsequently on becoming aware that there was a fifth witness present, the Magistrate cancelled his order of discharge, took further evidence, and committed the accused for trial to the Court of Session. *Held*, on submission of the case with reference to Explanation 1 of s. 197, Act X of 1872, that the commitment was good. *ANONYMOUS* . . . 7 Mad. Ap. 40

5. Commitment made without jurisdiction. Where a Magistrate without jurisdiction commits an accused person to the Sessions Court, such commitment is void, and no reference to the High Court is necessary to have it set aside. *In the matter of EMPRESS v. ALIM MUNDLE*

11 C. L. R. 55

COMMITMENT—*contd.*

See, however, s. 532 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1882.

6. Illegal commitment—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 197—Power to quash commitment.* Where the accused could not be found and the witnesses were examined in his absence under s. 327, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, and he was on arrest committed and put on his trial without any re-examination of the witnesses and pleaded not guilty: *Held*, that, having been committed and having pleaded to the charge, the commitment could not be quashed. *EMPRESS v. SAGAMBUR* . . . 12 C. L. R. 120

7. Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 215—*Defect in law.* Where a person was committed on a charge of using certain evidence known to be false: *Held*, that the fact that there was not any evidence to connect such person with the use of such false evidence was defect in law sufficient to justify the quashing of the commitment. *EMPRESS v. NAROTAM DAS*

I. L. R. 6 All. 98

8. Order for further Inquiry and Commitment passed simultaneously. Where the order of the Sessions Judge amounted to simultaneously directing further inquiry into the alleged offence and to ordering commitment of the accused: *Held*, that the commitment was premature and illegal, and must be set aside. *ADYAN SING v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . I. L. R. 13 Calc. 121

9. Power of the Court of Session to commit a discharged person for trial without the intervention of a Magistrate—*Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 193, 436, and 537.* In cases exclusively triable by the Court of Session, s. 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882) empowers the Court of Session or District Magistrate to order a discharged person to be committed for trial by such Court. There is nothing in that section to show that, when such order is made, the commitment thereupon must necessarily be made by the Magistrate who has discharged him, whilst the first proviso to it shows that it may be made by the Court of Session or by the District Magistrate, according as the power under that section happens to be exercised by one or the other. Meaning of the expression "a Court of competent jurisdiction" in s. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code (X of 1882) considered. A Court of Session may try a prisoner so committed and charged by itself. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KRISHNABHAT*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 319

10. Appellate Court, powers of, as to commitment—*Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 423, 436, 439.* The Appellate Court referred to in s. 423 of the Criminal Procedure Code can, in an appeal from a conviction, only order an accused person to be committed for trial when it considers that the accused is triable exclusively by the Court of Session. The meaning of the words in s. 423 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, "or order him to be tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordi-

COMMITMENT—contd.

nate to such Appellate Court, or committed for trial," is as follows: If on an appeal from a conviction the Appellate Court finds that the accused person, who was triable only by a Magistrate of the first class or by a Court of Session, has, by an oversight or under a misapprehension, been tried, convicted, and sentenced by a Magistrate of the second class, the Appellate Court may in that case reverse the finding and sentence, and order the accused to be re-tried by a Magistrate of the first class or by the Court of Session; and, in like manner, when the appellant, who was triable solely by the Court of Session, has been tried, convicted, and sentenced by a Magistrate of the first class, the Sessions Judge, in disposing of the appeal, is empowered to reverse the finding and sentence, and to order that the accused be committed for trial. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SUKHA* . . . I. L. R. 8 All. 14

11. *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 423, 439—Sessions Judge, powers of, as a Court of Appeal.* It is competent to a Sessions Judge acting as a Court of Appeal under s. 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, having reversed the finding and sentence, to order the appellant to be committed for trial to the Court of Session. *Queen-Empress v. Sukha, I. L. R. 8 All. 14*, dissented from. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MAULA BAKSH* . . . I. L. R. 15 All. 205

See *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JAHANULLA*.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 975

and SATIS CHANDRA DAS BOSE *v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 172
4 C. W. N. 166

12. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 423—Power of Appellate Court—Commitment to the Court of Session—Offences triable exclusively by the Court of Session.* S. 423 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not limited to cases triable exclusively by the Court of Session. An Appellate Court has under that section the power to order an accused person to be committed for trial by the Court of Session in cases which are not exclusively triable by the Court of Session. *Queen-Empress v. Sukha, I. L. R. 8 All. 14*, dissented from. *Queen-Empress v. Abdul Rahiman, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 580*, followed. *MISRI LAL v. LACHMI NARAIN BAJPIE* . . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 350

13. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 215—Commitment, quashing of, when may be made—Points of Law—Statements made by witnesses—Absence of evidence to go to a jury—Contradictory statements in cross-examination—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 193—False evidence in a judicial proceeding—High Court, power of, to quash Commitment.* Absence of evidence to warrant a commitment is a point of law, and may furnish a good ground for the quashing of a commitment. Under the present Code of Criminal Procedure, a Court of Session does not possess the power to withdraw a case from the jury on any ground whatsoever. Where the case is such that the Sessions Judge would, if he possessed the power

COMMITMENT—contd.

of withdrawing the case from the jury, exercise that power, the High Court will exercise its powers of revision. *JOGESHWAR GHOSH v. KING-EMPEROR (1901)* . . . 5 C. W. N. 411

14. *Right of the Accused to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, and to produce defence evidence before Commitment—Power of Magistrate to commit at any stage of the case—Jurisdiction of the High Court, as a Court of Revision, to quash a commitment made to it in its Original Criminal Jurisdiction—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 208, 215 and 347.* S. 347 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be read as subject to s. 208 so as to render it imperative on a Magistrate, after he has decided to commit the case to the Sessions, to allow the accused to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and to call witnesses in his defence. Where, therefore, the accused did not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses immediately after their examination-in-chief, but applied to the Magistrate, after the close of the prosecution, to cross-examine them and to examine defence witnesses: *Held*, that the Magistrate was justified under s. 347 in committing the case without the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and the examination of the witnesses for the defence. *In re Olive Durant, Ratanlal's Unreported Cr. Ca. 975*, followed. *Queen-Empress v. Ahmad, I. L. R. 20 All. 264*; *Emperor v. Muhammad Hadi, I. L. R. 26 All. 177*, dissented from. *Queen-Empress v. Sagal Samba Sajao, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 642*, distinguished. *Quære*: Whether the High Court, in its Appellate and Revisional Jurisdiction, has power to quash a commitment made to the Court in its Original Criminal Jurisdiction. *PHANINDRA NATH MITRA v. EMPEROR (1908)* . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 48

COMMON ASSEMBLY.

— responsibility of members of—

See DAMAGES—MEASURE AND ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES—TORT.

3 B. L. R. P. C. 44

See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.

COMMON MANAGER.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT.

10 C. W. N. 437

— appointment of—

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 381

Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 93, 94—Separate appointment for separate estates or groups of estates belonging to same co-owners—District Judge may reconsider question of necessity of appointment at any stage—Discretion, judicial—Position of co-owner who has separated his share but not by metes and bounds. Where a District Judge made an order for the appointment of a common manager in respect of several revenue-paying and revenue-free estates of which the co-

COMMON MANAGER—concl'd.

owners were not the same : *Held*, that the District Judge should have separately considered each property or group of properties belonging to the same co-owners and made separate appointments in regard to each property or group, though the same common manager might be appointed in all the cases. *Fazlul Ali Chowdhury v. Abdul Majid Chowdhury*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 659, followed. Where on being directed to deal with the case in the above manner, the District Judge instead of starting proceedings *de novo* and issuing notices on the co-owners under s. 93, Bengal Tenancy Act, to show cause why a common manager should not be appointed, issued notices under s. 94 of the Act asking them to appoint a common manager : *Held*, that, in the circumstances of the case, the proceedings should have been commenced *de novo* and the co-owners given an opportunity of showing that owing to the altered state of things there was no longer any necessity for appointing a common manager. A District Judge can in the exercise of his discretion consider the propriety of the appointment of a common manager whatever be the stage at which the proceedings may have arrived. This discretion is not, however, to be exercised arbitrarily but according to well established rules. A co-owner who has opened a separate account in the Collector's register or makes separate collection for his share is nevertheless liable to have his share taken over by a common manager, although the dispute may not have extended to his share. His remedy, if any, is to have his share demarcated by metes and bounds. *SARADINDU ROY v. THE COLLECTOR OF RUNGPUR* (1907) . . . 11 C. W. N. 1143

COMMON OBJECT.

See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL CASES—RIOTING.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 827, 955

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 630

3 C. W. N. 605

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 158, 865

See CHARGE TO JURY—MISDIRECTION.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 379

See CHARGE TO JURY—SPECIAL CASES—RIOTING . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 955

See CHARGE TO JURY—SPECIAL CASES—UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY

4 C. W. N. 196

See KIDNAPPING . . . 6 C. W. N. 208

See PENAL CODE . . . 8 C. W. N. 483

See PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 384

See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.

—Several alternative Common Objects charged—Judgment of Appellate Court—Omission to find whether the charge was sustainable and which common object has been proved. Where a charge, as drawn up by the Magistrate, alleges several alternative common objects of the unlawful

COMMON OBJECT—concl'd.

assembly, it is incumbent on the Appellate Court to determine, whether it is sustainable, and if so, which of the common objects stated has been made out. *MANARUDDI v. EMPEROR* (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 718

COMMON, RIGHTS OF.

See ENGLISH LAW.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 213

See INAMDAR . . . I. L. R. 3 Bom. 147

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS—BOMBAY.

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 684

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 26.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 213

See PASTURAGE, RIGHT TO.

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 110

See WASTE LANDS I. L. R. 19 All. 172

COMPANIES ACT (XIX OF 1857).

See APPEAL—ACTS—COMPANIES ACT, 1857.
6 Bom. A. C. 185

See COMPANY.

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23.

3 Bom. O. C. 45, 159

COMPANIES ACT (X OF 1866).

See COMPANY.

ss. 98, 100.

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 47.

8 Bom. O. C. 117

s. 173.

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 46.

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 350, 352

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 17

s. 231, s. 256.

See PRESIDENCY BANKS ACT (XI OF 1876) . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 466

COMPANIES ACT (VI OF 1882).

See APPEAL—ACTS—COMPANIES ACT, 1882 . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 215

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 944

4 C. W. N. 101

See COMPANY.

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—COMPANIES ACT . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 219

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—COMPANIES ACT.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 676

s. 4.

See CONTRACT—WAGERING CONTRACT.

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 212

1. ————— What is 'association' within the meaning of—Legal relation creating joint or mutual rights necessary—Chitfund.

COMPANIES ACT (VI OF 1882)—*contd.*s. 4—*concl.*

"To constitute an 'association' within the meaning of s. 4 of the Indian Companies Act, the existence of a legal relation between more than twenty persons giving rise to joint rights or obligations or mutual rights and duties is absolutely necessary." *Panchena Manchu Nayar v. Gadinhare Kumaranchath Padmanabhan Nayar*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 68, 73, referred to and approved. Where more than twenty persons enter into an agreement by which a chitfund is created and it is clear from the agreement that the only proprietors of the fund are the two organisers and the other persons have entered into no contract with each other, the parties to such agreement do not form an association of which registration is necessary under s. 4 of the Indian Companies Act. *NEELAMEGA SASTRI v. APPIAH SASTRI* (1906) I. L. R. 29 Mad. 477

2. *Company or Association—Elephant Kheda business carried on under license granted to one individual—Licensee taking other persons into partnership without allowing them any right to interfere with business—Agency.* Defendant No. 1 who had obtained a license for catching elephants in the Lushai Hills District, organised a kheda but not having sufficient money of his own subsequently joined in the enterprise the plaintiff and several other persons numbering over twenty persons under a deed of partnership which provided that the entire charge of catching and selling elephants would rest with the defendant No. 1 and that the other partners would not be allowed to interfere with that. It also appeared that although the patta of defendant No. 1 authorised him to take partners, there was no promise on the part of Government to recognise, nor did they recognise, them as partners in the business so as to create direct relationship between them and Government. The deed of partnership was not one executed by all the partners in favour of all but one between the first defendant on the one side and the other partners on the other: *Held*, applying the principles of *Smith v. Anderson*, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 247, and *Crowther v. Thorley*, 32 W. R. 330, that the case did not come within the scope of s. 4 of the Companies Act. All the members of a company or association must be directly interested in the management of the concern either personally or through their duly constituted agent. *BIPUL CHANDRA GUPTA v. HAZI NASIB ALI MAZUMDAR* (1909) 13 C. W. N. 638

s. 41.

See PLAINT—FORM AND CONTENTS OF PLAINT—PLAINTIFFS.

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 41

s. 58—*Suit by a Share-holder—Jurisdiction—Right to vote at meetings of share-holders—Cause of action, when not allowed to vote.* At a meeting of the share-holders of a Company, certain of the share-holders were, according to the decision of the majority of those present, not allowed

COMPANIES ACT (VI OF 1882)—*contd.*s. 58—*concl.*

to vote: these share-holders instituted a suit for a declaration that they were entitled to vote at the meetings of the Company. *Held*, that the plaintiffs had a cause of action although their names might not have been struck off from the list of share-holders and that there was nothing in the Companies' Act to exclude the jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Courts in such a suit. *Penders v. Lushington*, 6 Ch. D. 70, referred to. *GOBINDA PRASAD DASS v. AKHOY KUMAR DEY* (1906) 10 C. W. N. 906

s. 61—*Contributory liable in respect of unpaid portions of calls even when the company's right to recover them is barred by limitation.* S. 61 of the Companies Act creates a new liability on the share-holders in respect of unpaid calls; and such calls can be recovered though barred by limitation before the order for winding up is made. *VAIDISWARA AYYAR v. SIVA SUBRAMANIA MUDALIAR* (1907) I. L. R. 31 Mad. 66

s. 130—*Meaning of "Court"—Jurisdiction of District Judge and Subordinate Judge.* *Held*, that, with regard to a company the registered office of which was at Mussooree, "the Court," as that term is used in Part IV of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882), means the Court of the District Judge of Saharanpur, and not that of the Subordinate and Small Cause Court Judge sitting at Mussooree or Dehra. *HIMALAYA BANK v. QUARRY* I. L. R. 17 All. 252

s. 131—*Winding-up of a Company—Depositor, application by, to wind up company—Parties—Creditors and Contributories, applications by—Withdrawal of the original petition, effect of—Verification.* When a depositor in a Company applies under s. 131 of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882) for the winding-up of the Company and other creditors and contributories are allowed by the Court to join with him in prosecuting the case, the petition of the depositor should be considered as a joint petition of all the persons allowed to join; and his withdrawal from the case does not operate as a withdrawal of the whole case. If the original petition be duly signed and verified, the co-petitioners are not debarred from proceeding with the case for omission to verify their petitions. *DACCA LOAN OFFICE COMPANY v. ANANDA CHANDRA ROY* (1904) I. L. R. 31 Calc. 106

s. 134.

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—STAY OF PROCEEDINGS . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 65

s.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE AGAINST COMPANY IN LIQUIDATION.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 533

s. 144.

See PLAINT—AMENDMENT OF PLAINT. I. L. R. 17 All. 292

COMPANIES ACT (VI OF 1882)—*contd.*s. 144—*conclld.*See PLAINT—FORM AND CONTENTS OF
PLAINT—PLAINTIFFS.I. L. R. 17 All. 292
I. L. R. 18 All. 196

s. 149—Contract Act (IX of 1872).
s. 221—Lien of Agent under s. 221 of the Contract Act, not affected by winding up order under s. 149 of the Companies Act (VI of 1882). An agent, who is in possession of properties belonging to a company under an agreement, by which he was to advance moneys for working expenses, has, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, a lien on such properties under s. 221 of the Contract Act for the amounts disbursed by him, and s. 149 of the Companies Act does not authorise the Court to deprive the agent of his possession of the security. The making of a winding up order will not affect his right to continue in possession and make the necessary disbursements as long as his possession continues; and as regards such disbursements also he will have the same lien and stand in the position of a secured creditor against the properties, of which he was in possession as agent when dispossessed by order of Court. CHIDAMBARAM CHETTIAR v. TINNEVELLY SARRANGAPANI SUGAR MILLS COMPANY, LIMITED (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 123

ss. 149, 214.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 111.
I. L. R. 30 Bom. 173

See PRACTICE . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 173

s. 156—Notice to Creditors to prove claims—Failure by creditor to prove within time limited—Claimant excluded from benefit of previous distribution. A creditor of a company in liquidation failed to bring in his claim by the date announced by the official liquidator for claims to be made. He subsequently applied that his claim might be admitted. *Held*, that the creditor was not precluded from coming in at a later stage. The only penalty for failure to come in within the time stated in the notice was that prescribed by the latter part of the section, namely, that the claimant would be excluded from the benefit of any distribution made before his debt was proved. ISACK JESUDASEN PILLAI v. DIWAN BAHADUR RAMASAMY CHETTY (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 496

ss. 162 and 163.

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—DEPOSITIONS . . . I. L. R. 16 All. 88

s. 169.

See REVIEW—POWER TO REVIEW.

I. L. R. 16 All. 53

application under—

See, LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT
N.-W. P., cl. 10.

I. L. R. 17 All. 438

COMPANIES ACT (VI OF 1882)—*contd.*s. 169—*conclld.*

1. ————— “Re-hearing,”
meaning of—Application to set aside an *ex parte* order. S. 169 of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882) does not apply to an application to set aside an *ex parte* order. The term “re-hearing” in s. 169 of the Act means a re-hearing in the nature of an appeal. PARVATISHANKAR v. ISHVARDAS JAGJIVANDAS . . . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 208

2. ————— Appeal from order
in winding up—*Ex parte* application for extension of time—Service of notice within the extended time—Validity of extension made on *ex parte* application—Right of respondents to raise objections at hearing of appeal. By s. 169 of the Indian Companies Act, 1882, appeals are provided for against orders and decisions made in the winding up of companies, subject to the restriction that no such appeal shall be heard “unless notice of the same is given within three weeks after any order complained of has been made in manner in which notices of appeal are ordinarily given under the Code of Civil Procedure, unless such time is extended by the Court of Appeal.” Certain applicants, under s. 214, for an order against delinquent directors and officers of a company, appealed to the High Court against the order of a District Judge dismissing their petitions. An *ex parte* application was made by them, under s. 169, for an extension of time during which notice of the appeal might be given; an order for extension was made; and notice was in fact given to the respondents within the time so extended. Upon the appeal coming on for hearing, it was objected that the time should not have been extended without notice to the respondents, and that the extension, if granted, should be subject to objection being raised at the hearing. *Held*, that notice of the application for extension of time was unnecessary; but, inasmuch as the order granting an extension had been made *ex parte*, the respondents were entitled to raise objection to it at the hearing. Such an appeal must, under s. 169, be filed within three weeks of the date of the order, at the latest. *Per* BHASHYAM AYYANGAR, J.—While refraining from expressing an opinion on the point, the terms of s. 169 of the Companies Act are probably complied with by lodging the memorandum of appeal. LAKSHMINARASAYYA SETTI v. VENKANNA SETTI (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 576

ss. 169, 177, 185, 189, 191.

See APPEAL, RIGHT OF.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 22

ss. 177, 185.

See LIQUIDATORS . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 22

s. 214.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 12.

I. L. R. 18 All. 215

order under—

See COURT FEES ACT, SCH. II, ART. 11.

I. L. R. 17 All. 238

COMPANIES ACT (VI OF 1882)—*contd.*

— s. 214—*concl'd.*
 — proceeding under—
See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 36. I. L. R. 18 All. 12
 I. L. R. 19 Mad. 149

— s. 215.
See BANKERS . I. L. R. 16 All. 88

COMPANIES (MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION) ACT (XII OF 1895).

— ss. 9, 10.
See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—LEAVE TO APPEAL . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 415

COMPANIES, SHARES IN.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—GIFT.
 L. R. 34 I. A. 167

COMPANY. COL.

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2. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS . . 2082
3. RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS . . 2093
4. TRANSFER OF SHARES AND RIGHTS OF TRANSFEREES . . . 2094
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See STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. I, ART. 21.
 I. L. R. 20 Bom. 432

1. FORMATION AND REGISTRATION.

1. — Association of Artizans for acquisition of gain—*Registration of Association.* An association of artizans for the purpose of enhancing the price of their work by bringing all the business of the trade into one shop and dividing the prices of the work done amongst the members according to their skill is an association that has for its object the acquisition of gain, and if consisting

COMPANY—contd.**1. FORMATION AND REGISTRATION—contd.**

of more than twenty persons must be registered.
BHIKAJI SABAJI v. BAPU SAJU

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 550

2. Evidence of Registration—

Evidence of registration of shareholders. The register of shareholders required by s. 14 of Act XIX of 1857 may consist of particulars entered in different books, which taken together substantially contain all the information which the Act requires. If there be a substantial compliance with the requisitions of the Act, the register is not invalidated by reason of slight deviations from its directions or by unimportant omissions or defects in particulars of information specified in s. 14. If the certificate of registration be not forthcoming, the fact of incorporation may be proved *aliunde*. *In re ALLIANCE FINANCIAL CORPORATION: BLANEY'S CASE*

3 Bom. O. C. 106

3. Suit to recover debts arising from transaction before Registration—Company not authorized to sue by officers—Act X of 1866. A society, which came into existence after Act X of 1866, but was not registered until some time afterwards, under the provisions of that Act, sued by some of its officers to recover debts arising out of transactions entered into before registration. *Held*, that such society could not recover in the suits in their present form, as it was not, before registration, an association authorized to sue in the name of an officer. **SENNAY POORASAY HINDU JANONOOKOOLA NIDHI v. THAYAR AMMAL**

8 Mad. 193

4. Application for Registration—

Act X of 1866 (Indian Companies Act)—Application received while Act X of 1866 was in force—Delay in office of Registrar—Certificate purporting to be issued under Act X of 1866, but issued after repeal thereof by Act VI of 1882—General Clauses Consolidation Act (I of 1868), s. 6—"Proceedings commenced." Prior to the 1st May 1882, the secretary and manager of a projected company (which was to be limited by shares) applied to the Registrar of joint-stock companies for a certificate of incorporation of the company, intending that it should be registered under Act X of 1866, the Indian Companies Act then in force, and forwarded the memorandum and articles of association with the necessary stamp-fees, and did everything that was required to be done by, or on behalf of, the company to obtain a certificate under that Act. No order was passed by the Registrar upon this application until 6th May, and owing to delay, for which the applicants were not responsible, registration was not effected, and the certificate was not issued until the 3rd July, when a certificate was given purporting to be granted in pursuance of Act X of 1866. Meanwhile, on the 1st May 1882, the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882) repealing Act X of 1866 came into force, s. 28 of which provided that every share in any company should be deemed to have been taken and held subject to payment of the whole amount thereof in cash, unless the same had been otherwise determined

COMPANY—contd.**1. FORMATION AND REGISTRATION—contd.**

by a contract in writing filed with the Registrar. No such provision existed in Act X of 1866. The shareholders of the company paid nothing upon their shares in cash, but had agreed (not in writing filed with the Registrar) that, in consideration of certain property conveyed by them to the company at the time of its formation, fully paid-up shares were to be allotted to them. Subsequently, the company having gone into liquidation, the official liquidator sought to make the shareholders contributories to the assets of the company as the holders of shares upon which nothing had been paid, with reference to s. 28 of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882). *Held*, that the proceedings for obtaining registration of the company and a grant of a certificate of such registration commenced, within the meaning of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, when the memorandum and articles of association were received in the Registrar's office in April 1882, while Act X of 1866 was in force; that therefore the repeal of that Act by Act VI of 1882 did not affect those proceedings; that consequently the company must be taken to have been incorporated under the former Act; and that the provisions of s. 28 of Act VI of 1882 not being applicable, the shareholders were not liable to be placed on the list of contributories as not having paid the full amount of their shares. *In the matter of WEST HOPETOWN TEA COMPANY*

I. L. R. 11 All. 849

5. Registration of Association—

Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 4—"Gain"—Mutual Assurance Society. In 1870 a fund was formed by a number of persons over 20 in number, the object being, according to the prospectus and rules, to provide for the widows, children, and other relatives of the subscribers. The management was vested in a board of directors elected by the subscribers from amongst their own number. Subscriptions at fixed rates according to tables were paid by the subscribers to secure the provision of pensions for their widows, children, and relatives. The money so subscribed were invested in Government 4 per cent. securities, and in the course of management a large reserve fund was accumulated and so invested, the interest annually payable in respect of which amounted in the year 1888 to upwards of R46,000, but there was nothing to show that such reserve was larger than sound principles of management required. The rules provided for abatements of subscriptions according to a graduated scale, which might be granted or withheld from year to year by the directors according to their opinion as to the condition of the fund. A subscriber to the fund was under no obligation to continue his subscription, but might stop it at pleasure, subject in certain contingencies to forfeiture of the benefit of past payments. Fines were also provided for unpunctuality in payments of subscriptions. It was contended that the subscribers formed an association which required registration under s. 4 of the Indian Companies Act,

COMPANY—*contd.*1. FORMATION AND REGISTRATION—*contd.*

inasmuch as they carried on business having for its object the acquisition of gain by the association, or the individual members thereof, as the subscribers must be taken to contemplate the ordinary consequences of their acts, and the forfeitures, fines, and large and increasing reserve fund constituted "gain." *Semble*: that these did not constitute gain. But *held* that, whether they did or not, no business was carried on, having for its object the acquisition of gain by the association or the individual members thereof. The subscribers to the General Family Pension Fund are not a company, association, or partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on business that has for its object the acquisition of gain by the company, association, or partnership, or by the individual members thereof, within the meaning of s. 4 of the Indian Companies Act. Where the substantial purpose of an association is not to carry on a business for gain, the fact that gain may accrue incidentally or may arise from merely subsidiary provisions does not make registration necessary. *KRAAL v. WHYMPER*. I. L. R. 17 Cal. 786

6. ———— **Unregistered Association—Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 4—Mortgage, illegality of—Right of suit—Estoppel.** In 1868 the Madras Hindu Mutual Benefit Permanent Fund was created for the purpose of enabling Hindus to assist one another and invest their savings chiefly in landed property, and the doing all such other things as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objects. By the rules of the said fund, which was not registered under the Indian Companies Act (X of 1866), it was provided that the members should pay subscriptions at the rate of Rs. 2-8-0 per share per mensem for seven years from the date of admission, and that at the end of the seven years Rs. 250 should be paid in full discharge of each share. It was further provided that subscribers should be entitled to borrow money from the said fund at interest, that a reserve fund be formed and distributed once every five years to the subscribers, and that surplus collections be distributed among the subscribers annually. In 1868, defendants' father borrowed money on mortgage from the fund in accordance with the rules, and the amount was admittedly due at the time of suit. The fund was wound up under an order of the High Court, dated 15th September 1877, during the lifetime of defendants' father, who, however, took no active part in those proceedings. It further appeared that on the execution of the mortgage, the defendant's father (the mortgagor) took a lease from the mortgagees of the houses mortgaged, and retained possession of them as tenant. *Held*, that the association had for its object the acquisition of gain, and that, as the association consisted of more than twenty members and was not registered, its formation was forbidden by the Indian Companies Act (X of 1866), s. 4; that the mortgage suit, having for its object the carrying out of the illegal purpose of the associa-

COMPANY—*contd.*1. FORMATION AND REGISTRATION—*conclld.*

tion, was an illegal transaction; and that the suit must fail. *Held*, further, that the defendants were not estopped from setting up the plea of illegality either by the order of 1877 or by reason of their predecessor in title having attorned to the fund. *MADRAS HINDU MUTUAL BENEFIT PERMANENT FUND v. RAGAVA CHETTI*. I. L. R. 19 Mad. 200

7. ———— **Illegal Association—Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 4—Business carried on by unregistered association for the purpose of gain—Right of suit.** Persons more than twenty in number paid each a certain sum monthly to a stakeholder. The sum total of the subscriptions was then paid over as a loan free of interest to one of the subscribers chosen by casting lots, and he was thereupon required to execute a bond with a surety obliging him to continue his monthly subscriptions to the end of the period for which the arrangement was agreed to hold good—that period being as many months as there were subscribers. The bonds in question were executed in favour of the stakeholder and the subscribers. The business was not registered. A suit was brought on one of such bonds to recover the amount payable for subscription on account of the period subsequent to its execution. *Held*, that the obligees carried on business which had for its object the acquisition of gain within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1882, s. 4, and accordingly constituted an illegal association, and that the suit was not maintainable. *RAMASAMI BHAGAVATHAR v. NAGENDRAYAN*. I. L. R. 19 Mad. 31

8. ———— **Unregistered Association for gain—Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 4—Illegal contract—Lottery Company.** The prize winners in a lottery in which more than twenty persons took tickets covenanted with the promoters of the lottery to continue their subscriptions in respect of the successful ticket for two more years in accordance with the arrangement under which the lottery was established. The money not having been paid, the promoters brought a suit on the covenant. *Held*, that there was no association of twenty persons for the purpose of gain or at all, and consequently that the plaintiffs were not precluded from suing for want of registration under the Companies Act, s. 4. *PANCHENA MANCHU NAYAR v. GADINHARE KUMARANCHATH PADMANABHAN NAYAR*. I. L. R. 20 Mad. 68

2. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS.

1. ———— **Objections outside scope of Articles of Association—Companies Act, X of 1866, ss. 16 and 208.** S. 16 of Act X of 1866 does not refer to obligations contracted with a company in accordance with the purpose of its formation other than those directly implied by the articles of association. S. 208 of the Act has no application to companies formed, but not registered after the Act

COMPANY—*contd.*2. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS—*contd.*

came into force. PURSEWALKUM HINDU JANOBACARA NIDHI v. NARAYANA ACHARY

8 Mad. 198

2. ——— Articles of Association, variation in—*Liability of Shareholders*. Where a clause in the articles of association provided that the existing shareholders for the time being should have the option of taking and subscribing for the shares in the additional capital, rateably and in proportion to their respective shares in the existing capital of the company: *Held*, that the clause being imperative, and not merely directory, a deviation from it could not be made, unless with the assent of every shareholder. EASTERN FINANCIAL ASSOCIATION v. PESTANJI CURSETJI

3 Bom. O. C. 9

3. ——— Material variance between Prospectus and Memorandum of Association—*Illegal powers—Shareholders*. Distinction pointed out between the case of a person who agrees to take shares in a projected company upon the faith of a prospectus, and one who does so upon the faith of a document purporting to be the proposed memorandum of association of such a company. The defendant, on being shown a document purporting to be the memorandum of association of a projected company, signed his name to it as having taken four shares. This document was not registered as the memorandum of association of the company, but another was, which differed from it in omitting, in its 4th clause, the word *yearly* before the word *profits*, on which the company were to pay a certain commission to the secretaries, agents, and treasurers, and in adding to its 6th clause a provision empowering the company by special resolution in general meeting to subdivide the shares. *Held*, that the first was not, but the second was, a material variance. *Quere*: Whether the provision empowering the company to subdivide the shares was illegal. But even if it was, *held*, that the effect of it being practically to alter the position of the defendant from what it would have been had the document signed by him been registered as the memorandum of association of the company, the defendant was not a shareholder in the company registered. *In re the Financial Corporation*, L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 714, commented on. ANANDJI VISRAM v. NARIAD SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY, LIMITED

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 320

4. ——— Contributories—Act X of 1866, ss. 6, 11, 18, 22, 36, 37, and 101—*Liability of registered shareholders—Appeal from Recorder*. In June 1865 was projected the Pegu Saw Mills Company, Limited, appellants being amongst the projectors, and having signed the prospectus, and entered their names in a list (attached to the prospectus) of intending shareholders, each to a specified extent. Their names were also entered as such shareholders in the registration of the company

COMPANY—*contd.*2. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS—*contd.*

under Act X of 1866. In January 1867 certain contributors (amongst whom appellants were not) and certain creditors applied to the Recorder of Rangoon, under cls. 4 and 5, s. 101, to have the company wound up, and an official liquidator appointed. A liquidator having been appointed, he applied to the Court to call upon each of the contributories, named in a list which he presented, to pay up his contribution. Accordingly, the Recorder declared the appellants to be contributories, and directed each of them to pay the amount appearing against his name. *Held*, that this was a suit by the official liquidator to have appellants declared contributories, and an appeal therefore lay from the Recorder's decision so declaring them. *Held*, that the liability, under ss. 6, 11, 18, 22, 36, and 37, of a registered shareholder, as member of a company, to contribute, is a *prima facie* liability only; it being open to him to show that, although his name was on the register, yet he did not agree to become a member; and that, as appellants were not cognizant of (much less did they assent to) the registration of their names as shareholders, whilst they refused to receive any shares or pay up any calls or deposits, the sole step taken by them of joining others in putting forth the prospectus and affixing their names therein to a certain number of shares could not be said to be an agreement to become members of the company, and therefore they were not contributories. COTTON v. PEGU SAW MILLS COMPANY.

9 W. R. 539

5. ——— Name on Register—*Refusal to sign Articles of Association—Shareholder*. Defendant applied for 100 shares in a company, and on their being allotted to him paid R1,000 in deposit. His name was placed upon the register of shareholders, but he refused to sign the articles of association. *Held*, that he was not liable as a shareholder. GOOSERY COTTON MILLS COMPANY v. STEEL.

2 Hyde 238

6. ——— Share in Company, significance of—*Name on Register*. A share in a company signifies a definite portion of its capital, and does not necessarily mean the right of a person whose name is then actually on a register of shareholders. PARBHUDAS PRANJIVANDAS v. RAMLAL BHAGIRATH

3 Bom. O. C. 69

7. ——— Shareholder whose shares are forfeited, position of—*Contributories*. A member of a duly registered company whose shares have been forfeited is as much a past member as a member whose shares have been surrendered or transferred, but he is not liable to be placed on the list of contributories until it is established that the existing members are unable to satisfy the contributions required to be made by them, in pursuance of the Indian Companies Act, and that the debts, in respect of which he is called upon to contribute were incurred prior to the date on which he ceased

COMPANY—*contd.*2. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS—*contd.*

to be member of the company. *In re ALLAHABAD TRADING COMPANY*

1 N. W. Part 6, p. 101; Ed. 1873, 190

8. ——— Constituting person a member of Company—*Companies Act (X of 1866), s. 22—Member of Company—“Subscriber of the memorandum”—“Agreement to become a member”—Company not in existence—Rescission—Liability for Calls.* The defendant, amongst others, subscribed (for 101 shares) a copy of the memorandum and articles of association of the plaintiff company then in process of formation, but subsequently, and before registration, gave notice to the persons most active in the promotion of the said company that he would withdraw his signature, and would have no connection thenceforth with the proposed company. His withdrawal, however, was not accepted. Subsequently to the receipt of the said notice, the memorandum and articles of association so signed by the defendant and others were presented for registration; but registration was refused, on the ground that the said documents were not printed. A printed copy of each was then procured and registered. The registered copies differed, in respect of the signatures subscribed thereto, from the copies signed by the defendant. The defendant's name was put upon the register of the company as the holder of 101 shares, but without the defendant's assent or knowledge, and two calls were made upon him in respect of the said shares. The defendant denied that he was a member of the said company or liable for calls. *Held*, that the defendant was not a member of the plaintiff company, either (i) as a “subscriber of the memorandum of association” under the earlier part of s. 22 of the Indian Companies Act, inasmuch as the memorandum there referred to was the registered memorandum, of which the document signed by the defendant was not even a true copy, or (ii) by reason of an “agreement to take shares” under the latter part of that section, inasmuch as the agreement there alluded to was an agreement with the company, and the agreement (if any) entered into by the defendant was not, and could not have been, an agreement with the company, the company not being at that time in existence. *Quære*: Whether it is enough to constitute a person a member of a company under the earlier part of s. 22 to subscribe a true copy of the registered memorandum of association. *GUZERAT SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY v. GIRDARLAL DALPATRAM.* I. L. R. 5 Bom. 425

9. ——— Memorandum of Association—*Effect of signing memorandum—Withdrawal of signature before registration of memorandum—Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 45.* A person who signs a memorandum of association for a number of shares becomes absolutely bound to take those shares. The statutory liability, the creation of the agreement, commences with the signature of the memorandum, and is not held in

COMPANY—*contd.*2. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS—*contd.*

suspense until the memorandum is registered. There is no *locus penitentie* up to the date of registration, and no person who has signed the memorandum can, acting independently of the others, cancel his signature. *In re MACHINE EXCHANGE COMPANY. RUSTOMJI FRAMJI WADIA'S CASE. SHAPURJI BYRAMJI KATRUCK'S CASE.* I. L. R. 12 Bom. 311

10. ——— Signing duplicate of Memorandum before registration of Company—*Companies Act (VI of 1882) s. 45—Signature after registration of company, effect of—Proposal to take shares—Acceptance.* When a person signs a duplicate of the memorandum of association after the registration of the original memorandum, he does not thereby become a subscriber within the meaning of s. 45 of the Indian Companies Act, VI of 1882. Such signature, however, is equivalent to a proposal to the company to take shares, and if such a proposal is accepted, the person signing is a person who has agreed with the company to become a member within the terms of s. 45, and is liable to calls if entered on the register. *BOMBAY NATIONAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. AHMED BIN ESSA KHALIFFA.* I. L. R. 14 Bom. 196

11. ——— Member signing unregistered copy of Memorandum of Association—*Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 45—Agreement to become a member—Proposal—Acceptance—Repudiation before registration of Company.* On the 13th April, 1886, L signed a printed copy of the proposed memorandum of association of a projected company for ten shares, which on the 3rd August was registered as the Imperial Flour Mills Company. On that day, viz., the 3rd August 1886, L received a notice from the secretary of the company, informing him that the company had been duly registered and requesting him to pay R100 as the deposit on the shares subscribed by him. On the 5th August L replied, stating that he had decided not to take up the shares. On the 6th August the secretary wrote to L, stating that he had already become a shareholder, and could not withdraw. On the 25th September the directors held their first meeting, and resolved that the “shares applied for be allotted, and application and allotment money be called in.” On the 1st October the secretary notified to L the allotment of ten shares, and requested him to pay the overdue deposit call of R10 per share and the allotment call of R15 per share. L refused to pay, and repudiated his liability in respect of the shares. He contended that he had never become a member of the company. *Held*, that the defendant was not a member of the company, and was not liable to the plaintiff's claim. The fact that he had signed the proposed memorandum of association did not make him a member, inasmuch as the document which he had signed was not the document which was registered, nor even a true copy of it. Nor could the defendant be held bound as having

COMPANY—*contd.*2. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS—*contd.*

agreed to become a member within the meaning of s. 45 of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882). The agreement which binds a party under this section must be an agreement with the company itself. The company not being in existence at the date of the defendant's signing the memorandum of association (*viz.*, the 16th April 1886), that signature could amount, at the most, to an application for shares to the promoters, which by reason of its non-withdrawal before the registration of the company on the 3rd August became on that day an application to the company. There could be no acceptance of that application until the company was registered; and the defendant withdrew his application by his letter of the 5th August. The letter written by the company's agents on the 3rd August was not an acceptance. It was only a request for the payment of the deposit on the shares for which the defendant had applied, and which was required as a guarantee for the *bond fides* of the application. Further, the terms of the resolution of the board of directors of the 25th September made it clear that up to that date the defendant's application had not been made a binding agreement by acceptance. His repudiation, therefore, of the 5th August was in time, and he could not be held liable as a shareholder of the company. *Held*, also, that in no case could the defendant have been bound by the letter of the 3rd August written by the agents of the company. That letter was written—not by order of the directors at a meeting duly convened and composed of the proper quorum of four. It was written by the secretary after consulting separately three only of the directors. This was an irregular proceeding, which would not bind the company or the subscribers with regard to the application on the acceptance of shares. The directors did not act as a board, nor was the consent of a quorum obtained. IMPERIAL FLOUR MILLS COMPANY *v.* LAMB . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 647

12. ——— Agreement to take shares —Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 43—*Signing duplicate memorandum of association of the registration of company—Effect of such signature only equivalent to a proposal to take shares—Acceptance.* A, after the Bombay Electrical Company had been registered, signed a duplicate memorandum of association for five shares. He subsequently acted as director of the company, being qualified to act as such by procuring from a member of the company five fully paid-up shares. The shares for which he subscribed were never allotted to him, nor was he registered as holder of them. The company went into liquidation. *Held*, that A was not liable in respect of the five shares for which he subscribed. A person signing a duplicate memorandum of association is not bound as one who has signed the original memorandum, although such duplicate is signed after the company has been registered. Such a signature cannot be binding, because it does not

COMPANY—*contd.*2. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS—*contd.*

amount to a signing of the memorandum itself, and does not satisfy the requirements of s. 45 of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882). It does not create the positive agreement which the law has made the necessary consequence of the signature of the real memorandum before registration. It only amounts to a proposal to take shares. But in the present case there had been no acceptance by the company of the proposal. There had been no allotment and no placing on the register. Acceptance could not be legally inferred from the circumstances of the case. A's liability was only inchoate and never became complete. The company, while it was solvent, never accepted A's offer to become a shareholder, and after it went into liquidation it was too late. *In re BOMBAY ELECTRICAL COMPANY. NASSERWANJI DADABHOY KATRUCK'S CASE* . . . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 1

13. ——— Liability of a Signatory to the Memorandum of Association for a fully paid-up share given to him as a present—*Shares available for allotment, but not allotted.* The Bombay Electrical Company having gone into liquidation, the official liquidator applied to have E placed on the list of contributories in respect of one share for which he had subscribed, and signed the memorandum and articles of association on the 26th February 1885. The company was registered on the 5th March 1885, and went into liquidation in July 1886. In his affidavit E stated that he had been induced to sign the memorandum and articles of association by one P, who was a promoter of the company, and who had promised to give him a fully paid-up share as the share he had signed for; that in March 1883, P had accordingly handed him the certificate of a fully paid-up share; that the said share was one out of a hundred fully paid-up shares which were given by the company to P in part payment of money due to him from the company, and that the said share was duly entered in the share register of the company as having been fully paid-up on the 18th September 1885. He contended that the company was estopped from denying that the share was fully paid up; that no other share had been allotted to him, and that all the shares of the company had been allotted. *Held*, that he was liable in respect of the share. The transaction between him and P did not bind or affect the company. The present of a paid-up share by a third party does not satisfy the obligation of a subscriber of the memorandum. The issue of the certificate does not estop the company so long as the certificate has not passed to a *bond fide* transferee for value. If E had not, in fact, paid money or money's worth for the one share subscribed for, the company was still entitled to prove the non-payment, and claim the value of the share. *Held*, also, that, as there were left shares available for allotment, the fact that none had been allotted to E made no difference, and that the liquidator was entitled to hold

COMPANY—*contd.*2. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS—*contd.*

him to the contract which he had made with the company when he signed the memorandum. *In re BOMBAY ELECTRICAL COMPANY. ELMORE'S CASE.*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 57

14. ———— **Contract with the Company**—*Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 45—Signing duplicate of the subsequently registered memorandum—Subsequent allotment and repudiation—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877, s. 23, cl. (h), and s. 27, cl. (e)).* The defendant, in February 1886, signed duplicates of the documents subsequently registered as the memorandum and articles of association of the plaintiff company in December of the same year. By the documents which he signed, he "agreed" to take the number of shares (ten) set opposite his name. He never cancelled that agreement. Ten shares were subsequently allotted to him; but the defendant did nothing amounting to an acceptance of this allotment, and on the 19th April, 1888, definitely cancelled his previous agreement to take shares. *Held*, that the defendant had never become a shareholder of the company. Whatever the signing by the defendant of the documents in February 1886 amounted to—whether to a contract or to a mere proposal—the defendant in signing them addressed, not the company, which was not then in existence, but the promoters. If a contract, the company was not then in existence, and could not therefore ratify it: if a proposal, it was not a proposal to the company, or an agent for the company, and the company could not therefore accept it. S. 23, cl. (h) and s. 27, cl. (e), of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), do not apply to contracts to take shares; and only embody the English law as to cases where a company has taken the benefit of a contract, but refuses to carry it into effect. *IMPERIAL ICE MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. MUNCHERSHAW BARJORJI WADIA*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 415

15. ———— **Payment in cash**—*Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 28—Accord and Satisfaction—Contributory, liability of.* One P served the Nawab of Beyla Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited, as a broker, by getting shares subscribed for, collecting money from subscribers, and inducing people to take shares. There was no express agreement to pay him in cash, but there was a tacit understanding that he should get the usual broker's commission. He was given two shares as remuneration for his services. At the time he accepted the shares, the account of his commission as broker had not been settled, and no demand had been made by him for payment of any specified sum. When the Company was wound up under the orders of the Court, the liquidators placed his name on list A of the contributories for the value of the two shares. He applied to have his name removed from the list. *Held*, rejecting his application, that his name was rightly put on the list of contributories. The fact that the shares were given him as remuneration for his services could not be pleaded as a

COMPANY—*contd.*2. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS—*contd.*

payment of the calls on shares, as no definite sum had been found due when the shares were accepted by him. Where the circumstances relied on would, in an action for money due on the shares, be evidence only in support of a plea of accord and satisfaction, it would not be a good defence of "a payment in cash" within the meaning of s. 28 of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882), but otherwise, if the circumstances would support a plea of payment. *PARSHOTUMDAS v. ISHWARDAS*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 161

16. ———— **Shares issued as fully paid up**—*Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 28—Rights of a purchaser with notice taking from a purchaser without notice—Contributory.* Twenty shares of the Beyla Spinning, Weaving, and Manufacturing Company, Limited, were originally allotted to A as fully paid-up shares partly for work done and partly for work to be done for the Company. The agreement under which the shares were so allotted was not registered as required by s. 28 of Act VI of 1882. A sold three of these shares to D, who had no notice that they were not fully paid up. D sold the three shares to G, who was the Managing Director of the Company. The Company was wound up by the Court. At the date of the winding up, G was holder of the three shares. In settling the list of contributories, the Court ordered G's name to be placed on the list in respect of the three shares. *Held*, that G was not liable as a contributory. Though G was a Managing Director of the Company, and as such must have known that the shares had been issued as fully paid-up shares without complying with s. 28 of Act VI of 1882, he was not on that account estopped from taking advantage of the equitable rule which protects a purchaser with notice taking from a purchaser without notice. *In re GULABDAS BHAIIDAS*

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 672

17. ———— **Contributory—Increase of capital—Illegal issue of shares—Reduction of capital**—*Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 13.* The Nawab of Beyla Spinning, Weaving, and Manufacturing Company, Limited, was registered under the Indian Companies Act (X of 1866). The original capital of the company consisted of Rs. 4,00,000 divided into 1,600 shares of Rs. 250 each. In 1882 the capital of the company was increased by Rs. 1,00,000, divided into 1,600 shares of Rs. 62.5. The resolution to increase the capital was not passed in accordance with the articles of association, i.e., "with the sanction of a special resolution of the company passed at a general meeting." On the 5th November 1884, a resolution was passed at a general meeting of the company that the shareholders should take up 459 shares of the original capital and 1,027 shares of the increased capital, which were then in the hands of the company, in the proportion of one share to every two shares already held by them. In pursuance of this resolution, the appellants took up several shares of the original capital as well as of the new capital.

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On 19th October 1885, a general meeting of the company was held, at which it was resolved that the resolution of the 5th November 1884, and all acts done in connection with it, should be set aside, that the shares taken by the shareholders in pursuance of that resolution should be taken back by the company, and such amounts as had been paid by them on those shares should be credited to their names in the company's books. This was accordingly done, and the shares were transferred to the name of the company. In October 1886, the company was wound up by order of the Court. In settling the list of contributories, the District Judge of Surat held that the appellants were liable, as contributories, in respect of all the shares which they had taken up in pursuance of the resolution of 5th November 1884. On appeal from this decision: *Held*, that, with respect to the shares of the original capital, the resolution of the 19th October 1885 was illegal and invalid. It operated, not as an investment by the company of its funds in its own shares, but as an extinguishment of the shares, and such extinguishment was virtually a reduction of the capital which could not be done without complying with the provisions of s. 13 of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882). The holders of such shares were therefore properly placed on the list of contributories. *Held*, also, that the issue of the shares of the new capital was illegal, as the resolution to increase the capital had not been come to in accordance with the articles of association. It was therefore open to the company to set aside the resolution of 5th November, 1884. When it was set aside, the persons who held the new shares ceased to be shareholders, and could not, therefore, be held liable as contributories, *BHIMBHAI v. ISHWARDAS JUGJIWANDAS* I. L. R. 18 Bom. 152

18. ———— **Liability of the heirs of a deceased Contributory**—*Companies Act (VI of 1882), ss. 61, 126, and 144, cl. (g)*—*Calls made before the winding up—Limitation—Settlement by Official Liquidator of list of Contributories—Shares duly issued, cancellation of—Reduction of Capital.* S. 61, Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882), corresponding with s. 38 of the English Companies Act of 1862, creates a new liability in the shareholders, and that liability includes contribution, not only in respect of calls made since the winding up, but, also in respect of unpaid calls made before the date of the winding up, whether barred by limitation at that date or not. The Official Liquidator need not take out letters of administration to the estate of a deceased shareholder before settling the list of contributories. There is nothing in ss. 126 and 144 requiring the Official Liquidator to place on the list all the persons who may as representatives be liable to contribute in discharge of the liability of a deceased shareholder as contemplated by s. 126. Nor can the liability, under that section, of a person who has been placed on the list as his re-

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presentative be affected by omission of the Official Liquidator to do so. Directors have no power to cancel shares duly issued to a shareholder at his request and so reduce the capital of the company. *Bhimbhai v. Ishwardas Jugjiwandas*, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 152, followed. *SORABJI JAMSETJI v. ISHWARDAS JUGJIWANDAS* I. L. R. 20 Bom. 654

19. ———— **Suit by Liquidator—Limitation—Allotment of shares—Commencement of shareholder's liability—Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 125.** The liquidator of the Gujrat Company in September, 1889, sued the defendant as a registered shareholder of the Company to recover a sum of Rs. 2,483 due from him in respect of his shares. The plaint set forth the particulars of demand, one of which was Rs. 250, being the amount of deposit payable before allotment on 15th July 1886, and another a sum of Rs. 250 payable on allotment on 15th July 1886. This suit was brought on 10th September 1889, and the defendant contended that the above two items of claim were barred by limitation. The lower Courts, notwithstanding the statement in the plaint, found, as a fact, that the allotment of the shares was really made in November 1886. *Held*, therefore, assuming three years to be the period of limitation, that the claim was not barred. The debt due from the defendant did not become recoverable until he was registered as a shareholder. *MALICHAND DHARAMCHAND v. DALSUKHRAM HARGOVINDAS* I. L. R. 17 Bom. 469

20. ———— **Suit by Liquidator against Shareholder—Limitation—Commencement of liability of shareholder in respect of shares—Memorandum of Association—Attestation of signature of subscriber—Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 11.** A suit against a shareholder to enforce liability in respect of his shares, if brought within three years from the date at which his name is inscribed in the register as the holder of such shares, is not barred by limitation. Where a memorandum of association of a company has been registered, a subscriber cannot divest himself of his liability as a member of the company, although his signature to the memorandum may not have been properly attested. The transaction may be irregular, but it is not void. *CHHOTALAL CHHAGANLAL v. DALSUKHRAM HARGOVINDAS* I. L. R. 17 Bom. 472

21. ———— **Articles of Association—Proxy, qualification of—Meeting of shareholders to alter Memorandum of Association—Validity of votes given by proxy—Act XII of 1895.** By a power of attorney dated 14th October, 1881, some of the shareholders in the appellant company appointed and authorized certain specified persons, "and all persons who at any time during the continuance of these powers of attorney may be partners in the firm of Messrs. Wallace & Co. of Bombay, however that firm may be constituted . . . and in the absence from Bombay" of all the said persons "then the person or persons for the time being

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holding the procuration of the said firm and managing the said business," to vote as proxy for them at meetings of the company. Art. 65 of the articles of association of the company provided that "no person shall be appointed or have authority to act as a proxy who is not a shareholder in the company." At meetings in May and June 1902, the right of proxy was exercised by a person, who had become a shareholder in the company in March 1889, and was manager of the firm of Wallace & Co., and holding its procuration from 1st April 1889, but who was neither a member of the firm nor a shareholder in the company, when the power of attorney was executed. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee (reversing the decision of the High Court), that on the true construction of Art. 65, the proxy was not necessarily required to be a shareholder when the power of attorney was signed: the article was complied with by his being so qualified at the time when he was called upon to act as a proxy. *Held*, also, that although the proxy was not expressly named in the power of attorney, he was sufficiently described in it for all business purposes, and the articles of association required nothing more. *BOMBAY-BURMA TRADING CORPORATION v. DORABJI* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 126
L. R. 32 I. A. 39

3. RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS.

1. ——— Preferential Dividend payable to holder of one set of shares—*Construction of contract by the company to pay it to the shareholder and to his executor holding the same—Death of the shareholder—"Holder" of shares—Legal title to shares—Meaning of the word "hold"—Administration, effect of.* The goodwill of a business, which a merchant had carried on, and the capital, property and assets with it, were transferred by him in 1864 to a joint stock limited company, who agreed with him that, in consideration of the transfer by him of property, referred to in the contract as "the fixed assets," one hundred paid-up shares of Rs. 2,500 each, of which any assignment by him during the next five years from the registration of the company should not be recognized by them as valid, should be allotted to him. It was also agreed that in consideration of the transfer, he and "his executors or administrators shall be entitled, so long as they hold the said hundred shares, to an extra or preferential dividend." On this agreement the parties acted, and the shareholder held the shares till he died in England in 1888, having by will directed that his executors or administrators should hold the hundred shares in trust for his surviving brothers, of whom the executor, who proved the will, was one. Administration with the will annexed was granted in India to the plaintiff in this suit as the attorney of the executor. A note of this was made in the

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register of the company leaving the hundred shares still in the name of the testator. The company then discontinued to pay the preferential dividend, and contended that it was no longer payable, inasmuch as the testator's estate had been administered, and that the executor no longer held the shares as executor, but as trustee for the beneficiaries under the will. *Held*, that the contract was still in operation, the executor still "holding" the shares within its meaning; and that the preferential dividend continued payable to the estate of the testator, the company being only concerned with the legal title to the shares, and not with any claims, if there were any, that might be made by beneficiaries under the will against the executor as trustee. *BOMBAY-BURMA TRADING CORPORATION v. SMITH*; . . . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 1
L. R. 21 I. A. 139

Affirming decision of High Court in *BOMBAY-BURMA TRADING CORPORATION v. SMITH*.
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 197

4. TRANSFER OF SHARES AND RIGHTS OF TRANSFEREES.

1. ——— Blank Transfer—*Right of transferee under blank transfer to registration—Discretion of Directors—Companies Act, 1866, s. 34—Discretion of the Court to refuse to hear the case under s. 34.* The power given to the Court by s. 34 of the Indian Companies Act of 1866 is discretionary, and the Court will not order a transfer to be registered where the alleged transferor is not before the Court, and there is any real doubt as to the validity or *bona fides* of the transaction. *In the matter of the petition of LUCHMEE CHUND. LUCHMEE CHUND v. BENGAL COAL COMPANY*
I. L. R. 8 Calc. 317

2. ——— Refusal of Company to register purchase at sale in execution of decree—*Mandamus.* Where shares in the East Indian Railway Company belonging to an execution debtor who had absconded with the share certificates were sold in execution, the transfer being executed by a Judge under the provisions of Act VIII of 1859, s. 267: *Held*, that, although the Company's deed of settlement, under which their Act of Parliament declared that the company should be regulated, gave to the Board of Directors a power of approval or disapproval of intending shareholders, they had no option as to registering a shareholder who purchased shares in execution; and that they were also bound to grant him, under the circumstances, new share certificates. *REG. v. EAST INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY*
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 258: Bourke O. C. 395

3. ——— Suit to compel Directors to register Transfer—*Persons entitled to require registration of transfer—Insolvency of shareholder—Official Assignee, right of, to sell shares and obtain transfer.* One of the articles of association of the

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Coorla Spinning and Weaving Company provided that the board of directors might decline to register any transfer of shares, unless the transferee were approved by the Board. A shareholder, holding 423 shares, became insolvent, and his shares thereupon vested in the Official Assignee who sold them. The purchaser required the Official Assignee to transfer the shares into the names of two nominees, *viz.*, 200 shares to the name of one nominee, and 223 shares to the name of the other. The Official Assignee executed the necessary transfer deeds and sent them to the company, with a request that the shares might be transferred accordingly. The proposed nominees were already members of the company and registered holders of shares in it, and no objection was taken to them in their personal capacity. The directors, however, declined to approve of the transferees and to register the transfer, unless the transferees would pledge themselves not to approve a certain change in the mode of remunerating the agents of the company, which the directors desired to effect, and which they believed would be very advantageous to the company. The transferees refused to pledge themselves in any way as to their future action and brought this suit to enforce registration of the transfer. *Held*, following *Moffatt v. Farquhar*, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 591, that the directors were bound to register the transfers. It was contended that neither the Official Assignee nor the transferees had any legal right to call on the company to register the transfers. *Held*, that, having regard to the provision of the articles of association of the company, the Official Assignee was entitled to have the shares registered in the names of his vendees. *KAIKHOSRO MUNCHERJI HEERAMANICK V. COORLA SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY* I. L. R. 16 Bom. 80

4. ——— Sanction to transfer not obtained from Directors—*Application for registration by transferee—Refusal of Directors to register—Specific Relief Act, I of 1877, s. 45—Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 58.* G bought some shares in the Bombay Fire Insurance Company and applied to the directors for registration as a shareholder in respect of the shares bought. The directors refused the application, giving no reason for so doing. G now applied to the Court, under s. 45 of the Specific Relief Act and under s. 58 of the Indian Companies Act, for an order compelling the directors to register him as a shareholder. The articles of association of the company provided, (*inter alia*), that any shareholder might, with the sanction of the board of directors, sell or dispose of and transfer all or any of his shares to any other person approved by the board who shall not be bound to assign any reason for the withholding of such sanction. *Held*, that the application should be refused, for s. 45 of the Specific Relief Act did not apply (there being another

COMPANY—*contd.*4. TRANSFER OF SHARES AND RIGHTS OF TRANSFEREES—*contd.*

“specific and adequate legal remedy”), and under the Companies Act the proper procedure had not been adopted. G was a transferee whose title was not complete, inasmuch as the requisite sanction to the transfer had not been obtained, and, therefore, there was no privity between him and the directors of the company, and he had no right to complain. *In the matter of BOMBAY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY. Ex-parte GILBERT* I. L. R. 16 Bom. 398

5. ——— Approval of Transfer by Directors—*Such power of approval a fiduciary power—Resolution of Directors to approve of future transfers ultra vires.* By the articles of association of the New Great Eastern Spinning and Weaving Company, transfers of shares in the company were subject to the approval of the directors. On the 18th October, 1898, the directors passed a resolution “that up to the time of the next ordinary general meeting the board approve of all transfers of shares made by Dwarkadas Shamji and Ramdas Kessowji (two of the shareholders) or either of them and . . . will transfer shares standing in the name of Dwarkadas Shamji and in the name of Ramdas Kessowji to their or his transferees without claiming any lien or raising any objection.” *Held*, that the above resolution was *ultra vires* and not binding on the company. The power conferred on the directors by the articles of association was a fiduciary power to be exercised for the benefit of the company, and could not be exercised until the question of each transfer together with the names of the transferor and the transferee was before them and they had an opportunity of considering each case. *In re NEW GREAT EASTERN SPINNING AND WEAVING CO. Ex-parte RAMDAS KESSOWJI* I. L. R. 23 Bom. 685

6. ——— Application to compel Registration of transfers of shares—*Companies Act (VI of 1882), ss. 29, 58, 92—Discretionary power of Directors to refuse registration—Articles of Association—Interference of the Courts.* Where the directors of a company (the Muir Mills) refused to register the transfer of shares and relied on art. 21 of the articles of association, which empowered the directors to “decline to register any transfer of shares to any person of whom they may for any reason disapprove:” *Held*, (i) that it is not necessary under s. 58 for the applicants to join their vendors in their applications. *Ex-parte Penney*, L. R. 8 Ch. 446, distinguished. *Skinner v. City of London Marine Insurance Company*, L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 882; *London Founders Association v. Clarke*, L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 576; *Paine v. Hutchinson*, L. R. 3 Ch. 388; *Ex-parte Gilbert*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 398, referred to. *Ex-parte Shaw*, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 463, followed. (ii) Where it was found that there was a defect in the constitution of the board of directors, which was not cured by the articles of association, *held*, that the Court was not bound to dismiss the application under s. 58

COMPANY—*contd.*4. TRANSFER OF SHARES AND RIGHTS OF TRANSFEREES—*contd.*

on the ground of its being premature, there having been no refusal to register by a properly constituted Board, but might treat the defence set up as a refusal, and deal with the application on the merits. (iii) Where it was found that the real objections entertained by the directors to the various transferees were (a) their connection as employes of the Cawnpore Woollen Mills with *M* (the managing director of the Cawnpore Woollen Mills), and the personal animosity existing between *J.* (the managing director of the Muir Mills), and *M*, and (b) the desire of the directors (of the Muir Mills) that *M* should not add to his voting power at the meetings of the company, and (c) that therefore the objections were not personal to the applicants themselves. *Held*, that, where the articles of association give a discretionary power to the directors to refuse to register a transfer, and it appears that the directors have *bona fide* considered the matter, the Courts will not compel them to disclose their reasons, but if they do disclose their reasons, or evidence is produced as to their reasons, the Courts will consider whether those reasons proceeded on a right or wrong principle. *Held*, further, applying the principle of English cases, that objections not personal to the transferees do not constitute legitimate reasons. *Poole v. Middleton*, 29 *Beav* 646; *In re Bell Bros.*, 7 *L. T. Rep.* 689; *Ex-parte Penney*, *L. R.* 8 *Ch.* 446; *Moffat v. Farquhar*, *L. R.* 7 *Ch. D.* 591; *Kaikhosro v. Coorla Spinning and Weaving Co.*, *I. L. R.* 16 *Bom.* 80; *In re Coalport China Co.*, *L. R.* 2 *Ch.* 404, referred to. *MUIR MILLS COMPANY v. CONDON* *I. L. R.* 22 *All.* 410

7. ——— Rectification of Register—*Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 58—Application for rectification of register—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 115—Estoppel—Hindu Law—Property held by head of mutt—Presumption as to its being property of mutt.* The head of a *mutt* applied for and was allotted shares in a company in his own name. Payments were made by him, by way of calls on the shares, and by his successor in office, and the company credited the amounts paid by the successor towards the amount due as calls on the shares. Subsequently plaintiff, another successor in the office, applied to have the company's share register altered, so that the shares should stand in the name of the *mutt*. This the directors refused to do unless plaintiff provided them with a transfer from the original allottee (who was still alive) or an indemnity by the *mutt*. Plaintiff did neither, and the shares were ultimately declared by the company to be forfeited. Plaintiff now sued the company, claiming that the shares were not the private property of the original allottee, but belonged to the *mutt*, and that the forfeiture should be declared to be invalid, and that the company's register should be rectified. He adduced no evidence to show that the original applicant had utilised the funds of the *mutt* in payment of calls. *Held*, that no presump-

COMPANY—*contd.*4. TRANSFER OF SHARES AND RIGHTS OF TRANSFEREES—*contd.*

tion arose that the money paid belonged to the *mutt*. Nor was the company estopped, by s. 115 of the Evidence Act, from denying that the shares were the property of the *mutt*. On the refusal by the directors to transfer the shares to the name of the plaintiff, he should have applied for rectification of the company's register under s. 58 of the Indian Companies Act, though such an application could not have been successful, as in the circumstances he could not have shown that the directors had acted capriciously and unreasonably in refusing to enter plaintiff's name on the register without a transfer from the original holder or an indemnity. *MAHANT KISHORA DOSSJEE v. COIMBATORE SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY (1902)* *I. L. R.* 26 *Mad.* 79

8. ——— Sale of Shares—*Voucher by company of title of vendor—Estoppel—Pukka receipt issued by company.* In 1898, the plaintiff, through his broker, purchased in the open market three shares in the defendant company. According to the practice usual in Bombay, the transfer deeds signed by the vendors were brought to him by his broker and were signed by him and returned to the seller's broker, who lodged them, together with the share certificates, in the office of the company, and obtained a *katcha* receipt for the same, addressed to the seller. The directors of the company having duly approved of the transfers, the seller's broker returned the *katcha* receipt and obtained from the company a *pukka* receipt addressed to the plaintiff (*i.e.*, the purchaser) in the following terms: "Received for transfer the following share certificates with transfer deeds duly executed:—

Nos....

Total. . shares only.

(*Sd.*)—Transfer Clerk.

N.B. This receipt shall be presented within one week from this date, when the share certificates will be returned. The Company will not hold itself responsible for the safe custody of the above share beyond one week from this date." This *pukka* receipt was given by the seller's broker to the plaintiff's broker, who handed it to the plaintiff, and the latter thereupon (in accordance with the practice in Bombay) paid the price of the shares. No fresh certificate was issued by the company to the plaintiff, but his name was endorsed by the company on the existing certificate as transferee. He was also duly registered as transferee in the books of the company. It was subsequently discovered that, by reason of a previous transfer of the said three shares having been forged, the plaintiff's vendor had no title, and by a decree in a suit filed by the real owner of the shares the plaintiff was ordered to give them up. He thereupon filed this suit to recover the value of the shares from the company, contending that by their *pukka* receipt the company had represented to him that he was obtain

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ing shares in the company, and that upon that representation he had paid for them, and that the company were estopped from denying that he was entitled to them. *Held*, that the company were not estopped by the receipt from denying the plaintiff's title on the ground of the invalidity of the forged transfer. *RIVETT-CARNAC v. NEW MOFUSSIL COMPANY (1901)* I. L. R. 26 Bom. 54

9. ——— Agreement—Restraint of trade—Contract Act (IX of 1872)—Continuous cause of action—Damages—Transfer of business to a limited Company—Effect. *Held*, that an order directing a company to furnish an account will not extend beyond or include contributions, which accrued later than the date when the business of such company was transferred to a limited company. *FRASER & Co. v. THE BOMBAY ICE MANUFACTURING COMPANY (1905)*

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 107

5. MEETINGS AND VOTING.

1. ——— Meeting of Shareholders—Power of chairman—Poll—Time for taking a poll—Right of shareholder to vote at meeting—Articles of Association. At common law, and where the taking of a poll is not governed by statute or special rule, the chairman of a meeting is the proper authority to fix the time and place for the taking of a poll; and a poll is properly and correctly taken immediately after the termination of the meeting. The same rule applies to meetings of registered companies, unless their articles prescribe some other procedure. The object of a poll in the case of a meeting of members of a registered company, as of other meetings, is to ascertain the true sense of the meeting, and is not to give absent members a further opportunity of voting, unless a contrary intention is expressly or impliedly to be gathered from the articles of the company. There is no presumption in construing a doubtful article in the latter sense. One of the articles of association of a joint stock company provided as follows:—

"Every shareholder not disqualified by the preceding article or article No. 17, and who has been duly registered for three months previous to the general meeting, shall be entitled to vote at such meeting, and shall have one vote in respect of every share held by him. *Held*, that the meaning of the above article was merely that a shareholder should be registered for three months before he could vote, but that, having thus once acquired the right to vote, he had one vote in respect of every share held by him. It was not necessary under the article that every such share should have been held by him for three months. *LILADHAR SHAMJI v. REHMUBHOY ALLANA* I. L. R. 15 Bom. 164

2. ——— Articles of Association—General meeting of Shareholders—Proxies—Qualification of proxy—Memorandum of Association

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—*Alteration of Memorandum of Association—Act XII of 1895.* The right of a shareholder to vote by proxy depends on the contract between himself and his co-shareholders, and, where parties have a right depending on the contract between them and other parties, then all the requisitions of the contract as to the exercise of that right must be followed. Article 65 of the articles of association of the Bombay Burma Trading Corporation, Limited, provided as follows: "No person shall be appointed or have authority to act as a proxy who is not a shareholder in the company." *Held*, that the above article imposed two essential conditions, viz., that the proxy should be a shareholder at the date of his appointment and also at the date when he acted. By a power-of-attorney dated the 14th October, 1881, some of the shareholders in the above company authorized and appointed certain specified persons "and all persons who at any time during the continuance of these powers-of-attorney may be partners in the firm of Messrs. Wallace & Co., of Bombay, however that firm may be constituted . . . and in the absence from Bombay" of all the said persons, "then the person or persons for the time being holding the procuration of the said firm, and managing the said business, jointly and each of them severally" to vote as proxy for them at meetings of the above company. On the 20th March 1889, M became a shareholder in the company, and on the 1st April, 1889, he began to manage the business of Wallace & Co., holding its procuration. Under the above power he voted as proxy at meetings of the company held in 1902 for the purpose of altering the memorandum of association. *Held*, that, not having been a shareholder at the date of his appointment, as required by art. 65, he had not been validly appointed a proxy. It is not necessary that the actual name of the person appointed to be proxy should appear in the proxy paper. It suffices if he is designated by a description which fixes his identity at the date of appointment. *In the matter of the BOMBAY BURMA TRADING CORPORATION, LIMITED (1902)*

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 113

6. POWERS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS.

1. ——— Director—Qualification—Qualification shares not paid for by director, but transferred to him by a third person. Shares taken as a qualification for a directorship of a company need not be taken from the company. It is enough if they are taken in open market or from a friend within a reasonable time after acceptance of the office. They need not be shares for which the qualifying director has paid. *In re BOMBAY ELECTRICAL COMPANY. NASSERVANJI DADABHOY KATRUCK'S CASE* . . . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 1

2. ——— Power to appoint Solicitor to Company—Suit by agents of company to restrain it

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from carrying into effect a resolution of directors—*Injunction—Right to sue, survival of.* By the memorandum and articles of association of the New Dhurumsey Poonjabhoy Spinning and Weaving Company, the plaintiff's firm of M F & Co. were appointed agents of the company for twenty-five years, and it was provided that they should have the general control and management of the company. Clause 98 of the articles provided that the said firm, as such agents, should have full power and authority, *inter alia*, to appoint and employ, in or for the purposes of the transaction and management of the affairs and business of the company, such solicitors as they should think proper. An agreement, dated 26th August 1874, was also entered into between the company and the partners in the firm of M F & Co., their executors, administrators, and assigns, for the time being constituting the partnership firm of M F & Co., whereby it was agreed that the said firm should be agents to the company for twenty-five years to buy and sell, etc., and particularly to exercise all the powers contained in cl. 98 of the articles of association. Messrs. C and B were duly appointed solicitors to the company, and acted as such for a considerable time. Merwanji Framji, one of the members of the said firm of M F & Co., died in the middle of March, 1876. The plaintiffs complained that G, one of the shareholders in the company, became desirous of ousting the plaintiffs from the position of agents of the company, and of becoming the managing director of the company; that, in July 1881, he procured his own election and that of certain nominees of his as directors of the company; and on the 8th August 1881 procured the passing of a resolution at a board meeting to the effect that, as Messrs. C and B, the company's solicitors, were also the solicitors of the agents, it was desirable, for the interests of the company, that a change should be made, and that Messrs. H, C and L be appointed solicitors of the company. The plaintiffs alleged that the only object of passing the said resolution was to facilitate the design of G, of ousting the plaintiffs from their agency, and getting the management of the company for himself; that Messrs. H, C and L had been for a long time the solicitors of G, and had been advising him in his designs upon the company and upon the plaintiffs, and they contended that the resolution was a breach of the contract between the company and the plaintiffs, and a violation of the articles of association of the company. The plaintiffs sued G and two other directors of the company, and the company itself, and prayed for an injunction against the defendants to restrain them from committing any breach of the agreement of 26th August 1874, and in particular from carrying into effect the resolution appointing Messrs. H, C and L as solicitors for the company, and to restrain them from doing anything inconsistent with the memorandum and

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articles of association. The defendants contended that the contract of the 26th August 1874 had been determined by the death of Merwanji Framji, and that the powers conferred on the agents by cl. 98 of the articles were, subject to the general powers of management, vested in the directors by the articles, and that the case was not one in which an injunction could be granted. *Held*, that, having regard to the memorandum and articles of association, the contract was that the firm of M F & Co. for the time being should be the agents of the company for twenty-five years, and that the right to sue on the contract by its nature survived to the plaintiffs after the death of Merwanji Framji. *Held*, also, that there being no provision either in the articles of association or the agreement of 26th August 1874, that the power thereby conferred on the agents should be subject to the control or assent of the directors, there was no right in the directors to interfere with the agents in the exercise of their powers otherwise than as representing the company in virtue of their general powers of management. *NUSSERWANJEE v. GORDON*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 266

3. ——— Appointment of Partner of Director to do work for company as Solicitor—*Director of public company—Trustee.*

Although a director of a public company is always clothed with a fiduciary character in regard to any dealings with property of the company in his capacity of director, the rule that a trustee is not allowed to make a profit of his trust does not apply to such a director, *qua* director only. When a partner of one of the directors of the company did work for the directors as solicitor and there was nothing to show that he had not been duly appointed by the directors, his claim in respect of such work was allowed. Distinction drawn between a trustee and a director of a public company. *In the matter of PORT CANNING COMPANY, LIMITED*

6 B. L. R. 278

4. ——— Authority of Agent—*Corporation—Contract under seal—Companies' Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vic., c. 16, s. 97.* The Seinde Railway Company was incorporated by 18 & 19 Vic., c. 115, for the purpose of making and maintaining railways in India, and for other purposes. This was repealed by 20 & 21 Vic., c. 160, which authorized the company to extend their operations and also their capital, etc. This Act by s. 3 declared the Companies' Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, to be incorporated with it. By s. 18 the company have a "seal for use in India in lieu of the common seal of the company, and from time to time may vary and renew it, and make regulations for its use; and except as by this Act otherwise expressly provided, every document sealed with such seal, in conformity with such regulations, or in pursuance of any order of the directors, or of any authority given by the company under their com-

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mon seal, shall be as valid and effectual as if the common seal were affixed thereto." By s. 54, "the company from time to time may appoint and remove such committees, persons or person as the company think fit to act on behalf of the company in India or elsewhere, with respect to the making, maintaining, managing, working, and using of the railways and other works of the company, and the control and conduct of any of the affairs in India or elsewhere of the company; and may delegate to any such committee, persons and person respectively all or any of the powers of the company and of the directors and officers thereof, which the company thinks it expedient that such committee, persons, and person respectively should possess for the purposes of his or their respective appointment." In January, 1867, *E* was the agent of the company in India, and he entered, it was alleged on their behalf, into a contract with the plaintiffs for sixty sets of iron-work for low-sided waggons. The plaintiffs' firm did not deal in iron-work, and they had to get the goods manufactured for them in England. The Board of Directors were at the time supplying iron-work for the company. There was nothing to show that *E* had been appointed under the provisions of s. 54 of the Act, 20 & 21 Vic., c. 160, nor was there any evidence of the extent of his power or authority. A specification of the contract differed from it, in that it stated the waggons to be covered waggons, and not low-sided waggons. The contract was not made under seal of the company, nor was the iron-work, the subject of the contract, ever accepted by the company. The defendants admitted that at the date of the alleged contract *E* was the agent of the company in India, but denied that his power extended to the making of such contract; they further stated that the contract, if entered into, had been afterwards cancelled. *Held* by PHEAR, J., that there was no evidence to show that *E* had authority to make the contract. The contract was one which *E* would have had power to make in writing only, under s. 97 of the Companies' Clauses Consolidation Act, had he been appointed under s. 54, 20 & 21 Vic., c. 160; but there was no proof of such appointment. *Held* on appeal, that assuming that *E* had been appointed under s. 54, with powers as large as in the ordinary course could be conferred upon him under that section, the contract was not one by which, acting as such agent, he had power to bind the company. STEWART v. SCINDE, PUNJAB, AND DELHI RAILWAY COMPANY 5 B. L. R. 195

5. ——— Duties of Promoters and Directors—*Trustees.* *A* and *M*, at the request of *B*, agreed to get up a company which should purchase from *B* the good-will, stock, and furniture of Spence's Hotel and all outstandings due to *B* for four lakhs of rupees. The scheme was made public, and shares were applied for in excess of the intended capital. On the 1st May 1863, the

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memorandum of association was registered, signed, *inter alia*, by *A* and *M*. On the same day the prospectus was issued, which stated, *inter alia*, that "the company have purchased from the former proprietors for the sum of R4,00,000 the entire stock of hotel and shop, together with the outstandings, on the 30th April 1863, the latter amounting to about R50,000. The dividend of 10 per cent. per annum for two years is guaranteed to the shareholders." The prospectus was signed by *A* and *M* and another as directors, but the last took no active part. On the same day an agreement was signed by *B*, whereby he agreed, in consideration of R4,00,000 paid by *A* and *M* as therein mentioned, *viz.*, R1,50,000 in paid-up shares of the company, to transfer to them, or Spence's Hotel Company, Limited, all his right, title, and interest in Spence's Hotel the good-will, furniture, outstandings, etc. The articles of association were dated 7th September 1863. *A* and *M* with two others formed the first board of directors. These directors, at an extraordinary meeting on August 1st, presented a report, which was adopted by the meeting, in which they said, "*B* has deposited with *M* and *A* security sufficient to ensure the payment of the 10 per cent. dividend guaranteed to him by the company." On the 5th December, 1863 a deed was executed, with the approval of the company's solicitors, by *B* on the one part and *A* and *M* on the other, which, after reciting that as security for the guarantee of the 10 per cent. dividend *B* had deposited with *A* and *M* 400 fully paid-up shares in the company, witnessed "that *B* would pay to *A* and *M* such sums as would be necessary to make up and pay half-yearly a dividend of 10 per cent. per annum: and that he constituted *A* and *M* his attorneys to sell the 400 shares and out of the proceeds to make good the yearly dividend of 10 per cent., and after such payment towards the guaranteed dividend, to hold the remaining shares or balance of money in trust for *B* absolutely." On the same day another deed, prepared by *A*'s private solicitor, was executed by *B* on one part and *A* and *M* on the other, which, after reciting an agreement by *B* with *A* and *M* in April, that if they would assist him in forming such company, for the purchase of Spence's Hotel, and as they had in fact since formed, "he, *B*, would pay or secure to them, *A* and *M*, such fitting and proper remuneration for their trouble and risk as might be ultimately arranged;" and after reciting the first deed of 5th December, 1865, witnessed "that *B* covenanted with *A* and *M* that, notwithstanding the trust contained in the before-mentioned indenture whereby the surplus mentioned was declared to belong to *B* absolutely, the same surplus should belong to, and be the exclusive property of, *A* and *M* in equal shares: and that if the net profits of the Hotel Company should prove sufficient to pay the whole 10 per cent., then the whole of the 400 shares deposited with *A* and *M* should be retained

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by them for their own benefit in equal shares." This deed was undisclosed until the filing of their written statement by *A* and *M* in the present suit. There was no actual deposit of the 400 shares by *B*, but *A* and *M* respectively took 200 shares in their own names. R10,947-9-6 were paid by *A* and *M* to make up the deficit on the guaranteed dividend up to December 1864. Also, on the 5th December, 1863, *B* executed another deed, in which, after reciting that he had guaranteed that the outstanding debts of the hotel should realize, before May, 1865, R50,000 at least and that he had deposited with the company 50 fully paid-up shares as security for this guarantee, he, *B*, covenanted to pay any deficit, and appointed the company his attorneys to realize these shares, and out of the proceeds to pay themselves the deficit, and, subject to this, to hold the shares or the proceeds in trust for him, *B*. Fifty shares were received from *B* by *A* under the trusts of this deed. The outstandings fell short of the guaranteed amount by R19,255. In a suit by the company to recover the 400 shares and for an account of the profits of the same: *Held*, in the Court below and on appeal, that the suit was rightly brought by the company as plaintiffs. That *A* and *M* were the agents of the company to effect the purchase, and, as such, were bound to make for the company the best bargain which they reasonably could, and forbidden to obtain personal profit or benefit out of the matter. *A* and *M*, as regards the beneficial interest in the 400 shares, were trustees thereof for the benefit of the company from the date when that interest arose, and *A* and *M* were jointly as well as severally responsible for the 400 shares after satisfying the trust of the guarantee. In the lower Court it was decreed that *A* should make over the 50 shares or their value to the company, and account for the interim receipts and profits. *A* and *M* to account for the 400 shares at par value at least, and for dividends and profits thereon, including profits, if any, made by sale at a premium. *A* to account similarly for the 50 shares. *B* to make good his two guarantees after being allowed the benefit of the trust of the 400 shares. *SPENCE'S HOTEL COMPANY v. ANDERSON* 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 295

Held, also, on appeal, that *A* and *M* were trustees of the 400 shares for the benefit of the company, and jointly and severally responsible to make them good; and whatever benefit they took under the secret deed they must make good to the company. *A* to be responsible for the 50 shares (but in this respect, and in respect of the details of the accounts between the parties, the decree of the Court below slightly modified). *ANDERSON v. SPENCE'S HOTEL COMPANY* 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 378

6. ——— Liability of Directors—*Companies Act (VI of 1882), ss. 55, 56—Refusal to allow inspection of register of shareholders.* Where a person who is entitled under the provisions of

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s. 55 of the Indian Companies Act, 1882, to obtain inspection of the register of shareholders of a company applies for inspection during business hours and not at a time when inspection is prohibited either under s. 56 or by reason of any rules framed by the company under s. 55, such inspection must be granted, and even a temporary refusal, based upon grounds of convenience to the company's business, will render a director responsible for such refusal liable to the penalty provided for by s. 55. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BEER* I. L. R. 20 All. 126

7. ——— Liability of Directors for negligence in management—*Employment of agent by directors—Acquiescence of shareholders—Liability of estate of deceased director—Banker, who is a director.* The plaintiffs company went into liquidation early in the year 1879, in consequence of losses sustained by the failure of Nursey Kessowji & Co., which firm had been the bankers of the said company. The said firm had stopped payment on the 26th December 1878, having then in its hands the sum of R8,80,250-14-1, belonging to the company. In this suit the official liquidators of the company sought to recover that sum from the defendants, who had been directors of the company, and a further sum of R2,48,670-14-0 as damages sustained by the company through the fraud and gross negligence of the defendants in permitting Nursey Kessowji, the agent of the company, to deal with certain shares for his own purposes. The first four defendants were the directors of the company; the fifth defendant was the assignee of the estate of Nursey Kessowji, whose firm of Nursey Kessowji & Co. had become insolvent. The plaintiffs company was registered on the 31st July 1878, and by the memorandum and articles of association the said Nursey Kessowji was appointed secretary, treasurer and agent of the company for a period of twenty-five years, upon the terms and conditions contained in an agreement annexed to the articles of association, whereby, it was (*inter alia*) provided that Nursey Kessowji should deposit with such banker or bankers, as the directors for the time being should appoint, all the moneys due from him to the said company and exceeding in amount at any one time the sum of R5,000. On the 6th August 1878, the directors of the company appointed the firm of Nursey Kessowji & Co. to be the bankers of the company. It was further alleged by the plaintiffs that, immediately after the registration of the company, the directors and Nursey Kessowji began to borrow money upon the credit of the company far in excess of the legitimate wants of the company, and to pay over the money so borrowed to the firm of Nursey Kessowji & Co., to be used by that firm in speculative business; that the said loans were obtained by the directors, not *bonâ fide* for the purposes of the company, but for the purposes of supplying funds to the firm of Nursey Kessowji & Co., to enable it to carry on its business. At the

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end of the year 1878 the sum paid over by the directors to the firm of Nursey Kessowji had, by reason of such borrowing, amounted to the sum of Rs.80,250. The plaintiffs alleged that the said loans were wholly unnecessary; and they charged the directors with gross negligence in raising the said loans or permitting them to be raised; and in permitting the money so borrowed to remain in the hands of the firm of Nursey Kessowji & Co., to be applied by that firm to its own purposes. As to the Rs.248,670-14-0, the plaintiffs alleged that certain unallotted shares of the total value of Rs.93,750 had been left in the hands of the directors to be disposed of, the proceeds of which were to be applied in making certain payments due by the company; that instead of applying these shares to such purposes, the directors had filled up the said shares in the name of Nursey Kessowji, and authorized him to mortgage the same, in order to raise funds; that the said Nursey Kessowji had accordingly dealt with the said shares, and had applied the proceeds thereof to his own purposes. The plaintiffs charged the directors with fraud and gross negligence as to these shares, and claimed to recover Rs.248,670-14-0 in respect thereof from the defendants. The defendants alleged that they had acted *bonâ fide* in all matters connected with the company; that they had always believed the firm of Nursey Kessowji & Co. to be in a solvent condition; and had no reason to mistrust its management of the affairs of the company. One of the defendants (No. 3) died after the institution of the suit, and his sons were made parties. His representatives and Kessowji Naik (defendant No. 1), also claimed to set off against the plaintiffs' claim certain payments made by them as guarantors for the company. *Held*, (i) that one of the directors knew as a fact that the agent was not in a solvent condition; and that the other directors, in the circumstances of the case, ought to have ascertained his financial condition. (ii) Directors are responsible for the management of their company where, by the articles of association, the business is to be conducted by the board with the assistance of an agent. They cannot divest themselves of their responsibility by delegating the whole management to the agent, and abstaining from all enquiry. If he proves unfaithful under such circumstances, the liability is theirs, just as much as if they themselves had been unfaithful. (iii) That the directors had not used fair and reasonable diligence in the management of the company's affairs, and were liable to refund the money entrusted by them to the agent, Nursey Kessowji, without proper knowledge as to whether it was needed, and without any subsequent investigation of a serious character with respect to its disposal. Such conduct amounted to gross negligence. All the directors were equally responsible, as all attended the directors' meetings, and all gave the same blind sanction

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to every act and proposal of the agent. *Held*, also, that the estate of the deceased director was liable on the ground that the misfeasance of a director is a breach of trust, and not a mere personal default. A separate debt cannot be set off against a joint and several debt, and directors cannot set off money due from the company to them against sums which they may be ordered to refund to the liquidators. *NEW FLEMING SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY v. KESSOWJI NAIK*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 373

8. ——— Power of Directors to deal with profits either by declaring a dividend or by appropriating to reserve fund—*Power of Shareholders to interfere with declaration of dividend.* The articles of association of the *B Co.* provided (a) that the directors might, with the sanction of the company in general meeting, declare a dividend; (b) that the directors might, before recommending any dividend, set aside out of the profits of the company such sum as they thought proper as a reserve fund to meet contingencies or for equalizing dividends, etc. The directors of the company added to the existing reserve fund a certain portion of the profits of the company for the year 1885, and thereby diminished the amount of dividend which they could otherwise have declared. Some of the shareholders disapproved of the course taken by the directors, and contended (i) that the shareholders of the company had a right by resolution to withdraw from the reserve fund a sum sufficient to enable the directors to declare a suitable dividend; (ii) that they had the right to direct the directors to declare a dividend greater or less than that recommended by the directors out of the amount standing to profit and loss, including the amount so withdrawn. *Held*, that under the articles of association the contention of the shareholders could not be sustained. The reserve fund consisted of profits, and by the articles the disposal of profits was expressly entrusted to the directors. To allow the shareholders to deal with it would be a direct contravention of the articles, which entrusted to the management of the directors all the business of the company. Nor could the shareholders decide the question as to the amount of dividend. By the articles they agreed that the directors should declare the dividend and only reserved to themselves the power to vote a dividend to which they objected. The remedy of the shareholders, if they were dissatisfied with the directors, was to remove them from office, or to alter the articles of association. *BOMBAY BURMA TRADING CORPORATION v. DORABJI CURSETJI*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 415

9. ——— Sale and re-purchase of shares for future delivery—*Liability of Company for acts of Directors.* In January, 1865, the plaintiffs purchased from the defend-

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ants 2,000 shares in the defendants' company at 15 per cent. premium, for which they paid in cash R3,20,000, and the defendants simultaneously agreed to repurchase, for future delivery and payment at a fixed time in July, the same 2,000 shares at 29½ per cent. premium. The contracts for the re-purchase were signed by three directors of the defendants' company, and on each was a memorandum, initialed by two of them, referring to a list of the "Share Receipts," delivered with the words "we are duly to examine and receive the same at the fixed time." One hundred and ninety letters of allotment in the names of several persons, and for various numbers of shares, endorsed by the original allottees, and initialed by one of the three directors, were, together with receipts for the first call, handed over to the persons who acted for the plaintiffs by the three directors of the defendants' company who made the contracts. In April the defendants' company made a fresh call, payable on the 4th May. A list of the names and addresses of the original allottees of what were called "shares in the market" (*i.e.*, other than those purchased by the company itself for cash, or held by it on mortgage) was made out from the date of settlement, and notices of forfeiture for non-payment of the call were sent by post. The original holders of the 190 letters of allotment were included in the list, but no notice was sent to the plaintiffs. On the 27th of May, all shares upon which the second call was not paid were declared to be forfeited for the benefit of the company. The defendants' company, as stated in the memorandum of association, was established among other objects for the purchase and sale of debentures, stocks, shares of joint-stock companies (including the shares of this company), and other securities, the making loans and advances on such securities as the directors of the company might think fit. *Held*, that the contracts for the purchase of the 2,000 shares being within the scope of the authority of the directors, the defendants were bound by them; that the defendants were bound to treat the plaintiffs as the holders of those shares, and to give them the notice required by the articles of association; and that they were not at liberty to give that notice to the original allottees, who, by the admission of the defendants, testified by the acts of their agents in making the contracts, had parted with the shares; that the shares were, consequently, not legally forfeited, and the defendants having refused to accept them, and they being then unsaleable, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the full price as damages. **ORIENTAL FINANCIAL ASSOCIATION v. MERCANTILE CREDIT AND FINANCIAL ASSOCIATION**
3 Bom. O. C. 1

10. ——— Purchases of Shares by individual Directors—*Liability of directors—Absence of sanction of board.* *J S*, an allottee of 25 shares in a company registered under Act XIX of 1857, signed the memorandum and articles of asso-

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ciation, and paid the first call on the 28th September 1863, on which he sold the 25 shares to *B P*, the chairman of the company. The purchase by *B P* was made in pursuance of an agreement entered into between *B P* and *P H*, another director of the company, and two other persons who were members of the firm of *B B & Co.*, and then managers of the company, which they accordingly jointly purchased, and subsequently divided among themselves, *B P* taking for himself two-fifths of the whole, including the 25 shares of *J S*. The fact of the joint purchase was not communicated to the other directors of the company, nor was there any evidence to show that their attention had been called to certain entries in the books of the company relating to *B P* having paid the second call on his two-fifths of the joint purchase. *J S* got no notice to pay the second call, and never applied for or obtained a certificate for the 25 shares; but such a certificate was obtained by *B P* on the 10th of October 1864, certifying that *J S* was the shareholder. *J S* had signed a blank form of transfer and a blank form of request to the directors to transfer, which were undated and without particulars; but *B P* never executed the transfer as transferee, and the shares never were transferred to his name on the register, nor was the sale to him ever brought to the notice of the directors as a board or to any of his partners, of any portion of the 2,800 shares; and the articles of association required the consent in writing of the directors to every transfer. On application by *J S* that his name should be removed from the list of contributories as framed by the official liquidator, and the names of *B P*'s trustees under Act XXVIII of 1865 substituted therein in respect of the 25 shares: *Held*, that *J S* was not exonerated, under the circumstances, from the duty of obeying the articles of association and the provision of Act XIX of 1857; that the act of an individual director in his private capacity ought not to bind the board, which had never authorized or ratified his conduct; and that the official liquidator, as representing the body of shareholders, rightly insisted upon keeping *J S*'s name on the list of shareholders. **In re EAST INDIAN TRADING AND BANKING COMPANY. JAMNADAS SAVAKLAL'S CASE**
3 Bom. O. C. 113

11. ——— Purchase by Company of its own Shares—*Omission to register transfer—Contributories.* A company registered under Act XIX of 1857, and enabled by its memorandum of association to purchase its own shares, purchased seven thousand of them which were in scrip, share certificates having never been issued in respect of them. The letters of allotment indorsed by the allottees and receipts for the first call were made over, at the time of purchase, to the company. No transfers, however, were executed by the allottees, nor were the shares registered by the company in their own name, but they continued to stand in the names of the allottees. Two thousand

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of the seven thousand shares had been re-sold by the company; and the remaining five thousand were mentioned in a list, kept by the company, of shares purchased by them. On application to the allottees to have their names removed from the list of contributories, as framed by the official liquidator: *Held*, that the company, through its directors, having, as well by the act of purchase as by their subsequent conduct, treated themselves as the owners of the shares, could not be permitted to take advantage of their own neglect, or that of their officers, in not registering the shares in the name of the company, and that the name of the company therefore be substituted as holders of the shares. *In re MERCANTILE CREDIT AND FINANCIAL ASSOCIATION. Ex parte DALVI*

3 Bom. O. C. 125

12. — Purchase of Shares in other Companies and their own shares—Trustee shareholders—Parties—Acquiescence. The purchase by the directors of a joint-stock company, on behalf of the company, of shares in other joint-stock companies, unless expressly authorized by the memorandum of association, is *ultra vires*. A joint-stock company, even though it be empowered by its memorandum of association to deal in the shares of other companies, is not thereby empowered to deal in its own shares, and a purchase by the directors of the company of its own shares, on behalf of the company, is therefore, under such circumstances, *ultra vires*. A sharer in a joint-stock company can maintain an action against the directors of such company to compel them to restore to the company funds of the company that have by them been employed in transactions that the directors have no authority to enter into, without making the company a party to the suit. Where a shareholder purchased shares in a joint-stock company, knowing at the time that similar companies were in the habit of dealing in their own shares and those of other companies, and believing that the company in question adopted the same practice, but made no enquiry to ascertain whether or not such was the case, nor made any objections to such dealings of the company until it was discovered they had resulted in loss, it was held that he had, by his own conduct, lost his right to hold the directors personally liable in respect of such dealing, and the result was held to be the same whether the said shareholder was beneficially entitled to his shares, or merely a trustee of them for others. *JEHANGIR RASTAMJI MODI v. SHAMJI LADHA*

4 Bom. O. C. 185

13. — Misrepresentation in Prospectus—Companies Act, 1866, s. 154—Prospectus—Liability of Directors for Misrepresentation. *R G*, on the faith of statements in the prospectus of a company, was induced to apply for fifty shares in the company, which were allotted to him, and he paid the deposit money thereon. At the time of issuing the prospectus there were no

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other members of the company besides the directors. Some of the material statements in the prospectus were untrue to the knowledge of the directors. The prospectus, which was published on the 23rd June 1865, contained the following statements: "Capital fifty lakhs of rupees in 10,000 shares, of Rs500 each with power to increase. Rs50 per share to be paid on application, and the balance by calls of Rs100 each to be made within not less than three months of each other. The first call will not be made within less than three months after the closing of the share list. Of these 10,000 shares, 6,000 will be reserved for England, but the operations of the company will not be delayed until they can be sent home and taken up." On 18th July 1865, the company advertised that "all the Indian shares being subscribed for, the share list is now closed, and the letters of allotment will be issued at an early date. In truth, not half the number of "Indian shares" were at any time subscribed for. On the 22nd November, 1865, the directors resolved that "a call of Rs100 per share be made upon the shareholders, payable at the National Bank of India on the 15th December proximo." *R G* received notice of the call but did not pay it. On 18th April, 1866, the directors desired the secretary to write to shareholders who had not paid their first call in full, asking them to do so at once. *R G*, who had not signed the articles of association, on receipt of notice from the secretary, requested to be allowed to withdraw his money, forfeiting one-fifth, or to be allowed to hold five shares instead of fifty. The request was refused by the directors, who on 18th July, 1866, passed a further resolution that the defaulters, among whom *R G* was named, "have notice sent them that unless the amount of the calls due on their respective shares, together with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent. per annum from the 15th December 1865, be paid into the National Bank of India, Calcutta, on or before the 7th August 1866, legal proceedings will be adopted against them for the recovery without further notice." *R G*, on receiving notice of this resolution, wrote, through his attorneys, informing the directors that he would apply to the High Court to have his name removed from the register of shareholders. The directors thereupon declared the shares to be forfeited. On 25th September 1866, a resolution to wind up the company voluntarily was passed at a general meeting of the shareholders, and was afterwards confirmed. In the course of the winding up, the liquidator applied to the Court, under s. 154, Act X of 1866, to determine whether *R G* was entitled to a refund of the deposit money paid by him on the fifty shares allotted to him in the company, or whether he was liable to pay, as a contributory, the call in respect of his shares made before the shares were forfeited. It was not until the hearing of this application that *R G* became aware of the facts which proved that the directors had published material statements

COMPANY—*contd.*6. POWERS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS—*contd.*

which they knew to be untrue. *Held*, that the issuing of a prospectus is an act comprised within the term "management and conduct of the company's business." The statements made in the prospectus were the representations of the company. *R G* was entitled to have his contract to take 50 shares set aside, and to be repaid the amount of his deposit money. *In the matter of the INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1866. ROMANATH GOSSAIN'S CASE* . 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 296

14. ——— Suit by Company for Price of Shares allotted to defendant—*Misrepresentation by an alleged agent of a company not then in existence—Misrepresentation not alleged in the pleadings—Prospectus, misstatements in, before formation of company, effect of—Laches, effect of, in a plea to avoid contract on the ground of misrepresentation—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 18 and 19, Exception (1).* A misrepresentation was alleged to have been made by one *B*, as agent of a company, which was not then in existence. *B* became the managing director of the company upon its formation. *Quære*: Whether, assuming that the representation was made by *B*, that it was material and had been relied on, and that it was untrue in fact, the company, which was not then in existence, could be held to be bound by such misrepresentation. In a suit by the plaintiff company to recover money due upon certain shares taken by and allotted to the defendant, the defendant in his pleadings set out and relied upon certain misrepresentations said to have been orally made by one *B* as the agent of the plaintiff company. At the trial he also sought to rely upon a misrepresentation in the prospectus of the company. *Held*, that the defendant ought to be pinned down to the misrepresentations alleged in his pleadings and upon the faith of which he says he acted. It is not open to him to go into the question of misrepresentation in the prospectus. That the prospectus, although issued by the promoters before the formation of the company, was the basis of the contract between the company and the defendant for the allotment of the shares, and if the misstatements therein alleged by the defendant were relied upon by him and were material to the contract, the defendant would be entitled to rescind the contract and to repudiate the shares in the absence of laches or conduct on his part which would deprive him of that right. *In re Metropolitan Coal Consumers' Association. Karbery's Case, [1892] Ch. D. 1*, followed. When a person makes a positive assertion relying upon the statement of another that a certain third party would become a director, he is not warranted in making that assertion within the meaning of s. 18 of the Contract Act. That under the Exception in s. 19 of the Contract Act, the contract, even if caused by misrepresentation, would not be voidable, if the defendant had the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence. The application of that Exception is

COMPANY—*contd.*6. POWERS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS—*contd.*

not restricted to cases where the party is fixed with constructive notice of the true state of affairs. *MOHUN LALL v. SRI GANGAJI COTTON MILLS Co.*

4 C. W. N. 369

15. ——— Misrepresentation—*Bills of exchange—Liability of company on bill drawn by directors—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 18 and 19.* On the 9th October, 1878, the National Bank purchased from the *N Co.* a bill of exchange for 4,000 dollars, equivalent to Rs. 680, drawn by the *N Co.* upon the firm of *N K & Co.* of Hongkong. The bill was in the following form: "Sixty days after sight of this first of exchange (second and third of the same tenor and date not being paid) pay to the order of the National Bank of India the sum of dollars four thousand only, value received, and place the same to account of Nursey Kessowji Ghelabhoy Pudumsey, directors, Nursey Kessowji, secretary, treasurer and agent. The Nursey Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited." The bill was duly accepted and presented for payment, but was dishonoured. On the 6th January, 1879, the bank gave notice of dishonour, and demanded payment from the company as drawers of the bill. On the 18th January, 1879, the *N Co.* was ordered to be wound up, and the bank sent in a claim against the company as drawers of the bill, and subsequently sent in an alternative claim for Rs. 680, being the "amount paid by the bank to, and received by, the company." *Held*, on the authority of *In re the New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 275*, that having regard to the form of the bill, the *N Co.* could not be made liable as drawers; but *held*, also, that the bank was entitled to recover the amount of the bill from the *N Co.* as money received to the use of the bank, on the ground that the directors of the *N Co.*, while acting within their authority, had sold to the bank on behalf of the company, as a bill upon which the company was liable, one upon which the company was not liable, and had, therefore, been guilty of misrepresentation within the meaning of ss. 18 and 19 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872). *In the matter of NURSEY SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY*

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 92

16. ——— Power of Directors, as such, to draw bills of exchange—*Companies Act (X of 1866), s. 47—Winding up—Interest on debts subsequently to date of order to wind up—Rules of Bombay High Court of 3rd August 1866—Rule No. 24.* The articles of association of the New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited, authorized the directors "to raise or borrow from time to time in the name or otherwise on behalf of the company such sums of money as they from time to time think expedient, either by way of sale or mortgage of the whole or any part of the property of the company, or by bonds, debentures, or promissory notes or in such other manner

COMPANY—*contd.*6. POWERS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS—*contd.*

as they deem best, and for the purpose of securing the repayment of any money so borrowed with interests, to make and carry into effect any arrangement which they may deem expedient by conveying or assigning any property of the company to trustees or otherwise." *Held*, that, though power to borrow money on bills of exchange was not specifically given, yet bills of exchange being in many respects analogous to promissory notes, and promissory notes having been specifically mentioned in the article, the power to raise money by an equally well-known and recognized mode,—*viz.*, by drawing, endorsing, or accepting bills of exchange,—must be deemed to be included in the general words "or in such other manner as they deem best." Three of the directors of the above company, one of whom was also the secretary, treasurer, and agent of the company, drew a bill in favour of *S* in the following form: "sixty days after the date of this first of exchange (second and third of the same tenor and date not being paid) pay to the order of *S* the sum of rupees two lakhs only, value received, and place to account of *G P, K N, N K*, secretary, treasurer, and agent. The New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited, directors." The bill was endorsed by *S* to the bank of Bombay, was duly presented for payment to the drawee, and protested for non-payment. Subsequently to the date of the drawing of the bill, the New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited, went into liquidation. The Bank of Bombay claimed as endorsees of the bill to prove against the company as drawers. *Held*, that, assuming that companies under the Indian Companies Act (X of 1866) are by s. 47 liable on bills of exchange drawn on their behalf, or on account of persons acting under their authority, the bill in question was not such a bill. Whether or not a note or bill, must, on the face of it, express that it is made, accepted, or endorsed "by or on behalf or on account of" the company, yet there must be on the face of it that which shows that it was so made, accepted, or endorsed, and which excludes the inference that it was made, accepted, or endorsed by or on behalf or on account of any other person. A bill or note may be in a certain sense on behalf of or on account of a company, though there is upon its face no reference to the company, even in the form of a description of the persons who actually make, accept, or endorse as being directors or secretary. As between such persons and the company, such a bill or note may well be on behalf or on account of the company, but it is not therefore so between the company and third parties. So far as third parties are concerned, a company under the Indian Companies Act (X of 1866) can be made liable on a bill or note only when such bill or note on the face of it expresses that it was made, accepted, or endorsed by, or on behalf or on account of, the company, or where

COMPANY—*contd.*6. POWERS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS—*contd.*

that fact appears by necessary inference from what the face of the instrument itself shows. The addition to the signatures of individuals as makers, drawers, acceptors or endorers of notes or bills, of their description as director or directors, secretary, treasurer, and agent of a certain company, is not considered to raise such inference, as it does not exclude the supposition that, though described as directors, etc., they intended to make themselves personally liable to holders of the instrument, though as between themselves and the company they may be entitled to be indemnified for anything they may have paid on account of the company in respect of such notes or bills. *Dutton v. Marsh*, L. R. 6 Q.B. 361, followed. Rule No. 24 of the Rules dated the 3rd of August, 1886, made by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, under the powers given by s. 189 of the Indian Companies Act (X of 1866), is *ultra vires* so far as it allows interest on debts or claims subsequent to the debt of the order to wind up a company to creditors whose debts or claims do not carry interest. *In the matter of NEW FLEMING SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY*. I. L. R. 3 Bom. 439

Held, on appeal affirming the decision of GREEN, J., that the company was not liable. In order to make a company liable on a bill or note, it must appear on the face of such bill or note that it was intended to be drawn, accepted, or made on behalf of the company, and no evidence *dehors* the bill or note is admissible under s. 47 of the Indian Companies Act (X of 1866) *In re NEW FLEMING SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 275

17. ——— Trading by a company under its Memorandum of Association—*Memorandum of Association—Ultra vires*. The doctrine that a company can do nothing which is not expressly or impliedly warranted by its memorandum of association or other instrument of incorporation, must be reasonably understood and applied. A company, therefore, in carrying on the trade for which it is constituted, and in whatever may be fairly regarded as incidental to, or consequential upon, that trade, is free to enter into any transaction not expressly prohibited by its memorandum of association. *SHAMNUGGAR JUTE FACTORY Co. v. RAM NARAIN CHATTERJEE*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 189

18. ——— Liability of directors for funds of company applied in transactions ——"Ultra vires"—*Dealing in shares of other companies*. The plaintiff company was formed in 1864. By its memorandum of association its object was declared to be commission agency and general trading in cotton and also in goods and commodities suited for the market in the interior of India. The memorandum contained the following words:—"If found desirable, the company may effect purchases of cotton and produce in Bombay

COMPANY—*contd.*6. POWERS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS—*contd.*

and ship to England and carry on such local trade as may seem profitable." The company went into liquidation in 1867. In April, 1890, the present suit was filed against the defendant, who had been one of the directors of the company, and it was alleged that after the formation of the company the defendant and his co-directors had carried on speculative dealings in shares of other companies and had used the funds of the company for this purpose, which was not warranted by the memorandum of association. The plaintiffs alleged that their dealings which were duly set forth in their plaint, had resulted in a heavy loss to the company, and they now sought to recover from the defendant the sum of Rs. 37,700-13-5. There had been originally five directors of the company, but at the date of suit two of them were dead, and two had become insolvent. The plaint was filed in April 1890. *Held*, (affirming the decision of PARSONS, J.), (i) that the memorandum of association did not justify the directors of the company in dealing in shares of other companies, and that the transactions complained of by the plaintiffs were *ultra vires*; (ii) that the directors were liable to replace the moneys of the company which they had misapplied by applying them to a purpose which was *ultra vires*. KATHIAWAR TRADING Co. v. VIRCHAND DIPCHAND. I. L. R. 18 Bom. 119

19. ——— Bills of exchange, issue of—*Transactions ultra vires—Re-drafts.* A company was formed with the following objects, as stated in the memorandum of association, *viz.*, "of securing valuable property in the new port and town of C and its immediate vicinity; and of improving the property so acquired by building upon, letting or selling it, as may be deemed most advisable; and of undertaking the construction of public works calculated to facilitate trade and also of constructing tramways, roads, docks, wharves, and jetties upon the lands so to be acquired; and for all other purposes that may be essential or conducive to the attainment of, or connected with, the above objects." Soon after the establishment of the company, the directors were induced to take a share in, and become liable for the cost of, a mill for husking rice, which it was intended to establish by a separate company; and a considerable sum was advanced out of the funds of the company for the building of the mill and for machinery, etc. The undertaking failed, and the directors, to avoid losing the advances of the company, resolved to take over the mill, and carry it on as the property of the company. They accordingly purchased a large quantity of rice which was husked at the mill, and consigned to several firms in England. P. M. & Co. were appointed agents of the company in Calcutta for the purpose of shipping the rice, under letters from the directors guaranteeing that the company would pay at maturity any re-drafts which might be drawn on P. M. & Co. as their agents in respect of the shipments. Bills of exchange were drawn

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by P. M. & Co. on the firms to which the respective consignments were made, and these bills were sold in the ordinary course of business in Calcutta, P. M. & Co. realizing the proceeds for the benefit of the company. Those bills were honoured by the respective consignees. The rice was sold in England at a considerable loss, and re-drafts for the deficiency were drawn on P. M. & Co. or on the company. The company went into liquidation during these transactions. Some of these re-drafts had been accepted by the company, and others merely registered by the liquidators as claims against the company. Claims were now made on the company by the drawees or endorsees of these re-drafts, but the liquidators declined to pay them, stating that the proceedings in connection with the consignments of rice were not authorized by the memorandum and articles of association of the company, and that therefore the company was not liable for any losses in respect of such consignments. *Held*, that trading in rice was a transaction *ultra vires* of the company; the directors therefore could not bind the company, and the consignees could not recover in respect of the shipments. The company was not liable on the re-drafts; it had no power to issue bills of exchange or to accept the re-drafts, and therefore the holders of those which had been in fact accepted were in no better position than the holders of those which had not been accepted. *In the matter of* PORT CANNING COMPANY. 7 B. L. R. 583

20. ——— Promissory Notes, issue of—*Negotiation within ordinary course of business.* Where the articles of association of a limited company stated that the objects for which the company was established were for the purchase of the business of an hotel-keeper, confectioner, and provisioner, the future working and carrying on of the said business, and the doing of all such other things as were incidental or conducive to the attainments of the above objects, it was held that the directors had power to bind the company by the issue of negotiable securities in the ordinary course of business. Where a note, which had been taken by the company as a security from two judgment-debtors of the company, was endorsed by the company to a third party, and discounted by him, and was on the due date, not having been taken up by the makers, renewed by the company: *Held*, that such negotiation of the note by the company was within the ordinary course of the business of the company. Also held upon the facts that the power of the company to issue negotiable securities was well exercised, and that the company had due notice of dishonour by the makers. CHOONILAL SEAL v. SPENCE'S HOTEL COMPANY.

1 B. L. R. O. C. 14

21. ——— Liability of company for loan to secretary, treasurer, and agent—

COMPANY—*contd.*6. POWERS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS—*contd.*

Principal and Agent—Undisclosed Principal—Election—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 230, 233, 234. By the memorandum and articles of association of the New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company *N K* was appointed secretary, treasurer, and agent of the company, with power to raise or borrow from time to time, in the name or otherwise on behalf of the company, such sums of money as he might think expedient by bonds, debentures, or promissory notes, or in such other manner as he might deem best; and for the purpose of securing the repayment of any money so borrowed, to make any arrangement which he might deem expedient by conveying or assigning away property of the company to trustees or otherwise. *N K* was also secretary, treasurer, and agent of three other mill companies in Bombay. On the 31st October 1878, the directors passed the following resolution:—
 "That the unallotted shares be filled up in the name of Nursey Kessowji, Esq., secretary, treasurer, and agent, who is empowered to mortgage them at a fair rate of interest to enable him to obtain funds for the use of the company. On the 11th November 1878, *P* advanced a sum of Rs. 1,00,500 upon the terms contained in a Gujarati writing of that date, and signed by *N K*. In this document *N K* acknowledged the receipt of the money, for which 335 shares in the New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company were duly handed over as security, and he agreed to repay it within three months. The last clause in the agreement stated that it was 'duly agreed to and approved by him (*N K*) and his heirs and representatives.' As an additional security, *P*, when advancing the loan, obtained from *K N* (father of *N K*) a guarantee in the following terms:—"To Thukur Purmanundass Jivandass. Written by Sha Kessowji Naik. To wit,—This day Sha Nursey Kessowji has received from you Rs. 1,00,500, namely, one lakh and five hundred, having deposited by way of security 335, namely, three hundred and thirty-five 'shares' of 'The New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited.' If your said money cannot be paid with interest by the expiration of the time, and you should sustain any kind of loss in (respect of) that, I am duly to pay the same. As to that, I am not to raise any obstacle or objection. In case it should be necessary, I am to fill up and duly deliver to you an 'indemnity bond' on stamped paper through your vakil (solicitor). This writing is duly agreed to and approved by me and my heirs and representatives. Bombay, the 11th of November in the English year 1878." On the evening of the day on which the loan was made,—*viz.*, 11th November 1878,—but without the knowledge of *K N*, it was agreed between *N K* and *P* that the time for the repayment of the loan should be extended to six months. In December 1878 *N K* became insolvent, and on 28th December 1878 a petition was presented to the High Court to

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wind up the New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company. On the 30th December *P*, through his solicitors, wrote a letter to the company, stating that *N K* had obtained a loan from him of Rs. 1,00,500 on behalf of the company, and enquiring whether the fact appeared in the company's books. To this letter he received a reply signed by "*K N*, director," stating that the loan appeared in the books in *P*'s name. On the 17th January 1879, an order was made for the winding up of the New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company, and on the 4th February 1879 *P* gave notice on the official liquidators of the company of his claim against the company for the money advanced by him on the 11th November 1878. In March 1869 he filed a suit against *K N* to enforce his guarantee, but was unsuccessful, the Court holding that, by extending the period of the loan to six months, the agreement of the 11th November 1878 had been materially varied without *K N*'s knowledge, and that *K N* was consequently discharged. On the 24th April 1879, *P* filed his affidavit in support of his claim against the company. The company resisted the claim. *Held*, (i) that the directors had power, under the memorandum and articles of association, to authorize *N K* to borrow money on behalf of the company, and that they had done so, and with that object had entrusted him with the unallotted shares. (ii) That when *P* advanced the loan to *N K*, he was led to believe that *N K* was obtaining it on behalf of the four mill companies of which he was secretary, treasurer and agent, but that *P* was not aware and was not informed for which of the said companies the loan was obtained, and that the money was in fact advanced to *N* as to an agent acting on behalf of an undisclosed principal. (iii) That *P*, when he discovered that the money was obtained for the New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company, was entitled to claim against the company and to rank as a creditor of the company for the amount advanced to *N K* with interest from the date of the loan,—*viz.*, 11th November 1878—to the date of the presentation of the petition to wind up the company. *PURMANUNDASS v. CORMACK* . . . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 326

22. ——— Cancellation of Shares already issued—*Reduction of capital.* Directors have no power to cancel shares duly issued to a shareholder at his request and so reduce the capital of the company. *Bhimbai v. Ishwardas Jugjiwandass*, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 152, followed. *SORABJI JAMSETJI v. ISHWARDAS JUGJIWANDAS*
 I. L. R. 20 Bom. 654

23. ——— Director selling his own shares to shareholder of company—*Action for Deceit—Position of director as regards individual shareholders.* A director of a company, though he may occupy a fiduciary position with regard to the shareholders collectively, holds no such position with regard to individual shareholders. *Gilbert's*

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Case, L. R. 5 Ch. D. 559, and Gower's Case, L. R. 6 Eq. 77, referred to. WILSON v. MACAULIFFE
I. L. R. 18 All. 56

24. ——— Borrowing in excess of power in Articles of Association—Ratification. Under the articles of association of a limited company, the directors had power, from time to time, as they might see fit, without any previous consent of the shareholders, to borrow any sum of money not exceeding Rs50,000, on the bill, bond, note, or other security of the company, upon such terms as they might think proper; and had power, with the sanction of a special resolution of the company previously obtained at a general meeting, to borrow any sum of money not exceeding in the whole, together with the Rs50,000, the sum of Rs1,00,000. K advanced sums of money to the company amounting in 1879 to over Rs80,000. No previous sanction was given to any of these advances. On the 4th October 1879, an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders was held, at which a resolution was passed sanctioning a mortgage to K of the whole of the company's property, except a certain garden, to secure the payment of a sum, not exceeding Rs1,00,000, for advances already made and to be made, with interest at 7 per cent. This resolution was confirmed on the 16th of October, and the mortgage was executed on the 22nd of December 1879. Subsequently the company was ordered to be wound up, and K advanced a claim for Rs1,20,787. *Held*, that there is a distinction between loans which a company is empowered to raise under its borrowing powers, and debts which, in meeting its current liabilities and in the actual carrying on of its affairs, the company, or its agents on its behalf, have contracted; and that the advances made by K did not amount to a borrowing within the meaning of the articles of association. *In re Cefn Cilcen Mining Company, L. R. 7 Eq. 85, and Waterlow v. Sharp, L. R. 8 Eq. 501, followed. Held*, also, that the borrowing powers conferred by the articles of association justified a mortgage, the object of which was in part to cover previously incurred liabilities. *In the matter of the INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1866, AND OF MEDLA TEA COMPANY. KERNOT v. WALTON*
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 14

25. ——— Ratification—Act done by Directors in excess of authority. The ratification by a company of particular acts done by its directors in excess of the authority given them by the articles of the company does not extend the powers of the directors so as to give validity to acts of a similar character done subsequently. *IRVINE v. UNION BANK OF AUSTRALIA*
I. L. R. 3 Calc. 280

7. WINDING UP.**(a) GENERAL CASES.**

1. ——— Right to apply for winding up—Holder of paid-up shares. The holder of

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fully paid-up shares may apply for the winding-up of a company as a contributory under the 10th section of Act X of 1866. The Court will not be satisfied with the bare statement of a director that a company is unable to pay its debts, so as to grant a winding-up order. *In the matter of the INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1866, AND SYLHET AND CACHAR TEA COMPANY*
2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 94

2. ——— Branch of English Company in Calcutta—Leave to provisional Liquidator to advance money for a going indigo concern. A joint stock banking company, established by deed and Royal Charter in England, under the provisions of the English Joint Stock Companies Act of 7 & 8 Vic., with agencies in different parts of the world, and registered under the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1862 (25 & 26 Vic., c. 89), but not under any Indian Act, having its principal place of business in London, though having a principal branch in Calcutta in which the other branches in India are subordinate, is not such a company as can be wound up as an "unregistered company," under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act of 1866 (Act X of 1866), but should be wound up by the Court of Chancery, and an order of the Court of Chancery under the English Act of 1862, winding up the company in England, has the effect of winding up all branches of the company in India and elsewhere. *In the matter of the INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1866*
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 335

3. ——— Jurisdiction of High Court—Winding-up of Company formed in England—Principal place of business—Indian Companies Act (X of 1866), s. 213. A limited company formed in England under the English Companies Act, 1862, and having its registered office in England, but which has its principal place of business in Calcutta, and is managed exclusively by directors in Calcutta, and the business of which is carried on exclusively in India, can be wound up by the High Court. *In the matter of the INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1866, AND OF CALCUTTA JUTE MILLS COMPANY, LIMITED*
I. L. R. 5 Calc. 888

4. ——— Winding up in England—English Companies Act, 1862—Call-order made by Court of Chancery. The Courts in India treat a call-order made by the Court of Chancery in England upon a contributory of a company registered in England, and being wound up under the authority of the Court of Chancery as a foreign judgment, and will not allow the liability of a defendant sued upon such order to be disputed, unless it be shown that the Court had no jurisdiction to make the order, or that the defendant had no notice of it, or that it is not in its nature a final order. *LONDON, BOMBAY, AND MEDITERRANEAN BANK v. HORMASJI PESTANJJI FRAMJI*
8 Bom. O. C. 200

See LONDON, BOMBAY, AND MEDITERRANEAN BANK v. BURJORJI SORABJI LYWALLA
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 346

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5. ——— Winding up under supervision of Court—*Order for Dissolution of Company—Voluntary winding up—Official liquidator—Companies Act, VI of 1882.* As a general rule, a winding-up of a company under supervision of the Court should be terminated in the same way as a purely voluntary winding-up,—i.e., under ss. 186 and 187 of the Companies Act, VI of 1882. Although, under s. 195 of the Companies Act, VI of 1882, the Court has power to make an order dissolving a company in the course of winding-up, subject to its supervision, such cases must be exceptional and can only occur when the Court has deemed it proper to carry on the winding-up under supervision in a manner such as clearly to approximate to a winding-up by the Court. The ordinary rule is the other way, and it is reasonable that it should be so; as generally, a winding-up under supervision is not conducted under so intimate a control of the Court as to put the Court in a position to judge of the correctness of the liquidators' action and the completeness of the winding-up. So far as the Court does not interfere, a winding-up under supervision remains essentially a voluntary winding-up; but the Court in a winding-up under supervision has full authority to interfere and to exercise to any extent the power which it might have exercised if an order had been made for winding up the company by the Court. The words "official liquidator" in s. 160 of the Companies Act, VI of 1882, do not include the liquidators in a winding-up under supervision. Motion for an order for the dissolution of a company wound up under supervision of the Court refused. *In re CARWAR COMPANY* . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 640

6. ——— Voluntary Liquidation—*Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 177—Liability to be sued—Execution of decree.* Where a company has gone into a voluntary liquidation, it can still be sued for debts due by it incurred prior to liquidation although the fact that there are liquidators may be material if execution of the decree is sought. *KOTHANDAPANI v. SOMASUNDRAM*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 97

7. ——— Proceeding with suit—*Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 136—Proceeding to enforce execution of decree—Sanction of the Court—Suit or other proceeding.* The language of s. 136 of the Companies Act (VI of 1882) shows that proceedings in execution are regarded as distinct from the suit for the purpose of that section, therefore the leave given to proceed with a suit is not authority for proceedings taken in execution of the decree in the suit authorized. *ISHVARDAS JAGJIVANDAS v. DHANJISHA NASARVANJI*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 644

8. ——— Stay of Proceedings—*Jurisdiction of High Court, Calcutta, to wind up company at Bombay.* A bank was registered at Bombay only as an unlimited company under Act XIX of

COMPANY—*contd.*7. WINDING UP—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

1857, and carried on business at Bombay and Calcutta. At a meeting held before Act X of 1866 came into force, it was resolved that the company be wound up voluntarily under Act XIX of 1857, which resolution was confirmed after Act X of 1866 came into operation, and more than a month after the original resolution. *Held*, that these resolutions were informal; that the company was not winding-up under either Act; and that an action against it by a creditor could not be stayed. *Semble*: That an action will not be stayed against a company which is being wound up voluntarily under Act X of 1866. And held that a company registered at Bombay only as before mentioned cannot be wound up by the High Court in Calcutta. *In the matter of the INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1866, AND EAST INDIA BANK* . . . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 330

9. ——— Order of Chancery Court in England—*Stay of actions in India.* Where a company was being wound up by the Court of Chancery in England, all actions brought against it in this country were ordered to be stayed. *PEITSCH v. COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 363

10. ——— Order of Chancery Court in England—*Suit against Company in India.* A suit may be brought in the Courts in India against a company that is being wound up under "The Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vic., c. 89, s. 87)," without the leave of the Court of Chancery being first obtained. *Semble*: The High Court will, in the exercise of its general power, stay the proceedings in a suit against such a company where the circumstances are such as to render it proper to do so. *BANK OF HINDUSTAN, CHINA, AND JAPAN v. PREMCHAND RAICHAND. AMEDBHAI HABIBHAI v. PREMCHAND RAICHAND*

5 Bom. O. C. 83

11. ——— Leave to proceed to execution, order for—*Stay of execution.* Where leave had been given to certain creditors to proceed to execution in a suit against a company, while proceedings for the winding-up of the company were pending, but before the winding-up order had been made: *Held*, that the leave to proceed to execution was not necessarily affected by the winding-up order. *In the matter of the INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1866, AND SYLEET AND CACHAR TEA COMPANY*

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 123

12. ——— Act XIX of 1857, s. 72—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 288.* In an application, under s. 288 of the Civil Procedure Code, to execute an order of a District Court for the winding-up of a company by staying suits which had been filed against the company in the High Court: *Held*, first, that the order can take effect only from the time when it is filed in the Court to which it shall have been transmitted for the purpose of being executed, and that suits can only be stayed from

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that time; secondly, that where the decree in a suit has already been actually executed by the attachment of property of the defendants, although the sum decreed may not have been realized by a sale, there is no longer a suit or action to be stayed within the meaning of s. 72 of Act XIX of 1857.

NARAYAN SHAMJI v. GUJERAT TRADING COMPANY
3 Bom. O. C. 20

13. ——— Notice of Appeal—*Extension of time for appeal—Indian Companies Act (X of 1866), s. 141—Practice.* Notice of an appeal against any order or decision made or given in the matter of the winding-up of a company by the Court must, under s. 141 of Act X of 1866, be given to the respondent within three weeks after the order or decision complained of has been made. The Court has power to extend the time for giving the notice after the three weeks have expired, upon special circumstances being shown. *In the matter of SARAWAK AND HINDUSTAN BANKING AND TRADING COMPANY. LALLAH BARROOMUL v. OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 704 : 3 C. L. R. 581

14. ——— *Companies Act, VI of 1882, ss. 169, 214—Practice—Winding-up.* Notice of an appeal from any order or decision made or given in the matter of the winding up of a company by the Court must, under s. 169 of the Indian Companies Act, 1882, be given to the respondent within three weeks after the order complained of has been made, unless such time is extended by the Court of Appeal. RAMANAPPA v. OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR, BELLARY BRUCEPETTA STOCK AND LOAN TRANSACTING Co..

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 291

15. ——— Notice of Proceeding—*Service of notices and orders—Suit against contributories—Contributory in India to English company—Last known address or place of abode—Rule 63 of the rules of 1862 of the High Court, Bombay.* The London, Bombay, and Mediterranean Bank, a joint-stock company, registered under the English Companies Act, 1862, was ordered to be wound up by an order of the Court of Chancery in England in 1866, and by a subsequent order of the said Court made in the winding-up of the bank, it was ordered that service of any notice, summons, order, or other proceedings in these matters might be effected by putting such notice, etc., into any post office, either in England or at Bombay, duly addressed to such contributories, being past members according to their respective last known addresses or places of abode. By a final balance order dated 5th June 1879, it was ordered by the Court of Chancery in England that the persons named in the schedule to the said order, being contributories as past members of the said bank, should within four days after the service of the said order pay the amount set opposite to their names, with interest, from the 15th March 1879. The defendant's name appeared in

COMPANY—*contd.*7. WINDING UP—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

the said schedule, and the present suit was brought to recover the sum therein appearing as due from him to the bank, *viz.*, R3,900. The defendant denied that he had ever held shares in the plaintiffs' bank, or that he ever had notice of any of the proceedings in the winding-up. At the trial it appeared that all the various orders and notices to shareholders made in the winding-up of the bank prior to the balance order of the 5th June 1879 had been sent by post to the defendant, addressed to him at No. 36 Fanasvadi, and were all returned undelivered. It was proved that he had never resided there; but that his brother had a place of business there, and that the defendant used occasionally to go there for the purpose of attending to his brother's business. It further appeared that the residence of the defendant, as given in the register of shareholders, was Loharchall, and not 36, Fanasvadi. *Held*, that the notices, orders, etc., prior to the order of 5th June 1879, were not so served as to make the defendant subject to that final order; that the obligation to obey the command of the Court of Chancery contained therein had not arisen as against the defendant, and that, consequently, the present suit must fail. It is a leading principle of English law, always understood except when expressly excluded, that a person proceeded against in a Court must have due notice of the proceeding; failing such notice, he is entitled to protection if the judgment or order obtained in his absence is made the ground of a suit in any Court governed by English principles. The Court of Chancery in England had not in this case so called the defendant before it as to enable it in his absence to pronounce a definitive order against him or to bind him in the Court of his domicile, although he was included in the order of the Court of Chancery. The fact that the defendant frequently attended his brother's place of business at No. 36, Fanasvadi, was not sufficient to make that place his "last known address." If there had been evidence that he had used No. 36, Fanasvadi, as an address for receiving letters, that might probably have been sufficient. It would then have been known as his address at least as an address. The address or residence of a member of a company entered in the register of shareholders, although sufficiently ascertained for the purpose of communication from the company, is not, therefore, ascertained for a service of legal proceedings. For the purpose of such service, care must be taken to find out the last known place of abode of the alleged contributory, and to effect the substituted service there. LONDON, BOMBAY, AND MEDITERRANEAN BANK v. GOVIND RAMCHANDRA . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 223

16. ——— Suit against Contributory—*Service of notice and orders—Contributory in India to English company.* The defendant was sued as a contributory on the B list of shareholders liable in the winding-up of the London, Bombay, and Mediterranean Bank. The Bank was an English

COMPANY—*contd.*7. WINDING UP—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

Joint Stock Company registered under the English Companies Act, 1862, and the winding-up order was made by the Court of Chancery in England on the 20th July 1866. By a subsequent order made on the winding-up it was ordered by the said Court that service of notices, etc., of the various proceedings might be effected on contributories, being past members, by posting the same either in England or in Bombay duly addressed to the last known address or place of abode of such contributories. The Court of Chancery, on the 16th December 1878, made an order for a call of £10 per share upon the contributories, and on the 5th June 1879, the final balance order was made by the Court. This suit was brought to recover the sum of ₹754-7-0 alleged to be due by the defendant as a contributory in the B list under the said balance order. The plaintiff was an assignee of the bank. The defendant who resided at Sumari, in the Surat District, denied that he was a shareholder in the bank, and alleged that he had no notice of the various proceedings in the winding up. At the hearing it was proved that one of the notices, which had been posted in Bombay addressed to the defendant at Sumari, in the Surat District, *viz.*, a notice of the intended application for a call of £10 per share, dated the 27th August 1878, had been returned undelivered to the Dead Letter Office, having been carelessly addressed. No further steps were taken to serve it on the defendant. *Held*, that the defendant, not having received any summons or notice to attend the hearing of the application for a call of £10 per share, was not liable to the call made in his absence. Courts in British India, when called upon to give effect to a foreign judgment, should insist upon a strict proof of the validity and service of summonses and other processes alleged to have emanated from a foreign Court, and made a foundation for a liability to be enforced here by Courts that have no cognizance of the case on its merits. *Rousillon v. Rousillon*, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 351 and 371, followed. *EDULJI BURJORJI v. MANEKJI SORABJI PATEL*. I. L. R. 11 Bom. 241

17. ———— **Contributories—Shareholders**
—*Notice of allotment—Secondary evidence of notice—Press-copy letter—Evidence of original letter having been properly addressed and posted—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 16, 114—Register of members—Presumption of membership—Companies Act (VI of 1882), ss. 45, 47, 60, 61, Sch. I, Table A (97).* Upon the settlement of the list of contributories to the assets of a company in course of liquidation under the Indian Companies Act, one of the persons named in the list denied that he had agreed to become a member of the company or was liable as a contributory. The District Court admitted as evidence on behalf of the official liquidator a press-copy of a letter addressed to the objector for the purpose of proving that a notice of allotment of shares was duly communicated. No notice to the objector to produce the original letter appeared on

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the record; but at the hearing of the appeal it was alleged by the official liquidator and denied by the objector that such notice had been in fact given. There was no evidence as to the posting of the original letter or of the address which it bore; but the press-copy was contained in the press-copy letter book of the company, and was proved to be in the handwriting of a deceased secretary of the company, whose duty it was to despatch letters after they had been copied in the letter-book. The objector denied having received the letter or any notice of allotment. *Held*, that the Court should not draw the inference that the original letter was properly addressed or posted; that the press-copy letter was inadmissible in evidence; and that there was no proof of the communication of any notice of allotment. The evidence adduced by the official liquidator to show that the defendant was a member of the company and so liable as a contributory consisted of the register of members, a letter written by the objector, a reply thereto written by a managing director of the company, and the oral testimony of the director himself. The objector adduced no evidence at all. *Held*, that the official liquidator might, if he had chosen to do so, have put the register in evidence, and waited, before giving any further evidence until the objector had given some to displace the *prima facie* evidence afforded by the register, or to impugn the character of the register; but his case must be looked at as a whole, and having taken the line which he did, he must take the consequences of his other evidence contradicting or impugning the *prima facie* evidence of the register, and notwithstanding that the objector gave no evidence, the register was not conclusive. *RAM DAS CHAKARBATI v. OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR OF COTTON GINNING COMPANY*. I. L. R. 9 All. 366

18. ———— **Resolution to wind up—Dissentient shareholders—Notice of dissent—Requirements of such notice—Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 204.** The shareholders of the Gordon Mills having passed a resolution for the voluntary winding up of the company, five dissentient share-holders gave notice of their dissent by a letter to the liquidators in the following terms:—“With reference to the resolutions to wind up the above company voluntarily, and which were passed and confirmed on 14th instant, we hereby give you notice under s. 204 of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882), and require you to purchase the interest held by us in the said company at such price as may be determined either by private arrangement or by arbitration, as we are dissentients from such resolutions.” *Held*, that the letter was sufficient notice of dissent under the provisions of s. 204 of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882). *MOTIRAM BHAGUBHAI v. GORDON MILLS*

[I. L. R. 12 Bom. 526]

19. ———— **Suit against Contributory on the B list—Plea of discharge in insolvency**

COMPANY—*contd.*7. WINDING UP—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

—*Foreign judgment—Balance order—Insolvency Act (Stat. 11 & 12 Vic., c. 21), s. 61.* The plaintiffs, who were an English joint stock company registered under the English Companies Act, 1862, sued the defendant, as a past member of the bank, upon a balance order of the High Court of Justice in England, dated 24th February 1881. The bank was in liquidation under a winding up order made on 20th July 1866. The defendant pleaded discharge by insolvency, and it appeared that he had filed his schedule on 15th January 1873, and had obtained his discharge under s. 60 of the Indian Insolvency Act (Stat. 11 & 12 Vic., c. 21) on the 15th July 1874. *Held* (but doubting), that the question of the defendant's liability or non-liability to the claim made against him as a contributory could not be raised in this suit, and that on formal evidence being given by the plaintiffs, judgment must go against the defendant. *LONDON, BOMBAY AND MEDITERRANEAN BANK v. DADABHOY CURSETJI MAJJI* . . . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 582

20. ———— *Transfer of Assets to new Company—Companies Act (X of 1866), ss. 149, 154, and 175—Right of creditors of transferring company—Dissentient shareholder—Sanction of Court.* By special resolutions passed on the 3rd July 1878 and confirmed on 31st July 1878, the shareholders of the Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company (Limited) resolved that the company should be wound up voluntarily, and that all the assets of the said company should be transferred by the liquidators to a new company then intended shortly to be formed and registered in Bombay, called the New Fleming Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited, and that the liquidators should receive as the consideration for such transfer certain fully paid-up shares in the new company for distribution among the shareholders of the old company. The said transfer was to be made subject to a covenant on the part of the new company to perform all the agreements and to discharge all the debts and liabilities of the old company. The new company was duly formed and registered on the same day (31st July 1878) and the specified number of shares was delivered to the liquidators of the old company for distribution among the shareholders of the old company. Two of the said shareholders, *J* and *H*, the holders of 50 and 20 shares respectively, dissented from the special resolutions in the manner provided by s. 175 of the Indian Companies Act (X of 1866), and required the liquidators to purchase their interests. The matter was thereupon referred to arbitration. In the case of *H* an award was made and filed, but further proceedings were stayed by order of Court. In the case of *J* no award was made and he brought a suit which was still pending against both the old and new companies and the liquidators to recover Rs75,000, the alleged value of his shares. In pursuance of the resolution, the

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liquidators of the old company handed over the assets to the new company, but no formal grant or assignment, in writing, of the said assets was executed. They remained in its possession until the 17th January 1879, on which day the said new company was ordered to be wound up by the Court. The petitioners were appointed official liquidators, and as such were in possession of the assets at the date of the petition. No property whatever remained in the hands of the old company, except the shares remaining to be distributed among the dissentient shareholders. The new company had discharged debts of the old company to the amount of six lakhs of rupees, and there remained debts of over three lakhs due by the old company. Until after the new company had become insolvent, no creditor of the old company had expressed his dissent from the above special resolution, or had refused to accept the new company as his debtor. On 1st March 1879 the voluntary winding-up of the old company was directed to be continued as a winding-up under the supervision of the Court. The official liquidators of the new company now presented a petition, praying that the above special resolutions might be sanctioned by the Court. Certain unsatisfied creditors of the old company opposed the petition, insisting that the sanction should be refused, except upon the condition that they should be paid in full out of the property of the old company. The two dissentient shareholders, *J* and *H*, also objected to the sanction being given unless provisions were made for the satisfaction of their claims as soon as they should be ascertained. *Held*, that, under the special circumstances of the case, the sanction of the Court should be given to the resolutions, but subject to the value of the interest of the two dissenting shareholders being paid or adequately secured. Such order to be without prejudice to any question between the creditors of the old company and the dissenting shareholders. *In re FLEMING SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY* . . . I. L. R. 3 Bom. 299

21. ———— *Transfer or Sale of Business—Special resolution—Dissentient member—Notice of dissent—Requirements of notice—Powers of voluntary liquidator—Waiver—Arbitration—Failure to make award—Second arbitration—Companies Act, X of 1866, ss. 116, 149, 175 to 179.* The *F. S. & W. Co. (Ld.)*, in the course of being wound up voluntarily, proposed to transfer its business and property to another company to be called the *New F. S. & W. Co.*, and passed a special resolution on the 3rd July, confirmed on the 31st July 1878, under s. 175 of the Indian Companies Act, X of 1866, empowering the liquidators to carry out the transfer. *J*, a dissentient member of the old company, sent on the 5th August, and, therefore, within the seven days provided by that section, a notice expressing his dissent from such resolution; but the notice did not contain the

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requisition provided for by the latter part of that section requiring the liquidators either to abstain from carrying the resolution into effect or to purchase his interest in the company. The liquidators, however, replied on the 23rd August by offering to purchase *J*'s shares which offer being refused, they and *J* entered into an agreement on the 12th October, "in pursuance of the provisions in that behalf contained in the Indian Companies Act, X of 1866," for the reference of "the dispute as to the price to be paid to the said *J* for his shares in the *F. S. & W. Co. (Ltd.)*" to two arbitrators and an umpire to be named by them. The agreement fixed a short date for the making of the award. The arbitration was entered on, but the time limited for the award having expired without any award being made, *J* filed a suit, on the 28th of December, to recover the value of his shares. On the 1st March 1879, the winding-up of the *F. S. & W. Co.* was ordered to be continued under the supervision of the Court, and *J*'s suit was at the same time stayed. *J* then endeavoured to have the arbitration revived. In this he was unsuccessful, the submission not having been filed in Court, and the arbitration being held to be already dead and past revival. The suit subsequently came on to be heard and was dismissed, on the ground that s. 175 of the Act made an arbitration and an award a condition precedent to any suit. *J* then called on the liquidators to nominate an arbitrator, and enter on a fresh arbitration. This the liquidators doubted whether they could legally do, and therefore they now petitioned the Court for its order and direction in the matter. They submitted that *J* had never acquired the rights of a dissentient shareholder under s. 175 by reason of the insufficiency of his notice, and that, in any case, one arbitration having been already entered upon and determined, *J* could not now call upon them to enter on a fresh arbitration. *Held*, following *In re Union Bank of Kingston-upon-Hull*, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 308, that *J*'s notice of dissent of the 5th August was in itself an insufficient notice under the provisions of s. 175 of the Indian Companies Act, 1866, inasmuch as it did not contain the requisition to the liquidators required by the latter part of that section, and that, consequently, it was open to the liquidators to have treated *J* as disentitled to the rights of a dissentient shareholder under that section. *Held*, further, that it was within the power of the liquidators to waive such informality in the notice on behalf of the company, and that they had in fact done so, and that *J* was consequently entitled to the rights of a dissentient shareholder under that section. *Held*, further, that the rights of a dissentient shareholder, under that and the following sections, who had elected to have the value of his interest in the company decided by arbitration, were not limited to a single reference to arbitration, and were not extinguished by the expiry without an award being made, of the time fixed by such reference for making an award; that in such a

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case, unless otherwise disentitled, the dissentient shareholder was entitled to a second reference to arbitration for the purpose of arriving at a definite result by means of an award, which was the object contemplated by those sections of the Act. *In re FLEMING SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY. JEHANGIR GUSTADSI v. JOOSUP HAJI AHMED*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 494

22. ———— *Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 128, cl. (e)—Petition to wind up—"Other reason of a like nature."* When the law requires the fulfilment of one or more of several conditions, before an order could be made, the part fulfilment of two or more of such conditions should not be taken as having cumulative effect justifying the order. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the main original object, for which the Company was formed, has substantially failed or that the substratum of the Company is gone, it will consider that it would be just and equitable to wind up the Company and will make an order for its compulsory winding up. The Court would not be justified in making a winding up order merely on the ground that the Company has made losses and is likely to make further losses. *SHAH STREAM NAVIGATION COMPANY, In re* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 415

(b) DUTIES AND POWERS OF LIQUIDATORS.

23. ———— *Power of Liquidators to compromise under sanction of the Court—Act X of 1866, s. 174.* Under s. 174 of the Indian Companies Act, the Court has power to sanction compromises of calls, debts, and liabilities before the list of contributories has been settled, or the competence of the shareholders has been ascertained. The Privy Council will be reluctant to interfere with the discretion of Courts having jurisdiction to sanction a compromise by the liquidators of a company winding up under s. 174 of the Indian Companies Act, where all the facts have been placed before the Court in India, and there is no reason to suppose that the proceedings for a compromise have been tainted with fraud. *BANK OF HINDUSTAN, CHINA, AND JAPAN v. EASTERN FINANCIAL ASSOCIATION*

3 B. L. R. P. C. 8 : 12 W. R. P. C. 27
13 Moo. I. A. 15

24. ———— *Power of provisional liquidator to make advances—Mortgagee for advances to indigo factory.* Where it was shown that the bank was first mortgagee of certain indigo concerns, and had advanced money to the planter for the purpose of carrying on the cultivation and manufacture up to the time of the winding-up, and it was still necessary that further sums should be advanced for the completion of the cultivation and manufacture, and that under the circumstances it would be clearly for the benefit of the creditors that such advances should be made: *Held*, that the provi-

COMPANY—*contd.*7. WINDING UP—*contd.*(b) DUTIES AND POWERS OF LIQUIDATORS—*contd.*

sional liquidator, supposing the winding-up of the bank and his appointment by the Court in India had not been *ultra vires*, would have been authorized by the Court to make the required advances. *In the matter of the INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1866*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 335

25. ———— *Mortgagee for advances to indigo factory—Companies Act, 1866, ss. 116, 174—Sub-mortgage by liquidator of lien of company on indigo crop.* Where a bank at the time of its failure were mortgagees of an indigo crop for the season's outlay on which they had advanced sums of money, and it was found that a further sum was necessary to complete the season's cultivation and manufacture of the crop which would otherwise be lost, an application that the provisional liquidator should be allowed to borrow the money required from third persons, assigning to them the mortgage lien held by the bank on the crop on trust to pay themselves in the first place and afterwards to pay the surplus proceeds to the bank, was refused as not being sanctioned by the provisions of s. 116 and s. 174 of the Companies Act, 1866. The Court had no power to sanction such an arrangement, which would be altering in a material degree the footing on which a security held by the bank stood, and interposing a new trust between it and its debtor. *In the matter of the INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1866, AND OF AGRA AND MASTERMAN'S BANK*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 350

26. ———— *Powers of Liquidator after dissolution of company—Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 187—Promissory note, suit on.* Suit on a promissory note of the defendant in favour of a company: the note was payable to the company or order. The company had gone into liquidation, and a liquidator had been duly appointed. The plaintiffs had purchased, together with certain other assets of the company, the note sued on, but did not obtain the liquidator's endorsement of the note until after the dissolution of the company was completed. *Held*, that the liquidator had no power to endorse the note to the plaintiffs. *RAMACHANDRA RAU v. KANDASAMI CHETTI* I. L. R. 18 Mad. 498

27. ———— *Letters of administration to estate of deceased shareholder—Omission to put on list of Contributories all persons liable as representatives of deceased shareholders.* The official liquidator need not take out letters of administration to the estate of a deceased shareholder before setting the list of contributories. There is nothing in ss. 126 and 144 of the Companies Act (VI of 1882) requiring the official liquidator to place on the list all the persons who may, as representatives, be liable to contribute in discharge of the liability of a deceased shareholder as contemplated by s. 126. Nor can the liability, under that section, of a person who has been placed on the list as his representative be affected by omission of the

COMPANY—*contd.*7. WINDING UP—*contd.*(b) DUTIES AND POWERS OF LIQUIDATORS—*contd.*

official liquidator to do so. *SORABJI JAMSETJI v. ISHWARDAS JUGGIWANDAS* I. L. R. 20 Bom. 654

28. ———— *Voluntary Liquidation—Liquidator, borrowing powers of—Assets—Principal and agent—Election—Subrogation—Companies Act (VI of 1882), ss. 144 (f), 177 (g).* Case in which it was held that a liquidator of a company being voluntarily wound up had power to borrow for the purposes of winding up, including the working of steamers and docks, on the credit of the assets of the company without security, written or otherwise, and that the loan in question was within his powers and was in fact made to the company, though the liquidator also made himself personally liable. *Per PETHERAM, C.J.—Held*, that a person contracting with an agent may look directly to the principal unless by the terms of the contract he has agreed not to do so, whether he was or was not aware when he made the contract that the person with whom he was dealing was an agent only. *Calder v. Dobell*, L. R. 6 C. P. 486, referred to. *Per WILSON and PIGOT, J.J.—Held*, that the realized assets of a company divided among the shareholders in pursuance of a resolution are assets within the meaning of s. 144 (f) of the Indian Companies Act. *Per PIGOT, J.—Held*, that, if it were necessary to hold so, the principle of *Baroness Wenlock v. River Dee Company*, L. R. 19 Q. B. D. 155, would apply to the case. *In the matter of INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1882. In the matter of GANGES STEAM TUG COMPANY. EX PARTE DELHI AND LONDON BANK* I. L. R. 18 Calc. 31

29. ———— *Application by Official Liquidator for sanction to sale of company's property—Lease—Covenant against assignment—Covenant not applying to assignments other than by act of parties—Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 144—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 10, 12.* The power of the Court under s. 144 (c) of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882) to give sanction to an official liquidator to sell the property of the company overrides a private contract against assignment made by the company. A covenant in a lease to a company provided that the lessees should not "assign, underlet, or part with the possession of any part of the said premises unless with the express consent in writing of the said lessors or their assigns." The company having gone into liquidation, and the official liquidator having applied, under s. 144 (c) of the Indian Companies Act, for sanction to sell the company's property, it was objected on behalf of the lessors' assigns that the proposed sale would be in contravention of the covenant. *Held*, that the covenant did not apply to assignments by operation of law or assignments authorized by statute. Ss. 10 and 12 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) relate only to transfers by act of parties. *In the matter of WEST HOPETOWN TEA COMPANY*

I. L. R. 12 All. 193

COMPANY—*contd.*7. WINDING UP—*contd.*(b) DUTIES AND POWERS OF LIQUIDATORS—*concl'd.*

30. ——— Duty of Liquidator—Vakil of creditor appointed liquidator. A person who has been appointed liquidator of a company ought not, after such appointment, to continue to act as vakil of a creditor, whose right to prove against the company is in dispute in the liquidation. *In the matter of WEST HOPETOWN TEA COMPANY*

I. L. R. 9 All. 180

(c) COSTS AND CLAIMS ON ASSETS.

31. ——— Petitioning Creditor's Costs. In an application by a creditor of a company to have it wound up under the superintendence of the Court, the Court will always be in favour of making an order for its being so wound up. The petitioning creditor is entitled to his costs as a first charge on the assets of the company, subject to any prior liens on the estate. *In re NAHOR HABI TEA COMPANY*

3 B. L. R. Ap. 11

32. ——— Distribution of Assets—Companies Act (XIX of 1857), s. 73. Where a company is being wound up under Act XIX of 1857, and its assets are collected and distributed under the 73rd section of that Act, all creditors take *pro rata*. *In the matter of ACT XIX of 1857 AND GANGES STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 394

33. ——— Loan society—Member withdrawing from association—Notice of withdrawal. One of the articles of association of a registered loan society provided that a member who has received no loan may withdraw from the association and receive the amount at his credit in calls *minus* the arrears, if any, and interest due thereon on giving one month's notice, such withdrawals to be paid from the first available funds. The society went into voluntary liquidation. By an extraordinary resolution it was resolved that the assets be rateably divided among the shareholders who had already withdrawn and those who were still in the fund. The liquidators applied to the Court under Companies Act, s. 182, to determine the question how the assets should be distributed with reference to the above article. SHEPARD, J., ordered that notice of the application be given by advertisement on the notice-board of the Court and in newspapers, and that a copy be posted at the society's office. *Held*, affirming the judgment of SHEPARD, J., that those members who had given notice of withdrawal under the article quoted above were entitled to be paid out of the assets of the society in priority to the other members. ADIPURNAM PILLAI v. D'SENA.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 85

34. ——— Claims on Assets—Precedence of judgment-debt due to Secretary of State—Stay of execution of judgment-debt. A judgment-debt due to the Crown is in Bombay entitled to the same precedence in execution as a like judgment-debt in England, if there be no special legislative pro-

COMPANY—*contd.*7. WINDING UP—*contd.*(c) COSTS AND CLAIMS ON ASSETS—*contd.*

vision affecting that right in the particular case. Under similar circumstances, a judgment-debt due to the Secretary of State in Council for India is in Bombay entitled to the like precedence, and the reason is that such debt is vested in the Crown, and when realized falls into the State treasury. The nature of the cause of action in respect of which the judgment was recovered does not affect the right of the Crown or of the Secretary of State in Council for India to priority. As the Crown is not, either expressly or by implication, bound by the Indian Companies Act (X of 1866), and as an order made under that Act for the winding-up of a company does not work any alteration of property, such an order does not enable the Court to stay the execution of a judgment-debt due to the Crown or to the Secretary of State for India in Council. It is a principle recognized by the laws of many countries that claims of the Crown or State are entitled to precedence,—*e.g.*, the Hindu, Roman, and French Codes, the laws of Spain, the United States of America, Scotland, and England. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. BOMBAY LANDING AND SHIPPING COMPANY

5 Bom. O. C. 23

35. ——— Secured and unsecured Creditors—Application of English law where Indian Act is silent—Rule of justice, equity and good conscience. There being no provision in the Indian statute law by which on the winding-up of a company, secured creditors are entitled to any preference over unsecured creditors, in such proceedings the rule of English law—that secured creditors can only prove for the balance of their debts after deducting the value of their securities—should prevail as being consonant with justice, equity, and good conscience. *Waghela Rajsanji v. Mashudin*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 551 : L. R. 14 I. A. 89, referred to. MUSSOOREE BANK v. HIMALAYA BANK

I. L. R. 16 All. 53

36. ——— Right of Servants to prove preferentially to other creditors—Wages of Captain and Crew. Where a steam tug company was being wound up under the Indian Companies Act, 1866, it being admitted that the vessels were in the habit of going to sea:—*Held*, that the captains and crews were entitled to rank preferentially and to be paid their wages in full, in priority to the claims of other creditors. *Semble*: They would be similarly entitled if the vessels plied substantially in tidal waters, whether plying actually on the open sea or not. *Held*, also, that, in the absence of any contract or custom to the contrary, the captains and crews were monthly servants of the company, and were entitled to be paid only for the month in which they were dismissed. *Held*, also, that servants of companies generally had no right to prove in preference to other creditors, or to be paid in full, or in priority to them. But where A by his contract was to be paid Rs. 1,000 on any breach of its terms:—*Held*, that he was entitled to prove for Rs. 1,000. *In re*

COMPANY—*contd.*7. WINDING UP—*contd.*(c) COSTS AND CLAIMS ON ASSETS—*contd.*

THE INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1866, AND OF CALCUTTA STEAM TUG ASSOCIATION, AND *In re* EASTERN STEAM TUG COMPANY

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 17

But see *In the matter of* AGRA AND MASTERMAN'S BANK . . . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 352

where, however, the order was made under s. 46 of the Insolvency Act.

37. ————— *Wages of Labourers—Beng. Acts III of 1863 and VI of 1865.* The wages of labourers employed under Bengal Acts III of 1863 and VI of 1865 are leviable out of the land, and form a primary charge upon it, into whosoever hands it may pass. Therefore such labourers are entitled to their wages in full against a company which is being wound up; and purchasers of the land from the company are entitled to set off against the purchase-money payments made by them to such labourers on account of wages due to them by the company previous to the purchase. *In the matter of the* INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1866, AND SOUTHERN CACHAR TEA COMPANY

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 180

38. ————— *Salary of Servant—Proof of claims.* A had been engaged as assistant to a company for three years under articles of agreement, which contained no provision for his dismissal, except in case of A's failure to perform his covenants or for misconduct. Before the expiration of the three years the company was ordered to be wound up under the Indian Companies Act, 1866. At or about the time of filing the petition to wind up, notice had been given to A that his services were no longer required. Since then A had been unable, though he had done his best, to obtain service elsewhere. A's period of contract had since expired. B also had been similarly engaged, but had received no such notice, and was still continuing in the company's service. His period of contract had not yet expired. In a proceeding in proof of claims of creditors against the company:—*Held*, that A was entitled to his salary to the end of the period of three years. B was also entitled to his salary to the end of the period of his contract, or should that happen first, till the company came to an end. *In the matter of the* INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1866, AND SEEBSAUGOB TEA COMPANY

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 257

39. ————— *Unpaid Wages of Servants—Priority—Indian Companies Act, VI of 1882.* Under the Indian Companies Act, VI of 1882, the claim of servants of a company, in respect of unpaid wages, has no priority to other debts due by the company. *In re* PARRELL MILL COMPANY

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 211

40. ————— *Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 163—Extraordinary power of the Court under the Companies Act—Examination*

COMPANY—*contd.*7. WINDING UP—*contd.*(c) COSTS AND CLAIMS ON ASSETS—*concl.*

of witness—Costs. Certain persons connected with a company then in course of liquidation, who were also some of the defendants in a pending suit brought by the company (and revived subsequent to the order for winding up by the official liquidator) for an account and for the recovery of certain sums alleged to have been paid to the promoters of the company, having been examined under an order obtained under s. 162 of the Companies Act, 1882, applied through their counsel for costs incurred on such examination. *Held*, that no order as to such costs could be made. *In the matter of the* INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1882, AND *In the matter of* T. F. BROWN & Co. . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 219

41. ————— *Unsuccessful application to make shareholders liable—Costs—Practice.* An unsuccessful application by an official liquidator to place certain shareholders upon the list of contributories having been *bond fide* made in the liquidation of the company, the Court ordered that the cost of each side should be paid as a first charge out of the estate. *In the matter of* WEST HOPE-TOWN TEA COMPANY . . . I. L. R. 11 All. 349

(d) LIABILITY OF OFFICERS.

42. ————— *Voluntary Winding up—Inquiry into conduct of liquidators—Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 214—Misfeasance or breach of trust—Practice—Procedure—Affidavit, contents of—Summons, contents of.* Where contributories of a company in voluntary liquidation complain of the conduct of liquidators in the winding up, and desire an inquiry under s. 214 of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882), the proper procedure is by summons in chambers. Where it is sought to make an officer of a company liable for misapplication of the funds of a company or for misfeasance or breach of trust in relation to its affairs, the sum sought to be recovered should be definitely stated in the summons, and the grounds upon which the application is based should be fully and adequately set out in an affidavit or affidavits. *In re* JEHangir KARANI & Co. HORMASJI RUSTOMJI DASAR v. PESTONJI EDALJI DHEARWAR . . . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 88

43. ————— *Auditor—Misfeasance—Damages—Remoteness of loss—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 36.* An auditor of a company to which Act VI of 1882 applies, who is duly appointed by a general meeting of the company and not casually called in as occasion may require, is an officer of the company within the meaning of s. 214 of the above mentioned Act. *In re the London and General Bank*, [1895] 2 Ch. D. 673, referred to. The compensation, which, under s. 214 of the Indian Companies Act, 1882, may be assessed against a defaulting director or other officer of a company, is of the nature of damages; it is, therefore, necessary that the loss to the company in respect of

COMPANY—concl'd.**7. WINDING UP—concl'd.****(d) LIABILITY OF OFFICERS—concl'd.**

which compensation is asked for should be the direct, and not a remote and more or less speculative, consequence of the misfeasance or neglect of duty on the part of the director or other officer of the company from whom compensation is sought. The special proceeding provided for by s. 214 of Act VI of 1882 is not subject to the limitation prescribed by art. 36 of sch. II of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877. *CONNELL v. HIMALAYA BANK* . . . **I. L. R. 18 All. 12**

44. ——— Substitution of representatives of deceased respondent as parties—*Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 214—Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 368.* R W and others, contributories to a company which had gone into liquidation, filed an application under s. 214 of Act VI of 1882 directed against certain officers of the company. That application, after certain issues had been framed and partially tried, was dismissed, and an order was also made giving costs against the applicants. The applicants appealed to the High Court against the order of dismissal. Pending this appeal one of the opposite parties died, and it was sought to put his legal representatives upon the record of the appeal as a respondent. *Held*, that in view of explanation II to s. 214 of the Indian Companies Act, 1882, the legal representatives of the said deceased respondent could not be brought upon the record, either in respect of the relief prayed for in the original application or in respect of the order making costs payable by the applicants, as that order could not be separated from the dismissal of the application. *WALL v. HOWARD* . . . **I. L. R. 18 All. 156**

45. ——— Liability of directors and officers—*Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882), ss. 77, 136, 173, 214—Directors of a company, misappropriation by—Power of Court to make an order under s. 214 of the Companies Act, rendering all the Directors jointly liable for misappropriation—Jurisdiction of District Court to wind up a company—Misfeasance and nonfeasance—Liability of individual Directors.* S. 214 of the Indian Companies Act of 1882 gives a summary remedy only against such Directors or other officers of a company as have been personally guilty of some act of misfeasance, and does not give the Court power to make an order against the Directors *en masse* for all acts of misfeasance without any specific finding against the individuals who are actually responsible for the particular acts of misfeasance, as contemplated by that section. *Trevor v. Whitworth, L. R. 12 A. C. 409; In re National Funds Assurance Company, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 118; In re Denham & Co., L. R. 25 Ch. D. 752*, referred to, and *In re British Guardian Life Assurance Company, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 335*, commented upon. *JADU NANDAN GOSWAMI v. ASHUTOSH GOSWAMI (1902)* . . . **I. L. R. 29 Calc. 688**

COMPENSATION.

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1. Release of attached property
—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 88.* Compensation
under s. 88, Act VIII of 1859, can only be awarded
on the application of the defendant, by the Court
which disposes of the case, and cannot be given by
another Court in whose custody certain property
belonging to the defendant has been found and
attached at the instance of the plaintiff. HURO
SOONDERY DOSSEE v. BUNGSEE MOHUN DOSS
3 W. R. Mis. 28

2. Excessive attachment—*Civil
Procedure Code, 1859, s. 88.* Where a suit was
for R3,000, and the plaintiff, who was declared
entitled to R677, without sufficient grounds attach-
ed the defendant's property to the amount of
R3,000, the defendant was held entitled to com-
pensation. MAHOMED REZOODDEN v. HOSSEIN
BUKSH KHAN . . . 6 W. R. Mis. 24

3. Claim made by defendant
for compensation for arrest—*Civil Procedure
Code 1882, s. 491—Leave to appear and defend—
Cross claim in summary suit—Set-off—Practice.*
In a summary suit, if a defendant has been arrested
before judgment and claims compensation for such
arrest under s. 491, he is entitled on that ground to
apply for leave to defend the suit, and, if a *prima
facie* case is made out, leave to defend should be
given. Under the Civil Procedure Code (Act
XIV of 1882), a cross claim made by a defendant
against a plaintiff cannot, in ordinary cases, be set
up as a defence, except when it arises out of the very
transaction sued upon and is in the nature of a set-
off ; but the special cross claim provided for by s.
491 of the Code, *viz.*, a claim for compensation for
arrest on insufficient grounds, may under that
section be taken into account in any suit, and the
amount awarded as compensation be awarded in the
decree, and thus *pro tanto* be a defence to the
plaintiff's claim in the suit. ROULET v. FETTERLE
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 717

4. Land Acquisition Act (I of
1894)—*Compensation—Market value—Computing,
method of.* In calculating the amount of com-
pensation to be awarded for land compulsorily
acquired by Government, it is not permissible
to a Judge to take the amount, which the
claimant had expended in the purchase and im-
provement of the land, as if it had been invested
on loan since the date of such expenditure at the
prevailing rate of interest, and to treat the total

COMPENSATION—*contd.*1. CIVIL CASES—*contd.*

amount so arrived at as the market value of the land. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL *v.* KARTICK CHANDRA GHOSE (1905)

9 C. W. N. 655

5. ———— *Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), ss. 18, 20, 21—Apportionment—Reference to Court—Objection taken before Court by party who had raised no objection before Collector.* In a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, a party who had raised no objection to the apportionment of compensation made by the Collector must be taken to have accepted the award in that respect under ss. 18, 20 and 21 of the Land Acquisition Act, all that the Court can deal with is the objection which has been referred to it; it cannot go into a question raised for the first time by a party who have not referred any question or raised any objection to it under s. 18 of the Act. *ABU BAKAR v. PEARY MOHAN MUKERJEE* (1907) *I. L. R.* 34 Calc. 451

6. ———— *Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), ss. 11, 23—Market value—Bases of its calculation—Speculative advance in prices—Recent instances of sale—Rental of lands in the vicinity—General demand for land—Onus probandi.* Profit from the most advantageous disposition of land is one test for determining its market price. The probable use of land in the most advantageous way in accordance with the use already made of neighbouring lands leads to speculative advance in prices to which regard should be paid. The utility of land is an element for consideration in estimating its value, that is, the utility which may be calculated by a prudent business man. *Premchand Bural v. Collector of Calcutta*, *I. L. R.* 2 Calc. 103; *Hooghly Mills Company v. Secretary of State*, unreported; *Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v. Charlesworth Pilling & Co.*, *L. R.* 28 I. A. 121; *Rajendra Nath Banerjee v. Secretary of State*, *I. L. R.* 32 Calc. 343, referred to. The market value of the acquired lands is also to be ascertained from recent instances of sales in the same or in the adjoining localities, and from the average rental of these and similar lands in the vicinity. S. 21 of the Act authorizes the Judge to confine his inquiry into valuation to the interests of persons affected by the Collector's reference, but the section must mean the admitted interests. If there is any dispute as to the relative value of such interests, the Judge should determine the total amount payable for the land leaving the question of apportionment to be decided in a separate proceeding. The general demand for land, and the consequent reflex action on the prices of all classes of lands, is a factor in the calculation of the market value of lands under acquisition. The *onus probandi* varies according to the probative value of Collector's inquiry under s. 11 of the Act, and if he makes no inquiry or gives no reasons for his valuation, the *onus* on the claimant is nominal, and the Special Judge must decide on the weight of evidence. *FINE v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1907) *I. L. R.* 34 Calc. 599

COMPENSATION—*contd.*1. CIVIL CASES—*contd.*

7. ———— *Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)—Amount of Compensation payable for land on left bank of river Hooghly near Calcutta required for purposes of the Port Commissioners of Calcutta—Judgment in former land acquisition case regarding land in the vicinity, and amount awarded therefor—Review by High Court of valuation by Special Judge.* In this case which related to the amount of compensation payable to the owners of certain land on the left bank of the river Hooghly, near Calcutta, which had been acquired by the Government of Bengal under Act I of 1894 for the purposes of the Port Commissioners of Calcutta, the High Court did not agree with the scheme of valuation made by the Special Judge, and had increased his award relying upon the prices paid for a piece of land in the vicinity in previous land acquisition proceedings as affording a guide to the amount of compensation to be awarded in the present case. And on appeal by the Government it was contended that in doing so the High Court had wrongly disregarded the great experience of the Special Judge and had given undue weight as evidence to the decision in the former case, in which it was said that the land was so essentially different in area, locality, and special and peculiar advantages, that no deduction could be drawn from the amount awarded for it which would be of any use in estimating the value of the land now in dispute. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee holding that no good ground for such a contention had been established, dismissed the appeal. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA *v.* INDIA GENERAL STEAM NAVIGATION AND RAILWAY COMPANY, LIMITED (1909)

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 967

8. ———— *Compulsory Acquisition of land—Method of hypothetical development for fixing value of land to be acquired—Charges as to the costs of the speculator—Compensation based on sales of lands into suitable building sites—The two methods employed in conjunction and producing the same result.* The method of hypothetical development is open to the objection that it involves or presupposes the intermediation of a third person, called the speculator or exploiter that is to say, a person who purchases the land wholesale from the claimant in order afterwards to sell it retail for building purposes. The value of the land to the owner is what must be regarded, and that is the price which it will fetch if disposed of on most profitable terms. The owner is not to be deprived of the most advantageous way of selling his land by reason of the fact that it is subject to immediate acquisition. If the sale of the land in building sites is impossible except through the speculator then, no doubt, allowance will have to be made for the profits, costs and other charges of the speculator. But the claimant is not to be debited with these expenses unless the introduction of the speculator is a commercial necessity. And there is no necessary reason why the claimant should be driven to have recourse to the speculator for a

COMPENSATION—*contd.*1. CIVIL CASES—*concl'd.*

business which he can do for himself. When compensation is fixed on the general principle of a sale of the land split up into parcels suitable for building, it is not only necessary but inappropriate to make a special deduction on account of the small area marked off for the roadway. Where the method of hypothetical development is employed for assessing compensation in conjunction with the method of ascertaining the present value of the land by reference to the prices realised by the sale of neighbouring lands, and the consequence is that the two methods lead to very much the same result, it follows not only that the result is entitled to so much the greater degree of confidence but also that the method of hypothetical development is itself corroborated. In the method of arriving at a valuation of land by reference to prices realised by sales of neighbouring lands, it is plain that no evidence of former sales can be obtained which shall be precisely parallel in all its circumstances to the sale of the particular land in question. Differences small or great exist in various conditions, and what precise allowances should be made for these differences is not a matter which can be reduced to any hard and fast rule. *TRUSTEES FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE CITY OF BOMBAY v. KARSANDAS* (1908) I. L. R. 33 Bom. 28

2. CRIMINAL CASES.

See DEMOLITION . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 829

See EPIDEMIC DISEASES ACT, s. 4.
I. L. R. 31 Calc. 829

See FALSE CHARGE.
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 479

See PLAGUE REGULATION.
I. L. R. 31 Calc. 829

(a) FOR LOSS OR INJURY CAUSED BY OFFENCE.

1. ———— Order that portion of Fine should be paid as compensation—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 44*. The accused were convicted of the theft of some bullocks and fined. Under s. 44 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate directed that the fines, if collected, should be paid to a witness as compensation for having to return the bullocks which he had purchased to the complainant. *Held*, that this order was bad. The sale to the witness was not "the offence complained of" within the meaning of s. 44. ANONYMOUS 7 Mad. Ap. 13

2. ———— Award of portion of Fine in theft where property is recovered. Where loss is occasioned to a person whose property has been stolen, it is not illegal for the trying Magistrate to award portion of the fine inflicted on the accused as amends to the owner of such property, although the stolen property is recovered and restored to the owner. *REG. v. YESSAPPA BIN NINGAPPA*
5 Bom. Cr. 41

COMPENSATION—*contd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*(a) FOR LOSS OR INJURY CAUSED BY OFFENCE—*contd.*

3. ———— Nature of compensation—*Loss to person injured—Damages*. The compensation awarded, under s. 44 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to the person injured, in consideration of the loss which he has suffered, corresponds to damages awarded in civil proceedings. *QUEEN v. BALJOO KOORMEE* 5 W. R. Cr. 76

4. ———— Proof of loss or damage—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 44*. On a reference by a Sessions Judge, an order made by a Magistrate under s. 44 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, awarding compensation to the complainant out of a fine inflicted for causing hurt reversed, as there was no evidence on the record to show that loss was caused or that any special damage of a pecuniary nature resulted to the complainant from the offence. *REG. v. SAMSEN BABAJI*
3 Bom. Cr. 43

5. ———— Compensation between co-defendants—*Criminal Procedure Code, s. 44*. A Magistrate has no power to take property from one defendant and give it to another defendant. ANONYMOUS 4 Mad. Ap. 28

6. ———— Injury by negligence of accused—*Award from fine imposed on person negligently digging pit whereby another person was injured*. An award of compensation to the widow of a person who died in consequence of a fall into a pit, negligently dug by the accused, from the fine imposed on the latter, is illegal. *REG. v. SHIABASAPPA* 7 Bom. Cr. 73

7. ———— Death caused by rash and negligent act—*Criminal Procedure Code, s. 545—Compensation to widow of deceased*. An order that the amount of a fine imposed on one convicted of causing death by a rash and negligent act be paid as compensation to the widow of the deceased is illegal. *In re LUTCHMAKA* I. L. R. 12 Mad. 352

8. ———— Death caused by negligence—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1832), s. 545—Compensation to widow*. A Magistrate imposed a fine in addition to a sentence of imprisonment on a conviction for the offence of causing death by a rash and negligent act and gave compensation to the widow of the deceased out of the fine imposed. *Held*, that compensation could not be given to the widow under Criminal Procedure Code, s. 545. *YALLA GANGULU v. MAMIDI DALI*
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 74

9. ———— Heirs of person suffering by offence—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 44*. Compensation under s. 44 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be awarded to any one excepting the person who has directly suffered by the offence. It cannot be given to the heirs of a person who has been killed. *QUEEN v. LALL SINGH*
10 W. R. Cr. 39

COMPENSATION—*contd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*(a) FOR LOSS OR INJURY CAUSED BY OFFENCE—*contd.*

10. ———— **Form of order for compensation—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 44.** The award of compensation referred to in s. 44 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be a part of the sentence and order made upon a conviction for an offence of the nature specified therein, and should be found upon a statement of loss, damage, or expenses, as the case may be, ascertained at the trial. *QUEEN v. GOUR CHURN DOSS*

11 W. R. Cr. 53

11. ———— **Innocent purchaser of stolen property—Theft—Award of portion of fine—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 308.** Where a person has been convicted of theft and sentenced to a fine, s. 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872, does not authorize a Magistrate to award part of the fine as compensation to a person who has innocently purchased the stolen property. *QUEEN v. REDDON*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 286

12. ———— **"Taken into Account"—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 308.** The expression "taken into account" in the Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 308, means that the compensation awarded by the Magistrate is to be taken into consideration by the Court in a subsequent civil suit, not that it is to be afterwards deducted from the damages awarded. *LOVE v. AINSWORTH*

22 W. R. 336

13. ———— **Indirect consequences resulting from the offence—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 545.** Compensation for loss caused by inability of the complainant to attend to his work on account of his time being taken up with the prosecution of the accused cannot be ordered to be paid under s. 545 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which deals with expenses incurred in the prosecution and with compensation for the injury only. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NARAYAN VAMANJI PATIL*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 438

14. ———— **Award of compensation where no fine is inflicted—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 545.** Where an accused is discharged and no fine is imposed, no order for payment of compensation can be legally passed under s. 545 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *In re BASTOO DUMAJI*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 717

15. ———— **Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, s. 22—Illegal seizure of Cattle—Costs paid by complainant—Fine or imprisonment in default of payment of fine.** The illegal seizure of cattle under s. 22 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, is not a criminal offence. The law allows certain Magistrates to adjudicate compensation to a party injured by an illegal seizure. Court-fees paid by the complainant may form part of such compensation. It is not lawful to pass a sentence of fine or imprisonment in default of payment of the compensation awarded in a matter under s. 21

COMPENSATION—*contd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*(a) FOR LOSS OR INJURY CAUSED BY OFFENCE—*contd.*

of the Cattle Trespass Act. *In the matter of KETABDI MUNDUL* . . . 2 C. L. R. 507

16. ———— **Illegal Seizure and Detention of Cattle—Costs of prosecution—Court Fees Act, s. 31.** A Magistrate, having under s. 22 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, adjudged a seizure of cattle to be illegal, directed the captor, under s. 31 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, to pay the complainant the costs of the stamp and process fees incurred in prosecuting the complaint. *Held*, that s. 31 of the Court Fees Act did not apply. *Held*, also, that, under s. 22 of the Cattle Trespass Act, such costs could be awarded to the complainant as compensation for the loss caused by the seizure and detention of the cattle. *HUSSAIN v. SANJIVI* . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 345

17. ———— **Joint Fine—Fine and Compensation.** Proceedings under s. 22 of the Cattle Trespass Act are quasi-civil in their nature; a Magistrate being at liberty under that section to assess and enforce, in a summary manner, compensation for an injury for which a civil action might be brought. An order, therefore, for the payment of a sum as fine and compensation, passed against two persons under that section, which does not specify the proportionate amount payable by each, is good. *In the matter of NEAZ v. MONSOR*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 175

18. ———— **Illegal Seizure of Cattle—Fine—Imprisonment in default of payment of compensation—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 336.** An accused was found to have loosed the complainant's cattle at night from a cattle pen, and to have driven them to the pound with the object of sharing with the pound-keeper the fees to be paid for their release. He was proceeded against under Act I of 1871, and under the provisions of s. 22 ordered to pay compensation to the complainant, and in default to undergo one month's rigorous imprisonment. *Held*, that s. 22 was inapplicable to the facts of the case, and that the order must be set aside. On the facts it was not a case of "illegal seizure and detention" of cattle, but rather one of theft, as all the elements of that offence were present, and the accused should have been charged with and tried for that offence. *Held*, further, that the sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of the compensation was not warranted by law. Compensation may be levied as a fine, and the ordinary mode of levying fines is laid down in s. 336 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The law nowhere provides that fines may be levied by means of imprisonment. *PARYAG RAI v. ARJU MIAN*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 139

QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LAKSEMI NAYAKAN

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 238

19. ———— **Offence, whether mere breach of contract amounts to an—Criminal**

COMPENSATION—*contd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*(a) FOR LOSS OR INJURY CAUSED BY OFFENCE—*contd.*

Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 4, cl. (o), 250—Act XIII of 1859, s. 2. A mere breach of contract is not, under the first part of s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859, an offence within the meaning of the term in s. 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and no compensation can, therefore, be legally awarded under s. 250 of the Code in respect of such breach. *In the matter of the petition of RAM SARUP BHAKAT*
4 C. W. N. 253

20. ——— Expenses of prosecution—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 545—Order for payment of expenses of prosecution out of fine—Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 31—Re-payment to complainant of fees paid in criminal Courts.* A person, who was convicted by a Deputy Magistrate of having caused hurt, was ordered to pay a fine of Rs15, and also the complainant's costs of the prosecution. In the month following the conviction, the Deputy Magistrate issued a warrant for the collection of Rs12-4-0 from the accused, of which Rs2-4-0 were levied under s. 31 of the Court-fees Act as Court-fees paid by the complainant, and Rs10 under s. 545 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for two fees of Rs5 each paid by the complainant to the medical officer for a certificate and for giving evidence in the case. Objection having been made to the recovery of these sums, the case was referred to the High Court for orders. *Held*, that the levy of Court-fees was warranted by s. 31 of the Court-fees Act, which is not modified by s. 545 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Held*, also, that the Deputy Magistrate's order passed under s. 544 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the payment of expenses incurred in the prosecution was unsustainable, and that such expenses could only be awarded to the complainant out of the fine levied from the accused, and not in addition to it. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. YAMANA RAO* (1900) . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 305

21. ——— Imprisonment in default—*Order of payment of compensation and imprisonment in default of such payment—Legality of such order—Compensation recoverable as fine—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 250, 386, 387, 388 and 389.* A Magistrate passed an order, under s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directing the complainant to pay compensation in a certain sum, and he further directed that "if the compensation is not realized within eight days, the complainant shall undergo 30 days' simple imprisonment." *Held*, that the order was contrary to s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section directs that "compensation shall be recoverable as if it were a fine," and s. 386 and the following sections of the Code direct by what means a fine shall be recovered. These sections would therefore be applicable for realization of the money ordered to be paid as compensation. But, in regard to an order of

COMPENSATION—*contd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*(a) FOR LOSS OR INJURY CAUSED BY OFFENCE—*contd.*

imprisonment in such a case, s. 250, proviso (2), declares that "if the compensation cannot be recovered, simple imprisonment may be awarded for such term not exceeding 30 days." The alternative (imprisonment) therefore can only be awarded if compensation cannot be recovered. *LAL MAHMUD SHAIK v. SATCOWRI BISWAS* (1900)
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 164

22. ——— Demolition—*Epidemic Diseases Act (III of 1897), s. 4—"Done or intended to be done," meaning of—Plague Regulation A, cls. 2, 4.* The words "done or intended to be done" in Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897, s. 4, do not include omissions. *Jolliffe v. Wallasey Local Board*, 9 C. P. 162, explained and distinguished. A Magistrate, who omits to pay adequate compensation in respect of property demolished under the Act, is personally liable and an action will lie against him in respect thereof, even though he may have acted in his administrative capacity as Chairman of the Calcutta Corporation under cl. 2 of Plague Regulation A (2): *Calcutta Gazette, 1900, Part 1, page 1144.* The Magistrate's decision as to the amount of compensation to be accorded is not final and can be reviewed by the Courts. *RAM LALL MISTRY v. R. T. GREER* (1904)
I. L. R. 31 Calc. 829

(b) TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT.

23. ——— Compensation to accused—*Power to award compensation without hearing evidence.* *Held*, that it was not competent to the Magistrate to order compensation to the accused under s. 270, Act XXV of 1861, without hearing evidence. *BILASH v. MAKROO*
2 B. L. R. S. N. 15: 10 W. R. Cr. 61

24. ——— False case of theft—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 270.* Compensation is not allowable in false cases of theft. *JUHOO-RUN v. GIRDHAREE RAM*
3 W. R. Cr. 70

CHIDI CHOWBEE v. BHOWANY . 1 W. R. Cr. 1

QUEEN v. GOGUN SEIN . 2 W. R. Cr. 57

JALIL MUNSHI v. FARNAM HOSSEIN
6 W. R. Cr. 55

DHURAI NOSHYO v. HUBEE NOSHYO
7 W. R. Cr. 12

CHOOTOO DHOON BHARBONIA v. ABDOL MEAH
7 W. R. Cr. 40

GUNAMANEE v. HAREE DATTA
18 W. R. Cr. 6

But see *KALI CHURN LAHIRI v. SHOSHEE BHOSUN SANYAL* 23 W. R. Cr. 17

COMPENSATION—*contd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*(b) TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.*

25. _____ *Defamation.* Nor in a case of defamation. ASSARUDDIE KHAN v. BALOO KHAN 1 W. R. Cr. 6

26. _____ *Penal Code, s. 374.* But only in cases under Ch. XV of the Criminal Procedure Code, and therefore not in a case under s. 374 of the Penal Code. RATEBAH v. PHOKONDEE 5 W. R. Cr. 1

27. _____ *S. 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies only when a complaint of an offence, triable under Ch. XV of the Code, is dismissed.* ANONYMOUS

6 Mad. Ap. 49

QUEEN v. LALLOO SINGH 8 W. R. Cr. 54

where it was held the section did not apply to cases of mischief committed on land and house-breaking by night, though both contain an element of criminal trespass to which the section does apply.

28. _____ *Amount of compensation.* R50 is the measure of compensation awardable from any complainant, irrespective of the number of accused persons. QUEEN v. LALLOO SINGH 8 W. R. Cr. 54

29. _____ *Wrongful Confinement.* Compensation cannot be awarded in a case of wrongful confinement. JHARU v. BAHAR ALLY 7 W. R. Cr. 11

AZGUR HOWLADAR v. ASARUDDIN

17 W. R. Cr. 1

30. _____ *House-breaking.* Nor in a case of house-breaking by night. DHURA NOSHYO v. HUBEE NOSHYO 7 W. R. Cr. 12

31. _____ *Fines—Power of Subordinate Magistrates.* Subordinate Magistrates of the second class have no power to award fines to accused as compensation for frivolous and vexatious prosecutions. REG. v. JELLAPA BIN MUDAKAPPA

1 Bom. 181

32. _____ *Frivolous and vexatious case—Causing hurt.* In a trial for causing hurt, the Subordinate Magistrate awarded compensation to the defendant for a frivolous and vexatious complaint under s. 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Held*, that the section did not apply to such a case. ANONYMOUS 5 Mad. Ap. 40

33. _____ *Cases in which summons on complaint issues—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 270.* Amends, under s. 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, are awardable only in cases triable by the Magistrate in which a summons on complaint shall ordinarily issue. REG. v. RAMJI VALAD DAJI 5 Bom. Cr. 12

34. _____ *Fine—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, Ch. XIV.* A fine cannot be awarded as compensation in case falling under

COMPENSATION—*contd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*(b) TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.*

Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861. QUEEN v. NIJANUND 3 W. R. Cr. 60

35. _____ *Award on dismissal of vexatious complaint—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 270.* Under s. 270 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a Magistrate dismissing a complaint as frivolous or vexatious can only award a sum not exceeding R50 to the accused by way of compensation, and cannot impose it by the way of fine; nor can he directly sentence the complainant to imprisonment in default of payment. QUEEN v. GOPAI 2 N. W. 430

36. _____ *Failure to prove case—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 270.* The High Court refused to interfere with the order of a Magistrate fining complainants under s. 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when it appeared, after due enquiry by the Magistrate, that the complainants laid claim to large jummas in a chur, without possessing any documents to prove their rights. *In the matter of* MOTHOR GHOSE

11 W. R. Cr. 10

37. _____ *Unfounded charge of being person of bad repute—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 270.* A Magistrate is not authorized, under s. 270 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to award compensation from the complainant to the accused in respect of an unfounded charge brought against such accused of being a person of bad character or repute. QUEEN v. BAL KISHEN

2 N. W. 447

38. _____ *Offences other than under Penal Code.* The power of Magistrates to award compensation to accused persons against whom frivolous and vexatious complaints have been made is not confined to complaints brought under the provisions of the Penal Code. QUEEN v. TURNER 4 N. W. 94

39. _____ *Vexatious charge—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 270.* Where a complainant prefers three charges of three distinct offences, two of which are offences triable under Ch. XV and one under Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate may award amends to the accused under s. 270 of the Code, if he considers the charge with reference to the cases under Ch. XV to have been vexatious. MODHOSOODUN GHOSE *alias* MADHUB CHUNDER GHOSE v. JOYRAM HAZRAH 13 W. R. Cr. 39

40. _____ *Vexatious charge—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 270.* Where a judicial officer from over-anxiety for the due administration of justice in his Court makes a mistake in taking steps against parties whose conduct appears to obstruct the Court of Justice, somewhat too hastily and without due circumspection, it is not to be presumed that he had acted

COMPENSATION—*contd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*(b) TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.*

vexatiously in the sense of s. 270 of the Criminal Procedure Code, or otherwise than in perfect good faith, so as to justify an award of compensation to the person who was prosecuted by his directions. ANONYMOUS CASE . . . 15 W. R. 506

41. *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 250—Vexatious or frivolous charge—Case instituted "upon complaint."* A case instituted by the police, on a complaint to them, is not instituted "upon complaint" in the sense of s. 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and therefore in such a case an order awarding compensation made under that section is illegal. *In the matter of the complaint of ISKRI ISHREE v. BAKHSI* . . .

I. L. R. 6 All. 96

42. *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 250—Vexatious complaint.* The provisions of s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be applied in summon-cases, whether tried summarily or not. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BASAVA* . . .

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 142

43. *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 560—Compensation for frivolous or vexatious complaint—Complaint under s. 110 of Criminal Procedure Code.* The award of compensation under s. 560 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be in respect of a frivolous and vexatious accusation of an offence of which the accused person has been discharged or acquitted. That section is not applicable to an application made to a Magistrate solely with a view to his taking proceedings under s. 110 of the Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LAKHPAT* . . .

I. L. R. 15 All. 365

44. *Imprisonment in default of payment of compensation—Distress—Sentence, legality of.* The operation of s. 560 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is restricted to cases instituted by "complaint" as defined in the Code or upon information given to a police officer or a Magistrate, and consequently that section has no application to a case instituted on a police report or on information given by a police officer. *Quære*: Whether under the section a Magistrate has power to make an order for imprisonment in default of payment of the compensation awarded? A police constable arrested a carter and charged him before a Magistrate with an offence under s. 34 of Act V of 1861. The Magistrate acquitted the accused, and directed, under s. 560 of the Code, that the police constable should pay him R20 as compensation or undergo simple imprisonment for a fortnight. *Held*, that, as the section had no application to the case, the order was illegal, being made without jurisdiction. *Held*, further, that even if the Magistrate had power under the Code to pass an order for imprisonment in default of payment of compensation awarded under s. 560, it was illegal to pass such an order until some attempt had been made to

COMPENSATION—*contd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*(b) TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.*

levy the amount in the manner provided by s. 386 for the levying of a fine. *RAMJEEVAN KOORMI v. DURGACHARAN SADHU KHAN* . . .

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 979

45. *Penal Code, ss. 193 and 211—Sanction to prosecute and award of compensation—Imprisonment in default of payment of compensation—Sentence, legality of.* The complainant was directed to pay R50 as compensation to the accused, or, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month, under s. 560 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and sanction was also granted to prosecute him for offences under ss. 211 and 193 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that, if the Magistrate thought that this was a case in which a prosecution under ss. 211 and 193 of the Penal Code should be sanctioned, he ought not to have taken action under the provisions of s. 560 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Held*, also, that the order for imprisonment in default of payment of the compensation awarded was illegal. *Ramjeevan Koormi v. Durgacharan Sadhu Khan, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 979*, followed. *SHIB NATH CHONG v. SARAT CHUNDER SARKAR* . . .

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 586

46. *Order for Imprisonment in default of payment of compensation.* Although compensation awarded under s. 560 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is recoverable as if it were a fine, it is not competent to a Magistrate, immediately upon ordering a complainant to pay compensation, to direct that he should in default be sentenced to imprisonment. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PUNNA* . . .

I. L. R. 18 All. 96

47. *Compensation for frivolous and vexatious complaint—Order in the alternative for imprisonment.* It is not competent to a Court in awarding compensation under s. 560 of the Code of Civil Procedure against a complainant for making a frivolous and vexatious complaint, to order at the same time that in default of payment of the compensation the person against whom the order is made suffer imprisonment. *Queen-Empress v. Punna, I. L. R. 18 All. 96*, approved. *MANJHLI v. MANIK CHAND* . . .

I. L. R. 19 All. 73

48. *Compensation for vexatious complaint—Compensation where the complainant is a police officer.* S. 560 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, does not authorize a Magistrate to pass an order for compensation to be paid by the complainant to the accused, where the complaint is instituted by a police officer. *Ramjeevan Koormi v. Durgacharan Sadhu Khan, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 979*, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SAKAR JAN MAHOMED* . . .

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 934

49. *Sanction to prosecute for false charge under s. 211, Penal Code.* A

COMPENSATION—*contd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*(b) TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.*

Magistrate, in acquitting a person accused on a charge of theft which he found to be false and malicious, awarded compensation to each of them to be paid by the complainant. Subsequently one of the accused applied for and obtained sanction to prosecute the complainant for bringing a false charge under Penal Code, s. 211, and certain of his witnesses for the offence of giving false evidence under s. 193. *Held*, that the order granting sanction was not illegal as regards the complainant by reason of the previous award of compensation. *ADIKKAN v. ALAGAN*. I. L. R. 21 Mad. 237

50. — *Sanction to prosecute and award of compensation—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 250 and s. 476—Magistrate, discretion of.* It is an improper exercise of his discretion by a Magistrate to award compensation to the accused under s. 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and also to direct or sanction the prosecution of the complainant under s. 211 of the Penal Code for bringing a false charge. *Shib Nath Chong v. Sarat Chunder Sarkar*, I. L. R. 22 Cal. 586, followed. *Queen v. Rupan Rae*, 6 B. L. R. 296 : 15 W. R. Cr. 9, referred to. *BACHU LAL v. JAGDAM SAHAI*. I. L. R. 26 Cal. 181

51. — *Dismissal in Default of Appearance.* Where a Magistrate dismissed a complaint in default, under s. 259, Code of Criminal Procedure, and fined the complainant under s. 270, the fine was remitted and ordered to be refunded. *RAM CHURN DEY v. JANULL*

17 W. R. Cr. 6

52. — *Amount of compensation—Criminal Procedure Code, 1869, s. 270.* Since the passing of Act VIII of 1869, a Magistrate may, under s. 270, in a case in which more than one person has been accused, award compensation not exceeding Rs 50 to each person. *In the matter of the petition of BHYROO LALL*

14 W. R. Cr. 75

53. — *Alteration of Charge to bring offence under Ch. XV of Code—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 270.* When on a complaint being preferred to a Magistrate of an offence not coming within Ch. XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate alters it so as to bring it under Ch. XV, he cannot award compensation to the accused under s. 270 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the offence originally complained of not being one for which compensation can be awarded. *REG. v. GURNINGAPA* 7 Bom. Cr. 58

54. — *Alteration of Charge to bring offence under Ch. XV of Code. Held*, that, where a Magistrate is dealing with a charge which he has the power to dispose of finally under Ch. XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, although the charge, as originally laid, fell under Ch. XIV, he has a discretion to inflict fine under s. 270 of that

COMPENSATION—*contd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*(b) TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.*

Code. *HOTHOR LALOONG v. HINDOO SINGH MOUZ*. 10 W. R. Cr. 49

55. — *Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, s. 20—False complaint.* A complaint was made against certain persons under s. 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act of 1871, charging them with having illegally seized and detained the complainant's cattle. The Assistant Magistrate who heard the complaint found it to be false, and he ordered the complainant to pay Rs 20 compensation to the accused and in default to suffer simple imprisonment for 21 days. On application to the High Court: *Held*, that the order was illegal, and must be set aside. *In the matter of KALA CHAND v. GUDADHUR BISWAS*

I. L. R. 13 Cal. 304

56. — *Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, s. 20—Frivolous complaint—Compensation—Cattle Trespass Act, Ch. V—Complaint of illegal seizure, not complaint of offence—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 250.* The illegal seizure of cattle under colour of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, not having been constituted an offence under that Act or otherwise, an award of compensation, under s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to the accused on such complaint is illegal. *PITCHI v. ANKAPPA*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 102

57. — *Cattle Trespass Act, s. 20—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 4(a), s. 250—Illegal seizure of cattle under the Cattle Trespass Act, not an offence within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure.* In a case instituted upon complaint made under s. 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, the Magistrate acquitted the accused, and, being of opinion that the complaint was vexatious, directed the complainant to pay compensation to the accused as under s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Held*, that the act complained of was not an offence within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the order awarding compensation was illegal. *KOTTALANADA v. MUTHAYA*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 374

58. — *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 560—Frivolous and vexatious complaint—Cattle Trespass Act (IX of 1871), s. 20—Complaint of wrongful seizure of cattle—"Offence."* A complaint of the wrongful seizure of cattle is not a complaint of an offence within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently on the dismissal of such a complaint, it is not competent to a Court to act under s. 560 of the Code and award compensation to the persons against whom the complaint is made. *Pitchi v. Ankappa*, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 102, *Kottalanada v. Muthaya*, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 374, *Kalachand v. Gudadhur Biswas*, I. L. R. 13 Cal. 304, and *Nedaram Thakur v. Joonab*, I. L. R. 23 Cal. 248, referred to. *MUGHAI v. SHEOVIK*

I. L. R. 18 All. 353

COMPENSATION—contd.**2. CRIMINAL CASES—contd.****(b) TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.**

59. *Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, s. 20—Fine or imprisonment in default of payment.* It is not lawful to pass a sentence of fine or of imprisonment in default of payment of the compensation awarded in a matter under s. 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act (I of 1871). *In the matter of KETABDI MUNDUL* . . . **2 C. L. R. 507**

60. *Dismissal of charge—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 245 (1872, s. 211)—Order of acquittal.* An order for compensation against a complainant may be made on an order of acquittal under s. 211 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *MONA SHEIKH v. ISHAN BARDHAN* . . . **I. L. R. 6 Calc. 581**

61. *Dismissal of Charge after hearing evidence—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 245 and 250—Vexatious complaint—Acquittal—Compensation.* S. 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882) authorizes the payment of compensation in cases where the accused has been acquitted, under s. 245 of the Code, after the whole evidence in the case has been recorded. *Number v. Ambu, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 381*, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PANDU VALAD GOPALA* . . . **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 199**

62. *Failure to substantiate charge—Committal of prosecutor for false evidence—Act XXV of 1861, s. 270—Act X of 1872, s. 209.* When a prosecutor fails to substantiate his charge by making contradictory statements, the Magistrate who tries the case under Ch. XV of the Criminal Procedure Code can award compensation to the accused, although he commit the prosecutor to take his trial on a charge of giving false evidence. *QUEEN v. RUPAN RAI* . . . **6 B. L. R. 296: 15 W. R. Cr. 9**

63. *Trial in Original Court—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 209.* The special provisions of s. 209 of Act X of 1872 as to award of compensation to a complainant are applicable only in the case of original trials under Ch. XVI of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872. *ANONYMOUS* . . . **8 Mad. Ap. 7**

64. *Acquittal after trial of charge—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 209, 211.* Where a formal charge has been drawn up and the accused tried and acquitted, the acquittal should be one under s. 220, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, and not under s. 211, and therefore no compensation can be awarded to the accused under s. 209 in such a case. *RADHANATH PANJA v. WOOMA CHURN CHOWDHRY* . . . **22 W. R. Cr. 12**

65. *Acquittal after trial of charge—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 209.* The fact that the accused has been tried and acquitted is no bar to the award of compensation under s. 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872. *NUMBER v. AMBU* . . . **I. L. R. 5 Mad. 381**

COMPENSATION—contd.**2. CRIMINAL CASES—contd.****(b) TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.**

66. *Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 560—Separate charges and acquittal on one—Incomplete discharge or acquittal.* The accused was charged under ss. 352 and 379 of the Penal Code, but convicted under s. 352, being discharged under s. 379. The Magistrate ordered the complainant to pay compensation for bringing a frivolous and vexatious charge under s. 560 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The order for paying compensation was set aside on the ground that s. 560 could only operate when there was a complete discharge or acquittal. *MUKTI BEWA v. JHOTU SANTRA* . . . **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 53**
1 C. W. N. 17

67. *Complaint—Ministerial officer—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 209—Award of compensation.* A karkun on the establishment of a Civil Court, entrusted with the execution of a writ, reported to the Court that a particular person obstructed him in attaching property as commanded by the writ; and a report was thereupon made by the Court to a Magistrate with a view to proceedings being taken against the obstructor. The Magistrate acquitted the accused, and ordered the karkun to pay the accused compensation under s. 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Held*, that such last-mentioned order was wrong, the karkun not being a complainant within the meaning of s. 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In such a case as the above the Subordinate Judge should be regarded as the complainant, and he, having acted judicially, was not liable to the penalty provided in s. 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *In re KESHAV LAKSHMAN* . . . **I. L. R. 1 Bom. 175**

68. *Complainant—Complaint—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 250, 560—Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (IV of 1891), s. 2—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 186.* Where a Civil Court peon was sent by a Munsif to attach certain property, and on the peon reporting that he had been obstructed in making the attachment, the Munsif sent the case to the Deputy Magistrate for investigation and trial, and the Deputy Magistrate summarily tried the accused under s. 186 of the Penal Code, dismissed the case, and awarded compensation of Rs 20 to the accused:—*Held*, that the award of compensation was illegal: the peon, though nominally the informant in the case, was not the real complainant, nor could the proceedings properly be said to have been instituted before the Deputy Magistrate on his information. *BHARUT CHUNDER NATH v. JABED ALI BISWAS* . . . **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 481**

69. *Complaint—Hurt—Summons for assault—Discharge of accused.* Where the complaint, and the proof adduced in support thereof, showed that the accused persons, if guilty at all, were guilty of offences not triable under

COMPENSATION—*contd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*(b) TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.*

Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872, and the Magistrate issued a summons to answer a charge for assault under s. 352 of the Penal Code, and, after examining the witnesses for the complainant, discharged the accused and awarded compensation to the accused under s. 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872:—*Held*, that the order awarding compensation was illegal. *SOMER v. QUEEN* **I. L. R. 6 Mad. 316**

70. ———— *Complaint taken cognizance of by Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 250—Complaint to police.* Under s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, compensation cannot be awarded when, the complaint having been made to the police, the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the case upon receiving a charge sheet against the accused sent in by the police. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. POLAVARAPU* . **I. L. R. 7 Mad. 563**

71. ———— *Complaints under special law—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 270.* S. 270 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to complaints under a special law, but only to complaints triable by the Magistrate and punishable under the Penal Code with imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months. *QUEEN v. ABDOL AZEEZ KHAN* **14 W. R. Cr. 36**

72. ———— *Order for compensation to complainant under Act XIII of 1859—Breach of contract.* An order directing compensation under Act XIII of 1859 is illegal. Such portion of the money advanced to the defendant as had been appropriated to the fulfilment of the contract, or as could justly be set off against a part fulfilment of the contract, ought not to be ordered to be refunded. *ANONYMOUS* **4 Mad. Ap. 68**

73. ———— *Effect of award of compensation on dismissal of complaint—Right of suit.* The compensation or award which a Magistrate, who dismisses a complaint as frivolous or vexatious, is empowered in his discretion to award to an accused person, does not deprive the latter of any right of suit in the Civil Court which he may possess. *ADRAM v. HURBULLUB* . **2 N. W. 58**

74. ———— *Distress Warrant—Recovery of amount when not paid—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 209.* A Magistrate in making an order for compensation under s. 209, Code of Criminal Procedure, is bound, if the amount be not paid, to proceed to the recovery of it by distress and sale of the moveables of the person ordered to pay; but if such person admits he has no goods, and thereby waives the right to have the amount levied by distress, the Magistrate may proceed to imprison him in the civil jail. The warrant of distress cannot have currency simultaneously with the imprisonment. *BISHESHWAR SHAHA v. BISHWAMBHUR SIRCAR* **23 W. R. Cr. 65**

COMPENSATION—*contd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*(b) TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.*

75. ———— *Imprisonment in default—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 250—Compensation for vexatious accusation—Imprisonment in default of payment of compensation—Simultaneous order.* It is only after an attempt has been made to realize the compensation awarded that a Magistrate is competent to pass an order of imprisonment for default. A simultaneous order of imprisonment in default of payment of compensation is illegal. *PRIYA NATH BOSE v. ROY BASANTA KUMAR SINGH* (1900) . **5 C. W. N. 213**

76. ———— *Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 250—Compensation for frivolous and vexatious accusation, objection against, failure to record and consider—Simultaneous order of Imprisonment in Default of Compensation.* A Magistrate ought to record and consider any objection made and urged by the complainant against the making of an order for compensation for bringing a frivolous and vexatious accusation, and a failure to do so makes the order bad in law. An order of imprisonment in default of payment of compensation cannot, under the terms of s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, be made unless and until it is found that the payment of the compensation cannot be enforced by legal process. *SUCHANDI KOLITANI v. DOM KOLITA* (1900) **5 C. W. N. 214**

77. ———— *Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 250—False case—Imprisonment in default of payment of compensation—Summary proceeding—Conviction of offence under Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 211.* It is only if the compensation ordered to be paid under s. 250, proviso (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be recovered that imprisonment can be awarded; therefore an order of imprisonment passed before any attempt is made towards recovery of the sum ordered to be paid as compensation, is bad. S. 250 of that Code does not contemplate that compensation shall be awarded because a case is found to be false, but where the Magistrate is satisfied that the accusation is frivolous and vexatious. The words "frivolous and vexatious" in the section indicate an accusation merely for the purpose of annoyance, not an accusation of an offence which is absolutely false. The conviction by a Magistrate of a person of an offence under s. 211 of the Penal Code in a summary proceeding is improper. *PARSI HAJRA v. BANDHI DHANUK* (1900) **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 251**

Overruled by F. B. See *BENI MADHUB KURMI v. KUMUD KUMAR BISWAS* (1902)
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 123

78. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 250, 388 (2)—Compensation in respect of vexatious complaint—Sentence of imprisonment on non-production of sureties and on complainant's plea of inability to pay—Legality.*

COMPENSATION—contd.**2. CRIMINAL CASES—contd.****(b) TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.**

A Deputy Magistrate, having held that a complaint was vexatious, ordered the complainant to pay compensation under s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He recorded the following order: "The complainant is unable to produce any sureties, and pleads inability to pay the compensation. He is awarded 30 days' simple imprisonment." No attempt was made to levy the amount of the compensation. *Held*, that the order was invalid, whether it were passed under s. 260 (2) or s. 388 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Where an order to pay compensation has been made under s. 250, the Magistrate cannot make an order for imprisonment on the mere intimation by the person who is directed to pay the compensation that he is unable to do so. Under s. 388 (2), the issue of a warrant for the levy by distress of the amount awarded as compensation is a condition precedent to the carrying out of the sentence of imprisonment. *In the matter of* BYRAVALU NAIDU (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 127

79. Information—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 250—F frivolous or vexatious accusations—Case instituted on "information given to a Magistrate"—Information to a Village Magistrate—Discharge of accused—Order awarding compensation—Validity. A village Magistrate is not a Magistrate within the meaning of s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and, where a case has been instituted in consequence of a complaint made to a Village Magistrate, who sent a report to the police, who submitted a charge sheet, the person who complained to the Village Magistrate cannot be ordered, under s. 250, to pay compensation to the accused if the latter are discharged. *KING-EMPEROR v. THAMMANA REDDI* (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 667

80. Order in what cases may be made—Accused, order for payment of compensation to—Case which is false as well as frivolous or vexatious—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 250. *Held*, by the Full Bench (PRINSEP, C.J., dissenting), that an order under s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the payment of compensation to an accused person can be made in a case which is false as well as frivolous or vexatious. *Parsi Hajra v. Bandhi Dhanuk*, **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 251**, overruled. *BENI MADHUB KURMI v. KUMUD KUMAR BISWAS* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 123

81. Order when to be made—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 250—F frivolous accusation—Award of compensation to accused—Such award to be made by the order of discharge or acquittal, and not by a separate order. When a Magistrate, on finding a complaint to be frivolous or vexatious, thinks it right to award compensation to the com-

COMPENSATION—contd.**2. CRIMINAL CASES—contd.****(b) TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.**

plainant, he must do so by his order of discharge or acquittal. Where a Magistrate made such an order in a separate proceeding after the accused had been discharged, it was *held*, that his order was not merely irregular, but without jurisdiction. *In the matter of the complaint of* SAIFDAR HUSAIN (1903)

I. L. R. 25 All. 315

82. Police Officer—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 250, 4 (h)—Compensation for frivolous and vexatious accusation—Information given by a police constable, whether comes within s. 250—Complaint. S. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to a case instituted on information given by a police officer acting as such. *Ramjeevan v. Durga Charn*, **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 979**, followed. *SHEOBARAN OJHA v. NUNMONIA DOSHAD* (1900) . **5 C. W. N. 370**

83. Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss 4 (h), 250—Complaint—Report of police officer—Complaint by a police officer in a non-cognizable case—False complaint. There is no section in the Criminal Procedure Code which empowers a police officer to make, on his own motion, any report to a Magistrate in a non-cognizable case; hence, where he files a formal complaint in such a case, he cannot be said to 'make a report,' and his complaint falls within the definition of 'complaint' in s. 4 (h) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. Where a police officer appears before a Magistrate and makes a formal complaint of a non-cognizable offence, which is found to be false, the Magistrate can order him, under s. 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to pay compensation to the accused. *KING-EMPEROR v. SADA* (1901)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 150

84. Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 250—No power to order a police-officer when acting as such to pay compensation. A Magistrate has no power to order a police-officer, when acting as such, to pay compensation under s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section is limited to cases instituted by complaint, as defined in the Code, or on information given to a police-officer or to a Magistrate; and a police officer acting under the Calcutta Police Act (Ben. Act IV of 1866) does not come within its provisions. There is no distinction in this respect between s. 560 of the old Act and s. 250 of the present Act. *BAHADUR ALI v. NUR MAHOMED* (1902) . **7 C. W. N. 206**

85. Security to keep the peace—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 250—Application for an order that a person should give security to keep the peace—Refusal of application—Compensation under s. 250 of Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898). To justify the application of s. 250, a person must be accused before a Magistrate of an offence triable by a Magistrate. A

COMPENSATION—concl'd.**2. CRIMINAL CASES—concl'd.****(b) TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—concl'd.**

applied to a Magistrate of the first class to order *B* to give security to keep the peace (s. 107, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898). The Magistrate, after inquiring into the matter, discharged *B* under s. 119 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and directed *A* to pay *B* Rs 50, as compensation, under s. 250 of the Code. *Held*, that the award of compensation was illegal. The institution of proceedings under s. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not an accusation of an offence triable by a Magistrate, within the meaning of s. 250 of the Code. *Queen-Empress v. Lakhpai*, I. L. R. 15 All. 365, followed. *In re Govind Hanmant* (1900). I. L. R. 25 Bom. 48

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PLAINT . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 410

1. ——— Person giving information to police of murder—*Criminal Procedure Code*, 1861, s. 360. Where a person gave information to a Magistrate and the police of murder having been committed, and subsequently, on the charge having been dismissed, petitioned the Sessions Judge to have the matter re-investigated:—*Held*, that he was not a complainant within the meaning of s. 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861. *Reg. v. Fatechand Vastachand* . . . 5 Bom. Cr. 85

COMPLAINANT—concl'd.

2. ——— Contempt of Authority of public servant—*Criminal Procedure Code*, 1872, s. 210. In cases of contempt of lawful authority of a public servant, the complainant referred to in s. 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the public servant whose authority has been resisted, and without whose sanction no criminal proceedings can be instituted against the offender, and not the person injured by the resistance. *In re Muse Ali Adam* . . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 653

3. ——— Complaint of Bigamy by a person "aggrieved"—*Criminal Procedure Code*, s. 198—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)*, s. 494. Where the wife of a lunatic was prosecuted for bigamy on the complaint of the lunatic's brother:—*Held*, that the complainant, merely as brother of the lunatic, was not a "person aggrieved by such offence" within the meaning of s. 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code (X of 1882), and that the complaint could not be entertained. *Queen-Empress v. Bai Rukshmoni*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 340

4. ——— Complaint by Husband—"Person aggrieved"—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898)*, s. 198—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)*, s. 494. The husband is a "person aggrieved," within the meaning of s. 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code upon whose complaint the Court should take cognizance of an offence under s. 494 of the Penal Code. *Queen-Empress v. Rukshmoni*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 340, and *In the matter of Ujjala Bewa*, I. L. R. 523, referred to. *Deputy Legal Remembrancer v. Sarna Kahmi* I. L. R. 26 Calc. 336

Chellam Naidu v. Ramasami

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 379

5. ——— Witness refusing to answer—*Criminal Procedure Code*, 1882, s. 485—*Penal Code*, s. 179. *Semble*: A complainant is not a witness punishable for refusal to answer under s. 485 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under s. 179 of the Penal Code. *In re Ganesh Narayan Sathe* . . . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 600

COMPLAINT.

Col.

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1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES.

1. Cognizance of offence—*Criminal Procedure Code*, ss. 191, 202, 203—Magistrate, power of—"May take cognizance of," meaning of. The use of the term "may take cognizance of any offence" in s. 191 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not make it optional with a Magistrate to hear a complainant, but refers rather to the action of the Magistrate in taking cognizance of an offence

COMPLAINT—contd.**1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—contd.**

in either of the specified courses in which the facts constituting the offence may be brought to his notice. He is bound to examine the complainant, and then can either issue summons to the accused, or order an enquiry under s. 202 or dismiss the complainant under s. 203. *UMER ALI v. SAFFER ALI* . I. L. R. 13 Calc. 334

2. Cognizance of offence without complaint—*Power of Magistrate—Offence under Penal Code or special Act.* To give a Magistrate jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence without any complaint under s. 68, Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, there must be an offence committed which is punishable under the Penal Code or under some special Act. *QUEEN v. PANNA LALL MOOKERJEE* . 19 W. R. Cr. 4

3. Issue of Warrant—*Power of Magistrate.* A Magistrate, not being the Magistrate of the district, nor in charge of a division of the district, is not competent to issue warrants for the arrest of persons against whom no complaint has been preferred to him, nor any charge made by the police. *QUEEN v. OOMRAO SINGH* . 3 N. W. 317

4. Power of Magistrate—*Information of third person.* A Magistrate may take cognizance of a case on the information of a third person without any complaint by the party injured. *In re RAMRUTTUN NEOGEE* . 6 W. R. Cr. 3

5. Trial without complaint—*Illegal conviction—Railway Act, 1854.* A conviction and sentence by a Magistrate, F. P., under the Railway Act, reversed; there being no complaint made before the Magistrate, as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure. *REG. v. LARKINS* . 4 Bom. Cr. 4

6. Case referred from Civil Court. A Magistrate, F. P., has no jurisdiction without complaint to take up a case referred by the Civil Court to the District Magistrate and sent by him for trial. *REG. v. DIPCHAND KHUSHAL* . 4 Bom. Cr. 30

7. Case referred without jurisdiction by Subordinate Magistrate. A Magistrate, F. P., has no power to take up, without complaint being made to him, a case referred to him by a Subordinate Magistrate which such Subordinate Magistrate had no power to refer. *REG. v. BAGU VALAD OWSARI* . 4 Bom. Cr. 34
ANONYMOUS CASE . 7 Mad. Ap. 33

8. Accused voluntarily appearing. Where an accused person appears voluntarily before a Magistrate to answer a charge, the want of a complaint on oath, necessary for the issuing of a summons or warrant (ss. 66 and 43, Criminal Procedure Code) becomes immaterial. *Semble* : A Magistrate taking a complaint and issuing a summons thereon acts not ministerially, but

COMPLAINT—contd.**1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—contd.**

judicially. Conditions under which a Magistrate may proceed with an investigation or trial without a complaint upon oath considered, and cases bearing on the question reviewed and explained. *REG. v. SADA SHIBAPPA PUNDURANG GUPPA*

5 Bom. Cr. 29

9. ————— *Charge of furnishing false information in land acquisition proceedings—Omission to refer to particular false statement on which accusation made—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 177—Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894), ss. 9 and 10.* A Magistrate issued processes for the attendance of the accused on the complaint of the Land Acquisition Deputy Collector for having given false information within the terms of s. 177 of the Penal Code and s. 10 of the Land Acquisition Act in certain written statements that they had made to the Collector. The complaint was that the written statements were false. The documents, however, contained more than one statement of fact. Neither in the complaint made by the Deputy Collector nor in his examination by the Magistrate was any reference made to any particular statement, made by either of the accused as being a false statement, nor had the Deputy Collector put in the written statements, upon which he desired to proceed either with his written complaint or at the time of his examination by the Magistrate. *Held*, that the complaint was bad, and the case should not be allowed to proceed in its present form. The Magistrate was bound to require from the complainant the written statements on which the proceedings were founded, and also to ascertain from him the particular statement or statements on which the accusation was made. *DURGA DAS RAKHIT v. UMESH CHANDRA SEN*

I. L. R. 27 Cal. 985

10. ————— *Illegal conviction and sentence—Memorandum sanctioning the prosecution—Stamp Act, X of 1962, s. 3.* Conviction and sentence under s. 3 of Act X of 1862 (Stamp Act) reversed, as no complaint had been made to the trying Magistrate. A memorandum, under the signature of the Collector, sanctioning the prosecution, cannot be accepted in the place of a complaint, so as to authorize the issuing of a summons. *REG. v. BAI DIVALE*

5 Bom. Cr. 48

11. ————— *Offence charged not proved, but different offence shown—Fresh complaint.* Where a complaint laid before a Magistrate, F.P., by certain Government employes, accused the prisoner of criminal breach of trust of their wages, but from the evidence adduced it appeared that the offence of which the prisoner was guilty was criminal breach of trust of Government money, it was held that the Magistrate, F. P., had power to frame a charge against and convict the prisoner of the latter offence without a fresh complaint being made to him. *REG. v. DHONDU RAMCHANDRA*

5 Bom. Cr. 100

COMPLAINT—contd.**1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—contd.**

12. ————— *Offence disclosed in course of proceedings not triable by Magistrate without complaint—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 142.* A complaint was made to a Magistrate accusing a certain person of having taken or kept the wife of the complainant. In the course of the proceedings it appeared that the wife had committed bigamy (s. 494, Penal Code). The Magistrate, without a further complaint, committed the woman alone for trial by the Court of Session. *Held*, that the Magistrate had acted within his jurisdiction, s. 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being designed to prevent a Magistrate from enquiring without complaint into a case connected with marriage, but when a case is properly before the Magistrate, he may proceed against any person implicated. *In the matter of UJJALA BEWA*

I. C. L. R. 523

13. ————— *Offence charged under particular section of Penal Code—Power of Magistrate to apply any other section applicable.* A Magistrate is not bound to adhere to any particular section of the law which may be mentioned by a complainant, in his complaint but may apply any section which he thinks applicable to the case, so long as the parties are not misled, and the proper procedure is observed. He may recall an order which he finds to be wrong, and substitute any other which he may think right under the law. *KALIDASS BHUTTACHARJEE v. MOHENDRONATH CHATTERJEE*

12 W. R. Cr. 40

14. ————— *Case referred by Civil Court—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 263—Power to refer.* The various modes in which civil proceedings can be instituted under the Code of Criminal Procedure pointed out. Where a Civil Court makes over a case to a Magistrate for investigation, the Magistrate ought to examine the complainant and reduce the examination into writing, which should be signed by the Magistrate and the complainant. S. 273, Code of Criminal Procedure, only empowers a superior Magistrate to refer cases to a Subordinate Magistrate when the complaint is made to himself or before a police officer, but not cases where he himself takes cognizance of an offence. *BHUGOBAN CHUNDER PODDAR v. MOHUN CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY*

12 W. R. Cr. 49

15. ————— *Case irregularly sent by Civil Court—Investigation without complaint—Civil Procedure Code, 1861, s. 68.* Although a Civil Court acted irregularly in sending to the Magistrate for investigation a case of using or attempting to use false evidence when no suit was pending in that Court, yet as the Court had given its sanction to the prosecution of the offence:—*Held*, that it was in the competency of the Magistrate, under s. 68 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even without a charge or complaint, to proceed to investigate, and, if necessary, to

COMPLAINT—contd.

1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—contd.

commit to trial to the Sessions Court. *QUEEN v. DOORGA NATH ROY* . . . 8 W. R. Cr. 9

16. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 58, 190, 191—Cognizance taken by a Magistrate under s. 190, sub-s. (1), cl. (c)—Jurisdiction of Magistrate to hold a preliminary enquiry not thereby ousted. Held, that the fact of a Magistrate having taken cognizance of a case under s. 190, sub-s. (1), cl. (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not disqualify such Magistrate from holding a preliminary inquiry and committing the case to the Court of Session. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ABDUL RAZZAK KHAN* . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 109

See *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. FELIX*.

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 148

and *JAGAT CHUNDRAMAZUMDAR v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . I. L. R. 26 Cal. 786
3 C. W. N. 491

17. ———— *Previous Enquiry—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 146.* The previous enquiry provided for by s. 146 before a complaint is taken up ought not to be made after the accused has been brought before the Court under a warrant. *RANKANT SIRCAR v. JADAB CHUNDER DASS*
21 W. R. Cr. 44

18. ———— *Authorization to proceed with case—Form of Complaint, irregularity or defect in.* A Court of Session is competent to proceed to the trial of a prisoner brought before it upon a charge by a Magistrate authorised to make a commitment, though the complaint or authorization be contained only in a letter from the Judge of that Court to the Magistrate of the district, sent with the record of the case, notwithstanding an irregularity or defect of form in recording the complaint. The complaint or authorization of the Court before which, or against the authority of which, an offence mentioned in Ch. XI of the Code of Criminal Procedure is alleged to have been committed is a sufficient warrant for commencement of criminal proceedings. *Queen v. Mahim Chandra Chuckerbutty*, 3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 67, overruled. *QUEEN v. NARAYAN NAIK*
5 B. L. R. F. B. 660

s. c. *In the matter of NARAYAN NAIK*

14 W. R. Cr. 34

19. ———— *Extra-judicial knowledge of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 68—Summons without complaint.* The power which a Magistrate of a district, or a Magistrate in charge of a division of a district, has to issue a summons without any complaint, is not affected by the circumstance that the offence with which the accused was charged came to the knowledge of the Magistrate otherwise than through a petition which was presented against the accused. *BISSESHUR ROY v. HURPERSAD SINGH* . . . 11 W. R. Cr. 1

COMPLAINT—contd.

1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—contd.

20. ———— *Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 190 (1) (c)—Jurisdiction of Magistrate.* Where a Magistrate having lawful cognizance of an offence found it disclosed in the evidence that a certain other person not before the Court was concerned in the offence and thereupon issued process against him and tried him:—*Held*, that the Magistrate did not act without jurisdiction, although he was not specially empowered to take cognizance under cl. (c), sub-s. (1) of s. 190, Code of Criminal Procedure. *CHARU CHANDRA DAS v. NARENDRA KRISHNA CHAKRAVARTI*
4 C. W. N. 367

21. ———— *Co-accused—Punishment of some, if sufficient ground for refusal to try others who did not appear at the first trial—Further enquiry—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V. of 1898), ss. 190, 437.* If several persons commit an offence, a Magistrate cannot consider the punishment of some of them to be sufficient in regard to others and refuse to summon the rest of the accused. A Magistrate having taken cognizance of an offence has jurisdiction to hold judicial proceedings in respect of all persons who, the evidence discloses, are the offenders. *BISHEN DAYAL RAI v. CHEDI KHAN* . . . 4 C. W. N. 560

22. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 190, 191—Cognizance of a case taken upon an anonymous communication—Transfer of case.* Where a Magistrate took cognizance of a case on an anonymous communication and the accused applied for a transfer on the ground that the case came within the provisions of cl. (c) of s. 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court directed that the case be transferred to the file of another Magistrate for trial. *In the matter of HARI NARAYAN BISWAS*
3 C. W. N. 65

23. ———— *Act XXV of 1861, s. 68—Private Information.* A belief founded on private and anonymous information is not knowledge within the meaning of s. 68 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *In the matter of MOHESH CHANDRA BANERJEE. QUEEN v. PURNA CHANDRA BANERJEE. QUEEN v. KALI SIRCAR*
4 B. L. R. Ap. 1: 13 W. R. Cr. 1

24. ———— *Report of police officer—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 68—Act X of 1872, s. 142—Knowledge—Report of police—Interference of High Court.* S. 68 of the Criminal Procedure Code applies only to cases in which the private individual injured or aggrieved does not come forward to make a formal complaint. That section is intended for the purpose of enabling a Magistrate to take care that justice may be vindicated, notwithstanding that the persons individually aggrieved are unwilling or unable to prosecute; and even in such cases the jurisdiction to arrest requires, for its foundation, knowledge of the fact of an offence having

COMPLAINT—*contd.*1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—*contd.*

been committed, and that knowledge must be either personal or derived from testimony legally given. The report of the police, or any statement which falls short of an actual formal complaint, or of a statement made on oath, is not sufficient in law to give a Magistrate jurisdiction to issue his warrant. In this case, although the Magistrate had acted illegally before evidence was recorded, and had shown a want of discretion in some of the stages, the High Court refused to quash the Magistrate's order directing the prisoners to be put upon their defence, on the ground that the order had been made by a competent officer after hearing evidence which was judicially received and recorded. *In the matter of the petition of SURENDRA NATH ROY. QUEEN v. SURENDRA NATH ROY*

5 B. L. R. 274 : 13 W. R. Cr. 27

25. ————— *Power of Court to act on police report—Subordinate Magistrate—District Magistrate.* A Subordinate Magistrate is competent to act on a police report, but it is not proper for a District Magistrate to pass an order directing proceedings to be taken on the police report unless he has withdrawn the whole matter from the Court of such Subordinate Magistrate. *MOUL SINGH v. MAHABIR SINGH* 4 C. W. N. 242

26. ————— *Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 190, cl. (c)—Proceedings against one not originally accused without investigation or evidence on acquittal of accused—Deputy Commissioner as Magistrate and Revenue Officer—Judicial and executive functions, distinction between—Magistrate, orders by, to his subordinate on judicial matters, validity of—High Court, power of, to revise such orders.* On information received and police investigation, the Deputy Commissioner, as Magistrate, instituted proceedings against the informant for having himself put opium in a parcel consigned by rail by another and made him over to a Subordinate Magistrate for trial, and on the failure of the prosecution the Deputy Commissioner directed proceedings to be taken against the consignor. *Held*, that this order of the Deputy Commissioner against the consignor, without further information or investigation, was without jurisdiction. The Deputy Commissioner, who is also a Revenue Officer, did not act in his latter capacity as a mere complainant, but as a Magistrate acting under s. 190, cl. (c), Criminal Procedure Code, and as such his order is subject to revision by the High Court. *SHAHIRAM v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . 4 C. W. N. 825

27. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 191—Cognizance of an offence on suspicion—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 211—Police Report—False charge, prosecution for, without first enquiring into truth of original complaint.* A person having laid an information before the police, the police reported the case as false; the informant then appeared before a Magistrate, asking that his case might be investigat-

COMPLAINT—*contd.*1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—*contd.*

ed and his witnesses summoned. This application was refused, and the Magistrate, after perusing the police report, passed an order directing him to be prosecuted under s. 211 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the application to the Magistrate was "a complaint" within the meaning of s. 191 of the Criminal Procedure Code into which the Magistrate was bound to have enquired. A Magistrate may take cognizance under s. 191 of the Criminal Procedure Code of an offence brought to his notice by a police report which affords ground for a suspicion that an offence has been committed; but as matter of sound judicial discretion, a Magistrate should not so proceed and direct that the person suspected be tried until some person aggrieved has complained, or until he has before him a police report on the subject based on an investigation directed to the offence to be tried, and in cases of alleged false charges, until it is clear that the original charge has been either heard and dismissed or abandoned. And before the order to prosecute for the false charge is made, the person who made the original charge should be offered an opportunity of supporting it or abandoning it. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SHAM LALL* . I. L. R. 14 Cal. 707

28. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 4, 530, and 537—Third class Magistrate taking cognizance of case on receipt of a yadast from a Revenue Officer and convicting accused without examining complainant.* A Revenue Officer sent a yadast to a third class Magistrate charging a certain person with having disobeyed a summons issued by the Revenue Officer. The third class Magistrate thereupon tried and convicted the accused under s. 174 of the Penal Code. The District Magistrate referred the case on the ground that the conviction was bad under s. 530 (h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Held*, that, as the yadast amounted to a complaint within the meaning of s. 4, although the complaint was not examined on oath as required by s. 200, the conviction was not illegal. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MONU* . I. L. R. 11 Mad. 443

29. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 4, 198, and 200—Charge of Defamation not made in complaint, but added in subsequent examination.* A charge of defamation not contained in the complaint presented to the Magistrate, but added subsequently by the Magistrate upon statements made by the complainant in his examination under s. 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code, whether of his own accord or in consequence of suggestions from the Magistrate, is not a legal "complaint" made by an aggrieved person within the meaning of ss. 4 (a) and 198, so as to enable the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence. *Queen-Empress v. Kallu*, I. L. R. 5 All. 233, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DEOKINANDAN*

I. L. R. 10 All. 39

30. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 203, 248—Who may institute com-*

COMPLAINT—contd.**1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—contd.**

plaint. As a general rule, any person having knowledge of the commission of an offence may set the law in motion by a complaint, even though he is not personally interested or affected by the offence. The exceptions to this rule, of which ss. 195 and 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code are examples, are exceptions created by statute. There is nothing in the Code showing an intention to confine prosecutions to the persons directly injured. *In re GANESH NARAYAN SATHE*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 600

31. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 191 (c)—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 140 (c)—By whom a complaint of an offence may be made.* The complaint upon which, under s. 191 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence may be made by any member of the public acquainted with the facts of the case, not necessarily by the person aggrieved by the offence to which the complaint relates. *In re Ganesh Narayan Sathe, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 600*, followed. **FARZAND ALI v. HANUMAN PRASAD . I. L. R. 18 All. 465**

32. *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 198—Defamation of a Wife—Complaint by Husband.* When a married woman is defamed by the imputation of unchastity, her husband is a person aggrieved, upon whose complaint the Magistrate may take cognizance of a complaint under Criminal Procedure Code, s. 198. **CHELLAM NAIDU v. RAMASAMI . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 379**

DEPUTY LEGAL REMEMBRANCER v. SARNA KARMI . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 336

33. *Criminal trespass—Mischief—By whom complaint of offence may be made—Penal Code, ss. 426 and 441.* The words "any person in possession" in s. 441 of the Penal Code do not mean only "a complainant in possession." Certain persons were prosecuted under ss. 426 and 447 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) for committing mischief and criminal trespass by entering upon a certain field which was in the possession of the complainant's tenants and destroying the seed sown therein. The defence raised was an *alibi*; it was also contended on behalf of the accused that the field belonged to one of them, and that the complainant had no title whatever to it. The Magistrate who tried the case declined to go into the question of title; he found that the complainant's tenants were in possession of the field; and disbelieving the evidence of *alibi*, he convicted the accused and sentenced them to fine. On application in revision to the High Court, it was urged (*inter alia*) that the complainant, not being the person in possession, could not legally institute the criminal proceedings, and that, therefore, the conviction was bad. *Held*, that looking to the nature of the false defence set up by the accused, this was not a case for interference

COMPLAINT—contd.**1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—contd.**

in revision, as to do so would encourage perjury. *Held*, also, that the words "any person in possession" in s. 441 of the Penal Code do not mean only a "complainant in possession," there being no authority for taking the offences of mischief and criminal trespass out of the general rule which allows any person to complain of a criminal act. *Queen v. Kalinath Nag Chowdhry, 9 W. R. Cr. 1, Chand Persad v. Evans, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 123, Iswar Chandra Karmakar v. Sital Das Mitter, 8 B. L. R. Ap. 62, and In re Ganesh Narayan Sathe, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 590*, referred to. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KESHAVALAL JEYKRISHNA**

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 536

34. *Power of Magistrate to issue warrant or entertain case—Criminal Procedure Code, 1869, s. 66 (a) and ss. 68 and 155.* In cases in which the police cannot arrest without a warrant, a warrant cannot be legally issued by a Magistrate except on a complaint made upon oath (or under the provisions of s. 68), whether the Magistrate issuing the warrant is authorized to entertain cases either on complaint preferred directly to himself or on the report of the police officer, under s. 66 (a) of the Criminal Procedure Code or not. The report of a police officer referred to in the above section means, not any communication made by a police officer, but the formal report drawn up under s. 155 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in cases in which the police may arrest without warrant. **REG. v. JAFAR ALI 8 Bom. Cr. 113**

35. *Petition of third person—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 205—Magistrate entertaining petition by third party.* Certain parties having complained in the Magistrate's Court of assault or ill-usage by order of one whom they called their zamindar, with a view to making them pay enhanced rent, both complainants and accused were absent when the case was called on for hearing. As the Magistrate was about to dismiss the complaint, a third party appeared and alleged that the complaint had been made with the connivance of the accused for the purpose of fabricating evidence of his right or title to the mouzah where the complainants lived. Thereupon the Magistrate compelled the complainants to appear, took down the evidence of some of them, received a counter-complaint from the third party above mentioned, and convicted the complainants under the Penal Code, s. 193, and sentenced them to imprisonment. *Held*, that the Magistrate ought not to have entertained the third party's petition, or compelled the complainants to go on with their case: and that, under the circumstances, the evidence given was not judicial evidence. *In the matter of the petition of DUKHUN PAHAN . . . 24 W. R. Cr. 32*

36. *Omission to examine complainant.* The Deputy Magistrate was held to

COMPLAINT—*contd.*1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—*contd.*

have been wrong in summoning the parties charged before examining the complainant. *RUJUB MUNDLE v. LOCHUN MUNDLE*

W. R. 1864 Cr. 73

37. ———— *Omission to take sworn Examination of the Complainant—Complainant merely called upon to attest complaint in writing—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 200.* It is not a sufficient compliance with the provisions of s. 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure where a complainant, who has presented a written complaint, is merely called upon to attest the complaint on oath, no separate sworn statement of the complainant being recorded by or under the orders of the Magistrate to whom the complaint is presented. *Queen-Empress v. Murphy, I. L. R. 9 All. 666*, distinguished. *KESRI v. MUHAMMAD BAKSHI*. I. L. R. 18 All. 221

38. ———— *Omission of Examination of Complainant on oath—Dismissal of complaint—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 197, 200, 202, 203—Complaint against a public servant.* Upon receipt of a petition of complaint it is the duty of a Magistrate, as directed by s. 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), to examine the complainant on oath. Until he has done so, it is not competent for him to dismiss the complaint under s. 203 of the Code. It is an irregular proceeding on the part of a Magistrate, in place of examining the complainant on oath, to call on the person complained against to submit a report as to the truth or otherwise of the allegations made against him. If an investigation into the subject-matter of the complaint is considered necessary, it should be conducted according to the provisions of s. 202, either by the Magistrate himself or by some properly qualified officer. A complaint against a public servant such as the Chairman of a Municipality must be dealt with in exactly the same manner as any other complaint, and the consideration of the question as to the applicability of s. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the case should be postponed until after the complainant has been examined on oath in accordance with the law. *SATYA CHARAN GHOSE v. CHAIRMAN, UTTERPARA MUNICIPALITY*. 3 C. W. N. 17

39. ———— *Necessity for Examination of Complainant—Dismissal of complaint—Order for judicial inquiry or report without examining complainant, legality of—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 211—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 202, 203 and 476.* Where a Magistrate, after having examined the complainant and without hearing his witnesses or dismissing the complaint, ordered the complainant to be prosecuted under s. 211 of the Penal Code:—*Held*, that the Magistrate's order was without jurisdiction. Where a complainant, whose complaint had been reported false by the police,

COMPLAINT—*contd.*1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—*contd.*

complained to the Magistrate and asked him to try the complaint, and the Magistrate did not examine the complainant himself, but made over the case to a Subordinate Magistrate for judicial enquiry or report:—*Held*, that the Magistrate had no authority for this procedure. A complainant must be examined by the Magistrate who receives the complaint, or by some Magistrate to whom he has transferred the case. When a complainant has been examined, he is entitled to have the person accused brought before the Magistrate, and it is only when the Magistrate has reason not to believe the truth of the complaint from his examination that this can properly be refused and an investigation held. *MAHADEO SINGH v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 921

40. ———— *Bigamy—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 198—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 495—Prosecution started at the instance of the second husband's brother—"Person aggrieved".* *Held*, that, in respect of a prosecution for bigamy, the brother of the second (bigamous) husband of the accused was not a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of s. 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Queen-Empress v. Bai Rukshmoni, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 340*, followed. *EMPEROR v. IMTIAZAN (1902)*

I. L. R. 25 All. 132

41. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 198—Act XLV of 1860 (Indian Penal Code), ss. 494 and 498—Jurisdiction.* The husband of a woman who had left him laid a complaint before a Magistrate, alleging facts which seemed to constitute the offence provided for by s. 498 of the Indian Penal Code. In the course of the enquiry consequent upon this complaint, it appeared that an offence falling under s. 494 of the Code had been committed, and the Magistrate accordingly made an order of commitment under s. 494 of the Code. *Held*, that such commitment was not illegal. It was not necessary that the complainant should specify precisely the section under which the person complained against should be charged, and he had laid before the Magistrate matter which, if proved, would be sufficient to warrant a commitment under s. 494. *In the matter of Ujjala Bewa, 1 C. L. R. 523*, approved. *EMPEROR v. ALLI (1902)*

I. L. R. 25 All. 209

42. ———— *"Complaint"—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 4, cl. (h), 190, cl. (c)—Proceedings instituted on Magistrate's responsibility.* Where, in a petition presented to a Magistrate, a person alleged that he had been taken to a certain place and there made to sign a paper, but also expressly stated that he did not wish to prosecute: *Held*, that there was no complaint within the terms of the definition in s. 4, cl. (h), of the Criminal Procedure Code, and that no process could be issued upon the petition. *Proceedings taken upon such a petition cannot be*

COMPLAINT—contd.**1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—contd.**

justified as having been instituted by the Magistrate on his own responsibility under s. 190, cl. (c), of the Code of Criminal Procedure. **BHAMAN SINGH v. HALUMAN MANDAL** (1902)

6 C. W. N. 926

43. — Court of Wards—Petition to Collector against subordinate officer of Courts of Wards—Dismissal of petition—Witnesses, opportunity to call—Sanction to prosecute—False Charge—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 211—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 4 (h) and 195. A petition to the Collector, as the superior officer of the Court of Wards, directed against one of his official inferiors, a subordinate officer of the Court of Wards cutchery, asking the Collector, as the head of the department, to redress the grievances of the petitioner, is not a "complaint" within s. 4, cl. (h), of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Where, on such a petition being presented, the Collector saw the petitioner and got him to repeat the statement made in the petition on oath, and, dealing with it judicially as if it were a complaint, dismissed it without giving the petitioner an opportunity of calling his witnesses, and ordered his prosecution under s. 211 of the Penal Code: *Held*, that the order for the prosecution of the petitioner under s. 211 of the Penal Code should be set aside, as the Collector was not justified in arbitrarily turning a departmental complaint into a criminal complaint, and that, if he had been justified in taking the course that he did, he should have given the petitioner an opportunity of calling his witnesses and proving his allegations. **JAGOBUNDEO KARMAKAR v. EMPEROR** (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 415

44. — Defamation—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 500—Defamation—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 198—Person aggrieved—Defamation of subordinate officers of Municipality—Complaint by President—Maintainability. A newspaper published articles which, for the purposes of the point of law to be determined, were assumed to be defamatory. These related to the conduct of certain subordinate officers of the Madras Municipal Commission. A complaint was lodged by the President of the Commission in respect of the alleged defamation, it being contended on behalf of the complainant that, inasmuch as, by the Madras Municipal Act, the President is responsible for the efficient discharge of their duties by his subordinate officers, his conduct and administration had been impugned by the articles. *Held*, that, assuming for the purposes of the question under consideration that the statements complained of were defamatory of the subordinate officers of the Municipal Health Department, they were not defamatory of the complainant; and that the complainant was not a "person aggrieved," within the meaning of s. 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. **BEAUCHAMP v. MOORE** (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 43

COMPLAINT—contd.**1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—contd.**

45. — Duty of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 190 (c), 191—Cognizance of offence on personal knowledge or information—Trial of case by same Magistrate—Procedure. When a Magistrate takes cognizance of a case under cl. (c) of s. 190, Criminal Procedure Code, he is bound to take further proceedings under s. 191, Criminal Procedure Code; and his omission to do so renders his proceedings illegal. *In the matter of* **AKBAR MOMIN** (1901)

6 C. W. N. 202

46. — Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 203—Magistrate having power to receive complaint, jurisdiction of, to finally dispose of the same—District Magistrate, jurisdiction of, to issue process. A Magistrate having power to receive a complaint has power to deal with it finally, and it is his duty to do so, and a District Magistrate has no power to pass an order for the issue of process upon the accused unless he first removes the case to his own file. **MRINAL KANTI GHOSE v. EMPEROR** (1902)

6 C. W. N. 843

47. — Police officer—Complaint to police—Report by police—Case ordered to be entered as true by Magistrate—Judicial enquiry—Right of complainant to be examined and to have his case tried—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 173, 200 and 202. The complainant lodged information with the police, charging certain persons with assault and with forcibly carrying off grain. The complaint was investigated and a report made to the Sub-divisional Officer, who ordered the case to be entered as true, recording the offence under s. 147 of the Penal Code. He, however, declined to order a judicial enquiry, because in his opinion there was no chance of a conviction. The District Magistrate subsequently, on an application by the complainant, ordered a judicial enquiry by a Subordinate Magistrate, but on receipt of his report he declined to interfere in the matter. *Held*, that the complainant was entitled to be examined under s. 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code; and that, as his complaint had already been recorded as true, he was entitled to process against the accused and for the attendance of his witnesses. **KULDIP SAHAI v. BUDHAN MAHTON** (1901)

48. — Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 4 (h), 250—Report of police officer—Complaint by a police officer in a non-cognizable case—False complaint—Compensation. There is no section in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, which empowers a police officer to make, of his own motion, any report to a Magistrate in a non-cognizable case; hence where he files a formal complaint in such a case, he cannot be said to 'make a report,' and his complaint falls within the definition of 'complaint' in s. 4 (h) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. Where a police officer appears before a Magistrate and makes a formal complaint of a non-cognizable

COMPLAINT—contd.**1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—contd.**

offence, which is found to be false, the Magistrate can order him, under s. 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to pay compensation to the accused. *KING-EMPEROR v. SADA* (1901)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 150

49. ——— Rioting—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1890), ss. 190, 528—Cognizance of offence against persons accused but not sent up for trial—Refusal by trying Magistrate to issue processes against such accused persons—Transfer by District Magistrate of case—Warrants, issue of, against accused not sent up—Pending case—Jurisdiction. Where several persons were accused of rioting, and only one of the accused was sent up by the police and convicted of the offence, and the trying Magistrate, on application made for summoning the others, refused to summon them, and the District Magistrate transferred the case to his town file and directed the issue of warrants against the accused persons originally charged but not sent up for trial: *Held*, that the order of the trying Magistrate, refusing to summon the other accused persons, did not finally dispose of the case so as to remove it from his file altogether; and that the District Magistrate had ample jurisdiction to transfer the case to his own file under s. 528 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Nukheda Singh v. Ripu Mardan Singh*, 4 C. W. N. 239, referred to and followed. *Held*, also, that, even if the case be treated as not pending in the Court of the trying Magistrate at the date of his order refusing to summon the other accused persons, the District Magistrate had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case as against the other accused persons under s. 190 of the Code. *AYEN MAHMAD AKAND v. KING-EMPEROR* (1901) . . . **5 C. W. N. 488**

50. ——— Prosecution, commencement of. *Held*, that a prosecution commences, when a complaint is made. It is not necessary, in order to maintain an action for malicious prosecution, that the charge was acted upon by the Magistrate; it is enough if the charge was made to the Magistrate with a view of inducing him to entertain it. *AHMMEDBHAI v. FRAMJI EDULJI* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 226

51. ——— Petition—False charge—Police—Magistrate—Order to show cause without examination of complainant and disposal of complaint—Reference—Inquiry—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 4 (h), 200 to 203—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 211. J laid a charge at the thana against two persons, under s. 436 of the Penal Code, which the police after investigation reported as false. He thereupon filed a petition before the Sub-divisional Magistrate impugning the correctness of the police report, and praying that the persons accused by him might be brought to trial. The Magistrate did not examine the complainant, but ordered the petition to be "put up with the police report", and on the next

COMPLAINT—contd.**1. INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES—contd.**

day required him to show cause why he should not be prosecuted under s. 211 of the Penal Code. He afterwards referred the case for inquiry and report to a Sub-Deputy Magistrate with second class powers, who after examining the complainant and his witness reported the charge to be maliciously false. The Sub-divisional Magistrate then heard J's pleaders, and agreeing with the report passed an order directing his prosecution. *Held*, that the petition to the Sub-divisional Magistrate was a "complaint" within s. 4 (h) of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Held*, further, that according to the current of decisions of the Court, when a person institutes before the police criminal proceedings found on enquiry to be false, before he can be prosecuted under s. 211 of the Penal Code, he must first have an opportunity of proving his case, that if he impugnes the correctness of the police inquiry by a petition, he is entitled to have the persons complained against tried on the charge, or else his statement must be recorded on oath and his complaint dismissed under s. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code; and that the order of the Magistrate in the case was therefore bad. *In the matter of Chukradhar Polti*, 8 C. L. R. 289, *Queen-Empress v. Sham Lall*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 707, *Mahadeo Singh v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 921, *Gunamony Sapui v. Queen-Empress*, 3 C. W. N. 758, *Budh Nath Mahato v. Empress*, 4 C. W. N. 305, *In re Sahiram Argarwalla*, 5 C. W. N. 254, *Dusarath Singh v. Emperor*, unreported, Cr. Rev. No. 2773, dated 14th August 1903, followed, but the propriety of this procedure laid down in these cases discussed. *Ramasami v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 292, *Imperatrix v. Jijibhai Gobind*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 596, *Queen-Empress v. Roghu Tewari*, I. L. R. 15 All. 336, referred to. *JOGEN-DRA NATH MOOKERJEE v. EMPEROR* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1

2. POWER TO REFER TO SUBORDINATE OFFICERS.

1. ——— Case originating with District Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 68. A case originating with a Magistrate of the District must, under s. 68 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, be disposed of by the Magistrate himself, and cannot be referred to Subordinate Magistrate. *QUEEN v. HOSSEIN MANJEE*

9 W. R. Cr. 70

In the matter of the petition of DHUNPUT SINGH
19 W. R. Cr. 30

Irregularity in recording Complaint—Complaint not reduced to writing—Act X of 1872, ss. 144, 44 and 283—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), ss. 66, 273, 426, and 439—Irregularity in commencing proceedings. Under s. 66 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the examination of the prosecutor should be reduced

COMPLAINT—contd.**2. POWER TO REFER TO SUBORDINATE OFFICERS—contd.**

to writing, and signed by him. When a complaint is made before a Magistrate, but not reduced to writing, he cannot, under s. 273 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, refer the case to a Deputy Magistrate for trial. Ss. 426 and 439 do not apply to a case where the prosecution is not commenced by a complaint, as directed in the Code. A conviction with such irregularity cannot stand good, merely because the amount of punishment would have been the same if proper proceedings had been instituted. *QUEEN v. MAHIM CHANDRA CHUCKER-BUTTY* . . . **3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 67**

3. . . . *Complaint not reduced to writing or signed.* On receipt of a petition from the complainant, the Magistrate, without examining him, and reducing his examination into writing and obtaining his signature thereto, or appending his own signature as Magistrate, referred the petition to a Deputy Magistrate for trial. The Deputy Magistrate tried and convicted the accused. On a reference from the Sessions Judge, on the ground that the proceedings were irregular under s. 66, Act XXV of 1861, and that therefore the order of the Deputy Magistrate was without jurisdiction:—*Held*, that the petition was sufficient, and that the Magistrate was justified in making over the petition to a Deputy Magistrate who had the full powers of a Magistrate for enquiry and trial. *QUEEN v. UMESCHANDRA CHOWDRY* . . . **5 B. L. R. 160: 14 W. R. Cr. 1**

4. . . . *Non-compliance with provisions of Code.* A Magistrate of a district, before whom a complaint had been made, without complying with the provisions of s. 66, Act XXV of 1861, sent the petition to be disposed of by a Deputy Magistrate; and when the Deputy Magistrate had proceeded to some extent with the case, the Magistrate took it up and tried it himself. *Held*, that non-compliance with the provisions of s. 66 made the subsequent proceedings void. *QUEEN v. GIRISH CHANDRA GHOSE* . . . **7 B. L. R. 513: 16 W. R. Cr. 40**

5. . . . *Non-compliance with provisions of Code—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), ss. 66, 67—Act VIII of 1869, s. 66 (b)—Act X of 1872, ss. 144, 147, and 49.* A Magistrate of a district, before whom a complaint has been made without complying with the provisions of s. 66 of Act XXV of 1861, sent the petition to be disposed of by a Deputy Magistrate not authorized to receive complaints without reference from the District Magistrate who tried and convicted the offender. *Held, per KEMP, J.*, that non-compliance with the provisions of s. 66 of Act XXV of 1861 made the subsequent proceedings void. *Held, per AINSIE, J.*, that the order sending the petition to the Deputy Magistrate for disposal gave the latter officer power to receive the complaint under s. 66 (b) of Act VIII of 1869, and that the subsequent proceedings therefore were valid. *In*

COMPLAINT—contd.**2. POWER TO REFER TO SUBORDINATE OFFICERS—contd.**

the matter of ISWAR CHUNDER KOER v. UMESH CHUNDER PAL . . . **8 B. L. R. 19**

6. . . . *Omission to examine complaint—Act XXV of 1861, ss. 66 and 273—Act X of 1872, ss. 144 and 44—Reference by District Magistrate to Subordinate Magistrate.* A District Magistrate is not bound on receipt of a complaint, to examine the complainant under s. 66 of Act XXV of 1861 before referring the complaint to a Subordinate Magistrate for disposal. The examination of the complainant by the Magistrate to whom the case had been referred is sufficient. *QUEEN v. HARU* . . . **9 B. L. R. F. B. 146**

S. C. BHUGOBUT CHURN SEIN v. SIAM ALL. In re RAM CHUNDER GHUTTUCK, and In re HARU . . . **18 W. R. Cr. 18**

7. . . . *Reference to Subordinate Magistrate before reducing examination of complainant to writing—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 66.* The Magistrate of the district, on a complaint being presented to him, has no power to refer the petition to a Subordinate Magistrate for trial until he has himself reduced the examination of the petitioner into writing, in accordance with the provisions of s. 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *QUEEN v. BHIKAREE* . . . **4 N. W. 88**

8. . . . *Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 202, 203, 476—Dismissal of Complaint—Judicial enquiry—Examination of complainant, whether necessary—Reference to an enquiry by a Subordinate Magistrate of second class powers in a case triable by a Court of Sessions—Jurisdiction of such Magistrate—Order for prosecution for false complaint.* A complainant appeared before a District Magistrate and charged certain persons with offences triable only by a Court of Sessions and asked for a judicial enquiry into his complaint, and the Magistrate, without himself examining the complainant, made over the case to a Subordinate Magistrate of second class powers for holding the enquiry, and the latter having reported the case to be false, the District Magistrate sanctioned the prosecution of the complainant for an offence under s. 211, Penal Code. *Held*, that the Subordinate Magistrate exercising second-class powers had no jurisdiction to deal with the offence triable only by a Court of Sessions, and that the enquiry ought not to have been directed to be made by him. That the District Magistrate, to whom the complaint was made, was alone competent to deal with it, and that he could not make it over for enquiry to any Subordinate Magistrate without having previously himself examined the complainant. That the enquiry ordered could neither be regarded as one under s. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure nor could the proceedings be regarded as held under s. 20 of the Code, and that the order for the prosecution of the complainant was, therefore, not

COMPLAINT—contd.**2. POWER TO REFER TO SUBORDINATE OFFICERS—concl'd.**

made according to law. *BUDHNATH MAHATO v. EMPRESS* **4 C. W. N. 305**

9. ———— **Reference for enquiry and report—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 4, 202, 350.** A Magistrate, upon complaint made, having issued process and examined witnesses in support of complaint, ceased to exercise jurisdiction. His successor on taking up the case, referred the complaint to the police for enquiry and report, and upon receipt of the report discharged the accused. *Held*, that this procedure was illegal. A reference under s. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made after evidence has been taken for the complainant and process issued. *SADAGOPCHARYA v. RAGAVACHARYA* **I. L. R. 9 Mad. 282**

10. ———— **Reference to Police Officer—Examination of complainant.** It is not proper course for a Magistrate, when a complaint is made before him of an offence of which he can take cognizance, to refer the complaint to a police officer. He is bound to receive the complaint, and, after examining the complainant, to proceed according to law. *In re JANKIDAS GURU SITARAM* **I. L. R. 12 Bom. 161**

11. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 202—Reference of cases by Magistrate to the police for enquiry.** A Magistrate can send a case for enquiry by the police under Criminal Procedure Code, s. 202, only when for reasons stated by him he distrusts the truth of the complaint. In cases where the accused is a member of the police force, it is generally better that the inquiry should be prosecuted by a Magistrate. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KANAPPA PILLAI* **I. L. R. 20 Mad. 387**

12. ———— **Magistrate—Complaint to Magistrate in charge of the sadar—Reference of complaint to another Magistrate for enquiry and report—Jurisdiction of latter to direct prosecution of the complainant before dismissal of the Complaint—"Judicial proceedings"—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 4 (m) and 476.** Where a complaint was lodged before the Senior Deputy Magistrate in charge of the *sadar*, who referred it to a Junior Deputy Magistrate "for inquiry and report," and the latter, after taking evidence, drew up a proceeding under s. 476 against the complainant, and submitted a report to the former Magistrate, upon which he dismissed the complaint the next day:—*Held*, that the proceeding before the Junior Deputy Magistrate was a "judicial proceeding" within s. 4 (m), and that he had jurisdiction under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code to direct the prosecution of the complainant for an offence under s. 211 of the Penal Code committed before him. *KANCHAN GORHI v. RAM KISHUN MUNDUL* (1908) **I. L. R. 36 Calc. 72**

COMPLAINT—contd.**3. WITHDRAWAL OF COMPLAINT AND OBLIGATION OF MAGISTRATE TO HEAR IT.**

1. ———— **Withdrawal of Complaint—Act XXV of 1861, s. 270—Act X of 1872, s. 210.** Offences punishable under the Penal Code with more than six months' imprisonment are not triable under Ch. XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and consequently do not fall within the provisions of s. 271 of that Code. *ANONYMOUS CASE* **4 B. L. R. F. B. 41: 12 W. R. Cr. 59**

2. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 210—Penal Code, s. 352—Criminal force—Hurt.** Complainant alleged that he had been seized by the hands and legs, thrown to the ground, slapped, thumped, and slipped on the chests by three persons, one of whom gave a knife to another with directions to stab complainant. *Held*, that the complaint disclosed a case of hurt, and that s. 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872, did not justify the Magistrate allowing the complaint to be withdrawn. *SAMBASIVANNA v. BHOGAPPA* **I. L. R. 5 Mad. 378**

3. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, s. 248—"Complainant."** A complaint having been made to the police, the latter caused charges to be preferred under ss. 143 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code against certain accused. The person who had complained to the police subsequently filed a petition praying the Second-class Magistrate to withdraw the charges under s. 248 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate permitted the withdrawal and directed the accused to be set at liberty. *Held*, that the order was bad, there being no "complainant" in the case, and that consequently the Magistrate, in purporting to act under s. 248, had exceeded his powers. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHENCHHAYA* **I. L. R. 23 Mad. 626**

4. ———— **Withdrawal for want of prosecution—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, Ch. XIV.** Cases instituted and tried under Ch. XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be struck off the file at the request of the complainant, or for the want of prosecution on his part. The Magistrate must proceed in such cases in the manner prescribed by the Chapter, notwithstanding the complainant may desire to withdraw his complaint. *QUEEN v. JUGROOP UGRABEE* **3 N. W. 341**

5. ———— **Effect of withdrawal—Acquittal.** The withdrawal of a complaint by the complainant operates as an acquittal, and the High Court has no authority to entertain the matter at all, except upon an application duly made with sanction of the Government. *LUCHI BEHARA v. NITYANUND DOSS* **19 W. R. Cr. 55**

6. ———— **Objection of Magistrate to hear Complaint—Commencement of prosecution.** A prosecution commences when a complaint is made, the reception of the complaint being a stage of the judicial proceedings towards conviction. *EMPRESS v. LAKSHMAN SAKHARAM* **I. L. R. 2 Bom. 481**

COMPLAINT—contd.**3. WITHDRAWAL OF COMPLAINT AND OBLIGATION OF MAGISTRATE TO HEAR IT—contd.**

7. ———— *Complaint once instituted—Duty of Magistrate.* Where once a complaint of an offence which cannot be legally compounded is before a Magistrate, he is bound (unless proceeding under s. 146) to make a complete enquiry, and to see that the accused, if guilty, is brought to punishment. *QUEEN v. DODRAJ DOSADH* 22 W. R. Cr. 83

8. ———— *Remedy by Civil Suit—Duty of Magistrate.* If a complaint is duly made before a Magistrate, and the act imputed appears to amount to an offence and there is *prima facie* reason to suppose the accusation true, the Magistrate is bound to proceed, though he may consider a civil suit more applicable. *QUEEN v. NUBAS MUHTON* 8 W. R. Cr. 65

9. ———— *Duty of Magistrate—Remedy by civil suit.* Where there is a *prima facie* case (of abduction in this instance) made out, a Magistrate should send for the witnesses, and form his opinion on the evidence, and not merely on the strength of the police report reject the complainant's petition and refer him to the Civil Court. *BARODAKANT MOOKERJEE v. KALI BHUT-TACHARJEE* 9 W. R. Cr. 21

10. ———— *Remedy by civil suit.* A charge properly laid under the Penal Code should be investigated, even if the case be one in which a civil action will lie. *KHOSAL SINGH v. TOOLSEE CHOWDHRY* 10 W. R. Cr. 40
SEC KOREEM BOX v. HOORMUT 20 W. R. Cr. 60

11. ———— *Remedy by civil suit.* The High Court refused to interfere with an order of a Magistrate, by which he dismissed a complaint of theft, because it appeared to him, after making enquiries from the police, before whom the complaint was in the first instance brought, that the complaint was not one that the Criminal Court should entertain, but in respect to which a suit in the Civil Court should be brought. *QUEEN v. RUSSEK MONEE* 11 W. R. Cr. 54

12. ———— *Warrant and summons cases—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 248.* Where the offence charged is a "warrant" and not a "summons" case, a Magistrate ought to proceed with the enquiry or trial in spite of the withdrawal of the complaint, if he finds the elements of an offence on the facts set forth in the complaint. S. 248 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies only to a "summons" case. *In re GANESH NARAYAN SATHE* I. L. R. 13 Bom. 600

4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT.**(a) GROUND FOR DISMISSAL.**

1. ———— *Discretion of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 67—Discretion of Magistrate to dismiss case.* A Magistrate has a

COMPLAINT—contd.**4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.****(a) GROUND FOR DISMISSAL—contd.**

discretion, under s. 67 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to dismiss a complaint at once, and is under no obligation to go further. *BATOO L NASHYO v. BHUG-LOO CHOWKEEDAR* 10 W. R. Cr. 50

SHIBU MANJEE v. NOSHEE MOOKERJEE 17 W. R. Cr. 3

2. ———— *Acquittal without regular trial—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 250.* A Deputy Magistrate has no authority to acquit a prisoner of an offence under Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure for which he had not regularly put him upon his trial. He must proceed agreeably to s. 250 of that Code. *GOONATH MUNDUL v. TROYLOCKO CHUCKERBUTTY* 9 W. R. Cr. 15

3. ———— *Offence disclosed other than that charged—Additional Offence.* A Magistrate is not authorized to dismiss a case because he finds, in course of investigation, that the facts disclose an offence other than, or in addition to, that complained of, but is bound to adjudicate on the original charge. *DEGUMBER PAUL v. KALLY DOSS DUTT* 8 W. R. Cr. 82

4. ———— *Complaint laid by irresponsible person—Servant, charged by.* The dismissal of a charge for cutting and carrying away an indigo crop which was in his charge, on the mere ground that a more responsible servant ought to have laid the complaint, was held to be erroneous and was set aside, and the Magistrate directed to hear the case. *BOODHO ROY v. RAMDYAL SINGH* 18 W. R. Cr. 55

5. ———— *Delay in making charge—Want of material evidence of assault.* The High Court declined to interfere in these cases of dismissal by the Magistrate and Deputy Magistrate referred by the Judge, because the Judge considered that the Magistrate's reasons,—viz., (i) want of explanation of the cause of complainant's presence on the spot where the alleged assault was committed, (ii) want of explanation of delay in making the complaint, and (iii) want of material evidence in the shape of bruises—were not sufficient in law to justify a summary dismissal; and because the Judge considered that delay in making complaint was not of itself a legal ground for dismissal, particularly where an explanation of the delay is tendered. *HURNATH DE KHASH-KHIL v. JOYGOPAL DE SARKAR. AHNUDDY v. ANUND MOHUN MOZOOMDAR* 16 W. R. Cr. 75

6. ———— *Delay in prosecution after sanction—False charge.* Sanction was given by the Magistrate for the institution of criminal proceedings against the defendant for having made a false charge against the complainant. The Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the ground that the complainant had taken no step to prosecute for three months after the sanction was obtained.

COMPLAINT—contd.**4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.****(a) GROUND FOR DISMISSAL—contd.**

Held, that the Magistrate had power to dismiss the complaint. ANONYMOUS . 6 Mad. Ap. 15

7. ——— Refusal of complainant to lay complaint. A Magistrate is not bound to convict of a charge on which the complainant refuses to lay a complaint, although on the accused's own admission the offence has been committed. ANONYMOUS . . . 5 Mad. Ap. 5

8. ——— Non-appearance of complainant—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 205, 361*. Where a complainant is required to pay fees for summoning witnesses under s. 361 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and fails to do so, the Magistrate must deal with the case on the evidence before him, and is not justified in dismissing the complaint under s. 205 of that Code. KORAPULU v. MONAPPA I. L. R. 5 Mad. 180

9. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 208*. Under s. 208, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint if the complainant does not appear on the day to which the hearing has been duly adjourned, even though the complainant and his witnesses have been examined and their further attendance seems unnecessary. MUDOOSOODEN SHA v. HARI DASS DASS . . . 22 W. R. 40

10. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 259*. A Subordinate Magistrate has no power to dismiss a charge of criminal misappropriation under s. 403 of the Penal Code for non-appearance of the complainant, under s. 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section only applies to cases which fall within Ch. XV of the Criminal Procedure Code. ANONYMOUS . . . 4 Mad. Ap. 41

11. ——— *Order made in absence of parties*. When an order for adjournment was not made in the presence of the parties, the dismissal of the complaint, because the complainant did not appear on the day fixed, was held to be illegal. ANONYMOUS . . . 8 Mad. Ap. 6

12. ——— *Obstruction in repairing road without leave*. Where a person for having repaired a public road without having previously asked for leave to repair it was, on simple petition, charged with having obstructed the road, and the complainant never appeared :—*Held*, that the Deputy Magistrate ought to have dismissed the complaint. QUEEN v. BHOLA NATH BANERJEE . . . 7 W. R. Cr. 31

13. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 369, 432 and 247—Warrant case, "Dismissal for Default"—Presidency Magistrate, power of*. An order by a Presidency Magistrate "dismissing for default" a case under s. 420, Penal Code, for the non-appearance of the complainant is bad, inasmuch as he thereby applied to a warrant case a procedure provided by

COMPLAINT—contd.**4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.****(a) GROUND FOR DISMISSAL—contd.**

s. 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for summons cases only. RAM COOMAR v. RAMJEE . . . 4 C. W. N. 26

14. ——— *Presence of witnesses*. Where a complaint is preferred before a Magistrate, and the witnesses named by the complainant are summoned and attend, but the complainant is absent, a Magistrate may, if he thinks it unnecessary to carry on the enquiry in the absence of the complainant, discharge the accused. QUEEN v. DASOO MANJEE . . . 11 W. R. Cr. 39

15. ——— *Illegal adjournment*. The Deputy Magistrate's order dismissing a case for default (after repeated unnecessary adjournments and after the accused was put on his defence) upon a day to which no legal adjournment was made, was set aside as illegal. MOHOMED ALUM v. AKIL . . . 16 W. R. Cr. 68

16. ——— *Discharge of Accused*. In answer to a reference from a Sessions Judge, the Court were of opinion that in a case where the accused has been duly summoned or arrested under a warrant, and is present to meet any charge, and the complainant and his witnesses negligently fail to appear against him, if it be not shown to the Magistrate that the case is one in which he ought to adjourn the enquiry under s. 224, Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused person ought to be discharged; but also held that the question did not arise under the circumstances of the case, and the case must go back to the Magistrate for investigation. TAKI MAHOMED MANDAL v. KRISHNA NATH RAI . . . 7 B. L. R. 7
15 W. R. Cr. 53

QUEEN v. ABDUL BISWAS . 7 B. L. R. 8 note

But see QUEEN v. BHAGABATI SATHRAN

7 B. L. R. 9 note

S.C. NUNDLAL SOOTRODHOR v. BHAGIRUTTY SOOTRAN . . . 10 W. R. Cr. 31

17. ——— *Postponement for further evidence*. Where the charge was one under s. 347 of the Penal Code, and the evidence of the prosecutor and other evidence had been taken, and the case postponed for the evidence of further witnesses which was considered necessary by the Magistrate, and they failed to appear, an order by the Magistrate dismissing the case for want of sufficient evidence was held to be legal. QUEEN v. BIDUR GHOSE . . . 7 B. L. R. 9 note : 12 W. R. Cr. 27

18. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 247*. A case having been transferred from the file of one Magistrate to that of another, was on the day fixed called on for hearing, but the complainant not appearing, the case was dismissed under s. 247 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It appeared that the complainant and his

COMPLAINT—contd.**4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.****(a) GROUND FOR DISMISSAL—concl'd.**

witnesses, though not in attendance in the Magistrate's Court, were present in another Court in the same Court-house, being under the impression that his case had been transferred to the Magistrate of that Court. *Held*, that the complainant having been present in the Court-house, the provisions of s. 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been improperly applied. *ROMANATH BAL v. BEHARI BOG BAGDI* **13 C. L. R. 303**

19. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 247—Acquittal—Absence of Prosecutor when case called on—Subsequent appearance on same day.* A Magistrate before acquitting a person under the provisions of s. 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is not bound to wait until the Court is about to close for the day. *KUTTIYALI v. PARI MAKDI* **I. L. R. 7 Mad. 356**

20. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 200, 202—Complaint by Government Pleader—Judicial Inquiry—Cognisance—Jurisdiction.* On the complaint of a person who had no personal knowledge of the matter complained of, a judicial inquiry was directed and on the report thereof proceedings were taken. *Held*, that there was no complaint under s. 200, Criminal Procedure Code, properly so called on which a judicial inquiry could be directed. The proceedings were quashed. *CHAMROO SAHU v. EMPEROR (1906)* **11 C. W. N. 170**

(b) POWER OF, AND PRELIMINARIES TO, DISMISSAL.

21. *Power to dismiss case—Irregularity in dismissal—Transfer of case by Magistrate to Deputy Magistrate.* *S T* brought a charge of theft against *B* before a Magistrate. The case was made over to the Deputy Magistrate, on whose suggestion the Magistrate ordered that there should be a police enquiry. The police superintendent reported that, in his opinion, the charge was false, and that the plaintiff should be summoned for bringing a false charge; and the Magistrate, while declaring that he would not encourage charges of "false complaint," said that the injured party might swear an information if she chose. *S T* then petitioned to be allowed to call witnesses in support of her charge of theft, and objected to the police proceedings. The Magistrate recorded the following order:—"The case has been dismissed, and the accused, *Mrs. B*, has received permission to prosecute the woman *S T* for false charge; the present petition may be put in defence in that case." *Held*, that the order of the Magistrate must be quashed—(i) because he had no jurisdiction, the case having been made over to the Deputy Magistrate; (ii) because the order above was not a judicial dismissal of the case. Case remanded for trial of the original charge as brought by *S T*. *SHANTO TEORNI v. BELILIOS* **3 B. L. R. Ap. 151**

COMPLAINT—contd.**4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.****(b) POWER OF, AND PRELIMINARIES TO, DISMISSAL—contd.**

22. *Dismissal by one Court after transfer to another—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 203.* *Held*, that a Deputy Commissioner had no power to pass an order of dismissal under s. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) in a case which he had transferred to an Extra Assistant Commissioner and which was at the time pending in the Court of the latter. *KUTAB ALI v. EMPRESS* **3 C. W. N. 490**

23. *Dismissal of complaint on police report—Omission to give complainant opportunity to prove case.* After complainant's preliminary examination the case was referred to the police for report, and complainant had notice to appear on 6th November to hear the report. On 31st October, the Assistant Magistrate dismissed the case upon the report of the police officer without giving complainant an opportunity to show cause against the dismissal. His order was set aside by the High Court, and he directed to conform to Circular 5A., dated 7th September 1868. *BULLEE SINGH v. KANAI CHOWDHRY* **17 W. R. Cr. 2**

24. *Report of police officer who is an accused person—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 200-203, 437.* Ss. 200 to 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code must be read together, and a Magistrate dismissing a complaint under the provisions of s. 203 on any one of the three grounds—*viz.* (i) if he, upon the statement of the complainant, reduced to writing under s. 200, finds no offence has been committed; (ii) if he distrusts the statement made by the complainant; and (iii) if he distrusts that statement, but his distrust is not sufficiently strong to warrant him in acting upon it, except upon a further enquiry as provided for in s. 232—must record his reason for so doing, for, if such reasons were not recorded, it would be impossible for the High Court, exercising its revisional powers under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to consider whether the discretion of such Magistrate has been properly exercised. It was never contemplated that a Magistrate should call for a report from an accused person under s. 202 for the purpose of ascertaining the truth of the complaint. If such accused happened to be an officer subordinate to the Magistrate, where, therefore, a complaint was made against a police officer, and complainant's statement was duly recorded, and the Magistrate acting under the provisions of s. 202 called for a report from such police officer, and acting upon that report dismissed the complaint under s. 203:—*Held*, that he had acted illegally, and that his order made under the last-named section should be set aside, and the case proceeded with according to law from the time at which the complaint was made and the com-

COMPLAINT—*contd.*4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.*(b) POWER OF, AND PRELIMINARIES TO, DISMISSAL—*contd.*

plainant's statement so recorded. **BAIDYA NATH SINGH v. MUSPRATT** . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 141

25. *Failure to show in Magistrate's opinion any criminal offence—Act XXV of 1861, s. 180—Act X of 1872, s. 146—Powers of Magistrate.* The accused was charged before a Deputy Magistrate with an offence under s. 431, Penal Code. The Deputy Magistrate examined the complainant, took bail from the accused, but refused to examine the complainant's witnesses, although present, and delayed the investigation unnecessarily for a long time. The Magistrate of the District then called for the proceedings, and having looked at them considered that there was no case for the interference of the Criminal Courts, and discharged the prisoner, although he was present and under bail. *Held*, that the Magistrate was not only competent, but bound to discharge the prisoner, if his conclusion that no offence was made out was correct. But *held*, also, that the Magistrate's conclusion was wrong, and that the act complained of, if true, did amount to an offence under s. 431 of the Penal Code; therefore the Magistrate's order was set aside, and further enquiry ordered. **NIAMUTULLA v. GOPAL SAHA**

11 B. L. R. Ap. 6: 14 W. R. Cr. 63

26. *Preliminaries to dismissal—Recording evidence of complainant—Act XXV of 1861, ss. 66 and 180—Dismissal of complaint without recording evidence—Act X of 1872, ss. 144 and 140.* A charged B before a Magistrate for wrongful confinement of her brother. Previous to the petition to the Magistrate, the charge had been investigated by the police, and reported to be false. The Magistrate, without recording the complaint under s. 66 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sent for the police papers, and under s. 180 of the same Code dismissed the case. *Held*, that the proceedings were illegal; that the Magistrate was bound, under s. 66 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to record the examination of the complainant before he could, under s. 180, dismiss the complaint. **DULALI BEWA v. BHUBAN SHAHA**

3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 53

See **QUEEN v. HARRAKCHAND NOWLAKA**.

8 W. R. Cr. 12

DINONATH GOPE v. SARODA MOOKHOPADHYA.

7 W. R. Cr. 47

QUEEN v. RAMNATH

7 W. R. Cr. 45

SATYA CHARAN GHOSE v. CHAIRMAN, UTTARPARA MUNICIPALITY

3 C. W. N. 17

In the matter of NILMONY BHUTTACHARJEE

16 W. R. Cr. 368

But s. 180 applied to cases under Chap. XIV of the Code by s. 249 of Act VIII of 1869, and a Magistrate might dismiss a complaint without calling

COMPLAINT—*contd.*4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.*(b) POWER OF, AND PRELIMINARIES TO, DISMISSAL—*contd.*

evidence if he thought there was no sufficient ground for proceeding.

27. *Examination of Complainant.* A Magistrate is bound at least to examine a complainant before he can exercise the discretionary power to issue process or dismiss the complaint which is given to him by s. 67 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. **RANGASWAMI GOUNDEN v. SABAPATHY GOUNDEN** . 4 Mad. 162

28. *Examination of Complainant—Refusal to hear complaint—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 144.* A complaint of theft of cocoanuts valued at one anna and eight pies was made to a third class Magistrate, who returned the petition to the complainant, with an endorsement that he should obtain redress from the Village Magistrate. *Held*, under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, he was bound to hear the complaint. **ANONYMOUS**

7 Mad. Ap. 31

29. *Examination of Complainant—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 67—Act X of 1872, s. 147—Dismissal without enquiry.* Where Magistrate removed a case from the file of the Joint Magistrate to his own after complaint had been made and warrants issued by the Joint Magistrate upon the footing of the complaint and thereupon suspended the warrant and dismissed the complaint without hearing it in due course of procedure:—*Held*, that it was an improper proceeding; he ought to have proceeded with the case from the stage at which it was when he removed it. *In the matter of the petition of RAGHOO PARIRAH*

10 B. L. R. Ap. 26: 19 W. R. Cr. 28

30. *Examination of Complainant.* If a Magistrate considers a complaint false and groundless, he is not bound to issue a summons or warrant. The law vests him with a discretion, which discretion it is incumbent on him to exercise. At the same time the Magistrate should always take the examination of the complainant. **QUEEN v. RAMCHURN**

3 N. W. 272

31. *Examination of Complainant—Interference by High Court—Act X of 1872, ss. 144, 147, 295, and 296—Act XXV of 1861, s. 434.* Where a Magistrate had examined the complainant under s. 56 of Act XXV of 1861, and dismissed the complaint under s. 67:—*Held*, that the High Court would not interfere under s. 434. **QUEEN v. FOKTU SHAH**

2 B. L. R. S. N. 6: 10 W. R. Cr. 49

32. *Examination of Complainant—Omission to examine Complainant—Order for prosecution for false charge under s. 211, Penal Code.* A charge of burglary and theft having been preferred against two persons, the

COMPLAINT—contd.**4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.****(b) POWER OF, AND PRELIMINARIES TO, DISMISSAL—contd.**

Magistrate before whom the charge was laid, after comparing the petition of complaint with the papers submitted to him by the police, who had made an enquiry and reported the charge to be false, directed, without having taken the examination of the complainant, that the case should be struck out, and that proceedings should be instituted against the complainant under s. 182 of the Penal Code. Proceedings were accordingly taken and the complainant was ultimately tried and found guilty of an offence under s. 211. *Held*, on appeal, that the proceedings had been irregular and should be quashed; that the Magistrate should be directed to reopen the enquiry into the charge of burglary and theft, first examining the complainant; and that if after such examination he should be of opinion that the charge was false, the appellant might be proceeded against under s. 211 of the Penal Code. *In the matter of* BRYOGI BHAGUT **4 C. L. R. 134**

In the matter of RUSSICK LALL MULLICK

7 C. L. R. 382

33. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 203—"Examining"*—Written Complaint attested by Complainant on oath—Irregularity—*Criminal Procedure Code, s. 537*. Where a deposition in the shape of a complaint is made orally or in writing and is sworn to, the requirements of s. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code in regard to the examination of the complainant are sufficiently satisfied. *Held*, therefore, where a Magistrate dismissed a complaint of criminal breach of trust without examining the complainant on oath, but after the complainant had sworn to the truth of the matters alleged in the complaint, that the provisions of s. 203 had been sufficiently complied with, and, if not, that the irregularity was covered by the terms of s. 537. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MURPHY* **I. L. R. 9 All. 666**

34. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 203—Magistrate's discretion—Nature and extent of such discretion—"Sufficient ground," meaning of—Complainant's motive*. A Magistrate cannot dismiss a complaint under s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), until he has examined the complainant to see whether there is *prima facie* evidence of a criminal offence. In exercising his discretion under s. 203, the Magistrate ought not to allow himself to be influenced by a consideration of the motive by which the complainant may have been actuated in moving in the matter, nor by any other consideration outside the facts which are adduced by the complainant in support of his complaint. *In the matter of the petition of* GANESH NARAYAN SATHE **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 590**

35. ———— *Examination of Complainant—Dismissal without enquiry*. A charge

COMPLAINT—contd.**4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.****(b) POWER OF, AND PRELIMINARIES TO, DISMISSAL—contd.**

of theft should be enquired into before deciding it to be false or taking steps under s. 211, Penal Code. *In the matter of* BISHOO BARIK

16 W. R. Cr. 77

36. ———— *Examination of Complainant—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 147*. A charge of theft was preferred by the petitioner on the 7th October 1878, before the police, who thereupon instituted enquiries which subsequently resulted in their finding the charge unproved. Meanwhile, on the 15th October, the charge was repeated in a complaint before the Magistrate of the District who directed the complainant and his witnesses to attend on a particular day, but subsequently, without having examined them or the complainant, referred the matter to the Sub-Deputy Magistrate. That officer having reported the charge to be false, the Magistrate, on the 9th November, wrote upon the police report, which had meanwhile, on the 26th October, been submitted to him, the following direction, *viz.* "show as false". On the 19th November a counter-prosecution under ss. 211, 182 and 500 of the Penal Code was sanctioned, and eventually, on the 22nd May 1879, resulted in the petitioner being convicted. While the counter-prosecution was pending, the petitioner, on the 22nd April, applied to the Magistrate to proceed with his complaint according to law, but was informed that his complaint was dismissed. On the following day the Magistrate recorded the following order:—"Dismissed in accordance with my decision recorded in the police report under s. 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." *Held*, that the complaint had been improperly dismissed and that the order of the Magistrate, dated 23rd April 1879, must be set aside. *ERAD ALI v. NUSIBUN NISSA BIBEE*

4 C. L. R. 534

37. ———— *Hearing Evidence—Dismissal without hearing evidence*. A Magistrate ought to hear evidence in support of a charge before dismissing the complaint. A bare assertion by an accused charged with committing theft of a proprietary right in the alleged stolen property, is no reason for a Magistrate to refuse to entertain the charge of theft. *QUEEN v. KALI CHARAN MISSEER* **7 B. L. R. Ap. 55**

S.C. RUNNOO SINGH v. KALI CHARAN MISSEER

16 W. R. Cr. 18

38. ———— *Hearing Evidence—Dismissal without hearing evidence—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 270—Act X of 1872, s. 209*. On the day fixed for hearing a complaint of trespass and assault made against three persons named, the complainant appeared with his witnesses, and the defendant also appeared; and on one of them being found to be a child of 8 years of age, the Magistrate dismissed the case

COMPLAINT—*contd.*4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.*(b) POWER OF, AND PRELIMINARIES TO, DISMISSAL—*contd.*

without taking any evidence. *Held*, that the Magistrate was in error, and should not have dismissed the case merely because one defendant was a child. He should have followed the procedure laid down in ss. 265 and 266. *BILASH v. MAKROO*
2 B. L. R. S. N. 15 : 10 W. R. Cr. 61

39. ——— Examination of complainant's witnesses—Recording reasons—Penal Code, s. 211, charge under. A Deputy Magistrate was held to have acted irregularly in dismissing a complaint, and directing the trial of the complainant under s. 211 of the Penal Code without recording his reasons for doing so, and without examining all the witnesses tendered by the complainant, or allowing a reasonable time for the attendance of such of the witnesses as were not present. *QUEEN v. HEERA LALL GHOSE*. 13 W. R. Cr. 37

NISSAR HOSSEIN v. RAMGOLAM SINGH
25 W. R. Cr. 10

In the matter of GANGOO SINGH
2 C. L. R. 389

40. ——— Examination of complainant's Witnesses—Criminal Procedure Code, 1869, ss. 193, 249. S. 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies to cases under Chap. XV of that Code, and a Magistrate cannot dispose of a case under that Chapter without examining the witnesses called for the prosecution. *KISHORE SAHAI v. MUNGERI SAHAI*. 16 W. R. Cr. 48

So also under the Code of 1872.

JITAN KHAN v. DURGA SINGH
20 W. R. Cr. 59

41. ——— Examination of complainant's Witnesses—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 66. A Magistrate cannot refuse a summons to a complainant even in a case in which the charge might have been laid at the police in the first instance, but is bound, under s. 66 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to examine the complainant on oath and pass orders in the case. *AMEER MAHOMED v. BRASS*. 14 W. R. Cr. 36

42. ——— Examination of complainant's Witnesses—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 67. *Per GLOVER, J.*—Where the Criminal Procedure Code makes it necessary for a Magistrate, before dismissing a charge, to examine both the complainant and his witnesses, it supposes that there has been already a *prima facie* case made out; and where the complainant makes out such a *prima facie* case, the Magistrate is bound first to examine all the complainant's witnesses before dismissing the charge; but in a case where there is clearly no *prima facie* case established, the Magistrate is justified in acting under s. 67 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and in dismissing the case at once. *ISSER CHUNDER GHOSE v. PEARI MOHUN PALIT*. 16 W. R. Cr. 39

COMPLAINT—*contd.*4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.*(b) POWER OF, AND PRELIMINARIES TO, DISMISSAL—*contd.*

SREENATH MUNDLE v. SREERAM RAJPUT
24 W. R. Cr. 62

43. ——— Examination of complainant's Witnesses. A Magistrate is bound, before he discharges an accused person under s. 215 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to examine all the witnesses, and should not refuse to examine witnesses simply because their evidence will be to the same effect as that already taken for the prosecution. *EMPRESS v. HEMATULLA*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 389

44. ——— Examination of complainant's Witnesses—Discharge of accused without examining all the witnesses. Before a Magistrate discharges an accused person under s. 215 of Act X of 1872, he is bound, under that section, to examine all the witnesses named for the prosecution. *Empress v. Hematulla*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 389, followed. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. KASHI*

I. L. R. 2 All. 447

QUEEN v. PARASURAMA NAIKAR.
I. L. R. 4 Mad. 329

ANONYMOUS CASE. 8 Mad. Ap. 5

But see *JELDHARI SINGH v. SHUNKUR DOYAL*.
23 W. R. Cr. 9

45. ——— Power of, and preliminaries to, dismissal—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 203—Duty of Magistrate to examine Witnesses, for the complainant before dismissing complaint. When a case has not been disposed of under Criminal Procedure Code, s. 203, and the complainant's witnesses have been summoned, the Magistrate is bound to examine the witnesses tendered by the complainant, and is not entitled to acquit the accused on a consideration of the complainant's statement alone. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SINNAI GOUNDAN*. I. L. R. 20 Mad. 388

46. ——— Revival of proceedings—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 203, 437. A complaint was made, before a Magistrate of the first class, of an offence punishable under s. 323 of the Penal Code. The Magistrate recorded a brief statement by the complainant, but did not ask him if he had any witnesses to call. An order was passed directing that "a copy of the petition of complaint should be sent to the police-station, calling for a report on the matter," and on receipt of the report the Magistrate dismissed the complaint under s. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code. There was nothing in the Magistrate's original order to show that he saw reason to distrust the truth of the complaint, nor did he direct any local investigation to be made by a police-officer for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint. Subsequently to the dismissal of the complaint, the same complainant brought a fresh charge upon the same facts against the

COMPLAINT—contd.**4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.****(b) POWER OF, AND PRELIMINARIES TO, DISMISSAL—contd.**

same persons in the same Court, and upon this charge the accused were tried, convicted, and sentenced. *Held*, that the Magistrate had not complied with the provisions of s. 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and ought not, merely on the report he had received, to have dismissed the first complaint under s. 203. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PURAN* . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 85

47. ——— Examination of complainant—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 202, 203—Complaint before District Magistrate—Order for local inquiry to a Magistrate not competent to take cognisance of the complaint, legality of—Determination of complaint—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 211—False charge, prosecution for making—Opportunity given to complainant to establish the truth of his complaint—Preliminary Inquiry, whether necessary. Where a Magistrate dismissed a complaint after hearing complainant and considering the results of an investigation held under s. 202 : *Held*, that he had legally determined the complaint. Where an order for local enquiry under s. 202 was made to a Deputy Magistrate who was not competent to entertain the complaint, and the complainant claimed to have all his witnesses examined by a competent Magistrate : *Held*, that ss. 202 and 203 do not give that right to a complainant whose story is disbelieved by the Magistrate. In a prosecution under s. 211, Indian Penal Code, where the complaint on which the prosecution was founded was dismissed after hearing and the taking of such steps as are provided by the Code : *Held*, that the complainant had sufficient opportunity to establish the truth of his complaint. *Queen-Empress v. Sham Lall*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 707, referred to. *Mahadeo Singh v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 921, distinguished. In a prosecution for making a false charge, under s. 211, Indian Penal Code, though it may be sometimes desirable that a preliminary inquiry should be held, it is not a matter of imperative necessity. *Baperam Sarma v. Gauri Nath Dutt*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 474, and *In the matter of Mutty Lall Ghose*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 308, referred to. *SURJYA HARIANI v. KING EMPEROR* (1901)

6 C. W. N. 295

48. ——— False Charge—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 156, 159, 200, 202, 203—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 211—Jurisdiction of Magistrate. A complaint was made to a Magistrate, who, without examining the complainant, sent the petition of complaint, under s. 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the police, for enquiry, and, upon receipt of the police report, directed a Sub-Deputy Magistrate to make a preliminary inquiry into the case under s. 159 of the Code ; and, on receipt of his report,

COMPLAINT—contd.**4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.****(b) POWER OF, AND PRELIMINARIES TO, DISMISSAL—contd.**

the Magistrate, not being satisfied with it, cross-examined the complainant and some of his witnesses, examined some witnesses sent up by the police, and then dismissed the complaint under s. 203 of the Code, and directed the prosecution of the complainant under s. 211 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the order dismissing the complaint was illegal, the Magistrate having no jurisdiction to deal with the case or dismiss it under s. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code without complying with the requirements of the law as laid down in ss. 200 and 202 of that Code. *LOKENATH PATRA v. SANTYASI CHARAN MANNA* (1903) . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 923 : s. c. 7 C. W. N. 525

(c) EFFECT OF DISMISSAL.

49. ——— Dismissal for default in appearance of complainant—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 269—Bar to complaint being again made. Dismissal of a complaint under s. 269 of the Criminal Procedure Code in consequence of non-attendance of the complainant, the order of dismissal having been passed before the trial commenced, amounts to a discharge without trial, and does not bar the complaint from being again preferred. *ANONYMOUS* . . . 4 Mad. Ap. 8

ANONYMOUS . . . Mad. 8

50. ——— Dismissal of complaint for default in appearance of complainant—Presidency Magistrate's Act (IV of 1877), s. 124—Institution of fresh proceedings. An order of dismissal under s. 124 of Act IV of 1877 does not operate as an acquittal. *EMPRESS v. THOMPSON* I. L. R. 6 Calc. 523 : 8 C. L. R. 106

51. ——— Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 247, 437—Dismissal of complaint in absence of complainant in a summons case—Acquittal of one of two accused who alone was present—Powers to revise proceedings. The dismissal of a case and the acquittal of one of two accused under s. 247, Code of Criminal Procedure, on the ground of complainant's absence and purporting to be a termination of all proceedings relating to that matter, will operate also against a co-accused whose attendance could not be obtained and against whom the trial did not proceed. No order can be passed under s. 437 setting aside the order and directing the case to be proceeded with against the absent accused. *PANCHU alias PANCHANAN SINGH v. UMOR MAHOMED SHEIKH* . . . 4 C. W. N. 346

52. ——— Dismissal of summary case—Acquittal—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 212. The dismissal of a case in which a summons issues in the first instance amounts to an acquittal of the accused, against whom, after such an acquittal,

COMPLAINT—contd.**4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.****(c) EFFECT OF DISMISSAL—contd.**

no further proceedings in respect of the same act can be taken under a different charge. *IRFAN BISWAS v. JINNUT BIBEE* . 25 W. R. Cr. 63

53. — Dismissal after hearing evidence—Further proceedings—Acquittal—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 147. The further proceedings allowed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 147, can only be taken in cases where the complainant has been alone heard, and not where he has had the advantage of having his witnesses heard. In the latter case a dismissal would amount to a verdict of acquittal against the accused parties, and render a second trial on the facts impossible. *NITYANUNDO BUR v. KALA CHAND BUR* . 24 W. R. Cr. 75

54. — Dismissal without proper exercise of discretion—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 205—Acquittal. A woman accused a man of seduction under promise of marriage, and asked for maintenance for their illegitimate child. The Deputy Magistrate summoned the man; but on the day appointed for hearing neither the complainant nor the woman appeared, and the complaint was dismissed. Subsequently the woman petitioned, representing her inability to attend on the day appointed owing to causes beyond her control. The Deputy Magistrate, without enquiring into the allegation, held that his dismissal of the complaint operated like an acquittal. Held, that the Deputy Magistrate, though competent to dismiss the complaint, ought to have exercised some discretion, more particularly under the circumstances detailed by the prosecutrix, and that the section (Act X of 1872, s. 205) contemplated such an exercise of discretion. *TAZOONISSA v. WASSIL* . 24 W. R. Cr. 64

55. — Dismissal in exercise of judicial discretion—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 212—Acquittal. Where the Magistrate dismissed a case in the exercise of a judicial discretion, such dismissal by s. 212, Act X of 1872, has the effect of an acquittal of the accused person. The Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any application to interfere with the acquittal of an accused person, except the application be made either by Government or under the sanction of Government. In the matter of the petition of *BAGRAM*

19 W. R. Cr. 52

56. — Dismissal after adjournment for evidence—Non-attendance of witnesses—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 208, 212. The dismissal of a complaint under s. 208 operates as an acquittal by reason of s. 212, Code of Criminal Procedure. *EASTERN BENGAL RAILWAY COMPANY v. KALIDASS DUTT*

23 W. R. Cr. 63

57. — Dismissal on finding of not guilty—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 220 (1882, s. 258)—Acquittal. An order dismiss-

COMPLAINT—contd.**4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.****(c) EFFECT OF DISMISSAL—contd.**

ing a complaint under s. 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, amounts to an acquittal. In the matter of *JADUBAR MOOKERJEE* . 5 C. L. R. 359

58. — Dismissal on finding no offence proved—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 253 (1872, ss. 215, 216; 1861, s. 69, s. 250)—Acquittal. A discharge under s. 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, does not amount to an acquittal. *QUEEN v. HURPERSHAD* . 4 N. W. 23

59. — Issue of Warrant of Arrest and not taking proceedings under it—Power of District Magistrate to order proceedings against persons against whom warrant was issued—No final order of dismissal. Where there is evidence in any trial before a Subordinate Magistrate against certain persons that they have committed some offence, and the Subordinate Magistrate does not think it necessary to proceed against them, the District Magistrate cannot direct proceedings to be taken against them unless a final order of dismissal or discharge has been made, and he considers such order to be an improper one. Nor can he direct proceedings to be taken against such persons if they have not been before the Court unless he has removed the case for trial to his own Court by an express order. *MOUL SINGH v. MAHABIR SINGH* . 4 C. W. N. 242

60. — Dismissal for absence of complainant—Revival of and further inquiry into case by same Magistrate—Review—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 259, 369, 437 and 438. Complainant filed a complaint under ss. 341, 323, 447 and 426 of the Penal Code. The District Magistrate, after recording the statements of the complainant, ordered the issue of a summons to the accused, returnable on the 19th April. On that day the complainant was absent when the case was called on. The District Magistrate dismissed the case under s. 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Subsequently, on the application of the complainant, the District Magistrate revived the case and made it over to an Honorary Magistrate for trial. Held, that the terms of s. 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be read as controlled by s. 437 of that Code. S. 437 does not limit the power of a District Magistrate to make, or order a Subordinate Magistrate to make, further inquiry into a case in which an order of dismissal or discharge may have been passed by a Subordinate Magistrate. There is no bar to a District Magistrate making further inquiry into a case in which such order may have been passed by himself. *BRDHU CHANDALINI v. MATI SHEIKH MONDAL* (1900)

[I. L. R. 28 Calc. 102

61. — Revival of proceedings—Discharge of accused—Re-arrest of accused without previous order of discharge being set aside—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 252, 253, 403, 436 and 437—Indian Post Office Act (VI of

COMPLAINT—contd.**4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—contd.****(c) EFFECT OF DISMISSAL—contd.**

1898), s. 52. There is no express provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure to the effect that the dismissal of a complaint shall be a bar to a fresh complaint being entertained so long as the order of dismissal remains unreversed. An accused person was arrested on the charge of having stolen a registered letter from the Post Office, and was brought up before a Bench of Presidency Magistrates, charged with offences under s. 381 of the Penal Code and s. 52 of the Post Office Act, 1898. He was discharged on the same day, the Bench considering the evidence insufficient. Subsequently the accused was re-arrested on substantially the same charge, and was committed by the Chief Presidency Magistrate for trial upon further and fresh evidence. Upon an application by the accused to have the order of commitment discharged on the ground that the Chief Presidency Magistrate had no jurisdiction to make the commitment, as the previous order of discharge had not been set aside: *Held*, that the commitment was good. *Niratan Sen v. Jogesh Chundra Bhattacharjee*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 983, distinguished. *Grish Chunder Roy v. Dwarka Dass Agarwallah*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 528, dissented from. *Opoorba Kumar Sett v. Probod Kumary Dass*, I. L. R. 24 Cal. 49, followed. *QUEEN-EMPERESS v. DOLEGOBIND DASS* (1900) . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 211: s. c. 5 C. W. N. 169

62. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 203—Refusal by Magistrate to take cognizance of case—Subsequent trial by him.* A complaint was laid in the Court of a Town Magistrate charging certain persons with having committed offences under the Registration Act. The Town Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the ground that sanction, which he deemed to be necessary, had not been obtained. The complainant obtained sanction, and thereupon the Town Magistrate proceeded with the case and convicted the accused. On appeal, the Deputy Magistrate, while agreeing that the accused were guilty, reversed the conviction on the ground that, inasmuch as the Town Magistrate had once thrown out the complaint under s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he could not subsequently entertain it. On the case being referred to the High Court for order: *Held*, that, although in form the Town Magistrate's order purported to dismiss the complaint under s. 203, in substance it refused to take cognizance of the offence on the ground that sanction was necessary and had not been obtained; and that the acquittal must be set aside. *QUEEN-EMPERESS v. KUNYIL RARU* (1900)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 337

63. ——— *Further Inquiry—Complaint accusing several persons—Proceedings, institution of, against one—Conviction—Refusal by Magistrate to proceed against other persons accused—Notice—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of*

COMPLAINT—contd.**4. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—concl'd.****(c) EFFECT OF DISMISSAL—concl'd.**

1898), ss. 203 and 437. A complaint was made to a Magistrate, charging several persons with the commission of an offence. The Magistrate instituted proceedings only against one of them and after his conviction refused to issue processes against the others. On application by the complainant, the Sessions Judge, under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code, directed a further inquiry into the matter without notice to the other persons accused. *Held*, that the refusal by the Magistrate to issue processes was an order of dismissal of the complaint within the meaning of s. 203 of the Code, in regard to which a further enquiry could be made. *Held*, further, that it is not necessary that notice should issue to a person accused of an offence before an order can be properly passed under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code directing a further inquiry into a matter which has terminated in the summary dismissal of a complaint under s. 203 of the Code in the absence of any person excepting the complainant. *Hari Das Sanyal v. Saritulla*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 608, discussed. *GRIS CHUNDER GHOSE v. EMPEROR* (1902)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 457:
6 C. W. N. 638

5. REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT.

1. ——— *Revival of proceedings—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 203—Final disposal of case—Jurisdiction of Magistrate.* Where an original complaint is dismissed under s. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a fresh complaint on the same facts before the same Magistrate cannot be entertained so long as the order of dismissal is not set aside by a competent authority. *Niratan Sen v. Jogesh Chundra Bhattacharjee*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 983, followed. *KOMAL CHUNDRA PAL v. GOUR CHAND AUDHIKARI* . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 286
1 C. W. N. 185

SIMBHOO RAM LALL v. KARI HAZARI

3 C. W. N. 780

2. ——— *Right of Appeal—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), ss. 423 and 439—Presidency Magistrate, jurisdiction of.* Where a complaint was dismissed by an Honorary Magistrate, and an application was made to a Presidency Magistrate on the same facts and materials for a fresh summons:—*Held*, that as an Honorary Magistrate has co-ordinate jurisdiction with a Presidency Magistrate, there was no right of appeal to the Presidency Magistrate from the order of the Honorary Magistrate. The proper course would be to apply to the High Court under ss. 423 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code to set aside the order and direct a re-trial. *Niratan Sen v. Jogesh Chundra Bhattacharjee*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 983, approved; *Virankutti v. Chiyamu*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 557; and *Opoorba Kumar Sett v. Probod Kumary*

COMPLAINT—*contd.*5. REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.*

Dassi, 1 C. W. N. 49, discussed. GRISH CHUNDER ROY v. DWARKADASS AGARWALLAH

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 528
1 C. W. N. 370

3. ———— *Fresh complaint after dismissal—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 203—Final disposal of case—Application of s. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code.* Where an original complaint is dismissed under s. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a fresh complaint on the same facts cannot be entertained so long as the order of dismissal is not set aside by a competent authority. S. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not intended to apply to a case which has not been finally disposed of. NILRATAN SEN v. JOGESH CHUNDRA BUTTACHARJEE I. L. R. 23 Calc. 983
1 C. W. N. 56

4. ———— A conviction in such a complaint, if entertained, is bad in law as being without jurisdiction. KAMAL CHANDRA PAL v. GOUR CHAND ADHIKARI

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 286
1 C. W. N. 185

5. ———— *Complaint of offences under ss. 182 and 500 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)—Necessary sanction not obtained—Withdrawal of complaint—Discharge of accused—Fresh complaint lodged on same charges—Effect of previous discharge of accused—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 248, 253 and 403.* A complaint was lodged against the accused, charging him with offences under ss. 182 and 500 of the Penal Code. The complainant's solicitor, finding that no sanction had been obtained as required by s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code for proceeding with the charge under s. 182 of the Penal Code, applied to the Magistrate for leave to withdraw the complaint, which the Magistrate granted, adding to his order the words "accused is discharged". The complainant having subsequently obtained the requisite sanction, filed a fresh complaint on the same charges. It was objected on behalf of the accused that the accused had been acquitted under s. 248 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and that further proceedings were now barred under s. 403. The Magistrate allowed the objection and stopped the proceedings. On application to High Court:—*Held*, that the order of the Magistrate should be reversed and the complaint investigated. The order stopping the proceedings would be legal only if the accused had been acquitted by a Court of competent jurisdiction, which was not the case, as the Magistrate could not take cognizance of the charge under s. 182 of the Penal Code, without a sanction having been previously obtained. As to the charge under s. 500 of the Penal Code, the proper procedure in respect of it was that prescribed for warrant cases. The only legal order that could be made in such a case was an order of discharge under s. 253 of the Criminal Procedure Code and not of acquittal, and it was an

COMPLAINT—*contd.*5. REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.*

order of discharge that was actually made. *In re SAMSUDIN* . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 711

6. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 203—Subsequent complaint arising out of the same matter.* When a competent tribunal has dismissed a complaint, another tribunal of exactly the same powers cannot re-open the same matter on a complaint made to it. *Nilratan Sen v. Jogesh Chandra Buttacharjee*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 983; and *Komal Chandra Pal v. Gourchand Adhikari*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 286, followed. *Queen-Empress v. Puran*, I. L. R. 9 All. 85; and *Queen-Empress v. Umedan*, All. Weekly Notes (1895) 86, referred to. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ADAM KHAN

I. L. R. 22 All. 106

7. ———— *Revival of Complaint after discharge—Power of Presidency Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 403, 436-439.* P instituted a complaint of extortion in the Calcutta Police Court against O and B under s. 384 of the Penal Code. The Magistrate suggested that the matter should be settled by arbitration, and the accused was discharged on 24th July 1892. The arbitration fell through, and on B's application the complaint against O and B was revived on 6th May 1893. On the matter coming before the High Court on revision, it was found that the offence being not compoundable the reference of the parties to arbitration was irregular. *Held*, that the order of 24th July discharging the accused was improper; that the provisions of ss. 436 and 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code were not applicable to Presidency Magistrates who, therefore, can revive a complaint even after discharge; that the High Court has ample powers under the Charter Act, if not under the Code, to revise an order reviving a complaint after discharge; and that in this particular case the Presidency Magistrate has exercised a proper discretion in reviving the complaint. OPOORBA KUMAR SETT v. PROBOD KUMARY DASSI . . . 1 C. W. N. 49

See CHAROOBALA DABEE v. BARENDRA NATH MAZOOMDAR . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 126

8. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 203, 437 and s. 4 (a)—Magistrate's order to stay proceedings against accused—Revival of proceedings by setting aside order staying proceedings—Judicial or executive order—Order though right not authorised by law.* Where subsequent to the trial of one of several accused persons which ultimately resulted in his acquittal, an application was made asking the District Magistrate to direct the police to arrest the absconding accused and to proceed against them, and the District Magistrate passed an order staying further proceedings on the ground that the cases against such accused would not stand, and his successor in office made an order directing the arrest and reviving the proceeding against the accused. *Held*, that the order staying proceedings, whether the petition on which it was made was a complaint within s. 4 (a)

COMPLAINT—*contd.***5. REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT—*contd.***

or not was clearly one made in the course of a judicial proceeding, and was, therefore, a judicial, and not an executive, order; that it was, if not in terms, at any rate in effect, an order dismissing a complaint, and, therefore, it was not competent to the successor in office to set aside such order of his predecessor. *Kamal Chunder Pal v. Gour Chand Adhikari*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 286: 1 C. W. N. 185; *Niratan Sen v. Jogesh Chunder Bhattacharji*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 983: 1 C. W. N. 57, followed. An order not authorised by law cannot be allowed to stand whether it is for the ends of justice or not. The original order of the Magistrate staying proceedings could not be set aside unless the Crown took steps authorised by law to set it aside. *In the matter of Guru Charan Aich*, 1 C. W. N. 650, followed. *INDERJIT SINGH v. THAKUR SINGH* 2 C. W. N. 290

9. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, s. 203—Power of Presidency Magistrate to revive a case dismissed on non-appearance of complainant.* The Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) contains no provision which empowers a Presidency Magistrate to revive a case which he had dismissed for default in appearance of the complainant, whether the order of dismissal was proper or not. *RAM COOMAR v. RAMJEE* 4 C. W. N. 26

10. ———— *Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), ss. 259, 369, 439—Warrant case—Discharge of accused—Presidency Magistrate, power of—Revival of complaint.* A Presidency Magistrate, when he has once discharged the accused under s. 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), has no jurisdiction to revive the case, and therefore no jurisdiction to transfer it, and the Bench to which it was transferred had consequently no jurisdiction to hear it. *DAMINI DASSI v. HURRI MOHAN MOOKHARJI* 4 C. W. N. 46

11. ———— *Power of Sessions Court to direct further enquiry—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 67 (1872, s. 147).* A Court of Session had power to direct a Magistrate to enquire into a complaint dismissed by him under s. 67 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, or the corresponding section of the Code of 1872. *ANONYMOUS* 7 Mad. Ap. 16

12. ———— *Striking out offence on list reported—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 147.* A person made a complaint to the police that the accused had enticed away his wife (a non-cognizable offence) and committed theft (a cognizable offence). The police enquired into the latter offence only, and, finding no *prima facie* case made out, reported to that effect to a Magistrate, who directed that that offence be expunged from the list of reported offences. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, there had been no dismissal of the complaint in respect of the former offence, and that there was no bar to the complaint

COMPLAINT—*concl.***5. REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT—*concl.***

into that offence being taken up and proceeded with. *GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY v. SHIDAPA* I. L. R. 5 Bom. 405

13. ———— *Dismissal of warrant case not compoundable—Revival of prosecution—Discharge under Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 215.* A warrant case of a nature not compoundable under s. 214 of the Penal Code was "dismissed" on the parties coming to an amicable settlement. *Held*, that the "dismissal" was equivalent to a discharge under s. 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the composition did not affect the revival of the prosecution, if that should otherwise be thought necessary or expedient. *REG v. DEVAMA* I. L. R. 1 Bom. 64

14. ———— *Dismissal of complaint by Subordinate Magistrate—Refusal by District Magistrate to order further inquiry—Revival of complaint after such refusal—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 203 and 437.* A Subordinate Magistrate who has dismissed a complaint under s. 203 of the Code, is competent to revive it notwithstanding that the District Magistrate has refused to order a further enquiry in the matter on application made to him for that purpose. *JYOTINDRA NATH DAW v. HEM CHANDRA DAW* (1908) I. L. R. 36 Calc. 415

COMPOSITION-DEED.

See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 85

See INSOLVENCY ACT (11 AND 12 VICT., c. 21), ss. 9 AND 24.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 765

See REGISTRATION ACT.

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 364

COMPOUND INTEREST.

See CONTRACT ACT, IX OF 1872, s. 16.

I. L. R. 31 All. 386

See INTEREST—COMPOUND INTEREST.

See MORTGAGE . 12 C. W. N. 345

See PENALTY . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 138

——— *Mortgage bond—Stipulations in amount to penalties—Compound interest—Increased interest on default—Compensation for breach of contract—Interest after date fixed for payment, power to give—Interest at contract rate after such date.* Compound interest at a rate exceeding the rate of interest on the principal money being in excess of and outside the ordinary and usual stipulation, may be regarded as in the nature of a penalty. Where a stipulation in a mortgage bond for increased interest on default is retrospective and the increased interest runs from the date of the bond, and not merely from the date of the default, it is always to be construed as a penalty, because an additional money payment becomes in that case immediately payable by the mortgagor.

COMPOUND INTEREST—*concl.*

But the increased interest is not therefore to be disallowed altogether; for by s. 74 of the Contract Act reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount of the penalty is to be received by the party complaining of the breach of the contract. Where two mortgage bonds were executed each providing for interest, compound interest, and on default increased interest from the respective dates of the execution of the bonds, and on the date of the execution of the second bond the amount due on the first bond with interest was included in the principal of the second bond; the High Court in a decree on the bonds held that the increased interest by way of compensation on the first bond should run only from the date of execution of the second bond, and that on the second bond should run only from the date of default on that bond, and allowed compound interest at the same rate only as that at which simple interest was stipulated for in the bond, and the Judicial Committee affirmed that decree. Ss. 86 and 88 of the Transfer of Property Act contain no directions for interest beyond the date to be fixed by the Court up to which the account is directed to be taken; but it has long been the uniform practice of the Calcutta High Court to give such interest, and the power to do so, whatever the source of it (and that is immaterial since the decision in *Maharaja of Bharatpur v. Kanno Dei*, L. R. 28 I. A. 35; I. L. R. 23 All. 181) must be considered as established. *SUNDAR KOER v. RAI SHAM KRISHEN* (1906). I. L. R. 34 Calc. 150; L. R. 34 I. A. 9

COMPOUNDING OFFENCE.

See COMPLAINT—REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT.
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 64

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—COMPOUNDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES.

See FALSE CHARGE.
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 79

See GUARANTEE. I. L. R. 11 Bom. 566

See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
I. L. R. 3 Mad. 6

1. ——— Screening an offender—*Penal Code, s. 214*. The accused agreed to give R10 to S in consideration of his not giving evidence against K, who was charged with the offences of house-breaking by night and theft in a building. S gave evidence against K, who was, however, acquitted. The accused was charged under *Penal Code, s. 214*, but was acquitted. *Held*, that the acquittal was right. S. 214 of the *Penal Code* pre-supposes the actual commission of an offence, or the guilt of the person screened from punishment. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SAMINATHA*.
I. L. R. 14 Mad. 400

2. ——— Adultery—*Withdrawal of charge*. Where the husband of a woman with whom the accused was alleged to have committed adultery professed himself unwilling to proceed with the prosecution and the Assistant Judge thereupon

COMPOUNDING OFFENCE—*contd.*

ordered the accused to be discharged, the Court in the exercise of its discretion, declined to interfere. *REG. v. RAMLOJERIO*. 5 Bom. Cr. 27

3. ——— *Withdrawal of charge*. The power given to Magistrates to permit complainants to withdraw their complaints is confined to cases falling for disposal under Chap. XV of the Criminal Procedure Code. Consequently a charge of adultery cannot be withdrawn by a complainant with the Magistrate's consent. *QUEEN v. GUMBHEER*. 2 N. W. 234

4. ——— *Penal Code, s. 497—Appeal*. N charged T with having committed adultery with his wife. On inquiry into the charge by the Magistrate, the case was committed to the Session Court for trial, when T was convicted. T appealed to the High Court. After conviction, N and his wife were reconciled, and N at the hearing of the appeal asked for leave to compound the offence. *Held*, that at that stage of the case sanction could not be given to withdraw the charge. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. THOMPSON*

I. L. R. 2 All. 339

5. ——— *Assault—Penal Code, s. 214—Act irrespective of intention*. The offence of assaulting a man and intentionally causing grievous hurt does not consist of an act irrespective of the intention, and cannot be compounded. The term "assault" used in illustration (b) to s. 214 of Act XLV of 1860 does not mean assault as defined in the Code. It is to be construed in its general and more ordinary sense. *QUEEN v. MADAN MOHUN*

6 N. W. 302

6. ——— *Cheating—Forgery—Act X of 1872 (Criminal Procedure Code), s. 188—Construction of Act with reference to Bill before the Legislature*. Cheating and forgery are not offences which may be lawfully compounded. Where a Magistrate decided that certain offences could be lawfully compounded, having regard to a Bill which the Legislature had brought in amending s. 214 of the *Penal Code*:—*Held*, that it was irregular for such Magistrate to allow his decision to be guided by anything in a Bill that had not become law, and it was his duty to have interpreted that section without reference to merely contemplated legislation. *In the matter of the petition of RAUNAK HUSAIN v. HARBANS SINGH*. I. L. R. 3 All. 283

7. ——— *Criminal breach of trust—Penal Code, ss. 213, 214, 406*. The offence of criminal breach of trust, under s. 406 of the *Penal Code*, cannot, under the terms of ss. 213 and 214 of the same Code, be lawfully compounded. *In the matter of a REFERENCE FROM THE CHIEF PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATE*. 6 C. L. R. 392

REG v. MUTHAVAN. I. L. R. 1 Mad. 191

8. ——— *Criminal misappropriation—Penal Code, s. 404*. An offence under s. 404 of the *Penal Code* is not one of the class of offences that may be compounded. *ANONYMOUS CASE*
7 Mad. Ap. 34

COMPOUNDING OFFENCE—*contd.*

9. ———— Enticing away married woman—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 188.* The offence of enticing away a married woman with a criminal intent is not an offence which may lawfully be compounded. *REG. v. MUTHAVAN*
I. L. R. 1 Mad. 191

10. ———— House-trespass—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 248, 259—Case sent up by police.* A criminal charge under s. 448 of the Penal Code having been instituted, the accused was sent up by the police before a Deputy Magistrate of the first class. Previous to any evidence being taken the complainant intimated to the Magistrate that the case had been amicably settled, and that he did not wish to proceed further in the matter, upon which the Magistrate recorded an order, "Compromised; defendant acquitted." Subsequently the Magistrate of the district, relying upon ss. 248 and 259, and professing to act under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code, directed the Deputy Magistrate to send up the parties and proceed regularly with the case. *Held*, that ss. 248 and 259 had no bearing on the case, and that the mere fact of the accused having been sent up by the police did not prevent the offence, which was legally compoundable, from being compromised, and that consequently the order of the Deputy Magistrate was perfectly correct and legal. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NOWAB JAN*
I. L. R. 10 Cal. 551

11. ———— Hurt—*Voluntarily causing hurt—Penal Code, s. 323—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 188.* The offence of voluntarily causing hurt under s. 323 of the Penal Code is one which may lawfully be compounded, and the withdrawal from the prosecution in such a case is therefore permissible under s. 188 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861. *REG. v. JETHA BHALA*. 10 Bom. 68

12. ———— *Penal Code, s. 214—Causing grievous hurt.* Whenever the words "voluntarily," "intentionally," "fraudulently," "dishonestly," or others whose definition involves a particular intention, enter along with a specified act into the description of an offence, the offence not being one irrespective of the intention, is not one which the exception to s. 214 of the Penal Code, by itself, allows to be compounded. The offence, to admit of compromise, must be one in this sense irrespective of the intention, and it must be one for which a civil action may be brought at the option of the person injured, instead of criminal proceedings. The offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt cannot, accordingly, be compounded. *Reg. v. Jetha Bhala, 10 Bom. 68*, disapproved. *Reg. v. RAHIMAT*
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 147

13. ———— Kidnapping. The offence of kidnapping can be lawfully compounded. *QUEEN v. GOPES MOHUN MITTER*. 22 W. R. Cr. 26

14. ———— Mischief—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 345—Mischief done to the private property of a village Mahár.* The accused was charged with mischief for causing damage

COMPOUNDING OFFENCE—*contd.*

to crops which were the private property of a village Mahár. The Magistrate refused to allow the offence to be compounded, on the ground that the damage was done to a village Mahár and, therefore, could not be treated as damage affecting only a private person, as Mahárs had duties to perform in connection with the village. *Held*, that the offence was compoundable under s. 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), as the damage was caused to a private person and not to the public. The fact that the complainant was a village Mahár would not make his personal property the property of the public or even of the Mahár community generally. *In re MOTTRAM*
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 889

15. ———— Wrongful restraint. The causing of wrongful restraint to another may lawfully be compounded. *MOTHOORANATH BROOMICK v. KENARAM KURMOKAR*. 7 W. R. 33

16. ———— *Requisites for composition of offence valid in law—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 345—Onus of proof—Wrongful restraint and confinement of coolies employed on tea garden.* Where an accused person alleges that an offence with which he is charged has been compounded so as to take away the jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts to try it, the onus is on him to show that there was a composition valid in law. *M*, a European British subject, charged with the compoundable offences of wrongful restraint and wrongful confinement of coolies employed on a tea garden of which he was the manager, pleaded that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the cases, as they had been compounded by the complainants. The alleged compromise consisted of a Bengali paper, signed by the coolies, stating that they "made razinama" (compromise) "of the case of their own accord," and a paper in English signed by *M*, these papers being given to the District Superintendent of Police, who had investigated the complaints, and who stated that he asked the coolies as to the contents of the Bengali paper, and they said that they had signed it voluntarily and stated its purport, and that one of them said in the presence of the others that it was a razinama. *G*, one of the coolies, also wrote on the paper the words in Uriya, "I will not carry on the case." The Bengali paper was written by the Darogah of the police station in presence of *M*. The paper signed by *M* was as follows:—"I hereby agree with these Ganjam people that there shall be no legal proceedings of any kind taken against them with the exception of those who have not completed their agreements. Those whose agreements have not been completed, proceedings will be taken against them on 22nd May, if they have not returned to the garden before then". Neither of the papers were explained to *G* so as to make them intelligible to him, for though the Bengali paper was read out, *G* did not understand that language. *G* was one of the coolies who had completed his agreement with *M*. *Held*,

COMPOUNDING OFFENCE—contd.

per PRINSEP, J.—The compounding of an offence signifies that the person against whom the offence has been committed has received some gratification to act as an inducement for his desiring to abstain from a prosecution; here there was no forbearance on the part of *M* to proceed against *G*, who had served out the term of his engagement, and, therefore, there was no consideration for the agreement to compound. Having regard, moreover, to the ignorance and inferior intelligence of *G*, it was of vital importance for *M* to show what led to the alleged agreement, and how it was that the Darogah was instrumental to it, which he had not done. *Per* TREVELYAN, J.—Compounding an offence supposes an arrangement by which the parties have settled their differences, and in the more usual acceptance of the term implies that the prosecutor has received some consideration or gratification for dropping the prosecution. Although the provisions of the Contract Act may not apply, the proof of the arrangement must be similar to that which the Court requires for the proof of any agreement which is in issue; and unless it appears that the parties were free from influence of every kind and were fully aware of their respective rights, it would be impossible to give effect to a so-called arrangement or composition. Having regard to the fact that the writer of the Bengali agreement had not been called, and that the contracting parties were, on the one side, ignorant coolies, strangers to the land and to the language in which the document was written, and on the other, a European of some education, assisted by his Bengali clerk, and, having also the assistance of the police, it was not proved that *G* knew what he was about and was fairly contracting. *Held*, therefore, by the Court that there was under the circumstances no compounding of the offences with which *M* was charged, valid in law such as to deprive the Magistrate of jurisdiction to try them. *MURRAY v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*. I. L. R. 21 Cal. 103

17. ——— **Compounding after committal—Effect of, on committal.** A committal once made of an accused person by a Magistrate to the Sessions, cannot be annulled by his allowing the prosecutor to file a compromise. *QUEEN v. SALIM SHEIK*. 2 W. R. Cr. 57

18. ——— **Compromise—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 345—Filing of petition of compromise in Court—Effect of subsequent withdrawal of petition.** Where a complainant, a female, had presented a petition of compromise in respect of a compoundable offence and the Magistrate had examined her and satisfied himself as to her understanding the same. *Held*, that he was wrong in ordering the petition to be put up with the record but should have immediately dealt with the matter, and that he was under the terms of s. 345, Criminal Procedure Code, obliged to accept the compromise and to give effect to it. *Held*, also, that the complainant could not by a subsequent withdrawal of the

COMPOUNDING OFFENCE—contd.

above petition of compromise insist upon the case proceeding. *KUSUM BEWA v. BECHU BEWA*. 3 C. W. N. 322

19. ——— **Offence lawfully compoundable—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 342—Petition for withdrawal and compromise—Object and effect of—Duty of Magistrate on receipt of such petition.** When a charge is framed against an accused person only of an offence which can be lawfully compounded and a petition of compromise or for leave to compound the offence is put in, the Court should allow the parties to compound the offence, and acquit the accused. When a petition either for compromise of, or for withdrawal from, the case is put in, the Court ought to make an order either granting or refusing the application then and there, and should not put it off by ordering it to be filed with the record to be considered at the close of the trial. *MAHOMED ISMAIL v. FAIZUDDI*. 3 C. W. N. 548

20. ——— **Compoundable offence—Whether the compounding of an offence enures to the acquittal of all the parties complained against.** If, in the case of a compoundable offence, the complainant intimates to the Court that he has compounded it and desires to withdraw his complaint, the order passed by the Magistrate allowing the withdrawal is in respect of the offence and not solely in regard to the persons actually under trial at the time, as the law contemplates that all the accused persons should be under trial at the same time before a judicial officer, unless in some exceptional circumstances, such as their absconding, or sickness, or some such reason, the attendance of some of them cannot be obtained. Where, out of several persons named in the complaint, the Magistrate issued process against one, and subsequently allowed the complainant to compound with him, but did not issue process against the others, and also refused to stay proceedings against them in respect of the offence complained of: *Held*, that the Magistrate ought to have issued process against the latter at the same time as it was issued against the former, and, the offence having been compounded, all the persons complained against were equally entitled to an acquittal. *CHANDRA KUMAR DAS v. EMPEROR* (1902). 7 C. W. N. 176

21. ——— **Agreement to stifle a prosecution—Compounding a non-compoundable offence—Agreement as defence in a civil action—Suit for wrongful confinement—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 23.** The plaintiff sued the defendant in damages for wrongful arrest and confinement. The defence pleaded an agreement whereby the parties had agreed to settle their differences in consideration of compounding some criminal charges, one of which was not by law compoundable, and which were then pending between the parties in a Criminal Court. The lower Appellate Court held that the plaintiff was prevented from bringing the action by reason of the agreement.

COMPOUNDING OFFENCE—concl'd.

On appeal : *Held*, that the object of the agreement being to stifle a prosecution was bad in law, and that the agreement, therefore, could not be set up as a defence in a Court of Law. *DALSUKHRAM v. CHARLES DEBRETTON* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 326

COMPROMISE.

Col.

1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING,
EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE,
DEEDS OF COMPROMISE . . . 2215

2. REMEDY ON NON-PERFORMANCE
OF COMPROMISE . . . 2232

3. COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE . . . 2234

See ADMINISTRATION.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 561

See ADVOCATE . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 151

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss.
411, 412 . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 10

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 375.
I. L. R. 30 Mad. 478
8 C. W. N. 197
13 C. W. N. 1023

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 462.
13 C. W. N. 163

See COMPROMISE DECREE.

13 C. W. N. 217

See CONSENT DECREE.

13 C. W. N. 1197

See COSTS . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 27

See CREDITORS, GRANT
8 C. W. N. 105

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 345.
I. L. R. 31 All. 606

See DECREE—ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT
OF DECREE . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 1
L. R. 27 I. A. 197
7 C. W. N. 880

See DEPOSIT . . . 10 C. W. N. 535

See DIVORCE ACT, ss. 16, 17.
I. L. R. 10 All. 559

See ESTOPPEL—ESTOPPEL BY CONDUCT.
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 577

See EVIDENCE . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1010

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 74 . 25 W. R. 68

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION
ON OR AFTER AGREEMENTS OR COM-
PROMISES.

See HINDU LAW . I. L. R. 30 All. 75

See HINDU LAW—WILL.
I. L. R. 29 All. 451

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDIC-
TION—CAUSE OF ACTION—COMPROMISE.
I. L. R. 25 All. 48

COMPROMISE—cont'd.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 456

See LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT.

10 C. W. N. 57

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II,
ART. 57 . I. L. R. 31 All. 429

See MAHOMEDAN LAW.

I. L. R. 31 All. 557

See MALABAR LAW—ENDOWMENT.

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 153

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 1

See MORTGAGE . I. L. R. 31 All. 13

See OUDH LAND REVENUE ACT, XVII of
1876, s. 74 . I. L. R. 31 All. 73

See PARTIES . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 72

See PARTITION . I. L. R. 31 All. 3

See PROBATE . . . 8 C. W. N. 197

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 17.
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 553

See SUIT . . . 10 C. W. N. 529

See SUIT FOR DAMAGES.

I. L. R. 31 All. 173

See SURETY . I. L. R. 29 All. 627

See WAKFNAMA . . . 10 C. W. N. 560

— construction of—

See HINDU LAW . I. L. R. 31 All. 497

— decree—

See MINOR . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 83

— deed of—

See EXCHANGE . . . 11 C. W. N. 342

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 17 (1864,
s. 13) . . . 7 B. L. R. 197
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— effect of—

See MORTGAGE—TACKING.

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 368

— of suit, power to make—

See ARBITRATION—REFERENCE OR SUB-
MISSION TO ARBITRATION.
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 326

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

7 Bom. O. C. 79

See COUNSEL . I. L. R. 13 All. 272

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4 C. W. N. 169

6 C. W. N. 82

See GUARDIAN—DUTIES AND POWERS OF
GUARDIANS . . . 6 N. W. 179

5 W. R. 5

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16 W. R. P. C. 22

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 686

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_____ of suit, power to make—contd.

See HINDU LAW—WIDOW—POWER OF
WIDOW—POWER TO COMPROMISE.

See LIS PENDENS I L. R. 18 Calc. 188
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1 C. W. N. 62

See PLEADERS—AUTHORITY TO BIND
CLIENT 2 N. W. 149
2 Mad. 423
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_____ out of Court—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 244—
QUESTIONS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE.
7 C. W. N. 54

_____ out of Court without knowledge
of attorneys.

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—ATTORNEY
AND CLIENT 9 B. L. R. Ap. 19
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 887
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See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II,
ART. 84 (1871, ART. 85).
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 505

_____ pending appeal.

See PAUPER SUIT—APPEALS.
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 464

See STAMP DUTY, REFUND OF.
11 W. R. 158
4 B. L. R. Ap. 96, 96 note

**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT
OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF
COMPROMISE.**

1. _____ Construction—Release—“*All present and future liabilities.*” General words used in a deed of compromise or in a release must be confined to matters of the same nature and forming part of the transaction which the parties had in view. *Directors of the London and South-Western Railway Company v. Blackmore*, L. R. 4 H. L. 610, followed. *NEELANUND SINGH v. HAMIDOOD-DIN* I. L. R. 8 Calc. 576

2. _____ Hindu family—*Deed altering proper course of succession according to Hindu law.* Where a dispute in a Hindu family as to legitimacy and the right to succession resulted in a family arrangement as to the mode in which the estate was to be held by the sons :—*Held*, that such a document ought not to be construed narrowly by a strict interpretation of the literal meaning of the words, but that the object and general spirit are the best keys to the interpretation. Where a family arrangement, if construed strictly, would have given a taluk, in the event of the death of a younger son, to such of the lawful

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT
OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF
COMPROMISE—contd.**

widows as should have male issue :—*Held*, that as such a disposition would contravene the ordinary rules of devolution of Hindu property, and be contrary to the usages of Hindus, and as there was no mention of any change of intention as to the proprietary right, a construction which would postpone male issue to their mothers was inadmissible. *GAJAPATHI RADHIKA PATTI MAHADEBI GURU v. GAJAPATHI HARI KRISHNA DEBI GURU*

6 B. L. R. 202
14 W. R. P. C. 33
13 Moo. I. A. 497

Reversing the decision of the High Court in *GAJAPATHY HARI KRISHNA DEVI GARU v. GAJAPATHY RADHIKA PATTI MAHA DEVI GARU* and *GAJAPATHY NILAMANI PATTI MAHA DEVI GARU v. GAJAPATHY RADHIKA PATTI NEGHA DEVA GARU*

2 Mad. 369

3. _____ Agreement to relinquish claim—Continuing suit after agreement—*Liability to repay consideration-money.* Where, during the pendency of a suit, the plaintiff, in consideration of Rs. 2,000, executed contemporaneously a farigh-kutti, or relinquishment of the claim made by him in the suit, and an ikramamah, or engagement to deliver in a razinamah, or deed acknowledging himself to be satisfied :—*Held*, that the farigh-kutti and razinamah amounted to a decided agreement for the settlement of the action ; and that, although the plaintiff sued as a pauper, yet, as it was questionable whether he should have been allowed to sue as a pauper, and as he had failed to perform his duty according to his engagement in entering up a razinamah, he was liable to pay the consideration-money of the agreement and the costs incurred in consequence of his unsuccessful and apparently unjust litigation which he had instituted and carried on for the purpose of freeing himself from the obligation incurred by the farigh-kutti. *MUNNI RAM AWASTY v. SHEO CHURN AWASTY* 7 W. R. P. C. 29
4 Moo. I. A. 114

4. _____ Conditional agreement to pay interest. Where a compromise embodied in a decree was to the effect that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff the principal sum within a specified period, and that if he were successful in another suit against a different party he could also pay the interest ; and the defendant succeeded in his suit in the first Court, but his suit was dismissed on appeal :—*Held*, that he was not liable to pay the interest on the proper construction of the compromise. *BOLAKEE LALL v. MAHOMED HOSSEIN KHAN* 14 W. R. 63

5. _____ Mahomedan Law—*Estate limited to take effect in favour of a person after another's death.* It is not consistent with Mahomedan law to limit an estate to take effect

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

after the determination, on the death of the owner, of a prior estate by way of what is known to English law as a vested remainder, so as to create an interest which can pass to a third person before the determination of the prior estate. The parties to a solamah or compromise were, on the one side, the widow of a Mahomedan, she being in possession of villages in Oudh, which had belonged to him, and of which the summary settlement of 1858 had been made with her; and, on the other side, two brothers, alleged to be his sons. By the compromise, which was made in the course of proceedings at regular settlement, it was agreed that the widow should, during her lifetime, continue to hold possession, and remain proprietor, without power of alienation, and that after her death the two sons should possess each one-half of the property. *Held*, that, on the true construction of the compromise, the title of the sons to succeed was contingent upon their surviving the widow, and that no interest passed to their heirs on their deaths in her lifetime. **ABDUL WAHID KHAN v. NURAN BIBI** . . . **I. L. R. 11 Calc. 597 L. R. 12 I. A. 91**

6. ————— *Penalty for non-fulfilment of conditions, suit to enforce.* A suit for a kabuliati having been brought in the Revenue Court, a deed of compromise was filed in the suit, in which it was stipulated that a certain sum would be paid by the defendants to the zamindar as rent of four kanis of land, including homestead, after mutation of names; that Rs 15-8 on account of outstanding balance and charges connected with the rents would be paid to the plaintiffs within a month; and that in default the defendants would have no right to the lands specified. The defendants having failed to fulfil the conditions, the plaintiffs executed their decree and realised from them the balance above mentioned, and having sued them for the rent obtained a decree. The plaintiffs then brought this suit to recover possession, in virtue of *itmami* right, of the land on the ground of non-fulfilment of the conditions of the compromise. The first Court gave them a decree, which the lower Appellate Court reversed, holding that the deed merely imposed a penalty with a view to punctual payment. *Held*, that, as what the defendants had to do was of a perpetually recurring nature, and no action which the Court might take would be effectual in preserving the plaintiff from being sued by the zamindar, the intention was that the terms should be strictly enforced on failure to perform the conditions, and that the defendant should be obliged to surrender the lands. **MAHOMED HASHIM v. HOSSEIN ALI** . . . **19 W. R. 438**

7. ————— *Construction and enforceability of compromise of suit between members of grantee's family—Removal of manager—Appointment of receiver.* Early in the eighteenth century two villages were granted by the zamindars of Sivaganga and Guntamanaikanur to the last of

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

the Naik rulers of Madura for the maintenance of the rank and dignity of his family which was now represented by the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 to 23. The property was long managed by the representative, for the time being, of the senior line. In 1844 one of the junior members instituted a suit for partition, which terminated in a decree, declaring the corpus of the property to be indivisible and the annual produce to be divisible in certain shares. Subsequently in 1857 a compromise was entered into, by which the parties agreed to vary the distribution of the shares, but they agreed that the management of the estate, indivisible and inalienable, should continue to be vested in the eldest line subject to certain supervision on the part of the other members. The compromise was long acted upon by the family; but in 1892 the representative of the senior line died, leaving only his widow and infant sons. The widow, as guardian of the elder son, then entered on the management, and being gosha, delegated it to a stranger. The plaintiffs representing a junior line now sued for the removal of these persons from management and the appointment of another manager alleging both that they had no right to the managership and that they had been guilty of mismanagement. All the members of the family were made parties to the suit. *Held*, that the compromise was binding on the parties, and that under the compromise the plaintiffs had no right to joint management; and that the widow of the last manager should be removed from the managership, and that until one of her sons came of age the estate should be managed by a receiver appointed from among the members of the family. **TIRUMALAI NAIK v. BANGARU TIRUMALAI SAURI NAIK** . . . **I. L. R. 21 Mad. 310**

8. ————— *Assignment of villages, part of an impartible estate—Maintenance of a member of a junior branch of a joint Hindu family—Agreement—Arbitration award, decree and settlement there on—Revenue, by whom payable.* A talukhdar owning an impartible inheritance was the head of a joint Hindu family, of which the defendant, his first cousin, was a member in a junior branch. In 1864 they came to terms as to the latter's claims upon the ancestral estate. A decree in that year founded upon the award of arbitrators between them declared the talukhdar's ownership, and the assignment by him of eleven villages to the junior member, free of liability in respect of the revenue. These terms were entered in an administration paper, or *wajib-ul-arz*, of the talukh before the settlement of 1867, in the record whereof they were also entered. And they were referred to in a sanad granted to the talukhdar. When the settlement of 1889 was in progress the profits of the eleven villages and the Government demand thereon had greatly increased; and for this jumma the talukhdar was liable without any proportionate increase of profit from the eleven

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

villages. In 1881 the talukhdar sued for a declaration that the defendant's right in the villages consisted only of a certain amount of allowance for maintenance derivable from them. He also claimed that the defendant should repay to him a sum which he had paid for local cesses. The defence was that the defendant's right in the eleven villages had been conclusively settled in the above proceedings. *Held*, that by the true construction of the decree of 1864, which was the foundation of the title of either party, the profits of the eleven villages belonged to the defendant, and that the revenue was to be paid, as between the two, by the plaintiff with the enhancements, without benefit to him from the increase in the yield of the land. The principle of the judgments below was that the question to be decided was of the kind where the head of a family and a junior member dispute the amount of maintenance that should be paid. But the property assigned in this case was not of the variable character which belonged to an ordinary allowance for maintenance and there was nothing to show that the Courts had authority to disturb settled arrangements on the ground of their being originally based on claims to maintenance. The talukh was vested in the plaintiff subject to the right of the defendant to hold eleven villages, and as between them, the former was liable for the jumma and the latter for the local rates and cesses. *LOKNATH v. BISSESSAR-NATH* **I. L. R. 27 Cal. 103**

9. ——— Enforcing Compromise—
Compromise of family disputes—Hindu law—Agreement as to succession to property—Suit to enforce the agreement—Mistake in law. In 1859, two brothers, *A* and *B*, filed a petition in the Collectorate, by which it was agreed that the family property should be divided in certain shares. *B*, who had only lately attained his age of majority, acted on his own account and as guardian of his minor brothers. In a suit by *A* to carry out the terms of the petition, *B* contended that undue advantage had been taken of his youth and inexperience; that the agreement was invalid; and that there was no consideration. It appeared that, at the time of the agreement, there was a *bond fide* dispute as to the rights of the parties, and no evidence of fraud was adduced. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree. Principles upon which the Court acts in setting aside compromises considered. *RAM NIRUN-SUN SINGH v. PRAYAG SINGH*

I. L. R. 8 Cal. 138 : 10 C. L. R. 66

10. ——— Non-performance of ceremonies of Worship—Allegation of breach of. Two brothers executed and filed a deed of compromise, dividing between them the family property, and a decree was passed in terms thereof. Under this decree, the elder was to hold possession of certain lands, the rents of which were to go to perform the worship of the family idol. The elder was kept

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

out of possession of these lands by the younger, and he performed the worship at his own expense, and the younger took out execution, objecting that his brother had not performed his trust as family shebait, so that he had been compelled to perform the ceremonies at his own expense: but his objection was overruled. *Held*, on appeal by the younger, that the non-performance of any ceremonies by the elder brother gave him no cause of complaint, unless he could show that such failure was not caused by any default on his own part. *RADHA-JIBAN MUSTAFI v. TARA MANI DAS*

2 B. L. R. P. C. 79

11 W. R. P. C. 31

12 Moo. I. A. 380

11. ——— Decree made on compromise—Review of judgment—Altering decree. The manager of the Court of Wards effected a compromise with claimants on the estate; a decree was passed on the basis of that compromise, but before the parties wished the decree to be made; in the decree, leave was reserved to apply for a review, if the compromise was not sanctioned by the Commissioner, and was prejudicial to the parties. The compromise was sanctioned by the Commissioner, but afterwards the manager found that he had been deceived by his servants, and that the claim had been allowed erroneously. *Held*, that the Court having granted a review, and the claim being proved to be exaggerated, a decree was properly given for the true amount. *LALJI SAHU v. COLLECTOR OF TIRHOOT* **B. L. R. P. C. 648**

15 W. R. P. C. 23

12. ——— Effect of Compromise—
Reconveyance with condition of the gift of property—Restriction of alienation—Mahomedan Law—Gift. *M* and her son *S* departing on a journey, made a conditional gift of their property to *A*. On their return, *A*, under the award of a panchayat, restored their property, but by the instrument reconveying it their estate was limited to a life interest, and they were restrained from alienating it. The lower Courts held this instrument to be a deed of gift, and that the conditions attached to the gift were void by Mahomedan law. *Held*, on special appeal, that the lower Courts were wrong in so treating it, as it was in fact a compromise, the terms of which should be carried out, and *M* and *S* should be restrained from wasting or alienating the property. *ABUBEKAR BIN HAGADA HAJISABA v. MATIBIBI* **6 Bom. A. C. 77**

13. ——— Subsequently acquired property. The late Maharajah Mitterjeet Singh was entitled to the levy of a tax upon pilgrims resorting to the temple at Gya. On the abolition of the tax by the Government a compensation was awarded to the Maharajah in lieu of it in the shape of a perpetual annual payment, which sum, it was settled by an agreement and a decree of a Sudder

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

Court during the Maharajah's lifetime, was on his death to be divided in certain proportions between his two sons, through whom the present appellant and respondents claim as their heirs respectively. *Held*, that, in whatever mode the Government might think proper to deal with this sum, with reference to the jumma, the rights of the parties could not be affected thereby without their consent, but would continue to be adjusted according to the proportions originally established. *INDERJEET KOOR v. ISMUDDH KOOR* . . . **5 W. R. P. C. 14**
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 141
10 Moo. I. A. 329

14. ———— *Family Agreement as to division of property—Suit for further share.* The plaintiff, defendant, and K were brothers. K died, and after his death a division took place, and an agreement was executed by the parties by which one-third of the family property went to the plaintiff, and two-thirds to the defendant, whose son had been adopted by K, the plaintiff giving up his right to more than a third in consideration of the fact of the adoption. Subsequently K's widow sued for a share on behalf of her own son, but the suit was decided against her and affirmed by the High Court, on the ground that her son was an idiot. The plaintiff now sued for recovery of a moiety of the one-third share still in possession of the defendant which in ordinary course would have fallen to K or his representatives. *Held*, that the plaintiff having by the agreement accepted a third share, and abandoned his claim to the rest, could not recover. *SAMY AIYANGAR alias RAMASAWMY AIYANGAR v. ALAGASINGA AIYANGAR* . . . **3 Mad. 33**

15. ———— *Admission of Title in compromise, effect of.* A suit having been brought against R J and others, a compromise was effected, to which J D (a *pro forma* defendant) was no party, and a decree was passed on the terms of the compromise whereby certain land was awarded to the plaintiff. On attempting to take possession, the plaintiff was opposed by J D. The case was taken up under s. 230, Code of Civil Procedure, and J D's possession was upheld; the plaintiff then brought a suit against J D, who dying, was represented by the defendants in the former suit who had been parties to the compromise. *Held*, that these defendants were bound by the terms of the compromise in which they had admitted the title of the plaintiff in the lands in dispute, even if their title to the lands accrued to them since the compromise. *RAM CHUNDER ADHIKAREE v. RAM JEEBUN ADHIKAREE* . . . **12 W. R. 427**

16. ———— *Interest—A c t (XXXII of 1839)—Interest on certain amount payable on the happening of an event and at certain time—Sum agreed to be paid to defend a suit—Effect of compromise of suit on liability to pay.* A brought a suit against B and C. B wrote a letter

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

to C, proposing that counsel should be engaged to defend the suit, and that C should contribute R900 only for it. C agreed to the proposal and consented to pay the amount within ten days. Counsel was engaged, and R4,000 were paid to him. After several hearings the case was compromised. B then demanded from C the amount which he had promised to contribute, and also interest on it. C refused to pay and a suit was brought by B to recover the said amount with interest. C pleaded that he was not liable to pay the amount, inasmuch as the case was compromised, and also pleaded that he was not liable to pay interest on it, as the debt was neither certain in amount nor payable at a certain time. *Held*, that B was entitled to recover the amount, as there was a promise by C to pay on the happening of a certain event which had happened. *Held*, also, that B was entitled to get interest on the amount, inasmuch as the debt was not uncertain, the date of payment was defined, and C knew that the contingency upon which he became liable had occurred. *SURJA NARAIN MUKHOPADHYA v. PRATAP NARAIN MUKHOPADHYA* . . . **I. L. R. 26 Cal. 955**

17. ———— *Compromise consisting of two Agreements, one registered and the other not—Unregistered Agreement incorporated into a judicial proceeding.* A prior suit between the same parties, now contesting the right to part of an ancestral estate, claimed another part of the same estate, without comprising the lands now in suit, which, at the time when the first suit was brought, were outstanding under a mortgage. A decree had been made by consent, excluding the lands now sued for. The defendant's case was that the lands now claimed, together with those decreed by consent, had been made the subject of a compromise of which the terms had been stated in two written agreements not registered. Also, that according to the compromise each of the parties was to take a moiety of the whole estate. Each had obtained possession; but the decree was limited to the part of the estate for which the prior suit, then disposed of, was brought; and only one of the agreements—that one which related to the lands then in suit—was presented to and accepted by the Court which made the consent decree. *Held*, that this agreement had a different effect from the other one, as it constituted a step in a judicial proceedings, and did not require registration. The order was pronounced in terms of it. But as regarded the lands now in suit, excluded as they had been from the decree in the former suit, the defendant's title to them had been left to stand or fall by the other unregistered document. The latter, by the Registration Act, 1877, conferred no title, and this defence failed. *PRANAL ANNI v. LAKSHMI ANNI* . . . **I. L. R. 22 Mad. 508**
L. R. 26 I. A. 101
3 C. W. N. 485

18. ———— *Setting aside compromise—Suit to set aside deed of compromise—Onus probandi.*

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A solenamah or deed of agreement to compromise conflicting claims entered into in the presence of witnesses and solemnly acknowledged in Court, by parties who were mutually ignorant of their respective legal rights, cannot afterwards be set aside upon a plea of ignorance of the real facts when the party seeking to avoid the deed had the means of ascertaining those facts within his reach. Gross fraud and imposition are not to be imputed upon mere suspicion, and unless the charge is proved, a party cannot be released from an agreement entered into by his own solemn act. The onus of showing that a compromise has been fraudulently obtained by intimidation and false representation is cast upon those who seek to impeach the validity of their own deed. *RAJENDUR NARAIN RAE v. BIJAI GOVIND SINGH* . . . **2 Moo. I. A. 181**

19. *Application to set aside compromise—Review of judgment—New suit.* For the purpose of setting aside a decree passed in pursuance of a compromise come to out of Court, there are two available modes of procedure : (i) by suit ; (ii) by a review of the judgment sought to be set aside, the latter being the more regular mode of procedure. *Lalji Sahu v. Collector of Tirhoot*, 6 B. L. R. 649 ; *Mewa Lal Thakur v. Bhujun Jha*, 13 B. L. R. Ap. 11 ; *Gilbert v. Endean*, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 259, followed. *AUSHOOTOSH CHANDRA v. TARAPRASANNA ROY* . **I. L. R. 10 Calc. 612**

20. *Joint and undivided ancestral property—Separate property—Estoppel.* Certain ancestral estate was recorded as held in equal shares by four brothers, A, B, C, and D. On A's death his son E was recorded as the holder of the share. On the deaths of B and D, C was at first recorded as the owner of their shares. Shortly afterwards B's widow, F, and D's widow G, were recorded as the holders of their husbands' shares. Again, at a later period, the names of H and I, the sons of E, were substituted for those of the widows. The estate was subsequently sold for arrears of Government revenue, but a farm of it was given to E, H, I, and C. In 1853 the Government, having purchased the estate, proposed to regrant it to the old zamindars and farmers, and a report regarding the ownership of the estate was called for. It was reported that it appeared from the statements of E and J, the son of C, that the widows of B and D had made a gift of their shares to H and I. In 1853 E, J, H, and I were asked by the Collector in what manner they proposed to divide the estate if it were granted to them, and they replied that they would hold it in equal shares. The estate was eventually granted to these persons on payment of the arrears of revenue. Each of them contributed his quota in making such payment. In 1855 an administration paper was framed in which they were entered, at their own request, as in possession each of equal shares. In 1864 they agreed to a partition of the shares by arbitration. These pro-

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

ceedings were stopped by J advancing a claim to a moiety of the estate. In March 1867 J sued for possession of a moiety of the share originally held by B's widow, then deceased, and for a declaration of his right to a moiety of the share held originally by D's widow. In June 1867 the parties to the suit effected a compromise, agreeing to divide the estate into four lots on certain conditions. A decree was accordingly passed in the terms of the compromise. K, J's son, sued in 1876, in his father's lifetime, to obtain the same relief as his father had sought in 1867, and a declaration that the arrangement effected by the compromise and the decree was ineffectual. *Held*, that, assuming that the estate was joint until 1867, K was, in the absence of fraud, bound by the compromise entered into by his father, and his suit was not maintainable. Assuming that the estate was held in separate shares, the shares of K's great-uncles descended as inheritance liable to obstruction, and K could not have questioned his father's acts. *PITAM SINGH v. UJAGAR SINGH* **I. L. R. 1 All. 651**

21. *Suit to set aside—Fraudulent Representations—Sanction by Court of compromise entered into by a minor—Misapprehension or mistake as to material facts—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 20—Enquiry as to whether it would be for benefit of minor to set aside compromise.* The plaintiff, a minor, was, as daughter and one of the heirs of A, entitled to $\frac{2}{3}$ ths of his estate. The value of A's estate was uncertain, and depended on whether or not A had been a partner in business with M, and whether or not a sum of R30,000 had been paid by M to A in satisfaction of all claims which A had against M in respect of the estate of K, a deceased brother of A and former partner in the same business. M having, on A's death, possessed himself of all the estates of A, the plaintiff brought a suit against M, in which a decree was made ordering an account to be taken of the estate of A which had come into the hands of M. Pending such account M died, leaving a will, by which he appointed the son of A and another his executors, and the suit was revived against them. In their application for probate they stated that the value of M's estate, so far as they had been able to ascertain and were aware, was R4,41,000. Shortly after probate was granted, negotiations were entered into between the executors and the advisers of the plaintiff for a compromise, and a petition was, with the concurrence of the executors, presented by the plaintiff to the Court, asking for its sanction to the terms agreed upon by the parties, which were, that the plaintiff should receive R20,000 in full of all demands, and R5,000 for her costs of suit. This petition took, as the value of M's estate, the amount stated by the executors in their application for probate, and stated that the value of A's estate, in case the above-mentioned payment by M was proved, would be R30,000, and in case it was not proved,

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

then a moiety of the estate of *M*; and that, considering the difficulties the plaintiff had to meet in proving her case, and with a view to put an end to further trouble, litigation, and expense, the above terms had been agreed to on her behalf. These terms of compromise were sanctioned by the Court on the 11th September 1876. Shortly afterwards, further property was discovered belonging to the estate of *M*. The plaintiff brought a suit against the executors to set aside the compromise, allowing that the terms had been accepted by her on the faith of the representation made by the executors in their application for probate, and charging them with wilful and fraudulent concealment. There was evidence to show that some of the property subsequently discovered was such that the defendants as executors ought to have known, even if they did not, of its existence at the time of the compromise. *Held*, that even though the executors had no such knowledge, and there was no actual fraud, yet there was such culpable ignorance and neglect of duty on their part as to amount to fraud, and carry with it the consequences of knowledge; and as the compromise had in consequence been entered into by the parties and sanctioned by the Court under a misapprehension of material facts, the plaintiff was entitled to have the compromise set aside, and the parties restored to their rights in the former suit at the time it was effected. *Per* PONTIFEX, *J.*—In cases where the sanction of the Court is required, as where there is an infant concerned, each party is bound to see that the materials on which the sanction of the Court is asked for are unimpeachable. *Per* PONTIFEX, *J.*—*Quære*: Whether in this suit, if the questions were found to arise, it would be necessary for the Court to consider whether it would be for the benefit of the minor that the compromise should be set aside. *Per* GARTH, *C.J.*—*Semble*: Even if it only appeared that the compromise had been entered into and sanctioned under an entire mistake of the parties and of the Court with regard to the subject-matter of the agreement, it ought to be set aside under s. 20 of the Contract Act. *Per* GARTH, *C.J.*—In a substantive suit by a minor to set aside a compromise made with the sanction of the Court obtained by fraud or mistake, it is not the province of the Court to enquire whether it would or would not be for the benefit of the minor that the compromise should be set aside; though it might be otherwise on an application for review to the Court which granted the sanction. *SOLOMON v. ABDOL AZEEZ*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 687 : 8 C. L. R. 169

22. *Party subsequently found legally entitled to nothing—Compromise made on behalf of minors.* When parties enter into a compromise, or family arrangement, in order to avoid litigating the question as to whether one of the parties is entitled to certain property or not, such compromise will not be set aside, although it should eventually turn out that the party taking something

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

under the compromise was in reality legally entitled to nothing. But where such a compromise was alleged to have been entered into by a mother on behalf of two minor sons on the one hand, and an adult member of the family on the other, agreeing to give the latter more than had been awarded by a judicial decision, it was held that the compromise was not binding on the minors. *DHARMAJI VAMAN v. GURRAY SHRINIVAS*

10 Bom. 311

23. *Ground for setting aside compromise—Consideration—Estoppel—Fraud.* When a claim is once compromised, and a new contract entered into, the promisor is estopped from pleading illegality or absence of consideration for the new contract, the real consideration for it being the withdrawal of the claim itself, irrespective of the possibility of its being prosecuted to a successful issue. The new contract can only be questioned on the ground of fraud, such as want of good faith in making the claim compromised. *VARAJLAL SHIV-LAL v. DALSUKH VARAJLAL*

12 Bom. 196

24. *Ground for setting aside deed.* A deed of partition between two brothers based on a compromise of suit, ratified by a decree of the Sudder Court, and putting an end to litigation previously entered into by their father, cannot be set aside without strict proof of haste and precipitancy of the settlement, inequality, restraint, coercion, or fraud. *HETNARAIN SINGH v. MODNARAIN SINGH*

3 W. R. P. C. 51 ; 7 Moo. I. A. 311

25. *Effect of setting aside compromise on right of appeal.* In a suit brought on behalf of an infant daughter by her mother as guardian, a decision was given partly for and partly against the defendant, who thereupon filed an appeal, which he afterwards withdrew in accordance with the terms of a compromise purporting to have been made with the mother and daughter. Subsequently, at the suit of the daughter, the compromise was set aside as fraudulent and collusive, and a review of the original decision, in so far as it was adverse to the plaintiff's interest, was allowed. The defendant then applied that his appeal might be revived, but his application was rejected by the High Court, on the ground that he had deprived himself of his opportunity of appeal by his own fraudulent conduct. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee, that the effect of setting aside the compromise was to remit both parties to their original rights, and that if the plaintiff was to be allowed to be heard against so much of the original judgment as was unfavourable to her, the defendant must similarly be heard against so much of the same judgment as was unfavourable to him. *KHAJOOR-CONISSA v. ROUSHAN JEHAN*

**I. L. R. 2 Calc. 184 : 26 W. R. 36
L. R. 3 I. A. 291**

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.****26. ———— Suit to set aside**

Compromise—Set-off—Equitable Defence. D was the manager of a religious endowment called the Chinchvad Sansthan. On his death in 1852, disputes arose between C and G regarding the management of the sansthan, each claiming to be the heir and successor of D. After a long litigation they entered into a compromise in 1881, by which a portion of the sansthan property, consisting of certain inam villages, lands and varshasans, were assigned to G, and C was left in charge of the rest of the sansthan property, together with all the rights, privileges and manpans enjoyed by the hereditary trustee of the endowment. In 1886, by a decree made in a suit called the "Charity suit," C was removed from his office and the plaintiffs were appointed trustees in his place. In 1889 the plaintiffs filed the present suit to set aside the compromise of 1881, and recover back the sansthan property assigned to G under that compromise. G pleaded, by way of set off or equitable defence, that if the plaintiffs were at liberty to set aside the compromise they were bound to restore to him, in lieu of the trust property assigned to him under the compromise, certain private property belonging to his adoptive father which he had given up. *Held*, that G could not claim as a set off or as an equitable defence to recover from the plaintiffs in question the private property, there being nothing in the compromise to show that there was any exchange of private property for trust property. **DHUNDIRAJ GANESH DEV v. GANESH . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 721**

27. ———— Compromise in previous suit. A compromise entered into by the parties in a previous suit was maintained on the ground that the general principle in *Stapleton v. Stapleton*, 21 L. J. Ch. 434, applied to the case and nothing had been shown in the case to make it an exception to the general rule as mentioned therein. **RAMESHWAR PROSAD SINGH v. LACHMI PROSAD SINGH (1903) . . . 7 C. W. N. 688**

28. ———— Joint family—Joint Hindu family—Effect of conversion of member of joint Hindu family to Mahomedanism—Regulation VII of 1832, s. 9—Title taken under compromise between persons having mutually exclusive claims. In the year 1845 one Ratan Singh, who at that time formed with his son Daulat Singh a joint Hindu family, possessed as such of considerable property, both moveable and immoveable, became converted to Mahomedanism. In 1851 Ratan Singh died, his son Daulat Singh having predeceased him, and such portion of the property as was situate in British India was taken over by the Court of Wards and held by them apparently on behalf of Raj Kunwar, the widow of Ratan Singh, and Sen Kunwar, the widow of Daulat Singh (these two ladies being at that time detained in Lucknow under the supervision of the officials of the King of Oudh), without any recognition of either widow having a title superior to that of the other. In 1857

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

Sen Kunwar executed a bond for a considerable sum of money in favour of Jai Chand, the father-in-law of her daughter, Mewa Kunwar. Sen Kunwar died in 1857, and Raj Kunwar in 1858. After the deaths of these ladies three claimants to the property appeared, namely, Chatar Kunwar and Mewa Kunwar, the daughters of Daulat Singh, and Khairati Lal, the son of a daughter of Ratan Singh who had predeceased her father. The matter in dispute between these claimants was settled by means of a compromise, in virtue of which $8\frac{1}{2}$ annas of the property were assigned to the daughters of Daulat Singh and $7\frac{1}{2}$ annas to Khairati Lal; and in 1861 the partition of the property in accordance with the terms of the compromise was completed. In 1866 Chatar Kunwar died, and upon her death Mewa Kunwar successfully asserted her right by survivorship to the $4\frac{1}{2}$ annas which had been the share of her sister, and thus became possessed of the whole $8\frac{1}{2}$ annas assigned by the compromise mentioned above to the daughters of Daulat Singh. Meanwhile, however, Jai Chand had brought a suit upon the bond given to him in 1857 by Sen Kunwar. Why this bond was originally executed did not appear, not that there was evidence of any such legal necessity pressing upon Sen Kunwar as would have supported an incumbrance of more than her own life interest in the property. The final decree in this suit was obtained by Jai Chand in 1868, that is to say, after the surviving defendant, Mewa Kunwar, had been declared entitled to the entire $8\frac{1}{2}$ annas share; and it was a decree based upon a confession of judgment by Mewa Kunwar. In satisfaction of this decree certain villages, part of the said $8\frac{1}{2}$ annas share, were made over to the decree-holder, some of which, in turn, were sold by him to various vendees. On the suit by the sons of Mewa Kunwar to recover some of these villages on the ground that their mother had in them no more than a Hindu daughter's life estate which had come to an end on her death in 1899, it was *held*, that Ratan Singh, by his conversion to Mahomedanism, became, according to Hindu law, civilly dead, and that the whole of the property of the former joint Hindu family became vested in Daulat Singh, in 1845, the provisions of s. 9 of Regulation VII of 1832 embodying merely a rule of procedure and not a rule of substantive law, and no suit claiming the family property having been brought by Daulat Singh, to which the rule of procedure therein laid down could be applied; that in any case the conversion of Ratan Singh worked a separation of the joint Hindu family, and one-half of the property became vested in Daulat Singh, though it might not have been actually partitioned; that the property so becoming vested in Daulat Singh would be held by him as a separated Hindu; that the property was held by the Court of Wards during the lives of Raj Kunwar and Sen Kunwar, not specifically for either of them, but for the benefit of the rightful owner, both ladies being incapable of

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

managing their affairs; that, after the compromise arrived at between Chatar Kunwar and Mewa Kunwar on the one side and Khairati Lal on the other, the estate which Chatar Kunwar and Mewa Kunwar took was a Hindu daughter's estate merely, and not an absolute estate and that, inasmuch as no legal necessity was shown for the making of Sen Kunwar's bond or for the relinquishment by Mewa Kunwar of the villages which she made over to Jai Chand in satisfaction of his decree upon that bond, the estate taken by Jai Chand could not be more than that possessed by Mewa Kunwar, and on her death her sons were entitled to recover possession. *Abraham v. Abraham* 9 Moo. I A. 129, 237, referred to. *Held*, also, that, although the findings in the case between Mewa Kunwar and her brother-in-law (N.-W. P. H. C. Rep., 1868, p. 82) could not be held to be *res judicata* in the present appeal, the judgment in that case could be used as evidence to the extent pointed out in the cases of *Ram Ranjan Chukerbutty v. Ram Narain Singh*, L. R. 22 I. A. 60; *Bitto Kunwar v. Kesho Pershad*, L. R. 24 I. A. 10; *the Collector of Gorakhpur v. Palakdhari Singh*, I. L. R. 12 All. 1; and *Dharindhar v. Dhindiraj*, 5 Bom. L. R. 230. *GOBIND KRISHNA NARAIN v. ABDUL QAYYUM* (1903) L. R. 25 All. 546

29. ——— Minor—Guardian of minor—Proper course to set aside a compromise decree—Appeal—Adoption, suit to set aside—Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), ss. 47, 48—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 443, 622. When a compromise and a decree based upon it are sought to be set aside on the ground that the compromise was entered into by the guardian of a minor defendant without the leave of the Court having been granted after a judicial determination that it was for the minor's benefit: *Held*, that the proper course to set aside such a decree would be by way of an application for review in the first Court, or by a separate suit, but not by an appeal from the compromise decree. *Biraj Mohini Dasi v. Chinta Moni Dasi*, 5 C. W. N. 877, followed. S. 48 of the Guardians and Wards Act does not prevent a widow, who has been appointed by the District Judge under that Act, guardian of a minor as her husband's adopted son, from maintaining a suit for a declaration that the minor was not the adopted son of her husband. *RAKHAL MONI DASSI v. ADWYTA PRASAD ROY* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 613; s.c. 7 C. W. N. 419

30. ——— Specific performance—Specific performance, suit for—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244—Right of suit—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 113—Estoppel. When a previous suit for *khas* possession was compromised and dismissed, defendant agreeing to execute a *kabuliyat* in plaintiff's favour; and plaintiff sued again for specific performance of the contract to execute the *kabuliyat*, there being no direction

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

for its execution in the decree in the previous suit: *Held*, that the present suit was not barred under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. Where, after the compromise, but before executing the *kabuliyat*, defendant, who under the compromise was entitled to a ten years' lease, assigned the land, and plaintiff sued for ejectment on the ground that defendant had forfeited his tenancy by such assignment: *Held*, that plaintiff had not acted in contravention of the compromise, and was not precluded from suing on that compromise. *CHUNI LAL DUTTA v. HIRA LAL DUTTA* (1902) 7 C. W. N. 158

31. ——— Compromise-suit—Compromise of suit made by adult male members of joint family—Minors—Repudiation. In this case the appellant sued to set aside a compromise and decree in accordance therewith in a former suit, which had been made on his behalf by the adult members of a joint family, of which he was an infant member, and for other reliefs. The High Court held that under the circumstances the compromise was valid and binding, and on appeal the Judicial Committee were of opinion that he could not obtain the other relief prayed for without first setting aside the compromise, and held that there were no grounds for setting it aside. The Court had partly heard the suit before the compromise was entered into; the appellant had no separate interest; the adult male members of the family, who were presumably competent to judge of their own interests, had taken part in the compromise and assented to it; and the Court pronounced that it was for the benefit of the appellant, who had been made a party for the purpose of binding his interest. *RAMESWAR PERSHAD SINGH v. RAM BAHADUR SINGH* (1906)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 70

32. ——— Hindu Law—Compromise entered into by a Hindu female, effect of. *Held*, that a compromise made by a person holding a Hindu widow's or Hindu daughter's estate in the property of her deceased husband or father, is not binding on the reversioners, even though it has been followed by a decree of Court, nor is a decree on an arbitration award, one of the parties to the submission having been a Hindu widow, or daughter; but the reversioners can only be bound by a decree made after full contest in a *bona fide* litigation. *Amrit Konwur v. Roop Narain Singh*, 6 C. L. R. 76; *Sheo Narain Singh v. Khurgo Koerry*, 10 C. L. R. 337; *Jeram Laljee v. Veerbai*, 5 Bom. L. R. 885; *Sant Kumar v. Deo Saran*, I. L. R. 8 All. 365; *Ram Sarup v. Ram Dei*, *Weekly Notes* (1907) 33; and *Stapilton v. Stapilton*, 1 *White and Tudor* 230, referred to. *GOBIND KRISHNA NARAIN v. KHUNNI LAL* (1907) I. L. R. 29 All. 487

33. ——— Petition of compromise—Registration Act (III of 1877), s. 17—Mortgage—Immoveable properties—Petition—Charge on immoveable property—Civil Procedure Code (Act

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

XIV of 1882, s. 375—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 59 and 100. Upon a suit for recovery of money due on *bahikhata* accounts, a compromise was come to, and a petition filed, and in accordance with the petition a decree was made to the following effect, *viz.*, that the defendants do pay to the plaintiffs a certain sum of money together with interest in instalments, but in default of payment of two instalments the whole amount, with interest, will be realizable at once. The decree further declared that the immoveable properties specified therein should be hypothecated for the realisation of the said money, and that the defendants should not be able to create an incumbrance on the same. A certain sum of money having been realised, the plaintiff brought a suit for the balance under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, and prayed for the sale of the properties specified in the schedule to the said decree. On an objection by the defendants that the compromise decree was void for want of registration and non-compliance with the provisions of s. 59 of the Transfer of Property Act, and was of no effect in so far as it purported to create a lien on immoveable property: *Held*, that having regard to s. 17, cl. (1) of the Registration Act, the compromise decree need not be registered. *Held*, also, that as the decree under consideration had little resemblance in form to a simple mortgage, and the hypothecation clause created a lien and prohibited further incumbrances, the parties only intended to create a charge, and not a mortgage, on the immoveable properties mentioned in the schedule to the decree and therefore s. 59 of the Transfer of Property Act had no application, and the absence of the formalities required by that section would not bar the relief, which might be obtained by s. 100 of the Act. *Held*, further, that as the hypothecation of immoveable property in the consent decree was the consideration for the time allowed for payment of the sum decreed by instalments, and as it was an integral and necessary part of the adjustment of the claim in the suit, the hypothecation clause was properly inserted in the consent decree, and the Court did not act against the provisions of s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure in allowing its insertion. *GOBINDA CHANDRA PAL v. DWARKA NATH PAL* (1908) . . . **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 837**
s. c. 12 C. W. N. 849

34. ———— *Claim not frivolous or vexatious—Right to set aside—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 6 (a)—Release of reversionary right—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 82.* A compromise entered into between parties, litigating on doubtful rights under a document, cannot be impeached by one of the parties to it on the sole ground that the party whose right is admitted by the compromise had in fact no such right under the document, when it is not shown that such right was set up frivolously or vexatiously or that there was

COMPROMISE—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE, DEEDS OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

misrepresentation or surprise. Where the compromise is deliberately entered into and the party admitting the right receives valuable consideration for recognising such right, he will be bound, unless he can show that such compromise was illegal or void. A compromise between a widow and a reversioner, by which the latter admits that the former takes an absolute interest under the will of her deceased husband, does not effect a transfer by the latter of his reversionary right, as the existence of any such right is negated by the compromise and the transaction does not fall within s. 6 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, as a transfer of a mere *spes successionis*. The acceptance by the widow of a release from the reversioner, in accordance with the terms of the compromise, is not an acknowledgment by her of any right in the reversioner, but an arrangement by which she gives something to avoid disturbance. In the case of wills by Hindus, to which the provisions of s. 82 of the Succession Act apply, a gift, *simpliciter*, of immoveable property by a husband to his wife, will convey the whole interest of the husband, unless it appears that only a restricted interest was intended for her. *OLATI PULIAH CHETTI v. VARADARAJULU CHETTI* (1908)
I. L. R. 31 Mad. 474

35. ———— *Decree—Compromise-decree—Title suit—Agreement by one party to pay rent to another if outside subject-matter of suit—Consideration for agreement—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 875—Admissibility in evidence in subsequent rent suit.* A sued to recover possession of a plot of land claiming to be tenant and making B and the landlord defendants to the suit. The real contest, however, appeared to have been between B and the landlord. The suit was compromised, A having abandoned the suit on B, agreeing to pay a certain rate of rent to the landlord: *Held*, in a suit for rent by the landlord against B, that the agreement to pay rent was a valid consideration for the compromise and it did not go beyond the subject-matter of the suit. That the compromise-decree was admissible in evidence in the present suit. *Pranal Anne v. Lakshmi Anne*, 3 C. W. N. 485: s. c. I. L. R. 22 Mad. 508, followed. *RAMDHARI KUAR v. KEKAN LAL CHOWDHRY* (1908) . . . **13 C. W. N. 217**

2. REMEDY ON NON-PERFORMANCE OF COMPROMISE.

1. ———— *Effect of non-performance in accordance with compromise—Suit to enforce compromise.* A compromise entered into in a former suit, no fraud being alleged, is not annulled by non-performance by one of the parties. The other parties may sue for its enforcement, but they cannot revert to their original right. *RAM SAHAI SINGH v. DHUNOOKDHAREE SINGH* . . . **1 W. R. 266**

COMPROMISE—contd.**2. REMEDY ON NON-PERFORMANCE OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

2. ———— *Suit to enforce compromise—Revival of original right.* A compromise must be treated as a new and positive contract. A breach of its stipulations may be ground of a suit for its enforcement, but not for a revival of the original right. *BISHUN COOMAR ROY v. HURISH CHUNDER DEB ROY*

2 W. R. 209

3. ———— *Profits of Land.* Where a compromise was made that any deficiency in the plaintiff's seer land was to be made up of assamee land, and, if that were insufficient, from the defendant's seer land, but the compromise was not acted on, and the plaintiff was unable to make up the deficiency:—*Held*, that he was entitled to recover profits from the defendants in proportion to the deficiency in his seer land. *HIDAYUT-OLLAH v. DOOKHCHORE RAI*

2 Agra 204

4. ———— *Revival of original right—Suit to enforce conditions broken.* *Held*, in accordance with a ruling of the Calcutta High Court, and in contravention of a ruling of the late Sudder Court in 1850, that when a compromise has been effected and a party allowed to withdraw his suit under the provisions of s. 98, Act VIII of 1859, if the compromise has not been acted upon, the plaintiff is restored to his original right of action. On the contrary, if acted on, either in whole or in part, the plaintiff cannot be restored to his original right of action, but may bring a suit for the performance of the condition uncomplished with. *Held*, also, where a compromise is filed in Court, and a decree passed in accordance therewith, such decree must be first set aside before a second suit can be brought on the original cause of action. *AMEER BEGUM v. NOOR BEGUM*

Agra F. B. 1

5. ———— *Compromise after decree—Denial of compromise in execution of decree.* Where a compromise is set up, and disavowed by one of the alleged parties thereto, the other party cannot, by an application in the execution department, relying on the compromise, arrest the execution of the decree. Whatever rights may exist under the compromise must be established by a new suit. *JHUNDOO v. HIMMUT*

3 N. W. 81

6. ———— *Compromise pending Appeal.* Where a solenamah was based on the condition that the defendant should at once withdraw his special appeal but instead of doing so he went on with the appeal and caused notice to be served on the plaintiff and the plaintiff actually appeared, and the special appeal would have come on for hearing but for the accidental absence of the defendant's pleader on the day of hearing:—*Held*, that the defendant having by his own act put an end to the adjustment of the case, the plaintiff was entitled to revert to his original position and execute his decree. *RADHA KANT DOSS v. AYESH ALI SHAHA*

3 W. R. 109

COMPROMISE—contd.**2. REMEDY ON NON-PERFORMANCE OF COMPROMISE—contd.**

See *DWARKANATH SURMA MOJOOMDAR v. UNNODA SOONDUREE*

5 W. R. Mis. 30

7. ———— *Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 23, cl. (c)—Family arrangement—Compromise of doubtful rights—Suit to enforce compromise by a person not party thereto—Person beneficially entitled under the compromise.* A suit to set aside a deed of partition between the members of the same family was compromised. By the deed of compromise it was stipulated that certain of the parties to the compromise should pay to the plaintiff Rs. 5,000. The plaintiff was not a party to the suit or compromise. *Held*, that she, being a person beneficially interested under the compromise, was entitled to sue for the recovery of the money, if the compromise was a compromise of doubtful rights. *PROTAP NARAIN MUKERJEE v. SARAT KUMARI DEBI* (1900)

5 C. W. N. 383

3. COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

1. ———— *Sanction of Court to compromise—Minors.* Where a compromise of a suit is made, it ought to be carried out by proper deeds and filed in Court, particularly where infants are concerned, so as to have the assent of the Court at the time, instead of its being totally concealed from them. *ABDUL ALI v. MOZUUFUR HOSSEIN CHOWDERY*

16 W. R. P. C. 22

2. ———— *Compromise by Guardian ad litem—Decree in terms of compromise—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 462.* The conditions of s. 462 of the Civil Procedure Code, requiring the sanction of the Court to compromises entered into by the guardian *ad litem* of an infant suitor, are not sufficiently complied with by the Court passing a decree in the terms of a compromise presented by the guardian *ad litem*. A decree passed under such circumstances should be set aside. *RAJAGOPAL TAKKAYA NAIKER v. MUTTUPALEM CHETTI*

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 103

3. ———— *Suit by Minor—Approval of Court.* Where a compromise of a suit is entered into on behalf of an infant defendant, the approval of the Court to such compromise must be express, and will not be inferred from the subsequent passing of a decree in terms of such compromise. Without such approval, the compromise will not bind the infant and will be set aside at his instance. *Rajagopal Takkaya Naiker v. Subramanya Ayyar*, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 103, followed. *SHARAT CHUNDER GHOSE v. KARTIK CHUNDER MITTER*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 810 : 12 C. L. R. 455

4. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 462—Sanction to compromise a suit against a Minor—Suit to set aside a*

COMPROMISE—*contd.*3. COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE—*contd.*

consent decree for want of sanction. A suit instituted in 1879 against a minor was compromised by the plaintiff and the guardian *ad litem*, and a decree for the plaintiff was passed by consent. In 1882 the minor sued by his next friend to have the consent decree set aside on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud practised on the guardian *ad litem*. That suit was dismissed. In 1884 an application was unsuccessfully made in the original suit objecting that the compromise had been entered into without the sanction of the Court. The minor having attained majority now sued to have the consent decree set aside on the ground that it had not been sanctioned by the Court under Civil Procedure Code, s. 462. *Held*, that the Court by passing the consent decree had not, *ipso facto*, sanctioned the compromise under Civil Procedure Code, s. 462, and that the present suit was not barred by the order dismissing the application in 1884. ARUNACHALAM CHETTY *v.* MEYYAPPA CHETTY

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 91

5. ———— *Compromise of suit by Guardian ad litem—Leave of Court not obtained—Withdrawal from compromise by guardian—Inability of Court to enforce it.* The guardian *ad litem* of three minors having agreed to compromise a suit and having signed a petition embodying the terms arrived at, undertook to present the petition at the next sitting of the Court. Leave of the Court had not been obtained; and at the time appointed the guardian declined to present the petition and opposed a decree being passed in its terms. Upon the plaintiff seeking to have the compromise enforced:—*Held*, that inasmuch as leave of the Court had not been asked for, and the guardian had objected to the Court passing a decree in terms of the compromise, the Court had no power to enforce the compromise, even though the terms of it might appear to be beneficial to the minors. RANGA RAO *v.* RAJAGOPALA RAJU

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 378

6. ———— *Abandonment of Issue.* The abandonment of an issue does not amount to a compromise, and if the suit is being conducted by a guardian on behalf of a minor, leave of the Court is not necessary under s. 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure for such abandonment. VENKATA NARASIMHA NAIDU *v.* BHASHYAKARLU NAIDU

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 538

7. ———— *Compromise of decree by Next Friend of Minor—Application to set aside compromise—Modes of impeaching the decree.* Where a decree to which a minor is a party has been compromised with leave of the Court granted under s. 462 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), the compromise cannot be subsequently re-opened by the Court *proprio motu* on the ground that it gave the minor less property than he was entitled to under the decree. The modes in which such an order can be impeached are, at the most, two,

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namely, by review or by suit. VIRUPAKSHAPPA *v.* SHIDAPPA . . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 620

8. ———— *Suit on behalf of Minor—Compromise without sanction of Court—Right of minor on attaining majority to impeach decree—Waiver—Practice—Procedure.* One R as father and guardian of the present plaintiffs (three minors) filed this suit in 1870 to recover from the defendants, as executors of H, the arrears of a monthly allowance which they claimed under his will. By a decretal order, dated 6th November 1871, the suit was referred to the commissioner to take accounts of the administration of the estate by the defendants. Accounts were duly brought in by the defendants, and objections and surcharges to these accounts were filed on behalf of the plaintiffs in June 1874. In November 1875, R died, and in April 1876, his mother K (grandmother of the infant), was appointed guardian *ad litem* of his infant children (the plaintiffs). The commissioner made his report in March 1884, which was confirmed by the Court in 1885. The two elder children attained their majority and made no objection to the report, but the third plaintiff and the youngest of the three brothers, on attaining his majority in December 1887, at once instituted proceedings, and obtained a rule calling on the defendants to show cause why the proceedings in the suit subsequent to August 1876, should not be set aside, and why he should not be at liberty to proceed with the accounts filed in the office of the commissioner. He alleged that the inquiry before the commissioner had not been conducted in the interest of the infants, but had been improperly compromised by withdrawing objections which had been lodged to the accounts brought in by the defendants, and that this compromise had not been sanctioned by the Court. *Held*, that there had been, in effect, a waiver of the infants' claim under an agreement of withdrawal between the parties; and that for such waiver and withdrawal the Court's sanction on behalf of the infants was necessary; and that as such sanction had not been obtained, the plaintiff would be entitled to impeach the decree and re-open the accounts if he had proceeded in the proper manner by an application for review or by an original suit, but that the present procedure was wrong, and that the rule must be discharged. KARMALI RAHIMBOY *v.* RAHIMBOY HABIBBOY . . . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 137

On appeal: *Held*, that the rule should be discharged. The decree was regular in itself and on the face of it correct, and it could only be set aside by a regular suit. *Per FARRAN, J.*—The only modes of setting aside a decree prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure (XIV of 1882) are by review under s. 623 and by suit under s. 11. MIRALI RAHIMBOY *v.* REHMOOBHOY HABIBBOY I. L. R. 15 Bom. 594

9. ———— *Minor—Circumstances necessary to make a compromise by a guar-*

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by guardian or next friend on behalf of a minor binding on the minor. In order to make an agreement or compromise, to which s. 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies, a lawful agreement or compromise, it is necessary that the next friend or guardian should ask the Court to consider the proposed term of the agreement or compromise, and before making the agreement entering into the compromise should obtain permission from the Court to enter into the agreement or compromise proposed. The Court should record the fact that such application was made to it; that the terms of the proposed agreement or compromise were considered by the Court; and that, having regard to the interests of the minor, the Court granted leave to the making of the agreement or compromise. From the mere fact that the Court passed the decree in accordance with the compromise, it cannot be inferred that any of those steps preliminary and necessary to the making of the decree have been taken by the Court. *KALAVATI v. CHEDI LAL*. I. L. R. 17 All. 531

10. ———— *Compromise on behalf of a minor—Suit to set aside compromise as having been entered into without the leave of the Court.* Where the guardian *ad litem* of certain minors assented on their behalf to a compromise, which compromise was accepted by the Court and a decree passed thereon, and was found not to be prejudicial to the interests of the minors; it was held, that the minors could not, after the decree based upon the compromise had become final, succeed in a suit to set it aside on the sole ground that the Court had not previously given leave to the guardian to enter into the compromise. *Kalavati v. Chadi Lal*, I. L. R. 17 All. 531, distinguished. *AMAN SINGH v. NARAIN SINGH*. I. L. R. 20 All. 98

11. ———— *Agreement to take oath—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 98.* An agreement to take an oath by the parties to a suit filed in Court is not an adjustment by mutual agreement of compromise within the meaning of s. 98 of the Civil Procedure Code. The defendants agreed that a decree should be passed against them if they failed to perform an agreement by which they bound themselves to take an oath, the terms of which were set forth in the agreement and one of them failed to take the oath. The lower Court thereupon passed a decree for the plaintiff. Held, by the High Court, that the procedure of the lower Court was not sanctioned by law. *KANNAPALEN UTHACHADAYAN HAJE v. FEROTTA MELODEN RAMEN NAMBIAR*. 4 Mad. 422

See ANONYMOUS CASE. 4 Mad. Ap. 3

where it was decided that since the repeal of s. 27, Madras Regulation VI of 1816, and s. 6, Madras Regulation III of 1802, by Act X of 1861, the mofussil Courts no longer possess the power of settling cases by oath.

12. ———— *Oaths Act (X of 1873), s. 9—Civil Procedure Code, s. 462—Consent*

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by guardian of a minor defendant to accept the oath of the plaintiff. It was agreed by the defendants who were majors and by the father and guardian of a minor defendant on his behalf, that one of the issues in a suit should be determined under the Oaths Act, s. 9, by the oath of the plaintiff. The oath was taken, and a decree was passed accordingly. Held, that the minor defendant was bound by the consent of his guardian since there was no evidence of fraud or gross negligence on the part of the latter, although the Court had not sanctioned the agreement under s. 462, Civil Procedure Code. *CHENGALREDDI v. VENKATAREDDI*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 483

13. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 375—Agreement to be bound by oath of particular person—Oaths Act, s. 11.* The question in a suit was whether the purchase-money for a house, which had been paid by the defendant, had been paid out of his own funds or out of monies belonging to the plaintiff. A witness for the defence having made statements apparently favourable to the plaintiff's case, the pleaders for both parties signed and presented to the Court a petition that if upon a particular bond in the witness's possession it should be stated that the money was received through the defendant the Court should decree the suit, otherwise the suit should be dismissed. Held, that this arrangement was not an adjustment or compromise of the suit within the meaning of s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code, so as to determine the jurisdiction of the Court and necessitate its passing a decree according to the arrangement. *MUHAMMAD ZAHUR v. CHEDA LAL*. I. L. R. 14 All. 141

14. ———— *Assignment of interest pending suit—Civil Procedure Code, s. 372.* The "cases of assignment, creation, or devolution" or any interest pending a suit contemplated by s. 372 of the Civil Procedure Code, are those in which "the person to whom such interest has come" is arrayed on the same side in the suit as "the person from whom it has passed." Held, therefore, that a compromise in a suit for land, between the plaintiff and one of the defendants, whereby the latter consented to a decree being given to the former for half the land, was not a "case of assignment" of an interest in such land within the meaning of that section. *RADHA PRASAD SINGH v. RAJENDRA KISHORE SINGH*. I. L. R. 5 All. 209

15. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 375—Agreement to compromise suit—Subsequent disagreement—Application for decree in terms of agreement.* After the hearing of a suit had begun, the plaintiffs and defendants came to an agreement by which they settled all the matters in dispute between them in the suit. The agreement was in writing, and dealt in one clause with the dispute, the subject-matter of the suit, and in a second clause with another dispute of long standing between the parties, with which the suit

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had nothing to do. The plaintiffs subsequently objecting to consent to a decree being taken in terms of the first clause of the agreement, the defendants took out a rule *nisi*, calling on the plaintiffs to show cause why the agreement should not be recorded in Court, and why the Court should not pass a decree in accordance therewith, under the provisions of s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). The rule was argued on affidavits on either side, the plaintiffs objecting that the above section did not apply to such a case as this, and that, in any case, the matter could not be decided on affidavits, but evidence must be gone into. *Held*, that s. 375 gave the Court the power to deal with such a case as this in the manner required, and that this was a proper case in which to exercise such a power; and that, in the circumstances of this case, no definite procedure having been enjoined by the Court, the matter might properly be decided on affidavits. Rule made absolute accordingly. **RUTTONSEY LALJI v. POORIBAI . . . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 304**

16. Consent withdrawn before decree. By an agreement made in writing before the hearing, the parties to a suit entered into a compromise by which the plaintiff agreed for consideration to withdraw the suit. When the case came on for hearing, plaintiff refused to fulfil his promise. The defendant having produced the agreement, the Munsif held that it must be enforced, and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the District Judge held that the agreement could not be treated as a compromise, as the plaintiff did not consent, and remanded the suit. *Held*, that the agreement could be enforced. **RUTTONSEY LALJI v. POORIBAI, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 304, approved. KARPAN v. RAMASAMI . . . I. L. R. 8 Mad. 482**

17. Withdrawal from compromise—Agreement of parties—Decree on compromise—Appeal. After suit filed by the plaintiff against several defendants, one of whom was an infant, a petition of compromise entered into between the adult parties was filed in Court. The petition stated the terms of arrangement, and also that an application would be made by the guardian of the minor praying the Court to allow the compromise to be carried out on his behalf. Ten days after the petition of compromise was filed, the first defendant and the plaintiff presented petitions to the Court withdrawing from the compromise, and praying that the suit should proceed. The second defendant presented a petition praying that the compromise should be recorded and a decree passed according to its terms. The Court made a decree in accordance with the prayer of the second defendant's petition. The first defendant appealed. *Held*, that an appeal lay, and that the lower Court was wrong in enforcing the compromise at the instance of the second defendant. *Semble*: That s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure merely covers cases in which all parties consent to have the terms entered

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into, carried out, and judgment entered up. **RUTTONSEY LALJI v. POORIBAI, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 304, questioned. HARA SUNDARI DEBI v. KUMAR DUKHINNESSUR MALIA . . . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 250**

18. Agreement adjusting a suit—Subsequent disagreement of the parties—Application by one of the parties to record the agreement. Under s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882) an application to record an agreement adjusting a suit may be made, although, at the time of such application, one of the parties either denies that it was made, or wishes to withdraw from it, or otherwise objects to its enforcement. The Court being already seized of the suit which is adjusted, the application to record the alleged agreement is a proceeding in that suit, and the Court, in connection with that proceeding, necessarily has all the powers and has thrown upon it all the duties which appertain to it in regard to any other questions arising in any suit upon its file. **RUTTONSEY LALJI v. POORIBAI, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 304, approved and followed; HARA SUNDARI DEBI v. DUKHINNESSUR MALIA, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 250, dissented from. GOCULDAS BULABDAS MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. SCOTT . . . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 202**

19. Suit to enforce compromise—Deed of compromise, admissibility in evidence of—Registration. The plaintiff brought a suit to recover a certain jote. The suit was compromised, the defendant agreeing to give up a moiety not only of the jote in dispute, but also of another jote of which he had dispossessed the plaintiff. It was further agreed that the plaintiff would be entitled to bring a fresh suit for the recovery of the latter jote, if the defendant failed to carry out the agreement. The plaintiff was obliged to bring a fresh suit, and both the lower Courts held that he was entitled to a decree. On appeal by the defendant:—*Held*, that the lower Courts were right in decreeing the suit, there being nothing in s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code to prevent the compromise from being enforced. *Held*, further, that it was not necessary that the deed of compromise should be registered in order to make it admissible in evidence. **GUPTA NARAIN DAS v. BIJOYA SUNDARI DEBYA 2 C. W. N. 668**

20. Compromise not in terms of plaint. A decree should not be passed in terms of a compromise where the latter does not give to the plaintiff any of the reliefs claimed in the suit and deals with matters not forming the subject-matter of the suit. Upon such a compromise being presented, the Court should inform the parties that its terms cannot be embodied in a decree and if it appear that the compromise was arrived at conditionally upon its being incorporated in the decree, the suit should be proceeded with. **MUTHU VIJAYA RAGHUNATHA UDAYANA TEVAR v. THANDAVARAYA TAMBIRAN . . . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 214**

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21. *Dispute as to factum of compromise—Order dismissing suit in consequence of alleged compromise—Application to High Court by revision petition under s. 622—Right of appeal against order dismissing suit—Acceptance of civil revision petition as appeal on Court-fee being paid.* During the pendency of an appeal in a District Court a petition was filed by the pleaders of the plaintiffs and defendants in the suit, praying on behalf of their clients that the case might be struck off the file on the ground that the matter in dispute had been compromised. Two of the plaintiffs then filed a counter petition denying that a compromise had been arrived at, and praying that the appeal might be heard on its merits. The District Judge, after some intermediate orders, struck off the appeal, as prayed in the petition. The two plaintiffs preferred a civil revision petition to the High Court whereupon it was objected that the petition could not be entertained as an appeal lay against the order of the District Judge inasmuch as it was not a decree in pursuance of a compromise under s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but an order passed on a dispute as to whether a compromise had in fact been arrived at. The petition had been presented within the time allowed for appeal. *Held*, that inasmuch as the petition impeached the alleged compromise as not being a "lawful compromise" an appeal lay against the order of the District Judge; but that the petition might be treated as an appeal, on the Court-fee being paid. *Mahomed Wahiduddin v. Hakimian*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 757, at p. 778. Where a party to a suit impugns an alleged agreement or compromise by which he would be bound, the Court must satisfy itself by evidence that the agreement or compromise is a lawful one and that its terms have been consented to by the parties to the suit before it can proceed under s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure to record it and pass a decree in accordance therewith. *SRIDHARAN SOMAYAJIPAD v. PURAMATHAN SOMAYAJIPAD*. I. L. R. 23 Mad. 101

22. *Power of Court to refuse to record compromise too favourable to one party.* The terms of s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) are imperative, and a Court cannot refuse to record a lawful agreement of compromise, and to pass a decree in accordance therewith, merely because in its view it is too favourable to one of the parties. *MOTIRAM BAL-KRISHNA BALMANE v. ZESU*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 238

23. *Compromise made notwithstanding dissent of client—Counsel's powers to compromise—Consent decree set aside.* Where counsel, after consulting with his attorney and client as to the advisability of compromising a case, and after receiving instructions from the attorney "to do the best he could for his client, compromised the case, notwithstanding the express

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prohibition of the client; and the client before the consent decree was drawn up notified her dissent to the other side:—*Held*, that the consent decree must be set aside. *CARRISON v. RODRIGUES*

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 115

24. *Compromise extending beyond the terms of the suit—Compromise, modification of terms of.* The only compromise which a Court can in any case be bound under s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure to enforce, is one which adjusts, wholly or in part, the suit; matters going beyond the suit cannot, if included in a compromise, be so enforced. A Court refusing to grant a decree on a compromise going beyond the suit, cannot, however, grant a decree modifying the terms of the proposed compromise, but must leave the parties to proceed with the suit as they may be advised. *FAJALEH ALI MIAH v. KAMARUDDIN BHUYA*. I. L. R. 13 Calc. 170

25. *Compromise extending beyond scope of suit—Appeal—Form of decree on compromise.* In a suit for the partition of a zamindari the parties effected a compromise in writing which provided, *inter alia*, for certain reliefs which could only have been given by the Court in a suit based upon a different cause of action. The compromise was presented in Court and a decree was passed embodying the whole of its terms. *Held*, (i) that an appeal lay against the decree; (ii) that the decree should have been passed in the terms of such of the provisions agreed upon as related to relief which the Court could have given in the suit; (iii) that the decree should be modified accordingly. *VENKATAPPA NAYANIM v. THIMMA NAYANIM* I. L. R. 18 Mad. 410

26. *Recording compromise—Agreement made out of Court and comprising also matters not the subject of suit.* *Held* by the majority of the Full Bench, *MACLEAN, C. J.*, and *TREVELLYAN* and *BANERJEE, JJ.* (*O'KINEALY* and *BEVERLEY, JJ.*, dissenting), that where the parties to a suit have by an agreement adjusted the subject-matter of the suit, the Court can, by an order made in the suit under s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure, direct such agreement to be recorded and make a decree in accordance therewith, even if one of the parties to the agreement object. *Held* (*per O'KINEALY* and *BEVERLEY, JJ.*), that the Court could not make such an order, the case not being one to which s. 375 applied. *Per O'KINEALY, J.*—The High Court, on its Original Side, exercising the equitable jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery, would not on a contested motion give a decree of this nature. *Per BEVERLEY, J.*—S. 375 only applies to cases where the adjustment or satisfaction is made in Court, and should not be extended to cases adjusted out of Court. *BRJODURLABH SINHA v. RAMANATH GHOSE*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 908
1 C. W. N. 597

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27. ————— *Agreement to compromise—Appeal—Petition to Court by both parties—Consent withdrawn before decree by one party—Remedy—Transfer of Property Act, s. 59—Charge on immoveable property—Oral agreement as to terms of compromise of suit—Terms of compromise in dispute—Proof by affidavit and further evidence—Procedure.* The parties to an appeal, in which an issue had been remitted for trial to the lower Court, having presented a petition to the lower Court, stating that the suit had been compromised and the terms of the compromise, requested the lower Court to move the Appellate Court to pass a decree in accordance with such terms. Before a decree was passed, one of the parties objected to the compromise being accepted. *Held*, that it was open to the Court, such objection notwithstanding, to pass a decree in accordance with the agreement. *Ruttonsey Lalji v. Pooribai*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 304; and *Karuppan v. Ramasami*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 482, followed. *Hara Sundari Debi v. Kumar Dukhinesur Malia*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 250, observed upon. An oral agreement by the parties to a suit that a decree be passed creating a charge on immoveable property above R100 in value is not rendered inoperative by s. 59 of the Transfer of Property Act. The parties to an appeal applied to the Court to pass a decree in accordance with the terms of a compromise, and, before decree was passed, one of the parties objected to such decree being passed, on the ground that certain conditions precedent to be performed by the other party had not been performed. The Court (this being denied by the other party) called for affidavits in proof of the terms of the agreement of compromise, and, these being found not to be sufficiently conclusive, directed the lower Court to take evidence on the point. *APPASAMI v. MANIKAM* . . . I. L. R. 9 Mad. 103

28. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 577—Unverified solehnamah—Consent decree—Appellate Court, power of.* Where an application purporting to contain the terms of a compromise was presented to the High Court by one of the parties to an appeal before it, but on the so-called solehnamah being sent down to the lower Court for verification, it was found that the attendance of the parties for that purpose could not be procured. *Held*, that the High Court was not justified in passing a decree under s. 577 of the Code of Civil Procedure in accordance with the terms of the unverified solehnamah. *BANDHU BHAGAT v. MUHAMMED TAQUI* . . . I. L. R. 14 All. 350

29. ————— *Agreement adjusting suit—Power of Court to determine fact of agreement having been made—Reference of suit to arbitration—Award.* The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover certain property of which she alleged he had taken possession. Subsequently the "matters in difference in the said suit" were by a signed submission paper referred to arbitration. An award was made ordering the defendant to pay

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to the plaintiff R6,000, and cancelling a certain account. It also decided the claim of the plaintiff to two ornaments, which was a matter not included in the "submission paper," but had been verbally referred to the arbitrator in the course of the arbitration. The plaintiff now applied that the submission and award should be filed as an agreement adjusting the suit under s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), or, in the alternative, that the award should be filed under s. 525. The defendant disputed the agreement and denied the validity of the award. *Held*, that under s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court had jurisdiction to determine whether, as a fact, the alleged agreement adjusting the suit has been made, and if it was satisfied that it has been made to record it. Whether that fact should be tried on affidavit or by oral evidence is entirely for the discretion of the Court. The Court, accordingly, holding that the suit had been adjusted by the submission and award, ordered the same to be filed and the adjustment recorded. *Held*, further, that the Court could make no order as to that portion of the award which dealt with matter not relating to the subject-matter of the suit. A separate application should be made with regard to the ornaments. *SAMIBAI v. PREMJI PRAGJI* . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 304

30. ————— *Power of Court to frame additional issues as to an alleged compromise effected subsequent to the institution of the suit.* The Civil Procedure Code, s. 375, was intended to meet cases where the parties having agreed to compromise subsequently fall out. The original Court has power to frame an additional issue to decide whether a lawful compromise has been effected between the parties subsequent to the institution of the suit. *APPASAMI NAYAKAN v. VARADACHARY* . . . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 419

31. ————— *Execution of decree—Compromise in execution of decree—Estoppel—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 257A, 647.* Although a Court executing a decree is bound by the terms thereof, and cannot add to or vary or go behind them, the effect of s. 375 read with s. 647 of the Civil Procedure Code is that when a decree is put into execution, the proceedings taken therefor amount to a separate litigation in which the parties can enter into a compromise much in the same manner as in a regular suit. Such a compromise does not extinguish the decree, and the Court executing the decree is bound, subject to the conditions indicated by s. 375, to give effect to the compromise. In execution-proceedings the word "suit" in s. 375 must, with reference to s. 647, be read as meaning "execution of decree." By reason of the words in s. 375 "lawful agreement or compromise," the provisions of s. 257A become applicable to such a case; and, so long as the requirements of that section are satisfied, the compromise become a part of the decree itself, and—at least as between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor—can be given

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effect to in execution of the decree. When such a compromise has been duly made and sanctioned by the Court executing the decree, neither the decree-holder nor the judgment-debtor can resile from the position assumed by them in the matter of the compromise. Even if such a compromise has been irregularly sanctioned by the Court executing the decree—the irregularity not amounting to want of jurisdiction—the compromise must take effect until the order sanctioning it is set aside, and until that happens, the parties are bound by it in all proceedings relating to the execution of the decree, and, where they have acted upon it, they are estopped thereafter from questioning its validity. *Sita Ram v. Dasrath Das*, I. L. R. 5 All. 492, followed. *Devi Rai v. Gokal Prasad*, I. L. R. 3 All. 585; *Ram Lakhan Rai v. Bakhtaur Rai*, I. L. R. 6 All. 623; *Fateh Muhammad v. Gopal Das*, I. L. R. 7 All. 424; *Ganga v. Murlidhar*, I. L. R. 4 All. 240; *Sheo Gokam Lal v. Beni Prasad*, I. L. R. 5 Cal. 27; *Lakshmana v. Sukiya Bai*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 400; *Yella Chetti v. Munisami Reddi*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 101; *Pisani v. Attorney-General of Gibraltar*, L. R. 5 C. P. 516; and *Sadasiva Pillai v. Ramalinga Pillai*, L. R. 2 I. A. 219, referred to. **MUHAMMAD SULAIMAN v. JHUKKI LAL** . . . I. L. R. 11 All. 228

32. — Refund of Court fees—

Power to remit fees—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 98. S. 98, Act VIII of 1859, was applicable only to mofussil Courts, and a Judge exercising the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court had no power to remit fees under any circumstances. **BARROW v. POLLOCK**

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 57 : 1 Hyde 149

33. — *Compromise of suit on day for defendant's appearance—Refund of stamp duty.* After service of the summons, and on the day the defendant was required to appear, the parties filed in Court deeds containing terms of compromise. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to a return of the entire amount of the stamp duty, there having been no settlement of issues. **BHISTOO CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY v. PARBUTTY DABEA**

Marsh. 274 : 2 Hay 213

34. — *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 98—Return of stamp-duty—Stamp Act X of 1862, s. 26.* On the day fixed for the hearing of a suit in a Court of Small Causes, the plaintiff's vakeel appeared and stated on behalf of his client that the defendant had satisfied him in respect of the matter of the suit, which he prayed might be dismissed. The defendant did not appear. Held, that the Judge was right in dismissing the suit, but that he should have recorded an order under the first provision in s. 98 of Act VIII of 1859. Held, also, that in such a case, when the plaintiff applies for a return of stamp-duty, he must strictly bring himself within the subsequent part of the same section as modified by s. 26 of Act X of 1862. **ANONYMOUS CASE** . . . 1 Mad. 127

COMPROMISE—contd.**3. COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE—contd.**

35. — *Civil Procedure Code, s. 98.—Stamp Act, X of 1862, s. 26—Refund of the stamp-duty.* The rule allowing refund of fees for suits (s. 98 of Act VIII of 1859 as modified by s. 26, Act X of 1862) is not applicable to appeals which may be compromised. In the matter of **ZEBUNNISSA BIBEE** . . . 12 W. R. 376

36. — *Arbitration—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 375, 506, and 523—Arbitrator—Agreement to refer to arbitrator—Suit—Adjustment of suit, within the meaning of s. 375—Agreement not in writing.* Where a party to an agreement has petitioned to refer matters in dispute to arbitration: Held, that the Court has no power to make a decree under s. 375 "that the agreement to refer to arbitration be recorded, and that in terms of the said agreement the suit be referred to an arbitrator with all such powers and authorities as are vested in arbitrators under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, and that the arbitration be finished within six months from the date on which the decree shall be completed and filed, and that the records of the suit be delivered over to the arbitrator." Such a decree is in the nature of an order under Chapter XXXVII of the Code. Where an agreement to refer to arbitration is not in writing, s. 523 does not apply, neither does this section apply to an agreement to refer to arbitration in a pending suit. *Ghulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan*, I. L. R. 29 Cal. 167, referred to. *Harivalabdas Kallindas v. Utamchand Manekchand*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 1, doubted. *Per MACLEAN, C.J.*—A mere agreement to refer to arbitration is not an adjustment of the suit within the meaning of s. 375: under that section the subject-matter of the suit must be adjusted by the agreement. *Pragdas Sagarmall v. Girdhardas Mathuradas*, I. L. R. 26 Bom. 76, distinguished. *Per HILL and STEVENS, JJ.*—*Quære:* Whether an agreement to refer to arbitration could under no circumstances be treated as an adjustment of the suit, as contemplated by s. 375. **TINCOWRY DEY v. FAKIR CHAND DEY** (1902) . . . I. L. R. 30 Cal. 218

37. — *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 375—Compromise or adjustment of suit—Submission and award equivalent to adjustment, and may be recorded under the section—Decree passed without the suit appearing on the list for hearing—Practice—Procedure.* Where a suit is referred by the parties to arbitration, and an award is made, the submission and award may be recorded under s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) as an agreement adjusting or compromising the suit, and a decree passed in terms of the award. There is no fixed practice in Bombay which prevents a decree being obtained on motion without the suit appearing on the list for hearing. **PRAGDAS SAGURMALL v. GIRDHARDAS MATHURADAS** (1901) . . . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 76

COMPROMISE—contd.**3. COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE—contd.**

38. ——— Endowment — Hindu law—*Mirasi rights attached to Devasthanams—Suit against office-holder—Compromise consenting to sale of office and its emoluments—Decree in terms of compromise—Execution proceedings—Invalidity of compromise opposed to public policy—Right of Court to refuse to execute.* The sale of an office attached to a temple, involving services of a personal nature and entitling the holder of it to receive emoluments, is against public policy, and will not be recognised or enforced by the Courts. The holder of such an office was sued by a person to whom he had mortgaged his right to the office, together with other property; and a compromise was arrived at, by the terms of which the office-holder agreed that his right to the office and to its emoluments should be sold in satisfaction of the mortgage debt. A decree was passed in terms of the compromise, and the decree-holder sought to have the right to the office sold in execution of the decree, and contended (on objection being raised) that, inasmuch as a decree had been passed directing the sale of the office, the Court executing the decree was not at liberty to consider its validity, but must execute it according to its terms. *Held*, that, as the decree was based on an agreement of compromise, and the Court had merely adopted the contract, the Court must be taken to have adopted it with all its incidents. By s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree on a compromise unless it was a lawful compromise. Any terms of a contract which are opposed to public policy are invalid, and will therefore not be enforced by the Court, and so far as a decree embodies unlawful terms of a compromise it is inoperative and will not be enforced. *Nagappa v. Vencata Rau, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 265*, referred to. **LAKSHMANASWAMI NAIDU v. RANGAMMA** (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 31

39. ——— Extraneous matter—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 375—Compromise decree. A decree passed on a compromise cannot be regarded as *ultra vires* simply because it goes beyond the subject-matter of the suit and contains other conditions. The other conditions, if they are the considerations for the compromise of the subject-matter of the suit, must be incorporated in the decree; but, if the other conditions are independent of it, they may be regarded as surplusage. **PURNA CHANDRA SARKAR v. NIL MADHUB NANDI** (1901)

5 C. W. N. 485

40. ——— Minor—Compromise on behalf of minor—Compromise of execution proceedings—Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), s. 462—Sanction of Court—Form of sanction—Minority—Burden of proof. The plaintiffs, Shidappa and Basappa, both of whom were alleged to be minors, sued in 1895, by their mother and next friend, for partition and obtained a decree on the 21st December 1897. They subsequently applied for execution, but on the 13th June, 1898, Shidappa, describing himself as

COMPROMISE—contd.**3. COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE—contd.**

then of age, and Basappa, by his mother and next friend, got this application struck off the file, on the ground that they had compromised with the defendant and that the decree was satisfied. The compromise (*farkhat*) was executed by the first plaintiff himself, who, as alleged in the *farkhat*, had then attained his majority, and by the plaintiff's mother as guardian of the second plaintiff. Subsequently the present suit was brought by the plaintiffs by their next friend, to set aside the compromise, alleging that it was fraudulently obtained and prejudicial to their interests, and had not been sanctioned by the Court as required by s. 462 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). The defendant alleged that the first plaintiff had attained his majority at the date of the compromise, and he contended that the order of the Court striking off the application for execution on the ground that the plaintiff's claim had been compromised was a sanction within the provisions of s. 462 of the Civil Procedure Code. The lower Court held (i) that both plaintiffs were minors, and (ii) that the compromise had not been sanctioned as required by s. 462. It therefore set aside the compromise, and passed a decree for the plaintiffs. On appeal by the defendant: *Held*, that, Shidappa (plaintiff No. 1) having described himself both in the former suit and in the *farkhat* as of age, the burden of proof now lay upon him to show that he was a minor, and that he had failed to do so. But *held*, also, (dismissing the appeal), that Basappa (plaintiff No. 2) being a minor, the *farkhat* required the sanction of the Court under s. 462 of the Civil Procedure Code. That sanction had not been given. The Court had not before it the materials necessary to enable it to arrive at a judicial conclusion with respect to the compromise. It did not appear that the terms of the *farkhat* were before it, or any evidence as to its propriety or reasonableness. S. 462 of the Civil Procedure Code, therefore, had not been complied with. The form of expression used for the purpose of indicating that the Court grants leave to compromise is of slight importance. The question is whether the Court after a consideration of the circumstances, really intends to grant leave. The compromise of a suit on behalf of a minor without the leave of the Court is voidable under s. 462 of the Civil Procedure Code, and can be avoided by the minor on his attaining majority. It can be avoided before that time. *Bibee Solomon v. Abdool Azeez, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 687*, referred to. S. 462 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to a compromise of execution proceedings. **VIRUPAKSHAPA v. SHIDAPPA** (1901)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 108

41. ——— Minor—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 462—Compromise on behalf of minor—Certificated guardian, authority of—Whether compromise, upon which decree given, requires Court's sanction—Construction and meaning of words—Leave of Court, nature of, if must

COMPROMISE—contd.**3. COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE—contd.**

be express—Leave, granted by certificated guardian, when valid—Registration—Decree, if can validate unregistered lease—Holder of invalid lease, acceptance of, by certificated guardian—Trespasser—Ejectment—Notice. S. 462, Civil Procedure Code, requires every person acting as a next friend or guardian for the suit to a minor to take the leave of the Court before entering into an agreement or compromise on his behalf, and no exception is made in the case of a certificated guardian. The policy of the law being to protect minors from being taken at a disadvantage by their guardians, the leave of the Court is required, not only in the case of such agreements as are entered into out of Court, but also in the case of agreements which are given effect to by a decree of the Court. The words "any agreement or compromise with reference to the suit," in the section include a compromise finally determining the suit. *Raja Gopal Takkaya v. Mattupalem Chetti, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 103; Karmali Rahimbhoy v. Rahimbhoy Habibhoy, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 137, 146, relied on.* In order that a compromise may be binding upon a minor, the leave of the Court must be express, and it must be arrived at upon the exercise of a judicial discretion as to the propriety of compromise in the interests of the minor. *Kalarati v. Chedi Lal, I. L. R. 17 All. 531; Sarat Chandra Ghose v. Kartik Chander Mitter, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 810, relied on.* Where a certificated guardian, acting as next friend to a minor in a suit, entered into a compromise with the defendant, without the Court's leave, whereby it was agreed that the defendant should obtain a *mokurari* lease in respect of certain lands belonging to the minor, and the Court gave a decree in the terms of such compromise: *Held*, (in a suit to eject defendant and to set aside the compromise decree), that, although the guardian had been authorised by a previous order of the District Judge to grant leases on behalf of the minor, the lease in question, not having been granted by a registered instrument, was invalid; and the compromise decree which the minor, under the express authority of the law, sought to avoid, could not be invoked as a substitute for a duly-registered lease. *Held*, also, that, the certificated guardian having accepted defendant as a tenant, the defendant could not be considered a trespasser, the invalidity of the original lease and the compromise decree notwithstanding; and therefore could not lawfully be evicted without notice. *LALA MAJLIS SAHAI v. NARAIN BIBI (1902)* 7 C. W. N. 90

42. — Partition—Civil Procedure Code, s. 373—Suit for partition—Withdrawal of suit—Joint petition by parties praying that the suit might be struck off—Subsequent suit for partition barred. The plaintiff and the defendants in a suit for partition, having arrived at a compromise, presented to the Court a joint petition asking that the suit might be struck off (*kharij kardiya jawe*). The Court passed orders accordingly, in the terms of the

COMPROMISE—concl'd.**3. COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE—concl'd.**

petition, striking off the suit. The terms of the compromise were not, however, inserted in the decree, and were never carried out. Subsequently the plaintiff brought a second suit for partition of the same property. *Held*, that it was incumbent on the plaintiff to see that the Court did its duty and recorded a proper order in the suit with reference to s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that, as he had not done so, he must be taken to have withdrawn his suit without permission to sue again, and his second suit was barred by s. 373 of the Code. *GULKANDI LAL v. MANNI LAL (1901)*

I. L. R. 23 All. 219

43. — Compromise presented, but not decreed—Order to proceed with suit puts an end to such compromise—Procedure in sanctioning compromise on behalf of minors. Where a compromise had been presented, but no decree had been passed in accordance with its terms, and the Court subsequently at the instance of one of the parties, ordered the suit to be proceeded with on the issues framed before the compromise and on other issues, the compromise must be deemed to have been put an end to and the Court cannot, at a subsequent stage, treat the compromise as subsisting and proceed to pass a decree upon it. In sanctioning compromises on behalf of minors, the order should state in terms that the question whether the compromise was for the benefit of the minors was considered. *GOVINDASAMI NAIDU v. ALAGIRISAMI NAIDU (1906)* I. L. R. 29 Mad. 104

44. — Civil Procedure Code, s. 375—Incorporation in compromise decree of terms which are not unlawful, though outside the scope of suit cannot be objected to in execution. Where a compromise between the parties to a suit embraces matters not relating to the suit, and the decree following such compromise gives reliefs which are not unlawful, but which could not have been given if the suit had been decided after trial, any objection to such decree on the ground that it is in contravention of s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure, must be taken by way of appeal and not in execution of the decree. *Venkatappa Nayanam v. Thimma Nayanam, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 410, referred to. Mahibulla v. Imami, I. L. R. 9 All. 229, referred to. Kuruvetappa v. Sirasappa, 16 M. L. J. 354, referred to. MANAGER OF SRI MEENAKSHI DEVASTANAM MADURA v. ABDUL KASIM SAHIB (1907)*

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COMPROMISE DECREE.

See COMPROMISE.

See JUDGMENT-DEBTOR.

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COMPROMISE PETITION.

See REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877).

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COMPROMISE PETITION—concl'd.

Compromise petition, constituting a lease and filed in a criminal proceeding—Registration, if necessary. Plaintiff sued a tenant for increased rent on the basis of a petition of compromise filed in a criminal proceeding, which resulted in the withdrawal of the proceeding, though no order was passed incorporating the terms of the petition. *Held*, that the petition was not admissible in evidence without registration. If the petition had been filed in a civil proceeding and had been followed by an order or decree which embodied directly or indirectly its terms, then it would not have been necessary to have had it registered. *Pranal Annee v. Lakshmi Annee*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 508; 3 C. W. N. 485; s. c. L. R. 26 I. A. 101, *Kali Charan v. Ram Chandra*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 783; *Birbhadra v. Kalpataru*, 1 C. L. J. 388, referred to. *BIRAJ MOHINI DASSI v. KEDAR NATH KARNOKAR* (1908)
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CONCEALMENT OF BIRTH.

_____ Destruction of foetus—*Penal Code*, s. 318. A person cannot be convicted of concealment of birth of a child under s. 318 of the Penal Code, in the case of a miscarriage where the foetus is only a few months old. ANONYMOUS
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CONCILIATOR.

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CONFESSION.

COL.

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5 C. W. N. 864

1. GENERAL CASES.

1. _____ "Confession," meaning of as used in Evidence Act—*Evidence Act, 1872, ss. 26, 30.* The word "confession," as used in the sections of the Evidence Act relating to confessions,

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must not be construed as including a mere inculpatory admission which falls short of being an admission of guilt. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JAGRUP*

I. L. R. 7 All. 646

2. _____ Voluntary confession—*Proof of guilt.* A voluntary and genuine confession is legal and sufficient proof of guilt. *QUEEN v. JHURREE* 7 W. R. Cr. 41

3. _____ Confession to be taken as a whole. A prisoner's confession must be taken in its entirety. *QUEEN v. BOODHOO*

8 W. R. Cr. 38

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4. _____ *Statements of accused inconsistent with each other.* The ordinary rule of taking confessions as a whole and giving the accused (in the absence of other evidence against him) the benefit of any circumstance that may appear in his favour therefrom, cannot apply to confessions which are diametrically opposed to each other; but only where the more favourable view is not absolutely inconsistent with the general tenor of the confession. *QUEEN v. NITYO GOPAL DASS BYRAGEE* 24 W. R. Cr. 80

5. _____ *Inconsistent statements—Credibility of.* The words actually used by an accused, who is said to have confessed, ought to be ascertained. The Court should not accept merely the conclusions at which the witnesses deposing to a confession themselves arrived from the answers which the accused gave to questions put by them. Where an accused makes two distinct statements,—the one amounting to a confession of guilt, the other repudiating guilt,—if the one statement is taken against the accused, the other also must be taken, for what it is worth, in his favour. The Court ought to weigh well the relative credibility of the two statements before it accepts the one in preference to the other. *QUEEN v. SOOBIAN*

10 B. L. R. 332

6. _____ Confessions of prisoner in one case evidence in another. The confessions of the prisoner in one case in which he was convicted cannot be used against him in another case, unless they are deposed to on oath, either by the person who took them down, or by some one else who heard them. *In re MUNGER BHOOYAN*

10 W. R. Cr. 56

7. _____ Corroboration of evidence of accomplice by confession of another prisoner. The confession of one of the prisoners cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of an accomplice against the others. *REG. v. MALAPA BIN KAPANA* 11 Bom. 196

8. _____ Confessions of co-accused against others in their absence. Confessions of two of several accused persons made in the absence

CONFESSION—*contd.*1. GENERAL CASES—*concl'd.*

of the others are of no weight as against the latter. Such confessions, as well as the statements of approvers, are always regarded as tainted; because, from the position occupied by the persons making them, they are not entitled to the same weight as the evidence of ordinary witnesses. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BEPIN BISWAS* . . . I. L. R. 10 Cal. 970

9. ——— Admissibility in Evidence—*Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 149, 150.* To make the confession of a prisoner, not uttered in the presence of a Magistrate, admissible in evidence, the fact disclosed must be one which, of its own force, independently of the confession, would be admissible in evidence. *QUEEN v. CHODA ATCHENAH*

3 Mad. 318

10. ——— Thumb Impression—*Accused—Signature—General Clauses Act (X of 1897), s. 3, cl. 52—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 164.* A thumb-mark affixed to a confession by an accused able to write his name is not a "signature" within the meaning of s. 3, cl. 52 of the General Clauses Act, or s. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *SADANANDA PAL v. EMPEROR* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Cal. 550

2. CONFESSIONS UNDER THREAT OR PRESSURE.

1. ——— Statement admitting crime, but pleading compulsion by others. An admission by A and B that the crime charged against them was committed by C and D, and that whatever share they had in it was under compulsion, is not a confession on which any person ought to be convicted. *QUEEN v. KRISTO MUNDUL*

7 W. R. Cr. 8

2. ——— Proof of circumstances under which confession was made—*Warning by Magistrate, averment of—Allegations of irregularity—Duty of Sessions Court.* Although the averment on the record of a Magistrate by whom a prisoner is tried, that the accused, before making a confession, was warned that it was optional with him to answer the questions put to him or not, is on appeal conclusive as to the fact of such a warning having been given, it is not conclusive to show that such a confession has not been made under the influence of fear engendered by previous maltreatment, or is not otherwise valueless. Allegations made in a regular and proper manner before a Sessions Court on appeal, that a confession made by the accused before the Magistrate who tried the case was made under such circumstances as to preclude its admissibility in, or diminish its value as evidence, should receive due attention and be enquired into. A Sessions Court refusing to make such enquiry commits a grave error in law and procedure. *REG. v. KASHINATH DINKAR* . . .

8 Bom Cr. 126

3. ——— Record of circumstances under which confession was made—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 149—Judicial record.*

CONFESSION—*contd.*2. CONFESSIONS UNDER THREAT OR PRESSURE—*contd.*

To give weight to confessions of prisoners recorded under s. 149, Code of Criminal Procedure, there should be a judicial record of the special circumstances under which such confessions were received by the Magistrate, showing in whose custody the prisoners were, and how far they were free agents. *QUEEN v. KODAI KAHAR* . . . 5 W. R. Cr. 6

4. ——— Inducement to confess—*Person in authority, statement to.* W, a travelling auditor in the service of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company, having discovered defalcations in the account of the prisoner, who was a booking clerk of the company, went to him and told him that "he had better pay the money than go to jail," and added that "it would be better for him to tell the truth," after which the prisoner was brought before the Traffic Manager, in whose presence he signed a receipt for, and admitted having received, a sum of Rs26-8-0. The prisoner was subsequently put on his trial for criminal breach of trust as a servant in respect of this and of other sums. *Held*, that the words used by W, the travelling auditor, constituted an inducement to the prisoner to confess, and that W was a person in authority within the meaning of s. 24 of the Evidence Act, and that the receipt signed by the prisoner was, therefore, not admitted in evidence on his trial. *REG. v. NAVEOJI DADA-BHAI* . . . 9 Bom. 358

5. ——— *Illegal pressure—Presumption—Evidence Act, s. 24.* In the absence of evidence that a confession of an accused person has been induced by illegal pressure, it is not to be presumed that such confession was so induced. According to s. 24 of the Evidence Act, a confession is inadmissible only if the Court considers it to have been induced by illegal pressure. *REG. v. BALVANT PENDHARKAR* . . . 11 Bom. 137

6. ——— Confession made under threat for a purpose other than to extort confession—*Evidence Act, 1872, s. 24.* A prisoner was tried for wounding with intent to murder, and wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm. The offence was committed on the high seas on board a ship on which the prisoner was a seaman. At the trial it was proved for the prosecution that the master of the ship had sailed from Calcutta and could not be found, and the Standing Counsel thereupon tendered in evidence his deposition before the committing Magistrate, which contained an admission alleged to have been made to the deponent by the prisoner, when in custody. The Court refused to admit the portion of the deposition containing the admission to be read, as it was stated to have been made immediately after the prisoner with others had been threatened by the witness with a loaded rifle; it was immaterial that the threat was not made to extort a confession, but to suppress an attempt at mutiny. *QUEEN v. HICKS*

10 B. L. R. Ap. 1

CONFESSION—contd.**2. CONFESSIONS UNDER THREAT OR PRESSURE—contd.**

7. ——— Confession to panchayat caused by threat—*Evidence Act, 1872, s. 24—Proof of oral confession.* The matter before a "panchayat" was whether *M* and *K* had murdered *B*, and thereby disqualified themselves from further intercourse with the rest of their brotherhood. *M* and *B* made certain statements before the panchayat which it was afterwards sought to prove against them on their trial for the murder of *B*, as confessions corroborating the evidence of an approver. The witnesses called to prove these "confessions" did not state specifically what was said by *M* and *K* before the panchayat. One witness, a member of the panchayat, said: "*M* confessed and *K* acquiesced." Another witness, also a member of the panchayat, said: "*M* and *K* were taxed with taking *B*'s house, upon which both admitted having murdered him." The same witness also said: "The admissions were not taken down." It appeared that it was not till at the sixth meeting of the panchayat, and when *M* and *K* were threatened with excommunication from caste for life, that they made such statements. *Held*, that, if the statements attributed to *M* and *K* had been actually made and assented to, and this fact had been duly proved, the provisions of s. 24 of Act I of 1872 could not be pleaded against their admissibility, on the ground that such statements had been caused by such threat, for the members of the panchayat were not in authority over *M* and *K* within the meaning of that section, nor was there any threat made having reference to any charge against them. The statements, however, could not be accepted as sufficient in themselves to corroborate the evidence of the approver, or to support the conviction of *M* and *K* for the murder of *B*. The statements were in general terms and represented only the impression conveyed by what might have been said to the mind of the witnesses. It was always essential that the Court should know as nearly as possible what were the words used by the supposed confessors, and what were the questions or matters in regard to which they were said. It might have been that the words ascribed to *M* and *K*, taken with the questions put and the exact subject-matter of the enquiry, did not amount to a confession of the guilt believed by the hearers to have been confessed. *EMPRESS v. MOHAN LAL* **I. L. R. 4 Ail. 46**

8. ——— Warning by Magistrate—*Inducement to confess—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 163—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 24.* A Deputy Magistrate, before taking down a statement from a person brought before him by the police, noted on the paper on which he was about to take down the statement the following words, which, after excluding the police officers from his presence, he had verbally addressed to the accused: "After excluding from my presence the police officers, who brought him, I warned the accused that what he would say would go as evidence against him; so he had better tell the truth." *Held*, that the use

CONFESSION—contd.**2. CONFESSIONS UNDER THREAT OR PRESSURE—contd.**

of such language was calculated to hold out an inducement to the prisoner to confess, and that such a confession was therefore inadmissible in evidence against him. *QU-EN-EMPRESS v. UZEER*
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 775

3. CONFESSIONS SUBSEQUENTLY RETRACTED.

1. ——— Confession retracted before Sessions Judge. A confession before the Magistrate, though afterwards retracted before the Sessions Court, is evidence against the party making it under s. 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861. *QUEEN v. JEMA* **8 W. R. Cr. 40**

2. ——— Statement to Magistrate afterwards retracted—*Evidence—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 205.* A detailed confession made by an accused before a Magistrate, but retracted on the examination being read over to him in conformity with s. 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, does not amount to a confession, although the plea for retracting the confession—*viz.*, ill-treatment of the accused by the police—may be enquired into and found to be untrue. *REG. v. GARBAD BECHAR* **9 Bom. 344**

3. ——— Confession to Magistrate—*Want of corroboration.* Where the only evidence in a Sessions trial was a confession made to a Magistrate but subsequently retracted, and it was established that the police misconducted themselves in the search of the houses of the prisoners who confessed and of others under trial, and produced evidence which was rejected as false, it was held that the prisoners could not safely be convicted on their own statements without any corroboration. *SOFIRUDDEN v. EMPRESS* **2 C. L. R. 132**

4. ——— Statement made after conditional pardon—*Evidence Act (II of 1855), s. 32.* A conditional pardon was tendered to and accepted by the accused. He then, on solemn affirmation, made a statement before the committing Magistrate in which he criminated himself and two other persons. Three days afterwards he voluntarily came forward and made, on solemn affirmation, another statement, in which he retracted and contradicted what he had said in his former statement. The conditional pardon was thereupon cancelled, and the accused was put upon his trial. *Held*, that the first statement was admissible as evidence against the accused, under s. 32 of Act II of 1855. *REG. v. ALIBHAI MITHA*
8 Bom. Cr. 103

5. ——— Confessional statements of accused—*Subsequent retraction—Charge to Jury.* It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a confession made and subsequently retracted by a prisoner cannot be accepted as evidence of his guilt without independent corro-

CONFESSION—*contd.*3. CONFESSIONS SUBSEQUENTLY RETRACTED—*contd.*

borative evidence. A jury should be asked with reference to such confessions, not whether they were corroborated by independent evidence, but whether having regard to the circumstances under which they were made and retracted and all the circumstances connected with them, it was more probable that the original confession or the statements retracting them were true. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMAN* . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 83

6. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 288—Evidence—Confession retracted—Corroboration, Deposition of witnesses before Magistrates read under s. 238 insufficient.* Where a prisoner was convicted of murder on a confession, to a Magistrate, retracted at the trial, corroborated by depositions, read under s. 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and also retracted at the trial. *Held*, that the prisoner should not have been convicted on such evidence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BHARMAPPA* . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 123

7. *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 342, 364—Withdrawal of uncorroborated evidence by the witness—Examination of the accused.* A and B were charged with the murder of C, the husband of B. There was some evidence that B had said her husband was dead a few days after his disappearance; and some bones, a skull, and some cloths were found in a neighbouring burying ground which were identified as those of C's. B made a statement, recorded on June 4th by the village Munsif, to the effect that she had lured C into a garden, and that A, who was her paramour, had murdered him in her arms, which statement she repeated frequently with greater detail in answer to questions from the committing Magistrate, and subsequently before the Sessions Court. On her appeal to the High Court after she had been sentenced to death she retracted her former statements and made the usual charges of ill-treatment against the police. A made a statement to the committing Magistrate which he subsequently repudiated before the Sessions Court, to the effect that he had assisted in disposing of the corpse of C at the request of his brother-in-law, who corroborated the statement in two depositions before the Magistrate which were likewise repudiated by the deponent before the Sessions Court. *Held*, that the conviction of A was wrong; and further (*PARKER, J.*, dissenting), that the conviction of B was wrong. *Per KERNAN, J.*—"As the second prisoner has withdrawn all the confessional statements made by her, it is necessary according to the rulings of this Court, to examine the evidence and see if there is reliable independent evidence to corroborate to a material extent and in material particulars the statements contained in the withdrawn confessional statements. If no such corroborative evidence exists, then the contradictory statements of the second prisoner remain, and doubt exists as

CONFESSION—*contd.*3. CONFESSIONS SUBSEQUENTLY RETRACTED—*contd.*

to which statement is true, and the confessional statements cannot be safely relied on against the prisoner." *Semble*: The same rule should be followed when a witness withdraws his deposition before the Sessions Court. *Per KERNAN, J.* The examination of an accused person under Criminal Procedure Code, s. 364, is subject to the purpose referred to in s. 342, *viz.*, "to enable him to explain any circumstances appearing against him," and not to supplement the case for the prosecution against him to show that he is guilty. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RANGI* . I. L. R. 10 Mad. 295

8. *Confession afterwards retracted—Necessity of corroborative evidence—Practice.* A retracted confession, if proved to be voluntarily made, can be acted upon along with the other evidence in the case. There is no rule of law that a retracted confession must be supported by independent reliable evidence corroborating it in material particulars. The use to be made of such a confession is a matter of prudence rather than of law. *Queen-Empress v. Rangi, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 295*, and *Queen-Empress v. Bharmappa, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 123*, dissented from; *Reg. v. Balvant, 11 Bom. 137*, and *Queen-Empress v. Sangappa, Bom. H. C. Cr. Rulings of 25th April 1889*, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GHARYA* . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 728

9. *Confession subsequently retracted, effect of—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 164.* It is unsafe for a Court to rely on and act upon a confession which has been retracted unless upon a consideration of the whole evidence in the case the Court is in a position to come to the unhesitating conclusion that the confession is true: that is to say, usually, unless the confession is corroborated by credible independent evidence. *Queen-Empress v. Rangi, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 295*, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MAHABIR* . I. L. R. 18 All. 78

10. *Value to be attached to a confession subsequently withdrawn.* It does not necessarily follow, because a confession made by an accused person is subsequently retracted and there is little or no evidence on the record to support the confession, that therefore the confession is to be rejected. The credibility of such a confession is in each case a matter to be decided by the Court according to the circumstances of each particular case, and, if the Court is of opinion that such a confession is true, the Court is bound to act, as far as the person making it is concerned, upon such belief. *Queen-Empress v. Mahabir, I. L. R. 18 All. 78*, and *Queen-Empress v. Rangi, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 295*, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MAIKU LAL* . I. L. R. 20 All. 133

11. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 164 and 288—*

CONFESSION—*contd.*3. CONFESSIONS SUBSEQUENTLY RETRACTED—*contd.*

Impropriety of recording statements of witnesses with a view to fix them to those statements—Confession retracted—Evidence of witnesses retracted—Corroboration—Deposition before Committing Magistrate read under s. 288, Criminal Procedure Code. It is improper for a police officer to send a person practically under custody who is in the position of a witness, to have his statement recorded by a Magistrate under s. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, with the view of fixing him to that statement at the time when judicial proceedings are subsequently taken. The voluntary character of such a statement cannot but be doubted, and when retracted in the Court of Session, the Judge should not bring the statement on to the record under s. 288 of the Criminal Procedure Code, without making proper inquiry. It is not safe to convict an accused person on his retracted confession standing by itself uncorroborated, or on the statements of witnesses brought in under s. 288 of the Criminal Procedure Code without independent corroborating testimony; nor can these two be joined together and held as mutually corroborating each other so as to justify a conviction based on them. *Queen v. Amanulla*, 12 B. L. R. Ap. 15; 21 W. R. Cr. 49; *Queen-Empress v. Rangī*, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 295; and *Queen-Empress v. Bharmappa*, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 123, referred to and approved of. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JADUB DAS* I. L. R. 27 Cal. 295
4 C. W. N. 129

12. *Evidence—Retracted confession—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 24.* A confession duly recorded and certified under s. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) is admissible in evidence against the person making it, unless shut out by the provisions of s. 24 of the Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872). A mere subsequent retraction of a confession which is duly recorded and certified by a Magistrate is not enough in all cases to make it appear to have been unlawfully induced. The law in India is not identical with the law in England on the relevancy and admissibility of confessions. *Imperatrix v. Balya Dagdu*, Cr. Rul. No. 3 of 1898, dissented from. *Reg. v. Balvant*, 11 Bom. H. C. R. 137, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BASVANTA* (1900) I. L. R. 25 Bom. 168

13. *Retracted confession, evidential value of, against maker and co-accused—Corroboration.* A retracted confession should carry practically no weight as against a person other than the maker; it is not made on oath, it is not tested by cross-examination, and its truth is denied by the maker himself, who has thus lied on one or other of the occasions. The very fullest corroboration would be necessary in such a case, far more than would be demanded for the sworn testimony of an accomplice on oath. *YASIN v. KING-EMPEROR* (1901). I. L. R. 28 Cal. 689: s. c. 5 C. W. N. 670

CONFESSION—*contd.*3. CONFESSIONS SUBSEQUENTLY RETRACTED—*contd.*

14. *Confession at variance with the evidence, conviction on—Circumstances under which it is made.* The prisoner, a young girl of 15, being suddenly charged with the offence, was kept in the custody of the police for some time, and had complained that she had been beaten by the police with a view to forcing her to make a confession; and, on the very next day, she was taken before the Magistrate and made the confession, which she subsequently retracted. *Held*, that having regard to the circumstances under which the confession was made, and also to the fact that the confession was in material respects at variance with the evidence for the prosecution, the conviction should be set aside. *Per MACLEAN, C.J.*—"If the prosecution story taken as a whole, is false, the accused is entitled to an acquittal." *MOTIJAN BIBEE v. CROWN* (1902) 3 C. W. N. 380

15. *Evidence Act, s. 30—Evidence—Confession—Retracted confession—Use of retracted confession as against person making it and as against co-accused.* A retracted confession may be taken into consideration, that is, used as evidence, not only as against the person making it, but as against persons tried jointly with the confessing accused for the same offence. As regards the person making it a retracted confession may, even without any corroborative evidence, form the basis of a conviction. As regards other co-accused, although corroborative evidence may be necessary, it is not necessary that such corroborative evidence should by itself be sufficient to support a conviction. *Semble*: That a conviction based on the unsupported evidence afforded by the confession of a co-accused would not be unlawful. *Queen-Empress v. Maiku Lal*, I. L. R. 20 All. 483, followed. *Empress v. Ashootosh Chuckerbutty*, I. L. R. 4 Cal. 483, discussed. *Queen v. Mohesh Biswas*, 19 W. R. Cr. 16, referred to. *EMPEROR v. KEHRI* (1907) I. L. R. 29 All. 434

4. CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE.

1. *Practice of taking prisoners before Magistrate to get confession recorded.* The practice of taking prisoners before Magistrates not having jurisdiction in the case, for the purpose of getting a confession recorded, is not generally desirable, but such a confession is legally admissible in evidence when duly proved. *REG. v. VAHALA JETHA* 7 Bom. Cr. 56

2. *Statement made to Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 109.* S. 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure refers to cases where the confession of a prisoner has been made to the Magistrate conducting the investigation, and not to the police. It is only when properly made to the Magistrate that the confession.

CONFESSION—contd.**4. CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE—contd.**

can be used as evidence against the prisoner. The mere standing by of the Magistrate when the confession is being made to the police is not sufficient. *QUEEN v. DOMUN KAHAR* . 12 W. R. Cr. 82

3. Sufficiency of confession—Corroborative denial of statement in Sessions Court. The properly attested confession of a prisoner before a Magistrate is sufficient for his conviction without corroborative evidence, and notwithstanding a subsequent denial before the Sessions Court. *QUEEN v. BHUTTUN RUJWAN*

12 W. R. Cr. 49

4. Statement on preliminary enquiry—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872), ss. 122, 193, 346—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), ss. 342, 364. On a certain day a confession by an accused person was recorded by a Magistrate, and on the next day the same Magistrate, having jurisdiction to do so, examined the witnesses for the prosecution and eventually committed the accused. *Held*, following *Empress v. Anuntram Singh*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 954, that such confession, having been made to a Magistrate competent to hold, and who actually then was holding, an enquiry preliminary to committal, must be regarded as falling within s. 193 of Act X of 1872, or s. 342 of Act X of 1882, and as such governed by the reservations contained in s. 346 of the former Act or s. 364 of the latter. Observations on ss. 342 and 364 of Act X of 1882 (Criminal Procedure Code). *EMPRESS v. YAKUB KHAN* . I. L. R. 5 All. 253

5. Pardon wrongly tendered to witness—Admissibility of evidence—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 344—Evidence Act, s. 24. Where a pardon was tendered by the Magistrate to a person supposed to have been concerned with others in offences, one of which were exclusively triable by the Court of Session, and such person was examined as a witness in the case:—*Held*, that the statement made by such person was irrelevant and inadmissible as a confession, with reference to s. 344 of Act X of 1872, and s. 24 of Act I of 1872. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. ASHGAR ALI*

I. L. R. 2 All. 260

6. Improper examination of accused person by Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 164, 364, 533—Evidence Act, ss. 65, 80—Record rejected. The Deputy Magistrate of Malabar, purporting to act under the provisions of the Mapilla Act (Madras Act XX of 1859), recorded a statement in the nature of a confession made by V, who was under arrest on suspicion of being concerned in a Mapilla outrage. This statement, which was made in Malayalam, was recorded in English in the form of a narrative and was signed by the Magistrate only. The same Magistrate shortly afterwards, purporting to act under the Code of Criminal Procedure, before any evidence was recorded against V, examined him as to this statement which was read over and translated to

CONFESSION—contd.**4. CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE—contd.**

him. In answer to questions, V, admitted that he had made it voluntarily. This examination was recorded according to the provisions of s. 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After other evidence was recorded, V, retracted his statement. He was committed to the Sessions, tried, and convicted mainly on his own recorded statement and examination. The Deputy Magistrate was examined as a witness, and stated that the statement recorded by him was made by V, and was correctly recorded, and was made voluntarily. *Held*, that the record of the statement made by V to the Deputy Magistrate was not admissible in evidence against V. *Per PARKER, J.*—The provisions of s. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are imperative, and s. 533 will not render a confession admissible where no attempt has been made to conform to the provisions of the former section. If the confessional statement of V was recorded by the Magistrate in his executive capacity, it was not receivable in evidence under s. 80 of the Evidence Act. The action of the Magistrate in examining V as to his confessional statement before there was any legal evidence on the record against him was illegal, and therefore the record of such examination could not be used in evidence against V. Inasmuch as the record of the statement of V was not admissible, secondary evidence thereof could not be given. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. VIRAN*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 224

7. Record of statement before Magistrate—Certificate of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 205. A confession before a Magistrate should be recorded in the language in which it was made, and to make it evidence the certificate by the Magistrate required by s. 205, Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, must be attached. *QUEEN v. BHEEBEEKEE*

4 N. W. 16

8. Statement in foreign language. It is not necessary that a statement made to a Court by an accused in a foreign language should be taken down in the words of that language. The language in which the statement is conveyed to the Court by the interpreter is the language in which it should be recorded. *EMPRESS v. VAIMBILEE*. *VAIMBILEE v. EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 826

9. Improperly recorded confession—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 122 and 346. A confession not recorded according to the provisions of Act X of 1872, s. 346, is inadmissible as evidence. *QUEEN v. KALA CHAND PAL*

24 W. R. Cr. 29

QUEEN v. CHUNDER BUHTTACHARJEE

24 W. R. Cr. 42

10. Defect in confession—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 122, 346. A defect in a confession taken under s. 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be remedied, as in the case of an examination of a prisoner under s. 346

CONFESSION—contd.**4. CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE—contd.**

by evidence taken at Sessions. *EMPRESS v. HARI KISTO BISWAS* . . . **5 C. L. R. 209**

11. ———— *Unsigned confession—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 122 and 346—Oral evidence to prove.* The confession of an accused person, taken by a Magistrate having no jurisdiction to commit or try him, is imperfect, if not signed by the accused person or attested by his mark, and is inadmissible in evidence (ss. 122 and 346, Criminal Procedure Code). The term "Preliminary enquiry" in the final clause of s. 346 means such enquiries as are the subject of Chaps. XIV (of enquiries and trials) and XV (of enquiry into cases triable by the Court of session or the High Court); and, therefore, that clause does not apply to confessions recorded under s. 122, which refers to an enquiry not during a trial, or one held with a view to committal, but an enquiry for the purpose of forwarding confessions, when recorded, to the Magistrate by whom the case of the accused person is enquired into or tried. Consequently when a confession taken under s. 122 is inadmissible in evidence, oral evidence to prove that such a confession was made, or what the terms of that confession were, is inadmissible also (s. 91 of the Evidence Act). *REG. v. BAT RATAN* . . . **11 Bom. 166**

12. ———— *Confession not taken in proper form nor authenticated by Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 122, 346.* A confession, not taken in the form of question and answer, and not authenticated by the Magistrate's endorsement as to its accuracy, is inadmissible in evidence, even though no objection should be made to its reception: ss. 45, 122, 256 and 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and s. 91 of the Evidence Act. *REG. v. AMRITA GOVINDA* . . . **10 Bom. 497**

But see *EMPRESS v. SAGAMBUR*

12 C. L. R. 120

13. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 346—Confession improperly subscribed.* The direction of s. 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, enjoining that an accused person shall sign the record of his confession, is not satisfied by the following:—"Signature of A B (the accused); the handwriting of C D." Where the conviction of a person was based upon a confession thus subscribed, the High Court reversed it, and held that the Sessions Judge was bound to prevent the production of such a confession. *REG. v. DAYA ANAND* . . . **11 Bom. 44**

14. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 346—Prejudice—Failure by pleader to take objection.* An accused person whose signature to a statement made by him to the committing Magistrate is not taken, as provided in s. 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is not prejudiced thereby within the meaning of that section, unless he is unfairly affected as to his defence on the merits. Where a prisoner in the Court of

CONFESSION—contd.**4. CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE—contd.**

Session was represented by a pleader who had opportunity to object to the admissibility of his statement, and did not, the High Court held that he was not prejudiced. *REG. v. DEVA DAYAL* . . . **11 Bom. 237**

15. ———— *Confession taken by Magistrate other than the one investigating the case—Certificate of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 122.* S. 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires a Magistrate to certify on a confession his belief that it was voluntarily made, does not apply to the case of a confession taken by a Magistrate who is actually investigating the case and examining the witnesses preparatory to commitment, but to a case where some other Magistrate takes a confession and forwards it to the Magistrate by whom the case is enquired into or tried. *QUEEN v. JETOO* . . . **23 W. R. Cr. 16**

16. ———— *Memorandum of Magistrate as to voluntariness of confession—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 122 and 346—Admissibility in evidence.* A confession recorded under s. 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be admissible in evidence must not only bear a memorandum that the Magistrate believed it to have been voluntarily made, but also a certificate, under s. 346 of the Code, that it was taken in the Magistrate's presence and hearing, and contains accurately the whole of the statement made by the accused person. No oral evidence can be received to prove the fact of a confession if the confession itself be inadmissible. *REG. v. SHIVYA* . . . **I. L. R. 1 Bom. 219**

See (contra) *EMPRESS v. RAMANJIYYA*

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 5

17. ———— *Attestation of record—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 346—Confession made to trying officer at time of trial.* The attestation required by s. 346 of the Criminal Procedure Code is unnecessary when a confession is made in Court to the officer trying the case at the time of trial. In the matter of *CHUMMAN SHAH* . . . **I. L. R. 3 Calc. 756 : 2 C. L. R. 317**

18. ———— *Evidence of recording officer where confession defective—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 122—Admissibility of secondary evidence of confession not taken in accordance with s. 346 of Criminal Procedure Code (X of 1872).* When the confession of a prisoner under s. 122 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not taken in the manner provided by s. 346, and was, therefore, defective:—Held, that the evidence of the recording officer, that such confession was actually made, was inadmissible to remedy the defect. In re *EMPRESS v. MANNOO TAMOOLEE* . . . **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 696 : 4 C. L. R. 137**

QUEEN v. CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE

24 W. R. Cr. 42

19. ———— *Confession to Magistrate during enquiry held previously to committal—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 122 and 346.*

CONFESSION—contd.**4. CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE—contd.**

When a confession is made to a Magistrate by an accused person during an enquiry held previously to the case being taken up by the committing officer, and by an officer acting merely as a recording officer, it must be recorded in strict accordance with the provisions of ss. 122 and 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the provisions of these sections have not been fully complied with by the recording officer, the Court of Session cannot take evidence that the accused person duly made the statement recorded; and in cases where evidence can be taken, a Court of Session is not at liberty to treat a deposition, sent up with the record and made by the recording officer before the committing officer, to the effect that the accused person did in fact duly make before him the statement recorded, as evidence of that fact. In such a case the recording officer must himself be called and examined by the Court of Session, except in cases in which the presence of the recording officer cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, the Court of Session considers unreasonable. *NOSHAI MISTRI v. EMPRESS* I. L. R. 5 Cal. 958 : 6 C. L. R. 353

20. — Confession recorded by Magistrate who afterwards holds the preliminary examination—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), ss. 122, 193, 346.* A confession recorded by a Magistrate, who afterwards conducts the enquiry preliminary to committal, and has jurisdiction to do so, is to be treated as an examination under s. 193 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and not as a confession recorded under s. 122, notwithstanding that the prisoner may have been brought before the Magistrate before the conclusion of the police investigation. To such a confession consequently the provisions of the last paragraph of s. 346 apply. S. 122 of the Criminal Procedure Code contemplates and provides for cases in which confessions are recorded by a Magistrate other than the Magistrate by whom the case is enquired into or tried. *EMPRESS v. ANUNTARAM SINGH* . I. L. R. 5 Cal. 954 : 6 C. L. R. 297

21. — Confession, mode of recording, and admissibility of—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 164, 364, 533—Defective recording of a confession or statement—Magistrate recording a confession and holding subsequent judicial inquiry.* Whether a confession made by a prisoner to a Magistrate be regarded as a statement under s. 164 or under s. 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the terms of the law require that the record should be signed not only by the person who makes the confession or is under examination but also by the Magistrate and that, in addition thereto, there should be a certificate in the terms prescribed. Such a confession or statement to be admissible in evidence must strictly comply with the terms of the law. The defect in recording a confession may be remedied under s. 533, Criminal Procedure Code, by examining the Magistrate who

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recorded the confession. A confession freely made to a Magistrate and recorded under s. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is admissible in evidence, and the fact that after the confession so recorded, the same Magistrate holds the subsequent judicial inquiry and commits the case to the Court of Session, does not make the confession inadmissible on that ground. *EMPRESS v. ANUNTARAM SINGH*, I L. R. 5 Cal. 954, explained and distinguished. A Magistrate may become disqualified from dealing with a case by reason of some previous action taken by him, but the character of the evidence and its admissibility cannot be affected by his subsequent conduct; or in other words, what is admissible in evidence cannot become inadmissible through the course subsequently taken by a Magistrate. *EMPRESS v. LAL SHEIKH* 3 C. W. N. 387

22. — Confession made during or before investigation by police—*Statement to Magistrate other than the one holding enquiry—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 122, 346.* S. 122 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872) does not apply to a confession recorded by a Magistrate acting under Ch. XV or Ch. XVII, but to a confession made to a Magistrate other than the Magistrate by whom the case has to be enquired into or tried; and to a confession made during or before the commencement of an investigation by the police. *In the matter of BEHARI HADJI* 5 C. L. R. 238

23. — Confession made commencement of proceedings—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 122, 346—Prompt record of confessions.* A confession made by an accused person before a Magistrate who has jurisdiction to deal with the matter to which it relates, may be made the commencement of a trial or enquiry under Chap. XV of the Criminal Procedure Code, and be treated as a confession under s. 346, whether or not the case be still under the investigation of the police. *Per Curiam*.—The object of s. 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to enable any Magistrate, other than the Magistrate by whom the case is to be tried or enquired into, to record a confession promptly. *Behari Hadji*, 5 C. L. R. 238, and *Reg. v. Shivya*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 219, discussed. *KRISHNO MONEE v. EMPRESS*

6 C. L. R. 289

24. — Memorandum of Magistrate not in prescribed form—*Evidence Act, s. 24—Act X of 1872 (Criminal Procedure Code), ss. 122, 346.* A confession does not become irrelevant merely because the memorandum required by law to be attached thereto by the Magistrate taking it has not been written in the exact form prescribed. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. BHAIRON SINGH*

I. L. R. 3 All. 338

25. — *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 122, 346—Admissibility in evidence.* Where a Magistrate in taking the confession of a prisoner under s. 122 of the Criminal Proce-

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Code omits to take it in writing, with the formalities prescribed by s. 346 of that Code, such confession is not absolutely inadmissible in evidence. Evidence may be taken to show that the prisoner duly made the statement recorded. *Reg. v. Shivya*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 219, dissented from. *EMPRESS v. RAMANJIYYA* . . . I. L. R. 2 Mad. 5

26. ———— Certificate not recorded at time of confession—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1876, s. 122—Admissibility in evidence.* If the certificate required by s. 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872), that a confession is voluntarily made, is not recorded by the Magistrate at the time the confession is made, or at any rate, on the day it is reduced to writing, the confession is bad and inadmissible in evidence. To render the statement of one person jointly tried with another for the same offence liable to consideration against that other, it is necessary that it should amount to a distinct confession of the offence charged. *EMPRESS v. DAJI NARSU* . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 248

27. ———— Examination not recorded in proper form—*Error in recording examination—Question and answer—Statement of accused person—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 346—Admissibility in evidence.* The confession of an accused person was recorded in a simple narrative form instead of in the shape of question and answer as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 346. There was nothing in the character of the confession, or in the circumstances of the case, to lead to the inference that the accused had been prejudiced by the error. *Held*, that the error did not affect the admissibility of the statement in evidence. *In the matter of the petition of MUNSHI SHEIKH. EMPRESS v. MUNSHI SHEIKH.* I. L. R. 8 Cal. 616

TITU MAYA v. QUEEN

I. L. R. 8 Cal. 618 note : 1 C. L. R. 1

28. ———— Confession not recorded in language in which it is given, admissibility of in evidence—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 164, 364, and 533—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 91—Examination of Accused—Defect in confession.* An accused, when in custody, made a confession to a Deputy Magistrate in the presence of a Sub-Inspector, and during an investigation being held into a case of murder, under the provisions of Chap. XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code. The confession was recorded by the Deputy Magistrate in English, though made in Hindi, which the Deputy Magistrate perfectly well understood and could write. It purported to have been recorded under the provisions of s. 164, and was in reply to one question which was set out. The record bore the signatures of the accused and of the Deputy Magistrate, as well as the certificate as required by the section. It occupied about five pages of foolscap. At the trial the Sessions Judge excluded the confession on the ground that not having been recorded in the language in which it was made, and

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there being no reason why it should not have been so recorded, the document was inadmissible in evidence. He, however, called the Deputy Magistrate as a witness, and admitted in evidence his statement as to what the accused told him. This evidence, which occupied only a few lines, was to the effect that the accused told him he had committed the murder, and on this evidence alone the accused was convicted. On appeal, *held*, that the provisions of s. 164 read with s. 364 are imperative as to the language in which a confession is to be recorded, and that s. 533 does not contemplate or provide for any non-compliance with the law in this respect, and that, therefore, as it was not impracticable to record the confession in Hindi, the Sessions Judge was right in refusing to admit the document in evidence. *Held*, further, that the Sessions Judge erred in admitting the oral evidence of the Deputy Magistrate as to what the accused told him, as, seeing that he was acting under the provisions of s. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the confession was matter which was required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, and therefore under s. 9 of the Evidence Act no evidence could be given in proof of such matter except the document, where, as in this case, it was in existence and forthcoming. *Held*, also, that, as the defects in the record could not be cured under s. 533 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and no secondary evidence could be given, no proof of the confession could be given, and the accused must be acquitted. *JAI NARAYAN RAI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* I. L. R. 17 Cal. 862

See (contra) QUEEN-EMPRESS v. VISRAM BABAJI
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 495

and *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAGHU*
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 221

29. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 164, 364, and 533—Examination of accused.* Where a confession made in Hindustani was taken before a Sub-divisional Magistrate and was recorded by the Court Officer in Bengali, that being the language of the Court, and where it appeared that the Magistrate himself was a Mahomedan, and it was contended that he must be taken to have been able to record the confession in the language in which it was given, there being no evidence to the contrary:—*Held*, that, in the absence of such evidence, the Court should presume that the proceedings of the Magistrate were conducted in accordance with law, and that in the absence of anything to show that it was practicable for the officers of his Court to record the statement in Urdu, it could fairly be held that the Magistrate found that was impracticable, and adopted the alternative allowed by law of having the confession recorded in the Court language. *Jai Narayan Rai v. Queen-Empress, I. L. R. 17 Cal. 862*, doubted. *LALCHAND v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 18 Cal. 549

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30. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 364—Recording statement of accused on examination before Magistrate.* Where an accused, a Manipuri, was examined before the Magistrate through an interpreter, who obtained his answers in Manipuri, and they were recorded in that language, and the interpreter translated them into Bengali, and they were recorded by the Magistrate in English, and the statement in English and that in Manipuri were found to differ:—*Held*, that the statement recorded in Manipuri must be taken to be the record in the case. Had the Manipuri statement not been made, the Magistrate by recording the statement in English would not have strictly complied with the spirit and intention of s. 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code, though the record in English might not necessarily have been inadmissible in evidence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SAGAL SAMBA SAJAO*. I. L. R. 21 Calc. 642

31. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 364.* The confession of an accused person made in Bengali, the language in which the accused was examined, was recorded in English. The committing Magistrate, in his evidence in Court, said that he could not write Bengali well, and that there was no Mohurrir with him at the time when the confession was recorded. *Held*, that the provisions of s. 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code had been sufficiently complied with. *Jai Narayan Rai v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 862, distinguished. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RASAI MIA*. I. L. R. 22 Calc. 817

32. ————— *Confession to Presidency Magistrate—Statement of prisoner made before inquiry—Statement of prisoner made in the course of or after inquiry—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), ss. 164, 364 and 533—Examination of accused persons.* The sections comprised in Chap. XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882) (except s. 155), do not apply to the Police in the Presidency towns, and consequently a statement or confession made to a Presidency Magistrate does not come within s. 164, and the procedure prescribed in regard to the recording of statements or confessions by that section, and (by reference) s. 364, does not apply to statements and confessions recorded by a Presidency Magistrate before the commencement of the trial. But such statement or confession, though not taken under s. 164, is admissible in evidence against the prisoner. *Queen-Empress v. Nilmadhub*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 565, followed on this point. During an inquiry before a Presidency Magistrate after the evidence for the prosecution was taken, the Magistrate examined the accused under ss. 209 and 312 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The accused was examined in Marathi, but the questions and answers were recorded in English. The Magistrate deposed at the trial that it was the invariable practice in his Court to take down depositions in English, and that he could not himself have accurately recorded

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prisoner's statement in Marathi. He also deposed that the statement was correctly recorded in English, and that each question and answer when recorded was interpreted to the accused in Marathi, and that the accused then made his mark at the end of the recorded statements. He further stated that there were at hand native subordinate officials of his Court who could have recorded the statement in Marathi, but that he himself had not sufficient knowledge of Marathi as to be able to read what was written by such a subordinate, or to satisfactorily check or test the correctness with which it represented the statement made by the accused. *Held*, that, assuming that it was practicable to record the statement in Marathi and that consequently it was irregular with reference to s. 364 of the Code to record it in English, the statement was nevertheless admissible in evidence under s. 533, the irregularity not having injured the accused as to his defence on the merits. *Jai Narayan Rai v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 862, dissented from. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. VISRAM BABAJI*. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 495

33. ————— *Confession not signed by the accused—Admissibility of such confession—Parol evidence admissible to prove the terms of the confession.* S. 533 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882) is intended to apply to all cases in which the directions of the law have not been fully complied with. It applies to omissions to comply with the law as well as to infractions of the law. *Queen-Empress v. Visram Babaji*, I. L. R. 21 Bom. 195, followed. *Jai Narayan Rai v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 1862, dissented from. The accused was charged with murder. At the trial a confession made by him before the committing Magistrate was tendered in evidence against him. The Sessions Judge rejected the confession as inadmissible, as it did not bear the mark or signature of the accused, and, as there was no other reliable evidence to bring home the charge to the accused, he was acquitted. *Held*, reversing the order of acquittal, that though the record of the confession was admissible, parol evidence could be given of the terms of the confession, and those terms, when proved, might be admitted and used as evidence against the accused under s. 533 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882). The accused was, therefore, ordered to be re-tried. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAGHU*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 221

34. ————— *Evidence, admissibility of confession in—Question and Answer—Memorandum in English by Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 164, 364 and 533.* It is not necessary that the English memorandum referred to in para. 3 of s. 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be made in respect of confessions recorded under s. 164, as the manner in which such a confession is to be recorded under the provisions of that section is fully set out in the first two

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paras. of s. 364. A confession of an accused person was recorded before a Deputy Magistrate by one of his clerks, under the provisions of s. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, while the case was under investigation by the police. No English memorandum of the nature referred to in s. 364 was made by the Deputy Magistrate. A further confession was recorded by the Magistrate under the provisions of s. 364, while the case was being heard before him. Both confessions were recorded in narrative form, and the questions and answers were not taken down. At the trial before the Sessions Judge, both confessions were put in evidence and no evidence was given under the provisions of s. 533 of the Criminal Procedure Code that the accused duly made the statements recorded. The accused was convicted mainly on the strength of the confessions. *Held*, upon the authority of the decision in *Titu Maya v. The Queen*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 618 note, that as the accused was not prejudiced by the questions and answers not being recorded, it was unnecessary for the judge to take evidence under s. 533, and that the conviction based on the confessions must be upheld. *FEKOO MAHTO v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* I. L. R. 14 Calc. 539

35. ——— Statement recorded by a Magistrate—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 164—Evidence—Judicial proceeding—Giving false evidence—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 191 and 192.* A statement taken by a third class Magistrate under s. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), such Magistrate not having authority to carry on the preliminary inquiry in the case, is not evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding with the meaning of ss. 121 and 193 of the Penal Code, such that, when the statement is contradicted afterwards before the Magistrate having jurisdiction and exercising it in the preliminary inquiry, it will form a sufficient basis for an alternative charge of giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BHARMA*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 702

See *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KHEM.*

I. L. R. 22 All. 115

and *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ALAGU KONE*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 421

36. ——— Defect in confession—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 1, 164, 364, 533—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 21, 26, 80—Presidency Towns, investigations in.* An accused, in custody at the time, made to a Magistrate in Calcutta, in the course of a police investigation held in Calcutta, a statement confessing that he had murdered his father. The accused spoke and understood English, and the Magistrate questioned him in English, and was answered sometimes in English and sometimes in Bengali. Whenever the answers were given in English, they were so taken down; when in Bengali, they were written down in English and read over to the accused in that language, who

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accepted the English as being the meaning of that which he had stated, and signed the document in the presence of the Magistrate, who affixed the usual certificate thereto. In taking this confession the Magistrate purported to have acted under ss. 164 and 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code. At the trial, subsequently to the admission of the confession in evidence under s. 80 of the Evidence Act, the Magistrate was called as a witness and deposed to the above facts with reference to the language in which the confession was taken and the mode in which it was recorded. *Held*, on a reference to a Full Bench, as to whether the confession was inadmissible in evidence by reason of some of the answers having been given in Bengali, but recorded in English, that the provisions of s. 164 of the Code had no application to statements taken in the course of a police investigation made in the town of Calcutta and that consequently ss. 364 and 533 had no application. *Held*, nevertheless, that the documents was properly admitted upon the evidence of the Magistrate under the provisions of s. 26 of the Evidence Act. *Semle*: The provisions of s. 164, as read with s. 364, would not be complied with, where answers made by an accused to a Magistrate in one language are taken down in another, unless it could be shown that it was impracticable to have taken down the answers in the language in which they were given; and, further, that there would be grave doubt if such a defect could be cured by s. 533. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NILMADHUB MITTER*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 595

37. ——— Examination of accused persons at preliminary investigation—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 159, 164, 364, 533—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 21, 24, 25, 26.* A Deputy Magistrate was deputed by the District Magistrate under s. 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (X of 1882) to hold an investigation into a case of murder, and recorded the statements of the accused persons. *Held*, that the statements were rightly rejected as inadmissible. The rule, laid down in s. 21 of the Evidence Act, must be taken subject to the special provisions relating to confessions and statements of accused persons enacted in ss. 24, 25, and 26 of the Evidence Act, and ss. 164 and 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Were it otherwise, confessions and statements of accused persons not recorded in accordance with the requirements of ss. 164 and 364 of the Code might be proved as admissions by the accused, and the wholesome provisions elaborately laid down in those two sections practically reduced to a nullity. Nor can s. 533 of the Code be construed to favour that view. Under that section, when a confession or other statement of an accused person is duly made in accordance with the provisions of law, but in the recording of it those provisions have not been fully complied with, oral evidence is admissible to prove that the confession or other statement was duly made. The defect which the section is intended to cure is not one of substance, but of form only. *Queen-Empress v. Viran*, I. L. R.

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9 *Mad.* 224, and *Jai Narayan Rai v. Queen-Empress*, *I. L. R.* 17 *Calc.* 870, followed. The statements having been recorded by a Magistrate not being a police officer, in the course of an investigation under Ch. XIV of the Code, the provisions of s. 164 must be observed. The statements contemplated by that section should be recorded in the manner prescribed for recording evidence, and confessions must be recorded in the manner provided by s. 364. Ss. 355 to 363, which deal with the mode of recording evidence, can only relate to the statements of witnesses, while s. 364 deals with all statements made by accused persons, whether amounting to confessions or not. The reason that s. 164 provides only for the recording of that class of statements of an accused which are or purport to be confessions is that the section relates to a stage of the case, namely, the police-investigation stage, at which statements of the accused which do not amount to confessions and which are elicited by examination are not intended to be obtained. Ss. 209 and 342 of the Code are the only provisions authorising the examination of the accused by the Magistrate. *Empress v. Malka*, *I. L. R.* 2 *Bom.* 643, and *Queen-Empress v. Viran*, *I. L. R.* 9 *Mad.* 224, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BHAIRAB CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY*

2 C. W. N. 702

38. Conditional pardon to prisoner—*Power of Sessions Court to try person not committed—Approver, evidence of—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), ss. 162, 193, 337, 339, and 374—Statement to police officers—Deposition without opportunity for cross-examination—Evidence Act, ss. 24 and 30.* Two persons, J and U, were charged with the murder of U's husband, and in the course of the police inquiry made certain statements to the police. They were then sent up by the police to a Deputy Magistrate for inquiry. J made three statements on the 28th of February, the 1st of March, and the 9th of March 1894, respectively, two of which were confessions, the third being a withdrawal of such confessions. U also made two statements on the 2nd and 9th of March, the first of which was a confession, and the second a withdrawal thereof. On the 20th of April U was tendered a pardon, and was thereafter treated as an approver, in which capacity she gave evidence against J. J was then committed to the Court of Session to take his trial, U being sent up as an approver. In the Sessions Court U resiled from her deposition before the committing Magistrate, and was then and there treated as an accused person and placed on her trial with the other accused, and the deposition aforesaid was put in as evidence. Both accused were convicted mainly on their confessions, J of murder, and U of abatement of murder. *Held*, that the conviction of U was bad, the Court of Session having had no jurisdiction to try her, as she was never committed to that Court by any competent Magistrate. *Held*, that the conviction of J was also bad. (i) Because U's state-

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ment to the police was not admissible in evidence. (ii) Because her statements on the 2nd and 9th of March were not under the circumstances admissible in evidence, as she was not being legally tried jointly with him for the same offence. (iii) That her deposition on the 24th of April was not admissible in evidence, because, apart from other reasons, J had no opportunity to cross-examine her. (iv) Because J's confession under the circumstances was not a free and voluntary admission of guilt. *Held*, on the whole case, that independently of the aforesaid statements and confession there was not sufficient evidence to justify the conviction. *Queen-Empress v. Rama Tevan*, *I. L. R.* 15 *Mad.* 352, commented on. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JAGAT CHANDRA MAL* . . . *I. L. R.* 22 *Calc.* 50

39. Confession made before, and attested by, a judicial officer in a Native State, how far admissible as evidence in the Courts of British India—*Evidence Act, ss. 74, 80—Presumptions in respect of Record of Foreign Court.* Certain persons charged with a dacoity committed at Chawripura, a village on the borders of Gwalior, having gone over into Gwalior territory, were arrested and brought before the Magistrate of Bind in Gwalior. That officer recorded their statements, attesting each statement in the following words:—"I believe that this confession was made without threat or coercion, and it was made in my presence and to my hearing. The person making it, having heard it read out to him, stated it as correct. It contains a full and true account of the statement made by him." Each statement also bore the mark (by way of signature) of the person by whom it purported to have been made. Subsequently these persons were handed over to the British authorities and were tried by the Court of Session, who rejected the confessions above referred to as inadmissible in evidence. The accused having appealed to the High Court, it was held that each of the confessions recorded in the manner above described was admissible in evidence, certainly under s. 80 of the Evidence Act, and probably under s. 74 of that Act, as against the person by whom it was made. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SUNDAR SINGH* . . . *I. L. R.* 12 *Al.* 595

40. Confession made to a Magistrate of a Native State—*Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 26.* The words "police officer" and "Magistrate" in s. 26 of the Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872) include the police officers and Magistrates of Native States as well as those of British India. A confession made by a prisoner, while in police custody to a first class Magistrate of the Native State of Muli in Kathiawar, and duly recorded by such Magistrate in the manner prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act XI of 1882), is admissible in evidence. *Queen-Empress v. Sundar Singh*, *I. L. R.* 12 *Al.* 595, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NAGLA KALA*

I. L. R. 22 *Bom.* 235

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41. ———— **Refusal to sign confession—**
Penal Code, s. 180. S. 180 of the Penal Code does not apply to statements made under this section in reply to questions put by the Court. *EMPERESS v. SUSAPPA* I. L. R. 4 Bom. 15

42. ———— **Admissibility—Evidence—**
Retracted Confession—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 24. A confession duly recorded and certified under s. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) is admissible in evidence against the person making it, unless shut out by the provisions of s. 24 of the Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872). A mere subsequent retraction of a confession which is duly recorded and certified by a Magistrate is not enough in all cases to make it appear to have been unlawfully induced. The law in India is not identical with the law in England on the relevancy and admissibility of confessions. *Imperatrix v. Balya Dagdu, Cr. Rul. No. 3 of 1898*, dissented from. *Reg. v. Balvant, 11 Bom. H. C. R. 137*, followed. *QUEEN-EMPERESS v. BASVANTA* (1900) I. L. R. 25 Bom. 168

43. ———— **Police—Evidence—Confession of an accused while in custody of the police—Duty of Magistrate when such confession is made—Sessions Judge, duty of—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 164 (3)—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 24.** When an accused person has been in custody of the police and has made a confession, it is important that the Magistrate, before recording such confession under s. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), should ascertain how long the accused has been in custody. If there is no record of that fact, it is the duty of the Sessions Judge, before holding the confession relevant under s. 24 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872), to send for the Magistrate and satisfy himself on the point. *QUEEN-EMPERESS v. NARAYAN* (1901) I. L. R. 25 Bom. 543

44. ———— **Promise—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 24—Confession caused by promise—Village Magistrate—Person in authority—Appeal from conviction by jury—Misdirection.** Two days after a dacoity had been committed in a certain village, T went to the Village Magistrate of that village, who was inquiring into the dacoity, and requested him to report that T had not been concerned in the dacoity. The Village Magistrate replied that there was already a hue and cry against T, but that if T spoke the truth he would consult the Head Constable and arrange that T should be taken as a witness. T at first denied all knowledge of the dacoity, but ultimately made a confession. T was charged, with others, with having committed the dacoity and this confession was deposed to by the Village Magistrate. The Sessions Judge, in his charge to the jury, made no reference to the relevancy or otherwise of the confession under s. 24 of the Evidence Act, and he said that if the confession was true it was enough to warrant the conviction of the accused. The jury returned a

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verdict of guilty, and the accused was sentenced. On an appeal being preferred on the ground of misdirection: *Held*, that the Village Magistrate was a person in authority within the meaning of s. 24 of the Evidence Act, and that, as the arrangement promised by him before the confession was made was obviously intended to be one that would save the accused from prosecution if he would confess, the confession was irrelevant under that section. Also, that the misdirection was a materials and important one, likely to lead to an erroneous verdict, and that a new trial must take place. *THANDRAYA MUDALY v. EMPEROR* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 38

45. ———— **Record—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 164, sub-s. (3)—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 80—Confession, recording of—Magistrate's certificate.** A confession, unless made in accordance with s. 164, Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be admissible as evidence under s. 80 of the Evidence Act. Where a confession made before a Magistrate did not bear his certificate stating his belief that it was freely and voluntarily made as required by sub-s. (3) of s. 164, Criminal Procedure Code: *Held*, that it could not be admitted under s. 80 of the Evidence Act without proof of its having been made. *EMPEROR v. RADHE HALWAI* (1902)

7 C. W. N. 220

46. ———— **Witness—Statements of witnesses, recorded by Magistrate under s. 164, Criminal Procedure Code—Recognizance of such witnesses to appear on the same day as when accused's statement recorded—Presumption that such witnesses were sent under custody—Accused to cross-examine them—Record to show such statements voluntarily made—Previous statement of a witness made to a Magistrate in the course of a judicial inquiry made evidence under s. 288, Criminal Procedure Code, at the Sessions trial.** The evidence of witnesses who are sent up by the police for the purpose of having their statements recorded under s. 164, Criminal Procedure Code, and who were presumably in Police custody up till their production before the Magistrate should not be recorded by such Magistrate unless he has some assurance that their attendance and statement were voluntary. *Empress v. Jadab Das, 4 C. W. N. 129; Bajrangji Lall v. The Empress, 4 C. W. N. 49*, referred to and followed. Where the Sessions Judge used as evidence under s. 288, Criminal Procedure Code, the statement which a witness made before the committing Magistrate, but which he repudiated at the Sessions and attributed to improper influence in the course of the investigation, and the circumstances were such that the Sessions Judge could not properly rely on either of these statements: *Held*, that the Sessions Judge did not show a proper discretion in allowing the former statement to be treated as evidence. *Queen v. Amanulla, 12 B. L. R. App. 15,*

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followed. *KING-EMPEROR v. BHUT NATH GHOSE*
(1902) **7 C. W. N. 345**

5. CONFESSIONS TO POLICE OFFICERS.

1. ——— *Police Officer—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 25.* The provisions of s. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872), which declare that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence, applies to every police officer and is not to be restricted to officers of the regular police force. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SALEMUDDIN SHEIK*

I. L. R. 26 Cal. 589
3 C. W. N. 393

2. ——— *Confession made to a police patel, admissibility of—Evidence Act, ss. 25 and 26—Police officer.* A police-patel is a police officer within the meaning of ss. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872). A confession made to a police patel is inadmissible in evidence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BHIMA*

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 485

3. ——— *Confessional statements made in the custody of police—Evidence Act, ss. 26, 27—Test of admissibility.* The test of the admissibility under s. 27 of the Evidence Act of information received from an accused person in the custody of a police officer, whether amounting to a confession or not, is:—"Was the fact discovered by reason of the information, and how much of the information was the immediate cause of the fact discovered, and as such a relevant fact?" *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. COMMER SAHIB*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 153

4. ——— *Confession made to a police officer by accused while in police custody—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 25 and 26.* A statement made to a police officer by an accused person while in the custody of the police, if it is an admission of a criminating circumstance, cannot be used in evidence under ss. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872). *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JAVECHARAM*

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 363

5. ——— *Police custody—Jailor in a Native State—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 26.* The custody of the keeper of a jail in a Native State, who is not a police officer, does not become that of a police officer, merely because his subordinates, the warders of the jail, are members of the police force of that State. In the absence of any suggestion of a close custody inside of the jail, such as may possibly occur when an accused person is watched and guarded by a police officer investigating an offence, s. 26 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) does not exclude such a jailor from giving evidence of what the accused told him while in jail. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. TATYA*

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 795

6. ——— *Police officer of Native State—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 26. A*

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—contd.

confession to a police officer of a Native State if properly recorded, is admissible in evidence under s. 26 of the Evidence Act. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NAGLA KALA*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 235

7. ——— *Confession of an accused while in the custody of a chowkidar—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 25, 26—Chowkidar, whether a police officer.* A village chowkidar is not a police officer within the meaning of ss. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act; so a confession made by an accused while in the custody of a chowkidar is admissible in evidence. *Queen v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose, I. L. R. 1 Cal. 207, and Queen-Empress v. Bhima, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 485, distinguished.* *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BEPIN BEHARY DEY*

2 C. W. N. 71

But see *EMPRESS v. INDRA CHUNDER PAL*

2 C. W. N. 637

8. ——— *Chowkidar—Police Act (V of 1861)—Bengal Regulation XX of 1817—Village Chowkidars Act Amendment Act (Bengal Act I of 1892).* Semble: A chowkidar, although he is not a police officer under Act V of 1861, is a police officer under Bengal Regulation XX of 1817 and Bengal Act I of 1892, and a confession made to him is inadmissible. *Queen-Empress v. Bepin Behary Dey, 2 C. W. N. 71, dissented from.* *EMPRESS v. INDRA CHUNDER PAL*

2 C. W. N. 637

See *KALAI v. KANU CHOWKIDAR.*

I. L. R. 27 Cal. 368

4 C. W. N. 252

in which it was held that a chowkidar was not a police officer within the terms of s. 59 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.

9. ——— *Statement to police constable—Inducement to confess—Confession before Magistrate.* The accused confessed to a police constable, on being assured by him that nothing would happen to her, that she had killed her new-born child, and had buried it in the enclosure of her house. This statement led to the discovery of some bones of the head of an infant, a stone stained with blood, and a knife, with which stone and knife she said that she had killed her child. Before the committing Magistrate she made the same statement. In her trial before he Sessions Judge, she admitted the birth of the child; she stated that it did not cry, and that she buried it, not knowing whether it was alive or dead. She also stated that the police constable had pressed and threatened her, and told her that if she confessed the truth nothing would happen to her. She denied having killed the child with the stone and sickle, and said that she had merely pressed it on the ground and then buried it. There was no evidence to show that the child was born alive. *Held*, that the confession before the Magistrate

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contd.**

was irrelevant, and that the Court was not prepared to say that the confession made before the Sessions Judge was made after the impression caused by the promise of the police constable had been fully removed, and that, looking at the fact that a promise of safety had been made, the confession was, even if accepted, of a limited character; that there was nothing to show that the child was born alive, and considering that, if the child was born dead, the accused might, under fear of exposure and disgrace, have wished to conceal the body, the accused must be acquitted of murder. *QUEEN v. LUCHOO* **5 N. W. 86**

10. Statement to police officer also a Magistrate—Evidence Act, ss. 25, 26, and 167—Admissibility in evidence of confession—Deputy Commissioner of Police in Calcutta—Letters Patent, 1865, cl. 26—Case certified by Advocate General. The prisoner, on his arrest, made a statement in the nature of a confession which was reduced into writing by one of the inspectors in whose custody the prisoner was, and subsequently signed and acknowledged by the prisoner in the presence of the Deputy Commissioner of Police at the police office, the Deputy Commissioner receiving and attesting the statement in his capacity as Magistrate and Justice of the Peace. At the trial of the prisoner at the Criminal Sessions of the High Court, this statement was tendered in evidence against him, and admitted by the Judge, who overruled an objection on behalf of the prisoner that, under s. 25 of the Evidence Act, it was inadmissible. On a case certified by the Advocate General under cl. 26 of the Letters Patent:—*Held*, that the confession was under s. 25 of the Evidence Act, not admissible in evidence. *Per GARTH, C.J.*—S. 26 of the Evidence Act is not to be read as qualifying the plain meaning of s. 25. In construing s. 25 the term "police officer" is not to be read in a technical sense, but in its more comprehensive and popular meaning. *Per GARTH, C. J. (PONTIFEX, J., doubting).*—The Court which under that section is to decide upon the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction is, in a case coming before the Court and under s. 26 of the Letters Patent, the Court of review, not the Court below. Such decision is to be come to on being informed by the Judge's notes and, if necessary, by the Judge himself, of the evidence adduced at the trial. *Per Curiam.*—Apart from s. 167, the Court has power, in a case under cl. 26 of the Letters Patent, to review the whole case on the merits, and affirm or quash the conviction. *QUEEN v. HURRIBOLE CHUNDER GHOSE* **I. L. R. 1 Calc. 207 : 25 W. R. Cr. 36**

11. Confession to police officer by one of accused persons tried jointly—Evidence Act, 1872, ss. 25 and 167—Admissibility in evidence of confession—High Court's Criminal Procedure Act (X of 1875), ss. 23 and 101—Letters Patent, 1865, cl. 25—Power of the High Court on

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contd.**

a point of law reserved to consider the merits of the case. S. 25 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) does not preclude one accused person from proving a confession made to a police officer by another accused person tried jointly with him. Such a confession is not to be received or treated as evidence against the person making it, but simply as evidence on behalf of the other. The High Court, on a point of law as to the admissibility of rejected evidence, reserved under cl. 25 of the Letters Patent, 1865, and s. 101 of the High Court's Criminal Procedure Act (X of 1875), has power to review the whole case and determine whether the admission of the rejected evidence would have affected the result of the trial; and a conviction should not be reserved unless the admission of the rejected evidence ought to have varied the result of the trial (Evidence Act, s. 167). *EMPRESS v. PITAMBER JINA* **I. L. R. 2 Bom. 61**

12. Admission made to police officer before arrest—Evidence Act, ss. 25, 26. An admission made by an accused person to a police officer before arrest is admissible in evidence. *EMPRESS v. DABEE PERSHAD* **I. L. R. 6 Calc. 530 : 7 C. L. R. 541**

13. Circumstances rendering confession admissible—Evidence Act, ss. 24, 26. The circumstances which will render a confession objected to under ss. 24-26 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) admissible in evidence discussed. *EMPRESS v. RAMA BIRAPA* . **I. L. R. 3 Bom. 12**

14. Self-exculpatory statement to police officer in police custody—Re-trial. A statement made to a police officer by an accused person while in the custody of the police, although intended to be made in self-exculpation and not as a confession, may be nevertheless an admission of a criminating circumstance, and, if so, under ss. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act I of 1872, it cannot be proved against the accused. After excluding evidence improperly admitted and put before the jury, the High Court found that the remaining evidence was not of such a character that a conviction might reasonably be based upon it. It accordingly reversed the conviction and sentence of the accused declining to order his re-trial. *EMPRESS v. PANDHARINATH* **I. L. R. 6 Bom. 34**

15. Statements of prisoner to police officer on being accused—Evidence Act, ss. 25, 26, 27. P, accused of the murder of a girl, gave to a police officer a knife, saying it was the weapon with which he had committed the murder. He also said that he had thrown down the girl's anklets at the scene of the murder, and would point them out. On the following day he accompanied the police officer to the place where the girl's body had been found, and pointed out the anklets. *Held*, that such statements, being confessions made to a police officer, whereby no fact was discovered, could not be proved against P. *Obser-*

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variations on the use of confessions made to police officers. *Reg. v. Jora Hasji*, 11 Bom. 242, and *Empress v. Rama Birapa*, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 12, referred to. *EMPRESS v. PANCHAM*

I. L. R. 4 All. 198

But see (*contra*) *LEGAL REMEMBRANCER v. CHEMA NASHYA* . . . I. L. R. 25 Cal. 413

16. ——— Statement to police officer investigating case—*Evidence Act*, ss. 25, 27. Under s. 25 of the Evidence Act, I of 1872, a confession made to a police officer is inadmissible in evidence except so far as is provided by s. 27. It is immaterial whether such police officer be the officer investigating the case—the fact that such person is a police officer invalidates a confession. *In the matter of HIRAN MIYA* . . . I C. L. R. 21

17. ——— Confession before Village Magistrate—*Criminal Procedure Code*, s. 164—*Village Cess Act*, s. 7—*Evidence Act*, s. 25. A Village Magistrate is not a police officer, and, therefore, a confession made to a Village Magistrate is not inadmissible in evidence by reason of s. 25 of the Evidence Act. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SAMA PAPI* . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 287

18. ——— Incriminating statement by prisoner to police officer—*Evidence of police constable*. A policeman, on being cross-examined, stated that, when he arrested the prisoner, the prisoner said to him, "Some Chinamen at the time of the occurrence came out with hatchets." On re-examination the policeman so far altered the word stated to have been used by the prisoner as to substitute for the words at the time of the occurrence the words at the time, and on being asked if the prisoner had explained "what time," answered, "he said at the time I struck the deceased." Counsel for the prisoner interposed and objected to the evidence. The Standing Counsel contended that he was entitled to clear up a matter which had been left in doubt by the cross-examination. *Held*, that the evidence could not be given. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MATHEWS*

I. L. R. 10 Cal. 1022

19. ——— Confession made to police officer, admissibility of, for other purposes than as a confession—*Evidence Act*, s. 25—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882)*, ss. 517 and 523—*Evidence of Ownership*. Statements made to the police by accused persons as to the ownership of property which is the subject-matter of the proceedings against them, although inadmissible as evidence against them at the trial for the offence with which they are charged, are admissible as evidence with regard to the ownership of the property in an enquiry held by the Magistrate under s. 523 of the Criminal Procedure Code (X of 1882). The High Court declined to interfere with an order made by a Magistrate under s. 523 of the Criminal Procedure Code, for the delivery of

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property, where the Magistrate made such order upon the mere evidence of a confession of the accused to the police that the property was stolen from the adjudged owner. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. TRIBHOVAN MANEKCHAND* . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 131

20. ——— Information as to offence charged—*Evidence Act*, ss. 26, 27—*Confessions of persons charged—Information as to offence*. When a fact is discovered in consequence of information received from one of several persons charged with an offence, and when others give like information, the fact should not be treated as discovered from the information of them all. It should be deposed that a particular fact has been discovered from the information of A B, and this will let in, under s. 27, Evidence Act, so much of the information as relates distinctly to the information therein discovered. *QUEEN v. RAM CHURN CHUNG*
24 W. R. Cr. 38

21. ——— Evidence Act, ss. 25, 26, 27. B and R, accused of offences under s. 414 of the Penal Code, gave information to the police which led to the discovery of the stolen property. This information was to the effect that the accused had stolen a cow and a calf, and sold them to a particular person at a particular place. *Held*, by the Full Bench (MAHMOOD, J., dissenting), that s. 27 of the Evidence Act is a proviso not only to s. 26 but also to s. 25; and that, therefore, so much of the information given by the accused to the police officer, whether amounting to a confession or not, as related distinctly to the facts thereby discovered, might be proved. *Empress v. Kuarpala*, *Weekly Notes All.* (1882), 225, dissented from. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*, that s. 27 of the Evidence Act is not a proviso to s. 25, but only to s. 26, and that, therefore, the statements in question were wholly inadmissible in evidence. *Empress v. Pancham*, I. L. R. 4 All. 198, referred to by STRAIGHT, *Offg. C.J.*, and MAHMOOD, J. *Per STRAIGHT, Offg. C.J.*, that where a statement is being detailed by a constable as having been made by an accused, in consequence of which he discovered a certain fact or certain facts, the strictest precision should be enjoined on the witness, so that there may be no room for mistake or misunderstanding. Observations by STRAIGHT, *Offg. C.J.*, as to the mode in which the testimony of witnesses should be recorded in cases where two persons are being tried. Observations by STRAIGHT, *Offg. C.J.*, and DUTHOIT, J., upon the nature of confessions by accused persons in India, and the circumstances in which such confessions are made. *EMPRESS v. BUBU LAL* . I. L. R. 6 All. 509

22. ——— Confession while in custody of police—*Evidence Act*, ss. 25, 27. No judicial officer dealing with the provisions of s. 27 of Act I of 1872 should allow one word more to be deposed to by a police officer detailing a statement made to him by an accused, in conse.

CONFESSION—*contd.*5. CONFESSIONS TO POLICE OFFICERS—*contd.*

quence of which he discovered a fact, than is absolutely necessary to show how the fact that was discovered is connected with the accused so as in itself to be a relevant fact against him. S. 27 was not intended to let in a confession generally, but only such particular part of it as set the person to whom it was made in motion, and led to his ascertaining the fact or facts of which he gives evidence. *Empress of India v. Pancham*, I. L. R. 4 All. 198, *Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal*, I. L. R. 6 All. 509, discussed and commented on. Thus, when a police officer deposed that an accused had told him that he had robbed K of R48, whereof he had spent R8 and had got R40, and that he had made over the R40 to him:—*Held*, that the statement that he robbed K of R48 was not necessarily preliminary to the surrender of the R40, and was inadmissible in evidence against him. When also a police officer deposed to the fact that the accused, who was charged with murder, had stated to him that he and K had stolen some hides from C, and upon such statement he had sent for C and recorded his information, and when it appeared that C had already informed the police of the fact of the theft, though the witness was not aware of it:—*Held*, that the statement was inadmissible upon the ground that it would be most dangerous to extend the provisions of s. 27, and allow a police officer, who is investigating a case, to prove an information received from a person accused of an offence in the custody of a police officer, on the ground that a material fact was thereby discovered by him, when that fact was already known to another police officer. *ADU SHIKDAR v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 635

23. ————— *Confession while in custody of police—Evidence Act, ss. 25, 26, 27.* The accused were charged with theft of some jwari. During the police investigation they admitted before the police that they had taken the grain and concealed it in a jar, which they forthwith produced. The identity of the jwari recovered with that stolen was not proved to the satisfaction of the trying Magistrate, except by these admissions, and upon these admissions they were convicted of theft. *Held*, that, as the prisoners themselves produced the jwari, it was by their own act and not from any information given by them, that the discovery took place. S. 27 of the Evidence Act, therefore, did not apply; and, though the fact of the production of the property might be proved, the accompanying confession made to the police was inadmissible in evidence. *Empress v. Pancham*, I. L. R. 4 All. 198, and *Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal*, I. L. R. 6 All. 509, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KAMALIA*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 595

24. ————— *Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 25, 26—Admissibility of confession made to chowkidar—Retracted confession.* P, who was accused of the murder of his wife and was ar-

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rested by a chowkidar, was alleged to have made a confession to him of the crime in the presence of one D whose evidence was not accepted by the Judge. He subsequently, a few hours later, made a confession to the Magistrate detailing the account of the murder. Two days after he retracted his confession before the Magistrate, and alleged it had been made under police threats. *Held*, that, after the view taken of the evidence of D, it would not be safe to act upon the confession alleged to be made to the chowkidar, but having regard to the circumstances of the case, the second confession was reliable. *EMPRESS v. INDRA CHUNDER PAL*

2 C. W. N. 637

25. ————— *Statements made by accused while in police custody, admissibility of—Evidence Act, ss. 8, 25, 26, 27—Confession—Confession leading to discovery of a fact—Statements as evidence of conduct.* The accused was charged, under s. 411 of the Penal Code, with dishonestly receiving stolen property. In the course of the police investigation the accused was asked by the police where the property was. He replied that he had kept it, and would show it. He said he had buried the property in the fields. He then took the police to the spot where the property was concealed, and with his own hands disinterred the earthen pot in which the property was kept. He made a second statement when pointing out the spot to the effect that he had buried the property there. It was contended that those statements were inadmissible, having been made when the accused was in custody of the police. *Held*, (i) that the above statements were clearly in the nature of a confession, as they suggested the inference that the prisoner committed the crime, and even if not intended by the accused as a confession of guilt, they were an admission of a criminating circumstance, and would form a very important part of the evidence against the accused, as showing that he had not come by the property honestly, and were, therefore, properly within the rule of exclusion in regard to confessions made by a person in custody of the police. (ii) That neither of the above statements was admissible in evidence under explanation 1 of s. 8 of the Evidence Act, I of 1872, as evidence of the conduct of the accused. S. 8, so far as it admits a statement as included in the word "conduct," must be read in connection with ss. 25 and 26, and cannot admit a statement as evidence which would be shut out by those sections. (iii) That the accused's statement, that he had buried the property in the fields, was admissible in evidence under s. 27 of the Evidence Act as it set the police in motion and led to the discovery of the property. A statement is equally admissible under s. 27, whether the statement is made in such detail as to enable the police to discover the property themselves, or whether it be of such a nature as to require the assistance of the accused

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contd.**

in discovering the exact spot where the property is concealed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NANA*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 260

26. ——— Information received from the accused *Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 27—Statement leading to the discovery of a fact—Admissibility of such statement.* If the statement of an accused person in the custody of the police is a necessary preliminary of the fact thereby discovered, it is admissible under s. 27 of the Evidence Act; it is immaterial whether the statement is sufficient to enable the police to make the discovery by themselves, or is only of such a nature as to require further assistance of the accused to enable them to discover the fact. *Empress of India v. Pancham, I. L. R. 4 All. 198*, dissented from. *Queen-Empress v. Nana, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 268*, followed. *Adu Shikdar v. Queen-Empress, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 635*, referred to. **LEGAL REMEMBRANCER v. CHEMA NASHYA . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 413**

DEPUTY LEGAL REMEMBRANCER v. CHEMA NASHYA 2 C. W. N. 257

27. ——— Statement of accused to friend—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 26—Statement made in temporary absence of police. A person under arrest on a charge of murder was taken in a tonga, from the place where the alleged offence was committed, to Godhra. A friend drove with her in the tonga, and a mounted policeman rode in front. In the course of the journey, the policeman left the tonga and went to a neighbouring village to procure a fresh horse, the tonga meanwhile proceeding slowly along the road for some miles without any escort. In the absence of the policeman, the accused made a communication to her friend with reference to the alleged offence. At the trial it was proposed to ask what the prisoner had said, on the ground that she was not then in custody, and that s. 26 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) did not apply. *Held*, that, notwithstanding the temporary absence of the policeman, the accused was still in custody, and the question must be disallowed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LESTER I. L. R. 20 Bom. 165*

28. ——— Police system of verification—Admissibility. As a confession made to a police officer cannot be proved against an accused person, a statement by a police officer to that effect should not be placed on the Magistrate's record; also, a police officer should not be permitted to depose that the accused has confessed to him, even though the terms of the confession are not allowed to be proved. The system of verification introduced by police circular condemned. *EMPEROR v. RADHE HALWAI (1902)*

7 C. W. N. 220

29. ——— Punchayet—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 24—Confession before punchayet—Punchayet if police-officer or a person in authority—Sentence—Age of the accused. A punchayet

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contd.**

is not a police-officer but he is a person in authority within the meaning of s. 24 of the Indian Evidence Act. A confession made by an accused before the *punchayet* who only told the accused to speak the truth, is admissible in evidence. Where the accused, a girl of 16, was held guilty of deliberately killing her husband by means of arsenic poison which she mixed up with the food cooked and served up by herself to the husband: *Held*, that in consideration of her age she should be transported for life instead of suffering the extreme penalty of death. *EMPEROR v. JASHA BEWA (1907)*

11 C. W. N. 904

**6. CONFESSIONS OF PRISONERS TRIED
JOINTLY.**

1. ——— Evidence Act, 1872, s. 30—Admissibility of confession of one against others. A prisoner who pleads guilty at the trial, and is thereupon convicted and sentenced, cannot be said to be jointly tried with the other prisoners, committed on the same charge, who pleaded not guilty. Where, therefore, one of eight prisoners before the committing Magistrate made a confession affecting himself and five others, and afterwards, at the trial before the Assistant Sessions Judge, pleaded guilty, and was thereupon convicted and sentenced, and the Judge then proceeded to take his evidence on solemn affirmation, and recorded his confession as evidence in the case against the other prisoners:—*Held*, that the Judge was wrong in taking the confession into consideration against those prisoners who pleaded not guilty. The proper course for the Judge was either to have sentenced the prisoner who pleaded guilty, and then put him aside, or to have waited to see what the evidence would disclose. *REG. v. KALU PATIL*

11 Bom. 146

2. ——— Amendment of charges—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 447-449. While A and B were being jointly tried before a Court of Session, the first for murder and the second for abetment of murder, a confession made by A that he himself had committed the murder at the instigation of B, was put in as evidence against A. Subsequently, the charge against A was altered to one of abetment of murder, and the Sessions Judge, under the authority of s. 30 of the Evidence Act, used the confession against both and convicted them. The High Court held that the original and amended charges were so nearly related that the trial might, without any unfairness, be deemed to have been a trial on the amended charge from the commencement; and that no objection having been taken by B, who was represented by a Vakil, to the admissibility of A's confession against him when the charge against A was altered, the Sessions Judge was justified in using the confession against B also. *REG. v. GOVIND BABLI RAUL*

11 Bom. 278

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3. ——— **Co-prisoner—Statement of person tried jointly with others.** The statement of a person tried jointly with other persons for the same offence is not made less of an admission, as to all that the person knew concerning the offence affecting himself and the other persons, by the fact of the Court not thinking him guilty of the offence charged. *QUEEN v. BAKUR KHAN* 5 N. W. 213

4. ——— **Confession of Co-prisoner—Corroboration.** The confession of one prisoner cannot be used as corroborative evidence against another person. Corroboration as to the details of the crime, without corroboration as to the person of the accused, is worthless. *QUEEN v. DURBAROO DASS SIRDAR* 13 W. R. Cr. 14

5. ——— **Confession of Co-prisoner—Trial for substantive offence and for abatement.** The confessions of persons tried jointly for the same offence may, by s. 30, Act I of 1872, be "considered" as against other parties then on their trial with them, but such confessions, when used as evidence against others, stand in need of corroboration, and cannot be used as corroborating in any way the evidence of approvers against such other parties. S. 30, Act I of 1872, ought to be construed with great strictness, and the confession of one person is not admissible in evidence against another, although the two are jointly tried, if one is tried for the abatement of the offence for which the other is on his trial. *QUEEN v. JAFFER ALI* 19 W. R. Cr. 57

6. ——— **Statement of accused persons as evidence against other co-accused.** Statements made by one set of prisoners, incriminating another set of prisoners, when each individual prisoner made a case for himself in which he was free from any criminal offence, ought not to be taken into consideration under s. 30 of the Evidence Act against the prisoners of the second set, when the two sets, although tried together, were tried upon totally different charges. *QUEEN v. BUNWAREE LALL* 21 W. R. Cr. 53

QUEEN v. KHUKREE OORAM 21 W. R. Cr. 48

7. ——— **Confession of accused tried jointly—Joinder of charges of theft and receiving stolen property.** B, M, K, and R were jointly tried: B for receiving stolen property under s. 411, and M, K, and R for theft under s. 380. The confession of M, K, and R was used as evidence against B, and all the accused were convicted. Held, that the Magistrate committed an error of law in admitting the confession of M, K, and R as against B, and it was a ground for setting aside the conviction, but not for discharging the accused. *BISHNU BANWAR v. EMPRESS* 1 C. W. N. 35

CONFESSION—contd.**6. CONFESSIONS OF PRISONERS TRIED JOINTLY—contd.**

8. ——— **Confessions of Prisoners tried jointly as evidence.** Confessions of prisoners tried simultaneously with the accused for the same offence, which are in a very qualified manner made operative as evidence by Act I of 1872, s. 30, are only to be rated as evidence of a defective character, and require especially careful scrutiny before they can be safely relied on. *QUEEN v. SADHU MUNDUL* 21 W. R. Cr. 69

9. ——— **Statements made by Prisoners before committing officer.** Statements made by a prisoner before the committing officer, which implicate his fellows and exculpate himself, cannot be regarded as evidence under the Evidence Act, s. 30. *QUEEN v. KESHUB BHOONIA* 25 W. R. Cr. 8

10. ——— **Defects of confessions by Co-prisoners.** The confession of co-prisoners cannot, under the Evidence Act I of 1872, s. 30, be treated as evidence of ordinary character not distinguished by any special infirmity or qualifications against the other prisoners, as, in addition to the infirmity inherent in an accomplice's testimony, they are not given on oath, and are not liable to be tested by cross-examination. *QUEEN v. NAGA* 23 W. R. Cr. 24

11. ——— **Confession of Co-prisoner incriminating himself.** The statement of one prisoner cannot be taken as evidence against another prisoner under s. 30 of the Evidence Act, unless the confessing prisoner implicates himself to the full as much as his co-prisoner whom he incriminates. *QUEEN v. BAIJOO CHOWDRY* 25 W. R. Cr. 43

12. ——— **Confession by Co-prisoner implicating himself.** Where more persons than one are being tried for the same offence, and a confession made by one affecting himself and some of the others is proved, the Evidence Act, s. 30, does not provide that such confession is evidence, but that it may be "taken into consideration": the intention of the Legislature being that when, as against any person implicated by such confession, there is evidence tending to his conviction, the circumstance of such person being implicated by the confession of one of those who are being jointly tried with him shall be taken into consideration as bearing upon the truth or sufficiency of such evidence. *QUEEN v. CHUNDER BHUTTA-CHARJEE* 24 W. R. Cr. 42

13. ——— **Confessions of fellow-prisoners tried jointly for the same offence.** When the accused was convicted solely on the confessions of his fellow-prisoners, who were tried jointly with him for the same offence, held, that the conviction was bad. Under s. 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, such confessions could be "taken into consideration" against the accused, but they were not evidence within the definition

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given in s. 3 of the Act; and they could not, therefore, alone form the basis of a conviction. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KHANDIA BIN PANDU*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 66

14. *Value, as evidence, of confession of persons tried jointly.* The words "take into consideration" in s. 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, do not mean that the confession referred to in the section is to have the force of sworn evidence. *Queen-Empress v. Khandia, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 66*, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NIRMAL DAS*

I. L. R. 22 All. 455, 448 note

15. *Confession made by person charged jointly with another for separate offences arising out of one transaction, Admissibility of, as against the other.* In order to constitute an offence under s. 373 of the Penal Code, it is not necessary that the intention or knowledge of likelihood as to the employment of the minor for purposes of prostitution should be with reference to employment, either immediate or at some definite, and not very remote, future period, but an offence under the section is complete as soon as a girl is purchased with the guilty intention or knowledge of likelihood that she will, while still a minor under age of 16 years, be employed for that purpose, although the point of time for such employment may be remote by reason of her physical incapacity for the purpose. *H*, the father of two girls, twins, about a year old, sold one of them to *K*, a prostitute, for R9, and within ten days of such sale also sold her the other for R14. *K* was shown to have previously purchased another child whom she had brought up from her infancy, and who was then living with her and leading the life of a prostitute. Both *H* and *K* made confessions as to the guilty knowledge and intention with which the sale of the two children was made. *K*'s confession was made within two hours after her arrest, and immediately thereafter she was committed to *hajrat* for seven days. On the seventh day, on being brought up for trial before the Deputy Magistrate, she retracted her confession and assigned an innocent reason for her purchase of the girl. *H* and *K* were tried jointly, *H* being charged with an offence under s. 372, *viz.*, selling girls for the purpose of prostitution, and *K* with an offence under s. 373, *viz.*, buying for the same purpose. Neither was charged with abetting the other. The two confessions were used as evidence. *Held*, that, having regard to the circumstances under which the confession of *K* was given and retracted, it was open to suspicion, and could not safely be acted upon, and that the confession made by *H* was not legally admissible against her, as they were not being tried jointly for the same offence. *DEPUTY LEGAL REMEMBRANCER v. KARUNA BAISTOBI*

I. L. R. 22 Cal. 164

18. *Confession of Co-prisoner—Joint trial—Plea of guilty.* *A* and *B*

CONFESSION—*contd.*6. CONFESSIONS OF PRISONERS TRIED JOINTLY—*contd.*

were charged with murder. *A* pleaded guilty, but he was not convicted or sentenced till the conclusion of the trial of his fellow-prisoner *B*. The Sessions Judge, holding that both the accused were jointly tried for the same offence, took into consideration as against *B* the confessions made by *A*, and convicted both of murder. *Held*, that, after *A* had pleaded guilty, he could not be treated as being jointly tried with *B*. *A*'s confessions were, therefore, not admissible against *B* under s. 30 of the Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872). *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PAHUJI*

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 195

17. *Statement of Co-accused who pleaded guilty—Joint trial.* Where two out of several persons on their trial in a Court of Session on a joint charge pleaded guilty and made certain statements to the Court, it was *held*, that such statements could not be taken into consideration as evidence against the other accused persons, inasmuch as, after pleading guilty, the persons making those statements were no longer on their trial. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PIRBUH*

I. L. R. 17 All. 524

18. *Corroboration in material particulars.* Where the only evidence against two prisoners accused of murder directly implicating them in the commission of the crime consisted of confessional statements made by them before the committing Magistrate, which were subsequently retracted, and the statements in such confessions were corroborated in material particulars by other evidence on the record: *Held*, that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RARU NAYAR*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 482

19. *Confession of Co-accused—Plea of guilty by one.* On the trial of more persons than one, jointly, for the same offence, where one of them pleads guilty, the person so pleading is no longer on his trial, and cannot be treated as being jointly tried with the others. A confession by that person affecting himself and others cannot, therefore, be taken into consideration as against such others under s. 30 of the Evidence Act. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LAKSHMAYYA PANDARAM*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 491

20. *Confession by one of several persons jointly tried for the same offence—Plea of guilty by person so confessing—Discretion to continue trial after plea of guilty.* The trial of an accused person does not necessarily end if he pleads guilty. Under s. 271 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where an accused pleads guilty, "the plea shall be recorded," and the accused "may be convicted" thereon; but evidence may be taken in Sessions cases as if the plea had been one of "not guilty," and the case decided upon the whole of the evidence including the accused's plea. When such a procedure is adopted, the trial does not terminate with the plea of guilty, and therefore a confession by the person so pleading

CONFESSION—contd.**6. CONFESSIONS OF PRISONERS TRIED JOINTLY—contd.**

may be taken into consideration under s. 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as against any other person who is being jointly tried with him for the same offence. A trial does not strictly end until the accused has been either convicted or acquitted or discharged. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHINNA PAVUCHI* . . . **I. L. R. 23 Mad. 151**

21. *Confession of Co-prisoner who has withdrawn from associates before offence.* The confession of a person who says he abetted a murder, but withdrew before the actual perpetration of that murder by his associates, cannot be used as evidence against those associates, though the person confessing is tried with them jointly on a charge of murder. *REG. v. AMRITA GOVINDA* . . . **10 Bom. 497**

22. *Confession of Co-prisoner.* S. 30 of Act I of 1872 is an exception, and its wording shows that the confession is merely to be an element in the consideration of the evidence. Unless there is something more, a conviction on it will still be a case of no evidence, and bad in law. *ANONYMOUS* . . . **7 Mad. Ap. 15**

23. *Confession of a prisoner when admissible against Co-prisoner.* To render the confession of one prisoner jointly tried with another admissible in evidence against the latter, it must appear that that confession implicates the confessing person substantially to the same extent as it implicates the person against whom it is to be used in the commission of the offence for which the prisoners are being jointly tried. *QUEEN v. BELAT ALI*

10 B. L. R. 453 : 19 W. R. Cr. 67

QUEEN v. MOHESH BISWAS

10 B. L. R. 455 note : 19 W. R. Cr. 16

24. *Confession of Co-prisoner—Illegal conviction.* A conviction based solely on the evidence of a co-prisoner is bad in law. *QUEEN v. AMBIGARA HULAGU*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 163

QUEEN v. BUDHU NANKU **I. L. R. 1 Bom. 475**

25. *Conviction on uncorroborated confession.* A conviction of a person who is being tried together with other persons for the same offence cannot proceed merely on an uncorroborated statement in the confession of such other persons. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. BHAWANI EMPRESS OF INDIA v. RAM CHAND*

I. L. R. 1 All. 664, 675

26. *Confession of one prisoner implicating himself and another, effect of—"Court," meaning of.* Under s. 30 of the Evidence Act, the confession of a prisoner affecting himself and another person charged with the same offence is, when duly proved, admissible as evidence against both, but such second person can not, when it is uncorroborated as against him, be

CONFESSION—contd.**6. CONFESSIONS OF PRISONERS TRIED JOINTLY—contd.**

legally convicted on it. *Per GARTH, C. J.*—Such evidence must be dealt with by the Court in the same manner as any other evidence. The weight, however, to be attached to such evidence and the question whether taken by itself it is sufficient in point of law to justify a conviction, is a question for the Judge. Unsupported by other evidence, it, however, should be taken as evidence of the very weakest kind, being simply a statement of a third person not made upon oath or affirmation. If such confession is corroborated by other evidence, it is immaterial whether in proving the case at the trial the confession precedes the other evidence or the other evidence precedes the confession. *Per JACKSON, J. (McDONELL, concurring).*—Such evidence is not sufficient to support a conviction, even if corroborated by circumstantial evidence, unless the circumstances constituting corroboration would, if believed to exist, themselves support a conviction. *Per Curiam.*—The word "Court" in s. 30 of the Evidence Act means not only the Judge in a trial by a Judge with a jury, but includes both Judge and jury. *EMPRESS v. ASHOOTOSH CHUCKERBUTTY*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 483 : 3 C. L. R. 270

27. *Uncorroborated confession of a Co-accused, sufficiency of, for conviction—Uncorroborated testimony of an Accomplice—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 114, ill. (b).* The confession of a co-accused, if proved, is evidence against the accused, but it is evidence of the weakest kind, and, if uncorroborated, it is not sufficient to warrant a conviction. *Empress v. Ashootosh Chuckerbutty*, **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 483**, followed. *MANKI TEWARI v. AMIR HOSSEIN* **2 C. W. N. 749**

28. *Statement of prisoner exculpating himself.* A prisoner, charged together with others with being a member of an unlawful assembly, made a statement before the committing Magistrate implicating his fellow-prisoners and another person. He subsequently withdrew this statement, and made another in which he endeavoured to exculpate himself. *Held*, that this statement was not evidence against the other prisoners under s. 30 of the Evidence Act. It was not a confession, nor did it amount to any admission by the prisoner that he was guilty in any degree of the offence charged; but it was simply an endeavour on his part to explain his own presence on the occasion in such a manner as to exculpate himself; and any mention made by him in such a statement of other persons having been engaged in the riot was altogether irrelevant, and not evidence against them. *NOOR BUX KAZI v. EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 279 : 7 C. L. R. 385

29. *Confession not implicating prisoner confessing.* Where the confession of a person being tried jointly with other persons did not implicate him to the same extent as it implicated such other persons, and was not

CONFESSION—*contd.*6. CONFESSIONS OF PRISONERS TRIED JOINTLY—*contd.*

sufficient of itself to justify his conviction: *Held*, that such confession could not be taken into consideration under s. 30 of Act I of 1872 against such other persons. *Queen v. Belat Ali*, 10 B. L. R. 453, followed. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. GANRAJ*
I. L. R. 2 All. 444

30. ————— *Confession of prisoner exculpating himself.* Where a person being tried jointly with other persons made a statement deprecating any guilty knowledge and seeking to clear himself at the expense of such other persons: *Held*, that such statement could not be taken into consideration under s. 30 of Act I of 1872 against such other persons. *Queen v. Belat Ali*, 10 B. L. R., 453, and *Empress v. Ganraj*, I. L. R. 2 All. 444, followed. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. MULU* I. L. R. 2 All. 646

31. ————— *Trial for Dacoity and receiving stolen property.* A and B were committed for trial, the former for dacoity under s. 395 of the Penal Code, and the latter under s. 412 for receiving stolen property, knowing it to be such. A made two confessions, and in both he stated he had handed over to B some pieces of gold and silver stolen at the dacoity. When B was arrested, a gold ring and a silver wristlet were found in his possession. At the trial A pleaded guilty, and B claimed to be tried. A goldsmith deposed that he had made the ring and wristlet found with B out of pieces of gold and silver given to him for the purpose by B. On this evidence and on the confessions made by A the Sessions Judge convicted B. On appeal to the High Court: *Held*, that, A and B not having been tried jointly for the same offence, the confession of A was inadmissible as evidence against B. There was, therefore, no evidence of the identity of the goods stolen at the dacoity with those found in B's possession, and the case against him failed. Conviction quashed. *EMPRESS v. BALA PATEL* I. L. R. 5 Bom. 63

32. ————— *Statement by Prisoner in absence of Co-prisoners—Confession.* Several persons were charged together with offences under ss. 148, 302, 324, and 326 read with s. 149 of the Penal Code. The Sessions Judge, when about to examine the prisoners, required all but the prisoner under examination to withdraw from the Court, until his turn for examination came round, and convicted each prisoner chiefly upon what was said by his co-prisoners during his absence from the Court. *Held*, that the evidence so given was inadmissible. *In the matter of the petition of CHANDRA NATH SIRKAR.* *EMPRESS v. CHANDRA NATH SIRCAR* I. L. R. 7 Cal. 65: 8 C. L. R. 353

CHAKOWRI LALL v. MOTI KURMI
13 C. L. R. 275

33. ————— *Statement by Prisoner in absence of Coprisoners—Code of Criminal Procedure (X of 1872), s. 250.* The two

CONFESSION—*contd.*CONFESSIONS OF PRISONERS TRIED JOINTLY—*contd.*

accused persons were jointly tried before the Sessions Judge on a charge of murder. The Sessions Judge examined each of the accused in the absence of the other, making the latter withdraw from the Court during the examination of the former, though without objection from the pleaders of the accused persons. *Held*, that the examination of each accused could be used only against himself, and not against his fellow-accused. *EMPRESS v. LAKSHMAN BALA* I. L. R. 6 Bom. 124

34. ————— *Distinct Confession of offence charged.* To render the statement of one person jointly tried with another for the same offence liable to consideration against that other, it is necessary that it should amount to a distinct confession of the offence charged. *EMPRESS v. DAJI NARSU* I. L. R. 6 Bom. 288

35. ————— *Statements of Co-prisoners pleading guilty.* Several prisoners being charged together with house-breaking, some of them pleaded guilty. The Sessions Judge used the confessions made by those who pleaded guilty as evidence against a prisoner who was tried. *Held*, that such confessions were not evidence under s. 30 of the Evidence Act, 1872. *VENKATASAMI v. QUEEN* I. L. R. 7 Mad. 102

36. ————— *Offence of same definition arising out of single transaction—Inculpation through separable acts—Counterfeit Coin—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 239.* A and B were tried together, under s. 239 of the Penal Code (XLV of 1860), on a charge of delivering to another counterfeit coins, knowing the same to be counterfeit at the time they became possessed of them. A confessed that he had got the coins from B, and had passed them to several persons at his request. *Held*, that the confession of A was relevant against B. When two persons are accused of an offence of the same definition arising out of a single transaction, the confession of the one may be used against the other, though it inculpates himself through acts separable from those ascribed to his accomplice, and capable, therefore, of constituting a separate offence from that of the accomplice. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NUR MAHOMED*
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 223

37. ————— *Confession of Co-prisoner used against Abettor.* Upon the trial of A for murder, and B for abetment thereof, a confession by A implicating B cannot be taken into consideration against B under s. 30 of the Evidence Act, 1872. *BADI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* I. L. R. 7 Mad. 579

38. ————— *Confession if taken to be taken against all Co-accused—Admissibility of confession against Co-accused.* When more persons than one are jointly tried for the same offence, the confession made by one of them, if admissible in evidence at all, should be taken into consideration against all the accused, and not against the

CONFESSION—concl'd.**6. CONFESSIONS OF PRISONERS TRIED JOINTLY—concl'd.**

person alone who made it. *EMPRESS v. RAMA BIRAPA* **I. L. R. 3 Bom. 12**

39. *Want of Corroboration.* A conviction of a person who is tried jointly with other persons for the same offence cannot proceed merely upon the uncorroborated confession of one of such other persons. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DOSA JIVA* . . . **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 231**

QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KRISHNA BHAT **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 319**

40. *House-breaking—Production of stolen property.* Where the accused was convicted of house-breaking by night with intent to commit theft, and the only evidence against him was the confession of a fellow-prisoner, and the fact that he pointed out the stolen property some months after the commission of the offence: *Held*, that the mere production of the stolen property by the accused was not sufficient corroboration of the confession of the other prisoner. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DOSA JIVA* **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 231**

41. *Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 32—Joint Trial—Plea of guilty by some of the accused—Plea not accepted in order that their confessions might be considered against the other accused.* Where several accused persons are being tried jointly for the same offence, and some of them plead guilty, it is unfair to defer convicting those who have pleaded guilty merely in order that their confessions may be considered against the other accused. *Queen-Empress v. Pahuji*, **I. L. R. 19 Bom. 195**; *Queen-Empress v. Lakshmayya Pandaram*, **I. L. R. 22 Mad. 491**; *Queen-Empress v. Pirbhu*, **I. L. R. 17 All. 524**; and *Queen-Empress v. Chinna Pavuchi*, **I. L. R. 23 Mad. 151**, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PALTUA* (1900) **I. L. R. 23 All. 53**

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT.

1. *Confession at filing of plaint—Discretion of Judge to hear the case.* An insolvent defendant appeared and confessed judgment, at the suit of one of his creditors at the filing of the plaint. There were other suits filed by other creditors. The Judge (Recorder of Moulsmein) gave a decision for the plaintiff, but declined to sign judgment, pending a reference to the High Court, under Act XXI of 1863, s. 22, on the following question: Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree as of the date on which the defendant appeared and confessed judgment? *Held*, that the Judge has a discretion when parties have come to a mutual agreement, or when the defendant has confessed judgment, to decide the suit at once in accordance with such agreement or confession. He is not bound to do so till the time fixed for the regular hearing of the suit; and he cannot exercise that discretion where there is any

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT—concl'd.

doubt as to the good faith or identity of the parties. *BANK OF BENGAL v. CURRIE* **3 B. L. R. A. C. 396 : 12 W. R. 432**

2. *Conditional Confession of Judgment.* The confession of judgment must be unconditional unless the plaintiff consents to a conditional one, e.g., a decree on payment of instalments. *ATMA RAM v. CHUNDUN SINGH* **2 Agra 77**

CONFIDENTIAL RELATION.

See TRUSTEE.

CONFINEMENT.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 710

CONFISCATION.

See ACT OF STATE.

See FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY.

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—IMPARTIBLE PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 17 All. 456

1. *Forfeiture—Sedition—Printing Press—Instrument used for the commission of offence—Disposal of property—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 517—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 62, 124A.* The first part of s. 517 of the Criminal Procedure Code refers to cases of offences relating to property or documents, e.g., where the Court directs, as in cases of theft or criminal misappropriation or offences of a similar description, that the property stolen or misappropriated be restored to its owner. The words "which has been used for the commission of any offence" refer to cases of the same nature, i.e., to instruments like guns or swords produced in Court. A printing press cannot be said to have been used for the commission of sedition inasmuch as the offence consists in the publication, and not the printing, the press being only a remote instrument. *ABINASH CHANDRA BHATTACHARJEE v. EMPEROR* (1907) **I. L. R. 34 Calc. 986**

2. *Raj—Babuana or maintenance grant to younger members—Confiscation of Raj by Government—Effect on grantees—Restoration of Raj—Effect on rights acquired from Government during confiscation—Conditions of grant—Breach—Forfeiture.* When the question was whether a grant of lands originally made for the maintenance of younger members of the family was resumable for the alleged breach of condition of the grant, and it appeared that subsequent to the grant the parent estate was confiscated by Government, and Government settled with the grantees the lands held by them: *Held*, that this constituted a new settlement and when subsequently Government restored the estate to the grantor's heir, the transaction did not operate to recreate the maintenance grant with the conditions. When Government confiscated the estate all rights

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of the grantor as well as of the persons holding lands in the estate lapsed. The subsequent restoration of the estate did not destroy rights acquired whilst the estate was under forfeiture. *Ram Nundun Singh v. Janki Koer*, 7 C. W. N. 57 : I. L. R. 29 Calc. 828, referred to. *NARPAT SINGH DEO v. KASHIRAM SINGH DEO* (1907) 11 C. W. N. 655

CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY IN OUDH.

1. ——— **Limitation—Release of Government rights—Settlement—Cause of action.** House property in Lucknow, of which the Government had assumed possession as confiscated under the proclamations issued by Lord Canning and Sir James Outram in March 1858, was released under an order passed on the 6th July 1863, whereby the Government abandoned the confiscation and left former owners to their rights. This property had, previously to the confiscation, belonged to one *M. K.* Lands in Oudh confiscated under Lord Canning's proclamation were, in October 1863, directed to be settled with the heirs of *M. K.* In a suit brought in March 1875 by a plaintiff, who claimed a share of the house property and lands as one of the heirs of *M. K.* against a defendant who was an heir of *M. K.* and who had obtained possession of the houses and lands under the orders passed for the release of the one and the settlement of the other, the defendant pleaded that the entire property had come into her possession in 1856 under a gift from *M. K.*, and that the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation. *Held, first*, in respect of the house property, that if the defendant was in possession at the time when the proclamations were issued, the question of limitation must be decided as if there never had been a confiscation; and, *secondly*, in respect of the lands, that no question of limitation could arise, since the suit was brought within twelve years from the date of the Government order for settlement, under which alone any title to the lands could have been acquired by either of the parties. *JEHAN KADR v. ASSUR BAHU*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 727

2. ——— **Lord Canning's proclamation, 1858, effect of—Re-grant of confiscated lands.** The effect of Lord Canning's proclamation of the 15th March 1858 was to divest all the landed property from the proprietors in Oudh and to transfer it to, and vest it in, the British Government. Consequently all who since that date claim title to such property must claim through the Government. Where a re-grant is made to a former owner, the new title will depend entirely on the terms of the re-grant; and if such re-grant is made for life only, no suit can be maintained to rectify an alleged mistake, and for declaration of an absolute title according to the tenor of the sunnuds by which the property was held under the old dynasty and prior to the confiscation. *MULKA JEHAN SAHIBA v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF LUCKNOW*

L. R. 6 I. A. 63

CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY IN OUDH—cont'd.

3. ——— **Property standing and registered in name of one party but admitted to belong to another—Registration for fiscal purposes.** In Oudh, before its annexation to the British rule, a Rajah was a talukdar of a large talukh. A younger branch of his family had a separate mehal in the possession of *A* wholly distinct from, and independent of, the talukh the Rajah possessed as representing the elder branch of the family. The Oudh Government for fiscal purposes included *A*'s mehal with the Rajah's talukh, so that the Rajah as the elder branch of the family represented *A*'s mehal at the Court at Lucknow, notwithstanding that *A* remained in undisturbed possession as absolute owner, paying through the Rajah for his mehal a proportion of the jumma fixed on the talukh. This relation between the Rajah and *A* subsisted up to the time of the annexation of Oudh by the British Government. While the Government was making a settlement with the land-owners, and *A* was about to apply for a distinct settlement of his mehal, he, and after him his widow, was induced by the Rajah not to do so, the Rajah in letters fully recognising *A*'s absolute right to the mehal. After the suppression of the rebellion in Oudh, and the Government had recognized the talukhdari tenure with its rights, a provisional settlement of the talukh including *A*'s mehal was made with the Rajah; but before a sanad was granted to him, Government confiscated half his estates for concealment of arms. The Rajah suppressed the fact of the trust relation of the mehal of *A*, and contrived that it should be included in the half part of the estate the Government had confiscated, which mehal the Government as a reward granted to Oudh loyalists. *A*'s widow brought a suit against the Government and the grantees for the restoration of the mehal and for a settlement. The Chief Commissioner held that, as the Rajah was the registered owner of the mehal of *A* included in his talukh, it had been properly forfeited. Such finding was reversed, on appeal, on the ground that *A* was the acknowledged *cestui que trust* of the Rajah, and that *A*'s widow as equitable owner was not affected as between her and the Government by the act of confiscation of half the Rajah's talukh. *THUKRANI SOOKRAJ KOOWAR v. GOVERNMENT*

14 Moo. I. A. 112

4. ——— **Confiscation and restoration of lands in Oudh in 1858 and of immovables in Lucknow—Gift—Title.** On a claim for a share in property consisting of (a) immovables in Lucknow and (b) revenue-paying land in a district of Oudh, the defence was title by gift, with possession, from the former owner, a member of the family through which the plaintiff claimed. As to the immovables in Lucknow, they having been included in the confiscation which, having followed the capture of the town in 1858, was subsequently abandoned without any intention on the part of Government to make a re-grant in

CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY IN OUDH—concl'd.

favour of any person, the result in regard to the present question was the same as if no such event had occurred. The other property (b) came under the general confiscation of Oudh lands in 1858, and also was restored through subsequent settlement operations in which the final order, relating to the land in question, was to the effect that settlement should be made with the "heirs" of the previous owner. *Held*, that the above did not preclude the defence of exclusive title by gift; the order last mentioned, on its true construction, only designating all those who might take under and through the previous owner (deceased at the time of settlement), without excluding any claimant, save those who might claim adversely to such title. The Government did not in the settlement which followed the confiscation, make any arbitrary or wholly new re-distribution of estates, or proceed as if the existence of previous titles (although they had been brought to an end) was to go for nothing. The enquiry in most cases was as to who would have been entitled had there been no confiscation. As to both classes of property, the gift was maintained. *JEHAN KADR v. AFSAR BAHU BEGUM*

I. L. R. 12 Cal. 1: L. R. 12 I. A. 124

CONFISCATION OF SALT.

See ACTS AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

See ZANZIBAR . L. R. 28 I. A. 121

CONJUGAL RIGHTS.

See RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS.

CONNIVANCE.

See DIVORCE ACT, s. 14.

I. L. R. 3 Cal. 688
7 Mad. 284

CONSENT.

See ACQUIESCENCE.

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—VALUATION OF APPEAL

I. L. R. 18 Cal. 378

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 88.

I. L. R. 31 Cal. 1026

See CONSOLIDATION OF SUITS.

21 W. R. 198

See DECREE—FORM OF DECREE—GENERAL CASES . I. L. R. 9 All. 229

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MODE OF DEALING WITH EVIDENCE 12 W. R. 244

19 W. R. 248

CONSENT—cont'd.

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—MODIFICATION OF LAW . 1 Agra 106

2 Agra 173

3 Agra 143

See HINDU LAW—ADOPTION—REQUISITES FOR ADOPTION—AUTHORITY.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 627

See JUDGE—POWER . 21 W. R. 196

See JURISDICTION—QUESTION OF JURISDICTION—CONSENT OF PARTIES, ETC.

See PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—PLAINTIFFS.

17 W. R. 475: 8 B. L. R. Ap. 98

See PLEADER—AUTHORITY TO BIND CLIENT . 2 Moo. I. A. 253

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 591

2 Mad. 423

See WAIVER.

of occupier of house.

See COMMISSION—CIVIL CASES.

6 C. W. N. 927

of prisoner.

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 50

to bequest.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—WILL.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 497

proof of.

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 74.

I. L. R. 4 Cal. 79

Gujarat Talukdars' Act (Bom. Act VI of 1888, as amended by Act II of 1905), s. 31—Decree—Execution against Talukdars' estate—Consent of the Talukdari Settlement Officer—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 320, 323. In execution of a money decree against a talukdar, several villages belonging to him were attached: and the darkhast was sent to the Talukdari Settlement Officer (who combined in himself the functions of Collector and Talukdari Settlement Officer for the purpose of execution of decrees against or in respect of talukdari lands) to be dealt with under ss. 320—325 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882. That Officer acting under the sections framed a scheme of management and placed the decree-holder in possession of one of the villages for a given number of years. All this was done after the death of the original judgment-debtor and after the amendment of s. 31 of the Gujarat Talukdars' Act, 1888, was made in 1905, but in ignorance of the amendment. The Talukdari Settlement Officer then took up the position that what he had done was done by him under the Civil Procedure Code, 1882; and that as he had not given his written consent to the arrangement as provided by the amended s. 31, the darkhast preferred by the decree-holder should be

CONSENT—concl'd.

disposed of. *Per* CHANDAVARKAR, J.:—If a person holding a certain office is empowered by law in virtue of that office to give previous consent in writing to certain proceedings or acts as a condition precedent to their legality or validity, and the person as a matter of fact gives such consent, it cannot be the less a consent previously given in writing, merely because at the time of giving it he happened to be unaware of the law empowering him to consent, or, being aware of it, he thought he was consenting in virtue of another office which he held. His ignorance of the law giving him the power cannot make the consent not a consent and is no legal ground or excuse for withdrawing it after he has once given it. Where a certain act requires the concurrence of an official person, there is a presumption in favour of its due execution on the ground of the legal maxim *omnia presumuntur rite et solenniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium*. In such cases "everything is presumed to be rightly and duly performed until the contrary is shown." That presumption can be rebutted by proof that certain forms required by law were not complied with. Where the two offices are combined in one and the same person on grounds of public convenience or expediency, his action must be referred to the exercise of his discretionary powers under both the capacities if it can be so referred. S. 31 of the Gujarat Talukdars' Act (Bom. Act VI of 1888) requires that there must be (i) consent, (ii) it must be previous, and (iii) it must be in writing. If these conditions are fulfilled the requirements of the section are complied with. No particular form is requisite. PURSHOTTAM v. HARBHAMJI (1909)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 443

CONSENT DECREE.

See APPEAL—DECREE. 5 C. W. N. 877

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882), s. 375 I. L. R. 31 Bom. 15
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 867

See DECREE—CONSENT DECREE.

See LIS PENDENS . 13 C. W. N. 226

See TRANSFER . 13 C. W. N. 541

Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Consent decree—Application for review on the ground of fraud, coercion, misrepresentation, etc., refused—Fresh suit for same relief, if lies—Election of remedies—Res judicata—Appropriate remedy for setting aside consent decree on ground of fraud. When a consent-decree is sought to be attacked on the ground of fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, coercion or undue influence or any similar grounds, the appropriate remedy is by a suit, although on the terms of s. 623 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, as also on the authorities, it cannot be said that a Court has no jurisdiction to review a consent decree on any such ground. Ashutosh Chandra v. Tara Prasanna Roy, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 612, considered.

CONSENT DECREE—concl'd.

Lalji Sahu v. The Collector of Tirhut, 6 B. L. R. 649; *Mewalall Thakoor v. Bhujum Jha*, 13 B. L. R. App. XI; 22 W. R. 213; *Gilbert v. Endean*, 9 Ch. D. 259; *Radha Raman v. Pran Nath*, 5 C. W. N. 757; s. c. I. L. R. 28 Calc. 475; *Khagendra Nath v. Prannath*, 6 C. W. N. 473; s. c. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 395; L. R. 29 I. A. 99; *Unnoda Dabia v. Stevenson*, 22 W. R. 290; *Fool Coomary v. Woodoy Chunder*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 649; *Barhamdeo Parsad v. Banarsi Parsad*, 3 C. L. J. 119; *Surendra Nath v. Hemangini*, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 83; *Biku Halwai v. Mohesh Halwai*, 8 C. L. J. 266; *Jogeswar v. Gangabishnu*, 8 C. W. N. 473; *Sadho Misser v. Golab Singh*, 3 C. W. N. 375; *Rasik Chandra v. Rajani Ranjan*, 10 C. W. N. 286; *Mir Ali v. Rehmoobhoy*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 594, referred to. The two remedies though co-existing are not inconsistent remedies, so that when the party aggrieved has had recourse first to the less appropriate remedy of a review and has failed, the doctrine of election does not apply in bar of a regular suit for the same relief. No question of election of remedies arises unless the remedies are inconsistent and alternative. The decision of the Court upon the application for review would not also operate as *res judicata* in the regular suit subsequently instituted. *Ram Gopal Mazumdar v. Prasanna Kumar Sanial*; 10 C. W. N. 529; s. c. 2 C. L. J. 508, doubted. *Ram Kirpal v. Rup Kuari*, L. R. 11 I. A. 37; s. c. I. L. R. 6 All. 269; *Beniram v. Nanhumal*, L. R. 11 I. A. 181; s. c. I. L. R. 7 All. 102; *Mungul Pershad v. Grija Kant*, L. R. 8 I. A. 123; s. c. I. L. R. 8 Calc. 51, referred to. Where however in such a case, the aggrieved party has been successful in one proceeding, the judgment absorbs all his other judicial remedies. *GULAB KOER v. BADSHAH BAHADUR* (1909) . 13 C. W. N. 1197

CONSENT EX POST FACTO.

See HINDU LAW . I. L. R. 30 All. 1

See MORTGAGE.

CONSEQUENTIAL RELIEF.

See COURT FEES ACT, 1870, s. 7, AND SCH. II, ART. 17.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 511

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR.

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS—DECLARATORY DECREE, SUITS FOR.

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 39—Suit for declaration—Cancellation of document—Valuation. The plaintiff having sued for the cancellation of a sale-deed framed the prayer in the plaint so as to seek a declaration that the sale-deed was fraudulent and for an order to have it cancelled and a copy sent to the Sub-Registrar as provided by s. 39 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877). Held, that the suit was one for a declaration with a distinct prayer for consequential relief. Karam Khan v. Daryar

CONSEQUENTIAL RELIEF—concl'd.

Singh, I. L. R. 5 All. 331, dissented from. *PARVATI-BAI v. VISHVANATH GANESH* (1905)
I. L. R. 29 Bom. 207

CONSIDERATION.

See BENAMI TRANSACTION

10 C. W. N. 570
I. L. R. 30 All. 258

See BOND . . . 10 C. W. N. 788

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 27.
13 C. W. N. 388

See CONTRACT ACT, PRINCIPAL AND
SURETY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 411

See MORTGAGE.

See PROMISSORY NOTE—CONSIDERATION.

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—CONSIDERATION.

— agreement to continue joint must be for—

See PARTITION—JURISDICTION OF CIVIL
COURTS IN SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 769

— failure of—

See LIMITATION ACT, SCH. II, ARTS. 62
AND 97 . . . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 396

— illegal—

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL
CONTRACTS.

See TROVER . . . 6 B. L. R. 581

— immoral—

See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION
OF WILLS—BEQUEST FOR IMMORAL
CONSIDERATION I. L. R. 23 Mad. 613

— inadequacy of—

See CONTRACT—ALTERATION OF CON-
TRACTS—ALTERATION BY THE COURT
(INEQUITABLE CONTRACTS).
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 126

— proof of—

See EVIDENCE—SECONDARY EVIDENCE—
UNSTAMPED OR UNREGISTERED DOCU-
MENTS.

See ONUS OF PROOF—DOCUMENTS RELAT-
ING TO LOANS, EXECUTION OF AND CON-
SIDERATION FOR, ETC.

— want of—

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 54.
13 C. W. N. 692

1. — Practice of Courts in India
—Contract—Consideration, proof of. It is the
established practice of the Courts in India, in
cases of contract, to require satisfactory proof that
consideration has been actually received according

CONSIDERATION—cont'd.

to the terms of the contract, and a contract under
seal does not of itself in India import that there
was a sufficient consideration for the agreement.
A plaintiff, however, suing to set aside a security
admittedly executed by himself, must make out
a good *prima facie* case before the defendants can
be called on to prove consideration. *PRAHLAD
SEN v. BODHU SINGH. KALI PRASAD TEWARI v.
PRAHLAD SEN. PRAHLAD SEN v. DURGA PRASAD
TEWARI. PRAHLAD SEN v. RUN BAHADUR SINGH.
PRAHLAD SEN v. RAJENDRA KISHOR SINGH*
2 B. L. R. P. C. 11: 12 W. R. P. C. 6
12 Moo. I. A. 275-286

See RAJU BALU v. KRISHNARAY RAM-
CHANDRA . . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 273

2. — Proof of Consi-
deration. It is the practice of the Courts to receive
evidence as to the actual payment of consideration-
money, notwithstanding the sale deed may contain
an admission of the receipt thereof. It being
generally, if not universally, the case, that the con-
sideration-money is not paid at the time of the
execution of the deed, gross injustice would be com-
mitted if such evidence were excluded. *SURM
RAE v. UBHMAN RAE* . . . 2 N. W. 209

*RAJENDRA NATH BANERJEE v. JODOO NATH
SINGH* . . . 7 W. R. 441

RAJU BALU v. KRISHNARAY RAMCHANDRA
I. L. R. 2 Bom. 273

3. — Document im-
porting Consideration. A bond, although under
seal, does not in India of itself import that there
has been a sufficient consideration for it. *MA-
HOMED ZAHOOB ALI KHAN v. RUTTA KUNWOOR*
2 N. W. 481

4. — Sufficiency of consideration
—Contract Act, s. 2, cl. (d)—Consideration moving
indirectly from promisee—Stranger to considera-
tion. *L* granted an estate to *C*, and directed her to
make an annual payment to *L*'s brothers. *C* by
agreement of even date made with *L*'s brothers
promised to carry out *L*'s directions. *Held*, by
INNES, J., following *Dutton v. Poole*, 2 Lev. 210,
that the agreement was enforceable against *C* by
L's brothers. *Held*, by *KINDERSLEY, J.*, that the
grant by *L* and the promise by *C* to the brothers
of *L* being one transaction, there was a sufficient
consideration for the promise within the meaning
of the Contract Act, s. 2. *CHINNAYA RAU v.
RAMAYA* . . . I. L. R. 4 Mad. 187

5. — Contract Act, s.
2, cl. (d). The administratrix of an estate
having agreed to pay *S* his share of the estate if
S would give a promissory note for portion of a
barred debt claimed by *A* from her, *S* executed a
promissory note in favour of *A*, gave it to the
administratrix, and received his share of the asset.
Held, that there was consideration for the promis-
sory note within the meaning of s. 2, cl. (d), of the
Contract Act, 1872, and that *A* could recover upon
it. *SAMUEL PILLAI v. ANANTHANATHA PILLAI*
I. L. R. 6 Mad. 351

CONSIDERATION—*contd.*

6. ————— *Promissory Note*
—*Good consideration.* In an action on a promissory note, in which the defence was want of consideration, it appeared that the note was given by the defendants to the plaintiff in respect of a transaction in which it was arranged that the plaintiff was to find sureties in a certain appeal case in which the defendant was acting as mooktear or agent; the sureties were to be approved by the Collector and were to be paid R10,000. The plaintiff found the sureties; they were duly approved by the Collector, but the plaintiff paid them a much less sum than R10,000. *Held*, that there was good consideration for the note. *GUNGA NARAIN DOSS v. SIB CHUNDER SEN*
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 409

7. ————— *Execution of Letter of License by Creditors to Insolvent.* The execution of a letter of license to an insolvent by all the creditors mentioned in the schedule to his petition in the Insolvent Court, upon which his petition in the Insolvent Court was dismissed, was held to be sufficient consideration to enforce the contract to forbear against one of the creditors, although all the creditors were designated together as one party in the deed, and there was no express declaration that each creditor executed in consideration of all the others executing. *BUNGSEEDHUR PODDAR v. RAMJEE MORARJEE*
2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 243

8. ————— *Verbal Promise for Interest—Nudum pactum.* Where a contract of loan stipulated that the legally demandable rate of interest should be five per cent., it was held that a claim by the creditor of interest at eight per cent. founded upon a bare promise of the debtor to pay eight per cent., or upon the fact that the debtor had in account voluntarily debited himself with eight per cent. in lieu of five per cent., could not be maintained in law for want of consideration, amounting merely to a *nudum pactum*. *GUTHRIE v. LISTER*
6 W. R. P. C. 59
11 Moo. I. A. 129

9. ————— *Assignment of Debt*
—*Transfer of Mortgage.* A mortgaged to his brother B his twelfth share in the immoveable estate of the family. C at B's request became surety for A to Government. A having become a defaulter, C became liable to Government in respect of his default. B, with a view to indemnify C, transferred to him A's mortgage; C at the same time assigning to B a debt due by D to A which had been previously assigned by A to C. In a suit by C against B for possession of A's share: *Held*, that the assignment by C to B of D's debt was a sufficient consideration for the transfer by B to C of A's mortgage, and that a sale which was made by the Government of A's share was subject to such pre-existing valid charge. *YASHAVANT SUBAJI KULKARNI v. GOPAL LADKO BHANDARKAR*
2 Bom. 202: 2nd Ed. 194

10. ————— *Illegal consideration—Account stated—Mortgage—Construction of*

CONSIDERATION—*contd.*

Agreement. An agreement reciting that in consideration of the care which the plaintiff took of the defendant and her property during her infancy, and of the instruction given to her for which the plaintiff expended her own money, the defendant had mortgaged her house to the plaintiff; and stipulating that in the event of the defendant going to live with any man, and similarly after her death, the house would become the plaintiff's property: *Held*, that there was no illegal consideration shown, but the contract was good in law and in substance an account stated, with a mortgage to secure the amount due; and the usual decree for redemption was made, reversing the decrees of the Courts below which threw out the plaintiff's claim. *HEIRS OF HUSEN BEG BAI v. AKUBAI*
2 Bom. 357: 2nd Ed. 337

11. ————— *Want of consideration—Agreement to avoid further litigation.* A mutual agreement to avoid further litigation is not an agreement void for want of consideration. *BHIMA VALAD KRISHNAPPA v. NINGAPPA BIN SHIDAPPA TUSE*
5 Bom. A. C. 75

12. ————— *On demand Promissory Note given for interest on mortgage deed, with interest on such interest.* A promissory note payable on demand, given for interest due on a mortgage deed, with interest on such interest, cannot be enforced by suit, there being no consideration for the making of such a note. *RUSTAMJI ADESIK DAVAR v. RATANJI RUSTAMJI WADIA*
7 Bom. O. C. 9

13. ————— *Marriage—Valuable Consideration.* Marriage is a valuable and not merely a good consideration. *CHINTALAPATI CHINNA SIMHADIRAJ v. ZAMINDAR OF VIZIANAGRAM*
2 Mad. 128

14. ————— *Servant employing particular broker on his master's behalf—Void agreement.* Where a mehta, without the knowledge of his master, agreed with his master's brokers to receive a percentage (called *sucra*) on the brokerage earned by such brokers in respect of transactions carried out through them by the mehta's master, and no express consideration was alleged or proved by the mehta, the Court refused to imply, as a consideration, an agreement by the mehta to induce his master to carry on business through such brokers, and was of opinion that such an agreement would be inconsistent with the relation of master and servant. But where the same brokers agreed with the mehta not to charge him brokerage on such private transactions as he should carry on through them, and the mehta carried on private transactions through the brokers, it was held that the brokers were bound by that agreement, and could not maintain a claim for such brokerage. *VINAYAKRAV GANPATRAV v. RANSORDAS PRANJIVANDAS*
7 Bom. A. C. 90

15. ————— *Debt due—Consideration for Power.* J M executed in favour of

CONSIDERATION—contd.

P an instrument (authorizing P to recover by suit or otherwise from W and N a sum of R22,500) which contained this clause: "From whatever sum P may recover from W and N, he is to pay himself the sum of R8,640 which is due to himself, and also the expenses he may incur in making recovery, and he is to hand over the surplus to me." *Held*, that the above instrument was made on a good consideration, and was irrevocable. *PESTANJI MANCHARJI WADIA v. MATCHETT* 7 Bom A. C. 10

16. ———— *Mutuality of Obligation—Want of consideration.* An agreement whereby the defendant undertook to pay the plaintiff and two other co-creditors of an insolvent a share in any sums which he might recover from the insolvent, in consideration of receiving a share in any sums which might be recovered by the other creditors, is not, though the plaintiff has passed no similar agreement in favour of the defendant, invalid for want of consideration or mutuality of obligation. *BHAGTIDAS BHAGVANDAS v. OLIVE* 9 Bom. 418

17. ———— *Mutual consideration—Agreement to pay rent for ever.* Where there was a written agreement between the first defendant's father and the Collector, in which the first defendant's father undertook to pay a certain rent "for ever," but these general words were qualified by the words that he is to pay the rent "as long as the village remains in his possession," and the document did not contain any express agreement or undertaking on the part of the Collector: *Held*, that the enjoyment of the land by the first defendant's father at a certain rent as long as he retained possession of it was ample consideration and motive for his agreement to pay the rent; and that it was not necessary, in order to prevent the consideration and motive for his agreement from being wholly defeated, to imply on the part of the Collector an agreement that he should hold the land for ever at that rent and no more. *SUBPALAYI AMMAL v. APPAKUTTI AIYANGAR* 3 Mad. 106

18. ———— *New contract imposing fresh liability.* The defendants entered into a contract with the plaintiff in writing, by which, in consideration of the trouble taken and large sums of money advanced by the plaintiff on behalf of the defendants, the defendants promised that they would, from generation to generation, pay to the plaintiff R100 per annum out of a specified fund. *Held*, that the undertaking of the plaintiff to forbear from enforcing the debt due to him prior to the contract was sufficient new consideration to support the contract. *CHETU NARAYANA PILLAY v. AYAMPERUMAL AMBALOM* 4 Mad. 447

19. ———— *Contract to pay sum in event of Pleader winning a case.* A suit is not maintainable on a rookha for shukrana given after the terms of a pleader's remuneration have been agreed upon, and when his services are al-

CONSIDERATION—contd.

ready engaged; there being no consideration for the contract. *FULLER v. BISHOON KOOR*

3 N. W. 25

20. ———— *Debt due on decree barred by limitation.* A debt due on a decree is a sufficient consideration for the making of a promissory note, although execution of the decree be barred by limitation at the time the note is made. *MULLINS v. BEDDY* 6 N. W. 150

21. ———— *Moral Obligation—Advance of money to save Reputation of Family—Assignment of share in family estate.* Where a Hindu parcerher voluntarily advanced money to his brother and co-parcener for the purpose of his defence against a charge of forgery, without any previous request, and merely to save the reputation of the family, the obligation, being no more than a moral obligation, was held not to be a sufficient consideration to support an assignment to the former by the latter of his share in the undivided family estate. *VASUDEV BHAT v. VENKATESH SANBHAV* 10 Bom. 139

22. ———— *Moral Consideration—Promise to pay at majority debt during infancy—Promise to pay barred debt.* The general rule of law is that a consideration merely moral is not valuable consideration such as would support a promise. But there are instances of enforceable promises which formerly were referred to the now exploded principle of previous moral obligation, and which are still held to be binding, although that principle has been rejected. Amongst those instances is a promise after full age to pay a debt contracted during infancy, and a promise in renewal of a debt barred by the law of limitation. The efficacy of such promises is now based upon the principle that where the consideration was originally beneficial to the party promising, and he be protected from liability by some provision of the statute or common law meant for his advantage, he may renounce the benefit of that law, and if he promise to pay the debt, he is bound by the law to perform that promise. *D* executed a razinama in favour of the plaintiff on 20th August 1868 transferring certain lands to the latter. The plaintiff, after giving the usual kabuliat to the Collector, was put in possession of the lands. On the 7th April 1869, *T* obtained a money decree against *D*, and on the 3rd July 1869 attached the lands as belonging to *D*. *Held*, that a decree of 1862, which plaintiff held against *D*, though time barred in 1868, was (being then still unsatisfied) a good consideration for *D*'s razinama in 1868 in plaintiff's favour. *TILLACKCHAND HINDUMAL v. JITAMAL SUDARAM* 10 Bom. 206

SREENATH BANERJEE v. DOORGA DOSS NUNDY 9 W. R. 216

23. ———— *Suit on hundi—Indorsement of hundi.* A hundi was drawn out of Bombay upon a person in Bombay, indorsed and delivered out of Bombay to one who out of Bombay

CONSIDERATION—contd.

indorsed and sent it to the plaintiff in Bombay, who received it, got it accepted, and presented it for payment to the drawee, by whom in Bombay it was dishonoured. The plaintiff who was the agent and banker of an Ajmir constituent, on its acceptance by the drawee, credited the Ajmir constituent with the amount as of the date when the hundi would become payable. In a suit against the first indorser: *Held*, that, as between the Ajmir constituent and the first indorser (the defendant), the giving by the Ajmir constituent to the defendant of another hundi, which was never presented in Bombay for acceptance or payment, was a consideration for the indorsement by the defendant to the Ajmir constituent of the hundi sent by the latter to the plaintiff and sued on by him. *SUGANCHAND SHIVDAS v. MULCHAND JOHARMAL* 12 Bom. 113

Affirmed on appeal in *MULCHAND JOHARMAL v. SUGANCHAND SHIVDAS* . . . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 23

24. *Contract to give Lease—Proof of consideration.* In a suit for a declaration of right to, and to obtain possession of a rayati jote by virtue of an amaldari pottah granted to plaintiff by defendant, where the terms of the pottah were substantially that the plaintiff was to have a rayati jote at a certain jumma, and that, on there being a measurement and re-assessment, the plaintiff was to be liable to pay higher (i.e., pergunnah) rates, there being no mention of consideration or any reference to a right of occupancy: *Held*, that plaintiff could not urge that the written contract conveyed to him a right of permanent possession for due consideration, nor could defendant be legally called upon to prove payment of consideration. *BUNGO CHANDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. NUZMOODEEN AHMED* 11 W. R. 156

25. *Contract to pay Maintenance.* Plaintiff was brought from his native place by defendant's adoptive father, D, who had no one to inherit his property, except his daughter's daughter, with a view to give her to plaintiff in marriage, and confer on him all he possessed. After marriage D's grand-daughter died; but owing to defendant's being adopted, plaintiff was deprived of all the cherished hopes of his wife's future inheritance. Accordingly the adoptive mother and defendant executed a moshairah-patra in plaintiff's favour, promising him, in consideration of the above facts, a monthly allowance for maintenance. The present suit was to recover a balance due of this allowance. *Held*, that, whether the English law was applied, or the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience, the deed disclosed a good and sufficient consideration for the promise to pay, and defendant was bound to pay the stipulated allowance. *SHIB NUNDUN ROY v. SREEN NARAIN ROY* 11 W. R. 415

26. *Suit for land under pottah—Question of consideration.* In a suit to recover certain land alleged to have been

CONSIDERATION—contd.

granted under a pottah, the Judge, finding that no consideration had been given by the plaintiff, pronounced the contract a *nudum pactum* on which no action would lie. *Held*, that, as defendant had admitted the grant of the pottah, and contended that the whole of the lands had been made over to plaintiff's possession no question of consideration could arise. *ROOP NARAIN SINGH v. CHATOORREE SINGH* 12 W. R. 233

27. *Contract to grow Indigo—Extinguishment of original debt which was the consideration.* Where a rayat, in consideration of an advance of money, has stipulated to grow indigo for a certain number of years, the contract is not void as being without consideration because, during the period it had to run, the debt due from the rayat is extinguished by the delivery of indigo leaves. The contract is one entire contract upon one entire consideration, and a contract which was at its commencement based upon a valid consideration cannot become void for want of consideration by any change whatever in the situation of the parties. *LEDLIE v. GOPAL MUNDUL* 17 W. R. 91

28. *Appointment of Agent—Remedy in case of revocation of authority—Suit for specific performance.* The defendant, by an agreement in the nature of a letter of attorney, constituted the plaintiff and his descendants the hereditary agents of the defendant, gave him authority to collect the rents of his share in an inam village, and promised to pay him an annual salary out of the rents. *Held*, that, as between the parties and during their lifetime, the appointment was valid and binding, whether or not any valuable consideration passed; the mere acceptance of the office by the plaintiff being a sufficient consideration for the appointment. If the defendant had revoked the agency improperly, the remedy lay, under ordinary circumstances, in a suit by the plaintiff for damages for breach of contract. Where, however, the plaintiff chose to sue for specific performance and demanded arrears of salary: *Held*, that, without a valuable consideration for the defendant's promise, the agreement passed by him to the plaintiff would be *nudum pactum*, and the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover, except for work and services actually rendered. *VISHNUCHARYA v. RAMCHANDRA* I. L. R. 5 Bom. 253

29. *Promise to refrain from suing—Suit found to be barred.* Where, by reason of a promise, the promisee refrains from bringing a suit which, but for the promise, he might have brought, there is good consideration for the promise, but, if at the time of the promise no remedy remained to the promisee by reason of limitation, there is no valid consideration, and the promise cannot be enforced at law. *PETER v. VARDON* 23 W. R. 62

30. *Want of consideration—Decree, adjustment of, out of Court—*

CONSIDERATION—*contd.*

Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882) s. 258—Contract. The plaintiff held a decree against the defendant, and in execution of it attached the defendant's property. A compromise was then made by which the defendant executed to the plaintiff the bond sued upon, in satisfaction of the judgment debt. The compromise, however, was not certified to the Court. *Held*, that the bond was without consideration. The adjustment of the decree, not having been certified to the Court, was not binding on the plaintiff, and, therefore, constituted no valid consideration. *PANDURANG RAMCHANDRA v. NARAYAN* I. L. R. 8 Bom. 300

31. ————— *Uncertified Adjustment of Decree—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 244 (c), 258—Contract Act, IX of 1872, ss. 2, 10, 23, 28.* The consideration for a mortgage consisted partly of the amount of two decrees held by the mortgagee against the mortgagor. The mortgagee having sued to enforce the mortgage, the mortgagor pleaded failure of consideration as a bar to the enforcement of the mortgage. This plea was based on the allegation that the mortgagee had not certified the adjustment of the decrees as provided by s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, and they were still in force under the terms of that section. *Per DUTHOIT, J.*, that the failure of the mortgagee to certify the adjustment of the decrees did not constitute a failure of consideration, because he did not covenant to certify such adjustment, and it was not in fact necessary for him to do so; because he could not seek execution of the decrees on the ground that, though unsatisfied, they were still in force under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, without becoming liable to penalties; and because, if the mortgagor considered the entering up of the adjustment of the decrees to be imperative, he had his remedy by application to the Court in the terms of s. 258. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*, that the adjustment of a decree out of Court, if never certified to the Court, is under s. 258 ineffectual only so far as the execution of the decree is concerned; that there is nothing in the Contract Act to make such an adjustment invalid as the consideration for an agreement; that an agreement founded on such consideration may be enforced without defeating the objects of s. 258; and that consequently there was, in respect of the amount of the decrees, valid consideration for the mortgage. *Gunamani Dasi v. Pran Kishori Dasi*, 5 B. L. R. 223; *Meer Mahomed Kazem Jowharry v. Khetoo Bibee*, 20 W. R. 150; *Gani Khan v. Koonjoo Behary Sein*, 3 C. L. R. 414; *Davlati v. Ganesh Shashtri*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 295; *Shadi v. Ganga Sahai*, I. L. R. 3 All. 533, and *Sita Ram v. Mahipal*, I. L. R. 3 All. 533, followed. *Patankar v. Devji*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 146, and *Pundurang Ramchandra Chowghule v. Narayan*, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 300, dissented from. *RAMGHULAM v. JANKI RAI* I. L. R. 7 All. 124

32. ————— *Inadequacy of consideration—Suit to set aside deed.* Party seeking to set aside a transaction on the ground of inadequacy of consideration must show such inadequacy as

CONSIDERATION—*contd.*

will involve the conclusion that he either did not understand what he was about, or was the victim of some imposition. *ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL OF BENGAL v. JUGGESWAR ROY*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 192; 1 C. L. R. 107

33. ————— *Evidence of mala fides.* Inadequacy of consideration is not conclusive proof of mala fides. *KOMOLA PERSAD NARAIN SINGH v. NOKH LALL SAHOO* . . . 6 W. R. 30

34. ————— *Mortgage—Suit upon mortgage against mortgagor and subsequent transferee—Failure of plaintiff to prove as against transferee that the consideration entered in the bond was correct—Such failure considered in favour of the mortgagor, though evidence was not tendered by him on the point—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 74—Penalty—Compound interest in lieu of simple—Act VI of 1899, s. 4.* In a suit for sale on a mortgage, a subsequent transferee of a portion of the mortgaged property, who was made a defendant, put the plaintiff to proof of his mortgage, and he failed to establish that the actual consideration for the mortgage was any more than about two-thirds of the consideration entered in the bond. The mortgagor himself had offered no evidence to rebut the inference, derivable from his own previous statements and conduct, that he had received the full consideration stated in the bond. *Held*, that the mortgagor was nevertheless entitled to the benefit of the finding of the Court in favour of the other defendant. *Makund v. Bahori Lal*, I. L. R. 3 All. 824, referred to. *Held*, also, following the ruling in *Ganga Dayal v. Bachchu Lal*, *Weekly Notes* (1902) 178, that a stipulation for the payment of compound interest at the same rate as was payable upon the principal is not a stipulation by way of penalty within the meaning of the Explanation to s. 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. *JANKI DAS v. AHMAD HUSAIN KHAN* (1902) . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 159

35. ————— *Hypothecation Bond—Lease of even date to husband of mortgagee—Provision in both instruments that interest under bond should be paid by lessee out of rent—Liability of mortgagor.* First defendant and his brother (since deceased) executed an instrument of hypothecation to A, the wife of seventh defendant, on consideration that A should pay a creditor of the executants a sum which was due by them to him. The document provided that interest should be paid to A in the following manner. She was to be paid by her husband the rent payable by her husband to the executants under a lease recited as having been granted to the husband that day. The principal sum was to be repayable within 17 years. The lease was for a term of 28 years, and it, in its turn, referred to the instrument of hypothecation, and provided that the rent payable under it should be paid by the seventh defendant to A (his wife), and that after the debt to A under the hypothecation bond had been cleared, the rent should be paid to the lessors (the executants of the

CONSIDERATION—concl'd.

hypothecation bond, namely, first defendant and his deceased brother). On a suit being brought by the transferees of A's interest in the hypothecation bond: *Held*, that the first defendant and the sons of the deceased brother were not liable to the claim. The simultaneous execution of the hypothecation and the lease, the facts that the term of the latter covered the whole period fixed in the hypothecation bond for repayment of the principal, the relationship between the hypothecation creditor and the lessee (which pointed to their interests being practically identical), and the specific reference in each instrument to the appropriation of the rent to the interest, showed that the transaction between the parties was of a tripartite character, intended to relieve the obligors from any responsibility in respect of interest, and to entitle the obligee to look for liquidation of interest solely to the source pointed out. **CHENNAPATNAM GOPAL ROW v. TADAKAMALLA NARASIMHA ROW (1904) . I. L. R. 27 Mad. 86**

36. Absence of—
Where deed purports to convey some title and is not intended to be a sham, and is known to the grantee and partially acted upon, absence of consideration does not prevent passing of title. A deed, executed for no consideration but which purported to convey title and which was not intended by both the parties to be mere sham, will, if it is known to the grantee and partially acted upon and if the grantor knew the nature of the transaction, operate to convey the title which it purports to convey and not merely what the grantor intended to convey. Yaramati Krishnayya v. Chundru Papayya, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 326, distinguished. Ranga Ayyar v. Srinivasa Iyengar, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 56, referred to. Ramalinga Mudali v. Ayyadorai Nainar, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 124, distinguished. Cecil v. Butcher, 37 E. R. 744, 749, referred to. When relief will be given in the case of voluntary conveyances considered. AMIRTHATHAMMAL v. PERIASAMI PILLAI (1909) . I. L. R. 32 Mad. 325

CONSIGNEE OF WEST INDIAN ESTATE.

See LIEN . . . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 58

CONSIGNOR AND CONSIGNEE.

See CONTRACT—CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS.

See LIEN . . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 573

*See RAILWAYS ACT (IX OF 1890), s. 72.
. . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 257*

1. Goods consigned to Agent for sale on commission—Hundis drawn against goods and paid by agent—Railway receipts sent to agent—Equitable assignment of goods by consignor—Goods attached by judgment creditor of consignor—Claim by agent. One P at Viramgam consigned certain bags of seed to V H & Co. at Bombay for sale on commission and drew hundis against the goods for Rs. 2,200, which at his request V H &

CONSIGNOR AND CONSIGNEE—concl'd.

Co. accepted and paid on receiving the railway receipts by post. The goods were to be sold on arrival on P's account, and the proceeds credited to him as against the advances made by the payment of the hundis. On the arrival of the goods at Bombay, they were attached by B S & Co., who had obtained decrees against P. *Held*, that V H & Co. were entitled to the goods. They had made specific advances against the goods. B S & Co., as attaching creditors, occupied the same position as P himself, and had no better claim to the goods than he had, and if he had attempted to prevent the goods reaching the hands of V H & Co., who at his request had made specific advances against them, he would have been restrained by injunction. **VELJI HIRJI v. BHARMAL SHERPAL I. L. R. 21 Bom. 287**

2. Duty of Consignee as to clearing goods on arrival. There is no duty cast upon the consignee of goods arriving by a vessel to remove them on the first day of the arrival of the vessel, in the absence of an express contract. **SASSOON v. HARRY DASS BHUKUT I C. W. N. 44**

CONSOLIDATION OF APPEALS.

*See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—TEST CASE.
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 140*

CONSOLIDATION OF CLAIMS.

*See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—ADMIRALTY COURTS . . . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 511
3 C. W. N. 67*

CONSOLIDATION OF REFERENCES.

*See LAND ACQUISITION ACT.
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 483*

CONSOLIDATION OF SUITS.

1. Consolidation of suits on application of plaintiffs. Consolidation of suits on application of plaintiffs allowed. **PEACOCK v. BYJNATH . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 58**

2. Appeal. Two suits having been instituted by a purchaser of two different portions of the same tenure for enhancement of the rent of the respective portions, the first Court treated them as if they constituted one suit, and gave one decision in both. *Held*, that in doing so the Court acted sensibly and reasonably, and that there could be no objection to one appeal being filed from what was substantially one decree. **ENAYETOOLLAH v. RADHA CHURN ROY . . . 15 W. R. 395**

3. Irregularity in bringing Appeals. Where there were two suits separately instituted in the Collector's Court for partition of two mouzahs, and defendants appeared in both cases, but preferred only one appeal relating to both mouzahs instead of appealing separately: *Held*, that the Collector's decision as to one mouzah, of which no notice was taken by the Judge, must virtually be deemed as unappealed. **ALUR RAI v. SHEO DYAL . . . 2 Agra 142.**

CONSOLIDATION OF SUITS—*conclld.*

4. ——— Application for leave to appeal to Privy Council. *Quære*: Whether the Court has power to consolidate two suits on an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. *AJNAS KOORER v. LATEEFA* . 18 W. R. 21

5. ——— Power of Court to consolidate without consent of parties. When several cases are before a Court and the subject of suit and the defendants vary with each case, the Court has no authority to order them to be tried as one case against the will of the parties; and without the consent of all the parties no such consolidation can be effected by the Court as to make the evidence given by any party in one case evidence in all the case. *SOORENDRO PERSHAD DOBEY v. NUNDUN MISSEER* . 21 W. R. 196

CONSPIRACY.

See ABETMENT . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 523
21 W. R. Cr. 35
4 C. W. N. 528

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDICTION—CAUSE OF ACTION—FALSE EVIDENCE . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 280

——— requisites of—

See EXPLOSIVE SUBSTANCES ACT.
13 C. W. N. 861

1. ——— Evidence—*Relevant fact—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 10—Conspiracy, evidence of—Statements by an alleged conspirator to a third party, relevancy of.* Statements made by an alleged conspirator to a third party, suggesting that there had been a conspiracy between the plaintiff and others in connection with the forgery of an alleged will, are not relevant when such statements are used to prove (a) the existence of a conspiracy as to which there is no issue, or (b) that the plaintiff was a party to it. *KADAMBINI DASSI v. KUMUDINI DASSI* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 983; s.c. 7 C. W. N. 808

2. ——— Evidence of abetment—*Abetment of conspiracy, what amounts to evidence of—Attempt to murder—Mischief by fire—Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 10—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 107, 108, 109, 117, 307 and 486.* Conspiracy consists in a combination and agreement by persons to do some illegal act or to effect a legal purpose by illegal means; and the conspiracy is complete if two or more than two should agree to do an illegal thing. When it is shown that there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, may be proved both for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as also for showing that any such person was a party to it. Conspiracy is not a substantive offence in India, but is incorporated in the law of abetment of offences. In order to constitute the offence of abetment by conspiracy, there must be a combining

CONSPIRACY—*conclld.*

together of two or more persons in the conspiracy, and an act or illegal omission must take place in pursuance of that conspiracy and in order to the doing of that thing. It is not necessary that the act abetted should be committed, or that the effect requisite to constitute the offence should be caused. Nor is it necessary that the abettor should concert the offence with the person who commits it. It is sufficient, if he engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is committed. *KALIL MUNDA v. KING-EMPEROR* (1901)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 797

3. ——— Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 10—*Proof requisite for charge of conspiracy.* A conspiracy within the terms of s. 10 of the Evidence Act contemplates more than the joint action of two or more persons to commit an offence. *NOGENDRABALA DEBEE v. EMPRESS*

4 C. W. N. 528

4. ——— Auction-sale—*Fraud—Combination among bidders not to bid against each other—Cause of action—Fraud, allegations of, to be specifically pleaded.* A combination among bidders at an auction not to bid against each other, even if the combination amounts to a "knock-out," does not give rise to an action at the suit of the vendor. *Ambica Prosad Singh v. R. H. Whitwell*, 6 C. L. J. 111; *Fuller v. Abrahams*, 3 Brod. & B. 116; *Levi v. Levi*, 6 Car. & P. 239, dissented from. *Doolubdass v. Ramlall*, 15 Jur. 257, referred to. Allegations of fraud must be specifically pleaded: general allegations, however strong, are insufficient to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice. *Wallingford v. Mutual Society*, L. R. 5 A. C. 685, and *Ganga Narain Gupta v. Tiluckram Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 533, followed. *JYOTI PROKASH NANDI v. JHOWMULL JOHURRY* (1908)

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 134

CONSTRUCTION.

See POWER-OF-ATTORNEY.
13 C. W. N. 1190

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 90.
13 C. W. N. 138

See WILL . I. L. R. 30 All. 455

——— ejusdem generis.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 26.
13 C. W. N. 12

——— of grant.

See LIFE ESTATE . 13 C. W. N. 611

CONSTRUCTION OF DEED.

——— Mortgage—*Mortgage for a term of years—Profits to go in liquidation of debt—Redemption suit before the expiry of the period fixed.* By a deed bearing date the 4th July 1903, it was provided that in consideration of Rs 725 advanced to the plaintiff (an agriculturist), the defendant was to take possession of certain lands belonging to the plaintiff for 199

CONSTRUCTION OF DEED—concl'd.

years and to apply its profits in liquidation of the debt. The deed was headed "Lease in respect of Valatdan." Before the expiration of the period the plaintiff brought a suit for redemption of the mortgage and for possession of the lands alleging that the transaction evidenced by the deed was a mortgage. *Held*, that the transaction was a mortgage. *Takaram v. Ramchand*, I. L. R. 26 Bom. 252, followed. *MAHMAD v. BAGAS AMANJI* (1908) . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 569

CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMENT.

See AGRA TENANCY ACT (II OF 1901), ss. 56, 57 (a) AND (c), AND 80.

I. L. R. 28 All. 610

See DOCUMENT.

See HINDU LAW . I. L. R. 31 All. 339

See MAHOMEDAN LAW.

I. L. R. 28 All. 342

See MORTGAGE . I. L. R. 28 All. 157,
225, 622, 724

See OUDH SUB-SETTLEMENT ACT, XXVI OF 1866 . I. L. R. 31 All. 394

See PRE-EMPTION . I. L. R. 28 All. 60,
168, 454, 456, 618

I. L. R. 31 All. 538, 539

See STAMP ACT (II OF 1899), SCH. I, ART. 1. . I. L. R. 28 All. 436

See SUCCESSION ACT, X OF 1865, s. 84.
I. L. R. 31 All. 239

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, (IV OF 1882), ss. 10, 86, 88 AND 110 (g).
I. L. R. 28 All. 223, 400

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT (IV OF 1882), s. 68 (c). I. L. R. 30 All. 162

See WAJIB-UL-ARZ I. L. R. 28 All. 488
I. L. R. 30 All. 235

See WILL . I. L. R. 30 All. 455
I. L. R. 31 All. 58

1. ——— Documents executed in the Mofussil—Contracts of the People of India—Liberal construction—Regard to be had to all the circumstances of a transaction—Intention to make land security for payment of debt—Charge—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 100. Documents executed in the mofussil come within the statement of the Privy Council in *Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree*, 6 Moo. I. A. 411, that "deeds and contracts of the people of India ought to be liberally construed. The form of expression, the literal sense, is not to be regarded so much as the real meaning of the parties, which the transaction discloses." Where, having regard to all the circumstances of a transaction, there remains no doubt that the documents are sufficient and do show an intention to make the land security for the payment of the debt mentioned therein, the documents create a charge. *JANARDAN v. ANANT* (1908) . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 386

CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMENT—concl'd.

2. ——— Hindu Law Texts—Conflict between *Mitakshara* and *Vyavahara Mayukha*—Rule as to harmonising the difference. It is a well-established rule of the Bombay High Court that where the *Mitakshara* is silent or obscure, the Court must, generally speaking, invoke the aid of the *Vyavahara Mayukha* to interpret it, and harmonise both the works, so far as that is reasonably possible. *BHAGWAN v. WARUBAI* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 300

3. ——— Hindu Law texts—Disqualified Heir—Widow of the disqualified heir—Exclusion from inheritance. The wife or widow of a disqualified Hindu does not become incapable of inheriting property merely by reason of her husband's disqualification, whether she claims as heir to a deceased person through her husband or otherwise, if she is herself free from any of the defects, which exclude a person from inheritance under Hindu Law. It is a canon of interpretation in Hindu Law that a special text forming an exception to a general text should be construed strictly and applied only to the cases falling clearly within it. *Per Curiam*.—According to a well-known rule of interpretation in Hindu Law, when there is a collocation of two texts, dealing with the same subject, and in the first of them two words or expressions occur, of which only one is repeated in the second text, the other word or expression must be excluded as not applying to cases falling within that second text. *GANGU v. CHANDRA-BHAGABAI* (1907) . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 275

4. ——— Will—"Persona designata." By the terms of a will the testator gave all his property to his wife for her life, and then declared that after her death *Lalta Prasad*, his adopted son, should be owner of the property. The testator's wife pre-deceased him. *Held*, that after the death of the testator *Lalta Prasad* took as a *persona designata*, whether in fact his adoption was valid or not. *Nidhomoni Debye v. Saroda Pershad Mookerjee*, L. R. 3 I. A. 253, followed. *LALTA PRASAD v. SALIG RAM* (1908) . I. L. R. 31 All. 5

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

See LAND ACQUISITION ACT.

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 275

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 162

See STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

1. ——— Bombay City Police Act (Bom. Act IV of 1902), ss. 12, 16, 18. In construing an expression of doubtful import occurring in a statute, the Court may well have regard to considerations outside the language of the Act. *EMPEROR v. ATMARAM* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 480

2. ——— City of Bombay Municipal Act (Bom. Act III of 1888), s. 354. The primary object of s. 354 of the City of

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES—concl'd.

Bombay Municipal Act (Bom. Act III of 1888) is the safety of the public, to secure which the Commissioner must of necessity be given very wide powers. But it does not follow that those powers can be exercised arbitrarily and without due consideration to the provisions of the section and the right of individuals. *LALBHAI v. MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER OF BOMBAY* (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 334

CONSTRUCTION OF TEXTS.

Hindu Law—Marriage—Asura form—Brahma form. It is a principle enunciated by Vijnaneshvara that where all *smritis* are of equal importance and where there is a conflict between two or more writers, the Court is free to choose any it likes. *CHUNILAL v. SURAJRAM* (1909)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 433

CONSTRUCTION OF WILL.

See WILL . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 477, 493

See WILL, VALIDITY OF.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 149

CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE.

See NOTICE.

See MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE.

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 1

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 566

CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION.

See PARTITION . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 961

See POSSESSION. . 12 C. W. N. 273

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST.

See ESTOPPEL . 10 C. W. N. 747

CONSULAR COURT.

at Muscat.

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—BOMBAY—CRIMINAL

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 471

at Uganda.

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 54

at Zanzibar.

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—BOMBAY—CIVIL.

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 480

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 741

Registration of British subjects at Zanzibar—Stat. 6 & 7 Vic., c. 94—Order in Council of 9th August 1866, arts. 1, 6, 25, 30, 32, 35—Stat. 39 & 40 Vic., c. 46—Attachment, effect of. The jurisdiction of the British Consul at

CONSULAR COURT—concl'd.

Zanzibar to hear and determine suits of a civil nature between British subjects depends upon whether the causes of action in such suits have arisen within the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, and not upon the question whether parties to such suits are resident within those dominions. Under the treaty made in 1839 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Sultan of Muscat, British subjects are liable to be sued in the British Consular Courts at Zanzibar by Americans as being subjects of another Christian nation; and by convention with the Rao of Cutch, made with the acquiescence of the Sultan of Zanzibar, natives of Cutch, having been subjected to the British Consular Court in the same manner as if they were British subjects, may be sued by Americans and others in that Court. When the British Consul at Zanzibar has permitted persons, who have not been registered as under British protection, to bring and continue suits in his Court, that circumstance must be accepted as a sufficient indication that they have excused to his satisfaction their neglect to register under Art. 30 of the Order in Council of 9th August 1866. *Quere*: Whether Stat. 39 & 40 Vic., c. 46, deals with the Order in Council of the 9th August 1866, except so far as that order relates to the slave trade. *WAGJI KORJI v. THARIA TOPAN* . I. L. R. 3 Bom. 58

CONTEMPORANEOUS DEED.

See MORTGAGE . 11 C. W. N. 400

CONTEMPT OF AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC SERVANT.

See COMPLAINANT . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 653

Penal Code, s. 185—*Bidding at auction without intending to purchase.* A person is guilty of contempt under s. 185, Penal Code, who bids for the lease of a ferry sold at public auction by a Magistrate without intending to perform the obligation under which he lays himself by such bidding. *QUEEN v. REAZOODEEN*

3 W. R. Cr. 33

CONTEMPT OF COURT.

	Col.
1. CONTEMPTS GENERALLY . . .	2323
2. PENAL CODE, s. 174 . . .	2327
3. PENAL CODE, s. 175 . . .	2333
4. PENAL CODE, s. 228 . . .	2334
5. PROCEDURE . . .	2335
6. EFFECT OF CONTEMPT . . .	2337

See ADVOCATE . I. L. R. 29 All. 95

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882,

I. L. R. 27 All. 380

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 476 (1872, s. 471).

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 487 (1872, s. 473).

CONTEMPT OF COURT—*contd.*

See INJUNCTION—DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDER FOR INJUNCTION.

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 445

I. L. R. 23 All. 465

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, CL. 15 . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 236

See MUNSIF, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 131

See RECEIVER . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 648
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 790

1. CONTEMPTS GENERALLY.

1. ——— Sending officer to Judge to ask for explanation of language used on the Bench. A barrister, offended by the use of a strong expression on the part of a Judge while sitting in Court, sent an officer to the Judge's private residence upon a pacific errand to ask for an explanation. *Held*, by nine Judges out of eleven, that the party sending the message and the party conveying it were guilty of contempt of Court. *In the matter of PIFFARD* . 1 Hyde 79

2. ——— Communication with Judge. It is contrary to the practice of all Courts of Justice, unfair to an adversary, and a contempt of Court, for a suitor, under any pretext whatever, to communicate with a Judge, except by public proceedings in open Court, respecting the merits of any case in which he is interested, and which is either pending in the Court of such Judge or likely to come before him. *TAYLER v. ASMEDH KOON-WAR* 4 W. R. 86

3. ——— Resistance of process of Civil Court—*Jurisdiction of Criminal Court—Penal Code, s. 186*. The resistance of process of a Civil Court is punishable, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, by a Court of criminal jurisdiction. *QUEEN v. BHAGAI DAFADAR*.

2 B. L. R. F. B. 21: 10 W. R. Cr. 43

In re CHUNDER KANT CHUCKERBUTTY, over-ruled 9 W. R. Cr 63

4. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), ss. 163 and 163—Jurisdiction of Small Cause Court*. A Judge of a Small Cause Court in the mofussil found a judgment-debtor guilty of resisting an officer of the Court in attaching property in satisfaction of a decree, and fined him. *Held*, that the Judge acted without jurisdiction. He ought to have sent the judgment-debtor before the Magistrate. *In the matter of MANI CHANDRA DASS*

2 B. L. R. A. C. 188
11 W. R. 62

5. ——— Carrying off crops pending suit for rent—*Ground for dismissal of suit*. During the pendency of a suit for rent the plaintiff procured an attachment of the growing crops; and afterwards, and without authority, and before the suit was determined, carried off some of the crops. *Held*, that, although this was an act properly

CONTEMPT OF COURT—*contd.*1. CONTEMPTS GENERALLY—*contd.*

punished by the Court below as a contempt with a fine, it was no ground for dismissing the suit. *CHUTTOONATH SINGH v. SOOBOON SINGH*

Marsh. 21: 1 Hay 56

6. ——— Turning out the Sheriff's officers—*Officers in possession by order of Court*. Land belonging to N B had been seized by the Sheriff under a writ of *feri facias*, which expressly directed him to take that particular land; while in possession, his officers were turned out by A, who knew that they were in possession by order of the High Court. A had purchased the right, title, and interest of N B in the land at a sale held in the Court of the Zilla Judge of the 24-Pergunnahs, in execution of a decree of that Court against N B. A was put in possession by an officer of that Court. *Held*, that the turning out of the Sheriff's officers was a contempt of the High Court. *BRUGGEBUTTY DASSEE v. NOBIN CHUNDER BOSE*

2. Ind. Jur. N. S. 99

7. ——— Refusal of witness to sign deposition—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 163*. The defendant was convicted of contempt of Court under s. 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for having refused to sign a deposition given by him as a witness in the course of a revenue inquiry. The High Court set aside the conviction. *ANONYMOUS* 6 Mad. Ap. 14

8. ——— Officer of Court accepting bribes—*Person offering bribes to officers—Power of High Court*. The High Court, as a Court of Record, has the power of summarily punishing for contempt. Any officer of the High Court who asks for or accepts a present from any person in whose favour judgment is pronounced by the Court, is guilty of a gross breach of duty and a contempt of Court. So also any person who offers or gives such present is guilty of a contempt of Court. *In re ABDPOOL* 8 W. R. Cr. 32

9. ——— Refusal to pay money under order of Civil Court—*Imprisonment—Jurisdiction of High Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 341, 342*. The decree in an administration suit directed A, a party to the suit, to pay over a sum of money, which she admitted was in her hands, to her own attorney in the suit, to be applied by him as directed by the decree. A refused to pay over the money, and she was imprisoned for disobedience to the Court's order. After she had been in prison for six months, she applied to the Judge of the Court below, under s. 341 of the Civil Procedure Code, to be discharged. This order was refused. *Held*, on appeal, that the proceeding under which A had been imprisoned was not in execution of a decree, but that she was imprisoned under process of contempt, and that the provisions of ss. 341 and 342 did not apply to the case. *Per WHITE, J.*—The jurisdiction of the High Court to imprison for contempt is a jurisdiction that it has inherited from the old Supreme Court, and was conferred upon that Court by the Charters of the Crown,

CONTEMPT OF COURT—*contd.*1. CONTEMPTS GENERALLY—*contd.*

which invested it with all the powers and authority of the then Court of King's Bench and of the High Court of Chancery in Great Britain, and this jurisdiction has not been removed or affected by the Civil Procedure Code. *MARTIN v. LAWRENCE*

I. L. R. 4 Cal. 655

10. ——— Jurisdiction of High Court—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 136—Committal for contempt—Power to commit for contempt—Procedure.* Under the authority conferred by the Charters of the Supreme Courts and continued by their own Letters Patent, the High Courts in India possess the power of enforcing obedience to their orders by committal for contempt. As regards the High Courts in India, the remedies provided by s. 136 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877) in cases of disobedience to an order of Court may be regarded as cumulative. They subject the offender to particular liabilities for his contumacy, but do not extinguish the Court's power of constraining him to obedience. An application may properly be made in Court to commit for contempt of an order made in Chambers. *HASSONBHAY v. COWASJI JEHWANGIR*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 1

11. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 136 and 591—Committal for Contempt—Power to commit for Contempt.* The High Courts in India possess the power of enforcing obedience to their orders by attachment for contempt. An order for attachment for contempt is not an order in exercise of the High Court's civil jurisdiction, and, therefore, does not come within the provision of s. 591 of the Civil Procedure Code. *NAVIVAHOO v. NAROTAMDAS CANDAS*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 5

12. ——— *Publication of Libel reflecting upon a Judge in his judicial capacity—Offence not included in Penal Code—Defamation—Criminal Procedure Code (X of 1882), s. 5—Power of Courts of Record under common law—Jurisdiction of High Court to punish summarily.* The High Courts in the Indian Presidencies are Superior Courts of Record. The offence of contempt of Court, and the powers of the High Courts to punish it, are the same in such Courts as in the Superior Courts in England. Those powers, which formed part of the common law, were conferred upon the Supreme Courts, when they were established in the Presidency Towns. The Penal Code does not provide against a contempt of Court committed by the publication of a libel out of Court, when the Court is not sitting, and neither in Ch. XXI, "Of Defamation," nor elsewhere, provides for the punishment of a contempt of Court committed by the publication of a libel reflecting upon a Judge in his judicial capacity, or in reference to his conduct in the discharge of his public duties. Because the publisher can be punished for "defamation" under the Code, it does not follow that he cannot be punished summarily by the High Court for a contempt of Court.

CONTEMPT OF COURT—*contd.*1. CONTEMPTS GENERALLY—*contd.*

He can be so punished with fine, or imprisonment, or both. The provisions of s. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, relating to the procedure under which "all offences under the Indian Penal Code," and "all offences under any other law," are punished, do not include a contempt of the High Court committed by the publication of a libel out of Court, when the Court is not sitting, although such contempt may include defamation. Such a contempt is more than mere defamation, and is of a different character. The jurisdiction of the High Court to commit for contempt has not been affected by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882. By the common law every Court of Record is the sole and exclusive judge of what amounts to a contempt of Court. *SURENDRA NATH BANNERJEE v. CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUDGES OF THE HIGH COURT, CALCUTTA*

I. L. R. 10 Cal. 109

13. ——— *Punishment by imprisonment—Practice—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 493.* On 1st September 1890, in an administration suit in which G as executor of a will was defendant, a receiver was appointed and G was ordered to deliver to the receiver certain Government promissory notes of the value of Rs45,000 belonging to the estate, which was the subject matter of the suit. He did not obey the order, and absconded from Bombay; and, on 16th March 1891, in his absence a rule for his attachment for contempt was made absolute. It was afterwards ascertained that he had used the notes for his own purposes. A warrant was issued for his arrest, and he was apprehended; and, on 23rd April 1891, he was convicted of criminal breach of trust and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment. Previously to his trial (*viz.*, on the 9th April 1891) he had been committed to jail for contempt of the order of September 1890, so that after his conviction he was in jail both under his sentence and under the order for contempt. On the 4th October 1892, the Court passed a money-decree in the administration suit against the defendant for Rs80,000 and costs. The sentence passed upon the defendant for the criminal offence expired on the 22nd October 1892. Applications for his release from imprisonment under the order for contempt were made in December 1892 and 10th April 1893, but were refused. Counsel now moved again for his release. *Held*, that the defendant should be released from imprisonment. The right of the plaintiff to demand the promissory notes for him was merged in the money-decree. The right to demand the notes was gone, and the order that he should deliver them up to the receiver had ceased to be operative. The commitment, in so far as it was intended to enforce obedience to the order of the 1st September 1890, could no longer be continued on that ground. It was the decree now, and not the order which constituted the measure of the obligation between the parties. That was a simple money-decree, and it was contrary to the expressly

CONTEMPT OF COURT—*contd.*1. CONTEMPTS GENERALLY—*contd.*

declared will of the Legislature and to all modern principle and precedent to keep a defendant under commitment for contempt to compel him to pay a money-decree. If the attachment order was regarded as a punishment for the defendant's offence in not having delivered up the notes, the punishment should be commensurate with the offence. Imprisonment under it could not be indefinite. By s. 493 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), the Legislature indicated that such imprisonment should not extend beyond six months. The defendant had, however, been in jail for more than twenty months. For the criminal offence he had suffered the punishment to which he was sentenced, and the Court would not be justified in indirectly adding to its duration. *ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF BOMBAY v. GANGJI AKHAI* I. L. R. 19 Bom. 152

14. — District Court—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 493—Disobedience to injunction issued by District Court—Powers of District Court—Court of Record.* A District Court is not a Court of Record, and as such has no inherent power to commit for contempt. The jurisdiction which a District Court has to commit in case of disobedience to an injunction is conferred by s. 493 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but the powers conferred by that section are only exercisable when the Court is set in motion by a party who deems himself aggrieved. *KOCHAPPA v. SACHI DEVI (1902)*. I. L. R. 26 Mad. 494

15. — Criticism of Judge—*Language used in criticism which strikes at the root of all respect for the Court.* Any act done or writing published, calculated to bring a Court or a Judge of the Court into contempt or to lower his authority, or to obstruct or interfere with due course of justice or the lawful process of the Court, is a contempt of Court. Judges and Court are alike open to criticism, and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, it is not a contempt of Court. *Reg. v. Gray, [1900] 2 Q. B. 36*, followed. *In re NARASINHA CHINTAMAN KELKAR (1908)*. I. L. R. 33 Bom. 240

2. PENAL CODE, s. 174.

1. — Penal Code, s. 174—*Non-attendance in obedience to a summons—Summons, what it should contain—Omission to state time and place of attendance.* A summons should be clear and specific in its terms as to the title of the Court, the place at which, the day and the time of the day when, the attendance of the person summoned is required, and it should go on to say that such person is not to leave the Court without leave, and, if the case in which he has been summoned is adjourned, without ascertaining the date to which it is adjourned. Where a summons did not mention the place at which, or the time of the day

CONTEMPT OF COURT—*contd.*2. PENAL CODE, s. 174—*contd.*

when, the attendance of the person summoned was required: *Held*, that such person could not lawfully be punished under s. 174 of the Penal Code for non-attendance in obedience to such summons. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. RAM SARAN* I. L. R. 5 All. 7

2. — Defendant escaping from custody under civil warrant. S. 174 of the Penal Code does not apply to the case of a defendant escaping from custody under a warrant in execution of a decree of a Civil Court. *REG. v. SARDAR PATHU* 1 Bom. 38

3. — Chairman of Municipal Commissioners—*Act XXVI of 1850—Disobedience of order of public servant.* The Chairman of Municipal Commissioners appointed under Act XXVI of 1850, although a public servant is not legally competent as such to issue an order for attendance before him. *Held*, accordingly, that disobedience of such an order was not an offence within s. 174 of the Indian Penal Code. *REG. v. PURSHOTAM VALJI* 5 Bom. Cr. 33

4. — Order of Mahalkari in revenue case. A conviction under s. 174 of the Penal Code for having intentionally omitted to attend the Mahalkari's Court to give evidence in a revenue case in accordance with a summons duly issued and served under Regulation XVII of 1827, ss. 26 and 29, was not illegal. *REG. v. NARAINAPPA COMTE* 5 Bom. 39

5. — Verbal Order to attend, disobedience to. The defendant was arrested by a warrant and was released on bail to appear before the Magistrate on a specified day. The defendant appeared on that day, but the Magistrate being unable to take up the case, a verbal order was given to the defendant to appear on the following day. This he omitted to do, and was convicted under s. 174 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the conviction was good. *ANONYMOUS* 5 Mad. Ap. 15

But see *VENKATAPPOA v. PAPAMMAH* 5 Mad. 132 and *ANONYMOUS* 6 Mad. Ap. 10

6. — Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 219—*Forfeiture of Recognizance.* In consequence of the default in the appearance by the person bailed, the surety was compelled to pay the penalty mentioned in the recognizance. *Held*, that, notwithstanding s. 219 of Act XXV of 1861, the accused might have been proceeded against for contempt of Court under s. 174 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. TAJUMADDI LAHORY* I. B. L. R. A. Cr. 1: 10 W. R. Cr. 4

7. — Disobedience of order of Mahalkari—*Summons under s. 8, Act XI of 1843, power of Mahalkari to issue.* A Mahalkari invested with the powers of a second class Subordinate Magistrate cannot issue a summons under

CONTEMPT OF COURT—*contd.*2. PENAL CODE, s. 174—*contd.*

s. 8 of Act XI of 1843, nor can a person be convicted under s. 174 of the Penal Code for having disobeyed such a summons so issued. *REG. v. VENKAJI BHASKAR* 8 Bom. Cr. 19

8. ———— *Judge of Small Cause Court—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 21—Sentence of fine or imprisonment.* The Judge of a Court of Small Causes is only empowered, by s. 21 of Act XXIII of 1861, to inflict fine or imprisonment in cases where offences under s. 174 of the Penal Code occur in the presence or view of the Court. The power of the Judge does not extend to cases in which the witness fails to attend, or the failure to comply with an order of the Court is merely inferred from other circumstances. *Ex PARTE PAVADAY CHETTI* 2 Mad. 319

9. ———— *Disobedience to Summons—Subordinate Magistrate—Mad. Act I of 1863.* A Subordinate Magistrate who issues a summons may take cognizance of the offence of disobedience to that summons under s. 174 of the Penal Code, notwithstanding the repeal of Madras Act I of 1863. *ANONYMOUS* 4 Mad. Ap. 52

Correcting the decision in *ANONYMOUS CASE*
4 Mad. Ap. 51

10. ———— *Disobedience to verbal order.* A conviction under s. 174 of the Penal Code for disobeying a verbal order of a Village Magistrate is good. *ANONYMOUS* 7 Mad. Ap. 3

11. ———— *Omission to state place of attendance in order.* The summons must state the place where the person's attendance is required, otherwise no penalty can be attached to any disobedience of the order to attend. *ANONYMOUS* 7 Mad. Ap. 14

ANONYMOUS 7 Mad. Ap. 43

12. ———— *Wilful disobedience—Absence and consequent non-receipt of summons.* The non-attendance must be in the nature of wilful disobedience to attend. Where a witness was summoned for a certain day, and being absent from home did not receive the summons until after the day had passed, he could not be fined for non-attendance because he did not appear afterwards and state his reason for not attending. *QUEEN v. UNGUN LALL 1 N. W., Ed. 1873, 303*

13. ———— *Non-attendance in obedience to order of public servant.* A conviction for non-attendance in obedience to an order from a public servant, under s. 174, Penal Code, cannot be had unless the person summoned was legally bound to attend, and refused or intentionally omitted to attend. *In the matter of SREENATH GHOSE* 10 W. R. Cr. 33

14. ———— *Summons to give information—Census, etc.—Madras Act III of 1869.* A summons issued by a tahsildar to a village karnam to appear and give information required for the preparation of census, jumma bundi, and

CONTEMPT OF COURT—*contd.*2. PENAL CODE, s. 174—*contd.*

dowle accounts is not within the purview of Madras Act III of 1869, and disobedience of such a summons is not an offence under s. 174 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. SUBRAMANYAM*

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 377

Overruled in *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SUBBANA* :
(See para. 15, *post*.)

15. ———— *Disobedience of Summons—Revenue inquiry—Power to issue summons.* Under Madras Act III of 1869, Collectors and their subordinate officers may issue a summons for the purpose of any inquiry, however general, which they are empowered to make for the purposes of administration. *Queen v. Subramanyam, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 377* overruled. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SUBBANA* I. L. R. 7 Mad. 197

16. ———— *Madras Act III of 1869—Disobedience to lawful order of public officer—Summons by revenue officer to give evidence in pauperism inquiry—Standing order of Board of Revenue (Madras), No. 48a.* The accused, who were parties to a petition pending in a District Court, were summoned by a tahsildar to give evidence on an inquiry by him as to whether or not the petitioner was a pauper; they omitted to attend on the summons, and were charged in respect of such non-attendance under s. 174 of the Penal Code and were convicted. *Held*, that the conviction was bad, the tahsildar not being authorized to issue the summons under Act III of 1869 (Madras). *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. VARATHAPPA CHETTI*
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 297

17. ———— *Summons—Disobedience.* A man who, in obedience to a summons to appear and answer a criminal charge, attends a Magistrate's Court, but, finding the Magistrate not present at the time mentioned in the summons, departs without waiting for a reasonable time, is guilty of an offence under s. 174 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KISHAN BAPU*
I. L. R. 10 Bom. 93

18. ———— *Non-attendance on service of summons—Appearance by mukhtar—Criminal Procedure Code, Act V of 1898, s. 205.* In a summons case on the day fixed for trial an appearance was made on behalf of an accused person by his mukhtar, who asked the Magistrate, under s. 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused. The Magistrate, however, regarding the non-attendance of the accused as a contempt of Court, called upon him to show cause why he should not be prosecuted under s. 174 of the Penal Code for non-attendance on service of summons. *Held*, that the accused did make an appearance though not a personal appearance on service of summons; but that he did not personally attend should not, under the circumstances, have been regarded as an offence under s. 174 of the Penal Code. *DURGA DAS RAKHIT v. UMESH CHUNDRA SEN* I. L. R. 27 Calc. 985

CONTEMPT OF COURT—*contd.*2. PENAL CODE, s. 174—*contd.*

19. _____ *Mad. Act III of 1869—Power to order subordinate to carry out sale for arrears of revenue.* Madras Act III of 1869 confers no authority upon revenue officers to summon a subordinate to attend for the purpose of carrying out a sale of land for arrears of revenue, and, therefore, on failure to attend, he cannot be convicted under s. 174 of the Penal Code. ANONYMOUS 5 *Mad. Ap. 28*

ANONYMOUS 7 *Mad. Ap. 11*

20. _____ *Mad. Act III of 1869.* A subordinate Magistrate convicted certain persons, under s. 174 of the Penal Code, of disobedience to summonses issued by him as tahsildar. *Held*, that the convictions under the first part of s. 174 were sustainable. Madras Act III of 1869 gives a tahsildar power to issue summonses. ANONYMOUS 6 *Mad. Ap. 44*

This was the only law under which he can issue summonses, and on disobedience to them the persons summoned might be convicted under s. 174 of the Penal Code. ANONYMOUS . 7 *Mad. Ap. 11*

But he may not issue them to any person to appear before any one but himself, therefore a conviction for disobedience to a summons issued by him to appear before a revenue officer is illegal. ANONYMOUS 7 *Mad. Ap. 10, 11*

21. _____ *Disobedience to summons served.* In order to make a person summoned as a witness liable under s. 174 of the Penal Code, the fact must be that he intentionally omitted to attend at the place or time mentioned in the summons, or that he wilfully departed from the place where he had attended before the time at which it was lawful for him to depart. QUEEN v. SUTHERLAND. QUEEN v. NARAIN SINGH 14 *W. R. Cr. 20*

22. _____ *Evidence of Notice to attend.* Before convicting a person under s. 174 of the Penal Code, it is necessary to prove that he had notice to appear at a certain time and place, and that he did not do so. *In the matter of* SHIB PERSHAD CHUCKERBUTTY . 17 *W. R. Cr. 38*

23. _____ *Mad. Reg. IV of 1816, ss. 15, 16—Disobedience to summons—Concurrent jurisdiction.* The provisions of s. 174 of the Penal Code are not in conflict with the special provisions of ss. 15 and 16 of Regulation IV of 1816 (Madras). In ordinary cases disobedience to the summons of a Village Munsif should be dealt with under the Regulation. But if a charge is laid under the Penal Code, the Criminal Court must deal with it. QUEEN v. RAMACHANDRAPPA

I. L. R. 6 *Mad. 249*

24. _____ *Disobedience to a summons—Summons to appear at place outside British Territory.* It is not an offence under the Penal Code, s. 174, to disobey a summons issued by a British Magistrate directing the person summoned

CONTEMPT OF COURT—*contd.*2. PENAL CODE, s. 174—*contd.*

to appear before him at a place outside British territory. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PARANGA

I. L. R. 16 *Mad. 463*

25. _____ *Non-attendance in obedience to an order of a public servant—Absence of public servant.* The offence contemplated by s. 174, Penal Code, is an omission to appear at a particular time and at a particular place before a specified public functionary. Where, therefore, the public servant was absent on the date fixed in a summons: *Held*, that the person summoned could not be convicted under this section, though he failed to attend, having the intention to disobey the summons. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KRISHAPPAPPA

I. L. R. 20 *Mad. 81*

26. _____ *Land acquisition—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 174, 177—Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), ss. 9, 10—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 205—Giving false information to a public servant, whether non-furnishing of correct statements as to names and interests of persons, amounts to—Contempt of Court, whether non-attendance in Court in obedience of summons to attend Court, amounts to—Notice to persons interested in lands of intention of Government to take lands for public purposes—Joint Trial.* A Deputy Collector made a complaint against the lessor and the lessee of some lands taken up under the Land Acquisition Act that they had given false information in certain written statements that they made to the Collector in response to a call from him under s. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), but did not put in either with his written complaint or at the time of his examination by the Magistrate before whom he made the complaint, the written statements upon which he desired to proceed; and the Magistrate issued processes for the attendance of the accused to answer a charge under s. 177, Indian Penal Code, and s. 10 of the Land Acquisition Act. On the day fixed for trial the lessee appeared, and appearance was made on behalf of the lessor by his mukhtear, who asked the Magistrate, under s. 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to dispense with the personal attendance of that accused, which the Magistrate refused to accede to, and called upon him to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for contempt of Court under s. 174, Indian Penal Code. *Held*, that in the absence of the written statements on which the proceedings were founded, and in the absence of any reference as to the particular statement or statements on which the accusation was made, the Magistrate should not have issued processes against the accused, and that his action in the matter was without proper discretion, and that the complaint was bad and should not be allowed to proceed in its existing form. *Held*, also, that the lessor accused having made an appearance though not a personal appearance on service of summons, and his having moved the superior Courts against the proceedings of the Magistrate, his action should not have been regarded as an offence under s. 174 of the Penal

CONTEMPT OF COURT—*contd.*2. PENAL CODE, s. 174—*concl'd.*

Code, and that the Magistrate's proceedings were misconceived, and that they should cease. And that the proceedings in the civil case being still before the High Court in respect of the lessee, no prosecution should be taken before the Magistrate until at least the final orders of the High Court have been obtained. *Held*, further, that the offence if any committed by each of the accused was a distinct and separate offence, and should be tried separately. *DURGA DAS RAKHIT v. UMESH CHANDRA SEN* (1900) . . . 5 C. W. N. 131

27. ——— *Vakil—Professional Misconduct—Munsif, jurisdiction of—Disobedience of order.* A Munsif called upon a vakil to show cause on the 22nd November why a report should not be made against him to the High Court for gross professional misconduct. On the same date the vakil put in a written explanation, and the matter was ordered to be put up on the 6th December for orders. On the 6th December the vakil did not appear. Later, on the 20th December, a proceeding was drawn up for the prosecution of the vakil under s. 174, Indian Penal Code, for non-appearance on the 6th December. *Held*, that there was no order enjoining the vakil to appear personally before the Munsif on the 6th December, and that the proceeding under s. 174, Indian Penal Code, ought to be quashed; and it was accordingly set aside. *Held*, also, that when the vakil had been called upon to offer an explanation, which he did on the 22nd of November, to all intents and purposes this was a sufficient compliance with the order. *Quære*: Whether the Munsif had jurisdiction to take proceedings against the vakil in the way he did. *In the matter of PROKASH CHUNDER SARKAR* (1903)

7 C. W. N. 797

3. PENAL CODE, s. 175.

——— Penal Code, s. 175—*Omission to produce document when ordered by Court—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 477, 480, 485, and 487—Jurisdiction of Magistrate in respect of offence committed before him—Witness not producing document—Disobedience of lawful authority of public servant.* The accused was summoned as a witness to produce certain documents in a case before a Magistrate, but he failed to produce them saying that they were not in his possession. The Magistrate, having found that the statement was incorrect and that the accused could have produced the documents in question, charged him with having committed an offence under s. 175 of the Penal Code, and himself tried and convicted him. *Held*, that neither ss. 477, 480, nor s. 485 (which sections provide for the only cases in which a Court "other than a High Court, etc.," can try persons for offences committed before itself) was applicable to the case, and the Magistrate was therefore precluded by s. 487 from trying the case. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SESHAYYA* . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 24

CONTEMPT OF COURT—*contd.*3. PENAL CODE, s. 175—*concl'd.*

It does not appear from the statement of the case whether or not the offence was committed "in view or presence of the Court" and taken "cognizance of the same day." From the judgment it would appear that it was *not*, and this must form the ground for the decision; for offences under s. 175, Penal Code, are expressly mentioned in s. 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and if committed "in view or presence of the Court," and taken "cognizance of the same day," the Magistrate would apparently have had clear power to try the offence and convict the accused as he did.

See *In re* PREMCHAND DOWLATRAM

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 63

4. PENAL CODE, s. 228.

1. ——— Penal Code, s. 228—*Jurisdiction to try.* An officer before whom, whilst acting in a particular capacity, an offence under s. 228 of the Penal Code is committed cannot, in another capacity, take up and try the offence. *QUEEN v. CHUNDER SEEKUR ROY* . . . 12 W. R. Cr. 18

2. ——— *Prevarication—Refusing to answer questions.* *Held*, that prevarication while giving evidence does not constitute the offence under s. 228 of the Penal Code of intentionally causing interruption to a public servant sitting in a judicial proceeding. *REG. v. AUBABIN BHIVRAV* 4 Bom. Cr. 6

3. ——— *Prevarication.* Prevarication may, though it does not necessarily, amount to contempt of Court within s. 228, Penal Code, and s. 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872. *REG. v. JAIMAL SHRAVAN* . . . 10 Bom. 69

4. ——— *Prevarication—Refusing to answer Questions.* *Held*, that refusing or neglecting to return direct answers to questions does not constitute the offence under s. 228 of the Penal Code of intentionally offering insult, or causing interruption to a public servant sitting in a judicial proceeding. *REG. v. PANDU BIN VITHOJI* 4 Bom. Cr. 7

5. ——— *Giving evidence reluctantly and inconsistently.* No conviction can be had under s. 228 of the Penal Code, simply because witnesses in a case give inconsistent evidence, and give their evidence reluctantly, and take up the time of the Court. *QUEEN v. HURRY PARAMANICK TANTEE* . . . 15 W. R. Cr. 5

6. ——— *Obstruction of public servant.* A party who bids for an estate at a sale in execution, knowing, that he is not able to deposit the earnest money, obstructs the business of the Court, and is guilty of contempt of Court punishable under s. 228 of the Penal Code. *In re* MOHESH CHUNDER MOKERJEE . . . W. R. 1864 Mis. 3

7. ——— *In a conviction under s. 228, Penal Code, it ought to be stated that*

CONTEMPT OF COURT—*contd.*4. PENAL CODE, s. 228—*concl'd.*

the Judge was sitting in a stage of a judicial proceeding the nature of which should also be stated. *In the matter of the petition of* PROKASH CHUNDER DOSS . . . 12 W. R. Cr. 64

8. ——— Intention to insult. Before a conviction can be had under s. 228 of the Penal Code of offering an insult to a public servant, it must be proved that there was an intention to insult. *QUEEN v. HURRI KISHEN DASS* . . . 15 W. R. Cr. 62

5. PROCEDURE.

1. ——— Record of statement—*Contempt by Witness—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 21.* In a proceeding for contempt it is, under s. 21, Act XXIII of 1861, fatal to the conviction if the Judge fail to record, with the finding and sentence, the statement of the offender. *LEKH RAJ v. PALEE RAM* . . . 1 N. W. 162: Ed. 1873, 241

2. ——— When sentence of imprisonment necessary—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 163—Penal Code, s. 179.* Under s. 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if a Court before which the offence of contempt, under s. 179 of the Penal Code, is committed considers that a sentence of imprisonment is called for, it should record a statement of the facts constituting the contempt and the statement of the accused, and forward the case to a Magistrate. *QUEEN v. RUTTON SAHOO* . . . 11 W. R. Cr. 49

3. ——— Omission to call on party to make defence—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 163—Omission to follow, Directions of.* When a Civil Court omitted (as directed by s. 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) to call upon a person who was charged with contempt of Court to make any statement he might wish to make in his defence, it was held that this irregularity was fatal to the order, and that the High Court would exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and reverse an order so made. *KASHINATH VITHAL v. DAJI-GOVIND* . . . 7 Bom. A. C. 102

4. ——— Omission to state reasons and facts—*Fine for Contempt of Court.* A Criminal Court inflicting a fine for contempt of Court should specifically record its reasons and the facts constituting the contempt, with any statement the offender may make, as well as the finding and sentence. Where this course was not adopted, the High Court set aside the order inflicting a fine. *PANCHANADA TAMBIRAN* . . . 4 Mad. 229

5. ——— Sending case for investigation—*Penal Code, s. 174—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 171—Power of Subordinate Magistrate.* A Subordinate Magistrate has no power to try an offence punishable under s. 174 of the Penal Code committed against his own Court but is bound, under s. 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to send the case, if in his opinion there

CONTEMPT OF COURT—*contd.*5. PROCEDURE—*contd.*

is sufficient ground, for investigation to a Magistrate having power to try or commit for trial. *QUEEN v. CHANDRA SEKHAR ROY* . . . 5 B. L. R. 100: 13 W. R. Cr. 66

CHUTTOORBHOOJ BHARTHEE v. MACNAGHTEN . . . 15 W. R. Cr. 2
In the matter of TARAPROSHAD SAHOO . . . 15 W. R. 88

6. ——— Sending case for investigation—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 171.* A Civil Court may, under s. 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, transfer a case to the Criminal Court for investigation, without specifying the particular officer by whom it is to be investigated, and the deposition of the Civil Court officer setting forth the charge on which he transferred the case to the Criminal Court is a sufficient complaint. *QUEEN v. MADHUB CHUNDER MISSEER* . . . 13 W. R. Cr. 45

7. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 171.* Under s. 171 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a Court has no power to send a case to be investigated by the Magisterial authorities, but must specify the Magistrate by whom the investigation is to be made. *QUEEN v. NUREPUT SINGH* . . . 4 N. W. 86

8. ——— Duty and power of Collector—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 171—Act X of 1859, s. 147.* It is not necessary that the preliminary enquiry contemplated by s. 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be conducted in the presence of the accused. All the Court (Revenue in this case) making the enquiry has to do is to satisfy itself that there are *prima facie* grounds for sending the case for investigation to a Magistrate; and the Collector is not bound to dispose of a case of contempt of the lawful authority of a public servant under s. 147, Act X of 1859, but it is discretionary with him to proceed under s. 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *CHOTA SADOO v. BHOOBUN CHUCKERBUTTY* . . . 9 W. R. Cr. 3

9. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 480, 537—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 228.* The procedure laid down in s. 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be strictly followed. The provisions of the section should be applied then and there, at any rate before its rising, by the Court in whose view or presence a contempt has been committed which it considered should be dealt with under s. 480. Where a Magistrate in whose presence contempt was committed took cognizance of the offence immediately, but, in order to give the accused an opportunity of showing cause, postponed his final order for some days: *Held*, that such action, though it might be irregular, was not illegal, and as the accused had not been in any way prejudiced, was covered by s. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Held*, also, that, under the circumstances, it was doubtful whether there was any necessity for the Magistrate to postpone the final order until the accused had had

CONTEMPT OF COURT—concl'd.**5. PROCEDURE—concl'd.**

an opportunity of showing cause against it, and that he should have directed the detention of the accused and dealt with the matter at once or before his rising. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PALAMBAR BAKSHI* . . . I. L. R. 11 All. 361

10. ——— Mode of Arrest for contempt in foreign territory—*Punishment for contempt of Court*. The High Court will not send a special bailiff into the Gaikwad's territories to arrest a defendant who has been guilty of a contempt of Court, but the Court will send a special bailiff for such purpose beyond the local limits of the High Court to a place within the Presidency of Bombay. A defendant guilty of contempt of Court is liable to imprisonment on the criminal side of the Bombay Jail. *HARIYALLABHDAS KULLIANDAS v. UTAMCHAND MANIKCHAND* . . . 7 Bom. O. C. 172

11. ——— Application for discharge—*Practice*. When a person is in custody for contempt of Court, any application for release should be made to the committing Judge. It is advisable, but not necessary, to limit the period of commitment to a fixed time. *In the matter of SITTARAM ATMARAM* . . . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 23

12. ——— Notice of motion for committal—*Service of notice—Personal Service necessary—Service upon attorneys not sufficient—Appeal pending from order*. Where an application is made for committal of a person to jail or disobedience of the Court's order, it is necessary not only that the order should be served upon the defaulting party personally, but the notice to commit should also be similarly served upon him. Service upon the party's attorneys is not sufficient. When proceedings are taken for committal of a person for contempt of a Court's order, the Court is not obliged to stay those proceedings merely because an appeal has been filed from such order. *Gordon v. Gordon*, [1904] P. 163, followed. *BAI MOOLBAI v. CHUNILAL PITAMBER* (1909)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 630

6. EFFECT OF CONTEMPT.

1. ——— Person under Contempt—*Privilege from Arrest—Party to suit proceeding to Court*. When a writ of attachment for contempt was issued by the Court against a party to a suit in that Court: *Held*, that he could not claim privilege from arrest while proceeding to Court for the purpose of attending the hearing of his suit. *JOHN v. CARTER* . . . 4 B. L. R. O. C. 90

CONTENTIOUS SUIT.

See LIS PENDENS . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 745
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I. L. R. 22 Bom. 766

See CANTONMENT ACT, 1889.
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 841

See CONVICTION . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 1041

See KIDNAPPING . I. L. R. 19 All. 109
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 1041

See NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH MUNICIPAL ACT, 1900, s. 147.
I. L. R. 24 All. 309

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CONTINUING RIGHT.

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1. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS.

1. ——— Printed form of contract—
Writing and printing—Sale of goods to arrive.
 The defendants contracted to purchase certain piece goods from the plaintiffs, who were dealers in those goods. The contract of sale was written out on one of the printed forms of the plaintiffs' firm, which forms contained in print the words "now in course of landing or in the said godowns" and "now on board the ship." As a matter of fact, well known to both parties, the goods contracted for were neither in the godowns nor on board the ship. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, the printed words above set out formed no part of the contract entered into between the parties. *CARLISLE NEPHEWS AND COMPANY v. HURMOOK ROY*
 I. L. R. 9 Calc. 679 : 13 C. L. R. 120
2. ——— Contract partly
written and partly printed. Where a contract is partly printed and partly written, and there is a conflict between the printed and written part, the written part must be taken to control the printed part. *CARLISLE v. NUTHMULL NOWLUCKEE*
 2 Hyde 242
3. ——— "Tallow," contract to deliver. A contract for "tallow" is fulfilled by the delivery of the fat of sheep, goats, and other animals besides oxen. *MAHOMED IBRAHIM v. LAUDER* . . . Cor. 42
4. ——— Rope, contract to purchase. A contract in writing to "take all your rope and Manilla rope at the following prices" construed to mean all the vendor's rope in a certain godown on a particular day. *TARRACKNAUTH PAULIT v. SHERBOURNE* . . . Cor. 62
5. ——— Duration of contract—*Effect of recital in regard to control over operative words.* The parties during several years had transactions consisting of the deliveries of produce by the defendants to the plaintiff's agent, under advances, upon separate contracts, specifying prices, and of consignments by the defendants through the plaintiffs. A "purchase account" and an "interest account" kept between them resulted in a "general account;" and in 1872 a large sum was due thereon to the plaintiffs, to whom, in 1873, the defendants sent letters mortgaging property with instruments of

CONTRACT—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS—contd.**

title accompanying. In the beginning of 1874 the parties entered into a written agreement, which described the balance due in respect of previous advances as the "block account," comprising also an "interest account," and the transactions proceeded. The intention was shown that the advances should be liquidated "by returns," but the only date mentioned from which an inference could be drawn as to the intended duration of the arrangement between the parties was the 30th June 1875. In this suit, brought in December 1875, it was contended that the right construction of the agreement of 1874 required that it should continue to subsist (unless rescinded either by mutual agreement or on breach of its stipulations by one party justifying its rescission by the other) until the liquidation of the balance by returns; at all events, as regards the "block account." In order to the working of an agreement for a liquidation in such a way, it would have been necessary to imply obligations, for which no express provision had been made; nothing, for instance, having been fixed as to the extent, or duration, of the business, or as to the rates at which produce was to be offered or accepted. *Held*, that such provisions could not now be supplied, and that the stipulations as to the "block account" were binding only during the continuance of the arrangement for the conduct of the business by the parties, such arrangement being terminable at will, after the 30th June 1875. The letters of 1873, and the documents of title deposited with them, were held to constitute a security for the general balance due from the defendants to the plaintiffs, and not only a security for advances on certain of the contracts referred to in a paragraph in the nature of a recital; for the latter was not necessarily repugnant to the wider construction, and the operative words were wide enough to apply to all the transactions between the parties. The construction of an ambiguous stipulation in a written agreement may be governed or qualified by a recital; but, if the intention is clearly to be collected from the operative words, that intention is not to be defeated or controlled because it may go beyond what is expressed in the recital. *MARCAR V. SIGG*. **I. L. R. 2 Mad. 239**

6. ——— Extras not mentioned in contract—Allowance for extras. The plaintiff, in answer to an application to him by the defendant for an estimate of the cost of some surveying tents, replied—"We send you, as requested, the prices of tents, flags, and poles, etc.," enclosing a memorandum of prices in which there was no allusion to "flies" for the tents. It appeared that no mention had been made about the "flies" in a conversation which subsequently took place between the parties during the progress of the manufacture of the tents. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover an extra price on account of "flies." *LAUDER V. EASTERN BENGAL RAILWAY CO.* **1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 320**

CONTRACT—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS—contd.**

7. ——— Sale and Purchase of Indigo—Ground for rejection. A contract of sale and purchase of indigo, the produce of a certain concern, contained the following clause:—"The quality of the indigo to be equal to that usually made at the above concern, and to be delivered in good merchantable order, free from dampness, carefully packed, the contents of each chest to be of one quality, and got up with the usual care of the mark, and if not so delivered such allowance to be made to purchasers as shall be awarded by J. P. T." *Held*, that the words "if not delivered" referred to all the several preceding stipulations, including the quality: and therefore inferiority of quality below that usually made at the concern was no ground for rejection of the indigo tendered, but only the subject for an allowance to be awarded by J. P. T. *MACFARLANE V. ROBERT*. **2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 258**

8. ——— Contract for Coal on behalf of Government—Default of contractor. Where centered into a contract with the Government to construct a railway feeder, and purchased coal from a coal company, and after the coal had been delivered and deposited at a certain place, *C* absconded: *Held*, that the Government had no right to detain or claim the coal, or to take the same out of the possession of the coal company who were entitled to retain possession of the coal against any claimant but *C* himself. *GORDON STUART & CO. V. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER OF THE CALCUTTA AND JESSORE ROAD DIVISION*

7 W. R. 426

9. ——— Timber trade in Burma—Tainzahs. According to the timber trade in Burma, the holding of what are called tainzahs does not give possession of the timber; and where the parties in a contract use the word "received" and do not think fit to use the word "entered," they must be taken to have intended the word "received" to have the meaning of having obtained possession of the goods and not merely of having entered and got tainzahs for them. *BURMA COMPANY V. SNADDEN*. **17 W. R. 120**

10. ——— Delivery by Instalments—Tender—Abandonment of excess—Sale of goods. A contract made between the plaintiffs and the defendant stipulated for the delivery to the defendant of 7,500 bags of Madras Coast castor seed, which were to be shipped "per steamers," and then stated that shipment of 2,500 bags was to be made in December. On the 12th December 1,690 bags arrived by steamer *Shahjehan*, and notice in writing was given to the defendant, who requested that the delivery might be postponed owing to his not having godown room. On the 14th December the defendant refused to take the 1,690 bags, on the ground that he was not bound to take a portion of the 2,500 bags, but only the whole at one time. On the 16th December the defendant tendered the value of 2,500 bags, which was

CONTRACT—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS—contd.**

refused, and on the same day the plaintiffs resold the 1,690 bags. On the 17th December the plaintiffs informed the defendant that 810 bags, the balance of the 2,500 of the December shipment, were due on the 18th, and they did arrive on the 19th, but were refused by the defendant on the same ground as before, and they were accordingly re-sold by the plaintiffs. *Held*, that, according to the terms of the contract, there was a legal and proper tender of the December shipment by the plaintiffs, and that the defendant having committed a breach of the contract in not accepting the bags, the plaintiffs were justified in reselling them at once and suing for damages. *SIMSON v. GORA CHAND DOS*. I. L. R. 9 Calc. 473

11. ——— Delivery order for goods deliverable monthly—Sub-contract—Tender—Repudiation of contract—Damages. The defendant entered into a contract with the Union Mills for the purchase of "90,000 gunny bags at R21-8 per 100 bags, delivery from October to March, each month 15,000 bags." Subsequently the defendant contracted to sell to the plaintiffs these 90,000 bags "at R24-2 per 100 bags, delivery from October to March 15,000 each month, buyers to pay difference cash against delivery order on Mills." In August the defendant made out in the plaintiffs' favour a delivery order directing the mills to deliver 90,000 bags on receiving payment for the same at R21-8 per 100 bags, and on the same day sent to the plaintiffs a bill showing the amount of difference payable to him by them. The plaintiffs refused the delivery order on the ground that it had not been accepted by the mills; but on a subsequent tender of the order and bill, they offered, on the 5th September, to pay the amount of difference on receiving a delivery order accepted by the mills. The defendant treated the contract as at end, and sold the bags in the market. In a suit for damages: *Held*, that the defendant sold not only a delivery order, but the right to obtain from the mills 90,000 bags, deliverable in lots of 15,000 per month after payment of the difference, and impliedly undertook that the mills would accept the delivery order and deliver the goods in terms thereof when presented; that the plaintiffs were entitled to get the delivery order at any reasonable time before the first monthly instalment fell due; and, further, that the defendant was not entitled to repudiate the contract after the plaintiffs' offer of the 5th September, and having done so was liable in damages. *RAMDEO v. CASSIM MAMOOJEE*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 173

12. ——— Shipment at monthly intervals—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 39. The defendant agreed to purchase from the plaintiffs 120 cases of condensed milk which were to be shipped in London and delivered in Madras. The agreement stipulated for shipment in six lots of twenty cases each at monthly intervals, but it contained a proviso, whereby the plaintiffs were excused

CONTRACT—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS—contd.**

from monthly shipments if space in ships sailing for Madras were not available. The second shipment was not made within one month from the date of the first shipment; thereupon the defendant repudiated the contract. *Held*, (i) that the interval of time contemplated in the contract was one month more or less, regard being had to the time which it might be reasonable to allow to the plaintiffs for finding a steamer available for the required shipment; (ii) that the plaintiffs having failed to make the second shipment by a steamer of which they might have availed themselves, the defendant was justified in rescinding the contract. *VOLKART BROTHERS v. RUTNAVELU CHETTI*

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 63

13. ——— Delivery in whole of November on seven days' notice from buyer—Breach of Contract. A contract for delivery by the defendants to the plaintiff of 1,000 bags of ginger stated that "delivery was to be taken and given in the whole of November on seven days' notice from the buyer." On the 5th November, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants requiring delivery to be given "within seven days;" and again on the 11th, that he was prepared to take delivery on the following day. On the 12th, the defendants wrote to the plaintiff stating that they would give delivery on the 28th, 29th, and 30th November. On the 15th, the plaintiff gave notice that he considered the contract at an end. In a suit for damages for non-delivery: *Held*, affirming the decision of the Court below, that the words "on seven days' notice from the buyer" were intended to give the buyer the right of fixing the particular time in November at which the delivery was to commence, and that the defendants were, therefore, bound to commence delivery on the expiration of the seven days' notice. *JUGGERNATH KHAN v. MACLACHLAN*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 681 : 8 C. L. R. 225

14. ——— Non-acceptance—Breach of Contract. The plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant to deliver sulphur, to be imported by the ship *Michael Angelo*. No sulphur arrived by the *Michael Angelo* consigned to the plaintiff, and he procured it elsewhere, but the defendant refused to accept it. In an action for non-acceptance: *Held*, reversing the decision of the Court below (*MARKBY, J., 2 B. L. R. S. N. 9*), that the defendant was not bound to accept sulphur not imported by the *Michael Angelo*. *BIHARI LAL v. MADHUSUDAN KUNDU*. 2 B. L. R. O. C. 154

15. ——— Breach of Contract—"Ex a certain ship." By a contract entered into between the plaintiffs and defendant, the plaintiffs agreed to sell certain goods *ex a* specific ship to the defendant, the goods to be taken delivery of within forty-five days, and ten days to be allowed for inspection, and claiming allowance for any damaged goods, the defendant to take the risk of damage from the date of the contract. The

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period for taking delivery and for inspection dated from the 13th May. The plaintiffs did not receive the whole of the goods until 16th of June, and therefore were not ready to perform their contract by submitting them for inspection within the specified time: the defendant did not call upon them to do so. In a suit for breach of the contract by the defendant in not accepting the goods, *held*, that the plaintiffs not being in a position to complete the contract, no cause of action had arisen. *Held*, on appeal, that the goods ought to have been ready for inspection within the ten days stipulated, and the plaintiffs, not having shown that they were ready and willing so to perform the contract, had no right of action notwithstanding that the defendant never, in fact, called on them to deliver the goods for inspection. The words "*ex a certain ship*," must be taken to mean that the goods are really landed, and not in course of being landed, and therefore, independently of the question of the necessity on the part of the plaintiffs to show their readiness to perform their part of the contract the defendant was not bound to take goods on board ship, in respect of which, if the contract were binding upon him, he would have been bound to take the risk of any damage or loss to the goods on board ship, or in the course of landing. *ROBERTSON GLADSTONE & Co. v. KURTUR MULL* . . . 3 B. L. R. O. C. 103

16. ———— **Contract for Freight—June shipment—Naming probable date of arrival of steamer—Later arrival no breach of contract—Estoppel—Notice of readiness to load.** The defendant in April 1891 contracted with the plaintiffs for freight for 375 tons seeds, wheat, etc., "by any first class steamer, etc. (subject to safe arrival), June shipment. Goods to be alongside in time to be all taken in on or before the second day after notice that steamer is ready for cargo; otherwise difference of freight at market rate to be payable on demand as liquidated damages," etc. On the 29th May defendant wrote saying he would be glad to know the name and probable date of arrival of the steamer. On the 3rd June the plaintiffs replied declaring the S.S. *County of York* against the engagement, and adding, in a postscript, that the steamer would be ready to load on or about the 12th instant. The S.S. *County of York* arrived in Bombay on the 10th June, but from unforeseen circumstances had not a berth in the dock and was not ready to load until the 23rd instant. In the meantime, on the 18th June, the defendant repudiated the contract on the ground that, having been led by the plaintiffs to expect that the ship would be ready to load on the 12th instant, he had made telegraphic arrangements on that footing, and the ship not being ready he was compelled to ship his goods by other steamers, in order to fulfil his engagements. The plaintiffs accordingly re-let the freight on defendant's account, and brought this suit for the loss incurred in so doing. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to succeed, for that nothing had occurred to alter the original contract, which gave them the whole

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of June in which to provide a steamer. The statement made by the plaintiffs on the 3rd of June (in answer to the defendant's enquiries as to the probable date of the arrival of the steamer), that the steamer would be ready to load on or about the 12th instant, was not a promise, but a mere expression of opinion. The question of estoppel did not arise. On the 22nd June the plaintiffs gave their shippers, amongst others the defendant, a notice to the following effect: "As the *County of York* will be in dock to-morrow ready to receive cargo, we have to request that your cargo be down not later than Wednesday, the 24th instant, etc., etc." *Quære*: Whether this was a "notice that the steamer was ready for cargo" as required by the contract. *BEYTS, CRAIG & Co. v. MARTIN*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 389

17. ———— **Custom or usage qualifying contract—Shipment, meaning of.** On 18th April 1890, the defendant signed a contract (No. 3053) to buy from the plaintiffs 25 bales grey dhoties, "June shipment, in four lots, with an interval of four weeks." These goods were not supplied, as they could not be obtained at the price limited. On 24th September 1890, the defendant gave the plaintiffs an order at an increased limit of price in the following terms: "Please telegraph your Manchester friends to purchase on my account 25 bales grey dhoties relating to No. 3053 at an all-round advance of 1d. per pair on original limits for November, December, January shipments, in three monthly lots, about 8 bales to be shipped in each month." This order was accepted, and the goods were shipped as follows:—6 bales were handed to the carriers (the S. and N. W. Railway Co.) in Manchester on the 28th November 1890, and were shipped at Berkenhead on the 9th December 1890; 6 bales were handed to the same carriers on the 4th December 1890, and were shipped on the 13th December 1890; 10 bales were handed to same carriers on the 23rd December and 1 bale on the 24th December, and these 11 bales were shipped on the 6th January 1891. The defendant refused to accept the goods. He contended that the documents of 18th April and 24th September should be read together, and that the final contract was for November, December, January shipments, in three monthly lots, at intervals of four weeks. He also contended that the shipment on the 9th December 1890 was a late shipment, and that he was not, therefore, bound to accept the goods under the contract. As to this last contention, the plaintiffs alleged that by the custom of Bombay in the case of contracts made with members of the Native Piece-goods Association, the date of the carrier's weight note was to be regarded as the date of shipment, and that, under such a contract as the one in question, delivery to the Railway Company or other inland carrier was equivalent to shipment. This custom, it was alleged, originated in consequence of the above Association having agreed that all piece-goods ordered out by its members.

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should be conveyed to Bombay by certain lines of steamers only, and by no others. It was stated that, unless some such custom existed, it would in many instances be impossible for Bombay merchants to carry out their contracts, as no steamers of the selected lines might be available. The Judge of the Court of Small Causes at the hearing found that the alleged custom existed, and was generally accepted and understood by merchants and dealers in Bombay. On reference to the High Court: *Held*, that the contract finally agreed on was that 25 bales relating to No. 3053 (*i.e.*, the documents of the 18th April) should be purchased on defendant's account at an all-round advance of 1*d.* per pair on the original limits. Such bales to be shipped in the manner and at the times mentioned in the document of the 24th September 1890. *SMITH v. LUDHA GHILLA DAMODAR*. I. L. R. 17 Bom. 129

18. ——— **Sale of Goods—Non-acceptance of goods—Contract for goods to be ordered from Europe—Performance of contract by offer of goods of same description not ordered out for purchasers, but bought by vendors in Bombay.** On the 7th August the defendants commissioned the plaintiffs to order out from Europe 500 cwt. copper braziers, September shipment, assorted in the manner set out in the indent signed by the defendants, "free on board, Bombay harbour," at the rate of £53-5 per ton. On the same day the plaintiffs sent a reply to the defendants' order in their usual form partly lithographed and partly written as follows:—"We have the pleasure to inform you that we have received a telegram from our Manchester friends, and so far as regards the cyphers therein used, we learn that they advise the following purchases, which will be invoiced to you at your limit, subject to confirmation by letter as usual. Order this day hundred bundles of copper braziers, at £53-5 per ton, free on board, Bombay." As a fact, however, no telegram had been received from the plaintiffs' Manchester friends, and the plaintiffs had not learned that they had advised the purchases referred to in their reply. The acceptance of the plaintiffs' offer was really based on the plaintiffs' view of the probabilities of the copper market. The agents in England were unable to carry out the order, and it remained unexecuted. On the 26th October the plaintiffs, having negotiated with one Naga Ducha to take over from him a September shipment of copper by the S.S. *Merton Hall*, answering to the defendants' order, and for the purpose of fulfilling it, wrote to the defendants as follows:—"We beg to inform you of the arrival of the S.S. *Merton Hall* with hundred packages of goods sold to you as per agreement No. 213 and have, therefore, to request payment of the cash for those goods, according to the terms of the agreement." The plaintiffs' negotiations, however, with Naga Ducha fell through, and they were unable to supply the defendants with the goods from the *Merton Hall*. The defendants on the 30th October wrote through their solicitors to the plaintiffs, stating that they believed the goods

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never came to Bombay, and that they considered the contract at an end. The plaintiffs, however, on the 29th October had succeeded in purchasing a September shipment of goods from one Beg Mahomed, corresponding to those ordered by the defendants. They then on the 31st October wrote to the defendants, informing them that it was a mistake of their clerk to advise the arrival of the defendants' goods per *Merton Hall*, and handing the defendants invoice of 100 bundles arrived *ex Tuban Head*. The defendants discovered that the plaintiffs had not ordered out these goods, but had purchased them in Bombay, and on that ground they refused to accept them. The price of copper had then fallen. The plaintiffs sold the goods by auction, and brought this suit against the defendants, to recover the difference between the price realized by the sale and the price which by their contract the defendants had agreed to pay. It was admitted by the plaintiffs' witnesses that it was intended at the time the defendants gave their order that the goods should be ordered out from England by the plaintiffs; and that this was the invariable course of business of the plaintiffs' firm—the present case forming the only instance to the contrary. *Held*, that the defendants were not bound to accept the goods offered by the plaintiffs; and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the amount sued for. An importing firm which accepts a commission to order out goods at a fixed rate, and undertakes that they shall be invoiced to the person giving the order at that rate, does not (in the absence of proof of usage to the contrary) fulfil his contract by obtaining goods answering to the terms of the order from another firm in Bombay, and tendering them to the person giving the order. *BOMBAY UNITED MERCHANTS COMPANY v. DOOLUBRAM SAKULCHAND*

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 50

19. ——— **Contract to deliver goods—Suit for non-delivery—Agreement exempting from liability in case of loss of carrying ship—Necessity for declaring name of carrying ship to purchaser—Loss of ship, what is a—July-August shipment, what amounts to.** The defendants agreed to sell to the plaintiff 500 tons of coal per steamer July-August shipment. The last clause of the agreement was as follows:—"In the event of the ship being lost, this contract to be null and void." The coal was put on board the S.S. *Rubens* by the defendants at Sunderland on the 30th and 31st August. On the 1st September the *Rubens* was sunk by collision in dock, and remained at the bottom in twenty-three feet of water for sixteen hours when she was raised and her cargo discharged. The coal was pronounced unfit for a voyage to Bombay. Extensive repairs to the ship were found necessary, and she was useless until the 6th October. The plaintiff sued for damages for non-delivery of the coal. The defendants relied on the last clause of the agreement as exempting them from liability. *Held*, that the defendants were not

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their part of the contract during the second year of its continuance (1886), and praying (i) that all the defendants be directed to deliver to the plaintiffs the salt collected during 1886; (ii) that defendants 2, 4, and 7 should be held liable for any damages plaintiffs might suffer through a fall in the price of salt. The Court of first instance, having held that the contract contained seven separate and distinct contracts, each defendant having contracted with reference to his own pans only, decreed (1) that the seven defendants should pay damages at the rate of Rs.12-0 per garce for the salt collected by each during the years 1886 to 1889, leaving the quantity to be ascertained in the execution of the decree; (2) that the defendant should pay the plaintiffs' costs. On appeal, the District Judge modified the decree by fixing the rate of damages at Rs.10-0 for each garce of salt. *Held*, on appeal, that A was not competent to assign his interest in the contract to the second plaintiff, since the contract was based on personal considerations, and that the assignment of it as an executory contract was invalid without the consent of the defendants. *Farrow v. Wilson*, L. R. 4 C. P. 744; *Humble v. Hunter*, 12 Q. B. 310; *Arkansas Valley Melting Company v. Belden Mining Company*, 127 U. S. R. 379, followed. *NAMASIVAYA GURUKKAL v. KADIR AMMAL*

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 163

25. ———— *Sale of Goods—Special place of delivery "to be mentioned hereafter"—Assessment of damages—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 49, 94, and 231.* Bought and sold notes of Purneah indigo seed provided: "The seed to be delivered at any place in Bengal in March and April 1891." It was added, "the place of delivery to be mentioned hereafter." The buyer made mention of this on the 20th March 1891 in a letter to the broker for both parties. This letter, specifying Howrah railway station as the place, was forwarded to the vendor, who replied that he would deliver at his own godowns at Sulkea. This the buyer declined. The vendor and the buyer each insisting that the place named by him was the proper one for delivery, the buyer refused to accept at the vendor's godowns or at any place other than Howrah station. The vendor remained for a certain time ready and willing to deliver at his godowns at Sulkea: and the buyer not accepting delivery at that place, the vendor declared the contract cancelled. The buyer then sued him for breach of the contract to deliver at the place mentioned by the buyer. On the question whether the vendor had discharged his liability by readiness and willingness to deliver at his own godowns at Sulkea: *Held*, that the choice of place given originally by the contract to the buyer, subject only to the express contract that it must be in Bengal, and to the implied one that it must be reasonable, had not been converted, by the words about "mention" thereafter, into a deferred question to be settled by a subsequent agreement. The buyer, according to the contract already sub-

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sisting, had the right to fix the place. There was a special promise in the contract as to the delivery, and to complete its terms nothing more was required than a mention by the buyer of a reasonable place within Bengal. This had been made by him. The contract therefore did not fall within s. 94 of the Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872) dealing with cases where there has been no special promise as to delivery, and fixing the place of production as the place for delivery, but rather resembled what was contemplated in s. 49. And the buyer was entitled to damages on the contract. *GRENON v. LACHMI NARAIN AUGURWALA*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 8
L. R. 23 I. A. 119

26. ———— *Contract to supply goods at fixed price—Duty imposed on material subsequently to date of contract—Liability to supply goods—Indian Tariff Act (VIII of 1894), s. 10.* On 2nd November 1894 the defendant contracted to supply the plaintiff with a certain quantity of dhotars made of European or Egyptian yarn No. 80 at the rate of 225 pairs each month for a period of one year. In January 1895 an import duty of five per cent. was imposed by Government on the yarn. The defendant thereupon declined to supply the dhotars unless the plaintiff paid the duty in addition to the contract price. *Held*, that under s. 10 of Act VIII of 1894 the defendant could call on the plaintiff to pay the duty which he had paid on the yarn, that is, he could add so much to the contract price as would be equivalent to the duty which he himself had paid. The question was whether the dhotars supplied to the plaintiff were actually made out of yarn on which duty had been paid by the defendant. *TRIKAMLAL JAMNADAS v. KALIDAS DALPATRAM*

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 628

27. ———— *Offer of Performance—Tender of Railway Receipts endorsed in blank—Goods not available—Goods subject to demurrage or freight—Duty of seller.* P agreed to sell, and F to buy, certain goods to be delivered to F in April-May 1897. The contract of sale contained (*inter alia*) the following clauses: "(10) The goods to be tendered fully 48 hours before the expiration of the present term of 72 hours granted by the railway company in order to enable buyers to weigh, sample, and inspect the same; and the delivery not to be considered complete until the samples have been refracted and examined, and any dispute about quality, etc., settled. (11) If railway receipt be tendered, such to be handed to buyers 48 hours before the goods are liable to demurrage under the present term of 72 hours granted by the railway company." P, not having before the 31st May goods of his own to meet the contract, arranged with H for certain goods of H to be delivered under it, and tendered to F. On that day, certain railway receipts, which had been endorsed in blank by H in respect

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of the said goods, were tendered to *F*. *F* was ready to pay for the goods; but, before tendering the price, he insisted upon an endorsement of the railway receipts by *H* to *P* and by *P* to himself. *P* was unable to point out the goods to be delivered under the contract, nor could he indicate the wagon numbers. *P* refused to procure the endorsements required by *F*, and thereupon *F* declined to take delivery as proposed, though he tendered the price in exchange for the goods. *Held*, that, *F* not having had an opportunity of inspecting the goods as provided by the contract, the tender made as aforesaid by *P* was not such an offer of performance of the contract as *F* was bound to accept. *Held*, also, that *F* was not bound to accept a tender of railway receipts for goods subject (as some of these were) to demurrage nor for goods on which freight had not been paid (as was the case with some of these goods), nor for goods that were not available on the 31st May, as in the present case. In order to establish a valid tender of the goods, it was for *P* to show that, had *F* taken the railway receipts, the railway company would have been bound to deliver the goods upon production of the receipts; and *F* was under no duty to point out to *P* that the tender was defective. *F*'s duty under the contract arose when a sufficient tender was made to him, and not till then. Failure to justify an alleged breach of contract upon one ground only which is found insufficient does not disentitle the defendant to rely upon other grounds which his rights under the contract entitle him to rely upon. *Cowan v. Milburn*, *L. R. 2 Exch. 230*, and *Mothoormohun Roy v. Bank of Bengal*, *1. L. R. 3 Calc. 392*, referred to. *MOTICHAND v. FULCHAND*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 142
3 C. W. N. 116

28. ———— *Tender of Railway Receipts for goods subject to freight—Railway receipts for goods subject to demurrage—Defective tender—Estoppel.* Under a contract of sale of goods it was provided that, if, instead of the goods, railway receipts for them be tendered, they must be handed over to the buyers 48 hours before the goods were liable to demurrage under the present term of 72 hours granted by the railway company, that "sellers must be present at the time of delivery to inspect the weighing and sampling," and in their default "buyers will weigh and sample and sellers must abide by the result." On the last day of delivery the plaintiffs tendered to the defendants certain railway receipts purporting to cover the goods under the contract and "blank endorsed" by the consignee named in the receipts, and demanded payment of the goods; they did not offer to give delivery of the goods covered by the receipts. The defendants refused to accept the railway receipts until they were endorsed by the consignee named in them to the plaintiff and by the plaintiff to the defendants. It was subsequently found that freight had not been paid on the receipts, and that demurrage was payable on some

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of the goods, but the defendants did not at the time raise any objection on that ground. *Held*, that, having regard to the terms of the contract, the defendants were not bound to accept the railway receipts, or, upon their being tendered, to pay the price of the goods as demanded. That the plaintiffs had not complied with the terms of the clause relating to delivery by railway receipts, and it was open to the defendants to rely upon that objection, and they cannot be said to have waived all questions as to freight, demurrage and the tendering of railway receipts instead of the goods themselves. That the offer made by the plaintiffs did not constitute a readiness and willingness on their part to deliver the goods. *MOTICHAND v. SREEKISSEN* **4 C. W. N. 313**

29. ———— *Collateral Agreement—Contract Act, ss. 21, 65—Mistake of law—Agreement to secure repayment of loan, collateral to primary obligation.* By an agreement in writing, defendants, trustees of a temple, in consideration of an advance of money which they represented was required to pay off debts incurred for the benefit of the temple, granted to plaintiff a lease of the right to manage the temple lands, and plaintiff promised that he would repay himself out of the profits to be derived from the lands, and that neither the defendants nor their family property should be made liable for the debt. In a suit by plaintiff against a tenant of the temple lands, this lease was held to be void for illegality. Defendants subsequently resumed management, and plaintiff sued them to recover the money advanced by him. It was found that the agreement was entered into by both parties under a mistake as to the validity of the lease. *Held*, that, assuming s. 65 of the Contract Act was not intended to vary the rule, that a mistake of law is no ground for relieving a party from his own contract, plaintiff was nevertheless entitled to recover on the ground that the agreement which provided for repayment was collateral, and had failed. An agreement that an obligation which is contracted shall be discharged in some particular mode is collateral to the primary contract which created the obligation, though the two agreements may be mixed up in one contract. *KRISHNAN v. SANKARA VARMA* **I. L. R. 9 Mad. 441**

30. ———— *Agreement not to alienate—Mortgage.* Plaintiff sued, as managing trustee of a choultry, to set aside certain mortgages of the lands with which it was endowed, made by the second, third, and fourth defendants to the sixth and seventh defendants, and for an injunction to compel payment of kist, which had been allowed to fall into arrears, contrary to the provisions of the machalka sued upon. The defendants pleaded that the mortgages made were not in violation of the provisions of the machalka. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Civil Judge considered the provisions

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—“Moreover, we are only entitled to cultivate the said four villages and to maintain the said choultry with the income therefrom as above stated; and we have no right to alienate the said lands by sale, etc.—fatal to the right to mortgage advanced by the defendants one to five. Accordingly he reversed the decree appealed from. *Held*, by SCOTLAND, C. J., that the reasonable construction to be put upon that portion of the razinama relating to alienation was that the villages were not to be alienated so as to deprive the choultry of the receipt of the portion of the produce fixed by the razinama for its support; that the security of the cultivation of the land and the application of the fixed portion of the produce to the maintenance of the choultry was all that the parties intended to effect; that there was nothing in the record to show that the payment of that fixed portion had been rendered less certain by the transfer of the villages to the mortgagees; that, consequently, the beneficial interest of the plaintiff, as trustee under the razinama, was not impaired, and the mortgages were not made in violation of the provisions of the machalka. *Per HOLLOWAY, J.*, that the right set up was based upon a purely capricious exercise of the plaintiff's will, in the effectuation of which he had no conceivable interest; that contractual words seeking to create a right of this sort are ineffective to create it; and that, consequently, the alienations by mortgage were wrongly declared void. *KRISTNA MADALI v. SHANNUGA MUDALIAR* . . . 6 Mad. 248

31. ——— Agreement to share Costs of Litigation to be prosecuted to its furthest limits—Failure on advice to appeal to Privy Council. Plaintiffs having sought to recover from defendants their share of the costs of certain litigation which plaintiffs had set agoing at the instance of defendant's father, who was jointly interested with plaintiffs in certain property in suit, but who wanted the means to prosecute the litigation for its recovery, and who, accordingly, executed an ikramamah agreeing to share the costs of the necessary litigation proportionably with plaintiffs, provided they furnished the funds for prosecuting that litigation to the furthest limits; and the said litigation having terminated adversely to the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants, without any appeal having been preferred to the Privy Council, and defendants having repudiated all responsibility for costs on the ground of default in prosecution of litigation to the furthest possible limit: *Held*, that, as plaintiffs had merely undertaken to furnish the means for carrying on the litigation, but had not actually undertaken the conduct of that litigation, and as it was not in evidence that defendants had wished to go up to the Privy Council, and to this end had made a demand on, but had been frustrated by, plaintiffs, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover proportionate costs in the concerted litigation, with costs in the present suit proportioned to the amount

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thus obtained by them. The lower Courts in this case found that it had not been proved either that the pleaders had advised, or that defendant's father had agreed, that there should be an appeal to the Privy Council. *SHUSHEE MOHUN SHAHA CHOWDHRY v. TARA PURSHAD MOJOMDAR* 25 W. R. 478

32. ——— Settlement of dispute between Hindu widow and reversioners—Ikrarnamah—Condition in restraint of lease—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 10 and 15. In an ikramamah executed by a Hindu widow on the one side, and her husband's cousins on the other, in settlement of disputes regarding her husband's estate, one of the conditions agreed upon was that, if either of the parties should want to execute a lease, jointly or individually, “it would be executed and delivered by mutual consultation of both the parties,” and if “the document be not signed and consented to by both parties, it shall be null and void.” In a suit brought on the basis of the ikramamah to set aside a lease granted by the widow: *Held*, that there is nothing in any statute law which renders such a provision inoperative; neither ss. 10 and 15 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) nor any principle underlying them is applicable to it; it is not an unreasonable provision; there was no absence of equity in the arrangement, and effect should be given to it. *KULDIP SINGH v. KHET-RANI KOER* . . . I. L. R. 25 Cal. 869 2 C. W. N. 463

33. ——— Agreement to give refusal of purchase—Contract between purchaser from Hindu widow and reversioners—Breach of contract in leasing to others. W purchased an estate from a Hindu widow. On her death the reversioners brought a suit to set aside the sale and recover possession. Upon this W entered into an ikrar or undertaking, in which he agreed, on consideration of their desisting from the suit, that he would remain in possession as long as he pleased, and, when he had occasion to sell the property, would give them the refusal. Several years after, W entered into negotiations with third parties for the sale of the concern to which the property was annexed, but not being able to come to terms with them, he broke off the negotiation, and the property was subsequently leased to others. Upon this the reversioners sued to have the property conveyed to them. *Held*, that W's promise not to alienate the property, coupled with the promise that he would personally retain possession, amounted to an undertaking which was violated by what had taken place. Plaintiffs were therefore entitled to the conveyance sought for upon payment of the price. *RAM NATH SEN LUSHKUR v. RASH MOHUN MOOKERJEE* . . . 24 W. R. 214

34. ——— Contract to cultivate Indigo. By a contract for the cultivation of indigo the defendant agreed, in consideration of certain pay-

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ments, to prepare the land, sow the seeds that should be supplied, reap the crop, etc. And it was stipulated that in case the defendant should neglect to cultivate the lands, the amla of the factory might cultivate them and deduct the expense from the money payable to the defendant. *Held*, that it was not obligatory upon the plaintiff to enter upon the lands and cultivate them on default by the defendant. **MACRAE v. JHOOMTUCK MISSEER**

Marsh. 386 : 2 Hay 391

35. _____ *Construction of Agreement—Right of suit to recover advances.* A raiyat took advances from an indigo factory, on condition that he was not to repay any portion of the same until the expiration of the agreement, and even then he was not to be bound to repay the money in cash, but had the option either to pay the same in cash or continue to cultivate the land with indigo, and deliver the plants grown thereon until the whole of the advances were satisfied. *Held*, that an action would not lie for a refund of the balance in consequence of the plaintiff closing the factory before the expiration of the contract. **WATSON & Co. v. HURRY NATH SIRCAR**

7 W. R. 388

36. _____ *Breach of Contract—Non-completion of agreement of compromise as part performance of contract to sow indigo.* Where a contract for sowing indigo was entered into, and advances made in part performance of an agreement of compromise between the parties to a suit for enhancement of rent: *Held*, that the non-completion of the agreement of compromise did not exonerate the defendant from performing his part of the contract for sowing indigo. **SANDYS v. SETUL MUNDUL**

10 W. R. 420

37. _____ *Cash on delivery—Readiness and willingness to take delivery—Delivery, failure of, in terms of contract—Breach of contract—Custom.* Where a contract is for delivery "free on board," and cash on delivery is provided for, payment may be enquired upon delivery of the goods at the time and place mentioned for delivery in the contract. **HEILGERS & Co. v. JADUPLALL SHAW**

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 417

38. _____ *Demurrage—Sale of cargo by consignee—Several purchasers—Contract incorporating the charter party—Liability of one purchaser for delay of all—Contract absolute.* On the 2nd June 1888, the defendant entered into two contracts with the plaintiffs, the consignees of the cargo, each for the purchase of 500 tons of coal per S.S. *Dunedin* then in harbour. The contracts provided (*inter alia*) "delivery to be taken at a rate of not less than 200 tons per day. All conditions in the charter party to be binding on the purchaser." The charter party stated, "cargo to be discharged, weather permitting, at the average rate of not less than 300 tons a working day, or to pay demurrage at the rate of £30 per working day, or *pro rata*." Previously to the 2nd of June, the rest of the cargo

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had been sold by the plaintiffs to three other purchasers, and the lay days had already partially expired; but as regards neither of these facts did the defendants ask nor were they given information. The *Dunedin* discharged at only three of her four hatches, and so discharging was able to give delivery of something more than 300, but less than 400 tons a day. Delivery was given to whichever of the four purchasers was the first to come alongside. At the expiration of the lay days (being the days required to discharge the whole cargo at the average rate of 300 tons a day) the cargo had been completely discharged with the exception of 264 tons, which remained to be delivered to the defendant. The cargo to be discharged subsequently to 2nd of June would have been discharged within the lay days, but for the want of lighters on the part of the purchasers of the cargo generally. It occasionally happened, however, that a lighter was kept idle waiting for its turn at one of the three hatches. The plaintiffs paid one day's demurrage in respect of the delay in discharging the 264 tons, and now brought an action to recover the same from the defendant. *Held*, that the defendant was liable. The contract of the defendant (by incorporation of the charter party) to take delivery within the lay days, or to pay demurrage, being absolute, he could only excuse non-performance of his contract by showing it was due either to default of the captain of the ship, or of the plaintiffs themselves, neither of which had been shown. The plaintiffs were not to blame for any difficulties occurring by reason of there being other purchasers. That was the well-known nature of the trade, and it was for the defendant, if he desired protection in this respect, to provide for it in his contract. Neither were the plaintiffs bound to be able to deliver to the defendant at the rate of 400 tons a day under his two contracts. The stipulation in each of the two contracts, that delivery should be taken at a rate of not less than 200 tons per diem, was not one on which the defendant could insist, but was an independent stipulation in favour of the cargo. **VOLKART BROTHERS v. NUSSERVANJI JEHangir KHAMBATTA**

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 392

39. _____ *Sale of Goods—Delivery—Delivery on Sunday—Custom as to delivery.* Where the defendant, a European, was sued for damages for non-delivery of goods and contended that he was not bound to deliver on Sunday: *Held*, that delivery on Sunday was not unlawful, and that, in the absence of custom to the contrary, the defendant was bound to deliver the goods on that day if they had not already been delivered. **LALCHAND BALAKISSAN v. KERSTEN**

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 338

40. _____ *Goods ordered through commission agents—Contract of Agency—Contract of Sale—Form of action.* The defendants traded in Bombay as merchants and commission agents, under the style of *S D & Co.*, being a

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branch of a French firm trading in Paris under the same name, of which firm also the defendants were members. The Paris firm were agents for certain manufacturers of zinc. The plaintiff, a Bombay merchant, ordered out 48 casks of zinc sheets through the defendants' firm in Bombay by an indent in the following form:—"I hereby request you to instruct your agents to purchase for me (if possible) the under-mentioned goods on my account and risk upon the terms stated below." Such terms, *inter alia*, limited the price of the goods and the time within which the shipments were to be made. Later, the plaintiff consented to increase his limit of price. The defendants, having communicated with their Paris firm, wrote to the plaintiff as follows:—"We have the pleasure to inform you that our home firm has reported by wire concerning your esteemed order as follows:—'Placed at your increased limit'." Subsequently the plaintiff was informed by the defendants that, the manufacturers being full with orders, the zinc sheets would not be ready for shipment as soon as had been expected; and he was asked whether he agreed to give an extension of time, or desired to cancel the indent. Simultaneously the plaintiff wrote that the contract time had been exceeded, and that he would buy similar goods in Bombay on the defendants' account. This the plaintiff did, and brought this action to recover the difference in price as damages on account of the defendants having failed to perform their contract for the delivery of 48 casks of zinc sheets. *Held*, that neither the defendants nor their Paris firm had entered into any contract of sale on which they were liable to the plaintiff. They had only constituted themselves his agents to 'place' his order, *i.e.*, to effect a contract of purchase on his account with the manufacturers of zinc—and consequently the action as brought would not lie. *Ireland v. Livingston, L. R. 5 E. & I. Ap. 395*, and *Cassaboglou v. Gibb, L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 797*, discussed and considered. **MAHOMED ALLY EBRAHIM PIR-KHAN v. SCHILLER DOSOGNE & Co.**

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 470

41. ——— Agreement for permission to quarry—License, Non-renewal of—Implied condition. By an agreement (in renewal of similar agreements for the two previous years), dated the 3rd September 1888, the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff 'rent' for a piece of hilly ground at the rate of R329 per month for one year, during which time the defendant was to be allowed to blast stones and carry on the work of quarrying to the extent of seven crow-bars; such quarrying to be done at such places as the plaintiff had pointed out, or should choose to point out, from time to time. The rent to be paid was arrived at on a calculation of R47 per crow-bar; and was to be payable whether defendant employed the seven crow-bars or less. The defendant, by the sixth clause of the agreement, further undertook as fol-

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lows:—"As regards the police arrangement and other expenses at the time of blasting stones, and obtaining an order or license, etc., and as to any other kind of expenses, risk, and responsibility, all these are upon me. I will duly pay you at the rate of R329 per month clear until the fixed time." The defendant was a stone contractor, and had been employed in this work of quarrying all his life, and for the previous two years on this very spot, and was well aware that blasting could not be carried on without a license from the authorities, which was revocable at any time, and required renewal annually. At the time of the agreement the defendant was in possession of a license, which expired on the 31st December 1888. After that date the authorities refused to renew the license on the ground that the quarry, where operations were being carried on, was surrounded by houses on all sides, and the defendant thereupon refused to continue the payment of the monthly rent of R329. The plaintiff accordingly brought this suit in the Small Cause Court for three months' rent at the above rate. *Held*, looking at the nature of the contract, that it must be taken to have been the intention of the parties to it that the monthly sum of R329 should only be payable so long as quarrying was permitted by the authorities, and that there was no unconditional contract to pay R329 in all events in cl. 6 of the agreement or elsewhere. *Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826: 32 L. J. Q. B. 164*, followed. *Marquis of Bute v. Thompson, 13 M. & W. 487*, and *Ridgway v. Sneyd, Kay 627*, commented on and distinguished. **GOCULDAS MADHAVJI v. NARSU YENKUTI**

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 630

42. ——— Personal Contract—Assignment—Suit by Assignee. When considerations connected with the person with whom a contract is made form a material element of the contract, it may well be that such a contract on that ground alone is one which cannot be assigned without the promisor's consent so as to entitle the assignee to sue him on it. *Stevens v. Benning, 1 K. & J. 168*, referred to. By an agreement in writing, dated 13th December 1882, and executed in favour of *M D* and *H D*, who were the proprietors of an indigo concern, the defendant *R* agreed to sow indigo, taking the seed and tandi from *M D* and *H D*'s concern, on four bighas of land out of his holding selected, measured, and prepared by *M D* and *H D* or their amlah; and when the indigo was fit for weeding, "to weed, reweed, and turn it up to the extent necessary according to the directions of the amlah of the concern;" and when the indigo was fit for reaping, to "reap and load it on carts according to the directions of the amlah of the concern;" and "if any portion of the said indigo land" was "in the judgment of the amlah of the concern found bad," in lieu thereof to get some other land in his holding measured, and "on the land so measured in Bysack" to "sow Bhadbon crops only

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which will be reaped in Bhadur." The defendant also agreed not to sow on the land measured any crop that might "cause obstacle to the cultivation of indigo," and, if he did so, "the amlah of the concern" should "be at liberty to destroy such crop," and he should not "oppose the destruction thereof, nor sue in the Courts, Civil or Criminal, for destruction of the same." As regards a breach of any condition, it was provided: "If I or my heirs depart from the conditions of this indigo engagement directly or indirectly or in any way neglect to cultivate or do not cultivate indigo, I or they shall pay to the abovenamed *M D* and *H D* damages for the same from my or their person and property and shall raise no plea or objection." In 1886, *M D* and *H D* assigned the entire benefit of this agreement to the plaintiff. In a suit by the plaintiff against the defendant for damages on account of his alleged failure to cultivate indigo for the plaintiff's concern in accordance with the terms of the agreement of the 13th December 1882: *Held*, that the agreement must be construed as one which had been entered into by the defendant with reference to the personal position, circumstances, and qualifications of *M D* and *H D* and their amlah; and that therefore it was not assignable so as to give the assignee a right to sue upon it in his own name as for a breach of contract. *TOOMEY v. RAMA SAHAI* . . . I. L. R. 17 Cal. 115

43. — Agreement to pay an annual sum in consideration for abolishing a bazar, suit upon—*Subsequent sale of the land on which the bazar stood—Right to annual sum payable under the agreement.* Plaintiff and defendants entered into an agreement by virtue of which they settled their disputes, and amongst other matters it was agreed that the plaintiff should abolish her bazar at a certain place within her zamindari, which she had established in opposition to a bazar belonging to the defendants; and it was further agreed that the defendant should pay her annually R25 in lieu of her income from that bazar. Plaintiff also undertook that, so long as this annual payment was continued, she would not establish any new bazar within two miles of the bazar of the defendants. Subsequently the plaintiff sold the site of her former bazar together with some other land. *Held*, that, if the payment was to be made in consideration of her abolishing the bazar, she was not entitled to it after she had parted with the land upon which the bazar stood. That if the payment was in consideration of the plaintiff undertaking not to establish a new bazar within two miles of the defendant's bazar, she had disentitled herself to a continuance of the payment from the time when she made it impossible for herself to secure the fulfilment of the condition by parting with the land. *SARAT MOHINI DASI v. BHUBAN MOHAN GHOSE* 3 C. W. N. 182

44. — Consideration—*Compromise of a bona fide claim—Good consideration—Agreement to lend money on mortgage—Delay in comple-*

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tion of agreement—Subsequent agreement to pay interest from a certain date—Consideration for such agreement—Right to rescind—Time of essence of contract—Suit by lender against borrower. On 31st August 1891, the plaintiff agreed to lend the defendant R30,000 on a mortgage. By the agreement the mortgagor (defendant) was to clear the title, and the time fixed for completion of the agreement was eight days from its date. The mortgage was not completed within the stipulated time, in consequence of the non-production of the title-deeds by prior mortgagees, who were to be paid off out of the money to be advanced by the plaintiff. On the 9th September 1891, the plaintiff's solicitors wrote to the defendant reminding him that the time for completion had expired, and stating that the plaintiff would require interest to be paid on the money which he had with him lying idle on the defendant's account. On the 24th September 1891, the plaintiff formally tendered the R30,000 to the defendant, but as no mortgage-deed was then ready for execution, the money was not then paid. The plaintiff was always ready and willing to advance the money, but in consequence of the defendant's delay he insisted on interest being paid from the 24th September 1891. The title-deeds were ultimately produced at the end of November or the beginning of December, and on 7th December 1891, the draft mortgage was sent to the defendant for approval. It contained a clause stipulating for payment of interest from 24th September 1891. On the 9th December 1891, the plaintiff had an interview with the defendant. The two points then discussed were (i) what time after due date should be allowed to the defendant (mortgagor) for payment of interest; (ii) whether interest on the principal sum should run from the 24th September 1891. On the first point the plaintiff gave way, allowing defendant fifteen days, instead of eight, as originally provided. As to the second point, he declined to advance the money unless interest was paid from the 24th September 1891. The defendant ultimately agreed to this. The mortgage-deed was duly engrossed with a stipulation for payment of interest from the 24th September 1891, and the 26th January 1892 was fixed as the day for execution. On that day, however, one of the defendant's daughters who had to execute the deed was absent, and the plaintiff refused to advance the money until her signature was obtained. Subsequently the defendant refused to sign the deed on the ground that it contained the clause for payment of interest from 24th September 1891. He contended that he was not liable to pay interest from that date. The plaintiff brought this suit claiming R1,865-12-0 as damages for the defendant's breach of agreement. The lower Court held that, although the original agreement of 31st August 1891 mentioned no date from which interest should run, the defendant on the 9th December 1891 had agreed to pay it from 24th September 1891 and had made no objection

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on the point until February 1892. The defendant contended that, if such an agreement was made on the 9th December 1891, it was without consideration, but the Court held that the plaintiff was at that date at liberty to rescind the agreement altogether, and that he had consented not to rescind in consideration of being paid interest from the 24th December 1891. The lower Court accordingly passed a decree for the plaintiff. *Semble*: That time was not of the essence of the contract, but *held* that, in any case, under the circumstances here was consideration for the agreement made by the defendant to pay interest from the 24th September. The plaintiff clearly regarded himself as entitled to rescind, and at the defendant's request agreed to forbear to do so if the defendant would consent to pay interest from 24th September 1891. The claim of the right to rescind was undoubtedly a real one and made in good faith, and the forbearance to enforce it might well be an inducement to the defendant to agree to the plaintiff's terms, and the principle laid down in *Miles v. New Zealand Alford Estate Co.*, L. R. 32 Ch. D. 266, applied. *DADABHOY DAJIBHOY BARIA v. PRESTONJI MERWANJI BARUCHA*

I. L. R. 17 Rom. 457

45. ———— Maintenance—*Gifts for maintenance—Construction—Prima facie gifts for life.* Gifts or contracts expressed to be for maintenance, and indefinite as regards duration, may be shown by the acts of the parties or other circumstances to be intended to operate in perpetuity; but *prima facie* they are limited to the life either of grantor or of grantee. Where the ordinary construction of a gift for consideration was that it guaranteed payment of an annuity, for the life of the grantor: *Held*, that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must prevail. *KARIM NENSEY v. HEINRICH* (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 563 :
s. c. L. R. 28 I. A. 198 :
6 C. W. N. 1

46. ———— Proposal with unqualified assent—*Mistake in expression—Common mistake—Unilateral mistake—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 92, proviso 1—Contracting party not able to read—Contract differing from that pretended to be read.* It is of the essence of a contract that there should be (expressly or by implication) a proposal, to which an unqualified assent has been given: without such assent there is no contract; the minds of the contracting parties are not at one. Where a contracting party, who cannot read, has a written contract falsely read over to him and the contract written differs from that pretended to be read, the signature on the document is of no force, because he never intended to sign and therefore in contemplation of law did not sign the document on which the signature is. If a person executes a document knowing its contents, but misappreciates its legal effect, he cannot deny its execution. *DAGDU v. BHANA* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 420

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47. ———— *Contract for Sale of Goods, breach of—Price of goods not delivered—Market rate—Speculations on the rise and fall of market, how differ from ordinary contracts—Custom of trade—Committee of experts, adjudication by, on matters of skill—Effect of error and fraud on their decision.* The appellant entered into a contract to deliver certain quantities of cotton, and having failed, sought to have the price of the amount not delivered fixed at the ordinary market rates. It was found, however, that the transaction, though purporting to be an ordinary contract, was in reality of the nature of speculations on the rise and fall of the cotton market, and dealt with goods which had no real existence in the market; also that in such transactions it was customary for the prices to be settled by a skilled committee of merchants engaged in similar transactions. In the present case, the committee settled a higher rate than that actually prevalent in the market. *Held*, that in the absence of proof of fraud either in the inception or in the proceedings of the committee the appellant was bound by its decision. Mere error would not be sufficient to upset the decision of an expert tribunal voluntarily set up for the decision of matters of skill. *PESTONJI JEHANGIRJI v. JAISINGDAS HANSRAJ* (1904) . 8 C. W. N. 57

48. ———— *Contract—Consideration, executed or executory, failure of—Contract, subsequent claim for performance, after unsuccessful attempt to set aside—Estoppel—Benami transaction.* B, claiming to have been adopted by G's widow under an *anumatipatra* from G, brought a suit, which was compromised, for setting aside certain permanent leases, which G's mother, H, who was managing the estate after G's death, had, without authority, granted to K, the nearest male relative of B. K, in that suit, had set up the invalidity of B's adoption. The terms of the compromise were contained in four documents, one of which was an agreement by B promising to settle certain mehals in permanent *ijara* on K's wife and her heirs. Another of these documents was an *ekrar* executed by K, by which K purported to acknowledge the validity of B's adoption and to renounce his claims to the estate. A third was the *solehnama* filed by K by which K purported to surrender one of the leases granted by H on B ratifying another of those leases. In a suit brought by S's heirs for specific performance of the agreement in favour of S: *Held*, that K, having in subsequent proceedings impeached and contested the validity of the adoption, contrary to his *ekrar*, the consideration had failed and the agreement was unenforceable. That the plaintiffs in claiming as heirs of S were not in a better position than if they had sued as heirs of K, as the circumstances of the case showed that S was merely a *benamidar* for K, and could not in any case claim a better right or title than K. There is not necessarily any inconsistency in a party, who has unsuccessfully tried to rescind an agree-

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ment, afterwards claiming performance of it. Dictum of Lord Cranworth in *Blackett v. Bates*, L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 117, doubted. *SRISH CHANDRA ROY v. ROY BONOMALI RAI BAHADUR* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 594

49. ——— **Charter Party, contract of—Shipowner's Lien—Charterer and sub-charterer—Bill of lading issued to sub-charterer by captain—Captain authorised by shipowner to sign bills of lading "without prejudice to the charter"—Sub-charterer, if bound by charter party—Notice by shipper of charter party—Effect.** Where the captain of a chartered ship was by the terms of the charter party authorised to sign bills of lading on behalf of the shipowners, a bill of lading issued by the captain to a sub-charterer entitled the latter to have his goods delivered to him on the terms of the bill of lading irrespective of the charter party, although he had had notice of the charter party. *Colvin v. Newberry*, 1 Cl. & Fin. 283, and *Small v. Moates*, 9 Bing. 574, distinguished. *Fry v. The Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, etc.*, L. R. 1 C. P. 689, and *Gardener & Sons v. Trenchmann*, L. R. 15 Q. B. D. 154, followed. A stipulation in the charter party that the bills of lading were to be signed by the captain "without prejudice to the charter" only meant that the rights of the shipowners and the charterers against each other under the charter party were to be preserved. Third parties, to whom the bills of lading were issued, would not thereby be made liable to the conditions stipulated in the charter party. *Hansen v. Harold Brothers*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 612, referred to. Notice by a shipper of the charter party has not the effect of incorporating into the bill of lading any terms, which are inconsistent with it and which the captain was not bound to embody in the bill of lading. *TURNER v. HAJI GOOLAM MAHOMED AZAM* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 573

L. R. 31 I. A. 223

9 C. W. N. 1

50. ——— **Jurisdiction—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 17, expl. iii, cl. (2)—Suits arising out of contract—Clause of action—Place where the offer is accepted—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 8, 10 and 25.** A owed B a sum of money for which A gave B at Midnapore a cheque drawn on a firm in Calcutta, in favour of C. B took the cheque to C at Purulia and received the amount. C presented the cheque at Calcutta, where it was dishonoured. On a suit brought by the representative of C at Purulia against A for the recovery of the amount paid, the defence was that the Purulia Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. *Held*, that the contract, on which the suit was brought, was completed as soon as the consideration was paid, and as this was done at Purulia, the contract was made at that place within the meaning of s. 17, expl. iii, cl. (2) of the Civil Procedure Code, and therefore the Purulia Court had jurisdiction. *SITARAM MARWARI v. THOMPSON* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 884

CONTRACT—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS—contd.**

51. ——— **Goods—Mate's receipt—Fraud—Bills of lading—Goods purchased for shipment abroad—Unascertained goods—Appropriation of goods by seller to the contract—Conditional appropriation—Conversion of Mate's receipts into bills of lading before payment—Pledge of bills of lading to a third party without notice of seller's claim for the price of goods—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 77, 78, 82, 83, 88, 178.** A purchased certain goods from B for shipment abroad, delivery to be made at a later date. Cl. 13 of the contract provided as follows:—"Terms of payment cash on delivery of mate's receipts, dock receipts or as provided in cls. 8, 9, and 11. Should the said receipts or warrants be retained by the buyer for examination, they shall remain the property of the sellers and be held by the buyers in trust for and at the absolute disposal of the sellers, until payment has been made in cash in terms of this contract, and if payment be made by cheque, until such cheque has been cashed." Under A's instructions the goods were placed alongside the vessel by the seller and subsequently shipped. Mate's receipts were made over to A for examination together with B's bill for payment. A subsequently without paying for the goods obtained bills of lading in exchange for mate's receipts, and thereafter pledged them with C without notice of B's claim, and C thereupon gave credit to A for the full amount of the bills of exchange drawn against the goods represented by the bill of lading. *Held*, that the goods under the contract were unascertained at the date of contract, and therefore the sale was not complete, unless there was an appropriation by B as seller of the goods for the purpose of the contract, and that appropriation was found to be assented to by A. *Held*, also, that under cl. 13 of the contract the seller B obtained special property in the mate's receipts even though standing in the name of the buyer A, which would enable B to hold the documents as security for payment as against the real owner of the goods, and that there was nothing in the contract to show that the appropriation of the goods to the contract was intended by B to be other than final and absolute, that the sale and transfer to A was complete, and A had a right to dispose of the goods as owner, and in obtaining possession of the mate's receipts gained the means of exercising that right. So when A obtained bills of lading in exchange for mate's receipts he held possession of them as owner, and pledged them in that capacity to C. *Moyce v. Newington*, 4 Q. B. D. 32, relied on. *Clive Jute Mills v. Ebrahim Arab*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 177; *Pease v. Gloahac*, L. R. 1 P. C. 219, referred to. *Mirabita v. Imperial Ottoman Bank*, 3 Ex. D. 164, distinguished. *Held*, further, that the pledge by A to C did not come within the proviso to s. 178 of the Contract Act. *JUGERNATH AUGURWALLAH v. SMITH* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 547

52. ——— **Construction—Custom of trade in Bombay—Vendor and Purchaser—**

CONTRACT—*contd.*1. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS—*contd.*

Principal and agent—Goods ordered nett free godown—No remuneration fixed—Variance between printed and written terms—Liability to account. The plaintiffs sued to recover the balance due to them for goods delivered by them to the defendant under certain indents, the first clause of the printed portion of which ran as follows:—"We ^{us}_{me} hereby request and authorize you to order, and if possible, buy and send ^{us}_{me} the undermentioned goods on ^{our}_{my} account and risk and ^{We}_I bind ^{ourselves}_{myself} to pay for the same at the prices and conditions specified below." Other printed clauses provided that goods were to be landed by the defendant, who was to pay the import duty; the plaintiffs were not to be liable for damages though they might have advised the defendant of having placed the order, or any portion of it; the liability of the sellers and buyers, respectively, was to be the same as though a separate contract had been made out and signed in respect of each instalment, insurance was to be effected in Europe and the plaintiffs were to be free of all responsibility regarding it; the plaintiffs were not to be bound by any clauses or customs not specifically mentioned in the indent; and anything written in the indent form by the buyers in any language, other than English, except their signature, was to be null and void. To this indent form the following matter, *inter alia*, was added in writing:—"12 Cases Ea/contg. 18 Pcs. of 25/130 yds. Plain Velvet 1421/18 at 1s. 9d. per yard. Nett free godown including duty. 60 days, 6 per cent. Int. after due date." The plaintiffs brought out the goods referred to in the indents and the defendant took delivery of a portion of the same, but refused to take delivery of the remainder. The defendant contended, by way of defence and counter-claim, that the plaintiffs were his commission agents for the purpose of purchasing goods in the European markets, and that they were bound to furnish an account of the difference, if any, between the cost price of the goods and the price mentioned in the indents. The lower Court, by an interlocutory judgment, held that the relation between the parties was that of principal and agent, and ordered the plaintiffs to furnish an account. The plaintiffs appealed. On appeal the preliminary objection was taken that the lower Court had erred in excluding evidence as to the custom of trade in Bombay. By an order dated the 7th March 1904 the suit was referred back to the lower Court in order that such evidence might be taken. On further hearing, after such evidence was taken: *Held*, that there was an inconsistency between the printed and the written provisions of the indent. The print, however, could not be discarded, but it was necessary to discover the real contract of the parties from the printed as well as from the written words." *Gumm v. Tyrie*, 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 97, 111, followed. *Held*, also, that according to the custom of trade in Bombay, when a merchant requests or author-

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izes a firm to order and to buy and send goods to him from Europe, at a fixed price, nett free godown, including duty, or free Bombay harbour, and no rate of remuneration is specifically mentioned the firm is not bound to account for the price at which the goods were sold to the firm by the manufacturer. And it does not make any difference that the firm receives commission or trade discount from the manufacturer, either with or without the knowledge of the merchant. *PAUL BEIER v. CHOTALAL* (1904) . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 1

53. ——— *Pakki Adat—Incidents of the custom—Employment for reward.* The plaintiffs in Bombay bought and sold in Bombay cotton and other products on the orders of the defendant who traded at Shahada in Khandesh. In respect of the transactions sued on the plaintiffs before due date had entered into cross contracts of purchase with the merchants to whom they had originally sold goods on the defendant's account. The transactions were entered into on *pakki adat* terms. The contract of a *pakka adatia* in the circumstances of this case is one whereby he undertakes or guarantees that delivery should, on due date, be given or taken at the price at which the order was accepted or differences paid: in effect he undertakes or guarantees to find goods for cash or cash for goods or to pay the difference. The evidence in the case establishes the following propositions in connection with *pakki adat* dealing:—(i) That the *pakka adatia* has no authority to pledge the credit of the up-country constituent to the Bombay merchant and that no contractual privity is established between the up-country constituent and the Bombay merchant. (ii) That the up-country constituent has no indefeasible right to the contract (if any) made by the *pakka adatia* on receipt of the order, but the *pakka adatia* may enter into cross contracts with the Bombay merchant either on his own account or on account of another constituent, and thereby for practical purposes cancel the same. (iii) The *pakka adatia* is under no obligation to substitute a fresh contract to meet the order of his first constituent. *Held*, that the defendant knew of the custom, which was not unreasonable as it did not involve a conflict between the *pakka adatia's* interest and duty. *BHAGWANDAS v. KANJI* (1905)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 205

54. ——— *Assignability—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1892), s. 3—"Actionable claim"—Beneficial interest in moveable property—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 6 (h)—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 23—"Object or consideration."* The right to claim the benefit of a contract for the purchase of goods is a "beneficial interest in moveable property" within the definition of "actionable claim" in s. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), and, as such, assignable. In s. 6 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) and s. 23 of the Contract Act (IX

CONTRACT—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS—contd.**

of 1872), the words "object" and "consideration" are not synonymous, but distinct in meaning, the word "object" meaning "purpose." *Semble*: The benefit of a contract, that is the beneficial right or interest of a party under the contract and the right to sue to recover the benefits created thereby, are assignable, provided that (a) the benefit is not coupled with any liability or obligation that the assignor is bound to discharge, and (b) the contract has not been induced by personal qualifications or considerations as regards the parties to it. *JAFFER MEHAR ALI v. BUDGE BUDGE JUTE MILLS COMPANY* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 702
s. c. 10 C. W. N. 755

55. ——— Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 69—*Money voluntarily paid cannot be recovered back unless the party for whom such payment is made is bound to pay it—Revenue Recovery Act (II of 1864), s. 35—Applies only where party paying is tenant, mortgagor, or incumbrancer—Unregistered owner not bound to pay the revenue.* An action to recover money paid is not maintainable under s. 69 of the Indian Contract Act, unless the person from whom it is sought to be recovered was bound to pay it. On this point the law under s. 69 of the Indian Contract Act is the same as the English Law. *Bonner v. Tottenham and Edmonton Permanent Investment Building Society*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 161, referred to. The revenue due on land owned by one who is not the registered holder is not money which such owner is bound to pay under the Revenue Recovery Act, though it may be to his interest to do so and the registered holder voluntarily paying such revenue cannot recover it under s. 69 of the Contract Act. Neither can he recover it under s. 35 of the Revenue Recovery Act unless he is a tenant, mortgagor or incumbrancer of such land. *BOJA SELLAPPA REDDY v. VRIDHACHALA REDDY* (1906) **I. L. R. 30 Mad. 35**

56. ——— Putni taluk—Benamidar—Contribution. The mortgagee of a share of a putni taluk, in order to save his interest therein, paid up the putni rent and claimed to recover a proportionate share thereof from the appellant who had, subsequent to the mortgage, purchased the mortgagor's share in the taluk. The appellant pleaded that he was only a benamidar for the mortgagor. *Held*, that the appellant having held himself out as the purchaser, and having got his name registered in the zemindar's books in place of his vendor, was *prima facie* bound in law to pay the rent, and that under s. 69 of the Contract Act the mortgagee was entitled to succeed. *UMESH CHANDRA BANERJEE v. KHULNA LOAN COMPANY* (1906) **I. L. R. 34 Calc. 92**

57. ——— S. 69, Contract Act, applies only in cases where one person pays money which another is bound to pay—Payment must be to another person. S. 69 of the Contract Act applies only where one person pays to another

CONTRACT—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS—contd.**

money which a third party is bound to pay. Where Government, as mulgeni tenant, pays to itself the assessment, payable by the mulgar (landlord), it is not a payment by Government to another person, and the amount so paid or retained cannot be recovered from the mulgar under s. 69 of the Contract Act. *Quære*: Whether the Government can be held to have such an interest as will bring it within the section, as the sale to avert which the payment is made can be brought about only by its own orders. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. FERNANDES* (1907)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 375

58. ——— Contract Act, s. 70—Inamdar taking water for which zemindar is compelled to pay water-cess must recoup zemindar. When the holder of an inam within a zemindari takes for his benefit Government water and the zemindar, whose moveable and immoveable properties are liable for the payment of the cess to Government, pays them, the latter can recover the amount of cess so paid from the inamdar under s. 70 of the Contract Act. The zemindar must be considered as rendering himself liable for the benefit of the inamdar and as not intending to do so gratuitously. *RAJA OF VENKATAGIRI v. VUDUTHA SUBBARAYUDU* (1907)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 277

59. ——— Official Assignee—Whether benefit of contract vests in Official Assignee—Indian Insolvent Act (11 and 12 Vict., C. XXI), ss. 7 and 24—Assignment of contract—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 3, 6 (h)—“Actionable Claim”—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 23—Fraudulent object. Property under a contract which an assignor can pass to an assignee, is an "actionable claim" within the meaning of s. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act, and would, under s. 7 of the Indian Insolvent Act, vest in the Official Assignee on the insolvency of the assignor. Under the joint action of s. 6 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act and s. 23 of the Contract Act, where the object of an assignment is fraudulent, the assignment is void and inoperative. Decision of *SALE J.*, in *I. L. R. 33 Calc. 702*, affirmed. *JAFFER MEHAR ALI v. BUDGE-BUDGE JUTE MILLS CO.* (1906) **I. L. R. 34 Calc. 289**

60. ——— Sale of unascertained goods—Appropriation—Completion of sale—Transfer of ownership—Conditional appropriation—Jus disponendi—Mate's receipts—Bills of lading—Fraud—Conversion of mate's receipts into bills of lading without payment for goods—Pledge of bills of lading to a third party without notice of seller's claim for the price of goods—Contract Act (IX of 1892), ss. 77, 83, 95, 178. A agreed to purchase unascertained goods of a certain mark from B, the goods to be placed alongside the exporting vessel and to be paid for in cash against mate's receipts. Cl. 13 of the contract provided: "Terms of payment: Cash on delivery of mate's or dock receipts or as provided in cls. 8, 9 and 11."

CONTRACT—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS—contd.**

Should the said receipts or warrants be retained by the buyers for examination, they shall remain the property of the sellers and be held by the buyers in trust for and at the absolute disposal of the sellers, until payment has been made in cash in terms of this contract, and if payment be made by cheque, until such cheque has been cashed." Under A's instructions the goods were marked and placed alongside the vessel and subsequently shipped. Mate's receipts made out in A's name were obtained by B, and made over to A for examination together with B's bill and the usual measurement and weight certificates. Thereupon A obtained bills of lading in exchange for the mate's receipts and pledged them with C, who acted *bonâ fide* and without notice of B's claim. The goods were never paid for by A. *Held*, that there was an "appropriation" by the seller B, assented to by the buyer A, within the meaning of s. 83 of the Indian Contract Act. *Rohde v. Thwaites*, 6 B. C. 388, referred to. Under the conjoint operation of ss. 77 and 83 of the Indian Contract Act, the sale was complete and the property in the goods passed from the seller to the buyer, and the pledge by A of the bills of lading to C was valid. Cl. 13 did not reserve to the seller the right of disposing of the goods nor did it render the appropriation conditional on payment of the price. The pledge by A to C did not come within the proviso to s. 178 of the Indian Contract Act. *Per GEIDT, J.*—The object of cl. 13 was to secure the seller's lien on the goods. Judgment of *SALE, J.*, in *I. L. R. 33 Calc. 547*, affirmed. *JUDGGERNATH AUGURWALLAH v. E. A. SMITH* (1906). **I. L. R. 34 Calc. 173**

61. ——— Railway Company—Receipt of goods by one company for carriage over its own and another company's line—Liability in respect of overcharge made by delivering company—Bye-laws—Power of Railway Company to alter the principle of calculation of rates. Two wagon loads of chillies were received by the Station Master at Bezvada on the Nizam's Guaranteed State Railway for carriage to Agra station on the Great Indian Peninsula Railway at a rate of R270 per wagon for the whole distance. On arrival at Agra the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company's Station Master demanded payment of higher rates, calculated per maund, and refused delivery until such rates were paid. The consignees paid under protests and sued both Railway Companies for a refund of the excess charges. *Held*, that the contract for carriage of the goods for the whole distance was one entire contract with the receiving Company, who were liable for the overcharge, if any, wrongfully demanded from the consignees. *Muschamp v. Lancaster and Preston Junction Railway Company*, 8 M. & W. 421; 58 R. R. 758; *Webber v. The Great Western Railway Company*, 3 H. & C. 771, and *Kalu Ram Maigraj v. The Madras Railway Company*, 1 I. L. R. 3 Mad. 240, followed. *Held*, also, that a bye-law of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company which reserved to the Railway the right of remeasurement, reweighting, re-

CONTRACT—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS—contd.**

calculation and reclassification of rates, terminals and other charges at the place of destination and of collecting before the goods are delivered any amount that may have been omitted or under-charged did not authorize the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company to alter the contract between the parties and charge at the place of destination maund rates instead of wagon rates. *CHUNI LAL v. THE NIZAM'S GUARANTEED STATE RAILWAY COMPANY, LD.* (1906). **I. L. R. 29 All. 228**

62. ——— Contract in writing registered—Contract signed by only one party, but acted on by both—Covenant—Remote consequence of breach of contract—Damage—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 116. A contract, which has, in fact, been registered is no less a "contract in writing registered" within the meaning of Art. 116 of the Limitation Act, because it bears the signature of only one of the parties, in the absence of any statutory provision regarding the signatures of both parties. *Ambalavana Pandaram v. Vaguram*, 1 I. L. R. 19 Mad. 52; *Kotappa v. Vallur Zamindar*, 1 I. L. R. 25 Mad. 50; *Zamindar of Vizianagram v. Behera Suryanarayana Patrule*, 1 I. L. R. 25 Mad. 587, followed. *Apaji Bapuji Karjupi v. Nilkantha Annaji*, 3 Bom. L. R. 667, not followed. Where there is an agreement between the lessor and the lessee that the lessee was to pay to the superior landlords the rent, which the lessors were bound to pay to them under their contract with the superior landlords, and owing to the failure of the lessee to pay the rent, the leased property was sold. *Held*, that the loss of the property was not the natural consequence of the default of the lessee to comply with his covenant and the lessors are only entitled to compensation for any loss or damage, which naturally arose in the usual course of things for the breach of the contract. *GIRISH CHANDRA DAS v. KUNJA BEHARI MALO* (1908). **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 653**
s. c. 12 C. W. N. 628

63. ——— Bond given for the performance of a public duty, but not under the provisions of any law not within exception to s. 74 of Contract Act—Right of suit—Civil suit maintainable in respect of act amounting to criminal offence—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 6, 115—Local Board's Act (Madras), ss. 162-C and 162-D do not bar a civil suit on contract. An agreement between a contractor and a local Board contained the following terms: "As I have taken over under contract for R406 the right to collect the fees on the articles brought for sale in Udip, market from 1st April 1902 to 31st March 1903 I am bound to act according to the following conditions:—I am not entitled to collect more than the under-mentioned rate of fees from the person seated and trading on the site of the fair.

Rate of fees.

	Rs.	a.	p.
Each head-load	0	0	2
„ cart-load	0	2	0

CONTRACT—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS—contd.**

I am bound to put up a board with the rates of fees to be collected by me and my name in English and Canarese in a public place in the market. If I, my agent, or servant were to act contrary to the above regulations, I shall be liable to pay a fine not exceeding R50 imposed by the President of the Taluk Board, or I am not entitled to object if my gutta is put up for auction again subject to the loss that may be sustained by the Taluk Board." Under the terms of the above contract, the President of the Taluk Board imposed on the defendant a fine of R20 on 4th November 1902 in respect of illegal excessive collections made by his agent. The defendant not having paid the fine, the President instituted a civil suit for the amount of the fine on 4th January 1904. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable, although the acts of the defendant's agent amounted to a criminal offence and no criminal proceedings were taken against the agent. It is doubtful whether the doctrine that a person injured by a felonious act cannot seek civil redress without prosecuting the felon in the Criminal Courts, applies in India; and the doctrine does not apply where a principal is sued in the Civil Courts in respect of the wrongful acts of his agent. *Held*, also, that the agreement in question was not a bail, bond or recognisance within the meaning of the exception to s. 74 of the Contract Act, and though given for the performance of a public duty, it was not given under the provisions of any law. The exception to s. 74 did not apply and the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable damages under the section. *Held*, also, that the suit was based on contract and for purposes of limitation fell within Art. 68 or 115 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act and not under Art. 6 of the Schedule. *Held*, further, that the penal clauses of ss. 162-C and 162-D of the Local Board's Act did not preclude the plaintiff from suing the defendant on his contract. **PRESIDENT OF THE TALUK BOARD, KUNDAPUR v. BURDE LAKSHMINARAYANA KAMPTHI (1908)**

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 54

64. ——— Sale of Goods by description—Appropriation by Vendor—Refusal to take Delivery—Reference to Arbitration—Evidence of Assent—Action for Goods bargained and sold—Suit for Price—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 120. Where in a contract for the sale of goods by description the property in the goods has passed to the buyer, s. 120 of the Indian Contract Act does not deprive the seller of the form of action for goods bargained and sold, and such an action can be brought for the price of the goods on the buyer refusing to take delivery. *Mitchell, Reid & Co. v. Buldeo Doss Khettry, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 1*, distinguished. A letter of reference signed by both buyer and seller, requesting arbitrators to ascertain whether certain specific bales of goods, appropriated by the seller to the contract, are inferior in quality to the goods deliverable under the contract, and whether an allowance ought to be made, is evidence of assent by the buyer to the appropriation.

CONTRACT—contd.**1. CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS—concl'd.**

FINLAY, MUIR & Co. v. RADHAKISSEN GOPIKISSEN (1909) I. L. R. 36 Calc. 736

2. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT.

1. ——— Intention to execute more formal contract—Final agreement, effect of. Where two parties have come to a final agreement, the mere fact that at the time of their doing so they intended to embody the terms of such agreement in a formal instrument does not make such agreement less binding on them. **WHYMPER & Co. v. BUCKLE & Co.** I. L. R. 3 All. 469

2. ——— Intention to make more formal contract—Binding effect of preliminary agreement—Agreement to adjust suit, suit for damages for breach of. Even where formalities in the embodiment of contracts are at the option of the parties, there may be a concluded and binding contract, although there is an intention to put its terms into a more formal shape. The existence of such intention is evidence that neither party was to be bound until the intended formalities have been complied with. But when a sale, so as to pass an interest, requires certain formal steps, and nothing turns upon the intention of the parties, no inference against a concluded agreement can be drawn from the non-completion of formalities which are not of their selection. The parties to a suit executed a written agreement, which was duly registered, whereby the plaintiff agreed to accept the property of the defendant, specified in the agreement, in adjustment of the said suit. The agreement was not recorded under s. 98, Act VIII of 1859. The plaintiff proceeded with his suit, obtained a decree and sold the property mentioned in the agreement, in execution of the said decree. The sale-proceeds being insufficient to satisfy the decree, other property belonging to the defendant was attached and sold for R23,360. In a suit for damages brought by the defendant:—*Held*, that the agreements to withdraw the previous suit and to accept the properties of the present plaintiff in discharge of the claim were concluded agreements, and that, therefore, the present plaintiff was entitled with interest to the sum which property not mentioned in the agreement fetched at the sale under the decree obtained by the defendant. **VENKATACHELLASAMI CHETTIAR v. KRISTNASAWMY IYER**

8 Mad. 1

3. ——— Unseaworthiness—Breach of contract in not shipping goods—Part performance. In an action for breach of contract in not shipping certain goods, the defendants pleaded the unseaworthiness of the vessel. It was found that the ship was unseaworthy at the time of sailing, and that the defendants had placed part of the goods on board. *Held*, that it is a condition precedent that a vessel shall be in a proper state to take the goods on board for the purpose of the particular voyage; or in such a state that she may be made

CONTRACT—*contd.*2. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT—*contd.*

fit for the voyage with the goods on board, without such a delay as to frustrate the object of the merchant in shipping his goods. *Held*, that the putting part of the goods on board without knowledge of the unseaworthiness of the vessel was not a waiver of the performance of the condition. *Semle*: Unseaworthiness at the time of sailing is not a breach of the condition. TURNER MORRISON v. RALLI MAVROJANI . 2. B. L. R. O. C. 127

4. ——— Agreement to ship after two country voyages—*Contract of affreightment, construction of.* When a ship-owner has contracted to give a certain notice to a charterer, or to do any other act, with a view to inform the charterer when the ship will be ready, the charterer is not bound to ship his goods until the ship-owner has given him that notice or has done that act. *Held*, therefore, in an action for not shipping goods under the following contract:—"H. S. to arrive after completion of two country voyages for London on notice in May or June," it appearing that the plaintiffs had sent the vessel for one country voyage only, that the defendants were entitled to refuse to ship the goods. FLEMING v. KOEGLER . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 287 : 3 C. L. R. 297

Affirming decision in s. c. . 2 C. L. R. 169

5. ——— Stipulation not to sell to others same description of goods—*Suit for breach of contract.* The plaintiffs on the 4th August 1881 entered into a contract with the defendant for the sale to the latter of a quantity of goods of a certain description "to be delivered up to the 31st December 1881." The plaintiffs stipulated that they would make no sales of goods of the same description to others before the 1st December 1881. The goods arrived in Calcutta between the 4th and 24th November 1881. On the 15th August the plaintiffs entered into other contracts with other buyers for the sale of the same description of goods at a lower price than that at which they had sold to the defendant, these contracts being on terms that the goods were not to arrive in Calcutta until after the 31st December 1881. In a suit to recover damages for breach of the contract by the defendant in not accepting the goods:—*Held*, that the stipulation not to sell the goods to others itself amounted to a condition precedent to the defendant's obligation to accept the goods, and therefore the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages. CARLISLE NEPHEWS & Co. v. RICKNAUTH BUCKTEARMULL . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 809

6. ——— Condition to abide by interested referee—*Maxim "No man can be judge in his own cause."* A entered into a contract to supply Government with timber of a certain quality to be approved by K, the superintendent of the gun carriage factory, for which the timber was required, before acceptance. *K bona fide* tested and rejected the timber tendered. *Held*, that it was not open to A to question the reasonableness of K's refusal to accept the timber or to show that the

CONTRACT—*contd.*2. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT—*contd.*

timber was of the quality stipulated for. *Per INNES, J.*—The rule of civil law that a condition the happening of which is at the will of the party making it is null and void, as being destructive of the contract, is not a rule of the Indian Law of Contracts. *Per MUTTUSAMI AYYAR, J.*—The maxim that 'no man shall be a judge in his own cause' does not apply where one party to a contract agrees to abide by the judgment of the other, or where both parties agree to abide by the decision of an interested third party. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. ARATHOON . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 173

7. ——— Guarantee that casks for shipment are fit for purposes for which they are employed. If a party enters into a contract to provide and ship molasses at the risk and expense of the seller, he must be taken to guarantee that the casks are proper casks, and properly copered for any voyage from Calcutta for which such goods may be reasonably ordered by the plaintiffs to be shipped. PALMER v. COHEN . 1 Hyde 123

8. ——— Comparison of accounts of collection—*Contract to be liable for outstanding balance.* The defendant promised that in the event of his obtaining possession of certain land he would be responsible for all balances ascertained to be outstanding, after comparison of the collection accounts for 1259 (1852). *Held*, that the comparison of the accounts was a condition precedent to the defendant's liability, and therefore that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover such arrears, notwithstanding the defendant was let into possession and it was proved that there were such arrears, unless it was also shown that the accounts had been compared or an opportunity of comparing them had been afforded to the defendant. LUCKHY DASS MUSTOOFEE v. JOGESHWER MOOKERJEE . Marsh. 582 : 2 Hay 667

9. ——— Payment for removal of obstruction—*Suit on obstruction not being removed.* By the terms of an arrangement come to by the parties in the proceedings before the commissioner in a suit for partition of real property it was agreed that "T (one of the parties) is to be paid the price of a privy which is to be pulled down for the purpose of the new pathway to be opened on the west side of the premises, which price is to be ascertained (by the commissioner) on inspection, and paid by all parties, T being at liberty to take over the materials at a valuation." In a suit by the purchaser from one of the parties to the partition suit against T, charging that he obstructed the pathway, etc., such obstruction being the not removing the privy:—*Held* (reversing the decision of the Court below), that the payment to T of the price of the removal was a condition precedent to the obligation on T to remove the privy. TARRUCK NAUTH GHOSE v. KALEE PERSHAD KHETTRY . 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 210

10. ——— Suit on non-delivery of goods—*Mutual obligations.* The plaintiffs entered

CONTRACT—contd.**2. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT—contd.**

into a contract in writing by which the defendant was to deliver 2,450 bundles of gingelly seed on being put in possession of the necessary funds. In a suit for damages by reason of non-delivery :—*Held*, that the plaintiffs, before they could recover, must show that they paid or tendered the amount stipulated, and that the vendor's rights under the contract could not be controlled by the course of dealing between the parties. *SHAND & Co. v. ATMAKURI ADINARAYANA CHETTI* . . . 2 Mad. 193

11. ———— *Suit on non-delivery of goods—Reciprocal promises—Damages, measure of.* On 6th March 1883 *V* promised to sell 5,000 bags of gingelly seed at R7-11 a bag to *S*. Two-thirds of the price was paid in advance. *V* agreed to deliver the 5,000 bags at the end of April and to give *S* notice, as instalments of 1,000 bags were ready for delivery within the stipulated time, and *S* promised to pay *V* the balance of the contract price on each instalment when ready for delivery. There was neither delivery nor payment in terms of the contract, 3,000 bags were delivered by *V*, but *S* did not pay the balance of the price due, and 2,000 bags were never delivered. On 7th May *V* declined to deliver these bags, on the ground that *S* had not paid the balance of the contract price for the 3,000 bags delivered when ready for delivery, and, subsequently, repaid to *S* the balance due to him of the money advanced. In a suit by *S* against *V* for damages for non-delivery of 2,000 bags :—*Held*, that *V* was not excused from performance of his promise by the failure of *S* to pay the balance due for the bags delivered, and that *S* was entitled to recover the difference between the market and the contract price on the day the contract was broken by *V*. *SIMSON v. VIRAYYA*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 359

12. ———— *Averment of readiness and willingness—Covenant dependent or independent.* The plaintiff and defendants entered into the following agreement, dated 26th January 1851 :—“Under the bond executed to *J M* by *B* on the 9th October 1849 for R1,252-13, the balance left due by him in the matter of the jaggery which he undertook to supply to you, R1,360 remain due on this date to the exclusion of what has been paid for the amount of principal and interest; for this balance you have obtained by purchase the virthi land possessed by *B* in Sitaparam Agharam, and the half virthi of land of his elder brother. Under such circumstances, we hereby agree to pay you out of the said amount R680 within the end of May in the current year, and the remaining R680 within the end of May of the ensuing year 1852, and then to get the said deeds of sale endorsed by you and the 1½ virthi of land put into our possession as purchased by us. We will therefore pay the said amount of R1,360 in two instalments and take back this sanad along with the deeds of sale endorsed.” In a suit for recovery of a sum of money alleged to be due under the agreement :—*Held*, that on the true construc-

CONTRACT—contd.**2. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT—concl.**

tion of the contract it was not incumbent on the plaintiff to deliver, or aver readiness to deliver, the land to the defendants. The question whether covenants are dependent or independent, or whether a certain act is or is not a condition precedent, is entirely one of construction and to be determined in each case by educing the intention of the parties from the language they have used. *YOUNG v. MANGALAPILLY RAMAIA* . . . p. 3 Mad. 125

13. ———— Independent covenants.

Where defendants sub-rented an abkari farm for one year, from 31st July 1864, under a machalka, by which the defendants covenanted to pay monthly instalments of rent to plaintiff, and plaintiff covenanted to furnish defendants with the accounts of the farm from the month of July 1864, during which period the management was in the hands of plaintiff's agent, in an action by plaintiff for rent due to him, and the value of arrack supplied by him :—*Held*, that the covenants were independent, one not being a condition precedent to the other, and that therefore the non-performance by the plaintiff of the covenant to furnish accounts was not sufficient to justify the entire dismissal of his suit against the defendants, there being no obligation on him to allege readiness and willingness to furnish accounts. *RAMAIA v. NARAYANASAMY*

3 Mad. 209

14. ———— *Deposit with Bank—Receipt given for loan—Statement in receipt that loan was repayable on production of receipt—Non-production.* The plaintiff deposited the sum of R2,454-7-7 with the defendants' bank in Bombay as a loan for a year, to bear interest at the rate of four-and-a-half per cent. He was given a receipt for the said sum, which stated that the money was “repayable here on production of this receipt.” *Held*, that the receipt contained the terms of the contract of loan between the plaintiff and the defendants, and that the production of the receipt was a condition precedent to the repayment of the money. *DAIS v. HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 498

3. PRIVACY OF CONTRACT.

1. ———— *Privity, want of—Goods carried by two companies.* Plaintiff delivered a certain quantity of jute to the India General Steam Navigation Company at Serajunge, for delivery at the Eastern Bengal Railway Company's station at Sealdah, and it was arranged by the bill of lading (the contract in the case) that the freight from Serajunge to Sealdah should be payable to the Eastern Bengal Railway Company at Sealdah, and it was so paid upon the delivery of the goods. A portion of the jute was not delivered, and this suit having been brought against the Eastern Bengal Railway Company for the value thereof, the Small Cause Court Judge was disposed to dismiss the suit without further enquiry, on the ground of want of

CONTRACT—contd.**3. PRIVACY OF CONTRACT—concl'd.**

privity between plaintiff and defendant. *Held*, that it was premature for the Judge to say that the suit could not lie against defendant without proceeding with the further investigation of the case, and that, although plaintiff might have a remedy against the India General Steam Navigation Company, it by no means followed that he had none against the defendant company also. *GUJENDRO MOHUN SHAHA v. EASTERN BENGAL RAILWAY COMPANY* 17 W. R. 240

See S.C., after remand 18 W. R. 145

where it was held that the want of privity of contract was an inference the Judge might legally draw from the facts.

2. ——— Purchase in one name—
Agreement to hold on joint account. In an action by *A* against *B* for damages for non-acceptance of shares by *B*, alleged to have been bought by him of *A*, it was shown that the shares were bought by *C*, who, after the purchase, entered into an arrangement with *B* that the purchase should be on their (*B* and *C*'s) joint account. *Held*, there was no contract between *A* and *B*, and the suit was dismissed. *BARROW v. STEWART* 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 226

4. REPUDIATION OF CONTRACT.

1. ——— Contract entered into by mistake—*Power to replace parties in their original positions.* He who would disaffirm a contract entered into by mistake must do so within a reasonable time, and will not be allowed to do so unless both parties can be replaced in their original position. *MUHAMMAD MOHIDIN v. OTTAYAL UM-MACHE* 1 Mad. 390

2. ——— Delay—*Right to have contract set aside.* One who repudiates a contract and asks to have it treated as void is bound to take steps for this purpose at the earliest moment without avoidable delay. Although one of the parties to a contract was induced to enter into it by fraud of the other, he is nevertheless bound by the contract until he repudiates it, and this he cannot do when he has allowed that to occur on the footing, or in view of the contract, which renders it impossible that the parties should be put in *status quo*. In such circumstances his proper remedy is by an action for damages. *TALEB HOSSEIN v. AMEER BAKSH* 22 W. R. 529

3. ——— Right to rescind contract—*Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 39.* *A* agreed to purchase from *B* under two contracts 300 tons of sugar to be delivered at different dates. *A* having failed to take delivery under the first contract, *B* claimed to rescind both the contracts. *Held*, that as there was no refusal on the part of *A* within s. 39 of the Contract Act, *B* was not entitled to rescind the second contract. *Soolian Chand v. Schiller, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 252*, relied on. Though the English law does not govern this case, the views of the

CONTRACT—contd.**4. REPUDIATION OF CONTRACT—concl'd.**

learned Judges in the following English cases would serve as useful guides in determining what amounts to a refusal. *Freeth v. Burr, L. R. 9 C. P. 208. The Mersey Steel and Iron Company, Limited, v. Naylor Benson & Co., 9 App. Cas. 434*, referred to. *RASH BEHARY SHAHA v. NRITYA GOPAL NUNDY (1906)* I. L. R. 33 Calc. 477

5. BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTES.

1. ——— Evidence of Contract—
Material variation. *C & Co.* and *H & Co.* were merchants at Calcutta. *H & Co.* sold to *C & Co.* a large quantity of indigo through the medium of a broker, who drew up a sold note addressed to *H & Co.* and submitted it to *H* for his approval, when *H* having objected to a particular word remaining, the broker took the sold note to *C* and informed him of *H*'s objection. *C* struck his pen through the word objected to by *H*, placing his initials over that erasure, and returned it to the broker, who thereupon delivered it, so altered, to *H & Co.* The broker delivered to *C & Co.* on the following day a bought note, which differed in certain material terms from the sold note. In an action brought by *H & Co.* against *C & Co.* for non-performance of the contract contained in the sold note, the Supreme Court at Calcutta was of opinion that the sold note alone formed the contract, and found for the plaintiff's. *Held*, by the Privy Council on appeal (reversing that decision), that the transaction was one of bought and sold notes, and that the circumstances attending *C*'s alteration of the sold note, and affixing his initials, were not sufficient to make that note alone a binding contract; and that there being a material variation in the terms of the bought note with the sold note, they together did not constitute a binding contract. *COWIE v. REMFREY* 3 Moo. I. A. 448

2. ——— Broker's bought note. A broker's bought note is not of itself evidence of a contract. It is signed by one only of the parties. To complete the evidence of the contract, there should also be a sold note signed by the other party showing that the buyer had duly accepted his supposed obligations. *MACKINNON v. SHIB-CHANDRA SEAL* **Bourke O. C. 354**

3. ——— Material variation in notes. The bought note in a contract for the purchase and sale of silk "chussum" was as follows:—"Bought by your order, and for your account, the following silk chussum, of Messrs. Jardine, Skinner & Co., as much as they may supply of November and March bund," etc. The sold note was in similar terms, but stated that as much "as you can supply" was sold. *Held*, that the bought and sold notes did not constitute a contract binding Messrs. Jardine, Skinner & Co. to supply chussum of either the November or March bund at a loss. *TAMVACO v. SKINNER* 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 221

4. ——— Sold note differing from bought note—*Mistake in name of one or the parties to the contract—**Oral evidence to show*

CONTRACT—contd.**5. BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTES—contd.**

with whom the contract was really made—*Specific Relief Act, ss. 31, 34—Damages for breach of contract, right of suit for.* A contract intended to have been entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant was entered by a mistake on the part of the broker in the sold note, as having been made between a third person and the defendant. In a suit brought by the plaintiff on the contract, oral evidence was given to show that the contract was really made between the plaintiff and the defendant. The Judge of the Small Cause Court found that the mistake did not mislead the defendant, and gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff contingent on the opinion of the High Court as to whether the mistake in the sold note was a bar to the plaintiff's suit for damages on the contract. *Held*, that there was a contract between the parties for breach of which the plaintiff could sue for damages. *MAHOMED BHAY PUDDUMSEE v. CHUTTERPUT SING*
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 854

5. ———— *Contract of sale—Want of assent—Broker's bought and sold notes.* To contract through a broker, to sell a quantity of paddy at a price stated, the plaintiff firm signed the sold note. This was taken by the broker to the defendant firm, of which a member, before signing the bought note, wrote in Chinese characters, not understood by the vendor, a term as to quality. This was to the effect that the paddy was to be without yellow grains and not wet. A part delivery was made of paddy not answering this description. For this the defendant firm made a part payment at a reduced rate. Of the rest they refused to take delivery, when tendered, because it was not of the quality contracted for. *Held*, that the plaintiff's suit for the balance of the price of the part delivered, and for damages for non-acceptance of delivery of the rest, failed. If the plaintiffs—neither they nor their broker understanding Chinese—did not assent to the term written by the defendant, then there was no contract entered into to buy. If, on the contrary, the plaintiffs had assented to that term, then the paddy was not of the quality required by the contract. *AH SHAIN SHOKE v. MOOTHIA CHETTY*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 403
I. L. R. 27 I. A. 30
4 C. W. N. 453

6. ———— *Bought and sold notes—Misrepresentation—Fraud, effect of—Right of plaintiff to fall back on original contract—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 91, 92 (1)—Damages for breach of contract.* The plaintiff made a contract by telegram with the defendants for the purchase of a full cargo of kerosine oil, which the defendants had themselves contracted to buy from a firm of merchants in Calcutta. That firm declined to have their contract with the defendants transferred into the plaintiff's name and it was therefore arranged between the plaintiff and the defendants that bought and sold notes should be exchanged. In

CONTRACT—contd.**5. BOUGHT AND SOLD NOTES—concl'd.**

carrying out this arrangement the defendants misrepresented the amount of the cargo, and the words "100,000 cases" were inserted in the bought and sold notes, when the cargo really consisted of 125,000 cases of oil. Both the Courts below found that this misrepresentation was fraudulently made. The High Court in its Original Jurisdiction held that the bought and sold notes were invalidated by the fraud and gave the plaintiff a decree for damages on his contract, as proved by the oral evidence. The High Court in appeal treated the case as founded on the bought and sold notes, and held that no other evidence of the contract could be given, and dismissed the suit. *Held* by the Privy Council, that the bought and sold notes having been falsified, the plaintiff was entitled to disregard them and fall back on his original contract. *DURGA PROSAD SUREKA v. BHAJAN LALL LOHEA* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 614
s. c. 8 C. W. N. 489
I. R. 31 I. A. 122

6. CONTRACTS FOR GOVERNMENT SECURITIES OR SHARES.

1. ———— *Contract to deliver Government paper—Wagering—Contract Act XXI of 1848.* A Court will require strict evidence that a contract, *per se* legal, is intended to operate illegally. It is not necessary, in order to support a contract that the plaintiff should have possession of the Government paper when the contract is entered into; it is sufficient if he is in a position and is ready and willing to deliver it at due date. A letter, stating "the bearer will hand over to you R75,000 5½ loan notes" is sufficient to establish the *bona fide* nature of a transaction for purchase of Company's paper. *MOHINDRO NATH MITTER v. KOYLAS NATH BANERJEE* . . . Cor. 1: 2 Hyde 121

2. ———— *Suit for non-acceptance of Government paper—Contract Act, s. 30—Tender—Readiness and willingness—Action for non-acceptance.* Where a contract for the sale and purchase of Government paper provides for the delivery of the paper on a subsequent date, it is not necessary, in order to sustain an action against the buyer for non-acceptance on the due date, that the plaintiff should have taken the Government paper contracted for to the place of business of the defendant and then and there made an actual tender of it. *JUGGERNAUTH SEW BUX v. RAM DYAL*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 791

3. ———— *Sale of shares for future, delivery—Readiness and willingness.* In a suit to recover damages for the non-acceptance of shares, where the vendor had contracted to execute proper transfers and do all other things necessary on his part to transfer the shares, and to bear the expense of such transfer:—*Held*, on the issue whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, that it was sufficient to show that he

CONTRACT—contd.**6. CONTRACTS FOR GOVERNMENT SECURITIES OR SHARES—contd.**

had in his possession at the time fixed for the performance of the contract on his part such certificates of the shares contracted to be sold as were required by the law, and that he tendered the same with a deed of transfer to the purchaser, to effect the transfer; but that it was the duty of the purchaser himself, in such case, having accepted the shares, to have the transfer made into his name in the books of the company. *MAGANBHAJ HEMCHAND v. MANCHABHAJ KALLIANCHAND*

3 Bom. O. C. 79

4. ———— *Obligation to perform—Delivery and acceptance—Readiness and willingness.* Where on the face of the contract, it did not appear that either party was called upon to act first, it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, unless he proved performance of, or an effort to perform, his part. In the absence of any indication on the part of the plaintiff that he was ready to deliver, the defendant is not liable for non-acceptance. The readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff must be substantial, something on which the defendant may act, not a readiness and willingness concealed in the plaintiff's mind. *COMMERCIAL BANK v. MODOSOODUN CHOWDHRY*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 17

5. ———— *Performance of contract.* Held, that a contract to deliver shares in a public company is sufficiently performed when the vendor places the vendee in such a position as enables him to become the legal owner of them. *PARBUDAS PRANJIVANDAS v. RAMLAL BHAGIRATH*

3 Bom. O. C. 69

6. ———— *Covenants for transfer and payment—Readiness and willingness.* A contracts with B to sell him three numbered shares to be transferred upon payment of the price on or before a certain day. Held, that the covenants to transfer and to pay the price are concurrent; and that the ability of A to constitute B the legal owner of the shares contracted to be sold, together with willingness to do so, amounts to "readiness and willingness" on the part of A to fulfil his part of the contract. *IMPERIAL BANKING AND TRADING COMPANY v. ATMARAM MADHAVJI*

2 Bom. 260 : 2nd Ed. 246

7. ———— *Performance of contract—Readiness and willingness.* Plaintiffs contracted with defendant to sell him 250 shares in the Alliance Financial Corporation, and 10 shares in the Mazagon Reclamation Company, delivery to be made at defendant's option within six months from date of contract, and cash to be paid on due delivery to defendant or his order. On the last day for delivery plaintiff produced allotment receipt papers, all bearing date prior to the date of the contract, for the numbered shares contracted to be sold in both companies. The Alliance Financial papers were endorsed by the original allottees; but neither

CONTRACT—contd.**6. CONTRACTS FOR GOVERNMENT SECURITIES OR SHARES—contd.**

transfers nor applications for transfers signed by the original allottees were offered, nor had any such been executed, although the Corporation had opened transfer-books long before. Of the Mazagon Reclamation receipts, nine were endorsed by the allottees, one had no endorsement, and over the allottee of it and of another receipt plaintiffs had no power to enforce delivery. The Mazagon Reclamation Company had not opened transfer-books until long after the last day of delivery. On the issue whether plaintiffs were ready and willing to deliver the shares:—Held, as to the Alliance Financial shares, that plaintiffs, not being in a position to have constituted defendant as owner thereof, must fail in their suit in respect to them; and as to the Mazagon Reclamation shares that, although plaintiffs had done all that they were required to do by the usage of the market to transfer the interest in eight of them, yet the contract being an entire one, they must fail in respect to them also. If a party, bound to do an act upon request, is ready to do it when required, he will have performed his part of the contract, although he might have happened not to have been ready had he been called upon at some anterior period. *JIVARAJ MEGJI v. POULTON*

2 Bom. 267 : 2nd Ed. 253

8. ———— *Readiness and willingness.* Plaintiffs contracted with defendants to sell them two hundred shares, on payment of the price by defendants on or before the 1st of July 1865. Plaintiffs were in possession of the shares at the time of the contract, and continued so until they sold them after default made by defendants, and they were registered as holders of the shares on the 1st July, when the share certificates with transfer deeds in blank were tendered to defendants, who refused to accept them or to pay the purchase-money. On the issue whether plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform the contract on their part:—Held, that the acts necessary to be done on the 1st July were concurrent; and that plaintiffs, being able and willing on that day to make a valid transfer, if defendants had been ready to pay the price, were not bound to take any further steps until the purchase-money was paid by defendants. *IMPERIAL BANKING AND TRADING COMPANY v. PRANJIVANDAS HARJIVANDAS*

2 Bom. 272 : 2nd Ed. 258

9. ———— *Fraud—Contracts made with illegal object.* In a suit brought by a company against a former director of the company for the price of shares bargained and sold to the defendant, but not accepted by him, and for money found to be due on an account stated:—Held, that the plaintiffs could not recover, first, because no shares were really bargained and sold, as the plaint alleged; and what was done was, according to the intention and understanding of the parties, a mere form gone through, for the purpose of deceiving the public, and making it appear that 10,000 shares had been sold at a certain price;

CONTRACT—contd.**6. CONTRACTS FOR GOVERNMENT SECURITIES OR SHARES—concl'd.**

and, *secondly*, because the contracts were made for the purpose of defrauding other persons. **EASTERN FINANCIAL ASSOCIATION v. PESTONJI CURSETJI**

3 Bom. O. C. 9

7. WAGERING CONTRACTS.

1. ——— **Wagers on price of opium at opium sales—Stat. 8 & 9 Vic., c. 109.** By the common law of England, in force in India, an action may be maintained on a wager, although the parties had no previous interest in the subject-matter on which it is laid, if such wager be not against the interest or feelings of third parties, does not lead to indecent evidence, and is not contrary to public policy. The mere circumstance that a wager concerns the public revenue, or creates a temptation to do a wrong, will not render it illegal. A wager upon the average price which opium should fetch at the next Government sale at Calcutta, the plaintiffs having to pay the defendants the difference between such price and a sum named per chest, and the defendants having to pay the plaintiffs the difference between such price and the sum named, if the price should be above that sum, is not an illegal wager or contrary to public policy, though the proceeds of the opium sold at Calcutta formed part of the Government revenue. So *held* reversing the judgment of the Court at Bombay. The Stat. 8 & 9 Vic., c. 109, amending the law relating to games and wagers does not extend to India. **RAMLOLL THACKOORSEYDASS v. SOOJANMULL DHOONDUMULL**

4 Moo. I. A. 339

2. ——— **Conspiracy—Fraud—Act XXI of 1848—Engrossing or Regrating.** Wager contracts between the plaintiffs and defendants upon the price that Patna opium would fetch at the next Government sale at Calcutta: each party knowing that the other might use means to enhance or depress such price. *Held*, that the bidding at the sale by one of the plaintiffs, though done colourably, and, as it appeared, only to enhance the price, was no fraud on the defendants, or upon the public, as he had a right, in common with all the world, to bid at such sale, and was not precluded from recovering the amount of such wager contracts by the fact that such bidding tended to bring about the event by which the wager was to be won. *Held*, also, that employing agents at such sale (all of whom were cognizant that the object was to enhance the price of opium sold) to bid, there being no *crimen falsi* committed, did not constitute an illegal conspiracy, or such fraud as would vitiate the wager contracts. **Levi v. Levi**, 6 C. & P. 239, observed upon and questioned. The common law offence of engrossing or regrating applies only with respect to the necessities of life. By the sixth article of the convention between Great Britain and France, the French Government had a right to demand, out of quantities sold at the Government sale, 300 chests

CONTRACT—contd.**7. WAGERING CONTRACTS—contd.**

of opium at the average rate of sale. *Held*, that no fraud on the vendors was committed by inducing the French Consul to exercise that option in favour of the plaintiffs. After the contracts were entered into, and an action commenced in the Supreme Court, wager contracts were declared invalid by the Act of the Indian Legislature, XXI of 1848, which enacted "that all agreements, whether made in speaking, writing or otherwise by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void, and no suit shall be allowed in any Court of law or equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won on any wager, or intrusted to any person, to abide the event of any game, or on which any wager is made." *Held*, that this Legislative Act did not affect existing contracts or action already commenced upon such contracts; there being no words in the Act sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights. **DOOLUBDASS PETTAMBERDASS v. RAM LALL THACKOORSEY DAS**

5 Moo. I. A. 109

3. ——— **Wager as to price of opium at opium sales—Act XXI of 1848.** A wager contract in India (before the passing of Act XXI of 1848) in the average price opium would fetch at a future Government sale held legal, and an action thereon maintained. **RUGHOONATH SAHAI CHO-TAYLOLL v. MANICKCHAND**

6 Moo. I. A. 251

4. ——— **Partnership in wagering contracts—Act XXI of 1848—Bom. Act III of 1865—Suit by Agent for Brokerage.** Act XXI of 1848 simply annuls all contracts by way of wagering, and prohibits any suit in respect of them, but does not declare them to be unlawful; and neither by the provisions of Act XXI of 1848 nor by Hindu law is the agent of a wagerer precluded from maintaining against the latter a suit for moneys paid by the agent to the other wagerer, or his agent, in respect of the loss of the wager, nor from recovering fees and brokerage due to him as agent in effecting, or for services in connection with, the wagering transaction. **Motelall Heeralal v. Jumnadass Umroottal**, 2 Barr. Rep. 676, overruled. Bombay Act III of 1865 has not a retrospective force, and, therefore, applies neither to agreements collateral to wagering contracts entered into prior to its coming into operation, nor to interest subsequently accruing due on such agreements. Where the parties to an agreement (prior to the coming into force of Bombay Act III of 1865), collateral to a wagering transaction, stand to each other in the relationship of partners, and not merely of principal and agent, they are severally liable for contributions proportionate to their several shares, towards the losses incurred by the partnership in respect of such wagering transaction. **PARAKH GOVARDHANBHAI HARIBHAI v. RANSARDAS DULABHDAS**

12 Bom. 51

5. ——— **Transaction in nature of lottery—Act V of 1844—Illegal agreement.** A transaction is not necessarily a lottery within Act V of 1844, simply because a matter of whatever kind

CONTRACT—*contd.*7. WAGERING CONTRACTS—*contd.*

is agreed to be decided by lot. Where twenty persons agreed that each should subscribe R200 by monthly instalments of R10, and that each in his turn as determined by lot should take the whole of the subscriptions for one month:—*Held*, that the agreement was not illegal, and that a suit might be brought on a bond given by one of the subscribers who had received one month's subscriptions, to secure the payment of his subsequent monthly instalments. *KAMAKSHI ACHARI v. APPAVU PILLAI* 1 Mad. 448

6. ——— Companies' Act VI of 1882, s. 4—*Illegal Contract—Bond to secure payments under a kuri—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 294A.* An agreement is not illegal whereby a number of persons subscribe, each a certain sum, by periodical instalments, with the object that each in his turn (to be decided by lot) shall take the whole subscription for each instalment, all such persons being returned the amount of their contributions, the common fund being lent to each subscriber in turn. Nor is such an agreement rendered illegal by s. 294A of the Penal Code. *VASUDEVAN NAMUDURI v. MAMMUD . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 212*

7. ——— Contracts for forward delivery—*Settlement by payment of differences.* The defendant was sued by the plaintiffs as assignees of one S for "differences" on certain contracts of purchase and sale of cotton and seeds. The defendant contended that these contracts being in the nature of *sutta*, or wagering contracts, no suit would lie in respect of them. The defendant was not a dealer in produce, and entered into these contracts as a speculation. His *modus operandi* was, when he entered into a contract of purchase or sale, to sell or purchase again the same quantity, in one or more contracts, either with the original vendor, or some one else, so as to secure the profit, or ascertain the loss, before the "*Vayda*" day. The contracts were in the usual mercantile form, and were entered into through brokers, the principals not being brought into contact with each other until after the contract was made. S's procedure was also similar. S was a mukadam and guarantee broker to the plaintiffs; and he, too, entered into these contracts as a speculation, intending to settle them before the "*Vayda*" day, but prepared, if forced to do so, to perform them in kind. *Held*, that the contracts sued on were not shown to have been agreements by way of wager. It was a highly speculative mode of doing business, but there is no law against speculation, as there is against gambling. Contracts are not wagering contracts, unless it be the intention of both contracting parties, at the time of entering into the contracts, under no circumstances to call for, or give delivery, from, or to, each other. In this case, even the defendant—seeing that he did not know with whom contracts might be made on his behalf by his brokers—must have contemplated the possibility of being called on to give, or take, delivery. *TOD v. LAKHMIDAS PURSHOTAMDAS . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 441*

CONTRACT—*contd.*7. WAGERING CONTRACTS—*contd.*

8. ——— Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 30—*Bombay Act III of 1865—Broker, suit by, for differences paid in respect of contracts made by him for defendant.* Act III of 1865 (Bombay) is still in force, and has not been repealed by the Contract Act. *Dayabhai v. Lakhmichand, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 358*, followed. As between the original parties, a promissory note which has for its consideration a debt due on a wagering contract is void and, therefore, not binding in the hands of the original payee. *Oulds v. Harrison, 10 Exch. 572*, distinguished. In order to constitute a wagering contract, neither party should intend to perform the contract itself, but only to pay the differences. In order to ascertain the real intentions of the parties, the Court must look at all the surrounding circumstances, and will even go behind a written provision of the contract to judge for itself whether such provision was inserted merely for the purpose of concealing the real nature of the transaction. *Tod v. Lakhmidas, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 441*, *Eshoor v. Venkatasubba, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 480*, and *Universal Stock Exchange v. Strachan, [1896] A. C. 166*, referred to. The defendant employed the plaintiff from time to time as a broker to purchase Government paper and shares of the Manekji Petit Spinning and Weaving Company. The plaintiff did so to the extent of many lakhs of rupees. No delivery was given or taken, but the differences only between the contract price and the price at the date of settlement (the *Vadia* day in each month) were paid or received by the defendant. The plaintiff now sued the defendant on two promissory notes given to the plaintiff by the defendant in respect of differences due by him in respect of the contracts thus made on his behalf. The defendant pleaded that he was not liable, the contracts being wagering contracts. It appeared from the evidence that the practice in the bazaar (which was followed in this case) was for brokers to enter into such contracts in their own name, and not to disclose the principals. The brokers became liable to give or take delivery. The defendant stated that he did not know the persons to whom the plaintiff sold or from whom he purchased. *Held*, (i) on the evidence that the defendant authorized the plaintiff as his broker to contract on his behalf, but in the plaintiff's own name, on the understanding that the defendant would indemnify the plaintiff and pay him brokerage in respect of the transactions entered into by him on behalf or for benefit of defendant. Accordingly the plaintiff did enter into contracts in his own name with third parties. The defendant was not directly a party to them, nor did his name appear anywhere in the contracts themselves. (ii) That the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendant the losses which he paid to third parties in respect of the contracts made by the plaintiff on the defendant's behalf, and that such losses were a valid consideration *pro tanto* for the notes sued upon. No doubt so far as the defendant was concerned, all the contracts were merely wager-

CONTRACT—contd.**7. WAGERING CONTRACTS—contd.**

ing or gambling transactions, but there was no evidence to show that, so far as the third parties were concerned, they were otherwise than genuine. The plaintiff was not, as between himself and the defendant, the principal in the transactions. He was merely the broker with a personal liability to the third parties. There was nothing to show that as between himself and the third parties the contracts were not perfectly genuine. The non-delivery and payment of differences on hand was a matter of subsequent arrangement. If he was liable to be called upon to receive or make actual delivery, then, in the absence of any express agreement to the contrary, a similar liability rested on the defendant himself, whatever might have been the defendant's own intentions. As the contracts between the plaintiff and the third parties were not void, so the contracts between the defendant and the plaintiff to indemnify the plaintiff in respect of these contracts were also valid. The mere fact that the plaintiff, knowing the defendant's position and means, must have inferred that he did not mean or intend to perform the contracts in specie, was not, *per se*, without more, sufficient to render the contracts invalid and not binding on the defendant. The inference of the plaintiff would not be, *per se*, a binding agreement. *PEROSHA CURSETJI v. MANIKJI DOSSABHOY*. I. L. R. 22 Bom. 899

9. ——— **Contracts to buy and sell Government promissory notes—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 30—Onus of proof.** A, on various occasions, agreed to sell to B (a soukar) certain amounts of Government of India promissory notes, amounting in all to 4½ lakhs for delivery on the following 30th of November. On the 28th of November, B agreed to sell, and A to buy, 4½ lakhs worth of the notes for delivery on the 30th November. A did not perform his contract to sell, and B sued him for damages, amounting to Rs. 7,109-6-0, being the difference between the price at which he (B) had agreed to buy, and the price at which he had agreed to sell. B denied that the transactions were *bona fide* contracts made in the ordinary way of business, and pleaded that the real contract was only to pay differences as ascertained by the price of the Government paper on the 30th of November, and that such a contract, being by way of wager, was void under s. 30 of the Contract Act. *Held*, on the evidence, that neither party intended *bona fide* purchases and sales for delivery, and that, therefore, the contract was void as a wagering contract. *Held*, on appeal, that the burden of proof that the agreements were wagers, *i.e.*, that they were not in substance what they were in form, lay on A, as the party so alleging. *Per MUTTUSAMI AYYAR, J.*, that, it being proved on the evidence that it was the defendant's intention at the time he contracted to sell to pay differences only, the plaintiff either knew of this intention or he did not. In the former case the contract was a wager, and therefore void, and in the latter there was no *consensus* as to a matter which was of the essence of the contract, and

CONTRACT—contd.**7. WAGERING CONTRACTS—contd.**

therefore no valid contract. *Per BEST, J.*, that a contract is not a wagering contract unless it is the intention of both parties at the time of entering into the contracts to call for or give delivery from or to each other (see *Tod v. Lakshmidas Purshotamdas*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 441, and *Grizewood v. Blane*, 11 C. B. 526), and that no such common intention having been proved, the contract was a valid one. *ESHOOR DOSS v. VENKATASUBBA RAU*.

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 480

Held, in the same case, on appeal under the Letters Patent, by COLLINS, C.J., and PARKER and SUBRAMANIA AYYAR, JJ., that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for the reason that the agreement sued on was void under the Contract Act, s. 30, as being a gambling transaction. *ESHOOR DOSS v. VENKATASUBBA RAU*. I. L. R. 18 Mad. 306

10. ——— **Contracts to buy and sell Government promissory notes—Contracts for payment of differences only—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 30.** A having on various occasions sold certain amounts of Government promissory notes to B, aggregating on the whole to 2½ lakhs, for delivery on 30th November 1891, B on the 28th of November sold the same amount to A for delivery on the 30th November. On that day B, through his attorneys, called upon A to retain the 'paper' contracted to be sold by A to B in respect of that contracted to be sold by B to A, and to pay the differences in the prices of the two contracts to B, and subsequently sued him for the amount. *Held*, that, on the evidence, B having admitted that the original contract sued on was for payment of differences only, it was a wagering contract and therefore void. *Held*, on appeal,—*Per MUTTUSAMI AYYAR, J.*, that the above judgment should be confirmed. *Per BEST, J.*, that on the evidence it was not proved that, at the time of entering into the original contract, the intention of both parties was merely for payment of differences, and that consequently the contract was not a wagering contract, but a valid one. *VENKATACHELLALA CHETTI v. VENKATASUBBA RAU*. I. L. R. 17 Mad. 496

11. ——— **Life Insurance—Contract effected by the person on life of another in which he has no interest—Wager—Stat. 14 Geo. III, c. 48—Stat. 8 & 9 Vic., c. 109—Assignment of life policy to a stranger without interest in the life insured.** In India an insurance for a term of years on the life of a person in which the insurer has no interest is void as a wagering contract under s. 30 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), and that, therefore, a suit on such a policy must be dismissed. *Quere*: Whether an assignment of a life policy to a stranger having no interest in the life of the insured is void? *ALAMAI v. POSITIVE GOVERNMENT SECURITY LIFE ASSURANCE Co.* I. L. R. 23 Bom. 191

12. ——— **Sutta transactions—Suit to recover brokerage in respect of sutta transactions—Bombay Act III of 1865.** Plaintiff was employed

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by defendants to enter into cotton transactions on their behalf at Dholera. The contracts for the sale and purchase of cotton were made on terms contained in a printed form which incorporated the rules framed by the cotton merchants of Dholera. These rules expressly provided for the delivery of cotton in every case and forbade all gambling in differences. In spite of these rules, and the express terms of the contracts, the course of dealings was such that none of the contracts were ever completed except by payment of differences between the contract price and the market price in Bombay on the *Vaida* day. The plaintiff entered into numerous transactions of this kind on the defendants' behalf. He now sued to recover from them the balance due to him on account of brokerage, commission, and losses incurred in the said transactions. *Held*, that the transactions were a mere gambling for differences, and no suit would lie, under Bombay Act III of 1885, to recover any of the items connected with such transactions. In order to determine whether a contract is a wagering contract, the Court will not only look at the terms of the written contract, but also probe among the surrounding circumstances to find out the true intentions of the parties. *Universal Stock Exchange v. Strachan*, [1896] A. C. 166, and *In re Gieve*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 794, followed. *Doshi Talakshi v. Ujamsi Velsi*

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 227

13. — Account arising from illegal transactions—Act XXI of 1848. A plaintiff cannot recover on an account stated which springs out of transactions coming under Act XXI of 1848. *NOBINCHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. PROSONO KOOMAR BANERJEE*. 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 126
But see *TRIBHUBANDAS JAGJIVANDAS v. MOTILAL RAMDAS* 1 Bom. 34

14. — Suit to recover deposit paid on wagering contract—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 22, 24-30, and 65—Bombay Act III of 1865, s. 1—Act XXI of 1848—*In pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis*, application of the maxim—Plaint, amendment of—Deceit—Unilateral mistake. On the 21st of January 1883 the plaintiff contracted to purchase from the defendant the right to receive the dividend on 50 shares of the Empress Mill at R37 per share, the plaintiff being under an impression that the dividend was to be declared on some subsequent day. The plaintiff deposited R100 with the defendant as part payment of the purchase money. Subsequently it was ascertained that the dividend had been already declared on 17th January 1883 (i.e., four days before the contract) at R25. The plaintiff thereupon sued the defendant to have the contract declared cancelled, and sought to recover the deposit of R100, with interest. The Judge of the Court of Small Causes at Broach, being of opinion that the contract was in its nature a *sutfa*, or wagering contract, rejected the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff

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applied to the High Court, under its extraordinary jurisdiction, to set aside the lower Court's decision. *Held*, that, in the first instance, the plaintiff, as framed, not disclosing any cause of action, ought to have been returned for amendment. It should either have alleged a mistake common to both parties to the contract or should have contained an allegation of fraud, on the defendant's part, inducing the plaintiff to enter into the agreement. The mere circumstance that the contract was "caused by one of the parties to it being under a mistake as to a matter of fact" would not, under s. 22 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), have made the contract voidable. *Held*, also, that, if the contract was really a wager, the deposit could not be recovered under s. 65 of the Contract Act, as its nature must from the first have been known to the parties. To an agreement, so known to be void, s. 65 does not apply. If the contract was in the intention of both parties a wager, the suit would be barred by s. 1 of Bombay Act III of 1835, which, though it formed a part of Act XXI of 1848, which is repealed by the Contract Act, is not, being a special Act applicable to the Bombay Presidency, itself repealed. It must be read with s. 30 of the Contract Act. *Held*, also, that to constitute a wager, the transaction between the parties must "wholly depend on the risk in contemplation," and "neither party must look to anything but the payment of money on the determination of an uncertainty." But if one of the parties has "the event in his own hands," the transaction is not a wager. If the plaintiff's real contention was that defendant was aware of a declaration of dividends at R25 per share, and by keeping plaintiff in ignorance of the facts induced him to enter into a wagering agreement for payment of differences at a contract rate of R37 per share, then to a suit for the recovery of the deposit made to the defendant with reference to such an agreement, Bombay Act III of 1885 has no application. Wagering contracts are not illegal. They are simply destitute of legal effect. If fraud was practised on plaintiff, the maxim *potior est conditio possidentis* would not apply. *DAYABHAI TRIBHOBANDAS v. LAKHMIKHAND PANACHAND*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 358

15. — Betting on horse race—Contract Act, s. 23 and s. 30—Entrance money for horse race—Agreement by way of wager. Where a person who had lost a bet on a horse race requested another to pay the amount of such bet, agreeing to repay him, and the latter paid such amount:—*Held*, that the money so paid was recoverable from the person for whom it was paid, the consideration for the agreement not being unlawful within the meaning of s. 23 of the Contract Act, 1872, and the agreement not being one by way of wager, within the meaning of s. 30 of the same Act. *Knight v. Fitch*, 24 L. J. C. P. 122, *Knight v. Cambers*, 24 L. J. C. P. 121, *Jessopp v. Lutwyche* 10 Exch.

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614, and *Beeston v. Beeston*, L. R. 1. Ex. D. 13, referred to. *PRINGLE v. JAFAR KHAN*

I. L. R. 5 All. 443

16. ——— **Contract Act, IX of 1872, s. 30—Loan to facilitate gambling—Loan to aid in paying off gambling debt.** Held, that the fact that the object with which the plaintiff lent money to the defendant was to enable him to pay off a gambling debt did not taint the transaction with immorality so as to disentitle the plaintiff to recover. *BENI MAHDO DAS v. KAUNSAL KISHOR DHUSAR* . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 452

17. ——— **"Badni" transaction—Burden of proof—Contract Act (IX of 1872) s. 30.** Contracts are not wagering contracts unless it be the intention of both the contracting parties, at the time of entering into the contracts, under no circumstances to call for or give delivery from, or to, each other. *Tod v. Lakmidas Purshotamdas*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 441, followed. *AJUDHIA PRASAD v. LAJMAN* (1902) . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 38

18. ——— **Differences—Gambling transactions—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 30—Contracts for sale and purchase of goods without intention to complete them by delivery and payment—Agreement for "differences"—Suit on promissory note given for differences—English Gaming Act (8 & 9 Vict., c. 109).** Where the circumstances as to contracts for sale, purchase and delivery of goods at a given time and place are such as to warrant the legal inference that the contracting parties never intended any actual transfer of goods at all, but only to pay or receive money between one another according as the market price of the goods should vary from the contract price at the given time, the contract is not a commercial transaction, but a wager on the rise or fall of the market. There is no distinction between the expression "gaming and wagering" in the English Gaming Act, 1845, and the earlier Indian Act, XXI of 1848, and the expression "by way of wager" used in s. 30 of the Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872). Transactions for the purchase and sale of goods comprised two classes of contracts—the one class, suitable to traders, such as the defendants were, and all duly fulfilled by delivery and payment, and the other class extravagantly large and left without any attempt at fulfilment. Held, that the inference was that in the latter class the parties never intended completion, but that the contracts were for differences only; and, where such differences formed the consideration for which a promissory note was given, the plaintiffs could not recover in a suit on the note. *The Universal Stock Exchange v. Strachan*, [1896] A. C. 166, referred to. *KONG YU LONE & Co. v. LOWJEE NANJEE* 1901)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 461 : s.c. 5 C. W. N. 714 ;
L. R. 28 I. A. 239

19. ——— **Principal and Agent—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 30—Contract collateral to**

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a wagering contract not unenforceable. Although, by reason of s. 30 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a wagering contract is void, a contract collateral to such a contract is not necessarily unenforceable; and the fact that a person has constituted another person his agent to enter into and conduct wagering transactions in the name of the latter, but on behalf of the former, the principal, amounts to a request by the principal to the agent to pay the amount of the losses, if any, on those wagering transactions. *Parakh Govardhanbhai Haribhai v. Ramsardas Dulabhdas*, 12 Bom. H. C. Rep. 51, and *Thacker v. Hardy*, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 685, referred to. *SPIBHO MAL v. LACHMAN DAS* (1901) . . . I. L. R. 23 All. 165

20. ——— **Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 30—Principal and Agent—Suit by principal to recover from agent money received on account of a wagering contract.** Held, that an agent, who has received money to the use of his principal on an illegal contract between him as such agent and a third party, cannot be allowed to set up the illegality of the contract as a defence in an action brought by the principal to recover from the agent the money so received. *De Mattos v. Benjamin*, 63 L. J. Q. B. 248; *Bridger v. Savage*, L. R. 15 Q. B. D. 363; and *Tenant v. Elliott*, 1 B. & P. 3, referred to. *BHOJA NATH v. MUL CHAND* (1903) . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 639

8. ALTERATION OF CONTRACTS.**(a) ALTERATION BY PARTY.**

1. ——— **Addition of words to contract—Sale of goods. R G G & Co.** entered into a contract to sell certain goods to *A S, N S*, both Calcutta firms. The contract, which was in a printed English form, was taken on the 18th December 1868 by one *M*, on behalf of the firm of *R G G & Co.*, to obtain the signature of the vendee's firm. It was signed on their behalf by *A S*. Neither *M* nor *A S* understood English, and no explanation was given of the terms of the contract to *A S* at the time he signed it, but there had been negotiations between *M* and *A S* as to these goods prior to the time when *A S*'s signature was obtained. It did not appear that the goods had been identified in any way by the purchasers, who had merely seen a sample. After his signature, *A S* wrote in Nagri, "Goods fresh grenadines five cases at two annas and three pie per yard." *A S, N S*, afterwards, on the 9th February 1869, paid Rs. 1,000 as earnest money, which was accepted by *R G G & Co.*, who then allowed further time for taking delivery of the goods, which, however, *A S, N S*, finding some of the goods were stained, declined to do. *R G G & Co.* thereupon brought an action for breach of contract in not taking delivery, and a cross-suit was brought by *A S, N S*, to recover the Rs. 1,000 paid as earnest money. Held, that the

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words "fresh goods" after the signature of A S constituted part of the contract into which the parties entered, and by which they were bound. *MADHAB CHANDRA RUDAR v. AMRIT SING NARYAN SING*

5 B. L. R. 111

ROBERTSON GLADSTONE & Co. v. KASTURY MULL
3 B. L. R. O. C. 103, 106

See AH SHAIN SHOE v. MOOTHIA CHETTY
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 403

where an alteration in a contract in English was made in the Chinese language, which was not understood by the broker or the other party to the contract, and therefore was held not to have been agreed to.

2. ———— *Signature—Repudiation—Statute of Frauds.* The plaintiffs contracted with the defendant for the purchase from him of a certain quantity of hog's lard. The terms of the contract were contained in a letter, which was drafted by the plaintiffs and sent to the defendant for signature. The defendant returned the letter unsigned, with two additional clauses. The plaintiffs, not being able to agree to one of these clauses, had an interview with the defendant, when the defendant took the document away with him, and subsequently on 17th May returned it signed, but with the additional clauses still remaining. The plaintiffs had another interview with the defendant on 5th June, during which the additional clause objected to by the plaintiffs was struck out, one of the plaintiffs writing the word "cancelled" against that clause, and the defendant putting his initials against the word "cancelled." The plaintiffs then added to the contract the words "approved," together with "R and C," being the initials of their firm. Other alterations had been made in the document, and, it containing many erasures, the plaintiffs on the same day sent a fair copy to the defendant for signature, but the defendant wrote repudiating the alleged contract, and refusing to sign the document. *Held* (confirming the decision of the Court below), that there was no binding contract between the parties. The signature of the defendant put to the document on 17th May was not a sufficient signature by the party to be charged so as to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. *CHARRIOL v. SHIRCORE*

8. B. L. R. 305

3. ———— *Signature.* To a contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant, for the purchase by the defendant of a cargo of salt the plaintiffs, after the contract had been signed by the defendant, added in the margin: "Ten days demurrage will be allowed at R250 per diem." *Held*, that the addition of the words in the margin did not amount to an alteration within the rule of English law: the alteration must be either something which appears to be attested by the signature or something which alters the character of the instrument. *EDE v. KANTO NATH SHAW* I. L. R. 3 Calc. 220

CONTRACT—contd.**8. ALTERATION OF CONTRACTS—contd.****(a) ALTERATION BY PARTY—contd.**

4. ———— *Filling up document after signature—Execution of document—Sufficiency of signature.* Where a document, although blank when signed and put into the hands of one of certain parties, is afterwards filled by the consent of those parties with words which had already been agreed upon by them, and had, in consequence of such consent, been already drafted, the signature to the fair copy, although attached before the words were filled in, is just as binding as if it was attached to the document after the words had been written down in it. *AHED HOSSEIN v. LALLA RAM SURUN*
11 W. R. 216

5. ———— *Addition to document—Material alteration.* Where a subsequent addition to a document, though unauthorized by the executant, serves only to state explicitly what is already implied in the document, and what the law would infer from it, such addition is immaterial, and does not vitiate the instrument. Interest at a penal rate should not be awarded if there be no demand for it, or for a sum by way of compensation for special damage, on the part of the plaintiff. *TIKANDAS JAVAHIRDAS v. GANGA KOM MATHURADAS*
11 Bom. 203

6. ———— *Alteration of date of Bond, effect of—Suit to enforce altered document.* In suits upon two hypothecation bonds executed by different defendants, the plaintiffs in the first suit sued for recovery from the defendants personally, and in the second suit for recovery from the defendants and also from the property hypothecated, and in each case obtained a decree. The lower Appellate Court reversed both decrees, on the ground that the bonds were vitiated by a fraudulent alteration of them in the material part, *viz.*, the date fixed for payment. *Held*, that the documents might be used as evidence of the debt between the parties and also of the creation of the charge upon the property hypothecated. It lies upon the parties who seek to enforce an altered instrument to show the circumstances under which the alteration took place. *RAMASAMY KON v. BHAVANNI AYYAR. RAMASAMY KON v. SINTHIWAIYAN alias CHINNA BHAVANI AYYAR*

3 Mad. 247

7. ———— *Alteration in bond, sued on—Materiality of alteration—Fraud—Admissibility on evidence.* Suit on a bond the date of which had been altered from 11th September to 25th September, while it was in the possession of the plaintiff. Fraud was not proved, and the period of limitation reckoned from the 11th September had not expired. *Held*, that the bond was void as such, and was not receivable in evidence to prove the debt. *Christacharu v. Karibasayya*, I. L. R., 9 Mad. 399, followed. *GOVINDASAMI v. KUPPUSAMI*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 239

8. ———— *Fraudulent alteration in document, effect of.* An alteration made in a

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deed, without the consent of the parties who originally executed the deed, and with the fraudulent view of benefiting him who propounds it, vitiates the deed only. The materiality or otherwise of the alteration does not affect this rule of law. **KALEE COOMAR ROY v. GUNGA NANAIN DUT ROY**

10 W. R. 250

So also as to the alteration in a will. See **PARAMMA v. RAMACHANDRA** . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 302

9. ——— Alteration of Document
—Effect of, as to admissibility in evidence. If an instrument on which a case depends should appear to have been altered, it cannot be received in evidence or be acted upon till it is most satisfactorily proved by all the subscribing witnesses at the least and other evidence, that the alteration was made antecedently to the signature. **PETAMBER MANICKJEE v. MOTTECHAND MANICKJEE**

5 W. R. P. C. 53 : 1 Moo I. A. 420

10. ——— Material alteration, effect of—Bond Forgery—Fraud. A person who had a bond executed in his favour by one of three brothers forged the signatures of the other two brothers to the bond, and brought a suit upon it in its altered form against the three brothers. The forgery having been established, the Court of first instance dismissed the suit as against all the three defendants, and this decision was affirmed on appeal. On second appeal to the High Court :—**Held**, that the decision was correct, as a material alteration in a bond is, if fraudulently made, sufficient to render the bond void. A party who has the custody of an instrument made for his benefit is bound to preserve it in its original state, and any material alteration of it will vitiate the instrument. Where a person brings a suit upon a document which, when produced in evidence, is found to have been fraudulently altered to the knowledge of the plaintiff, no Court ought to allow an amendment to enable him to succeed upon it in its original state. **GOGUN CHUNDER GHOSE v. DHURONIDHUR MUNDUL**

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 616 : 9 C. L. R. 257

11. ——— Material alteration—Promissory note—Negotiable instrument—Alteration of rate of interest. An alteration which vitiates an instrument must be such as to cause the instrument on the face of it to operate differently from the original instrument. The alteration of the rate of interest in one of the clauses of a promissory note held to be a material alteration vitiating the note, although the clause so altered was a penal clause to which, even if unaltered, the Court would not give effect. **ODEYCHAND BOODAJI v. BHASKAR JAGONATH**

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 371

See **ANANDJI VISRAM v. NARIAD SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY** . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 320

12. ——— Consent of Parties—Material alteration of document. A material alteration

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made after execution does not vitiate a deed, if it be made with the consent of all the parties. **ISAC MAHOMED v. BAI FATMA** . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 487

13. ——— Fraudulent alteration of document, effect of—English law how far applicable in mofussil. In a suit brought to recover R815, principal and interest due according to the terms of a registered mortgaged bond, it was found that the plaintiff had fraudulently altered the terms of the bond prior to registration (i) by inserting a condition making the whole sum payable upon default of payment of any instalment, and (ii) by doubling the rate of interest. The defendant admitted in his written statement that he had received a certain portion of the consideration for the bond from the plaintiff. At the trial the plaintiff claimed to amend the plaint and recover the first instalment according to the terms of the bond as executed by defendant. **Held** by the Full Bench (**KERNAN, Offg. C. J., MUTTUSAMI AYYAR, HUTCHINS, PARKER, and HANDLEY, J.J.**), that the suit must be dismissed. **Per KERNAN and MUTTUSAMI AYYAR, J.J.**—The decision in *Ramasamy Kon's Case*, 3 Mad. 247, is in conformity with the law of England. **Per KERNAN, HUTCHINS, PARKER, and HANDLEY, J.J.**—The rule in *Master v. Miller*, 1 Smith L. C., 10th Ed., 747, is in consonance with equity and good conscience and applicable to the mofussil. **Per MUTTUSAMI AYYAR, J.**—That rule is more penal than equitable, but, having been adopted by the Courts since 1866, must be followed. **CHRISTACHARLU v. KARTBASAYYA** . I. L. R. 9 Mad. 399

14. ——— Alteration in material part—Effect of alteration as vitiating document—Vesting of interest by execution of mortgage instrument. By an agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendants' predecessors in title plaintiff undertook to sell and convey certain lands to the purchasers and to allow half the purchase-money to remain at interest for three years on security of the lands sold. Plaintiff's mother was alive, as also his son, who was then a minor. In order to protect the purchasers from any claims by the said mother or son as against the lands so agreed to be sold, plaintiff further agreed to give the purchasers a bond indemnifying them from any such or other claims. Plaintiff, in pursuance of the said agreement, duly executed a conveyance of the lands; he also gave the purchasers an indemnity in respect of claims by his mother as against the lands. The purchasers executed a mortgage over the lands in plaintiff's favour, in which the indemnity to be furnished by plaintiff was at first referred to in general terms, but the document concluded with the words, "a security should be furnished for this sum on account of the minor only." The balance of purchase-money so secured not having been paid, plaintiff brought a suit for the sale of the mortgaged land, and before doing so tendered

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^an indemnity protecting the defendants against any claims that might be made as against the lands by the plaintiff's said minor son. It was found that the words "for the minor only" had been added to the mortgage instrument after its execution. On its being contended that the alteration was a material one and vitiated the document, and that the suit, being based on the altered document, must fail, and that the tender of a general guarantee as originally agreed upon was a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to sue:—*Held, per COLLINS, C.J., and BENSON, J.* (in an order calling for a finding as to whether the alteration had been made with the mortgagor's consent), that the mortgage instrument having provided for security to be given by plaintiff in general terms, the addition of the words "for the minor only" restricted the liability of the property to be given by plaintiff as security to claims made by the said minor son. It diminished the guarantee to be given by plaintiff against claims by the mother or others. It was thus an alteration in a material part of the document, and would vitiate it as a basis for the plaintiff's suit unless the plaintiff could show that the alteration had been made with the consent of the mortgagors, who executed the document. The finding of the lower Court was that the alteration had been made without the mortgagor's consent. *Held, SUBRAMANIA AYYAR, Offg. C. J., and MOORE, J.* (O'FARRELL, J., dissenting), that on the execution of the mortgage instrument any interest in the property comprised therein at once became vested in the plaintiff; that such interest was not, and could not have been, divested from him by the subsequent addition of the words referred to, and that in asking for the sale of the land plaintiff was seeking to enforce, not a right resting on the contract or covenant, but one arising by operation of law with reference to the vested interest created by the instrument having been executed; that, though reference was made in the plaint to the provisions relating to the mortgage instrument in its altered state, such reference was not an essential part of plaintiff's cause of action, and that the suit was not necessarily based on the altered instrument; that the execution of a security bond in terms of the mortgage instrument before it was altered was not a condition precedent, and the suit was sustainable, though no such security had been given before the institution of the suit; and that (the question of damages not arising) plaintiff was entitled to a decree on the mortgage instrument, which would also provide that he must furnish a proper security bond before an order absolute would be passed. *Per O'FARRELL, J.*—That, inasmuch as the suit was based, not on the transferred right, but on the altered document, and as no obligation had as yet attached under the unaltered document, the suit should be dismissed; that the defendants' liability was contingent upon the prior execution by plaintiff of a general guarantee and not of the limited one

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which he, relying on the fraudulent alteration, had tendered; that where an agreement has, as to one of the parties, been wholly executed, the altered contract may be given in evidence of the correlative obligations incurred by the other party; but that here the agreement, so far as it related to repayment of the purchase-money, was executory and contingent upon the fulfilment by the plaintiff of the prior obligation to execute a proper guarantee; and that a conditional decree upon a proper security bond being executed could not be given. *SUBRAMANIA AYYAN v. KRISHNA AYYAN*

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 137

15. ——— Addition of false attestation—*Bond—Material alteration of a document.* In an action on an attested instrument not required by law to be attested, the obligee, while the instrument was in his possession and custody, got another attesting signature added to it by a man who had not, in fact, witnessed the execution of it by the obligor. *Held*, that, although the alteration did not vary the contract, it was material in the sense of stating a falsehood, either expressly or by implication, by way of increasing the apparent evidence of its genuineness, and that the obligee could not sue upon it. *SITARAM KRISHNA v. DADI DEVAJI*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 418

16. ——— Interpolation of name of witness, effect of—*Document not requiring Attestation—Material Alteration.* The interpolation of the name of a witness in document which need not be attested is not a material alteration that would render the document void. *Suffell v. Bank of England*, 9 Q. B. D. 555, explained. *Sitaram Krishna v. Dayi Davaji*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 416, dissented from. *MOHESH CHUNDER CHATTERJI v. KAMINI KUMARI DABIA* . I. L. R. 12 Calc. 313

17. ——— Addition of name of attesting witness—*Forged Attestation.* In a suit on a hypothecation bond, dated before the Transfer of Property Act came into operation, and executed in favour of the plaintiff by the father (deceased) of defendant No. 1, it appeared that, after the bond had come into the hands of the plaintiff, the name of defendant No. 1 had been added as that of an attesting witness, and that this was a forgery. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not precluded from recovering by reason of this alteration in the bond sued on. *RAMAYYAR v. SHANMUGAM* . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 70

18. ——— Material alteration—*Addition of a witness's signature subsequent to execution of the bond.* The fact that the signature of an attesting witness has been affixed to a bond after execution is not a material alteration, and does not make the bond void. *VENKATESH PRABHU v. BABA SUBRAYA* I. L. R. 15 Bom. 44

19. ——— Mortgage—*Suit for sale after redemption of a prior mortgage—Bond held by prior mortgagee found to have been altered in a*

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material particular—Effect of such alteration. A puisne mortgagee brought a suit for sale against his mortgagors on two mortgages, and impleaded therein as defendants the heirs of a prior mortgagee. As to this prior mortgage, the plaintiff stated in his plaint:—"The plaintiff has now learnt that the defendant No. 1, Tajammul Husain Khan had made a prior mortgage of a four *biswa* share in mauza Saiyid Nagar *alias* Nayagaon, Paragana Bilari, to Bhagwan Das under a registered bond, dated the 7th August, 1886, for Rs. 1,000. Bhagwan Das is dead. The defendants Nos. 3 to 6 are his heirs. As the plaintiff has a right to redeem on payment of Rs. 1,000 the prior debt, or of the amount which may be found due to the defendants Nos. 3 to 6, he is entitled to get the entire property sold by auction and to recover the whole amount." And the plaintiff prayed "that in case of default in payment (by the mortgagors) of Rs. 1,000, or whatever may be found due to the defendants Nos. 3 to 6, the plaintiff may be asked to pay that sum; and the entire hypothecated property may be sold by auction, and the whole amount of the prior incumbrance which the plaintiff might have to pay, and also the entire amount claimed, and costs and interest up to date of payment, may be satisfied out of the sale-proceeds." The prior mortgagees brought the mortgage deed of the 7th of August, 1886, into Court, and claimed that Rs. 6,764, principal and interest, were payable thereunder. The bond, when produced, was found to have been tampered with and altered in a material particular, the extent of the share mortgaged having been increased. *Held* by STANLEY, C.J., and BANERJI, J. (*dissentiente* AIKMAN, J.), that such alteration did not render the instrument void *in toto* so as to justify a Court in ignoring its existence and passing a decree in favour of the plaintiff for sale of the property comprised in it without payment of the amount due under it, or any part of that amount. An interest in immovable property having become vested by the operation of the mortgage bond, that instrument was admissible in evidence, on behalf of the mortgagee, to show the estate which passed under it. *Davidson v. Cooper*, 13 M. & W. 343; *Pigot's Case* (1615), 11 Co. 26b; *Master v. Miller*, 1 Smith L. C. 10th ed. 747; *Ganga Ram v. Chandan Singh*, 1 L. R. 4 All. 62; *Gogun Chunder Ghose v. Dhurondhur Mundul*, 1 L. R. 7 Cal. 616; *Sitaram Krishna v. Daji Devaji*, 1 L. R. 7 Bom. 418; *Christacharlu v. Karibasayya*, 1 L. R. 9 Mad. 399; *Ramasamy Kon v. Bhavani Ayyar*, 3 Mad. H. C. Rep. 247; *Suffell v. Bank of England*, 9 Q. B. D. 555; *Subrahmanya Ayyan v. Krishna Ayyan*, 1 L. R. 23 Mad. 137; *Beanland v. Hirst*, 23 R. R. 756; *Hutchins v. Scott*, 46 R. R. 770; *Stewart v. Aston*, 8 Ir. C. L. R. 35; *Browne v. Lockhart*, 10 Sim. 420; *Chichester v. Marquis of Donegall*, L. R. 5 Ch. 497; and *Kennedy v. Green*, 6 Sim 6, referred to. *West v. Stewart*, 14 M. & W. 47, and

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Agricultural Cattle Insurance Company v. Fitzgerald, 18 Q. B. 432, also referred to by BANERJI, J. *Held*, by AIKMAN, J., that the mortgage-deed of the 7th August, 1886, being the sole admissible evidence of the rights of the prior mortgagee in respect thereof, and that instrument containing a material and unexplained alteration, the prior mortgagee could neither sue upon it nor use it as a defence to the action brought by the puisne mortgagee. *Crookewit v. Fletcher*, 1 H. & N. 893; *Bolton v. The Bishop of Carlisle*, 2 H. Bl. 259; *Caldwell v. Parker*, 1r. Rep. 3 Eq. 519; and *Musammatt Khoob Conwar v. Baboo Moodnarain Singh*, 9 Moo. I. A. 1, referred to, in addition to most of the cases mentioned above. MANGAL SEN v. SHANKAR SAHAI (1903)

I. L. R. 25 All. 580

(b) ALTERATION BY THE COURT (INEQUITABLE CONTRACTS).

20. ——— Power of Court—Alteration of, without consent of parties. The Court has no power, without the consent of the parties, to alter the contract, or substitute for it terms which the Court may prefer. *RAGHO GOBIND PARANJPE v. DIPCHAND* I. L. R. 4 Bom. 96

KOTOO v. KO PAY YAH 6 W. R. 255

DIGAMBUREE DABEE v. NUNDGOPAL BANERJI
1 W. R. Mis. 1

But see JUDOBUNSEE BHUGTABE v. MUKKIM KOWAREE 1 W. R. Mis. 6

21. ——— Power of Government in its executive capacity. It is not within the power of a Court of law, in the face of the contracts originally made between the mula-vargdars (superior holders) and their mul-gainidars (permanent tenants) to relieve the former from the hardship caused to them by reason of the enhancement by Government of the assessment on their lands to an amount exceeding or equal to the rent received by them (mula-vargdars) from the mul-gainidars. It is doubtful whether Government, in its executive capacity, has any more power than Courts of law to interfere with contracts made between private persons. The remedy lies rather in the hands of the Legislature. *RANGA v. SUBA HEGDE*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 473

22. ——— Nature of alteration. The Court should not by its decree make for the parties a different contract from that which they themselves had entered into. *BALA VALAD SANKIA v. GABAJI BALVANT KULKARNI*

2 Bom. 175 : 2nd Ed. 168

23. ——— Inequitable agreements—Alteration of rate of interest—Act XXVIII of 1855—Fiduciary relationship. The provision con-

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tained in Act XXVIII of 1855, that any rate of interest which the parties may have agreed upon shall be awarded, in no way prevents a Civil Court in India, which administers both law and equity, from examining into the character of agreements made between persons, such as mortgagor and mortgagee, trustee and *cestui que trust*, between whom a relation exists, enabling one party to take advantage of the other, and from declining to enforce such agreements when they are shown to be unfair and extortionate. *VINYAK SADASHIV VOZE v. RAGHI* 4 Bom. A. C. 202

24. ——— Power of Collector to alter contract. The Collector, when he has to enquire into contracts between the parties, and to determine whether a breach of any such contract has been committed, cannot, upon supposed considerations of equity, set aside that which the parties have deliberately agreed upon between themselves, and substitute further terms of his own. *RAM COOMAR BRUTTACHARJEE v. RAM COOMAR SEIN* 7 W. R. 132

25. ——— Suit to set aside agreement—Failure of Consideration. A person cannot sue to set aside an agreement under which he has lent money on security of a lease of land subject to extension in the event of deficiency in the assets, unless he shows such gross and excessive deficiency in the assets as amounts to a failure of the consideration and deprives him of the security for his money, and unless he also shows that this deficiency was caused by the representations of the party to whom he lent the money, and in spite of due care and diligence on his own part. *MAHOMED HOSSEIN v. OKHOY NARAIN PAUL* 4 W. R. 70

26. ——— Application to alter contract with regard to payment of rent—Fraud. An application to have a contract altered in regard to the amount of rent to be paid under it in future cannot be generally entertained by a Civil Court, which can only reform a contract so as to make its terms accord with the original intentions of the parties. Where a party was induced to agree by fraudulent misrepresentation, this may entitle him to avoid a contract altogether: but if he abides by it, he cannot have its terms altered by the Civil Court. *NILMONEE SINGH DEO v. ISSUR CHANDER GHOSAL* 9 W. R. 92

28. ——— Grounds for setting aside agreement—Error in statement of accounts. In a written agreement by a debtor to pay his debt by instalments, securing the payment by a mortgage of land, the amount of the debts was erroneously stated to be greater than it actually was. In a suit on the agreement—*Held*, that such an error was ground for reforming the account, but not for setting aside the agreement. *SETH GOKUL DASS GOPAL DASS v. MURLI* I. L. R. 3 Calc. 602: 2 C. L. R. 156

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29. ——— Effect of Misrepresentation by a party as to part of the subject matter of a contract. Where one party induces another to contract on the faith of representations made to him, any one of which is untrue, the whole contract is in a Court of Equity considered as having been obtained fraudulently. Where a tenant had executed a kabuliat containing a stipulation which the landlord had told him would not be enforced, the tenant could not be held to have assented to it, and the kabuliat was not the real agreement between the parties. *PERTAB CHUNDER GHOSE v. MOHENDRONATH PURKAIT* I. L. R. 17 Calc. 291
L. R. 16 I. A. 233

30. ——— Execution of deed obtained by Misrepresentation—Cancellation of signature—Contract Act, ss. 18 and 19—Breach of duty—Ordinary diligence. The firm of Nicol & Co. having suspended payment, a general meeting of creditors was convened, at which it was unanimously resolved that the business of the firm should be wound up by voluntary liquidation under the supervision of a committee; and that the winding up should be conducted by two trustees under the supervision and control of the said committee. At a subsequent meeting of the creditors the above resolutions were confirmed, and it was further resolved that a composition-deed should be prepared in pursuance of the terms of the above resolutions. The adoption of this last resolution was strongly pressed upon the meeting by the solicitor for the insolvent firm on the ground that the mode of procedure therein proposed was proposed solely in the interest of the creditors. He entirely repudiated the idea that the members of the firm were to obtain any benefit by the proposed measure. No mention was made at either of the meetings of any release to be given to the parties. The plaintiffs were creditors of Nicol & Co., and *R. S.* and *B.* were their respective agents in Bombay. *R. S.* and *B.* attended the said meetings on the plaintiffs' behalf, and were appointed members of the committee of supervision and control. A few days after the last-mentioned meeting, *M.*, one of the partners of the insolvent firm, called upon *R.*, who at the time was deeply engaged in pressing an important business. *M.* produced a deed which had been prepared by the solicitors of the firm, and which contained a clause by which the creditors, in consideration of the assignment of the estate to trustees, released and discharged the members of the firm from all claims. *M.* was aware of the existence of the release in the deed. He asked *R.* to execute the deed stating that it was "the trust deed." *R.* requested *M.* to leave the document, saying that he would go over it and return it in the course of the day. *M.* then earnestly pressed him to execute the document at once, stating that it was of the utmost importance that no time should be lost, as the native

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creditors were coming to his office, and that it was necessary that all the members of the committee of supervision should sign first. *R* objected to sign the document without reading it, and *M* thereupon led him to suppose that the deed only carried out what was agreed to at the creditor's meeting. Upon the faith of that assurance, *R* executed the deed on behalf of the first plaintiffs in the belief that it was nothing more than an assignment to trustees for the benefit of creditors. Subsequently, on the same day, *M* took the deed to *S*, and asked him to sign. *S* was also engaged in pressing business, and asked *M* to leave the deed for perusal; but *M* gave the same reason for not doing so that he had given to *R*, and further stated that *R* had signed, and that he (*M*) hoped that *S* would also sign. *S* glanced at the deed, and being assured by *M* that it was in order, thereupon on the faith of that assurance, and believing that the deed was nothing more than an assignment of the estate to the trustees, executed the deed on behalf of the second plaintiffs without reading it. *M* on the same day took the deed, with the signature of *R* and *S* attached thereto, to *B*, who was also engaged in pressing business, and asked him to sign it. After some conversation *B* said to *M*: "The deed, then, is merely an assignment of the firm's effects for the creditors," and *M* replied in the affirmative. *B* then on behalf of the third plaintiffs executed the deed without reading it believing it to be merely an assignment of the estate to the trustees. On the 15th October, *R* and *B* heard that the deed contained a release by the creditors to the debtors, and on the 16th October *S* was also for the first time informed of it. On the 16th October *R* and *S* wrote a letter to *M*, repudiating their signatures, and refusing to be bound by the deed; and on the 26th October, *B* caused a similar letter to be written to *M*'s solicitor. The plaintiffs sued to have the signatures of their said agents and managers severally cancelled, and to have it declared that the deed was not binding on the plaintiffs. *Held*, that, having regard to what passed at the meetings of creditors, the deed, so far as it operated as a release, was a different deed from that which *R*, *S*, and *B* either intended to execute, or thought they were executing when they affixed their signatures, and that not having read the deed, but having trusted to *M* to inform them as to its contents, their signatures could not be held to be a consent to its contents, and that, therefore, so far as the deed operated as a release, their signatures were null. *Held*, also, that under the special circumstances of the case it became the duty of *M* to communicate to *R*, *S*, and *B* the existence of the release, and that, not having done so, he committed a breach of duty such as is contemplated by cl. 2 of s. 18 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872). *Held*, also, that, under the circumstances, *R*, *S*, and *B* had not the means of discovering the truth with ordinary

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diligence, and that the exception to s. 19 of the Contract Act was not applicable. *ORIENTAL BANK CORPORATION v. FLEMING*. I. L. R. 3 Bom. 242

31. ——— Execution of deed obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation—*Marriage Presents, suit to recover value of.* *A* entered into a contract with *B* for the marriage of his daughter *C*. The marriage was duly performed, but *C* was never sent to the house of *B*, and *B* thereupon instituted a suit to compel *C* to live with him; but the suit was dismissed on the ground that the marriage was invalid, it being found that *C* was of age at the time of the marriage, and that her consent was not given. In a suit brought by *B* against *A*, to recover as damages the value of certain presents he alleged he had made to *C*'s family in consideration of the marriage:—*Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover unless he could show fraudulent representations on the part of the defendants in consequence of which he was induced to contract the marriage and incur the expenses sought to be recovered. The case was remanded for the trial of the issue of fraud. *ASGAR ALI CHOWDHRY v. MAHA-BHAT ALI*. 13 B. L. R. Ap. 34 : 22 W. R. 403

32. ——— Stipulation by judgment-creditor for additional sum on postponement of sale in execution. Where a judgment debtor agreed to pay an additional sum, and obtained postponement of the sale of his property:—*Held*, that the stipulation was not one which the Courts could decline to enforce. *SOOKH RAM v. NIRPUT SINGH*. 3 Agra. 67

33. ——— Interest at exorbitant rate—*Inequitable contract—Stipulation in ikrar for payment of interest at high rate.* The plaintiff advanced money to the defendants on an ikrar, by which it was agreed that he was to allow them to draw on him to the extent of Rs20,000 within three years, the plaintiff to repay himself by having an ijara of the defendant's share in certain property which his loan was to aid them in recovering. A 4-anna share of the profits, after deducting Government revenue and expenses, was to go in payment of interest on the money lent; half of the remaining three-fourths to go towards payment of the principal, and the other half to the defendants. If at the end of the term any balance remained due to the plaintiff, the defendants were to pay it with interest at 18 per cent. If the defendants failed to give the ijara, they agreed to pay the amount borrowed with interest at 6½ per cent. per mensem. The plaintiff advanced the money and obtained a receipt therefor from the defendants. The defendants failed to give the plaintiff the ijara. In a suit brought to recover the sum lent by the plaintiff with interest, the first Court gave a decree for the plaintiff for the sum claimed with interest at the higher

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rate stipulated for in the ikrar, viz., 75 per cent. On appeal by the defendants to the High Court :—*Held*, that, in the absence of evidence of any fiduciary relation between the parties, of any imposition or misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiff, or any want of capacity on the part of the defendants, and there being nothing in the circumstances which led to the execution of the ikrar to show that there was any constructive fraud on the part of the plaintiff, or any undue advantage taken by him, the contract was not one which the Code would set aside as being unreasonable, inequitable, or oppressive in character. *OMDA KHANUM v. BROJENDRO COOMAR ROY CHOWDHRY*

12 B. L. R. 451 : 20 W. R. 317

34. Unconscionable agreement

—*Usury*. The defendant borrowed a sum of money from the plaintiff, a professional money-lender, and agreed by his bond to repay the principal with interest at 36 per cent. per annum. The defendant having made default in payment, the plaintiff brought the present suit. The defendant pleaded his minority. The Court found he was not a minor at the time he entered into the contract, but on the merits of the case the lower Court (PHEAR, J.) found that the agreement was unconscionable, and one which a Court of Equity would not enforce. *Held* by the Appeal Court (GARTH, C. J., and MACPHERSON, J.), in accordance with the decision of PHEAR, J., that the plaintiff is only entitled to a decree for the amount actually received by the defendant from him, with interest at 6 per cent. *MOTHOORMOHUN ROY v. SOORENDRO NARAIN DEB*

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 108

35. Unconscionable Bargain—Usurious Agreement—Contract Act, s. 74. Plaintiff sued to recover R643-10-6, value of 1,230 *paras* of paddy, due under an account dated 8th September 1876. The account, on a *cadjan*, was for R315 payable with 12 per cent. interest within fifteen days, and in default plaintiff to be paid, on 14th November 1876, paddy for the amount due calculated at the rate of 4 annas 7 pies per *para*. Immediately after the execution of this agreement the price of rice rose, the defendant did not pay within the fifteen days, and in the plaint in this suit the price of rice was calculated at 8 annas per *para*. *Held*, that the bargain was unconscionable. Under the Contract Act, s. 74, in a case falling within its terms only reasonable compensation could be given, which in the present case would be interest at a somewhat high rate. The contract in effect was that, if the principal with 12 per cent. were not paid on 22nd September, double the amount should be payable on the 15th November. Such a contract a Court of Equity would not enforce. *VENKITTARAMA PATTAR v. KESHAVA MENON*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 349

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36. Unconscionable Bargain—Purda-nashin Lady. Fraud apart, a loan to a purda-nashin woman from her own mukhtear at an exorbitant rate of interest, the security being ample, may be a hard and unconscionable bargain on which the contract for such rate of interest will not be enforced. *Benjyon v. Cook*, L. R. 10 Ch. Ap. 389, referred to and followed. *KAMINI SUNDARI CHOWDHURANI v. KALI PROSSUNNO GHOSE*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 225

L. R. 12 I. A. 215

37. Undue influence—Ground for setting aside deed. In this case an ikrarnamah, whereby the three plaintiffs (two of them being under age) parted with half of their property, without consideration, whilst not fully acquainted with their rights, without professional advice, and during a state of things likely to overawe them and materially affect the free exercise of their will, was set aside. *PREM NARAIN SINGH v. PARASRAM SINGH. PREM NARAIN SINGH v. ROODER NARAIN SINGH*

L. R. 4 I. A. 101

38. Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 16, award made under—Coercion—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 522, 526. Under s. 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, as it stood before amended by Act VI of 1899, it is not sufficient, in order to render a contract voidable on account of undue influence, that the party claiming to avoid the contract should have been at the time he entered into it in a state of fear amounting to mental distress which enfeebled the mind; but there must further be action of some kind, the employment of pressure or influence by or on behalf of the other party to the contract. *Jones v. Merionethshire Buildings Society*, [1892] 1 Ch. 173, referred to. *GOBARDHAN DAS v. JAI KISHEN DAS*

I. L. R. 22 All. 224

39. Voluntary Transfer—Act IX of 1872 (Contract Act), s. 16. In a transaction between two persons where one is so situated as to be under the control and influence of the other, the Courts in this country have to see that such other does not unduly and unfairly exercise that influence and control over such person for his own advantage or benefit, or for the advantage or benefit of some religious object in which he is interested, and will call upon him to give clear and cogent proof that the transaction complained of was such a one as the law would support and recognize. Where a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relation had existed, Courts of Equity have invariably placed the burden of sustaining the transaction upon the party benefited by it, requiring him to show that it was of an unobjectionable character and one which it ought not to disturb. The exercise of this beneficial jurisdiction is not confined to cases only between guardian and ward, attorney and client, father and son, but the relief thus granted.

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stands upon a general principle applying to all the variety of relations in which dominion may be exercised by one person over another. The plaintiff, who on the death of the widow of his brother became entitled to the estate of the deceased, found himself resisted in his claim by wealthy relatives. He was a man without means. The defendant took him to his house, kept him there, found him all the money for the purpose of carrying on his litigation with his relatives, in which the plaintiff succeeded. While the litigation for mutation of names in respect of the property was pending in the Revenue Court, and while plaintiff was residing with the defendant, he executed the sale deed in favour of defendant's brother for the nominal consideration of R9,500, or half the property he claimed: and again, shortly after the mutation case had terminated in his favour, he executed a deed of endowment of the remaining half in favour of a temple founded by the ancestor of the defendant, and in which the defendant was interested, and the result was that plaintiff was left as poor as he was when he first came into the defendant's hands. Plaintiff sued for cancellation of the deed of endowment, on the ground that the same had been obtained from him by the exercise of undue influence and by means of fraud, and obtained a decree. On appeal by the defendant it was *held* that, looking at all the facts, such a relation between plaintiff and defendant in the course of the year 1885 had been established as to cast upon the latter the obligation of satisfying the Court that the transaction, which was given effect to by the deed of endowment, was an honest *bonâ fide* transaction and one that ought to be upheld. *SITAL PRASAD v. PARBU LAL*

I. L. R. 10 All. 535

40. ——— Unconscionable bargain—Equitable relief—Promissory note—Interest deducted in advance from the sum lent—Inadequacy of consideration—Grossly exorbitant interest. The Court will afford no protection to persons who willfully and knowingly enter into extortionate and unreasonable bargains. It is only where a person has entered into an extortionate bargain, and it is shown that he was in ignorance of the unfair nature of the transaction, that the Court is justified in interfering. *MACKINTOSH v. WINGROPE*

I. L. R. 4 Cal. 137 : 2 C. L. R. 433

41. ——— Oppressive conditions in deed—Inadequacy of Consideration. Where money-lenders dealing with ignorant, illiterate peasants made use of the necessitous position of those peasants, who were seeking to raise a sum of money for the purpose of stocking and tilling their lands, to impose upon them a contract in the form of a mortgage, by which they agreed in default of punctual payment of the half produce, and other events,

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to sell their land at a gross undervalue, *viz.*, one-third of the amount of the mortgage debt, which in itself was not more than equal to half the value of the annual produce of the land, and to remain liable to the remaining two-thirds of that debt with interest, and even if no default should occur on their parts in payment of a moiety of the annual produce, or the performance of their other covenants, and notwithstanding full payment of the principal, to continue for fifteen years to pay the half produce of the lands to the mortgagees:—*Held* (reversing the decrees of both the Courts below), that the deed of mortgage should only stand as security for the payment of the principal sum of R300, and interest at 9 per cent., and in all other respects should be set aside as inequitable, fraudulent, and grossly oppressive. *Held*, also, that if in execution of the reversed decrees the lands had been made over to the mortgagees as purchasers, they should be restored to the mortgagors, and that the rents, profits and produce received by the mortgagees while in possession should be set off on account against the said principal sum and interest, and that the balance should be paid by the party against whom the same might be found. Mere inadequacy of consideration, unless it be so great as to amount to evidence of fraud, is not sufficient ground for setting aside a contract, or refusing to decree specific performance of it. But inadequacy of consideration when found in conjunction with any such other circumstances as suppression of true value of property, misrepresentation, fraud, surprise, oppression, urgent necessity for money, weakness of understanding or even ignorance, is an ingredient which weighs powerfully with a Court of Equity in considering whether it should set aside contracts, or refuse to decree specific performance of them. *KEDARI RANU v. ATMARAMBHAT* **3 Bom. A. C. 11**

42. ——— Extortionate claims made by professional persons to litigants—Fiduciary relationship. All litigants are entitled to the protection of the Court from extortionate claims made upon them by those whose professional aid they seek. Brokers and meddlers in litigation, who avail themselves of the weakness and ignorance of suitors to obtain from them, under a pretence of services to be rendered, engagements for the payment of money, will find that protection will be afforded by the Court against them also. *ROOR NARAIN MISR v. KUSHI RAM SINGH TANBIRAM*

2 N. W. 67

43. ——— Parties dealing on unequal terms—Inequitable Contract. Assuming that the same principles are applicable here as in the English Court of Chancery, the High Court held that, although in a class of cases without positive fraud a contract may be set aside unless it is shown to have been made upon adequate consideration,

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yet as a general rule, before the defendant is called upon to prove that he has given full value for property sold to him, the plaintiff must first make out that the parties to the bargain were dealing on terms so unequal as to render it improper for a Court of Justice to enforce any contract they may have made, unless it can be shown that the contract was in fact one which a prudent person with proper advice and assistance might well have made.

JUGO BUNDHOO TEWAREE v. KARUM SINGH

22 W. R. 341

44. ————— *Release by Widow, suit to set aside—Duress—Coercion—Fraud—Grounds on which relief is granted.* B R, the widow of a zamindar, having for valuable consideration released all her claims on her husband's estate in favour of V S, her husband's brother, by a deed executed five days after the death of her husband, brought a suit against V S to set aside the deed of release on the ground that it was obtained by threats and fraud, and to recover the estate. *Held*, that it was not sufficient to find that the consent given by the plaintiff was not caused by coercion as defined in the Contract Act, nor by duress as known to the English law; but that the questions to be decided were, (i) whether undue advantage had been taken of the plaintiff's position; (ii) whether the plaintiff had been sufficiently informed as to her rights or had proper advisers; (iii) whether the contract was an unconscionable or "catching" bargain. *BUCHI REMAYYA v. JAGAPATHI*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 304

45. ————— *Inequitable contract.* In a suit brought upon two bonds for R2,000 and R1,000, respectively, where the transaction was found to be that defendant's property having been about to be sold in execution of a decree for a sum much more than R3,000, he was made to appear to borrow from the plaintiff at 75 per cent. interest R3,000 which were immediately applied to the payment of the debt, the defendant deriving no other benefit, and the plaintiff not binding himself to stay execution:—*Held*, that the contract in these bonds was of such a nature as to involve the conclusion that defendant was imposed upon, and was not a free agent; and that the transaction was of a kind not to be supported by a Court of Equity. *LAL BEHAREE AWUSTEE v. BHOLANATH DEY CHAKLADAR*

23 W. R. 49

46. ————— *Unconscionable bargain—Interest—"Dharta"—Illiterate Agriculturist.* The High Court as a Court of Equity possesses the power exercised by the Court of Chancery of granting relief in cases of such unconscionable or grossly unequal and oppressive bargains as no man of ordinary prudence would enter into, and which, from their nature and the relative positions of the parties, raise a presumption of fraud or undue in-

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fluence. The principles upon which such relief is granted apply to contracts in which exceedingly onerous conditions are imposed by money-lenders upon poor and ignorant persons in rural districts. The exercise of such power has not been affected by the repeal of the usury laws. *Chesterfield v. Janssen*, 2 Ves. 155, *O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke*, L. R. 2 Ap. Cas. 814, *Earl of Aylesford v. Morris*, L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 484, *Nevill v. Snelling*, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 679, and *Beynon v. Cook*, L. R. 10 Ch. Ap. 389, referred to. An illiterate Kurmi in the position of a peasant proprietor executed a mortgage-deed in favour of a professional money-lender to whom he owed R97, by which he agreed to pay interest on that sum at the rate of 24 per cent. per annum at compound interest. He further agreed that "dharta" or a yearly fine at the rate of one anna per rupee should be allowed to the mortgagee, to be calculated by yearly rests. It was also provided that the interest should be paid from the profits of certain malikana land of the mortgagor, and that, if the interest were not paid for two years, the mortgagee should be put in possession of this land. As security for the debt, a six pies zemindari share was mortgaged for a term of eleven years. The effect of the stipulation as to "dharta" was that one anna per rupee would be added at the end of every year, not only to the principal mortgage-money, but also to the interest due, and the total would be again regarded as the principal sum for the ensuing year. Ten years after the date of the mortgage, the mortgagor brought a suit for redemption on payment of only R97 or such sum as the Court might determine as due to the mortgagee. At that time the accounts made up by the mortgagee showed that the debt of R97 with compound interest had swollen to R873, of which the "dharta" alone amounted to R111. *Held*, that the stipulation in the deed as to "dharta" was not of the kind referred to in s. 74 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), and that there was no question of penalty, but that, looking to the relative positions of the parties, and the unconscionable and oppressive nature of the stipulation, the benefit thereof should be disallowed to the mortgagee and the mortgagor permitted to redeem on payment of the mortgage-money and interest, no appeal having been preferred by him from the decree of the first Court making redemption subject to the payment of interest. *LALLI v. RAM PRASAD*

I. L. R. 9 All. 74

47. ————— *Bond—Compound Interest.* In a suit for the recovery of a principal sum of R99 due upon a bond, with compound interest at 2 per cent. per mensem, it was found that advantage was taken by the plaintiff of the fact that the defendant was being pressed in the tahsili for immediate payment of revenue due, to induce him to execute the bond, charging compound interest at the above-mentioned rate, not-

CONTRACT—contd.**8. ALTERATION OF CONTRACTS—contd.****(b) ALTERATION BY THE COURT (INEQUITABLE CONTRACTS)—contd.**

withstanding that ample security was given by mortgage of landed property. It was also found that, although, under the terms of the bond, the plaintiff had power to enforce the same at any time by bringing to sale the mortgaged property, he had wilfully allowed the debt to remain unsatisfied, in order that compound interest at a high rate might accumulate. *Held*, that the bargain was a hard and unconscionable one, which the Court had undoubted power to refuse to enforce, and which, under all the circumstances, it would be unreasonable and inequitable for a Court of justice to give full effect to; and that, under the circumstances, compound interest should not be allowed. *Kamini Sundari Chaudhrani v. Kali Prosunno Ghose*, I. L. R. 12 Cal. 227, *Beynon v. Cook*, L. R. 10 Ch. Ap. 389, and *Lall v. Ram Prasad*, I. L. R. 9 All. 74, referred to. The Court decreed the principal sum of R99, with simple interest at 24 per cent. per annum, up to the date of institution of the suit. *MADHO SING v. KASHI RAM* I. L. R. 9 All. 228

48. *Contract to pay Expenses of Litigation.* The result of the English cases regarding "hard" or "unconscionable bargains" is that in dealings with expectant heirs, reversioners, or remaindermen, the fact that the bargain was declined by others as not being sufficiently advantageous, does not raise a presumption that it was fair and reasonable; and that until the contrary is satisfactorily proved by the party trying to maintain the bargain, the Court may presume that a bargain which apparently provides, in the opinion of the Court, for an unusually high return or an exceptionally high rate of interest is a hard and unconscionable bargain against which relief should be granted. The doctrine of equity on the subject of such bargains is applicable in England only to dealings with expectant heirs, reversioners, or remaindermen. The judgment of the Privy Council in *Kamini Sundari Chaudhrani v. Kali Prosunno Ghose*, I. L. R. 12 Cal. 225; L. R. 12 I. A. 215, does not imply that the doctrine is to be applied in India to cases except where it would have been applied in England, or except where the case is in some way analogous to a case of snatching a bargain with an expectant heir, reversioner, or remainderman, or except there is some fiduciary relationship between the lender and the borrower, although there may be no fraud or undue influence, or except there is some incapacity, such as ignorance, on the part of the borrower to appreciate the true effect of his bargain. For the purposes of meeting the expenses of an appeal to the High Court, the appellant, on the advice of his legal advisers, executed a bond for R25,000 in consideration of the obligee agreeing to defray such expenses. The obligor agreed to pay the R25,000 within one year from his recovering possession of the property in suit; and, at the request of the obligor's pleader,

CONTRACT—contd.**8. ALTERATION OF CONTRACTS—contd.****(b) ALTERATION BY THE COURT (INEQUITABLE CONTRACTS)—contd.**

the obligee advanced R3,700, which was applied to the expenses of the appeal. The High Court dismissed the appeal; and in a deed executed by the obligor in favour of the obligee and others for the purpose of defraying the expenses of a further appeal to the Privy Council, he admitted his liability under the former bond. The Privy Council decreed his appeal, and he obtained possession of the property in suit, but declined to pay the R25,000 upon which the obligee sued upon the bond. It was found that, apart from the moneys borrowed by the obligor from time to time, he was without even the means of subsistence; that he executed the bond with his eyes open and perfectly understood his position and the effect of both the instruments executed by him; that no fraud or improper pressure appeared to have been allowed to him; that his legal advisers had acted honestly and to the best of their ability in his interests; that there was nothing to show that, having regard to the risks of the litigation, he could have obtained the assistance necessary for the prosecution of his appeal on better terms than those contained in the bond; that without such assistance he could not have appealed to the High Court; and that the obligee gave him such assistance upon his application. *Held*, that, although there was nothing to show that the obligor could have obtained an advance on terms more advantageous to himself, it was for the obligee to establish to the Court's satisfaction, without reasonable doubt, that he could not have done so; and that, this not having been established, and the reasonableness and fairness of the bargain not being proved by showing that there had been difficulties in negotiating it, or that others had refused it as not sufficiently advantageous to them, the Court should hold the bargain to be a hard and unconscionable one, which should not be enforced. The Court gave the plaintiff a decree for the R3,700 actually advanced, with simple interest at 20 per cent. per annum from the date of the bond to the date of the decree, with costs in proportion and interest at 6 per cent. per annum on the R3,700, interest and costs, from the date of the decree until payment. *CHUNNI KUAR v. RUP SINGH*

I. L. R. 11 All. 57

49. *Gambling in litigation—Agreement opposed to public policy—Act IX of 1872 (Contract Act), s. 23.* For the purpose of meeting the expenses of an appeal to the Privy Council from concurrent decrees of the Subordinate Judge and the High Court, the plaintiff-appellant executed a deed of sale of certain property worth over R50,000 in consideration of the vendees providing the necessary security and moneys. The plaintiff experienced considerable difficulty in procuring the means of appeal. The vendees were not professional money-lenders, they did not put pressure on the plaintiff, but, on the contrary, he and

CONTRACT—contd.**8. ALTERATION OF CONTRACTS—contd.****(b) ALTERATION BY THE COURT (INEQUITABLE CONTRACTS)—contd.**

his agent put pressure on them to agree to the terms of the deed. It appeared that, apart from the moneys borrowed by him from time to time, he was without even the means of subsistence; that he fully understood the nature of the deed; that his agents negotiated the transaction *bona fide*, and to the best of their powers, in his interest; that there was no fraud or deception on the part of the vendors, and that they performed all that they undertook as regards meeting the expenses of the appeal. Under the deed, the plaintiffs were liable to furnish security to the extent of R4,000 and to advance R8,500 for other necessary expenses, and they did in fact furnish such security and advanced sums aggregating R7,542. The appeal was successful. The appellant having failed to put the vendees in possession of the property conveyed by the deed, and recovered by him under the Privy Council's decree, the vendees sued him for possession of the property and mesne profits, afterwards agreeing that the Court should in lieu thereof award them compensation in money equivalent thereto. *Held*, that, although the case was very different from cases in which persons interfered for their own benefit in litigation not their own, or in which mukhtars, vakils, or persons of that class of professional money-lenders, taking advantage of the borrower's position, sued to enforce a contract obtained by them from him, and, although the defendant was not entitled to sympathy, yet, judging by the disproportion between the liability incurred by the plaintiffs under the contract and the reward which they were to obtain in the event of defendant's success, it must be concluded either that they did not believe his claim to be well founded, and consequently entered, though unwillingly, into a gambling transaction, or, if they believe the claim to be well founded, that the reward contracted for was excessive and unconscionable; and in either case the contract could not be enforced in its terms. *Held*, also, that, if the doctrine of equity applicable to such cases were applied in favour of the borrower, it should also be applied in favour of the lender; that as there was no reason to suspect the plaintiff's motives, it would be inequitable to relieve the defendant from all liability; that it was only fair that he should compensate the plaintiffs for the use of their security bonds from the date when they were deposited in the High Court to the earliest date after the judgment of the Privy Council when the plaintiffs could have obtained them back; that simple interest at 12 per cent. per annum on the amounts of the bonds for the period would be reasonable compensation for such use; that the defendant should also repay the amounts advanced by the plaintiffs for the expenses of the litigation with interest on each advance at 20 per cent. from the date on which it was made to the date of the decree in the present case; and that he should pay interest on the whole

CONTRACT—contd.**8. ALTERATION OF CONTRACTS—concl'd.****(b) ALTERATION BY THE COURT (INEQUITABLE CONTRACTS)—concl'd.**

amount thus decreed at 6 per cent. from the date of the decree till payment. *Chunni Kuar v. Rup Singh*, I. L. R. 11 All. 57, *Prahlad Sen v. Budhu Singh*, 12 Moo. I. A. 1275, and *Bowes v. Heap*, 3 V. & B. 117, referred to. *LOKE INDAR SINGH v. RUP SINGH* . I. L. R. 11 All. 118

See *HUSAIN BUKSH v. RAHMAT HUSAIN*

I. L. R. 11 All. 128

50. ————— *Undue Influence*
—*Sale—Inadequacy of consideration—Voidable contract—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 16.* Inadequacy of consideration, in conjunction with the circumstances of the indebtedness and ignorance of the vendor, are facts from which a Court may infer the exercise of undue influence. *BHIMBHAT v. YESHWANTRAO* (1900) . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 126

9. BREACH OF CONTRACT.

1. ————— *Contract to carry coolies by ship—Appointment of Master prohibited from taking ship—Acting against Emigration Act, XIII of 1864.* Where a contract was entered into for the carriage of coolies, the ship-owner was held guilty of breach of contract in appointing a master who was prohibited by an order of Government from commanding a ship carrying emigrants. *EALES v. RUTTONJEE EDULJEE*

I Ind. Jur. N. S. 131

2. ————— *Act alleged to be not a breach of contract—Onus of proof.* An agreement entered into between the plaintiff and defendants, members of the same caste, contained a stipulation that in the event of the defendant objecting to the receiving of a girl from, or the giving a girl to, the plaintiff in marriage, the defendant should be bound to return R500 with interest, which the plaintiff had paid to the defendant under the agreement. It was found by the Civil Judge that the fifteenth defendant's son was engaged to be married to the second plaintiff's daughter, and that the marriage was broken off on the part of the fifteenth defendant. *Held*, on special appeal, that this was *prima facie* a breach of the agreement which entitled the plaintiff to recover, and that it was for the defendants to show that it did not bring them within the terms of the agreement. *KONI CHETTY v. VERIAPPA CHETTI* 4 Mad. 325

3. ————— *Time for Performance—Reasonable time—Conditional grant of lease.* When an agreement to grant a lease was incomplete and conditional upon an advance within eight days or a reasonable time required to meet pressing demands, a delay of nineteen days was held to be unreasonable, and likely to defeat the object of the lease. *FISCHER v. KAMALA NAICKER*

3 W. R. P. C. 33 : 8 Moo. I. A. 170

CONTRACT—contd.**9. BREACH OF CONTRACT—contd.**

4. ————— *Contract for sale of seed—Excess refraction.* A contract for the sale of seed contained the following provision :—“Refraction guaranteed at four per cent., with usual allowance up to six per cent., exceeding which the seller is to reclean the seed at his expense within a week; failing which, buyers to have the option of cancelling that portion of the contract tendered, or of buying against the seller, or of taking the parcel as it stands, with usual allowance for excess refraction. Delivery from seller's godown in pile up to the 15th of July next.” On the 10th July, the vendor tendered the seed. On examination the refraction was found to be above the contract rate. It was agreed that the vendor should reclean the seed; and on the 15th July, the purchasers went to take delivery of the seed, which was found still to be not sufficiently cleaned. On the 15th July, the vendor said that he should require a week longer for that purpose. The purchasers then cancelled the contract. In a suit by the vendor for damages for breach of contract :—*Held*, (i) that the breach of the contract was with the plaintiff; (ii) that the week allowed for recleaning commenced from the 10th July; and that, as the plaintiff had not succeeded in reducing the rate of refraction to the contract rate, the defendants had a right to reject the seed; and that the plaintiff was not entitled to further time to reclean it again. *BUDDREE DOSS v. RALLI* . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 678 : 8 C. L. R. 294

5. ————— *Agreement to deliver goods at specified place—Tender of goods—Right to rescind contract.* If a person contracts to deliver goods at a specified place, he must be there in person or by agent, and be ready to deliver them; if to deliver them by a certain time, he must tender them so as to allow sufficient time for examination and receipt. But when a thing is to be performed at a certain place, on or before a certain day, to another party to a contract, the tender must be to the other party at that place, and that other party must be present at some particular part of the day before sunset, so that the act may be completed by daylight. Where a thing is to be done anywhere, a tender at a convenient time before midnight is sufficient. In case of violation of a contract by one party, the other party may ordinarily rescind it totally or partially, provided he himself is guilty of no default or violation, and exercises the right within a reasonable time. If, after default of the other party, he does an act recognizing the contract, he cannot afterwards rescind it. *KARTICK NATH PANDEY v. GOVERNMENT* . . . 11 W. R. 58

6. ————— *Failure in performance of stipulation giving party right to rescind—Impossibility of strict and literal performance.* When an agreement provides that an act is to be done by one of the parties within a limited time, and the party fails to perform the act within such time, if the other party elects notwithstanding to take the benefit of the contract, the latter must perform his

CONTRACT—contd.**9. BREACH OF CONTRACT—contd.**

part of it; and though exact and literal performance of the original stipulation has become impossible, the terms of the contract must be carried out as nearly as possible. *BROJO SOONDUREE DEBIA v. COLLINS* . . . 13 W. R. 359

7. ————— *Revocation of contract by new agreement—Breach of new contract.* If a second contract be entered into between two parties in revocation of a previous one, the contractee cannot fall back upon the conditions of the first contract, on the ground of the breach by the contractor of the subsequent one, unless there be express conditions in the latter agreement to that effect. *KALLIPERSAD SINGH v. GRANT*

2 Hay 329

8. ————— *Prevention by one party of completion of contract—Contract to cut trees—Right of action.* Plaintiff purchased, at advertised Government sale by auction, certain felled trees then lying in the forest of K. He also contracted for the delivery to Government of certain “sleepers” to be cut in the said forest. The Government refused to admit plaintiff's agent to the forest, and thereby prevented him from completing his contract. The remedy for such loss is by a common law action, and not by bill in equity, and a bill for the purpose ought consequently to be dismissed with costs. *JOHNSON v. SECRETARY OF STATE* . . . Cor. 71 : 2 Hyde 153

9. ————— *Difference between articles contracted for and those tendered—Action for non-acceptance.* The plaintiffs contracted to supply the defendants with from 275,000 to 300,000 of gunny bags described as No. 6 quality, size 40 by 28 inches, “the defendants to have the option of taking bags of a longer or shorter length at proportionate prices, duly giving a fortnight's notice to the plaintiffs, delivery to be taken in August 1870.” The defendants, after taking delivery of 11,600 of the bags, found that the bags tendered were mixed in size, some being longer and some being shorter than the contract size, and refused to take delivery of the remainder. In an action for breach of contract in not accepting the bags, the Court below found on the evidence that out of 2,000 bags which were examined, 100 were short by from a quarter to half an inch, but that the bags which were really short were very few out of a large quantity which came up to contract size, and held, therefore, that there had been a substantial performance of the contract on the part of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Court found that the parties did not contemplate any large margin of difference in the size of the bags, and that the proportion of those which differed was large enough to justify the defendants in refusing to take delivery, and held that the tender of such bags by the plaintiffs was not a substantial performance of the contract. *MILLER v. GOURIPORE COMPANY*

8 B. L. R. 285

CONTRACT—*contd.*9. BREACH OF CONTRACT—*contd.*

10. ———— *Part acceptance of goods by defendant not according to contract—Rate payable for such goods.* The defendants contracted to purchase from the plaintiffs "2,000 maunds of fresh, clean, and good up-country indigo seed, guaranteed growth of season 1870-71, at R11 per maund, to be delivered to the defendants' agent at Hajipore all in February next." In part performance of this contract, the plaintiffs delivered, and the defendants' agent at Hajipore accepted, 865 maunds of seed, no objection as to quality being then taken. But when the remainder of the seed was tendered in February, the defendants refused to accept it on the ground that it was not according to contract. At the same time and upon the same grounds, they refused to pay the contract price for the seed already accepted, and tendered instead the market price at the time of delivery. In an action to recover the contract price of the 865 maunds delivered, and damages for loss on re-sale of the remainder of the seed, the Judge of the Court below found on the facts that the seed was not "seed of the growth of 1870-71" as far as it was reasonably possible to procure it; and that, though there was evidence to show that seed of the previous season, if of good quality and in good preservation, was occasionally mixed with the new seed, and that seed so mixed had been accepted as a performance of contracts for 1870-71, yet there was no evidence that, under such contracts as the present, the seller was by custom at liberty to mix seeds of two crops so as to bring the sample up to an average quality, and, further, that a custom, so directly at variance with the express terms of the contract, could not, if proved, be allowed to prevail. *Held*, also, that the defendants had waived any objection to the 865 maunds which must therefore be taken as a good delivery *pro tanto* under the contract, and must be paid for accordingly. *Held*, on appeal (affirming the decision of the Court below), that the plaintiffs had not delivered seed according to the contract; but (reversing the decision of the Court below) that the contract was a contract for the delivery of the entire quantity of 2,000 maunds; and that the plaintiffs could only recover for the 865 maunds as on a new contract arising at the time when the seed was accepted; such contract being to pay for the seed according to its value, and not according to the rate stipulated for the 2,000 maunds. *MACFARLANE v. CARE*

8 B. L. R. 459 : 17 W. R. 244

11. ———— *Endorsement by parties on original contract—Transfer of Contract—Action for non-acceptance.* On the 16th April 1878 the plaintiffs contracted to purchase from F. M. & Co., of Bombay, at R18 per ton, "the entire cargo of coal per 'Culzean,' amounting to 900 tons or thereabouts." On 18th April the plaintiffs transferred the contract to the defendants and one Nanabhai Bomansha, and the following endorsement was made:—"The contract to be transferred

CONTRACT—*contd.*9. BREACH OF CONTRACT—*contd.*

to Messrs. Tullockchand and Shapurji and Nanabhai Bomansha at R20½. For C. H. B. Forbes and Selves, W. Tennent & Co." Underneath this endorsement the transferees wrote as follows:—"Accepted 450 tons at R20½ per ton. Nanabhai Bomansha. Accepted 450 tons at R20½ per ton. Tullockchand and Shapurji." The *Culzean* arrived at Bombay with a cargo of 2,167 tons of coal, on board of which it appeared that 1,300 tons had been shipped to the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway Company and 867 tons to the order of the shippers. F. M. & Co. were agents at Bombay for the shippers. The defendants refused to take delivery of the coal, on the ground that the contract transferred to them and Nanabhai Bomansha was a contract for an "entire cargo." The plaintiffs sued the defendants for non-acceptance, contending that there had been no transfer to defendants and Nanabhai Bomansha of the original contract, but a new several contract for separate portions of the cargo. *Held*, that the joint effect of the endorsement and the original contract was that the defendants agreed to purchase 450 tons, part of an entire cargo of 900 tons, or thereabouts; that, inasmuch as the cargo of the *Culzean* consisted of 2,167 tons, the defendants were not bound to accept any part of such cargo, and that the suit was not maintainable. *Borrowman v. Drayton, L. R. 2 Ex. D. 15*, followed. *FORBES v. TULLOCKCHAND MANOCKCHAND*. I. L. R. 3 Bom. 386

12. ———— *Dispute as to quality of goods tendered—Right to examine goods—Survey—Reasonable time for examination of goods by purchaser—Contract Act, IX of 1872, s. 33.* The defendant agreed to purchase from the plaintiffs one hundred full-pressed bales "fully good fair Kishil cotton" at R208-8 per candy, to be delivered from March 15th to April 1st. On March 21st the plaintiffs sent the defendant a letter reminding him of the contract and requesting him to take delivery. On receipt of this letter, the defendant put the matter into the hands of V. The plaintiff had then no cotton of the specific kind to deliver, nor did the letter refer to any particular bales. At 11-30 o'clock A.M., on March 30th, the plaintiffs sent the defendant a letter enclosing a sampling order directed to an employé of Messrs. H and S, on whose premises the bales referred to in the order were lying. V, on behalf of the defendant, got samples taken of the cotton and examined them, but without reference on that day to any standard. He then, however, conceived doubts as to the quality of the cotton, and expressed his doubts to the plaintiff in the evening of that day. On 31st March the plaintiffs sent the defendant a delivery order enclosed in a letter from their solicitors calling on the defendant to attend with his surveyor at 1 P.M. on that day to survey the cotton, as otherwise an *ex parte* survey would be held. This letter reached the defendant at 11-30 o'clock A.M., and was given by him to V at noon of the same day. V applied to M

CONTRACT—contd.**9. BREACH OF CONTRACT—contd.**

to attend as surveyor, but *M* was unable to do so. The plaintiffs had an *ex parte* survey held by Messrs. C. and B at 1 p.m., and they pronounced the cotton, samples of which were submitted to them, to be "fully good fair Kishli cotton." While this survey was going on, the defendant was on the Cotton Green, but declined to attend, saying that *V* and his surveyor were coming. Shortly afterwards *V* did come, and subsequently wrote a letter to plaintiffs in the defendant's name, stating that the cotton was not of the description contracted to be sold by them, and asking for a survey. This letter reached the plaintiffs at 2-19 o'clock p.m. After this there was a discussion between plaintiffs and defendant and *V*. On that afternoon (the 31st March) the plaintiffs' solicitors sent a letter to the defendant stating the result of the survey and requiring him to take delivery. This was answered by a letter of next day (April 1st) from the defendant's solicitors denying that the cotton was of proper quality or that proper notice of the survey had been given, alleging that the defendant had that morning attended with his surveyor and asked leave to survey the cotton which had been refused, and stating that the contract must be treated as cancelled. The cotton was sold by auction on April 5th. The plaintiffs brought this suit to recover Rs. 1,631-1-11 as damages for non-acceptance of the cotton. The defendant contended that there had been no reasonable time allowed by the plaintiffs for the examination of the cotton, and that a joint survey should have been held. *Held*, that a joint survey was not necessary under the terms of s. 38 of the Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872), and that the defendant, having had a period of twenty-four hours for inspection, had had a reasonable opportunity of seeing whether the cotton offered by the plaintiffs was such cotton as the plaintiffs were bound by their contract to deliver. A purchaser of goods is not entitled to continue inspecting and examining the goods offered by the vendor until the expiration of the period for delivery. A reasonable opportunity for such inspection and examination is all that he is entitled to. **RUTTONSEY MORARIJI v. JAMNADAS PITAMBERDAS**
I. L. R. 6 Bom. 692

13. — Breach of Warranty—Goods not agreeing with sample—Conduct of parties—Estoppel. In a suit for damages for breach of warranty, where the dispute was whether the goods tendered (shellac) were according to the contract, it appeared that a sample had been taken by the plaintiff's sircar, and referred to the selling broker to decide whether the goods from which it had been taken ought to be accepted, and he decided that they should be taken at one rupee per maund less than the contract rate, which award the parties agreed to abide by. The sircar then went to the godown of the defendants, thoroughly examined the undelivered shellac, and removed it to the godown of the plaintiff. *Held*, that after this the parties could not be allowed to raise the question whether

CONTRACT—contd.**9. BREACH OF CONTRACT—contd.**

there had been a breach of that contract and to ask for damages by reason of the goods not being of the quality contracted for. **FORNARO v. RAMNARAIN SOOKDEB**
14 B. L. R. 180: 23 W. R. 136

14. — Alleged breach of warranty by vendor on a sale and delivery of goods—Burden of proof after acceptance, following upon an examination by purchaser. Under five contracts for the sale of good Burma cutch, to be delivered to a Calcutta firm, in Calcutta, by the vendors, who knew that it was bought for the export market, delivery and acceptance followed upon a searching examination of the cutch by the purchasers. The latter having sent advices of this purchase to a New York firm, with which they were in partnership, parcels of cutch were sold to different buyers in America, to whom, under such "forward" contracts, the cutch was shipped in separate shipments by the Calcutta firm. On the arrival of the cutch, objection was taken to its quality by the American buyers, who refused to take delivery. The Calcutta firm thereupon sued the vendors under the five contracts above mentioned. The burden of proof being upon the plaintiffs, who had accepted the cutch after full examination in Calcutta, to prove the breach of contract by the vendors by cogent evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of due performance that arose from such acceptance.—*Held*, that this presumption was not rebutted in the absence of evidence as to the treatment of the cutch on its re-shipment by the plaintiffs, on the voyage from India to America, and at the port of arrival. **GAN KIM SWEE v. RALLI BROTHERS**

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 237
L. R. 13 I. A. 60

15. — Executory sale—Delivery order—Appropriation of goods to contract—Substitution of liability—Condition precedent—Delivery in certain months—Payment in advance—Refusal to deliver—Damages. In January 1883, *W & Co.*, of Madras, contracted to deliver to *P & Co.*, of Madras, certain goods of a certain quality, subject to survey before shipment, at a certain price "f. o. b. Cocanada, delivery in April and May, terms full advance and local exchange $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. payable at Madras." This contract was contained in bought and sold notes. It was further agreed that the goods were to be delivered on board any ship *P & Co.* might direct at the port of Cocanada. *P & Co.* paid the full amount of the purchase money in January. On the 31st March *P & Co.* wrote to *W & Co.* requesting that the goods might be marked in a certain way. On the 18th May *W & Co.* wrote to *P & Co.*, enclosing a letter from *W & Co.* to *S N & Co.* of Cocanada, requesting *S N & Co.* to hold the goods (which were said to have been purchased by *W & Co.* from *S N & Co.* and to be in godown) at the disposal of *P & Co.* In the letter to *P & Co.* from *W & Co.* the goods were also said to be in godown at that date. On the same day *P & Co.*

CONTRACT—contd.**9. BREACH OF CONTRACT—contd.**

wrote to *S N & Co.* enclosing a delivery order for the goods (which *P & Co.* stated they believed to be in godown), requesting that they might be marked in a particular way. On the 25th May *S N & Co.* wrote to *P & Co.* informing them that they held the goods at *P & Co.*'s disposal. On the 28th May *P & Co.* received this letter. On the 31st May *P & Co.* chartered a ship to take on board the said goods and other goods bought by *P & Co.* from *S N & Co.* and others, and wrote to *S N & Co.* informing them that the ship would arrive about the 12th June. On the 5th June *P & Co.* wrote acknowledging receipt of a letter which stated that only a portion of the goods to be shipped was ready. On the 9th June *P & Co.* received a letter from *S N & Co.* stating that all the goods were ready. On the 17th June the ship arrived at Cocanada. On the 21st June *S N & Co.* stopped payment and ceased to carry on business. No goods were delivered according to the contract. *S N & Co.* never had the goods to deliver between 18th May and 17th June. In a suit by *P & Co.* to recover from *W & Co.* the price paid and damages for breach of contract to deliver the goods, it was contended for *W & Co.* (i) that the transfer of the delivery order of the 18th May amounted to a delivery of the goods. *Held*, that, as *S N & Co.* had neither had possession of the goods to be delivered nor had appropriated any goods to the contract, the delivery order was inoperative. (ii) That the acceptance of the delivery order by *P & Co.* amounted to an agreement that *S N & Co.* should deliver to *P & Co.* the goods when ready, and that the liability of *S N & Co.* was substituted for that of *W & Co.* *Held*, that such an agreement could not be inferred. (iii) That as *S N & Co.*, by accepting the delivery order, were estopped from denying that they had possession of the goods as against *P & Co.*, *S N & Co.* were discharged as against *W & Co.*, and therefore *P & Co.* had no remedy against *W & Co.* *Held*, (1) that *S N & Co.* were not discharged as against *W & Co.*, as *S N & Co.*'s representations were false; (2) that even if *S N & Co.* were discharged, this could not affect *P & Co.* (iv) That as *P & Co.* had not supplied a ship in May, they had failed to perform their part of the contract and could not recover. *Held*, distinguishing *Bowes v. Shand*, *L. R. 2 App. Ca. 455*, and *Reuter v. Sala*, *L. R. 4 C. P. D. 239*, that the presence of the ship in May was not a condition precedent to *P & Co.* recovering. (v) That *W & Co.* had rescinded the contract on the 29th June by refusing to deliver, and therefore *P & Co.* were only entitled to recover the price paid. *Held*, that *W & Co.* were not entitled to rescind the contract. *Held*, also, that *P & Co.*, having paid in advance, were entitled to a reasonable time after the 29th June to prepare to purchase other goods, and were entitled to the difference between the contract price and the market price on the 1st of July as damages for the breach to deliver. *SHAW v. BILL*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 38

CONTRACT—contd.**9. BREACH OF CONTRACT—contd.**

16. ——— Sale of unascertained goods—Appropriation by Vendor—Passing of property—Power of re-sale—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 107—Measure of Damages. The contract was for sale by description of 15 bales of grey shirtings (to arrive) at an agreed price. It was found that the 15 bales, which were tendered by the plaintiff, did answer the description, but the defendants refused to accept them, alleging that they were wrongly marked. Under the contract of sale, the plaintiffs had an express power of re-sale. After giving notice to the defendants, they had the goods re-sold at auction and bought them in themselves as the highest bidders. Then they brought an action for the difference between the contract price and the price realized at the re-sale, framing the suit as for loss on re-sale and not for damages for breach of the contract. *Held*, that, the defendants having refused to accept the goods, the property in them remained in the vendors (plaintiffs), and the re-sale had no effect whatever. To such a case as this neither s. 107 of the Contract Act nor the proviso for re-sale in the contract itself can have any application. Such power is required when the property in the goods has passed to the purchaser, subject to the lien of the vendor for the unpaid purchase-money. The plaintiffs were entitled to receive only the difference between the market price of the day and the contract price, and that was the true measure of damages. *YULE & Co. v. MAHOMED HOSSAIN*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 124

1 C. W. N. 71

17. ——— Passing of Property—Power of re-sale—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 107—Measure of damages. The plaintiff under several contracts with the defendant produced by manufacture goods answering to the description of the contracts, and appropriated them to the several contracts. On notice of the production of the goods being given to the defendant, he directed the goods so appropriated to be marked and despatched for shipment according to certain instructions. The plaintiffs carried out these instructions, but the goods could not be shipped, as the vessels in which they were to be shipped were not available at their usual place. *Held*, the ownership in the goods was transferred to the defendant, and the plaintiffs became entitled under s. 107 of the Contract Act, after due notice, to re-sell them on the defendant's refusal to take delivery and to recover as damages the difference between the contract prices of the goods and the price at which they were resold. *CLIVE JUTE MILLS Co. v. EBRAHIM ARAB*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 177

See PRAG NARAIN v. MULCHAND

I. L. R. 19 All. 535

See BASHDEO v. SMIDT **I. L. R. 22 All. 55**

18. ——— Failure to take delivery under indent of goods—Right of re-sale—Con-

CONTRACT—contd.**9. BREACH OF CONTRACT—contd.**

tract Act (IX of 1872), s. 107—Liability for loss. Plaintiffs had procured certain goods in pursuance of indents signed by defendants, which provided that, in the event of defendants failing to take due delivery of the goods, plaintiffs should be at liberty to re-sell them on defendants' account, and that defendants should pay to plaintiffs any deficiency arising from such re-sale. Goods were re-sold at a loss, and in a suit to recover such loss it was contended, in defence, that the property in the goods had not passed to the defendants, and that plaintiffs' only remedy was by way of damages. *Held*, that a clause such as that contained in the indent came into operation notwithstanding that the property had not passed to the buyers; and that plaintiffs were entitled to recover the deficiency arising from the re-sale. *BEST v. MUHAMMAD SAIT* . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 18

19. ————— *Breach of contract—Power of re-sale—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 107—Damages.* The plaintiffs sold to the defendant under an "Indent" contract ten cases of tobacco at an agreed price. On arrival, the defendant refused to pay for and take delivery of the goods on the ground that they were not the goods contracted for. After notice to the defendant, the plaintiffs re-sold the goods and sued to recover the expenses of the re-sale and the difference between the price realized and the contract price with interest. *Held*, that cl. 1 of the Indent contract gave the plaintiffs a right to re-sell the goods and sue for the damages mentioned therein. *S. 107 of the Contract Act had no bearing on the case.* *Yule & Co. v. Mahommed Hossain, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 124*, dissented from. *MOLL SCHUTTE & Co. v. LUCHMI CHAND* . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 505
2 C. W. N. 283

20. ————— *Carriers—Railway Receipt—Jus tertii—Title.* In March 1871, *T & Co.*, brokers in Calcutta, sold to *S & Co.*, on account of *C*, an up-country seed merchant, 200 tons of poppy-seed, and allowed *C* to draw upon them to the extent of the value of fifty tons before despatch, on the terms of a previous contract, by which they had allowed *C* to draw against cotton to arrive in Calcutta before the drafts matured, *C* authorizing them to receive payment on his account on goods sold and delivered through them. Towards the end of March, *C* entered into an agreement with *E*, a merchant in Calcutta, under which *E* accepted bills to a large amount for *C*, upon *C*'s promise to cover the bills before maturity. In June *C* ordered the defendant Railway Company to consign all goods despatched from Fyzabad to *E*'s address, and empowered *E* to take delivery of, and give receipts for, all such goods. In the same month, *C* despatched from Patna, in bags supplied by *S & Co.*, fifty-five tons of poppy-seed to Calcutta, and sent the railway receipt to *E*, who was therein named as the consignee. One of the terms printed on the receipt

CONTRACT—contd.**9. BREACH OF CONTRACT—contd.**

stated that goods would only be delivered to the consignee named in the receipt, or to his order. In advising *E* of the despatch of poppy-seed, *C* informed him that it had been sold to *S & Co.*, and that delivery was to be made through *T & Co.*; and *E* had also seen letters which passed between *C* and his agents, in which the following passages occurred: "Our Calcutta firm will deliver the poppy to *T & Co.*," and "Do your best, and hurry off despatches of fifty tons of poppy; the rest of the poppy and linseed can go to *E*." *E* endorsed the railway's receipt to *S & Co.*, who paid the freight, and sircars of *E* and *S & Co.* together went to the railway station and demanded delivery, which the Railway Company at first promised to give, but afterwards, under an order from *C* to "deliver fifty tons to *T & Co.*, and to no other party, the rest of the seed to be delivered according to documents," they, at *T & Co.*'s request, delivered the whole fifty-five tons to them. In an action by *E* against the Railway Company for non-delivery of the seed to him:—*Held* (per MARKBY, J.) *E* was mere agent of the vendor for the delivery of the goods; *T & Co.* had superior title to the goods, of which *E* had notice. *Held* (per COUCH, C.J., and MACPHERSON, J., on appeal) the Railway Company was bound to deliver to *E*. The property in the goods and the right of possession was in him; he had an authority coupled with an interest which *C* could not revoke; he had no notice of the title of *T & Co.*, which was an equitable right only. *EAGLETON v. EAST INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY* . 8 B. L. R. 581: 17 W. R. 532

21. ————— *Betrothal—Marriage—Breach of promise of marriage—Reciprocal contingent contract—Damages—Upariyaman—Halai Bhatia caste.* The plaintiffs alleged that by a written agreement dated the 18th March 1882 the first defendant and her deceased son *L* agreed that the second defendant *K*, who was the daughter of the first defendant, should be given in marriage to the second plaintiff, who was the son of plaintiff No. 1; and that the betrothal of these two persons took place accordingly. The agreement was executed by the said *L*, as eldest male member of his family, in the name of his deceased father. In pursuance of this agreement, the plaintiffs paid to the first defendant *R700* as "upariyaman," and they presented *K* with ornaments and clothes of considerable value. The plaintiffs complained that the first defendant subsequently refused to carry out the contract of marriage and had married her daughter, *K* (defendant No. 2), to another person. They claimed in this suit to recover the ornaments and clothes, together with the *R700* paid to the first defendant as "upariyaman" and *R10,000* as damages. The first defendant was sued both in her personal capacity and as heir and legal representative of her son *L*. The first defendant pleaded that neither she nor the second defendant were bound by the betrothal agree-

CONTRACT—*contd.*9. BREACH OF CONTRACT—*contd.*

ment, as they were not parties to it; that the contract had been a contingent contract, inasmuch as her son, *L*, had agreed to give *K* (defendant No. 2) in marriage to the second plaintiff only on condition that he (*L*) should obtain in marriage *U*, the daughter of the third plaintiff, and that *L* and *U* were accordingly betrothed; that *L* had died in 1884, and that the contract had been thereby determined; that she had been willing to renew it, and had proposed that a younger son of hers (*J*) should be accepted as the husband of *U*, but that the plaintiffs had declined this offer. In proof of her allegation that the contract was a reciprocal contingent contract, the first defendant relied upon the following clause in the agreement:—"At the time when the marriages are to take place, the marriages of the two girls are to be performed together. When you shall give your daughter in marriage, I also am at the same time to give my daughter in marriage." *Held*, that the agreement of betrothal was not a reciprocal contingent contract; and that the first defendant had committed a breach of the agreement by not giving her daughter, *K* (defendant No. 2), in marriage to the second plaintiff; and that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover from the first defendant the value of the ornaments and the Rs 700 paid by the plaintiffs as "upariyaman," together with Rs 600 damages for the breach of contract. The second defendant, being a minor, was held not liable, and the suit as against her was dismissed. *MULJI THAKERSEY v. GOMTI*. I. L. R. 11 Bom. 412

22. ——— Building contract—Breach of contract—Power of re-entry—Certificate of Architect, how far conclusive. By a building contract entered into between plaintiff and defendants, it was agreed that plaintiff should erect certain premises on behalf of the defendants at the rates specified in the bill of quantities annexed. The agreement provided that defendants should pay to plaintiff at the rate of 90 per cent. upon the value of work executed and materials laid down as certified by the architect, and that, should defendants make default in so doing for a period beyond fourteen days after the amount thereof shall have been certified, plaintiff should be at liberty to suspend the works and require payment of all works executed and materials laid down. The agreement further provided that, if the contractor shall suspend or delay the performance of his part of the contract, the defendants might, through their architect, give notice requiring the works to be proceeded with, and in case of default on the part of the contractor for a period of twenty-eight days might enter upon and take possession of the premises. It was further provided that the decision of the architect with respect to the amount, state, and condition of the works actually executed or in respect to any questions that may arise shall be final. During the continuance of the works, disputes arose as to the amount due to the plaintiff, although certified by

CONTRACT—*contd.*9. BREACH OF CONTRACT—*contd.*

the architect as agreed, and in consequence plaintiff refused to continue the work, whereupon defendants, after giving due notice, entered upon the premises. Plaintiff sued for damages in consequence of the defendants having taken possession and for the balance due on the accounts. *Held*, (i) that the defendants committed a breach of the contract by refusing to pay the full amount due under the architect's certificate; (ii) that the plaintiff thereupon rescinded the contract, and that, therefore, defendants were entitled after due notice to enter and take possession; (iii) that in the absence of proof of collusion between the architect and the plaintiff, the defendants were bound by the architect's certificate as to the amount due to the plaintiff. *KUPPUSAMI NAIDU v. SMITH & CO.* I. L. R. 19 Mad. 178

23. ——— Delivery—Damages, measure of—Delivery, specific period for—Seller's option—Notice of inability to perform contract. If a vendor has any specific period of time allowed to him to deliver goods, and before the time has elapsed gives notice to the purchaser that he will be unable to complete the delivery, the purchaser not rescinding the contract, the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the price of the subject-matter on the last day of the period within which the delivery ought to have been made. The terms, "shipment at seller's option during August-September," in a contract, do not mean that the seller has an optional period of two separate months in which he can deliver, but they refer merely to the character of the delivery. *Leigh v. Paterson, 8 Taunt. 540*, referred to. *MACKERITCH v. NOBO COOMAR RAY* (1903) I. L. R. 30 Cal. 477 : s.c. 7 C. W. N. 431

24. ——— Re-sale or rejection—Right of re-sale—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 107—Inferiority of quality—Right to reject—Proprietary right, exercise of—Damages. Unless there is anything in the contract to the contrary, a buyer cannot be compelled to take goods with an allowance for inferiority of quality. If the right to reject the goods as being of an inferior quality is not exercised by the buyer when the goods are tendered, but a right of a proprietary character in respect of the goods is exercised by directing delivery to be made to third parties then the buyer accepts the goods, and, if they remain in the possession of the seller, then the latter has a lien upon them, and is entitled, under s. 107 of the Contract Act, to re-sell the goods and recover as damages the difference between the contract price and the price at the re-sale. *HARIDAS KHANDELWAL v. KALUMULL* (1903) I. L. R. 30 Cal. 649 : 7 C. W. N. 562

25. ——— Damages, suit for—Breach of contract—License to work in forest—Construction of contract—Verbal agreement, contemporaneous—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 91 and 92, proviso (2).

CONTRACT—contd.**9. BREACH OF CONTRACT—contd.**

One of two defendants in consideration of advances made to him by the plaintiff for the purpose of paying the cost of obtaining the lease of a forest in the name of his son, the other defendant, made an agreement with the plaintiff that "when my son returns I will make him to arrange for you in some way or other (or by any means) to go on working the forest within the years for which a written permit has been obtained." The son was not a party to the agreement. *Held*, in a suit for damages for breach of contract in not giving the working of the forest to the plaintiffs, that on its true construction the agreement contemplated the making of a contract for working the forest only on the return of the son and left all terms to be then arranged; and the plaintiff was entitled only to recovery of the advances with interest. An alleged contemporaneous verbal arrangement as to the rates the plaintiff was to pay for working the forest was *held* not to be proved; and, *quære*, whether, if proved, evidence of it would have been admissible with reference to s. 91 of the Evidence Act. *MAUNG SHWE OH v. MAUNG TUN GYAW* (1905). . . . **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 96**
s.c. 9 C. W. N. 147
L. R. 31 I. A. 188

26. ——— Marriage settlement—Construction of document—Agreement to pay annuity to bride. On the occasion of the marriage of the plaintiff, then a minor, with the son of the defendant, the defendant agreed with the father of the plaintiff to pay to the plaintiff unconditionally the sum of Rs 500 a month from the date of the marriage, and the payment of this allowance was made a charge upon certain immoveable property specified in the agreement. The plaintiff after a time refused, for reasons stated by her in her plaint, to live with her husband. Subsequently to this the stipulated allowance having been stopped, the plaintiff sued on the agreement above referred to to recover arrears amounting to Rs 15,000. *Held*, that the plaintiff, though not a party to the agreement in question, was entitled to sue on it; also, on a construction of the agreement that no conditions as to the conduct of the plaintiff being laid down therein the fact that the plaintiff refused to live with her husband was no bar to the suit. *HUSAINI BEGAM v. KHWAJA MUHAMMAD KHAN* (1906). . . . **I. L. R. 29 All. 151**

27. ——— Criminal breach of contract—Complaint against workman of failure to complete work—Completion of work by complainant prior to complaint—Maintainability of charge—Act XIII of 1859, s. 2. An employer applied for an order under s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859, alleging that a workman had received an advance on account of the work and had failed to perform his part of the contract. Prior to lodging the complaint, the employer had completed the work, and he claimed an order for the repayment of the advance:—*Held*, that no order could be made. The section

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only applies, when the work is uncompleted, when the complaint is made. If the work has been completed, when the complaint is made, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction under the section though the employer has a remedy against the workman in the Civil Courts. *High Court Proceedings, dated 29th March 1865 (Weir's 'Law of Offences,' 445), approved.* The offence created by the act is not the neglect, or refusal of the workman to perform his contract, but the failure of the workman to comply with an order made by the Magistrate that the workman should repay the money advanced or perform the contract. *King-Emperor v. Takasi Nukayya, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 660, approved. In the matter of ANUSOORI SANYASI* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 37

28. ——— Criminal breach of contract—Act XIII of 1859, ss. 2 and 3—Imprisonment—Effect of extension of the Act beyond the Presidency towns—Liability to repay money after the expiry of the term of the contract. The effect of s. 5. of Act XIII of 1859 is to extend the whole of its provisions to the place, where it is declared to be in force, and a master or employer resident or carrying on business at such place has the same rights as are conferred on masters or employers resident or carrying on business in a Presidency town. *Per STEPHEN, J.*—The expiration of the term of the contract does not deprive the complainant of his right to ask for the repayment of the money advanced by him. *Queen-Empress v. Konda, I. L. R. 16 Mad. 347, followed. Khoda Buksh v. Moti Lal Johori, 11 C. W. N. 247, dissented from. Per HOLMWOOD, J. (contra).*—The complainant cannot exercise an option to recover the amount advanced after the expiry of the contract. *In re Chikka Putta, 1 Weir 704; In re Matha Goundan, 1 Weir 705; In re Bettay, 1 Weir 706, and Khoda Buksh v. Moti Lal Johori, 11 C. W. N. 247, followed. NARISING PRASAD SINGH v. EMPEROR* (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1028

29. ——— Criminal breach of contract—Act XIII of 1859, ss. 2, 3—Imprisonment—Legality of simultaneous orders to perform the work contracted for and to suffer imprisonment in default. An order of imprisonment in default, passed simultaneously with an order to perform work according to the terms of the contract under Act XIII of 1859, is illegal. *NARWANJI PRASAD SINGH v. LACHMAN HAJAM* (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1035

30. ——— Injunction—Breach of contract—Contract of personal service—Agreement—Absence of negative agreement—Negative covenant implied—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 57, also illustration (d)—Restraint of trade—Damages—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 74—Codified law. By an agreement made in England, M was engaged by B & Co., a firm of Engineers in Calcutta, as an assistant in their firm for a period of five years, and it was, *inter alia*, agreed that "he

CONTRACT—contd.**9. BREACH OF CONTRACT—concl'd.**

should diligently and to the best of his ability devote himself to the duties incumbent on him and should faithfully observe and comply with such instructions as he might from time to time receive from the firm." During the term of his engagement, *M* left the employ of *B & Co.* and entered that of another firm. On a suit, instituted by *B & Co.*, for an injunction to restrain *M* from serving, working or being employed by any other person or persons and for damages:—*Held*, although there was no negative condition in terms in the agreement, a negative covenant could be properly implied, under s. 57 of the Specific Relief Act, and illustration (d) thereto, which gave legislative sanction in India to the law as laid down by *Selborne L. J.* in *Wolverhampton and Walsall Railway Company v. London and North Western Railway Co.*, *L. R. 16 Eq. 433*, *Charlesworth v. MacDonald*, *I. L. R. 23 Bom. 103*, *Lumley v. Wagner*, *5 DeG. & S. 485*, *Withwood Chemical Company v. Hardman*, [1891] *2 Ch. 416*, *Ehrman v. Bartholomew*, [1898] *1 Ch. 671*, referred to. Where the law has been codified, it is of little avail to enquire what is the law apart from such codification; the Code itself must be looked to as the guide in the matter. As the contract had been most deliberately broken the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction according to the principles of equity, justice, and good conscience. *BURN & Co. v. McDONALD* (1908)

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 354

10. LAW GOVERNING CONTRACTS.

1. ——— Contract made out of British India—Principal and Surety—*Lex loci contractus*. Under a contract, made and to be performed in the territory of an Independent State, between the State and contractors, the latter received an advance of money, for the repayment whereof, in case the contract should fail, a third party became surety to the State. The contract failed and was terminated by the State, to which the surety repaid, on its demand, the money advanced, with some deduction on account of a part performance. For this amount the surety sued the principals, who were subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in British India. In deciding whether the contract had or had not failed within the meaning of the suretyship undertaken by the plaintiffs:—*Held*, that not the law of British India, but what was in the contemplation of the parties as to the result of the contract when they entered into it, must be regarded. *SUJAN SINGH v. GUNGA RAM*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 337
L. R. 9 I. A. 58

11. VOID CONTRACTS.

1. ——— Contract with public servant—Conflict with public duties—Public policy.—

CONTRACT—concl'd.**11. VOID CONTRACTS—concl'd.**

Void Contract—Expert agent, negligence of—Damages. If a person enters into a contract with a public servant which he knows casts upon the public servant duties which may conflict with the duties he owes to the public, such a contract is void. A defendant with special skill when employed for reward by the plaintiff is bound to exercise his skill in the execution of the duties entrusted to him and ought not to rely on the statement of others. *SITARAMPUR COAL Co., LD. v. T. H. COLLEY* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 59

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872).

See CONTRACT.

See PENALTY, PRINCIPAL AND SURETY,
RES JUDICATA, TRIAL BY JURY.

See TRUST DEED . **9 C. W. N. 817**

1. ——— Operation of. *Semble*: The Contract Act is not retrospective. *OMDA KHANUM v. BROJENDRO COOMAR ROY CHOWDHRY*

12 B. L. R. 451: 20 W. R. 370: and
21 W. R. 352

2. ——— Illustrations appended to sections, how far binding. *Per STUART, C. J.*—Remarks on the legal character of the "Illustrations" attached to Acts of the Indian Legislature, and opinion expressed that they form no part of these Acts. *NANAK RAM v. MEHIN LAL*

I. L. R. 1 All. 487

3. ——— Illustrations appended to sections. The practice of looking more at the illustrations in the contract Act than at the words of the sections of the Act pointed out as a mistake. *OMED ALI v. NIDHEE RAM*

22 W. R. 367

s. 2.

See PROMISSORY NOTE, FORM OF.

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 283

s. 2, cl. (d).

See CONSIDERATION.

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 37

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 13

ss. 2 (d) and 25—Services rendered during the defendant's minority at his desire and continued at his request after his majority—Agreement to compensate for services. Services rendered at the desire of a minor expressed during his minority and continued at the same request after his majority form a good consideration for a subsequent express promise by him in favour of the person who rendered the services. By s. 2 (d) of the Contract Act, services already rendered at the desire of the promisor are placed on the same footing with such services to be rendered and constitute a good consideration for a definite agreement. Cases where a person without the knowledge of the promisor or otherwise than at his request does the latter some service, and the promisor undertakes to compensate

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

ss. 2 (d) and 25—*concl'd.*

him for it are covered by s. 25 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872); in them the promise does not need a consideration to support it. *SINDHA SHRI GANPAT-SINGJI HIMATSINGJI v. ABRAHAM*

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 755

ss. 2, cl. (g), 23, 24—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 257A.
I. L. R. 31 Bom. 552

s. 4.

See PROMISSORY NOTE—FORM OF.
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 669

See STAMP ACT, s. 34.
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 669

Letter of acceptance incor- rectly addressed. A letter of acceptance to a proposer, not correctly addressed, could not, although posted, be said to have been "put in a course of transmission" to him within the meaning of s. 4 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872). *Townsend's Case, L. R. 13 Eq. 148*, referred to. *RAM DAS CHAKARBAT v. OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR OF THE COTTON GINNING COMPANY*

I. L. R. 9 All. 366

ss. 4, 5—*Place where contract is made—Proposal and acceptance by letter—Jurisdiction—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 17—*"Place where the contract was made." Plaintiff, who resided at Kurnool, filed a suit in the District Court of Kurnool against the defendants, who resided in Madras, for damages. Plaintiff had been consigning goods for sale to the defendants as commission agents and he now complained that they had sold his goods at rates unnecessarily low. The contract of agency had been concluded by postal communications between plaintiff and defendants. *Held*, that the suit was one arising out of contract within the meaning of s. 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that, within the meaning of expl. III to that section, the cause of action arose at the place where the contract was made, *i.e.*, at Madras, and that cl. (iii) of the explanation was inapplicable to the suit, inasmuch as the amount claimed was one payable not in performance of the contract but as damages for its breach. Under the Indian Contract Act, where the proposal and acceptance are made by letters, the contract is made at the time when and at the place where the letter of acceptance is posted, though the contract is voidable at the instance of the acceptor by communication of his revocation before the acceptance has come to the knowledge of the proposer. *KAMISSETTI SUBBIAH v. KATHA VENKATASWAMY (1904)*

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 355

s. 10.

See CHARTER PARTY.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 241
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 389

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

s. 10—*concl'd.*

See MINOR—LIABILITY OF MINOR ON, AND RIGHT TO ENFORCE, CONTRACTS.

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 552
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 146

ss. 10 and 63—*District Municipal Act (Bombay Act II of 1884), ss. 27 (2), (17) and 30—Municipality—Special general meeting—President—Dispensation or remission—Promise—Contract by Corporation—Executed consideration.* In order that a meeting of the Special General Committee of a District Municipality should be properly constituted, it must be called by the President under s. 27 (2) of the District Municipal Act (Bombay Act II of 1884). If the meeting be not so-called, the defect is not cured by s. 27 (17). Under s. 63 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), there can be dispensation or remission only by means of a promise. There must be a proposal of the dispensation or remission, which is accepted. Under s. 10 of the Contract Act, consideration is not an essential of an agreement. In the Act the word "agreement" refers both to "a promise" and a "set of promises forming the consideration for each other." Though a contract by a corporation must ordinarily be made under seal, still, where there is that which is known as an executed consideration, an action will lie, though this formality has not been observed. *ABAJI SITARAM v. TRIMBAK MUNICIPALITY (1904)*

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 66

ss. 10, 11, 64 and 65—*Minority—Contract by Infants—Void contract—Repayment of advance on contract made by an infant.* *Held*, that a mortgage entered into by an infant is not merely voidable, but void *ab initio*. *Held*, also, that ss. 64 and 65 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, apply only to contracts between competent parties and are not applicable to a case where there is not and could not have been any contract at all. *Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, I. L. R. 39 Calc. 539*, followed. *KAMTA PRASAD v. SHEO GOPAL (1904)*

I. L. R. 26 All. 342

ss. 10, 11, 68, 247, 248—

See INFANT . . . 11 C. W. N. 135

s. 11.

See DOMICILE . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 697

See ESTOPPEL—ESTOPPEL BY CONDUCT.
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 539

See MAJORITY, AGE OF.

I. L. R. 7 All. 490, 763

See MINOR—LIABILITY OF MINOR ON, AND RIGHT TO ENFORCE, CONTRACTS.

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 50
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 697
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 415
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 508
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 381
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 276
3 C. W. N. 466

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 11—*concl.*

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 50

See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE—SPECIAL CASES .
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 415
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 545
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 276

Minor—Act No. I of 1872 (*Indian Evidence Act*), s. 115—*Estoppel*—Effect of minor fraudulently representing himself to be of full age. Whether or not the doctrine of estoppel applies to a contract entered into by a minor, where persons who are in fact under age by false and fraudulent misrepresentations as to their age induce others to purchase property from them, they are liable in equity to make restitution to the purchasers for the benefit they have obtained before they can recover possession of the property sold. So held by BANERJI, *J.* *Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 539, *Brohmo Dutt v. Dharmodas Ghose*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 381, *Ganesh Lala v. Bapu*, I. L. R. 21 Bom. 198, and *Stikeman v. Dawson*, 16 L. J. Ch. 205, referred to. RICHARDS, *J.*, differed on the question of fact as to whether the plaintiffs had been induced by any misrepresentations of the defendants as to their ages to enter into the contract sought to be set aside. *JAGAR NATH SINGH v. LALTA PRASAD* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 All. 21

s. 13.

See LACHES . I. L. R. 4 All. 334

ss. 13 and 14.

See CHARTER PARTY.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 241
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 389

ss. 15 and 16—Coercion—Obstructing removal of corpse of husband until widow has accepted a boy in adoption and signed a deed of adoption. The minor widow of a deceased Hindu (who had authorized her to adopt a son) corporeally accepted a boy as in adoption from his natural father who belonged to a different gotra from her deceased husband. At the time when the child was handed over to the widow, her husband's corpse was still in the house, and the relatives of the child and other members of the caste obstructed the removal of the corpse until the child had been accepted in adoption, and until the widow had executed a deed of adoption. Held, that obstructing the removal of the corpse by deceased's widow or her guardian unless she made an adoption and signed a document was an unlawful act, and amounted to "coercion" and "undue influence," such as are defined in s. 15 or 16 of the Contract Act. *RANGANAYA RAMMA v. ALWAR SETTI* . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 214

s. 16—

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 493

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 16—*contd.*

See CONTRACT—ALTERATION OF CONTRACTS—ALTERATION BY THE COURT (INEQUITABLE CONTRACTS).

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 126

See DEED—CANCELLATION.

I. L. R. 10 All. 535

See DISQUALIFIED PROPRIETOR.

10 C. W. N. 849

1. Fraud—Amending Act VI of 1889—Voidable contract—Defendant entitled to plead fraud—Lapse of time—Undue influence. Fraud does not make a transaction void, but only voidable at the instance of the person defrauded. The plaintiff sued in 1900 to recover from the defendant the amount due for interest on a mortgage-bond dated the 15th April 1893 by sale of the mortgaged property. The defendant contended that he did not execute the bond with free consent, and that it was obtained from him under pressure of criminal proceedings. Held, that the defendant was entitled to resist the claim made against him by pleading fraud, and that he was entitled to urge that plea, though he had not brought a suit to set aside the transaction. Held, further, that under the circumstances he was not precluded from urging that plea by lapse of time. *Jugaldas v. Ambashankar*, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 501, distinguished. *RANGNATH SAKHARAM v. GOVIND NARSIN* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 639

2. Mortgage—Each case to be decided by its own circumstances. Held, that the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience do not of necessity disentitle a mortgagee from insisting on his security for a greater sum than what has been actually advanced: in each case the question must be asked whether there has or has not been a hard and unfair bargain on the borrower, but when that is not established against the mortgagee, then the right to redeem still remains, though it is redeeming not on payment of the sum advanced, but of the sum, which the parties agreed it was worth the mortgagor's while to pay in order to get a smaller advance, when he was in want of money. Each case must be determined according to its own circumstances. *HARI v. RAMJI* (1904) . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 371

3. Undue influence—Urgent need of money—Loan borrowed by a person in urgent need of money—Promise to pay a time-barred debt—Unfair and unconscionable bargains—Fraud—Coercion—Equity. The defendant, a karkun in the Government service, being heavily indebted and being very much harassed by his creditors, applied to the plaintiff for a loan on a mortgage. The plaintiff agreed to lend provided the defendant executed a *khata* for the payment of Rs 307-4-0, originally due by the latter's father, but which in 1894 had been held to be time-barred in a suit brought by the plaintiff, and also for the payment of Rs 25, the costs of that suit. The defendant, accordingly on the 16th

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.***s. 16—*contd.***

September 1895, passed a *khata* for R332-4-0, for the amount due under which the defendant finally passed a promissory note for R600 on the 27th August 1901. Upon this promissory note the present suit was brought. The Subordinate Judge held that the defendant received from the plaintiff only R28 on the 16th September 1895, of which R10 had been repaid; and passed a decree for R36 (*viz.*, R18, the amount of principal and R18 as interest). On appeal, the District Judge varied the decree by allowing the plaintiff's claim to the further extent of R307-4-0; and disallowed the rest of the claim on the ground that it was vitiated by undue influence which the plaintiff exercised over the defendant. On appeal: *Held*, that the plaintiff's claim ought to be allowed in full. If, according to law, a promise to pay a debt barred under the Statute of Limitations is valid and is supported on the principle that in so promising the debtor is doing what every honest man, morally speaking, ought to do and would do, the same principle ought equally to apply to a further promise to pay the said debt with interest, because interest is only accessory to the principal, and is paid to the creditor, because the latter has been deprived of the use of his money and the debtor has had the benefit of it. Under s. 16, cl. 1 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), when two persons enter into a contract, *first*, there must be subsisting between them some relation of the kind described in the section, and *secondly*, the dominating position arising out of that relation must have been used by the party holding that position to secure an *unfair* advantage over the other party. When a man, who is in urgent need of money on account of his poverty and pecuniary difficulties, asks for a loan from another, that other is in one sense in a position to dominate the will of the former by proposing his own terms and getting the borrower to agree to them. The borrower's necessity is in such cases the measure of the terms agreed to. That is a feature of every contract of money-lending, where the borrower is a man without credit and the lender is exposing his money to considerable risk. But that is not the vague kind of relation and domination contemplated by the plain terms of cl. 1 of s. 16 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872). There are well-known relations such as those of guardian and ward, father and son, patient and medical adviser, solicitor and client, trustee and *cestui que trust* and the like, which plainly fall within cl. 1 of the section. Where no such specific relations exist and the parties are at arm's length, being strangers, undue influence may be exerted, but its existence must be proved by evidence; and in such cases the nature of the benefit or the age, capacity, or health of the party, on whom the undue influence is alleged to have been exerted, are of great importance. In short, the test is, confidence reposed by one party and betrayed by the other, which means that there must be an element of fraud or coercion, under either of which the acts constituting undue influence must range themselves. The expression "unfair advantage" in cl. 1

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.***s. 16—*concl.***

of s. 16 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) is used as meaning an advantage obtained by unrighteous means. A Court of Equity will not set aside a contract, merely because it flows from moral, not legal, obligations, unless it was proved that the defendant was forced, tricked or misled into it by the plaintiff by means of fraud, using that word not merely in the restricted sense of actual deceit, but in the larger sense of an unconscientious use of power arising out of certain circumstances and conditions, and showing that the defendant, having been victimised by the plaintiff's unfair and improper conduct, was unable to understand what he was doing. *GANESH v. VISHNU* (1907) . . . **I. L. R. 32 Bom. 37**

4. ————— *As amended by Act No. VIII of 1899—Suit on bond—Unconscionable transaction—Debtor and creditor—Disqualified proprietor whose estate was under control of Court of Wards—Exercise by creditor of undue influence—Compound interest—Onus of proof of undue influence.* This was an appeal by the defendant, a "disqualified proprietor" under the provisions of the Oudh Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1876) whose property, on the ground of his indebtedness and consequent inability to manage it, had been placed in charge of the Court of Wards. Whilst it was under their control and without their sanction he executed on 27th January 1896, in favour of the plaintiff, a bond by which he contracted to pay in two years with interest and compound interest with yearly rests, the sum of R9,950 which was due on a former bond, dated 14th September 1889, executed by him for a loan of R4,000 in favour of the same creditor. No actual money consideration, therefore, passed at the execution of the bond in suit. The defendant's estates were restored to him in July 1898, and on 25th January 1904 the plaintiff brought a suit for R32,877 principal and interest due on the bond. The defence was that the bond was obtained by "undue influence," and that it was an unconscionable transaction. Both the courts below placed the onus on the defendant to prove undue influence, and found that he had failed to do so and that the transaction was not unconscionable. *Held* by the Judicial Committee (reversing the decisions of the Courts in India) following the case of *Dhanipal Das v. Maneshar Bakhsh Singh*, **I. L. R. 28 All. 570; L. R. 33 I. A. 113**, in which the same defendant as in the present case was the borrower that he was (as in that case) placed in such a condition of helplessness that the plaintiff was in a position "to dominate his will" within the meaning of s. 16 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) as amended by Act VIII of 1899, and that he used that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the defendant. Under the circumstances the bond was set aside, and a decree passed for the original sum of R4,000 with simple interest at 18 per cent. per annum from 14th September 1889 to the date of payment. *MANESHAR BAKHSH SINGH v. SHADI LALL* (1909) . . . **I. L. R. 31 All. 386**

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

ss. 16 and 17.

See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 666

See GIFT . . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 15

ss. 16, 19A.

1. ——— Undue Influence—Money-lender—Exorbitant rate of interest—Undefended suit—Court's right to interfere—Reasonable rate of interest, what is—Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), s. 210—Power of High Court to make its money decrees payable by instalments. Under ss. 16 and 19A of the Indian Contract Act the Court has power to interfere and relieve a defendant against what may appear to the Court to be unconscionable transactions. The circumstances in each case must be looked to in order to decide what would be a reasonable rate of interest to allow. Under s. 210 of the Civil Procedure Code this Court has the power to make its money decrees payable by instalments. *Per CURIAM*: The general impression prevailing in the minds of money-lenders in Bombay, as echoed in the plaintiff's affidavit, that in all cases they can defeat the provisions of the Code as to payment by instalments and get a decree for immediate payment by avoiding the Small Causes Court and coming to this Court, is erroneous and needs to be corrected. *POMA DONGRA v. WILLIAM GILLESPIE* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 348

2. ——— Unconscionable bargain—Parties not on an equal footing—Defendant not aware of the nature of the transaction—Undue influence—Contract voidable. To render a contract voidable on the ground of undue influence there must be evidence of undue influence as required by s. 16 of the Contract Act. A high rate of interest, which would induce a Court of Equity to give relief against a bargain as being on that account hard and unconscionable, is not by itself sufficient evidence of undue influence. There must be additional circumstances and when there is evidence of such additional circumstances they should be considered in the light of justice and equity. When the parties to the transaction are not on an equal footing, when it appears that the borrower was not aware of the real nature of the bargain, so that he put his signature to a document, which in fact imposed very different terms to those appearing on the face of it, when the actual rate of interest is many times higher than what appears on the document, when the borrower, when pressed for payment for what appears due on such a document, has to renew, on still more exorbitant terms, all these are additional circumstances sufficient to make out a *prima facie* case of undue influence so as to throw the onus on the lenders to disprove it. *CHATTRING MOOLCHAND v. WHITCHURCH* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 208

ss. 16, 74—Mortgagor and Mortgagee—Undue influence—Act VI of 1899, ss. 2, 4—Stipulation for increased interest—Compound Interest—Penalty—Rate of Compensation—Transfer of Property Act, ss. 86, 88—Six per cent. on amount found

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*ss. 16, 74—*concl'd.*

due. Where in a suit to enforce two mortgage-bonds there was no evidence of any actual exercise of undue influence by the mortgagees or of any special circumstances from which an inference of undue influence could be legitimately drawn, except that the mortgagor was in urgent need of money: *Held*, that this circumstance is not sufficient of itself to place the mortgagees in a position to "dominate the will" of the mortgagor within the meaning of s. 16 of the Contract Act, 1872, as amended by Act VI of 1890, s. 2. *Dhanipat Das v. Maneshar Bakhsh Singh*, L. R. 33 I. A. 118, distinguished. In default of payment of interest, both bonds stipulated that additional interest should be paid by the mortgagor from the date of their execution, both by increase of the general rate and by the increased rate of the compound interest; but at the date of the execution of the second bond there was a settlement of accounts as regards the interest due on the first bond and simple interest only was charged, the amount being included in the principal of the second bond: *Held*, that the stipulation for increased interest being retrospective and not merely from the date of default was a penalty within the meaning of s. 74 of the Contract Act as amended by Act VI of 1889, s. 4; but that under the Act reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount of the penalty was payable by the mortgagor. Their Lordships approved the concurrent findings of both Courts that the compensation should be at the same rate as the increased interest stipulated for; and also the direction of the High Court that in the case of the first bond and in the case of the second bond it should run from the date of default of that bond, compound interest being allowed only at the rate at which simple interest was stipulated for. *Held*, also, that on the true construction of ss. 86, 88 of the Transfer of Property Act and the Rules of Court made under s. 104, the High Court was right in allowing 6 per cent. interest only and not the mortgage rate of interest on the aggregate amount found due from the date fixed for redemption until realization. *SUNDAR KOER v. SHAM KRISHEN* (1906)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 150

s.c. L. R. 34 I. A. 9

s. 17.

See REGISTRATION ACT, s. 35.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 872.

ss. 17 and 19.

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—FRAUD.

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 419

ss. 18 and 19.

See CHARTER PARTY.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 241

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 389

See COMPANY—POWERS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS.

4 C. W. N. 369

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

s. 19.

See ESTOPPEL BY CONDUCT.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 539

See SALE

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 323

s. 20.

See ADMINISTRATION.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 955

See ADMINISTRATION BOND.

10 C. W. N. 623

12 C. W. N. 481

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 955

See ADMINISTRATOR.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 955

I. L. R. 35 I. A. 109

s.c. 12 C. W. N. 802

See COMPROMISE—CONSTRUCTION, ENFORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING ASIDE DEEDS OF COMPROMISE.

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 687

See COVENANT, CONSTRUCTION OF.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 284

See LACHES

I. L. R. 4 All. 334

See SETTLEMENT—CONSTRUCTION.

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 407

1. — ss. 20, 21—*Mistake of Facts—Erroneous expectation.* The defendant executed to the plaintiff in 1847 a mulgeni kabuliat (corresponding to a lease at a fixed rental), agreeing to pay to the plaintiff R150 annually. At the date of the execution of the mulgeni the Government assessment was R56-8-0, but in 1872 it was enhanced to R129-8-0, and a local fund cess of R4-9-0 imposed in addition. The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover from him the enhanced assessment and the cess. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, inasmuch as the defendant's liability was fixed by the terms of the mulgeni, which was binding, although it had been executed by both parties in the belief that the Government assessment would not be increased. A mistake as to existing facts may invalidate a contract; but an erroneous expectation, which events entirely falsify, has no effect. *BABSHETTI v. VENKATARAMANA*

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 154

2. — *Mula-vargdars, power of, to raise rent of mul-gainidar—Enhancement of assessment—Power of the State.* A mula-vargdar, or superior holder, cannot raise the rent of his mul-gainidar, or permanent tenant holding at a fixed rent on the ground that the assessment on the land has been enhanced at the Government survey. *Babshetti v. Venkataramana*, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 154, and *Ramkrishna Kine v. Narshiva Shanbog*, S. A. No. 46 of 1879, followed. *Vyakunta Bapuji v. Government of Bombay*, 12 Bom. Ap. I, referred to. *RANGA v. SUBBA HEGDE*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 473

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

ss. 20, 30 and 65.

1. — *Advance on Risk (yogyam) of Ship—Marine Insurance—Contract by way of Wager.* In a document, dated 3rd August 1896, signed by defendants and addressed to plaintiff, it was recited that plaintiff had lent a sum of money to defendants on the risk or security ("yogyam") of a ship belonging to defendants "now under sail to the Nicobars" from Negapatam; and the defendants stipulated that "as soon as the said ship starts for and reaches the Nicobar Isles and thence sets sail and goes to Rangoon, Moulmein, and from there starts again and reaches Negapatam. . . ., that is, as soon as the said ship shall come back to the Negapatam harbour again, we shall repay to you on the expiry of eight months from 23rd July 1896," the sum advanced, with interest. The ship had left Negapatam on 23rd July 1896, and was lost at sea three days later. Plaintiff sued defendants for the sum advanced, on the ground, among others, that, as the vessel had been lost before the date of the agreement, the latter was void, and defendants were liable to refund the amount advanced. *Held*, that he was not entitled to recover. The risk which formed the basis of the agreement, according to its true construction, commenced from the 23rd July 1896, as set out in the document, because it was on that day that the vessel sailed from port and commenced to incur the perils of the deep. The agreement was consequently not void under s. 20 of the Contract Act, nor were the defendants bound, under s. 65 of that Act, to restore to plaintiff the sum they had received under its terms. Such an agreement could not be held to be in any sense a policy of marine insurance. *Per DAVIES, J.*—The suit should be dismissed, under s. 30 of the Contract Act, on the further ground that the agreement was one by way of wager. *VAPPAKANDU MARAKAYAR v. ANNAMALAI CHETTI* (1901). I. L. R. 25 Mad. 561

2. — ss. 20—35, 65—*Indian Trusts Act (II of 1882), s. 34—Agreement to pay a certain sum in consideration for a promise to marry—Part payment—Failure of the agreement—Suit to recover part payment—Agreement by way of Marriage brokerage—Agreement—Contract—Difference between the two.* By an agreement made between the parties the plaintiff promised to pay the sum of R1,800 to the defendant as consideration for the latter's promise to marry his niece to the plaintiff's son. But before the marriage could take place the plaintiff's son died of plague. Under the agreement, however, the plaintiff had before her son's death paid to the defendant the sum of R750. Subsequently the plaintiff having brought a suit to recover that sum, the defendant contended that the agreement being by way of marriage brokerage was void as opposed to public policy and, therefore, under s. 65 of the Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872) no sum paid under it could be recovered. *Held*, that having regard to the character of the agreement between the parties the plaintiff was entitled to

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*ss. 20—35, 65—*concl'd.*

recover the sum from the defendant. S. 65 of the Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872) provides for the restitution of any advantage received under a contract or agreement. The section preserves the distinction between agreement and contract which is maintained throughout the Act. The section speaks generally of an agreement discovered to be void without any express reference to the cause or origin of the void character, so that an agreement which is void by reason of a principle of law would not on that account fall outside the scope of the section. *GULABCHAND v. FULBAI* (1909)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 411

ss. 20, 59, 142, 143.

See ADMINISTRATION BOND.

L. R. 33 Calc. 137

See REVENUE SALE LAW (ACT XI OF 1859), ss. 28, 30.

s. 21—*Mortgage with proviso that in case of non-redemption in a prescribed time it should become a Sale—Razinama by mortgagor declaring sale to mortgagee—Transfer of possession to mortgagee—Extinction of equity of redemption—Subsequent sale by mortgagor of equity of redemption—Mistake of law.* Under the Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 21, error of law does not vitiate a contract; much less will it annul a conveyance after the lapse of many years, unless there has been some fraud or misrepresentation and an absence of negligence. In 1848, *B* and *R* mortgaged a piece of land to *V*. It was to be redeemed in eight years, or else to become the absolute property of the mortgagee. It was not redeemed; and in 1859, *B*, in whose name the land was entered in the Government records, executed a *razinama* in favour of *V*, and *V* passed a *kabuliat* accepting the land. *B* and *R* then became *V*'s tenants, and were as such successfully sued by him for rent in 1863. In 1872, *V* sold the land to *N*, who again sold it to the defendant. The plaintiff, as purchaser from the original mortgagors (*B* and *R*) of their alleged equity of redemption, filed the present suit to redeem the property. *Held*, that, as the *razinama* given by *B* contained no reservation, and as it was accompanied by a transfer of possession, it had the effect of a conveyance of all the mortgagor's rights to the mortgagee. It operated to extinguish the equity of redemption, notwithstanding any misconception or ignorance on *B*'s part of his rights as mortgagor. *VISHNU SAKHARAM PHATAK v. KASHINATH BAPU SHANKAR*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 174

s. 22.

See PLAINT—AMENDMENT OF PLAINT.

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 358

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

s. 23.

COL.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—

- (a) GENERALLY . . . 2448.
- (b) AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY . . . 2457.
- (c) COMPOUNDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES . . . 2468.
- (d) ILLEGAL CESSSES . . . 2472.
- (e) IMMORAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . 2473.

See ACT XL OF 1858, s. 18.

I. L. R. 2 All. 902

See AGRA TENANCY ACT (II OF 1901), ss. 20, 21, 31 . . . I. L. R. 29 All. 327

See AGREEMENT OPPOSED TO PUBLIC POLICY . . . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 530

See ASSIGNMENT . . . 10 C. W. N. 755

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 29.
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 895

See CHAMPERTY . . . I. L. R. 11 All. 58

See CONTRACT . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 289
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 702See CONTRACT—ALTERATION OF CONTRACTS—ALTERATION BY COURT.
I. L. R. 11 All. 118See CONTRACT—WAGERING CONTRACTS.
I. L. R. 5 All. 443
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 358

See EXECUTOR . . . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 14

See HINDU LAW—HUSBAND AND WIFE.
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 751See INJUNCTION—UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 431
I. L. R. 9 All. 497

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—TRANSFER OF RIGHT . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 511, 878

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS.

(a) GENERALLY.

1. ———— Contract void as contrary to law—Agreement partly void and partly valid. When the void part of an agreement can be properly separated from the rest, the latter does not become invalid; but where the parties themselves treat debts—void as well as valid—as a lump sum, the Court will regard the contract as an integral one, and wholly void, upon which neither the principal nor the sureties can be sued. *DAVLATSING v. PANDU*. . . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 17

2. ———— Contract between Brokers to divide profits. A contract between two brokers to divide the profits of a transaction is not

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—contd.**s. 23—contd.****ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—contd.****(a) GENERALLY—contd.**

an illegal contract, and an action to enforce it is therefore maintainable. *SUHAJ v. BISHUN DYAL*

1 Agra 269

3. ———— *Contract in consideration that person will give Evidence in Civil Suit—Void contract—Consideration.* A contract to pay money upon the consideration that the plaintiff would give evidence in a civil suit on behalf of the defendant cannot be enforced. Such a contract is either for true evidence, and then there is no consideration, or for favourable evidence, either true or false, and then the consideration is vicious. *Semble*: If the consideration had been the plaintiff's promise not to evade process, that would still be no consideration for the defendant's undertaking. *SASHANNAH CHETTI v. RAMASAMY CHETTI*

4 Mad. 7

4. ———— *Fraud—Contract illegal and fraudulent as against third parties, but enforceable between the parties to it.* A contract between several persons to make separate tenders to Government and that whoever should obtain a contract from Government should share the profits with the others, although fraudulent towards the Government, will be enforced against any of such persons at the suit of any one of them who may have made the tender in pursuance of the contract. *ISSER CHUNDR A GHOSE v. BHOORUN MOHUN BANERJEE*

Bourke O. C. 313

5. ———— *Agreement to join Somaj.* A suit, brought to enforce a penalty for breach of an agreement by which the defendant contracted to join a certain Somaj, of which the plaintiffs were members, and agreed that he would not, without the plaintiff's permission, leave the community or join any other, it was held must be dismissed, the contract not being one capable of being enforced in a court of law. *NITAI SHAHA v. SHUBAL SHAHA*

2 B. L. R. S. N. 4 : 10 W. R. 349

6. ———— *Contract made by company before Registration Act, XIX of 1857, s. 2.* In a suit filed on the 28th of April 1866 and brought by a joint-stock company, after registration, to recover damages for breach of a contract made with the defendants before registration: *Held* (by *COUCH, C.J.*, and *ARNOULD, J.*, affirming on appeal the decree of *SARGENT, J.*), that the contract was illegal under s. 2 of Act XIX of 1857, and that the plaintiffs could not sue upon it. *GUJARAT TRADING COMPANY v. TRIKAMJI VEIJI*

3 Bom. O. C. 45

7. ———— *Contract made by company before Registration Act XIX of 1857, s. 2.* In a suit brought by a transferee of shares in a joint stock banking company formed after the passing of Act VII of 1860, and neither incorporated nor registered when the plaint was filed, to compel the directors, trustees, and public officers of the company to give up the share certificates which had come into

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—contd.**s. 23—contd.****ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—contd.****(a) GENERALLY—contd.**

the possession of the bank, or to pay damages to the plaintiff: *Held* (by *COUCH, C.J.*, and *SARGENT, J.*, affirming on appeal the decree of *ARNOULD, J.*), that the company being illegal under s. 2, Act XIX of 1857, the suit was not maintainable. *MANIKJI SORABJI v. CAMA*

3 Bom. O. C. 159

8. ———— *Payment in consideration of releasing person from Prison.* The plaintiff's husband being in jail, the plaintiff agreed with the defendants to pay them Rs 50 in consideration of their obtaining her husband's release, which they stated they could do. She accordingly paid the money. In an action for breach of contract: *Held*, that the action would not lie, as the contract was an illegal one. *PROTIMA AURAT v. DUKHINA SIKKAR*

9 B. L. R. Ap. 38 : 18 W. R. 450

9. ———— *Assessment—Contract to obtain more favourable assessment by means not stated.* In a written agreement the defendant, in consideration of a sum of money received by him, promised to obtain a more favourable assessment upon certain villages in respect of waste and cultivated lands, and in case of failure to repay the amount received. In a suit to recover the amount paid to the defendant: *Held*, that the contract was not vitiated by reason of illegality. *Aliter*, if it appeared upon the face of the plaint, or if it were established by evidence independently of written agreement, that the arrangement was that the defendant should use corrupt or illegal means, or improperly exercise any personal influence which he possessed or professed to possess over a public servant. *PICHAKUTTRY MUDALI v. NARAYANAPPA AIYAN*

2 Mad. 243

10. ———— *Bribe to Ameen.* A civil suit does not lie to recover money paid to a Civil Court Ameen to induce him to make a favourable report. *GOGUN CHUNDER DUTT v. JANOKEE*

20 W. R. 235

11. ———— *Contract against alienation—Agreement—Consideration.* By a written instrument, duly registered, *T* agreed, in consideration of the recognition by his two brothers of his rights in the joint and undivided property of the three brothers, not to sell, transfer, or mortgage his share except to them, and, should he desire to dispose of it, to dispose of it to them for a certain sum. In breach of this agreement, he gave a usufructuary mortgage of his share to *L*. *Held*, in a suit by *L* to enforce the mortgage, that the agreement was valid, and that the mortgage was bad against *T*'s brothers. *LAKHMI CHAND v. TORI LAL*

I. L. R. 1 All. 618

12. ———— *Agreement for release of attached property—Contract Act, s. 20—Mistake of fact.* Where the property of a judgment-debtor had been attached in execution for a sum claimed to be due under a decree, but which sum in fact included interest not awarded by the decree: *Held*,

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(a) GENERALLY—*contd.*

that an agreement, whereby the debtor obtained the release of his property on condition of paying by instalments the entire amount claimed inclusive of the interest, was not unlawful and void under cl. 2, s. 23 of the Indian Contract Act; and that the mistaken belief of the parties to the agreement that interest could be recovered by proceedings in execution was not a mistake of fact rendering the agreement voidable under s. 20 of that Act. *SETH GOKUL DAS GOPAL DAS v. MURLI*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 602 : 2 C. L. R. 156 :
L. R. 5 I. A. 78

13. — Agreement to become surety for good behaviour on amount of security being deposited with surety—*Illegal consideration—Void assessment—Suit to recover deposit.* *F* was required by the Magistrate, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, to furnish two sureties who should be responsible for his good behaviour, each in a certain sum. *S* agreed to become a surety on condition that *F* would deposit with him the amount of the security. *F* made the deposit, and *S* became a surety. The period for which *S* was responsible for *F*'s good conduct having expired without *F* committing any act to forfeit the security and *S* refusing to return the deposit, *F* sued *S* to recover the deposit. *Held*, that, as the consideration for the agreement defeated the object of the law, the consideration was unlawful, and *F* was not entitled to relief. *FATEH SINGH v. SANWAL SINGH*

I. L. R. 1 All. 751

14. — Champerty and Maintenance—*Assignment of chose in action—Illegal consideration.* A *bond fide* purchase of a share in a claim about to be enforced by a suit is not void under s. 23 of the Indian Contract Act, and a suit may, after such purchase, be properly brought by the vendee and vendors as co-plaintiffs. *A* and *B* having a claim against *C* for Rs. 13,099-3, but not being in circumstances themselves to institute a suit for its enforcement, sold fourteen annas or fourteenths of their claim to *D* for Rs. 4,000; and a suit was then instituted by *A*, *B*, and *D* against *C*. *C* pleaded that the sale to *D* was void under s. 23 of the Indian Contract Act, and that *A* and *B* could not sue for two annas only of their entire claim. *Held*, that the sale to *D* was not void; that the suit was properly framed; and that, even if the sale had been void, the suit by *A* and *B* was not liable to dismissal. *ABDOOL HAKIM v. DOORGA PROSHAD BANERJEE*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 4

15. — Sale made to defeat execution of decree. There is nothing in ss. 23 and 24 of the Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872) to support the opinion that a sale made with the view of defeating a probable execution is a sale with fraudulent and unlawful object, and therefore void within the meaning of those sections. *RAJAN HARJI v. ARDESHIR HOERMUSJI WADIA* I. L. R. 4 Bom. 70

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(a) GENERALLY—*contd.*

16. — Government Ferry—*Lease—Ben. Reg. VI of 1819—Illegality of contract.* *M* took a lease for three years of a Government ferry, and covenanted with the Magistrate, who granted the lease, not to underlet or assign the lease without leave or license of the Magistrate. *M* subsequently admitted *B* as his partner to share with him equally in the profits to be derived from the lease. *Held*, that such partnership was not void by reason of the covenant not to underlet or assign the lease. *S. A. No. 119 of 1872*, decided on the 1st August 1872, overruled. *GAUR SHANKAR v. MUMTAZ ALI KHAN* I. L. R. 2 All. 411

17. — Partnership in liquor contract—*Illegal partnership—Right of partner to sue for a share—Abkari Act (Bombay Act V of 1878), s. 45—Breach of License—Penalty.* A contract entered into for the purpose, or with the necessary effect, of defeating a statute will not be enforced or recognized by the Courts, at any rate where both parties stand *in pari delicto*. *A* and *B* took a liquor contract from the Government. By the terms of their license they were forbidden to take a partner, and under s. 45 of the Bombay Abkari Act (V of 1878) they were liable to a penalty of Rs. 100 for a breach of their license. *C* entered into partnership with *A* and *B* with full knowledge of the conditions of the license, and afterwards filed a suit for an account of the partnership transactions. *Held*, that *C* was not entitled to any relief, having entered into the partnership in direct violation of the law. *HORMASJI MOTABHAI v. PESTANJI DHANJIBHAI* I. L. R. 12 Bom. 422

18. — Excise Act, XXII, 1881, s. 42—*License—Sub-lease—Breach of conditions—Consideration forbidden by law—Immoral consideration—Consideration opposed to public policy.* The plaintiff obtained from the excise authorities a license to manufacture and sell country liquor, such license containing a condition against sub-letting the benefits of the license. By s. 42 of the Excise Act (XXII of 1881) the violation of any condition of a license granted under the Act is made a punishable offence. The plaintiff sub-let the license to defendants, who on the 5th of September 1884 executed an agreement to pay to the plaintiff a certain sum of money, in which was included the sum of Rs. 1,500 which the defendants had undertaken to pay to plaintiff as rent reserved on the sub-lease. The plaintiff instituted a suit for recovery of the amount due to him on the agreement, and it was decreed by the Court of first instance, but dismissed by the lower Appellate Court. On second appeal the plaintiff contended on the authority of *Gauri Shankar v. Mumtaz Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 2 All. 411, that his suit had been wrongly dismissed. *Held*, that the sub-letting of a license to manufacture and sell country liquor having been made punishable as an offence is to be deemed as an act contrary to law

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(a) GENERALLY—*contd.*

within the meaning of s. 23 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), and the claim to recover money due on such sub-lease was, therefore, not enforceable in a Court of Justice. *Gauri Shankar v. Mumtaz Ali*, I. L. R. 2 All. 411, distinguished. *DEBI PRASAD v. RUP RAM* . . . I. L. R. 10 All. 577

19. — Lease to retail Opium—*Sub-lease of such shops without the Collector's permission—Opium Act (I of 1878), s. 4—Rules made under Opium Act, ss. 43, 44, 45, and 52—Right to recover advances made for an illegal purpose subsequently carried out.* The plaintiff who held the farm of the right of retail opium at certain shops in a district, and whose lease contained a clause prohibiting sub-letting without the Collector's permission, entered into an agreement with the defendant to sub-let to him, on certain conditions, the management of certain shops in the district for one year without the Collector's permission. After the expiration of the year, the plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant to recover the balance due to him under the agreement, and obtained a decree. *Held*, reversing the decree, that the agreement not being permitted by the rules framed under the Opium Act (I of 1878) was forbidden by s. 4 of the Act, and was void as having in view an object forbidden by law. *Held*, further, that the plaintiff could not recover the price of the opium supplied to the defendant, inasmuch as advances made for an illegal purpose, subsequently carried out, cannot be recovered. *RAGHUNATH LALMAN v. NATHU HIRJI BHATE*

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 626

20. — Partition—*Agreement to relinquish ex-proprietary rights—N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), ss. 7 and 9—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 125.* By a mutual agreement entered into between the parties to a private partition of certain villages held by them jointly the parties agreed that, if either party at the time of the partition was holding *sir* land in a village which upon partition fell into the share of the other party, he would relinquish his rights in such *sir* land in favour of the party into whose share the said village had fallen. *Held*, that under such private partition the holder of the *sir* land became, on partition being effected, an ex-proprietary tenant in respect of the land previously held by him as *sir*, and that consequently the agreement to relinquish his rights in such land was not enforceable in law. *KASHI PRASAD v. KEDAR NATH SAHU* . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 219

21. — Agreement not to bid against each other at an auction. There is nothing necessarily unlawful in two or more persons agreeing not to bid against one another at an auction-sale. *HARI BALKRISHNA v. NARO MORESHVAR* I. L. R. 18 Bom. 342

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(a) GENERALLY—*contd.*

22. — Condition against sub-contract—*Sub-contract made notwithstanding condition—Suit by sub-contractor—Illegality of sub-contract—Damages—Compensation for work done.* Defendant contracted with the Executive Engineer of the Public Works Department to supply materials for the construction of a public road. One of the conditions of the contract was that no work was to be underlet, or let by task work, by the contractor without the express permission, in writing, of the Executive Engineer or his duly authorized agent. Subsequently the defendant, without obtaining the requisite permission, entered into an oral agreement with the plaintiff, under which the plaintiff was to do the contract work and the defendant to pay him all moneys received from the Executive Engineer under the contract, after deducting ten per cent., as the defendant's profit. It did not appear that the plaintiff knew of the condition against underletting contained in the contract. The plaintiff sued the defendant for the balance of money due to him under the oral agreement. The first Court found that the plaintiff had executed the whole of the contract work: and that the defendant had received from the Executive Engineer a total sum of R2,766-11-11, and of this had paid to the plaintiff R2,334-13-6, leaving a sum of R431-14-5 still in his hands. It ordered the defendant to pay this sum to the plaintiff less 10 per cent. of the whole sum of R2,766-11-11, and passed a decree accordingly for R155-3-8. On appeal, the Judge varied the decree by awarding to the plaintiff the whole sum of R431-14-5. He found that it had been agreed that the defendant should retain 10 per cent., but held that the agreement to assign or sublet the contract was contrary to public policy, and bad under s. 23 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872). On appeal to the High Court. *Held* (reversing the decree of the Judge and restoring that of the first Court), that as it did not appear that the plaintiff knew of the condition in the contract, and as the objection of illegality was not taken by the defendant, the plaintiff was not precluded from enforcing against the defendant his own contract. Even if, however, the plaintiff could not enforce the contract, he would, under the circumstances, be entitled to receive from the defendant compensation for the work and labour of which the defendant had received the benefit. The only question was how the work done should be valued. There was no direct test of its market value. The best available test was the amount which the plaintiff, at the time when he entered into the agreement, accepted as sufficient, namely, the amount to be paid by the Executive Engineer less 10 per cent. The High Court, therefore, restored the decree of the Subordinate Judge. *GANGADHAR RAGHUNATH JOSHI v. DAMODAR MOHANLAL*

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 522

23. — Insolvency—*Promissory note given in fraud of insolvency law—Illegal considera-*

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—contd.

s. 23—contd.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—contd.

(a) GENERALLY—contd.

tion. In a suit on a promissory note it appeared that it had been given by the defendant to the plaintiff in consideration of his withdrawing his threatened opposition to the discharge of an insolvent and consenting to an arrangement among the general body of creditors, who were not, though the insolvent was, aware of this transaction whereby the plaintiff was to obtain a special advantage. *Held*, that the contract was unlawful, and the suit could not be maintained. **KRISHNAPPA CHETTI v. ADIMULA MUDALI** . . . **I. L. R. 20 Mad. 84**

24. ——— Compound Interest—Sonthal Parganas Settlement Regulation (III of 1872), s. 6—Sonthal Parganas Justice Regulation (V of 1893), s. 24—Contract Act, s. 24—"Unlawful" Consideration, meaning of. There is no law or regulation laying down that an agreement between any two persons living in the Sonthal Parganas to pay compound interest upon the amount borrowed is "unlawful" within the meaning of s. 23 of the Contract Act. All that the law provides is that compound interest will not be decreed by any Court. Referring to the Sonthal Regulations, s. 6 of Regulation III of 1872, and s. 24 of Regulation V of 1893, it was *held* in respect of an agreement to pay interest on an amount composed partly of the principal and interest due on a former debt that such agreement is not void under s. 24 of the Contract Act, and that the obligor may recover such sums of money as he is entitled in law to recover, notwithstanding that part of the consideration is compound interest. **SHAMA CHARAN MISSEER v. CHUNI LAL MAHWARI** . . . **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 233**

25. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 257A—Agreement for, or to give time for satisfaction of, judgment-debt—Agreement without sanction of Court—Illegal contract—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 23—Consideration. The plaintiff obtained a decree against the defendant under which the judgment-debtor was liable to pay the amount by instalments with interest at 4 per cent. Eventually, the defendant failing to pay, the plaintiff accepted a bond executed jointly by the defendant and T, his father, by which they both became liable for the amount of the decree with interest at 18½ per cent. In a suit on the bond, it was contended that it was void within the meaning of s. 23 of the Contract Act as being forbidden by, or of a nature to defeat the provisions of s. 257A of the Civil Procedure Code; and that, consequently, the suit on it was not maintainable. *Held*, the bond was not void under s. 23 of the Contract Act. *Semble*: The words "any law" in that section refer to some substantive law, and not to an adjective law such as the procedure Code is. **HUKUM CHAND OSWAL v. TAHARUNNESSA BIBI** . . . **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 504**

26. ——— Dancing Girls—Suit on Bond—Money borrowed for immoral purposes—Naikins or

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—contd.

s. 23—contd.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—contd.

(a) GENERALLY—contd.

dancing girls of Nasik. The father of naikins (dancing girls) in Nasik by two bonds mortgaged certain property as security for money lent to him by the plaintiff. The bonds stated that the object of the loan was to enable the mortgagor to get his daughters taught singing and for household expenses. In a suit brought by the plaintiff upon the bonds it was contended that they were void on the ground that the loan was for an immoral purpose. The District Judge was of opinion that the object of teaching the girls to sing was to make them more attractive as prostitutes, and therefore, to further an immoral purpose, which could not be separated from the legal part of the purpose for which the loan was contracted. He accordingly held that the bonds were void, and could not be enforced. On appeal: *Held*, that the bonds were not void, inasmuch as, amongst the community of naikins, singing was not necessarily acquired by the women with a view of practising prostitution. It was distinct mode of obtaining a livelihood not necessarily connected with prostitution although it might be true, as a fact, that most of those who sing lead a loose life. The District Judge, therefore, went too far in concluding that the singing was necessarily intended, to the knowledge of the plaintiff, to increase the attractiveness of the mortgagor's daughters as prostitutes. **KHUBCHAND v. BERAM** . . . **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 150**

27. ——— Gift—Illegal or immoral consideration—Fraud, want of proof of. In the year 1870 H made a gift of certain immoveable property to W, who was his mistress, but lived with him as his wife, "on condition of her continuing to be his wife and remaining obedient to him, her husband." W acquired possession of the property in virtue of the gift, and had held it for eight years, when a creditor of H, under a decree enforcing a debt created by H subsequently to the gift, sued, amongst other things, for a declaration that the gift was invalid, as it had been made for an illegal consideration, viz., the future immoral cohabitation of W with H. *Held*, that, assuming that the consideration for the gift was illegal in the absence of fraud, the gift could not be set aside so many years after W had acquired possession thereunder. **Ayerst v. Jenkins, L. R. 16 Eq. 275**, followed. **LACHMI NARAIN v. WILAYTI BEGAM** . . . **I. L. R. 2 All. 433**

Affirmed on appeal to the Privy Council in **RAM SARUP v. BELA** . . . **I. L. R. 6 All. 313**
s. c. **L. R. 11 I. A. 44**

28. ——— Past Cohabitation—Immoral or void consideration. M had for many years lived with G as his concubine. In consideration of such past cohabitation, G, by an agreement in writing, dated the 28th March 1869, and duly registered, settled an annuity on M, charging a portion

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(a) GENERALLY—*concl'd.*

of his real estate with the payment of such annuity. *Held*, in a suit by *M* against *G*'s heir, his married wife, to enforce the agreement, that the consideration for the agreement was not under the law then in force immoral, nor was the agreement under the same law void for want of consideration. *Held*, also, that before *M* could recover from the defendant on the agreement, it was necessary to show that the defendant had received funds available to meet the claims from the profits of the estate charged with the payment of the annuity or other property of *G*. *MAN KUAR v. JASODHA KUAR*

I. L. R. 1 All. 478

29. ——— **Gambling**—*Mofussil of Madras*—Money lent for, recoverable. Gambling not being prohibited by law in the mofussil of the Madras Presidency, money lent for such gambling is recoverable by suit. *SUBBARAYA v. DEVANDRA*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 301

30. ——— **Abkari Act—Mad.** Act I of 1886, s. 24 (c)—License to sell arrack, issued under the Act—Rule contained in license, imposing duty on license-holder to obtain Collector's permission to sub-let—Agreement to sub-let and sell arrack to sub-lessee without sanction—Suit on agreement for rent and for price of arrack sold—Unlawful consideration—Void agreement—Maintainability of suit. Plaintiff, being the holder of a license issued under s. 24 (c) of the Madras Abkari Act, 1886, entered into an agreement with the defendants that the latter should sell arrack 'in plaintiff's licensed shop, and that plaintiff should supply the liquor to be sold. Rule 21 of plaintiff's license imposed a duty on plaintiff to obtain the sanction of the Collector in case he should sub-let. Neither plaintiff nor defendants obtained such sanction. On a suit being filed by plaintiff for a sum of money due under the agreement: *Held*, that the agreement was illegal and that plaintiff could not sue on it. *TITHI PAKURUDASU v. BHEEMUDU* (1902) I. L. R. 26 Mad. 430

31. ——— **Mortgage—Contract.** A mortgage contract is not illegal within the meaning of s. 23 of the Contract Act merely because the mortgagors were entitled only to a half share and not the whole of the property mortgaged. *JOGO MOHAN DEB LASKAR v. DAUDOONG BURMAN* (1907) 12 C. W. N. 94

(b) AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.

32. ——— **Contract against policy of the Insolvency Act.** In a suit for money due on three promissory notes, two of them executed by defendant and one *T* in favour of plaintiff, the third by defendant alone,—the defence was that the plaintiff agreed to give up the three notes sued upon, and

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(b) AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY—*cont'd.*

to take in lieu thereof a single note signed by *T*, while a petitioner in insolvency, in favour of defendant, and by defendant endorsed to plaintiff. *Held*, as the consideration for the making of that note by *T* was the defendant's withdrawing his opposition in the Insolvency Court, that the arrangement was brought about by plaintiff to secure to himself and defendant an undue share of the insolvent's property, and was an arrangement contrary to the policy of the Insolvency Act, and therefore void. *AGAR CHAND v. VIRARAGHAVALU CHETTI*

3 Mad. 172

33. ——— **Prohibiting discharge of obligation attaching under Decree of Court.** *A* became surety for certain judgment-debtors, whose property had been attached in execution of a decree, but who had agreed with the decree-holder to liquidate the amount of the decree by yearly instalments. An agreement between *A* and the judgment-debtors contained the following conditions: "If any of the instalments be paid by the said *A*, the obligors shall not be at liberty to liquidate the remaining instalments either from their own funds or by borrowing money; but that *A* shall continue to pay the instalments as they fall due, and shall hold possession of the estate." The judgment-debtors afterwards satisfied the decree in full. *Held*, in a suit against them by *A*, that the above condition was void as contrary to public policy, as it prohibited the discharge of an obligation which, by decree of Court, the judgment-debtors were ordered to pay. *LAIL MUNEE v. PYAGDUT DOOBEY*

1 N. W. 137 : Ed. 1873, 220

34. ——— **Agreement to officiate as Patil—Illegal contract as opposed to public policy—Act XI of 1843.** An agreement between two members of a patil family that they are to officiate in turns is not illegal as being opposed to public policy. The Court will not, however, compel the actual patil to vacate office under such an agreement as long as his appointment under Act XI of 1843 is unrevoked. *VAKU VALAD RAM PATIL v. PAND VALAD MALJI PATIL*

6 Bom. A. C. 243

35. ——— **Agreement to remunerate Vakil—Public policy.** *Quare*: Whether a special agreement entered into by the agent of a Hindu widow acting on behalf of a minor, under which the vakil, in an appeal he was conducting for her, was to receive for his services a stated fee, and in case of success a further reward proportional to the amount recovered, was one which the Court would enforce. *RAO SAHEB V. N. MANDLIK v. KAMALJA BAI SAHEB NIMBALKAR*

10 Bom. 26

See per WESTROPP, C.J., in VINAYAK RAGHUNATH v. GREAT INDIAN PENINSULA RAILWAY COMPANY

7 Bom. O. C. 118

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(b) AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY—*contd.*

36. ———— *Unlawful consideration—Illegal contract.* The defendant, with the expressed intention of benefiting the judgment-debtor, and of thwarting the judgment-creditor against whom he had a grudge and for whom he entertained ill-feeling, entered into a contract with a pleader of the Court in which the decree had been obtained to pay him R50 if he could get the case, which was decreed, dismissed, struck off, or anyhow rejected from the file of the Court. *Held*, that the contract was one against public policy, and could not be enforced. *BAMANDAS BANERJEE v. HAROLAL SHAHA*

1 B. L. R. S. N. 10 : 10 W. R. 14

37. ———— *Contract of partnership with Overseer in Public Works Department—Fraud.* Where an Overseer in the Public Works Department, who is prohibited by the rules of his office from entering into any trade or contracts with that Department, enters into an agreement of partnership for carrying on business under contract with the Department, such agreement is a fraud upon the public, and is therefore one which a Court of Justice ought to treat as an absolute nullity. *SHARODA PERSHAD ROY v. BHOLA NATH BANERJEE*

11 W. R. 441

38. ———— *Marriage, contract to invalidate—Public policy—Hindu law.* A contract entered into by Hindus living in Assam, by which it is agreed that, upon the happening of a certain event, a marriage is to become null and void, is contrary to the policy of the law, and a suit cannot be maintained upon it. *SITARAM v. AHEEREE HEERAHNEE*

11 B. L. R. 129 : 20 W. R. 49

39. ———— *Contract by person with license letting house or shop licensed—Beng. Act II of 1866—Contract against public policy.* The intention of Bengal Act II of 1866 is that the person who has the license shall "keep," *i.e.*, dwell in, and have the management and control of, the shop or place of entertainment. A contract by which he lets the shop and the use of the license for a fixed term, receiving rent, is contrary to the policy of the law, and comes within the rule that a contract which is illegal or is contrary to public policy cannot be enforced. *JUDOONATH SHAHA v. NOBIN CHUNDER SHAHA*

21 W. R. 289

40. ———— *Divorce—Husband and wife—Promise of marriage.* In consideration of advances of money made by N to V, a married woman (both being of the Kunbi caste), in order to enable her to obtain a divorce from her husband, V promised to marry N as soon as she should obtain a divorce. N subsequently sued V to recover the advances. *Held*, that the agreement, having for its object the divorce of the defendant from her husband and her marriage with the plaintiff, was *contra bonos*

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(b) AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY—*contd.*

mores, and, therefore, void. *BAI VIJLI v. NANA NAGAR*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 152

41. ———— *Agreement in consideration of staying criminal proceedings.* Plaintiff sued to recover from defendants, his brothers, R25,000, with interest, on a deed of assignment "B" granted to him by one R G, dated 30th October 1870, transferring to plaintiff a promissory note "A" for R25,000, executed by first and second defendants to the aforesaid R G, as one of the mediators, in conjunction with one S G, in a division of family property between plaintiff and defendants and others, agreeing to pay over on demand by the 30th September 1870 to plaintiff, through the mediators aforesaid, R25,000 in lieu and on account of family property in possession of defendants. The defendants admitted the execution by them of the document for R25,000, to be paid by them to plaintiff (A), and pleaded that it was given on consideration of the withdrawal of a criminal prosecution, or if not, that there was no consideration at all; and that, at the time of its execution by them, there was no dispute or question between them and plaintiff as to a partition of family property, which had been definitely settled by the Civil Court at Salem in Original Suit No. 2 of 1868, under the decree in which the defendants had recovered R13,000 and odd from the plaintiff. They denied any division of family property by mediation, as also that they agreed to pay R25,000 on account of family property in their possession, also the validity of A, and that it was legally binding upon them. The Court of first instance found (i) that a partition of family property was effected by mediation, and the document A was executed to the mediators by defendants on account of family property in defendant's possession; (ii) that A was valid in law and binding on defendants; and gave judgment for plaintiff for the amount sued for. Upon appeal by the first defendant: *Held*, by the High Court, that, as the decree in original suit No. 2 of 1868 (finally disposed of in appeal by the High Court) settled all the rights of the parties, and, among other matters, the question of this alleged concealment, or theft, which the Court found the present plaintiff to have falsely asserted, there was here, therefore, no *res dubia* or *lis incerta*, nor could either party believe that there was such. The final judgment of a competent Court in a suit to which the plaintiff was a party had determined the matter. That, on the facts of the case, it seemed impossible to doubt that the note was executed as a consideration for getting rid of the criminal proceedings, and that, as such a consideration is not only null, but vicious, the decree of the Civil Judge should be reversed. *NAMASIVAYA GAUNDAN v. KYLASA GAUNDAN*

7 Mad. 200

See PUDISHARY KRISHNEN v. KARAMPALLY KUNHUNNI KARUP

7 Mad. 378

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(b) AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY—*contd.*

42. Contract relating to social and religious customs—*Public policy*. A Court cannot take notice of an agreement (*e.g.*, in the way of awarding damages for breach thereof) which has reference to social and religious customs, and which cannot be enforced by a Civil Court. An agreement between members of different Somajes to have social intercourse with each other, and to intermarry, is not opposed to public policy, but rather in accordance therewith. *HURONATH PATTUR v. NITTO PARAMANICK*. 22 W. R. 517

43. Transaction defeating Government right of escheat—*Contract Act, s. 65—Specific Relief Act, s. 35*. Where the plaintiff and her mother executed in favour of the defendant a document which purported to divest the plaintiff and her mother of the entire property of the *illom* of which they were the sole proprietors, and to vest it in the defendant in consideration of his promising to marry and raise up heirs to the *illom*, and to maintain the plaintiff and her mother till death: *Held*, by INNES, J., that the document aimed at defeating the right of escheat of the Government, and the transaction was against public policy with reference to the decision in *Cavali Vencata Narainappa's Case*, 8 Moo. I. A. 500, but that the plaintiff, being in *pari delicto* with the defendant, could not recover the property. *Held*, by KINDERSLEY, J., that, as no claim was made by the Crown, it was not necessary to decide as to rights which may or may not be claimed by the Crown, and that, if plaintiff and her mother were not, as apparently they were not, in the position of ordinary Hindu widows, there was nothing opposed to public policy, in their disposing of the property, as being the last owners and competent to dispose of it absolutely. *TAMARA SHERRI SIVITHRI ANDARJANOM v. MARANAT VASUDEVAN NAMBU DRIPAD*. I. L. R. 3 Mad. 215

44. Agreement to divide property—*Hindu law—Public policy*. There is nothing in Hindu law which makes illegal an agreement entered into by expectants, to divide a particular property in a certain way, on the happening of a particular contingency. Nor is such an agreement contrary to public policy. *Wethered v. Wethered*, 2 Sim. 183; *Harwood v. Tooke*, 2 Sim. 192; *Hyde v. White*, 5 Sim. 524, referred to. *RAM NIRUNJUN SINGH v. PRAYAG SINGH*. I. L. R. 8 Calc. 188: 10 C. L. R. 66

45. Contract in consideration of marriage—*Public policy*. Where a Hindu, contracting a second marriage, agreed to confer, on the party whose sister was to be his second wife, a talukh which was to be carved out of his estate and, until it was carved out, to make a yearly payment of a fixed sum: *Held*, that the undertaking was for ample consideration, and was

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(b) AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY—*contd.*

not opposed to public policy. *LALLUN MONEE DOSSEE v. NOBIN MOHUN SINGH*. 25 W. R. 32

46. Contract to give in Marriage—*Consideration money, suit for return of—Public policy*. The defendant, in consideration of R100, promised to give his minor daughter in marriage to the plaintiff; the defendant failed to fulfil his part of the promise, and the plaintiff brought a suit to recover the money paid as consideration for the promise. *Held*, that such a suit would lie. *Jogeswar Chuckerbutty v. Panch Cowri Chuckerbutty*, 5 B. L. R. 395: 14 W. R. 154, approved. *Quære*: Whether the Court could have enforced the payment of the R100 to the father of the minor as against the person engaging to marry the minor. *RAM CHAND SEN v. AUDAITO SEN*. I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1054

47. Unlawful consideration—*Marriage Brokage Agreement*. Plaintiff agreed to give his daughter in marriage to defendant's nephew in consideration of a payment of R400. It was not alleged that the money was to be a dowry or settlement for the bride. R200 were paid, and defendant executed a bond for the balance. The marriage took place in the asura form. The plaintiff now sued on the bond. *Held*, that the consideration for the bond was not unlawful, nor was the contract illegal as being one contrary to public policy under s. 23 of the Contract Act. *VISVANATHAN v. SAMINATHAN*. I. L. R. 13 Mad. 83

48. Contract for Marriage—*Consideration, suit for return of—Marriage Brokage*. The plaintiff sued to recover the value of certain ornaments which he had presented to the defendant's daughter on his agreeing to marry her to plaintiff's brother. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant broke the agreement, and gave his daughter in marriage to another person. He, therefore, asked for the restoration of the ornaments, but the defendant refused to return them: hence the present suit. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable, there being nothing in the plaintiff's claim, which was either against morality or public policy. *RAMBHAT v. TIMMAYA*. I. L. R. 16 Bom. 678

49. Illegal agreement—*Agreement against public policy—Guardian and Ward—Agreement for Marriage by a Guardian to give a ward in marriage on payment of a sum of money*. The plaintiff stated as her cause of action that a young girl had been left in her charge and had been maintained by her for a number of years; that in January 1888, arrangements had been made with a Bhatia to get this girl married, and that she (the plaintiff) was to receive R2,500 on the marriage; that the defendant had also agreed to pay

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(b) AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY—*contd.*

her (the plaintiff) R2,000 if she would give the girl to him in marriage; and that, before the marriage ceremony could be performed, the defendant had induced the girl to quit the plaintiff's house for immoral purposes. She claimed R2,500 as damages. *Held*, that the alleged agreement on which the suit was brought was immoral and against public policy, and that the action was not maintainable. *DULARI v. VALLABDAS PRAGJI*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 126

50. ———— *Agreement to procure Marriage in consideration of a money payment—Marriage Brokage—Illegal agreement—Public policy.* The defendant was the eldest of three brothers whose mother on her marriage had been put out of the Lovana caste for having married a man belonging to a different caste. The defendant was anxious that he and his brothers should be re-admitted to the caste; and in 1864 he entered into an agreement with the plaintiff, who was at that time one of the setias of the caste, whereby the latter agreed to procure the admission of the plaintiff and his brothers and get them married to girls belonging to the caste. In consideration for these services, the defendant was to pay the plaintiff the sum of R5,000, which sum was to become due on the marriage of the defendant's youngest brother to a girl of the caste, and to be expended in purchasing caste utensils, which were to be kept for the use of the caste. The plaintiff alleged that part of this money had been already paid to him, and that on the marriage of the defendant's youngest brother in 1880, he had demanded payment of the balance (*viz.*, R3,149), which the defendant had not paid. He now sued to recover this balance. *Held*, that the contract sued on, in so far as it promised a money payment for the negotiations of a marriage by a third party, was immoral and contrary to public policy. *PTAMBER RATANSI v. JAGJIVAN HANSRAI*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 131

51. ———— *Agreement to procure Marriage—Marriage Brokage Contract—Hindu law.* An agreement to assist a Hindu for reward in procuring a wife is void as being contrary to public policy. *VAITHYANATHAM v. GANGARAZU*

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 9

52. ———— *Contract to pay money to a father for giving his child in Marriage—Public policy.* A contract which entitles a father to be paid money in consideration of giving his son or daughter in marriage is against public policy, and cannot be enforced in a Court of law. *DHOLIDAS ISHVAR v. FULCHAND CHHAGAN*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 658

53. ———— *Contract to make a payment to the father in consideration of his giving his daughter in marriage is immoral and opposed to*

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(b) AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY—*contd.*

public policy—Hindu Law—Asura marriage. On the question whether a contract to make a payment to a father in consideration of his giving his daughter in marriage is to be regarded as immoral or opposed to public policy within the meaning of s. 23 of the Indian Contract Act: *Held*, by the Full Bench, that such a contract was immoral and opposed to public policy. Although a marriage when performed in the Asura form is valid, an agreement to pay money to the father in consideration of such marriage is not valid and the money cannot be recovered by suit. If the money had been paid and the marriage solemnised, the money cannot be recovered back. *Visvanathan v. Saminathan*, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 83, considered. *Vaithyanatham v. Gangarazu*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 9, considered. *Dholidas v. Fulchand*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 658, followed. *KALAVAGUNTA VENKATA KRISHNAYYA v. KALAVAGUNTA LAKSHMI NARAYANA* (1908) I. L. R. 32 Mad. 185

54. ———— *Assignment of mortgage-bond—Void contract—Transfer of mortgage-bond for valuable consideration.* An assignment of a mortgage-bond for a valuable consideration is not void under s. 23 of the Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872) as being opposed to public-policy. *KEVAL VANMALI v. FAKIRA JIVAN*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 42

55. ———— *Champerty—Agreement opposed to public policy.* For the purpose of meeting the expenses of a suit for possession of immoveable property, the plaintiff, who was in straitened circumstances, agreed with the defendant that the latter in consideration of paying such expenses from the Court of first instance up to the High Court, should have half the property and half the mesne profits, with all his costs, in the event of success. The suit was brought, and was conducted by the plaintiff and the defendant jointly, and was decreed by the High Court on appeal, and the defendant obtained possession of half the property. The plaintiff sued to recover possession of the half on the ground that the agreement was illegal and void. It appeared that the amount actually spent by the defendant in the former litigation was R368, and that, if that suit had failed, he would have lost about R600. It was found that the value of the half share of the property was about R1,000. *Held*, that the agreement was unfair, unreasonable, extortionate, and contrary to public policy within the meaning of s. 23 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of the land in suit on payment of compensation for the advances made by the defendant in the former litigation, with interest at 12 per cent. per annum. *Chunni Kuar v. Rup Singh*, I. L. R. 11 All. 57, and *Loke Indar Singh v. Rup Singh*, I. L. R. 11

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(b) AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY—*contd.*

ALL. 118, referred to. HUSAIN BAKSH V. RAHMAT HUSAIN . . . I. L. R. 11 ALL. 128

56. ————— *Champerly—Speculative Purchase—Agreement not opposed to public policy.* In a suit for land worth R2,300, the plaintiff claimed under a conveyance executed to him by defendant No. 1 shortly before suit in consideration of R250. The property had previously belonged to the father, since deceased, of the first defendant's wife and her sister, defendant No. 2. Shortly after the father's death, a suit for maintenance was brought by his sister-in-law against his widow and two daughters, in which the then defendants alleged that the property now in question had been given by him to the wife of the plaintiff's vendor, and the Court recorded a finding that the gift was valid. *Held*, that the plaintiff's purchase, which was found by the District Judge to be, though not a champertous transaction, one of a very speculative character, was not void as being contrary to public policy. *Gopal Ramchandra v. Gangaram Anandishet*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 72, followed. RAMANUJA AYYANGAR V. NARAYANA AYYANGAR . . . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 374

57. ————— *Contract—Agreement opposed to public policy—Promissory note given for repayment of money in respect of which a criminal Prosecution might possibly have lain.* Where a *bona fide* debt exists and where the transactions between the parties involve a civil liability as well as possibly a criminal act, a promissory note given by the debtor by a third party as security for the debt constitutes a valid agreement. *Keir v. Leeman*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 371, 392; 72 R. R. 298; *Flower v. Sadler*, L. R. 10 Q. B. D. 572, and *Kessowji Tulsidas v. Hurjiwan Mulji*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 566, referred to. JAI KUMAR V. GAURI NATH (1906)

I. L. R. 28 ALL. 718

58. ————— *Bengal Act VII of 1878—Revenue, protection of—Public policy.* The Bengal Excise Act of 1878 is not an Act framed solely for the protection of the revenue, but is one embracing other important objects of public policy as well. An agreement, therefore, for the sale of fermented liquors, entered into by a person who has not obtained a license under that Act, is void and cannot be recovered on. *BOISTUB CHURN NAUN V. WOOMA CHURN SEN* . . . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 436

59. ————— *Agreement to sub-let Tolls—Illegal contract—Bombay Tolls Act (Bom. Act III of 1875), s. 10—Bombay Tolls Amending Act (Bombay Act V of 1881), s. 2.* Under s. 10 of the Tolls Act (Bombay Act III of 1875), Government leased to plaintiff the levy of tolls on certain conditions. One of the conditions was that plaintiff should not sublet the tolls without the permission of the Collector previously obtained.

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(b) AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY—*contd.*

One of the clauses of the lease provided that for a breach of any of the conditions of the lease, the Collector might impose a fine of rupees two hundred. The plaintiff sublet the toll to the defendants without the permission of the Collector and sued to recover a certain amount which the defendants promised to pay for the sub-lease. The defendants contended that the contravention of the condition of the lease, was illegal and opposed to public policy; that, therefore, the contract was void under s. 23 of the Contract Act, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the amount. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed. The agreement to sublet was not illegal or opposed to public policy, merely because it was forbidden under a pecuniary penalty by conditions in the lease to the plaintiff. The penal consequences of the breach were limited to the specific penalty, and did not make the contract void. *BHIKANBHAI V. HIRALAL RAMDINSHAT MARWADI* . . . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 622

60. ————— *Pre-emption—Mortgage—Covenant to give mortgagee right of pre-emption.* An agreement by the mortgagor to give the mortgagee a preference of pre-emption in case of sale is not contrary to public policy, and may be enforced against a purchaser with notice of the covenant. *HARIS PAIK V. JAHURUDDI GAZI* 2 C. W. N. 575

61. ————— *Contract relating to purchase of land within his circle by a Patwari—N.W. P. Land Revenue Act, XIX of 1873, s. 257.* A contract entered into by a patwari for the purchase for his benefit of land situated within his circle is a contract which is opposed to public policy, even though it may not be rendered void by the rules framed by the Board of Revenue for the guidance of patwaris. *SHIAM LAL V. CHEAKI LAL*

I. L. R. 22 ALL. 220

62. ————— *Agreement by Priest of Hindu idol—Consideration—Right to succeed to office of priest.* In a suit on an ekrar executed by the priest of an idol for recovery of arrears of maintenance and for a declaration that the money due was realizable from the surplus of the *charao* (offerings to the idol), and recoverable from the defendant's successors in office: *Held*, there having been at the date of the ekrar a *bona fide* dispute as to the right to succeed to the office of priest, there was consideration for the contract, and the contract in the circumstances of the present case was not opposed to public policy. *Miles v. New Zealand Alford Estate Co.*, L. R. 32 Ch. D. 266, referred to. *Parson v. Thompson*, 1 H. Bl. 322; *Waldo v. Martin*, 4 B. & C. 819; *Juggurnath Roy Chowdhry v. Kishen Pershad Surma*, 7 W. R. 266; *Durga Bibi v. Chanchal Ram*, I. L. R. 4 All. 84; *Narasimma Thatha Acharya v. Anantha Bhatta*, I. L. R. 4 Mad. 39; *Kuppa Gurukul v.*

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(b) AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY—*contd.*

Dorasami Gurukul, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 76; Vurmah Valia v. Ravi Yurma Kunhi Kutty, I. L. R. 1 Mad. 235, distinguished. Mancharam v. Pranshankar, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 298, and Sitarambhat v. Sitaram Ganesh, 6 Bom. H. C. 250, referred to. GIRIJANUND DATTA JHA v. SAILAJANUND DATTA JHA

I. L. R. 23 Cal. 645

63. ——— Parents making profit for themselves out of the marriage of their daughter—*Act IX of 1887, Sch. II, cl. (38)—Small Cause Court suit.* The parents of a girl caused her to enter into an utterly unsuitable marriage, the husband agreeing to pay a certain sum monthly for the maintenance of the parents. On suit by the mother to recover certain instalments of the maintenance so promised: *Held*, (i) that the suit was one not cognizable by a Court of Small Causes; and (ii) that the agreement was one which was opposed to public policy, and ought not to be enforced. *Bhagvantrao v. Ganpatrao, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 267; Dholidas Ishwar v. Fulchand Chhagan, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 658; and Visvanathan v. Saminathan, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 83, referred to. BALDEO SAHAI v. JUMNA KUNWAR (1901)*

I. L. R. 23 All. 495

64. ——— Agreement in restraint of trade—*Continuous cause of action—Damages—Transfer of business to a limited Company—Effect.* In March 1902, certain Ice Manufacturing Companies in Bombay entered into an agreement relating to the manufacture and sale by them of ice. The agreement fixed, *inter alia*, the minimum price at which ice was to be sold by the parties, the proportion of the manufacture which each was to bear, and the proportion of the profits which each was to receive. It further created a monthly obligation to pay into, and a corresponding right to receive from, a general common fund, the difference, if any, between the profits actually received by the parties and those to which they were, under the agreement, entitled. On a suit being instituted for breach of the agreement, in which damages, sustained prior to and pending the hearing of the suit, were claimed; *Held*, the fact that an agreement, if carried out, would limit competition and keep up prices, did not necessarily bring it within the terms of s. 27 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872); to succeed in the defence under that section it was necessary to establish that the agreement was one whereby a person was restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind. *Held*, further, that whether or not a High Court in India could award damages, in respect of a continuing cause of action, up to the date of its decree, subsequent successive accruals of an obligation to contribute to a fund could not be treated as falling within that descrip-

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(b) AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY—*concl.*

tion, and could not be awarded in a suit, where they had accrued due, subsequently to its institution. An order, directing a Company to furnish an account, will not extend beyond or include contributions, which accrued later than the date when the business of such Company was transferred to a limited Company. *FRASER AND COMPANY v. THE BOMBAY ICE MANUFACTURING COMPANY (1905).*

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 107

65. ——— Agreement tending to create monopoly—*Madras District Municipalities Act (IV of 1884), s. 191, cl. 2, and s. 362, cl. 2—Construction of statutes, observations on—Refund of money obtained under a void agreement.* Agreements having for their object the creation of monopolies are void as opposed to public policy under the English Common Law and under s. 23 of the Indian Contract Act. The power conferred by s. 191, cl. 2 of Madras District Municipalities Act (IV of 1884) on the Chairman of a Municipality to license places for selling meat, etc., only empowers him to consider the propriety of granting or withholding licenses in each case and not to enter into agreements, which must preclude him from considering any such application except from a particular person or persons. A power to interfere with the ordinary rights of citizens will not be inferred in the absence of express grant, unless it be necessarily implied as incidental to other powers expressly granted or is indispensable to repress the mischief contemplated and advance the remedy given. *Rossi v. Edinburgh Corporation, [1905] A. C. 21, referred to. Logan v. Pyne, 43 Iowa 524; 22 Am. Rep. 261, 262, followed.* Doubts as to the existence of such powers must be resolved against the Corporation and in favour of the public. Where a municipal body receives license fees under a void agreement, it must, when the agreement is set aside, refund the amount so received; and a suit to recover such amount will not be barred by s. 262 (2) of Madras Act IV of 1884. Discretionary power to grant licenses conferred by s. 191, cl. 2, District Municipalities Act, does not empower Municipalities to refuse licenses, unless clear grounds exist for so refusing. *SOMU PILLAI v. THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, MAYAVARAM (1905)*

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 520

(c) COMPOUNDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES.

66. ——— *Contract compounding an Assault.* A contract compounding an assault is not illegal, and may be sued upon. The fact of two of the defendants being Mahomedans does not affect the principle of this decision. *MOTHOORANATH DEY v. GOPAL ROY*

5 W. R. S. C. C. Ref. 18

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(c) COMPOUNDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES—*contd.*

67. ————— *Contract to pay money in consideration of foregoing a criminal Prosecution.* A contract to pay money in consideration of foregoing a criminal prosecution is opposed to public policy, and will not be enforced. The consideration to support the promise in such a contract is a vicious consideration. *Keir v. Leenan*, 6 Q. B. 308 : s. c. on appeal, 9 Q. B. 371, observed upon. *KANDAN CHETTI v. COORGE SEIT* . 2 Mad. 187

68. ————— *Execution of Deed of Sale in consideration of abstaining from criminal proceedings.* Where the defendant agreed to execute a kobala of certain lands in favour of plaintiff in consideration of the latter's abstaining from taking criminal proceedings against the former with respect to an offence which is compoundable: *Held*, that the contract could not be regarded as forbidden by law or as against public policy, and that it might be enforced. *AMIR KHAN v. AMIR JAN*

3 C. W. N. 5

69. ————— *Consideration in part illegal—Stifling a Prosecution.* The plaintiff, claiming to be entitled, together with two of the defendants, to the office of archaka of a temple, sued in 1889 for a declaration of his title, and for a declaration that an agreement entered into by them in 1886 with the other defendants was void as having been executed under coercion, and because part of the consideration was the withdrawal of a pending criminal charge of trespass and theft against them. These averments were proved. *Held*, that the agreement was void, although the withdrawal of the criminal proceedings formed part only of the consideration for it. *SRI RANGACHARIAR v. RAMASAMI AYYANGAR*

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 189

70. ————— *Agreement to abstain from prosecuting for Perjury.* A Court cannot take cognizance of a bargain to abstain from the prosecution of a person who has committed such an offence as that of wilfully giving false evidence. *QUEEN v. BALKISHEN*

3 N. W. 166 : *Agra F. B. Ed.* 1874, 252

71. ————— *Compounding charge of fraudulent Abstraction of Documents—English Common Law rule.* The plaintiff, a resident of Pondicherry, held a bond from one of the defendants (the second) for a certain sum of money. This bond the plaintiff charged the said defendant before the French legal authorities with having fraudulently abstracted from his house in Pondicherry, and he obtained the arrest and extradition from the British territory of the second defendant, as also of his brother, the first defendant. The latter on his way to Pondicherry met the plaintiff, and a settlement of accounts took place. The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth defendants made themselves liable by execut-

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(c) COMPOUNDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES—*contd.*

ing the bond sued on for the sum found due to the plaintiff, and took indemnity bonds to themselves from the first defendant, the consideration being the agreement of the plaintiff to discontinue further proceedings in the criminal charge. The Court at Pondicherry sanctioned the agreement as a compromise by civil redress, and suspended further proceedings in accordance with the law in force in the Settlement. *Held*, that the contract was enforceable, the facts of the case not showing the compromise to be in its nature prejudicial as being in contravention of public policy under the Government of British India, or injurious to the good order and interests of society in regard to the administration of public justice. The English Common Law rule, that contracts for the compounding or suppression of criminal charges for offences of a public nature are illegal and void has no application to a contract for compounding the prosecution of criminal proceedings for an offence against the municipal law of a foreign country. The rule of international law, that the law of the place of a contract governs its validity, is subject to the qualification that every State may refuse to enforce a contract when it is for the fraudulent evasion of its law, or is injurious to its public institutions or interests. *SUBRAYA PILLAI v. SUBRAYA MUDALI* . 4 Mad. 14

72. ————— *Compounding charge of Wrongful Restraint—Offence legally compoundable—Suit to recover Consideration.* Where A was criminally prosecuted by B for wrongful restraint, and he came to terms with B to pay him for the withdrawal of the complaint, or to deposit money or property with C to be paid over to B on the disposal of the case according to B's petition of withdrawal, and the Magistrate, instead of allowing the withdrawal of the charge, punished A criminally: *Held*, that A could sue for the recovery of the money or property, as the charge was not one out of which it would have been illegal for A to withdraw, with the consent of the Magistrate, the offence charged consisting of an act for which B might have sued for damages in the Civil Court. *MATHOORA NATH BHOOMIK v. KENARAM KURMOKAR* . 7 W. R. 38

73. ————— *Transfer of Property as Compensation for Criminal Charge—Illegal pressure.* Certain parties convicted of a criminal offence, in order to avoid apprehension, entered into a compromise with complainant, who agreed to accept a sum of money as costs and as compensation for the disgrace he had suffered. They accordingly transferred to him some property in lieu of cash. *Held*, that the transfer was not made under illegal pressure, and they could not sue to set it aside. Though the offence was one in which a compromise could not legally be admitted, the error of the Magistrate in admitting it, the parties acting in good faith,

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(c) COMPOUNDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES—*contd.*

ought not to affect the position of the parties.
 NUBEE BUKSH v. HINGON . . . 8 W. R. 412

74. ———— *Contract based on Condonation of Criminal Offence—Onus of Proof.* In a suit to enforce a contract, should the defendant plead that the contract was based upon the condonation of a criminal complaint against the plaintiff, which might have been of a nature not condonable by law, and that the contract was therefore void, it would be for him to show what was the nature of the offence complained of. KUMALA NATH SEIN v. BEHAREE KANT ROY . . . 11 W. R. 314

75. ———— *Money paid to condone offence—Causing death accidentally.* Where, to suppress a criminal prosecution for having accidentally caused the death of his wife, plaintiff voluntarily paid money to defendant, knowing the defendant to be the nearest relative of the deceased who could take a part in the prosecution, the contract was held to be void, as against morality and public policy and plaintiff was not entitled to sue for the money so paid. JETOO MAHATO v. MONURAM MAHATO . . . 17 W. R. 84

76. ———— *Agreement to withdraw charge of Criminal Breach of Trust—Unlawful agreement—Void consideration—Public policy.* The plaintiff sued the defendant for possession of a house and premises, which he had bought from the latter. The defence was, that the sale was made for the purpose of raising money to be given to certain third parties as a bribe to induce them to withdraw a charge of criminal breach of trust which they had preferred against the defendant. The lower Appellate Court held that the defence was bad on the ground that there was no evidence to show that the plaintiff was a party to, or in any way concerned in, the unlawful agreement, and gave the plaintiff a decree. *Held*, that the decree was correct, as there was no evidence to show either that the plaintiff knew of the agreement to suppress the criminal prosecution or that any money had been paid in pursuance of such unlawful agreement. RAJKRISTO MOITRO v. KOYLASH CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 24

77. ———— *Criminal Breach of Trust—Consideration—Guarantee on condition of not taking criminal proceedings—Compounding Felony.* S gave the creditors of H a guarantee for the payment of the debts due to them by H. As a consideration for this guarantee, the creditors were to abstain from taking criminal proceedings against H for criminal breach of trust for fifteen days, and by implication were to abstain from taking such proceedings altogether if the said debts were paid within that time. *Held*, that such a guarantee could not be enforced by the creditors. A man, to whom a civil debt is due, may take securities for

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(c) COMPOUNDING CRIMINAL OFFENCES—*contd.*

that debt from his debtor, even though the debt arises out of a criminal offence and he threatens to prosecute for that offence, provided he does not, in consideration of such securities, agree not to prosecute. He must not, however, by stifling a prosecution obtain a guarantee from third parties. KES-SOWJI TULSIDAS v. HURJIVAN MULJI . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 566

78. ———— *Agreement to stifle a prosecution—Compounding a non-compoundable offence—Agreement as defence in a civil action—Suit for Wrongful Confinement.* The plaintiff sued the defendant in damages for wrongful arrest and confinement. The defence pleaded an agreement whereby the parties had agreed to settle their differences in consideration of compounding some criminal charges, one of which was not by law compoundable and which were then pending between the parties in a Criminal Court. The lower Appellate Court held that the plaintiff was prevented from bringing the action by reason of the agreement. On appeal, *held*, that the object of the agreement being to stifle a prosecution was bad in law, and that the agreement, therefore, could not be set up as a defence in a Court of law. DALSUKHRAM v. CHARLES DEBRETTON (1904) . . . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 326

(d) ILLEGAL CESSES.

79. ———— *Cess not authorized—Ben. Reg. VII of 1822, s. 9, cl. 1.* A claim for a cess or collection not avowed and sanctioned at the time of settlement nor taken into account in fixing the Government jumma is illegal under cl. 1, s. 9, Reg. VII of 1822, and consequently inadmissible. HUSHMUT ALI v. SEETA RAM . . . 1 Agra 336

80. ———— *Cess not authorized—Ben. Reg. VII of 1822, s. 9, cl. 1.* *Held*, that a suit substantially brought to prove a right to collect cesses not authorized under the provisions of cl. 1, s. 9, Reg. VII of 1822, being for an illegal object, was not maintainable. KHYRAT ALI v. MAHOMED YASEEN KHAN . . . 2 Agra 207

81. ———— *Contract relating to illegal cess.* Every contract relating to the collection from raiyats and payment to the zamindar of an illegal cess is *ab initio* void. KAMALA KANT GHOSE v. KALU MAHOMED MANDAL . . . 3 B. L. R. A. C. 44 : 11 W. R. 395

82. ———— *Stipulation to pay Collection Charges—Lease, condition in.* A condition in a lease, that the tenant will pay to the landlord collection charges, can be enforced if the condition is definite and certain in its nature, and forms part of

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(d) ILLEGAL CESSES—*concl'd.*

the consideration for the lease. MAHOMED FAYEZ CHOWDHRY v. JAMOO GAZEE I. L. R. 8 Calc. 730

83. ————— *Payment added to Rent—Customary Payment.* Where a raiyat has for many years been paying a tulluh beshee of 2 annas in each rupee in addition to the asal jumma of his holding, and the two payments have been incorporated in time and have actually formed the subject of a single receipt, which the zamindar challenged the raiyat to produce, but which the raiyat failed to produce: *Held*, that, if a raiyat for the purpose of preventing disputes with his landlord and for securing his own interests, agrees to make a definite payment to his landlord in addition to his rent, the additional payment cannot be treated as an illegal cess, for the law favours such arrangements and provides for their being enforced. SERAJGUNGE JUTE COMPANY v. SORABDEE AKOOND . . . 25 W. R. 252

But see ORJOON SAHOO v. ANUND SINGH 10 W. R. 257

84. ————— *Suit for recovery of illegal cess.* In the absence of a special agreement, a claim for an illegal cess cannot be recovered in a Court of law. SONNUM SOOKUL v. ELAHEE BUKSH 7 W. R. 453

85. ————— *Collection by tahsildar of Present for Zamindar for Birth Ceremonies.* A sum collected by a tahsildar as purvi-bhika or present for the zamindar on the annaprashun ceremony (first eating of rice after birth) considered as an illegal cess, and therefore irrecoverable in a suit under Act X of 1859, s. 24. NOBIN CHUNDER ROY v. GOORA GOBIND SURMAH . . . 14 W. R. 447

86. ————— *Kuntagara levy of—Public policy.* There is nothing illegal or contrary to public policy in the levying by riparian owners of "kuntagara" or a charge imposed upon boatmen for driving stanchions or pegs into the river bank for the purpose of attaching their boats thereto. DHUNPUT SINGH v. DINO BUNDHU SAHA 9 C. L. R. 279

87. ————— *Agreement to pay prohibited tax.* An agreement to pay a tax prohibited by an Act of the Legislature would defeat the object of the Act, and was, consequently, void, and could not be enforced—Indian Contract Act, IX of 1872, s. 23. GOSVAMI SHRI PURUSH OTAMJI MAHARAJ v. ROBB . . . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 398

(e) IMMORAL CONSIDERATIONS.

88. ————— *Immoral Consideration, assignment of mortgage for—Right of one in pari delicto to set aside executed contracts—Completed gift cannot, but transfer for consideration may be,*

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*contd.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*contd.*(e) IMMORAL CONSIDERATIONS—*contd.*

set aside—Raising new points in second appeal. In 1898 the plaintiff, who was then young and inexperienced, assigned to the defendant, a dancing girl, a mortgage for Rs. 1,500, the consideration stated in the deed being payments in cash and jewels to the plaintiff and the discharge by the defendant of debts due by the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued in 1901 to set aside the assignment on the ground that no consideration passed as recited therein, but that the real consideration was the future continuance of immoral relations between himself and the sister of the defendant. The defendant contended that the consideration stated in the deed actually passed, and further that the plaintiff, who admitted that the assignment was for an immoral consideration, could not sue to set it aside. Both the lower Courts found that there was no consideration for the deed and set it aside. On second appeal to the High Court, it was contended that the transaction being for an immoral consideration and completely executed, the plaintiff as a person *in pari delicto* could not sue to set it aside. *Held*, that, where the transaction amounted to a voluntary gift, it cannot be set aside; but, where the transaction, though completed, was intended to be for consideration, it can be impeached, if the consideration is immoral, and it makes no difference whether the transaction is executed or executory. *Ayerst v. Jenkins*, L. R. 16 Eq. 272, distinguished. Whether what has been transferred has been transferred by way of gift or not will depend on the intention of the parties and the facts of the particular case; and the form of the transaction will be material in determining the question. *Phillips v. Probyn*, 1 Ch. D. 811, 816 and 817. *Held*, also, that on the facts, the transaction was between the plaintiff on the one hand, and the defendant as the managing member of a joint family of dancing girls consisting of the defendant and her sister on the other. *Kamakshi v. Nagarathnam*, 5 Mad. H. C. 161, referred to. *Held*, further, that considering the age and inexperience of the plaintiff and that he had no independent advice, he was not *in pari delicto*. A point not taken in the lower Courts, on which no issue was raised, and on which the parties had no opportunity of adducing evidence, cannot be urged in second appeal. THASI MUTHUKANNU v. SHUNMUGAVELU PILLAI (1905) . . . I. L. R. 28 Mad. 413

89. ————— *Immoral transactions—Suit for Ejectment.* If a plaintiff cannot make out his case, except through an immoral transaction, to which he was a party, he must fail. *Fivaz v. Nicholls*, 2 C. B. 501, followed. BANI MUNCHARAM v. REGINA STANGER (1907) . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 581

90. ————— *Lease of House to a Prostitute.—Contract—Agreement immoral or*

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 23—*concl.*ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—*concl.*(e) IMMORAL CONSIDERATIONS—*concl.*

opposed to public policy. Held, that knowingly letting a house to a prostitute with the object of her carrying on therein prostitution is immoral and contrary to public policy; and a landlord who knowingly so lets quarters to a prostitute to carry on prostitution cannot recover the rent in a Court of law. *CHOGA LAL v. PIYARI* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 All. 53

s. 24.

See *BENGAL TENANCY ACT*, s. 29.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 395

See *HINDU LAW—CONTRACT—HUSBAND AND WIFE* . . . 4 C. W. N. 488See *SANTHAL PERGUNNAS SETTLEMENT REGULATION*, s. 6 I. L. R. 26 Calc. 238*Criminal Procedure Code*

(Act V of 1898), s. 513—*Criminal prosecution—Bail for Appearance—Nominal sale-deed and rent-note passed to indemnify bail—Suit for recovery of rent—Sale-deed void as opposed to public policy—Rent-note and sale-deed part and parcel of same transaction—Rent-note void.* While a criminal prosecution was pending against the defendant, his pleader entered into a bail bond for his appearance. To indemnify the pleader against any loss which he might suffer under the bail bond, a nominal sale-deed and a nominal rent-note were passed by the defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff having subsequently brought a suit to recover two years' rent with interest on the strength of the rent-note, the defendant met the claim by a denial that the property belonged to the plaintiff. *Held*, dismissing the suit, that the consideration for the sale-deed was opposed to public policy. The sale-deed was therefore void under s. 24 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872). *Herman v. Jeuchner*, L. R. 15 Q. B. D. 561, referred to. *Held*, further, that as the sale-deed and rent-note, which latter was merely intended to secure interest on the principal sum, were part and parcel of one single transaction, the rent-note was tainted with the same illegality, which affected the sale-deed and was therefore also void. Part of a single consideration for one object being unlawful, the whole agreement is void under s. 24 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872). *LAXMANLAL v. MULSHANKAR* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 449

s. 25.

See *CONTRACT ACT*, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—GENERALLY.See *LIMITATION ACT*, 1877, s. 19 (1871, s. 20)—ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBTS.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 590

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 230

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 683

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 405

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 580

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 94

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 25—*contd.*See *LIMITATION ACT*, 1877, s. 20.

I. L. R. 31 All. 495

See *POWER OF ATTORNEY*.

11 C. L. R. 581

See *STAMP ACT*, 1879, Sch. I, Cl. 1.

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 194

See *VENDOR AND PURCHASER—CONSIDERATION* . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 176

1. ———— *Consideration—Void agreement.* While certain hundis were running, the acceptor gave the holder, the drawer having become bankrupt, a mortgage of certain immoveable property as security for the payment of the hundis in the event of their dishonour when they became due. *Held*, in a suit on the mortgage-deed, the hundis having been dishonoured, that there was no consideration, within the meaning of that term in Act IX of 1872 for the agreement of mortgage, and the same was void under s. 25 of that Act. *MANNA LAL v. BANK OF BENGAL*

I. L. R. 1 All. 309

2. ———— *Vakil and Client—Promise of additional sum in case of success in suit—Consideration.* An agreement executed by a client to his vakil after the latter had accepted a vakalutnama to act for the former in a certain suit, whereby the client bound himself to pay to the vakil, in the event of his conducting the suit to a successful termination, a certain sum in addition to the vakil's full fees held *nudum pactum*, and a suit founded upon it dismissed as unsustainable. *RAMCHANDRA CHINATAMAN v. KALU RAJUTA*

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 362

NUTHOO LALL v. BUDREE PERSHAD 3 Agra 286

FULLER v. BISHOON KOOR . . . 3 N. W. 25

3. ———— *Inam Chithi—Vakalutnama—Consideration—Act I of 1846, s. 7—Nudum pactum.* Where the acceptance of a vakalutnama by a pleader and the execution of an inam chithi (agreement) by his client, intended as a remuneration for the professional services of the pleader were contemporaneous, and the vakalutnama was not filed by the pleader until after the execution of the inam chithi. *Held*, that the acceptance of the vakalutnama and the execution of the inam chithi constituted one transaction, and that the agreement was not illegal under Act I of 1846, s. 7. *SHIVARAM HARI v. ARJUN* . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 258

4. ———— *Past Cohabitation.—Consideration—Void Agreement—Immoral Consideration.* Past cohabitation would not be an immoral consideration, if consideration it can properly be called, for a promise to pay a woman an allowance. Such a promise, however, is to be regarded as an undertaking by the promisor to compensate the promisee for past services voluntarily rendered to him, for which no consideration, as defined in the Contract Act, would be necessary. *DHIRAJ KUAR v. BIKRAMAJIT SINGH* . I. L. R. 3 All. 787

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 25—*contd.*

5. ————— *Post-nuptial contracts—Consideration—Contract partly legal and partly illegal.* The defendant, a Mahomedan husband, executed a kabinnama in favour of his wife, by which he agreed, among other things, that he would maintain her and make over to her whatever money he should earn; that he would never exercise any violence upon her; that he would not take her away from home; that it should not be within his power to marry or make any nika without her permission; that he would do nothing without her permission, and, if he did, she should be at liberty to divorce him, and realize from him the amount of dinmohur forthwith, and the nika would then be null and void. The plaintiff sued her husband upon this document, which was registered, to recover from him all his earnings amounting to Rs65, after deducting Rs54, which she admitted having received from him. The lower Appellate Court held, reversing the decision of the Munsif, that the agreement had been made subsequently to the marriage, and was, though registered, void for want of consideration. *Held*, on appeal, that the agreement, being registered, came within s. 25 of the Contract Act, and was not void on the ground that there was no consideration. Although some parts of the agreement might be illegal as being contrary to public policy, and therefore void, yet those which were legal could be enforced. *See Davlat Singh v. Pandu, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 17.* The Court treated the suit as one to enforce that part only of the contract which was legal, and considered the plaintiff entitled to recover a fair sum for her maintenance. *POONOO BIBEE v. FYZE BUKSH*
15 B. L. R. Ap. 5 : 23 W. R. 66

6. ————— *Agreement to postpone Execution Proceedings—Consideration—Suit on agreement when execution is barred.* In execution of a decree, dated the 28th May 1843, under which certain persons were jointly liable, the 10th February 1881 was fixed for the sale of the debtors' property, which was then under attachment, but on that day all the debtors except one, K, arranged with the decree-holders that the money should be paid by them in Bysack following, *i.e.*, by the 12th May 1881; that in the meantime the execution proceedings should be struck off, the attachment still subsisting; and that, if default should be made, execution should proceed, and no objection, on the ground that the decree was more than twelve years old, should be made by the debtors. The terms of the arrangement were embodied in a petition and sanctioned by the Court, which thereupon struck off the case. The debtors having made default on the 13th September 1881, the decree-holders applied for execution, but K, who had not agreed to the arrangement, objected that the application was barred under s. 230 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the objection was held to be valid. The decree-holders then sued to recover the money for which execution had been taken out, basing their suit upon

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 25—*contd.*

the arrangement made by the defendants on the 10th February 1881. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to succeed on proof that there was a contract between the parties on good consideration, and that the petition of 10th February 1881, though not a contract giving the plaintiffs a right of suit, might be regarded as evidence corroborating other evidence of such a contract. *SYAM SINGH v. BAIDYANATH RAI*
13 C. L. R. 176

7. ————— *Voluntary Alienation or Conveyance—Gift—Consideration.* A decree-holder instituted a suit against his judgment-debtor and the latter's son for a declaration that a gift by the judgment-debtor to his son of certain property was fraudulent, and that such property was liable to be taken, in execution of the decree. *Held*, that, such gift having been made by the donor out of natural love and affection for the donee and in order to secure a provision for him and his descendants, and therefore for good consideration, and having operated, and the donor having reserved to himself sufficient property to satisfy the decree, the mere fact that the donor reserved to himself no property within the jurisdiction of the Court which made the decree was not a ground for holding that such gift was fraudulent and not made in good faith, and for setting it aside and allowing the decree-holder to proceed against the property transferred by it. The law relating to voluntary alienations explained. *NASIR HUSAIN v. MATA PRASAD*
I. L. R. 2 All. 891

8. ————— *Agreement without Consideration.* The plaintiff sued to establish an agreement in writing by which the defendants promised to pay him a commission on articles sold through their agency in a bazar in which they occupied shops, in consideration of the plaintiff having expended money in the construction of such bazar. Such money had not been expended by the plaintiff at the request of the defendants, nor had it been expended by him for them voluntarily; but it had been expended by him voluntarily for third parties. *Held*, that such expenditure was not any consideration for the agreement within the meaning of s. 2 (d) of Act IX of 1872, and the agreement did not fall within cl. (2), s. 25 of that Act, and was void for want of consideration. *DURGA PRASAD v. BALDEO*
I. L. R. 3 All. 221

9. ————— *Balancing Accounts—Account stated—Promise to pay.* The Gujarati words "baki deva," which are of common use in balancing accounts, import no more than the English words "balance due," from which an unwritten contract may be inferred, but which do not of themselves amount to a promise to pay within the sense of Act IX of 1872, s. 25, cl. 3. *RANCHODAS NATHUBHAI v. JEYCHAND KHUSALCHAND*
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 405

10. ————— *Adjustment of Accounts—Promise to pay—Acknowledgment—*

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 25—*contd.*

Account stated—"Ruzu"—*Limitation Act* (XV of 1877), s. 19. The "ruzu" or adjustment of an account can operate either as a revival of an original promise or as evidence of a new contract. If it is to be used as evidence of a new contract furnishing a basis for a new cause of action, it must contain a promise in writing duly signed as required by the Contract Act IX of 1872, s. 25, cl. 3, a bare statement of an account not being such a promise. *RAMJI v. DHARMA*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 683

11. ——— *Barred Debt—Judgment Debt—Consideration—Debt barred by limitation.* A judgment-debt is a debt within the contemplation of s. 25, cl. 3 of the Contract Act IX of 1872. *SHRIPATRAY v. GOVIND NARAYAN*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 390

12. ——— *Judgment Debt.—Promise to pay a debt barred by limitation.* The holder of a decree for money, dated the 22nd June 1868, applied for execution on the 23rd February 1869. In September 1869, before the decree had been executed, the judgment-debtor, admitting that a certain amount was due under the decree, agreed to pay such amount by instalments; and that, if default were made, the decree should be executed for the whole amount thereof. Default having been made early in 1873, the decree-holder applied at once for execution of the decree. On the 5th May 1873, a petition, signed by the judgment-debtor, was preferred on his behalf to the Court executing the decree, such petition being in effect as follows: "Execution case for R6,839-15-3. In this case the decree-holder has filed an application for execution of his decree in consequence of a default in payment of instalments: the fact is that the petitioner has failed to pay the instalments simply owing to illness, otherwise he has no objection to the decree-holder's demand: in future he will not fail to pay instalments: he has written a letter to plaintiff asking him to pardon his breach of promise, and to agree to realize the decree-money by the instalments formerly fixed, and to stay execution of the decree for the present. The decree-holder has granted this request: the petitioner therefore presents this petition and prays that monthly instalments of R150 may be fixed, and execution of the decree be postponed for the present: in case of default being made in payment of two instalments in succession, the decree-holder will be at liberty to realize the balance of the decree-money with interest at twelve per cent. per annum." At the time such petition was preferred, execution of the decree was barred by limitation. *Held*, that a "debt" within the meaning of s. 25 (3) of Act IX of 1872 includes a "judgment-debt," and such petition was a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation within the meaning of that law, and a suit founded on such petition to recover the balance of the money due under the decree was maintainable. *BILLINGS v. UNCOVENANTED SERVICE BANK* I. L. R. 3 All. 781

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 25—*contd.*

13. ——— *Promise to pay barred Debt—Document containing requisites of s. 25.* A document sufficiently complies with s. 25 of the Contract Act when it is signed by the person to be charged, and refers to the debt in such a way as to identify it, and contains a promise to pay wholly or in part the debt referred to therein, or expresses an intention to pay which can be construed to be a "promise." To create a "promise" within the meaning of the section, it is not necessary that there should be an accepted proposal reduced to writing, a written proposal, accepted before action, becoming by the definition clause a promise when accepted. The words of the section show that it is the debt, and not a sum of money in consideration of the barred debt that the promisor should refer to. In defence to a suit for rent, a tenant pleaded that a portion of the claim was barred by limitation. Plaintiff relied on a letter which had been signed by defendant, after the disputed portion had become barred, and in which the defendant, after referring to the periods in respect of which the arrears of rent were due, said, "I shall send by the end of Vysakha month." *Held*, that the document contained the ingredients required by s. 25, cl. (3), of the Contract Act, and that the claim was not barred by limitation. *APPA RAO v. SURYAPRAKASA RAO*

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 94

14. ——— *Acknowledgment of barred debt—Kistbundi, suit on—Limitation Act, XIV of 1859, s. 4.* A obtained a decree in 1858 against B, but did not apply for execution till 1864, when B, although objecting that the decree was barred, presented to the Court, under arrangement with A, a petition acknowledging a certain sum to be due, and executed a kistbundi agreeing to pay the debt by monthly instalments. B paid several instalments, but did not do so on one occasion, until execution was taken out against her. On her death, shortly afterwards, execution was taken out against her representatives. The representatives objected that the decree was barred, and that the kistbundi could not be substituted for the decree. The objection was, on appeal to the High Court, allowed. A then brought a suit on the kistbundi. *Held*, that, at the time the kistbundi was entered into, the decree was, under the limitation law then in force, capable of being executed, and that there was, therefore, valid consideration for the kistbundi. *Held*, also, that even had there been no valid consideration for the kistbundi, yet the principle laid down in s. 25, cl. 3, of Act IX of 1872, and which prevailed before the passing of that Act, would have saved the kistbundi from becoming void for want of consideration. *HEERA LALL MOOKHOPADHYA v. DHUNPUT SINGH*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 500
3 C. L. R. 554

15. ——— *Power of Collector as Agent to Court of Wards—Promise to pay a time-barred debt—Madras Regulation V of 1894,*

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 25—*contd.*

s. 17. A Collector has no authority to bind a ward of the Court of Wards by a promise under the Contract Act, s. 25, cl. 3, to pay a debt which is barred by limitation. *SURYANARAYANA v. NARENDRA THATRAZ* . . . **I. L. R. 19 Mad. 255**

16. ———— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 19—Acknowledgment—Promise to pay a time-barred debt.* Where it is sought to recover a time-barred debt on the strength of a subsequent promise to pay made in writing by the debtor, the document relied on must contain an express promise to pay. A promise to pay cannot be inferred from a mere acknowledgment of the debt. *Maniram Seth v. Seth Rupchand*, **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1047**, distinguished. *GOBIND DAS v. SARJU DAS* (1908) **I. L. R. 30 All. 268**

17. ———— *Renunciation by a Co-parcener of his rights by registered document—Suit for partition.* The plaintiff, a member of an undivided Hindu family, having by a registered document renounced all right to the family property in favour of the remaining co-parceners, who were to manage the estate in future, pay all debts, and maintain the plaintiff in the family, sued to recover his share of the family property. *Held*, that the plaintiff was still a co-parcener, and was not estopped by the document from bringing the suit. *APPA PILLAI v. RANGA PILLAI* **I. L. R. 6 Mad. 71**

18. ———— *Bond—Coercion—Consideration.* A person, while under arrest in execution of a decree, which had been made against him by a Court having no jurisdiction to make it, gave the holder of such decree a bond for the amount of such decree plus a small sum paid for him for the stamping and preparation of such bond, in order that he might be released from such arrest. *Held*, that such bond was given under duress, and that it was executed without consideration, the small sum paid by the holder of such decree for preparing and stamping the bond not being in any legitimate sense of the phrase "consideration" for such bond, and therefore such bond was void. *BANDA ALI v. BANSPAT SINGH* . . . **I. L. R. 4 All. 352**

19. ———— and s. 19—*Voidable Contract—Misrepresentation—Suit to recover money advanced under contract.* *J* having represented to *C* that there were good roads, metalled to within six or seven miles of the place where he wanted *C* to forward a certain engine and boiler, and a fair kucha road the remainder, *C*, relying on his statement, agreed to forward the same to the place of destination for a certain sum, part of which *C* received on different occasions, and duly forwarded to the place the engine, but, on passage across an iron suspension bridge on the road being refused to the boiler by the officer in charge of the bridge on account of its weight, *C* threw up the contract. *J*, having conveyed the boiler across the nala spanned by the

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 25—*contd.*

bridge and finally to the place of destination, sued to recover from *C* the money expended by him in so doing, alleging breach of contract. It was held that the suit was rightly dismissed on the ground that the agreement was voidable by *C* under the provisions of s. 19 of Act IX of 1872. It was also held that the plaintiff could not recover in the suit any portion of the moneys advanced to the defendant. *JOHNSON v. CROWE* . . . **6 N. W. 350**

20. ———— *Agreement to compensate for services rendered—Consideration.* Cases where a person without the knowledge of the promisor or otherwise than at his request does the latter some service, and the promisor undertakes to compensate him for it, are covered by s. 25 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872); in them the promise does not need a consideration to support it. *SINDHA SHRI GANPATISINGJI HIMATISINGJI v. ABRAHAM* **I. L. R. 20 Bom. 755**

21. ———— *Agreement to put estate under management of Court of Wards—Consideration for agreement.* *H D* and *S D*, two brothers, constituted a joint Hindu family owning considerable landed property. *H D* having incurred heavy personal debts, the two brothers in 1879 united in applying to have their property taken over by the Court of Wards. This was done; and, on the 17th of June 1889, while such property was still under the management of the Court of Wards, the two brothers entered into an agreement whereby *H D* remained as manager of the property with an allowance of R12,000 per annum for his support, but ceded to his brother absolutely and unconditionally all his proprietary interest in the family property, and all power to make the family property liable in any way for the payment of his debts. On the 6th of October 1889, the Court of Wards released the property freed from the liabilities imposed upon it by *H. D.* In 1891, one *B D* obtained in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Agra a money decree against *H D.* *H D* died in the following year, and, subsequently to his death, *B D* sought to execute his decree against *S D* as representative of *H D* by attachment of property in the hands of *S D.* *S D* objected to the attachment, and his objection was allowed. *B D* appealed, and on this appeal it was held that, having regard to the agreement of the 17th June 1889, above referred to, the property in question could not be attached as the property of *H D.* The said agreement was not bad for want of consideration; the consideration being that at the request of his brother, which must be presumed from the circumstances of the case, *S D* had agreed to place his interest in the property under the management of the Court of Wards, and had also foregone, during the ten years that estate was under the management of the Court of Wards, the greater part of his interest in the profits of the estate, and had refrained on cessation of the Court of Wards' management from suing his brother for an account; and even if this were not so, the agreement would be

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 25—*concl'd.*

good either under s. 25, cl. (2), or under s. 70 of Act IX of 1872. *BITHAL DAS v. SHANKAR DAT DUBE* . . . I. L. R. 17 All. 264

s. 27.

1. ———— *Contract in restraint of trade—Consideration—Exclusive right to convey passengers.* In the case of covenants in restraint of trade, the deed of covenant must show a good consideration. The Courts will not enter into the question of the adequacy of the consideration. A covenant giving a person the exclusive right to convey passengers to and fro on the road from Ootacamund and Metapollum is not a contract in general restraint of trade, and therefore is one which the law will enforce. *AUCHETRLONY v. BILL* . 4 Mad. 77

2. ———— *Contract in restraint of trade.* In a suit for (so-called) damages, on the ground that defendants, after executing an agreement by which they stipulated to sell fish every day in plaintiff's bazar, and to pay a fee per diem, and bound themselves to pay "damages" to a specified extent, in the event of their leaving his bazar and resorting to any other bazar, had left his for another bazar, where they were vending fish. *Held*, that the suit could be maintained, being an action upon a contract, in which there was nothing illegal. *MADHUB CHUNDER ROY v. LUKHEE JEL-LANEE* . . . 9 W. R. 212

3. ———— *Contract in restraint of trade—Small Cause Court, Law of—Agreement between Hindus—Acts IX of 1850 and XXVI of 1864—21 Geo. III, c. 70, ss. 17 and 18—Letters Patent, 1862, cl. 18—Letters Patent, 1865, cl. 19.* The effect of Act XXVI of 1864 was that suits in the Small Cause Court were to be decided according to the law or equity administered in the High Court; by the Charter of 1862 that law or equity was to be "the law or equity which would have been applied by the Supreme Court," and by the Charter of 1865, that "which would have been applied by the High Court" under the Charter of 1862. The Stat. 21, Geo. III, c. 70, which applied to the Supreme Court, and gave to Hindus the right to have matters of contract decided by their own laws, became, if its provisions apply to the High Court, part of the law of that Court not by virtue of the Statute itself, but by virtue of the Charter which was subject to alteration by the Governor General in Council; and having ceased to have any operation as an Act, it was unnecessary to repeal it expressly by the Contract Act (IX of 1872). That Act is applicable to Hindus residing in Calcutta; therefore, where the plaintiff, a Hindu, agreed with the defendants, also Hindus, that he would cease to carry on his business in a certain locality in Calcutta, in consideration of receiving from them a specified sum, it was held, in a suit to enforce the contract, that such an agreement was void under s. 27 of the Contract Act. The words "not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act," in s. 1 of the Contract Act, apply to "any

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usage or custom of trade" or "any incident of any contract." *MADHUB CHUNDER PORAMANICK v. RAJCOOMAR DOSS*

14 B. L. R. 76 : 22 W. R. 370

4. ———— *Contract in restraint of trade—Damages—Covenant—Breach of covenant.* *D* and *E*, being in England, entered into a written agreement with *A*, *B*, and *C*, the partners of a firm carrying on trade in Madras, to go to Madras, and there enter into the service of the firm—the service to last for five years, or to be determined at any time by certain notice being given,—and covenanted that on the expiry of the five years, or sooner determination of the service, they would not carry on within 800 miles from Madras any business carried on by the firm; and also covenanted that on such expiry, or sooner determination, they would, whenever requested by the firm so to do, return to England. In pursuance of the agreement, *D* and *E* went to Madras, and entered into the service of the firm. After it had continued for about 2½ years, the service was determined by notice from the firm. *D* and *E* then, in violation of their said covenants, refused to return to England, though requested to do so by the firm, and proceeded to set up and carry on, on their own account, business of the same kind as that carried on by the firm. *Held*, in a suit by the firm against *D* and *E* for damages for breaches of the said covenants, and for a perpetual injunction restraining *D* and *E* from carrying on in Madras, or within 800 miles from Madras, any business carried on by the firm, that, treating the covenant in restraint of trade as one entered into in England, it could not, even if valid by the law of England, be enforced in India, inasmuch as its object was to contravene the law of India (s. 27 of Act IX of 1872). *Held*, further, that that covenant would have been void by the law of England because the limit of the restriction was unreasonable, and, as no narrower limit had been mentioned in the agreement, this was not a case where the covenant could have been enforced within a narrower and reasonable limit. *Held*, also, that the covenant to return to England, except so far as it operated improperly in restraint of trade, was a covenant the breach of which did not in any way cause damage to the firm, and therefore such breach did not entitle them to any damages. *OAKES v. JACKSON* . . . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 134

5. ———— *Contract in restraint of trade—Public policy.* In a suit upon an agreement binding defendants to remain subject to the orders of plaintiff, the head of their caste, not to carry on their trade with the assistance of any other persons than their own caste, and imposing penalties for non-performance: *Held*, that it would be contrary to public policy to give effect to such an agreement. *VAITHELINGA v. SAMINADA*

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 44

6. ———— *Contract in restraint of trade.* *Held*, that a stipulation in a con-

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tract prohibiting any sales of goods to others during a particular period, of a similar description to those bought under the contract, is not a stipulation in restraint of trade under s. 27 of Act IX of 1872. *CARLISLE NEPHEWS & Co. v. RICKNATH BUCKTEAR MULL* I. L. R. 8 Calc. 809

7. ———— *Contract in restraint of trade.* A contract under which a person is partially restrained from competing, after the term of his engagement is over, with his former employer, is bad under s. 27 of the Contract Act. *Quere* : As to the effect of an agreement of service by which a person binds himself, during the term of his agreement, not directly or indirectly, to compete with his employer. *BRAHMAPUTRA TEA COMPANY v. SCARTH* I. L. R. 11 Calc. 545

8. ———— *Contract in restraint of trade—Contract void for uncertainty.* Plaintiff, who was a broker, agreed to give up an admitted claim to brokerage on 2,000 corahs previously disposed of, in consideration of defendant, who was a commission agent for different kinds of goods, employing him to sell a like quantity of other corahs and all his other goods for the future, employing plaintiff alone as his broker for the sale of his goods. It was also agreed that, if defendant did not sell the second batch of corahs through plaintiff, the brokerage on the whole would be payable by defendant. *Held*, that the agreement was not void either as being in restraint of trade or for uncertainty. *BUSKIN v. RAMKISSEN SEAL* 23 W. R. 146

9. ———— *Contract in restraint of trade—Construction of contract.* A contract under which goods were purchased at a certain rate for the Cuttack market, containing a stipulation that, if the goods went to Madras, a higher rate should be paid for them, is not one in restraint of trade; and where the purchaser sold the goods to a person in Calcutta, who in turn resold to another, who took them to Madras: *Held*, that the original purchasers were, under the terms of the contract, liable to pay at the enhanced rate. *PREM SOOK v. DHURUM CHAND* I. L. R. 17 Calc. 320

10. ———— *Partial restraint of trade.* S. 27 of the Contract Act does away with the distinction observed in the English cases between partial and total restraint of trade, and makes all contracts falling within its terms void unless they fall within its exceptions. The section was intended to prevent a partial as well as a total restraint of trade. *A* and *B*, two ghat-serangs, entered into a contract with *X* and five others who carried on the business of dubashes at Chittagong for the purpose of carrying on their respective business in unanimity and not injuring one another's trade. The contract, which was to last for three years, provided, *inter alia*, that *A* and *B* were to act as ghat-serangs only and do

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 27—*contd.*

no service to ships in any other capacity; that *X* and the other dubashes were to give *A* five vessels secured by them every year for him to act as ghat-serang; and that *A* was only to act as ghat-serang to the said five ships, and, with the exception of ships for which he had previously acted as ghat-serang, he should not act as ghat-serang or do any other services for ships belonging to any one else. The contract also contained provisions as to the apportionment of the five ships so to be given to *A* amongst the various dubashes, and amongst such, an agreement by *X* to give *A* the third ship he should secure. It also contained a provision for the payment of R1,000 as damages by any one breaking the contract to the person who should suffer by the breach. In a suit by *A* against *X* alleging a breach of the contract by the latter in not giving him the third ship as agreed, and claiming R1,000 by way of damages, *X* pleaded that the contract was void under s. 27 of the Contract Act as being in restraint of trade. *Held*, that the contention was sound, and that the suit must be dismissed. The consideration for the promise by *X* to give the ship to *A* was the agreement by *A* not to carry on any other business than that of a ghat-serang, and that only in respect of his old ships and the five agreed to be so furnished to him by the dubashes. The effect of this agreement was absolutely to restrain *A* from carrying on the business of a dubash and to create a partial restraint on his power to carry on the business of a ghat-serang, and whether or not (even had the latter stipulation not been illegal) the contract would have been void under the provisions of s. 24 of the Act by reason of part of the consideration being the undertaking by *A* absolutely to refrain from carrying on the business of a dubash, it was void for both reasons under the provisions of s. 27, and *A* was not entitled to recover any damages under it. *NUR ALI DUBASH v. ABDUL ALI*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 765

11. ———— *Contract in restraint of trade—Divisibility of contract.* One having a license for the manufacture of salt entered into contract with a firm of merchants, whereby it was provided that he should not manufacture salt in excess of the quantity which the firm at the commencement of each manufacturing season should require him to manufacture; and that all salt manufactured by him should be sold to the firm for a fixed price. The agreement was to be in force for a period of five years. In a suit by the merchants for an injunction restraining the licensee from selling his salt to others: *Held*, that, whether or not the first of these clauses was invalid under s. 27 of the Contract Act, it was separable from the second clause, which was not bad as being in restraint of trade. *MACKENZIE v. STRIRAMIAH* I. L. R. 13 Mad. 472

SADAGOPA RAMAIAH v. MACKENZIE

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 79

12. ———— *Contract in restraint of trade.* The defendant obtained a license to

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sell salt in the salt factory at Krishnapatam, and he executed an agreement by which he was to manufacture salt in the said factory as long as the excise system should be in force, and deliver the same to the plaintiffs for sale, and the plaintiffs were to give him a fixed price for it. *Held*, that the agreement, so far as it restrained the sale of salt to others than the plaintiffs, was bad. *RAGAVAYYA v. SUBBAYYA*. I. L. R. 13 Mad. 475

13. ———— Agreement to share profits of trade—Restraint of trade. Four persons, each of whom owned a ginning factory, entered into an agreement, which (*inter alia*) provided that they should charge a uniform rate of R4-8-0 per palla for ginning cotton; that of this sum, R2-8-0 should be treated as the actual cost of ginning, and that the remaining R2 should be carried to a common fund to be divided each year between the parties to the agreement in proportion to the number of ginning machines which each of them possessed. The agreement was to be in force for four years. The other parties had carried out the agreement, but the defendant, although he had carried the R2 to a separate account, refused to pay the plaintiff his share of the amount. He also refused to pay the other two parties their shares. The accounts had been duly made up, showing the sums which the defendant under the agreement had to pay both to the plaintiff and the two other parties to the agreement. The plaintiff sued the defendant for his share. The defendant contended that the agreement was in restraint of trade, and was, therefore, not enforceable. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover his share from the defendant. The only agreement sought to be enforced in this suit was the agreement to divide the profits. That was a lawful agreement founded upon consideration (*viz.*, the mutual agreement to share each other's profits) and it might be enforced. *Per FARRAN, C.J.*—"I am inclined to agree with the lower Appellate Court that the stipulation, that the parties to the agreement are bound to charge at the rate of R4-8-0 per palla for ginning cotton, is a stipulation in restraint of trade." *Per CANDY, J.*—"I am not satisfied that the agreement in question was, as a fact, in restraint of trade, and, further, to accurately quote the words of s. 27 of the Contract Act, I am not satisfied that it was an agreement by which any one was restrained from exercising a lawful trade." *HARIBHAI MANEKLAL v. SHARAFALI ISABJI*. I. L. R. 22 Bom. 861

14. ———— Contract for personal service—Contract not to practise as physician—Restraint of trade. A agreed on certain terms to become assistant for three years to B, who was a physician and surgeon practising at Zanzibar. The letter which stated the terms which B offered and which (as the Court found) A accepted contained the words "the ordinary clause against practising must be drawn up." At the end of a year a disagreement took place, and A ceased to act as B's

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assistant and began to practise in Zanzibar on his own account. B sued for an injunction to restrain him. *Held*, that this was not a contract in restraint of trade, and that B was entitled to an injunction restraining A from practising in Zanzibar on his own account during the period of three years. *CHARLES-WORTH v. MACDONALD*. . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 103

See *CALLIANJI HARJIVAN v. NARSI TRICUM. Per CANDY, J.*. . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 702, 703

15. ———— Agreement in restraint of Trade—Public policy—Unreasonable restraint—Mutuality in contract necessary—Consideration—Attempt to monopolise trade, illegality of. R took an agreement from 29 out of 30 manufacturers of combs in the city of Patna, whereby the latter agreed to supply R with combs and not to sell the same to any one else. R himself did not execute the agreement and, further, it was stipulated that R was not bound to accept the goods manufactured if he found there was no market for them in Patna, Calcutta or elsewhere. *Held*, that the agreement was void as being in restraint of trade, the restraint being unreasonable within the rule of law laid down in recent English cases, and certainly void under the wider language of s. 27 of the Contract Act. That, further, the agreement was wanting in mutuality and without consideration. That it was also void as being an attempt to suppress competition by means of contracts with independent manufacturers for their entire products, so as to monopolise the market. Under s. 27 of the Contract Act whether the restraint is general or partial, unqualified or qualified, if it is in the nature of a restraint of trade, it is void. *Madhab Chunder v. Raj Coomer*, 14 B. L. R. 76 : s. c. 22 W. R. 370, followed. *Carlisle Nephews & Co. v. Rickmanth, I. L. R. 8 Cal. 809*, referred to. *SHAIKH KALU v. RAM SARAN BHAGAT* (1909). . . 13 C. W. N. 388

s. 28.

See ARBITRATION.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1169

1. ———— excep. 1.—Agreement to refer to Arbitration, revocation of—Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 (17 & 18 Vic., c. 125)—9 & 10 Will. III, c. 15—3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 42—Specific performance of agreement to refer—Suit for damages for breach of agreement to refer. A contract entered into by the plaintiffs with the defendants contained a clause providing, in case of any dispute, for a reference to two arbitrators in England, one to be appointed by each of the contracting parties, whose decision in the matter was to be final. The contract contained no provision for making the submission to arbitration a rule of Court, so that 9 & 10 Will. III, c. 15, and 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 42, s. 39, did not apply. Matter of dispute arising, the defendants refused to appoint an arbitrator, and an award was made by arbitrators appointed by the plaintiffs. Previous to the making of the

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 28—*contd.*

award, the plaintiffs, under the provisions of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, had the submission to arbitration made a rule of the Court of Common Pleas. In a suit in which the plaintiffs' claim was for damages awarded by the arbitrators and incurred by the plaintiffs in respect of the breach of the contract: *Held*, that the award was invalid. The making the submission a rule of Court has not the effect of depriving a party of his right to revoke, at any time before the award, the authority of arbitrators whom he has appointed: still less could it have any effect to prevent him from declining to appoint an arbitrator. *Held*, also, that the contract was not within the scope of s. 28, Act IX of 1872. To make an agreement conform to excep. (1) of that section, the jurisdiction of the Courts must be excluded in all respects except the matter which is the result of the arbitrators' award. Agreements which exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts until an award is made, as in *Scott v. Avery*, 2 *Jur. N. S.* 815: 5 *H. L. C.* 811, are within that exception, and are not illegal. *Quære*: Whether it was intended by that exception to authorize the Court to entertain a suit for specific performance of an agreement to refer to arbitration. S. 28, Act IX of 1872, does not forbid an action for damages for the breach of such an agreement. *KOEGLER v. CORINGA OIL COMPANY*

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 42

Held, on appeal, that the contract was not one of the nature referred to in s. 28, Act IX of 1872. That section only refers to contracts which wholly or partially prohibit the parties absolutely from having recourse to a Court of Law. The first exception in that section applies only to a class of contracts where the parties have agreed that no action shall be brought, until some question of amount has first been decided by the arbitrators. *Semle*: A suit will not lie to enforce an agreement to refer to arbitration, even in the case referred to in the first exception to s. 28 of Act IX of 1872. *CORINGA OIL COMPANY v. KOEGLER*. I. L. R. 1 Calc. 466

2. ——— Agreement not to appeal—*Void agreement*. Where, in consideration of A giving B time to satisfy a decree against him held by A, B agreed not to appeal against the decree and did appeal: *Held*, that the agreement was not prohibited by s. 28 of Act IX of 1872, and that the Appellate Court was bound by the rules of justice, equity, and good conscience to give effect to it and to refuse to allow B to proceed with the appeal which he had instituted in contravention of it. *ANANT DAS v. ASHBURNER & Co.* I. L. R. 1 All. 267

See *JATI RAM TALUKHDAR v. DASS RAM KOLITA*
3 C. L. R. 574

3. ——— Agreement not to appeal—*Release of judgment-debtor*. Where a plaintiff had obtained a decree and under it in execution arrested his judgment-debtor, the latter filed a petition in Court agreeing not to prefer any appeal

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 28—*concl.*

against the judgment obtained by the plaintiff in consideration of his release and being allowed to pay by instalments: *Held*, that s. 28 of the Contract Act had no relation to such an undertaking. *PROTAP CHUNDER DASS v. ARATHOON*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 455: 10 C. L. R. 448

4. ——— excep. 1—*Agreement not to appeal—Arbitration—Misconduct of arbitrators—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 521, 523, 524*. In an agreement to submit to arbitration, which was filed in Court under the provisions of s. 523 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was stipulated that the decision of the arbitrator should be accepted as final, and that no appeal therefrom should be made by either party: *Held*, that this stipulation did not prevent the Court from setting aside the award on the ground of misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. *RANGA v. SITHAYA*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 368

5. ——— Agreement to refer to Manager questions arising under agreement—*Tramways Company—Agreement with Conductor—Manager, power of—Jurisdiction of Courts of Justice*. The plaintiff became conductor of the Calcutta Tramways Company in accordance with an agreement which, amongst other things, provided that "the Company will retain a sum of money deposited by the conductor together with all his wages for the current month as security for the discharge of his duties, and in case of any breach by him of the rules, the manager of the company shall be the sole judge as to the right of the Company to retain the whole or any part of the deposit and wages, and his certificate in writing in respect of the amount to be retained and the cause of such retention shall be binding and conclusive evidence between the parties in all Courts of Justice." On a reference from the Calcutta Court of Small Causes as to the effect of this agreement: *Held*, that it was a contract to refer to arbitration rendered valid by s. 28, example 1, of the Contract Act, and that the certificate of the manager was conclusive. *AGHORE NAUTH BANERJEE v. CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS COMPANY*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 232

s. 29.

See *MORTGAGE—CONSTRUCTION OF MORTGAGES*. I. L. R. 12 All. 175

1. ——— Agreement void for uncertainty—*General charge on property*. A promise to pay out of the debtor's property indefinitely, and an indefinite order for the satisfaction of a decree out of the assets of a deceased person in whose hands soever they may be found, create no charge on specific property such as will bind it in the hands of a purchaser unless he purchases it in fraud. *BHERI DORAYYA v. MADDIPATU RAMAYYA*
I. L. R. 3 Mad. 85

See also *DEOJI v. PITANBAR*

I. L. R. 1 All. 275

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 29—*concl'd.*

2. ————— *Agreement void for uncertainty.* In a suit for maintenance the defendant alleged that, after the plaintiff had left his house, an agreement had been made between them to refer their dispute to arbitration, and that the agreement of reference had been actually signed, but that, on the day fixed by the arbitrators for making their award, the plaintiff had given notice to them not to make an award, and accordingly they had not done so. The alleged agreement to refer was in the following terms:—"To Bhai Dossa Moraji and Dwarkadass Damodar. We, the undersigned two persons, give in writing to you as follows:—We used to reside and act in the house together in peace and harmony. Lately, a few days ago, in consequence of a disagreement amongst the women, V resided separately. Upon persuasion having been used towards her, V again resides in the house together with the rest: so now all are residing in the house in peace and harmony. If any occasion should arise, and if any disagreement should take place amongst the women in order to find a remedy for that, we, the undersigned two persons, give in writing to you as follows:—As to whatever award or settlement you two persons together will make, in accordance therewith, we agree to receive or pay. As to that, we are truly to act on our true religious faith; and we have written and delivered this writing of our free will and pleasure. The same is agreed to and approved of by our heirs and representatives, all; the 11th Jyesth Vadya, Samvat 1939, the day of the event, Friday, the 1st June 1883. And as to this, you are truly to make and deliver a settlement within fifteen days' time." *Quære*: Whether the above agreement was not void by reason of uncertainty. *Quære*: Whether the actual submission of a subject in dispute to named arbitrators, followed by the attempt of one of the parties to such submission to withdraw from or to prevent an award being made upon the submission, falls within the concluding paragraph of s. 21 of the Specific Relief Act, I of 1877. *ADHIBAI v. CURSANDAS NATHU*
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 199

s. 30.

See ante, ss. 20, 30; AND s. 65.

See CONTRACT—WAGERING CONTRACTS.

I. L. R. 9. Bom. 358

I. L. R. 5 All. 443

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 899

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 191

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 227

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 92.

1. ————— *Wagering contracts.* In order that a transaction may fall within s. 30 of the Indian Contract Act, there must be at least two parties, the agreement between whom must be by way of wager, and both sides must be parties to the wager. It is of the essence of a wager that each side should stand to win or lose, according to the uncertain or unascertained event, in reference to

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 30—*concl'd.*

which the chance or risk is taken; in other words, to make an agreement a wager there must be a common intention to bet. *SASSOON v. TOKERSEY* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 616

2. ————— *Wagering contracts*

—*Agreement to pay differences—Surrounding circumstances—Form of contract not of moment—Bombay Act III of 1865.* The law which is contained in s. 30 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) and in Bombay Act III of 1865, is that the Court must not only consider the terms in which the parties have chosen to embody their agreement, but must look to the whole nature of the transaction or institution, whatever it may be, and must prove among all the surrounding circumstances, including the conduct of the parties, with a view to ascertain what in truth was the real intention or understanding between the parties to the bargain. The actual form of the contract is of little moment, for gamblers cannot be allowed to force the jurisdiction of the Courts by the expedient of inserting provisions, which might in certain events become operative, to compel the passing of property though neither party anticipated such a contingency. The Court should be astute to discover what in fact was the common intention of both parties, and should do all that is possible to see through the ostensible and apparent transaction into the underlying reality of the bargain. *MOTILAL v. GOVINDRAM* (1905)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 83

s. 38.

See CONTRACT—BREACH OF CONTRACT.

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 692

See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 461

See LEGAL TENDER.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 305

See TENDER . . . 5 C. L. R. 105

s. 39.

See CONTRACT—CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS . . . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 63

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 477

See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—BREACH OF AGREEMENT . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 18

1. ————— *Right to rescind—Refusal to perform—Time of essence of contract—Suit for damages for non-delivery.* S. 39 of the Contract Act only enacts what was the law in England and in India before the Act was passed,—*viz.*, that where a party to contract refuses altogether to perform, or is disabled from performing, is part of it, the other party has a right to rescind. In a suit for damages for the non-delivery of linseed upon a contract the terms of which as to payment were cash on delivery, part delivery had been made by the defendants, and a sum of Rs. 1,000 had been paid on account by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs then made a claim against the defendants for excess

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 39—*concl'd.*

refraction, and the defendants thereupon refused to deliver the remainder of the linseed unless the plaintiffs paid the full amount owing for the portion that had been delivered. The plaintiffs declined to accept these terms, and the defendants then cancelled the contract. *Held*, that there was not such a refusal on the part of the plaintiffs to perform their part of the contract as to entitle the defendants to rescind under s. 39 of the Contract Act. *SOOLTAN CHAND v. SCHILLER*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 2 52 : 3 C. L. R. 287

2. *Expression of Intention not to perform contract—Right to sue for non-performance—Rescinding contract.* Where a vendor contracts to deliver goods within a reasonable time, payment to be made on delivery; if before the lapse of that time he merely expresses an intention not to perform the contract, the purchaser cannot at once bring his action unless he exercise his option to treat the contract as rescinded. *MANSUK DAS v. RANGAYYA CHETTI*

1 Mad. 162

3. *Mortgage—Part breach of contract by mortgagee—Rescission of contract—Acquiescence—Suit by mortgagee for interest due under the mortgage as regards the part fulfilled.* A mortgaged certain land to B for R800. Under the terms of the mortgage deed, B was to pay R500 of the advance to C in discharge of a previous mortgage executed by A in favour of C. Of the balance of R300 B was to retain R200 in payment of a previous debt of A due to him, and the balance of R100 was to be paid to A. B paid the said R100, retained the R200, but neglected to pay the said R500 to C, who sued A and recovered the debt by attachment and sale of A's moveable property. After eight years from the date of the mortgage, B brought a suit to recover the interest due under the mortgage on R300 only. *Held*, that, under s. 39 of the Contract Act, A was entitled to cancel the contract of mortgage owing to B's conduct, but that he was bound to give up the benefit he had received, *viz.*, R300, and pay interest thereon up to the date of cancellation. B was not entitled to treat the original mortgage as a mortgage in force with all its stipulations for R300 instead of R800, and on that view to sue for interest alone. *SUBBA RAU v. DEVU SHETTI*

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 126

s. 42.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—JOINT RIGHT.

I. L. R. 7 All. 313

ss. 42, 43 and 44.

See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 461

s. 43.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 153.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 378

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—PARTNERSHIP, SUITS CONCERNING.

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 700

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 257

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 43—*contd.*

1. *Joint liability—Suit against joint contractors—Res judicata.* A suit in which a decree has been obtained against one of the several joint makers of a promissory note is a bar to a subsequent suit against the others. The effect of s. 43 of the Contract Act is not to create a joint and several liability in such a case. That section merely prohibits the defendant in such a suit pleading in abatement, and thus places the liability arising from the breach of a joint contract and the liability arising from a tort on the same footing. The rule laid down in the case of *King v. Hoare*, 13 M. & W. 494, and *Brinsmead v. Harrison*, L. R. 7 C. P. 547, is one of principle, not merely of procedure. *HEMENDRO COOMAR MULLICK v. RAJENDRO-LALL MOONSHEE*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 353 : 1 C. L. R. 488

See LAKSHMISHANKAR DEVSHANKAR v. VISHNURAM

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 77

2. *Decree against member of joint family for trading debt—Suit to declare son's property liable for father's debt.* V and his three infant sons constituted an undivided trading Hindu family in 1875 when part of the family property was sold to pay a trading debt of V. In February 1877, V, at the request of his wife, as compensation to his sons for the loss of their interests in the property sold, *bona fide* assigned to his sons his share in a house, No. 9, A Street. In October and November 1877, M and S each obtained decrees against V for *bona fide* trading debts and issued execution against the house No. 9, A Street. The mother of the infant sons intervened and the attachment was raised, and M and S were referred to a regular suit to establish their claims. In January 1878 V was declared insolvent. M and S respectively sued to have it declared that the house No. 9, A Street, was liable to be attached and sold in satisfaction of their decrees against V. *Held*, reversing the decree of KERNAN, J., that the plaintiffs, by obtaining decrees against V, had exhausted their remedy, and that a second suit against the sons of V was not maintainable. *Hemendro Coomar Mullick v. Rajendro Lall Moonshee*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 353, approved. *GURUSAMI CHETTI v. SAMURTA CHUMLA MAMAR CHETTI. GURUSAMI CHETTI v. SADASIYA CHETTI*

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 37

And see CHACKALINGA MUDALI v. SUBBARAYA MUDALI

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 133

3. *Liabilities of joint Contractors.* Where five brothers had made themselves jointly liable for a sum of money under a bond, and mortgaged a certain mouzah as security for the debt; and the mortgagee, having subsequently taken a separate bond from each of two of the brothers for one-fifth of the whole amount, now sought to recover the remaining three-fifths of the said amount from the remaining three brothers; but the latter contended that the claim, being jointly held against all five, could not be

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 43—*contd.*

broken up: *Held*, that any one of the five might be sued for the whole amount, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the three-fifths from the three brothers. *MAHTAB SINGH v. SADHOORAM BHUGUT* 25 W. R. 419

4. ———— *Joint Contract—*
Right of promisee to sue any or all of the joint promisors
—Right of joint promisors to be joined as defendants—Decree against some only of several joint promisors—Effects of such decree—Civil Procedure Code, s. 29. The effect of s. 43 of the Contract Act, 1872, being to exclude the right of a joint contractor to be sued along with his co-contractors, the rule laid down in the cases of *King v. Hoare*, 13 M. & W. 494, and *Kendall v. Hamilton*, L. R. 4 A. C. 504, is no longer applicable to cases arising in India, at all events in the mofussil, since the passing of that Act, and a judgment obtained against some only of the joint contractors and remaining unsatisfied is no bar to a second suit on the contract against the other joint contractors. *In re Hodgson*, L. R. 31 Ch. D. 177, *Hammond v. Schofield*, L. R. [1891] 1 Q. B. 453, *Nuthoo Lall Chowdhry v. Shoukee Lall*, 10 B. L. R. 200, *Hemendro Coomar Mullick v. Rajendrolall Moonshiee*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 353, *Gurusami Chetti v. Samurti Chinna Mannar Chetti*, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 37, *Lukmidas Khimji v. Purshotam Haridas*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 700, *Rahmubhoy Hubibbhoy v. Turner*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 408, *Chockalinga Mudali v. Subbaraya Mudali*, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 133, *Narayana Chetti v. Lakshmana Chetti*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 256, *Sitanath Koer v. Land Mortgage Bank of India*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 888, *Nobin Chandra Roy v. Magantara Dassya Roy*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 924, *Lutchmiput Singh v. Land Mortgage Bank of India*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 469 note, *Radha Pershad Singh v. Ramkhelawan Singh*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 302, *Bhukandas Vijbhukandas v. Lallubhai Kashidas*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 562, *Laksmishankar Devshankar v. Vishnuram*, I. L. R. 24 Bom. 77, *Dharam Singh v. Angan Lal*, I. L. R. 21 All. 301, *Motilal Bechar Dass v. Ghellabhai Hariram*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 6, *Brinsmead v. Harrison*, L. R. 7 C. P. 547, *Wilson, Sons & Co. v. Balcarres Brook Steamship Co.*, L. R. [1893] 1 Q. B. 422, *Robinson v. Geisel*, L. R. [1894] 2 Q. B. 685, *Balmakund v. Sangri*, L. R. 19 All. 379, *Priestley v. Fernie*, 2 H. & C. 977, *Bir Bhaddar Sewak Pande v. Sarju Prasad*, I. L. R. 9 All. 681, *Bhavani Pershad v. Kallu*, I. L. R. 17 All. 537, *Dhunpat Singh v. Sham Soonder Mitter*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 291, referred to. The plaintiff sued B and M, alleged to be the managing members of a joint Hindu family, for sale upon four mortgages executed by them in respect of property, owned by the joint family, and obtained a decree in 1894. He brought the present suit against defendants 1 to 15, the other members of the same family (said to be the brother, brother's sons and cousins of B and M) claiming enforcement of the same mortgages against the defendants by sale of their interests in

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 43—*concl.*

the mortgaged property. *Held*, that the cause of action against the defendants 1 to 15 or the mortgages in suit was not merged in the decree of 1894 and that the suit against them was not barred. *MUHAMMAD ASKARI v. RADHE RAM SINGH* I. L. R. 22 All. 307

s. 44

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—JOINT DECREE, EXECUTION OF, AND LIABILITY UNDER 6 C. L. R. 212

See MORTGAGE—SALE OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY—RIGHTS OF MORTGAGEES. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 953.

Release to one of several Partners—*Compromise with one partner.* In a suit for damages against a partnership firm, the plaintiffs compromised the suit with one of the partners upon the terms contained in the following receipt: "Received from A the sum of Rs. 9,500 in full discharge of all claims upon him as an individual and as a partner in the late firm of B, S. & Co., and we hereby undertake to immediately withdraw the suit against him and others." *Held*, that although, according to English law, the receipt operated as a discharge to all the remaining defendants, yet that the 44th section of the Contract Act applies to liabilities arising out of the breach of a contract, as well as to the performance of contracts, and that A alone was released. *KIRTEE CHUNDER MITTER v. STREUTHERS* I. L. R. 4 Calc. 336: 3 C. L. R. 546.

s. 45.

See CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION—RIGHT TO SUE OR EXECUTE DECREE WITHOUT CERTIFICATE. I. L. R. 17 Mad. 108.

See COVENANT.

See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. I. L. R. 20 Mad. 461.

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—PARTNERSHIPS, SUITS CONCERNING. I. L. R. 9 All. 486
 I. L. R. 18 Calc. 86
 I. L. R. 17 Bom. 6
 I. L. R. 21 Bom. 412
 I. L. R. 20 All. 365.

See PARTNERSHIP I. L. R. 9 All. 486

See REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PERSON I. L. R. 25 Mad. 385.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—JOINT RIGHT. I. L. R. 7 All. 313
 13 C. W. N. 509

ss. 46, 49, 94—*Commission Agent—*
Place of payment of debt—Cause of action—Jurisdiction—Letters Patent, c. 12. *Held*, that where no specific contract exists as to the place where

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*ss. 46, 49, 94—*conclld.*

the payment of the debt is to be made, it is clear, it is the duty of the debtor to make the payment, where the creditor is. *MOTILAL v. SURAJMAL* (1904) I. L. R. 30 Bom. 167

s. 49.

See CONTRACT—CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS I. L. R. 24 Calc. 8
I. R. 23 I. A. 119

s. 51.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 546

1. *Suit for Damages for non-delivery—Time of essence of contract—Contract Act, s. 55—Readiness and willingness.* In a suit for damages for non-delivery of linseed upon a contract the terms of which as to payment were cash on delivery, part delivery had been made by the defendants, and a sum of Rs. 1,000 had been paid on account by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs then made a claim against the defendants for excess refraction and the defendants thereupon refused to deliver the remainder of the linseed unless the plaintiffs paid the full amount owing for the portion which had been delivered. The plaintiffs declined to accept these terms, and the defendants then cancelled the contract. *Held* by GARTH, C.J., that s. 51 of the Act was not applicable, inasmuch as it did not appear that the plaintiffs were unwilling to pay for the deliveries which the defendants refused to make, and that time was not of the essence of the contract so as to bring the case within the provision of s. 55 of the Act. *Held*, by MARKBY, J., that s. 51 would have applied if the defendants, when they came to make delivery, had insisted upon the contract being strictly performed and upon payment being made on delivery; and that, if the defendants had so insisted, time might have been of the essence of the contract within the meaning of s. 55. *SOULTAN CHUND v. SCHILLER*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 252; 3 C. L. R. 287

2. *Sale of Goods where no time is fixed—Mutual obligations to pay for and deliver.* In an action for damages for breach of contract: *Held*, that no time being fixed for payment or delivery by a contract for the purchase and sale of certain goods, the construction of law is, that the seller will deliver on payment of the price, and that the buyer will pay the price on receiving the goods, and either party is competent to call upon the other within a reasonable time, to fulfil his part of the agreement, if ready to fulfil his own. *JUGGUNATH v. BECK*

2 N. W. 60

3. *Contract—Suit for damages for breach of contract—Non-delivery—Tender of price—Readiness and willingness to pay without making actual tender of money.* In a suit for damages for breach of a contract to deliver cotton, there was evidence that the plaintiffs

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 51—*conclld.*

had called on the defendant to perform his part of the contract by giving delivery, but that he had refused to do so and had repudiated the contract. The plaintiffs proved that they were ready and willing to carry out their part of the bargain and had made preparations with the object of having the money ready to pay for the cotton on delivery. *Held*, that, under s. 51 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), they had done sufficient to entitle them to recover damages, and were not obliged to show that they made an actual tender of the money. *SHRIRAM RUPRAM v. MADANGOPAL GOWARDHAN* (1903) I. L. R. 30 Calc. 865

4. *Contract for sale of goods—Reciprocal promises—Agreement to buy and promise to deliver—Refusal to make delivery—Breach—Tender of price, if necessary—Damages.* The respondents had agreed to buy some bales of cotton from the appellant, and the latter to deliver the same to the respondents. The respondents now called upon the appellant to carry out the bargain without at the same time making a tender of the price, but it was proved that they had made preparations with the object of having the money ready in hand. The appellant refused to make delivery and the respondents brought this suit for damages. *Held*, that the appellant was liable. The respondents had done all that they were required to do under s. 51 of the Contract Act. They were not required to make tender of payment. *SHRIRAM RUPRAM v. MADANGOPAL GOWARDHAN* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 25

s. 53—*Reciprocal Promises—Voidable contract.* B sued the obligees to enforce a bond hypothecating immoveable property, to the discharge of which he had agreed by means of a sale of the property. The contract of sale was never carried into effect, although the vendors were ready and willing to put him in possession of the property, as B failed to pay the price which he covenanted to pay. It was held that B was not at liberty to enforce the bond. *NARAIN SINGH v. MADHO PARSHAD* 7 N. W. 153

s. 55—*Sale of goods—Delivery at certain date—Rescission of contract—Vendor's remedies—Time of essence of contract.* In a contract for the sale of ascertained goods, terms cash on delivery, to be given and taken in ten or eleven days, the vendee obtained an extension of the time for the performance of the contract, agreeing to pay godown rent and interest. He took delivery of, and paid for some of the goods, and subsequently obtained a further extension of time. A small balance remained in the vendor's hands, after giving the vendee credit for the goods taken delivery of, godown rent, and interest. After the expiration of the further time, the vendee tendered the price of the remaining goods and demanded delivery, when the vendors stated that they had rescinded the contract. In an action for damages for non-delivery: *Held*, that time was of the essence of

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 55—*concl'd.*

the contract, and that, under s. 55 of the Contract Act, the vendors were entitled to rescind. *BULDEO DOSS v. HOWE*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 64: 8 C. L. R. 582

ss. 55, 65.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, Sch. II, ART. 97

I. L. R. 31 All. 68

s. 56.

See DAMAGES—MEASURE AND ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES—BREACH OF CONTRACT . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 432

1. *Breach of contract—Impossibility to perform a portion arising after execution.* A contract was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant, by which the plaintiff agreed to cultivate indigo for the defendant, for a specified number of years, in certain specified lands situated in different villages, with respect to portion of which lands the plaintiff was a sub-tenant only. Subsequently, during the continuance of the contract, the plaintiff lost possession of those lands, through his immediate landlord having failed to pay the rent, and having been in consequence ejected therefrom by the owner. In a suit by him, under the above circumstances, to have so much of the contract as related to those lands cancelled, on the ground that it had become impossible of performance through no neglect on his part: *Held*, that such a case came within the provisions of cl. 2, s. 56 of Act IX of 1872 (Contract Act), and that the mere fact that the plaintiff could have paid up the debt due by his immediate landlord and so retained possession of the land was not sufficient to constitute such an omission or neglect on his part as to take it out of the provisions of that section. *INDER PERSHAD SINGH v. CAMPBELL* . . . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 474: 8 C. L. R. 501

2. *Contract to carry Passengers in Ship—Passengers infected with Disease—Excuse for non-performance of contract—Implied term in contract—Performance become illegal—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), s. 269.* By a contract made with the plaintiffs, the defendants agreed to carry from Bombay to Jeddah, in their steamer *Mobile*, 500 pilgrims who were about to arrive in Bombay from Singapore in the plaintiffs' ship, the *Stura*. The defendants were to be paid at the rate of Rs 26 per head, and the ship *Mobile* was to receive the pilgrims on the 3rd May 1888. The *Stura* arrived in Bombay on the 1st May with about 600 pilgrims on board, and on the 2nd May the plaintiffs gave notice to the defendants that 500 of them were ready to go on board the *Mobile* on the next day in accordance with the contract. The defendants refused to receive the pilgrims on board the *Mobile* on the ground that they had come to Bombay in the *Stura*, and that during the voyage of that ship to Bombay there had been an outbreak of small-pox on board; that the 500 pilgrims had been in close contact with those who had been suffer-

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 56—*concl'd.*

ing from the disease, and that on the 3rd May fresh cases were occurring among the pilgrims brought from Singapore. They pleaded that under these circumstances they were not bound to ship and carry the 500 pilgrims, contending (i) that it was an implied term in the contract that the 500 pilgrims should be free from small-pox or other dangerous disease, and (ii) that the performance of the contract had under the circumstances become unlawful (s. 269 of the Penal Code and s. 56 of the Contract Act). *Held*, that the defendants were bound to carry out the contract. In the absence of proof, that a term providing that the pilgrims should be free from small-pox was to be implied by the usage of the pilgrim-carrying trade, there could be no reason for implying it. The possibility that some of the 500 pilgrims might have the germs of the disease in them owing to their exposure to infection, might make carrying them more expensive and onerous, but it was a contingency which from the very nature of the trade must have been known to the defendants, and if they wished to provide against it they should have done so by express terms. *Held*, also, that the performance of the contract had not become unlawful. The risk of disease was not greater than would necessarily be incurred in every crowded emigrant ship. But, even if special precautions were desirable under the circumstances, it was for the defendants, who had entered into an absolute agreement, to have taken them. *BOMBAY AND PERSIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v. RUBATTINO COMPANY*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 147

s. 59.

See SALE . . . 10 C. W. N. 948

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 636

s. 60.

See APPROPRIATION OF PAYMENTS.

W. R. 1864, Act X, 15

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 164

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 39

2 C. W. N. 633

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 636

s. 62.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CONTRACTS OR AGREEMENTS . . . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 441

1. *Substitution of new contract for old one.* The mere fact of one party alleging that a new contract has been substituted for an old one does not of itself put an end to the old contract even as against the party so alleging, unless the allegation is proved to be true. *ROVSHAN BIBEE v. HURRAY KRISTO NATH*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 926

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 62—*concl'd.*

2. ——— and s. 63—*Novation—Contract, novation of—Satisfaction of contract.* The plaintiff sued to recover the sum of Rs. 1,173 due on a bond. It was found as a fact that after the due date of the bond an arrangement was come to between the plaintiff and the defendant by which the plaintiff agreed to accept in satisfaction of what was due to him at the time of the arrangement Rs. 400 in cash and a fresh bond for Rs. 701, payable by instalments; and it was further found that the plaintiff never intended or agreed to accept the naked promise of the defendant to pay the Rs. 400 and to give the bond for Rs. 701. The defendant did not pay the Rs. 400 or give the bond, but pleaded that there had been a novation of the original contract by reason of the subsequent agreement, and that the suit, being based on the original contract, could not be maintained, and he relied on the provisions of ss. 62 and 63 of the Contract Act in support of his contention. *Held*, that neither section had any bearing on the case, and that upon the breach by the defendant of the terms which he had made, and upon the non-performance by him of the satisfaction which he had promised to give, the parties were relegated to their rights and liabilities under the original contract, and that consequently the plaintiff was entitled to the relief he claimed. *Held*, further, that s. 62 of the Contract Act is merely a legislative expression of the common law, and the provisions thereof do not apply to a case where there has been a breach of the original contract before the subsequent agreement is come to. *MONOHUR KOYAL v. THAKUR DAS NASKAR* . . . I. L. R. 15 Cal. 319

1. ——— s. 63—*Agreement extending time for performance of contract—Consideration.* An agreement extending the time for the performance of a contract falling under s. 63 of the Contract Act does not require consideration to support it. *DAVIS v. CANDASAMI MUDALI* . . . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 398

2. ——— Mortgage—*Power of sale—Suit to set aside sale under power of sale—Promise by mortgagee to postpone sale.* The plaintiff mortgaged certain property to the first defendant on 28th December 1895. By the mortgage-deed the mortgage-debt was made repayable on the 28th December 1896. On the 12th May 1897, the first defendant sold it by auction under the power of sale contained in the mortgage-deed, and the second defendant was the purchaser. The plaintiff now sued to set aside the sale and be allowed to redeem, alleging that on the day before the sale the first defendant had orally promised and agreed to postpone the sale for four days, and that the second defendant had notice of this fact before he purchased the property. *Held*, that the said promise or agreement, if made by the mortgagee, was not an extension of time for the performance of the plaintiff's (mortgagor's) promise to him, which was to pay the mortgage-debt on the 28th December 1896, but was an agreement to refrain from exercising, for a stated period, the right

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 63—*concl'd.*

of sale arising from non-performance, and, therefore, s. 63 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) did not apply. *TRIMBAK GANGADHAR RANADE v. BHAGWANDAS MULCHAND* . . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 348

3. ——— Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 92, proviso 4—*Registered document—Subsequent oral agreement—Remission of portion of promise—Discharge in full on receipt of portion of amount due—Evidence of oral agreement.* In a suit for two years' rent, due under a registered lease, defendant pleaded a subsequent oral agreement by plaintiff to remit a portion of the rent each year, and filed a receipt by which plaintiff accepted payment at the reduced rate in full discharge in respect of one of the years. *Held*, that though, under proviso 4 to s. 92 of the Evidence Act, evidence of such an agreement was inadmissible, and plaintiff was entitled to claim rent at the rate stipulated in the registered lease, the discharge for one of the years was valid under s. 63 of the Contract Act, and took effect. It was immaterial that the discharge had been given in pursuance of the alleged oral agreement, which, though not admissible in evidence, was not illegal. *KARAMFALLI UNNI KURUP v. THEKKU VITTHIL MUTHORAIKUTT* (1902) . . . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 195

s. 64.

See GUARDIANS—DUTIES AND POWERS OF GUARDIANS. . . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 289

See ESTOPPEL—ESTOPPEL BY CONDUCT. . . I. L. R. 33 Cal. 539

See MINOR—LIABILITY OF MINOR ON, AND RIGHT TO ENFORCE, CONTRACTS. . . 1 C. W. N. 453

1. ——— Money advanced to Minor on mortgage declared void—*Restoration of benefit by minor.* If money advanced to an infant on a mortgage declared void is spent by him, then there is no benefit which he is bound to restore under the provisions of s. 64 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872). *DHARMO DAS GHOSE v. BRAHMO DUTT* . . . I. L. R. 25 Cal. 616
2 C. W. N. 330

Affirmed, on appeal, in *BROHMO DUTT v. DHARMO DAS GHOSE* . . . I. L. R. 26 Cal. 381
3 C. W. N. 468

——— "Person" "Party"—*Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 11.* The words "person" and "party" in s. 64 of the Contract Act are interchangeable, and mean such a person as is referred to in s. 11 of that Act, i.e., a person competent to contract. *BROHMO DUTT v. DHARMO DAS GHOSE* . . . I. L. R. 26 Cal. 381
3 C. W. N. 468

s. 65.

See ante, ss. 20, 30 AND 65.

See ACT XL OF 1858, s. 18.

I. L. R. 9 All. 340

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 65—*contd.*

See CONTRACT—CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS . I. L. R. 9 Mad. 441

See CONTRACT—WAGERING CONTRACTS. I. L. R. 9 Bom. 358

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. I. L. R. 3 Mad. 215

See ESTOPPEL—ESTOPPEL BY CONDUCT. I. L. R. 30 Cal. 539

See GUARDIAN—DUTIES AND POWERS OF GUARDIANS . I. L. R. 9 All. 340

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—DAMAGE TO PREMISES LET . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 15

See INSURANCE—LIFE INSURANCE. I. L. R. 26 Mad. 183

See SETTLEMENT—CONSTRUCTION. I. L. R. 17 Bom. 407

1. ———— *Obligation of person receiving advantage under void agreement—Restitution.* S. 65 of the Contract Act should not be read as if the person making restitution must actually have been a party to the contract, but as including any person whatever who has obtained any advantage under a void agreement. *GIRRAJ BAKSH V. HAMID ALI* . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 340

2. ———— *Retention by debtor of debt as part of consideration for another contract.* In contemplation of a sale of land by the debtor to the creditor, it was agreed that the book-debt should be retained by the former in satisfaction of part of the price, but the parties failing to agree as to certain other terms, a suit, brought by the intending vendor for specific performance, was dismissed on the ground that no effectual agreement had been made. *Held*, that this decree brought about a new state of things and imposed a new obligation on the debtor who could no longer allege that he was absolved by the creditor's being entitled to the land instead of the money. He became bound to pay that which he had retained in payment of his land, the date of the decree giving the date of the failure of an existing consideration, within the meaning of Art. 97 of the Limitation Act, 1877. The matter might also be regarded as falling under s. 65 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), under which, when the agreement was decreed ineffectual, the debtor having previously received an advantage under it, was made liable "to restore" that advantage or "to make compensation for it." *BASSU KUAR V. DHUM SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 11 All. 47

3. ———— *Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 97—Agreement to sell—Suit for specific performance—Agreement declared unenforceable—Alternative claim for refund of consideration paid thereunder—Limitation.* The defendants, against whom a decree for foreclosure was outstanding, agreed to sell certain immovable property to

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 65—*contd.*

the plaintiff, and the plaintiff paid into Court, as part of the consideration, the amount due by the defendants under the foreclosure decree. The defendants neither executed a conveyance of the property which they had agreed to sell, nor returned to the plaintiff the money which he had paid on their behalf. The plaintiff thereupon sued the defendants, claiming in the alternative either a decree for specific performance of the agreement to sell or a refund of the money paid by him as part of the consideration for the sale agreed upon. The Court of first instance gave the plaintiff a decree for specific performance. On appeal by the defendants, it was held by the High Court (i) that, the terms of the agreement to sell not being satisfactorily proved, no decree for specific performance could be made; (ii) that the plaintiff was therefore entitled to get back the money which he had paid under the agreement; (iii) that the plaintiff's alternative claim for a refund on failure of consideration was governed as to limitation by Art. 97 of the second Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, and was not barred by limitation, inasmuch as limitation only began to run from the date of the High Court's decree declaring the agreement to sell to be unenforceable. *BASSU KUAR V. DHUM SINGH*, I. L. R. 11 All. 47, followed. *UDIT NARAIN MISR V. MUHAMMAD MINNATULLA* (1903) I. L. R. 25 All. 618

4. ———— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 97—Contract—Failure of consideration—Suit to recover money paid—Limitation.* One, Farzand Ali, negotiated on behalf of his wife, Najm-un-nissa, a mortgage for Rs. 26,000 in favour of Jamna Das. This mortgage included two items, one of Rs. 3,403-11-6 and the other of Rs. 679-10-6. The former was a debt due by Farzand Ali to Jamna Das, for which Farzand Ali represented his wife was willing to become security; the latter was a sum taken by Farzand Ali in cash on the representation that it would be paid by him to the mortgagor on suit by the mortgagee for recovery of the mortgage-money. The first Court decreed the plaintiff's claim in full; but on appeal the High Court exonerated the mortgagor from payment of the two sums mentioned above. After the death of Farzand Ali the mortgagee sued the representatives of Farzand Ali for recovery of these two items. *Held*, that the mortgagee had a good cause of action in respect of which limitation only began to run from the date of the decree of the High Court, which decided that the sum claimed could not be recovered from Najm-un-nissa as part of the mortgage debt. *BASSU KUAR V. DHUM SINGH*, I. L. R. 11 All. 47, followed. *JAMNA DAS V. NAJM-UN-NISSA BIBI* (1906) I. L. R. 28 All. 466

s. 68.

See CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—CO-SHARERS, LIABILITY OF . 6 C. W. N. 903

See HINDU LAW—MARRIAGE—CEREMONIES . . . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 497

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 68—*concl'd.*

See MINOR—LIABILITY OF MINOR ON, AND
RIGHT TO ENFORCE, CONTRACTS.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 872

See MINOR—REPRESENTATION OF MINOR
IN SUITS . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 140

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—
SETTING ASIDE SALE—GENERAL CASES.
6 C. W. N. 336

s. 69.

See CHARTER PARTY I. L. R. 7 Bom. 51

See MADRAS REVENUE RECOVERY ACT,
s. 35 . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 35

See PURCHASER . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 461

1. ———— *Payment for which another person is liable.* S. 69 of Act IX of 1872 was intended to include cases not only of personal liability, but all liabilities to payment for which owners of land are indirectly liable, when such liabilities are imposed upon lands held by them. That section must be held to include such a case as a sub-lessee paying rent to a superior landlord, for which the intermediate lessee is liable under a covenant. *MOTHOORANATH CHUTTOPADHYA v. KRISTOKUMAR GHOSE* . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 369

2. ———— *Money paid under compulsion of law—Voluntary payment.* A mortgagee of two separate properties became by purchase the owner of the equity of redemption of one of them, and of this property the value was so proportioned to his payments that the mortgage-debt was in effect satisfied. This mortgagee, however, obtained a decree and order in execution for the sale of the other property, on which his mortgage was the second. Of the latter property, the plaintiffs, who also represented the first mortgagee, had become purchasers, and they filed objections to the sale. These were disallowed, and they thereupon paid into Court money sufficient to satisfy the decree in order to prevent the sale. *Held*, that this was not a voluntary payment, nor a payment of money equitably due; but one made under compulsion of law, *i.e.*, under pressure of the execution-proceedings. *Held*, further, that this might be recovered in a suit for a money-decree, the remedy not being confined to the execution-proceedings. *DULICHAND v. RAM-KISHEN SINGH* . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 648

See MOHESH CHUNDER BANERJEE v. RAM PURSONO CHOWDHRY . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 539

3. ———— *Reimbursement of person paying money due by another in payment of which he is interested—Purchase of mortgaged property.* M and R conveyed certain property to S by a deed of sale, in which the vendors asserted themselves to be in possession of the property, and no mention was made of the property being mortgaged. There was nothing to show that the purchaser purchased a mere

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 69—*cont'd.*

equity of redemption, nor that he was aware of the mortgage. Before S obtained possession of the property, the mortgagee sued to enforce his lien and obtained a decree and attached the property in execution, and it was advertised for sale. S satisfied the decree, which was equal in amount to the purchase-money, and brought a suit to obtain possession of the property. The Court of first instance decreed the claim conditionally on the payment of the purchase-money to the defendants, but the lower Appellate Court reversed the decree, being of opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to an unconditional decree, and its decree was affirmed in special appeal. *MAZHA ALI v. MAHOMED SAHIB KHAN* . . . 7 N. W. 336

4. ———— *Payment of Revenue—Revenue Sale Law (Act XI of 1859), s. 9.* Where two co-sharers in an undivided estate took from a third co-sharer a farming lease of her interest in a portion of the said estate, on the stipulation that they should meet the Government demand on the said co-sharer, and take credit for the amount in the rent reserved; and the two farmers leased out the same share in a *dur-ijara* lease to a fourth person, who, on the failure of the said farmers to meet the Government demand, paid it in himself to save the estate, and then brought a suit against the third co-sharer to recover the amount; and the Munsif decided that the suit could only lie against the two farmers, but the Judge ruled that the suit could only lie against the third co-sharer as proprietor;—it was found by the High Court that, as the third co-sharer's share was not separate, and the whole estate was liable to sale for default, the two farmers were generally liable as proprietors with the third co-sharer, and, having recovered the rent for the share, might have been made liable for the revenue, even if the suit had been brought, as supposed by the Judge under s. 9, Act XI of 1859, but *held*, that, as the suit had not been brought under any particular section of the law, s. 69 of the Contract Law applied to the suit as well as s. 9, Act XI of 1859, and that the money paid by the *dur-ijaradar* was recoverable from the two farmers who had realized the rent and were responsible, both under their contract and as co-proprietors, for the revenue. *TARINI alias SAWAH MONEE DEBIA v. SREENATH MOOKERJI* 25 W. R. 385

5. ———— *Hindu Law—Liability of undivided brother of deceased Hindu to defray expenses of his niece's marriage—Improper refusal—Performance by widow—Maintainability of suit brought by widow—"Person who is interested in the payment of money."* The defendant having improperly refused to perform the marriage ceremony of his niece, the daughter of his undivided brother (deceased), the widow of the latter herself performed the ceremony, borrowing money for the purpose, and sued her late husband's said brother (the defendant) to recover the amount

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 69—*contd.*

expended on the marriage. On its being contended that defendant was under no obligation to provide for the expenses of his brother's daughter's marriage: *Held*, that defendant was liable, the marriage having been properly performed. *Held*, further, that the suit was maintainable, though it had been brought by the mother of the bride, and not by the bride herself. *Semle*: That the mother was, within the meaning of s. 69 of the Indian Contract Act, interested in making the payment which had given rise to the action. It was not necessary for her to prove that she had been compelled to make it, or that she had made it at the defendant's request. *VAIKUNTAM AMMANGAR v. KALLAPIRAN AYYANGAR*

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 512

6. ————— *Payment by one interested—Decree for land in plaintiff's favour—Land withheld pending appeals—Payment of kist by plaintiff—Suit for amount paid.* Plaintiff had obtained decrees for possession of certain lands, but, pending an appeal and second appeal, the lands were withheld from him. He, however, paid the kist, and now sued to recover the amount so paid. *Held*, that he was entitled to recover. It was a payment by one interested in it, which the defendants, as the persons in actual possession, were bound by law to pay. *CHINNASAMY AYYAR v. RATHNA-SUBAPATHY PILLAY* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 338

7. ————— *Putni taluk—Mortgage—Sale in execution—Arrears of rent due previous to sale—First charge.* A mortgaged a certain putni taluq to B. B subsequently brought a mortgage suit against A, and in execution brought the property to sale and purchased it himself. In the meantime the rent due to the zamindar had fallen into arrear, and the zamindar obtained a rent decree, and in execution thereof advertised the putni for sale. The mortgagee, to save the property, paid in the amount of the decree and afterwards sued the mortgagor for contribution. *Held*, that a mortgagee, who purchases property at an execution sale, is under a legal liability to pay the rent due upon the property at the time of purchase, and therefore cannot claim, under s. 69 of the Contract Act, contribution from the mortgagor. *Maharani Dasya v. Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhry*, 1 C. W. N. 458, and *Peary Mohan Mukhopadhyaya v. Sreeram Chandra Bose*, 9 C. W. N. 794, relied on. *MANINDRA CHANDRA NANDY v. JAMAHIR KUMARI* (1905).

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 643
s.c. 9 C. W. N. 670

8. ————— *United Provinces Land Revenue Act (III of 1901), ss. 183 and 233—Suit to recover money paid to release property from unlawful Attachment—Jurisdiction—Civil and Revenue Courts.* The plaintiff sued in a Civil Court to recover money from the defendants on the allegation that certain property belonging to her having been

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 69—*contd.*

wrongfully attached in order, to realize arrears of Government revenue due from the defendants, she, the plaintiff, had, in order to save her own property, paid the arrears of revenue due from the defendants to Government. *Held*, that the cause of action was a good cause of action having regard to s. 69 of the Contract Act, 1872, and that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain the suit was not ousted by the provisions of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901, ss. 113 and 233 (m). *Smith v. Dinonath*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 213, and *Bama Sundari Dasi v. Adhar Chunder*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 28, referred to by *BANERJI, J. TULSA KUNWAR v. JAJESHAH PRASAD* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 563

ss. 69, 70—

See LAND-REVENUE.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 504

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
DEPOSIT TO STAY SALE.

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 452

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—
JURISDICTION—CONTRACT.

I. L. R. 4 All. 134, 152

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 652

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 349

See SPECIAL APPEAL—SMALL CAUSE
COURT SUITS—CONTRACT.

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 652

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 349

See VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 28

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 305

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 826

1 C. W. N. 458

2 C. W. N. 150

1. ————— *Illegal collection of Cess—Bom. Act III of 1869, s. 8—Suit to recover cess fraudulently levied.* The plaintiffs sued to recover back from the defendant the amount levied by him as local cess on certain wanta lands belonging to the plaintiffs, the defendant claiming to be the superior holder of the village in which the lands were situated. The amount was levied by the defendant through the assistance of the mamlatdar under Bombay Act III of 1869, s. 8. The defendant contended that, in consequence of a demand from Government, he had paid local cess on the whole of his talukh, including the village in which the plaintiffs' lands were situated, and was, therefore, entitled, under ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), to recover from them the amount which he had paid to Government as a portion of the cess which rateably fell upon their lands. It was found that the defendant was not the proprietor of the lands held by the plaintiffs, and that the relation of landlord and tenant did not exist between them; also that defendant paid

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*ss. 69, 70—*contd.*

local cess for the plaintiffs' lands fraudulently and with the intention of thereby making evidence of title to their lands, knowing that he had no lawful or just claim to them. *Held*, that the defendant was not a person "interested in the payment" of the money made by him to Government within the meaning of s. 69 of the Contract Act, assuming that a portion of that sum was demanded by Government in respect of the plaintiffs' wanda lands, and that they were "bound by law to pay" it to Government. *Held*, further, that the defendant did not "lawfully" make the payment within the meaning of s. 70 of the Act, inasmuch as he did so fraudulently and dishonestly. *DESAI HIMATSING v. BHAVABHAI* I. L. R. 4 Bom. 643

2. ——— Suit for Contribution—*Summary Settlement (Bom.) Act VII of 1863, ss. 2, 6, 9—Inamdar—Suit for Contribution.* The plaintiff was the jaghirdar of a village in which the defendant held certain land as inamdar on the annual payment of a certain quit-rent. The plaintiff's jaghir was, in point of time, subsequent to the defendant's inam. Ever since the time of the jaghir, the ancestors of the defendant (and after them the defendant himself) paid the quit-rent to the ancestors of the plaintiff, and after them to the plaintiff himself. In 1869 the summary settlement was introduced into the village under Bombay Act VII of 1863. Under s. 9 of that Act, a notice was served upon the plaintiff by the Collector in respect of the village, and he accepted the settlement provided in ss. 2 and 6 of the Act. Government, accordingly, granted the village to him at the summary settlement of two annas in the rupee of the full assessment. No notice was served upon the defendant under the Act, nor did the plaintiff inform the defendant of the notice which the plaintiff had received in respect of the village. The certificate issued by the Collector to the plaintiff, previously to the grant of the sanad regarding the settlement contained the following passage:—"Before the villages (Vesu and Sanya) were granted in jaghir, lands were held by peta-inamdars over which the jaghirdar has no right. They are entered in the sanad only for the purpose of receiving the settlement and paying it over to the Sarkar." In 1877 the plaintiff sued the defendant for the amount of three years' summary settlement which he (plaintiff) had paid to Government on account of the defendant's land. *Held*, that ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) did not apply to the case. *KAMALUDIN v. PARTAP MOTA*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 244

3. ——— Suit for Contribution—*Payment by one person where both are liable. Quære: Whether a suit for contribution, where both plaintiff and defendants were liable for the money paid by the plaintiff, falls within the scope of either s. 69 or s. 70 of the Contract Act, which seems rather to contemplate persons who, not being themselves bound to pay the money or to do*

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*ss. 69, 70—*contd.*

the act, do it under circumstances which give them a right to recover from the person who has allowed the payment to be made and has benefited by it. *FUTTEH ALI v. GUNGANATH ROY*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 118: 10 C. L. R. 20

4. ——— Voluntary payment—*Contract, relations resembling—Money paid.* B sold certain immoveable property to A, one of the terms of the agreement of sale being that A should retain a portion of the purchase-money, and therewith pay the amount of a simple decree for money against B held by C. A failed to pay the amount of C's decree, and B therefore sued him for the balance of the purchase-money and obtained a decree. In the meantime, C had the property attached in execution of his decree against B. A thereupon paid the amount of C's decree. B subsequently took out execution of his decree against A for the balance of the purchase-money, and A paid the amount of the decree. A then sued B to recover the amount which he had paid in satisfaction of C's decree against B. *Held*, that A was entitled, under s. 70 of the Contract Act, 1872, to recover such amount, B having enjoyed the benefit of the payment, and the same not having been intended to be gratuitous. *Semble: That the case came within the provisions of s. 69 of the Contract Act and of the principle laid down in Dulichand v. Ramkishen Singh, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 648.* *AJUDHIA PRASAD v. BAKAR SAJJAD* I. L. R. 5 All. 400

5. ——— Vendor and Purchaser—*Arrears of Government Revenue.* On the date of the purchase of a revenue-paying estate there were arrears of revenue due. The instrument of sale was silent as to the party liable to pay such arrears. The purchaser was compelled to pay such arrears. *Held*, that the purchaser could not recover the money so paid from the vendor. *DOST MUHAMMED v. SAJJAD AHMAD* I. L. R. 6 All. 67

6. ——— Meaning of "lawfully"—*Mortgage—Decree enforcing hypothecation—Satisfaction of decree by person not subject to legal obligation thereunder—Suit for contribution brought by such person against judgment-debtor—Gratuitous payment.* The widow of D, a separated Hindu, hypothecated certain immoveable property which had belonged to her husband. The immediate reversioners to D's estate were his nephew S and the three sons of his brother O. After the widow's death, the mortgagee put his bond in suit, impleading as defendants S, two of S's four sons, and the three sons of O. Only the three last-mentioned persons resisted the suit, and the mortgagee obtained a decree directing the sale of the mortgaged property in satisfaction of his claim. From the operation of this decree S was wholly exempted, and his sons were made liable only to pay their own costs. Before any sale in execution of the decree could take place, the sons of S paid the amount of the decree into Court, thus

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*— ss. 69, 70—*contd.*

saving the property from sale. They subsequently sued the sons of *O* for contribution in respect of this payment. It was found that, at the time when the payment was made, *S* was a member of a joint Hindu family with the defendants and that his sons, the plaintiffs, had, at that time, no interest in the property by transfer from him. *Held*, that at the time of the payment the plaintiffs could not properly be regarded as in the position of co-mortgagors with the defendants, so as to have an equitable lien upon the property they had saved from sale; that it was not a case of a payment which the defendants were bound to make in which the plaintiffs were "interested" within the meaning of s. 69 of the Contract Act; and that therefore the fiction of an implied request by the defendants to the plaintiff to make the payment could not be imported into the case, and the plaintiffs were not entitled to contribution. *Held*, also, that there was no such relationship between the parties as would create or justify the inference of any right in the plaintiffs to look to the defendants for compensation so as to make s. 70 of the Contract Act applicable; and that, if the plaintiffs as mere volunteers chose to pay the money not for the defendants, but for themselves, they could not claim the benefits of that section. The principle of the decision in *Pancham Singh v. Ali Ahmed*, *I. L. R. 4 All. 58*, has been recognized and provided for in the Transfer of Property Act. By the use of the word "lawfully" in s. 70 of the Contract Act, the Legislature had in contemplation cases in which a person held such a relation to another as either directly to create or reasonably to justify the inference that by some act done for another person, the person doing the act was entitled to look for compensation to the person for whom it was done. *Ram Tuhul Singh v. Biseswar Lal Sahoo*, *L. R. 2 I. A. 131*, referred to. *CHEDI LAL v. BHAGWAN DAS*. *I. L. R. 11 All. 234*

7. — *Payment of Government revenue by person wrongfully in possession of land.* *B*, who was in wrongful possession of land which by right belonged to *K*, collected rents and paid the Government revenue. *K* eventually established her title to the property, obtained possession, and recovered the rents from the tenants, and *B* was obliged to refund the same. Subsequently *B* sued *K* to recover the sum which he had paid on account of revenue. *Held*, that the claim did not fall within the provisions of ss. 69 and 70 of the Contract Act, and the fact that the plaintiff had been a loser by his wrongful act, or that the defendant had been benefited by the payment he made, would give him no right of action against her. *Tiluk Chand v. Soudamini Dasi*, *I. L. R. 4 Calc. 566*, referred to. *BINDA KUAR v. BHONDA DAS*. *I. L. R. 7 All. 660*

8. — *Voluntary payment—Landlord and tenant—Government revenue, payment of, by patnidar—Defaulting proprietor, lia-*

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*— ss. 69, 70—*contd.*

bility of, to recoup patnidar who pays Government revenue for him, when a separate account has been opened—Revenue Sale Law (Act XI of 1859), ss. 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 54. A patnidar who had made certain payments on account of Government revenue due by his superior landlords who had defaulted, although a separate account had been opened for the payment of such Government revenue, brought a suit to recover the amount so paid. In such suit it was contended that the payments were merely voluntary, and that the plaintiff could not recover them. *Held*, that the plaintiff was "interested" in making the payments, and was therefore entitled to recover under s. 69 of the Contract Act. *Held*, further, that s. 70 of the Contract Act applied to the case, inasmuch as the word "does" in that section includes payments of money, and also that the plaintiff was entitled to recover under s. 9 of the Revenue Sale Law, as he believed in good faith that his interest would be endangered by a sale taking place. The liability of a landlord under s. 9 of the Revenue Sale Law to recoup a person paying Government revenue for him does not depend upon the question of whether the money was originally deposited or not, but accrues upon its being credited in payment of the arrears. *SMITH v. DINONATH MOOKERJEE*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 213

9. — *Money paid for Income Tax by the person assessed and on whom demand is made cannot under these sections be recovered from a person, who is alleged to be the party really liable to pay.* When the income-tax authorities assess a person in respect of certain income alleged to be derived by him and recover the tax so assessed from him, such person cannot, under s. 69 or s. 70 of the Contract Act, recover the amount so paid from another person on the ground that such other was in actual receipt of the income. S. 69 cannot apply, as the latter person, not being assessed, was not legally bound to pay the tax and s. 70 cannot apply as the persons paying the tax did so on his own account and not on behalf of another. *RAGHAVAN v. ALAMELU AMMAL* (1907).

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 35

10. — *"Person interested in the payment of money"—Volunteer—Civil Procedure Code, s. 283.* The plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be the purchasers of the mortgagees' rights in certain land, paid the amount of a decree against the mortgagee in order to save the property from sale. But it had been already found in a suit under s. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the sale to the plaintiffs was fictitious and inoperative. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the amount paid as above described from their vendors. *Ram Tuhul Singh v. Biseswar Lal Sahoo*, *L. R. 2 I. A. 131*, and *Chedi Lal v. Bhagwan Das*, *I. L. R. 11 All. 234*, referred to. *JANKI PRASAD SINGH v. BALDEO PRASAD* (1908). *I. L. R. 30 All. 167*

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

s. 70.

See COSTS . . . 3 C. W. N. 178

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—
DEPOSIT TO STAY SALE.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 794

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—
JURISDICTION—CONTRACT.

I. L. R. 3 All. 66

I. L. R. 4 All. 134, 152

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 652

1. ————— *Repairs by Government to a tank in which zamindar is interested—Suit against zamindars for share of cost.* The Government repaired a certain tank from which were irrigated lands in the zamindari of the defendants, and also raiyatwari villages held under Government which had been severed from the zamindari. It was found that the defendants knew that the repairs which were necessary for the preservation of the tank were being carried out, and did not wish to execute them themselves except as contractors, and that they had enjoyed the benefit of the work done, and further that Government had carried out the repairs not intending to do them gratuitously for the defendants. It was not found that there was any request, either express or implied, on the part of the defendants to the Government to execute the repairs. In a suit by the Secretary of State to recover from the defendants their share of the cost incurred: *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled under the Contract Act, s. 70, to recover part of the cost incurred, estimated with reference to the irrigable area of the villages owned by the plaintiff and defendants, respectively. *DAMODARA MUDALIAR v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* I. L. R. 18 Mad. 88

2. ————— *Debutter estate—Fees.* The fees of certain pleaders, who had been engaged by a deceased *shebait* in conducting suits in connection with the *debutter* estate, having been paid by his executors, the *debutter* estate was liable, under s. 70 of the Contract Act, to make good such payment. Expenses incurred by a *shebait* in criminal cases, in which the *debutter* estate was interested, were charged on the *debutter* estate. *PEARY MOHAN MOOKERJEE v. NARENDRA NATH MOOKERJEE* (1905) I. L. R. 32 Calc. 582 s.c. 9 C. W. N. 42

3. ————— *Improvements by Co-owner—Non-gratuitous act—Contract Act (IX of 1872) s. 70—Notice by Municipality.* A notice was issued upon the owners of a *hdt* by the Municipality to effect certain improvements, and A, one of the co-sharers, effected the required improvements, for in the event of non-compliance with the notice, the license for holding the *hdt* was threatened to be withdrawn. Upon a suit for contribution brought by A against B, the other co-sharer: *Held*, that inasmuch as the property was saved from a forfeiture or disability, which would have injuriously affected its value, A in

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 70—*conclld.*

making the improvements did not intend to act gratuitously and was, therefore, entitled to contribution under s. 70 of the Contract Act. *DAMODARA MUDALIAR v. The Secretary of State for India*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 88, approved. *JARAO KUMARI v. BASANTA KUMAR ROY* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 374

s. 72.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882), s. 310A . . . 12 C. W. N. 151

See MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 548

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—
JURISDICTION—DAMAGES.

I. L. R. 2 All. 671

1. ————— *Mistake—Liability of person to whom money is paid by mistake—Principal and Agent.* A treasury officer, under the imposition of a gross fraud, paid money to the defendant, who was the innocent agent of the person who contrived the fraud. In paying the money the treasury officer neglected no reasonable precaution, nor was he in any way guilty of carelessness. *Held*, that the defendant was bound to repay the money received by him, and that he could not defend himself by the plea that he had paid it to his principal; nor could the Court allow that the circumstance that the principal was himself a servant of the plaintiff, and in the course of his employment obtained facilities for committing the fraud, relieved the defendant from his liability. *SHUGAN CHAND v. GOVERNMENT, NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES* I. L. R. 1 All. 79

2. ————— *Arrears of Revenue—Voluntary Payment—Mistake—Payment under a mistake.* The plaintiffs, believing that they held a four annas share, and the defendants the remaining twelve annas share, in a *patni*, the revenue of which was in arrears, paid to the zamindar, on the 8th of March 1876, a portion of the arrears corresponding to the share in the *patni* to which they considered themselves entitled. It was afterwards decided, in a suit between the parties, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any share in the *patni*, and that the defendants were entitled to the whole sixteen annas thereof. Subsequently to this decision, the defendants, in paying up the arrears of revenue due on the *patni*, took the benefit of the payment made by the plaintiffs on the 8th of March 1876, and paid in only so much as, together with the previous payment, made up the whole arrear. The plaintiffs then brought the present suit to recover from the defendants the amount of the payment made to the zamindar on the 8th of March 1876. *Held*, that the payment was not a voluntary payment, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. *NOBIN KRISHNA BOSE v. MON MOHUN BOSE*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 573: 9 C. L. R. 182

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 72—*concll.*

But see *TILUCK CHAND v. SOUDAMINI DASI*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 566 : 3 C. L. R. 456

3. ————— *Payment of debt erroneously supposing person was liable to contribute.* Where the plaintiff purchased property and discharged a debt for which the property was hypothecated, believing that certain persons were liable to contribute, of whom one was subsequently declared not liable to contribute, *held*, not to be such a payment by mistake as to give him a right of suit. *NILKUNTH SAHEE v. HUNOOMAN PERSHAD* 3 N. W. 136

4. ————— *Money paid under Mistake—Fraud inducing a mistake.* A, a gomastah of B's deceased husband, represented to B that he had her husband's will in his possession, containing a legacy in A's favour, and obtained from B an agreement for Rs. 2,000, expressed to be in consideration of the alleged will being given up to B, of A foregoing his legacy, and of services to be rendered by A in winding up the affairs of the shop. In pursuance of this agreement, B paid a sum of money to A, but, upon discovering that the alleged will was not a will at all, sued to recover back the money so paid by her. *Held*, that under the circumstances the taking of the agreement was a fraud upon B, that the payment of the sum of money by B was not a voluntary payment, and could be recovered back, and that the Court could not apportion the amount (if any) that might be claimable by B for work done under the agreement. *RUPABAI v. PARBHURAM KIRPASHANKAR*

8 Bom. A. C. 102

5. ————— *Voluntary Payment—Money paid, but not due, and paid under compulsion.* In execution of a decree, the plaintiff purchased certain property. Subsequently the defendant, in execution of another decree against the former owner of the property, proceeded to execute his decree against the same property. The plaintiff thereupon preferred a claim, which was disallowed, as he had not then obtained, and consequently could not produce, the sale certificate. In order to prevent the sale, he then paid the amount of the defendant's decree into Court, and subsequently instituted a suit against the defendant to recover the amount so paid into Court to prevent the sale. The defendant contended that the amount was paid voluntarily and could not be recovered back. *Held*, following *Dooli Chand v. Ram Kishen Sing*, L. R. 8 I. A. 93, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 648, that it was not a voluntary payment, and that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree. *Fatima Khatoon Chowdrain v. Mahmood Jan Chowdhry*, 12 Moo. I. A. 65 : 10 W. R. P. C. 29, referred to. *Asibun v. Ram Proshad Das*, 1 Shome 25, doubted. *JUGDEO NARAIN SINGH v. RAJA SINGH* . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 656

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

s. 73.

See DAMAGES—MEASURE AND ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES—BREACH OF CONTRACT . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 242

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—ARREARS OF RENT.

I. L. R. 18 All. 240

See INTEREST—OMISSION TO STIPULATE FOR, OR STIPULATED TIME HAS EXPIRED.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 481

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 116.

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 76

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 357

See OUDH RENT ACT.

I. L. R. 26 All. 299

1. ————— *Vendor and Purchaser—Contract to sell immovable property—Damages for breach of such contract.* The rule in *Flureau v. Thornhill*, 2 W. Bl. 1078, is not law in this country. S. 73 of the Contract Act imposes no exception on the ordinary law as to damages, whatever the subject-matter of the contract. In cases of breach of contract for sale of immovable property through inability on the vendor's part to make a good title, the damages must be assessed in the usual way, unless it can be shown that the parties to the contract expressly or impliedly contracted that this should not render the vendor liable to damages. *Pitamber Sundarji v. Cassibai*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 272, distinguished. *RANCHHOD v. MANMOHANDAS* (1907) . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 165

2. ————— s. 73 and ss. 77, 83, 84, and 107—*Re-sale, notice of—Right of unpaid vendors—Nominal damages.* The defendant purchased from the plaintiffs a cargo of Watson's Hartley steam coal at Rs. 21 per ton, to arrive by ship *Grecian*, but on its arrival the defendant, on being called upon to do so, refused to take delivery, on the ground that the usual certificate that the coal was what it was stated to be did not accompany the cargo. The plaintiffs thereupon gave notice to the defendant that, unless delivery were taken, the coal would be sold on his account and at his risk; and on the defendant repeating his refusal to take delivery, the plaintiffs caused the coal to be sold, and it was purchased in the name of M & Co., for Rs. 13 per ton. In a suit, which was stated in the plaint to be for the loss sustained by the plaintiffs on the re-sale, the Court found that the plaintiffs themselves were the real purchasers, and that the sale had taken place without proper notice, and under the circumstances was invalid. *Held*, both in the lower Court and on appeal, that the plaintiffs had, by the way in which they had dealt with the coal, rendered themselves accountable to the defendant in respect thereof, and that, notwithstanding the defendant had committed a breach of the contract in refusing to take delivery of the coal, the plaintiffs were bound to give an account of the coal and prove that they had sustained a loss on the re-sale, and on

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 73—*concl'd.*

their omission to do so they were not entitled to recover any damages. *Held* on appeal, *per* MARKBY, J., that the plaintiffs were not entitled to put aside the sale as invalid and treat the case as one for damages for breach of contract. Under the circumstances, they were not entitled to even nominal damages. The mere shipment on board the *Grecian* did not pass the property in the coal to the defendant under s. 77 of Act IX of 1872. *Per* PONTIFEX, J.—Whether, by virtue of the contract and the subsequent appropriation and shipment, the property in the coal passed or did not pass to the defendant within the meaning of s. 84 or s. 83 of Act IX of 1872; even if the sale were invalid, the plaintiffs were not entitled, considering their conduct in dealing with the coal, and the concealment of their interest in the purchase, and in the absence of satisfactory evidence of what ultimately became of the coal, to recover any damages. BUCHANAN v. AVDALL . . . 15 B. L. R. 276

s. 74.

See ADMINISTRATION BOND.

I. L. R. 10 All. 29

See CONTRACT—ALTERATION OF CONTRACT—ALTERATION BY COURT.

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 349

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 354; 736

See DAMAGES—MEASURE AND ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES—BREACH OF CONTRACT . . . 20 W. R. 431

I. L. R. 5 All. 238

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 242

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 453

3 C. W. N. 43

See INTEREST—STIPULATIONS AMOUNTING OR NOT TO PENALTIES.

See MADRAS DISTRICT MUNICIPALITIES ACT, s. 261 . . . I. L. R. 16 Mad. 474

See PENALTY . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 960

1. ————— Penalty—*Suit by a joint proprietor for arrears of rent—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 29 (b)—Kabuliat executed prior to—Covenant for a higher rate—Enhancement of rent—Bengal Rent Act (VIII of 1869), s. 5.* In a kabuliat executed in 1881, it was stipulated that upon the expiry of the term of seven years fixed therein, a fresh lease should be executed; that should the defendant cultivate the lands without executing a fresh kabuliat, he would pay rent at the rate of R4 a bigha (a rate much higher than that fixed for the term). No fresh kabuliat was executed on expiry of the term, and the plaintiff, a part proprietor, collecting rent separately, brought this suit for arrears of rent at the new rate of R4. The defendant objected, *inter alia*, that the plaintiff, being a part proprietor, was not entitled to sue for enhanced rent, and that the stipulation for the

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 74—*cont'd.*

higher rate was a mere threat, and not intended to be carried out. The first Court gave a decree at an enhanced rate, or an addition of two annas in the rupee, in terms of s. 29 (b) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the whole suit, on the ground that the suit being one for enhanced rent, and the plaintiff a part proprietor, the suit did not lie. *Held*, that, the kabuliat having been executed before the Bengal Tenancy Act was passed, the present case did not come within the operation of that Act, and the plaintiff, although a part proprietor, could bring this suit. *Ram Chunder Chackerabutty v. Giridhar Dutt*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 755, followed. *Held* by PRINSEP and GHOSE, JJ. (RAMPINI, J., dissenting), that the additional rent was intended to be enforceable only on default to execute a fresh kabuliat, and the so-called agreement to pay at the enhanced rate of R4 was in the nature of a penalty. *Held* by RAMPINI, J.—The plea that the rate of R4 was a penalty was not taken by the defendant in his written statement, and, in any case, the stipulation did not come within the purview of s. 74 of the Indian Contract Act, and the suit was not for compensation for breach of contract, but for rent at a rate which the defendant has agreed to pay from a certain time. *Held*, also, that s. 29 (d) of the Bengal Tenancy Act has no retrospective effect, and does not apply to the present kabuliat, which was executed before the passing of that Act. That s. 5 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 did not debar an agreement by an occupancy raiyat to pay whatever rate he pleased. *Banke Behari v. Sundar Lal*, I. L. R. 15 All. 232, referred to. TEJENDRO NARAIN SINGH v. BAKAI SINGH I. L. R. 22 Calc. 658

2. ————— Penalty—*Interest—Stipulation to pay higher rate—Rate originally contracted for—Subsequent reduction.* A sum of money was borrowed at a certain rate of interest. Subsequently on a settlement of account between the parties, it was agreed that a lower rate of interest would be chargeable on the amount remaining due, if paid within a certain date; but, if not so paid, the higher rate originally contracted for would be payable. *Held*, that the stipulation for the payment of interest at the higher rate cannot be regarded as a penalty, that being the rate originally contracted for. Where the parties are *sui juris* and there is no question of fraud or oppression or improper dealing or undue influence, they are competent to make and must stand by their own bargain. KIRTI CHUNDER CHATTERJEE v. ATKINSON (1906) 10 C. W. N. 640

3. ————— Interest—*High rate—Penalty.* A stipulation for the payment of interest at the rate of R75 per cent. per annum from the date of the bond, on failure to pay the principal amount in two instalments on dates as fixed in the bond, was held in the circumstances of the case to

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 74—*contd.*

be a penalty. It is open to a Court to consider the facts and circumstances of each case and determine whether a stipulation for a high rate of interest is or is not a penalty, its finding on the question being rather a finding of fact than of law. *MIAJAN PATARI v. ABDUL JUBBAR* (1906)

10 C. W. N. 1020

4. ——— Forfeiture of deposits—*Forfeiture, no relief against, if amount reasonable.* Neither s. 74 of the Contract Act, nor the principle of law laid down in decisions dealing with *promises to pay specified sums* in case of breach of contract apply to cases of forfeiture of deposits for breach of stipulations even when some of them are but trifling, while others are not such. *Wallis v. Smith, L. R. 21 Ch. D. 243, 258.* In such cases the rule is that where the instrument refers to a sum deposited as security for performance the forfeiture will not be interfered with, if reasonable in amount. *Srinivasa v. Rathmasabapathi, I. L. R. 16 Mad. 474*, not followed. *MANIAN PATTAR v. MADRAS RAILWAY COMPANY* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 118

5. ——— Damages—*Bond given for the performance of public duty, but not under the provisions of any law not within exception to s. 74 of the Contract Act—Right of suit—Civil suit maintainable in respect of act amounting to criminal offence—Limitation Act (XV of 1867), Sch. II, Art. 6, s. 115—Local Board's Act, ss. 162C and 162D do not bar a civil suit on contract.* An agreement between a contractor and a Local Board contained the following terms:—As I have taken over under contract for R406 the right to collect the fees on the articles brought for sale in Udiipi market from 1st April 1902 to 31st March 1903, I am bound to act according to the following conditions:—I am not entitled to collect more than the under-mentioned rate of fees from the persons seated and trading on the site of the fair—

Rate of fees.

	R	a.	p.
Each head-load	0	0	2
„ cart-load	0	2	0

I am bound to put up a board with the rates of fees to be collected by me and my name in English and Canarese in a public place in the market. If I, my agent, or servant were to act contrary to the above regulations, I shall be liable to pay a fine not exceeding R50 imposed by the President of the Taluk Board, or I am not entitled to object, if my gutta is put up for auction again, subject to the loss that may be sustained by the Taluk Board. Under the terms of the above contract, the President of the Taluk Board imposed on the defendant a fine of R20 on 4th November 1902 in respect of illegal excessive collections made by his agent. The defendant not having paid the fine, the President instituted a civil suit for the amount of the fine on 4th January 1904. *Held*, that the suit was main-

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 74—*concl'd.*

tainable, although the acts of the defendant's agent amounted to a criminal offence and no criminal proceedings were taken against the agent. It is doubtful whether the doctrine that a person injured by a felonious act cannot seek civil redress without prosecuting the felon in the criminal Courts applies in India; and the doctrine does not apply where a principal is sued in the civil Courts in respect of the wrongful acts of his agent. *Held*, also, that the agreement in question was not a bail-bond or recognisance within the meaning of the exception to s. 74 of the Contract Act, and though given for the performance of a public duty, it was not given under the provisions of any law. The exception to s. 74 did not apply and the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable damages under the section. *Held*, also, that the suit was based on contract and for purposes of limitation fell within Art. 68 or 115 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act and not under Art. 6 of the schedule. *Held*, further, that the penal clauses of ss. 162C and 162D of the Local Board's Act did not preclude the plaintiff from suing the defendant on his contract. *PRESIDENT OF THE TALUK BOARD, KUNDAPUR v. BURDE LAKSHMINARAYANA KAMPTHI* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 54

6. ——— Expl. effect of—*Mortgage—Simple mortgage, personal liability under, exists unless special contract to the contrary—Absence of specific prayer in plaint no ground for refusing appropriate relief—Delay no abandonment of right.* In the case of simple mortgages, the personal liability of the mortgagor exists, unless there is a specific contract to the contrary. *Wahid-un-Nissa v. Gobardhan Dass, I. L. R. 22 All. 453, 461*, referred to. Where the plaint asks for a decree against the defendants as members of the family and "for such other relief as the Court may think fit," the Court ought to grant the plaintiff such appropriate relief as he is entitled to and such relief cannot be refused on the ground that there is no specific prayer for such relief. Though it is within the scope of the authority of the managing member of a Hindu family to execute the mortgage so as to bind the family assets, the plaintiff in a suit on such mortgage is not entitled to a personal decree against a defendant member of the family who is not a party to the mortgage in respect of the money alleged to be in his hand. Mere delay by the plaintiff in suing to enforce a contract is no evidence of an intention not to enforce its terms. Under the explanation to s. 74 of the Indian Contract Act, it is for the Court to decide on the facts of the particular case whether a stipulation for increased interest from the date of default is or is not a stipulation by way of penalty. It was not the intention of the Legislature to enact that such stipulations are always to be considered penal. The explanation was simply intended to meet the decisions in which it was held that such stipulations are not penal and must be enforced. *ABBAKKE HEGGADTHI v. KINHIAMMA SHETTY* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 491

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

1. ——— s. 78—Government currency note. A Government currency note was stolen from A and cashed by B in good faith for C. On the conviction of C for theft, the Magistrate ordered the note to be given to B. A appealed to the Sessions Judge, who was of opinion that he was not competent to interfere as a Court of Appeal under s. 419 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but submitted the case for the orders of the High Court. *Held*, that the provisions of s. 76 of the Contract Act did not apply, as the change of a currency note for money is not a contract of sale, and that, as the note came honestly into the hands of B, the order of the Magistrate was right. *EMPRESS v. JOGESSUR MOCHI* . . . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 379

2. ——— Government currency note—Goods. A Government currency note is not "goods" within the meaning of the Contract Act. *In the matter of MICHELL* . . . 1 C. L. R. 339

ss. 77, 78, 82, 83, 88, 178.

See CONTRACT . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 547

ss. 77, 83, 95, 178.

See CONTRACT . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 173

s. 78.

See INSURANCE . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 816

1. ——— Sale of goods—Ascertained goods—Transfer of ownership—Contract Act, s. 86—Breach of warranty—Ordinary diligence. A contracted with B to sell him 975 maunds of rice, the whole contents of a certain golah at Kallygunge (near which place B resided), at a certain rate. B paid to A certain earnest-money, and agreed to remove the whole of the rice, after weighing, on or before a certain date. B transferred his contract to C, who, through his servant, took delivery from A of 130 maunds, paying to A R1,000, but subsequently refused to take delivery of the residue, as he alleged it to be of inferior quality to that contracted for. The golah was accidentally burnt, and the residue of the rice destroyed. In a suit by A to recover from B the balance of the purchase-money (after deducting the payments made) under the contract:—*Held*, that the sale was complete, and the ownership, with the risk of loss in the rice sold, passed to B under ss. 78 and 86 of the Contract Act, because the contract was for "ascertained goods" for which B had paid earnest-money and taken part-delivery; and that it was not open to B to rescind the sale on alleging and proving a breach of warranty on the part of A unless he could bring the case within the provisions of s. 19; but that he was precluded from so doing, because he might have discovered the inferiority of the quality of the rice by using "ordinary diligence." *SHOSHI MOHUN PAL CHOWDHRY v. NOBO KRISHTO PODDAR* . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 801

2. ——— Sale of goods by description—Purchaser's right to reject—Whether

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

s. 78—*conclld.*

goods according to contract or not, how relevant—Delivery of part of the goods—Suit for prices of goods rejected—Contract Act, s. 92. B K agreed to buy from M R five bales of chrome orange twists, "or any part thereof that may be in a merchantable condition *ex City of Cambridge*, or other vessel or vessels" with specific marks and numbers, each bale containing 500 lbs., at so much per lb., to be paid for on or before delivery. B K took delivery of, and paid for, only one bale, but rejected the others. M R brought a suit for the price of the four bales rejected. *Held*, that the property in the goods did not pass to the defendant by the terms of the contract, nor was the delivery that was taken by him of the one bale a delivery of "part of the goods" within the meaning of ss. 78 and 92 of the Contract Act; the suit, therefore, did not lie. *Held*, also, that the question whether the defendant was entitled to refuse the goods—in other words, whether the goods were according to the contract or not—was one that was unnecessary for the purposes of the present suit, but it would have been otherwise if the suit were one for damages on the ground of the defendant's refusal to accept the goods. A purchaser's right to reject goods by reason of their not answering the description in the contract may be independent of the question whether the property in the goods has passed to him or not. *MITCHELL REID & Co. v. BULDEO DOSS KHETTRY*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 1

s. 90.

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—ANNUITY OR PENSION.

I. L. R. 6 All. 634

s. 93.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CONTRACTS OR AGREEMENTS . . . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 1

Suit for Damages for non-delivery—Obligation to deliver. In a suit for damages on account of failure to deliver goods (kulaye) sold, where the contract was to deliver by weight, the weighment taking place in the seller's own premises: *Held*, that, as plaintiffs did not apply for delivery, the sellers, defendants, were not under the Contract Act, s. 93, bound to deliver the goods. *KANOORAM SRIMAN v. GOLAP CHAND NOWLUCKHA* . . . 24 W. R. 178

s. 94.

See CONTRACT—CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 8
I. L. R. 23 I. A. 119

s. 103.

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—VENDOR, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 57

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

s. 107.

See CONTRACT—BREACH OF CONTRACT.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 124, 177

I. L. R. 19 All. 535

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 18

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 505

2 C. W. N. 283

7 C. W. N. 562

See DAMAGES—MEASURE AND ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES—BREACH OF CONTRACT . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 124; 177

I. L. R. 19 All. 535

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 505

2 C. W. N. 283

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 18

s. 108.

See DELIVERY ORDER.

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 501

1. ———— *Excep. 1—Possession of Goods by person other than owner—Title conveyed by vendor to vendee.* The plaintiff let to *D* a piano on hire on the following terms:—"At Rs30 per month; if duly paid for and kept three years, shall then become the property of hirer." These terms were embodied in a voucher which was signed by *D*. The monthly hire was not regularly paid, and the plaintiffs sued for and obtained a decree for a portion of the hire up to May 1873. Subsequently in that month, *D* sold the piano to the defendant who obtained delivery of it in June. In a suit by the plaintiff in trover for conversion of the piano, the Judge found that the defendant acted in good faith. *Held*, that the possession acquired by *D* was not possession by consent of the owner within the meaning of s. 108 of Act IX of 1872, excep. 1, and that he did not, by sale to the defendant, transfer the ownership in the piano to him. *Excep. 1* of s. 108 does not apply where there is only a qualified possession, such as a hirer of goods has, or where the possession is for a specific purpose. *GREENWOOD v. HOLQUETTE* . 12 B. L. R. 42 : 20 W. R. 467

2. ———— *Possession with consent of Owner—Bailment—Bailee—Sale by bailee of goods bailed—Title of vendee.* The general rule laid down by s. 108 of the Contract Act that no seller can give to a buyer a better title than he has himself is qualified by excep. 1 to that section. But the possession contemplated by that exception does not extend to every case of detention of chattels with the owner's consent. The exception has particular relation to the cases of persons allowed by owners to have the *indicia* of property, or possession under such circumstances as may naturally induce others to regard them as owners and constituting some degree of negligence or defect of precaution imputable to the true owners. Where, however, the detention of a chattel is allowed for a particular limited purpose, there is not a possession such as is required by the exception. In the case of a gratuitous bailment of a chattel, the possession remains constructively with

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 108—*conclld.*

the owner. *S* left with *C* a buffalo and a calf, to be taken care of during his absence from home. *C* sold the animals to *M*. *S* sued to recover them. *Held*, that the bailment by *S* to *C* was a gratuitous one, or else a mere custody by *C* for *S*; that *S* was, therefore, at the time of sale in constructive possession of the animals, and *C* could not transfer to *M* an ownership that he had not himself. *SHANKAR MURLIDHAR v. MOHANLAL JADURAM*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 704

s. 120.

See CONTRACT . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 736

s. 124.

See VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 299

ss. 123-147.

See DEKKAN AGRICULTURISTS RELIEF ACT, s. 72 . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 647

s. 127.

See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF SURETY.

I. L. R. 1 All. 487

s. 128.

See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF SURETY.

4 C. L. R. 145

See SURETY—LIABILITY OF SURETY.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 697

s. 129.

See ACT [No. V of 1881, s. 78.

I. L. R. 31 All. 56

s. 130.

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 140

See MINOR—BOMBAY MINORS ACT (XX OF 1864) . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 245

See RES JUDICATA—CAUSES OF ACTION—CONTINUING GUARANTEE.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 418

See SURETY—DISCHARGE OF SURETY.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 68

——— *Revocation of continuing guarantee—Application to a contract of suretyship under administration bond—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 78—Administration bond entered into by surety—Allegations by surety against administratrix of waste and mismanagement—Suit by surety against administratrix seeking to be discharged from liability regarding future acts of administratrix—Maintainability.* First defendant was administratrix of her husband's estate. Plaintiff became one of her sureties under s. 78 of the Probate and Administration Act.

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 130—*concl'd.*

Plaintiff brought this suit alleging that first defendant as administratrix was wasting and mismanaging the estate. He asked that he might be discharged from his recognisance as a surety as regards future transactions on the part of the administratrix, that in the alternative the administratrix might be directed to complete her administration of the estate, and that his surety bond might then be vacated :—*Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief asked for. *Held*, also, that, s. 130 of the Contract Act does not apply to the special contract of suretyship, which is entered into by a surety to an administration bond. *Raj Narain Mookerjee v. Ful Kumari Debi*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 68, not followed. *Bai Somi v. Chokshi Ishwardas Mangaldas*, I. L. R. 19 Bom. 245, followed and approved. *SUBROYA CHETTY v. RAGAMMALL* (1905) I. L. R. 28 Mad. 161

s. 131.

See GUARANTEE . I. L. R. 10 All. 531

See HINDU LAW—DEBTS.

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 373

ss. 132, 139.

See BILL OF EXCHANGE.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 174

s. 133.

See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 626

ss. 133-143.

See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

ss. 134, 137.

See SURETY—DISCHARGE OF SURETY.

I. L. R. 24 All. 504

ss. 141-142.

See VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 299

s. 142.

See GUARANTEE . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 406

ss. 143, 144.

See ADMINISTRATION BOND.

10 C. W. N. 673

s. 145.

See CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBT BY ONE DEBTOR.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 322

ss. 148-161.

See CARRIERS.

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

ss. 150, 151, 152.

See ONUS OF PROOF—BAILMENTS.

I. L. R. 9 All. 393

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

s. 151.

See BILL OF LADING.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 489

ss. 151, 152.

See HOTEL-KEEPER AND GUEST.

I. L. R. 22 All. 164

ss. 151, 152, 161.

See RAILWAYS ACT (IX OF 1890), s. 72.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 257

s. 170.

See BAILMENT .

I. L. R. 6 All. 139

See LIEN .

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 312

s. 171.

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 1

See BANKERS .

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 234

See LIEN .

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 312

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 314

s. 176—*Suit for sale of property pledged—Pledgor's right to sue for sale—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 57, 120.* Plaintiff lent money on the pledge of jewels, and sued more than three years and less than six years from the date of the pledge, to recover the amount lent, by sale of the jewels and from defendant personally. *Held* (per SUBRAHMANYA AYYAR and BENSON, J.J.), that plaintiff was entitled to sue for the sale of the property pledged to him notwithstanding that he was also entitled, under s. 176 of the Contract Act, to sell the property without reference to the Court. *Held*, also, that the claim to proceed against the property pledged was governed by Art. 120, and the claim to proceed against the debtor personally was governed by Art. 57 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act. *Per DAVIES, J.*—That the claim to proceed against the debtor personally was governed by Art. 57 and was barred, but that, in so far as the suit was for a sale of the pledged property, that was merely an incident in the nature of an accessory to the right to recover the debt, which became barred with the right of suit for that debt. The right of sale, however, remained. *Villa Kamti v. Kalekary*, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 153, commented on. *MAHALINGA NADAR v. GANAPATHI SUBBIEN* (1902)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 528

s. 178.

See LIEN .

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 573

I. L. R. 18 I. A. 78

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 57 I. L. R. 24 All. 251

1.

Custody of Servant—Possession—Pledge of goods. A servant, entrusted by his mistress with the custody of goods, pawned them during her absence. The mistress sued in *trover* for the goods. *Held*, that the custody of the servant was not "possession" within the

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 178—*contd.*

meaning of s. 178 of the Contract Act, and that, if he was to be regarded as having taken the goods into his possession for the purpose of pawning them, the case came within the second proviso to that section, and that accordingly the action would lie. *BIDDOMOYE DABEE v. SITTARAM. BIDDOMOYE DABEE v. SOOBUL DAS MULLICK* I. L. R. 4 Calc. 497
3 C. L. R. 398

See *GREENWOOD v. HOLQUETTE*
12 B. L. R. 42

2. ——— Goods obtained by offence or fraud—*Bailment—Pawner—Pawnee.* *G* went to the plaintiff's place of business in Calcutta, and representing to him that he wanted some jewellery on inspection, and would purchase it if he did not return it within ten days, obtained from the plaintiff a quantity of jewellery, depositing as security R2,000 with the plaintiff. *G* having thus obtained the jewellery, took it to *K* at his residence which was out of the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, and pledged the jewellery to *K* for R6,000. In a suit brought against *G* and *K* to recover the jewellery or its value, *G* did not appear, and *K* alone defended the suit. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the jewellery from *K* under s. 178 of the Contract Act, *G* having obtained it from the plaintiff by an offence or fraud within the meaning of that section. *KARTICK CHURN SETTY v. GOPALKISTO PAULIT*
I. L. R. 3 Calc. 264

3. ——— Pledge—*Husband and wife—Possession required for valid pledge.* The plaintiff sued to recover from the defendant the value of certain ornaments pledged with the defendant by the plaintiff's deceased wife. The plaintiff and his wife had lived together; and the latter, with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, had charge of the jewel-case containing the ornaments in question, which, however, belonged exclusively to the plaintiff. Without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, his wife pledged these ornaments with the defendant as security for the repayment of certain promissory notes passed by her in favour of the defendant. After her death, the defendant claimed payment of the promissory notes from the plaintiff. The plaintiff refused to pay, and sued the defendant for the value of the ornaments. *Held*, that the plaintiff's wife had not in the beginning, nor did she subsequently acquire, such possession as would validate the pledge by virtue of the provisions of s. 178 of the Contract Act. To create a pledge under that section, the pledgor must be in juridical possession of the goods; mere custody will not suffice. *SEAGER v. HUKMA KESSA*
I. L. R. 24 Bom. 458

4. ——— Jewel lent on hire—*Pledge by hirer to third party—Bonâ fide advance of money by third party—Suit by owner for recovery—Liability of third party.* The owner of a jewel lent

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 178—*contd.*

it on hire to first defendant, who pledged it with third defendant—the latter acting in good faith. In a suit by the owner against the hirer and the pledgee to recover the jewel: *Held*, that the pledgee was liable to pay the owner the value of the jewel. *Per SUBRAHMANIA AYYAR, J.*—Ss. 178 and 179 of the Indian Contract Act contemplate mutually exclusive cases. S. 179 refers to certain cases, where the pawnor has possession, which is necessarily traceable to, and is an incident of, a limited interest he has in the goods pledged. S. 178 refers to cases where a pawnor has a document of title to goods or has possession of goods independently of any interests of his therein, though, as one invested with the symbol of property, he may, notwithstanding the absence of any interest, make a valid transfer of the goods in certain circumstances. Though the pawnor had possession, it was traceable to, and was an incident of, his right as the hirer of the jewel. It was not such possession as is contemplated by s. 178. *NAGUNADA DAVAY v. BAPPU CHETTIAR* (1904)
I. L. R. 27 Mad. 424

5. ——— Pawnor and Pawnee—*Pawnor not owner but having a right to possession—Suit by owner for declaration of his title.* A person, who had obtained possession of certain moveable property belonging to a minor in the capacity of a trustee, and who had been allowed to retain possession of such property after the minor came of age, pawned some of it to persons, who were found to have acted, negligently perhaps, but honestly and in good faith. *Held*, that the pledge was valid, but the owner was entitled to a declaration of his right to redeem the articles so pawned. *SUNDAR DEO v. BHAGWAN DAS* (1908) . I. L. R. 30 All. 165

ss. 187, 188.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 343

s. 192.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—LIABILITY OF AGENTS . . . 11 C. L. R. 547

s. 196.

See CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE.
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 420

See HINDU LAW—ALIENATION.

ss. 198, 211, 216.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
I. L. R. 29 All. 730

ss. 201, 218.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 89.
I. L. R. 12 All. 541

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—LIABILITY OF AGENTS . . . I. L. R. 12 All. 541
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 715

s. 202.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—COMMISSION AGENTS . . . I. L. R. 20 Mad. 97

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

ss. 202, 203.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—REVOCATION
I. L. R. 5 Bom. 253
I. L. R. 24 Bom. 403

s. 205.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
8 C. W. N. 831

s. 208.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—REVOCATION
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 265

ss. 215, 216.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—COMMISSION AGENTS
I. L. R. 16 Mad. 238

ss. 217, 218—*Lien—Legal Practitioners Act (XVIII of 1879), s. 28—Agreement not filed in Court.* The Legal Practitioners Act does not enact that no claim by a pleader for professional services rendered or for recovery of out-fees advanced shall be sustainable, unless an agreement in writing for the same has been entered into with the client and filed in Court, but only that an agreement, if any, in respect thereto, shall be void, unless the same has been reduced to writing, and filed in Court. A pleader (as the Court found) at the request of his client disbursed moneys for out-fees in a suit in which he was retained, and took a promissory note for the amount of the disbursements. *Held*, that the promissory note was, within the meaning of s. 28 of the Legal Practitioners Act, an agreement respecting the amount of payment for charges incurred or disbursements made by the pleader in respect of the suit in which he had been retained, and as it had not been filed in Court as required by the section, it was invalid. But that, independently of the promissory note, the pleader was entitled to recover the out-fees advanced by him, and, under s. 217 of the Contract Act, he was entitled to retain the same out of the sums received by him to the credit of his client. *Razi-ud-din v. Karim Bakhsh*, I. L. R. 12 All. 169, and *Sarat Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Chundra Kanta Roy*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 805, commented on. *SUBBA PILLAI v. RAMASAMI AYYAR* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 512

ss. 217, 221.

See LIEN
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 302

s. 221.

See COMPANIES ACT (VI OF 1882).
I. L. R. 31 Mad. 123

Lien of Agent under s. 221 of the Contract Act, not affected by winding up under s. 149 of the Companies Act (VI of 1882). An agent, who is in possession of properties belonging to a company under an agreement by which he was to advance monies for working expenses has, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, a lien on such properties under s. 221 of the Contract Act for the amounts disbursed by him and s. 149 of the Companies Act does not authorise the Court to

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 221—*concl.*

deprive the agent of his possession of the security. The making of a winding up order will not affect his right to continue in possession and make the necessary disbursements as long as his possession continues; and as regards such disbursements also he will have the same lien and stand in the position of a secured creditor against the properties of which he was in possession as agent when dispossessed by order of Court. *CHIDAMBARAM CHETTIAR v. THE TINNEVELLY SERANGAPANI SUGAR MILLS COMPANY, LIMITED* (1907) I. L. R. 31 Mad. 123

s. 229.

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—
SUITS CONCERNING DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 29 I. A. 203

s. 230.

See CHARTER PARTY.

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 51

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—LIABILITY OF AGENTS

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 71
I. L. R. 5 Bom. 584
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 449
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 754
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 130

Contract by Agent—Principal resident abroad—Presumption of personal liability of Agent—Rebutted where contract made in name of Principal. Plaintiff telegraphed to P. & Co. (who were the managing agents of a company having its registered office in England, but carrying on business in India) for a quotation as to the price of sugar. P. & Co. replied in their own name, merely quoting the rate, and plaintiff accepted the offer and forwarded a deposit. On the following day P. & Co. addressed a letter to plaintiff, with which was enclosed a memorandum of sale, which contained all the terms of the contract. The letter and the memorandum bore the name of the company printed at the top and P. & Co. signed both as "managing agents." Delay having occurred in the delivery of sugar, plaintiff instituted the present suit against P. & Co. for the return of the deposit and for damages. P. & Co., in their written statement, pleaded that the suit was not maintainable against them, inasmuch as they were merely agents. *Held*, (i) that the contract, for the alleged breach of which the suit was brought, was that which had been formally reduced to writing in the memorandum of sale; (ii) that the company was resident abroad, and that a presumption, in consequence, arose under s. 230 of the Contract Act that the defendants, though the agents of that company, were personally liable under the contract; (iii) that this presumption of law is one which can be rebutted, and is rebutted when the foreign principal is, in writing, made the contracting party, and the contract is made directly in his name. *TATIKA BASA- VARAJU v. PARRY & Co.* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 315

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CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

s. 231.

See CONTRACT—CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 8
L. R. 23 I. A. 119

Agent—Undisclosed

Principal—"Discloses himself"—*Strict construction.* S. 231 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) deals with the rights (a) of the principal and (b) of the third party, in cases where the contract is entered into by the agent without disclosing the principal. The first clause refers to the general case and the rule is that the third party shall have as against the undisclosed principal the same rights which he would have against the agent, if the agent had been the principal. The second clause deals with the particular case, where the principal discloses himself before the contract is completed. The second clause should be read as governed by the first clause. The words "discloses himself" in s. 231 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) should be construed strictly. *Per BATCHELOR, J.*—It has been warmly urged that the third party's right to repudiate, which is allowed, if the principal himself makes the disclosure, should not be refused merely because the disclosure is made by some other person or the information reaches him from some other source. But the argument to my mind is not convincing. For whatever may be the subjective belief or conviction of the third party, it is conceivable that he should have no right to avoid the contract unless the principal, hitherto undisclosed, comes out into the open and claims the benefit of the contract for himself, and there would be no hardship in requiring the third party to challenge the alleged principal as to whether he makes this claim or not. *LAKSHMANDAS v. ANNA LANE* (1904)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 356

ss. 231, 232, 233, 234.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL . . . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 447
I. L. R. 9 All. 681
I. L. R. 23 Mad. 597

s. 235.

See CHARTER PARTY . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 51

See RIGHT OF SUIT—MISREPRESENTATION.
I. L. R. 24 Bom. 166

s. 236.

provisions of—

See INTEREST . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 354

Principal and Agent.

S. 236 is not restricted to cases where an agent purports to act for a named principal, but follows the rule underlying the cases of *Rothschild v. Brookman*, 2 Dow & Cl. 188, and *Robinson v. Mollet*, L. R. 7 E. & I. App. 802, that an agent cannot recover on a contract if he really acts as a principal. *SEWDUTT ROY MASKARA v. NAHAPIET* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 628

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*

s. 237.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—AUTHORITY OF AGENTS . . . 22 W. R. 156

s. 238.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL . . . 6 C. W. N. 429

s. 239.

See HINDU LAW—JOINT FAMILY—NATURE OF JOINT FAMILY.
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 149

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—JOINT FAMILY . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 378

ss. 239, 240.

See PARTNERSHIP—WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP . . . I. L. R. 4 All. 74

ss. 240, 245.

See PARTNERSHIP . . . 10 C. W. N. 313

s. 242.

See PARTNERSHIP—WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP . . . 6 C. W. N. 429

s. 247.

See HINDU LAW—JOINT FAMILY—DEBTS AND JOINT FAMILY BUSINESS.
I. L. R. 3 Calc. 738

s. 249.

See PARTNERSHIP—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTNERS . . . 9 C. L. R. 21

s. 251.

See PARTNERSHIP—DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP . . . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 42
I. L. R. 31 Mad. 206

s. 253.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 145.
8 C. W. N. 885

See HINDU LAW—JOINT FAMILY—NATURE OF JOINT FAMILY.
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 149

See PARTNERSHIP—DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP . . . 25 W. R. 49
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 669
12 C. W. N. 455

See PARTNERSHIP—SUITS RESPECTING PARTNERSHIPS . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 281

ss. 253 (10), 263—*Indian Insolvency Act, s. 7—Insolvency of sole surviving partner—Official Assignee takes subject to the rights and obligations of such surviving partner.* On the death of a partner the partnership is dissolved under s. 253 (10) of the Indian Contract Act, and, under s. 263, the rights and obligations of the partners continue in all things necessary for the winding up of the partnership business. It becomes therefore the duty of the surviving partner to wind up the partnership; and, as between

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 253—*concl.*

such partner and the representative of the deceased partner, the former has, by virtue of this overriding duty, the power, if necessary, for the purpose of winding up the partnership business, to continue the business, to borrow moneys or to sell the partnership assets, real or personal. On the insolvency of the surviving partner, the interest of the insolvent in the partnership vests in Official Assignee, under s. 7 of the Indian Insolvency Act, subject to the obligation of the surviving partner to wind up the partnership. The rights incidental to such obligation, *i.e.*, the right to realise the partnership assets and do all things necessary to wind up the partnership also vest in the Official Assignee. The right and obligation of the insolvent as surviving partner can be made available for the benefit of the firm in the insolvency proceedings under the vesting order and it is not necessary for the Official Assignee to institute a suit against the representative of the deceased partner for winding up the partnership. *ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF MADRAS v. OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE OF MADRAS* (1909)

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 462

s. 260.

See GUARANTEE. I. L. R. 28 Calc. 597

s. 264.

See PARTNERSHIP—

SUITS RESPECTING PARTNERSHIPS ;

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 606

DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 42

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 678

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 242

s. 265.

See COURT FEES ACT, s. 7, CL. 4.

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 143

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 125

13 C. L. R. 160

See COURT FEES ACT, SCH. I, CL. 1.

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 535

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—PARTNERSHIP . . .

I. L. R. 7 All. 227

See PARTNERSHIP—DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP . . .

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 669

See PARTNERSHIP—SUITS RESPECTING PARTNERSHIPS I. L. R. 22 Calc. 692

See RES JUDICATA—MATTERS IN ISSUE.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 692

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 692

1. ——— Jurisdiction of District Court—*Suit for Dissolution of Partnership and for Account.* The suit was brought for a dissolution of partnership between plaintiff and first defendant, and for an account as between them. It was alleged in the plaint that plaintiff and first defendant en-

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 265—*contd.*

tered into partnership in 1864 to work a jungle in the North Arcot District which had been leased to plaintiff for three years ; that fourth defendant was subsequently admitted a partner, and that the contract was carried on under the style of *R T & Co.* ; that in March 1867, fourth defendant took up a contract in Madras and another general partnership was established, of which plaintiff and first defendant were members ; that the funds of the first firm became incorporated in the second firm, which was styled *K T & K*, and that this firm undertook several contracts in Madras and Chingleput ; and finally, that the cause of action was the refusal of first defendant to account, and accrued in North Arcot District, where all the defendants resided permanently. The District Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that, under s. 265 of the Contract Act, he had no jurisdiction. *Held* on appeal, that the District Court of North Arcot had jurisdiction, as the defendants were resident within the district ; that the provision in the Contract Act is permissive, and does not prohibit a suit elsewhere than at the place where the partnership was carried on if a sufficient ground of jurisdiction exists. *JAVALI RAMASAMI v. SATHANBAKAN THEERTUVENGADASAMI*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 340

2. ——— Jurisdiction of

District Court—*Suit for adjustment of accounts of a partnership.* S. 265 of the Contract Act, while it enables a partner, after the termination of a partnership to apply to the District Court to wind up the business, does not take away the ordinary right of suit in any Civil Court having jurisdiction to have the accounts of the partnership taken. *LUCHMAN LALL v. RAM LALL*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 251 : 8 C. L. R. 115

3. ——— Jurisdiction of District Court—*Partnership, winding up—The Bombay Civil Courts Act, No. XIV of 1869—Power of District Judge to refer to Assistant Judge a case falling under s. 265 of the Contract Act.* A previous dissolution of partnership is necessary in order to give jurisdiction to the District Court under s. 265 of the Contract Act. Accordingly, where a suit was instituted in the District Court of Ahmedabad by some members of a partnership (which, however, was not dissolved at the date of the suit) for the winding up of the business of a ginning factory and for distributing among the shareholders any surplus that might remain, after providing for the payment of its debts, under s. 265 of Act IX of 1872, and the Assistant Judge, to whom it was referred for trial by the District Judge, directed the dissolution of the partnership and the winding up of its business, the High Court on appeal reversed the decree of the Assistant Judge, and returned the plaint to the plaintiffs for its presentation to the proper Court. *Quære* : Whether the District Judge had power, under the Bombay Civil Courts Act XIV of 1869, to refer to the Assistant Judge a case falling under

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 265—*contd.*

s. 265 of Act IX of 1872. *SORABJI FARDUNJI v. DULABHIBHAI HARGOVANDAS* I. L. R. 5 Bom. 65

4. ————— *Jurisdiction of District Court—Winding up Partnership—Subordinate Court—Bengal Civil Courts Act (VI of 1871), s. 11.* The Court of a Subordinate Judge is inferior to the Court of a District Judge within the meaning of s. 11 of the Civil Courts Act. The word "may" in s. 265 of the Contract Act has a somewhat similar force to the words "it shall be lawful" in a statute, which merely make that legal and possible which there would otherwise be no right or authority to do. And the words "may apply" in the section create a new jurisdiction, which must be exercised strictly in accordance with the statute which creates it, that is to say, the jurisdiction created by the section must be exercised exclusively by a Court not inferior to the Court of a District Judge, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the place or principal place of business of the firm, which it is sought to wind up, is situated. It was the intention of the Legislature, in enacting s. 265 of the Contract Act, to create a new jurisdiction to be exercised exclusively by the Court of the District Judge; and in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the members of a partnership, or their representatives, cannot obtain the relief mentioned in the section except by resorting to that Court. The presumption that the existing jurisdiction of a Court is not intended to be taken away unless express words have been used for that purpose usually applies only to the jurisdiction of the superior Courts. Unless the jurisdiction of a superior Court is expressly and clearly taken away, such jurisdiction will be presumed to continue. *PROSAD DOSS MULICK v. ROSSICK LALL MULICK. PROSAD DOSS MULICK v. KEDAR NATH MULICK* I. L. R. 7 Cal. 157 : 8 C. L. R. 329

But see *post*, *KALIAN DAS v. GANGA SAHAJ* I. L. R. 5 All. 500

5. ————— *Jurisdiction of District Court—Suit to wind up partnership firm.* A suit to wind up the business of a partnership firm, to provide for payment of the debts, and to distribute the surplus according to the shares of the partners respectively, should be brought in the Court of the District Judge. *RAM CHUNDER SHAHA v. MANICK CHUNDER BANIKYA*

I. L. R. 7 Cal. 428 : 9 C. L. R. 157

6. ————— *Jurisdiction of District Court—Suit with respect to partnership—Jurisdiction of Subordinate Judge—Transfer of case by High Court.* A suit claiming a declaration that certain other defendants were partners with the first defendant, that if the partnership should be held to be subsisting, it might be dissolved, or that if it had ceased to exist, the date of its termination might be fixed, and that in either event a liquidator might be appointed to take an account, and, after realising assets and discharging liabilities, might be ordered to pay a share to each party out of the

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.*s. 265—*contd.*

balance remaining, was instituted in the Court of the District Judge, who transferred it to the Court of a Subordinate Judge. The High Court subsequently transferred it to its own file. *Held*, that the suit was not one falling within the purview of s. 265 of the Contract Act; but, assuming that it was such a suit, and the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction, the High Court was nevertheless competent to transfer it. *HARRISON v. DELHI AND LONDON BANK* I. L. R. 4 All. 437

7. ————— *Jurisdiction of District Court—Suit for Profits of a Ship—Co-owners in a ship—Partnership—Contract Act (IX of 1871), s. 239, illus. (c)—Jurisdiction of District Judge.* The fact that several persons are co-owners of a ship does not make them partners, and it is not necessary that a suit by one co-owner against the managing owner or ship's husband, for his share of the profits made by the ship before she has been sold, should be brought in the Court of the District Judge under s. 265 of the Contract Act, but such suit may be brought in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. *HYDER ALI v. ELAHEE BUX MALOOM*

I. L. R. 8 Cal. 1011 : 10 C. L. R. 606

8. ————— *Jurisdiction of District Court—Suit to wind up Partnership and distribute profits.*—A suit to wind up a partnership and to distribute the profits is not cognizable by a Court subordinate to a District Court by virtue of s. 265 of the Contract Act. *RAMAYYA v. CHANDRA SEKARA* I. L. R. 5 Mad. 256

9. ————— *Jurisdiction of District Court—Suit for Dissolution of Partnership—Finality of decree in accordance with award—Civil Procedure Code, s. 215, Ch. XXXVII—Arbitration.* A suit for dissolution of a partnership, taking the accounts of the firm, and a declaration of the plaintiff's right to a certain share in the debts due to the firm was, with reference to the value of the subject-matter of the suit, instituted in the Court of a Munsif. The matters in difference in the suit were eventually referred to arbitration under Ch. XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, and an award was given declaring the plaintiff entitled to recover a certain sum from the defendant. Judgment and a decree were given in accordance with the award. *Held*, that the suit was not an application of the nature mentioned in s. 265 of the Contract Act, 1872, but a suit of the nature mentioned in s. 215 of the Civil Procedure Code, and was therefore not cognizable in the District Court, but in the Court of the Munsif. *PROSAD DOSS MULICK v. ROSSICK LALL MULICK*, I. L. R. 7 Cal. 157, and *Ram Chunder Shaha v. Manick Chunder Banikya*, I. L. R. 7 Cal. 428, dissented from. *KALIAN DAS v. GANGA SAHAJ* I. L. R. 5 All. 500

10. ————— *Jurisdiction of District Court—Partnership suit—Subordinate Court—Dissolution—Wrong—Damages—Code of Civil*

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*contd.***s. 265—*contd.***

Procedure, Act XIV of 1882, s. 213. A suit for winding up an expired partnership can be brought in the District Court under s. 265 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) and s. 213 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). But the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts is not annulled by the special jurisdiction assigned to the District Court by s. 265 of the Contract Act. Any one having a cause of action arising out of partnership transactions may sue the person liable in the ordinary Court. The jurisdiction of such Court, however, does not extend to the case of a winding up of an expired partnership. This jurisdiction is given to the District Court by s. 265 of the Contract Act, and when, along with a new mode of relief, particular jurisdiction is constituted to administer it, the Court specified, and no other, is to be understood as vested with authority. Hence, though administration for the purpose may apparently be sought in the subordinate Courts, it can be obtained in the case of an expired partnership, only in the District Court or the High Court. But the jurisdiction of the subordinate Courts in other respects is not extinguished. An apparent cause of action gives a right to sue in them for such relief as they can afford, though not for the particular kind of relief contemplated in s. 265 of the Contract Act. Where in a suit a cause of action appears which in itself is cognizable by an inferior Court, such a Court is not justified in rejecting the suit, merely because it is one in which the District Court might have jurisdiction under s. 265 of the Contract Act. Where an application under s. 265 of the Contract Act is presented to the District Court, that Court should determine whether it is (i) a mere case of administration, or (ii) of administration sought as a cloak for strictly litigious claims, or (iii) of administration *plus* claims involving litigation of the ordinary means. In the second case it may properly decline a function that properly belongs to an ordinary Court. In the last case it may either assume the administration of the estate of the firm, or decline to do so, according to circumstances, subject to appeal, and in the former case it may either itself deal with all questions arising between the ex-partners, or if these be of such a kind as to form separable subjects of adjudication, it can direct the party in each case interested to proceed on the particular alleged cause of action in the Court having ordinary jurisdiction, and itself use the result as an element of its administration. *ADARJI DORABJI v. ERAKSHAH DHANJI*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 272

11. ————— *Jurisdiction of District Court—Jurisdiction of Subordinate Court—Practice.* S. 265 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) assumes that there has been a partnership, and enables the District Court to wind it up, but does not deprive the ordinary Courts of their jurisdiction in cases seriously contested as to the existence of partnership. Such contests ought to be decided as in

CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872)—*concl.***s. 265—*concl.***

ordinary cases. *KISANDAS HAJARIMAL v. GULAB-CHAND* . . . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 494

12. ————— *Partnership—Suit to recover share of profits realized.* A suit to compel the defendant to account for and pay over a share of a sum realized on a joint speculation, or to provide for the plaintiff's share out of another fund realized under the joint orders of the parties, is not affected by the provisions of s. 265 of the Contract Act, 1872. *PITCHAYYA v. NARASAYYA*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 246

CONTRACT (AMENDMENT) ACT (VI OF 1899).

————— *Applicability of Act VI of 1899 to suits filed prior to its coming into force. Semble:* That the Contract (Amendment) Act of 1899 does not apply to a suit filed prior to the date upon which it came into force. *CHINNA VENKATASAMI v. PEDDA KONDAIAH (1902)*

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 445

ss. 1, 4.

See INTEREST—STIPULATIONS AMOUNTING OR NOT TO PENALTIES.

ss. 16, 74.

See UNDUE INFLUENCE.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 150

CONTRACT OF SERVICE.

See ADOPTION . . . 11 C. W. N. 147

CONTRACTORS.

See NEGLIGENCE I. L. R. 17 Bom. 307

damage done by—

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT, 1863.

8 B. L. R. 265

CONTRADICTIONARY STATEMENTS.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 142

See FALSE EVIDENCE—CONTRADICTIONARY STATEMENTS.

CONTRIBUTION.

See CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR.

See CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872), s. 69.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 9

See MORTGAGE . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 65

See MORTGAGE—SALE OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY—PURCHASERS.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 379

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PURCHASERS.

6 C. W. N. 794

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT (IV OF 1882), s. 82 . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 13

CONTRIBUTION—*conold.*

Money spent for the benefit of another—*Obligation to repay.* It is not in every case in which a man has benefited by the money of another that an obligation to repay that money arises. *Ram Tuhul Singh v. Bisesswar Lall Sahoo*, L. R. 2 I. A. 131, and *Ruabon Steamship Company v. London Assurance*, [1900] A. C. 6, referred to. *JYANI BEGAM v. UMRAY BEGAM* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 612

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR.

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|----------------------------------------|-------|
| 1. CO-SHARERS, LIABILITY OF | 2540. |
| 2. VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS | 2544. |
| 3. PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBT BY ONE DEBTOR | 2550. |
| 4. JOINT WRONG-DOERS | 2559. |
| 5. INTEREST | 2563. |

See ACT IX OF 1887.

I. L. R. 28 All. 292

See APPEAL . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 643

See BOND . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 155

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 13.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 95

See CONTRACT ACT, ss. 69, 70.

See DECREE—FORM OF DECREE—CONTRIBUTION.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 99 (1871, ART. 100).

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ARTS. 99 AND 132 . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 743

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 107 . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 18

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 120.

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 241

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 132.

I. L. R. 12 All. 110

See MORTGAGE . . . 8 C. W. N. 30

See MULTIFARIOUSNESS . . . 5 N. W. 215

7 N. W. 82

25 W. R. 41

I. L. R. 1 All. 455

I. L. R. 12 All. 110

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 540

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—MORTGAGES, SUITS CONCERNING.

5 C. W. N. 423

See PARTNERSHIP—SUITS RESPECTING PARTNERSHIPS . . . 12 Bom. 97

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 254, 262 note

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 176

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—JURISDICTION—CONTRIBUTION.

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 82.

6 C. W. N. 583

I. L. R. 24 Mad 85, 96

I. L. R. 26 All. 407

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.***1. CO-SHARERS, LIABILITY OF.**

1. *Liability under decree for Costs—Division of liability.* A suit having been brought before a Subordinate Judge against co-sharers in a joint property for contribution on account of costs levied from plaintiffs in a suit which had been preferred by all the co-sharers (plaintiffs and defendants) together, a decree was given ordering the defendants to contribute *per capita* in equal shares. On application made to the Subordinate Judge's successor, a review was granted, and additional evidence called for as to the respective shares of the parties in the property. *Held*, that the parties were liable for contribution according to their respective interests in the property, and not simply *per capita*. *MURDAN ALI v. TUFUZZUL HOSSEIN* . . . 16 W. R. 78

2. *Allegation and proof of specific liability.* In a suit for contribution, where a joint decree cannot be passed, the specific liability of each co-sharer must be not only alleged, but clearly established. *PITAMBUR CHUCKERBUTTY v. BHYRUB NATH PALEET*

15 W. R. 52

3. *Unequal distribution in execution of decree—Proportionate liability.* In execution of a decree for an enhanced rent against the holders of a jote jumma, the landlord put up for sale, and caused to be sold, a talukh which was also the joint property of the same parties. One of these parties accordingly sued others of them, on the allegation that his share of the property sold exceeded the lands occupied by him in the jote jumma, and asked the Court to give him a joint and several decree against all the defendants for the entire amount of the difference. *Held*, that plaintiff could not be entitled to such a decree, but should have asked that the defendants might be directed to contribute to him in proportion to their respective shares, if his complaint was well founded. But as defendant alleged that, although plaintiff held that small quantity, it was compensated for in other ways, it was for plaintiff to show that he did not derive from, or by virtue of his share in, the jote jumma a profit or interest equivalent to the interest he held in it. *UNNODA PERSHAD ACHARJEE v. SHUR-BOSOONDEREE DEBIA* . . . 11 W. R. 453

4. *Suit for revenue paid by lumberdar for co-sharers.* Until the shareholders formally take steps to set aside as lumberdar a co-sharer whose rights and interests in the mouzah have been sold, their relative positions continuing unaltered, the lumberdar can sue in the Revenue Court to recover from them their quotas of revenue which he has been obliged to pay as lumberdar. *GONESH PERSHAD v. SALIG RAM* . . . 6 N. W. 278

5. *Costs of suit for possession of accreted lands against zamindars—Proportionate liability.* B, having obtained a decree against T and other zamindars of pergunnah Mysingsh for possession of certain accreted lands as

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*1. CO-SHARERS, LIABILITY OF—*contd.*

pertaining to pergunnah Jaffershye, took out execution and recovered costs, etc., from *T* alone, who sued his co-debtors for contribution, no question being raised as to separate liabilities. *T* obtained a joint decree, took out execution, and recovered from *R* alone, who then brought a suit for contribution against the other co-debtors, obtaining a decree in both Courts. In special appeal it was contended, *inter alia*, that the principle of the decree was wrong, and that the defendants were liable only for that portion of the land of which they were in wrongful possession. *Held*, that, as in the original suit there was no plea that the lands were in the occupation of the answering defendants, in any other way than under their zamindari title, the only way in which the liabilities could be awarded was by making each party pay according to the shares they held in the parent zamindari. *OBHOY KANT LAHOREE v. RAM SOONDUREE DABEE CHOWDHURANI* 20 W. R. 209

6. ——— Sums expended in maintaining common property—*Consent of Co-sharers*. A co-owner is liable to contribute to the payment of all sums necessarily expended by another co-owner in maintaining the common property. But he cannot be called upon to contribute in respect of money expended on improvements to which he has not assented. *MAHOMED KHAN v. SHAISTA KHAN* 2 N. W. 248

7. ——— Repair of common water-course by one co-owner. Where a water-course was for the common benefit of joint owners and one party repaired it at his own cost, he was held entitled to call upon the other owner for contribution. *BUZLOOL HOSSEN v. GUNPUT CHOWDHRY* 25 W. R. 170

8. ——— Rent-suit against recorded tenants—*Co-owners, liability of, in a suit for contribution*. All the co-owners of a talukh are jointly liable for the rent during the period over which their ownership extends, and although the landlord sues only the recorded tenants for the rent, this would not relieve the unrecorded tenants from the equitable liability of paying their share of the rent to those of the recorded tenants who are obliged to pay the whole. The fact that one of the co-owners (whose name is not recorded and who is not a party to the suit for rent) sold away his interest before the date of the suit, he having been a co-owner at the time the liability arose, would not relieve him of the liability, although he may not have derived any advantage from the payment made. *GOBINDO CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. BASANT KUMAR CHUCKERBUTTY* 3 C. W. N. 384

9. ——— Dispossession by co-sharer—*Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 69*. Where a co-sharer is kept out of possession wrongfully by another co-sharer, a suit for contribution at the instance of the latter for rent paid by him during

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*1. CO-SHARERS, LIABILITY OF—*contd.*

the period of dispossession does not lie against the former. *SWARNAMOYEE DEBT v. HARI DAS. ROY* (1902) 6 C. W. N. 803

10. ——— Appeal—*Decree—Defendants—Appellate Court, power of, to make another defendant liable, where no appeal by plaintiff*. In a suit for contribution, in which the plaintiff asked for relief against several defendants separately and the first Court gave a decree against defendant No. 1 and dismissed the suit against defendant No. 2: *Held*, that in an appeal by the defendant No. 1, in which the defendant No. 2 was made a party respondent, the Appellate Court had power to alter the decree so as to make defendant No. 2 liable, as the real contest in the case was between the defendants. *Upendra Lal Mukerjee v. Girindra Nath Mukerjee*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 565, upheld. *Hudson v. Basdeo Bajpye*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 109, referred to. *RUP JAN BIEBE v. ABDUL KADIR BHUYAN* (1904) I. L. R. 31 Calc. 643
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 496

11. ——— Mesne profits—*Decree—Shareholders—Assessment—Interest*. The plaintiff's right to succeed in a suit for contribution in respect of a decree for mesne profits, under which all the parties to the suit were liable as judgment-debtors, depended on the amount of the share to which they were respectively entitled as shareholders in a certain estate, of a portion of which they had been wrongfully in possession from 1826 to 1854. *Held*, that the basis on which contribution should be estimated was the amount of the respective share of the parties at the date of the decree for mesne profits and not (as decided by the High Court) the amount of the shares, of which the parties were respectively in possession from 1826 to 1854. Some of the payments in execution of the decree had been made from the local Treasury, in which the money was held not on joint account, but on separate accounts to the credit of the several share-holders, and one of the parties contended that in assessing the contribution he should have been credited with a share of such money proportionate to the share, to which he was entitled in the estate. *Held*, that he was rightly credited only with the amount standing to his credit in the Treasury. Some of the parties contributed relatively more largely to the earlier payments under the decree and others to the latter payments. *Held*, that allowance should be made in the decree for this distinction. Each payment on account diminished the interest on the decretal amount and the benefit of that reduction of interest ought to go in relief of those, who made the payments, and not of those who continued in default. *JOTINDRA MOHUN LAHIRI v. GURU PROSUNNO LAHIRI* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 597
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 625
L. R. 31 I. A. 94

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*1. CO-SHARERS, LIABILITY OF—*contd.*

12. ——— Decree for mesne profits—Shareholders in estate—Payments made by the various parties at various times on decree—Reciprocal rights and obligations towards each other on such payments—Calculation of interest on such portion of decree as from time to time remained unpaid—Adjustment of accounts so as to equalise rights and liabilities according to proportionate shares in estate. The appellants and respondent were jointly liable under a decree for mesne profits of a share in an estate, of which share they had for many years been in wrongful possession. On 3rd April 1882 the amount of the decree was finally ascertained as Rs. 85,795 with interest at 6 per cent. from 12th May 1879 until realization. The liability under the decree was finally extinguished by payments made at different times by the various parties extending down to 17th September 1889, during all which time interest was running on so much of the decreed amount as for the time being remain unsatisfied. In a suit for contribution between the parties, disputes arose as to their reciprocal rights and obligations towards each other, having regard to the amounts of their several contributions, the times at which they had been made, and the different proportions of their interests in the other shares in the estate itself; and when the suit came on appeal to the Privy Council those shares had been ascertained, but their Lordships remitted the suit to the High Court to retake certain accounts and give consequential relief thereon. *Held*, that what ought to be taken as the amount representing the total debt to be discharged was not the actual sum received by the decree-holder in satisfaction of the decree, *viz.*, Rs. 1,25,826, nor a sum arrived at on the footing that the principal and interest had all been paid on the same day, *viz.*, 17th September 1889, which amounted to Rs. 1,39,059; but an amount arrived at by crediting interest at the same rate on each amount paid in favour of the party on whose behalf it was paid, from the date of payment until the final satisfaction of the decree, *viz.*, Rs. 1,48,873, and that sum was the amount, which was to be divided amongst the parties in proportion to their several interests in the property. The burden to be borne was made heavier to all by reason of the length of time over which the liquidation was protracted, while the rights of individuals were equalized by the allowance of interest on their contributions from the time they were made. The account should be taken on the above footing and the amounts of their several contributions set off against their several liabilities so adjusted. This having been in effect done by the High Court the appeal was dismissed. GURU PROSANNA LAHIRI *v.* JOTINDRA MOHAN LAHIRI (1907)

I. L. R. 35 Cal. 303
s.c. L. R. 35 I. A. 32

13. ——— Improvements by co-owner—Non-gratuitous act—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 70—Notice by Municipality. A notice was issued

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*1. CO-SHARERS, LIABILITY OF—*concl'd.*

upon the owners of a *hāt* by the Municipality to effect certain improvements, and A, one of the co-sharers, effected the required improvements, for in the event of non-compliance with the notice the license for holding the *hāt* was threatened to be withdrawn. Upon a suit for contribution brought by A against B, the other co-sharer:—*Held*, that inasmuch as the property was saved from a forfeiture or disability, which would have injuriously affected its value, A in making the improvements did not intend to act gratuitously and was, therefore, entitled to contribution under s. 70 of the Contract Act. *Damodara Mudaliar v. The Secretary of State for India*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 88, approved. JARAO KUMARI *v.* BASANTA KUMAR ROY (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Cal. 374

14. ——— Co-heir—Co-heir not liable to contribute towards expenses incurred by other heirs in litigation in respect of common property. A co-heir is not liable either, under an implied contract or on grounds of equity to contribute towards the expenses of litigation *bona fide* carried on by other heirs in respect of the common property. *Dakshina Mohan Roy v. Saroda Mohan Roy*, I. L. R. 21 Cal. 142, referred to. HALIMA BEE *v.* ROSHAN BEE (1907)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 526

15. ——— Set off—Limitation. Where in a suit for contribution by a co-sharer for a certain sum of money paid on behalf of his other co-sharers to discharge a decree for rent obtained against them jointly, the latter (*i.e.*, the defendants) claimed a set off on account of previous payments by them of similar decrees for the benefit of the plaintiff amongst others. *Held*, that no question of limitation arose as regards the claim for set off. The remedy might have been barred, but the right to the debt was not extinguished. *Mohesh Lal v. Basani Kumari*, I. L. R. 6 Cal. 340, referred to. GAJADHAR MAHTO *v.* RAGHUBAR GOPE (1907)

12 C. W. N. 60

2. VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS.

1. ——— Payment for support of family idols—Moral obligation. When a Hindu ancestor makes no endowment or trust for the support of the family idols, no legal obligation rests on his descendants to support the idols, nor can any suit for contribution lie against any of them for payments made for the expenses of the idols. SHAM LALL SET *v.* HURO SOONDUREE GUPTA

5 W. R. 29: 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 36

2. ——— Payment of debt by one of several co-guarantors—Principal and Surety—Co-sureties. If one of several co-guarantors, on the default of the principal, pays the whole debt, or more than his proportion of it, he may recover for such excess above his proper share by contribution from the others. An action by one guarantor against his co-guarantors will lie where a single

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—contd.**2. VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS—contd.**

guarantor has paid the debt, and it is not necessary in order to maintain such an action, to show that the liquidating guarantor had previously applied to, or proceeded against, the principal, with a view to recover the debt from him. *NURO NARAIN DOSS v. BROJO MOHUN DOSS* . W. R. 1864, 70

3. ——— Payment for arrears of rent by one of several co-tenants—Sureties. In a suit to recover contribution on the allegation that plaintiff and defendant were joint tenants, and that there was an arrear of rent due from them, for which the zamindar was about to sue when the plaintiff paid it, together with several other cesses and expenses: *Held*, that, as there had been no demand upon the defendant, nor any suit nor other effectual proceeding for the recovery of the rent, the payment by the plaintiff was voluntary and officious, and that, as the demand with which plaintiff complied was an excessive demand, his compliance with it would not bind the defendant to pay the amount of contribution sued for. *Held*, further, that the rules which govern Courts in England in matters of suretyship could not be applied to a case like this, where joint and several liability was not found as a fact, and where the sum alleged to be due was not certain, but contested. *LUCKHEE KANT DOSS v. SHIBCHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY* . 12 W. R. 462

PITAMBAR CHUCKERBUTTY v. BHYRUBNATH PALEET . 15 W. R. 52

4. ——— Payment of arrears of rent by purchaser. The plaintiff brought a suit against the defendants to recover as contribution their share of a sum paid by him for arrears of rent due on a farming lease in a zamindari which had been purchased by the plaintiff. *Held*, that the payment was a voluntary one, and the suit therefore would not lie. *KRISHNA KISHORE PODDAR v. KAILAS CHANDRA MOOKERJEE*

6 B. L. R. 641 note

S. C. KISTO KISHORE PODDAR v. KOYLASH CHUNDER MOOKERJEE . 12 W. R. 128

5. ——— Payment by judgment-creditor on cross-decree by one only of his judgment-debtors—Payment for arrears of rent. A decree-holder for arrears of rent against three persons jointly placed certain sums of money in Court to the credit of one of them, *viz.*, the plaintiff who, in her capacity of guardian of her son, had a cross-decree against him, and afterwards he withdrew those sums in execution of the joint decree. Thereupon the plaintiff sued the other two joint debtors for contribution, as she had repaid to her minor son the sum of money so taken away. *Held*, that the payment by the plaintiff to her minor son was a voluntary payment, and was not therefore such a payment as entitled her to sue her joint debtors for contribution. *RAJLAKSHI DEBI v. TARAMONEE CHOWDHRAIN* . 2 B. L. R. A. C. 281: 11 W. R. 218

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—contd.**2. VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS—contd.**

6. ——— Suit for fees of Ameen deputed to make partition—Payment by one proprietor. A suit for contribution for the fees of an ameen who was deputed to make a batwara will lie against another proprietor of the estate who joined with the plaintiff in applying for the batwara and is not affected by the fact that the batwara was, for certain reasons, not carried out. The Collector having called upon the proprietors to pay the fees of the ameen, the plaintiff's payment of the whole amount was not a voluntary payment, as the Collector could have sold the whole estate to realize the fees. Such suit is governed by XI of 1838. *GREESH CHUNDER LAHOORY v. ASUDONISSA BEBEE* . 8 W. R. 333

7. ——— Payment of costs by one of representatives of judgment-debtor—Joint liability for Costs. Notwithstanding an order of the Privy Council that a certain sum should be paid to a judgment-debtor out of money deposited by the judgment-debtor in their treasury, the former took out execution against the property of the latter, who, having died in the meantime, was represented by plaintiffs and defendants. Certain property belonging to the deceased having been attached and advertised for sale, plaintiffs paid the costs due under the Privy Council decree, and then sued for contribution. *Held*, that defendants were liable for the sum paid in excess of plaintiff's share. *AHMUDUOLLAH v. MEAH KHAN* . 14 W. R. 105

8. ——— Payment to stay sale—Suit for refund on ground of previous satisfaction of decree. A was in possession of certain lands in lieu of dower. B put up to sale, in execution of a decree against C (A's husband), C's rights and interest in those lands. A under protest deposited in Court the amount claimed in order to stop the sale, and consented that it should be paid over to B until the rights of the parties could be settled in a regular suit. A then sued B for a refund of the money on the ground that at the time of B's attaching the property his decree against C had been already satisfied. The Zilla Court gave a decree for A upon the merits. The High Court, on appeal, held that the payment into Court was a voluntary payment, and therefore A had no right of action against B. *Held* (reversing the decision of the High Court), that the payment was not a voluntary payment. *FATIMA KHATUN v. MAHOMMED JAN CHOWDHRY*

1 B. L. R. P. C. 21: 10 W. R. P. C. 29
12 Moo. I. A. 65

9. ——— Payment by lessee of Government revenue on default of malik. When a sub-lessee (kutkinadar holding from a zur-i-peshgeedar) pays the Government revenue on the default of the malik, who sells the estate to escape liability, the obligation to repay the same is a personal liability on the part of the malik which could be enforced in a suit for contribution, and

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*2. VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS—*contd.*

cannot be enforced against the estate. *JHOO BRUGGUTH v. TARA HOOM HOSSEIN*

W. R. 1864, 132

10. ——— Payment by dar-patnidar to stay sale—*Liability of co-sharers in zamindari.* Held, that plaintiff, who held partly as zamindar and partly as dar-patnidar, was entitled to look to his co-sharers in the zamindari for contribution of Government revenue paid by him to save the entire estate from sale, and that the fact of his being a sharer in the dar-patni could not bind him to recover his over-payments from the patnidars. *RADHA MADHUB DUTT v. RAM RUNJUN CHUCKERBUTTY* 17 W. R. 461

11. ——— Payment of revenue to save estate from sale—*Suit against Co-sharers.* Where a village was in arrear through the deficiency of a former lumberdar, and the plaintiff having purchased at auction the share of the lumberdar, and not his right and liabilities, had to pay the revenue to save the estate:—Held, that the plaintiff had a right to call upon his co-sharers to contribute their quota of Government revenue, the co-sharers' remedy being against the defaulting lumberdar. *FUZUL ALI v. JUMNA DOSS*

1 Agra 229

12. ——— Payment to prevent foreclosure—*Evidence of defendants' shares.* In a suit by one of several shareholders in certain mortgaged property to recover contribution on account of payment made by plaintiff to save the property from being foreclosed, not the sudder jummas assessed on the villages to which the claim related, but the zamindar's collections, would be the better evidence of the relative values of the villages and the proportion payable by the defendants. *KHATOON KOONWAR v. HURDOOT NARAIN SINGH* 20 W. R. 163

13. ——— Payment of revenue to stay sale—*Liability of mortgagees of co-sharer in possession.* The interests of a Hindu widow (*R D*) in certain estates having been mortgaged, the mortgagees in the course foreclosed the mortgage, and obtained a decree for possession. Intermediately, *R D* committed default in the payment of the Government revenue, and her share was paid in by her co-sharers, who brought a suit against *R D* to recover the amount, and obtained a decree. This decree proving infructuous, they brought the present suit against the mortgagees. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover against the defendants, who had completed their legal title to *R D*'s share, and were entitled, had they chosen, to make the payment which she omitted to make. Held, that a suit for contribution is not founded upon implied promise or request; but that the obligation to pay rests on a different ground, *viz.*, that in *æquali jure* the law requires equality. *GUNGA GOBIND MUNDUL v. ASHOOTOSH DHUR*

21 W. R. 256

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*2. VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS—*contd.*

14. ——— Payment to save from sale property attached under mortgage decree. *D*, having obtained a decree against his debtors, *J, P*, and others, took out execution and attached certain property which had been pledged by them as security. He then brought part of it to sale, exempting the share of *P* (which he purchased without notice to the other tenants) and realized his dues, *J* paying the amount in order to save the property from sale. *J* then sued *P* for contribution, and obtained a decree making her (*P*'s) share liable, which he attached and put up for sale. *D* objected under Act VIII of 1859, s. 246, but his objection was disallowed, and he paid up *P*'s contribution. He now sued to recover the amount so paid. Held, that *D*'s claim was unjust, for when he was paid up by *J*, he was bound to give up his lien on *P*'s share, which became vested in *J*. Accordingly, in buying that share he took it burdened with his own lien, and when *J* paid off the entire liability, he succeeded to the right of contribution from *P* by buying it from her share. If, therefore, *D* wished to retain that share, he was bound to make good *P*'s defalcation. *JETRAM DUTT v. DOORGA DASS CHATTERJEE*

22 W. R. 430

15. ——— Payment of Government revenue—*Principle of distribution of liability.* In a suit for contribution of Government revenue the previously paid and recognized quotas must be taken as the proper data for distribution until a regular batwara is made and sanctioned under Regulation XIX of 1814. *POORNOCHUNDER GANGOOLY v. KISHEN CHUNDER GHOSE*

5 W. R. 112

16. ——— Payment by landlord—Landlord and tenant—*Expenses of perfecting title.* The plaintiffs were the registered holders of the village of Mankoli in the Ahmedabad Collectorate, for which they obtained a sanad in 1864 under Bombay Act VII of 1863. The defendants were the descendants of the original owners of the village, who, about 1768, finding themselves unable to meet the expenses attaching to the village, gave up their title to it to the ancestors of the plaintiffs on condition of retaining a third of the lands, rent-free as their *wanta*, or share, subject to no other condition but a house-tax. Held, that a settlement made by the plaintiffs without the defendants' consent was not binding on the latter, and any payment made by them to Government was a purely voluntary one, to which they could not ask the defendants to contribute. Also, assuming that the relationship of landlord and tenant did exist between the parties, a suit by the plaintiffs against the defendants would not lie for contribution to any expenses to which the plaintiffs as landlords might have been put in defending or perfecting their title. *JESINGBHAI v. HATAJI* I. L. R. 4 Bom. 79

17. ——— Payment by Jaghirdar—*Summary Settlement Act, Bombay, VII of 1863—Liability of inamdar.* The plaintiff was the jaghir-

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*2. VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS—*contd.*

dar of a village in which the defendant held certain land as inamdar on the annual payment of a certain quit-rent. The plaintiff's jaghir was, in point of time, subsequent to the defendant's inam. Ever since the time of the jaghir, the ancestors of the defendant (and after them the defendant himself) paid the quit-rent to the ancestors of the plaintiff, and after them, to the plaintiff himself. In 1869 the summary settlement was introduced into the village under Bombay Act VII of 1863. Under s. 9 of that Act, a notice was served upon the plaintiff by the Collector in respect of the village, and he accepted the settlement provided in ss. 2 and 6 of the Act. Government, accordingly, granted the village to him at the summary settlement of two annas in the rupee of the full assessment. No notice was served upon the defendant under the Act, nor did the plaintiff inform the defendant of the notice which the plaintiff had received in respect of the village. The certificate issued by the Collector to the plaintiff previously to the grant of the sanad regarding the settlement, contained the following passage:—"Before the villages (Vesu and Sanya) were granted in jaghir, lands were held by peta-inamdars over which the jaghirdar has no right. They are entered in the sanad only for the purpose of receiving the settlement and paying it over to the Sarkar." In 1877 the plaintiff sued the defendant for the amount of three years' summary settlement which he (plaintiff) had paid to Government on account of the defendant's land. *Held*, that the defendant was not liable to pay, whether regarded as an independent inamdar holding directly under Government or as a tenant of the plaintiff. **KAMALUDIN HUSEN KHAN v. PRATAP MOTA**

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 244

18. ———— **Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 132—Voluntary payment—Assessment—Payment by A of assessment due on B's land does not give A a Charge on such land—Contribution.** The plaintiff filed this suit in 1901 to recover R30, which he had paid for the defendants in respect of yearly assessments due upon their land since the year 1891. Their land formed part of a larger holding which stood in one name in the revenue records, and the assessment on which the plaintiff paid. He now sued the defendants for contribution in respect of the assessment paid for their part of the holding, and contended that their land was charged with the amount so paid by him, and that the period of limitation applying to his claim was that prescribed in Art. 132 of Sch. II to the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). *Held*, that the money paid by the plaintiff for the defendants did not become a charge on the defendants' land, and that Art. 132 of Sch. II to the Limitation Act did not apply. The mere fact that the plaintiff was obliged to pay the assessment for the defendants' land in order to save his own might, under the circumstances, give him a right to claim contribution; but a charge is not incident to that

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*2. VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS—*concl.*

right. **SHIVRAO NARAYAN v. PUNDLIK BHAIRE (1902)** I. L. R. 26 Bom. 437

19. ———— **Putni taluk—Mortgage—Sale in execution—Arrears of rent due previous to sale—First charge—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 69.** A mortgaged a certain putni taluq to B. B subsequently brought a mortgage suit against A, and in execution brought the property to sale and purchased it himself. In the meantime the rent due to the zamindar had fallen into arrear, and the zamindar obtained a rent decree, and in execution thereof advertised the putni for sale. The mortgagee, to save the property, paid in the amount of the decree and afterwards sued the mortgagor for contribution. *Held*, that a mortgagee who purchases property at an execution sale is under a legal liability to pay the rent due upon the property at the time of purchase and therefore cannot claim, under s. 69 of the Contract Act, contribution from the mortgagor. **Maharani Dasya v. Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhry, 1 C. W. N. 458, and Peary Mohan Mukhopadhyaya v. Sreeram Chandra Bose, 9 C. W. N. 794, relied on. MANINDRA CHANDRA NANDY v. JAMAHR KUMARI (1905)**

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 643

20. ———— **Second Appeal—Civil Procedure Code, s. 586—Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887), Sch. II, Art. 41—No second appeal where in suits for contribution debt in respect of which contribution is sought, is created by the payment itself—Appeal ability determined by subject-matter of suit and not by amount claimed in execution.** The suits for contribution exempted from the jurisdiction of Courts of Small Causes by Sch. II, Act IX of 1887, are suits in which contribution is claimed in respect of payment made by a sharer of money due from a co-sharer. The exemption does not apply to cases where no debt was due from the co-sharer prior to payment, but contribution is sought in respect of a debt which became due only by virtue of such payment. In such cases no second appeal will lie under s. 586 of the Code of Civil Procedure if the subject-matter of the suit is less than R500. In determining whether second appeals lie in such cases in execution proceedings, the amount of subject-matter of the suit and not the amount sought to be recovered in execution must be taken into consideration. **MAVULA AMMAL v. MAVULA MARACOTE (1906)**

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 212

3. PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBT BY ONE DEBTOR.

1. ———— **Mortgaged property purchased by various persons—Payment to save portion from sale.** In March 1864, the owner of an estate mortgaged it as security for the payment of certain moneys. Subsequently, portions of such estate were purchased by the plaintiff and the defendants at an execution sale. Subsequently, again, the mortgagee sued the mortgagor and the plaintiff for the mortgage-money, claiming to re-

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—contd.**3. PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBT BY ONE DEBTOR—contd.**

cover it by the sale of the portion of such estate purchased by the plaintiff. Having obtained a decree, the mortgagee caused a portion of such portion to be sold in the execution of the decree. In order to save the remainder of such portion from sale in the execution of the decree, the plaintiff satisfied the judgment-debt. The plaintiff then sued the defendants for contribution. *Held*, that assuming that the mortgagee, by not including the defendants in his suit upon the mortgage-bond, had put it out of his power to proceed at law by another suit on the basis of the same bond against the properties in the possession of the defendants as purchasers, it did not follow that the plaintiff's equitable right to recover a fair contribution from the defendants on the ground of his having paid the whole debt due to the mortgagee was thereby invalidated. **JAGAT NARAIN v. QUTUB HUSAIN . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 807**

2. ——— Sale of property subject to mortgage in execution of money-decree against mortgagors—Subsequent suit by mortgagee to recover his mortgage-debt by sale of part of mortgaged property only—Payment of mortgage-debt by holder of part of mortgaged property—Right on such payment to sue for contribution from other holders of the mortgaged property. The owner of a portion of property comprised in a mortgage, who, in order to save his share from sale, has satisfied a decree obtained by the mortgagee on the mortgage against him, can exact contribution from the owner of another portion of the mortgaged property who was not a defendant in the mortgagee's suit. **Jagat Narain v. Qutub Husain, I. L. R. 2 All. 807** followed. **CHAGANDAS MAGANDAS v. GANSING . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 615**

3. ——— Joint mortgage—Purchase of share in mortgage at sale in execution. *T* and *D* in May 1867 jointly mortgaged their respective two biswas shares of a certain village. In August 1877, the mortgagee sued to recover the mortgage-money by the sale of the mortgaged property, and obtained a decree. Before this decree was executed, *L* obtained a decree against *D*, in execution of which his two biswas share was put up for sale on the 20th June 1878 and was purchased by *A*. Subsequently the mortgagee applied for execution of his decree, and *D*'s two biswas share was attached and advertised for sale in execution thereof. In order to save such share from sale, *A*, on the 29th June 1878, satisfied the mortgagee's decree. He then sued *P*, *D*'s co-mortgagor, to recover half the amount he had so paid, by the sale of *P*'s two biswas. *Held*, that, inasmuch as, when *A* discharged the whole amount of the mortgage-debt, he not only became entitled to a contribution of half such amount from *P*, but having acquired the rights of the mortgagee, was competent to assert a lien on *P*'s two biswas share *A* was entitled to a decree as claimed, **PANCHAM SINGH v. ALI AHMED . . . I. L. R. 4 All. 58**

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—contd.**3. PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBT BY ONE DEBTOR—contd.**

4. ——— Mortgage debt—Apportionment of decree according to share of purchased property—Payment of money for which other person is liable. In execution of a decree, the right, title, and interests in two parcels of property of a judgment-debtor, who had previous to the attachment, executed a single mortgage thereof to *A*, were sold; and *B* and *C* respectively purchased them at different prices. *A* sued the mortgagor and the purchasers *B* and *C* for enforcing his lien on the two parcels of property. The suit was dismissed by the first Court, but on appeal the order was "Appeal decreed." *A* entered into a compromise with *B*, and entered satisfaction of a moiety of the decree. He afterwards issued execution of the other moiety against *C*, and compelled him to pay. *C* now sued *B* for recovery of the proportion of the amount paid by him to *A*, but which, according to the valuation of the respective properties, should have fallen into the share of *B*. *Held*, that the debt due upon the mortgage-bond was a general burden upon the two properties, for which no portion of those two properties was more liable than the other. *Held*, also, that, as between the plaintiff and defendant, the liability was not joint, but several, in proportion to the respective values of the properties, and that the plaintiff, having been compelled to pay money for which the property of the defendant was legally liable, was entitled to recover the amount from the defendant. **BHAIRAB CHANDRA MADAK v. NADYAR CHAND PAL . . . 3 B. L. R. A. C. 357**

S.C. BHYRUB CHUNDER MUDDUCK v. NUDDIAR CHAND PAL . . . 12 W. R. 291

5. ——— Sale of mortgaged property to different persons—Undertaking by one to discharge liabilities. *A* and *B*, respectively, at different dates, purchased portions of a property on which there was a mortgage. On the mortgagee obtaining a decree against the property, *B* paid off the entire debt, and brought a suit against *A* for contribution. *Held*, that he was entitled to recover, notwithstanding in the deed of sale to *B* there was an undertaking by *B* that he would discharge all the liabilities of the mortgagor, including the mortgage on the property. **MOTHOORA-NATH CHUTTOPADHYA v. KRISTOKUMAR GHOSH . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 369**

6. ——— Release granted to one debtor—Payment of more than proper share of debt. Any debtor paying more than his share is entitled to sue his co-debtors for contribution, whether a release has been granted or not. **SHEO CHURN LALL v. RAM SURUN SAHOO . . . 16 W. R. 49**

7. ——— Joint bond—Payment by one debtor on bond. *A* and *B* jointly executed a bond in favour of *C*. When the bond fell due, *A* alone executed a second bond for a larger amount in

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*3. PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBT BY ONE DEBTOR—*contd.*

favour of *C*, covering the amount of the debt under the former bond, together with a further advance to him (*A*). At the same time, *C* cancelled the former bond. *Held*, that thereupon *A* could maintain his suit against *B* for contribution. *TRAILAKHANATH ROY v. KASHINATH ROY* . . . 6 B. L. R. 633
14 W. R. 458

8. ——— Decree against one of several joint debtors—*Cause of action*. The mere existence of a decree against one of several joint debtors does not afford ground for a suit for contribution against the other debtors. *RAM PERSHAD SINGH v. NEERBHAY SINGH*
11 B. L. R. 76
19 W. R. 24

SERAJOOL HUQ v. ROY LUCHEPUT SINGH
20 W. R. 242

9. ——— Payment of joint decree by one of Hindu co-parceners. A decree having been passed against the plaintiff and defendant, undivided Hindu brothers, jointly for a family debt, and the decree-holder having levied the sum decreed from the plaintiff, a suit was brought by him in a Small Cause Court for contribution against the defendant. *Held*, that the suit would not lie under the circumstances of the case. *CHELLAPILLA RAU PANTULU v. BALARAMA KRISHNAMA PANTULU*
I. L. R. 6 Mad. 424

10. ——— Purchase of decree by one of several judgment-debtors—*Execution of decree*. One of several joint judgment-debtors who has taken an assignment of the decree cannot execute it against his co-debtors. His only remedy is to sue them for contribution towards the amount he paid for the decree in the proportion in which they were bound, *inter se*, to satisfy the decree. *In the matter of the petition of DIGUMBUREE DABEE. In the matter of the petition of SOROOP CHUNDER HAZRA* . . . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 938

S.C. DIGUMBUREE DABEE v. ESHAN CHUNDER SEIN. SOROOP CHUNDER HAZRA v. TROYLUCKONATH ROY . . . 9 W. R. 230

DIGAMBUREE DEBIA v. ESHAN CHUNDER SEIN
15 W. R. 372

OBHOY CHURN ROY CHOWDHRY v. NOBIN CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY . . . 23 W. R. 95

DIGAMBUREE DEBIA v. SHARODA PERSHAD ROY
5 W. R. Mis. 46

KHOSHALEE v. NUND LALL . . . 6 N. W. 1

11. ——— Execution of decree against another. One of nine judgment-debtors paid the whole of the debt, and then applied to execute the decree against one of the others. *Held*, that he was entitled to receive only one-ninth of the debt from him. *KISHEN KAMINEE CHOWDRIN v. MOHIMA CHUNDER ROY*
Marsh. 339 : 2 Hay 459

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*3. PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBT BY ONE DEBTOR—*contd.*

12. ——— Suit for contribution against joint judgment-debtor—*Right of suit—Remedy by separate suit and not in execution of decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 244*. S. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to a suit brought by one of two joint judgment-debtors who has been compelled to satisfy the decree in full against the other joint judgment-debtor for contribution. *RAM SARAN PANDE v. JANKI PANDE* . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 106

13. ——— Execution against one of several joint debtors—*Barred decree*. A decree having been executed for the full amount due against a joint debtor, the latter sued his co-debtors for contribution, who pleaded that at the time of payment the decree had been barred in consequence of a certain proceeding in the execution case not having been *bona fide*. *Held*, that the question raised by the defendants was necessarily considered in the execution case that the Court must be assumed to have acted rightly in granting execution, and that the plaintiff, having been compelled to pay the joint debt, was entitled to reimbursement. *SHIB CHUNDER BIDYARUTTUN v. HUREE DASS BHUTTACHARJEE* . . . 13 W. R. 298

14. ——— Payment of debt by one of several joint debtors—*Form of decree*. When parties are bound by a joint liability, and one of them discharges the whole debt due to the creditor, he may bring an action against his co-debtors for a contribution by each of them for his share of the sum due to the original creditor. The plaintiff in such a case can only sue each of the co-debtors for his share of the amount paid, and the decree should not be given jointly and severally, but severally against each of the defendants for the contribution due by each. *EGLINTON v. KOYLASHNATH MOZOOMDAR* . . . W. R. 1864, 303

ROGHONATH DOSS v. ALLADEEN PATTUCK
8 W. R. 201

15. ——— Small Cause suit to recover money paid by the plaintiff in discharge of a decree-debt against him and the defendants—*Jurisdiction of Court to go into facts of former suit*. *A* sued four persons against whom, together with *A*, a money-decree had been passed in a previous suit to recover a proportionate part of a sum paid by *A* in discharge of the decree-debt. Two of the defendants pleaded that they had not appeared in the former suit, and had been unnecessarily brought into the record by *A*. *Held*, that the Court had jurisdiction to inquire into the circumstances of the previous suit. *Suput Singh v. Imri-Tewari*, I. L. R. 5 Cal. 720, followed. *THANGAMMAL v. THYYAMMUTHU* . . . I. L. R. 10 Mad. 518

16. ——— Where a judgment was passed against several defendants jointly and severally, and some of them paid the whole of the judgment-debt :—*Held*, that they might sue the

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—contd.**3. PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBT BY ONE DEBTOR—contd.**

others for contribution. *SUPPANACHARI v. CHAKARA PATTAN* 1 Mad. 411

17. ——— Judgment-debtors under summary order of inferior Court for execution of decree—*Effect of payment under order.* A summary order of an inferior Court for the execution of a decree may be conclusive as between the decree-holder who obtained it and those against whom it was made, but is not necessarily so against the latter as between themselves only. Such an order has not necessarily the same effect, so far as contribution is concerned, as if it were the original decree in the suit. *NUND COOMAR SINGH v. GANGA PERSHAD* 3 W. R. 207

18. ——— Payment of debt by one debtor—*Partition of property among debtors.* Where there had been disputes respecting family property and an agreement was entered into by which the parties made a division of the property and agreed to pay a debt in equal shares, and one of the parties had been made under a decree to pay the whole debt:—*Held*, that he had a clear right to recover from the others their proportion of the debt unless they could show some answer to his claim. *DOMAN SINGH v. KASEERAM* 5 W. R. P. C. 39
1 Moo. I. A. 366

19. ——— Joint liability for a debt paid by one debtor in suit for debt—*Costs.* If one of several persons jointly liable for a debt is sued, and is compelled to satisfy the debt and the costs of the suit, he can only call on the others to contribute in respect of the debt, and not in respect of the costs. *PUNJAB v. PETUM SINGH* 6 N. W. 192

20. ——— Payment to stay sale for arrears of rent—*Liability of person in use and occupation.* The land of a jote jama belonging to plaintiff and one P having been attached in satisfaction of a joint decree for arrears of rent, plaintiff deposited the entire amount of the decree. He then sued M, who had obtained D's share of the jote, for contribution, on the ground that M was in use and occupation. *Held*, that the case against M was not met by the plea that he was not a party to the suit in which the decree was obtained. *GUDADHUR CHOWDARY v. SHAMA CHURN MITTER* 16 W. R. 8

21. ——— Costs payable jointly and severally—*Intervenor.* In a suit for possession an intervenor claimed the lands in dispute upon a title distinct from that of plaintiff; whereupon the intervenor was made a defendant, and a decree was ultimately passed in plaintiff's favour, with costs payable jointly and severally by all the defendants. The original defendants having been obliged to pay the whole amount of these costs in execution, they brought a suit for contribution against the legal representatives of the intervenor. *Held*, that, in the absence of any contract or agreement, there was no equity between the parties to justify a suit for

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—contd.**3. PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBT BY ONE DEBTOR—contd.**

contribution. *KRISTO CHUNDER CHATTERJEE v. WISE* 14 W. R. 70

22. ——— Joint decree for costs against defendants having separate defences—*Right of suit.* In a suit against one defendant for possession of certain property, which was claimed as his by the original defendant, certain third persons got themselves added to the array of parties as defendants and put in a defence in opposition to, and exclusive of, that of the first defendants. The plaintiff in that suit obtained a decree, the claims of both sets of defendants being found to be unsupported, and the decree gave costs jointly against all the defendants. The decree having been executed for costs against the first defendant, he sued the other defendants for contribution. *Held*, that the suit would not lie. *Kristo Chunder Chatterjee v. Wise*, 14 W. R. 70, *Sreeputty Roy v. Loharam Roy*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 687 : 7 W. R. 384, *Abdul Wahid Khan v. Shaluka Bibi*, I. L. R. 21 Cal. 496, and *Suput Singh v. Imrit Tewari*, I. L. R. 5 Cal. 720, referred to. *FAKIRE v. TASADDUQ HUSAIN* I. L. R. 19 All. 462

23. ——— Separate suits where joint debtors are sued for debt paid by one—*Ascertainment of shares.* Ordinarily claims for contribution should be brought in separate suits against the individual contributors, but there may be cases where, by reason of special difficulty in the ascertainment of the shares, convenience may suggest a departure from the ordinary rule of separate suits. In those cases the ascertainment of the shares should form a portion of the relief sought for. *RUJAPUT RAI v. MAHOMED ALI KHAN* 5 N. W. 215

24. ——— Costs—*Contribution—Suit against three defendants—Decree against all for payment of plaintiff's costs—Payment of entire costs by one defendant—Suit by him against his co-defendants for contribution—Maintainability.* A, B and C, being defendants in a partition suit, were ordered to pay the costs of the plaintiff therein. A was impleaded because he held a mortgage which had been executed in his favour by B over a portion of the property. Upon a warrant of attachment being issued against A, he paid the whole amount due in respect of the costs, and now sued B and C for contribution. *Held*, that he was entitled to contribution. *Fakire v. Tasadduq Husain*, I. L. R. 19 All. 462, distinguished. *Merryweather v. Nixon*, 8 T. R. 186, commented on. *SHAKUL KAMEED ALIM SAHIE v. SYED EBRAHIM SAHIB* (1902) I. L. R. 26 Mad. 373

25. ——— Evidence—*Contribution as between judgment-debtors—Decree against two defendants jointly—Satisfaction by one alone—Prima facie case made by production of judgment and certificate of satisfaction—Joint Tortfeasors.* Where the amount of a decree has

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*3. PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBT BY ONE DEBTOR—*contd.*

been recovered from one of two judgment-debtors against whom it was jointly passed, and he sues the other judgment-debtor for contribution, a *prima facie* case is made by the production of the judgment and the certificate of satisfaction. That judgment is conclusive as between the judgment-debtors, in the sense that it will not be open to either of them to contend that the former suit should have been dismissed, or that one of the parties should not have been held liable to the decree-holder therein, or that the amount decreed was excessive or based on principles erroneous on the face of the judgment. But it will be open to the party from whom contribution is sought, without impugning the propriety of the judgment, to plead and establish that as between the joint debtors the plaintiff is solely liable for the debt, or that the defendant is not equally liable with the plaintiff, or that the suit is not maintainable by reason of the fact that the plaintiff and the defendant are joint tort-feasors in a sense in which, on public grounds, the right to claim contribution is negatived. And, though it may have been rightly held in the former suit that both judgment-debtors were jointly liable for the mesne profits of land for three years, it will still be open to the defendant in the suit for contribution to show that the plaintiff alone enjoyed those profits; and in that case the plaintiff will not be entitled to contribution. *Quære*: Whether the principle laid down in *Merryweather v. Nixon*, 8 T. R. 186, should be followed in India. *SIVA PANDA v. JUJUSTI PANDA* (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 599

26. ———— *Evidence Act* (Act I of 1872), s. 92—*Construction of document—Evidence of oral agreement not excluded.* The plaintiff sued to recover money which he had been compelled to pay in virtue of a mortgage executed by his two half-sisters and himself. His claim was based on the plea that, though appearing in the bond as a co-obligor, he was in reality merely a surety. *Held*, that evidence was admissible to show that the plaintiff executed the mortgage-bond as a surety only. The plaintiff failed to prove that he was other than a principal, whereupon it was held that he was not entitled to recover anything from the defendants by way of contribution, the case upon which he came into Court being totally different from a suit for contribution. *Mul Chand v. Madho Ram*, I. L. R. 10 All. 421, followed. *SHAMSH-UL-JAHAN BEGAM v. AHMAD WALI KHAN* (1903)

I. L. R. 25 All. 337

27. ———— *Revenue sale—Hindu law—Payment by one of several co-sharers owning estate subject to revenue, to save sale—Charge on share of co-sharers—Contribution—Transfer of Property Act* (IV of 1882), ss. 82, 100—*Revenue Recovery Act* (Mad. Act II of 1864), ss. 2, 32, 42—*Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), s. 501—*Statutory application of general principle of equity to particular cases—*

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*3. PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBT BY ONE DEBTOR—*contd.*

Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 61, 99, 132. Where one of two or more co-sharers owning an estate subject to the payment of revenue to the Government pays the whole revenue in order to save, and so does save, the estate from liability to be sold by the Government for realizing the arrears of revenue, he is by operation of law entitled to a charge upon the share of each of his co-sharers for the realization of the latter's share of the revenue, as between the co-sharers. *Seshagiri v. Pichu*, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 452, followed. *Achut Ramchandra Pai v. Hari Kamti*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 318; *Kinu Ram Das v. Mozaffer Hosain Shaha*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 809; and *Seth Chitor Mal v. Shib Lal*, I. L. R. 14 All. 273, dissented from. *Per BHASHYAM AYYANGAR, J.* (at the first hearing).—That the suit was governed by Art. 132 of Sch. II to the Limitation Act, in so far as it related to the enforcement of a charge. Assuming that the plaintiff had no charge on the defendant's share of the estate, the Article applicable would be Art. 61 or Art. 99, but not Art. 120. Though a claim for contribution generally arises in cases where the party seeking contribution has himself paid the amount in respect of which contribution is sought, and though, in the present case, the arrear of revenue had not been paid to the Government by the plaintiff, but had been realized by the Collector under the Revenue Recovery Act from the income of the plaintiff's share after it had been registered as a separate estate, plaintiff's right to claim contribution was not affected. Nor did that fact affect the application of Art. 99 or Art. 61 of Sch. II to the Limitation Act, in both of which the person bringing the suit is referred to as having "paid" the amount sought to be recovered. In such a case, it is but just that all should contribute in proportion towards a benefit claimed by all. It is immaterial whether the party seeking contribution made the payment voluntarily or involuntarily, namely, by payment to avert coercive process against his property or by the seizure of his property under process of law for realization of the amount. In either case he has been damnified, and the parties against whom he seeks contribution have been benefited to that extent. *RAJAH OF VIZIANAGRAM v. SETRUCHERLA SOMASEKHARARAZ* (1903)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 686

28. ———— *Surety—Contract Act* (IX of 1872), s. 145—*Implied promise by principal debtor to indemnify surety—Joint decree against two judgment-debtors—Satisfaction by one of them by execution of promissory note—Suit by him for contribution—Maintainability—"Sum paid under the guarantee."* Two persons jointly executed a negotiable promissory note payable to S for Rs 1,000, each receiving Rs 500 out of the consideration. S subsequently sued them on the note, and obtained a decree against them jointly for Rs 1,480, being the amount due under the note, costs, etc. That decree was executed as against one of them, namely, the

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*3. PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBT BY ONE DEBTOR—*concl'd.*

present plaintiff, who gave *S* another promissory note (in which a third party joined) for the whole amount due under the decree, namely, Rs. 1,480, and obtained a receipt which showed that the last-mentioned promissory note was accepted by *S* as payment of the amount due under the decree. This note had not, at the date of the suit, been paid. Plaintiff now sued the other joint maker of the original promissory note for contribution. *Held*, that he had no cause of action at the date of suit. *PUTTI NARAYANAMURTHI AYYAR v. MARI-MUTHU PILLAI* (1902) . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 322

4. JOINT WRONG-DOERS.

1. ——— Liability of wrong-doers as amongst themselves. One tort-feasor cannot recover contribution against another. *SUPPANA CHARI v. CHAKKARA PATTAN* . I Mad. 411

2. ——— Costs of suit rendered necessary by wrong-doers. The plaintiff and defendants jointly opposed and prevented the *amin* of a zamindar from measuring certain lands. The zamindar thereupon brought a suit against them to have his right to measure declared, and obtained a joint decree with costs. In execution of the decree for costs, the property of the plaintiff was attached, and he solely paid the whole amount due for costs. The plaintiff now sued the defendants for contribution. *Held*, that such a suit would lie. *RUTTEE SIRDAR v. SAJOO PORAMANICK*

11 B. L. R. 345: 20 W. R. 235

3. ——— Wrong-doers with intention — *Bona fide exercise of right*. The question as to whether as between persons against whom a joint decree has been passed there is any right of contribution at all, depends upon the question whether the defendants in the former suit were wrong-doers in the sense that they knew, or ought to have known, that they were doing an illegal or wrongful act. In that case no suit for contribution will lie. If the defendants in the former suit were not guilty of wrong in that sense, but acted under a *bona fide* claim of right, and had reason to suppose that they had a right to do what they did, then they may have a right of contribution *inter se*; and in such case the Court should enquire what share they each took in the transaction; because, according to circumstances, one or more of them might be excused altogether or in part, from contributing,—as, for instance, one of them might have acted as a servant, and by the command of the others; or the others might have been the only persons benefited by the wrongful act; in which case those who were benefited, or who ordered, the servant to do the act would not be entitled to contribution. S. 22 of Act XV of 1877 does not apply to a case in which the persons to whom a right of suit is assigned after the institution of the suit, obtain leave to carry on the suit. *SUPUT SINGH v. IMRIT TEWARI*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 720: 6 C. L. R. 62

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*4. JOINT WRONG-DOERS—*contd.*

4. ——— Unintentional wrong-doer — *Ignorance of illegal act*. An objection to the attachment and sale of certain immoveable property raised by one who claimed to have purchased the same at a sale in execution of a prior decree was disallowed on the ground that under the prior decree, the rights of one only of the present judgment-debtors had been sold and purchased by the objector. In accordance with this order, two-thirds of the property under attachment were sold, and the objector thereupon brought a regular suit for a declaration of his right as a purchaser of the whole property in execution of the prior decree. To this suit he impleaded as defendants the decree holder and the judgment-debtors. The suit was decreed, and in the result the decree-holder alone was compelled to pay the whole of the costs. Subsequently he brought a suit for contribution in respect of these costs, making defendant to the suit (i) *R*, one of his co-defendants in the previous suit, personally and as heir of *A* who was another of those co-defendants, (ii) *N* and (iii) *S*, these two being sued in the character of heirs of *A*. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the rule preventing one wrong-doer from claiming contribution against another was confined to cases where the person seeking relief must be presumed to have known that he was acting illegally, and in this case there was no evidence to show that the plaintiff in attaching and advertising the property for sale in execution of his decree knew he was doing an illegal act, but the inferences were all the other way, he was fully entitled in law to maintain the suit and to recover from the defendants the proportionate amount of the costs which he had to pay for them. *Merryweather v. Nixon*, 2 Sm. L. C. 5th Ed. 456, *Adamson v. Jarvis*, 4 Bing. 66, *Dixon v. Faucus*, 30 L. J. Q. B. 137, and *Suput Singh v. Imrit Tewari*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 720, referred to. *KISHNA RAM v. RAKMINI SEWAK SINGH*

I. L. R. 9 All. 221

5. ——— Joint tort-feasor—*Adjustment of a loss arising from an illegal contract*. A deed of partition between *A* and *B*, members of an undivided Hindu family, provided that *A* who took over all the debts due to the family, should bear the loss, if any, incurred in an appeal then pending in a suit brought by the family on a bond. The bond was held to evidence a fraudulent transaction, and the appeal was dismissed with costs. The decree for costs was executed against *B* and satisfied by him; he now sued the son of *A* (deceased) to recover the amount paid by him. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the claim not being barred by the rule against contribution between joint tort-feasors. *LAKSHMANA AYYAN v. RANGASAMI AYYAN* . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 78

6. ——— Costs of suit in which false defence is set up. Where a decree for costs against two defendants jointly was executed against one of them, who had set up a false defence in the

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*4. JOINT WRONG-DOERS—*contd.*

suit in collusion with the other, and the former brought a suit to recover one moiety of the amount paid by him from the latter :—*Held*, that the suit would not lie. *VAYANGARA VADAKA VITTIL MANJA v. PARIYANGOT PADINGARA KURUPPATH KADUGOCHEN NAYAR* . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 89

7. ———— Decree for costs—*Evidence to prove collusion—Proceedings in former case not between same parties—Admissibility in evidence of finding in former case.* *S* granted to *G*, and *A* a patni of a certain share in a zamindari, and thereupon *P* brought a suit against *G*, *S*, and *A* for specific performance of an agreement to grant to him (*P*) a patni of the same share. That suit was decreed with costs, the whole of which were realised from *G*. In a suit for contribution brought by *G* against *S* and *A*, the lower Appellate Court found that *G*, *S*, and *A* had conspired in setting up a false defence in the former suit in order to defeat *P*'s claim. *Held*, in second appeal, that, assuming such collusion were proved, the suit for contribution was not maintainable, *G*, *S*, and *A* being joint wrong-doers. *Vayangara Vadaka Vittil Manja v. Pariyangot Padingara Kuruppath Kadugochen Nayar*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 89, followed. *Brojendro Kumar Roy Chowdhury v. Ras Behary Roy Chowdhury*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 300, distinguished. The only evidence on which the lower Appellate Court had acted as establishing such collusion was the finding of the Court in the former suit (gathered from the grounds of appeal in that suit). *Held*, that that finding was inadmissible in evidence as laid down in *Surendra Nath Pal Chowdhury v. Brojo Nath Pal Chowdhury* I. L. R. 13 Calc. 352, being the finding in a case in which *G*, *S*, and *A*, were all co-defendants, and a third party the plaintiff; and the case was remanded for the determination of question whether *G*, *S*, and *A* were wrong-doers, and were as such held liable for the costs of the former suit. *GOBIND CHUNDER NUNDY v. SRIGOBIND CHOWDHRY* I. L. R. 24 Calc. 330 1 C. W. N. 179

8. ———— Payment of damages under decree by one of several joint wrong-doers. Where one of several joint wrong-doers liquidates the whole amount of the damages obtained in satisfaction of the wrong committed by them all, he is not entitled to contribution from the rest. *HARNATH V. HAREE SINGH* . . . 4 N. W. 116

9. ———— Payment of decree by one of several joint wrong-doers. *Cause of action—Breach of covenant—Damages for breach of contract—Breach of contract.* In a suit for damages against *A*, and others for breach of a covenant not to open a ferry at a particular place, a decree was obtained against all the defendants. The amount of this decree was levied by execution from *A* alone, who thereupon brought a suit for contribution against his co-defendants in the former suit. Both the lower Courts dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff and the defendants had been joint

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—*contd.*4. JOINT WRONG-DOERS—*contd.*

wrong-doers, and that no suit for contribution would lie as between them. On second appeal to the High Court :—*Held*, that the rule of law relied on by the Courts below had no application to the circumstances of the present case, and that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain his action. *Brojendro Kumar Roy Chowdhury v. Rash Behary Roy Chowdhury* I. L. R. 13 Calc. 300

10. ———— Payment to secure property—*Mesne profits.* In a claim for contribution arising out of a former suit in which a District Judge had given a decree against the present plaintiff and defendant, and in the execution of which the Munsif had allowed mesne profits to the plaintiff, although the Judge's decision which entered fully into other details, had omitted to award mesne profits :—*Held*, that, as the Judge's decision had made no mention of mesne profits, the present plaintiff was not entitled to recover as contribution the sum which, in order to secure his property against the joint decree, he had paid on behalf of the defendant. *BUNWAREE LALL SAHOO v. SUDHIST LALL* . . . 25 W. R. 269

11. ———— Bona fide claim—*Bona fide claim of right.* When a joint decree was passed against several persons, no suit for contribution would lie as between them if they were wrong-doers in the sense that they knew or ought to have known that they were doing an illegal or wrongful act. But if they were not guilty of wrong in that sense, but acted under a *bona fide* claim of right, and had reason to suppose that they had a right to do what they did, then there is a right of contribution *inter se*. Some time in 1826, *R*, the common ancestor of the parties, dispossessed *K* of a share in a certain property; after an interval of 27 years and 6 months *K* brought a suit and proved his right and recovered possession; meanwhile, *i.e.*, 5 years after the dispossession, *R* had died and had been succeeded by his sons. There was nothing to show that *R*, or, after him, his heirs, knew that they were doing a wrongful or unlawful act or that they did not act under cover of a *bona fide* claim of right. The circumstances pointed to the opposite conclusion. *Held*, that in such a case a suit for contribution lay. *Merryweather v. Nizam*, 8 T. R. 186; *Betts v. Gibbins*, 2 A & E. 57, 74; *Adamson v. Jarvis*, 4 Bing. Rep. 66; *Pearson v. Skelton*, 1 M. & W. 504; *Palmer v. Wick and Pulteneytown Steam Shipping Company, Ltd.*, [1894] A. C. 318; *Sreepully Roy v. Loharam Roy*, 7 W. R. 384; *Saput Singh v. Imrit Tewary*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 720; and *Brojendra Kumar Roy Chowdhury v. Rash Behari Roy Chowdhury*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 300, referred to. *HARI SARAN MAITRA v. JOTINDRA MOHAN LAHIRI* (1900) 5 C. W. N. 393

12. ———— Dispossession—*Tort-feasor.* Where the plaintiffs were in possession of land standing in the names of their father and deceased brother, part of which was sold by the

CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—concl'd.**4. JOINT WRONG-DOERS—concl'd.**

deceased brother's widow to the defendants, who got a decree for possession against the plaintiffs, who kept the former out of possession: *Held*, that plaintiff's possession should not be considered as that of tort-feasors, and that they were therefore entitled to recover from the defendants, by way of contribution, the rent paid by the plaintiffs for the portion of the land purchased by the defendants. *MOHESH CHANDRA MUNDLE v. BOYDIA NATH VAITANDI* (1901) . . . 6 C. W. N. 88

5. INTEREST.

1. ——— Discretion of Court—*Act XXXII of 1839*. In suits for contribution it is in the discretion of the Court to allow or refuse interest on the amount claimed, whether there has been a written demand for it or not, inasmuch as *Act XXXII of 1839* does not apply to such suits. *BISTOO CHUNDER BANERJEE v. NITHORE MONEE DABEE* . . . 10 B. L. R. 352: 19 W. R. 98

LULLEET BISWAS v. PROSONNOMOYEE DOSSEE . . . 10 B. L. R. 353 note

CONTRIBUTORY.

See COMPANY—FORMATION AND REGISTRATION—ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION.

I. L. R. 11 All. 349
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 672
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 152
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 654
9 W. R. 539

See COMPANY—WINDING UP—GENERAL CASES . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 223
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 241
I. L. R. 9 All. 366

——— Liability of—

See COMPANY—ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND LIABILITY OF SHARE-HOLDERS.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

See PENAL CODE, s. 304A. . . 8 C. W. N. 645
See RAILWAYS ACT, 1890, s. 101. . . 8 C. W. N. 645

CONVERSION.

See DAMAGES—MEASURE AND ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES—TORTS.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 116
See HINDU LAW—CONVERSION. . . I. L. R. 29 All. 487
See HUNDI . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 516
See LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877). . . 12 C. W. N. 1090

See PLEDGEE AND PLEDGEE. . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 322

——— of mates' receipts—

See CONTRACT . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 173

CONVERSION—concl'd.

1. ——— Stolen notes. Two notes are stolen from A, which B (not a *bona fide* holder for valuable consideration) tenders to C in payment for certain articles. C, not knowing B, refuses to deal with him, whereupon B brings D, who is known to C, and the purchase is made by him. *Held*, that the part which D performed in the transaction amounted to a "conversion of the notes to his own use," and that he is liable to A. *KISHORIMOHUN ROY v. RAJNARAIN SEN* . . . 1 Hyde 263

2. ——— Appropriation of goods as to which there is dispute—*Delivery to party without title*. K received into his godown certain goods belonging to the plaintiff and in charge of his servant, concerning which there was a dispute between the plaintiff's agent and B, of which circumstances K was aware; and he advanced money to B on the security of such goods, which were subsequently delivered to B and sold by him with the acknowledgment of K, and, notwithstanding the plaintiff's servant objected to it, delivered them to the purchaser. *Held*, that K was liable for damages at the instance of the plaintiff in an action for conversion of the goods. *ANANT DAS v. KELLY* . . . 1 N. W., Part 7, p. 107: Ed. 1873, 194

3. ——— Trespass on land—*Conversion of moveables lying on land—Civil Procedure Code, s. 43*. Defendants having forcibly taken possession of plaintiff's land upon which was (i) standing timber and (ii) logs of timber lying stored on the ground, plaintiff had, in a prior suit, recovered possession and damages. Subsequently to the institution of such prior suit defendants (i) cut and removed certain standing trees, and (ii) removed the logs which lay stored on the ground. Upon plaintiff bringing a second suit to recover damages on both grounds, objection was raised as to the logs that a claim for their value might have been included in the former suit, since their conversion was effected when the plaintiff was dispossessed of the land upon which they lay, and that, under s. 43, no claim could now be made in respect of them. *Held*, that a trespass on a piece of land is by itself no proof of any conversion of moveables lying upon the land at the time that the trespass takes place; that notwithstanding plaintiff's eviction from the land, possession of the timber lying stored upon it should be presumed to have continued in him in the absence of proof of any act on the part of the defendant with special reference to such timber and showing unequivocally that the plaintiff was entirely deprived of the use of them; and that conversion of the logs was not effected by the trespass, but only by their removal subsequently to the institution of the previous suit. *MOYI v. AVUTHARAMAN* . . . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 197

CONVERTS.

See BIGAMY

3 Mad. Ap. 7
I. L. R. 4 Bom. 330
I. L. R. 10 Mad. 11
I. L. R. 18 Calc. 264

CONVERTS—contd.

See DIVORCE ACT, s. 2.

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 382

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 252

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.

4 Mad. 185

See HINDU LAW—ADOPTION—REQUISITES FOR ADOPTION AUTHORITY.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 551

See HINDU LAW—CUSTOM—ADOPTION.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 518

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—DIVESTING OF EXCLUSION FROM, AND FORFEITURE OF, INHERITANCE—MARRIAGES.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 264

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—DIVESTING OF, EXCLUSION FROM, AND FORFEITURE OF INHERITANCE—OUTCASTES

2 Agra 311

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 169

I. L. R. 11 All. 100

See HINDU LAW—MARRIAGE—DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE.

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 169

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 264

See MARRIAGE

10 B. L. R. 125

16 W. R. 249

See NATIVE CHRISTIANS.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 25

See SALSETTE LAW, APPLICABLE IN.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 680

See SUCCESSION ACT, s. 331.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 783

1. ———— **Hindu Convert to Christianity—Law governing converts—Hindu law.** Upon the conversion of a Hindu to Christianity, the Hindu law ceases to have any continuing obligatory force upon the convert. He may renounce the old law by which he was bound, as he has renounced the old religion, or, if he thinks fit, he may abide by the old law, notwithstanding he has renounced the old religion. The profession of Christianity releases the convert from the trammels of Hindu law, but it does not of necessity involve any change of the rights or relations of the convert in matters with which Christianity has no concern, such as his rights and interest in, and his powers over, property. The convert, though not bound as to such matters, either by the Hindu law or by any positive law, may, by his course of conduct after his conversion, have shown by what law he intended to be governed as to these matters. *ABRAHAM v. ABRAHAM*

1 W. R. P. C. 1: 9 Moo. I. A. 195

2. ———— **Law governing Converts—Succession Act, s. 331.** Native Christians are governed by the Succession Act, but if a family of native Christians continued to observe the Hindu law of succession until the Succession Act altered their rule of succession, the members of the family born before the Succession Act came into

CONVERTS—contd.

operation could not be deprived of the rights acquired by them under Hindu law. *PONNUSAMI NADAN v. DORASAMI AYYAN* I. L. R. 2 Mad. 209

3. ———— **Marriage, validity of—Succession to estate of Hindu who has become a Christian—Succession Act, s. 35.** If a Hindu becomes a convert to Christianity and dies intestate, succession to his estate is governed by the Indian Succession Act, 1865. *A K*, a Brahman, went through a Hindu marriage ceremony with *S*, a Brahman girl of eight years of age, in 1850. The marriage was never consummated nor was the consummation ceremony performed. In 1851 *A K* was converted to Christianity. *S* refused to live with him because he was an outcaste, and in 1857 *S* renounced all claims on him or his estate. In 1858 *A K* went through a Christian form of marriage with *M*. In 1881 *A K* died intestate, and possession was taken of his estate by the Administrator-General. *S* claimed the estate from the Administrator-General. Her suit was dismissed on the ground that *A K* having died an outcaste and degraded, and his degradation not atoned for under Hindu law, no right of inheritance remained to her. Before judgment was delivered, *S* died, and the suit abated. In a suit filed by the Administrator-General to have the estate administered by the Court, the claimants were (i) the father of *A K*, (ii) the brother of *A K* undivided, from his father, and (iii) the executor of *M. Held*, that *S* was the wife of *A K* when he went through the form of marriage with *M*, and that, but for the fact that had relinquished her rights, *S* would have been entitled on the death of *A K* to such portion of his estate as the law assigned to her as his widow. *Held*, also, that under s. 35 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865, the father of *A K* was entitled to the whole of the estate. *ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF MADRAS v. ANANDACHARI*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 466

4. ———— **Survivorship—Succession Act, 1875—Effect of Act on estates of native Christians previously following Hindu law.** *A* and *J*, brothers, Native Christians, descendants of Brahmins, were living in co-parcenary and owned certain land on the date when the Indian Succession Act, 1865, came into force. In 1872 no partition having been made, *A* died. *Held*, that *J* did not take the whole estate on the death of *A* by survivorship. *TELLIS v. SALDANHA*

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 69

5. ———— **Native Christians—Change of religion—Law applicable to converts—Succession—Inheritance.** Where, in consequence of the conversion of a person from one form of religion to another, the question arises as to the law to be applied to such person, that question is to be determined not by ascertaining the law which was applicable to such person prior to the conversion, but by ascertaining the law or custom of the class to which such person attached himself after conversion and by which he preferred that his suc-

CONVERTS—*contd.*

cession should be governed. *LASTINGS v. GONSALVES* . . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 539

6. ——— *Hindus becoming Mahomedans—Succession of property.* Held, that the question as to succession of property between parties who, though originally Hindus, subsequently embraced the Mahomedan religion, and professed that religion for successive generations, must be disposed of under the Mahomedan law; and the plea of usage opposed to Mahomedan law must not be recognised. *SUEMUST KHAN v. KADIR DAD KHAN* 1 *Agra F. B.* 39 : Ed. 1874, 29

7. ——— A Hindu embracing the Mahomedan religion is bound by the Mahomedan law of inheritance. *SOJAN v. ROOP RAM* . . . 2 *Agra* 61

LALLA OUDH BEHAREE LALL v. MEWA KOONWAR 3 *Agra* 82

8. ——— *Converts from Hindu to Mahomedan religion—Custom as to inheritance.* The general presumption arising from the intimate connection between law and religion in the Mahomedan faith is that the Mahomedan law governs converts from the Hindu religion to Mahomedanism. But a well-established custom in the case of such converts to follow their old Hindu law of inheritance would override that general presumption, and a usage establishing a special rule of inheritance as regards a special kind of property would be given the force of law, even though it be at variance with both Hindu and Mahomedan laws. *MAHOMED SIDICK v. HAJI AHMED. ABDULLAH HAJI ABDSATAR v. HAJI AHMED* I. L. R. 10 Bom. 1

9. ——— *Suni Borah Mahomedans—Conversion, effect of—Hindu converts to Mahomedanism, custom and usage of—Inheritance among such converts—Native Christians—Law applied to Native Christians prior to Indian Succession Act (X of 1865)—Burden of proof.* The Suni Borah Mahomedan community of the Dhandhuka Taluka in Gujarat are governed by the Hindu law in matters of succession and inheritance. Held, therefore, that in this community a widow is entitled to succeed to her husband's estate to the exclusion of a daughter or a step-daughter. As to the law governing Hindu converts to Mahomedanism, the following principles may now be regarded as settled:—(i) Mahomedan law generally governs converts to that faith from Hinduism; but (ii) a well-established custom of such converts following the Hindu law of inheritance would override the general presumption. (iii) This custom should be confined strictly to cases of succession and inheritance. (iv) If any particular custom of succession be alleged which is at variance with the general law applicable to these communities, the burden of proof lies on the party alleging such special custom. If evidence is given as to the general prevalence of Hindu rules of succession in a Mahomedan community in preference to the rules of Mahomedan law, the burden of proof is discharged, and it then rests

CONVERTS—*contd.*

with the party disputing the particular Hindu usage in question to show that it is excluded from the sphere of the proved general usage of the community. Among native Christians, certain classes strictly retain the old Hindu usages, others retain these usages in a modified form, and others again wholly abandon them. Before the Indian Succession Act (X of 1865), the Christian convert could elect to attach himself to any one of these particular classes, and he would be governed by the usage of the class to which he so attached himself. *Abraham v. Abraham*, 9 *Moo. I. A.* 195. These same principles are applied to the case of Hindu converts to Mahomedanism, such as Khojas and Cutchi Memons. *BAI BAIZI v. BAI SANTOK*

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 53

10. ——— *Molesalam Girasias—Hindu converts to Mahomedanism—Retention of Hindu law and usages—Hindu law—Inheritance.* The Hindu law of inheritance and succession applies to Molesalam Girasias who were originally Rajput Hindus, but were subsequently converted to Mahomedanism. *FATESANGJI JASVATSANGJI v. KUVAR HARISANGJI FATESANGJI*

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 181

11. ——— *Hindus becoming Mahomedans—Hindu law—Joint Hindu family—Effect of conversion of member of joint Hindu family to Mahomedanism—Regulation VII of 1832, s. 9—Compromise—Title taken under compromise between persons having mutually exclusive claims.* In the year 1845 one Ratan Singh, who at that time formed with his son Daulat Singh a joint Hindu family, possessed as such of considerable property, both moveable and immoveable, became converted to Mahomedanism. In 1851 Ratan Singh died, his son Daulat Singh having predeceased him and such portion of the property as was situate in British India was taken over by the Court of Wards, and held by them apparently on behalf of Raj Kunwar, the widow of Ratan Singh, and Sen Kunwar, the widow of Daulat Singh (these two ladies being at that time detained in Lucknow under the supervision of the officials of the King of Oudh), without any recognition of either widow having a title superior to that of the other. In 1857 Sen Kunwar executed a bond for a considerable sum of money in favour of Jai Chand, the father-in-law of her daughter, Mewa Kunwar. Sen Kunwar died in 1857, and Raj Kunwar in 1858. After the death of these ladies, three claimants to the property appeared, namely, Chatar Kunwar and Mewa Kunwar, the daughters of Daulat Singh, and Khairati Lal, the son of a daughter of Ratan Singh who had predeceased her father. The matters in dispute between these claimants were settled by means of compromise, in virtue of which $8\frac{1}{2}$ annas of the property were assigned to the daughters of Daulat Singh and $7\frac{1}{2}$ annas to Khairati Lal, and in 1861 the partition of the property in accordance with the terms of the compromise was completed. In 1866 Chatar Kunwar died, and upon her death Mewa Kun-

CONVERTS—contd.

war successfully asserted her right by survivorship to the 4½ annas which had been the share of her sister, and thus became possessed of the whole 8½ annas assigned by the compromise mentioned above to the daughters of Daulat Singh. Meanwhile, however, Jai Chand had brought a suit upon the bond given to him in 1857 by Sen Kunwar. Why this bond was originally executed did not appear, nor that there was evidence of any such legal necessity pressing upon Sen Kunwar as would have supported an incumbrance of more than her own life-interest in the property. The final decree in this suit was obtained by Jai Chand in 1868, that is to say, after the surviving defendant, Mewa Kunwar, had been declared entitled to the entire 8½ annas share, and it was a decree based upon a confession of judgment by Mewa Kunwar. In satisfaction of this decree certain villages part of the said 8½ anna share, were made over to the decree-holder, some of which, in turn, were sold by him to various vendees. On suit by the sons of Mewa Kunwar to recover some of these villages on the ground that their mother had in them no more than a Hindu daughter's life estate, which had come to an end on her death in 1899, it was held, that Ratan Singh by his conversion to Mahomedanism became, according to Hindu law, civilly dead, and the whole of the property of the former joint Hindu family became vested in Daulat Singh in 1845, the provisions of s. 9 of Regulation VII of 1832 embodying merely a rule of procedure and not a rule of substantive law, and no suit claiming the family property having been brought by Daulat Singh to which the rule of procedure therein laid down could be applied; that in any case the conversion of Ratan Singh worked a separation of the joint Hindu family, and one half of the property became vested in Daulat Singh, though it might not have been actually partitioned; that the property so becoming vested in Daulat Singh would be held by him as a separated Hindu; that the property was held by the Court of Wards during the lives of Raj Kunwar and Sen Kunwar, not specifically for either of them, but for the benefit of the rightful owner, both ladies being incapable of managing their affairs; that, after the compromise arrived at between Chatar Kunwar and Mewa Kunwar on the one side and Khairati Lal on the other, the estate which Chatar Kunwar and Mewa Kunwar took was a Hindu daughter's estate merely, and not an absolute estate, and that inasmuch as no legal necessity was shown for the making of Sen Kunwar's bond or for the relinquishment by Mewa Kunwar of the villages which she made over to Jai Chand in satisfaction of his decree upon that bond, the estate taken by Jai Chand could not be more than that possessed by Mewa Kunwar, and on her death her sons were entitled to recover possession. *Abraham v. Abraham*, 9 Moo I. A. 199, 237, referred to. Held, also, that, although the findings in the case between Mewa Kunwar and her brother-in-law (N. W. P. H. C. Reps., 1868, p. 82) could not be held to be *res judicata* in the present appeal, the judgment in that case could be used as evidence to the extent pointed out in the case of

CONVERTS—concl.

Ram Ranjan Chukerbatty v. Ram Narain Singh; L. R. 22 I. A. 60; *Bitto Kunwar v. Kesho Pershad*, L. R. 24 I. A. 10; *the Collector of Gorakhpur v. Palakdhari Singh*, I. L. R. 12 All. 1, and *Dharnidhar v. Dhundiraj*, 5 Bom. L. R. 230. GOBIND KRISHNA NARAIN v. ABDUL QAYYUM (1903) I. L. R. 25 All. 546

12. ——— Forfeiture of property—*Omission to take property forfeited, effect of.—* *Quære*: Whether when a person becomes a convert and his property is under Hindu law forfeited to his son, the mere omission by the son to enter upon the property vested in him by the forfeiture, or otherwise assert his right to it, would re-vest it in the convert and make it descendible to his heirs. LALLA OUDH BEHAREE LALL v. MEWA KOONWAR

3 Agra 82

CONVEYANCE.

See EVIDENCE ACT.
I. L. R. 30 Bom. 911

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.
10 C. W. N. 345

See REGISTRAR OF HIGH COURT.
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 380

See REGISTRATION ACT, VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

See REVENUE SALE LAW, s. 33.
13 C. W. N. 518

See STAMP ACT, 1869, s. 3, ART. 11.
10 Bom. 354
8 Mad. 112

See STAMP ACT, 1869, SCH. I, ART. 15.
16 W. R. 208
I. L. R. 1 Mad. 133

See STAMP ACT, 1869, SCH. I, ART. 21.
I. L. R. 13 Calc. 43
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 432
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 283
I. L. R. 20 Mad. 27

See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 3, ART. 9.
I. L. R. 7 Mad. 350
I. L. R. 7 Calc. 21
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 422

See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 24.
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 675

See STAMP ACT (II OF 1899)—
s. 24 AND SCH. I, ART. 23.
I. L. R. 27 Bom. 150

SCH. I, ARTS. 55, 23 AND 62 (c).
I. L. R. 24 All. 372

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 54.
13 C. W. N. 692

——— return of, by Purchaser.

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—COMPLETION OF TRANSFER
I. L. R. 2 Bom. 547

Stamp Act (II of 1899),
Art. 23—Pressing factory—Partnership—Transfer

CONVEYANCE—concl'd.

of a share in consideration of a certain sum—
Document—Release—Conveyance on sale of property.
Where by a document, the executing party, pur-
porting to be entitled to a share in a going press-
ing factory, transfers absolutely the whole of that
share to the other persons interested in the factory
in consideration of a certain sum, the document is
a conveyance on sale of property. *HIRALAL NAVAL-
RAM, In the matter of* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 505

CONVICTION.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 106.
8 C. W. N. 517

See EVIDENCE ACT.
I. L. R. 28 Bom. 479

See PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATE.
I. L. R. 31 Calc. 983
8 C. W. N. 587, 589

See PREVIOUS CONVICTION.

— for several offences.

See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.

— legality of—

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASE—PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE.
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 288

— no bar to civil action—

See DAMAGES—SUITS FOR DAMAGES—
TORT . . . 6 C. W. N. 915

— on wrong charge—

See ERROR . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 481

— previous—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 403.
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 174

See SENTENCE—SENTENCE AFTER PREVIOUS
CONVICTION.

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—PRE-
VIOUS CONVICTIONS.
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 689

— setting aside, for error in law.

See ACCOMPLICE.

See JOINDER OF CHARGES.
5 C. W. N. 866

— setting aside, when accused does
not appeal—

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES.
5 C. W. N. 330

— validity of—

See EXCISE ACT, 1871.
I. L. R. 1 All. 630, 635, 638

— without framing charge—

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 63

CONVICTION—concl'd.

— without jurisdiction—

See MAGISTRATE—RE-TRIAL OF CASES.
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 412

1. — Conviction without evidence—
Illegal conviction. A conviction on no evidence is
wrong in point of law. *QUEEN v. CHAND BAGDEE*
7 W. R. Cr. 6

QUEEN v. POORNO CHUNDER DOSS.
8 W. R. Cr. 59

2. — Want of complaint and of
evidence—*Illegal conviction.* Where a Magis-
trate, acting merely on certain information con-
tained in a letter addressed to him, convicted a
person for obstruction and nuisance, the High
Court set aside the conviction on the ground
that there was no complaint and no evidence. *In*
the matter of RAM COOMAR . . . 10 C. L. R. 521

3. — Conviction on evidence
taken in absence of accused—*Illegal conviction.*
A conviction based upon evidence taken in
the absence of the accused is illegal. *ANONYMOUS*
3 Mad. Ap. 34

QUEEN v. RAJCOOMAR SINGH . 8 W. R. Cr. 17

QUEEN v. LALLA CHOWBEY . 2 N. W. 49

QUEEN v. RAMNATH . 7 W. R. Cr. 45

QUEEN v. HOSSEIN ALI CHOWDHRY
8 W. R. Cr. 74

4. — Conviction on statement of
complainant. A conviction on the statement of
a complainant is lawful. *KULUM MUNDUL v. BHO-
WANT PROSAD* . . . 22 W. R. Cr. 32

5. — Conviction on plea of guilty
without assessors—*Criminal Procedure Code*
(Act XXV of 1861), s. 362. A conviction of a
prisoner on a plea of guilty before a Court of Session
is valid, although there were no assessors. *QUEEN*
v. SRIKANT CHABAL . . . 2 B. L. R. F. B. 23
10 W. R. Cr. 43

6. — Conviction of deaf and dumb
person without attempt to make him under-
stand the charge—*Illegal conviction.* A deaf
and dumb prisoner was convicted of an offence.
Upon the trial, no attempt was made to commu-
nicate with the prisoner respecting the charge
against him. The High Court quashed the con-
viction. *ANONYMOUS* . . . 6 Mad. Ap. 7

7. — Conviction for one offence
under Penal Code and Act I of 1871—*Illegal*
conviction. A conviction under the Penal Code and
also under a special law as the Cattle Trespass Act
(I of 1871), in respect of one and the same offence, is
illegal. *QUEEN v. HOSSEIN ALI* . 5 N. W. 49

8. — Conviction under both ss. 471
and 474 of Penal Code—*Illegal conviction.*
Convictions of using forged documents (s. 471)
and of having them in possession with intent to use
them (s. 474 of the Penal Code) cannot stand
together. *QUEEN v. NUZUR ALI* . 6 N. W. 39

CONVICTION—contd.

9. ——— Conviction without jurisdiction—*Trial under Act I of 1849—Omission to record order giving jurisdiction.* Where a tindal of a small vessel had been convicted of criminal breach of trust which appeared to have been committed in the Portuguese possession of Goa, but no order giving himself jurisdiction was recorded by the Sessions Judge of Mangalore, who tried the case under s. 9 of Act I of 1849: *Held*, that the conviction was illegal, and that there ought to be a new trial. ANONYMOUS . . . 5 Mad. Ap. 13

10. ——— Order for imprisonment for future default—*Punishment for contingent failure to work—Act XIII of 1859, s. 2.* An order of a Magistrate passed under s. 2 of Act XIII of 1859, that the prisoner should work for a certain period, and, in case he failed to do so, should suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month, annulled as to the latter part, the Magistrate having no power to make that order until the failure had occurred and been proved before him. REG. v. JOMA BIN BALU . . . 4 Bom. Cr. 37

11. ——— Conviction of offence without specific charge—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 57—Conviction of minor charge on charge for graver offence.* When a person is charged with an offence consisting of parts, a combination of some only of which constitutes a complete minor offence, he may, under s. 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, be convicted of the latter without being specifically charged, but only when the graver charge gives notice of all the circumstances going to constitute the minor offence. Hence, where a man charged with murder was convicted of abetment of it, the High Court annulled the conviction and sentence, and ordered him to be retried on the latter charge. REG. v. CHAND NUR . . . 11 Bom. 240

See REG. v. RAMAJIRAV JIVBAJIRAV

12 Bom. 1

12. ——— Double conviction for same offence—*Illegal conviction.* F brought a charge of assault against M before a Bench of Magistrates, who, finding no evidence to show by whom complainant's arm had been broken, treated the case as one of simple hurt, and sentenced the accused accordingly. Complainant then applied for compensation to the District Magistrate, who instituted fresh proceedings, and convicted the accused of grievous hurt. *Held*, that, as the whole matter was one transaction and went as a whole before the Bench of Magistrates, and as the facts were deposed to by the same witnesses before the Magistrate, the two convictions could not stand side by side. The proceedings before the Bench of Magistrates were accordingly quashed. *In the matter of the petition of FAKKER MAHOMED* . . . 24 W. R. Cr. 46

13. ——— Alternative conviction—*Doubt as to which of several offences accused is guilty of.* Judgment in the alternative cannot be passed in cases in which it is doubtful whether the

CONVICTION—contd.

accused person is guilty of any one of the several offences charged, but where it is doubtful of which of those offences he is guilty, such an alternative conviction is illegal. QUEEN v. JAMURHA . . . 7 N. W. 137

14. ——— Conviction of one offence and acquittal on others where several are proved—*Cognate offences—Illegal conviction.* When more than one offence is proved, it is not proper to convict only of one and to acquit of the others, although the offences may be cognate. REG. v. MURAR TRIKAM . . . 5 Bom. Cr. 3

15. ——— Conviction on evidence taken before another Magistrate—*Illegal conviction.* When a prisoner is convicted by one Magistrate upon evidence previously recorded before another, the defect cannot be cured by the evidence being again recorded, and the conviction confirmed. QUEEN v. POORNO CHUNDER DOSS . . . 8 W. R. Cr. 59

And see QUEEN v. GOPI NOSHYO

21 W. R. Cr. 47

16. ——— Power to quash conviction. A lower Court has no power to quash its own conviction, though illegal. *In re GUNOWREE BHOOEA* . . . 6 W. R. Cr. 70

17. ——— Valid conviction in case improperly originated. Per MACLEAN, J.—The High Court may, without reference to the local Government, set aside a conviction on a trial improperly originated. *In the matter of the petition of NOBIN CHUNDRAN BANIKYIA.* EMPRESS v. NOBIN CHUNDRAN BANIKYIA . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 560 : 10 C. L. R. 369

18. ——— Ground for setting aside conviction—*Police Act V of 1861, s. 29—Offence under Penal Code.* That the facts proved would also constitute an offence under a section of the Penal Code seems to be no reason for quashing a conviction under the special law, Act V of 1861. QUEEN v. KASSIMUDDIN . . . 8 W. R. Cr. 55

19. ——— Subsequent Evidence. A valid conviction arrived at by a Magistrate who had jurisdiction in the matter cannot be set aside simply because, subsequent to the trial and conviction, fresh evidence has been discovered which may tend to convict the accused of an offence other than that for which he was convicted. QUEEN v. RAMDOYAL MAHARA . . . 21. W. R. Cr. 47

20. ——— Conviction under sanction obtained after trial—*Want of jurisdiction.* A conviction having been set aside as arrived at without jurisdiction, no sanction to the prosecution having been obtained from the Court against which the offence was committed, formal sanction was obtained, the accused re-arrested, and, without being called upon to plead, ordered to undergo the sentence previously passed. *Held*, that the whole of these proceedings were illegal. *In the matter of the petition of EDOO KHANSAMAH* . . . 24 W. R. Cr. 64

CONVICTION—contd.

21. *Irregular proceedings of Magistrate—Illegal conviction under Stamp Act.* Conviction and sentence for an offence under the Stamp Act (XXXVI of 1860, s. 26) reversed on reference by the Sessions Judge, as the proceedings of the Magistrate who tried the case were highly irregular. *REG. v. DEVSANVAT BIN SHIVRAM SANVAT* **3 Bom. Cr. 34**

22. *Irregular proceedings by Magistrate.* A conviction and sentence for criminal breach of trust as a public servant reversed, owing to irregularities in the preliminary enquiries and irregular procedure as to the examination of the prisoner in the Court of Session. *REG. v. DIAZ* **3 Bom. Cr. 51**

23. *Dispute between civil suitors—Improper prosecution—Illegal conviction.* As a general rule, one of two parties to an impending suit ought not to put the Criminal Law in motion as against the other in matters connected with the suit; or if he does so, the hearing of the criminal case ought to be postponed until the suit is concluded. But, although that is a good ground for questioning the propriety of a prosecution, it is not a ground for questioning the legality of a conviction. *QUEEN v. ACHEET LALL* **17 W. R. Cr. 46**

24. *Irregularity in criminal proceedings—Prejudging defence.* Upon the single charge of wrongful confinement preferred under s. 342 of the Penal Code, before a Joint Magistrate, the prisoners raised a defence justifying the confinement on the ground that the persons confined had been caught by them under circumstances which led to the belief that they had committed house-breaking by night with intent to commit theft. Enquiry having been made, the Magistrate committed the prisoner not only for wrongful confinement, but, disbelieving the defence, for fabricating false evidence and for bringing a false charge. The prisoners were tried by the Sessions Judge and found guilty on all three charges at one and the same time. *Held*, that the conviction on the last two charges was illegal, as by adding the additional charges the Magistrate had really prejudged the defence to the first charge. Where the Court, without having first heard the evidence for the prosecution, examines the witnesses for the defence, he commits an irregularity, but if the prisoners are not materially prejudiced thereby, the conviction will not be set aside. *In the matter of TURIB-ULLAH* **4 C. L. R. 338**

25. *Complaint originally made not believed—Conviction for a different offence—Prejudice.* Where the original complaint was with regard to an offence, which the Magistrate disbelieved at a later stage of the case, and he drew fresh charges of wrongful confinement and assault and convicted the accused on those charges notwithstanding their protest that they had not been given an opportunity of properly defending themselves, and the Sessions

CONVICTION—concl.

Judge on appeal disbelieved the case both as originally made and as made out by the Magistrate, and yet convicted the accused on a charge of assault: *Held*, that this was not a proper way of dealing with the case, and that the accused ought not to have been convicted of an offence which did not form the subject-matter of complaint, especially when all the other matters relating to the event were found to be false or not proved. *RAMESWAR SINGH v. JOGI SAHOO* (1900) . . . **5 C. W. N. 296**

26. *Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 290, 447—Public nuisance—Criminal trespass—Conviction on a charge which the accused was not called upon to meet.* When the accused was called upon to answer a charge under s. 447, Indian Penal Code, and was convicted under that section as also under s. 290, Indian Penal Code, and on appeal the Sessions Judge was of opinion that the conviction could not be maintained under s. 447, but that s. 290 was wide enough to cover the act: *Held*, that, as the accused was not called upon to meet the charge under s. 290, Indian Penal Code, and had no opportunity to give evidence in rebuttal thereof, the conviction could not stand. *In the matter of CHINIBAS PAL* (1901) . . . **5 C. W. N. 567**

27. *Conviction of an offence without specific charge.* If the accused are charged with an offence under s. 304 or with one under s. 325, they may be convicted of an offence under s. 322 of the Penal Code, though no charge under that section has been drawn up against them. But when they are charged with those offences alleged to have been committed by another person in the course of a riot, i.e., when they are charged under ss. 147, 304 and 325 combined with s. 149 of the Penal Code and the commission of the riot is disbelieved, they should not be convicted of the offence under s. 323 in respect of their individual acts with which they are not charged and which are not imputed to them in the Judge's charge to the Jury. *DASARATH MANDAL v. EMPEROR* (1907)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 325

COOCH BEHAR.

— Court of the Dewan Ahilkar of—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 229,

4 B. L. R. A. C. 134

13 W. R. 154

CO-OWNER.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT.

9 C. W. N. 32

See PARTITION . **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 961**

— adverse possession by—

See PARTITION . **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 961**

CO-PARCENERS.

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—JOINT PROPERTY AND SURVIVORSHIP.

1 Mad. 412
I. L. R. 3 Bom. 151
I. L. R. 4 Bom. 37
I. L. R. 3 Mad. 145
I. L. R. 7 Mad. 458
I. L. R. 18 Calc. 151
I. R. 17 I. A. 128

See HINDU LAW—JOINT FAMILY.

See HINDU LAW—WILL—POWER OF DISPOSITION—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 48
8 Mad. 6, 13 note

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—PRE-EMPTION—RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—CO-SHARERS.

See NATIVE CHRISTIAN.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 25

See PARTITION.

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 201; 330

— consent of—

See PARTITION—MODE OF EFFECTING PARTITION . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 514
5 W. R. 208

CO-PLAINTIFF.

See LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877).

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1065

CO-PRISONER.

— evidence of—

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS OF PRISONERS TRIED JOINTLY.

COPIES OF DOCUMENTS.

See COURT FEES ACT, 1870, SCH. I, ART. 8.
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 526

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—SECONDARY EVIDENCE—COPIES OF DOCUMENTS, ETC.

See STAMP ACT, 1862, s. 14.

4 Mad. Ap. 58

See STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. I, ART. 22.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 687
I. L. R. 19 All. 293

See STAMP ACT (II OF 1899), SCH. I, ART. 24 . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 522

— Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 162, 164—Right of accused to copies of statements recorded by Magistrate. An accused person under remand is not, before the commencement of the preliminary inquiry, entitled to be furnished with copies of statements made on oath by various persons and recorded by the Magistrate under ss. 162 and 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure. No such right is conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure and the question whether any person has a right to inspect a public document is outside the scope of the Evidence Act. Such statements may, however, be put to contradict the persons making

COPIES OF DOCUMENTS—concl'd.

them when called as witnesses and it will then form part of the record, of which the accused will be entitled to a copy after commitment. There is no general principle of common law which would entitle an accused person to copies of such documents. *Queen-Empress v. Arumugam*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 189, distinguished. *EMPEROR v. MUTHIA SWAMIYAR* (1907) . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 466

COPY OF COPY OF DOCUMENT.

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—SECONDARY EVIDENCE—COPIES OF DOCUMENTS . . . 7 B. L. R. 621

3 B. L. R. A. C. 54

15 W. R. 102

6 W. R. 80

5 Bom. A. C. 48

COPY OF DECREE.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ss. 12 AND 5.
7 C. W. N. 109

COPY OF DECREE OR JUDGMENT.

— deduction of time necessary for obtaining—

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 12 (1871, s. 13).

— necessity for—

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 177.

I. L. R. 1 All. 644

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 189

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 301

See MADRAS RENT RECOVERY ACT, s. 69.

8 Mad. 44

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 476

See REVIEW—FORM OF, AND PROCEDURE ON, APPLICATION.

I. L. R. 17 All. 213

COPYRIGHT.

See COPYRIGHT ACT.

1. — Infringement of copyright—Evidence. Where there is no original matter in the work, the strongest evidence of servile imitation and piracy must be afforded before an action for an infringement of copyright can be successful. *ROUSSAC v. THACKER & Co.* . 1 Hyde 9

2. — Annotated edition of an ancient religious work—Originality—Colourable imitation—Injunction—Damages—Account—Act XX of 1847, s. 12. The plaintiff, a bookseller, in 1884 brought out a new and annotated edition of a certain well-known Sanskrit work on religious observances, entitled "Vrtraj," having for that purpose obtained the assistance of Pundits who re-cast and re-arranged the work, introduced various passages from other old Sanskrit books on the same subject, and added foot-notes. In 1885 the plaintiff registered the copyright of this work. In 1886 the defendants printed and published an edition of the same work, the text of which

COPYRIGHT—*contd.*

was identical with that of the plaintiff's work, which moreover contained the same additional passages and the same foot-notes, at the same places with many slight differences. *Held*, that the plaintiff's work was such a new arrangement of old matter as to be an original work and entitled to protection, and that, as the defendants had not gone to independent sources for their material, but had pirated the plaintiff's work, they must be restrained by injunction. *Held*, also, that an account of the net profits made by the defendants by the sale of the plaintiff's book could be ordered, notwithstanding the provisions of s. 12 of Act XX of 1847, as the result of the account would be to give to the plaintiff what he could have claimed as damages under that section. *GANGAVISHNU SHRIKISONDAS v. MORESHVA BAPUJI HEGISHTE*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 358

3. ———— *Translation—Act XX of 1847—Act XXV of 1867.* A person who translates a book into another language is not thereby guilty of an infringement of copyright. *ABDURRUMAN v. MAHOMED SHIRAZI*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 586

4. ———— *Translations—Jurisdiction—Cause of action—Stat. 5 & 6 Vic., c. 45—Act XX of 1847, s. 8—Order for books sent from Bombay to Delhi—Registration of copyright—Notice of disputed proprietorship.* The plaintiffs were publishers in London. The defendant carried on a printing and publishing business at Delhi. Between the years 1869 and 1891, the defendant translated certain English works (e.g., Todhunter's Mensuration, Barnard Smith's Algebra, etc.), into the Urdu language for the use of native students, and sold and distributed copies of such translations in various parts of India. The plaintiffs alleged that they were the proprietors of the copyright in the said books, and they sued in Bombay for a declaration of their ownership, and that the said books printed and sold by the defendant were an infringement of the said copyright and for an injunction, etc. It appeared that in June 1894 the plaintiffs' agent, who was then in India, instructed the Bombay firm of S to order copies of the said translations from the defendant. A letter was accordingly sent by S to the defendant at Delhi requesting him to send the books to Bombay by value-payable post, which the defendant did, and he received payment for them from the post office at Delhi. The defendant pleaded (*inter alia*) that the High Court of Bombay had no jurisdiction, and he denied that he had infringed the plaintiffs' copyright. *Held*, that no part of the plaintiffs' cause of action arose in Bombay, and that the High Court of Bombay had no jurisdiction. The act of S in paying for and receiving the goods formed no part of the defendant's offence, which was completed when he posted the books at Delhi. The English Copyright Act (Stat. 5 & 6 Vic., c. 45) extends to all parts of India. Having regard to s. 15 of that Act, it is clear that a person who infringes copyright must be sued, if

COPYRIGHT—*contd.*

he offends in India, not only within the limits of that country, but also in that part of India in which the offence has been committed. See also s. 13 of the Indian Act XX of 1847. *Held*, also, that translations are not copies, and that the defendant, by translating the books, had not infringed the plaintiffs' copyright. The plaintiffs had registered themselves as the proprietors of the copyright of the books in question both in London and in India. The defendant had not given notice of his intention to dispute the plaintiffs' copyright as required by s. 8 of Act XX of 1847. *Held*, that the plaintiffs' copyright in the book had been established. *MAC-MILLAN v. SHAMSUL ULAMA M. ZAKA.*

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 557

5. ———— *Form of Registration—"Selection" of poems, copyright in—Infringement of copyright by publication of copy before registration—Assignments of copyright previous to registration—Limitation of suits for infringement of copyright—Stat. 5 & 6 Vic., c. 45.* The plaintiffs, the partners of a firm M & Co., were the proprietors registered under 5 & 6 Vic., c. 45, of the copyright of a selection of songs and poems, composed by numerous well-known authors, which was prepared by one P, and originally published in 1861. Since the original publication, the book ran through several editions, one of which was published in the year 1882. The book was registered under the provisions of the above statute on the 8th February 1889, the name of both the publisher and proprietor being entered in the register as M & Co., the firm's address being given, and the date of the first publication was entered as the 19th July 1861. The poems contained in the book were arranged by P, not in chronological order of their production, but in gradation of feeling and subject, and at the end of the book were given some notes, critical and explanatory. On the 15th January 1889 the defendant published, at Calcutta, a book containing the same selection of poems and songs as was contained in P's book. The arrangement, however, of the defendant's book differed from P's in that the poems of each author were placed together and in order of their composition. In one of the poems the defendant printed forty lines, which were contained in the work by the original author, but which were omitted by P, and in another poem one line. In many places there were differences of reading in the two books and in more of punctuation. In the defendant's book some of the titles to the poems, which had been assigned thereto by P and not by the original authors, appeared as well as good many of P's notes, some with acknowledgment and some without. With each poem the defendant gave a mass of notes, critical and explanatory, and he also prefixed to the poems of each author a biographical notice. The suit was instituted on the 27th February 1890, and the plaintiffs complained that the publication of defendant's book constituted a breach of their copyright, and prayed for the usual relief by way of injunction and damages. They contended that

COPYRIGHT—*contd.*

although the copyright in the works of the original authors had long lapsed, they were entitled to the copyright in the "selection" made by P. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that there could be no copyright in such a selection; that if any existed, the defendant's book did not infringe it; that the plaintiffs' book being registered as first published in 1861 and the infringement charged being in respect of the edition of 1882, and there being no evidence to show that the same selection was contained in the latter as in the former edition, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief prayed for; that the author of the plaintiffs' book being P, in whom the copyright would *prima facie* be, and the property being registered as in the plaintiffs' firm, the registry was bad, as the assignment of the copyright to the plaintiffs was not shown; that the registration was also bad, as the entry merely contained the name and address of the plaintiffs' firm, and not the individual names and addresses of the partners of the firm; that the publication of the defendant's book having been before the date of registration, the suit would not lie; and that the suit was barred by the special limitation provided by s. 26 of the Stat. 5 & 6 Vic., c. 45. *Held*, that such "a selection" could be the subject-matter of copyright, the true principle applicable to such cases being that one person is not at liberty to use or avail himself of the labour which another has been at for the purpose of producing his work, and so take away the result of the other's labour, or in other words his property. *Held*, further, that the defendant's book constituted a piracy of the plaintiffs' book, and had infringed their copyright, and that they were entitled to the relief they sought. *Held*, also, that in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it was reasonable to assume that successive issues of a book of this kind under the same name are substantially the same book; that it was unnecessary that the registry should show an assignment of the copyright by P to the plaintiffs: *Weldon v. Dicks*, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 247, followed; that the registration was not bad by reason of the names and addresses of the partners of the firm not being given: *Low v. Rouledge*, 33 L. J. Ch. 717, and *Weldon v. Dicks*, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 247, followed; that the title to copyright is complete before registration, which is only a condition precedent to the right to sue, and that the plaintiffs had not therefore lost their right of action by reason of the defendant's book being published before theirs was registered: *Tuck v. Priester*, L. R. 19 Q. B. D. 629, and *Gourband v. Wallace*, 25 W. R. 604: *All. W. N.* (1877) 130, followed; and that, assuming that the rule of limitation provided by s. 26 of the Statute was applicable in this country, the suit was not barred by limitation: *Hogg v. Scott*, L. R. 18 Eq. 444, followed. *MACMILLAN v. SURESH CHUNDER DEB.*

I. L. R. 17 Cal. 951

6. ——— Copyright of ornamental design—5 & 6 Vic., c. 100—24 & 25 Vic., c. 73. A registered proprietor of the copyright

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of an ornamental design within the United Kingdom, under 5 & 6 Vic., c. 100 (amended by 6 & 7 Vic., c. 65; 13 & 14 Vic., c. 104; and 21 & 22 Vic., c. 70) cannot sustain an action against any person who applies such design to articles, or who sells any articles to which such design has been applied in British Burma. *BAKER v. SUTHERLAND*

S B. L. R. 298: 16 W. R. 80

7. ——— Illustrations in catalogue—*Infringement—Portion of catalogue protected—Puffing Statements—Injunction.* The plaintiff is not prevented from suing to restrain the infringement of copyright in certain illustrations in his catalogue, by the fact that the copyright in some of the other illustrations in the same catalogue is vested in others. *Lamb v. Evans*, [1892] 3 Ch. 462, followed. It is no defence to an action to prevent infringement of copyright in a book, that the book contains inaccurate statements, where the statements are in the nature of puffing statements, unless a strong case of fraud on the public has been made out. *Macfarlane & Co. v. Oak Foundry Co.*, 10 C. of S. Cas. (Sc.) 801, referred to. *LAWRENCE v. BUSHNELL* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 35 Cal. 433
s.c. 12 C. W. N. 756

COPYRIGHT ACT (XX OF 1847).

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, Sch. II, ART. 40 (1871, CL. 11) . I. L. R. 3 Cal. 17

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—JURISDICTION—COPYRIGHT.

I. L. R. 6 Cal. 499

ss. 3 and 6—Order expunging entry under s. 6—*The Press and Registration of Books Act (XXV of 1867), s. 18—Catalogue of Books kept at Bombay—Jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court—Trial on affidavits—Copyright in British territory.* The High Court of Calcutta has jurisdiction to order the expunging of entries in the catalogue of books kept in Bombay under s. 18 of the Press and Registration of Books Act (XXV of 1867). *ISMAIL BIN SHAIK BADAL v. ALI BHOY SARAFALI* (1905) . . . 9 C. W. N. 591

ss. 6 and 14—"Person aggrieved"—*Summary proceedings—Infringement—The Press and Registration of Books Act (XXV of 1867), s. 18—Catalogue of Books kept at Bombay—Charter Act (24 and 25 Vict., cap. 104), s. 14—Letters Patent, s. 36—Jurisdiction of the High Court of Calcutta, Original Side—Evidence by affidavits.* On an application under s. 6 of the Indian Copyright Act of 1847 by the assignee of the copyright in certain books for an order that the entry registering the name of another person as proprietor of the copyright in the same books be expunged from the Catalogue of books kept at Bombay under Act XXV of 1867: *Held*, that s. 18 of Act XXV of 1867 did not oust the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Calcutta vested in it by s. 6 of the Indian Copyright Act of 1847, that the High Court of Calcutta as the direct successor of the Supreme

COPYRIGHT ACT (XX OF 1847)—concl'd.**ss. 6 and 14—concl'd.**

Court is invested with all its powers and functions, and that a Judge sitting on the Original Side under s. 14 of the Charter Act has jurisdiction to dispose of an application under s. 6 of the Indian Copyright Act of 1847 to expunge an entry from the Catalogue of Books kept at Bombay under Act XXV of 1867. *Held*, "the proprietor of a copyright is a person aggrieved" within the meaning of s. 6 of Act XX of 1847, when another person gets his name registered in a Catalogue of Books in fraud of the proprietor's rights. If a case of this sort is clear upon the merits, the Court is justified in disposing of it upon evidence by affidavit. *Held*, that an application under s. 6 of Act XX of 1847 is a "summary proceeding in respect of an infringement of copyright" within the meaning of s. 14 of the Act, and the omission to make an entry of the applicant's name as proprietor of the copyright in the Book of Registry at the office of the Secretary of the Home Department of India, before commencing proceedings, constitutes a bar to the application. *ABDOOLIA BHAY SARAFALLI v. ISMAIL BIN SHEIKH BADAL* (1905) **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 571** s. c. **10 C. W. N. 134**

s. 14—Act XXV of 1867—Law under s. 14 of Act XX of 1847 same as law in England—No copyright in published work, except where copyright registered and subsists. The law as settled in England is that in the case of a book which has been published, there is no right to sue for piracy, except where the copyright is registered and subsists under statutory provisions. Copinger on 'Copyright,' pp. 29 and 33 referred to. *Macklin v. Richardson* and *Gaubaud v. Wallace*, 7 *Ruling Cases* 66 at pp. 67, 70 and 128 respectively, referred to. The law is the same in India. The proviso to s. 14 of Act XX of 1847 has not effected any change in the law as stated above and does not protect copyright in published works when not registered under Act XX of 1847 or Act XXV of 1867. *Macmillan v. Suresh Chandra Deb*, **I. L. R. 17 Calc. 951**, distinguished. *SABAPATHI MUDALIAR v. SEETHARAMIAH* (1906) **I. L. R. 29 Mad. 292**

CORONER.

1. ——— Commitment—Coroner's Act (IV of 1871), ss. 24, 25, 26, 29—Prisoners Act (III of 1900), ss. 2, 11—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 213, 214, 477, 478, 213, sub-s. (2)—Coroner's Inquisition—Commitment to High Court Sessions—Jurisdiction of Presidency Magistrate to try or inquire—Acquittal or Discharge by Magistrate—Bill—Jurisdiction of the High Court. The Coroner has power to commit to the High Court; but a commitment by him does not oust the jurisdiction of the Presidency Magistrate, either to inquire into the case and to commit, or to try the case himself, when the offence is one triable by him. *Queen-Empress v. Mahomed Rajudin*, **I. L. R. 16 Bom. 159**, referred to. An

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inquisition drawn up by a Coroner has the effect of a valid commitment to the High Court in its Original Criminal Jurisdiction when the High Court accepts the inquisition and the High Court officers draw up charges in accordance with the same. Where, during inquiry by the Magistrate, bail has been allowed by him, and subsequently the Coroner, after the verdict of the jury, refuses bail and commits the accused to jail, the only Court which has power to grant bail is the High Court. Any order of acquittal or discharge made by the Magistrate will be operative, subject to the discretion of the High Court when subsequently considering the Coroner's inquisition. *EMPEROR v. JOGESSUR PARSII* (1903) **7 C. W. N. 889**

2. ——— Power of Coroner of Calcutta

—Power to commit to prison. The Coroner of Calcutta has no power to commit any person to prison pending an inquest. In cases where he has authority to commit, a commitment to the officers deputed to receive prisoners by the statute in force is valid, and it is not necessary that the commitment be directed to the Sheriff. *In re TAYLOR*

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 101

3. ——— Inquisition—Commitment—Presidency Magistrate, power of, to enquire into a case committed by Coroner—Discharge or acquittal by Presidency Magistrate, effect of—Bail—Coroner's Act (IV of 1871), ss. 24, 25, 26, 27, 29—Prisoners Act (III of 1900), s. 11—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 213, 214, 215, 477, 478, 498. An inquisition drawn up by the Coroner of Calcutta under the Coroner's Act against an accused person, although it may have the effect of a valid commitment upon which the High Court in the exercise of its Original Criminal Jurisdiction may act, has not that effect, until it has been accepted by the High Court, and the officers of the Crown have drawn up a charge in accordance with it. Such a commitment by the Coroner does not of itself oust the jurisdiction of a Presidency Magistrate to inquire into, commit or try the case; and until the High Court has accepted such commitment, any order of acquittal or discharge made by such Magistrate in the case will be operative subject to the discretion of the High Court whether it should take action upon the inquisition of the Coroner as an effective commitment. *Queen-Empress v. Mahomed Rajudin*, **I. L. R. 16 Bom. 159**, referred to. After a Coroner has drawn up an inquisition against a person and committed him to prison, the High Court alone is empowered to release such person on bail. *EMPEROR v. JOGESHWAR PASSI* (1904) **I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1**

CORONER'S ACT (IV OF 1871).

See CORONER.

s. 25.

See PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATE.
I. L. R. 16 Bom. 159

CORONER'S INQUEST.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 176,
PARA. 1 (1872, s. 135).

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 742

CORPORATION.

See CONTRACT ACT.

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 66

See MANDAMUS . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 466

See PRESIDENCY BANKS ACT (XI OF 1876)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 466

— interference of Court with—

See BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT,
1873, s. 42 . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 212

— principal officer of—

See PLAINT—VERIFICATION AND SIGNA-
TURE . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 60

L. R. 20 I. A. 139

5 C. W. N. 91

See WRITTEN STATEMENT.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 268

— restraining libel in resolution
of—

See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—PUBLIC
OFFICERS WITH STATUTORY POWERS.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 132

— suit against—

See PLAINT—FORM AND CONTENTS OF
PLAINT—DEFENDANTS.

2 B. L. R. S. N. 6

15 W. R. 534

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 286

— suit by—

See PLAINT—VERIFICATION AND SIGNA-
TURE . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 103

See PLAINT—FORM AND CONTENTS OF
PLAINT—PLAINTIFFS.

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 41

I. L. R. 20 All. 167

CORPSE.

See THEFT . I. L. R. 25 All. 129

CORPUS DELICTI.

See MURDER . 11 W. R. Cr. 20

I. L. R. 3 All. 383

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 635

See THEFT . 7 Mad. Ap. 19

CORROBORATION.

See CONVICTION . I. L. R. 27 Mad. 271

CO-SHARER.

Col.

1. GENERAL RIGHTS IN JOINT PRO-
PERTY 2588.

CO-SHARER—contd.

Col.

2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—

(a) CULTIVATION 2597.

(b) ERECTION OF BUILDINGS 2601.

(c) EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF
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(d) LEASES BY ONE CO-SHARER 2610.

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1901), s. 201 . I. L. R. 29 All. 158

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12 C. W. N. 478; 885

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DEBTOR . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 686

See CO-OWNER.

See CO-PARCENERS.

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—CO-SHARERS.

See DECREE—FORM OF DECREE—POSSES-
SION.

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JOINT FAMILY;

PARTITION—EFFECT OF PARTITION.

I. L. R. 24 All. 483

See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—POS-
SESSION OF JOINT PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 500

See JURISDICTION OF REVENUE COURT—
N.-W. PROVINCES RENT AND REVE-
NUE CASES.

See LAND REGISTRATION ACT, 1876.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 773

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—PRE-EMPTION—
RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—CO-SHARERS.

See ONUS OF PROOF—LIMITATION AND
ADVERSE POSSESSION.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 362

See PARTITION—RIGHT TO PARTITION—
GENERAL CASES . 3 B. L. R. Ap. 120

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 379

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 458

11 C. W. N. 397

12 C. W. N. 640

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See PRE-EMPTION . I. L. R. 30 All. 467

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CO-SHARER—*contd.*

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS—PARTITION . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 381

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—INVALID SALES—PURCHASER WITH KNOWLEDGE OF LIABILITY TO PARTITION.
I. L. R. 26 Bom. 519

— appeal in suit by co-sharer landlord for rent—

See APPEAL—ACTS—BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 153 . . . 7 C. W. N. 908

— dispossession by co-sharer landlord; limitation—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, SCH. III, ART. 3 . . . 5 C. W. N. 405

— in a mehal.

See CO-SHARERS—GENERAL RIGHTS IN JOINT PROPERTY.
I. L. R. 14 All. 273

— liability of—

CO-SHARER . . . 6 C. W. N. 903

— limitation of application by one of several co-sharers—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, SCH. III, ART. 6 . . . 5 C. W. N. 763

— right of, to measurement.

See MEASUREMENT OF LAND.

10 B. L. R. 397, 398 note, 401 note, and 403 note
I. L. R. 7 Calc. 69
20 W. R. 385
5 C. L. R. 132
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 86

— suit by, for rent—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 188.
6 C. W. N. 326

— suit by some of several co-sharers—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 188.

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—CASES WHICH MAGISTRATE CAN DECIDE AS TO POSSESSION.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 573
17 W. R. Cr. 9, 33
4 C. W. N. 426

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 313

See PRE-EMPTION . I. L. R. 23 All. 247

See RIGHT OF SUIT—CO-SHARERS.

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 611

— suit or application by one of several—

See BENGAL RENT ACT, 1869, s. 102.
15 B. L. R. 111

CO-SHARER—*contd.*

1. GENERAL RIGHTS IN JOINT PROPERTY.

1. ——— Right of co-sharers—*Tenants of co-sharers.* The right of a sharer in a joint estate is a right of common enjoyment of the lands and premises, together with the tenants of the co-sharers, in like manner as the co-sharers themselves would have it. *HULODHUR SEN v. GOOROO DAS ROY*
20 W. R. 126

2. ——— Occupation by co-sharers of separate portions of estate. The legal position of co-sharers in an estate occupying separate portions in it is that each possesses and holds, in respect of his several right, to enjoy that which is his own. If one holds a portion larger than his share, the inequality may be rectified by a partition, or if a dispute arise on a division of the annual profits, it may be adjusted in a suit for an account. *KALEE PERSHAD v. LUTAFUT HOSSEIN*
12 W. R. 418

3. ——— Use of property by co-sharers or tenants-in-common. A Court of Equity will not interfere where a tenant-in-common acts reasonably for the purpose of enjoying the property held in common in any way in which an owner can enjoy such property without injury to his co-parcener, but the case is different where there has been a direct infringement of a clear and distinct right. *GOPEE KISHEN GOSSAIN v. HEM CHUNDER GOSSAIN* . . . 13 W. R. 322

4. ——— Manager of Khoti-Tenure—Right of manager to abandon rights without consent of co-sharers. In the absence of evidence of custom rendering the act of one sharer in a khotship (which act involved the sacrifice of important rights) binding upon his co-sharers, a managing khot has, without the assent of his co-sharers, no power to give up rights which belong to them as well as himself. *COLLECTOR OF RATNAGIRI v. VYANKATRAV NARAYAN SURVE*
8 Bom. A. C. 1

5. ——— Sale by some co-sharers—Authority to sell—Debt due by all the co-sharers. The mere circumstance of the existence of a debt due from all the co-sharers is by no means of itself enough to confer authority on some of several co-sharers to dispose of the other share. *MAHOMED FAIZ ALI KHAN v. GUNGA RAM* . . . 1 Agra 112

6. ——— Collection of rent in various kinds for joint tenure—Sharer in *ijmali Julkur*. The sharer of an *ijmali julkur* is not debarred from collecting his separate *julkur jumma* if he legally can do so, simply because it suits the purpose of another sharer to receive, in lieu of such a *jumma*, a consolidated *chitti jumma*. *KASHER NATH DHUR v. GUDADHUR PAL* . . . 11 W. R. 374

7. ——— Consent to commutation of rent—Want of consent of all sharers. When a tenant applied for commutation of rent paid in kind, one of three lumberdars was held entitled to insist upon the adjudication on the amount of the rate as directed by law; and the consent of two other

CO-SHARER—contd.**1. GENERAL RIGHTS IN JOINT PROPERTY**
—contd.

lumberdars to accept a lower rate of rent cannot debar this right. *ROOPA v. SAHIB SINGH*

1 *Agra Rev. 58*

8. ——— Rights and limitation of rights of joint owners of property—*Alteration of incidents of property*. It is not competent for owners of property in this country, by any arrangement made in their own discretion, to alter the ordinary incidents of the property which they possess; a joint property, therefore, cannot be made impartible in perpetuity by any such arrangement, though the owners may, for sufficient consideration, bind themselves to forego their rights for a specified time and definite purpose by a contract which could be enforced against them personally. *RADHANATH MUKERJEE v. TARRUCKNATH MUKERJEE*

3 *C. W. N. 126*

9. ——— Separate payment of share of rent. A co-sharer in an under-tenure cannot claim separate payment of his share of the rent without the written consent of the zamindar; and if the zamindar refuses to make a division of the property, application should be made to the Collector under s. 27, Act X of 1859. *ISSUR CHUNDER GHOSAL v. MOOKTORAM PANDA*

9 *W. R. 606*

10. ——— Receipts of rent by co-sharers—*Accounts—Limitation*. Where persons jointly interested in an estate arranged that the rents should be received by an agent, and they themselves sometimes collected direct from the tenants, such collection being treated as a receipt by the agent or by some one on his behalf, and not as a collection antagonistic to the rights of the other joint tenants, the law of limitation is no bar to taking the back accounts. Where one tenant-in-common receives rents and then relinquishes his interest in the estate to another, that other is not answerable to the third tenant-in-common for any claim he may have against the first for having received more than his share. *KHAJURUNNISSA v. AHMED REZA. AHMED REZA v. KHAJURUNNISSA*

8 *B. L. R. 93: 16 W. R. P. C. 1*

11. ——— Right of one co-sharer to receive rent—*Irregular appointment of lumberdar by Collector—Right of tenant to pay his entire rent to individual co-sharer and of co-sharer to receive it—N. W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 65—Custom*. Held, that where the Collector of a district appointed by order one of two co-sharers in a mehal to be lumberdar and directed the tenants to pay rent to her, no lumberdar having been appointed at the settlement of the mehal or at any time by agreement between the co-sharers, such appointment by the Collector did not empower the lumberdar, so appointed, to collect the rents of the tenants. Held, also, that, in the absence of either an arrangement recorded at the settlement under s. 65 of Act XIX of 1873 or a local custom or special contract, one of several co-sharers in a mehal

CO-SHARER—contd.**1. GENERAL RIGHTS IN JOINT PROPERTY**
—contd.

could not be taken to have a general right to receive the whole of the rent payable by a tenant in the mehal. *PARBATI v. NIADAR*

1 *I. L. R. 18 All. 129*

12. ——— Co-sharer acting as manager—*Remuneration*. A volunteer who acts as manager cannot claim remuneration from his co-sharers without showing a previous consent on their part to pay him. *GUNDO ANANDRAYETAL v. KRISTNARAV GOVIND*

4 *Bom. A. C. 55*

13. ——— Measurement of land, right to—*Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 38—Fractional proprietor—Parties*. A part proprietor of an estate is competent, under s. 38 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, to apply for measurement of its lands after making the remaining proprietors parties to the proceedings. *ABDOOL HOSSEIN v. LALL CHAND MAHTON*

1 *I. L. R. 10 Cal. 36: 13 C. L. R. 323*

14. ——— Liability for repairs of tank by zamindar—*Joint and several liability—Proportionate liability*. A zamindar had expended certain sums at the defendants' request to repair a tank for the irrigation of lands held by them in common with him. In a suit brought to recover the sums so expended, it was contended that the receiver could only sue the defendants severally for their proportionate shares of the sum claimed. Held, that the defendants were jointly and severally liable for the sum sued for. *SUNDARAM v. SANKARA*

1 *I. L. R. 9 Mad. 334*

15. ——— Purchaser of rights of one of several co-sharers—*Collections of rent*. A party who purchases the rights of one of a number of co-sharers comes into all arrangements made in respect to the collections; any express consent by him is not necessary for the payment of his share of the rent to any one else. *RAM NATH SINGH v. GONDEE SINGH*

10 *W. R. 441*

16. ——— Purchaser of a share in a joint tenure—*Severance of tenure by sale of share—Appointment of rent—Parties*. A sale of a share in a tenure, let out to a tenant in its entirety, does not of itself necessarily effect a severance of the tenure or an apportionment of the rent; but if a purchaser of the share desires to have such a severance, he is entitled to enforce it. If he takes no steps for that purpose, then the tenant is justified in paying the entire rent to all the parties jointly entitled to it. But if the purchaser desires to effect a severance of the tenure and an apportionment of the rent, he must give the tenant due notice to that effect, and then if the parties cannot agree to an apportionment, the purchaser may sue the tenant for the purpose of having the rent apportioned, making all the other co-sharers parties to the suit. It is impossible upon principle to distinguish cases where a tenure is sold privately from those where it is sold by public auction, or, on the other hand, to distinguish cases where a tenure is severed by different

CO-SHARER—*contd.*I. GENERAL RIGHTS IN JOINT PROPERTY
—*contd.*

portions of its area being sold to different persons from those where it is sold to different persons in undivided shares. In all such cases the entirety of the joint interest should be considered as severable at the option of the purchaser. *ISHWAR CHUNDER DUTT v. RAM KRISHNA DASS*
I. L. R. 5 Calc. 902 : 6 C. L. R. 421

17. ———— *Payment of arrears of revenue by one co-sharer—Charge on share of estate in hands of a purchaser.* B, the owner of a fractional share in a joint mehal, mortgaged her share to A. A obtained a decree on her mortgage, and attached B's share in the estate, and afterwards purchased the same at the execution-sale. Whilst her share was under attachment, B stopped paying the Government revenue, whereupon the plaintiff, a co-sharer in the estate, paid the whole revenue in order to save the mehal from sale. In a suit brought against A and B for recovery of the sum paid by the plaintiff on behalf of B's share:—*Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to have the sum so paid declared to be a charge upon the share of B, which had been transferred to A, but not to a personal decree against A. *ENAYET HOSSEIN v. MUDDUN MONEE SHAHOON*

14 B. L. R. 155 : 22 W. R. 411

See also *RAM DUTT SINGH v. HORAKH NARAIN SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 549

MATHOORA NATH CHATTOPADHYA v. KRISTO KUMAR GHOSE . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 369
and *KRISTO MOHINEE DOSSEE v. KALI PROSONNO GHOSE* . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 402

where, however, it was not necessary to decide the point, and no decision on it was given, but the Court expressed an opinion contrary to that held in *Enayet Hossein v. Muddun Monee Shahoon*, 14 B. L. R. 155, and in *Ram Dutt Singh v. Horakh Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 549.

See also *HURRI MOHUN BAGCHI v. GRISH CHUNDER BANDOPADHYA* . . . 1 C. L. R. 152

DEO NUNDUN AGHA v. DESPUTTY SINGH
8 C. L. R. 210 note

18. ———— *Payment of arrears of Government Revenue by one co-sharer, effect of—Charge—Lien—Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), ss. 93, 177, 178, 181—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), ss. 146, 148—Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Salvage, Maritime Civil, principle of—Act IV of 1882 (Transfer of Property Act), s. 100.* A co-sharer in a mehal, who was also the lumberdar, paid arrears of Government revenue for the years 1882, 1883, and part of 1884, in respect of certain lands in the mehal which were the exclusive property of another co-sharer. These lands were subject to simple mortgages executed in 1873, upon which decrees were obtained in 1884, and had been sold in execution of these decrees in 1887. The co-sharer lumberdar, having obtained a decree in a Court of revenue against the mortgagors under

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s. 93 (g) of the N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881) for recovery of the arrears of revenue paid by him, sought to execute that decree under s. 177 of the Act by sale of the lands which had been sold in 1887; and thereupon the auction-purchaser at that sale objected under s. 178, and the objection having been overruled, brought a suit, as authorized by s. 181, in a Civil Court to establish his title to the lands and to have them protected from sale in execution of the Court of Revenue decree. This suit was decreed, and the decree, not having been appealed against, became final. Subsequently, the co-sharer lumberdar brought a suit in the Civil Court, in which he claimed a decree for enforcement of lien by sale of the land for the amount of the Court of Revenue decree, and for a declaration that the said lien, "which is on account of Government," be declared preferential to the mortgages of 1873, the decrees thereon of 1884, and the sales under those decrees of 1887. He claimed this lien not only in respect of the arrears of Government revenue paid, but also in respect of future interest. *Held* by the Full Bench (*MAHMOOD, J.*, dissenting).—(i) That the Legislature had not given or recognized in the North-Western Provinces any such right of charge or lien in favour of a person paying Government revenue as was claimed here, or provided any means by which such a charge could be enforced, and that any such charge would be at variance with the policy and intention of the Government as disclosed in its legislative enactments. (ii) That no Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and no Court of revenue had jurisdiction to make a decree for sale of the immoveable property or a decree in execution of which the immoveable property could be sold to the prejudice of incumbrances to which it was subject. (iii) That it was not the intention of the Legislature that a Civil Court should have jurisdiction to invest, by declaration or otherwise, a decree of a Court of revenue with the attributes of a decree for sale such as could be passed by a Civil Court in a suit for sale under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (iv) That there is no general principle of equity to the effect that whoever having an interest in an estate makes a payment in order to save the estate obtains a charge on the estate; and therefore, in the absence of a statutory enactment, a co-sharer who paid the whole revenue and thus saved the estate does not, by reason of such payment, acquire a charge on the share of his defaulting co-sharer. *Kinnu Ram Das v. Mozaffer Hosain Shaha*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 809, approved. (v) That the principle of Maritime Civil Salvage had no application to the case, and that no analogy could exist between the case of a salvor in Maritime Civil Salvage and the case of a co-sharer in a mehal to whom s. 146 or s. 148 of the North-Western Provinces Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873) applied. *Leslie v. French*, L. R. 23 Ch. D. 552, and *Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Company*, L. R. 34 Ch. D. 34, referred to. *SETH CHITOR MAL v. SHIB LAL*
I. L. R. 14 All. 273

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—contd.

19. ——— **Payment of revenue by one co-sharer—Payment to stay sale.** Where a co-sharer of a portion of a talukh is compelled to pay a quota of the Government revenue due on account of a share not his own in order to save the portion of the talukh from being sold, he is entitled to a charge upon such share for the money so paid, and such share should be charged even when it has passed subsequently into the hands of a third party. *Enayet Hossein v. Muddun Monee Shahoon*, 14 B. L. R. 155 : s.c. 22 W. R. 411, followed. *NOBIN CHUNDER ROY v. RUP LALL DAS*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 377

20. ——— **Payment of arrears of revenue by one co-sharer, effect of—Charge—Act XI of 1859, s. 9, construction of—Lien.** *Held* (MITTER and NORRIS, JJ., dissenting), that there is no general rule of equity to the effect that whoever having an interest in an estate makes a payment in order to save the estate obtains a charge on the estate, and therefore, in the absence of a statutory enactment, a co-sharer who has paid the whole revenue and thus saved the estate does not by reason of such payment acquire a charge on the share of his defaulting co-sharer. *Enayet Hossein v. Muddun Monee Shahoon*, 14 B. L. R. 155, overruled. *Nogendra Chunder Ghose v. Kamini Dassi*, 11 Moo. I. A. 258, explained and distinguished. *Kristo Mohini Dasi v. Kaliprosono Ghose*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 402, approved. *In re Leslie*, L. R. 23 Ch. D. 552, relied on. *KINU RAM DAS v. MOZAFFER HOSAIN SHAHA*. *KINU RAM DAS v. HAJJATULLA SHAHA*. *KINU RAM DAS v. KAMARUDDIN SHAHA*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 809

See KHUB LALL SHAHU v. PUDMANUND SINGH
I. L. R. 15 Calc. 542

21. ——— **Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 174—Payment of decretal amount by one co-sharer to set aside sale for arrears of rent, effect of—Lien or charge on property.** Where the plaintiffs and defendants were co-tenants of certain jotes which were sold by auction in execution of a decree for rent, and the plaintiffs, by paying the decretal amount and auction-purchaser's fees under s. 174, Bengal Tenancy Act, had the sale set aside :—*Held*, that the plaintiffs did not, by such payment, acquire a charge on the shares of their defaulting co-tenants. *Kinu Ram Das v. Mozaffer Hosain Shaha*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 809, followed. *GOPI NATH BAGDI v. ISHUR CHUNDRA BAGDI*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 800

22. ——— **Limitation—Limitation Act, 1877, Arts. 99 and 132—Suit to recover assessment paid by a co-owner of property from other co-owners.** In 1868, the uncle of the plaintiff brought a suit (No. 176 of 1868) against five members of the undivided family to which the defendants in the present suit belonged, and obtained a money-decree. In execution of that decree, he attached and sold

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—contd.

certain land in which all the members of the defendants' family were interested. At the sale he purchased the land himself and was put into possession. In 1873 he began to pay the assessment upon the whole property. Subsequent litigation took place between him and the defendants' family, pending which the plaintiff separated from his uncle and obtained the property in question as his share. The result of that litigation was a decree by the High Court, on the 23rd September 1879, declaring that the plaintiff's uncle was only entitled to the interest of the five members of the family who had been defendants in his suit (No. 176 of 1868) in execution of the decree in which the property had been sold. The plaintiff brought the present suit in 1883 against the other members of the family to recover their proportionate share of the assessment for the years 1875—1878, during which period he had paid the whole assessment. He prayed for a sale of their interest in the land. Both the lower Courts held that the payment of assessment did not create a charge on the property, and that the plaintiff having omitted to sue within three years from the date of the payment made by him, the present suit was barred. On appeal by the plaintiff to the High Court :—*Held*, confirming the lower Court's decree, that the suit was barred. The plaintiff paid the assessment as full owner of the property, and it was entirely by his own action that the defendants had been excluded from the property and did not pay their quotas of the assessment. Under those circumstances, the payments could be regarded as salvage payments so as to make them a charge, according to equity, justice, and good conscience upon the shares of the other co-owners. *ACHUT RAMCHANDRA PAL v. HARI KANTI* . . . **I. L. R. 11 Bom. 313**

23. ——— **Joint ownership—Use of joint property as between co-owners—Rights amongst themselves of co-sharers of joint property where there is a profitable use by one of them without others being excluded—Ferry worked by one of the co-owners of land.** Property does not cease to be joint merely because it is used so as to produce more profit to one of the joint owners, who has incurred expenditure for that purpose, than to the others, where the latter are not excluded. Joint property being used consistently with the continuance of the joint ownership and possession, without exclusion of the co-sharers who do not join in the work, there is no encroachment on the rights of any of them, as regards common enjoyment, so as to give ground for a suit. The defendant, a co-sharer in village lands, without claiming to restrain competition, acted upon the right that a ferry may be established in India by a person on his own property taking toll from strangers, and that he may acquire such a right, by grant or user, over the property of others, whether a co-sharer with them or not. He used property that he owned jointly with the plaintiffs, his co-sharers, excluding none of them. As no

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—contd.

grant was ever made to him, he could only have set up an exclusive right by showing that he had either dispossessed them, or had had adverse possession for twelve years, or that he had used the ferry for twelve years as of right. The question, however, of any exclusive right in the defendant had not arisen. For the parties being co-owners, the defendant had made use of the joint property in a way quite consistent with the continuance of the joint ownership and joint possession. *Watson & Co. v. Ramchand Dutt*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 10 : L. R. 17 I. A. 110, distinguished in regard to the exclusion of co-sharers which there took place, and referred to as to caution to be exercised by Courts in interfering with the enjoyment of joint estates as between their co-owners. *LACHMESWAR SINGH v. MANOWAR HOS-SAIN* . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 253
L. R. 19 I. A. 48

24. ———— *Joint Possession, suit for—Effect of purchase of a right of occupancy, not transferable by custom, by a co-sharer landlord without the consent of the other co-sharers—Abandonment—Right to partition.* In a suit to recover joint possession of an occupancy holding in respect of his share by a co-sharer landlord on the ground that the defendant acquired no title by the purchase of the said holding, as it was not transferable by custom, and that there was an abandonment of the holding by the former tenant, the defence (*inter alia*) was that the plaintiff was not entitled to joint possession, and that he could not get any relief except by bringing a suit for partition, inasmuch as they (the plaintiff and the defendants) were joint proprietors. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief claimed, and that the claim for joint possession without partition was maintainable. *Watson & Co. v. Ram Chand Dutt*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 10 : L. R. 17 I. A. 110, and *Lachmeswar Singh v. Manowar Hossain*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 253 : L. R. 19 I. A. 48, distinguished. *DILBAR SARDAR v. HOSEIN ALI BEPARI* . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 553

25. ———— *Right to joint possession—Evidence—Costs.* One of two co-sharers by ancestral title in the under-proprietary right in certain villages obtained in 1870 decrees against the talukhdar for sub-settlement and getting possession had his name entered in the khewat. The other co-sharer remained entitled to claim that this possession was held partly for him. The present suit was brought upon two agreements, purporting to have been made in 1870, between the two co-sharers, while proceedings to obtain the above decrees were pending, to the effect that, whereas both had claims against the talukhdar, one only was to sue him, the other paying half of the costs and being entitled to receive half of what might be decreed. The Judicial Committee, upon the evidence, concluded that the Appellate Court, attributing too much to certain omissions and acts on the plaintiff's part, which were more or less explained, had erred in

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reversing the decree of the first Court, which maintained the agreements depriving the plaintiff of his costs in that Court only. *MUHAMMAD YUSUF v. MUHAMMAD HUSAIN* . . . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 62

26. ———— *Fractional share-holders in joint undivided estate—Lien on tenure for share of rent—Sale of tenure in satisfaction of decree.* The owner of a fractional share in a joint undivided estate has no lien on the tenure itself for his share of the rent, although such share is collected separately, and, therefore, cannot cause the tenure to be sold in satisfaction of a decree for his share of the rent. *BHABA NATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. DURGA PROSUNNO GHOSE* . . . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 326

27. ———— *Right to quarry—Lessee under a co-sharer—Right of Co-sharer—Suit by other owner—Liability to account.* B took a lease of a hill from certain co-sharers of an estate and worked a quarry. A, the other co-sharer, brought a suit against B claiming an account of all the stones quarried and carried away by him. *Held*, that inasmuch as there was an actual ouster or destruction of the common property by working a quarry, which was the proper and legitimate use of the hill, A was not entitled to an account in the absence of any proof that B had received more than his just share. *Job v. Polton*, L. R. 20 Eq. 84, distinguished. *MAHESH NARAIN v. NOWBAT PAT-HAK* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 837

28. ———— *Rent—Right of one co-sharer to sue for the whole rent making defendants his co-sharers, who refuse to join in the suit as plaintiffs—Right to bring whole tenure to sale—Agreement to pay rent to co-sharers separately, effect of—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 65, 152, 188.* By the express terms of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) in the event of rent being unpaid, the owners of the zemindari interest are entitled by suit under that Act to bring a patni to sale with the consequences prescribed by the Act. And it is a general rule—a rule not derived from the Bengal Tenancy Act, but from the general principles of legal procedure, that a sharer, whose co-sharers refuse to join him as plaintiffs, can bring them into the suit as defendants and sue for the whole rent of the tenure. S. 188 of the Act does not preclude such a suit; the filing of a suit not being a thing, which the landlord is, under the Act "required or authorized to do," but an application to the Court against an alleged grievance which the plaintiff is entitled to submit, not by reason of any provision in the Tenancy Act, but under the general law. Although an agreement expressly proved or implied by the conduct of the parties, for the payment of rent to co-sharer landlords separately, may establish the right to sue separately for the shares of rent receivable by the separate shareholders, yet such an agreement merely affects the right to sue separately for rent and in no other respect modifies the terms of the

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holding. The right, therefore, to bring the tenure to sale for arrears of rent remains intact, and also the right of one co-sharer to sue making his co-sharers defendants, when they refuse to join as plaintiffs. *PRAMADA NATH ROY v. RAMANI KANTA ROY* (1907) I. L. R. 35 Calc. 331 s.c. I. L. R. 35 I. A. 73 12 C. W. N. 249

2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY.**(a) CULTIVATION.**

1. ———— **Altering property without consent of co-sharers—Growing Indigo.** Several persons jointly held lands which were not divided by metes and bounds, but in specified shares. One of the shareholders leased out his share or interest in the lands. The lessee sowed indigo on the joint lands. The other shareholders brought a suit to restrain the lessee of their co-sharer from growing indigo on the land. *Held*, that a co-sharer cannot use ijmali lands so as to alter the condition of the property as regards the other shareholders without their consent; that indigo as a crop being valueless for purposes of distraint, the lessee must be restrained from growing it without the consent of all the proprietors. *CROWDER v. BHEKDHARI SINGH* 8 B. L. R. Ap. 45: 16 W. R. 41

HUNOOMAN SINGH v. CROWDIE . 23 W. R. 428
where, however, it was found consent had been given.

2. ———— **Cultivation by one co-sharer—Right to profits—Acquiescence.** Where one of two co-owners of land, who are not joint, cultivates the land with the acquiescence of the other who stands by and offers no objection, the latter cannot claim a share of the profits, but only his proper share of rent. *RAJKISHEN MOOKERJEE v. PEAREE MOHUN MOOKERJEE* . 20 W. R. 342

3. ———— **Cultivation of Indigo by one co-sharer without consent of others—Injunction as between co-sharers—Practice of the English Courts in granting injunction, applicability of.** *W*, while in possession of an entire mouzah as ijaradar, had under an arrangement with the proprietors built factories and cultivated indigo by reclaiming a quantity of waste land. On the expiration of his lease, *W*, who still held a portion of the mouzah in ijara from a 2-anna co-sharer, continued to cultivate indigo on the khas lands as before, and, disregarding the opposition of the 14-anna co-sharers, claimed an exclusive title to do so. The 14-anna co-sharers thereupon brought a suit against *W* for ijmali possession of the khas lands, and prayed, among other things, for an injunction prohibiting the defendant from sowing indigo upon the ijmali lands without the plaintiffs' consent, and also for a general injunction to prohibit the defendant from throwing any obstacles in the way

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of plaintiffs holding ijmali possession of the lands. The Court below granted an injunction prohibiting the defendant from growing indigo on the khas lands without the consent of the plaintiffs. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction; but having regard to the circumstances under which the defendant cultivated the lands, it was necessary to vary the injunction granted by the Court below by making it an injunction restraining the defendant from excluding by any means the plaintiffs from their enjoyment of the ijmali possession of the lands. *RAM CHAND DUTT v. WATSON & CO.* I. L. R. 15 Calc. 214

But *held* on appeal to the Privy Council (reversing the above decision), that the resistance being made by the co-sharer in occupation simply with the object of protecting himself in the profitable use of the land, in good husbandry, and not in denial of the other's title, such resistance was no ground for proceedings on the part of the other to obtain a decree for joint possession or for damages; nor would granting an injunction be the proper remedy. As the Courts in Bengal, in cases where no specific rule exists, are to act according to "justice, equity, and good conscience," so, on its being found that where land was held in common between the parties, one of them was in the act of cultivating a part of the land which was not actually used by the other, it would not have been consistent with this rule to restrain the former from proceeding with his proper cultivation; but money compensation, at a proper rate, in respect of the exclusive use by, and benefit to, the one who, though possessing in common, was carrying on cultivation for himself, not unsuitable in itself, was awarded between the parties. *WATSON & CO. v. RAMCHAND DUTT* I. L. R. 18 Calc. 10 I. R. 17 I. A. 110

4. ———— **Willingness to pay rent.** One shareholder alone in a joint estate or his assignee cannot claim to cultivate any portion of the property which is not his zeraif, and without the consent of the other sharers, merely on the ground that he is willing to pay a reasonable rent for it. *NUNDUN LALL v. LLOYD* . 22 W. R. 74

5. ———— **Lease for cultivation given by one co-sharer—Indigo cultivation—Landlord and tenant—Joint property—Estoppel.** *A* and *B* were joint owners of a certain piece of land. In the year 1874, *A* leased his share to the defendant for a term ending in October 1880 for the purpose of growing indigo. At the same time, *B* leased his share to the defendant for the same purpose for a term ending in October 1881. *A* and *B* sold their shares to the plaintiff in the year 1879. In January 1881, plaintiff sued to prevent the defendant from growing indigo on the land and for khas possession on the ground that the lease of *A*'s share having expired, the defendant was not entitled to

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contd.****(a) CULTIVATION—contd.**

retain the land for the purpose of growing indigo under the lease given by B. *Held*, that the plaintiff having by his own act become the owner of both shares, he could not, as owner of one share, exercise a right which he was precluded from exercising as owner of the other share, and that the suit should have been dismissed. *HOLLOWAY v. MUDDUN MOHUN LALL*.

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 446: 10 C. L. R. 381

6. ——— **Waste lands common to all sharers—*Enjoyment and use by one co-sharer.*** An individual sharer cannot, without the consent, express or implied, of other co-sharers, make use of waste land common to the whole village in such a way as to exclude permanently other co-sharers from all use or enjoyment of it. The law of joint property entitles another co-sharer to interfere and obtain restoration of the land to its former condition. *DOULAT RAM v. TARA* . . . **1 Agra 12**

DIRGAPAL RAI v. BHONDO RAI . . . **2 Agra 341**

7. ——— **Co-sharer as tenant cultivating land separately.** Proprietors are not entitled to oust their co-proprietors from lands which the latter have as tenants brought into cultivation. *PRAN KISHORE GOSSAMI v. DINO-BUNDHOO CHATTERJEE* . . . **9 W. R. 291**

8. ——— **Exclusive possession and cultivation of land by one co-sharer—*Restraining cultivation of indigo—Damages.*** Where a suit was brought to recover possession of certain lands in which plaintiff and defendant were co-sharers, and to secure damages for the exclusive possession which defendant had enjoyed for some years, and to obtain an injunction against defendant to prevent him from cultivating indigo on the land in suit without the consent of the plaintiff:—*Held*, that, though a suit for partition is the best means of settling difficulties between co-sharers who will not agree, every co-sharer in an estate is entitled to joint possession with every other co-sharer, and has a right to prevent any one not having a right of occupancy from cultivating any portion of the land contrary to his or their wishes, and is also entitled to damages for any exclusive possession which can be shown to have been enjoyed. *Held*, also, that it would be an ineffectual way of enforcing plaintiff's right in this case to allow the adverse possession of the defendant and to let plaintiff recover damages from time to time. *LLOYD v. SOGRA* **25 W. R. 313**

9. ——— ***Mesne profits, right to, of co-sharer kept out of joint possession.*** Where a five-anna shareholder in an estate sought to be put in joint possession of it with the representative of the owners of the remaining eleven annas, and the latter contended that he had for many years held the entire land in suit and cultiva-

CO-SHARER—contd.**2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—
contd.****(a) CULTIVATION—contd.**

ted indigo on it, and that plaintiff's right in the said land was confined to the receipt of rent for it:—*Held*, that plaintiff was entitled to joint possession and management of the land, that defendant could not cultivate indigo on it without the consent of the plaintiff, and that the consent said to have been given to the defendant by the other co-sharers could not bind plaintiff. *Held*, also, that plaintiff was entitled to mesne profits with interest. *DEBEE PERSHAD SAHOO v. GUGADHUR PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH* **25 W. R. 374**

10. ——— **Cultivation of sir land on partition—*Reference to arbitration—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 125.*** When the co-sharers of a mehal agree to have such mehal partitioned by an arbitrator, they must be understood to agree to the arrangements made by such arbitrator, and if he provides by his award that the sir land of one co-sharer that falls by lot into the share of another co-sharer should be surrounded, that land must be given up by the co-sharer who has hitherto cultivated it. Such co-sharer's consent to such arrangement must be understood to have been given when he agreed to arbitration. S. 125 of Act XIX of 1873 must not be regarded as empowering a co-sharer, who has once given his consent to surrender the cultivation, to continue to cultivate the land against the will of the co-sharer who has become the owner of it by partition. *ABHAI PANDEY v. BHAGWAN PANDEY* **I. L. R. 3 All. 818**

11. ——— ***N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 125.*** Sir land of one sharer included on partition in the mehal assigned to another sharer is to be treated in the same way as sir land is dealt with after its proprietor has lost his proprietary right therein. In both cases alike the right of ex-proprietary tenancy comes by force of law into existence. *RAM PRASAD RAI v. DINA KUAR* **I. L. R. 4 All. 515**

Dissented from in *KASHI PRASAD v. KEDAR NATH SAHU* **I. L. R. 20 All. 219**

12. ——— **Planting trees on joint land without consent—*Permission by one co-sharer to cultivator to plant.*** Where it was stipulated in the wajib-ul-urz that trees could only be planted by cultivators on the common land, with the consent of the proprietors:—*Held*, that one out of several co-proprietors (unless he was properly authorized to manage the joint estate) was not competent to give an ijazutnamah to a cultivator to plant a bagh, and could not by his single consent dispense with the performance of a condition of which the other sharers had a right to call for the fulfilment. If such an ijazutnamah was given without their consent, express or implied, they have a right to have it set aside. *GHAZEEODEEN HYDER v. BHOOLUN*

2 Agra 344

CO-SHARER—*contd.*2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*

(b) ERECTION OF BUILDINGS.

13. ———— *Erection of buildings by one co-sharer—Right to removal of buildings.* A sued B for possession of certain land on which B had erected a building, on the allegation that it belonged jointly to them, as well as for removal of the building from the land. It was found as a fact that the land was held jointly by A and B. *Held*, that B had no right to do anything which altered the condition of the joint property without the consent of his co-sharer, and it was rightly ordered that B should remove the building from the land. GURU DAS DEAR v. BIJAYA GOBIND BARAL

1 B. L. R. A. C. 108 : 10 W. R. 71

HOLLOWAY v. WAHID ALI

12 B. L. R. 191 note : 16 W. R. 140

15. ———— *Right to removal of buildings.* The plaintiff sued for possession of a one-third share of certain land after demolition of the buildings erected thereon by the defendants who were her co-sharers. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for demolition of the buildings, as she had no right to compel her co-sharers to adopt her views of the enjoyment of the property. She could only get a decree for possession of an undivided one-third share. BINDABASINI DEBI v. PATIT PABAN CHATTAPADHYA . 3 B. L. R. A. C. 267

14. ———— *Right to removal of buildings.* Where two parties were joint owners of land, and one of them erected a wall upon the land without obtaining the consent of his co-sharer :—*Held*, that the Court would not interfere to order the demolition of the wall when there was no evidence to show that injury had been done to the co-tenant of the building by its erection. LALA BISWAMBHAR LAL v. RAJARAM

3 B. L. R. Ap. 67 : 13 W. R. 337 note
16 W. R. 140 note : 21 W. R. 373 note

16. ———— *Right to removal of buildings.* One of several co-sharers of joint undivided property has no right to erect a building on land which forms a portion of such property, so as to materially alter the condition thereof, without the consent of his co-sharers. SHEOPERSAD SINGH v. LEELA SINGH 12 B. L. R. 188 : 20 W. R. 160

17. ———— *Right to removal of buildings.* In a suit in which it was sought to demolish a building which had been erected by the defendant on land belonging to himself and the plaintiff jointly :—*Held*, that, as a co-partner, the defendant was entitled to use the whole land, and if in erecting the building he took possession of more land than he would be entitled to on partition, the suit should have been for division of the lands, and not for demolition of the building. DWARKANATH BHOODEA v. GOPENATH BHOODEA

12 B. L. R. 891 note : 16 W. R. 10

CO-SHARER—*contd.*2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*(b) ERECTION OF BUILDINGS—*contd.*

18. ———— *Erection of scaffolding—Exclusive possession by one co-sharer—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530, Order under—Suit to recover joint possession.* One of several co-proprietors has no right to take exclusive possession of any portion of the land of which he is one of the co-proprietors without the sanction of all of his co-proprietors ; and when, after he has taken such exclusive possession, an order has been made by a Magistrate acting under s. 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confirming the possession taken by him, such order is no answer to a suit brought by one of his co-proprietors to recover joint possession of the portion of land so wrongfully taken by him into his exclusive possession. One of several co-proprietors has no right to erect a nowbuthkana, or a scaffolding supporting a platform for the accommodation of musical performers, upon land of which he is only one of several co-proprietors, without the sanction of all his co-proprietors. RAJENDRO LALL GOSSAMI v. SHAMA CHURN LAHORI

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 188 : 4 C. L. R. 417

19. ———— *Removal of building erected by one of several co-sharers—Acquiescence.* In a case where a permanent building has been erected by some or one of several co-sharers on the land jointly held, and another co-sharer subsequently seeks to have the building removed, the principle upon which the Court acts is that, though it has a discretion to interfere and direct the removal of the building, this is not a discretion which must necessarily be exercised in every case ; and, as a rule, it will not be exercised unless the plaintiff is able to show that injury has accrued to him by reason of the erection of the building, and, perhaps further, that he took reasonable steps in time to prevent the erection. NOCURI LALL CHUCKERBUTTY v. BINDABUN CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 708

20. ———— *Right to removal of buildings.* In a suit to obtain an order for the demolition of a house erected on land, the joint property of the plaintiff and defendant, even though in strictness the defendant had no right to erect the house without the consent of his co-sharer, the Court ought to enquire whether, under all the circumstances, the ends of justice could not be satisfied by some other remedy. MASSIM MOLLAH v. PANJOO GHORAMEE 21 W. R. 373

21. ———— *Rights of other co-sharers.* Defendant having spent large sums of money in improving what was originally *patit* land by locating raiyats and building houses upon it and turning it into a village :—*Held*, that plaintiff, his co-sharer, was not entitled to claim possession of a specific share in that village, but only to demand a partition in which plaintiff would obtain compensation by receiving elsewhere land equivalent to that

CO-SHARER—contd.**2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—
contd.****(b) ERECTION OF BUILDINGS—contd.**

brought into cultivation by the defendant at his own expense. *GOKOOL KISHEN SEN v. ISSUR CHUNDER ROY* **18 W. R. 12**

22. ————— *Compensation for removal.* If one sharer chooses to build against the wishes of the other co-sharers, he must take the consequences and cannot ask for compensation in case his building is ordered to be pulled down. *BISHAMBHUR SHAHA v. SHIB CHUNDER SHAHA* **22 W. R. 286**

23. ————— *Use of land for his own purposes—Removal of buildings.* In a suit to recover possession of a share of a talukh, on the ground that a co-sharer had dispossessed plaintiff by digging a tank, building a schoolroom, and manufacturing bricks for his own use, the lower Courts refused to compel the defendant to restore the land to its former state. As plaintiff had suffered no injury by what defendant had done, the High Court refused to interfere. *Quære*: Did the alleged acts constitute dispossession? *MOHIMA CHUNDER GHOSE v. MADHUB CHUNDER NAG* **24 W. R. 80**

24. ————— *Lessee of co-sharers—Lease by some of several co-sharers—Removal of buildings erected by lessee—Acquiescence.* A lessee of co-sharers stands in the place of a co-sharer, and where some of the co-sharers in an estate sought to get their right acknowledged in respect of some lands which other co-sharers had leased out, and also sought to have a thakoorbari which the lessee had built on it removed:—*Held*, that the right of the protesting co-sharers to the land in suit was clear enough, but that, in order to acquire the right to remove a building, it was necessary not merely to have alleged non-consent, but to prove that objections had been offered before the building was raised. *DOORGA LALL v. LALLA HULWANT SAHOY* **25 W. R. 306**

25. ————— *Rights of co-sharers in matters affecting common property—Sale of property by one co-sharer.* One of several owners of property is entitled to sue for a declaration that a sale deed, executed by one of the co-owners which endangers his right, will not affect that right, and, if the common property is a house or land, he is also entitled to resist the erection of any building, or addition to any building, on the common property, and, if such building is erected without his consent, to have the property restored to its original condition. *MEHDEE HOSSEIN KHAN v. AUJUD ALI* **6 N. W. 259**

26. ————— *Suit for removal of buildings on joint land—Civil Procedure Code, 1877 (1882), s. 30—Parties—Suit by one of several co-sharers against others affecting joint land.* A shareholder of an undivided piece of land sued three

CO-SHARER—contd.**2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—
contd.****(b) ERECTION OF BUILDINGS—contd.**

of his co-sharers, who, he alleged, had trespassed on the land by building thereon, for restoration of the land to its original condition. The Court of first instance tried and determined the suit as brought and framed. The lower Appellate Court dismissed the suit on the ground that, there being many co-sharers, the plaintiff could not alone sue, and under s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code the suit was bad. *Per STUART, C.J.*—That the lower Appellate Court was right in holding that s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code applied to the case, but that it was not right in dismissing the suit, but should have remanded it for the procedure provided by that section. Also that the permission mentioned in s. 30 is express and not constructive. *Per BRODHURST, J.*—That s. 30 was not applicable to the case, that section contemplating a case in which there are numerous parties having the same interest in a suit, who are all before the Court, and are all anxious to have the matter in dispute disposed of, but, in order to save trouble and expense, are desirous that one or more of them shall sue or defend on behalf of all in the same interest. *Per STRAIGHT and TYRELL, JJ.*—That s. 30 was not applicable to the case, the first part of that section implying that the plaintiff therein contemplated wishes to sue on behalf of other persons similarly interested in suing, they also wishing the same. *HIRA LAL v. BHAIROO* **I. L. R. 5 All. 602**

27. ————— *Suit to restrain erection of building and alteration of land.* The defendant was in possession of land under a pottah granted by the ijaradars of the proprietors, and thereon commenced to build a house and plant a garden. The plaintiff, who had brought the right, title, and interest of one of the proprietors, sued to restrain him. He did not allege any injury. *Held*, that such suit would not lie. *SRICHAND v. NIM CHAND SHAHEE*

5 B. L. R. Ap. 25: 13 W. R. 337

See also *NABIN CHANDRA MITTER v. MAHES CHANDRA MITTER*

3 B. L. R. Ap. 111: 12 W. R. 69

But see *In the matter of THAKOOR CHUNDER PARAMANICK*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 595, 597 note

28. ————— *Erection of buildings on joint property—Building by one co-sharer against the wish of others—Suit for injunction to restrain building—Discretion of Court—Act I of 1877 (Specific Relief Act), s. 54.* One of several co-sharers in a mehal having begun to erect certain kachcha buildings upon the common land, another co-sharer, three or four days after the building had commenced, brought a suit for an injunction to restrain the continuance thereof, on the ground that the defendant was ousting the plaintiff as a co-sharer from a portion of the common land. It

CO-SHARER—*contd.*2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*(b) ERECTION OF BUILDINGS—*contd.*

was found that the defendant was building upon land which was in excess of the share which would come to him on partition, and that on partition the plaintiff could not be adequately compensated. *Held* by the Full Bench, that the plaintiff was entitled to a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding further with the building, and directing that the building, so far as it had proceeded, be pulled down, and prohibiting the defendant from building on the land as exclusive owner at any future time. *Paras Ram v. Sherjit*, I. L. R. 9 All. 661, referred to. *Per* STRAIGHT, J., that it was for the defendant appellant to show that the lower Appellate Court had exercised a wrong discretion in granting the injunction, and that, this not having been shown, the High Court ought not to interfere. *SHADI v. ANUP SINGH* . I. L. R. 12 All. 436

29. ————— *Rights of co-sharers as to erection of buildings on joint land—Injunction.* One of several joint owners of land is not entitled to erect a building upon the joint property without the consent of the other joint owners, notwithstanding that the erection of such building may cause no direct loss to the other joint owners. *Shadi v. Anup Singh*, I. L. R. 12 All. 436, referred to. *NAJJU KHAN v. IMTIAZ-UD-DIN* . I. L. R. 18 All. 115

30. ————— *Suit by one coparcener for possession of a building erected by a stranger on the joint property and purchased by the other co-parceners—Trespassers.* Where stranger to the property built upon certain land jointly held by several co-parceners, and some of the co-parceners purchased from the stranger the building so erected, it was *held*, that the purchasers were, *quoad* the building in suit, trespassers, and that a suit might be maintained by the remaining coparcener to be put into joint possession of the building; and this though it was not shown that any special damage had been suffered by the plaintiff by reason of the building. *Paras Ram v. Sherjit*, I. L. R. 9 All. 661, and *Najju Khan v. Imtiaz-ud-din*, I. L. R. 18 All. 115, referred to. *MUHAMMAD ALI JAN v. FAIZ BAKHSI* . I. L. R. 18 All. 361

31. ————— *Right to Injunction to restrain building.* There is no such broad proposition as that one co-owner is entitled to an injunction restraining another co-owner from exceeding his rights, absolutely and without reference to the amount of damage to be sustained by the one side or the other from the granting or withholding of the injunction. *SHAMNUGGER JUTE FACTORY CO. v. RAM NARAIN CHATTERJEE* . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 189

32. ————— *Right to deal with joint property—Building by one co-sharer against the wish of others—Suit for demolition of building—Discretion of Court.* The mere fact of

CO-SHARER—*contd.*2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*(b) ERECTION OF BUILDINGS—*contd.*

a building being erected by a joint owner of land without the permission of his co-owners, and even in spite of their protest, is not sufficient to entitle such co-owners to obtain the demolition of such building unless they can show that the building has caused such material and substantial injury as could not be remedied in a suit for partition of the joint land. *Lala Biswambhar Lal v. Raja Ram*, 3 B. L. R. Ap. 67, *Nocury Lal Chuckerbutty v. Bindabun Chunder Chuckerbutty*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 708, *Girdhari Lal v. Vilayat Ali*, W. N. All. 1885, 277, *Wahid Ali Khan v. Ghansham Nurain*, W. N. All. 1887, 116, and *Joy Chunder Rukhit v. Bipro Churn Rukhit*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 236, referred to. *PARAS RAM v. SHERJIT* . I. L. R. 9 All. 661

33. ————— *Excavation of tank—Right to deal with joint property—Discretion of Court in granting injunction—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 55.* Before a Court will in the case of co-sharers make an order directing that a portion of the joint property alleged to have been dealt with by one of the co-sharers without the consent of the other should be restored to its former condition (as, for instance, where a tank has been excavated), a plaintiff must show that he has sustained, by the act he complains of, some injury which materially affects his position. *Lala Biswambhar v. Rajaram Lal*, 3 B. L. R. Ap. 67, applied in principle. *Shamnugger Jute Factory Co. v. Ram Narain Chatterjee*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 189, approved. The fact that a portion of the land on which a tank had been excavated by the defendant was fit for cultivation does not constitute an injury of a substantial nature such as would justify an order of that nature. *JOY CHUNDER RUKHIT v. BIPO CHURN RUKHIT* . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 236

34. ————— *Excavation of Tank by one co-sharer—Injury—Right of other co-sharer to have the same filled up.* Where on ijmali land one co-sharer excavates a tank and there is no proof of any injury caused thereby to the property, the other co-sharer has no right to have the tank filled up or the land restored to its former condition, but he is entitled to a declaration of title to the extent of his share. *ATARJAN BIBEE v. ASHAK* . 4 C. W. N. 788

35. ————— *Party-wall—Erection on the wall by one co-sharer—Right of other co-sharers to have building removed—Right of suit.* One of two tenants in common of a party-wall raised the height of the wall with a view to building a superstructure on his own tenement. The other tenant in common, who had not consented to the alteration in the wall, but had suffered no inconvenience therefrom, now sued to enforce the removal of the newly erected portion. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought. *KANAKAYYA v. NARASIMHULU* . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 38

CO-SHARER—*contd.*2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*(b) ERECTION OF BUILDINGS—*concl.*

36. ———— *Temple—Right to build temples on joint land.* The plea of limitation is not applicable to a suit for declaration of title regarding ijmal lands upon which a temple has been built, and an idol established, by another co-sharer. If that shareholder claim exclusive use of the temple, he must prove a possession and enjoyment different from those of a Hindu co-sharer of joint property, particularly with regard to a temple added by him to an ancestral poojah-bari. *KISSORYNATH CHOWDHRY v. HURRO KANT CHOWDHRY* 2 W. R. 183

37. ———— *Right to share in temple built by one co-sharer with separate funds on joint land.* A co-sharer was held not entitled to a share in a temple, built on common land by another co-sharer out of his separate funds, on the ground that the temple was built on common land. *KISHEN SARUP v. DESRAJ* 7 N. W. 179

38. ———— *Land dedicated to family idol—Land excluded from partition of family property and declared inalienable—Subsequent purchase from Escheat Department of Government—Sale in execution.* By a partition deed by the six members of a Hindu family it was provided that part of the land of the family should be set apart for the maintenance of the family idol and should be inalienable, and the rest of the land was divided equally. Subsequently the Government claimed the dedicated land as an escheat, and sold it to the members of the family jointly, of whom one built a house on part of it—less than one-sixth—with the consent of the others. The house and its site were sold in execution of a decree against the builder. *Held*, that the other members of the family were not entitled to have the house removed or the sale cancelled. *MALAN v. PURUSHOTHAMA* I. L. R. 12 Mad. 287

39. ———— *Erection of wall—Discretion of Court—Judgment, contents of.* Where several parties are joint owners of land, and one of them erects a wall upon the land without the consent of his co-sharers, the Court should not interfere to order the demolition of the wall when there is no evidence to show that injury has been done to the party complaining and that reasonable steps were taken in time to prevent the erection of the wall. *Najju Khan v. Imtiazuddin* I. L. R. 18 All. 115, dissented from. *Nocury Lall Chuckerbutty v. Bindabun Chunder Chuckerbutty*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 708; *Shamnagar Jute Factory Co. v. Ram Narain Chatterjee*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 189; and *Joy Chunder Rukhit v. Bypro Churn Rukhit*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 236, followed. In a suit like the present, it is of the utmost importance that the decree should state the precise nature of the relief granted. *FAZILATUNNESSA v. IJAZ HASSAN* (1903) I. L. R. 30 Calc. 901

CO-SHARER—*contd.*2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*

(c) EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF PORTION OF JOINT PROPERTY.

40. ———— *Right to exclusive possession—Consent—Injunction.* One of several co-sharers of joint undivided property has no right to take exclusive possession and alter the condition of any portion of the joint property without the consent of his co-sharers, and the Court will grant an injunction to restrain him from doing so. *STALKARTT v. GOPAL PANDAY* 12 B. L. R. 197: 20 W. R. 168

41. ———— *Co-parcener's right to joint possession of the whole or any part of the joint estate without necessity for partition—Hindu law—Joint family.* A co-parcener in the undivided property of a joint Hindu family is entitled to claim joint possession of a portion of the property, and need not sue for a partition. Where it appeared that the parties to the suit each held parcels of the undivided family property in exclusive possession, and the plaintiff asked to be put in joint possession with the defendant:—*Held*, that he was entitled to a decree for joint possession. A co-parcener is entitled to a joint benefit in every part of the undivided estate. *RAMCHANDRA KASHI PATKAR v. DAMODHAR TRIMBAK PATKAR* I. L. R. 20 Bom. 467

42. ———— *Joint Tenant—Partition.* A joint tenant is not entitled to khas possession of any portion of a joint and undivided property without a batwarah. *HUREE DYAL GOOHO MOJOMDAR v. GOBIND CHUNDER PAL* 17 W. R. 387

43. ———— *Arrangement as to occupation of joint property—Suit for profits of portion allotted to another.* An arrangement come to between the joint owners of land not being a joint Hindu family, by which some parts of the property were to be exclusively in the possession of one or other of them, is sufficient to bar one of them from suing for the profits derived from any portion allotted to the exclusive possession of any other. *OODOY TARA CHOWDHRAHEE v. KHAJA ASANOOLLAH* 22 W. R. 180

44. ———— *Arrangement for exclusive possession of one co-sharer.* When one co-sharer of a joint family is allowed by the other members of the family to have separate and exclusive possession of family property for a long period of years,—such, for instance, as would give him a right on a batwara taking place to insist on having the land which he has enjoyed allotted to him,—the other co-sharers must be taken to have knowingly given him the opportunity of creating subordinate rights or allowing such rights to grow up, and they cannot be permitted afterwards, without showing that they have been deceived in the matter, suddenly to start up and repudiate such subordinate rights. *JOTEE ROY v. BHEECHUK MEAH* 20 W. R. 288

CO-SHARER—*contd.*2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*(c) EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF PORTION OF JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*

45. ———— *Liability for rent of some shareholders taking exclusive possession of house.* The co-sharers in a house who continued to occupy the whole house to the exclusion of one co-sharer after notice that he would charge them rent for his share of the house, were declared just as liable to pay rent to the co-sharer as they would be for rents of any other species of property. *CHUNDERKANT ROY v. GOPEENEE DEBIA*

6 W. R. 17

46. ———— *Exclusive use of portion of property—Effect of, on rights of the others.* By tacit agreement, co-parceners in a joint property may have temporarily an exclusive use of different portions of it without prejudice to the common rights of all, or to the right of each or any of them to enforce at pleasure a partition of the whole. *YUSAF ALI KHAN v. CHUBBEE SINGH*

5 N. W. 122

47. ———— *Adverse use of land by co-sharer.* Held, that the defendants, as joint proprietors with the plaintiff, could not by the use of the land with the tacit assent of the plaintiff create a right contrary to his interest, nor would their use of it before they became co-proprietors operate to create any such right. *JAHANOBY DEO NARAIN SINGH v. UMBICA PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH*

17 W. R. 74

48. ———— *Adverse possession.* Exclusive possession by A of property which originally had been admittedly joint does not, *per se*, amount to adverse possession as against A's co-sharers. The Court should further ascertain whether A's exclusive possession was due to his title being really a separate one from the plaintiff's, and could not be accounted for by the fact of some arrangement having been come to at a previous time between the parties. *ASUD ALI KHAN v. AKBAR ALI KHAN*

1 C. L. R. 364

49. ———— *Possession by one co-sharer—Adverse possession.* The circumstances of a case may shew that mere occupation and enjoyment by one co-sharer does not *per se* constitute an adverse possession as against the other co-sharer. In this case the exclusive possession of one was held not to be adverse to the other. *Asud Ali Khan v. Akbar Ali Khan*, 1 C. L. R. 364, followed. *BARODA SUNDARI DEBY v. ANNODA SUNDARI DEBY*

3 C. W. N. 774

50. ———— *Adverse possession—Proof of intention to set up adverse possession.* When one co-sharer sets up as against another adverse possession of land which had previously been waste, but at some former time had been occupied and then been admittedly held jointly, it is for him to show that he has held possession in such a way as to give distinct notice to his other co-sharers of his

CO-SHARER—*contd.*2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*(c) EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF PORTION OF JOINT PROPERTY—*concl'd.*

intention to set up a title adverse to them. *RAKHAL DAS BUNDOPADHYA v. INDU MONEE DEBI*

1 C. L. R. 155

51. ———— *Enjoyment of joint property—Right to joint possession—Suit relating to the joint property—Exclusion of a co-sharer in denial of his right.* The defendants had in defiance of the rights of the plaintiff, who was their co-sharer, seized possession of land appertaining to the joint estate; they were not cultivating any part of the land or carrying on any work thereon inconsistent with the joint possession of the plaintiff, nor had they improved the lands by spending labour and capital thereon, nor was there any acquiescence by the plaintiff. Held, that even if the defendants had originally taken possession of the land for the purpose of cultivating indigo, that purpose having come to an end they were not entitled to continue in exclusive possession of the land and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover joint possession. It would be subversive of the right of joint owners to hold that it is open to any co-sharer, who may appear first on the field to seize possession of any land newly formed by accretion to the joint estate and hold it to the permanent exclusion of the other co-sharers. *Watson & Co. v. Ram Chund Dutt*, 1 L. R. 18 Calc. 10; 1 L. R. 17 I. A. 110, *Lachmeswar Singh v. Manowar Hossein*, 1 L. R. 19 Calc. 253; 1 L. R. 19 I. A. 48, and *Madan Mohun Shaha v. Rajab Ali*, 1 L. R. 28 Calc. 223, referred to and distinguished. *SURENDRA NARAIN SINGHA v. HARI MOHAN MISSEER* (1906)

I L. R. 33 Calc. 1201

52. ———— *Separate possession of distinct plots by arrangement—Sale by a co-sharer—Purchaser's right to exclusive possession.* When by private arrangement amongst co-sharers, one of them is in exclusive possession of a certain portion of the *ijmali* land, a purchaser of the right, title and interest of the latter is entitled to be placed in the same position as his vendor. An arrangement amongst co-sharers like the above continues to be a good and binding arrangement until the co-sharers themselves agree to give it up and come to some other arrangement or until any one of the co-sharers demand a partition of the entire joint lands either in Court or out of Court. *KUMUDINI MAZUMDAR v. RASIK LAL MAZUMDAR* (1906)

11 C. W. N. 517

(d) LEASES BY ONE CO-SHARER.

53. ———— *Power to grant lease—Consent.* One of several co-sharers in sir land cannot grant a lease of any portion of it without the consent of the others. *CHAHUZ v. NUND KISHORE*

4 N. W. 15

CO-SHARER—contd.**2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—
contd.****(d) LEASES BY ONE CO-SHARER—contd.**

54. ———— **Effect of lease granted by one of several co-sharers.** A pottah granted by one co-sharer in an estate is not binding on the other sharers. *GOLUCK CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. TEELUCK CHUNDER SHAH* . . . 2 May 49

55. ———— **Powers of lumberdar to deal with co-parcenary lands—Lease of such lands for ten years at an inadequate rent.** Held, that a lumberdar has no general power to grant any lease of co-parcenary land beyond such as the circumstances of the particular year or the particular season may require. *Jagan Nath v. Hardyal*, All. W. N. (1897) 207, followed. *BANSIDHAR v. DIP SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 238

56. ———— **Effect of lease by one of several co-sharers of his own share.** Although one co-sharer cannot give a good lease of the whole sixteen annas of property which belongs to himself and his co-sharers, yet one co-sharer may give a lease of his own share which would be binding against himself at least. *RAM DEBUL LALL v. MITTERJEET SINGH* . . . 17 W. R. 420

57. ———— **Lease by co-sharer of his own share—Enjoyment of share of, by lessee.** An undivided shareholder is not prohibited by law from granting a lease of his share to a third person; all that the other co-proprietor can insist upon is that the lessee should be prevented from dealing with the subject of the lease in any way different from that in which the lessor, his co-proprietor, could deal with it. A joint shareholder or any lessee of a joint shareholder is at liberty to contract with the raiyats of the zamindari for any lawful purpose even without the consent of the other co-proprietors. *MACDONALD v. LALA SHIB DYAL SINGH PAUREY* . . . 21 W. R. 17

58. ———— **Long possession under lease—Acquiescence—Presumption of authority.** Long possession under an authentic pottah from one sharer, without interference or disturbance from the others, legally warrants the inference that the grantor had authority to bind his co-sharers. *HILLS v. ARADHUN MUNDUL* . . . 10 W. R. 389

59. ———— **Right of ejectment.** Where land is held jointly and there is no partition, one part-owner cannot insist on the ejectment of a person who has been holding under the other part-owner for 16 or 17 years. *BISSESSUR KURMOKER v. JUGGOBUNDUO KURMOKER* . . . 14 W. R. 183

60. ———— **Right of lessee of one co-sharer to hold possession without consent of others—Right of ejectment.** In a suit by a co-sharer for ejectment of a lessee who was holding over after the expiration of his lease at the end of 1275 and after sufficient notice, the defendant pleaded a pottah from the plaintiff's shareholder under which

CO-SHARER—contd.**2. ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—
concl'd.****(d) LEASES BY ONE CO-SHARER—concl'd.**

he was entitled to remain to the end of 1282. Held, that, as defendant's occupation and enjoyment of the land to the end of the year 1275 had been by virtue and under the authority of two separate leases granted by each shareholder, each co-extensive with his share only, and as that granted by the plaintiff had expired in 1275, the defendant had not had exclusive enjoyment of the property as tenant by virtue of the other lease. And though the other co-sharer had granted a new lease when the first lease expired in 1275, yet as the plaintiff refused to do so, and had ever since treated the defendant as a trespasser, the defendant had no right of occupation so far as regarded the plaintiff's share. *HAMILTON v. RUGHOO NUNDUN SINGH* . . . 20 W. R. 70

**3. SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT
TO THE JOINT PROPERTY.****(a) POSSESSION.**

1. ———— **Suit for share of estate—Shares in estate sold for arrears of revenue—Act XI of 1859, ss. 10 and 11.** An eight-anna shareholder in four mouzahs out of six which constituted an estate was held to be not entitled to sue alone under either s. 10 or s. 11 of Act XI of 1859. *NUNHOO SHAHEE v. RAM PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH* . . . 21 W. R. 38

2. ———— **Suit to recover joint property—Parties.** In a suit to recover property belonging to co-sharers all the co-sharers must join. *PARAM v. ACHAL* . . . I. L. R. 4 All. 289

BATAHEE BEGUM v. KHOOSHAL . . . 3 Agra 221

MOOKTA KESHEE DEBEE v. OOMABUTTY

14 W. R. 31; 8 B. L. R. 396 note

SUDABURT PERSHAD SAHOO v. LOTF ALI KHAN . . . 14 W. R. 339

ALUM MANJEE v. ASHAD ALI . . . 16 W. R. 138

3. ———— **Suit by some of several co-sharers—Parties objecting to be plaintiffs.** All co-owners must join in a suit to recover property, unless the law otherwise provides: they may agree that property shall be managed and suits conducted by some or one of them, but they cannot invest such person or persons with a right to sue in his own name on their behalf, although, perhaps, a tenant might be estopped from denying the title of his lessor in such case. If some co-owners refuse to sue, the proper course for the rest to adopt is to make them defendants in the case. *KUTTUSHERI PISHARETH KANNA PISHARODY v. VALLOTIL MANAKEL NARAYANAN SOMAYAJIPAD* . . . I. L. R. 3 Mad. 234

4. ———— **Suit for portion of estate—Shareholder in possession of whole estate on con-**

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ditions. It was held that a shareholder, who was in possession of the joint estate on the understanding that he paid certain fixed allowances to his co-sharers, could maintain alone a suit to recover possession of a portion of the estate. **AMIR SINGH v. MOAZZUM ALI KHAN . . . 7 N. W. 58**

5. ———— *Suit for possession of property pledged in usufructuary mortgage.* One of several co-sharers of a joint estate cannot sue in respect of his particular share to get rid of a mortgage entered into jointly by all the co-sharers. **UNJOOR SINGH v. FUZBOONNESSA . . 2 Hay 155**

6. ———— *Suit for undivided share of patni talukh.* A suit to recover possession of an undivided share of a patni talukh, where the title to the share as against the zamindar depends upon a grant made to the plaintiff and others *ijmali*, cannot rightly proceed until the co-sharers are made parties. **PARBUTTY CHURN DOSS v. PROTAP CHUNDER SEN . . . 23 W. R. 275**

7. ———— *Liability for rent.* A suit to recover possession is not maintainable against one's co-sharer in respect of property still joint and undivided, nor can rent be legally claimed from him except on the ground of some agreement or undertaking, express or implied. **GOBIND CHUNDER GHOSE v. RAM COOMER DEY . . . 24 W. R. 393**

8. ———— *Suit by puttildars of raiyatwari village—Right to sue jointly—Custom.* The puttildars of a raiyatwari village have not such a common interest, as puttildars, in all their holdings that they can jointly sue for the recovery of them. If in any case such a right exist, it must be established by evidence. **MAYANDY TEVAN v. NARANAIAAN . . . 4 Mad. 108**

9. ———— *Suit by one co-sharer for his share of jote—Separation of interest—Evidence of separation.* The co-sharers in a certain jote who were raiyats having a right of occupancy paid their rents separately to the puttildars, who gave each party a separate receipt for his "share of undivided tenure." One of the raiyats who alleged that he had been dispossessed brought a suit to recover possession of his separate share of the jote against the other co-sharers and the puttildars, and put the receipts in evidence to show that the puttildars had consented to the jote being divided and held in separate shares. *Held*, that they were insufficient to do so; and that the suit could not be maintained in its present form. **GOBABJAN v. MOSHIATOLAH . . . 1 C. L. R. 537**

10. ———— *Suit for possession against single shareholder for portion of joint estate held separately by agreement.* A suit for possession of land will not lie against a single shareholder for a particular portion of a joint estate

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held separately under an existing arrangement acquiesced in by the plaintiffs and agreed to by the other co-sharers, nor can the plaintiffs let to a tenant the property in the lawful possession of such shareholder. **CHOWDHRY NIL KANT PERSHAD SINGH v. AHLAD SINGH . . . 5 W. R. 287**

11. ———— *Suit by one co-sharer to redeem more than his share—Subsequent severance of interest—Parties—Time of taking objection.* In 1805 a two-anna share in certain property held by co-sharers was mortgaged to the defendant. The mortgage was effected by the mortgagor as manager of all the co-sharers in union. In 1848 one of the co-sharers redeemed his share of two pies in the mortgaged property, and a further share of two pies therein was redeemed by a second co-sharer in 1867. The plaintiff was admittedly the owner of another two-pie share; but he now sued the defendant to redeem the whole of the property still unredeemed, *viz.*, a one-anna eight pies share of the original mortgage. The defendant objected that the plaintiff could only redeem his own two-pie share, which had become separated from the rest. The plaintiff denied that the estate had been divided. *Held*, that the plaintiff's claim being to redeem all that remained of the estate in the mortgagee's possession, the suit could not be maintained, unless all the other persons interested in the equity of redemption were before the Court either as co-plaintiffs or as defendants. Without their presence, the suit could not be properly disposed of, and the excuse, that the defendant did not take objection at the right time, had, under such circumstances, no validity. As owner of a two-pie share, which by consent of all interested had become an estate wholly separated from the other parts of the original aggregate, the plaintiff would have been bound to set forth the transactions on which his right rested. **RAGHO SALVI v. BALKRISNA SAKHA RAM . . . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 128**

12. ———— *Suit to recover possession of portion of tenure—Dispossession of purchaser by mortgagee—Parties.* A landlord who was in receipt of a half share of the rent of a certain tenure caused that share of the tenure to be sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent. After such sale, A, the purchaser, took possession. Subsequently the tenant executed a mortgage, and a decree being obtained by the mortgagee, the whole tenure was brought to sale in execution thereof and purchased by the mortgagee, who proceeded to oust A. In a suit by A to recover possession of his half share of the tenure on the footing of his purchase:—*Held*, that, as it appeared that the mortgagor, whose rights and interests only were thus sold, was only one of several co-sharers, in the absence of the co-sharers who were not parties to the suit, A was not entitled to the relief he sought. **REILY v. HUR CHUNDER GHOSE . . . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 722**
12 C. L. R. 398

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TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*(a) POSSESSION—*contd.*

13. ——— Suit for possession after foreclosure—*Power of lumberdars to bind co-sharers in mortgage.* The lumberdars of a mehal, in order to pay revenue due by them and the other co-sharers of the mehal, transferred the mehal by conditional sale for a term of years, possession of the mehal being delivered to the conditional vendee. The mortgage-debt not having been paid within such term, the conditional vendee applied, as against the lumberdars, for foreclosure, and the mortgage having been foreclosed sued all the co-sharers including the lumberdars for possession of the mehal, alleging that the lumberdars had acted in the matter of the conditional sale, not only for themselves, but as agents of the other co-sharers. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the other co-sharers had not either expressly or by implication authorized the lumberdars to enter into the particular contract represented by the conditional sale, and as they had not ratified such contract, they were not bound by the conditional sale and foreclosure. *BHAJAN LAL v. MORT* . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 177

14. ——— Suit to recover possession by setting aside sale—*Sale for arrears of revenue—Splitting suits—Separation of claims.* A, B, C, D, and E, were joint lessees, without specification of shares under Government, of a certain mehal. The estate was sold for arrears of revenue. A, B, C, D, and E each brought a suit separately to set aside the sale. *Held*, that, as the estate was single and indivisible, and the cause of action and relief sought in each case was the same, the claim of the lessees could not be split into five distinct suits. *BISWANATH BHUTTACHARJEE v. THE COLLECTOR OF MYMENSING* . . . 7 B. L. R. Ap. 42
21 W. R. 69 note

15. ——— *Sale for arrears of rent—Suit by one co-sharer.* Where a patni talukh, belonging to several co-sharers, each of whom collected his own share of rent from the mehal, was sold for arrears of rent, and one of the co-sharers brought a suit in the Munsif's Court to recover possession of his share by setting aside the sale, and valued his suit according to his share, making the other co-sharers defendants:—*Held*, that the suit could not be maintained in that form. The cause of action was the sale of the whole estate, and the suit should have been framed and valued accordingly, and brought in a Court in which the rights of all the parties interested in setting aside the sale might have been declared in one suit. *UNNODA PERSAD ROY v. ERSKINE* . . .
12 B. L. R. F. B. 370
21 W. R. 68

16. ——— Suit for possession on expiry of tenancy—*Notice to quit—Co-sharers, suit by—Withdrawal of one co-sharer from the suit.* Where several co-sharers have served a joint

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notice to quit, upon which notice they jointly institute a suit for the recovery of the land, the fact that one of the plaintiffs withdraws from the suit will not prevent the remaining plaintiffs from obtaining a decree for possession of their shares of the land. *DWARAKA NATH RAI v. KALI CHUNDER RAI* . . .
I. L. R. 13 Calc. 75

17. ——— Suit concerning joint property—*Suit for khas possession—Exclusive possession of one co-sharer—Partition—Denial of title in written statement—Cause of action—Improvement by tenant—Meliorating waste.* Where one co-sharer holds possession of certain land, and deals with it in a particular way and in the ordinary course, and another co-sharer objects to that dealing or to that course of conduct, his proper remedy is to sue for partition, by which the rights of all the co-sharers may be adjusted and the loss sustained by one may be made good at the expense of another. When one co-sharer landlord, in exclusive possession of a waste plot of land, although such exclusive possession may be held with the permission of the other co-sharer landlord, leases it out to a tenant, who improves it without any objection on the part of the latter, it is not open to the latter to obtain *khas* possession of the land so improved, jointly either with the lessor landlord or with the tenant. A denial of a right in a written statement does not give rise to a cause of action: a cause of action must be antecedent to any allegation made in the pleadings. *Watson and Co. v. Ram Chand Dutt*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 10, explained. *MADAN MOHUN SHAHA v. RAJAB ALI* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 223

(b) MISCELLANEOUS SUITS.

18. ——— Suit by some co-sharers deducting share of those non-consenting—*Suit to enforce agreement relating to the whole property.* The consent of all the sharers to a joint holding being necessary to give validity to any agreement regarding the same, certain sharers in a joint holding cannot, by the device of deducting from their claim a portion of the holding representing the share of some of their co-sharers, non-consenting parties to an agreement, sue to enforce such agreement, all the sharers having an undivided share in every biswa of the joint holding. *SHIBRA v. RAM LALL* . . . 3 N. W. 216

19. ——— Suit on bond—*Liability of some co-sharers for acts of others—Bond executed for payment of rent due on joint estate—Patni talukh.* Two out of certain co-sharers in a patni talukh executed a mortgage bond with the object of paying off a quota of the rent due on the estate. In a suit brought on the bond, to which all the co-sharers were defendants:—*Held*, that the liability

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under the bond only extended to the co-sharers who actually signed the document, and to such of the other co-sharers as, by their presence at the time when the bond was executed, might impliedly be considered to have acquiesced in such execution. *MOHESH CHUNDER BANERJEE v. RAM PROSONNO CHOWDHRY* . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 539

20. — Suit by one of several shareholders for accounts and papers, etc. A suit by one of two shareholders to recover certain accounts and papers alleged to have been kept by her agents will lie; such a suit stands upon different grounds from a suit by one of several joint land-owners suing separately for his rent. *PUDDOMONEE DOSSEE v. BANEE KANT GHOSE*

9 W. R. 344

21. — Lumberdar, suit by, for profits without consent or authority of co-sharers—*Suit for settlement of accounts*. The lumberdar of one putti of a mehal, who was a shareholder of both puttis of the mehal, sued the lumberdar of the other putti and a shareholder of such putti for profits divisible among the shareholders of the mehal generally, deducting the share of such profits belonging to the defendants. *Held*, that, as the suit was one for settlement of accounts between the body of shareholders in which it was necessary that all of them should be properly represented, and as the plaintiff was suing without their authority, the suit was not maintainable. *UDAI RAM v. GHULAM HUSAIN* . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 186

22. — Suit for mesne profits—*Trespass by unauthorized cultivator of land*. One of several co-sharers can maintain alone a suit for damages in the shape of mesne profits against a party who has been in exclusive possession of his share of the land by sowing indigo thereon. *CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. MACNAGHTEN* . 23 W. R. 386

23. — Suit for a settlement of accounts—*Suit for a share in the profits of a mehal—Limitation*. With reference to the periods of limitation prescribed by s. 94 of Act XII of 1881, a suit for a share of the profits of a mehal does not become a suit for a settlement of accounts, because, in order that a Court may give the plaintiff a decree, it is necessary for the Court to settle disputed items of credit and debit: but where the main object of the suit is to obtain a settlement of accounts between the plaintiff, recorded co-sharer, and the lumberdar, or between such plaintiff and one or more or all of the co-sharers in the village, although the ulterior object of obtaining such statement of accounts may be that the plaintiff may obtain a decree for a share, if any, of the profits, due to him, then the suit must be regarded as a suit for a settlement of accounts to which a period of one year's limitation applies. *ROHAN v. JWALA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 16 All. 333

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24. — Suit by a recorded co-sharer for recorded share of profits—*N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), ss. 93 and 94—Suit for settlement of accounts—Limitation*. Where one collecting co-sharer in a mehal sued other collecting co-sharers, not being lumberdars of the mehal, for a refund of profits which the plaintiff alleged the defendants to have collected over and above the shares which they were entitled to collect:—*Held*, by *TYRRELL and KNOX, JJ.*, that this was not a suit by a recorded co-sharer for a recorded share of the profits of a mehal within the meaning of the former portion of s. 93, cl. (h), of Act XII of 1881, but was a suit for a settlement of accounts within the meaning of the latter portion of the same clause; and that, such being the case, the period of limitation applicable was that prescribed by the third paragraph of s. 94 of the abovementioned Act. *Dabee Deen v. Goorga Pershad*, 3 N. W. 49, referred to by *TYRRELL, J. Per BURKITT, J., contra*—"The suit" . . . "may be considered to be a suit for profits within the meaning of the opening words of s. 93 (h) of the Rent Act, and cannot be considered to be a suit for 'a settlement of accounts' within the meaning of the concluding words of that clause." *Durga Prasad v. Dip Chand*, All. W. N. (1881), 27, *Kushalo v. Ram Das*, All. W. N. (1889), 171, *Dabee Deen v. Doorga Pershad*, 3 N. W. 49, referred to. *INDO*

I. L. R. 16 All. 28

25. — Suit by recorded co-sharer for recorded share of profits—*Adverse possession—Limitation*. The mere circumstance that a co-sharer's name is recorded in the revenue papers will not prevent a suit by him for his share of profits being barred by limitation if in fact he has received no profits for more than twelve years prior to such suit. *Maksood Ali Khan v. Ghazee-ooddeen*, 3 Agra 1858, and *Tulshi Singh v. Lachman Singh*, All. W. N. (1881) 20, followed. *MUHAMMAD HUSAIN v. BADRI PRASAD* . I. L. R. 17 All. 423

26. — Suit for recorded share of profits—*Suit for settlement of accounts—Limitation*. Where for the purposes of a suit in which a share of profits is claimed by a recorded co-sharer, either against the lumberdar or against one or more or all of the other co-sharers, the Court is asked to adjust the accounts, what has to be looked to is the main and substantial object of the suit. If the main and substantial object of the suit is to obtain a settlement of accounts, and the obtaining a decree for a share of the profits is only the ulterior object of obtaining such settlement of accounts, then the suit is to be regarded as a suit for settlement of accounts. If the main and substantial object of the suit is to recover a share of profits which the defendant has received in excess of what he is entitled to, and if the Court is only asked to go into the accounts incidentally to that main object,

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and for the purpose of determining whether the sum claimed is due, then the suit is not a suit for settlement of accounts merely, but it is a suit for a share of profits within the first category of s. 93 (b) of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, 1881. *Rohan v. Jwala Prasad*, I. L. R. 16 All. 333, explained. *Indo v. Indo*, I. L. R. 16 All. 28, referred to. *MUHAMMAD KARIM v. GANGA PANDE* . I. L. R. 22 All. 334

27. ——— *Suit against lumberdar for profits—Liability of heir of lumberdar.* The liability of a lumberdar to pay to a co-sharer the profits which the lumberdar has failed through his gross negligence to collect is a personal liability and cannot be enforced against the lumberdar's legal representative. *Gulab v. Fateh Chand*, All. W. N. (1886) 32, referred to. *MURAD-UN-NISSA v. GHULAM SAJJAD* . I. L. R. 20 All. 73

BIR NARAIN v. GIRDHAR LAL

I. L. R. 20 All. 74 note

28. ——— *Suit by one co-sharer to set aside alienation made without his consent—Alienation by tenant of co-sharer.* Although one co-sharer cannot eject a tenant from a holding in an undivided estate in which the tenants are tenants of the whole body of co-sharers, yet a co-sharer is entitled to sue to set aside an alienation made by a tenant to a stranger without consent of the zamindars. *SOPHA RAM v. GUNGA PERSHAD*

2 N. W. 260

29. ——— *Assignment of share by one co-sharer without consent of others—Right of Assignee.* Held, in accordance with the principles laid down by the Privy Council in *Byjnath Lal v. Ramooddeen Chowdhry*, 21 W. R. 233: L. R. 1 I. A. 106, viz., that one co-sharer in a joint and undivided estate cannot deal with his share so as to affect the other co-sharers, but his assignee takes subject to their rights, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief they sought for, and their suit must be dismissed. *SHARAT CHUNDER BURMON v. HURGOBINDO BURMON* . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 510

30. ——— *Suit for cancellation of leave for forfeiture—Parties—Breach of covenant.* Where it is optional with several joint lessors to avail themselves of a condition of re-entry upon breach of certain covenants, one or more of the lessors cannot insist upon a forfeiture without the consent of the others. Held, therefore, in a suit which was brought for the cancellation of a mukurari lease, and the recovery of sir possession, on the ground of forfeiture for breach of covenant, that all the co-sharers should join as plaintiffs; and that, as some of the co-sharers, who were made defendants, appeared and opposed the cancellation of the lease, the suit must be dismissed. *REASUT HOSSEIN v. CHOWAR SING* . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 470

9 C. L. R. 260

CO-SHARER—contd.**3. SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—contd.****(b) MISCELLANEOUS SUITS—concl'd.**

31. ——— *Suits for rents collected by one co-sharer in respect of another's share—Intermeddler—Suit for recovery of rents—Intermeddler, liability of.* The lessee of two-thirds of a five biswas zamindari share asserted and exercised a right of collecting rents in respect not only of the two-thirds, but also of the remaining one-third. It appeared that he made these collections not as a matter of contract, but as an intermeddler and in defiance of the wishes of the holder of the one-third share. Subsequently a suit was brought against him by a purchaser of the five biswas for recovery of rents so collected, the claim extending to rents which the defendant might have collected, but neglected to collect, and which were consequently lost to the plaintiff. Held, that the defendant, not having been under any obligation to collect the rents of the one-third share, could not be made liable for any of such rents which he had not actually collected, and that, as the collection expenses had exceeded the amount collected, the suit must be dismissed. *BALWANT SINGH v. GOKARAN PRASAD* . I. L. R. 9 All. 519

32. ——— *Damages, suit for—Non-joinder of lessee as plaintiff—Parties.* In a suit by one of two lessees against the lessor for damages for cancelling the lease, the other lessee was made a defendant. Held, that the suit was not bad for non-joinder of the second lessee as plaintiff; nor for the reason that the plaintiff could not prosecute the suit against him or obtain any relief against him; and that he was rightly made a defendant in the suit. *Kattusheri Pishareth Kanna Pisharody v. Vallotil Manakel Narayanan Somayajipad*, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 234, followed. *VITHILINGA PADAYACHI v. VITHILINGA MUDALI* . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 111

33. ——— *Bengal Tenancy Act (Act VIII of 1865), s. 188—Suit for recovery of damages by some of several joint landlords.* A suit for recovery of damages for recovery of value of trees cut down by tenant is maintainable at the instance of one of several joint landlords. *HRISIKES SINGHA v. SADHU CHARAN LOHAR*

2 C. W. N. 80

(c) EJECTMENT.

34. ——— *Ejectment of tenant taken by all the co-sharers—Stranger admitted without consent of all.* When all the co-sharers have allowed a tenant to enter and occupy land, the tenant cannot be ejected without the consent of all. *LUTCHMAN PERSHAD v. DABEE DEEN*

3 Agra 264

GOUREE SUNKUR SURMAH v. TIRTHO MONEE

12 W. R. 452

HULODHUR SEN v. GOOROO DOSS ROY

20 W. R. 126

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DINOBUNDHOO GHOSE v. DROBO MOYEE DOSSIA
24 W. R. 110

35. ——— Suit by some co-sharers to eject tenant taken by others. One or more co-sharers cannot allow a stranger to occupy a portion of the mouzah without the consent of the other co-sharers, unless they are authorized to act on behalf of the other co-sharers, and the dissentient co-sharers may sue to eject him. LUTCHMUN PERSHAD v. DABEE DEEN . . . 3 Agra 264

36. ——— Ejectment of person put in possession by all the co-sharers—*Trespassers—Decree*. Where a tenant has been put into possession of ijmali property with the consent of all the co-sharers, no one or more of the co-sharers can turn the tenant out without the consent of the others; but no person has a right to intrude upon ijmali property against the will of the co-sharers or any of them; if he does so, he may be ejected without notice either altogether if all the co-sharers join in the suit, or partially if only some wish to eject him. The legal means by which such a partial ejectment is effected is by giving the plaintiffs possession of their shares jointly with the intruder as explained in *Hulodhur Sen v. Gooroo Dass Roy*, 20 W. R. 126. RADHA PROSAD WASTI v. ESUF

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 434: 9 C. L. R. 76

GHUNSHYAM SINGH v. RUNJEET SINGH

4 W. R., Act X, 39

Contra, MURDUN SINGH v. NURPUT SINGH

2 W. R. 290

and LUCHMUN SAHAJ CHOWDHRY v. SEAMI JHA

5 W. R., Act X, 93

37. ——— Partial ejectment and joint possession. A decree for partial ejectment and joint possession can be made in favour of a co-owner of property. *Hulodhur Sen v. Gooroo Dass Roy*, 20 W. R. 126, and *Radha Prosad Wasti v. Esuf*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 434, approved of. KAMAL KUMARI CHOWDHRANI v. KIRAN CHANDRA ROY

2 C. W. N. 229

38. ——— Ejectment, suit for, of trespasser—*Tenant of one co-sharer*. Any one of several joint tenants of land may sue to eject a trespasser. The consent of one joint tenant to the possession of a trespasser does not make him less a trespasser with regard to other joint tenants. TEELUK RAI v. RAMJUS RAI . . . 5 N. W 182

39. ——— Ejectment, suit for, by some only of the co-sharers. Some of the co-sharers are not entitled to sue for ejectment unless all the co-sharers join in the suit. Where, however, the lumberdar collects as manager for the whole community, he can sue for and obtain ejectment without joining the co-sharers as plaintiffs. HIDAYATULLAH v. Inderjeet Tewaree

2 Agra 282

CO-SHARER—contd.**3. SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—contd.****(c) EJECTMENT—contd.**

40. ——— Suit for ejectment by one of two co-sharers—*Sole manager of estate*. Where a suit was brought by one of two co-sharers to recover land from a tenant, not only in the absence of, but against the express desire of, the other co-sharer:—*Held*, that the suit was not maintainable, and that the plaintiff could only sue jointly with his co-sharer, though the plaintiff was sole manager of the joint estate. *Umanna v. Purshotam*, S. A. No. 379 of 1873, followed. KRISHNARAV JAHAGIRDAR v. GOBIND TRIMBAK . . . 12 Bom. 85

41. ——— Suit by one co-sharer as manager—*Parties—Failure of tenant to pay enhanced rent after notice*. A co-sharer who is manager cannot, even with the consent of his co-sharers, maintain a suit by himself and in his own name to eject a tenant who has failed to comply with a notice calling on him to pay enhanced rent. BALKRISHNA SAKHARAM v. MORO KRISHNA DABHOLKAR . . . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 154

42. ——— Suit to eject trespasser—*Suit to restrain trespass*. If raiyats are interfered with in the occupation of their land, they have a right to sue for an injunction restraining the trespasser from interference; but if they are ousted, the zamindar has a right to bring an action against the trespasser to recover possession. Where land is held in joint proprietorship, an action to recover it from a stranger in wrongful possession must be brought in the name of all the proprietors jointly. NUNDUN LALL v. LLOYD . . . 22 W. R. 74

43. ——— Suit for ejectment of tenant of a Fishery. A suit will not lie to eject a tenant of a joint fishery unless all the joint proprietors are joined as parties. DOLI SATI v. IKRAM ALI

4 C. L. R. 63

44. ——— Suit by one co-sharer for ejectment of tenant on determination of tenancy. The purchaser of a two-thirds share of a tank sued to obtain khas possession from the tenant whose sons had purchased the remaining one-third share. *Held*, that, on the tenancy being shown to have been determined, the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for khas possession. GOPI NATH CHATTERJEE v. MODHU SUDUN DEY . . . 11 C. L. R. 51

45. ——— Act XL of 1858—*Certificated guardian, power of, to grant lease—Unauthorized transfer, effect of*. A lease for a term of 12 years, but renewable at the pergunnah rate and transferable in its character, granted by a certificated guardian, without the authority of the Court, is void *ab initio*, and will therefore not avail the lessee, even for the period of five years for which such guardian is at liberty to grant the lease. *Held*, accordingly, that in the case of ijmali property, whether such a lease was executed by the guardian conjointly with the co-sharers of the minor

CO-SHARER—*contd.*3. SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*(c) EJECTMENT—*concl.*

or separately, the minor was entitled to eject the lessee as a trespasser in respect of his own share without making his co-sharers parties to the suit. *Quære*: Whether such a lease granted by a certificated guardian conjointly with the co-sharers of a minor, and thus creating one and the same tenancy, is not also void as against the co-sharers. HARENDRA NARAIN SINGH CHOWDHRY v. MORAN

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 40

(d) KABULIATS.

46. ——— Suit to enforce joint kabuliati. Where a kabuliati creates an obligation from a tenant to two parties jointly, the obligation can only be properly enforced by a suit brought by those parties jointly. GOPAL CHUNDER GOOHO v. JUGGODUMBA DOSSEE

10 W. R. 411

Even where there is an allegation that the plaintiff has been realizing his quota of rent separately for years. KALEE CHURN SINGH v. SOLANO

24 W. R. 267

47. ——— Suit by one co-sharer on joint kabuliati—*Parties*. A kabuliati was executed by one of the defendants to the plaintiff for the entire sixteen annas of an estate, of which the plaintiff admitted, at the time of the execution of the kabuliati, he was only proprietor of eight annas. The owner of the other eight annas share was made a defendant in a suit brought by the plaintiff in the Revenue Court to recover his share of the rent under the kabuliati. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue separately for his share of the rent, even though he made his co-sharer defendant to the suit. KALINATH BANERJEE v. MAHOMED HOSSEIN

6 B. L. R. 528 note: 13 W. R. 469

48. ——— *Parties*. Where a tenant had executed a kabuliati to four persons:—*Held* two of them could not sue him for arrears of rent in the Collector's Court, making their other two co-sharers, or their representatives, defendants jointly with him. GANGA GOBIND SEN v. GOBIND CHANDRA ROY

4 B. L. R. Ap. 39

49. ——— *Parties*. A kabuliati was executed in respect of certain lands by B, P, and K in favour of R, by which they agreed to pay to R an annual rent of Rs. 9,000. R died, leaving two daughters. In a suit in the Revenue Court by one of the daughters against B, P, and the representatives of K to recover a moiety of the rents due for a certain period under the kabuliati, the other daughter refused to join as a plaintiff, and was not made a defendant. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue alone, or without making her sister a party to the suit. On her sister's refusal to join as a plaintiff, she ought to have been made a defendant. JAGADAMBA DASI v. HARAN CHANDRA DUTT

6 B. L. R. 526 note: 10 W. R. 108

CO-SHARER—*contd.*3. SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*(d) KABULIATS—*contd.*

50. ——— It is not competent to landlords to whom a joint kabuliati has been given without any specification of shares to institute separate suits, and to call upon the Collector, on the original contract between the parties, to apportion to each plaintiff that share of the rents to which he may be entitled. KALEE CHURN SINGH v. SOLANO

8 W. R. 200

51. ——— Suit by one co-sharer for kabuliati. A proprietor of a fractional share of an undivided estate may sue to obtain a kabuliati from the raiyat without making his co-sharers parties, when there is no dispute as to his share, and when the tenant has paid him rent separately for his share. RAMNATH RAKHIT v. CHAND HARI BHUYA

6 B. L. R. 356: 14 W. R. 432

SALEHOONISSA KHATOON v. MOHESH CHUNDER ROY

17 W. R. 452

52. ——— *Proprietor of fractional share in estate*. A proprietor of a fractional share of an undivided estate, though receiving a definite portion of the rent from [the raiyat, is not entitled to maintain against him a suit for a separate kabuliati in respect of such undivided share. SARAT-SUNDARI DEBI v. WATSON

S. C. SURUT SOONDERY DABEE v. WATSON

11 W. R. 25

53. ——— *Proprietor of fractional share*. One of the shareholders of an undivided zamindari cannot institute a suit to obtain a separate kabuliati from a raiyat for his fractional share thereof. UDAYA CHARAN DHAR v. KALITARA DASI

S. C. WOODCOY CHUNDER DHUR v. KALEE TARA DASSIA

11 W. R. 393

See also INDRA CHANDRA DUGAR v. BINDABAN BHARA

8 B. L. R. 252

15 W. R. F. B. 21

54. ——— Joint shrotriyamdars—*Madras Rent Act (Madras Act VIII of 1865, s. 99)*—*Distinct contract by tenant in respect of a share*. The plaintiff was one of two joint shrotriyamdars. In 1288 the defendant accepted a pottah from, and executed a muchalka to, him in respect of the half share of the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued to enforce acceptance of a pottah and execution of a muchalka or 1290 and for arrears of rent. *Held*, that the suit lay without joinder of the other joint shrotriyamdar. PURUSHOTTAMA v. RAJU

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 11

55. ——— *Tenant taking lease from co-sharer for his own separate share of holding*. When a tenant has taken a lease from one of several joint landlords in respect of his own share of the holding, the landlord is entitled

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to sue for rent without joining his co-sharers.
BEHARY CHURN SEN v. BHUT NATH PRAMANICK
3 C. W. N. 214

56. Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 178.—*Suit by a co-sharer landlord for additional rent, whether maintainable if the other co-sharer is not made a party—Right of suit.* Where a co-sharer landlord brings a suit against a raiyat for arrears of rent and for additional rent on the basis of a kabuliya, executed by the raiyat, in which the right of the plaintiff to certain rent was admitted, and his right to additional rent for lands found on measurement to be in excess of the area stated was also admitted, and the right of the plaintiff and the liability of the defendant were distinctly set out as the basis of the agreement between the parties without any reference to the right of any other co-sharer landlord: *Held*, that such a suit is maintainable, although plaintiffs' co-sharer is not made a party. *Held*, also, that s. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not affect the co-sharer landlord's right under the kabuliya unless the right to make such an agreement is otherwise forbidden by the Bengal Tenancy Act, and that s. 178, which is the only section which deals with the full action of landlords and tenants in the matter of contract, does not refer to such a matter. *Baidya Nath De Sarkar v. Jhin*, 2 C. W. N. 44, distinguished. *Panchanan Banerjee v. Raj Kumar Guha*, 1. L. R. 19 Cal. 610; and *Hurry Churn Bose v. Ranjit Singh*, 1 C. W. N. 521, referred to. *GOBIND CHANDRA PAL v. HAMIDULLA BHUTAN* (1903). **7 C. W. N. 670**

(e) RENT.

57. Parties. One of several joint landlords is competent to sue for the entire rent due from a tenant making his co-sharers parties to the suit. *PREM CHAND NUSKUR v. MOKSHODA DEBI*. **I. L. R. 14 Cal. 201**

58. Suit for separate share of rent—Parties. One of several co-sharers cannot sue for his separate share of the rent without making his co-sharers parties to the suit. *INDROMONEE BURMONEE v. SUROOP CHUNDER PAUL*
12 B. L. R. 291 note: 15 W. R. 395

HURKISHOR DAS BHOOLA v. JOOGUL KISHOR SABA ROY **12 B. L. R. 293 note: 16 W. R. 281**

NANOO ROY v. JHOOMUCK LALL DOSS
12 B. L. R. 292 note: 18 W. R. 376

59. Joint property—Form of suit—Parties. If ijmal property is let to a tenant at an entire rent, the rent is due in its entirety to all the co-sharers, and all are bound to sue for it; no one co-sharer can sue to recover the amount of his share separately, whether the co-

CO-SHARER—contd.**3. SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—contd.****(e) RENT—contd.**

sharers are made parties or not. But if the land demised ceases to be ijmal and different portions of it become the property of different owners, any one of the owners may sue for so much of the rent as he considers himself entitled to, making the other owners parties to the suit. Where co-sharers of ijmal land let to a tenant at an entire rent brought a suit against their tenant to recover their proportionate shares of the rent, and made the other co-sharers defendants, avowedly for the purpose of obtaining an adjudication of their title as between themselves and the defendants other than the tenant:—*Held*, that, as the area of the property had not been divided, as the rent had always been paid in its entirety, and as the title of all the co-sharers remained ijmal, the suit would not lie. *ANNODA CHURN ROY v. KALLY COOMAR ROY*
I. L. R. 4 Cal. 89: 2 C. L. R. 484

60. Suit for arrears of rent by undivided co-sharer against co-sharer. An undivided co-sharer cannot maintain a suit for arrears of rent against an occupant of the estate without evidence that the rents due to such co-sharer have been separately collected, or that there was an agreement to pay them separately. Still less can such a suit be maintained where the defendant is himself a co-sharer. *DINOBUNDHOO CHOWDHRY v. DINONATH MOOKERJEE*. **19 W. R. 168**

61. Extent of shares admitted. In a mehal where by custom each co-sharer collects his proportionate share of rent from the common tenants:—*Held*, that the several co-sharers can, where the extent of their shares is admitted by the tenants, sue to recover their respective shares of rent. *HIDAYETOOLLAH v. Inderjeet TEWAREE*. **2 Agra 282**

62. Ascertained shares. Shareholders whose shares are clearly ascertained may sue for their respective shares of the rent payable to them without waiting for the other parties entitled to rent joining the suit, or without adding them as parties. *UMRIT CHOWDHRY v. HYDER ALI*. **W. R. 1864, Act X, 63**

MOHAMMED SINGH v. MUGHY CHOWDHRAIN
1 W. R. 253

63. Separate allotment and arrangement to pay separately. When by a specific arrangement the sharers in an undivided mehal had divided the cultivated lands, assigning definite portions to the shareholders severally, the rents of which they would be entitled to receive from the cultivators cultivating such plots respectively:—*Held*, that such sharers stand to such cultivators in the relation of landlord and tenant, and are competent alone to bring suits against their cultivators. *Hidayetoolah v. Inderjeet Tewaree*, 2

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Agra 282, distinguished. *JANKEE DASS v. MA-HOMED* . . . 1 N. W. Part 2, 16 : Ed. 1873, 76

64. ———— *Co-sharer occupying more than his own share.* Where a co-sharer occupies a larger portion than his own share, or the whole estate, by renting the land he occupies from one or more of his co-sharers, he may be sued for the rent by the person or persons with whom he engaged. Where a co-sharer occupies more than his own share, or holds the whole estate by renting the land he occupies from one or more of his co-sharers, the liability of the cultivating shareholder to payment must, in the absence of usage, agreement, or evidence, be deemed single and entire. But if there is an agreement, express or implied, that the occupying shareholder shall pay separately to each of his co-proprietors a definite sum, such sum may be recovered by each co-proprietor by a separate rent suit. *KALEE PERSHAD v. LUTAFUT HOSSEIN* . . . 12 W. R. 418

65. ———— *Collusion of other sharers with tenant.* One of three co-sharers of certain property, the rent of which was paid by the tenant to a person acting as agent of the co-sharers, from whom they received it in proportion to their respective shares, brought a suit against the tenant for her share of the rent of which she alleged her co-sharers were colluding with the tenant to deprive her. To this suit she made her co-sharers defendants. The defendants alleged that she had not received, and was not entitled to receive, the rent from the tenant; but the lower Courts found these facts in her favour, and gave her a decree. It was objected on special appeal that the suit would not lie, inasmuch as the plaintiff, being one of several co-sharers, was not competent to sue alone for her share of the rent. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, and the co-sharers having been made defendants, the suit was maintainable. *DOORGA CHURN SURMA v. JAMPA DASSEE*

12 B. L. R. F. B. 289 : 21 W. R. 46

66. ———— *Agreement to pay separately.* A landlord, one of several co-sharers, cannot sue a tenant of the joint estate for his separate share of the rent unless the tenant has paid or agreed to pay him separately. *GANGA NARAYAN DAS v. SARODA MOHAN ROY CHOWDHRY*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 230 : 12 W. R. 30

RAKHAL CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY v. MAHTAB KHAN . . . 25 W. R. 221

BEIJOKISHORE BHUTTACHARJEE v. OOMA SOONDUREE DEBIA . . . 23 W. R. 37

BYKUNT KYBURTO DOSS v. SHUSHEE MOHUN PAL CHOWDHRY . . . 22 W. R. 526

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SREE MISSER v. CROWDY . . . 15 W. R. 243

NUSSURUT ALI v. ABDOL KAREEM CHOWDHRY . . . 11 W. R. 373

RAMJOY SINGH v. NAGUR GAZEE . . . 5 W. R., Act X, 68

67. ———— *Specification of land of which rent is sued for.* One of undivided joint sharers of land cannot sue alone for his share of the rent of the land without specifying the land in respect of which the suit is brought. *BHYRUB MUNDUL v. GUNGARAM BONERJEE*

12 B. L. R. 290 note : 17 W. R. 408

68. ———— *Costs.* Each of two shareholders in a talukh sued separately for his share of the rent due from a tenant who held under one *kabuliat*. *Held*, that when both the shareholders were before the Court, though in different suits, the suits were maintainable, but that no more costs were to be awarded to the plaintiffs than if they had sued jointly. *PYARI MOHAN SING v. GAZI*

2 B. L. R. A. C. 337 : 11 W. R. 270

69. ———— *Landlord and Tenant—Collusion of other sharers with tenant.* Where one of a number of co-sharers of certain property, the rent of which was paid by the tenants to a person acting as agent of the co-sharers, from whom they received it in proportion to their respective shares, brought a suit against the tenants for arrears of rent, and it appeared that the agent had been dismissed by the other co-sharers without the consent of the plaintiff, and contrary to her wish, and that she had given notice to the tenants to continue the payment of her share as before and not to pay any newly-appointed agent, and it also appeared that the other co-sharers were colluding with the tenants and the plaintiff made them parties defendants with the tenant:—*Held*, that such a suit would not lie, and that the proper course to pursue was that pointed out in *Tara Chunder Banerjee v. Ameer Mundle*, 22 W. R. 394. *JADOO SHAT v. KADUMBINEE DASSEE*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 150 : 8 C. L. R. 445

70. ———— *N.-W. P. Rent Act (XVIII of 1873), s. 106—Lease to mortgagors.* B and N, the mortgagees of a mehal, granted the mortgagors a lease thereof, the mortgagors agreeing to pay "the mortgagees" a certain rent half-yearly "on account of the right they held in equal shares," and that "in default in payment of such rent the mortgagees should be entitled to sue for payment." The mortgagors having made default in payment of the rent and N refusing to join in a suit against the mortgagors to enforce payment, B sued them alone for a moiety of the rent due. *Held per SPANKIE, J.*, that s. 106 of Act XVIII of 1873 did not apply, and B was entitled separately to sue for the whole of the rent. *SHIB GOPAL v. BALDEO SAHAJ* . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 264

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71. ———— *Joint payment of rent to co-sharers.* Where a tenant, who held under co-sharers, to whom he had been accustomed to pay his rent jointly, was sued by one of the co-sharers, the others being made defendants to the suit, and pleaded that he had paid the rent to his co-defendants who admitted receipt thereof:—*Held* the suit should be dismissed; the remedy of the co-sharer who has not received his share of the rent is against his co-sharers, not against the tenant.

AHAMUDEEN v. GRISH CHUNDER SHAMUNT

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 350

72. ———— *Suit for rent—Tenant settled on the land by a trespasser, Position of—Joint landlords—Payment of rent by a tenant to some of the landlords, whether sufficient discharge from liability to other landlords—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 157 and 188.* A suit was brought by the plaintiffs against a tenant for the entire rent, making the co-sharer landlords also defendants to the suit. The defence of the tenant, defendant No. 1, was denial of relationship of landlord and tenant, and payment to the co-sharer landlords: *Held*, that the payment to the co-sharer landlord, defendants Nos. 2 and 3, was not sufficient to discharge the defendant No. 1 from liability to the plaintiffs. *Ahamudeen v. Grish Chunder Shamunt*, **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 350**, distinguished. *AZIM SIRDAR v. RAMLALL SHAHA*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 324

73. ———— *Collusion of co-sharers with tenant—Parties.* A co-sharer, on the allegation that a tenant, in collusion with the rest of the co-sharers in the estate, had withheld the payment of his rent (hitherto paid jointly to all the co-sharers), brought a suit for the recovery of his share of the arrears of rent, making the tenant and all the colluding shareholders defendants to the suit. *Held*, that such suit was maintainable. *JADU DASS v. SUTHERLAND*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 556; 3 C. L. R. 223

74. ———— *Separate payment of rent—Admission of claim—Suit for fractional share of rent.* The plaintiff alleging himself to be a fourteen annas shareholder in a zamindari, sued a tenant for a proportionate share of the rent due to him as such shareholder. The other co-sharers were made defendants, but did not contest the suit. *Held*, that, inasmuch as it had been shown that the tenant-defendant had, on previous occasions, paid the plaintiff rent separately, though not in the proportionate share now demanded by him, and it being further to be presumed that the co-sharers admitted the plaintiff's claim, such suit would lie. *GUNCANARAIN SIKKAR v. SREENATH BANERJEE*. **I. L. R. 5 Calc. 915; 6 C. L. R. 16**

75. ———— *Suit for arrears of rent—Liability of tenant acquiescing in arrange-*

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ment for separate payment. Where on the consent of all the shareholders, landlords, a tenant in an undivided property has agreed to pay the different sharers the rent of the tenure in proportion to their respective shares, and can be and has been sued for the rent of a particular share, it is not open to such tenant to cease from paying the proportionate fraction of the rent due in accordance with his agreement, except on the consent of the owner of that particular share. Where co-sharers in an undivided property acquiesce in a decision declaring one of their number the owner of a recognized share in such property, it is not open to a tenant (who had previously agreed to pay his rent in accordance with the shares of the respective part-owners) to refuse payment of the proportionate share of the rent claimed by such co-sharer as the owner of the recognized share, simply on the ground that he had never before paid rent so proportioned to such co-sharer. *LOOTFULHUCK v. GOPEE CHUNDER MOJOOMDAR*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 941; 6 C. L. R. 402

76. ———— *Arrangement for separate payment of rents—Evidence of arrangement—Parties—Suits for arrears of rent—Suit for kabuliati—Cancellation of lease.* Where it has been arranged between the co-sharers of an estate and their tenant that he shall pay each co-sharer his proportionate share of the entire rent, each co-sharer may bring a separate suit against the tenant for such proportionate share. In the absence of such an arrangement, no such suit can be maintained. Such an arrangement may be evidenced either by direct proof or by usage from which its existence may be presumed, and is perfectly consistent with the continuance of the original lease of the entire tenure. But an arrangement of this nature will not enable one co-sharer to sue the tenant for a kabuliati, for a co-sharer who obtains a kabuliati, is bound at the request of the tenant to give him a pottah upon the same terms, and the grant and acceptance of a binding lease of any separate share cannot exist contemporaneously with an original lease of the entire tenure. The cancellation and determination of the original lease ought not to be presumed from the mere fact of a separate payment of rent to one or more of the co-sharers. *GUNI MAHOMED v. MORAN. DOORGA PERSHAD MYTEE v. JOYNARAIN HAZRA*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 96; 2 C. L. R. 371

77. ———— *Presumption as to separate payment of rent—Agreement for separate payment.* It has often been decided that, from the fact of rent having been collected for some time by one of several co-sharers separately, an agreement for payment of the separate rent of a share could be presumed. *Held* (on appeal from *AINSLIE, J.*), that the facts of this case were not

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sufficient to warrant the making of such a presumption. *ANOO MUNDUL v. KAMALOODDEEN*

1 C. L. R. 248

KAMALOODDEEN v. ANOO MUNDUL

1 C. L. R. 564

78. ———— *Rent paid to person without title.* Where a tenant, knowing that a co-proprietor has been in possession of a share for a very long time, and after distinct notice, paid rent which belonged to the said sharer to another person who had no title at all, it was held that a suit by that single proprietor for his share of the rent was maintainable. *DINOBUNDOO ROY v. OOMA CHURN CHOWDHRY* . . . 23 W. R. 53

79. ———— *Lease—Suit by one of several joint lessors for balance of rent—Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), s. 106.* M and S were joint lessors of certain land by a kabuliati which did not contain any specification of the shares of the lessors. M, stating that the share of rent due to S had already been paid, sued the lessee for the recovery of his own share. The amount claimed was all that remained due on the lease. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled, as one of the joint lessors, to sue for the balance of rent, and that his suit was therefore not barred by the terms of s. 106 of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act (XII of 1881). *Manohar Das v. Manzur Ali*, 1 L. R. 5 All. 40, referred to. *Quere*: Whether the kabuliati whereon the suit was based might not be called a "special contract" within the meaning of s. 106 of the Rent Act, so as to render that section inapplicable. *MURLIDHAR v. ISHRI PRASAD* . . . 1 L. R. 6 All. 576

80. ———— *Suit by some co-sharers for proportionate amount of rent making others defendants.* Three out of five co-sharers, proprietors of certain mouzahs, brought a suit against the patnidars for the proportionate amount of the rent due to them, and for the determination of that amount, making the two remaining sharers defendants. *Held*, that the suit was properly framed. *SREENATH CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. MOHESH CHUNDER BUNDOPADHYA* 1 C. L. R. 453

81. ———— *Claim to whole rent or whole balance due.* One of several co-sharers can bring a suit for rent, making his co-sharers parties, only when he claims in such suit the whole rent due to all the shareholders, or, where any portion of it has been paid, the whole unpaid balance. *DINO NATH LAKHAN v. MOHURUM MULLICK* 7 C. L. R. 138

82. ———— *Suit by co-sharer making another defendant without asking him to join as plaintiff.* Two of four persons who were jointly entitled to rent of a talukh purchased

CO-SHARER—*contd.*3. SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*(e) RENT—*contd.*

the talukh. One of the two other co-sharers thereupon sued the purchasers for the balance of rent after deducting the amount to which the purchasers were entitled as zamindars, and he made the fourth co-sharer a defendant without having asked him to join as a plaintiff. The lower Appellate Court dismissed the suit as improperly framed. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not bound to ask the first co-sharer to join as plaintiff, and that the suit was properly framed. *TARINI KANT LAHIRI v. NUND KISHORE PATRONOVIS* . . . 12 C. L. R. 588

83. ———— *Suit by co-sharer making another defendant—Failure to show refusal to join as plaintiff.* When one of several co-sharers brought a suit for arrears of rent due to all of them, and made the other co-sharers defendants in the suit, on the allegation that they were not willing to join as plaintiffs though asked to do so, and the co-sharers did not appear, the Courts below dismissed the claim for the entire rent on the ground that there was no evidence to show that the co-sharer defendants refused to join as plaintiffs. *Held*, that there was no authority for dismissing the claim on that ground. *Tarini Kant Lahiri v. Nund Kishore Patronovis*, 12 C. L. R. 588, referred to. *BISSESSWAR ROY CHOWDHRY v. BROJO KANT ROY CHOWDHRY* . . . 1 C. W. N. 221

84. ———— *Rent, suit for—Parties—Right of some of several co-sharers to sue alone—Refusal to join suit as plaintiffs.* It is only when plaintiffs can show that those entitled as co-sharers to join with them have refused to join, or have otherwise acted prejudicially to the plaintiffs' interest, that they are entitled to sue alone and make their co-sharers defendants in the suit, *DWARKANATH MITTER v. TARA PROSUNNA ROY* 1 L. R. 17 Calc. 160

JIBANTI NATH KHAN v. GOKOOL CHUNDER CHOWDHRY . . . 1 L. R. 19 Calc. 760

85. ———— *Right of some of several co-contractors to sue alone—Refusal to join in the suit as plaintiff, effect of.* Where two parties contract with a third party, a suit by one of them making the other a co-defendant ought not to be dismissed merely because the plaintiff has not proved that the co-defendant had refused to join as a co-plaintiff. *PYARI MOHUN BOSE v. KEDAR NATH ROY* . . . 1 L. R. 26 Calc. 409

PYARI MOHUN BOSE v. NOBIN CHUNDER ROY 3 C. W. N. 271

86. ———— *Suit for rent by one of several co-sharers—Rent suit—Landlord and tenant—Parties.* A suit for arrears of rent cannot be brought by one of several co-sharers unless it is shown that the co-sharers are unwilling to join as plaintiffs. *SHOSHEE SHEKHARESWAR ROY v. GIRIS CHANDRA LAHIRI* . . . 1 C. W. N. 659

CO-SHARER—*contd.*3. SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*(e) RENT—*contd.*

87. ————— *Co-sharers, suit by one of several, for separate share of rent, or in alternative for whole rent due if more than share claimed should be found due—Parties.* The plaintiffs, some of the co-sharers in certain lands, instituted a suit against a tenant and the remaining co-sharer P, alleging that the tenant held under a pottah granted by all the co-sharers; that rent was due from him for the period in suit; and that they had ascertained from P that he alleged that he had received his share of the rent for that period from the tenant, and that he refused to join as plaintiff in the suit. They accordingly prayed (a) for a decree for the amount of their share of the rent against the tenant; (b) if it should appear that any part of P's share of the rent remained unpaid, the requisite extra Court-fee might be received and a decree made for whole of the arrears in favour of themselves and P, and that the latter might, if he consented, be made a co-plaintiff; (c) that if it appeared that P had realized more than his share of the rent, a decree might be made against him for the excess and against the tenant for the balance. The plaintiff also asked for costs and further relief. The tenant contested the suit and submitted that it was in effect a suit for plaintiff's share of the rent only, and could not therefore be maintained. He further pleaded that the plaintiffs and P were members of a joint Hindu family, of which P was the manager, and that, under arrangement with the latter, he had applied the rent due under the pottah towards the liquidation of debts due under bonds in P's name, but for which the joint family were liable. The first Court dismissed the suit on the preliminary issue that it was in substance a suit for a specific share of the rent by some only of the co-sharers, and that, there being no agreement by the tenant to pay the co-sharers their respective shares of the rent separately, such a suit would not lie. *Held* (upholding the order of the lower Appellate Court), that the order of the first Court was wrong. The suit, as framed, was necessarily a suit in the alternative; and as the plaintiffs were necessarily not aware whether any portion of P's share of the rent was due or not, but believing that none was due, they could only claim their share, asking to have the plaint amended so as to include the whole rent due if it should appear that anything was due to P, and thus bring the suit within the rule that, in the absence of special agreement between a tenant and co-sharers to pay their rateable proportion of the rent, a suit by one of the co-sharers must be for the entire rent due, making his co-sharers defendants if they refuse to join as plaintiffs. The prayer of the plaint fully provided for this, and the suit should have been tried on its merits and the plaint amended if the facts proved showed that any rent remained unpaid and due

CO-SHARER—*contd.*3. SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*(e) RENT—*contd.*

to P as asked for by the plaintiffs. *PERGASH LAL v. AKHOWRI BALGOBIND SAHOY*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 735

88. ————— *Parties—Plaintiffs—Suit for adjustment of proportionate share of rent by one co-sharer—Lease, construction of.* A lease of certain land of which the plaintiff was a fractional co-sharer provided as follows:—"After the land in question is fully brought under cultivation, you shall pay rent without default, according to kists year after year, as per measurement and jummabandi at the said rate of Company's 10 annas 10 gundahs for the quantity of land that will be left after deducting beds of khals, pasture lands, lands unfit for cultivation, places of worship, *hajats*, *pujai basha bris*, and your remuneration for reclamation, upon measurement of all the lands by the standard rod used in the abads of the said talukh. On no account shall any larger amount be demanded." In a suit instituted when the land had been fully brought under cultivation, and after measurement, the plaintiff claimed only her own share of the rent and her co-sharers did not join her as co-plaintiffs, nor were they made defendants. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable. What the lease contemplated under the circumstances which had arisen was a final adjustment of the rent, and such an adjustment could be obtained only by a suit brought by all the co-sharers or by some of them if the others refused to join, but in that case the suit must be for the adjustment of the entire rent, and all the necessary parties must be properly before the Court. *BINDU BASHINI DAS v. PEARI MOHUN BOSE*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 107

89. ————— *Suit by a joint proprietor for arrears of rent—Kabuliat executed prior to Bengal Tenancy Act—Covenant for a higher rate—Enhancement of rent.* In a kabuliat executed in 1881, it was stipulated that, upon the expiry of the term of seven years fixed therein, a fresh lease should be executed that, should the defendant cultivate the lands without executing a fresh kabuliat, he would pay rent at the rate of R4 a bigha (a rate much higher than that fixed for the term). No fresh kabuliat was executed on expiry of the term, and the plaintiff, a part proprietor collecting rent separately, brought this suit for arrears of rent at the new rate of R4. The defendant objected, *inter alia*, that the plaintiff, being a part proprietor was not entitled to sue for enhanced rent. The first Court gave a decree at an enhanced rate. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the whole suit on the ground that, the suit being one for enhanced rent and the plaintiff a part proprietor, the suit did not lie. *Held*, that, the kabuliat having been executed before the Bengal Tenancy Act was passed, the present case did not come within the operation

CO-SHARER—*contd.*3. SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*(e) RENT—*concl'd.*

of that Act, and the plaintiff, although a part proprietor, could bring this suit. *Ram Chunder Chackrabutty v. Giridhar Dutt*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 755 followed. *TEJENDRO NARAIN SINGH v. BAKAI SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 658

90. ———— *Suit for rent under contract—Right of suit by one of several co-sharers for rent making the rest parties.* Plaintiff, the co-plaintiff, defendant No. 1 and other persons who also were defendants, held a tenure under which defendant No. 1 held an under-tenure. Plaintiff brought this suit for the whole of the rent, claiming only his own share of it, making those co-sharers defendants who did not join as plaintiffs. The terms of the defendant's pottah were that the whole of the lands being brought under cultivation, the landlords would be at liberty to measure the lands of the *ganti*, and if the land be found greater in quantity than 150 bighas, the tenant would pay rent at the rate of 10 annas per bigha. The lands being found greater than the said quantity, the plaintiff prayed for a decree for rent at that rate for the whole area. The defendant pleaded, *inter alia*, that the plaintiff, as a fractional sharer in the landlord's interest, could not sue him alone. *Held*, that, the plaintiff having sued for the whole rent and made all the non-joining co-sharers parties defendants, there was no defect in the suit. *Bindu Bashini Dasi v. Pearl Mohun Bose*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 107, *Tejendra Narain Singh v. Bakai Singh*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 658, referred to. *DINTARINI DAS v. BROUGHTON* . . . 3 C. W. N. 225

(f) ENHANCEMENT OF RENT.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT. S. 188.

91. ———— *Suit for enhanced rent on agreement of one of several co-shares.* The rent of a joint undivided tenure cannot be enhanced on the strength of an *ikrar* executed by one of the co-parceners. *HEMAYETOLLAH CHOWDHRY v. NIL KANT MULLICK* . . . 17 W. R. 139

92. ———— *Suit to enhance share of rent—Enhancement of rent, suit for, by one co-sharer.* Where rent, whether payable in money or in kind, to one person or several, is rendered under an entire contract or obligation, it is not competent for one of several co-sharers to bring a suit to enhance his portion of such rent. The fact of the claimant making the other co-sharers parties defendants in the suit cannot alter his rights, and there being a common interest in all the co-sharers, one of the number cannot proceed as if his rights were separate and distinct. *MAMOMED SAID-OD-DEEN v. MAHOMED HOSSEIN* . . . 2 N. W. 438

93. ———— *Enhancement, suit for, by one co-sharer.* One co-sharer cannot

CO-SHARER—*contd.*3. SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—*contd.*(f) ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—*contd.*

enhance the rent of his share, such an enhancement being inconsistent with the continuance of the lease of the entire tenure. *GUNI MAHOMED v. MORAN. DOORGA PROSHAD MYTEE v. JOYNARAIN HAZRA*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 96 : 2 C. L. R. 371

overruling on this point *DOORGA PROSHAD MYTEE v. JOYNARAIN HAZRA* . . . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 474 and *TROYLOCKOTARAN CHOWDHRY v. MATHOORA MOHUN DEY* . . . W. R. 1864, Act X, 41

94. ———— *A suit will not lie by one co-sharer for enhancement of the rent of a fractional part of the joint property. Quere: Is the owner of a fractional share of a superior tenure competent to maintain a suit for enhancement of rent of a fractional share of an under-tenure subordinate to the former?* *RAJ CHUNDER MOJOOMDAR v. RAJARAM GOPE* . . . 22 W. R. 385

95. ———— *Holder of specific share.* The holder of a specific share in an estate not regularly partitioned may sue for enhancement of his share of the rent. *RAM LOCHUN DUTT v. PETUMBER PAUL*

W. R. 1864, Act X, 111

96. ———— *A sharer in a joint estate not partitioned, although he may collect separately his share of rent, cannot enhance the rent without the concurrence of his co-parceners.* *SUJUN KOER v. HEITOO* . 1 N. W. 165 : Ed. 1873, 244

97. ———— *Right of sharer to enhance rent—Admission of claim.* Where there is no joint lease, and the plaintiff's share is not disputed, a suit for a *kabuliat* at an enhanced rent will lie. In such a case the suit must be for the enhancement of the rent of the whole of defendant's tenure, to enable the Courts to decide as to the proportion payable to plaintiff. *DOOKEE RAM SIRCAR v. GOWHUR MUNDUL* . 10 W. R. 307

98. ———— *Joint notice of enhancement—Separate suit for rent.* Although an estate is joint and the notice of enhancement prescribed by s. 13, Act X of 1859, was jointly issued by both the proprietors, yet where they collected their quota of rent from each of the common tenants, separately according to their respective shares, it was competent to one of them to claim alone for his share of the rent enhanced by the notice. *ISREE PERSHAD RAE v. TOOLSEE RAM* . 3 Agra 352

99. ———— *Enhancement of rent of a jote—Suit by one co-sharer for separate payment of rent.* A suit by the owner of an undivided share to enhance the rent of a jote, the tenant of which has been in the habit of paying his rent to each sharer separately, will not lie, even though plaintiff's co-sharers be made defendants to the suit. *RAJENDRO NARAIN BISWAS v. MOHENDRO LALL MITTER* . . . 3 C. L. R. 21

CO-SHARER—contd.**3. SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—contd.****(f) ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—contd.**

100. ————— *Suit by one of two joint khots for enhanced rent—Notice.* One of several tenants in common, joint tenants or coparceners (unless he is acting by consent of the others as manager of an estate) is not at liberty to enhance rent or eject tenants at his pleasure. *Doorga Prosad Mytee v. Joynarain Hazra*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 474, distinguished. *BALAJI BAIKAJI PINGE v. GOPAL BIN RAGHU KULI*. I. L. R. 3 Bom. 23

KRISHNARAY v. GOVIND

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 25 note

HIDAYETOULLAH v. Inderjeet Tewaree

2 Agra. 282

101. ————— *Evidence of previous enhancement in a suit by another co-zamindar.* More than twenty years before the institution of a suit for the enhancement of the rent of a share in a dependent talukh, the zamindari under which the talukh was held was partitioned under a batwara among three zamindars. A ten-anna share was allotted to one (the present plaintiff), a four-anna share to another, and a two-anna share a third. The talukhdars continued to hold the entire property, and paid the rent apportioned by law severally to each of the parties entitled. In 1861 the owner of the two-anna share obtained a decree against the talukhdars for enhancement of the rent of his share. In the present suit against the same talukhdars, the defendants contended that the rent of their talukh had not been changed for a period of more than twenty years before suit. *Held*, that the decree in the suit of 1861 had the effect of enhancing the rent payable for the whole talukh, that the plaintiff could avail herself of that decree, although she was not a party to it. *SARAT SOONDARY DABEA v. ANAND MOHUN SURMA GHUTTAK* I. L. R. 5 Calc. 273; 4 C. L. R. 448 *See HEM CHANDRA CHOWDHRY v. KALI PRASANNA BHADURI*. I. L. R. 26 Calc. 832

102. ————— *Arrangement for separate payment of rent—Suit for arrears of rent at enhanced rates—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 29.* One co-sharer cannot (even if he make his co-sharers parties to his suit) sue for the enhancement of his share of the rent, such an enhancement being inconsistent with the continuance of the lease of the entire tenure. *BHARRUT CHUNDER ROY v. KALLY DAS DEY*. I. L. R. 5 Calc. 574; 5 C. L. R. 545

103. ————— *Parties—Enhancement of rent—Separation of shares—Act XI of 1859, s. 10.* Two co-sharers, joint owners of a zamindari, caused their shares to be separately registered in the Collector's office under s. 10, Act XI of 1859. Subsequently one of the co-sharers sued certain persons (who held raiyati tenures in the co-sharers' zamindari) for enhancement of rent without making the other co-sharer a party. *Held*,

CO-SHARER—contd.**3. SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—contd.****(f) ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—contd.**

that no such suit would lie. *Guni Mahomed v. Moran*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 96, followed. *JOGENDRO CHUNDER GHOSE v. NOBIN CHUNDER CHOTTO-PADHYA*. I. L. R. 8 Calc. 353

104. ————— *Suit by one co-sharer—Parties.* Even if a single shareholder can raise the rent of a joint tenant without the consent of his co-parcener, he can only do so in a suit to which all the sixteen annas proprietors must be made parties. *GOPAL v. MACNAGHTEN*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 751

BHEEKOO v. OOMAR KHAN

1 N. W. Ed. 1873, 236

105. ————— *Notice of enhancement—Held*, in a suit for enhancement by one co-sharer, to which the other co-sharer was made a party, that one co-sharer is not competent to issue a proper notice of enhancement without the consent of the other co-sharers previously obtained, though the rent has been paid to each co-sharer separately. Under the ruling of the Full Bench, in the case of *Guni Mahomed v. Moran*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 96, he must first establish his right to a separate contract to recover his rent separately on his individual share. *KASHEEKISHORE ROY CHOWDHRY v. ALIP MUNDUL*. I. L. R. 6 Calc. 149; 7 C. L. R. 107

But see *CHUNI SINGH v. HERA MAHTO*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 633; 9 C. L. R. 37

and *ABDOOL HOSSEIN v. LALL CHAND MOHTAN*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 36; 13 C. L. R. 323

106. ————— *Notice of enhancement—Parties.* A and B were talukhdars of a certain village, each having an eight-anna share. A certain raiyat held a jote within the village, in respect of which he paid his rent separately—eight annas to A and eight annas to B. A served a notice of enhancement on the raiyat, but the notice was signed by A only and it did not appear that the consent of B had been previously obtained. A afterwards instituted a suit for arrears of rent at the enhanced rate, making B a defendant to the suit. *Held*, that the notice of enhancement was sufficient to maintain a suit so framed. *BIDHU BRUSHUN BASU v. KOMARADDI MUNDUL*. I. L. R. 9 Calc. 864

107. ————— *Suit for enhancement of a proportionate share of the rent by one co-sharer—Collection of rent separately.* A, an eight-anna sharer in an undivided estate, who collected his portion of the rent separately, brought a suit upon notice issued by himself against a tenant in which he made the other co-sharers parties defendants to recover arrears of rent at an enhanced rate in proportion to his share. *Held*, that such a suit was not maintainable unless it could be shown that the co-sharers had refused to join as plaintiffs.

CO-SHARER—concl'd.**3. SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—concl'd.****(f) ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—concl'd.**

Bidhu Bhushun Basu v. Komaraddi Mundul, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 864, distinguished. *KALI CHANDRA SINGH v. RAJKISHORE BHUDDRO*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 615

108.

Enhancement by one out of a number of co-sharers when possible—Ijmati mehal—Practice of separate leases by several co-sharers. The mere fact of their being other co-sharers in an undivided mehal is not sufficient to put the plaintiff out of Court in a suit for enhancement in respect of a particular plot of land, and the proper issue in such a case is, whether the defendant tenant has been holding under the plaintiff separately or under a joint lease from the plaintiff and his co-sharers in the mehal. *Guni Mahomed v. Moran*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 96, *Jogendra Chunder Ghose v. Nobin Chunder Chattopadhyaya*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 353, distinguished. *RASHBEHARI MUKHERJI v. SAKHI SUNDARI DASI*

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CO-SHARER LANDLORD.

See *BENGAL TENANCY ACT*, s. 188.

10 C. W. N. 787

See *BENGAL TENANCY ACT*, SCH. III, ART. 2 (b) 11 C. W. N. 1026

See *CO-OWNER*.

See *CO-PARCENERS*.

See *CO-SHARER*.

See *LANDLORD AND TENANT*.

13 C. W. N. 746

—decree against recorded tenant.

See *LANDLORD AND TENANT*.

10 C. W. N. 1

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—suit for rent by—

See *LANDLORD AND TENANT*

13 C. W. N. 685

1. —Co-sharer landlord

—Decree for rent against registered tenant—Private sale of tenant's interest prior to suit—Sale in execution of decree if affects the purchaser's rights. When certain co-sharer landlords instituted a suit for the rent of a jote, making all persons interested in the jote parties defendants, and obtained a decree, a sale in execution of the decree passed the entire jote to the purchaser. But a sale in execution of a decree for rent obtained by the same landlords in a suit subsequently instituted against the purchaser, but after the latter had parted with his interest in the jote to a third party, did not affect the rights acquired by such third party by his purchase. The fact that such third party had not got his name registered in the zamindar's sherista, in place of the

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first purchaser was immaterial as at the second auction-sale only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor was sold. *UMESH CHANDRA ROY v. GOUR LALL CHAUDHURY* (1906)

10 C. W. N. 1042

2.

Rent, suit for—Co-sharer landlords—Separate collection, effect of—Right to sue jointly for whole rent—Implied contract. From the mere fact that co-sharer landlords have for a long period collected their shares of the jama separately, it cannot be inferred that the parties contracted that separate collection should go on for ever. There is nothing, therefore, to prevent the co-sharer landlords from joining to sue for the whole rent. *Guni Mohamed v. Moran*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 96; *Gopal Chunder Das v. Umesh Narain Chowdhury*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 695; *Pramada Nath Roy v. Romani Kant Roy*, 9 C. W. N. 34; *Shyama Charan Bhattacharya v. Akhoy Kumar Mitter*, 10 C. W. N. 787; *Girish Chandra Mukhopadhyaya v. Chhatradhar Ghosh*, 3 C. L. J. 379, referred to. *AKSHOY KUMAR MITRA v. GOPAL KAMINI DEBI* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1011

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3.

Separate collection of rent—Suit for entire rent by transferee of whole interest of one co-sharer making other co-sharers defendants—Maintainability—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), Sch. III, Art. 2—Limitation Act (XV of 1887), Sch. II, Art. 110. Where a tenant is jointly and severally liable for rent to the several co-sharer landlords, a suit for rent by the transferee of the whole interest of one of the co-sharers, making the other co-sharers parties defendants is maintainable and a decree for the entire rent is valid; *Pramada Nath Roy v. Ramani Kanta Roy*, I. L. R. 35 Calc. 331, L. R. 351 A. 73, followed. *Held*, also, that such a suit is governed by the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), Sch. III, Art. 2. *Mohendra Nath Kalamooree v. Koilash Chandra Dogra*, 4 C. W. N. 605, distinguished. *SASHI KUMAR MIRBAHAR v. SEETA NATH BANERJEE* (1908)

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 I. L. R. 19 Bom. 221, 770
 13 C. W. N. 557
 ——— appeal against order for—
 See COURT-FEES ACT (VII OF 1870).
 I. L. R. 28 Calc. 567
 ——— award of—
 See JURISDICTION . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 41
 See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS.
 ——— in Criminal Court,
 See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.
 I. L. R. 20 Calc. 687
 ——— of inquiry before granting probate or letters of administration—
 See COURT-FEES ACT (VII OF 1870), s. 19H . . . 6 C. W. N. 898
 ——— of respondent—
 See PRIVY COUNCIL APPEAL
 I. L. R. 36 Calc. 653
 ——— recovery of, when taxed.
 See RULES OF HIGH COURT, BOMBAY—RULE NO. 183 . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 152
 ——— taxation of—
 See COMMISSION—CIVIL CASES.
 12 B. L. R. Ap. 4
 See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 84.
 I. L. R. 22 Calc. 943, 952 note
 ——— of wife—
 See DIVORCE ACT (IV OF 1869), s. 7.
 I. L. R. 29 Calc. 619

1. SPECIAL CASES.

1. ——— Abated suit—Death of plaintiff—Cost of interlocutory order in abated suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 210, 296. Under ss. 210 and 296 of Act VIII of 1859, the representative of the deceased plaintiff in an abated suit is liable for costs of interlocutory orders in the suit. MAHULDEE ALLEE KHAN v. ROHEEMOODEEN
 Bourke O. C. 154

2. ——— Abated appeal—Death of appellant—No application for substitution—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 582, 368, 365 and 366. Per MITTER, J. (GARTH, C. J., dubitante).—Notwithstanding that s. 582 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not expressly direct that the word "plaintiff" occurring in s. 366 shall be held to include an "appellant," yet the power conferred by s. 366 on the Court of original jurisdiction to award costs against the estate of a deceased plaintiff may, by analogy, be taken to be conferred on the Appellate Court. Lakshmbai v. Balkrishna, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 654, followed. RAJMOONEE DABEE v. CHUNDER KANT SANDEL . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 440
 10 C. L. R. 437

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

3. ———— *Account, suit for—Suit for account by principal against agent.* Where in a suit for an account by a principal against his agent, the defendant falsely denied his fiduciary position, he was ordered to pay the whole costs of the suit up to and including the costs of an appeal to the Privy Council without regard to the result of the account. *HURBINATH RAI v. KRISHNA KUMAR BAKSHI* I. L. R. 14 Calc. 147
L. R. 13 I. A. 123

4. ———— *Admiralty or Vice-Admiralty—Practice—Appeal from original side in exercise of Admiralty or Vice-Admiralty jurisdiction—Increased costs caused by excessive bail in salvage case.* In an action of salvage in which a ship was arrested and the bail asked for was found to be excessive, the Court held that the promovents must pay to the impugnants the costs required by the bail being excessive. *The George Gordon*, L. R. 6 P. D. 46, followed. Where an appeal was held to lie under the High Court Charter and the Letters Patent from the original side in the exercise of Admiralty or Vice-Admiralty jurisdiction, and the procedure was mainly governed by the Civil Procedure Code, the usual practice as to costs on appeal was followed. *In the matter of the Ship "CHAMPION"* I. L. R. 17 Calc. 84

5. ———— *Consolidation of two separate salvage claims—Separate Costs.* When two separate salvage actions are consolidated at the instance of the common impugnant, and no order is made giving the conduct of both to one plaintiff, the promovents are entitled to separate costs. Practice of the Court followed, and costs given on the ordinary scale provided for in the rules under the Civil Procedure Code, and not under the schedule relating to Vice-Admiralty actions. *In the matter of the Steamship "DRACHENFELS," THE "RETRIEVER" v. THE "DRACHENFELS," THE "HUGHLI" v. THE "DRACHENFELS."*
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 860

6. ———— *Appeal—Appeal irregularly brought after time has been granted to apply to original Court.* Certain objections were taken in an execution proceeding, and the Judge before whom the objections were heard passed an order disposing of the objections save as to two, which he decided he had no jurisdiction to entertain. The objector then made a special application to the Judge to obtain time to make an application with reference to these objections to the Court from which the decree had been transferred, and accordingly time was granted him to do so; but, instead of applying, the objector preferred an appeal to the High Court against the order of the Judge disposing of the objections. The High Court, on hearing the appeal, made the appellant pay the costs of the appeal, disapproving strongly of the course taken by the objector. *JASSODA KOER v. LAND MORTGAGE BANK OF INDIA* I. L. R. 8 Calc. 916
11 C. L. R. 348

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

7. ———— *Laches in bringing appeal—Application to High Court's superintendence when appeal lay.* A suit was appealed to the Judge, who remanded it to the lower Court for re-trial; the lower Court dismissed the suit. The plaintiff then presented a petition to the High Court praying that the order of the Judge remanding the suit might be set aside under the provisions of s. 35, Act XXIII of 1861, on the ground that, as the value of the property in suit was admittedly more than Rs. 5,000, the Judge had exceeded his powers in hearing the appeal. The High Court held that it had no power under s. 35 of Act XXIII of 1861 to entertain the application, as it was open to the petitioner to present an appeal against the order of the Judge remanding the suit, and that he must proceed by way of appeal. The plaintiff having appealed, the order of the Judge was set aside; but it was held that by reason of his laches the plaintiff was disentitled to his costs. *TURKEE ALI v. SAADUT ALI* 5 N. W. 137

8. ———— *Costs of successful Appellant refused—Failure to prove exclusive title when set up.* The costs of the appeal, though successful, were refused, because the defendant appellant had set up as his defence an exclusive title, which he had failed to prove. *LACHMESWAR SINGH v. MANOWAR HOSSAIN*
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 253
L. R. 19 I. A. 48

9. ———— *Dismissal of Appeal—Time occupied in hearing of preliminary objection to appeal.* An appeal was dismissed with costs notwithstanding that almost the whole time occupied in the hearing of the case on appeal was taken up by the argument on a preliminary objection that no appeal lay which was taken by the respondents and was unsuccessful. *TOLSEE MONEY DASSEE v. SUDEVI DASSEE* I. L. R. 26 Calc. 361
3 C. W. N. 347

10. ———— *Second appeal—Discretion of Court to give costs—Principle.* A second appeal lies, as to costs, against an appellate decree. *Daulat Ram v. Durga Prosad*, I. L. R. 15 All. 333, relied upon. A Court has full discretion as to costs; but that discretion must be exercised on general principles, and not arbitrarily. Case where it was held that the order of the first Court, ordering that plaintiff, who was the unsuccessful party, was not to pay any costs to defendant, was bad. *BHUGOBATI PAL v. MAHOMED ALI* (1903) 7 C. W. N. 647

11. ———— *Appeal to Privy Council—Appeal dismissed for want of prosecution—Order made by the High Court that the appellant should pay the respondent's costs of application for leave to appeal.* Where an appeal to the Privy Council was dismissed for want of prosecution, the High Court ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the application for leave to

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

appeal. *Milson v. Carter*, [1893] A. C. 638, followed. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. JANARDAN GANPATRAO* (1902)

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 124

12. ———— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 58, 67, 99—Security for costs of respondents, in appeal before Privy Council—Recovery of costs awarded—Separate suit necessary—Interest on costs. Held*, on the construction of a bond executed by an appellant before the Privy Council as security for the costs of the respondents, that it was a mortgage within s. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act. Costs awarded to the respondents by order of the Privy Council could not therefore be recovered by a sale of the properties comprised in the security otherwise than by instituting a suit under s. 67 of the Transfer of Property Act. No interest on the costs could be claimed when such interest was not allowed by the order of the Privy Council. *TOKHAN SINGH v. GIRWAR SINGH* (1905) 9 C. W. N. 372

13. ———— *Appeal to Privy Council—Costs—Execution of decree—Application for execution of order as to costs—Jurisdiction—Inherent power of Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 583. The High Court made an order dismissing an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, with costs. Held*, that although there is no section in the Code of Civil Procedure directly applicable to the case yet, by analogy to s. 583 of the Code, the proper Court to execute the order as to costs is the lower Court. The Code of Civil Procedure is not exhaustive, and when a Court has made an order which it has jurisdiction to make, there is inherent power in the Court to have that order carried into effect. *JOGENDRA CHANDRA SEN v. WAZIDUNNISSA KHATUN* (1907) I. L. R. 34 Calc. 860

14. ———— *Attorney and Client—Attorney's lien for costs—Compromise of suit by parties—Collusion. Where the parties to a suit came to a compromise between themselves without the knowledge of the plaintiff's attorney, when the suit was at such a stage that it did not appear that the plaintiff was entitled to recover anything, and there was no proof that he was to receive anything from the defendant on the compromise, or that the compromise was not a bona fide one:—Held*, the plaintiff's attorney was not entitled to have the compromise set aside, on the ground that he might thereby be deprived of his costs. A clear case of fraud and collusion must be made out to entitle the attorney to the interference of the Court. *RAMANATH DUTT v. MATUNGINEE DOSSEE* 12 B. L. R. 110

15. ———— *Compromise of suit by parties out of Court without knowledge of attorneys—Taxation and payment of costs. After the filing of the plaint a suit was compromised out of Court by the parties without the intervention or knowledge of the attorneys. The plaintiff's attorney applied to his client for payment of costs, and*

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

on his refusal to pay, he applied to the Court that his bill should be taxed, and that his client should thereupon pay it, and the Court granted the application. *ISWAR CHANDRA DUTT v. ISWAR CHANDRA GHOSE* 9 B. L. R. Ap. 19

16. ———— *Order directing client to pay costs. It is not the practice to make an order directing a client to pay his attorney the costs of suit when taxed. Such an order can only be made in a regular suit by the attorney against his client. DOMUN v. EMAUM ALLY*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 401

17. ———— *Suit for Damages—Successful plaintiff's costs allowed between attorney and client. In a case against a railway company for damages, where damages were given, costs were given between attorney and client so as not to exhaust the damages or the greater portion thereof. EAST INDIAN RAILWAY CO. v. KALLY DASS MOOKERJEE* I. L. R. 28 Calc. 465

18. ———— *Mortgagor and Mortgagee. Where in a mortgage deed the mortgagee covenanted to re-convey on being paid principal and interest, and "all costs and charges, as between attorney and client," and the mortgagee, in default of repayment of the mortgage money, obtained an ex parte decree for sale, the Court should award him costs as between attorney and client. CHUNDER COOMAR CHATTERJEE v. ESSEN CHUNDER CHATTERJEE* 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 222

19. ———— *Redemption, suit for—Costs between party and party—Practice. In a suit upon a mortgage of certain property, A, who had purchased the property in question subject to the mortgage sued upon, in execution of a decree upon another mortgage, paid off the amount due to the plaintiff for principal and interest, and applied to the Court that he might be made a party, and that, upon his paying the plaintiff the costs of the suit to be taxed as between party and party, the plaintiff should be directed to re-convey the property to him free from all encumbrances. Held*, that the practice was to make the costs in such circumstances payable as between attorney and client, and not as between party and party. *OBHOY CHURN SEN v. DABENDRO NATH MULLICK*

S. C. I. R. 437

20. ———— *Change of Attorneys during a pending suit—Costs of both attorneys realized by the second attorney—Attorney's lien for costs. Case in which, upon a change of attorneys during the pendency of a suit, there being no express agreement as to the first attorney's costs, it was held that the second attorney, on recovering the costs of both attorneys from the client after notice that the costs of the first attorney were unpaid, did so on behalf of the first attorney to the extent of his share of the costs. ORR v. NORENDRA NATH SEN*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 368

COSTS—contd.

1. SPECIAL CASES—contd.

21. ———— Agreement as to costs between attorney and client—Change of attorney—Right of attorney to his taxed costs. Where F, an attorney, agreed to conduct a suit for his client and to accept R150 for his personal services, and not in respect of out-of-pocket costs and counsel's fees, and in the event of his client being successful to recover his full costs from the opposite party and to refund the R150: Held, upon the client desiring to change to another attorney, that he could do so upon payment to F of his taxed costs. GHASSEE JEMADAR v. NASSIRUDDIN MISTRY . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 769

See BASANTA KUMAR MITTER v. KUSSUM KUMAR MITTER . . . 4 C. W. N. 767

22. ———— Lien of Attorney for Costs—Application for costs to be paid out of money in hands of receiver in the suit—Practice. The attorneys for the plaintiff claimed a lien on the amount in the hands of the receiver of the Court to the credit of the plaintiff in a partition suit, for the costs of the suit which had been secured by deposit with the attorneys of the title deeds of the plaintiff's family dwelling-house which formed a portion of the property sold by the receiver under the decree in the suit. Held, on an application by the attorneys for payment to them of such costs, that the lien could not be given effect to in summary proceedings of this nature, but should form the subject of a regular suit. Except in such a suit, it is not the practice of the Court to make any order for payment of costs between an attorney and his client. DOMUN v. EMAUM ALLY, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 401, followed. MAHOMMED ZOHURUDDIN v. MAHOMMED NOOROODDEEN . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 85

23. ———— Attorney's lien for costs—General jurisdiction of High Court over all suitors—Compromise by parties without knowledge of attorney—Lien, notice of. The decree obtained by the plaintiff in this suit was satisfied by defendant behind the back of the plaintiff's attorney, although he had notice of the lien for costs of the plaintiff's attorney. The plaintiff's attorney thereupon applied for an order upon the plaintiff and the defendant, or either of them, to pay his costs. Held, that the High Court has general jurisdiction over its suitors; that although a defendant has the right to compromise with a plaintiff without the knowledge of the plaintiff's attorney, such compromise must be made with the honest intention of ending the litigation, and not with any design to deprive the attorney of his costs, and he cannot make a payment to the plaintiff under that compromise, if he has notice of the lien for the costs of the plaintiff's attorney. KHETTER KRISTO MITTER v. KALLY PROSUNNO GHOSE . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 887

2 C. W. N. 508

24. ———— Attorney's costs—Summary jurisdiction—Collusive and fraudulent compromise to deprive attorney of his costs—Com-

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promising suit without knowledge of attorney. An attorney applied for an order that the plaintiff and the defendant, or either of them, should pay to him his taxed costs on the ground that they had fraudulently and collusively compromised the suit with the object of depriving him of his costs. Held, that in cases of this kind where charges of fraud and collusion are made, it is inconvenient for the Court to dispose of the issues on affidavits alone. Held, also, that it is not the practice of the Court to interfere summarily between attorneys and their clients as regards claims for costs. KHETTER KRISTO MITTER v. KALLY PROSUNNO GHOSE, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 887, dissented from. RAMDOYAL SEROWGIE v. RAMDEO . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 269

4 C. W. N. 208

25. ———— Practice—Attorney, change of—Employment of attorney by testator continued by executor—Executor, change of attorney by—Costs incurred by testator, liability of executor to pay. An executor desiring to change an attorney who had been employed by the testator and continued in such employment by him, must pay not only the costs incurred since such employment by him but the past costs incurred in the lifetime of the testator. SHAMRAV PANDURANG v. TRUSTEES OF BHAGVANDAS (1886), 5 Bom. H. C. 163, distinguished. GIRINDRA COOMAR DUTT v. AMULYA CHARAN GHOSE (1902) . . . 6 C. W. N. 306

26. ———— Solicitor's lien for costs—Summary jurisdiction of Court over suitors—Compromise by parties without knowledge of solicitor—Solicitor's right to oppose motion—Negotiable security—Transfer of negotiable security by debtor to his creditor—Effect. By a private compromise between Cullianji the plaintiff in the first suit, and Lakshmibai, the 6th defendant, who was also the plaintiff in the second suit, it was agreed that the plaintiff should give to Lakshmibai certain immoveable property and R15,853 in full settlement of her claim and a further sum of R500 for her solicitor's costs. On the 21st February 1904, possession of the immoveable property was given and a sum of R500 paid to Lakshmibai. Cullianji also gave to her 3 hundis for R5,000, R5,000 and R5,853 respectively, but the hundis were dishonoured on their due dates. In March and April 1904, the plaintiff paid two sums of R5,000 to Lakshmibai by cheque, in lieu of the two hundis for R5,000. On the 4th June 1904, Lakshmibai's solicitor gave notice to the plaintiff, that he had a lien for costs on the sum of R15,853 agreed to be paid by the plaintiff to his client. On the 22nd of June 1904, the plaintiff paid the sum of R5,853 to Lakshmibai, in cash, in respect of the hundi for R5,853, which was dishonoured. The plaintiff thereupon moved for an order, authorizing the delivery to him of certain property, alleging that he had settled and satisfied the claims of Lakshmibai. Lakshmibai's solicitor opposed the motion on the ground that

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the settlement and satisfaction were collusive transactions intended to cheat him out of his costs and asked the Court to order the plaintiff to deposit the sum of Rs.9,000 as security for the same. *Held*, that in the absence of fraud or collusion between the parties, the solicitor was entitled to be paid his taxed costs, by the plaintiff, up to Rs.5,853, being the amount paid by the plaintiff after notice of the lien. The High Court of Bombay has a summary jurisdiction over its suitors for the purpose of enforcing a solicitor's lien for costs : and in enforcing it the Court must be guided by the principles of English law. Whether the solicitor moves the Court by an application of his own or appears to oppose a motion of the party against whom the lien for costs is alleged to arise, in either case he calls in aid the equitable interference of the Court under its summary jurisdiction. *Devkabei v. Jefferson, Bhaishankar and Dinsha, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 248*, and *Khetter Kristo Mitter v. Kally Prosunno Ghose, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 887*, followed. *Ramdoyal Serowgee v. Ramdeo, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 269*, dissented from. *Held*, also, that the giving of a negotiable security by the plaintiff to Lakshmibai operated as a conditional payment only and not as a satisfaction of the debt. *In re Romer and Haslam, L. R. 2 Q. B. 286, 296*, followed. *CULLIANJI v. RAGHOWJI (1904) I. L. R. 30 Bom 27*

27. — Award—Application to file an award—Act VIII of 1859, s. 327. Where an application under s. 327, Act VIII of 1859, was considered as a regular suit, the Judge was right in decreeing costs as in a regular suit. *ROY PRIYANATH CHOWDHRY v. PRASANA CHANDRA ROY CHOWDHRY . . . 2 B. L. R. A. C. 249*

s. C. PREONATH CHOWDHRY v. RAMDEUN

11 W. R. 104

28. — Bombay Minor's Act (XX of 1864)—Suit to recover costs of proceedings under. An action brought to recover costs of proceedings held under Act XX of 1864 is not maintainable when the Court, before which such proceedings were taken, has made no order as to the payment of such costs. *KABIR VALAD RAMJAN v. MAHADU VALAD SHIWAJI . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 360*

29. — Certificate under Act XI of 1858—Costs of opposing grant of certificate. Where the widow of a deceased proprietor, as the guardian of his minor son, put in a petition for a certificate under Act XI of 1858, in which she represented that she was in possession of the whole of the deceased's property, specifying a particular pergunnah and its appurtenances :—*Held*, that, though she did not expressly ask for a certificate to manage the particular pergunnah named, as her petition was so worded as to obtain, and had the effect of obtaining, a certificate of that tenor, she must be held liable for the costs of a party entitled to object to the grant of such a certificate, and appealing with a view to its amendment. *FEDA HOSSEIN v. KHAJOOORONISSA . 9 W. R. 459*

COSTS—contd.**1. SPECIAL CASES—contd.**

30. — Collector—Costs of investigation into conduct of ameen—Power to award costs. Upon the application of the Collector, who was a party to a suit, an enquiry was held by the Subordinate Judge into the conduct of a Civil Court ameen, who had made a local investigation in the suit. The ameen was acquitted, and the Collector ordered to pay his costs, including vakil's fees. *Held*, that, as in the case of miscellaneous proceedings, the Civil Court was competent to award such costs against the Collector. *In the matter of COLLECTOR OF TIRHOOT . . . 14 W. R. 390*

31. — Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 162—Extraordinary power of the Court under the Companies Act—Examination of witness—Costs. Certain persons connected with a company then in course of liquidation, who were also some of the defendants in a pending suit brought by the company (and revived subsequent to the order for winding up by the official liquidator) for an account and for the recovery of certain sums alleged to have been paid to the promoters of the company, having been examined under an order obtained under s. 162 of the Companies Act, 1882, applied through their counsel for costs incurred on such examination. *Held*, that no order as to such costs could be made. *In the matter of the INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1882, and in the matter of T. F. BROWN & Co. . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 219*

32. — Co-sharers—Separate suits for share of rent. Each of two shareholders in a talukhsued separately for his share of the rent due from a tenant who held under one kabuliati. *Held*, that no more costs were to be awarded to the plaintiffs than if they had sued jointly. *PYARI MOHAN SINGH v. GAZI . . . 2 B. L. R. A. C. 337 : 11 W. R. 270*

33. — Pro forma defendants—Suit for contribution against co-sharers. When co-sharers who have paid their share of revenue assessments are made defendants in a suit for contribution, together with other co-sharers, whose proportion was paid by the plaintiff, the defendants who have paid are entitled to their costs of appearing, etc., notwithstanding that the plaintiff may have made no claim against them, but has joined them merely for the sake of conformity. *GOLAM AHMED SHAH v. BEHARY LALL Marsh. 239 : 1 Hay 500*

34. — Pro forma defendants—Suit for partition. Where co-sharers were made consenting defendants only in order to plaintiff's obtaining a complete decree for partition, it was held that plaintiff ought to pay the co-sharers, costs, which, however, should be a small sum, sufficient to cover the costs of their appearing. *RAMPUTTY KOER v. KALEE CHURN SINGH*

14 W. R. 94

35. — Suit for Contribution against co-sharers, some of whom only were defaulters in payment of revenue. Where the plaintiff, one of several co-sharers, paid the shares of

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revenue due by other co-sharers to save the estate from sale, and then brought a suit for the balance of the revenue, after deducting his own share, against all the co-sharers, the lower Court made the plaintiff pay the costs of the defendant, who had not made default in payment of revenue. *Held*, that, since the payment by the plaintiff of the full amount of revenue was an act whereby all the shareholders benefited, inasmuch as the mere payment of their respective shares by the shareholders who did not default would never have protected the estate, the plaintiff was entitled to get the costs of his suit against all the shareholders, to be levied from them in the proportion of their respective shares in the estate. *RADHA JIBON MUSTOFE V. FORLONG* 2 Hay 122

36. ————— *Defendants—Conduct rendering them liable to costs—Costs given to plaintiff though suit be dismissed.* A defendant who, although he has a good defence, has by his conduct induced the plaintiff to sue him, may be made liable for the plaintiff's costs, though the suit be dismissed. *LALLAH BHUGWAN DOSS V. AKBAR* 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 390

37. ————— *Conduct rendering them liable for costs—Defendant refused costs, though claim against him dismissed.* Where a party's admissions and conduct induced the supposition of his liability for a claim, the Court refused him his costs, although the suit against him founded on such claim was dismissed. *SREENAETH ROY V. GOLUCK CHUNDER SEN* 15 W. R. 348

38. ————— *Unnecessary and unsuccessful defence in mortgage suit.* In a suit on a mortgage against A, the executrix under the will of the mortgagor and entitled to a life estate in the property, B, C, and D, the reversioners under the will, were also joined as defendants. They pleaded that they were not necessary parties, but joined A in disputing the claim in suit. The Court below decreed the claim in full with costs against A, but dismissed the suit with costs as against B, C, and D. *Held*, that, if the reversioners had confined their defence to merely pleading that they were unnecessary parties, the decree of the lower Court could not be questioned; but they having disputed the plaintiff's claim in common with A, and having been unsuccessful therein, the proper order for costs would be to award them pleader's fees, not upon the full amount of the claim, but upon one-half of that amount. *TARA PROSUNNO MUKHERJEE V. SATISH CHANDRA SINGH* 4 C. W. N. 90

39. ————— *Unscrupulous conduct of defendant.* Where the plaintiff brought a series of charges and claims, the bulk of which he abandoned at the hearing and was defeated on others, costs were, on account of the defendant's unscrupulous conduct, given to the plaintiff, though he only recovered judgment to a trifling amount. *RAMGOPAUL CHATTERJEE V. BHOBUNMOHUN BANERJEE* Cor. 126

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40. ————— *Defendant colluding with plaintiff.* A defendant who colludes with the plaintiff and induces him to bring a suit for his benefit may be ordered to pay the costs of his co-defendants in the Court below. It seems that he may also be ordered to pay the costs of an appeal by the plaintiff. *BHYROO RAOOT V. ANOORODEB DEO NARAIN SINGH* **Marsh. 608**

41. ————— *Separate Appearance of—Common Defence.* Where the defence is common and not separate, one set of costs should be awarded to all the defendants, even though they appear by separate vakils. *DE ASSIS V. DE AUGOS* 17 W. R. 188

42. ————— *Separate Appearance of—Common Defence.* Several defendants were sued in respect of the same matter and their defences were identical, but they appeared separately. *Held*, that, in dismissing the suit, the Judge properly allowed the defendants the costs of a joint defence. *JOYKISHEN MOOKERJEE V. HURRY-BUNGSO BURRAL* **Marsh. 95 : 1 Hay 162**

KASSEER NAUTH ROY CHOWDHRY V. HULLODHUR ROY 2 W. R. 60

43. ————— *Separate Defence where defences are identical.* Where the obligees of a bond brought a suit against their joint obligors, the heirs of their surety, a purchaser from those heirs of the property mortgaged in the money-bond, and one D, in which suit they claimed to recover the money due on the bond by the sale of the property mortgaged therein, a 6½ biswas share in certain property, and also by the sale of the property mortgaged in the security bond:—*Held*, that one set of costs was enough for the heirs of S and the purchaser from them of the property mortgaged in the security bond, as their defences were identical, and that D's costs should be calculated on the value of the 6½ biswas, the decree of the Court of the first instance being modified to this extent. *BHUP SINGH V. ZAIN -UL ABDIN*

I. L. R. 9 All. 205

44. ————— *Separate appearance of—Separate defences.* Under the Code of Civil Procedure, it is the duty of the first Court to ascertain the costs of suit, i.e., the costs of all the parties to the suit; but when the first Court does not consider that the defendants have properly severed in their defence and properly employed different vakeels, the Court ought not to allow more than one set of costs to the defendants, and should only specify in its decree the costs so allowed. *RAM CHUNDER SEN V. DOORGA NATH ROY*

2 C. L. R. 152

45. ————— *Separate appearance of.* In a suit against several defendants to recover possession of land, one of them stated in defence that he had nothing to do with it, and made good his defence. The other defendants claimed to be entitled to the land and proved their title. The

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disclaiming defendant appeared by a separate pleader, and incurred a separate set of costs. *Held*, that the Sudder Ameen rightly awarded a separate set of costs to him, and the Judge had not exercised a sound discretion in modifying the Sudder Ameen's decree, by awarding one set of costs only to all the defendants. *RAMCHANDRA GOSWAMI v. MATILAL BAGCHI* **2 B. L. R. A. C. 169**

S.C. RAM CHUNDER GOSSAIN v. MUTTY LALL BAGCHEE **11 W. R. 19**

46. ———— *Separate appearance of—Suit to recover endowed property.* Certain landed property, alleged to have been sold to an idol, and registered in the name of the vendee's infant son as shebait, had, after the death of that son, been mortgaged twice by the vendee, who succeeded to the office of shebait, and was mortgaged subsequently, on the death of the vendor, by his widow, to pay off the charge created by her husband. The last mortgage was foreclosed, and the mortgagee obtained a decree for possession. In a suit for the recovery of the property by a descendant of the vendee claiming as shebait of the idol, it was held that the zamindar and the patnidar, who were both compelled to appear for the protection of their interests, and whose defences were not necessarily identical, were entitled to separate costs. *GOBIND NATH ROY v. LUCHMEE KOOMAREE* **11 W. R. 36**

47. ———— *Separate costs allowed to separate defendants—Receipt for costs.* Where two separate sets of defendants were allowed separate costs:—*Held*, it was not necessary to keep the whole amount in Court after levying it from the plaintiffs, until a joint receipt could be given by the whole of the defendants: the proper course was to give notice to the second set of defendants to come in and show what portion of the costs they were entitled to. *NUFFER CHUNDER PAUL v. NUDUROONISSA BEEBEE* **9 W. R. 387**

48. ———— *Costs of defendant with separate interests consenting to decree.* The rules relating to pleaders' fees by the Court on 13th June 1866 do not provide for the case of defendants who have separate interests, and who consent to a decree, the amount of costs to be allowed in such a case being in the discretion of the Court. *RAMPUTTY KOER v. KALEE CHURN SINGH* **14 W. R. 94**

49. ———— *Costs of ijmali-holders as defendants.* Ijmali-holders, defendants, should be represented ijmali by one pleader and one set of pleadings, and are not entitled to separate costs. *BRINDABUN CHUNDER CHOWDHEE v. RAM COOMAR CHOWDHERY* **1 W. R. 139**

50. ———— *Separate defence on charge of misappropriation—Joint charge.* Under a charge against several defendants for having jointly misappropriated property, one defendant is not bound to entrust his defence to the counsel for

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

the others, but each has a right to defend himself, and is entitled to separate costs, if successful. *NILKANTH SURMA v. SOOSELA DEBIA* **6 W. R. 324**

51. ———— *Imputation of Fraud, when unsustained.* The appellant defendant, continuing to impute fraud to the respondent plaintiff, which he could not sustain, was deprived of his costs in appeal. *LEWIN v. MORRISON* **2 Agra Pt. II, 151**

52. ———— *Mahomedan Law—Gift—Transfer of possession.* It was within the discretion of the lower Court to allow separate costs to the first defendant and her minor children. But only one set of costs was allowed in the appeal. *KHABIR SULTAN v. RUKHIA SULTAN* (1905) **I. L. R. 29 Bom. 894**

53. ———— *Rent deposited under s. 61 of Bengal Tenancy Act—Suit found to be unnecessary.* Where in a suit for rent the defendant pleads that he has deposited it in Court having a *bond fide* doubt as to who was entitled to it, and the defendant is found to be not to blame for the litigation, he is entitled to his costs. *STALKARTT v. GURU DAS KUNDU CHOWDHRY* **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 680**

54. ———— *Delay—Civil Procedure Code, s. 315—Limitation—Sale in execution set aside—Application by purchaser for refund of purchase money—Accrual of right to apply.* A suit by a judgment-debtor whose *sir* land had been sold in execution of a decree, to have the sale declared void and illegal on the ground that the *sir* was incapable of sale, was decreed on appeal by the High Court on the 13th June 1884. On the 11th June 1887, the purchaser at the sale applied, under s. 315 of the Civil Procedure Code, for a refund of the purchase money. *Held*, that the right to apply accrued on the passing of the High Court's decree, and the application was therefore not barred by limitation; but that, looking to the great delay there had been on the part of the applicant, he should not be allowed any costs. *GIRDHARI v. SITAL PRASAD* **I. L. R. 11 All. 372**

55. ———— *Divorce—Suit for dissolution of marriage—Costs between party and party—Costs between attorney and client—Liability of co-respondent—Damages—Divorce Act (IV of 1869), s. 45—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 220—Practice.* Where a husband obtained an order for dissolution of marriage and costs, but no damages were asked for by the petitioner against the co-respondent, it was ordered that the costs granted should include costs as between attorney and client. *OUTHWAITE v. OUTHWAITE AND DIAZ* (1900) **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 84**

56. ———— *Error or mistake—Proceedings initiated through error of Courts.* On the 14th February 1884, the High Court dismissed an application of the 22nd March 1883 by a *purda-nashin* lady

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

for leave to appeal in *forma pauperis* from a decree, dated the 16th September 1882, the application, after giving credit for 86 days spent in obtaining the necessary papers, being out of time by 73 days. On the 16th August 1884, an order was passed allowing an application which had been made for review of the previous order to stand over, pending the decision of a connected case. On the 24th April 1885, the connected case having then been decided, the application for review was heard and dismissed. Nothing more was done by the appellant until the 18th June 1885, when, on her application, an order was passed by a single Judge allowing her, under s. 5 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), to file an appeal on full stamp paper, and she thereupon having borrowed money on onerous conditions to defray the necessary institution-fees, presented her appeal, which was admitted provisionally by a single Judge. *Held*, by MAHMOOD, J., that the *ex parte* order of the 18th June 1885 was one which the Civil Procedure Code nowhere allowed and was *ultra vires*, and that the bench before which the appeal came for hearing was competent to determine whether the order admitting the appeal should stand or be set aside. *Dubey Sahai v. Ganesh Lal*, I. L. R. 1 All. 34, referred to. *Held*, further, by MAHMOOD, J., that although, but for the erroneous order of the 18th June 1885, the appellant would neither have borrowed the money required to defray the institution-fees nor preferred the appeal, and this was a circumstance to be considered in the exercise of the discretionary power conferred by s. 220 of the Code, it could not be said that the error of a Court of justice which leads a party to initiate proceedings against another is sufficient to exonerate the losing party from paying the costs incurred by the opposite party, and that the appeal should therefore be dismissed with costs. HUSAINI BEGAM v. COLLECTOR OF MUZAFFARNAGAR . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 11

The Judges having differed on the question as to whether sufficient cause had or had not been shown for the admission of the appeal after time, TYRRELL J., holding that there was sufficient cause, and MAHMOOD, J. that there was not, an appeal was heard under the Letters Patent and the decision of MAHMOOD, J. on that point was affirmed, and the appeal was eventually dismissed with costs. HUSAINI BEGAM v. COLLECTOR OF MUZAFFARNAGAR . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 655

57. ———— **Fraud**—*Putting forward fabricated documents.* Where an ikramamah relied on by the respondents and on which the case depended was found to be fabricated, and the appellant was successful, no order was made as to costs, fabricated documents having also been put forward on behalf of the appellant. COOMARI RODESHWAR v. MANROOP KOER . . . I. L. R. 13 I. A. 20

58. ———— **Fresh suit wrongly brought**—*Bringing fresh suit where appeal is the proper course.* Where the Court refused to execute a

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decree given on terms of a petition embodying a compromise, and the applicant, instead of appealing, which was his proper course, brought a suit on the decree, the Court refused to give him his costs, but gave all costs in favour of the defendant. RUTNESSUR CHATTERJEE v. GOOROO CHURN CHATTERJEE . . . 9 W. R. 296

59. ———— **Government**—*Suit for Compensation for lands taken for railway.* The plaintiff, as ijaradar, claimed a sum of money as compensation for land taken compulsorily for the purpose of a railway, and which had been awarded and was lying in deposit. A farmer of the lands under him claimed a portion of the same sum as compensation for the residue of his lease. *Held*, that the farmer was entitled to such compensation, and that, in apportioning the costs of a suit brought to try the question, in which the ijaradar was plaintiff and the Government and the farmer defendants, the farmer was entitled to receive from the ijaradar the costs of his demand to the extent to which it was established, and the plaintiff to receive from the former costs applicable to an excess in the demand of the farmer beyond that which he succeeded in establishing; and that Government was entitled to receive the costs which it had incurred from both parties, in the proportion in which each had failed in establishing his claim. NUSEEROODEEN AHMED v. RAILWAY COMMISSIONERS . . . Marsh. 91: 1 Hay 157

60. ———— **Survey proceedings**—*Allegation of misconduct and collusion of survey officers.* The act of the survey authorities in demarcating lands is a necessary and legal act, and Government cannot be saddled with costs unless it can be proved that its officers are wilful wrong-doers. A mere allegation of the plaintiff, to the effect that the defendant had colluded with the survey officers, is no reason for saddling the Government with costs. COLLECTOR OF MOORSHEDEBAD v. RAM-MOHINEE DOSSEE . . . 1 Hay 520

61. ———— **Application to sue in forma pauperis**—*Omission to make inquiry into pauperism*—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 409, 412.* A applied for leave to file a suit in *forma pauperis* against B. B resisted the application on the ground that A was a minor. The Government pleader also resisted on the ground that A was not a pauper. The Court, without inquiring into A's pauperism, rejected the application solely on the ground that A was a minor, and that he was not properly represented by a next friend or guardian. The Court ordered all costs to be paid out of the minor's estate. The minor died soon afterwards. The Collector then applied to the Court to attach certain property in B's hands which was alleged to form a part of the minor's estate. B objected, but the attachment was allowed. *Held*, on an application for revision of the order on which the order for costs against the minor's estate was held to be illegal and *ultra vires*, that no inquiry having been made into A's pauperism and no order passed such as is con-

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

templated in s. 409 or 412 of the Code, the Collector was not entitled to costs. *AMICHAND TALAKCHAND v. COLLECTOR OF SHOLAPUR*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 234

62. ——— Grounds of Appeal—*Practice.*

If grounds of appeal which are absolutely untenable are joined with grounds which are tenable, in order to bring a case within the rule as to the value authorizing an appeal as of right, this matter may be considered in regard to the question of costs. *HURRO DURGA CHOWDHURANI v. SARUT SUNDARI DEBI*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 332

63. ——— Guardian—Guardian *ad litem*

—*Misconduct.* Where a guardian *ad litem* of an infant had been guilty of gross misconduct in putting executors to proof of a will which he wished to upset for his own private purposes, and which the evidence showed was to his knowledge duly executed by the testatrix in a sound state of mind:—*Held*, that he was liable for the costs of the suit. *GOOLAM HOSSEIN NOOR MAHOMED v. FATMABAI*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 391

64. ——— Guardian *ad litem*—Decree for costs against—Civil Procedure

Code, 1877, s. 458. The Civil Procedure Code does not authorize a Court to decree costs against the guardian of a defendant except in the case referred to in s. 458. *NARASIMHA RAU v. LAKSHMIPATI RAU*

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 263

65. ——— Civil Procedure

Code, 1882, s. 220—*Practice*—Costs of guardian *ad litem*—Advance by plaintiff for costs of minor defendants—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 68, 70—Right to recover amount advanced. Plaintiff having, in a prior suit, sued the defendants, who were minors, and their father, for specific performance, was ordered by the Court to advance money to the guardian *ad litem* of the minors (who was appointed by the Court), to enable him to conduct their defence. Plaintiff succeeded, but the Court refused to provide in its decree for the repayment to plaintiff of the amount so advanced. On the plaintiff bringing this suit to recover that amount:—*Held*, per *SUBRAMANIA AYYAR, J.*, (i) that the Court in which the prior suit had been brought had power neither to direct the plaintiff to make the advances to the guardian as had been done, nor to award the amount so paid as costs in the cause. The present suit, therefore, was not unsustainable for the reason that the subject-matter of it was one for the Court to have dealt with in the previous suit; (ii) that the circumstances of the case were not such as to render the amount recoverable under s. 70 of the Contract Act, inasmuch as the defendants could not be said to have enjoyed the benefit of the expenditure; (iii) that payments or charges connected with legal expenses in which infants are concerned may, in certain circumstances, come under the head of necessities within the meaning of s. 68 of the Contract Act. Disbursements properly made

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

in defence of the suit by the guardian *ad litem* out of the plaintiff's advances might be allowable if it be alleged and proved that there were reasonable grounds for the defence put forward, though it proved unsuccessful. But that this ground could not now be relied upon on second appeal, inasmuch as it had not been put forward in the Court below, when an issue relating to it could have been framed. Per *DAVIES, J.*, that a matter of this nature can and should be settled in the suit in which it arises; and that where a plaintiff is successful, a supplementary issue should be framed and tried as to the amount due to him on account of advances made by him to the guardian *ad litem* for conducting the defence, and a decree passed in his favour for the total amount of costs found to have been properly incurred in the case by the guardian out of such advances. *VENKATA VIJAYA GOPALARAJU v. TIMMAYYA PANTULU*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 314

66. ——— Indemnity, contract of—Costs incurred in course of ascertaining and settling claim. In 1864 a lease of a house was granted to A for a term of ten years. The lease contained a covenant to repair. A died, and B, his administrator, assigned the lease to another, and it ultimately became vested in the plaintiff. In 1872 the plaintiff assigned the lease to the defendants, "under and subject to the covenants" therein contained. The defendants failed to repair, and after the term had expired, C, the representative of the lessor, sued B for arrears of rent and damages for non-repair. B defended the suit, but C obtained a decree against him for R6,167-3 and costs, amounting in all to R8,328-3. His own costs amounted to R1,491-1. In 1876 B paid C the R8,328-3. In 1877 B sued the plaintiff for the amount which he had been compelled to pay C, and for the amount of his own costs. The plaintiff gave notice to the defendants to intervene and defend if they desired, but they did not reply, and the plaintiff consented to a decree for R6,932-12-11 with costs. Thereupon the plaintiff instituted the present suit to recover from the defendants the sum recovered from him by B, together with his own costs of defence. *Held*, that, in the case of contracts of indemnity, the liability of the party indemnified to a third person is not only contemplated at the time of the indemnity, but is the very moving cause of that contract; and in cases of such a nature costs reasonably incurred in resisting, or reducing, or ascertaining the claim may be recovered. *Held*, therefore, that the costs incurred by B in the suit instituted against him by C, and those incurred by the plaintiff in the suit by B against him, were reasonably and properly incurred, and that he was entitled to recover them from the defendant. *PEPIN v. CHUNDER SEEKUR MOOKERJEE*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 811: 6 C. L. R. 167

67. ——— Interpleader suit—Lien of plaintiff on fund for costs. The plaintiff in a properly instituted interpleader suit is entitled to his

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costs, and has a lien for them on the fund. **SECRETARY OF STATE v. MAHOMMED HOSSAIN**

1 Mad. 360

See **BOMBAY, BARODA AND CENTRAL INDIA RAILWAY Co. v. SASSOON** . . . **I. L. R. 18 Bom 231**

68. — Jurisdiction—Want of jurisdiction—Power to give Costs. After notice served upon, and appearance made by, the defendant, it appeared that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction, but that the suit ought to have been instituted in the Revenue Court. *Held*, that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to order the defendant his costs, and that, as he had been unnecessarily brought before the Court, it ought to order him his costs. **GOPAL CHUNDER BOSE v. DHURUNDHUR ROY**

Marsh. 3: 2 Hay 188

69. — Want of jurisdiction, dismissal of suit for. When a suit is dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the Court will give costs. **PUNCHANUN GHOSE v. BROJENDRONARAIN DEB** . . . **1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 38**

JUGGESHUR BUNWAREE GOBIND v. CHUNDER SIRCAR . . . **Marsh. 375: 2 Hay 344**

70. — Want of jurisdiction. Quere: Whether the High Court can give costs in a case in which it has declined jurisdiction. **JARDINE, SKINNER & Co. v. MONEY** **14 W. R. 312**

Express power is now given to the Court by s. 220 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, to give costs in such a case.

71. — Judge exceeding his jurisdiction—Application for consequent costs. When a Judge exceeds his jurisdiction, a party claiming costs in consequence thereof must apply for them when objecting thereto. **RAKUB DOSS v. SOORAJ MULL** . . . **Bourke O. C. 181**

72. — Landlord and Tenant—Construction of contract to pay costs. *M C M* and others took a share of a turuff in patni by executing a kabuliati in favour of *R L D* and others, which contained a stipulation that, if a suit brought by certain parties against the former, and then pending in the High Court, were decided against the lessors, the lessees would pay whatever costs of suit might be payable by the lessor, and if decided in favour of the lessors, the costs awarded would go to the lessees. The case was decided against the lessors. *Held*, on the construction of the kabuliati, that the lessees were liable to pay the whole of the costs paid by the lessors,—not only the costs to which they were justly liable on account of their own share, but also all costs that might be recoverable from them; but *quere*: whether the Small Cause Court Judge should provide for the lessees being enabled to use the right which the lessors would have for recovering in a suit for contribution the costs which they had paid on behalf of the other parties to the suit. **RAJ LUCKHEE DEBIA v. MOHESH CHUNDER MOJOONDAR**

14 W. R. 191

COSTS—contd.**1. SPECIAL CASES—contd.**

73. — Letters of administration—Concealment of material facts on application. An applicant for letters of administration to the estate of a widow, having concealed the existence and claims, of which he was aware, of the relatives of the deceased husband of the widow, on the application being dismissed, was ordered to pay the costs of the application and of the caveats entered by some of the relatives of the deceased husband. **JAIRISON-DAS GOPALDAS v. HARRISON-DAS HULLOCHANDAS**

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 9

74. — Litigation unnecessary—Defendant not to blame for litigation. In a suit for rent which was dismissed on proof that the defendant had deposited the rent in Court under s. 61 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and it was found that the defendant had not been to blame for the litigation, he was held entitled to his costs. **STALKARTT v. GURU DAS KUNDU CHOWDHRY**

I. L. R. 21 Cal. 680

75. — Misjoinder—Dismissal for misjoinder. The legal result, when a suit is dismissed for misjoinder, is that the plaintiff pays the defendant's costs. **MUTHRA PERSHAD v. BUNDEE ROY** . . . **5 N. W. 20**

76. — Suit rejected for misjoinder. Where a plaint had been rejected, having been filed against several persons who had different defences, it was held to be within the discretion of the Judge in appeal to dismiss the suit and saddle the plaintiff with the costs of all the defendants, notwithstanding that all the latter, except one set, admitted the claim, and retired from the contest. **KOSSELLA KOER v. BEHARY PATUCK**

12 W. R. 70

77. — Suit against several defendants dismissed for multifariousness. In a suit against 34 defendants to recover 3,820 bighas of land 13 came in and defended separately, each in respect of his own portion of the land claimed. The suit was dismissed for multifariousness. Fixing a certain valuation (Rs5,440) for the suit so far as it was dismissed, the Judge allowed each defendant full costs upon that valuation or a vakil's fee of Rs257 to each defendant, being in many instances greater than the value of the property in dispute. *Held*, that this could not be a just and equitable way of awarding fees, that the best plan in the present case was to allow each defendant in respect of a plot exceeding 20 bighas and not exceeding 40 bighas, three gold mohurs; and of a plot less than 20 bighas, two gold mohurs. **ROODUR NARAIN ROY v. COOMAR NARAIN PATNAIK** . . . **13 W. R. 320**

78. — Mortgage—Costs of enforcing mortgage. A mortgagee is, as a general rule, entitled to the costs of enforcing his security; but where the Court, in consideration of his usurious bargain, declines to award them wholly or in part,

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the High Court will not interfere. *CARVALHO v. NUR BIBI*. **I. L. R. 3 Bom. 202**

79. ————— *Right to personal decree for Costs against Mortgagor.* Where a mortgage deed provided that the costs of any proceedings necessitated by the default of tenants in payment of rents should be deducted from the revenues, and there was no express promise by the mortgagor to personally pay those expenses:—*Held*, that the mortgagee was not entitled to a decree for such costs against the mortgagor personally. *GANESH DHARNIDHAR MAHARAJDEV v. KESHAVRAV GOVIND KULGAVKRA*. **I. L. R. 15 Bom. 625**

80. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 221—Costs due by mortgagee to mortgagor—Set-off against the mortgage-debt—Suit for redemption.* The mortgagor is entitled to set-off or deduct the amount of costs payable to him under the decree against or from the mortgage-debt payable by him. If the amount of the costs be larger than the mortgage-debt, the mortgagor is entitled to obtain possession at once of the mortgaged property and to recover the balance against the mortgagee. *SIDU v. BALI*. **I. L. R. 17 Bom. 32**

81. ————— *Mortgage—Prior and subsequent Mortgagees—Costs recoverable from puisne mortgagees—Act IV of 1882 (Transfer of Property Act)—s. 90.* A prior mortgagee in a suit upon his mortgage prayed for an order for costs against a puisne mortgagee personally. No such order was contained in the decree passed under s. 88 of Act IV of 1882. *Held*, that the prior mortgagee was not entitled to a decree under s. 90 of the Act against the puisne mortgagee for the amount of the costs. *RAM LAL v. SIL CHAND* (1901) **I. L. R. 23 All. 439**

82. ————— *Transfer of Property Act, ss. 88, 90—Mortgage-decree under s. 88 cannot impose personal liability for costs—Such liability should be enforced under s. 90.* It will be contrary to the scheme of the Transfer of Property Act and to the practice of the English Courts of Equity to make the mortgagor personally liable for costs in any case before the sale-proceeds have proved insufficient to satisfy the mortgage claim. *Sharples v. Adams*, 32 *Beav.* 213, referred to. *Liverpool Marine Credit Co. v. Wilson*, *L. R. 7 Ch. 507*, referred to. A decree under s. 88 of the Transfer of Property Act must not order the defendants personally to pay the costs. It may contain a declaration of the personal liability of defendant for principal or costs, but such a declaration is not part of the usual form of decree under the Transfer of Property Act and is enforceable only under s. 90. The words "the amount due on the mortgage for the time being" in s. 90 must be taken to include costs. *Mogbul Fatima v. Lala Prasad*, *I. L. R. 20 All. 523*, referred to. *KAMALAMMA v. KAMANDUR NARASIMHA CHARLU* (1907) **I. L. R. 30 Mad. 434**

83. ————— *Mortgage decree—Execution of decree for costs—Mortgaged properties*

COSTS—contd.**1. SPECIAL CASES—contd.**

—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 90.* A decree-holder in executing a mortgage decree must, for the purpose of recovering the costs awarded by the decree, proceed in the first instance against the property mortgaged; and in the event of the same being found insufficient he can proceed against properties other than the mortgaged property. The order for costs is a part of the mortgage decree. *Rutnessur Sein v. Jusoda*, *I. L. R. 14 Calc. 185*, and *Damodar Das v. Budh Kuar*, *I. L. R. 10 All. 179*, distinguished. *Magbul Fatima v. Lala Prasad*, *I. L. R. 20 All. s. 23*, followed. *RAJ KUMAR SINGH v. SHEO NARAYAN SAHU* (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 431
s. c. 12 C. W. N. 384

84. ————— *Official Assignee—Payment of costs personally—Civil Procedure Code, XIV of 1882, s. 219—Practice.* If the Official Assignee defends a suit, he is liable, in the event of failure, to be ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs in the same way as any other defendant, and if the estate be insufficient to pay the costs, he will have to bear them personally. It is for him to protect himself by getting a guarantee of indemnity from the parties who set him in motion. *BEVIS v. TURNER*. **I. L. R. 7 Bom. 484**

85. ————— *Appeal against order of adjudication of insolvency.* The Official Assignee is entitled to his costs of appearing in an appeal against an order of adjudication. *In the matter of HAROON MAHOMED*. **I. L. R. 14 Bom. 189**

86. ————— *Parties—Parties added at hearing, liability of, for Costs.* The plaintiffs having filed their plaint against parties *primâ facie* liable to them upon the contract, and having opposed a claim made by the original defendants to have the suit dismissed as against them on their paying money into Court, and to have third parties added as defendants:—*Held*, that, the plaintiffs having succeeded against the third parties ordered to be added as defendants, the added defendants were liable for the whole costs. *ASSARAM BUTTEAH v. COMMERCIAL TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION*. **2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 113**

87. ————— *Parties in Court below not made parties to appeal.* In the first Court the Government obtained their costs; the opposite party appealed, but did not make the Government a respondent. On appeal the decree of the first Court was reversed. *Held*, that the Government, not having been made a party to the appeal, were entitled to recover their costs in the first Court. *GOVERNMENT v. LALJI SAHU* **1 B. I. R. S. N. 23**

BHOYRUB CHUNDER DOSS v. WAJEDUNNISSA KHATOON. **6 C. I. R. 234**

88. ————— *Parties unnecessarily joined—Parties who have no interest in suit.* Where parties who have no interest in a suit are unnecessarily made co-defendants, the lower Court

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ought, as a general rule, to award them costs; but as by s. 187, Act VIII of 1859, the awarding of costs is left to the discretion of the Court, no appeal lies from its decision. *COLLECTOR OF DACCA v. KUMALAKANT MOOKERJEE* . 2 W. R. 33

89. ————— *Parties unnecessarily joined—Disclaimer of interest—Discretion as to Costs.* Although the question of costs is within the discretion of a Court, yet the Court is bound to give some reasons for the exercise of that discretion. A party disclaiming all interest in a suit and unnecessarily made a party to it is entitled to costs. *SHUNF BUKSH v. LALLA NUND RAM*. 11 W. R. 48

90. ————— *Parties unnecessarily joined—Suit for Foreclosure—Disclaiming defendants.* Suits for foreclosure may be dismissed with costs against disclaiming defendants. *MAC-KINTOSH v. NOBINMONEY DOSSEE* 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 160

91. ————— *Party unnecessarily joined in suit.* One of several judgment-debtors jointly liable under a decree, having paid a larger amount than was due as between himself and his co-defendants, brought a suit to recover from them the excess paid by him. One of the defendants having paid more than his share, the claim against him was dismissed by the Principal Sudder Ameen, who nevertheless, on the ground that it was necessary to make him a party, awarded him no costs. *Held*, that it was not necessary to make this defendant a party, and that cost should not have been refused. *Held*, also, that the scale on which costs should be awarded to him depended on what plaintiff claimed against him, and that he was entitled to costs on the usual scale on the amount for which the suit was brought. *KASHEENATH SEN v. CHUNDERMONEE DEBIA* 9 W. R. 288

92. ————— *Party unnecessarily joined—Collector.* Where a Collector had been unnecessarily made a party to a suit in which damages might have been awarded against him had he not appeared, he was held entitled to his costs. In his appeal from the Judge's order passed in favour of the plaintiff and disallowing his own claim for costs, a defendant unnecessarily made a co-defendant a respondent. As this respondent could not be injured in any way in this appeal, it was held by the Chief Justice (MITTER, J., dissenting) that, although the appeal was dismissed, the co-defendant was not entitled to costs simply because he had been present watching the case. *COLLECTOR OF THE 24-PERGUNAHS v. WILKINSON* . 12 W. R. 444

93. ————— *Party unnecessarily joined—Defendant improperly brought before the Court.* Where a plaintiff improperly brings a defendant before a Court and his suit is dismissed, the defendant should not be deprived of costs merely because the Court considers the defence a fabri-

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cation to meet the plaintiff's claim. *DEVARAKONDA NARASAMMA v. DEVARAKONDA KANAYA* I. L. R. 4 Mad. 134

94. ————— *Party disclaiming interest though denying plaintiff's title—Suit for possession of land—Non-occupation of land by defendant—Denial of plaintiff's title—Exemption from costs.* In a suit for recovery of the possession of land in which the plaintiff recovers a decree, it is no ground for exempting a defendant from costs that he did not himself occupy any part of the land if he has denied the plaintiff's title in the suit, or was instrumental, as the agent of others, in dispossessing the plaintiff. *KOOMEROONISSA BEGUM v. HUNOONMAN DOSS* . Marsh. 122: 1 Hay 266

S.C. HUNOONMAN DOSS v. KOMBURUNISSA BEGUM W. R. F. B. 40
1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 42

95. ————— *Partition—Suit for partition by one of several co-sharers.* The costs of a suit for partition by one shareholder of a patni talukh against his co-sharers, as well as of effecting a partition, must be borne by each party, as such expenses are not caused by any wrongful act of either party, but by the nature of their tenancy. *SAMASUNDARI DEBI v. JARDINE, SKINNER & Co.* 3 B. L. R. Ap. 120 : 12 W. R. 160

96. ————— *Hindu Widow.* In a suit by a childless Hindu widow for partition of her late husband's estate, from which she alleged that she had been ejected by the defendant, the reversionary heir, the widow consented to a decree for partition, whereby a moiety of the property was allotted to her for the estate of a Hindu widow, and the parties were ordered to pay their own costs respectively. There was nothing in the decree to show that the defendant had been guilty of any misconduct, or that there was any necessity for the suit. An application by the widow that her costs of suit might be paid by the sale absolutely of the share allotted to her, was refused. *KISTOKAMINY-DOSSEE v. MIRTOONJOY DUTT* 11 B. L. R. Ap. 35

97. ————— *Costs on unjustifiable partition suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 187.* The costs in a partition suit where the property is of so small a value that it is likely to be wholly absorbed by the expenses, and where the suit by a joint holder is therefore brought unjustifiably and to the detriment of the others, ought to be paid by the plaintiff. *BHOOBUN MOHUN DEY v. DINONATH DEY* . 1 Hyde 122

98. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 222—Costs of partition charged under that section on shares of parties in partition suit—Mortgage by one sharer of undivided shares—Liability for costs of partition of mortgagee not party to partition suit—Application in suit by person not party to suit—Remedy by supplemental suit—Procedure.* K S and K B were joint owners of certain

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properties. In 1886 *K S* mortgaged his undivided share to *SC* in consideration of a loan advanced by *SC* to him. In 1887 *K S* brought a suit to which *SC* was not made a party against *K B* for partition, and on 27th April 1888 obtained a decree under which a commission of partition was issued. In the course of the suit, both *K S* and *K B* died—*K B* on 2nd September 1888 and *K S* on 30th March 1892—and by orders of Court their sons were put on the record in place of their respective fathers. The return to the commission of partition was made on 24th February 1892, and, on 20th July 1893, an order was made confirming the return, and under s. 222 of the Civil Procedure Code, charging the costs of suit and of the commission of partition to the shares of the plaintiffs and defendants, respectively, in the suit. Meanwhile in July 1889, *SC* brought a suit on his mortgage and obtained a decree, dated 5th August 1889, for an account and sale, and in that suit a final order for sale was made on 5th January 1891, which, however, was only filed on 19th August 1893. Under that order, the property was advertised for sale, the return to the commission of partition being set out in the abstract of title as part of the title, and the property to be sold being described as a divided moiety. In an application made both in the partition and mortgage suits, by the defendants in the partition suit for an order for sale of a portion of their share of the property in order to pay the costs of the suit and of the partition and other debts and liabilities for which they were liable:—*Held*, that the mortgagee, having had the benefit of the partition, and having accepted and approved of it as part of his title, as shown by the proceedings for sale, was, though not a party to the partition suit, bound by the equities attaching to the mortgaged property as incidents of the partition. He was, therefore, liable in respect of a proportionate share of the charge for costs of the partition created by the order of Court made in that suit under s. 222 of the Civil Procedure Code, and such proportionate share of those costs should be deducted in priority out of the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property. The defendants in the partition suit, however, not being parties to the mortgage suit, such an order could not be properly made at their instance, but they should enforce the charge for costs against the mortgagee by supplemental suit, and the Court stayed the sale of the property for a reasonable time to give the parties an opportunity of moving for stay of the sale in any such suit as might be instituted. *KHETTERPAL SRITIRUTNO v. KHELAL KRISTO BHUTTACHARJEE. KALLY CHURN BHUTTACHARJEE v. DURGA CHURN BHUTTACHARJEE. SRISTI-DHUR COUCH v. KALLY CHURN BHUTTACHARJEE.*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 904

99. ———— *Costs—Suit for partition—Apportionment of costs of partition between lessor and lessee—Appeal.* In a suit for partition certain defendants were made parties both in their character

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as proprietors and also as *mokarari* lessees of a fraction of the share owned by the plaintiff, and by the partition, allotments were made so as to give them separate possession of different parcels representing their proprietary and tenancy interest respectively. *Held*, that the costs of partition proportionate to the share held by the defendants in *mokarari* should be borne by the lessor and the lessees in proportion to their respective interests in the share. *Herbert v. Hedges*, 10 Ir. Eq. Rep. 479; *Herbert v. Eyre*, 2 Jones (Ir.) 803; *Cornish v. Gest*, 2 Cox 27, referred to. Costs in a partition suit up to the stage of the preliminary decree should ordinarily be borne by the parties themselves. *Shama Soondaree Debia v. Jardine Skinner & Co.*, 12 W. R. 160, followed. An appeal will lie upon a question of costs when a matter of principle is involved. *DILDAR ALI KHAN v. BHAWANI SAHAI SINGH* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 878

100. ———— *Partnership—Suit relating to partnership.* Under ordinary circumstances, the costs of a partnership suit should be paid out of the assets of the partnership, or, in default of assets, by the partners in proportion to their respective shares unless any partner denies the fact of a partnership, or opposes obstacles to the taking of the accounts, and so renders a suit necessary, when he is usually made to pay the costs up to the hearing. *RAM CHUNDER SAHA v. MANICK CHUNDER BANIKYA* I. L. R. 7 Calc. 428; 9 C. L. R. 157

101. ———— *Suit on hath-chitta—Some partners denying debt, others admitting debt.* In a suit brought against several partners to recover a sum of money on a hath-chitta, some of the partners denied the debt and the partnership, whilst others admitted both the partnership and the liability; the Court found in favour of the plaintiffs, and gave them a decree for the amount sued for with costs, and ordered the defendants who had disputed the debt and the fact of the partnership to pay the costs of the other defendants who had admitted their liability. *JUGGUT CHUNDER ROY v. ROOP CHAND SHAW*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 811

102. ———— *Payment into Court—Money paid into Court at Settlement of Issues.* At the settlement of issues, defendant paid money into Court, which plaintiff took out in part satisfaction of his claim, and raised an issue as to damages. The plaintiffs subsequently accepted the sum paid in full satisfaction and withdrew the suit. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to his costs up to and including those of the settlement of issues. *ARDESIR LIMJI v. SORABJI PESTANJI* . . . 1 Bom. 70

103. ———— *Deposit of Costs—Admission.* A deposit of costs, accompanied by a prayer that they should be enquired into upon a particular principle, does not imply an admission on the part of the depositor of his obligation to pay costs to the extent of the deposit. *LEELANUND SINGH v. COURT OF WARDS* . . . 14 W. R. 387

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104. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 220, 379—Suit for injunction or damages—Payment into Court by defendant to satisfy plaintiff's claim—Costs in such case—Costs—Discretion of Court.* The plaintiffs sued alleging certain windows in their house to be ancient windows and complaining that a building in course of erection by the defendant would, when completed according to the building plan, obstruct the light through the said windows. In his written statement the defendant denied that the plaintiffs' windows were ancient, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to the light and air as an easement. At the time of filing his written statement, the defendant paid into Court the sum of R200 which in his written statement he stated was more than sufficient to compensate the plaintiffs for any damages they might sustain, and which he (defendant) paid in without prejudice to his contentions, but for the sake of peace and to avoid litigation. At the hearing the plaintiffs abandoned their claim for an injunction, but insisted that they were entitled to more than R200 as damages. The Court found that the plaintiffs' windows were ancient, but that the R200 paid into Court were sufficient damages. It therefore ordered that the defendant should pay all the plaintiffs' costs up to the date at which the R200 were paid into Court, and as to their subsequent costs that the defendant should pay three-fourths of the plaintiffs' subsequent costs, and the plaintiffs should pay to the defendant one-fourth of the defendant's subsequent costs. The Court offered to simplify its order by directing the defendant to pay all the costs of the plaintiffs up to the date of paying the R200 into Court and half the plaintiffs' taxed costs subsequent to that date. The defendant appealed, contending that under s. 379 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) the plaintiffs should have been ordered to pay all the defendant's costs subsequent to the payment into Court. *Held*, that the suit was not one to recover a debt or damages, and therefore s. 379 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply. That being so, the Judge had full discretion under s. 220 of the Civil Procedure Code to apportion the costs, and the Court of Appeal would not interfere with that discretion. *Held*, also, that in cases not being suits to recover a debt or damages where money is paid into Court, the principle underlying s. 379 of the Civil Procedure Code ought to regulate the discretion of the Court in directing the payment of costs. *LUXMON NANA PATIL v. MOROBA RAMKRISHNA* . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 502

105. ——— *Payment out of Court—Failure to join in application to take money out of Court—Suit for share of money.* A suit by A having been decreed and execution proceedings taken out, the judgment-debtors paid into Court the amount decreed. Subsequently the decree-holder (A) and his cousin (M) put in a petition intimating that the money belonged to them in equal shares, and the Court afterwards held a proceeding in the presence of the vakil that no steps had

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been taken by his client to take out the money, and that the name of M had been registered with that of A as decree-holders, and the money was available for payment on their joint application. Eventually M sued A for a moiety of the amount. The Subordinate Judge, holding that it was entirely owing to the passive opposition of A that the money could not be drawn out from the Court, decreed the claim with costs. *Held*, that the decision of the Subordinate Judge was correct and just. *AJOODHYA DOSS v. MUTHOORA DOSS*

23 W. R. 14

106. ——— *Plaintiffs—Separate appearance of plaintiffs.* Plaintiffs in the same interest should be represented by the same pleader or set of pleaders, no costs being allowed for others. *JANKI-BAI v. ATMARAM BABURAV* . 8 Bom. A. C. 241

107. ——— *Liability of unsuccessful plaintiff for costs unnecessarily incurred by the defendant owing to his vakil's negligence.* The costs which a defeated plaintiff should be required to pay are those necessarily incurred by the successful party in the defence of the suit. Costs cannot be deemed necessary if by reasonable diligence on the part of the defendant or his pleader the expenditure of them could have been avoided. *SEETA PATTA MAHADEVI v. SURYUDAMMA*

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 128

108. ——— *Pleas taken out of time—Pleas taken after hearing of evidence—Plea of res judicata.* Costs not allowed where the plea of *res judicata* was not raised until after all the evidence had been taken. *RUN BAHADOOR SINGH v. LUCHO KOORER* . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 406 : 7 C. L. R. 251

109. ——— *Plea taken on appeal for first time—Appeal succeeding on point taken for first time—Respondent's costs.* Where the appellants succeeded on a point taken by them for the first time in appeal, they were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of appeal. *HARIDAS PURSHOTAM v. GAMBLE* . 12 Bom. 23

110. ——— *Preliminary Issue—Cost of preliminary issue in partition suit—Stamp in partition suit.* The plaintiff brought a suit to have 99 items of property partitioned. The plaintiff bore a Court-fee stamp of R10. The defendants admitted that three of the properties were ancestral and joint; but as to the other items, the second defendant stated that they were the self-acquired property of her deceased husband, and contended that the plaint was insufficiently stamped, as the object of the suit was to obtain a declaration of title to, and possession of, properties in which the plaintiff had no interest. An issue was raised on this point, and on this issue the Subordinate Judge allowed the objection and rejected the plaint. On appeal: *Held* by PETHERAM, C.J., and NORRIS, J., that the plaint was sufficiently stamped. The only relief prayed for was partition, and for the purposes of the stamp the cause of action,

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which is stated in the plaint, and that only, must be looked at. The members of the Appeal Bench, however, differed in opinion as regards the question of costs, PETHERAM, C.J., being of opinion that the costs of the appeal should be treated in the same way as the rest of the costs in the case, and be divided between the parties to the partition; and NORRIS, J., holding that the respondent having failed on appeal, ought to pay the costs; and on this question an appeal was preferred under the Letters Patent, cl. 15. *Held* by PRINSEP and TREVELLYAN, J.J., that the costs of the appeals were severable from the general costs of the suit, and therefore, though the suit was one for partition, the principle that the unsuccessful party must pay the costs was applicable so far as the appeals were concerned; the respondent therefore should pay all the costs in the two appeals. *Held* by PICOT, J., that the respondent should pay in any event her own costs of the preliminary issue and of the appeal, but that, as to the plaintiff's costs of that issue and of the appeal, they should be in the discretion of the Court as between the parties to this appeal, such costs being in no case to form part of the costs of the partition. MOHENDRO CHANDRA GANGULI v. ASHUTOSH GANGULI

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 762

111. ———— *Printing and Translations—Decree of Privy Council.* When the Privy Council decrees not only a certain specified sum as the costs of the appeal to England, but also awards the costs incurred in the Courts in India, the decree-holder is entitled to the costs of translating the record of the appeal and of transmitting it to England. ASHUR ALI v. NUGENDRO CHUNDER GHOSH 23 W. R. 463

See MADAN THAKUR v. LOPEZ

9 B. L. R. Ap. 22: 18 W. R. 253

UMATUL FATIMA v. AZHUR ALI

9 B. L. R. Ap. 23 note: 15 W. R. 356

SARODA PRASAD MULLICK v. LUCHMIPAT SINGH DUGAR . 9 B. L. R. 23 note: 18 W. R. 89

and NIL MADHUB DOSS v. BISSUMBHUR DOSS

21 W. R. 411

112. ———— *Appeal to Privy Council.* Costs of printing and translation, certified by the Deputy Registrar of the High Court, are a necessary part of the costs of an appeal to the Privy Council. The amount of such costs is left to be ascertained by the High Court, and is not assessed by the Privy Council Office. RAM COOMAR GHOSH v. PROSUNNO COOMAR SANNYAL

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 106

113. ———— *Probate—Costs of obtaining probate—Liability of residuary estate for costs.* The appellant cited the respondent, who was the executor of one T, to bring in and prove his testator's will. The Division Court (STARLING, J.) ordered the respondent to lodge the will in Court and to take out probate, but directed that the ap-

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pellant should pay half the costs of obtaining probate. On appeal:—*Held* (varying the order of STARLING, J., as to costs), that the fund primarily liable to the costs of probate was the residuary estate; and part of the residuary estate being as yet undistributed, it should, in the first instance, be applied to this purpose, and after that the appellant and respondent should contribute in equal shares. DAYABHAI TAPIDAS v. DAMODARDAS TAPIDAS . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 75

114. ———— *Grant of Probate—Subsequent inconsistent will of which probate is also granted—Costs of executor.* The executor of a will had obtained probate thereof, when the executor of a subsequent (and inconsistent) will applied for and obtained probate of the second will. *Held*, that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, and to the fact that the litigation was produced by the conduct of the testatrix herself, the executors of both wills were entitled to their costs to be paid out of the estate; but that, in so far as the costs would not be covered by the estate, each party must bear his own costs. In the goods of TARAMONI DASI . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 553

115. ———— *Application for revocation of probate—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 55, 83—Costs allowed as pleader's fees in such proceeding—General rules and circular orders of High Court, p. 94, para. 8—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 220—Power of High Court over costs of lower Courts.* S. 55, and not s. 83, of the Probate and Administration Act applies to a proceeding for revocation of probate. Such a proceeding cannot be regarded as a regular civil suit, but as a miscellaneous proceeding, and pleader's fees in such a proceeding should be fixed on that footing. The High Court has full power to make an order for the awarding of costs in the lower Courts. Where the lower Court had treated the application for revocation of probate as a suit and had given Rs. 1,254 for pleader's fees, the High Court held that Rs. 80 should be allowed, the maximum allowed by the rules of the Court. PRATAP CHANDRA SHAHA v. KALI BHANJAN SHAHA

4 C. W. N. 600

GARABINI DASSI v. PRATAP CHANDRA SHAHA

4 C. W. N. 602

116. ———— *Reference to High Court—Practice—Costs of reference to High Court—Small Cause Court (Presidency Towns) Act (Act XV of 1882), s. 69—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 220, 617, 620.* Under s. 620 of the Civil Procedure Code, the costs of a reference to the High Court cannot be dealt with separately, but must be dealt with when awarding the costs of the suit. They are, however, in the discretion of the Court, and need not necessarily follow the event of the suit. NICOL v. MATHOORA DASS DUMANI

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 507

COSTS—contd.**1. SPECIAL CASES—contd.**

117. — Remand—Stamp on plaintiff—Pleader's fees. Where a suit was decided after trial, and the decision being reversed by the High Court on appeal, the case was remanded with orders allowing the plaintiff to amend his plaint, but requiring him to pay all the costs of the first two hearings. *Held*, that the stamp for the plaint was properly included in the costs of the second hearing in the Court below, and that, as the case was sent back for re-trial and not as a mere remand, the whole of the pleader's fees should be paid for the second rial. **MADHUB CHUNDER BERA v. RAM LOCHUN BERA** 14 W. R. 143

118. — Order for costs in remand order directing 'costs to abide result'—Execution for such costs by successful party when same not specified in decree of Court below—Remand, materials necessary for ascertaining result of, for purposes of awarding costs. Where an Appellate Court, after setting aside the decree of the lower Court, remanded the case and the order as to costs, provided "costs will abide the result":—*Held*, that, if the result of the remand was entirely in favour of the successful party, he was entitled, as a matter of course, to the costs in question, even if the decree of the lower Court after remand did not contain any such direction. That the only materials that should be placed before the Court to determine the result of the remand are the judgment and the decree made in the case. **FANI BHUSAN ROY CHOWDHRY v. BAMA SUNDARI DEBI** 4 C. W. N. 343

119. — Respondent — Constructive notice to purchaser—Secrecy in transaction. Where the respondent had been guilty of secrecy in a transaction with constructive notice of which he sought to affect a purchaser as appellant, the High Court gave the appellant his costs in both Courts. **HORMASJI TEMULJI v. MANKUVARBAI** 12 Bom. 262

120. — Successful preliminary objection to appeal—Practice. Where a preliminary objection was successfully taken to the hearing of an appeal, the High Court refused to follow the practice adopted in bankruptcy appeals in England by depriving the respondent of costs on the dismissal of the appeal, on the ground that the appellant had no previous notice of the preliminary objection. *Ex parte Brooks*, L. R. 13 Q. B. D. 42, and *Ex parte Blease*, L. R. 14 Q. B. D. 123, referred to. **IMTIAZ BANO v. LATAFATUN-NISSA** I. L. R. 11 All. 328

121. — Assignment of decree pending appeal—Assignee of decree made respondent to appeal—Adding parties on appeal—Liability of Assignee for Costs of hearing in lower Court. The Standard Oil Company and one *E* sued the defendant for damages. The lower Court found that there was no privity of contract between the company and the defendant, and dismissed the

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suit of the company (plaintiff No. 1) with costs, but passed a decree for *E* (plaintiff No. 2) with costs. The defendant appealed, in the first instance, making *E* the sole respondent. The company, however, gave the defendant (appellant) notice that the decree obtained by *E* had been assigned to them. Whereupon he (the appellant) obtained leave to make the company party respondents as assignees of the decree from *E*. The company objected to be made respondents. The Appeal Court reversed the decree of the lower Court and dismissed the suit, and the question arose whether the company could be made liable for the general costs of the hearing in the lower Court. *Held*, that the company were liable only for the costs of the appeal in which they had taken an active part, but not for the general costs of hearing in the lower Court, except so far as the suit was their suit. *E* was liable for the costs throughout. The appellant (defendant) was not entitled, by bringing the company on the record against their will, to obtain an additional security for the costs already incurred in the lower Court. The assignee of a decree who is made respondent in an appeal from it and takes no steps actively to support it, ought not to be ordered to pay costs. **RAMJI MORARIJI v. ELLIS** I. L. R. 20 Bom. 167

122. — Parties plaintiffs under s. 30, Civil Procedure Code—Unsuccessful respondents in appeal—Parties having no control of suit. The plaintiffs respondents on behalf of themselves and 42 others, 36 of whom had intimated their willingness that the suit should be carried on by the plaintiffs, sued for the dismissal of a mohunt and to set aside an alienation of property by him and obtained a decree. The purchaser of the alienated property appealed to the High Court, and the decree was set aside on the ground that the suit was misconceived and was not one under s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the judgment concluded by saying merely that "the appeal is allowed with costs" without specifying any names of parties by whom the costs were to be paid. The decree, when drawn up and signed, named to two plaintiffs and the 42 other persons as respondents and directed the costs to be paid by the plaintiffs respondents. *Held*, in an application for amendment of the decree, that since the 42 persons did not themselves join as parties as provided for under s. 32 of the Code and were not parties to the suit in the sense that they had any voice or control in the conduct of it, they were not party respondents, though they might fall under the category of persons interested under s. 30, and so might be bound by the decision. The decree must, therefore, be amended by limiting the order as to the payment of costs to the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2. **SAJEDUR RAJ v. BAIDYA NATH DEB** 1 C. W. N. 65

123. — Service of summons by mistake—Service on wrong person. In a suit brought by the plaintiffs against *A*, the summons

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was by mistake served upon B, who thereupon filed a written statement denying his liability and alleging that he was erroneously described in the title to the plaint. On the day of the hearing of the case the plaintiffs' agent saw B for the first time, and ascertained that he was not the real defendant in the suit. *Held*, that B, having done nothing to mislead the plaintiffs as to his identity, was entitled to his costs of suit. *LONDON, BOMBAY, AND MEDITERRANEAN BANK v. MOHOMED IBRAHIM PARKAR* . . . **1 L. R. 4 Bom. 619**

124. ——— *Small Cause Court Suits—Act IX of 1850—Suit on a mortgage.* When a suit is brought for the principal sum and interest due on a mortgage, the High Court gave costs, although the decree was for less than R1,000, as the Small Cause Court had no jurisdiction. *MIRTUNJOY DUTT v. KAMENEE DOSSEE* . . . **1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 95**

125. ——— *Suit on a Contract—Suit which ought to have been brought in Small Cause Court.* Where an action on a contract was brought in the High Court, and judgment was given to the plaintiff for R454-13-4 :—*Held*, that, as the amount so found due was less than R500, the plaintiff could not have his costs, unless the Judge who tried the cause certified that the action was fit to be brought in the High Court. The 37th clause of the Charter of the High Court does not give the Court an uncontrolled discretion as to costs in civil suits. *SABAPATI MUDALIYAR v. NARAYANSAMI MUDALIYAR* . . . **1 Mad. 115**

126. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 187—Portion of costs given to losing party.* Portion of the costs awarded to the defendant in exercise of the discretion given by Act VIII of 1859, s. 187, where in a suit for some jewels it appeared on the evidence of the plaintiffs that they were not worth so much as stated in the plaint, and the suit might have been brought in the Small Cause Court. *SOUDAMINEY DOSSEE v. JUGGOMOHUN SEN* . . . **1 Hyde 172**

127. ——— *Act XXVI of 1864, s. 9—Small Cause Court suit brought in High Court.* The fact that a suit was brought in the High Court because it was thought necessary to attach the defendant's property before judgment, which could not have been done by the Small Cause Court, does not take the case out of the operation of s. 9, Act XXVI of 1864. *HURBAN CHUNDER GANGOOLY v. SHIB CHUNDER MITTER* . . . **2 Hyde 237**

128. ——— *Small Cause Court Act (XXVI of 1864), s. 9—Mortgage.* In a suit by a mortgagee, the prayer of the plaint was for a decree for R300 with interest, and for foreclosure or sale in default of payment. *Held*, that it was an action within s. 9 of Act XXVI of 1864, and, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to costs. *KHET-TRANMOHAN CHATTERJEE v. KISORIMOHAN BOSE* . . . **1 B. L. R. O. C. 27**

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

129. ——— *Certificate under Act XXVI of 1864, s. 9—Appellate Court, power of.* Where in an action in the High Court founded on contract a verdict was found for the plaintiff for a sum less than R1,000, and the Judge who tried the case awarded costs without certifying under s. 9, Act XXVI of 1864, that the action was fit to be brought in the High Court :—*Held*, that the Court might supply the omission on appeal. *NOBOCOOMAR DOSS v. KEWATA MUG* . . . **10 B. L. R. 358**

S.C. KEWATA MUG v. NOBOCOOMAR DOSS . . . **19 W. R. 207**

130. ——— *Suit on decree of Small Cause Court.* In a suit upon a decree of the Small Cause Court brought by reason of there being no process of that Court whereby satisfaction of its decree could be obtained :—*Held*, that the High Court had power to award to the plaintiff his costs of suit. Under the circumstances of the case, costs were not given. *MADAN MOHAN BOSE v. LAWRENCE* . . . **1 B. L. R. O. C. 66**

131. ——— *Act XXVI of 1864, s. 9—Set-off.* Where the defendant proved a set-off against the plaintiff, and thus reduced the amount which he (plaintiff) was entitled to recover from the defendant for breach of contract :—*Held*, that, notwithstanding the provisions of s. 9 of Act XXVI of 1864, the plaintiff was entitled to his costs. *KISHORCHAND v. MADHOWJI* . . . **1 L. R. 4 Bom. 407**

132. ——— *Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882), s. 22—Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (I of 1895), s. 11—Suit brought before, but determined after, the passing of Act I of 1895—Certificate for costs—General Clauses Consolidation Act (I of 1868), s. 6.* The plaintiff, before the passing of Act I of 1895, instituted in the High Court a suit to recover from the defendant a sum of over R2,000, which was reduced to a sum of less than R2,000 before the hearing, and therefore below the limit for suits cognizable by the Small Cause Court. At the time of its institution, Act XV of 1882 was applicable, by s. 22 of which Act a plaintiff was deprived, in a suit cognizable by the Small Cause Court, of his costs if he obtained a decree "for less than R2,000," unless the Judge who tried it certified it as a fit case to be tried in the High Court. The suit was not determined until after the passing of Act I of 1895, by s. 11 of which the deprivation of costs applied to cases in which the plaintiff obtained a decree for less than R1,000. The Judge made a decree in favour of the plaintiff and, without certifying that the case was one fit to be brought in the High Court, he allowed the plaintiff the costs of the suit. *Held*, on appeal, that the case was governed by s. 6 of the General Clauses Consolidation Act (I of 1868); Act I of 1895 was not applicable, and the plaintiff was not entitled to his costs of suit. The principle of *Deb*

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

Narain Dutt v. Narendra Krishna, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 267, applied. *ISMAIL ARIFF v. LESLIE*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 399
1 C. W. N. 18

133. ———— *Right of plaintiff recovering less than Rs2,000 in High Court—Presidency Small Cause Court Act (XV of 1882), s. 22—Presidency Towns Small Cause Court Amendment Act (I of 1895)—General Clauses Consolidation Act (I of 1868), s. 6.* In this suit the plaintiffs recovered a total sum of Rs1,907 from the defendant for breach of contract. The suit was brought in 1894. It was contended for the defendant that s. 22 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act (XV of 1882), which was in force at the date of the institution of the suit, applied to the case, and that under that section the plaintiffs although successful were not entitled to their costs. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover costs. The power to award costs is derived entirely from Acts of the Legislature, and in making the award the Court cannot base its decision on provisions which have been repealed and are no longer effective at the time its order is passed. *Held*, also, that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act (I of 1868) did not apply to the case. *Ismail Ariff v. Leslie*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 398, not followed. *Yonosuke Mitsue v. Ookerda Khetsy*. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 779

134. ———— *Special appeal—Costs of special appeal after remand by High Court.* If a case, after being decided in appeal by the Zilla Court, is brought before the High Court in special appeal and is remanded, the costs of the special appeal can only be recovered if the High Court's order of remand provides that they are to abide the decision on appeal below. *Digambur Chatterjee v. Ram Roodro Gungopadhy*. 13 W. R. 39

135. ———— *Stay of execution—Application for stay of execution—Practice.* Where the defendants in an original suit applied to the Appellate Court for stay of execution of the decree pending the appeal:—*Held* (Banerjee, J., dissenting), that the applicant who asked for the indulgence must pay the costs of the application. *Chuni Lal v. Anantram*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 893

136. ———— *Suit or appeal only partly decreed—Discretion of Court in awarding.* It is not correct in law or justice to say that costs must be invariably awarded in proportion to the amount decreed and dismissed. The Court can exercise the largest discretion in the matter; but this discretion is to be exercised with special reference to all the circumstances of the case, including the conduct of the parties. *Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree*. *Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Bishonath Tewaree*. *Shib Dyal Tewaree v. Bishonath Tewaree*. *Judoonath Tewaree v. Bishonath Tewaree*. 9 W. R. 61

137. ———— *Failure as to portion of special appeal.* Where a special appel-

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

lant to the High Court failed as to a portion of his appeal, the costs of that Court were decreed against him. *Heera Ram Bhuttacharjee v. Ashruf Ali*. 9 W. R. 108

138. ———— *Proportionate costs on partial decree.* In cases of partial decree, costs should be awarded to both parties in proportion to the amount decreed and dismissed. *Ninboora v. Heeraram Misser*. 1 Hay 277

139. ———— *Costs to defendants on sum in excess of what plaintiff is entitled to.* When a plaintiff has asked for a sum which is in excess of what the Court holds him entitled to, and to which a lower rate of pleader's fee or of stamp-duty applies than to the rest of the claim, the defendant who succeeds in that part of the case is entitled to recover the costs applicable to that particular part of the subject-matter (*Bayley, J.*, dissenting). *Bamasoondery Debia v. Rogers*. 7 W. R. 127

Upheld on review. 8 W. R. 55

140. ———— *Claim partly decreed and partly dismissed.* If a plaintiff claims in respect of two distinct matters, and succeeds as to one and fails as to the other, the costs will be apportioned so as to give each party the costs applicable to that matter upon which he has succeeded. *Tarachand Mookerjee v. Jadoonath Mookerjee*. Marsh. 79: 1 Hay 141

Jadoonath Mookerjee v. Tarachand Mookerji. 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 102

141. ———— *Order decreeing costs in proportion.* An order decreeing to plaintiff his costs in proportion must be taken to mean as if costs were given in proportion to the amount decreed and dismissed; so that, except when there is a distinct order restricting cost to the plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to his costs on the portion of the claim dismissed, although the order does not in words provide for it. *Bykunt Nath Chowdhry v. Mohessuree*. 4 W. R. Mis. 9

142. ———— *Unsuccessful plaintiff as to whole claim.* Where a plaintiff is entitled to some part of his claim, he ought not to be deprived of the benefit of the decree by such an order as to costs as would make him liable to the defendant for more than he would himself recover. *Ram Chunder Chowdhry v. Marriott*. 15 W. R. 465

143. ———— *Plaintiff only partly successful—Pressure by defendants to sue.* Although the plaintiff was unable to satisfy the Judge below as to each item of property for which she sued and did not obtain a decree for the full amount claimed, yet she was held entitled to recover the whole of the costs incurred by her in a suit into which she had been forced by the defendants for the recovery for her property. *Shib Pershad Chuckerbutty v. Gunga Monee Debee*. 16 W. R. 291

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

144. ————— *Costs between party and party—Calculation of costs—Portion of claim allowed and part disallowed.* Where the decree in a suit directed the payment of costs by the plaintiff and defendants, respectively, in proportion to the amounts decreed and disallowed, the Second Subordinate Judge, before whom the matter came, gave the plaintiff costs at the rate of 5 per cent. on the amount decreed, up to Rs5,000, and to the defendants at the rate of 2 per cent. on the amount disallowed, on the ground that such was in accordance with the practice not only of the Court of the Munsif, but of the First Subordinate Judge of the district. *Held*, that the method adopted was erroneous, and that the proper mode of giving effect to such a decree was to calculate the amount of the costs of the suit as laid, and then divide the entire sum proportionately between the parties according as they have respectively succeeded or failed. *BAMASOONDERY DEBIA v. ROGERS*, 7 W. R. 127, followed. *LECKIE v. JOY GOBINDO NATH ROY*. 7 C. L. R. 114

145. ————— *Set-off of costs ordered on the disposal of a preliminary point against costs awarded at the final disposal of the suit—Costs of partly successful appeal.* It is not the usual practice, when costs of an interlocutory proceeding have been disposed of, to consider that an award of the general costs of the suit interferes with the order as to the partial costs. A prior decree having given the costs incurred on the disposal of a preliminary point to the party successfully raising it, a later decree, without expressly referring to the former, gave the costs of the suit generally to the opposite side. *Held*, that the costs due under the prior decree should be set off against those due under the later. Although an appellant only partly succeeded in his appeal, the whole of his claim having been opposed in the Courts below on an untenable ground:—*Held*, that there was no reason for departing from the general rule that the defeated party should pay the costs. *RADHA PERSHAD SINGH v. RAM PARMESWAR SINGH*. I. L. R. 9 Calc. 797 : 13 C. L. R. 22

146. ————— *Suit for Damages—Decree for nominal damages—Costs to defendant on difference.* Where a suit for damages was partially decreed on a finding of nominal damages, and costs on the amount undecreed were awarded to the defendant with interest:—*Held*, that there was no good reason for such a course, and no ground of justice for saddling the plaintiff with defendant's costs. *MOSEEHUN v. MUNOORUN*. 24 W. R. 69

147. ————— *Consequential costs—Partial relief.* Costs are not consequential upon partial relief being granted in a suit involving a much larger subject-matter, a portion of which is still *sub judice*, and cannot therefore be given by the High Court upon a decree of the Privy Council, if not provided for by the decree. *LEELANUND SINGH v. COURT OF WARDS*. 14 W. R. 387

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

148. ————— *Administrator General's Act (II of 1874), s. 35—Plaintiff succeeding as to part of claim only.* In April 1885, A entered into an agreement in writing with B, whereby he agreed to act as the manager of B's zamindaris and other landed properties for three years on certain terms therein mentioned. The agreement was duly registered. On the 15th of June 1882, B sued the Administrator-General of Bengal, as administrator of A's estate, to recover certain sums of money, set forth in detail in the plaint, as having been received by A and not accounted for, stating that they had been misappropriated by A. *Held*, that, under the special terms of the Administrator General's Act, II of 1874, the plaintiff (having succeeded as to part of his claim only) was not entitled to any costs as against A's estate, but was liable to pay costs on the portion of his claim which was disallowed. *HARENDER KISHORE SINGH v. ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL OF BENGAL*. I. L. R. 12 Calc. 357

149. ————— *Suit for injunction or damages—Decree refusing injunction, but not giving damages—"Substantial success."* In a suit for an injunction or damages for obstruction by the defendant of the plaintiff's light and air, the defendant paid Rs200 into Court. The first Court granted an injunction, but on appeal the decree was varied, and an injunction refused, but Rs500 damages given to the plaintiff. On the question of costs, it was argued for the defendant (appellant) that he should be given his costs of appeal, as he had succeeded in setting aside the injunction granted by the lower Court, and should also get his costs of hearing in the lower Court, as the whole contest there had been as to the right to an injunction, which in appeal had been refused. The defendant had paid Rs200 into Court when he filed his written statement, and would have paid more if he could have obtained any indication from the plaintiff of the amount that would satisfy him. Nothing, however, would satisfy the plaintiff but an injunction, and he had failed to get it. *Held*, that the plaintiff should have his costs of hearing in the lower Court, and that each party should pay his costs of the appeal and of the proceedings on the rule for an injunction before the trial, the ordinary rule should be observed, and the costs should follow the event. The event in this case was that the plaintiff had proved his case against the defendant, although he had not got the precise form of relief which he wanted. If a party substantially succeeds, he is entitled to his costs. *GHANASHAM NILKANT NADKARNI v. MOROBA RAMCHANDRI PAI*. I. L. R. 18 Bom. 474

150. ————— *Summary suit for possession—Cases under s. 15, Limitation Act (XIV of 1859)—Act XX of 1865—Pleader's fees.* In cases under s. 15, Act XIV of 1859, it was in the discretion of the Court to give costs, either as provided in s. 1 of the rules passed by the High Court under

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

Act XX of 1865 or (if the proceedings be a miscellaneous case) according to s. 8 of those rules. **RADHA KRISTO CHAKLANUVIS v. KALEE PROSSONO ROY** 15 W. R. 268

151. ———— **Tender**—Amount stipulated for in contract not tendered—Right of plaintiff to come to Court for determination of amount of compensation. In a suit on a bond which stipulated for interest at 6 per cent., and 24 per cent. interest from date of loan in case the terms of the bond were not complied with, the defendant tendered what he considered sufficient compensation to the plaintiff before suit, and claimed exemption from payment of interest and costs. *Held*, that, as the defendant had not tendered the amount stipulated for in the bond, the plaintiff was justified in coming to the Court to obtain a decision as to the rate of compensation which should be paid and was entitled to his costs. **VENGIDESWARA PUTTER v. CHATU ACHEN** I. L. R. 3 Mad. 224

152. ———— **Third persons, payment of costs by**—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 187—Power of Court to order costs to be paid by person not a party to the suit—Sham Plaintiff. *A L D* and others having got a decree in a suit in which *S B D* a purdah-nashin, was plaintiff, a rule *nisi* was obtained by them against *J C S* and another, on the ground that he was the real plaintiff and *S B D* only a nominal one. It appeared that *S B D* had no means of her own, but lived in the house of *J C S* who could explain nothing of her circumstances, or why she was residing in his house; but he stated that she had purchased the former plaintiff's right in the suit against a decree, she having been previously uninterested in the matter, and the only reason suggested for her doing so was that a small portion of the premises in question would serve for carrying out a religious purpose said to be entertained by her. The Court found that *S B D* was only a sham plaintiff, and that *J C S* was the real one, and the rule was made absolute. *Held*, that the words "another party" in s. 187 of Act VIII of 1859 should be read as if identical with "another party to the suit." *Held*, also, that the Court cannot, by its judgment in any given suit, deal directly with persons not before it in that suit; that the Court has the same power of directing that the costs of any party to a suit for the recovery of land shall be paid by a person who is not on the record, as the late Supreme Court had, and as the Courts at Westminster still possess and exercise; that the recovery of costs from the real plaintiff in a suit in which the plaintiff on the record is only a sham one is not a step in the proceedings in any particular suit, nor can it be made the subject of a separate plaint, but is of the nature of a substantive proceeding in personam, and is within the equitable jurisdiction of the Court; that if the plaintiff on the record in a suit be only a sham one, the defendant may proceed against the real plaintiff for costs; that the real plaintiff in a suit in

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*contd.*

which the one on the record is a sham plaintiff is liable for the costs. **BAMA SUNDERY DOSSEE v. ANUNDOLOLL DOSS** Bourke O. C. 44

Affirmed on appeal . . . Bourke A. O. C. 96

S.C. JOINTEE CHUNDER SEIN v. ANUNDO LALL DAS 14 W. R. O. C. 1

153. ———— **Person setting Court in motion for improper purpose**—Champerly and Maintenance. Where the Court finds any person, though not a party to the suit, guilty of champerly or maintenance, and setting in motion the process of the Court for improper purposes, such person will be made to pay the costs of such proceeding. **JUGGESSUR COOWAR v. PROSSONO COOMAR GHOSE** 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 282

154. ———— **Order for payment of costs by person not party to the suit, and after dismissal of suit**—Power of Mofussil Courts. The plaintiffs brought a suit for the recovery of certain property and *R* and *B*, being desirous of entering into a transaction for the purpose of assisting the plaintiffs to recover it, agreed that they should receive one-half the property that might be recovered in consideration of their assistance in recovering it; they thereupon purchased from the plaintiffs for a nominal sum one-half their interest in the property, but instead of taking a conveyance in their own names, and joining as plaintiffs in the suit, they took a conveyance in the name of one *S*, an indigent member of their family and dependent on them for support, and caused the suit to be brought in the name of *S* and the plaintiff jointly. The Judge found that *S* had been put forward by *R* and *B* in order to save themselves from having to pay the costs of the suits which were brought to establish the claim, in case they should be unsuccessful, and was of opinion that *R* and *B* were the real plaintiffs in the suit, though acting in the name of *S*. Two suits had then been brought by the plaintiffs and *S*, which were dismissed, and decrees for costs given in favour of the defendants; and the Judge ordered that the names of *R* and *B* should be added to the decrees for costs. *Held*, that, though the Judge might have had power to make the order whilst the suits were pending before him, he had no power to make such order after dismissing the suits. Mofussil Courts have no power to make orders in *pænam* against persons who are not parties to the suit, such as is possessed by the original side of the High Court. **RAMNIDHY KOONDoo v. AJOODYARAM KHAN** 11 B. L. R. Ap. 37 : 20 W. R. 123

155. ———— **Payment of costs by person not party to suit**—Plaintiff's costs. Circumstances under which the Court will order costs of the suit, or of parties to the suit, to be paid by third persons not parties to the suit. **BAMASUNDARI DAS v. RAMNARAYAN MITTER** 8 B. L. R. Ap. 65

COSTS—contd.**1. SPECIAL CASES—contd.**

156. ———— *Sham Defendant.*
The Court will not order a person not on the record to pay the costs decreed against the defendant, when the latter is real and not a sham defendant, and himself did the wrongful act on which the suit was based, and has an interest in the subject-matter of the suit; and when the plaintiff knew before the trial the circumstances under which he afterwards sought to make such third person responsible for the costs, and might have added him as a defendant on the record. *PRANKUMARI DASI v. ABINASH CHANDRA MOOKERJEE* . **9 B. L. R. 210**

See CHUNDER KANT MOOKERJEE v. RAMCOOMAR KOONDOD . **13 B. L. R. 530 : 22 W. R. 138**

157. ———— *Payment or security for costs by person not a party to the suit—Suit against stranger to suit for costs—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73.* Where it appears that the plaintiff in a suit is in fact suing on behalf of another person who is not a party on the record, the ordinary practice is to require security for costs and to stay the proceedings till it is given. The rejection by the Court of an application under Act VIII of 1859, s. 73, to have a stranger, who has an interest in the suit, made a co-plaintiff on the record, cannot give a ground for an action against such stranger for costs incurred in the suit, which would not otherwise lie. The cases in which persons other than parties to the suit have been held liable to costs in England relate to applications either in the cause itself or to the disciplinary and summary jurisdiction of the Courts. They give no support to the contention that an independent action will under such circumstances lie. *RAM COOMAR COONDOD v. CHUNDERKANTO MOOKERJEE*
I. L. R. 2. Calc. 223 : I. R. 4 I. A. 23

158. ———— *Payment of costs by persons made parties without their consent.* Persons who without their consent are made parties to a suit in the appellate stage cannot be made liable for costs, simply because they encouraged the plaintiff to bring the suit and provided him with the necessary funds. *WATSON & Co. v. HURGOBIND SOOKUL* . **22 W. R. 35**

159. ———— *Transfer of case from undefended to defended board—Practice.* The costs of a transfer of a case from the undefended to the defended board must be borne by the party making the application. *BINDOO MADHUB MITTER v. WOOMESH CHUNDER PAUL* . **2 Hyde 86**

BHOYRUB CHUNDER DOSS v. CHUNDI CHURN MITTER . **Bourke 238**

160. ———— *Transfer of case from chambers into Court—Payment of costs of summons as condition precedent to proceeding with a suit—Practice.* The Court will not order as a condition precedent to proceeding to the hearing of a suit the payment of the costs of a summons adjourned from chambers into Court and there dismissed with costs. *SOOKABAI v. LAKSHMIBAI*
12 Bom. 9

COSTS—contd.**1. SPECIAL CASES—contd.**

161. ———— *Trustees—Separate set of costs.* Trustees will be allowed a separate set of costs on appeal. *PETERS v. MANUK*
13 B. L. R. 383 : 22 W. R. 175

162. ———— *Trustee delaying in assigning the legal estate—Costs—Cestui que trust, conveyance by, and suit by purchaser to compel trustee to join in the conveyance.* A trustee who acts unreasonably in delaying to join in a conveyance, though guilty of no actual misconduct, further than that shown by an unwarrantable delay in doing that which he is bound to do, will be made to pay the costs of a suit brought against him for the purpose of compelling him to do his duty, notwithstanding that neither an offer to pay such costs as he might incur attending the conveyance, nor a tender of a release from his position as trustee, has ever been made to him; he, however, will still be allowed his costs attending the conveyance when completed. *MACKERTICH v. REBBEIRO*
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 628

163. ———— *Valuation of suit—Discretion as to costs.* A Judge is not bound to give costs at a certain valuation. *KHODA BUKSH v. MOWLA BUKSH* . **14 W. R. 255**

164. ———— *Stamp duty—Mistake of Court in law.* A defendant is only chargeable as costs with that amount of stamp duty which can legally be demanded from the plaintiff, and not with any excess he may have had to pay through a mistake in law by the Court. *AJOODHYA CHOWBEY v. DAIBEE SINGH* . **3 Agra Rev. 5**

165. ———— *Appeal—Court Fees Act, 1870, s. 12—Discretion as to costs.* An appellant was held to have acted rightly in putting in his appeal upon the valuation of the plaintiff as approved of by the first Court, although that valuation had been greatly over-estimated, and the Appellate Court was held to have been justified in awarding costs in proportion to what it considered the proper valuation. There is nothing in s. 12 of the Court Fees Act to preclude a Judge from exercising his discretion as to costs. *MUTHOORANATH MOJOOMDAR v. MOHOBUTOONNISSA BIBEE*
20 W. R. 206

166. ———— *Vendor and Purchaser—Suit for damages for breach of contract and refund of earnest money—Omission to tender.* In a suit for damages for breach of a contract to sell immoveable property and for refund of the earnest money paid to the plaintiff by the defendant in which the plaintiff obtained a decree for the earnest money:—*Held*, that, as the defendant had not paid the earnest money into Court, nor formally tendered it, she must pay the costs of the suit. *PITAMBER SUNDARJI v. CASSIRAI*
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 272

167. ———— *Vexatious litigation—Successful party ordered to pay costs.* The Court departed from the general rule that a successful party

COSTS—*contd.*1. SPECIAL CASES—*concl.*

is entitled to his costs, in a case where the appellant had manifestly acted vexatiously towards the respondent, and, as a protest against frivolous litigation, ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs. *GYANEE RAM v. PALKEE RAM*. 2 N. W. 73

168. ——— Will—Costs of opposing will by heirs of deceased. The heirs of a deceased person have a right to insist upon an adverse will being proved in solemn form by the attesting witnesses, and ought not to be saddled with the adverse party's costs when occasioned by such opposition as they were entitled to offer. *MATUNGINEE DOSSEE v. HUREE PERSAD MUNDAL*. 24 W. R. 25

169. ——— Withdrawal of suit—Omission to obtain leave to bring another—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 97 and 187. The High Court has no power, under the Civil Procedure Code, to award costs to the defendant when the plaintiff withdraws, not having asked leave to do so, with liberty to bring another suit for the same matter. *BRASS v. TIREVENGADA PILLAI*. 1 Mad. 247

170. ——— Order for costs made in absence of, and without notice to, plaintiff. The plaintiffs on the day fixed for hearing asked for permission to withdraw a suit, which was granted *ex parte*. Before the order was drawn up, the defendants' pleaders, hearing that the suit had been withdrawn, applied for their costs. The application was allowed and the order was prepared, costs being awarded to the defendants. *Held*, that, as the defendants had been summoned, the lower Court should neither have passed an order allowing the suit to be withdrawn without notice to the defendants, nor should it, without notice to the plaintiffs, have passed an order charging them with costs. *MISSER DEBEE PERSHAD v. BULDEO PERSHAD*. 5 N. W. 116

171. ——— Witness—Suit by witness to recover costs incurred in giving evidence in proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898)—Maintainability—Public duty, if exists to give evidence in criminal case, when proceeding quasi-civil—Implied contract—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 70—Refusal to give costs by Magistrate—*Res judicata*. A civil suit brought by a witness to recover costs incurred in appearing to give evidence in a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is maintainable. A witness in such a proceeding had asked for his costs in the Magistrate's Court and had been referred to the Civil Court. On his bringing a civil suit: *Held*, that the principle of *res judicata* did not apply in a matter like this and the suit was maintainable. *Semble*: Such a suit may come under s. 70, Indian Contract Act. *Hallet v. Mears*, 13 *East's Reports of Cases* 15, *Pell v. Daubeny*, 5 *Exchequer Reports* 955, referred to. *NEMAI CHANDRA GHOSE v. AJAHAR CHOWDHURY*. 8 C. W. N. 178

COSTS—*contd.*

2. COSTS OUT OF ESTATE.

1. ——— Administration suit—Next friend—Unnecessary suit—Liability of next friend for costs—Adoption of suit by plaintiff—Costs of solicitor of next friend where suit unnecessary—Solicitor's lien on estate recovered or preserved by suit—Preservation of estate from future risk—Appointment of Receiver—Insane Executrix—Act II of 1874, s. 35. The plaintiff, who was a minor, sued by her next friend (her husband) for the administration of her father, Purshotam Ramji. The defendants in the suit were the plaintiff's mother, Nanbai, who was the widow and executrix of Purshotam Ramji, and one Burjorji, who had been appointed by Nanbai to act for her during her absence on pilgrimage. The plaintiff alleged that Nanbai was insane and unfit to manage the estate, and that Burjorji was mismanaging and wasting it. A receiver was appointed shortly after the filing of the suit. At the hearing the suit was dismissed as against Burjorji, and the Court ordered that his costs should be paid by the plaintiff's next friend being of opinion that he was the real actor in the suit, and that it would be unfair to make the plaintiff's estate bear the costs of proceedings in which she had no real voice. The Court was further of opinion that at the time the suit was filed Nanbai was not of unsound mind, but that she had subsequently become insane. The usual accounts were ordered to be taken as against Nanbai. The result of taking these accounts was that her administration of the estate as executrix was found to be unimpeachable, and in December 1883 the Court made an order directing that the next friend should pay the costs of the infant plaintiff. The next friend became insolvent, and his solicitors (the respondents) obtained an order from the Judge in chambers that the receiver should pay their costs out of the estate in his hands. The plaintiff appealed. The respondents contended that the plaintiff had adopted the suit, and that they had a lien for their costs—at any rate so far as they were incurred for the recovery and preservation of the estate. *Held*, that the respondents were not entitled to be paid out of the estate. The plaintiff had done no overt act signifying her adoption of the suit, and the fact that she remained passive was consistent with her disapproval of it, as the decree did not immediately affect her, or require her to take action until the death of her mother Nanbai. *Held*, also, that the property in the hands of the receiver could not be held to have been recovered by means of the suit, as it appeared that the investments were of a perfectly legitimate nature; that there was no cause for alarm with respect to the safety of the property, and that the suit, so far as it was based on alleged danger to the estate, was quite uncalled for. It was argued for the respondents that the appointment of a receiver preserved the estate from future risk arising from the fact that the executrix Nanbai was of unsound mind. *Held*, that the mere fact that the appointment of a receiver would preserve the estate from a possible danger in the future could not bring the

COSTS—*contd.*2. COSTS OUT OF ESTATE—*contd.*

case within the ordinary rule as to solicitor's lien.
DEVKABAI v. JEFFERSON, BHAIHANKAE, AND
DINSHA . . . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 248

2. ——— Administrator General's Act (II of 1874), s. 18 and s. 35—*Conflicting claims to property in possession of Administrator-General under order of Court—Costs of Administrator-General in a suit to recover such property, how paid—Expenses of taking care of such property incurred by Administrator-General.* The plaintiff and defendants Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 were the daughters of one S, who died in Bombay on the 9th November 1885. Shortly after the death of S, the plaintiff went to Delhi, leaving certain ornaments and other valuables belonging to her locked up in a box, which also contained certain property which had belonged to her mother S. The box remained in the house in which the plaintiff had resided with S. The key of the box was taken by the plaintiff to Delhi. During the plaintiff's absence one of her sisters (defendant No. 3) presented a petition to the High Court alleging that all the property in the said box belonged to her deceased mother S, and was in danger of being misappropriated by the plaintiff. Upon these allegations the Court, on the 16th January 1886, made an order under s. 18 of Act II of 1874, directing the Administrator-General to "take possession of the property of S, and hold the same, subject to the further order of the Court." Pursuant to this order, the Administrator-General took possession of the box and all its contents. The plaintiff, admitting that some of the ornaments in the box had belonged to the estate of S, sued to recover the remainder of the ornaments therein, which she alleged belonged to herself, and which she specified in a separate list. Defendant No. 3 denied her claim and contended that all the property belonged to the estate of S. The other sisters of the plaintiff (defendants Nos. 2, 4, and 5) admitted the plaintiff's claim. The Court held that the plaintiff had proved her claim, and directed that her property should be delivered over to her by the Administrator-General. *Held*, as to costs, that the Administrator-General was in the position of an interpleading plaintiff, and that he was entitled, in the first instance, to recover his costs from the losing claimant (defendant No. 3). Failing recovery from defendant No. 3, he was entitled to be paid his costs out of the estate of S, and if and in so far as to that estate proved insufficient, he was entitled to recover them out of the property which was the subject-matter of the suit. *Held*, also, that the costs of the Administrator-General included the expenses incurred by him in taking care of the property entrusted to him by the order of the Court; such expenses to be apportioned according to the amounts respectively belonging to the estate of S and to the plaintiff, and to be paid accordingly out of the said estate and out of the property of the plaintiff. AMIR JAN v. RIVETT-CARNAC

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 350

COSTS—*contd.*2. COSTS OUT OF ESTATE—*contd.*

3. ——— Partnership suit—*Deceased partner—Costs of his legal representative ordered out of the estate he represents—Beneficiaries not represented—Parties.* The plaintiff as Administrator-General and Administrator of the estate of one, H, filed this suit against the partners of H to recover H's share in the partnership. A decree was made referring it to the Commissioner to take the accounts of the partnership, etc., and the plaintiff's costs were ordered by the said decree to be paid out of the partnership assets, and in case such assets should be insufficient, it was ordered that the plaintiff do recover his costs from the estate of H. There were no assets of the partnership. The plaintiff now took out a summons calling on R as son and legal representative of H to show cause why he should not pay the said costs, or why in default the estate of H in his hands should not be attached. R objected that he was no party to this suit when the decree was made, and neither he nor his father's estate in his hands was bound by it. *Held*, that the summons must be dismissed. The decree, so far as it purported to affect the estate of H, was not a valid decree, inasmuch as the person or persons beneficially interested in that estate were not then before the Court. LOUDON v. KHATAO ROWJI . . . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 515

4. ——— Unsuccessful suit while in possession pending appeal—*Reversal of decree for possession on appeal.* A under a decree against B took possession of B's estate and continued a litigation which had been commenced by B's manager, and in which he was unsuccessful and charged with the costs of suit. B meanwhile, having appealed to the Privy Council, obtained a decree restoring her to possession of the estate. *Held*, that A could not recover the costs he was charged with from the estate. HURO MONEE alias HURO MONEE DEBIA v. RAM KISHORE ACHARJEE

6 W. R. Mis. 124

5. ——— Will, construction of—*Difficulty of construction caused by testator.* In a suit for the construction of a will, *Held*, that the difficulty of construction having been caused by the testator himself, and in regard to the circumstances and position of the parties, costs should come out of the estate. INDRA KUNWAR v. JAIPAL KUNWAR

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 725.

L. R. 15 I. A. 127

6. ——— Suit for construction of will—*Construction too simple to require assistance of Court.* In a suit for the construction of a will, where the construction was not so difficult as to have required the assistance of the Court, it was *held* to be not a case where the estate should bear the costs. The suit was therefore dismissed with costs. NARAYANI DASI v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 683

7. ——— Subsequent inconsistent will of which probate is also granted—*Costs of executor.* The executor of a will had obtained

COSTS—contd.**2. COSTS OUT OF ESTATE—concl.**

probate thereof, when the executor of a subsequent (and inconsistent) will applied for and obtained probate of the second will. *Held*, that, having regard to the circumstances of the case and to the fact that the litigation was produced by the conduct of the testatrix herself, the executors of both wills were entitled to their costs, to be paid out of the estate, but that, in so far as the costs would not be covered by the estate, each party must bear his own costs. *In the goods of TARAMONI DASI*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 553

3. INTEREST ON COSTS.

1. ———— **Discretion of Court—Execution of decree.** The Court, in executing a decree, has no power to allow interests on costs when not mentioned in the decree. The proper course for obtaining such interest is to apply to the Court which passed the decree to amend it. *ULFUTUNISSA v. MOHAN LAL SUKUL*

6 B. L. R. Ap. 33

2. ———— **Costs of translation and printing—Execution of decree of Privy Council.** When on appeal to the Privy Council it was ordered that the decree of the High Court be reversed with £276-12-2 costs, and that the decree of the Zilla Court be affirmed with costs in the Courts below, in execution of the decree it was held that the decree-holder was entitled to the costs of translation and printing incurred by him for transmission of the record to the Privy Council, and that he was entitled to interest upon these costs, but not to interest upon the said £276-12-2. *MADAN THAKUR v. LOPEZ*

9 B. L. R. Ap. 22

S.C. MUDDUN THAKOOR v. MORRISON

18 W. R. 253

3. ———— **Refund of costs paid under decree subsequently reversed—Money paid under good decree.** Costs paid in compliance with a decree subsequently reversed may be ordered to be refunded by the Court which made the original decree. A party to a suit, whose case has been dismissed in both the lower Courts with costs, is entitled, when the decrees of the lower Courts are reversed by the Privy Council and the case remanded for re-trial, to apply for a refund of the costs already paid under the decrees of the lower Courts, but not for interest on such costs. Such an application need not be made to the Privy Council, but may be made to the Court in which the suit was instituted. *DORAB ALLY KHAN v. ABDOL AZEEZ*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 229 : 3 C. L. R. 358

4. ———— **Where a decree under which costs were recovered is reversed, no express order is needed for refund of the costs; the party who recovered having no right to retain the same. Interest is awardable on costs to be so refunded.** *KEDAR NATH PAKRASEE v. DOYA MOYEE DEBIA*

20 W. R. 49

COSTS—contd.**4. COSTS IN THE CAUSE.**

1. ———— **Costs in the Cause meaning of such an order made in an interlocutory proceeding.** Where, in an interlocutory proceeding, the order as to costs is that the costs thereof shall be "costs in the cause," these words do not mean that costs will follow the event, but that those costs remain to be dealt with by the Court at the hearing, the Judge at the trial having still power to deal with such costs. *TEMPLETON v. LAURIE* (1900)

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 230

5. ORDER AS TO COSTS.

1. ———— **Appeal from order as to costs—Dismissal of suit for non-appearance—Restoration of suit to file on application of plaintiff—Order that plaintiff should pay the general costs of suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 99—Practice.** A Judge, when restoring a suit to the file under s. 99 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act IV of 1882), has no jurisdiction to pass at that time any order as to the general costs of the suit. *KRISHNA VITHAL POOLE v. GANESH BHASKAR TALLAK* (1901)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 201

6. SCALE OF COSTS.

1. ———— **Costs on highest scale.** In the Court below a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff with costs on scale No. 3. On appeal the decree as to costs was altered, it being ordered that each party should pay his own costs to be taxed on scale No. 2. *BULDEO NARAYAN v. SCRYMGEUR*

6 B. L. R. 581

See also *MILLER v. GOURIPORE COMPANY*

8 B. L. R. 285

7. TAXATION OF COSTS.

1. ———— **Appearance before taxing officer—Attorney—Appearance for several parties—Summons to attend taxation—Practice.** Any work which an attorney does jointly for several parties together he can only make one charge for, and where he appears for any number of parties before the taxing officer at the taxation of the costs of a suit, he must be taken to represent them jointly. The taxing officer should not issue separate summonses to different parties who appear by one attorney. *KENNY v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL*

7 B. L. R. Ap. 50

2. ———— **Accountants employed not under order of Court—Useful and necessary expense.** In a suit to set aside a settlement, two accountants were employed at the plaintiff's instance, and not by order of Court, to examine the settler's books and give evidence:—*Held*, that the investigation being most useful to the Court, and adapted to the ends of justice, the taxing master was right in allowing their expenses. *MACNAB v. HOGG*

2 Hyde 89

COSTS—*contd.*7. TAXATION OF COSTS—*contd.*

3. ——— Costs of Government Solicitor where suit against Government has been dismissed with costs—*Power of Taxing Officer.* The Government solicitor, who receives a monthly salary as such, receives no further payment from Government in respect of any costs of litigation to which Government is a party, except "out fees" or actual payments made by him on behalf of Government, and pays no fees when he instructs the Advocate-General; but under his arrangement with Government, he is entitled to retain the costs decreed to Government, if recovered, and he then pays to the Advocate-General the fees of counsel allowed by the taxing officer. *Held*, that, when a suit against Government is dismissed with costs, costs should be taxed in the usual way, and the taxing officer cannot enquire into the arrangement as to remuneration of its Law Officers by Government. *AZIMULLA SAHEB v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . . . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 405

4. ——— Suit against Secretary of State—*Dismissal of suit with costs—Remuneration of Law Officers—Agreement between Government and Government Solicitor—Agreement not illegal nor contrary to public policy.* Assuming that the arrangement between the Government and its solicitor is that the latter should receive a salary, and in addition the costs awarded to Government, this arrangement cannot affect a third party, condemned in costs, and the taxing officer has no right to take such an arrangement into consideration; neither is it illegal or contrary to public policy. *MUHAMMED ALIM OOLLAH SAHIB v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . . . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 162

Affirming, on appeal, decision in *AZIMULLA SAHEB v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . . . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 405

5. ——— Attorney and Client—*Trustees—Bills of costs paid by majority of trustees—Right of dissenting trustees to have bills taxed even after payment—Jurisdiction of High Court.* In a suit relating to a charitable trust, the decree directed that the costs of all parties thereto, when taxed, should be paid out of the trust fund. Certain bills of costs were subsequently furnished to the trustees by the attorneys. Two of the trustees thought the bills reasonable, and agreed that they should be paid. The third trustee objected to the amount of the bills as exorbitant, and desired that they should be taxed. Notwithstanding his protest, however, the other trustees paid the bills without taxation. He thereupon took out a summons calling upon his co-trustees and the attorney to show cause why the bills should not be taxed, and why they should not refund any sum which had been overpaid. *Held*, that the dissenting trustee was entitled to have the bills taxed, although they had been paid, and that the High Court had jurisdiction to order taxation to be made. *JIJIBHOY MUNCHERJI JIJIBHOY v. BYRAMJI JIJIBHOY* . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 189

COSTS—*contd.*7. TAXATION OF COSTS—*contd.*

6. ——— Suit relating to charitable institution or endowment—*Defendants' costs as between attorney and client ordered out of the charity estate—Charges allowed and disallowed as against estate—Discretion of Taxing Master—Trustee.* In a suit brought by the Advocate-General at the instance of relators for the purpose of removing the defendants from the position of directors of a Mahomedan mosque, and for administration of the property of the mosque, etc., the decree ordered that the defendants should have their costs taxed as between attorney and client out of the charity funds. The attorneys of the defendants accordingly brought in their bill of costs, and in taxation it was contended that they should be allowed out of the charity funds all the sums which the taxing master certified they should pay their attorneys. *Held*, that where the taxing master decided that certain items allowed against the defendants should not come out of the charity funds, his decision could not be disturbed. It does not follow that because a charge is proper to be allowed between an attorney and client that the client, if a trustee, should be allowed that charge out of the trust funds. *ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF BOMBAY v. ABDUL KADUR* . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 301

7. ——— Costs of two Counsel—*Discretion of Taxing Officer—Insolvency proceedings—Allegations of improper conduct—Purchaser—Practice.* A rule was obtained in certain insolvency proceedings against the purchaser of property of the insolvent to show cause why such purchase should not be set aside, and alleging improper conduct on the part of the purchaser, who was represented by two counsel at the hearing of the rule. On taxation of costs of the purchaser, the other parties objected to the costs of two counsel on behalf of the purchaser being allowed. *Held*, that, having regard to the allegations made, the taxing officer exercised a right discretion in allowing the costs of two counsel. *In the matter of BEER NURSING DUTT* . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 891

8. ——— *High Court Rules and Forms, 1901, Rule 577—Taxing Master's decision on a question of costs—Review by the Chambers Judge—Third Counsel's costs in a defended long cause—Practice as to retaining of Counsel and their costs—Costs of a third Counsel engaged to ask for transfer of case from one Judge to another—Practice.* As a general rule the Judge in Chambers will not, on a review of taxation, interfere with items of taxation, which are entirely within the Taxing Master's discretion or go into details of such discretionary items; but there is nothing to prevent him from doing so if it appears to him that the interests of justice require his interference and it would be his duty in all such cases to review and revise taxation and judge and decide for himself what would be a just order to make under the circumstances. Where two counsel are already briefed in a case, and a third is instructed to make an appli-

COSTS—concl'd.**7. TAXATION OF COSTS—concl'd.**

cation to transfer the case from one Judge to another and the order making the transfer makes no provision as to costs, the costs should on taxation be refused between party and party, though they may be allowed between attorney and client. A party to a defended long cause is entitled to appear by two counsel. If both counsel attend throughout the hearing and the other party is ordered to pay costs of the suit their brief fees and full refreshers would be allowed on taxation against the losing party. If the suit is conducted by one counsel only throughout, the full refreshers of the conducting counsel and a nominal refresher of 2 G. Ms. of the other counsel would be properly allowable against the opponent, if ordered to pay costs. If the absent counsel attends for portions of the time the case is at hearing, his refresher, proportionate to the time he attends, would also be properly allowable in addition to the full refresher allowed to the counsel, who attends and conducts the case. Where a party to a defended long cause engages two counsel he has a right to the services of at least one of them. He is under no obligation whatever to engage a third counsel. If both counsel find that they would owing to other engagements be unable to go in and conduct the case, when it is called on, it is obviously the duty of one of them to return the brief. If three counsel are engaged *before* the hearing it will be for the Taxing Master to consider the fees and refreshers of which two he will allow between party and party and which counsel's fees should go between attorney and client. A Solicitor engaging three counsel is entitled to have his third counsel's costs taxed between attorney and client, if he proves express authority from his client or if he proves that some peculiar contingency arose, which made it necessary for him to engage a third counsel in order to safe-guard his client's interests. If a third counsel is added after the hearing of the suit has commenced such addition must be at the cost of the party doing so. *BANOO BEGUM v. MIR AUN ALI* (1907) **I. L. R. 32 Bom. 262**

COSTS OF COMMISSION.

See *CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE*, 1882, ss. 397, 649 **10 C. W. N. 234**

CO-TRUSTEE.

See *LAND REGISTRATION ACT (BENGAL ACT VI OF 1876)* **12 C. W. N. 441**

COTTON FRAUDS ACT (BOM. ACT IX OF 1863).

See *APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACTS—BOMBAY COTTON FRAUDS ACT.*
3 Bom. Cr. 12

See *MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF.*
3 Bom. Cr. 12

1. ——— s. 2—*Possession of adulterated cotton.* Possession of adulterated cotton, even

COTTON FRAUDS ACT (BOM. ACT IX OF 1863)—concl'd.**s. 2—concl'd.**

though accompanied by a knowledge that the cotton is adulterated, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of fraudulent adulteration or deterioration of cotton under the Cotton Frauds Act. No criminality attaches to such possession till the cotton is actually offered for sale or compression. *REG. v. HANMANT GAVDA* . . . **I. L. R. 1 Bom. 228**

2. ——— *Mixing cotton.* Ginning together two varieties of cotton which had been mixed before, constitutes "mixing" within the meaning of s. 2 of Bombay Act IX of 1863. *REG. v. CHOUTHMAL LACHHIRAM* **11 Bom. 144**

3. ——— ss. 2, 8—*Offering adulterated cotton for compression—Fraudulent intention.* To constitute the offence of offering adulterated cotton for compression under s. 8 of Bombay Act IX of 1863, it is not necessary to prove that the accused had a fraudulent intention, or that he had knowledge of the cotton having been adulterated, or deteriorated, or mixed, as described in s. 2 of that Act. *REG. v. PREMJI BHAGVAN* . . . **10 Bom. 295**

ss. 6 and 14.

See *JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT*
—OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY
IN ONE DISTRICT—ADULTERATION.
I. L. R. 3 Bom. 384

COTTON FRAUDS REGULATION (BOM. REG. III of 1829).

——— s. 1. cl. (1)—*Charge under.* Cotton having been sold subject to examination by an inspector, the mere fact of cotton of two different qualities being found in one of the bales was held to be not sufficient to support a charge under s. 1, cl. (1) of Regulation III of 1829 (Bombay). *REG. v. RATTANJI BHUKAN* **1 Bom. 17**

COUNCILS ACT.

See *INDIAN COUNCILS ACT.*

COUNCILS ACT, 1892.

——— ss. 5; 55 and 56 Vic., C. 14.

See *BOMBAY CIVIL COURTS ACT (BOMBAY ACT XIV OF 1869).*
I. L. R. 32 Bom. 634

COUNSEL.

See *ADVOCATE* **14 B. L. R. Ap. 12**
5 B. L. R. Ap. 70

See *BARRISTER.*
See *CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE*, 1882, ss. 102, 103, 117 **I. L. R. 33 Bom. 475**

See *COMMISSION—CIVIL CASES.*
8 B. L. R. Ap. 101
12 B. L. R. Ap. 4
Cor. 7

See *COSTS—TAXATION OF COSTS.*

See *COSTS OF TWO COUNSEL.*
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 475

COUNSEL—*contd.*

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 36.

11 B. L. R. Ap. 33
I. L. R. 3 Bom. 270

See PRACTICE . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 196
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 475

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—MOTIONS.
B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 609

See RIGHT TO BEGIN . 9 B. L. R. 417

— adjournment for convenience
of—

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—AFFIDAVITS.
9 B. L. R. Ap. 10
10 B. L. R. 57

— costs of second counsel.

See COSTS—TAXATION OF COSTS.
I. L. R. 21 Cal. 891
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 475

— exclusive right of audience—

See PRACTICE—VAKIL AND COUNSEL.
I. L. R. 30 Cal. 983

— giving instructions to, on refer-
ence to High Court.

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, CL. 10.
8 B. L. R. 418

— non-appearance of—

See APPEAL—DEFAULT IN APPEARANCE.
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 237

— privilege of—

See DEFAMATION . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 340

— receipt for fees of—

See STAMP ACT, 1879, S^{CH.} II, ART. 15.
I. L. R. 16 All. 132

— refreshers to—

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—COUNSEL'S
FEES . I. L. R. 12 Cal. 551

1. — Practice as to Hearing.
Where the senior counsel was absent when an appeal
was opened, the Court allowed him to follow his
junior. DODS *v.* STEWART . 8 B. L. R. 340
17 W. R. 49

2. — Hearing of Argument on
preliminary issues. Two counsel for the same
party may be heard on argument of a preliminary
issue. FATMABAI *v.* AISHABAI
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 454

3. — Privilege of Speech—Ques-
tion as to the extent of privilege of speech accorded
to counsel and advocates considered. REG. *v.*
KASHINATH DINKAR . 8 Bom. Cr. 123

4. — Advocate—Privi-
lege. An advocate in India cannot be proceeded

COUNSEL—*contd.*

against civilly or criminally for words uttered in his
office as advocate. SULLIVAN *v.* NORTON
I. L. R. 10 Mad. 28

5. — Arguments—*Per* NORMAN, J.
It is improper in argument to endeavour to influ-
ence a Court by reference to a course which another
Court might think fit to adopt, or to the view which
the Appellate Court might take of its proceedings, or
even to refer to the likelihood of an appeal.
JUGGERNAUTH SAHOO *v.* MAHOMED HOSSEIN
15 W. R. 173

6. — Power to bind Client—
*Appeal to Privy Council—Agreement by counsel
not to appeal—Binding agreement on client.* Where
the counsel for the appellant had agreed, at the
hearing of the case on appeal before the High Court,
that, if the High Court would restrict its judgment
to a finding on one of several issues, his client
would not appeal to England:—*Held*, that that
agreement was binding, and that the appeal could
not be heard. AMIR ALI *v.* INDERJIT KOER
9 B. L. R. 460 : 14 Moo. I. A. 203

7. — Right to appear in Criminal
Courts. A counsel or pleader is entitled to appear
and act on behalf of the prosecution in a criminal
case. CHANDI CHARAN CHATTERJEE *v.* CHANDRA
KUMAR GHOSE . 5 B. L. R. Ap. 70

8. — References to High
Court under s. 434, Criminal Procedure Code (Act
XXV of 1861). In a reference to the High Court
under s. 434 of the Criminal Procedure Code
counsel are not heard as a matter of right, but of
indulgence of the Court. ANGELO *v.* CARGILL
9 B. L. R. 417 : 18 W. R. Cr. 41

REG. *v.* DEVAMA . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 64

9. — Right of counsel to conduct
prosecutions. *Public Prosecutor—Criminal Pro-
cedure Code, 1872, ss. 59, 60, 235, 251, 252.* Whe-
ther or not a private complainant is permitted,
under s. 59, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to
conduct a case as prosecutor, he may instruct coun-
sel who shall be entitled to appear under No. 7, Ch.
XI of the High Court rules, and the Public Prosecu-
tor may thereupon avail himself of the counsel's
services under s. 90. The effect of s. 235 of the
Code, read with ss. 59 and 60, is to make every case
tried by the Court of Session a case falling within
the provisions of s. 60,—that is to say, the Public
Prosecutor may always avail himself of the services
of counsel retained by a private individual, and in
so doing he does not deprive himself of the manage-
ment of the case. Where the assistance of counsel
has once been accepted, that assistance is not ex-
cluded at the stages of the trial (summing up by the
prosecutor and his reply) to which ss. 251 and 252
apply. *In re* NARAYAN M. PENDSHEE
11 Bom. 102

10. — Right of counsel or attorney
to conduct prosecution—*Presidency Magis-
trate's Act, s. 129—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882
s. 495.* With the exception of the Advocate Gene-

COUNSEL—contd.

ral, Standing Counsel, Government Solicitor, or other officer generally or specially empowered by the Local Government in that behalf, no person, whether counsel or attorney, can claim the right to conduct the prosecution of any criminal case without the permission of the Presidency Magistrate. *EMPRESS v. BUTOKISTO DASS*. I. L. R. 6 Calc. 59
6 C. L. R. 374

11. ——— Statement by counsel to Court—Practice. The Court will accept a statement from counsel from his place at the bar without burdening him with an oath. *Per STANLEY, J. NISTARINI DASSEE v. NUNDO LALL BOSE*
3 C. W. N. 694

In the case on appeal, however, it was held that, though it has been the practice in Courts in England to accept the statements of counsel made from his place at the bar, the Court entertained great doubt whether, if that course be objected to by the opposite side, the party putting forward such statement could insist upon its being made without the sanctity of an oath. *NUNDO LAL BOSE v. NISTARINI DASSI*. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 428

12. ——— Authority of counsel to compromise a case on behalf of his client—Nature of power conferred by counsel's retainer. A counsel, unless his authority to act for his client is revoked, and such revocation is notified to the opposite side, has, by virtue of his retainer and without need of further authority, full power to compromise a case on behalf of his client; and the Court will not disturb a compromise so entered into, unless it appears that it was entered into under a mistake and that some palpable injustice has been thereby caused to the client. *Strauss v. Francis*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 379, *Mattheus v. Munster*, L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 141, and *In re West Devon Great Consols Mine*, L. R. 38 Ch. D. 51, referred to. *JANG BHADUR SINGH v. SHANKAR RAI*
I. L. R. 13 All. 272

13. ——— Compromise, of matters in suit, of matters outside scope of suit—Authority of counsel to make such compromise—General authority—Special authority—Notice—Evidence, statement of counsel not made on oath if objected to. *Per MACLEAN, C.J., and MACPHERSON and HILL, JJ., on appeal from STANLEY, J.*—Counsel possesses a general authority, an apparent authority which must be taken to continue until notice be given to the other side by the client, that it has been determined to settle and compromise the suit in which he is actually retained as counsel. Where the compromise, however, extends to collateral matters, to matters quite outside the scope of the particular case in which counsel is engaged, in order to bind his client it must be shown that he had given his client special authority to compromise, upon the terms upon which the compromise was effected, and the other side cannot avail themselves of the position that they did not know that it had not been given; they are not entitled to assume as in the case of an apparent authority that it was given and

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was existing. Where counsel under a misapprehension of his client's instructions and believing himself to have authority, acts in fact without it, he cannot bind his client. *NUNDO LAL BOSE v. NISTARINI DASSI*. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 428
4 C. W. N. 169

14. ——— Compromise by, of suit—Compromise by counsel or vakil, how far binding on client—Presumption—Admission by counsel or vakil, how far binding. When a case is compromised by counsel or vakil on the instruction of a person who watches the case on behalf of the party: *Held*, that, even if the person instructing has no authority to bind the party, the compromise is binding on the latter if he ratifies the acts and the compromise. *Per BANERJEE, J.*—The appointment of counsel or a vakil by a party to conduct a case does not necessarily authorise him to make a binding compromise on behalf of his client, unless there is express authority for it, although it gives him authority to make binding admissions on behalf of his client. But when a counsel or vakil enters into a compromise on behalf of his client, a presumption arises that he has done so with his client's assent. *BHUT NATH SIRCAR v. RAM LALL SIRCAR* (1900)
6 C. W. N. 82

COUNSEL'S COSTS.

See COSTS—TAXATION OF COSTS.

COUNTERFEITING COIN.

See "COIN". I. L. R. 29 All. 141

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 235.

8 C. W. N. 717

See PENAL CODE (ACT XLV of 1860), s. 231. I. L. R. 30 All. 93

1. ——— Test of whether coin is money—*Penal Code*, ss. 230, 231. The test of whether a coin is money or not, is the possibility of taking it into the market and obtaining goods of any kind in exchange for it. For this its value must be ascertained and notorious. *Held*, therefore, that to counterfeit a coin of the Emperor Akbar's time was not an offence under ss. 230 and 231 of the *Penal Code*. *REG. v. BAFU YADAV* 11 Bom. 172

2. ——— *Penal Code*, s. 232—Counterfeiting Queen's coin—Removing rings from coins used as ornaments, and restoring the same to circulation. It is not an offence under s. 232 of the Indian *Penal Code* to remove the ring from a coin which has been used to form part of a necklace or other ornament, and to work up the face of the coin where the ring has been, it not being shown that any material part of the coin has at any time been removed. *KING EMPEROR v. MUHAMMAD HUSAIN* (1901). I. L. R. 23 All. 420

3. ——— *Penal Code*, s. 239, application of. S. 239 of the *Penal Code* is directed against a person other than the coiner, who procures, or obtains, or receives counterfeit coin, and

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not to the offence committed by the coiner.
QUEEN v. SHEOBUN alias SHEOPERSHAD

3 N. W. 150

4. ——— **Penal Code, s. 241.—Delivery of coin not genuine.** The gist of an offence under s. 241, Penal Code (passing as genuine coin known to be counterfeit), is that a person should deliver or attempt to induce any other person to receive as genuine coin known to be counterfeit. **QUEEN v. SOORUT** **4 N. W. 62**

5. ——— **Coin not forming legal tender—Penal Code, s. 230—Act XIX of 1872—Coins—Money.** It is not necessary, to satisfy the ordinary definition of money, that a coin should be a legal tender receivable at a value in rupees fixed by law. Gold mohurs which, although they do not pass at an absolutely fixed value, yet have a current value, not ascertainable merely by weighing them as lumps of gold, but attaching to them as coin, are coins "for the time being used as money" within the meaning of Act XIX of 1872. **QUEEN v. KUNJ BEHAREE** **5 N. W. 187**

6. ——— **Proof of fabrication—Guilty knowledge.** Where the charge is one of counterfeiting Queen's coin, direct proof of fabrication is not necessary to render the person punishable under the sections of the Penal Code with reference to the uttering of false coin. **PARUSHULLAH MUNDUL v. KHEROO MUNDUL. QUEEN v. GURIB SHEK. RAM RUTTON SAHA v. BAWOOL MUNDUL** **23 W. R. Cr. 4**

7. ——— **Uttering coins—Coins of unusual kind—Penal Code, s. 239—Evidence.** Evidence of the possession and attempted disposal of coins of an unusual kind is relevant on a charge of uttering such coins soon afterwards when the *factum* of uttering is denied. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NUR MAHOMED** **I. L. R. 8 Bom. 223**

COUNTERFEITING GOVERNMENT STAMP.

See **MAJORITY ACT, s. 3.**

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 944

See **SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHERE SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE.**

I. L. R. 15 All. 141

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 659

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 36

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 872

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 154

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 3, 500

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 201

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 138

See **SONTHAL PERGUNNAHS SETTLEMENT.**

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 183

——— **Penal Code, s. 260.—The passing off a one-anna stamp as a one-rupee stamp is not counterfeiting a one-rupee stamp. QUEEN v. SHURROOP CHUNDER DOSS** **2 W. R. Cr. 65**

COUNTERFEITING TRADE MARK.

See **CAUSE OF ACTION. 10 C. W. N. 107**

See **COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, POWER OF. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 511**

See **TRADE-MARK.**

COUNTRY-LIQUOR.

See **BOMBAY ABKARI ACT.**

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 157

COURT.

See **APPEAL. I. L. R. 29 Bom. 13**

See **DECREE. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 306**

See **DISTRICT REGISTRAR. I. L. R. 30 Mad. 326**

See **FOREIGN COURT, JUDGMENT OF.**

See **MANAGEMENT OF ESTATE BY COURT.**

——— **meaning of —**

See **BOMBAY CITY IMPROVEMENT ACT.**

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 424

See **COMPANIES ACT, s. 130.**

I. L. R. 17 All. 252

See **CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS OF PRISONERS TRIED JOINTLY.**

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 483

See **EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, s. 3.**

13 B. L. R. Ap. 40

See **EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, s. 57.**

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 176

See **SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 622.**

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 279

See **WORDS AND PHRASES.**

——— **power of —**

See **RECEIVER. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 336**

——— **Place of trial of criminal case—**

Open Court—Pronouncing judgment in private house—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 279.

Where a Magistrate conducted and closed the trial in the established Court-house, but could not by reason of illness pronounce judgment, which he did at his private house:—*Held*, that the procedure, being exceptional and in no way prejudicial to the prisoner, could not be quashed as illegal under s. 279 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861. **GOVERNMENT v. HOLASEE SINGH** . . . **1 Agra Cr. 17**

COURT ACTING AS ARBITRATOR.

See **AGREEMENT. 10 C. W. N. 835**

COURT, JURISDICTION OF.

——— *Has power to review wrong order passed by it—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622—No interference where right result has been reached.* A Court, which has dealt with a suit under a wrong section, has power to review and set aside its order for sufficient reason.

COURT, JURISDICTION OF—*concl'd.*

The High Court will not interfere under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, where the lower Court has, in so setting aside its previous order, arrived at the right result, though it purported to act under a wrong provision of the Code. *BOLLAPRAGADA NARAYANA ROW v. BOLLAPRAGADA JANAKI RAMIAH GARU* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 414

COURT FEES.

See COURT FEES ACTS.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

10 C. W. N. 199, 857

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 411.

I. L. R. 29 All. 537

See JURISDICTION I. L. R. 32 Calc. 734

See MORTGAGE . 10 C. W. N. 1010

See PLAINT, REJECTION OF.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 20

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—TEST CASE.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 140

See PROCEDURE . I. L. R. 30 All. 103

See SUITS VALUATION ACT.

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 307

See VALUATION OF SUIT.

dismissal of suit for non-payment of—

See RES JUDICATA—JUDGMENT ON PRELIMINARY POINTS . 4 Bom. A. C. 110

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 163

I. L. R. 13 All. 44

order for payment of—

See PAUPER SUIT—SUITS.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 77

payment of—

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 4.

I. L. R. 13 All. 305

See PAUPER SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 75

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 214

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 735

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 464

See PAUPER SUIT—SUITS.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 7

I. L. R. 1 All. 230, 596

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 508

I. L. R. 17 All. 526

I. L. R. 18 All. 206

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 733

question as to sufficiency of—

See APPELLATE COURT—OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—SPECIAL CASES—VALUATION OF SUIT.

1 Bom. 62

14 W. R. 196

22 W. R. 433

I. L. R. 19 All. 165

COURT FEES—*cont'd.*

question as to sufficiency of—
cont'd.

See DECREE—FORM OF DECREE—GENERAL CASES . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 415

recovery of, by Government.

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—DECREES.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 111

See PAUPER SUIT—SUITS.

2 B. L. R. Ap. 22

I. L. R. 9 All. 64

I. L. R. 18 All. 419

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 111

remission of—

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—COURT FEES . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 124
3 C. W. N. 82

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 879

time for payment of—

See COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870), s. 2.
I. L. R. 30 Mad. 32

1. Act XXVI of 1867—*Practice—Filing petitions.* Petitions of appeal might be filed on several stamps sufficient to make up the full amount required by law, even though the petition was written on one paper. *TARINEE CHURN NYA BACHUSPUTTY v. TARANATH GOOHO* 12 W. R. 449
DAWD ALI v. NADIR HOSSEN 16 W. R. 153

2. Mode of making up stamp duty—*Case where one stamp of full value is available.* When a stamp of the full value is available, parties ought to use as small a number of stamps as they can. *KHAJOOROONISSA v. ROHIM- OONISA* 16 W. R. 152

3. *Plaint—Insufficient stamp.*—There is no illegality in the reception of a plaint engrossed on insufficient stamp paper, if the full amount of the stamp duty has been paid at the time. *GOBIND KUMAR CHOWDHRY v. HARGOPAL NAG* 3 B. L. R. Ap. 72: 11 W. R. 537

4. *Appeal presented before Act came into force, but returned for irregularity.* Where, owing to an irregularity, a petition of appeal was returned before the Stamp Act, XXVI of 1867, came into force, and the appeal was not filed until after that Act came into force, held, that the appeal must be filed on a stamp of the amount prescribed by the new law. *ARADHUN DEY v. GOLAM HOSSEIN MALOOM.* 7 W. R. 461

See FAGAN v. CHUNDER KANT BANERJEE

7 W. R. 452

In the matter of the petition of *SREENATH ROY CHOWDHRY* 7 W. R. 462

COURT FEES—*contd.*

5. ———— *Copy of decree and order for execution—Certificate of amount remaining due.* Act XXVI of 1867 required that copies of the decree and of the order for execution should be stamped; the certificate as to any sum remaining due under a decree required no stamp. *VENKATA SUBIA v. SIVARAMAPPA* . . . 4 Mad. 331

6. ———— *Copies of documents for purpose of appeal in criminal case.* The exemption of the Government of India, dated the 19th September 1870, cannot be extended to copies of the statement of evidence and grounds of conviction. Persons desirous of obtaining copies of such documents for the purpose of appeal must furnish stamped paper on which the copies are to be written. *ANONYMOUS* . . . 6 Mad. Ap. 12

Sch. B, cl. 6, art. 10—*Applications for copies of decree.* Applications to the High Court for certified copies of the decree and judgment might be engrossed on a stamp of one anna, under cl. 6, art. 19, sch. B of Act XXVI of 1867. *In the matter of the petition of TURIF BISWAS*

7 W. R. 455

7. ———— *Razinama admitting satisfaction of decree—Petition.* After instituting a suit on a bond for Rs 32 with interest, the plaintiff filed a razinama stating satisfaction of his claim and withdrawing the suit. *Held*, the razinama was rather of the nature of a petition than of an agreement. *PUNCHANUN SIBCAR v. GUNESH MUNDUL. MANICK CHUNDER ROY v. LALLMON SEIKH* . . . 8 W. R. 214

8. ———— *Petition setting forth terms of parol agreement.* A document in the shape of a petition to a Court setting forth an arrangement come to between the parties in a suit may be received in evidence in support of a fresh suit founded upon the agreement recited in such petition, although only stamped as a petition, it not appearing that the agreement recited was made in writing. *RAMDYAL v. DHOOREY JHAUNNAN LAL*

3 N. W. 14

cl. 11.

See VALUATION ON SUIT.

9. ———— *Petition of special appeal to High Court, Appellate Side.* Petitions of special appeal to the High Court at Bombay, on its appellate side, had to be stamped according to the scale contained in cl. 11 of Sch. B of Act XXVI of 1867. *Ex parte DESAI KALYANRAI HAKUMATRAI*

4 Bom. A. C. 145

10. ———— *Notice of cross-appeal.* Though a notice of a cross-appeal may be lodged with the Registrar of the High Court previously, the objection itself had, under s. 348, Act VIII of 1859, to be taken at the hearing of the appeal and to bear the stamp required by s. 6, Act XXVI of 1867. *LULEET SINGH v. ALI REZA*

8 W. R. 322

RASHOMONEE DOSSEE v. CHOWDERY JUNMOJOY MULLICK . . . 9 W. R. 356

COURT FEES—*contd.*

cl. 11—*concl.*

ABDOOL GUNNEE v. GOUR MONEE DEBIA

9 W. R. 875

11. ———— *Notice of objections by respondent.* When the appeal of an appellant was against the whole of the decision of the lower Court and upon the full value of the original suit, no additional stamp duty was required in respect of the respondent's objection under s. 348, Act VIII of 1859. *ANUND MOHUN CHATTERJEE v. SUTTO RAM MOZOOMDAR* . . . 8 W. R. 124

12. ———— *Art. 11, cl. (c)—Objections by respondent—Pauper respondent.* Note (e) to Art. 11, Sch. B, Act XXVI of 1867, contained no reservation as to the stamp duty to be levied on a petition of objection under s. 348, Act VIII of 1859, filed by a pauper respondent. *RASHOMONEE DASSEE v. CHOWDERY JUNMOJOY MULLICK* 9 W. R. 356

13. ———— *Plaint.* The object of the note to Art. 11, Sch. B of Act XXVI of 1867, was to prevent appeals only where the question merely related to the amount of stamp to be impressed upon the plaint. *COLLECTOR OF SYLHET v. KALI KUMAR DUTT*

7 B. L. R. F. B. 663 : 16 W. R. F. B. 10

See (contra) *MADHUSUDAN CHUCKERBUTTY v. RYMANI DAS*

7 B. L. R. 664 note : 13 W. R. 415

14. ———— *Applications—Application under Act VIII of 1859, s. 230.* A had been dispossessed of certain land, in execution of a decree, which B had obtained in a suit against C under s. 15, Act XIV of 1859. A applied under s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, to recover the land. *Held*, no stamp was necessary on A's application. *BRAHMA MAITI DEBI v. BARKAT SIDDIQ*

4 B. L. R. F. B. 94

15. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 25, Petition under.* An application under s. 25, Act X of 1859, for the assistance of the Collector in ejecting a raiyat was not a suit, and therefore the Revenue Courts could receive such petitions engrossed on a stamp paper of the value of 8 annas. *PYARI MOHAN MOOKERJEE v. KENA BEWA*

2 B. L. R. A. C. 226

S.C. *PEARY MOHUN MOOKERJEE v. KENA BEWA* . . . 11 W. R. 90

16. ———— *Document, description of—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 40.* *Held*, that the description of a document delivered to the Court under s. 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, was neither a petition nor an application liable to duty within the meaning of the Stamp Act. *CHOTALAL AMRITLAL v. BOMBAY, BARODA AND CENTRAL INDIA RAILWAY* 5 Bom. A. C. 101

17. ———— *Complaint by Munsif—Complaint preferred by Munsif under s. 168 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1861.* A complaint preferred by a Munsif under s. 168 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, need not, though it did not bear the

COURT FEES—*contd.*Art. 11, cl. (c)—*contd.*

seal of the Munsif's Court, be on stamped paper. *REG. v. SAJJAN VALAD VITHU*. 5 Bom. Cr. 104

18. ———— *Insolvency—Fee payable on appeal under Indian Insolvent Debtor's Act (11 and 12 Vict., cap. 21).* The Court-fee payable on an appeal preferred under s. 73 of the Indian Insolvent Debtors Act is that which is provided for in Art. 18 of Sch. A to the table of fees in the rules of the Original Side of the Madras High Court, dated 5th May, 1891. *LILADHARA VIAS v. OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE OF MADRAS (1900)*. I. L. R. 24 Mad. 160

19. ———— *Pauper suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 373, 412—Pauper—Suit—Withdrawal of suit with permission to bring a fresh suit—Failure in the suit—Adjudication.* Where a pauper plaintiff withdraws a suit with permission to bring a fresh suit, he is liable to pay to the Government the Court-fees, which would have been paid by him, if he had not been permitted to sue as a pauper. The words "if the plaintiff fails in the suit" in s. 412 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) apply to the withdrawal of a suit under the provisions of s. 373 of the Code. *SECRETARY OF STATE v. NARAYAN BALKRISHNA (1905)*

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 102

20. ———— *Appeal from order to file award—Memorandum of appeal—Decree—Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), Sch. I, Art. 1.* On an application to file an award made on a reference to arbitration without the intervention of a Court a decree was made to the effect that the plaintiff do recover a certain sum of money as awarded by the arbitrator. *Held*, that an order directing such an award to be filed is a decree and an appeal from such an order is an appeal from a decree and ought to bear a Court-fee in accordance with Art. 1, Sch. I, of the Court-fees Act. *Ghulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 167, followed; decision of *OLDFIELD, J.*, in *Dayanand v. Bakhtwar Singh*, I. L. R. 5 All. 333, approved; *Upadhya Thakur v. Persidh Singh*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 723, distinguished. *HARI MOHAN SINGH v. KALI PRASAD CHALIHA (1905)*. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 11

21. ———— *Set-off—Set-off claimed in a written statement.* Where in a suit for rent the question was as to whether defendant was entitled to claim a deduction on account of payment made by him for cesses payable by the plaintiff on account of years previous to those for which rent was claimed: *Held*, that the payment cannot be treated as part payment of the rents sued for, but as an antecedent debt. The claim was, therefore, in the nature of a set-off and Court-fees must be paid for the same. *Dictum of BANERJEE, J.*, in *Fakir Chandra Dutta v. Messrs. Gisborne & Co.*, 8 C. W. N. 174, not followed. *GUISE v. ANANTA RAM RATHI (1905)*. 10 C. W. N. 199

22. ———— *Ad valorem fee—Appeals against decrees under s. 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure.* Where a claim under s. 330 of the Code of

COURT FEES—*contd.*Art. 11, cl. (c)—*contd.*

Civil Procedure has been registered as a suit, an appeal against the decree directing delivery of property in such suit ought to be stamped with an *ad valorem* fee. *BALASUNDRA MUDELLY v. RAJALINGAM CHETTIAR (1905)*

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 172

23. ———— *Suit for declaration and consequential relief—Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 7, sub-s. (iv), cls. (c) and (d)—Valuation of suit—Court's power to revise plaintiff's valuation—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 54, cl. (b).* In cases covered by s. 7, sub-s. (iv), cls. (c) and (d) of the Court-fees Act, although it is for the plaintiff to state the amount at which he values the relief sought and although the amount of Court-fees payable varies with the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint, it is open to the Court if a question is raised as to the true valuation of the suit to determine such question, and it is within the power of the Court to take action under s. 54 of the Civil Procedure Code if it is established that the valuation is improper. Where the suit was for a declaration that a mortgage-decree for Rs. 10,000 obtained by the defendant against the plaintiff was fraudulent and for an injunction to restrain the defendant from executing it by a sale of the mortgaged properties, *held*, that the prayer for injunction was a prayer for consequential relief within s. 7, sub-s. (iv), cl. (c) of the Court-fees Act. That the proper value of the relief by way of injunction was the amount sought to be realised under the decree, and the plaintiff's valuation of the same at Rs. 100 was so manifestly unjust that the Court was justified in rejecting the plaint under s. 54, Civil Procedure Code. *Hari Sanker v. Kali Kumer*, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 734, referred to. *Baidynath v. Makham Lal*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 680, approved. *UMATUL BATUL v. NANJI KOER (1907)*.

11 C. W. N. 705

24. ———— *Insufficiency of—Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), ss. 9, 10, 11, 28—Court-fee—Plaint—Court-fee on plaint discovered during progress of suit to be insufficient—Limitation—Act No. XV of 1877 (Indian Limitation Act), s. 4.* *Held*, that when it has been discovered that through mistake or inadvertence a plaint has been filed on an insufficient court-fee stamp the Court upon discovering the mistake can at any time and without any regard to limitation have the proper court-fee made up, and when it is so made up, the plaint is as valid as if it had been properly stamped when presented. The principle of the decision in *Balkaran Rai v. Gobind Nath Tewari*, I. L. R. 12 All. 129, so far as applicable to plaints, rejected. *HARI RAM v. AKBAR HUSAIN (1907)*.

I. L. R. 29 All. 749

25. ———— *Suit before Settlement Officer—Court-fee on plaint—Reg. III of 1872, ss. 5, 8—Settlement—Suit instituted before Settlement Officer without Court-fee—Transfer to Civil Court*

COURT FEES—concl'd.**Art. 11, cl. (c)—concl'd.**

—*Court-fee on plaint, if leviable.* No institution Court-fee need be paid, when a suit, which was instituted before a Settlement Officer under the provisions of Reg. III of 1872 without a Court-fee, was transferred to a Civil Court under s. 5 of the Regulation. *GOLAP KUMARI SAHEBA v. KADIRUDDIN* (1908) **12 C. W. N. 917**

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870).

See APPELLATE COURT—INTERFERENCE WITH, AND POWER TO VARY, ORDER OF LOWER COURT.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 501, 516

See COURT-FEES.

See SUITS VALUATION ACT.

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 543

1. ——— *Copy of decree made under old stamp laws.*—Where a decree had been prepared while the old stamp laws were in operation, and R6 were awarded in it as the value of the stamps for a copy thereof, the Court allowed a copy to be taken for R4 by a party applying after Act VII of 1870 came into operation. *In the matter of HUREEHUR MAHTOON* **14 W. R. 167**

2. ——— *Practice—Petition of appeal—Making up stamp fee.* There is no illegality in making up the stamp fee chargeable in an appeal by means of any number of stamps of smaller values. *DAWD ALI v. NADIR HOSSEIN*

16 W. R. 153

TARANEE CHURN NAYABACHUSPUTTY v. TARA-NATH GOOHO **12 W. R. 449**

HURO MONEE v. KRISTO INDRO SHAHA

17 W. R. 220

But when a stamp of the full value is available parties should use as small a number of stamps as possible. *KHAJLOORONISSA v. ROHIMOONISSA*

16 W. R. 152

——— **s. 2**—*Does not contemplate the fixing by the decree of a time for payment of extra Court-fees—Where Court fixed such time, payment within such time no condition precedent to execution.* It is not intended by the first part of s. 2 of the Court Fees Act that the Court should fix a time for the payment of the extra Court-fee in respect of mesne profits subsequent to the institution of the suit but that execution in respect of such profits should be stayed till such payment is made. Where the Court by its decree directs the payment of such Court-fees within a fixed time, such direction is no part of the decree and execution of the decree is not conditional on payment within the time so fixed. *PERIANAN CHETTI v. NAGAPPA MUDALIAR* (1906) **I. L. R. 30 Mad. 32**

——— **s. 5**—

1. ——— *Court-fee on memorandum of appeal—Finality of taxing officers'*

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—concl'd.**s. 5—concl'd.**

decision—Mistake—Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VI of 1892), s. 3. Where an appellant whose memorandum of appeal had been declared by the taxing officer of the Court to be insufficiently stamped, applied for relief under s. 3 of Act No. VI of 1892, and it was found that the report of the taxing officer was erroneous, and that the correct stamp had, as a matter of fact, been put on the memorandum of appeal: *Held*, that the appellant was entitled to the relief sought notwithstanding the provisions of s. 5 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870). *BADRI PRASAD v. KUNDAN LAL*

I. L. R. 15 All. 117

2. ——— *Objection as to amount of Court-fee on petition of appeal—Decision of taxing officer—Appellate Court, Power of.* An objection taken on behalf of respondents at the hearing of an appeal as to the amount of the Court-fee stamp affixed to the petition of appeal to the High Court cannot be entertained, the decision of the officer on that point being final unless referred to the Chief Justice. *RANGA PAI v. BABA*

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 398

3. ——— *and s. 7, cl. 8—“Value—Suit to set aside attachment on land.* The meaning of cl. 8, s. 7 of the Court Fees Act, VII of 1870, is, that a person suing to set aside an attachment on land shall in no case be called upon to pay a higher fee than he would have to pay if he were suing for possession of the land. Accordingly, in a suit for setting aside a summary attachment, under Bombay Act I of 1865, placed by the Collector on land held on a settlement, for a period not exceeding thirty years, the value was held to be five times the assessment, and the stamp duty calculated upon it, irrespective of the actual market value or the amount for which the land was attached. *COLLECTOR OF THANA v. DADABHAI BOMANJI*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 352

4. ——— *Where there has been no decision by the taxing officer under s. 5, it is open to the respondent to raise the objection on appeal at the hearing.* *KASTURI CHETTI v. DEPUTY COLLECTOR, BELLARY* **I. L. R. 21 Mad. 269**

5. ——— *and s. 12—Finality of Taxing Officer's decision as to Court-fee—“Final,” meaning of—Duty of Court-fees Act Officer.* The word “final” in s. 5 of the Court Fees Act has the same meaning as in s. 12, though it is applied to a different subject. The cases in which it has been held that, notwithstanding the use of this word in s. 12, an appeal lies from a decision as to the category in which the relief sought by a plaintiff or appellant falls, do not mean that decisions which the section declares to be “final” are nevertheless appealable, but that the question of category is not a “question relating to valuation,” and therefore is not declared by the section to be final. In both s. 5 and s. 12 “final” is used in its ordinary legal sense of unappealable. A decision under s. 5 of the Act is not open to appeal, revision, or review, and is

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 5 and s. 12—*concl'd.*

final for all purposes, and no means have been provided or suggested by the Legislature for questioning it. The officer mentioned in s. 5 of the Court Fees Act is not bound to advise parties as to the stamp required under the Act, or to give them notice that they have not sufficiently stamped documents which the Act requires to be stamped before presentation. *BALKARAN RAI v. GOBIND NATH TIWARI* I. L. R. 12 All. 129

6. — ss. 5 and 7, clause IX—*Reference—Court-fee—Foreclosure suit—Plaintiffs ordered to discharge prior mortgage—Validity of mortgage challenged in appeal—Ad valorem fee.* In a suit for foreclosure a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff conditionally on his redeeming a prior mortgage on payment of R 5,914-6-5. The plaintiff appealed, assailing the validity of the prior mortgage, and stamped his memorandum of appeal with an *ad valorem* court fee on the amount of the principal sum of money secured by the prior mortgage. *Held*, that the proper amount of court-fee payable was an *ad valorem* court-fee on the amount which the plaintiff had been ordered to pay to the prior mortgagee. *Nepal Rai v. Debi Prasad, All. Weekly Notes (1905) 40*, and *Jhanda Mal v. Himmat, unreported judgment of Burkitt, J., dated 15 January 1908*, followed. *BAJI LAL v. GABARDHAN (1909)* I. L. R. 31 All. 265

s. 5, Sch. I, Art. 45—*Court-fee—Interlocutory order—Review.* *Held*, that an application for review of an interlocutory order was properly stamped with a court-fee stamp of R2, and that neither Art. 4 nor Art. 5 of Sch. I of the Court-fees Act refers to an interlocutory order. *Bom. Printed Judgments, 1892, p. 383*, followed. *JAGANNATH PRASAD v. MULCHAND (1909)* I. L. R. 31 All. 262

s. 5, Sch. II, Art. 11—*Court-fee payable on memorandum of appeal—Order not having the force of a decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 2—Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), ss. 18, 30, 53, 54.* In a reference made under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the District Judge valued the compensation to be given in the case at R4,200, and the amount was placed in deposit with the Collector. One *H* then applied to the District Judge for payment of the amount to him, and the application was opposed by other persons, who claimed a title to the property, some claiming the whole of the compensation money and others portions of it. The District Judge's order on the application was :—This suit be dismissed. The parties may seek redress in the Civil Court. *H* appealed to the High Court. *Held* (by MACLEAN, C.J., and BANERJEE, J.) on a reference by the Registrar under s. 5, Court-fees Act, that the order of the District Judge was not a decree within the meaning of s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, and Court-fee was payable in the appeal under Art. 11

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 5, Sch. II, Art. 11—*concl'd.*

of Sch. II of the Court-fees Act, *i.e.*, two rupees, and not as computed on the amount in deposit with the Collector and claimed by the appellant under Art. 1 of Sch. I of the Court-fees Act. *Held*, (by RAMPINI and GUPTA, J.J.) on the merits that the order of the District Judge was without jurisdiction. He ought to have apportioned the amount of the compensation awarded as he thought fit. *HARRISH CHANDRA CHATTERJI v. BHABA TARINI DEBI (1900)* 8 C. W. N. 321

s. 6.

See APPELLATE COURT—EXERCISE OF POWERS IN VARIOUS CASES—SPECIAL CASES—APPEAL I. L. R. 15 Mad. 29

See APPELLATE COURT—REJECTION OR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED OR REJECTED BY COURT BELOW—UNSTAMPED DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 12 All. 57

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 316.
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 670

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 4.
I. L. R. 20 Mad. 319
I. L. R. 22 Mad. 494

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 5.
I. L. R. 12 All. 57

1. — *Applications not required to be in writing.* Applications to the Court not required by the Civil Procedure Code to be in writing, do not fall within the 6th section of the Court Fees Act. The term "application" in Sch. II of the Court Fees Act, when read with s. 6, must be construed to mean an application in writing. *TETLEY v. ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL OF BENGAL* 2 N. W. 418

2. — *Certificate of Guardianship—Act XL of 1858, s. 3—Period from which authority of guardian dates.* S. 6 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), which says that a certificate under Act XL of 1858 (among other documents) "shall not be filed, exhibited, or recorded in any Court of justice, or received or furnished by any public officer," unless a certain fee be paid, means that such certificate cannot come into existence until the person who has the permission of the Court to obtain it deposits the requisite amount of stamp duty. *SAHAI NAND v. MUNGNIRAM MARWARI* I. L. R. 12 Calc. 542

3. — *Set-off.* In a suit to recover a sum of money due as wages, the plaintiff alleging that the defendant had engaged him to sell cloth on his account at a monthly salary, the defendant claimed a set-off at the price of cloth which he alleged the plaintiff had sold on his account on commission. *Held*, that the Court-fee payable on the claim for set-off was the same as for a plaint in a suit. *AMIR ZAMA v. NATHU MAL* I. L. R. 8 All. 396

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 6—*concl.*

4. *Written statement*
—*Set-off—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 111 and 216.* A written statement containing a claim of set-off is chargeable with the Court-fee which would be payable on a plaint of that nature. *BAI SHRI MAJTRAJBAL V. NAROTAM HARGOVAN*
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 672

s. 7.

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES
IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT —
VALUATION OF APPEAL. 18 W. R. 21

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 96

See PLAINT—REJECTION OF PLAINT.

I. L. R. 23 All. 423

Appeal—Preliminary
Objection. A preliminary objection was taken that no appeal lay to the High Court on the ground that the suit had been valued at Rs 40 and was one for a declaration, the prayer for possession being merely consequential. *Held*, overruling the objection, that the suit falls within the scope of s. 7, cl. v of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), and that the real value of the property being more than Rs 5,000, an appeal lay to the High Court. *RAI MEHERBAI V. MAGANCHAND (1905)*
I. L. R. 29 Bom. 96

s. 7. sub-s. (1), Sch. II, Art. 17, cl. (ii) and (vi)—*Decree for mesne profits—Amount left unascertained—Memorandum of appeal, court-fee on*
Practice contrary to law, force and validity of—Hindu law—Mitakshara—Suit by co-parcener to set aside alienation by another co-parcener—Purchaser's equities—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 8, Sch. II, Arts. 91, 142, 144—Death of transfer or pending suit—Effect—Infant co-parcener, if barred in respect of mesne profits, if adults barred. When a suit for recovery of possession and mesne profits is decreed the mesne profits being directed to be ascertained in execution: *Held*, that the memorandum of appeal preferred against the decree for mesne profits should bear court-fee stamp upon the amount of the mesne profits claimed antecedent to the suit. The case is governed by s. 7, sub-s. (i) and not by cl. (iii) or cl. (vi) of Art. 17 of Sch. II of the Court Fees Act. *Ram Krishna Bhikaji v. Bhima Bai, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 416, and Maiden v. Janakiramayya, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 371*, referred to. To bring a case within the expression "where it is not possible to estimate at a money-value the subject-matter in dispute" in Art. 17, cl. (vi) of Sch. II of the Court Fees Act, it must be established that it is not possible even to state approximately a money-value for the subject-matter in dispute. The practice obtaining in the office of the High Court of allowing the memorandum of appeal in such cases to be stamped with a court-fee stamp of Rs 10 is contrary to law and should be discontinued. *Kishori Lal Roy v. Sharut Chunder Mazumdar,*

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 7—*contd.*

I. L. R. 8 Cal. 593, referred to. *BUNWARI LAL V. DAYA SUNKER MISSER (1909)*. 13 C. W. N. 815

s. 7, cls. i and ii, and s. 11—*Suit for Compensation for Use and Occupation.* The plaintiffs sued, by virtue of a deed of conditional sale which had been foreclosed, for, among other things, compensation in the nature of rent for the use and occupation of a house from the date of suit to the date on which possession of the house should be delivered to them, the defendants having purchased the house subsequently to the conditional sale, but before the foreclosure. *Held, per SPANKIE, J.,* that cl. 2, s. 7 of the Court Fees Act, did not apply to the claim, nor was it one for money within the meaning of cl. 1 of that section, but one for which s. 11 of that Act provided. *Per OLDFIELD, J.—*That Court-fees were leviable in respect of the claim, with reference to cl. 1, s. 7, and s. 11 of the Court Fees Act. *CHEDI LAL V. KIRATH CHAND*
I. L. R. 2 All. 682

cl. iv.

See COURT FEES . 11 C. W. N. 705

cl. iv (b), and cl. v—*Suits Valuation Act (IX of 1887), s. 8—Suit for partition and separate possession of joint family property—Valuation for Court-fee purposes—Market value of subject-matter determines jurisdiction.* The plaintiff sued for partition of certain houses, house sites, moveables and lands, valuing his share in lands at five times the assessment (i.e., at Rs 489-6-0) for Court-fee purposes and in the moveables at Rs 1,455-8-0. The market value of the plaintiff's share in the lands was Rs 5,600. The plaintiff was presented in the Court of First Class Subordinate Judge, as the value of the plaintiff's share was over Rs 5,000. The Subordinate Judge held that the value for Court Fees, that is, Rs 1,944-14-0 should be treated as the value for jurisdiction under s. 7, cl. (iv) (b) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, and returned the plaint for presentation in the Court of Second Class Subordinate Judge. *Held*, reversing the orders, that the suit fell within the jurisdiction of the First Class Subordinate Judge. *Held*, further, that the suit fell not within s. 7 (iv) (b) but under s. 7 (v) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, did not apply. That, therefore, it was the market value of the lands, houses, etc., that determined the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge. *Motibhai v. Haridas, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 315*, commented on. *DAGDU V. TOTARAM (1909)* . . . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 658

cl. iv (c).

See COURT-FEES ACT (VII OF 1870).

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 567

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—
MISCELLANEOUS SUITS.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 788

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 7, cl. iv (c)—*contd.*

See JURISDICTION . 13 C. W. N. 493

See VALUATION OF SUIT.

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 480

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 89

1. ————— Declaratory decree—*Consequential relief*. In a suit for a declaratory decree to set aside a summary order under Act VIII of 1859, s. 246, where the plaintiff asked also for an order "confirming possession after declaration of title," it was *held* that consequential relief was sought, and that the stamp fee leviable was the *ad valorem* fee prescribed by the Court Fees Act. *BOHURONISSA BIBEE v. KUREEMOONISSA KHATOON* . . . 19 W. R. 18

2. ————— Declaratory decree—*Consequential relief*—*Suit to establish right to attached property*—Court Fees Act, 1870, Sch. II, Art. 17. In a suit, under s. 283 of Act X of 1877, for a declaration of her proprietary right to certain immoveable property attached in the execution of a decree the plaintiff asked that the property might be "protected from sale." *Held*, that consequential relief was claimed in the suit, and Court-fees were therefore leviable under s. 7, cl. (c), and not under Sch. II, Art. 17 (iii) of Act VII of 1870. *RAM PRASAD v. SUKH DAI*. I. L. R. 2 All. 720

3. ————— Declaratory decree—*Consequential relief*—*Court-fees*. In a suit for a declaration of proprietary right in respect of a house in which the removal of an attachment of such house in the execution of a decree was sought, the plaintiff did not, as s. 7 of the Court Fees Act directs, state in his plaint the amount at which he valued the relief sought, nor did the Court of first instance cause him to supply this defect. On appeal by the plaintiff from the decree of the Court of first instance dismissing his suit, the lower Appellate Court demanded from the plaintiff Court-fees in respect of his plaint and memorandum of appeal computed on the market value of such house, the plaintiff having only paid in respect of those documents respectively the Court-fees payable in a suit for a declaration of right where no consequential relief is prayed. *Held*, that the market value of the property could not be taken by the lower Appellate Court to be the value of the relief sought, as the plaintiff did not seek possession of the property, and that, as the valuation of the relief sought rested with the plaintiff, and not the Court, and as in this instance the declaration of right claimed necessarily carried with it the consequential relief sought, of which the value was merely nominal, further Court-fees could not be demanded by the lower Appellate Court from the plaintiff. *OSTOCHE v. HARI DAS*

I. L. R. 2 All. 839

4. ————— *Suit to have a lease set aside and buildings erected by lessees demolished*—*Suit for possession of land and demolition of buildings erected thereon*—*Declaratory decree*—*Conse-*

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 7, cl. iv (c)—*contd.*

quential relief. Certain co-sharers of a village sued to have a lease of certain land, the joint undivided property of the co-sharers, which the other co-sharers had granted, set aside, and to have the buildings erected on such land by the lessees demolished on the ground that such lease had been granted without their consent, without which it could not lawfully be granted. They valued the relief sought at Rs. 100. The value of the buildings of which they sought demolition was Rs. 3,000. *B* sued *N* claiming, *inter alia*, possession of certain land and to have certain buildings erected thereon by the defendant demolished. *Held*, by STRAIGHT, BRODHURST, and TYRELL, JJ., with reference to the first suit, that it was one for a declaratory decree in which consequential relief was prayed, and fell under s. 7, Art. 4, cl. (c), Court Fees Act, 1870, and such relief being valued at Rs. 100, had been properly instituted in the Munsif's Court. *JOGAL KISHOR v. TALE SINGH* . I. L. R. 4 All. 320

BINDESHRI CHAUBEY v. NANDU

I. L. R. 4 All. 320

5. ————— *Suit to set aside mortgage*—*Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 39*—*Suit for declaratory decree*. *C*'s father mortgaged certain land to *D*. *A* purchased the instrument of mortgage and sued *C*, whose father had died, upon it, and obtained a decree enforcing the mortgage. *C* then mortgaged a moiety of the land to *B*, and subsequently sold the same moiety to *A*. *A* sued *B* for the cancellation of the instrument of mortgage to *B*. *Held*, that the suit was in the nature of a simple declaratory suit. *KARAM KHAN v. DARYAI SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 331

See (contra) para. 13, post.

6. ————— *Suit to set aside a trust deed and to recover trust-money*—*Appeal by trustee*—*Duty payable on memorandum of appeal*. *A* brought a suit against *B*, a trustee, and others to set aside a trust-deed and to recover Rs. 2,50,000, the amount of the trust-money, and valued his suit at Rs. 2,50,000. *A* obtained a decree. *B* appealed and sought to affix to his memorandum of appeal a ten-rupee stamp, under Art. 17 (cl. 6) of Sch. II of Act VII of 1870. *Held*, that the duty payable on the memorandum of appeal was the same as that paid on the plaint in the suit. *MAHOMED NASIK v. MALKAI MUKADRAI UZWA BADSHAH MEHAL SAHIBA*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 380

7. ————— *Suit for Declaration and Injunction*—*Stamp*—*Consequential relief*. The plaintiff sued to obtain a declaration that he was entitled to the exclusive management of certain devasthan immovable and moveable property. His plaint, which bore a ten-rupee stamp, contained a prayer for an injunction. The Subordinate Judge rejected the plaintiff's claim on the ground that he had not paid the proper stamp fees. On appeal to the High Court: *Held*, that the plaint was insufficiently stamped. The injunction

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 7, cl. iv (c)—*contd.*

prayed for would be consequential relief, and cl. 4 (c) of s. 7 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) was, therefore, applicable. The appellant was accordingly required to state in the memorandum of appeal at what amount he valued the relief sought, in order that the fee might be computed.

RAGHUNATH GANESH v. GANGADHAR BHIKAJI

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 60

8. ——— Partnership—Application to wind up a Partnership under s. 265, Contract Act—Suit for an account. An application to the Court to wind up a partnership made under s. 265 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) is in the nature of a suit for an account and should be stamped accordingly.

ABAD ALI PRADHAM v. JAMIEBUDDIN MAHOMED

13 C. L. R. 160

9. ——— Appeal—Contract Act, s. 265. The stamp duty payable on an appeal from an order made by a District Judge on an application under s. 265 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) should be an *ad valorem* fee as in a suit for accounts, under s. 7, cl. 4 (f) of the Court Fees Act, VII of 1870. *Javali Ramasami v. Satham Bakam*, I. L. R. 1 Mad. 340, and *Lachman Lall v. Ram Lall*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 321, approved.

LADUBHAI v. REVICHAND . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 143

10. ——— Suit for accounts—Stamp—Plaint—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 265. The stamp duty payable on an application to the District Court under s. 265 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) for an account and winding up of partnership should be an *ad valorem* fee under s. 7, cl. 4 (f), of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870). *Bhogilal v. Popatbhai* . . .

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 125

11. ——— Suit for possession of wife—Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 7, cl. iv (c), and Art. 15 of Sch. II—Suit for declaratory decree and consequential relief—Appeal—Costs. S. 7, cl. iv (c), and not Art. 15 of Sch. II, of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) applies to a case in which the plaintiff seeks for a declaration that the defendant is lawfully married to him, and prays for the consequential relief that the defendant should be ordered to live with him. Mode of computation of Court-fees discussed. It is doubtful whether there is a right of appeal against the order for costs, when no matter of principle is involved.

AMIRUL HOSSAIN v. KHAIRUNNESSA (1901)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 567

12. ——— Cancellation of document—Suit for cancellation and delivery of mortgage-bond for Rs. 4,000—Valuation of relief by plaintiff at Rs. 50—Duty of Court to accept plaintiff's valuation in suits of this class. Where cases fall under s. 7, para. IV, cl. (c), of the Court Fees Act, the plaintiff should make a verified statement in his plaint of the amount at which he values the relief sought. Where this has been done the Court has no jurisdiction to decline to accept the valuation thus given or to revise it. Such a power of revision is limited to cases provided

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 7, cl. iv (c)—*contd.*

for by s. 9, which relates to an estimate given by the plaintiff of the annual net profits of the land or the market value of the land, house or garden as mentioned in s. 7, paras. V and VI. Plaintiff sued for the cancellation and delivery up of a mortgage bond for Rs. 4,000, executed in defendant's favour, for which, it was alleged, no consideration had been paid by defendant. The relief claimed was valued in the verified plaint at Rs. 50. *Held*, that the Court could not revise the valuation or decline to accept the plaint. *CHINNAMMAL v. MADARSA ROWTHER* (1904) . . .

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 480

13. ——— Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 89—Cancellation of document—Suit for declaration—Consequential relief—Valuation. The plaintiff having sued for the cancellation of a sale-deed, framed the prayer in the plaint so as to seek a declaration that the sale-deed was fraudulent and for an order to have it cancelled and a copy sent to the Sub-Registrar as provided by s. 39 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877). *Held*, that the suit was one for a declaration with a distinct prayer for consequential relief. *Karam Khan v. Daryai Singh*, I. L. R. 5 All. 331, dissented from. The plaint was stamped with a Court-fee stamp of Rs. 10 only. *Held*, that the case was one falling under s. 7, paragraph 4, cl. (c) of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), and must be valued accordingly. *PARVATIBAI v. VISHVANATH GANESH* (1905) . . .

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 207

14. ——— cl. iv, (c), (d)—Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 7, para. IV, cls. (c) and (d)—Suit for Injunction and Damages on allegation of possession. Where a suit was brought by the plaintiff alleging that he was in possession of a certain jungle and that the defendants had interfered with his possession by cutting certain trees and he sought therefore for a declaration of his title to the whole jungle and damages for the trees cut, and an injunction restraining the defendant from cutting any more trees: *Held*, that the suit fell within the provisions of para. IV, cls. (c) and (d) of s. 7 of the Court Fees Act, and in a case like the present it is not the duty, nor is it within the power, of the Court to ascertain the value of the property for the purposes of jurisdiction, but it should accept the value of the relief stated in the plaint, both for the purposes of Court-fee and for determining the jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit. *HARI SHANKAR DUTT v. KALI KUMAR PATRA* (1905) . . .

9 C. W. N. 690

15. ——— cl. iv (c), and Sch. II, Art. 17 (6)—Registration Act (III of 1877), s. 77—Suits Valuation Act, s. 8—Suit for registration of document under s. 77 of the Registration Act does not fall for purposes of Court-fees within s. 7, cl. (4) (c) of the Court Fees Act, but under Art. 17 (6) of Sch. II of the Act such suit to be valued for purposes of jurisdiction on the value of the property. A suit for registration of a document under s. 77 of the Registration Act is not, for the purposes of payment

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 7, cl. iv (c)—*concl'd.*

of Court-fees, a suit for a declaratory decree with consequential relief within s. 7, cl. (4) (c), of the Court Fees Act, but is a suit in which it is not possible to estimate at a money-value the subject-matter in dispute, within Art. 17 (6) of Sch. II of the Act. The Court-fee payable in such cases is a fixed fee of 10 rupees. *Juntoo v. Radha Canto Doss*, 1. L. R. 8 Calc. 515, followed. *Savarimulhu Pillai v. Alagiam Pillai*, 12 Mad. L. J. 88, followed. The question of valuation for purposes of jurisdiction is not in such cases to be decided under s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. The value in such cases will be the value of the interest created by such document. *Ramakrishnamma v. Bhagamma*, 1. L. R. 13 Mad. 56, followed. *RAMU AIYAR v. SANKARA AIYAR* (1908) . 1. L. R. 31 Mad. 89

s. 7, cls. iv, v, vi, ix, and x (d)—
See SUITS VALUATION ACT.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 73

cl. iv (d)—*Valuation by plaintiff of relief sought—Increase of valuation by Court, and return of plaint for want of jurisdiction—Invalidity of order.* A plaint was filed in a certain Court, praying for an injunction, the relief sought being valued at Rs50, on the basis of which valuation the Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. On objection being taken by the defendant that the plaintiff's valuation was incorrect, and that the proper valuation of the suit exceeded the pecuniary limits of the Court's jurisdiction, an issue was framed and the question was tried whether the suit was in fact within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, with the result that the Judge held the proper valuation of the relief sought to be Rs2,700, which exceeded the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. He accordingly returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. *Held*, that the Court had no power to increase the value of the suit. S. 7, cl. iv (d), of the Court-fees Act requires that, in a suit for an injunction, the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought. The plaintiff had valued the relief at Rs50, and the Court therefore had jurisdiction. *GURUVAJAMMA v. VENKATAKRISHNAMA CHETTI* (1900)

I. L. R. 24 Mad 34

1. s. 7, cl. v—*Subordinate tenure-holder—Assessment of Court-fee in suit for possession of a fractional part of an estate.* The assessment of the Court-fee in a suit by a subordinate tenure-holder to recover possession of a definite portion of an entire estate paying a permanently-settled annual revenue to Government, should be made under the first part of sub-division (a), cl. 5 of s. 7 of the Court-fees Act. *HUBIBUL HOSSEIN v. MAHOMED REZA*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 192: 10 C. L. R. 385

2. Stamp—*Construction and applicability of the proviso—Valuation of suits for land in a talukhdari village—Talukhdar's jumma—Remission.*—*Per WEST and NANABHAI, JJ.*

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 7, cl. v—*cont'd.*

The proviso to Art. 5 of s. 7 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) was clearly intended to provide a standard of valuation in the Bombay Presidency, not only for the comparatively rare case of land forming part, but not a definite share, of an estate paying revenue to Government, but for all cases of suits for land. The theory being that all land is primarily liable to be rated or taxed for the public revenue, any sum not levied according to the appraisal made in order to show the proper amount of the land-tax may be regarded as a remission. In the case of a talukhdari village, the proprietor of which had, under a settlement with Government for a period of twenty-two years, agreed to pay a fixed annual jumma or lump assessment, instead of the full survey assessment for the whole village: *Held*, by a majority of the Full Bench, that the difference in amount between the jumma and the full survey assessment was a remission, and therefore a suit for possession of lands in this village was to be valued according to cl. 3 of the proviso to Art. 5 of s. 7 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870). *Per BIRDWOOD, J.*—The remission contemplated by cl. (3) of the proviso "is an express remission, and not a mere difference in amount between the actual assessment payable by a talukhdar and the survey assessment." The three clauses of the proviso seem to apply only to lands which have been subjected to a survey settlement as ordinarily understood and legally provided for in the Bombay Presidency; the first clause being applicable to lands settled for a period not exceeding thirty years, the second to lands settled for a longer period or permanently, and the third to inam lands on which the whole or a part of the survey assessment has been expressly remitted. The talukhdars are not inamdars. They are landholders liable to pay a land-tax, but not under a survey settlement, such as is applicable to lands for which provision seems to have been specially made in the proviso to Art. 5 of s. 7 of the Court-Fees Act. No part of the proviso, therefore, applies to a suit for the possession of lands in a talukhdari village. Such a suit should be valued according to cl. (d) of Art. 5 of s. 7 of the Court Fees Act. *ALA CHELA v. OGHAD BHAI THAKERSI*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 541

BAVAJI MOHANJI v. PUNJABHAI HANUBHAI

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 550 note

3. Paramba in Malabar—*Valuation of suit for.* On its appearing that a paramba in Malabar is not subject to land-tax, but that a tax is levied on trees of certain kinds which may grow on it, *Held*, that a paramba must be regarded for the purposes of the Court Fees Act as a garden or as land which pays no revenue, according to the circumstances of each case. *AUDATHODAN MOIDIN v. PULLAMBATH MAMALLY*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 301

s. 7, cl. v (a) and (d)—*Revenue-paying estate—Suit for possession of share in*

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 7, cl. v (a) and (d)—*conclld.*

—*Court-fee on plaint*—"Definite share," if must also be separately assessed with revenue. In a suit to recover possession of a definite share in a permanently settled revenue-paying estate, the court fee on the plaint should be calculated according to the first part of cl. (a) of s. 7, sub-s. V of the Court Fees Act, i.e., at ten times the proportionate revenue annually payable. Whether such share is recorded in the Collector's register as separately assessed with revenue or not does not matter. The words "definite share" in the first part of the clause does not mean a definite share separately assessed with revenue. *Hubibul Hossein v. Mahomed Reza*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 192, referred to. *BUNTIAD LAL v. SHYAM LAL* (1908)

12 C. W. N. 990

s. 7, cl. v (b)—

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS.

I. L. R. 24 All. 218

cl. v, proviso (3)—*Annual survey assessment, which is remitted.* Proviso 3 to cl. 5 of s. 7 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) has apparently reference only to "the annual survey assessment, which is remitted," that is to say to the rate of remission at date of suit. It has, therefore, no reference to remissions previously made, but no longer existing. *BALAVANT RAM-CHANDRA v. SECRETARY OF STATE* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 480

cls. v, xi (e)—*Suit against landlord and other persons claiming under him by lessee of melveram rights falls under s. 7, cl. v, and not under cl. xi (e).* A suit by the lessee of melveram rights to recover possession from his landlord and others claiming through the landlord falls within s. 7, cl. v of the Court Fees Act, as a suit for possession of land. Such a suit does not fall within s. 7, cl. xi (e) as cl. xi applies to suits between tenant and landlord only, and the wording of cl. xi (e) makes it applicable only to persons in actual physical occupation and not to persons having the melveram rights only. *Fur-zand Ali v. Mohanth Lal Puri*, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 268, followed. *PALANIAPPA CHETTI v. SITHRA-VELU SERVAI* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 14

cl. v (b), (d) and s. 28—*Court-fee—*

Document received through mistake or inadvertence. The plaintiff in a suit for pre-emption stated in his plaint—"The suit is valued at R197-8-0, five times of R39-8-0, the amount of revenue of the property." The property claimed was described as "41 bighas 10 biswas 5 biswansis paying a revenue of R39-8-0, entered as holding No. 2 in the khewat, out of a 3 biswa 10 biswansi 18 kach-wansi 9 nanwansi 15 tanwansi share, comprising an area of 101 bighas, paying a revenue of R95, situate in thak Deputy Ali Raza Khan, in village Ukarna." The Munsarim of the Court in which the plaint was presented on the last day of limitation accepted this valuation and reported

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 7, cl. v (b), (d) and s. 28—*conclld.*

that the plaint was properly stamped. *Held*, that inasmuch as the plaintiff had not stated whether the revenue payable in respect of the share claimed had been separately assessed and recorded in the Collector's register as such, it became the duty of the Munsarim to inquire whether it was separately assessed. The plaint had been admitted through the mistake or inadvertence of the officer of the Court and the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of s. 28 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. *HASIB-UL-NISSA v. GHAFUR-ULLAH KHAN* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 382

cl. v and vi and s. 12—*Court-fees—Presumption—Valuation of suit—Appeal—General Clauses Act (X of 1897), s. 3 (59).* *Held*, that the expression "the year next before the date of presenting the plaint" occurring in cl. (c) of sub-s. (v) of s. 7 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, denotes a period of 365 days reckoning backwards from the date of presentation of the plaint. *Held*, also, that where a Court had based its decision as to the valuation of a suit upon a wrong construction of the expression "the year next before the date of presenting the plaint," an appeal was not precluded by s. 12 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. *GHASI RAM v. HAR GOBIND* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 411

cl. viii—*Suit to restore attachment—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246.* A stamp of R10 is sufficient for the plaint or memorandum of appeal in a suit brought, under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859, to restore an attachment upon a house which has been removed at the instance of an intervenient under that section. A person whose property was attached was not compelled to resort in the first instance to an application under s. 246 of the late Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859). There was nothing to prevent him from commencing his litigation by a regular suit, if such were his pleasure. Cl. viii of s. 7 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) would apply to such a suit. The language of that section is not limited to suits to set aside any special kind of attachments on land. It is large enough to include suits brought in pursuance of the permission given by s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859, to set aside attachments on land, as well as other suits for that purpose brought independently of that section. The term "land" in cl. viii, s. 7 of the Court Fees Act, does not include a house. *Quære*: Whether that clause includes all suits to set aside attachments upon land, or all such suits, except where the result of setting aside the attachment would be to alter or set aside a summary decision or order of any Civil Court not established by Letters Patent or of Revenue Court. *DAYA CHAND NIM CHAND v. HEM CHAND DHARAM CHAND*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 515

1. — cl. ix—*Suit against a Mortgagee for the recovery of a portion of property mortgaged.* In cases in which it is competent to the

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—contd.**s. 7, cl. ix—contd.**

mortgagor to sue to recover a portion of the mortgaged property, the debt must be regarded as distributed over the whole property; and as regards the portion of the property sued for, "the principal money," expressed to be secured, must be taken to be the proportionate amount of the debt for which such portion of the property is liable. **BALKRISHNA v. NAGVEKAR** . . . **I. L. R. 6 Bom. 324**

2.

Redemption suit—Separate memorandum of appeal presented by each of two appellants—Proper fees chargeable on. A decree having been given by the lower Courts in a redemption suit, directing that the mortgaged property should be redeemable on payment of the amount expressed to be secured by the mortgage deed, viz., R1,152-15-4, to the defendants, viz., R568-9-8 to the defendant Umarkhan and R584-5-8 to the defendant Moro and two others,—appeals were preferred to the High Court by Umarkhan and Moro, each of them presenting a separate memorandum of appeal. A question arose as to what Court-fees should be levied on them. On reference by the taxing officer of the Court: *Held*, that the Court-fees to be computed upon each memorandum of appeal was, under s. 7, cl. ix of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) to be according to the principal money expressed to be secured by the deed of mortgage, viz., R1,152-5-4. **UMARKHAN v. MAHOMED KHAN** . . . **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 41**

s. 7, ix, Sch. I—Court-fee—Suit for redemption of mortgage—Appeal in respect of a specified portion of the sum declared payable for redemption. In a suit for the redemption of a mortgage the plaintiff obtained a decree for redemption conditional on the payment by him of a sum fixed by the decree. The plaintiff appealed upon the ground that such sum was in excess by a specified amount of the sum rightly payable by him for redemption. *Held*, that the Court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal was to be calculated according to the sum, which the appellant claimed to have deducted from his decree; and not, as in the case of a suit for redemption, according to the principal sum secured by the mortgage. **Pirbhu Narain Singh v. Sita Ram**, **I. L. R. 13 All. 94**, *quoad hoc*, dissented from. **NEPAL RAI v. DEBI PRASAD** (1905) . . . **I. L. R. 27 All. 447**

s. 7 (e), cl. ix, and Sch. I, Art. I—Does the Act apply to appeals in mortgage suit.—Court Fee payable on subject-matter in dispute in the appeal. S. 7 (e), cl. IX of the Court Fees Act, applies only to "suits" and not to appeals. In the case of appeals in mortgage suits, Art. I of Sch. I of the Act applies. The Court-fee in such cases is payable on the value of the subject-matter in dispute in the appeal and not of the subject-matter in dispute in the suit. **Nepal Rai v. Debi Prasad**, **I. L. R. 27 All. 447**, followed. **Amar Khan v. Mahomed Khan**, **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 41**, dissented from. **REFERENCE UNDER COURT FEES ACT, 1870 (1906)** . . . **I. L. R. 29 Mad. 367**

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—contd.**s. 7—concl.**

cl. ix; Sch. I, Art. I—Court-fee—Decree for redemption of mortgage—Appeal on the main ground that nothing was due under the mortgage. *Held*, that in the case of an appeal from a decree allowing a defendant mortgagor to redeem the mortgage on payment of a sum named therein based upon the ground that the mortgage debt has been satisfied out of the usufruct of the property mortgaged and nothing whatever is due from him; the proper Court-fee payable is an *ad valorem* fee upon the total amount of the decree under appeal. **Nepal Rai v. Debi Prasad**, **I. L. R. 27 All. 447**, and *Reference under Court Fees Act, 1870*, **I. L. R. 29 Mad. 367**, followed. **MAHADEO PRASAD v. GORAKH PRASAD** (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 547

cl. xi (e)—Occupancy holding, suit for possession of. S. 7, cl. 11 (e) of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) does not apply to a suit for possession of an occupancy holding brought by the tenant against the landlord as well as the person whom the landlord has inducted into the land: the Court-fee payable on the plaint in such a case must be computed on the market-value of the property which the plaintiff seeks to recover. **FURZAND ALI v. MOHANTH LAL PURI** (1905) . . . **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 268**

Sch. I, Art. I—Appeal, valuation of, when no amount claimed, but dispute about liability of certain properties—Value of such properties—Proper valuation of the appeal. S. 7 of the Court Fees Act has no application in the case of appeals in which no amount is claimed. Where the appellant in an appeal against a mortgage decree does not dispute the amount decreed, but raises the question of the liability of certain properties for the decretal amount, the value of the appeal, for the purpose of Court-fees, under Art. I. of Sch. I of the Court Fees Act, is the value of such properties, when such value is less than the amount decreed and when such value exceeds the amount decreed, such decretal amount. **Venkappa v. Narasimha**, **I. L. R. 10 Mad. 187**, followed. **Krishnama Chariar v. Srinivasa Ayyangar**, **I. L. R. 4 Mad. 339**, followed. **KESAVARAPU RAMAKRISHNA REDDI v. KOTTA KOTA REDDI** (1906) . . . **I. L. R. 30 Mad. 98**

ss. 8, 11.

See APPELLATE COURT—INTERFERENCE WITH, AND POWER TO VARY, ORDER OF LOWER COURT. **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 501**

s. 10.

See RES JUDICATA—JUDGMENTS ON PRELIMINARY POINTS **I. L. R. 8 All. 282**

1. Rejection of plaint—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 54. S. 54 of Act X of 1877, which directs that a plaint shall be rejected in certain cases, applies only to the initial stages of a suit before a plaint has been registered,

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 10—*contd.*

whereas the application of s. 10 of the Court Fees Act, which directs that a suit shall be dismissed in a certain case, is not susceptible of restriction to any particular stage. *VALIYA KESAVA VADHYAR v. SUPPEN NAIR*. I. L. R. 2 Mad. 308

2. *Dismissal of Suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 54, 56—Court Fees Act, s. 11.* The "dismissal" of a suit under s. 10 or s. 11 of the Court Fees Act has the same effect as that provided by s. 56 of the Code in the case of "rejection" of a plaint under s. 54. *BALKARAN RAI v. GOVIND NATH TEWARI*

I. L. R. 12 All. 129

3. *Suit insufficiently valued—Order for payment of additional Court fees—Power of Court to enlarge time for payment.* Held, that it is competent to a Court which has made an order under s. 10, cl. (ii) of Act VII of 1870, for the payment of an additional Court-fee to enlarge, either before or after its expiration, the time limited for the payment of such additional fee. *Badri Narain v. Sheo Koer*, I. L. R. 17 Cal. 512; *L. R. 17 I. A. 1*, and *Bhugwandas Bagla v. Abu Ahmad*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 263, referred to. *CHUNNI LAL v. AJUDHIA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 19 All. 240

4. *Appeal—Procedure—Second appeal—Appeal to lower Appellate Court by respondent in High Court insufficiently stamped.* Where it was discovered in second appeal in the High Court that the respondent, when appellant in the lower Appellate Court, had not paid a sufficient Court-fee on his memorandum of appeal in that Court, and up to the date of the hearing of the appeal in the High Court, though called upon to do so, had not made good the deficiency: Held, that the proper procedure was not to dismiss the respondent's appeal to the lower Appellate Court under s. 10 of the Court Fees Act, but to stay the issuing of the decree, if any, of the High Court in favour of the respondent until such time as the additional Court-fee due by him might be paid. *NARAIN SINGH v. CHATURBHUI SINGH*

I. L. R. 20 All. 362

5. *Order requiring additional Court-fee on claim passed subsequent to decree—Decree prepared so as to give effect to subsequent order—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 54, 56, 584—Court Fees Act, ss. 12 and 23.* A judge, after disposing of an appeal on the 1st March 1883, again took it up, and on the 21st March 1883 directed the appellant to pay additional Court-fees on her memorandum of appeal. On the 2nd May 1883, the appellant paid the additional Court-fees under protest, and a decree was then prepared, bearing date the 1st March 1883, but it referred to and carried into effect the subsequent order of the 21st March and the 2nd May. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*, that as soon as the Judge had passed the decree of the 1st March 1883, he ceased to have any power over it, and was not competent to introduce new matters

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 10—*contd.*

not dealt with by the judgment; that the order of the 21st March and the deposit of the 2nd May, whether right or wrong, were not proceedings to which effect could be given in the antecedent decree of the 1st March 1883; and that the decree was *ultra vires* to that extent and was therefore liable to correction in second appeal under s. 584 of the Civil Procedure Code. The powers conferred by ss. 54 (a) and (c) and 55, read with s. 582 of the Civil Procedure Code, or by s. 12 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) read with cl. (ii) of s. 10, are intended to be exercised before the disposal of the case, and not after it has been decided finally so far as the Court is concerned. The powers conferred by s. 28 of the Court Fees Act cannot be exercised by an order passed after the decision of the case to which the question of the payment of Court-fees relates, and even assuming that they can be so exercised, such an order, though it may be subject to such rules as to appeal or revision as the law may provide, cannot be given effect to by making insertions in an antecedent decree. *Per OLDFIELD, J.*—That the Court had power to make the order it did, inasmuch as the collection of Court-fees was no part of a Judge's functions in the trial of a suit which could be said to have ceased with its determination; and the provisions of the Court Fees Act fixed no time within which the presiding Judge could exercise his power of ordering documents to be stamped, and seemed, on the other hand, to contemplate the exercise of that power at any time subsequent to the receipt, filing, or use of a document, and to make the validity of the document and the proceedings relative thereto dependent on the document being properly stamped. *MAHADEI v. RAM KISHEN DAS*

I. L. R. 7 All. 528

6. *Court-fee—Abandonment of portion of claim in respect of which the Court-fee was deficient—Dismissal of suit.* When a plaintiff in the initial stage of the litigation abandons a portion of his claim, he is not compellable to pay Court-fees in respect of the portion abandoned under penalty of having the whole of his suit dismissed. *RAM PRASAD v. BHIMAN (1905)*

I. L. R. 27 All. 151

7. *Court-fee—Net profits or market value wrongly estimated—Limitation.* Where action is taken by a Court under s. 10 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, the Court is not bound, as in the case of action taken under s. 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to fix a time within the period of limitation for the suit within which the deficiency in the Court-fee must be made good, this section applying to a different stage of the suit from that contemplated by s. 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Valiya Kesava Vadhyar v. Suppannair*, I. L. R. 2 Mad. 808, followed. *Jaini Prasad v. Bachu Singh*, I. L. R., 15 All. 65, and *Balkaran Rai v. Govind Nath Tiwari*, I. L. R. 15 All. 129, distinguished. *Durga Singh v. Bisheshwar*

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 10—*conclld.*

Daial I. L. R. 24 All. 218, referred to. *BABU LAL v. ASI KUNWAR* (1905) . I. L. R. 27 All. 197

8. ——— ss. 10 and 12—*Court-fee—Procedure—Second appeal—Appeal to lower Appellate Court by respondent in High Court insufficiently stamped.* Where it was discovered in second appeal in the High Court that the respondents, when appellants in the lower Appellate Court, had not paid a sufficient Court-fee on their memorandum of appeal in that Court and up to the date of the hearing of the plaintiffs' appeal in the High Court, though called upon to do so, had not made good the deficiency: *Held*, that the proper procedure was not to dismiss the respondents' appeal to the lower Appellate Court, but to stay the issuing of the decree, if any, of the High Court in favour of the respondents until such time as the additional Court-fee due by them might be paid. *Narain Singh v. Chaturbhuj Singh*, I. L. R. 20 All. 362, followed. *Madan Lal v. Jai Kishan Das*, All. Weekly Notes (1905), 277, overruled. *MOHAN LAL v. NAND KISHORE* (1905) . I. L. R. 28 All. 270

See VALUATION OF SUIT.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 954

1. ——— s. 11—*Interest accruing on Decree in suit for money lent.* The Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 11, is not applicable to interest accruing upon a decree in a suit which is neither for mesne profits, nor for immoveable property, nor for an account, but simply an action for money lent. *KRISHNARAV v. ANTAJI VIRUPUKSHA* 12 Bom. 227

2. ——— *Execution of Part of Decree—Payment of full amount of Court-fees not necessary for such part-execution—Construction of Act—Court Fees Act, s. 17.* The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover possession of a house and for mesne profits. In the same suit he also claimed certain account books and documents from the defendant. In paying Court-fees he estimated the mesne profits at Rs 151, and paid on that amount. He obtained a decree, and the amount of mesne profits awarded to him was Rs 3,349-13-3. The decree further directed that possession of the house should be given to him, and that the books and documents should be handed over to him. He now applied for execution of that part of the decree which directed the delivery of the house and of the account books and other documents. The defendant contended that, under s. 11 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), the plaintiff was not entitled to execution of any part of the decree until he paid the proper Court-fees on the sum awarded as mesne profits, *viz.*, Rs 3,349-13-3. *Held*, that the plaintiff might obtain execution of that part of the decree which ordered delivery of the house and books and documents without paying the fees payable on the amount awarded for mesne profits. S. 11 and s. 17 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) ought to be similarly construed; and the language of the latter section, which deals with multifarious suits, shows that for the purposes of the stamp-revenue such

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 11—*conclld.*

suits are deemed to be a collection of distinct suits relating to the several causes of action combined in them. In applying s. 11 to such suits, in order to give a harmonious construction to the Act as a whole the term "suit" in that section should be construed as confined to that part of the suit in question which related to mesne profits. *FULCHAND v. BAI IOHHA* I. L. R. 12 Bom. 98

3. ——— *Mesne profits—Suit for possession and mesne profits—Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 212—Assessment of mesne profits—Dismissal of suit—Application for execution of decree.* Where, upon the application of the decree-holder, the Court executing the decree has assessed the amount of mesne profits, but the necessary Court-fees have not been deposited within the time fixed by the Court as provided by s. 11 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), the suit, that is, the claim in respect of those mesne profits, must be dismissed; after such dismissal, no application for execution of the decree for mesne profits can be entertained, as no such decree is in existence. The word "suit" in the last part of para. 2 of s. 11 of the Court Fees Act does not mean the entire suit; it means the claim in respect of the mesne profits. *KEWAL KISHAN SINGH v. SOOKHARI* I. L. R. 24 Calc. 173

I. C. W. N. 243

4. ——— *Past and future mesne profits—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 209, 211, 212.* Where a plaintiff asked for past as well as future mesne profits and an amount was claimed and Court-fees paid for past mesne profits only: *Held*, that s. 11 of the Court Fees Act applied. *Ram Krishna Bhikaji v. Bhimabai*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 46, *Chedi Lal v. Kirath Chaud*, I. L. R. 2 All. 682, and *Kewal Kissan Singh v. Sookhari*, I. L. R. 24 Calc., 173, referred to. There is no analogy between interest awarded under s. 209 of the Code and mesne profits claimed and awarded under ss. 211 and 212. Interest may be awarded under s. 209 as an inducement to prompt satisfaction of the decree and as a penalty for non-compliance with it. Such interest is no part of the claim or relief granted as in the case of mesne profits. *DWARKA NATH BISWAS v. DEBENDRA NATH TAGORE* (1916)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1232

5. ——— s. 11, Sch. II, Art. 17 (vi)—*Court-fee—Suit for sale on a mortgage—Appeal—Claim for future interest.* The plaintiffs, in whose favour a decree for sale on a mortgage had been passed allowing interest up to the date fixed by the decree for payment of the mortgage money, appealed on the ground that interest should have been allowed up to the date of realization. *Held*, that the proper Court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal was ten rupees as provided by Art. 17 (vi) of the second schedule to the Court Fees Act, 1078, *Krishnarav v. Antaji Virupuksha*, 12 Bom. H. C. 227, followed. *BHAWANI PRASAD v. KUTUB-UN-NISSA BIBI* (1905) . I. L. R. 27 All. 559

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*

s. 12.

See APPEAL—ACTS—COURT FEES ACT.
1870, . . . 19 W. R. 214
23 W. R. 296

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 145, 219
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 249
I. L. R. 14 Mad. 169
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 384

See APPEAL—DECREES.

I. L. R. 11 All. 91

See APPELLATE COURT—OBJECTIONS
TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—
SPECIAL CASES—VALUATION OF SUIT

1 Bom. 62

14 W. R. 196

22 W. R. 433

I. L. R. 19 All. 165

See APPELLATE COURT—REJECTION OR
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED OR
REJECTED BY COURT BELOW—VALUA-
TION OF SUIT, ERROR IN.

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—VALUATION
OF SUIT . . . 20 W. R. 206

and s. 28 — *Finality of decision of Court on question of Court-fee.* The decision of the Court on a question of the Court-fee payable on a plaint or memorandum of appeal which is to be "final as between the parties to the suit" must be a decision made between the parties on the record and after they had an opportunity of being heard, and not a mere decision based upon the report of a Munsarim before the plaint or memorandum of appeal is filed, and therefore before any parties are before the Court. Hence where a Court of first instance held on the report of the Munsarim that a plaint presented to it had been insufficiently stamped, but subsequently, both parties being before the Court and arguments having been heard, decided that the Court-fee originally paid was sufficient: *Held*, that the latter decision was the decision which was final as between the parties within the meaning of s. 12 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. *AMJAD ALI v. MUHAMMAD ISRAIL* . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 11

s. 14 and Sch. I, Art. 5—*Application for Review filed after time.* An application for a review of judgment having been made on the first day after the vacation, after the ninetieth day from the date of the judgment which it was sought to review, it appeared that the ninetieth day fell during the vacation when the High Court was closed. *Held*, that the full fee leviable on the memorandum of appeal must be paid in the first instance, but that the Court, if satisfied that the delay was not caused by the laches of the applicant, might direct a refund of one-half of such fee. *In the matter of DOORGA PROSUNNO GHOSE* . . . 9 C. L. R. 479

s. 16.

See PAUPER SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 75

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 16—*concl.*

1. *Alteration in form of decree on appeal.* Where plaintiff prayed for a separation into two equal shares of the whole property to which she and the defendant were jointly entitled, and the lower Court decreed to her joint and undivided possession of her half share, and she also succeeded in the whole of her claim as before the High Court in special appeal: *Held*, that, as the separate possession by partition is a form of decree at the option of the plaintiff, the Court was in justice bound to grant her request, that the decree should be re-framed in such a manner as to award possession to her in severalty, without regard to any stamp fee. S. 16 of the Court Fees Act refers to a case where a party losing substantially a portion of his claim is precluded from re-asserting it before the Appellate Court without paying the proper stamp fee. *BISSONATH CHATTERJEE v. MADHUB-MONEE DABEE* . . . 15 W. R. 511

2. *Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), ss. 4, 16—Stamp duty on memorandum of objections—When payable.* Stamp duty on a memorandum of objections filed by a respondent in an appeal under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure, need not, under s. 16 of the Court Fees Act, be paid till the time of hearing. *REFERENCE UNDER COURT-FEES ACT, 1870, s. 5 (1901)* . . . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 24

s. 17—

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—TEST CASE
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 140

1. "Distinct subjects"—*Distinct causes of action.* *Held* (SPANKIE, J. dissenting), that the words "distinct subjects" in s. 17 of Act VII of 1870 mean distinct causes of action or distinct kinds of relief. *Per SPANKIE, J.*—Such words mean every separate matter distinctly forming a subject of the claim. *CHAMAILI RANI v. RAM DAI* . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 552

2. *Civil Procedure Code (1859), s. 9 (1877, ss. 44, 45)—Multifarious suit—"Distinct subjects"—Plaint—Memorandum of appeal.* *Held*, that the words "distinct subjects" in s. 17 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, mean distinct and separate causes of action. *Chamaili Rani v. Ram Dai, I. L. R. 1 All. 552*, observed on. The plaintiff sued his brothers and a nephew for his share according to the Hindu law of inheritance, and, under a will, of the moveable and immoveable property of his deceased uncle, by the cancelment of a deed of gift of the immoveable property in favour of the nephew. *Held, per STUART, C. J., and STRAIGHT, J.,* that, under s. 17 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, the plaint and memorandum of appeal in the suit were chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees to which the plaints or memoranda of appeal in separate suits for the moveable and immoveable property would have been liable under that Act. *Per OLDFIELD, J.,* that Court-

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—contd.**s. 17—contd.**

fees were leviable on the plaint and memorandum of appeal on the total value of the claim, the suit not being one of the nature to which s. 17 of the Court Fees Act referred. *MUL CHAND v. SHIB CHARAN LAL*. I. L. R. 2 All. 676

3. ————— “Distinct subjects”

Plaint and memorandum of appeal. The plaintiffs sued, in virtue of a conditional sale which had been foreclosed, for (i) possession of a house, (ii) compensation, in the nature of rent, for its use and occupation from the date of foreclosure to the date of suit, and (iii) like compensation from the latter date to the date on which possession of the house should be delivered to them, the defendants having purchased the house subsequently to the conditional sale, but before the same was foreclosed. The plaintiffs stated that their cause of action arose on the date of foreclosure. *Held* (SPANKIE, J., dissenting) that the suit embraced “distinct subjects” within the meaning of s. 17 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and the plaint and memorandum of appeal were chargeable with the aggregate amount of fees to which the plaints or memoranda of appeal in separate suits for the different claims would have been liable. *CHEDI LAL v. KIRATH CHAND*. I. L. R. 2 All. 682

4. ————— “Distinct subjects”

Suit for specific moveable property or for compensation—“Multifarious suit.” A, to whom a certificate of administration in respect of the property of a minor had been granted in succession to B, whose certificate had been revoked, sued B claiming the delivery of specific moveable property of various kinds belonging to the minor, which had been intrusted to B, and B detained, or the value of each kind of property as compensation in case of non-delivery. *Held*, that the suit did not embrace “distinct subjects” within the meaning of s. 17 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and the Court-fees payable in respect of the plaint in the suit should be computed under cl. 1, s. 7 of that Act, according to the total value of the claim. *AMAR NATH v. THAKURDAS*. I. L. R. 3 All. 131

5. ————— Suit on Hundis—

Distinct causes of action—“Distinct subjects.” In a suit upon three different hundis executed on the same date by one of the defendants in favour of the other three defendants and by them assigned to the plaintiff, and not paid on maturity: *Held*, that each hundi afforded a separate cause of action, that the suit embraced three separate and distinct subjects, and that the memorandum of appeal by the first defendant was chargeable with the aggregate amount of the Court-fees to which the memorandum of appeal in suits embracing separately each of such subjects would be liable under the Court Fees Act. *PARSHOTAM LAL v. LACHMAN DAS*. I. L. R. 9 All. 252

6. ————— Suit for possession of immoveable property and for mesne profits or damages—“Distinct subjects”—Valuation of suit.

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—contd.**s. 17—contd.**

A suit upon one and the same cause of action for possession of immoveable property and for mesne profits or damages for the wrongful retention of such property is not a suit embracing two or more distinct subjects within the meaning of s. 17 of Act VII of 1870. *Chamaili Rani v. Ram Dai*, I. L. R. 1 All. 552, *Mul Chand v. Shib Charan Lal*, I. L. R. 2 All. 676, *Chedi Lal v. Kirath Chand*, I. L. R. 2 All. 682, and *Kishori Lal Roy v. Sharut Chunder Mozumdar*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 593, discussed. REFERENCE UNDER THE COURT FEES ACT, 1870, s. 5. I. L. R. 16 All. 401

7. ————— Multifarious suit—

Court-fees on plaint and memorandum of appeal—Court Fees Act, 1870, Sch. I, Art. 1. The rule laid down in s. 17 of the Court Fees Act regarding multifarious suits is subject to the proviso at the end of Art. 1, Sch. I of that Act, and the maximum fee leviable on the plaint or memorandum of appeal in such a suit is, under that proviso, Rs. 3,000. *RAGHOBIR SINGH v. DHARAM KUAR*. I. L. R. 3 All. 108

8. ————— Suit for possession and mesne profits—Stamp fee payable on appeal. For the purposes of determining the stamp fee payable on an appeal to the High Court, in a suit for possession and for mesne profits, the claim for possession and mesne profits is to be taken as one entire claim. *Chedi Lal v. Kirath Chand*, I. L. R. 2 All. 682, dissented from. *KISHORI LAL ROY v. SHARUT CHUNDER MOZUMDAR*. I. L. R. 8 Calc. 593
10 C. L. R. 359

9. ————— Court-fee—“Distinct subjects”—Pre-emption—Suit for pre-emption of two villages out of a larger number conveyed by the same sale-deed. The plaintiffs sued for pre-emption of shares in two villages out of a larger number sold in one and the same transaction. They paid Court-fees on their plaint calculated on five times the aggregate amount of the Government revenue payable by each of the two villages. *Held*, that this was a proper mode of calculation. The two villages were not “distinct subjects” within the meaning of s. 17 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and Court-fees were not therefore leviable in respect of each village separately. *Chamaili Rani v. Ram Dai*, I. L. R. 1 All. 552, *Mul Chand v. Shib Charan Lal*, I. L. R. 2 All. 676, and *Sukru v. Tajazzul Husain Khan*, I. L. R. 16 All. 401, followed. *DURGA PARSAD v. PURADAR SINGH* (1905). I. L. R. 27 All. 186

10. ————— Two or more distinct subjects—First part of section applies to cases where alternative reliefs on different causes of action are joined in one suit. The operation of s. 17 of the Court Fees Act is not necessarily confined to cases where cumulative reliefs are claimed. Alternative claims, forming different matters which could have been made the grounds of separate suits, are “distinct subject” within

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 17—*concl'd.*

the meaning of the section, although they arise out of the same instrument and a suit for enforcing such alternative claims ought to be valued for the purpose of Court-fees as also of jurisdiction on the aggregate value of such reliefs. *Kashinath Narayan v. Govinda Bin Piraji*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 82, not followed. *NEELA KANDHAN NAMUDRIPAD v. TRIBUNILAI ANANTHAKRISHNA AYYAR* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 61

11. *Court-fee—Suit embracing two or more distinct subjects—Suit based primarily on an agreement to sell with an alternative claim for pre-emption.* The plaintiff came into Court claiming in the first place specific performance of an alleged agreement to sell to him certain immovable property, and, secondly, in the alternative, the enforcement of a pre-emptive right in respect of mortgage of the same property executed by one of the defendants in favour of the other. *Held*, that the suit was within the meaning of s. 17 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, a suit embracing two distinct subject-matters and therefore chargeable with the Court-fee assessable upon each alternative relief separately. *HASHMAT-UN-NISSA v. MUHAMMAD ABDUL KARIM* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All. 155

s. 19.

See WRITTEN STATEMENT.

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 400
12 C. L. R. 367

1. *Stamp on memorandum of appeal by judgment-debtor in custody from order refusing application to be declared insolvent.* A judgment-debtor, whilst in custody, applied to the Court, under Ch. XX of the Civil Procedure Code, to be declared an insolvent. The application was refused, and the judgment-debtor appealed against the order rejecting his application. No Court-fee was affixed to the memorandum of appeal. *Held*, that no Court-fee was leviable under cl. 17 of s. 19 of the Court Fees Act. *KALI PROSAD BANERJI v. GISBORNE & Co.*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 61 : 13 C. L. R. 156

2. *Complaints made by municipal officers—Process fees—Court Fees Act, s. 31.* No process fee is leviable on complaints made by municipal officers, and the accused are not liable to refund sums illegally levied from the complainants as process fees. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KHAJABHOY*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 423

1. *s. 19 D—Act XIII of 1875, s. 6—Exemption from probate duty—Joint family—Conveyance to four members of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara law as tenants-in-common—Survivorship.* The deceased, who was a member of a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law, left a will, of which he appointed his brothers the executors and trustees. The brothers as executors applied for probate, but claimed ex-

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 19 D—*cont'd.*

emption from the payment of probate-duty on the ground that the property was "joint ancestral property which would pass by survivorship." The petition stated that in the lifetime of the testator he and his brothers, out of the income of the ancestral estate, purchased from the Corporation of Calcutta some plots of land which were conveyed to them as tenants-in-common; that the effect of this was to vest an undivided one-fourth share in the testator, which on his death would pass not to the remaining co-parceners under the rule of survivorship, but to this legal representatives; and that, in order that effect might be given to the rule of survivorship, it was necessary to obtain probate. *Held*, that the property, though conveyed to the brothers as tenants-in-common, vested in them as trustees for the benefit of all the co-parceners, and consequently was not liable to duty. *In the goods of POKURNULL AUGURWALLAH*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 980
1 C. W. N. 31

2. *Court Fees Amendment Act (XI of 1899), s. 191—Letters of administration—Limited grant—Trust property—Exemption from probate duty.* One Harilal died possessed of certain shares in Joint Stock Companies and in the Bank of Bombay valued at Rs. 11,980 standing in his name as their registered holder. He left three sons. The sons applied for letters of administration limited to one share only valued at Rs. 275 and their application was granted. Subsequently they applied for letters of administration with respect to all the shares, except the one for which limited letters of administration had already been granted and claimed exemption from stamp duty. The question arose as to whether they were entitled to the exemption. *Held*, that the property with respect to which the letters of administration were sought being property held in trust by the deceased for the joint family, the property was entitled to exemption from the Court-fee. *Held*, further, that the exception of trust estates from the payment of *ad valorem* Court-fee is not conditional on the circumstance that there had been a previous grant of probate or letters of administration on which a Court-fee had been paid. The exemption has reference to the character of the property and not to the procedure adopted. *The Collector of Ahmedabad v. Savchand*, I. L. R. 27 Bom. 140, disapproved. *In the goods of Pokurnull Augurwallah*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 980, followed. *COLLECTOR OF KAIRA v. CHUNILAL* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 161

3. *s. 19 D and Sch. I, Art. 11—Probate duty—Letters of administration, duty on—Letters of administration granted in respect of property passing by survivorship—Application for refund of duty.* A Hindu died intestate, leaving two sons who were joint with him. Part of the deceased's estate consisted of two sums of Rs. 5,000, one of which was deposited with the Bank of

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 19 D and Sch. I, Art. II—*concl'd.*

Bombay and the other with a Commercial Company. Both the Bank and the Company refused to pay these sums unless letters of administration were obtained. Letters of administration were accordingly obtained in respect of these portions of the estate of the deceased, and a sum of Rs 207-2-0 was paid as duty thereon under Art. II, Sch. I, of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870). Subsequently an application was made for a refund of this amount on the ground that the property in respect of which it had been paid was the joint property of the deceased and his sons and had passed to the latter by survivorship, and that, therefore, under s. 19D of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), no duty was chargeable. *Held*, that the refund could not be allowed. The section only applies where probate or letters of administration have already been granted on which the Court-fee has been paid. In such case no further duty is payable in respect of property held by the deceased as trustee. But where no duty has been paid, the section does not apply. Here no letters of administration had been granted, other than those in respect of which the refund was applied for. Therefore there were no letters on which the Court-fee had been paid so as to bring the case within the section and to entitle the present letters of administration to exemption. *COLLECTOR OF AHMEDABAD v. SAVCHAND LADUKHAND* (1902)

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 140

s. 19H—*Valuation of Assets by attorney-administrator—Application for inquiry under s. 19 H, Court Fees Act—Materials necessary—Costs not provided in the Act—Assurance of the administrator to pay fee on the excess.* In moving the Court for an inquiry into the true value of the assets of a deceased person under s. 19H, Court Fees Act, it is not enough for the Collector simply to make an application for inquiry; he should place before the Court materials showing that an inquiry was needed, i.e., he should make a case for inquiry upon definite facts. The Act does not specify in what way or by whom the expense of inquiry should be met. It would be the duty of the Court, if possible, and if the circumstances permit, to hold the inquiry itself and so save further expense to the parties. *In the goods of J. R. A. STEVENSON* (1902)

6. C. W. N. 898

s. 20, cl. 1—*Rules under that section framed by the High Court in 1878—Process—Commission issued to ameen to fix mesne profits.* A commission issued to an ameen to hold a local investigation for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of mesne profits is not a process within the meaning of cl. 1 of s. 20 of the Court Fees Act; and Art. 3, part II of the rules, promulgated in 1878, framed under that section, is therefore *ultra vires*, and cannot be enforced. *JAGAT KISHORE ACHARJEA CHOWDHRY v. DINA NATH CHUCKERBUTTY CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 281

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*

s. 22.

See PENAL CODE, s. 186.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 596

s. 25.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 4.

I. L. R. 12 All. 129

s. 26—*Certificate of heirship—Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), ss. 17 and 20—Notification of Governor General, No. 361, dated 18th April 1883, Irregularity in observing directions of—Effect of, on validity of stamp.* A certificate having been granted on an ordinary stamp of requisite value, it was contended that it was not properly stamped in accordance with the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) as required by s. 17 of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), because it did not bear upon it the words "Court-fees" as directed in the notification of the Governor General, No. 361, dated 18th April 1883. *Held*, that, though s. 26 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) provides that the stamp used to denote the fee chargeable under the Act shall be of such particular kind as the Governor General of India in Council may by notification from time to time direct, and that, though the Governor General had issued such notification, still the direction in the notification that the stamp should bear the words "Court-fees" was not a matter on which he had authority to give any direction under the terms of s. 26 of the Court Fees Act, and therefore could only be regarded as a departmental order, the non-observance of which could not invalidate the stamp for the purpose of the Act. *ANNAPURNA BAI v. LAKSHMAN BHIKAJI VAKHARKAR*

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 145

s. 28.

See APPELLATE COURT—EXERCISE OF POWERS IN VARIOUS CASES—SPECIAL CASES—APPEAL. I. L. R. 15 Mad. 29

See APPELLATE COURT—REJECTION OR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED OR REJECTED BY COURT BELOW—UNSTAMPED DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 2 All. 682

I. L. R. 12 All. 57

See APPELLATE COURT—REJECTION OR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED OR REJECTED BY COURT BELOW—VALUATION OF SUIT, ERROR IN.

I. L. R. 7 All. 528

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 4.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 747

I. L. R. 12 All. 129

I. L. R. 15 All. 65

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 319

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 494

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 5.

I. L. R. 12 All. 57

See PLAINT—REJECTION OF PLAINT.

I. L. R. 23 All. 423

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 28—*contd.*

1. ———— **Plaint insufficiently stamped**—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 54, 56—Dismissal of suit—Rejection of plaint—Court Fees Act, ss. 9, 10, 11.* When a memorandum of appeal, which, when tendered, was insufficiently stamped, has subsequently been sufficiently stamped, the affixing of the full stamps cannot have a retrospective effect so as to validate the original presentation unless it has been done by order made under the second paragraph of s. 28 of the Court Fees Act. In the case of a High Court, such an order can be made only by a Judge and by him only, in cases "of mistake or inadvertence." These words mean mistake or inadvertence on the part of the Court or its officers, and not on the part of the appellant or his advisers. The expression "head of the office" in s. 28 does not refer to the head of the office of a Court, or at all events to the head of the office of a High Court, acting not as such, but as a taxing officer; but it refers to the head of a public office, such as the Board of Revenue. Ss. 9, 10, and 11 of the Court Fees Act are not in conflict with s. 28, nor are ss. 9, 10, 11, and 28 read together in conflict with s. 54 of the Civil Procedure Code. Cases within s. 10 or s. 11 of the Act would arise only where, through mistake or inadvertence of the Court, a plaint which subsequently was discovered to be insufficiently stamped had been received, filed, or used in the Court; and *cls. (a) and (b) of s. 54 of the Code* are similarly related to s. 28 of the Act, and were not intended to cut down or limit its provisions. The "dismissal" of a suit under s. 10 or s. 11 of the Act has the same effect as that provided by s. 56 of the Code in the case of "rejection" of a plaint under s. 54. **BALKARAN RAI v. GOBIND NATH TIWARI**
I. L. R. 12 All. 129

2. ———— **Plaint insufficiently stamped—Dismissal of suit—Appeal by plaintiff to District Court—Stamp on memorandum of appeal also insufficient—Second appeal by plaintiff properly stamped—Maintainability of second appeal—Order by High Court for payment of proper duty on plaint and on memorandum of first appeal.** The plaint, in a suit for the cancellation of a sale deed for R2,500, was filed with a ten-rupee stamp. The suit was dismissed, and an appeal was preferred by the plaintiff to the District Court, on which R10 were also paid as stamp duty. The appeal was dismissed, whereupon plaintiff preferred a second appeal, upon which he paid R150 as stamp duty. On its being objected that the second appeal could not be entertained on the ground that insufficient stamp duty had been paid on the plaint and in the the lower Appellate Court: *Held*, that, inasmuch as the plaint had been filed and used without being properly stamped, through a mistake of law as to the Court-fee payable, the case was within s. 28 of the Court Fees Act. An order was accordingly made by the High Court for a Court-fee of R150 to be paid on the plaint and on the memorandum

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 28—*contd.*

of first appeal, within a specified time. **VALAMBAL AMMAL v. VYTHILINGA MUDALIAR (1900)**

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 321

3. ———— **Insufficient duty on plaint and on memorandum of appeal—Order by High Court on second appeal for payment of the duty properly payable—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 582 A—Retrospective validation of defective memorandum of appeal—Effect of this section on defective plaint.** In a suit for the cancellation of a sale-deed executed by plaintiff to defendant for R2,500, stamp duty of R10 was paid on the plaint. The suit was dismissed by the District Munsif, and plaintiff appealed to the District Court, paying a similar duty on his memorandum of appeal. The District Court dismissed the appeal, whereupon plaintiff filed a second appeal, paying stamp duty thereon R50. On objection being taken in the High Court that the second appeal could not be entertained because of the insufficient payment of stamp duty in the lower Courts, the High Court *held* that the proper Court-fee payable on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal was R150, and ordered, under s. 28 of the Court-fees Act, that such fees be paid within twenty-one days. The duty having been paid in due course, the High Court considered and decided the second appeal on its merits. **VALAMBAL AMMAL v. VYTHILINGA MUDALIAR (1902)**

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 380

4. ———— **Plaint insufficiently stamped—Deficit Court-fee, time for payment of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 54—Limitation.** Under s. 54 of the Civil Procedure Code and s. 28 of the Court Fees Act, the Court has discretionary power to fix a time within which the requisite Court-fee is to be furnished, and if the stamp be made good within the time indicated, the date of the institution of the suit is to be reckoned from the date of presentation of the plaint. **Moti Sahu v. Chhatrai Das, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 780; Surendra Kumar Basu v. Kunja Behary Singh, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 814**, followed. The Court has also a discretionary power to enlarge the time originally fixed for making good the requisite stamp. **RAJKISHORI KOER v. MADAN MOHAN SINGH (1904).**

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 75

5. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, s. 54—Valuation of suit—Limitation—Rules of Court of the 4th April 1894, Rule 12—Duties of Munsarim.** When reporting as to the sufficiency of the stamp on a plaint it is not necessary for the Munsarim to do more than ascertain whether the plaint is sufficiently stamped according to the plaintiff's valuation of the subject-matter of the suit; his duty does not extend to an examination of the correctness of the plaintiff's valuation. Hence, where a plaint was correctly stamped according to the plaintiff's valuation, and so reported by the Munsarim, but it was afterwards discovered—when the period of limitation for the suit had ex-

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 28—*concl.*

pired—that the plaintiff's valuation was wrong and the plaint was in fact insufficiently stamped: *Held*, that the suit was barred by limitation. *Muhammad Ahmad v. Muhammad Sirajuddin*, I. L. R. 23 All. 423, followed. *CHATARPAL v. JAGRAM* (1905) I. L. R. 27 All. 411

6. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 54—Suit filed on last day of limitation on an insufficient Court-fee—Limitation.* When by a mistake of the plaintiff, and not of the Court or of any officer of the Court, a plaint was filed upon an insufficient Court-fee and this was not discovered until after the period of limitation for the suit had expired: *Held*, that the suit was barred. *Munro v. The Cawnpore Municipal Board*, I. L. R. 12 All. 57; *Muhammad Ahmad v. Muhammad Sirajuddin*, I. L. R. 23 All. 423; *Balkaran Rai v. Gobind Nath Tiwari*, I. L. R. 12 All. 129, and *Jagram v. Chatarpal*, All. Weekly Notes (1904) 133, followed. *Valambal Ammal v. Vythilinga Mudaliar*, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 311, dissented from. *RAM TAHAL SINGH v. DUBRI RAI* (1905) I. L. R. 28 All. 310

ss. 28 and 30—*Further rules of 1883—Rules 7 and 5—Stamps bearing names of different attorneys and different dates—Indulgence in respect of same—Practice.* A plaint bearing stamps of the value of R17 was stamped with an impressed stamp of R15 and an adhesive stamp of R2. The impressed stamp bore the name of the attorney for the plaintiff, and the adhesive stamp that of another, and it further appeared that the stamps had been purchased on different dates. On the attorney seeking to get the stamps punched, the punching officer refused to punch them. The Registrar wrote to the attorney to state the special circumstances in writing, to enable him to make the necessary orders for punching. The attorney, without complying with this request, claimed it as a matter of indulgence to him, and applied to the Court to have the plaint admitted and the stamps punched. *Held*, that the punching officer, noticing the irregularity, was fully justified in refusing to punch the stamps. *Held*, also, that mere intimation from the Registrar did not confer the indulgence which the Registrar could extend under the rules, and that the solicitor should have placed the circumstances on paper, to entitle him to the same. *GERSON v. RADHA KISSEN* (1902) 6 C. W. N. 785

s. 30.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 4.

I. L. R. 12 All. 129

s. 31.

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODES.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 687

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 421

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—FOR LOSS OR INJURY CAUSED BY OFFENCE

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 345

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 305

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 31—*contd.*

—*Order to repay fine under—Retaining fee in deposit.* An order to repay a fee under s. 31 of Act VII of 1870 is an integral part of the sentence, and the fee should be treated as a fine imposed by the Court, and may be retained in deposit pending an appeal, where an appeal lies. ANONYMOUS 5 Mad. Ap. 28

QUEEN-EMPRESS v. TANGAVELU CHETTI

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 153

1. ————— *Sch. I, Art. 1—Petition to wind up partnership—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 265—Plaint.* An application for the winding up by the Court of the business of a firm after the termination of partnership, under s. 265 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), whatever it be called, is essentially a plaint, and must be paid for in fees at the same rate as any other plaint for an account extending to a like amount of valuation. *ERAKSHAH DHANJISETH v. ADARJI DORABJI* I. L. R. 7 Bom. 535

See ABAD ALI PRADHAM v. JAMIRUDDIN

MAHOMED 13 C. L. R. 160

2. ————— *Application to file Award—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 525.* The proper Court-fee upon an application to file an award under s. 525 is the Court-fee prescribed for applications, and not the Court-fee upon a plaint. *BIJADHUR BHUGUT v. MONOHUR BHUGUT*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 11

S.C. PALUT BHUGUT v. MONOHUR BHUGUT

13 C. L. R. 171

3. ————— *Memorandum of Appeal from an order under s. 331 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882)—Practice.* A memorandum of appeal from an order, under s. 331 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), should be stamped with an *ad valorem* duty as provided by Art. 1, Sch. I of the Court Fees Act, VII of 1870. *NARAYAN RAGHUNATH v. BHAGVANT ANANT*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 238

4. ————— *Proviso—Appeal under Beng. Act XI of 1862, s. 9—Appeal not "otherwise provided for."* An appeal from an order of a lower Appellate Court on an application under s. 9, Bengal Act VI of 1862, not being otherwise provided for by the Court Fees Act, may be admitted on a 6-anna stamp. *PURIAG BHUGUT v. DONZELLE*

14 W. R. 21

5. ————— *Court-fee on Petition of Complaint—Liability of the workman to pay—Workman's Breach of Contract Act (XIII of 1859), ss. 1, 2.* In a proceeding under the Workman's Compensation Act where the workman admits the advance and repays the same, it is not competent to the Magistrate to make him pay to the complainant the Court-fee paid on the petition of complaint. *EMPEROR v. DHONDU* (1904)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 22

6. ————— *Power of Appellate Court to set aside order under s. 31 of Court-fees Act*

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. 31—*concl'd.*

(VII of 1870). An order under s. 31 of the Court Fees Act directing the accused, who was convicted of a non-cognizable offence, to repay to the complainant the fee paid by him on the complaint is not part of the sentence passed on the accused for the offence. On appeal against such conviction it is not competent to the Appellate Court to set aside the order under s. 31 of the Court Fees Act. *EMPEROR v. MADDIPATLA SUBBARAYUDU* (1908).

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 547

1. s. 34—*Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), as amended by Act XII of 1891, s. 34, Stamp Act (II of 1899), s. 69—Sale by thief of stolen stamps—Offence.* A person who had been convicted of stealing two stamps was charged, under s. 69 of the Stamp Act, 1899, with having sold them, he not being a licensed vendor of stamps. *Held*, that the words "sells or offers for sale," which occur in s. 69 of the Stamp Act and in s. 34 of the Court Fees Act, include the case of a thief who exchanges a stolen stamp for a sum of money, even though the thief cannot give a legal title by the transaction. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. VIRASAMI* (1900)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 319

2. *Court-fees stamp, sale of— "Sale"—Exchange—Transfer of stamp on promise that one of equal value would be returned.* Where a mukhtear, who had purchased a Court-fee stamp for a client, transferred it to another client, the latter having agreed to return to the mukhtear another Court fee stamp of the same value, and was convicted of an offence under s. 34 of the Court Fees Act: *Held*, that there had been no 'sale' of the stamp within the meaning of s. 34 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), and that the conviction should be set aside. *KEDAR NATH SHAHA v. EMPEROR* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 921
s. c. 7 C. W. N. 704

Sch. I, Art. 1.

See COURT-FEE I. L. R. 33 Calc. 11

See VALUATION OF SUITS.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1133

Sch. I, Art. 1, proviso.

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—TEST CASE

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 140

Sch. I, Art. 11.

See ante, s. 19D AND SCH. I, ART. 11.

1. *Assessment of value of estate principally consisting of a chose in action.* A petition for probate set out that the estate of the deceased consisted, at the time of her death, of property in possession worth only about R125, and the subject-matter of a suit in which she claimed some R17,000. The petitioner declared the value of the estate at under R1,000. *Held*, that there was nothing to enable the Court to determine the

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*Sch. I, Art. 11—*concl'd.*

value of the right which the petitioner (as executor) was seeking to enforce in the suit, and that the Court could not say that the estate had been undervalued. Probate was accordingly directed to be issued without payment of stamp duty (it being declared at under R1,000), but the petitioner was ordered, on the termination of the suit, to file in Court a statement showing its result. *SALDANHA v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1900)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 241

2. *Will by husband conferring general power of appointment over a fund on his wife—Payment of probate duty on the husband's decease—Exercise of the power by the wife by will—Decease of wife—Liability of her estate for probate duty in respect of the power—"Property."* By his will, A directed that R7,000 out of his property should be lent out at interest, that the interest derived from time to time should be added to the principal amount, and that the amount so accruing should be paid to whoever B, his wife, by her will, should appoint. A died, and his will was proved, probate duty being paid on the principal amount of R7,000. Executed a will in which she exercised the power of appointment, and also died. Her executor now applied for probate of her will, and the question was raised whether he was liable to pay probate duty on the fund or any part thereof. *Held*, that the power of appointment created by the will was property, within the meaning of Art. 11 of Sch. I to the Court Fees Act, and that the estate of the testatrix was liable to probate duty in respect thereof. *In the goods of George*, 6 B. L. R., Appx. 133, commented on. *In re LAKSHMINARAYANA ANMAL* (1902)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 515

Sch. I, Art. 3.

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1871, s. 2.

6 Mad. 351

1. Sch. I, Arts. 4 and 5—*Application for Review.* An application for review of judgment, such as is alluded to in Arts. 4 and 5, Sch. I of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), does not include an application for a new trial in a Small Cause Court in the mofussil. *GOPEENATH ROY v. RAM JOY*

14 W. R. 249

2. *Application for review of judgment in pauper suit—Court-fee—Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), Sch. I, cl. 5—Civil Procedure Code, s. 410.* *Held*, that, when an application for review is presented in a suit in forma pauperis that application, like the plaint in the suit, is not liable to any Court-fee. *UMDA BIBI v. NAIMA BIBI*

I. L. R. 20 All. 410

3. *Stamp—Petition of review.* When a plaint or memorandum of appeal comprises a number of claims, and a portion only of such claims has been allowed by the judgment, the party seeking a review should be

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*Sch. I, Arts. 4 and 5—*contd.*

required to stamp his application with a fee sufficient to cover the amount of the claims in regard to which he wishes the Court to review its judgment. *In re* MANOHAR G. TAMBekar. I. L. R. 4 Bom. 26

4. ———— *Court-fee—Application for review affecting only portion of decree.* Held, that the proper fee leviable on an application for review of judgment when it refers only to a portion of the decree is the fee leviable on the plaint or memorandum of appeal, in which the judgment, review of which is asked for, is passed. *Proceedings January 16, 1872, 7 Mad. H. C. R. app. 1; In re Manohar Tambekar, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 26, not followed. Nobin Chandra v. Uzir Ali, 3 C. W. N. 292, and Imdad Hasan v. Badri Prasad, All. Weekly Notes (1898) 212, followed.*

In the matter of SHEIKH MAQBUL AHMAD (1909)
I. L. R. 31 All. 294

1. ———— Sch. I, Art. 5—*Review—Stamp.* The stamp fee on an application for review must be calculated on the amount that would be obtained if the review were granted, and not necessarily on the whole value of the suit. ANONYMOUS

7 Mad. Ap. 1

2. ———— *Review of judgment—Stamp duty—Court Fees Act, s. 14—Computation of time—Limitation Act, 1877, s. 5.* In computing the period of eighty-nine days from the date of decree, within which an application for review of judgment may be presented on payment of half the fee leviable on the plaint or memorandum of appeal (under Art. 5 of Sch. I of the Court Fees Act, 1870), the time during which the Court is closed for vacation cannot be excluded. *In re KOTA*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 134

3. ———— *Application for review—Whether Court-fee payable is on the value of the relief asked for or upon the valuation of the whole suit—Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), Sch. I, Art. 5.* A suit being decided in favour of the plaintiff, one of the defendants made an application for review of the decision so far as it dealt with the question of costs. The petitioner paid stamp duty on the relief asked for, i.e., for the entire amount of costs. The lower Court ordered the petitioner to pay stamp duty on the entire value of the suit, and the petitioner not complying with this order, his application was rejected. Held, that, having regard to the language of Art. 5, Sch. I of the Court Fees Act, the Munsif did not come to an erroneous conclusion. *In re Manohar G. Tambekar, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 26, distinguished. NOBIN CHANDRA CHUCKERBUTTY v. MOHAMED UZIR ALI SARKAR*

3 C. W. N. 292

4. ———— *Fee payable on application to review appellate decree under Letters Patent, s. 10.* For the purpose of ascertaining the Court-fee to be paid under Sch. I, Art. 5, of the

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*—Sch. I, Arts. 4 and 5—*concl.*

Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), upon an application to review an appellate decree, the fee to be considered is the fee leviable on the memorandum of the appeal in which the decree sought to be reviewed was passed, and not the fee which was leviable on the plaint, nor—where the decree sought to be reviewed was passed on appeal under s. 10 of the Letters Patent from an appellate judgment of a Division Bench—the fee which was leviable on the memorandum of the appeal before such bench. *HUSAINI BEGAM v. COLLECTOR OF MUZAFFARNAGAR*

I. L. R. 11 All. 176

——— Sch. I, Art. 7—*Notes of judgment furnished to parties—Copies of decrees.* Notes of judgment furnished to parties under the Rule of Practice for the guidance of Small Cause Courts are copies of decrees which require a stamp under Art. 7, Sch. I of Act VII of 1870. ANONYMOUS

6 Mad. Ap. 24

See ANONYMOUS CASE . . . 6 Mad. Ap. 12

——— Sch. I, Art. 8—*Stamp Act, 1879, Sch. I, Art. 1—Copies of originals returned to the party—Liability of such copies to stamp duty.* In the course of a suit the plaintiff put in evidence certain entries from his day-books and ledger. The books had been produced in Court, and had been returned to the plaintiff as usual on his furnishing copies of the said entries. The Subordinate Judge, feeling doubt as to whether such copies should be furnished on stamped paper, referred the question to the High Court. Held, that the original entries, not having been in the handwriting of the debtor were not liable to stamp duty under Sch. I, Art. 1 of the Stamp Act, I of 1879, and that, therefore, the copies of them were not chargeable with any Court-fees under Sch. I, Art. 8 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870). *HARICHAND v. JIVNA SUBHANA*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 526

1. ———— Sch. I, Art. 11—*Probate—Ad valorem fee—Property subject to a mortgage—Stamp duty found insufficient on taking account.* By cl. 11, Sch. I, of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), an *ad valorem* duty of two per cent. on the amount or value of the estate is chargeable for probate of a will, where the amount or value of the property, in respect of which probate is granted, exceeds Rs. 1,000. The term "value" in the Act apparently means market value, and the market value of mortgaged property is the equity of redemption. An executor having applied for probate in respect of property which was alleged to be charged and mortgaged in excess of its value, no fee was charged for the probate of the will. In such a case, however, if it be found, when the accounts are filed, that sufficient stamp duty has not been paid, payment of any deficiency can be enforced. *In the goods of MACLEAN*

6 N. W. 214

2. ———— *Probate granted to second executor when leave has been reserved to him to take out probate.* No stamp duty is payable

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*Sch. I, Art. 11—*contd.*

under the Court Fees Act, 1870, on probate granted to a second executor, to whom leave was reserved to take out probate when the first probate was granted. *In the goods of AMEERUN*

15 W. R. 496

3. ——— Letters of administration.

Before the passing of the Court Fees Act, the Administrator General obtained letters of administration to a certain estate, limited until the will should be proved; and the fixed duty prescribed by the Succession Act was paid in respect of such letters of administration. The will was proved, and a petition presented for general letters of administration with the will annexed, after the passing of the Court Fees Act. *Held*, that the fee therein prescribed must be paid on the amount of the property irrespective of the duty paid on the grant of the former letters of administration. *In the goods of CHALMERS*

6 B. L. R. Ap. 137: 21 W. R. 246 note

4. ——— Letters of administration with will annexed.

The Administrator General obtained letters of administration with a copy of exemplification of probate of the will annexed, and the full *ad valorem* duty prescribed by Sch. I, cl. 11, of the Court Fees Act was paid on the amount of the property. Subsequently, the Administrator General produced a document referred to in the will of the testator, and obtained an order for letters of administration with a copy of the exemplification of probate of the will annexed, and of the document produced as part of the will, in lieu of the former letters of administration. *Held*, that he was not liable to pay a second *ad valorem* duty. *In the goods of MOSSON*

6 B. L. R. Ap. 139

5. ——— Property subject to a Trust.

Where property was conveyed by *T* to *L* on trust to pay the income to *T* for her life, and after her death to hold the property for her children in such manner or form as she should by will appoint, and *T* afterwards intermarried with *G* and shortly afterwards made a will of which she appointed her husband and the trustee of the settlement executors: *Held*, that the *ad valorem* duty prescribed by Sch. I, cl. 11, of the Court Fees Act was not payable in respect of such trust property. The words of that clause mean property which the deceased was possessed of or entitled to. *In the goods of GEORGE*

6 B. L. R. Ap. 138: 15 W. R. 457 note

6. ——— Trust property—

Letters of administration—Financial Resolution 2004, 14th July 1871. *A* and *B* were brothers joint in estate. *A* died unmarried, leaving no relative except *B*. *B* obtained grant of letters of administration of the estate of *A*, consisting of a half share of certain property, the other half share of which was claimed by *B* to belong to himself. By Financial Resolution No. 2004, 14th July 1871,

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*Sch. I, Art. 11—*contd.*

the fees chargeable under Sch. I, Art. 11 of the Court Fees Act were remitted in respect of letters of administrations relating to "property which a deceased person was possessed of as a trustee for any other person." *Held*, that *B*'s half share should be treated as trust property, and exempted from the 2 per cent. *ad valorem* fee. *In the goods of BRINDABUN GHOSE*

11 B. L. R. Ap. 39: 19 W. R. 230

7. ——— Trust property—

Letters of administration—Estate of Hindu in hands of deceased daughter's representatives. On the death of a Hindu lady, who had succeeded to her father's property, for the estate of a Hindu daughter, it appeared that certain Government promissory notes, which formed a portion of the father's property, were then standing in her own name. On an application by the sons for letters of administration to her estate: *Held*, that on her death the grandfather's estate became, in the hands of her representatives, trust property in respect of which no duty was payable under the Court Fees Act. *In the goods of JOYMONEY DOSSEE*

14 B. L. R. 184

8. ——— Property on which

there is a mortgage or incumbrance—*Duty on letters of administration.* When letters of administration are granted in respect of property which is subject to a mortgage, the value of the property for the purpose of estimating the *ad valorem* duty payable under the Court Fees Act is the value of the entire property, less the amount of the incumbrance. A duty paid on former letters of administration, which were afterwards cancelled, was allowed to be deducted from the amount payable for fresh letters of administration. *In the goods of INNES*

8 B. L. R. Ap. 43: 16 W. R. 253

9. ——— Letters of administration, Duty payable on.

A suit for a division of a joint estate having terminated in a settlement, the terms of which were embodied in a decree, the receivers who had been appointed *pendente lite* endorsed and transferred certain securities and shares to one of the parties, *D*, pursuant to the decree. The Bank of Bengal Account Department and the companies concerned having refused to recognize the transfer, *D* applied for letters of administration in respect of the securities and shares in question, claiming exemption from the duty prescribed by the Court Fees Act, Sch. I, cl. 11, on the ground that she ought not to have been required to obtain such letters, her right having been declared by a decree of the High Court. *Held*, that the prescribed duty must be paid, and that there was no ground of exemption from it. *In the goods of SRINATH DASS*

20 W. R. 440

10. ——— Letters of administration, Duty payable on—

Debts due by deceased—Letters limited to collect rents. The fee payable for letters of administration under Act VII of 1870,

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*Sch. I, Art. 11—*contd.*

Sch. I, Art. 11, is to be calculated on the amount or value of the property in respect of which the letters are sought, without deducting therefrom the debts due by the deceased. Where letters are granted limited for the purpose of collecting the rent of a house, the duty is to be assessed on the value of the house. *In the goods of RAM CHANDRA DAS*

9 B. L. R. 30

18 W. R. 153

11. ———— *Appointment by will.* Where a person having a life-interest in a fund, with a general and absolute power of appointment thereover, exercises such power by will, no *ad valorem* fee is payable in respect of such fund under the Court Fees Act. *In the goods of ORRAM*

12 B. L. R. Ap. 21

21 W. R. 245

12. ———— *Letters of Administration—Doubtful debt.* The uncertainty of recovering a debt due to the estate of a deceased person is not a sufficient ground for a proportionate reduction of the fee payable in respect of letters of administration to such estate. *In the goods of BEAKE*

13 B. L. R. Ap. 24

21 W. R. 397

13. ———— *Probate—Value of Annuity—Property subject to a mortgage.* For the purpose of determining the probate fee in respect of an annuity the word "value" in the Court Fees Act, VII of 1870, Sch. I, cl. 11, must be taken to mean the market value of the annuity, and not ten times the amount of a yearly payment. Where the property, in respect of which probate is sought, is mortgaged, the amount of the mortgage incumbrance must be deducted from the market value of the property and the probate fee charged on the balance. *In re will of RAMCHUNDRA LAKSHMANJI*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 118

14. ———— *Executors obtaining second grant of probate—Grant of probate before Court Fees Act came into force.* Executors obtaining a second grant of probate subsequent to the enactment of the Court Fees Act of 1870 (the first grant having been taken out previously to that enactment) are not exempted from the payment of the *ad valorem* duty chargeable under that Act, although the full fee then chargeable by law had already been paid at the time when the first probate was taken out. *In the goods of GASTER*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 733

2 C. L. R. 436

15. ———— *Probate duty—Annuity charged on property of testator.* Where it appeared that property disposed of by a will was bequeathed to the testatrix subject to the payment thereof of an annuity for life to a person who survived her: *Held*, that the *ad valorem* fee prescribed by Sch. I, cl. 11, of the Court Fees Act ought to be levied upon the value of the property, less the capitalised value of the annuity. *In the goods of RUSHTON*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 736

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*s. Sch. I, Art. 11—*contd.*

16. ———— *Letters of administration—Liability of property on which duty has been paid in England—Fees.* A testator died in England, and his executrix proved his will there and then in this Court, paying duty in each country on the assets there. On the death of the executrix, the Administrator General obtained letters of administration *de bonis non* of the testator's unadministered property valued at a greater sum than the sum on which duty was originally paid in this country by the executrix, but which sum was made up of assets from England upon which duty had already been paid there. *Held*, that, as the assets were within the jurisdiction of this Court at the time of the grant of administration, and the Administrator General could not have obtained possession of them otherwise than by virtue of the grant, they were liable to the *ad valorem* fee prescribed by cl. 11, Sch. I of the Court Fees Act. *In the goods of MURCH*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 725

17. ———— *Ad valorem duty on probate—Parties married and holding property under the Code Napoleon—Law of France—Trust property.* The deceased *F* was a European subject of the German Empire. He married a lady of Solingen in Rhenish Prussia, where the Code Napoleon is in force. There, in contemplation of the marriage, the parties entered into a contract whereby it was provided that "there should be, and rule, universal community of his and her present and future moveable and immoveable property," which contract placed the parties under the law of France respecting community of property between husband and wife. Under that law, a husband and wife have an equal interest in the property comprised in the community; on the death of either, the property is divided into two parts of which one part goes to the survivor and the other to the heirs or to donees under a testamentary disposition. *Held*, that on the death of *F* only one-half of the property was chargeable with the *ad valorem* duty payable under Art. 11 of Sch. I of the Court Fees Act; the other half being trust property, which should, under the provisions of s. 19D of that Act, be exempted from payment of such duty. *In the goods of FROESCHMAN*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 575

18. ———— *Duty payable on taking out probate or administration—Value of property not reduced to possession and as to which suit is brought.* Under Art. 11 of Sch. I of the Court Fees Act, duty is payable by a person taking out probate on the amount or value of the property in respect of which probate or letters of administration shall be granted, if the amount or value of such property exceeds Rs. 1,000. In a case where property has not been reduced into possession at the time of taking out probate, and the right to it is the subject of a suit, it is permissible to declare

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*Sch. I, Art. 11—*concl'd.*

the value of the property as not exceeding R1,000
In the goods of ABDOL AZIZ

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 577

19. ———— Probate duty—

Asset in British India at date of death. Probate duty is payable only on assets which at the date of the testator's death are in British India. *In re ABRAHAM* . . . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 139

20. ———— Doubtful debt.—

Probate fee. The uncertainty of recovering a debt due to the estate of a deceased person is not a sufficient ground for a proportionate reduction of the fee payable in respect of probate as a will. *In the goods of RAM CHUNDER GHOSE* . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 567

21. ———— Locality of Assets

Partner of firm with head office in London and branches in Calcutta and Bombay. S died in England in October 1896, and probate of his will was obtained in England on 1st December 1896. He left a large amount of property and credits in Bombay, and he was a partner in the firm of David Sassoon & Co., which had its head office in London and had branches in Bombay and Calcutta. *Held*, that no probate duty was payable on the value of the share of the deceased as a partner in the firm of David Sassoon & Co. or the properties of the firm situated in British India at his death. *In the goods of SASSOON* . . . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 673

22. ———— and Art. 12—*Trust property.*

The term property in cls. 11 and 12 of Sch. I of the Court Fees Act includes not only property to which the deceased was beneficially entitled during his lifetime but also all property which stood in his name as trustee, or of which he was possessed *benami* for others. *In the goods of BERESFORD* 7 B. L. R. 57: 15 W. R. 456

Sch. I, Art. 12.

See CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION—
RIGHT TO SUE OR EXECUTE DECREE
WITHOUT CERTIFICATE 6 Mad. 131

1. ———— Probate duty, Ex-

emption from—Interest in partnership property. The testator, a member of the firms of G A & Co. of Calcutta, and O G & Co., of Liverpool, died in England, leaving a will, of which he appointed G in England and O in Calcutta his executors. As a partner in the Calcutta firm, the testator was entitled to a share in an indigo concern and in certain immoveable property in Calcutta, and his share in these properties was, on his death, estimated, and the money value thereof paid to his estate by the firm in Liverpool, and probate duty had been paid thereon by G in obtaining probate of the will in England. Shortly after the testator's death, the indigo concern was contracted to be sold, and the testator's name appearing on the title-deeds as one of the owners, O applied for probate of the will, to enable him to join in the conveyance and in any

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*Sch. I, Art. 12—*concl'd.*

future sale of the other immoveable property. An unlimited grant of probate was made to O, who claimed exemption from probate duty in respect of the properties on the grounds (a) that duty had already been paid in England on the testator's share in them, and (b) that there was no amount or value in respect of which probate was to be granted in India. *Held*, on a case referred by the taxing officer, that O was not entitled in obtaining probate to exemption from the probate duty payable under Sch. I, cl. 12, of the Court Fees Act in respect of the properties. *In the goods of GLADSTONE* . . . I. L. R. 1 Calc. 168

2. ———— Application for Certificate of Heirship. In cases in which the value of property in respect of which a certificate of heirship is sought exceeds R1,000, the stamp duty should be calculated on the whole amount, and not on the excess over R1,000 under Act VII of 1870, Sch. I, Art. 12, but exceeding R1,000 is the condition of liability. ANONYMOUS

5 Mad. Ap. 45

3. ———— Certificates of administration to estate of deceased. The Court-fee stamp to be imposed on a certificate of administration ought not to be assessed on a valuation, including property absolutely denied by the applicants to belong to the intestate's estate until the contrary be proved. NITYO KALI DABEA v. KADER NATH CHATTERJEE . . . 5 C. L. R. 368

Sch. II, Art. 1.

See CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY.
I. L. R. 16 Bom. 700

1. ———— Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 281—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 8—*Examination of Defendant.* When the plaintiff, in order to make the proof referred to in s. 281, Act VIII of 1859, chooses to examine the defendant he must pay for the oath and the cost of reducing the deposition of the witness to writing. It would be otherwise under s. 8, Act XXIII of 1861, in which case the fee is demandable from the applicant. EDMOND v. NIERSES

8 B. L. R. Ap. 42: 16 W. R. 84

2. ———— Fees for Translations. When portions of khatta books are translated, each portion translated is treated as a separate document, and any portion less than a folio is charged for under the Court Fees Act as a whole folio. The portions containing less than a folio are not to be taken together and charged according to the whole number of folios they contain. BRAJANATH DHAR v. BHABO MOHAN DHAR

6 B. L. R. Ap. 137

3. ———— Petition for New Trial in Small Cause Court—Court Fees Act, 1870. Sch. I, Art. 5. A petition for a new trial in a Small Cause Court is, under the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), properly stamped with a one-anna stamp,

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*Sch. II, Art. 1—*conclld.*

as it falls within Sch. II, Art. 1, of that Act, and not under Sch. I, Art. 5. *CHOTA LAL JAMNADAS v. BULAKIDAS JETHA* . . . 7 Bom. A. C. 109

4. ——— Stamp for application for Probate or Administration. The stamp requisite for an application for a probate of a will or letters of administration, is not required to be proportionate to the value of the property involved, as such applications come under the provisions made in Art. 1, Sch. II, Act VII of 1870, for common applications and petitions. *In the matter of JUDONATH SADROOKHAN* . . . 15 W. R. 40

5. ——— Application by witness for return of document. Stamp duty is not chargeable on an application by a witness for the return of a document filed by him in obedience to summons. *ANONYMOUS CASE* . . . 15 W. R. 237

6. ——— Petition to withdraw suit—Agreement—Bond. A petition, stamped as an agreement having been presented to a District Court by the parties to a suit, informing the Court that they had entered into an agreement, whereby, *inter alia*, the defendant was bound to deliver to the plaintiff certain wood, and requesting that the suit might be removed from the file, the District Judge impounded it, levied a sum for insufficient stamp duty and a penalty on the ground that it was a bond, and forwarded it to the Collector. Upon a reference made by the Board of Revenue at the instance of the Collector: *Held*, that the duty leviable was a Court-fee stamp under Art. 1 (b) of Sch. II of the Court Fees Act, 1870. REFERENCE UNDER STAMP ACT, 1879. I. L. R. 8 Mad. 15

7. ——— Complaint of illegal Seizure and Detention of cattle—Act III of 1857, s. 14—Order to repay stamp to complainant—Court Fees Act, s. 21. The illegal seizure and detention of cattle, to which s. 14 of Act III of 1857 refers, is not an "offence" within the meaning of s. 31 and Sch. II, Art. 1, cl. (b), of the Court Fees Act, VII of 1870. Complaints of such illegal seizure and detention do not require a stamp. If such complaints be stamped, it is not competent for the Court to direct that the accused shall repay the amount of such stamp to the complainant. *REG. v. AVJI BIN NARU* . . . 8 Bom. Cr. 22

Sch. II, Art. 6—Security bond for cost of appeal—Act I of 1879, Sch. I, No. 13. *Held*, by the Full Bench, that where a bond is given under the orders of a Court as security by one party for the costs of another, it is subject to two duties—(a) an *ad valorem* stamp under the Stamp Act, Art. 13, Sch. I (b), a court-fee of eight annas under the Court Fees Act, Art. 6, Sch. II. *KULWANTA v. MAHABIR PRASAD* . I. L. R. 10 All. 16

Sch. II, Art. 10 (a)—Stamp Act, Sch. I, Art. 50 (b)—Power to vakil to obtain copies from Collector's office—Stamp. A document authorizing a vakil to apply for copies of records from the Collector's office is properly stamped with a court-

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*Sch. II, Art. 10 (a)—*conclld.*

fee stamp under Art. 10(a) of Sch. II of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and does not require to be stamped as a power-of-attorney under Art. 50(b) of Sch. I of the Stamp Act, 1879. REFERENCE UNDER STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 46 . . . I. L. R. 9 Mad. 146

1. ——— Sch. II, Art. 11—Application to set aside order directing award to be filed. An application to the High Court to set aside an order of a District Court, reversing an order of the Court of first instance directing an award made without the intervention of a Court to be filed, should be treated as an application for a miscellaneous special appeal. Such an application may be made on a stamp of the value of two rupees, under Sch. II, Art. 11, of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870). *LAKSHMAN SHIVAJI v. RAMA ESU* . . . 8 Bom. A. C. 17

2. ——— Appeal from order under s. 331 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), as amended by s. 52 of Act XII of 1879. Appeals from orders under s. 331 of Act X of 1877, as amended by s. 52 of Act XII of 1879, are chargeable with the same court-fee as is required in the case of appeals from decrees. *MAHBUBAN v. UMRAO BEGUM. SHAYAMA SUNDURI DASI v. WATSON & Co.* . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 720 : 11 C. L. R. 98

3. ——— Memorandum of appeal from order under Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 214—Decree—Valuation of appeal. An order under s. 214 of Act VI of 1882 (Indian Companies Act) is not a decree or an order having the force of a decree, and consequently an appeal from such an order to a High Court is properly stamped, with reference to the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), Sch. II, Art. 11 (b), with a court-fee stamp of Rs. 2. REFERENCE UNDER COURT FEES ACT I. L. R. 17 All. 238

4. ——— Appeal under cl. 10, Letters Patent, High Court, N.-W. P., from an order of remand under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882—Court-fee. *Held*, that in an appeal, under s. 10 of the Letters Patent, from an order of a single Judge of the Court remanding a case under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure the proper court-fee is Rs. 2. *BALLI RAI v. MAHABIR RAI* . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 178

Sch. II, Art. 15.

See COURT-FEES ACT (VII OF 1870).

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 567

Sch. II, Art. 17.

See ante, s. 7 . . . 13 C. W. N. 815

1. ——— Suit—Title—Possession—Injunction—Consequential relief—*Ad valorem* fee—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 283. A suit of the nature referred to in s. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure instituted for the declaration of the plaintiff's right to and possession of a property attached, and for a perpetual injunction to restrain its sale in execution

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*Sch. II, Art. 17—*concl'd.*

of a decree, is one in which consequential relief is prayed for and therefore subject to an *ad valorem* court-fee duty. *Ahmed Mirza Saheb v. Thomas*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 162; *Madhusudan Koer v. Rakhal Chunder Roy*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 104; and *Mufti Jalaluddeen Mahomed v. Shohorullah*, 15 B. L. R. App. 1; 22 W. R. 422, followed. *Ram Prasad v. Sukh Dai*, I. L. R. 2 All. 720, referred to. *FULKUMARI v. GHANASHYAM MISRA* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 511

2. Civil Procedure

Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 283, suit under—Stamp on plaint. In a suit brought under s. 283 of the Civil Procedure Code, the proper Court-fee payable on the plaint is R10 under the Court-fees Act, Sch. II, Art. 17, cl. (i). *Dhondo Sakharam Kulkarni v. Govind Babaji Kulkarni*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 20, approved. *PHUL KUMARI v. GHANASHYAM MISRA* (1907)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 202

s.c. 12 C. W. N. 169

L. R. 35 I. A. 22

3. Partition—Fixed

fee or ad valorem fee. A suit for partition of joint property is governed by Sch. II, Art. 17, cl. vi of the Court Fees Act, and the plaint is properly stamped, if a Court-fee of ten rupees is paid upon it. A mere denial on the part of the defendant as to plaintiff's title and possession does not convert the suit into one for declaration of title and recovery of possession; the plaintiff is entitled to maintain a suit for partition, if his possession to some part of the joint property is admitted or established, but if it is established that he is not in possession at all of any portion of the joint property, that there has been a complete ouster, he must sue for recovery of possession and partition and pay *ad valorem* Court-fees upon a plaint appropriately framed for the purpose. *BIDHATA RAI v. RAM CHARITER RAI* (1907)

12 C. W. N. 37

Sch. II, Art 17, cl. i.

See VALUATION OF SUIT.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 202

1. Suit to contest

award of Settlement Officer—Mad. Act XXVIII of 1860, s. 25. A suit under (Madras) Act XXVIII of 1860, s. 25, to contest the award of a settlement officer falls within the terms of Art. 17 (1) of Sch. II of the Court Fees Act. *ANNAMALAI CHETTI v. CLOETE*

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 204

2. Suit to set aside

order under Act VIII of 1859, s. 246—Stamp. A suit brought under the provisions of s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859 to set aside an order allowing a claim to attached property and releasing the property from attachment is a suit to try the title and establish the right of the person who brings the suit: and such a suit must be valued according to the value of the property, and cannot be brought upon a stamp of R10, under Art. 17 of Sch. II of the Court

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*Sch. II, Art. 17, cl. i—*contd.*

Fees' Act. *MUFTI JALALUDDIEN MAHOMED v. SHOHORULLAH*

15 B. L. R. Ap. 1: 22 W. R. 422.

3. *Suit after rejection of claim to attached property—Ad valorem stamp.* In execution of a decree by the defendant, certain property was attached as being that of the judgment-debtor. The plaintiff preferred a claim but his claim was disallowed, and the property ordered to be sold. In a suit to have it declared that the property belonged to the plaintiff: *Held*, that it was a suit in which consequential relief was asked for, and that the *ad valorem* duty prescribed by Sch. I of the Court Fees Act was payable on the plaint, and not that provided by Sch. II, Art. 17. *Jalaluddin Mahomed v. Shohorullah*, 15 B. L. R. Ap. 1: 22 W. R. 422, followed. *AHMED MIRZA SAHEB v. THOMAS*

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 162

4. Suits brought to

set aside or restore attachment—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246—Summary decision—Limitation Act, 1871, Art. 15 (1877, Art. 13)—Interpretation of Acts—Valuation of suits. Suits brought to set aside or to restore an attachment upon a house in pursuance of the permission given in s. 246 of the Civil Procedure Code may be regarded either as "suits to obtain a declaratory decree or order where consequential relief is prayed" so as to fall within s. 1, cl. 4, Art. (c), of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), or as suits to obtain or set aside a summary decision or order, in which case the stamp duty payable would be that prescribed by Art. 17, cl. 1, Sch. II of the Court Fees Act. The Court Fees Act being a fiscal enactment, it is the duty of the Courts to treat such suits as belonging to the latter class (it being the more favourable for the suitor), and to impose fees accordingly. Decisions under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859, as to the removal or retention of attachments, are "summary decisions or orders" within the meaning of Art. 17, cl. 1, Sch. II of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870). The words "summary decision or order" in this clause of the Court Fees Act mean decision or order not made in a regular suit or appeal. The construction which has been given to these words, or nearly similar words, in the Limitation Acts (e.g., Act IX of 1871, Sch. II, Art. 15; and Act XV of 1877, Sch. II, Art. 13) affords no guide to their construction in the Court Fees Act. When Acts are in *pari materia*, they may be treated as forming a Code, and may be read together; but when this is not so, the construction which has been put upon one cannot be relied upon as a guide to the construction of another. The valuation of suits for the purpose of jurisdiction is perfectly distinct from their valuation for the fiscal purpose of Court-fees. Therefore Court Fees Acts, which are fiscal enactments, are not to be resorted to for construing enactments which fix the valuation of suits for the purpose of determining jurisdiction. *Motichand Jaichand v. Dadabhai Pestonjee*, 11 Bom. 186, explained.

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—contd.

————— Sch. II, Art. 17, cl. i—contd.

Ravaji Tamoji v. Dholapa Raghu, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 123, dissented from by WESTROP, C.J. *DAYACHAND NEMCHAND v. HEMCHAND DHURAMCHAND*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 515

5. ————— Stamp—Valuation of suit—Summary decision. The plaintiff had attached certain immoveable property in execution of a decree against a third party. The attachment was removed on application by the defendant under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859, whereupon the plaintiff sued for a declaration that the property in dispute belonged to his judgment-debtor, and was liable to be attached and sold under his decree. The plaint, which did not state any amount as the value of the claim, bore a R10 stamp. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaint ought to have been stamped according to the value of the plaintiff's claim. *Held*, by the High Court on appeal, that the plaint was properly stamped under Sch. II, Art. 17, cl. 1, of Act VII of 1870, as the suit was a suit to set aside a summary decision of a Civil Court not established by Letters Patent. *SADASHIV YESHWANT v. ATMARAM SAKARAM*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 535

6. ————— Suit for a declaration of right—Suit to set aside an order under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859 disallowing a claim to property under attachment—Consequential relief. *Held*, that a suit for a declaration of the plaintiff's proprietary right to certain moveable property attached in the execution of a decree while in the possession of the plaintiff, and for the cancelment of the order of the Court executing the decree, made under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859, disallowing his claim to the property, could be brought on a stamp of R20, and need not be valued according to the value of the property under attachment. *Chunia v. Ram Dial*, I. L. R. 1 All. 360, followed. *Jalal-ud-din Mahomed v. Shohorulla*, 15 B. L. R. Ap. 1, dissented from. *Motichand Jaichand v. Dadabhai Pestanji*, 11 Bom. 186, and *Chakalingapeshana Naiker v. Achizhar*, I. L. R. 1 Mad. 40, distinguished. *GULZARI LAL v. JADAUN RAI*

I. L. R. 2 All. 63

7. ————— Suit to set aside summary decision—Suit to establish right. The plaintiffs alleged in their plaint as follows: Certain property having been attached in execution of a decree, their mother, the wife of the judgment-debtor, objected to the attachment on the ground that the property had previously come into her possession under a transfer by sale in lieu of her dower-debt. The plaintiff's mother died pending the determination of the objection, having devised her property to the plaintiffs. They succeeded to the same, and certain other property, which also had been transferred to their mother in lieu of her dower-debt, having been also attached in execution of the same decree, the plaintiffs objected to the attachment. The Court executing the decree passed orders disallowing both objections. Upon these

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—contd.

————— Sch. II, Art. 17, cl. i—contd.

allegations the plaintiffs claimed to set aside both orders. They paid with reference to cl. 1, Art. 17, Sch. II of the Court Fees Act, 1870, a court-fee of R20 on their plaint, but the Court of first instance held that this was not sufficient, and that the court-fee should be calculated on the amount of the decree in execution of which the property had been attached. *Held*, that, looking at the nature of the reliefs sought, cl. i, Art. 17, Sch. II of the Court Fees Act, 1870, was applicable, and that a R10 stamp in respect of each order sought to be set aside was payable. *Dayachand Nemchand v. Hemchand Dharamchand*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 515, and *Gulzari Lal v. Jadaun Rai*, I. L. R. 2 All. 63, followed. *FATIMA BEGAM v. SUKH RAM*

I. L. R. 6 All. 341

8. ————— and s. 7 (viii)—Suit to obtain a declaratory decree—Suit to set aside a summary order—Attachment of property—Suit to establish right. Certain immoveable property having been attached in execution of two Rent Court decrees, the wife of the judgment-debtor, under s. 178 of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act (XII of 1881), objected to the attachment on the ground that the property had previously been conveyed to her by her husband under a deed of gift. The objection was disallowed, and she thereupon brought a suit with reference to the provisions of s. 181 (b) of the Rent Act, (i) to establish her right to the property; (ii) to set aside the order passed on her objection. *Held*, that, looking at the nature of the reliefs sought, cls. (1) and (3), Art. 17, Sch. II of the Court Fees Act, 1870, were applicable and that the plaintiff should pay a ten-rupee stamp on each of her claims. *Fatima Begam v. Sukh Ram*, I. L. R. 6 All. 341, followed. *MANRAJ KUARI v. RADEHA PRASAD SINGH*

I. L. R. 6 All. 466

————— Sch. II, Art. 17, cl. ii.

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—ADOPTIONS . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 248

————— Sch. II, Art. 17, cl. iii.

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—MISCELLANEOUS SUITS. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 788

1. ————— Suit for declaration of right to have doors closed. A right or interest in the subject-matter of a suit for the purpose of closing a new door alleged to have been opened with a design to assert (injuriously) rights over adjacent lands, may be shown without paying the stamp necessary in a suit directly for the land itself. *CHUNDUN v. TALIB ALI* . . . 2 N. W. 41

2. ————— Suit for declaratory decree. In a suit for possession and wasilat, plaintiff obtained a decree declaring his right to possession upon the death of his father. Defendant appealed. *Held*, that, as the decree had given consequential relief, i.e., relief from the operation of conveyance

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*Sch. II, Art. 17, cl. iii—*contd.*

and mortgages, which on the face of them affected plaintiff's interest, an appeal from the decree should bear an *ad valorem* stamp duty. *MILLER v. AKHOREE RAM* 15 W. R. 412

3. ———— *Suit for declaratory decree—Stamp—Valuation of suit.* The plaintiff, claiming under a will of the deceased, applied for a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, but the High Court on appeal refused the same. He now brought a suit alleging that he was in possession of the property of deceased, and asked for "confirmation of right and possession by enforcement of the will, in reversal of the summary order of the High Court" *Held*, that cl. 3, Art. 17, Sch. II of Act VII of 1870, did not apply. This was not a suit to obtain a declaratory decree where no consequential relief was prayed for. *DINABANDHU CHOWDHRY v. RAJMOHINI CHOWDRAIN*

8 B. L. R. Ap. 32

S.C. *DINABANDHU CHOWDHRY v. RAJMOHINI CHOWDRAIN* 16 W. R. 213

4. ———— *Valuation of suit for declaratory decree—Consequential relief—Court Fees Act, 1870, s. 7, cl. 4, and s. 17.* A suit praying merely for a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to require the defendants to account to him, and to permit him to inspect their books, is simply a suit for a declaratory decree without consequential relief, and falls within Art. 17, cl. 3 of Sch. II of Act VII of 1870. A suit praying for such a declaration as the above, and also for a positive order in the nature of a mandatory injunction for the production of the defendants' books and property in their hands, or a suit praying for such declaration as the above, and also for a positive decree for an account to be taken by the Court, and for the production of the books and property, would range under s. 7, cl. 4, Art. (c) of Act VII of 1870, as being a suit "to obtain a declaratory decree or order where consequential relief is prayed," and also within Art. (d) of the same section, as being a suit "to obtain an injunction;" and a suit of the third species described above would fall under Art. (f) of the same clause, as being a suit "for accounts." *Quere*: Whether in the case of a suit for a declaration of the right of the plaintiff to an account and to inspection of the defendants' books, and for a mandatory injunction for the production of those books, or of a suit for such declaration and for a positive decree for the taking of an account by the Court, and the production of the defendants' books, the plaint would by virtue of s. 17 of Act VII of 1870, require separate stamps under Arts. (d) and (f) of cl. 4, s. 7, or be sufficiently covered by the stamp under Art. (c) of the same clause; and whether, assuming the declaration and the account each to require a stamp, the prayer for an injunction or order for the production of books is not merely ancillary to, and not a dis-

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870) *contd.*Sch. II, Art. 17, cl. iii—*contd.*

tinct subject from, the taking of an account. *Quere*: Whether the provision in s. 7, cl. 4, of Act VII of 1870, that the amount of the fee payable in suits falling within that clause shall be computed "according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint," is so inconsistent with that portion of s. 31 of Act VIII of 1859 which permits the Court receiving the plaint to revise the valuation of the claim as to render that portion of s. 31 of Act VIII of 1859 inoperative in suits within s. 7, cl. 4, of Act VII of 1870, notwithstanding the concluding passage in that clause. *Quere*: Whether the concluding passage in cl. 4, s. 7 of Act VII of 1870, is too express to admit of a limitation of the power of the Judge, and leaves him the right to revise the valuation placed on suits under cl. 4 by the plaintiff. But, assuming this to be so, it would, generally, not be advisable that the Judge should enhance the valuation on the reception of the plaint. The fee payable under s. 7, cl. 4, of Act VII of 1870 is according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint, and not the value of the subject-matter of the plaint. *MANOHAR GANESH v. BAWA RAMCHARAN DAS*

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 219

5. ———— *Stamp—Declaratory decree—Substantial relief.* Where the plaintiffs sued for a declaration that a mutwalli had been guilty of misfeasance, and asked to have her removed from the mutwalliship and themselves appointed in her place, whereby they would have been entitled to a share in the profits of the waqf: *Held*, that the fixed stamp fee of Rs 10 required by cl. 3, Art. 17, Sch. II of Act VII of 1870, was not sufficient; but the plaint should bear a stamp of a value proportionate to the subject-matter of the suit. *DELROOS BANOO BEGUM v. ASHGUR ALLY KHAN* 15 B. L. R. 167: 23 W. R. 453

6. ———— *Valuation of suit—Mahomedan law—Waqf—Endowment—Removal of trustee—Court Fees Act, Act VII of 1870, s. 7, cl. (3), and sub-cl. (f).* In a suit for the removal of the defendant from the management of certain trust funds on the ground of misconduct, the plaintiff stamped his plaint with a court-fee stamp of Rs 10, and valued the suit at Rs 7,000 "for the purpose of jurisdiction." *Held*, that the Rs 7,000 must be taken, under the circumstances, to be the plaintiff's interest in the subject-matter of the suit, and that the court-fee must be estimated upon that sum. *Delroos Banoo Begum v. Asgar Ali Khan*, 15 B. L. R. 167, followed. *OMRAO MIRZA v. JONES* I. L. R. 10 Cal. 599

7. ———— *Stamp—Suit to set aside a deed or will—Declaratory decree—Consequential relief.* In a suit for confirmation of possession by declaration of proprietary right, and also to set aside a forged and invalid will: *Held*, that the plaintiff sought consequential relief over and above the declaratory decree prayed for, and therefore the petition of appeal ought to be engrossed

COURT FEES ACT (VII OF 1870)—*contd.*

————— Sch. II, Art. 17, cl. iii—*contd.*

on a stamp of proportionate value to the subject-matter of the suit. *JOY NARAIN GIREE v. GREESH CHUNDER MYTEE*

15 B. L. R. 172 : 22 W. R. 438

See *THAKOOR DEEN TEWARRY v. ALI HOSSEIN KHAN*

13 B. L. R. 427 : 21 W. R. 34;
L. R. 1 I. A. 192

8. ————— *Declaratory suit.*

Where a suit was brought against the holder of an impartible palaiyapat and others, to whom portions of the estate had been alienated, by the son of the palaiyakar, entitled to succeed to the estate on his father's demise for a decree declaring that the alienations made by his father did not affect his rights: *Held*, that the Court-fee leviable on the plaint was R10 under Art. 17 (3) of Sch. II of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and not an *ad valorem* fee calculated upon the amount for which the alienations had been made. *SANKARA NARAINA v. VIJAYA RAGHUNADHA MATTAYAN PANNIKONDAR*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 184

9. ————— *Suit for declaratory decree—Consequential relief.* A suit in which plaintiff seeks an account of his father's estate from the executor appointed under his father's will, and in which he claims damages to the extent of R35,000 in default of his obtaining the accounts, should be filed on the stamp required for a suit for the recovery of R35,000, and not on a stamp of R10, which, under cl. 3, s. 17, Sch. II of the Court Fees Act, 1870, is the stamp laid down for a declaratory suit in which no consequential relief is sought and which cannot be valued. *RAM DOOLAL SINGH v. GOPAL KRISTO SINGH*

16 W. R. 156

10. ————— *Suit for declaratory decree—Consequential relief.* Where plaintiff sued to establish her right as the heir of her deceased son, and to set aside a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, granted jointly to her as well as to the defendant, with a view to being permitted to draw interest on Government promissory notes belonging to the estate of the deceased: *Held*, that, as consequential relief was to follow the declaratory decree sought, the stamp fee of R10 prescribed by Art. 3, s. 17, Sch. II, Court Fees Act, was not sufficient for the plaint. *MOKHODA DASSEE v. NOBIN CHUNDER MITTER*

16 W. R. 259

11. ————— *Suit for declaratory decree.* The plaintiff recognized the validity of a mortgage for a term of twenty years of her deceased father's estate made in 1854 by her two brothers, nor did she dispute the sale, in 1863 after the death of the brothers, of the estate to the mortgagees by *M*, her mother, describing herself as sole owner, as a transfer of *M*'s rights. She claimed to be declared to have a right to redeem from the mortgage of 1854, in due course of time, the share in the estate which devolved upon her by inheritance from her father and brothers, the sale deed of 1863 notwithstanding. The Court was of opinion

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————— Sch. II, Art. 17, cl. iii—*concl.*

that the suit was one for declaration of right only and that the fee of R10, which was paid by her in respect of the memorandum of special appeal, was the fee properly payable. *IMAMAN v. LALTA BAKSH*

7 N. W. 343

12. ————— *Suit to set aside sale under the Revenue Sale Law (Act XI of 1859)—Court-fee payable on the plaint—Declaratory suit—Right to possession and to set aside sale—Consequential relief.* A suit to set aside an alleged illegal sale held for arrears of revenue, and a declaration of right and possession in respect of the property in dispute, falls within Art. 17, cl. iii, as a suit to obtain a declaratory order where consequential relief is prayed for; and the plaint should be stamped as such. *MAHOMED TAKIBUDDIN BUDDI v. COLLECTOR OF THE 24 PARGANAS (1901)*

6 C. W. N. 157

1. ————— Sch. II, Art. 17, cl. 6—*Stamp duty on appeals arising out of suits under s. 77 of the Registration Act (III of 1877).* The Court-fees payable on all appeals to the High Court arising out of suits brought under s. 77 of the Registration Act of 1877 is a fee of ten rupees, irrespective of the value of the suit. *JANTOO v. RADHA CANTO DOSS*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 515

2. ————— *Court-fee—Suit to recover possession of share in immovable property after partition.* Where on the face of the plaint it appeared that the suit was in fact a suit to establish the plaintiff's title to a one-third share in certain property and to recover possession of the same, a claim for partition being added to make the relief sought effectual: *Held*, that an *ad valorem* fee was payable on the plaint and not a fee of R10 as provided by Article 17, cl. vi, of the second Schedule to the Court-fees Act. *Bulwant Ganesh v. Nana Chintamon*, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 209, followed. *Kirby Churn Mitter v. Aunath Nath Deb*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 757, referred to. *WALI-ULLAH v. DURGA PRASAD (1906)*

I. L. R. 28 All. 340

COURT FEES AMENDMENT ACT (XI OF 1899).

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 404, 407

COURT OF SESSION.

See JURY—WITHDRAWAL OF CASE FROM.

5 C. W. N. 411

See SESSIONS JUDGE.

COURT OF WARDS.

See COURT OF WARDS ACT.

See DISQUALIFIED PROPRIETOR.

I. L. R. 28 All. 570

See GUARDIAN—DISQUALIFIED PROPRIETORS

I. L. R. 24 All. 136

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 10.

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 91

COURT OF WARDS—*contd.*

See LUNATIC . . . 8 B. L. R. Ap. 50
 I. L. R. 1 All. 476
 I. L. R. 13 Calc. 81
 L. R. 13 I. A. 44
 I. L. R. 14 Mad. 289

See MINOR—REPRESENTATION OF MINOR
 IN SUITS . . . 21 W. R. 312
 I. L. R. 13 Mad. 197
 I. L. R. 23 Calc. 374, 984
 I. L. R. 24 Calc. 853
 L. R. 24 I. A. 107

See OUDH LAND-REVENUE ACT (XVII OF
 1876) . . . 5 C. W. N. 881

— agent of—

See ACT XX OF 1863, s. 5.
 I. L. R. 19 Mad. 285

See COLLECTOR . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 20
 I. L. R. 19 Mad. 255

— petition to Collector against
 officer of—

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COM-
 PLAIN, AND NECESSARY PRELIMI-
 NARIES . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 415

— position of manager of—

See PUBLIC SERVANT.
 I. L. R. 28 Calc. 344

— powers of—

See TRESPASS . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 23

— tenure created under—

See BENGAL ACT IV OF 1870.
 15 B. L. R. 343

1. ——— Position of Collector as man-
 ager of Court of Wards. In the management
 of estates under the Court of Wards the Collector
 acts, not in his ordinary capacity as an officer of
 the executive Government, but as a ministerial
 officer of the Court of Wards, and for misfeasance
 in that capacity he is made personally responsi-
 ble by the regulation constituting that Court.
 SHEORAJ SINGH v. COLLECTOR OF MORADABAD

2 N. W. 379

2. ——— Right of suit—*Recovery of land
 belonging to minor.* The Court of Wards has a
 perfect right to maintain a suit for the recovery of
 land belonging to a minor, which is in possession
 of a person not having a good title thereto.
 BOLAKEE SAHOO v. COURT OF WARDS

14 W. R. 34

3. ——— Right of female to surrender
 estate—*Consent of Court of Wards.* A female
 whose estate is under the management of the
 Court of Wards cannot, without the consent of
 the Court of Wards, give up her rights in favour
 of the next heir. GOVERNMENT v. MONOHUR DEO.
 KUSTOORA KOOMAREE v. MONOHUR DEO

W. R. 1864, 39

COURT OF WARDS—*contd.*

4. ——— Appeal by ward of Court
 of Wards—*Order in execution of decree.* A widow
 under the Court of Wards cannot, in the summary
 department, appeal from an order passed by the
 Judge in execution of a decree assented to by the
 Court of Wards. KUSTOORA KOOMAREE v. BINODE-
 RAM SEIN . . . 4 W. R. Mis. 5

5. ——— Liability of Court of Wards
 for personal debts of committee. The obliga-
 tion of the Collector on behalf of the Court of
 Wards properly to manage the estate of a lunatic
 does not include liability for his personal debts.
 REAZOODEN v. COLLECTOR OF CUTTACK

10 W. R. 175

6. ——— Act of Court of Wards in
 paying Government revenue to save estate.

—*Admission.* Where the Court of Wards, in
 order to save a minor's estate from sale, pays on
 his behalf not only his own share of the revenue
 due to Government, but also all that is not paid
 by the other share-holders, such payment does
 not constitute an admission on the part of the
 Court of Wards of the minor's liability for the
 excess revenue so paid. RAM RUNJUN CHUCKER-
 BUTTY v. BANEE MADHUB MOOKERJEE

21 W. R. 253

7. ——— Power of Court of Wards—
*Beng. Reg. X of 1793, s. 10—Remuneration to
 manager, Determination of.* The Courts of Wards
 has authority, under s. 10, Regulation, X of 1793,
 to determine the proper remuneration to be given
 to the manager of an estate under their charge,
 and the Civil Courts have no power to question
 the arrangements made by the Court of Wards.
 SHURUT SOONDERY DEBIA v. COLLECTOR OF
 MYMENSINGH . . . 7 W. R. 221

8. ——— Minor under Court of Wards
 —*Beng. Reg. X of 1793, s. 33—Power to adopt—
 Beng. Reg. XXVI of 1793, s. 2. Semble:* The
 operation of s. 33, Regulation X of 1793, which
 read together with s. 2, Regulation XXVI of 1793,
 prohibits a landholder under the age of eighteen
 from making an adoption without the consent of
 the Court of Wards, is confined to persons who
 are under the guardianship of the Court of Wards.
 JUMOONA DASSYA v. BAMASUNDARI DASSYA

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 289

25 W. R. 235

L. R. 3 I. A. 72

9. ——— Ward under Court of Wards
 —*How far incapacitated from contracting—Beng.
 Reg. X of 1793—Court of Wards Act (Beng. Act
 IX of 1879)—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 11.* On
 a reasonable construction of the whole of Regula-
 tion X of 1793, a ward of Court, duly constituted
 as such, is not thereby absolutely incapacitated
 from contracting, but the power of the ward to
 contract is taken away so far as regards all property
 which, under the provisions of the law, comes under
 the charge and control of the Court of Wards.
 The view taken by the Courts of the Regulation
 and Acts concerned with the Courts of Wards

COURT OF WARDS—*contd.*

in Bengal is, that although the possession of a revenue-paying property is a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the Court of Wards attaching, yet when once that jurisdiction has attached, all the property of the ward comes under the control and management of the Court. *Mahomed Zahoor Ali Khan v. Rutta Koer*, 11 Moo. I. A. 478, considered. *DHUNPUT SINGH v. SHOOBHUDRA KUMARI* I. L. R. 8 Calc. 620 : 11 C. L. R. 285

10. *Disqualification to contract—Beng. Reg. LII of 1803.* On a consideration of the provisions of Regulation LII of 1803 (the provisions of Regulation X of 1793 are similar), it was held that the mere fact that the Court of Wards has charge of the estates of a female did not necessarily disqualify her from contracting debts. That Regulation must be construed strictly, the provisions requiring the Collector to report to the Board a female as disqualified, and the subsequent procedure thereon should be strictly carried out, as not mere matters of form, but necessary preliminaries, before the female can be considered disqualified. From the absence of the observance of those provisions in the case of *R A*, and the conduct of the Government officials representing the Court of Wards, the custody of the Court of Wards of her estates was held to be of such a character as did not render her a disqualified female incapable of contracting debts. The case having been framed incorrectly, it was, under the circumstances, remanded for trial by the High Court under special directions. *MAHOMED ZAHOOOR ALI KHAN RUTTA KOOR*

9 W. R. P. C. 9 : 11 Moo. I A. 478

11. *Beng. Reg. LII of 1803—Incompetency of disqualified proprietor to contract.* Under s. 7 of Regulation LII of 1803, lakhiraj lands belonging to a disqualified proprietor may be committed by the Government (on its appearing that this will be for its interests and those of such proprietor) to the charge of the Court of Wards; and thereupon the whole estate and effects, real and personal, of such proprietor become vested in that Court. An estate consisting of lakhiraj lands was duly placed under the management of the Court of Wards, the proprietress, a Mahomedan, being disqualified under the Regulation. This ward having then become a party to a mortgage of such lands to secure repayment of money advanced to her, it was held that she neither bound herself nor charged the estate. This case distinguished from *Mahomed Zahoor Ali Khan v. Rutta Koer*, 11 Moo. I. A. 478, where the proprietress, no intention to treat her as disqualified having been shown, was adjudged capable of contracting, though the Court of Wards was in possession of her estate. On the facts of this case it was also held that, although the Court had given to this ward an authority, under certain limitations of which the plaintiff had notice, to borrow money for a special purpose, there had not been such a holding out to the world of her

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competency as would have induced any reasonable person to suppose that she had power to make the contract on which this suit was brought.

BALKRISHNA v. MASUMA BIBI

I. L. R. 5 All. 142 : L. R. 9 I. A. 182
13 C. L. R. 232

12. *Beng. Reg. LII of 1803, s. 37—Disqualified proprietor—Necessity of following procedure preliminary to taking estate under the Court of Wards.* The procedure prescribed by regulation No. LII of 1803 for disqualifying proprietors and taking their estates under the Court of Wards must be strictly followed in order that the disabilities incident to the status of a disqualified proprietor may ensue. *Mahomed Zahoor Ali Khan v. Rutta Koer*, 11 Moo. I. A. 478, referred to. It is incumbent, therefore, upon one seeking to dispute an adoption on the ground that the person making it was a "disqualified proprietor" to show that all the procedure necessary to make such person a disqualified proprietor was carried out according to law. *ISHRI PRASAD SINGH v. LALLI JAS KUNWAR*

I. L. R. 22 All. 294

13. "Person." The Court of Wards is not a "person" and letters of administration cannot under the law be granted to it. *GANJESSAR KOER v. COLLECTOR OF PATNA*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 795

14. *Act XL of 1858, s. 7—"Person."* The Court of Wards is not "a person" within the meaning of s. 7, Act XL of 1858, and is not entitled to administer to an estate by virtue of a will or deed executed by a private person. *ROWSHUN JEHUN v. COLLECTOR OF PURNEAH*

14 W. R. 295

15. *Certificate of administration—Act XL of 1858.* The Court of Wards is not prevented by Act XL of 1858 from taking an infant and his estate under its protection by reason of a certificate of administration to the estate having been granted by the Civil Court. The Court of Wards has a right to assume charge of the estate, although originally it may have refrained from acting. *MADHUSUDAN SINGH v. COLLECTOR OF MIDNAPORE*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 199 : 3 W. R. 82

16. *Act XL of 1858, s. 14—Guardianship of minor proprietors.* Under s. 14, Act XL of 1858, an estate ceases to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Wards when any of the co-proprietors attain majority; but the Judge may, on the representation of the Collector, direct him to retain charge of the persons and shares of the still disqualified proprietors during the continuance of their disqualification, or until such time as it is otherwise ordered. *SUFFER-oonissa Beebee v. GHOLAM HOSSEIN CHOWDHRY*

W. R. 1864, Mis. 2

17. Release of property from superintendence of Collector—North-West

COURT OF WARDS—*contd.*

Provinces Land Revenue Acts, XIX of 1873, ss. 194-195; and VIII of 1879, s. 20—Disqualified proprietor. *M*, a female proprietor, brought a suit to recover possession of certain lands, which were in the hands of the Collector, as manager of the Court of Wards, on the allegations that she had placed the property in the hands of the Court some years previously, because she was not at that time in a position to manage it herself, but that she was now capable of managing it, and desired to get it back. The suit was dismissed, and the plaintiff appealed on the ground, *inter alia*, that inasmuch as she was not a "disqualified proprietor" within the meaning of Act, XIX of 1873 (North-West Provinces Land Revenue Act) the Court of Wards had no jurisdiction to take the property, and that its possession was merely the result of an arrangement to which she was a consenting party, and which she now desired to terminate. *Held*, that, with reference to the provisions of Act XIX of 1873 and Act VII of 1879 (North-West Provinces Land Revenue Acts), the suit as brought was not maintainable, inasmuch as there was no evidence that the plaintiff had obtained the previous sanction of the Local Government to the release of the property from the superintendence of the Court of Wards, as required by s. 20 of the latter Act. *Held*, also, that the plaintiff could not be allowed in appeal entirely to change the nature of the grounds upon which she alleged herself to be entitled to claim relief, and that hence she could not now raise the plea that the Court of Wards, in taking the property under its management, had acted without jurisdiction. The expression "local Government" in ss. 194 and 195 of Act XIX of 1873, and s. 20 of Act VIII of 1879, means the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces. *MASUMA BIBI v. COLLECTOR OF BALLIA* I. L. R. 7 All. 687

18. ——— *Beng. Act IV of 1870—Death of minor—Right of suit.* *Held*, with reference as well to s. 79, Bengal Act IV of 1870, as to the justice and equity of the case, that the power of the Court of Wards to represent the estate or bring a suit on behalf of a minor does not cease with the death of the minor. *SOOMUNGUL KOOR v. COURT OF WARDS* 17 W. R. 560

19. ——— *Minor—Irrregular procedure.* On 27th July 1871, a disqualified proprietor, *B*, signed a duly attested document declaring he had adopted a boy, by name *D*, the next heir *R* signing a declaration of his approval of the adoption. Before sanction of the Lieutenant-Governor could be obtained under Bengal Act IV of 1870, s. 74, *B* died, and the sanction was subsequently refused on the ground of *B*'s death. On application made under Act XXVII of 1860, the Judge, on 28th March 1872, found the adoption good and appointed one *P* to be guardian of the minor *D*, and directed the estate to be placed under the management of the Court of Wards. *M*, a judgment-creditor of *R*'s, failing to execute his decree against the estate of *B*, brought a suit to have it declared

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that *R*, as heir, had inherited all *B*'s property, and that he, *M*, was entitled to have the property attached and sold in satisfaction of his decree. The only defendants were *A H*, manager under the Court of Wards, and *R*. The Subordinate Judge gave plaintiff a decree, declaring that *D* was not the legally adopted son of *B*. This was appealed from. *Held*, that the Judge had no power to make any such order as that of the 28th March 1872 in regard to the Court of Wards. What he had power to do under Act XL of 1858, s. 12, was to direct the Collector to take charge of the estate, and it would then have become the duty of the Collector to appoint a manager and a guardian in the same manner, etc., as if the minor's property and person were subject to the Court of Wards. *Held*, that the minor's interest were not properly represented before the Subordinate Judge, whose decree, therefore, could not stand so as to affect the minor, and that the minor must be made a party strictly in the manner prescribed by Bengal Act IV of 1870, s. 69. *ABDOOL HYE v. MITTERJEET SINGH* 23 W. R. 348

20. ——— *Sale for arrears of rent—Power of Collector—Tenure created under Court of Wards—Previously existing tenure.* The provisions of s. 75 of Bengal Act IV of 1870 apply only to tenures created by the Collector during the time the estate has been in the hands of the Court of Wards, and not to tenures created previously. A Collector, therefore, has no power to sell for arrears of rent a tenure created before he took charge of the estate without previously obtaining a decree for such arrears in the regular way. *COLLECTOR OF CHITTAGONG v. KALA BIBI*

15 B. L. R. 343 : 24 W. R. 149

Upholding on appeal under Letters Patent the decision of *MARKBY, J.*, differing from *MITTER, J.*, in *KALA BIBEE v. COLLECTOR OF CHITTAGONG* 20 W. R. 362

21. ——— *Disqualified proprietor—Act XVII of 1876 (Oudh Land-revenue Act), Chap. VIII—Nature of disqualification imposed by proceedings taken under Chap. VIII—Domicile.* Where a person, who had been made a "disqualified proprietor" in Oudh under the provisions of Chap. VIII of Act XVII of 1876, attempted to sell a small portion of his property situated in the North-Western Provinces, which property had not been entered in any list of the property of the disqualified proprietor taken under the management of the Court of Wards, and had apparently escaped the notice of the Court of Wards: *Held*, that the disqualification imposed as a consequence of proceedings legally taken under Chap. VIII of the Oudh Land-revenue Act, 1876, was a personal disqualification, and extended to all dealings of the disqualified proprietor with any property, wheresoever situate; nor was this disability affected by the fact that this particular property had not been specifically taken over as part of the disqualified proprietor's estate by the Court of Wards.

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Sottomayor v. DeBarros, L. R. 3 P. D. 1; *In re Cooke's Trusts*, 56 L. J. Ch. 637; *Cooper v. Cooper*, L. R. 13 A. C. 88; and *Stuart v. Bute*, 9 H. L. C. 440, referred to. LACHMI NARAIN v. FATEH BAHADUR SINGH (1902)

I. L. R. 25 All. 195

22. ———— **Servants of—Prosecution of** servants of Court of Wards, by proprietor of estate, on assuming management. The owner of an estate on assuming management thereof, is competent to prosecute a servant of the Court of Wards for criminal breach of trust committed during the management of the estate by the Court. TARAK NATH NUNDY v. GOBINDA CHANDRA MITRA (1900) 5 C. W. N. 248

23. ———— **Discretion of—Power of Court of Wards to sell property under its superintendence.** The estate of a Mahomedan lady, named Hawa Begam, was at her own request taken under the superintendence of the Court of Wards under s. 194, cl. (g), of Act No. XIX of 1873. This was in 1896. In 1902 the Court of Wards sold a portion of Hawa Begam's property, as was alleged without her consent. *Held*, on suit by persons claiming title through Hawa Begam to recover the property so sold, that the Court of Wards was under the circumstances entitled to sell, even without the owner's consent, and that its discretion could not be questioned in any Civil Court. MOHSAN SHAH v. MAHBUB ILAHI (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 589

24. ———— **Trespass—Court of Wards, what state can be taken possession of by—“Proprietor,” meaning of—Infant beneficiary if proprietor, when estate vested in executrix—Residuary legatee, when estate vests in—Court of Wards Act (IX of 1879)—Notice of suit, when necessary—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 424—Injunction, suit for, if notice required for—Jurisdiction—Cause of action—Immoveable property within jurisdiction—Acquisition by executrix—Maladministration, who to determine—Trespass under order of higher official, who liable for—Power of Court of Wards to override wishes of testators—Possession, disturbance of—Remedy, injunction or ejectment action.** The Court of Wards can take possession only of an estate of a minor, if he can be said to be the proprietor thereof within the meaning of the Court of Wards Act and has no right to take over an estate from an executrix in whom the estate is vested in law, until the infant beneficiary becomes the proprietor. A residuary legatee does not become the “proprietor” of the estate until the administration has been completed and the residue ascertained and made over by the executrix to him. The Court of Wards Act was never intended to and the language thereof does not warrant the construction that it should have power to override private rights, such as the wishes of testators and proprietors generally in desiring and directing that their estate should vest in and be managed by an executor or in creating a trust *inter*

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vivos for the benefit of an infant. When public officers are sued not in their admitted official capacity but as individual trespassers, no notice under s. 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure is necessary. Even in a case where such a notice would be otherwise necessary, so far as the suit sought relief by an injunction to restrain the commission of an act, no notice under that section would be necessary. An acquisition by an executrix for an estate, out of the assets of the estate, is a part thereof, even if the acquisition has taken place after a declaration by the Court of Wards taking over the management of the estate. The High Court may entertain an action in respect of immoveable property, provided that a portion of such property is within the jurisdiction. Where, although but a portion of the estate regarding which certain declarations and injunctions are sought in an action, is within its jurisdiction, the High Court has power to grant the same declarations and injunction as regards the whole estate. Where there had been undoubted disturbance of plaintiff's possession some rents having been collected and appropriated by the defendant and the plaintiff's establishment directed to obey the order of the defendant, but no mutation of names having been effected, the rents had been collected and money orders cashed in the name of the plaintiff, and her establishment taken over by the defendant in the plaintiff's absence and without her consent, to which the plaintiff at once protested, and she also made certain collections on her own behalf. *Held*, that the possession of the estate had really remained in the plaintiff; and there had been a continuing trespass, for which the plaintiff was entitled to have an injunction and it was not necessary for her to institute an action in ejectment against the defendant. It is not for the Court of Wards to determine whether there has been maladministration of an estate by an executrix, and on its own determination, take possession thereof on behalf of an infant residuary legatee before the administration is complete. It is not essential that the defendants should all actually commit trespass to be liable to the plaintiff; a trespass committed by a subordinate officer under orders from the superior officers is in substance the act of them all and both the subordinate as well as the superior officers are liable to the plaintiff as trespassers. Hearing of rule *nisi* and suit. GANODA SUNDARI CHAUDHURANI v. NALINI RANJAN RAHA (1908)

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 28;
s.c. 12 C. W. N. 1065

COURT OF WARDS ACT (BENG. IX OF 1879).

See COURT OF WARDS.

See TRESPASS . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 28

1. ———— **Effect of claim preferred on behalf of a minor by the manager without the sanction of the Court of Wards.** An order which was passed during his minority is not binding upon a person whose estate is under the management of the

COURT OF WARDS ACT (BENG. IX OF 1879)—*contd.*

Court of Wards, if the proceeding in which it was passed was not instituted by the manager with the sanction of the Court of Wards, *i.e.*, of the Commissioner to whom the Court of Wards delegated its authority to grant such sanction. **RAM CHANDRA MUKERJEE v. RANJIT SINGH**

**I. L. R. 27 Calc. 242
4 C. W. N. 405**

2. *Bengal Act III of 1881, s. 7—Suit on behalf of ward by manager without sanction of the Court of Wards, effect of—Sanction after appeal, effect of.* In the absence of some order by the Court of Wards authorizing the bringing of a suit, a suit instituted by a manager on behalf of a ward must be dismissed. A suit was instituted in the Court of the First Subordinate Judge of Dacca on behalf of a ward by his manager without the order or sanction of the Court of Wards and proceeded to judgment without any such order or sanction. The suit was partially decreed; and the manager appealed to the District Judge for that portion of the claim which had been dismissed by the Court of first instance. At the hearing of the appeal, an application was filed on behalf of the appellant, accompanied by a letter giving sanction to the institution of the suit, the appeal and other proceedings connected therewith, with retrospective effect from the date of its institution. The Judge dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court. *Held*, having regard to s. 55 of the Court of Wards Act, 1879, as amended by s. 7 of Bengal Act III of 1881, the lower Appellate Court was right in dismissing the suit. *Held*, also, that the sanction given after appeal did not have a retrospective effect. **DINESH CHUNDER ROY v. GOLAM MOSTAPHA. DINESH CHUNDER ROY v. FAHAMIDUNNESSA BEGAM. DINESH CHUNDER ROY v. NISHI KANT GUNGOPADHAYA** . . . **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 89**

3. *Suit rejected when filed on behalf of a minor under the Court of Wards without sanction of that authority to proceed with it.* Where, under s. 55 of the Bengal Court of Wards Act (IX of 1879), the manager of an estate authorized the plaintiff, in order to save limitation, to institute a suit on behalf of the Court of Wards, which refused afterwards to sanction the proceeding with the suit:—*Held*, that the judge rightly ordered that the suit be rejected as incapable, under the above section, of being prosecuted. **BISESWAR ROY v. SHOSHI SIKARESWAR ROY** **I. L. R. 17 Calc. 688
I. R. 17 I. A. 5**

ss. 6, 7 and 10—Court of Wards—Revenue—Proprietor—Jurisdiction—Civil Court—Lunatic—Charge of the person and property of a person adjudged to be a lunatic—Act XXXV of 1858, ss. 9, 10, 11. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court under s. 10 of the Bengal Court of Wards Act (Bengal Act IX of 1879), to apply to the Court of Wards to take charge of the person and prop-

COURT OF WARDS ACT (BENG. IX OF 1879)—*contd.*

ss. 6, 7 and 10—*conclld.*

erty of a person who had been adjudged a lunatic under Act XXXV of 1858, and whose property consists of land or an interest in land, is not dependent upon the nature of the property, and is not restricted to property paying Government revenue. S. 6 does not profess to define the term "disqualified proprietors;" it defines the circumstances under which a certain class of persons, namely, the proprietors of land subject to Government revenue, shall be held to be disqualified from managing their own property. The section does not imply that the proprietors of other classes of property may not be similarly disqualified. **ss. 6, 7 and 10 of the Bengal Court of Wards Act (Bengal Act IX of 1879) and ss. 9, 10 and 11 of Act XXXV of 1858, discussed and explained.** **MUKUND KOERI v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF CHOTA NAGPUR (1902)**
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 688 : s.c. 7 C. W. N. 20

ss. 6, 27, 35—Court of Wards, power of, to take over a minor estate—Right of Court of Wards to sue on bonds executed in favour of executor—Minority. A died leaving a minor son. By a will the appointed defendant No. 2 executrix to his estate and directed that she should remain in charge of the property during the minority of his son. After the executrix had taken out probate of the will, the Court of Wards took over the estate from her. A suit was brought by the manager under the Court of Wards on behalf of the minor, upon a mortgage bond executed by defendant No. 1, in favour of the defendant No. 2, the executrix. Upon an objection being taken that the Court of Wards could not take over the estate of the minor, and that it had no right to sue: *Held*, that the Court of Wards had full authority to act under the provisions of ss. 6, 27 and 35 of the Court of Wards Act and to take possession of the property as guardian of the minor, and a manager under the Court was competent to institute the suit. **TARAN SINGH HAZARI v. RAMRATAN TEWARI (1904)**
I. L. R. 31 Calc. 89

ss. 14, 39—Manager—Lease granted or renewed by manager—Presumption. A lease granted by a manager under the Court of Wards cannot be held to be void on the ground that there is no evidence to show that he had granted it under the orders of the Court. *Held* by **RAMPINI, J.**, that under ss. 14 and 39 of the Court of Wards Act (Bengal Act IX of 1879), the manager had a *prima facie* right to grant the lease, and that it must be presumed that he had the sanction of the Collector under whose authority he must have acted. *Held* by **MOOKERJEE, J.**, that a lease granted by a manager without the orders of the Court is only voidable at the option of the ward, and a lease which in fact was necessary for the good management of the ward's property, is not vitiated merely by reason of the absence of the orders of the Court. **UMA CHURN MAHALDER v. NARENDRA NATH BASU (1906)** . . . **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 273
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 126**

COURT OF WARDS ACT (BENG. IX OF 1879)—concll.

ss. 14, 39, 40, 48, 49, 50.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—PRE-EMPTION.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 575

ss. 20 and ss. 51-55—"Suit"—
Application for execution by Collector on behalf of ward, when manager of ward's estate has been appointed. The word "suit" as used in ss. 51 to 55 of Bengal Act IX of 1879 is not limited to what is usually called a "regular suit," but covers miscellaneous proceedings in a suit, such as an application for execution of a decree in which the ward for the first time seeks to have the carriage of litigation instituted by his predecessor in title. When it appeared that a manager of a minor's property had been appointed by the Court of Wards under the provision of s. 20 of Bengal Act IX of 1879, and during the absence of such manager on leave an application was made on behalf of the minor by the Collector of the district for execution of a decree—*Held*, that the office of manager did not become vacant because the manager obtained leave, and that, if it were not vacant, s. 51 of the Act did not enable the Collector to appear on behalf of the minor. *BHOOPENDRO NARAIN DUTT v. BARODA PROSAD ROY CHOWDHRY* I. L. R. 18 Calc. 500

s. 55.

See MAJORITY ACT, s. 3.

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 944

COURT-SALE.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 310A.

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 575

Specific Performance—Issues—Discretion of Court—Delay—Laches—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 22—Purchase subject to subsisting equities—Right, title and interest of judgment-debtor. The plaintiff sued for specific performance of an agreement whereby the father of the first defendant and the husband of the second defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff 500 square yards of land forming part of a property consisting of a chawl and vacant land. The agreement was dated the 29th of June 1901, and the suit was filed on the 30th November 1903. The third defendant purchased the entire property at a Court sale in execution of a money-decree obtained by the creditors of the original vendor against his estate. He had notice of the plaintiff's claim. *Held*, that even if a purchaser at a Court sale purchases without notice, he can only buy what the Court could sell, i.e., the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor, as these existed at the date of the sale, and as these could have been honestly disposed of by the judgment-debtor himself. *Sobhagchand v. Bhaichand*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 193, followed. *PEER MAHOMED v. MAHOMED EBRAHIM* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 234

COURTS (COLONIAL) JURISDICTION ACT, 1874 (37 & 38 Vic., c. 27).

See OFFENCE COMMITTED ON THE HIGH

SEAS I. L. R. 21 Calc. 782

COUSINS.

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—SPECIAL HEIRS—MALES—COUSINS.

COVENANT.

See BUILDING LEASE.

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 528

See CONTRACT—CONDITIONS PRECEDENT.

3 Mad. 125

See LEASE I. L. R. 36 Calc. 271

See REGISTRAR OF HIGH COURT.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 330

breach of—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—FORFEITURE

—BREACH OF CONDITIONS.

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 49.

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 273

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—BREACH OF COVENANT.

construction of—

See PERSONAL COVENANT.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 672

for renewal of lease.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

13 C. W. N. 595

in restraint of trade.

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 27.

in restraint of alienation—

See LEASE I. L. R. 36 Calc. 745

not to alienate—

See MORTGAGE—FORM OF MORTGAGE.

Transfer of property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 55, 59—What amounts to a "contract to the contrary" within the meaning of section—Contract Act—(IX of 1872), s. 20—Mistake does not prevent the party from claiming the protection of a special covenant—Want of attestation as laid down in s. 59 of the Transfer of Property Act will not bar the personal remedy. A, who had brought a suit to recover the amount due on a mortgage executed to him, assigned to B, for valuable consideration, all his claims under the mortgage deed and in the suit brought by A. The assignment contained a covenant that "A, his executors or administrators shall not be liable for any defect in the claim hereby transferred and assigned or for any sums of money that may not be recovered." Subsequent to the assignment, B was added as a co-plaintiff in the suit brought by A and it was discovered that the mortgage executed to A was inoperative as it was attested by only one witness and the suit was withdrawn. B filed a suit against A for a declaration that the contract of assignment was void and for a return of the consideration paid. *Held*, that A was entitled to claim the

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benefit of the covenant, which exempted him from any liability, even though both *A* and *B* acted under the mistaken belief that the mortgage was valid and that *A* was not bound to refund the consideration received. *Per* SIR ARNOLD WHITE, *C.J.*—The covenant is a "contract to the contrary" within the meaning of s. 55 of the Transfer of Property Act which will negative the statutory covenant of title under the section. *Per* SIR S. SUBRAHMANYA AYYAR, *J.*—Non-compliance with the rule laid down in s. 59 of the Transfer of Property Act as to attestation does not render the personal covenant void. *Madras Deposit and Benefit Society, Limited v. Oonnammalai Ammal* I. L. R. 18 Mad. 29, not approved. The existence of a separate warranty in a contract is evidence that the matter of the warranty is not a condition or essential part of contract a mistake, in regard to which will render the contract void under s. 20 of the Contract Act. *SADA KAVAUUR v. TADEPALLY BASAVIAH* (1906) I. L. R. 30 Mad. 284

COVENANT RUNNING WITH LAND.

See LEASE . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 675

1. ———— **Transfer of the land.** *S*, by an instrument in writing, duly registered, agreed, for valuable consideration, for himself, his heirs and successors, to pay his wife, *A*, a certain sum monthly out of the income of certain land, and not to alienate such land without stipulating for the payment of such allowance out of its income. He subsequently gave *L* a usufructuary mortgage of the land subject to the payment of the allowance. *L* gave *R* a sub-mortgage of the land agreeing orally with *R* to continue the payment of the allowance himself. *Held*, in a suit by *A* against *L* and *R* for the arrears of the allowance, that *A* was not affected by an agreement between *L* and *R* as to the payment of the allowance, and *R* being in possession of the land was bound to pay the allowance. *ABADI BEGAM v. ASA RAM* . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 162

2. ———— **Malikana—Heritable charge—**
Suit for arrears of malikana allowance—Bond fide transferee without notice—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 3. *S* sold a share in immoveable property to *M* by a registered deed of sale which contained the following provisions:—"The said vendee is at liberty either to retain possession himself or to sell it to some one else; and he is to pay R25 of the Queen's coin to me annually (as malikana) which he has agreed to pay." *M* mortgaged the property to *B*, who obtained possession and, after the mortgage, the annual payments provided by for the deed of sale ceased. The representatives of the vendor sued *M* and *B* to recover arrears of malikana. *Held*, without expressing any opinion as to whether registration of the deed of sale operated as notice to all the world, or whether notice of the terms of the deed was necessary to bind *B* and assuming *B* to have had no such notice in fact, that if he had searched the register, he would have ascertained

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those terms, and if he did not search the register, he must have wilfully abstained from so doing, or was guilty of gross negligence in not so doing; that in either case he could not be treated as a *bond fide* mortgagee without notice; and that, being in receipt of the profits of the property, he was liable for the annual payment of the R25 from the date when he took possession as mortgagee. *Agra Bank v. Barry*, L. R. 7 H. L. 135, and *Pilcher v. Rawlins*, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 259, distinguished. *Abadi Begam v. Asa Ram*, I. L. R. 2 All. 162, referred to. The definition of the word "notice" in s. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) correctly codifies the law as to notice which existed prior to the passing of the Act. *CHURAMAN v. BALLI*

I. L. R. 9 All. 591

COVENANT TO RENEW.

——— **Settlement—Amalnama.** *A*, a zamindar, entered into negotiations with Government for settlement of certain lands. Pending the settlement, *A* sublet to *B* and granted him an amalnama for one year, and covenanted therein that whatever term of settlement he might obtain from Government, he would grant to *B* a pottah for the corresponding term. The negotiations with *A* were broken off, and Government settled with *C* on condition that he should abide by the above amalnama. *Held*, that *C* was bound by the covenant to renew; the amalnama did not require to be registered. *RADIKA PRASAD CHUNDER v. RAMSUNDER KUR* . . . 1 B. L. R. A. C. 7

COVERTURE, PLEA OF.

See APPELLATE COURT—OBJECTIONS
TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—
SPECIAL CASES

1 N. W. Ed. 1873, 243

See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

8 B. L. R. 372

CO-WIDOWS.

See HINDU LAW—ADOPTION—WHO MAY
OR MAY NOT ADOPT.

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 160

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 416

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 250, 327

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—SPECIAL
HEIRS—FEMALES—WIDOW.

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 290

L. R. 4 I. A. 212

1 Bom. 66

3 Mad. 263, 424

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 59

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 194

I. L. R. 7 All. 114

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 333; 431

CO. WIDOWS—concl'd.

See HINDU LAW—PARTITION—RIGHT TO PARTITION—WIDOW.

- I. L. R. 1 Mad. 290
- L. R. 4 I. A. 212
- I. L. R. 2 Mad. 194
- 3 Mad. 424
- 6 B. L. R. 134
- I. L. R. 12 All. 51
- L. R. 16 I. A. 186
- L. R. 22 Mad. 522
- I. L. R. 31 Bom. 560

See HINDU LAW—WIDOW—POWER OF DISPOSITION—ALIENATION.

- I. L. R. 9 Calc. 580
- I. L. R. 16 Mad. 1
- L. R. 19 I. A. 184
- I. L. R. 22 Mad. 522
- I. L. R. 31 Bom. 560

COWRIE.

- See* GAMBLING . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 23
 I. L. R. 19 All. 311
 I. L. R. 25 Calc. 432
 5 C. W. N. 503

COWS.

— slaughter of —

See PUBLIC NUISANCE.

- I. L. R. 30 All. 181

CRABS.

See PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 881

CREATION OF ENDOWMENT.

See HINDU LAW—ENDOWMENT.

- I. L. R. 36 Calc. 1003

CREDITOR.

- See* ADMINISTRATION . . . 9 C. W. N. 167
See BENAMIDAR . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 551
See COMPANY . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 106
 I. L. R. 27 Mad. 496

See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

See EXECUTRIX I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1100

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—DEBTS.

See MORTGAGE . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1051

See PROBATE—OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF, GRANT.

- I. L. R. 2 Calc. 208
- I. L. R. 6 Calc. 429; 460
- I. L. R. 10 Calc. 19, 413
- L. R. 10 I. A. 80
- I. L. R. 17 Mad. 273
- I. L. R. 19 Calc. 48

See RECEIVER . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1175

— joint—

See RIGHT OF SUIT . . . 13 C. W. N. 509

See TRUST ACT (II OF 1882).

- I. L. R. 31 Mad. 97

CREDITOR—concl'd.

— joint—concl'd.

See TRUST PROPERTY.

- I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1084

See WAKFNAMA . . . 10 C. W. N. 560

— not included in Schedule, petition by—

See INSOLVENCY . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 512

— removal by, of debtor's property.

See THEFT.

- I. L. R. 22 Calc. 669; 1017

- I. L. R. 18 All. 88

— suit by—

See ADMINISTRATION . . . 14 B. L. R. 296

- I. L. R. 10 Calc. 731

See RECEIVER . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 937

See REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PERSON.

CREMATION.

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 425

- 2 C. W. N. 113

See NUISANCE—PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER PENAL CODE . . . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 464

CRIMINAL APPEAL.

See PRACTICE . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 178

CRIMINAL BREACH OF CONTRACT.

See ACT XIII OF 1859.

See CONTRACT . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 96

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN ONE DISTRICT—CRIMINAL BREACH OF

- CONTRACT . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 354
- I. L. R. 10 Mad. 21

See WORKMEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT ACT.

1. ——— Penal Code, s. 490—*Contract of service to convey indigo to the vats.* An agreement for personal service in conveying indigo from the field to the vats is not a contract the breach of which is punishable by s. 490 of the Penal Code. *Re NOWA TEWAREE* . . . 6 W. R. Cr. 80

2. ——— *Offences against travellers. Quære:* Whether the words "during a voyage or journey" in s. 490 of the Penal Code do not limit the offences made under that section to offences against travellers. That section, however, does not apply to a contract to place the defendant's carts at the complainant's disposal for a specified time to convey a thing from where he pleases to where he pleases. *SAGE v. NIRUNJUN CHATTERJEE* . . . 9 W. R. Cr. 12

CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.

- See ACT XIII OF 1859.
 See ABETMENT . 4 C. W. N. 309
 See BANKERS . I. L. R. 16 All. 58
 See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.
 8 Bom. Cr. 115
 I. L. R. 17 All. 153
 I. L. R. 18 All. 116
 I. L. R. 24 Calc. 193
 See COMPOUNDING OFFENCE.
 I. L. R. 1 Mad. 191
 6 C. L. R. 392
 See CONTRACT . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 54
 See CORONER, CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST, JURY, PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATE.
 I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1, 142, 925
 983, 1007, 1058
 See COURT OF WARDS . 5 C. W. N. 248
 See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 234.
 I. L. R. 27 All. 69
 See EXTORTION—WRONGFUL RESTRAINT TRANSFER.
 I. L. R. 31 Calc. 691, 710, 715
 See GOOD BEHAVIOUR, SECURITY FOR.
 I. L. R. 31 Calc. 783
 See JOINDER OF CHARGES.
 I. L. R. 24 All. 254
 See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—GENERAL JURISDICTION.
 I. L. R. 1 Mad. 55
 I. L. R. 31 Calc. 685
 See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN ONE DISTRICT—CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 147
 I. L. R. 19 All. 111
 See PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.
 6 B. L. R. Ap. 133
 13 B. L. R. 310 note : 15 W. R. Cr. 51
 13 B. L. R. 307 : 21 W. R. Cr. 58
 13 B. L. R. 308 note : 21 W. R. Cr. 10
 See PENAL CODE, ss. 405—409.
 See PENAL CODE (ACT No. XLV OF 1860), ss. 62, 406 . I. L. R. 29 All. 25
 See PENAL CODE, s. 405.
 I. L. R. 27 All. 28, 260
 See PUBLIC NUISANCE.
 I. L. R. 31 Calc. 979
 See PUBLIC SERVANT, ORDER BY.
 I. L. R. 31 Calc. 870
 See REPLY, PROSECUTOR'S RIGHT OF.
 I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1050
 See SANCTION.
 I. L. R. 31 Calc. 664, 685, 783
 811, 979, 990, 1050
 See THEFT . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 758

CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST—contd.

- See VERDICT OF JURY—POWER TO INTERFERE WITH VERDICTS.
 I. L. R. 19 Bom. 749
 See WORKMEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT ACT.
 1. ———— Act XIII of 1859—*Furnishing false accounts.* Where there is no provision in the Penal Code and any other law (such as the Breach of Trust Law, Act XIII of 1859) provides punishment for an offence, any person committing such offence may be tried under that law. *WATSON & Co. v. BYKANTNATH DASS* . . . 14 W. R. Cr. 80
 2. ———— *Requisites for offence.* To constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust, there must be dishonest misappropriation by a person in whom confidence is placed as to the custody or management of the property in respect of which the breach of trust is charged. *ISSUR CHUNDER GHOSH v. PEARI MOHUN PALIT* . . . 16 W. R. Cr. 39
 3. ———— *Immoveable property—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 403 and 405.* The property referred to in s. 403 of the Penal Code is, as in s. 403, moveable property, and criminal breach of trust cannot be committed in respect of immoveable property. *Reg. v. Girdhar Dharamdas*, 6 Bom. H. C. Cr. 33, followed. *JUGDOWN SINHA v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 372
 4. ———— *Pledging of articles already in possession of pledgee by way of pledge.* A person who pledges what is pledged to him may be guilty of criminal breach of trust. There are two elements—(i) the disposal, in violation of any direction of law or contract, express or implied, prescribing the mode in which the trust ought to be discharged; (ii) such disposing dishonestly. ANONYMOUS . . . 6 Mad. Ap. 28
 5. ———— *Pledgee of turban using it—Dishonesty.* The pledgee of a turban cannot be convicted of criminal breach of trust for wearing it, there being no dishonesty in the Act. Meaning of the word "dishonesty" in the Penal Code. ANONYMOUS . . . 3 Mad. Ap. 6
 6. ———— *Misappropriation of pay of thanna police—Penal Code, ss. 405, 409.* A constable who dishonestly misappropriates to his own use the pay of his thanna police entrusted to him is guilty of criminal breach of trust. *QUEEN v. SUBDAR MEEAH* . . . 3 W. R. Cr. 44
 7. ———— *Refusal to give up land mortgaged—Denial of mortgage—Penal Code, s. 305.* A refusal to give up land alleged to have been mortgaged, the mortgage being denied, cannot be treated as a dishonest misappropriation of the documents of title amounting to a criminal breach of trust under s. 405 of the Penal Code. *Reg. v. JAFFER NAIK* . . . 2 Bom. 133 : 2nd Ed. 127
 8. ———— *Fraud by mortgagor in respect of mortgaged property.* If a mortgagor in possession who is entrusted with the dominion

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over the mortgaged property by the mortgagee (the mortgage being in the English form) wilfully defaults and causes the property to be sold for arrears of Government revenue, for the purpose of defrauding the mortgagee, and purchases it benami, he is liable to be punished for criminal misappropriation under s. 405 of the Penal Code. *RAM MANICK SHAH v. BRINDABUN CHUNDER POTDAR* **5 W. R. 230**

9. ———— **Cheating—Penal Code, ss. 405, 417.** Where silver was entrusted to the prisoner for the purpose of making ornaments and he introduced copper into the ornaments:—*Held*, that the offence committed was not cheating, but criminal breach of trust. *REG. v. BABAJI BIN BHAI* **4 Bom. Cr. 16**

10. ———— **Intention to cause wrongful gain or loss—Penal Code, ss. 405, 406—Cattle Trespass Act (I of 1871), s. 19.** The accused was sub-inspector of police at the thana of Dunyar. A pony was brought to the pound at the police station and confined there under Act I of 1871. The books kept at the station showed that the pony had been sold by auction under the Act and purchased by one Gopinath. After some time the pony had eventually been purchased by the accused from a vendor from Gopinath. The Magistrate found on the evidence that there had been no sale under Act I of 1871, and convicted the accused of criminal breach of trust, and sentenced him under s. 406 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the conviction was illegal. There must be an entrusting of the accused with the property, and that he dishonestly misappropriated it; there must be an intention on the part of the accused to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss. *QUEEN v. RAJ KRISHNA BISWAS* **8 B. L. R. Ap. 1**

s.c. In re RAM KISTO BISWAS

16 W. R. Cr. 52

11. ———— **Failure to account—Penal Code, ss. 406, 407, 408.** The prisoner, a gomastah, took from his employers, between 15th April and 30th June, sums amounting to Rs 600, for the purchase of wood. During that period he supplied wood to the value of Rs 234, but the prosecutor alleged that most of that was to be set off against balance to the debit of the prisoner for the year before, and that the value of the firewood was, as a fact, only Rs 34. The prisoner was charged with criminal breach of trust as a servant. The defence was that he had purchased wood and made advances, on that account; but this defence was proved to be false. The Magistrate convicted him, but the Judge held it was merely a failure to account, and acquitted the prisoner. *Held*, that the prisoner was guilty of criminal breach of trust. *WATSON v. GOLAB KHAN* **1 B. L. R. S. N. 21 : 10 W. R. Cr. 28**

12. ———— **Penal Code, s. 405.** Where a complaint only amounted to a statement that the accused had, in consequence of certain arrange-

CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST—contd..

ments made with the complainant's father, received certain moneys and had refused to render accounts, but contained no allegation that he had, in fact, realized and dishonestly misappropriated any particular sum, and obviously was made for the purpose of forcing him to render accounts:—*Held*, that the Magistrate was right in dismissing it, since the facts alleged did not constitute criminal breach of trust. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MURPHY* **I. L. R. 9 All. 686**

13. ———— **Partner—Master and Servant.** The accused was convicted of criminal breach of trust in respect of the value of goods which had been entrusted to him to sell. It was urged before the High Court that the conviction would not be sustained as the accused was a partner with the prosecutor: *Held* by JACKSON, J., that the finding of the Magistrate and Sessions Judge on the evidence was to the effect that the prisoner was not a partner, but a servant; that such finding could not be interfered with by the High Court as a Court of revision, unless there was a mistake in law; that the finding was correct in law; that the defence of the prisoner could not be taken to mean to say that he was a partner, but merely that he claimed a small share in the profits, and that such claim did not make him a partner, an agent's remuneration being a share in the profits not constituting the agent a partner. *Held* by KEMP and MITTER, JJ. (releasing the prisoner), that, though the allowance of a portion of the profits or goods does not destroy the relation of master and servant, the accused in this case distinctly pleaded he was a partner, and not only that he was entitled to a share in the profits; that the lower Courts did not specifically decide that the accused was a servant; and that the prosecutor's remedy was a civil suit for an account. *In the matter of LALL CHAND ROY* **9 W. R. Cr. 37**

14. ———— **Public servant—Penal Code s. 409.** A village shroff whose duty it was to assist in collecting the public revenue received grain from raiyats and gave receipts as if for money received by virtue of a private arrangement. *Held*, that he could not be convicted of criminal breach of trust by a public servant under s. 409 of the Penal Code, as he was not authorized to receive the public revenue in kind, and the party who delivered the grain did not thereby discharge himself from liability for the revenue. *ANONYMOUS* **4 Mad. Ap. 32**

15. ———— **Penal Code, s. 409—Naib Nazir.** The Naib Nazir is a 'public servant' within the meaning of s. 409 of the Penal Code, and not the mere private servant of the Nazir. *QUEEN v. MAHMOOD HOSSEIN* **2 N. W. 298**

16. ———— **Penal Code, ss. 408, 409—Sentence, mitigation of.** Where a Court inspector improperly delegated to a constable the custody, etc., of Government moneys (taking from him private security to save himself from loss in case of defalcation), and the constable dis-

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honestly converted the money to his own use, although he afterwards restored it, the case was held to fall under s. 408, and not s. 409, of the Penal Code, and the sentence reduced from ten years' transportation and a fine of Rs 500 to one year's rigorous imprisonment without fine. *QUEEN v. BANEJ MADHOB GHOSE*

8 W. R. Cr. 1

17. ————— *Penal Code*, s. 409. To constitute an offence under s. 409, it is not necessary that the property should be that of Government, but that it should have been entrusted to a public servant in that capacity. *In the matter of RAM SOONDER PODDAR.*

2 C. L. R. 515

18. ————— *Penal Code*, s. 409—*Absence of dishonest intention.* Where the accused in his capacity of revenue patel received from the Government treasury small sums of money on account of certain temple allowances, and did not at once pay over the same to the persons entitled to receive them, as he was bound to do, but it appeared that such persons were willing to trust him, and had actually passed receipts which the accused forwarded to the revenue authorities:—*Held*, that the accused fulfilled the trust reposed in him by Government, and that his mere retention of the money for a time, in the absence of any evidence of dishonesty, did not amount to criminal breach of trust within the meaning of s. 409 of the Penal Code (XLV of 1860). *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GANPAT TAPIDAS*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 256

19. ————— *Master and Servant—Servant entrusted with moneys for payment to tradesman of account settled with master for a specific sum—Gratuity of tradesman to servant—Right of master to benefit of gratuity—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 405, 409.* When a master entrusts his servant with money for the payment of an open account, i.e., an account of which the items have never been checked or settled, and the tradesman makes the servant a present, and the transaction amounts to a taxation of the bill and a reduction of the price by the servant, the latter obtains the reduction for his master's benefit, the money in his hands always remains the master's property, and, if he appropriates it, he commits criminal breach of trust. But where the master himself has settled the account with the tradesman for a specific sum, and sends the servant with money, and the servant, after making the payment, accepts a present from the tradesman, in that case the servant does not commit criminal breach of trust, inasmuch as the money is given to him by a person whom he believes to have a right to give it, though it may be that, according to the strict equitable doctrines of the Court of Chancery, he is bound to account to the master for the money. *Hay's Case, In re Canadian Oil Works Corporation, L. R. 10 Ch. App. 593*, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. IMDAD KHAN*

I. L. R. 8 All. 120

20. ————— *Penal Code*, s. 408—*Criminal breach of trust by a servant—Crim-*

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iminal misappropriation. An accused person who was in the service of zamindars, and whose duty it was to pay into the Collectorate Government revenue due in respect of their estates, immediately before the due date of a kist received from them a certain sum of money with no specific instruction as to its application. On receipt of that money, he paid a portion only of it into the Collectorate on account of the revenue, and having done so, he then altered the challan given back to him showing the amount actually paid, and made it appear that a much larger amount had been paid in than was the fact. This challan he sent to his employer for the purpose of showing the application of the money. He was charged (amongst other offences) with criminal breach of trust as a servant (s. 408 of the Penal Code) in respect of the difference between the amount actually paid into the treasury and the amount shown to have been paid in by the altered challan. The accused was convicted on all the charges. It was contended that the charge under s. 408 was not sustainable, inasmuch as the money was not alleged to have been sent to the accused for the specific purpose of paying the Government revenue, and that the accounts between him and his employers had not been adjusted, and that it was not shown whether at the date of the alleged breach of trust the accused was indebted to his employer or the reverse. *Held*, that, as the money was sent to the accused immediately before the kist day, and the challan was sent to the employers showing, in its altered state, the amount really payable as revenue which nearly covered the whole amount remitted, it was reasonable to infer that the accused was aware of the implied purpose for which the money was remitted, and as he deposited a very much smaller amount than that remitted, and tried to pass off the altered challan as genuine, there was a dishonest misappropriation of the difference sufficient to constitute the offence under s. 408. *LOHR MOHAN SARKAR v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 22 Cal. 313

21. ————— *Penal Code*, s. 409—*Rice condemned and ordered to be destroyed—Property according to the Penal Code—Sale of the same by municipal inspector.* A certain consignment of rice lay unclaimed at the Kidderpore Docks, and was advertised for sale by auction by the Port Commissioners. Before it was put up to auction, the rice was found to be in a rotten condition. It was condemned, and with the consent of the Port Commissioners seized by the officers of the Health Department of the Corporation of Calcutta, and ordered to be destroyed. *Held*, that, assuming that the rice was entrusted by the Superintendent of the Health Department to the accused (who were inspectors employed in that department) for the purpose of destruction, and that the accused, instead of destroying the rice, sold the same to a third party and retained the proceeds of such sale, they did not commit the offence of criminal breach of trust as public servants. *Semb'e*: The accused,

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committed no offence punishable under the Penal Code, though they may have been guilty of infringing a departmental rule. *EMPRESS v. WILKINSON* 2 C. W. N. 216

22. ——— **Claim for money—Refusal to pay to a person money claimed by another—False claim—Suit brought by person claiming—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 406.** An accused person should not be convicted of criminal breach of trust on refusing to give to the complainant money, which is claimed by another person as well as by the complainant, and which the accused denies is due to the complainant. The fact that that other person has brought a suit to recover the amount claimed by him against the accused is a complete answer to the charge of criminal breach of trust against the accused, and to the findings of the Courts that the claim made by that other person was a false claim. *RAJ KISHORE PATER v. JOY KRISHNA SEN* (1900) . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 362

23. ——— **Servant—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 405, 408, 109, 23, 24—Criminal breach of trust by a servant—Dishonest user of property—Deterioration in value, appreciable and substantial—Wrongful gain or wrongful loss—Dominion over property—Contract, implied, violation—Abetment—Advantage gained by accused.** Where a person entrusted another with some blocks of wood-engraving to print his catalogue, and that other person used the blocks, or allowed other persons to use the blocks, to print a rival firm's catalogue: *Held*, that such dealing with the blocks was a violation of an implied contract, and caused wrongful gain to the accused, for he obtained a catalogue at a less expense, and wrongful loss to the owner, inasmuch as his property deteriorated in value, and therefore constituted criminal breach of trust. A user of property comes within the definition of the offence when such user causes substantial or appreciable loss to the owner of the property or gain to the accused. *High Court Proceedings, 18th September 1866, 3 Mad. H. C. App. 6*, distinguished. *KESHAB CHANDRA BORAL v. NITYANUND BISWAS* (1901) 6 C. W. N. 203

24. ——— **Criminal breach of trust by servant—Papers ordered to be destroyed—Property—Appropriation of papers by servant—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 95 and 408—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 432.** The accused, a servant, was ordered by his employers in Calcutta to take certain bags of papers and forms belonging to them to their yard in Garden Reach and there to burn and destroy them. Instead of doing this, the accused brought some of them to Bow Bazar in Calcutta. *Held*, that the act of the accused did not amount to criminal breach of trust under s. 408 of the Penal Code. *Empress v. Wilkinson*, 2 C. W. N., 216, followed. *Held*, also, that s. 95 of the Penal Code has no application, unless the act in question would amount to an offence under the Code but for the opera-

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tion of that section. *EMPEROR v. PREONATH CHOWDHRY* (1902) . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 489

25. ——— **Charge—Misjoinder of charges—Statement by accused—Confession—Admission—Evidence, admissibility of—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 164, 202, 222, 234, 364.** An accused was tried for criminal breach of trust in respect of three distinct sums, and one charge was drawn up specifying all the three sums and the persons from whom he collected them. He was not charged with three offences, but with one offence under s. 409 of the Penal Code, and was convicted of one offence and sentenced to one term of imprisonment:—*Held*, that the charge as framed was not contrary to law, it being in accordance with ss. 222, sub-s. (2), and 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Emperor v. Gultari Lall*, I. L. R., 24 All. 254; *Samiruddin Sarkar v. Nibaran Chandra Ghose*, I. L. R. 31 Calc. 928, and *Emperor v. Ishtiaq Ahmad*, I. L. R. 27 All. 69, referred to. *Subrahmanya Ayyar v. King-Emperor*, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 61, distinguished. An admission or confession made before a Magistrate carrying on an enquiry under s. 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not a statement recorded under s. 164 or 364 of the Code and is therefore not admissible in evidence against the accused without further proof. *SAT NARAIN TEWARI v. EMPEROR* (1905) I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1085

26. ——— **Dishonest conversion—Partnership—Liability of a partner to account for partnership money—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 406.** A partner is entitled to be called upon for an account of the expenditure of the money, which he has received, and it is open to him to spend the money received by him and to account for it in dealing with the partnership. Where it was not satisfactorily made out that this was not done, and could not be made out in the absence of a proper demand for accounts: *Held*, that there was no dishonest conversion, which would justify his conviction under s. 406 of the Penal Code. *DEBI PRASAD BHAGAT v. NAGAR MULL* (1908) . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1108

CRIMINAL CASE.

See ACT XIII OF 1859 I. L. R. 27 Calc. 131
4 C. W. N. 201

See INSOLVENT ACT, s. 50.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 605

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, CL. 15.

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 105

See WORKMEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT ACT.

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— disposal of property by—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODES, ss. 517, 523.

See STOLEN PROPERTY—DISPOSAL OF, BY THE COURT.

CRIMINAL COURT—concl'd.

— powers of—

See PRODUCTION OF PROPERTY.

7 C. W. N. 522

— proceedings in—

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—CRIMINAL COURT, PROCEEDINGS IN.

See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT
— CRIMINAL COURTS.

Jurisdiction — Deputy Magistrate—District Magistrate—Subordinate Court—Cognizance—Process. Where on a police report cognizance was taken by a Joint Magistrate (acting for the District Magistrate) of an offence alleged to have been committed by several persons, and the case was made over to a Deputy Magistrate for disposal, and the Deputy Magistrate tried and convicted some of the accused persons mentioned in the original complaint, and on his refusal to proceed against the rest of the accused, the Joint Magistrate ordered a summons to issue against them: *Held, per HENDERSON, J.*—The following propositions may be deduced from the authorities quoted: (i) That the order of the Deputy Magistrate refusing to issue process on the ground that it was unnecessary to take further action, amounted to a discharge; (ii) that the order making over the case to the Deputy Magistrate for disposal was an order making over the whole case mentioned in the original police report to the Deputy Magistrate; (iii) that until the District Magistrate had withdrawn the case so made over from the file of the Deputy Magistrate to that of his own Court, he had no power to make any order save an order for further enquiry under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Held, per GEIDT, J.,* that the case having been transferred to the Deputy Magistrate, that officer alone had jurisdiction to deal with any application for a summons, until the case was withdrawn from his cognizance; the order of the Joint Magistrate to issue a summons was, therefore, not warranted by law. *Golapdi Sheikh v. Queen-Empress, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 979, Moul Singh v. Mahabir Singh, 4 C. W. N. 242, and Radhabullav Roy v. Benode Behari Chatterjee, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 449, referred to. AJAB LAL KHIRHER v. EMPEROR (1905) I. L. R. 32 Calc. 783 s.c. 9 C. W. N. 810*

CRIMINAL FORCE.

See PENAL CODE, ss. 350 TO 358.

— dispossession by—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 522.

5 C. W. N. 250

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—DISPOSSESSION BY CRIMINAL FORCE 23 W. R. Cr. 54
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 494

See UNLAWFUL COMPULSION.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 572

CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION.

See PENAL CODE, ss. 503, 506, 507.

See RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP THE PEACE—WHEN RECOGNIZANCE MAY BE TAKEN.

I. L. R. 2 All. 351

1. — Threat of injury—*Penal Code, s. 503.* Where the accused went to the complainant, the brother of an adult woman, and told him that he had come from the Sarkar and would get him six months' imprisonment if he (the complainant) did not let his sister go:—*Held,* that these words did not constitute either criminal intimidation within the meaning of s. 503 of the Penal Code (there having been no threat of an injury in the sense of the Code) or any other offence known to the law. *REG. v. MOROBA BHASHKARJI 8 Bom. Cr. 101*

2. — Threatening to obtain dismissal of police constable—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 503 and 506.* A threat of getting a police constable dismissed from the police service is not such a threat of injury as is punishable under s. 506 of the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860). *Reg. v. Moroba Bhashkarji, 8 Bom. 101, followed. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DADA HANMANT DANI I. L. R. 20 Bom. 794*

3. — Ex-communication by Roman Catholic priest—*Penal Code, ss. 190, 503, 508—Criminal proceedings stayed until complainant established the illegality of the priest's acts in a Civil Court.* Where the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction is plainly *ultra vires*, or otherwise unsanctioned by the ordinances of a religious society, or where such ordinances controvert the general law, and, in either case, consequences result which the criminal law was intended to restrain, the Criminal Courts are not at liberty to decline jurisdiction. A Roman Catholic complained to a Magistrate that he had been threatened with an illegal sentence of ex-communication and had been excommunicated by the ecclesiastical authorities, with a view to prevent him from asserting his legal rights in defending a civil suit concerning the property of a church. *Held,* that, under the circumstances, the proper course was for the Magistrate to postpone the trial till the complainant proved in a Civil Court the illegality of the action of the ecclesiastical authorities. *In re DECRUZ I. L. R. 8 Mad. 140*

4. — Attempt to commit offence—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 503, 507, 511.* The accused sent a fabricated petition to the Revenue Commissioner, S D, containing a threat that, if a certain forest officer were not removed elsewhere, he would be killed. The accused was charged with the offence of criminal intimidation under s. 507 of the Penal Code (XLV of 1860). The Sessions Judge found that the Commissioner had neither official nor personal interest in the forest officer. He therefore acquitted the accused of the offence of criminal intimidation, but convicted him of an attempt to commit the offence punishable under s. 507, and sentenced him to four months' simple imprisonment. *Held,* reversing the conviction and sentence, that, as the person to whom the petition was addressed was not interested in

CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION—*concl'd.*

the person threatened, the act intended and done by the accused did not amount to the offence of criminal intimidation within the meaning of s. 503 of the Penal Code. *Per* WEST, J.—“The offence of criminal intimidation, as defined, seems to require both a person to be threatened and another in whom he is specially interested. Then there must be the intent to cause alarm to the former by a threat to him of injury to the latter. The intent itself might be complete, though it could not be effected. But the existence of the interest seems essential to the offence, as also and equally to the attempt at the offence, since otherwise the attempt would be to do something not constituting an offence.” *Per* BIRDWOOD, J.—“No criminal liability can be incurred, under the Penal Code, by an attempt to do an act which, if done, would not be an offence against the Code. In the present case, therefore, if the accused was not guilty of committing criminal intimidation, because the act intended and done by him lacked an ingredient of that offence, he could not be guilty of an attempt at that offence.” *QUEEN-EMPERESS v. MANGESH JIVAJI* . . . **I. L. R. 11 Bom 376**

5. ————— *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 503.* The threat referred to in s. 503 of the Penal Code must be a threat communicated, or uttered with the intention of its being communicated, to the person threatened for the purpose of influencing his mind. *GUNGA CHUNDER SEN v. GOUR CHUNDER BANIKYA* . . . **I. L. R. 15 Calc. 671**

6. ————— *Threat to ruin another by cases—“Injury”—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 44, 503 and 506.* In order to convict a person of criminal intimidation under s. 506 of the Penal Code, it must be found that there was a threat by him to another person of injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested. Where the petitioner, who threatened to ruin the complainant by cases, was convicted of criminal intimidation under s. 506 of the Penal Code: *Held*, that the conviction could not stand. Had the threat been to ruin the complainant by false cases, the offence of criminal intimidation would have been committed; but as the threat was to ruin him by cases, it could not be assumed that by cases were meant false cases. If the cases were not false, the mere fact that they were instituted for the purpose of prosecuting the complainant, would not bring them within the definition of the term “injury.” *JOWAHIR PATTAK v. PARBHOO AHIR (1902)* . . . **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 418; s.c. 7 C. W. N. 116**

CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT (XIV OF 1908).

See BARRISTERS . . . **13 C. W. N. 605**

CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF MASTER.

See EMIGRATION ACT (XXI of 1883). . . **I. L. R. 32 Bom. 10**

CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATION.

See CHARGE—SPECIAL CASES—CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATION . . . **2 C. W. N. 341**

See COMPOUNDING OFFENCE.

7 Mad. Ap. 34

See CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.

3 W. R. Cr. 44

8 B. L. R. Ap. 1

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 313

I. L. R. 9 All. 66

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 222, 517, 520.

See PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.

6 B. L. R. Ap. 133

13 B. L. R. 307, 308 note, 310 note

See POST OFFICE ACT, s. 48.

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 229

See THEFT.

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 388, 390, 392 note

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 852

See VERDICT OF JURY—POWER TO INTERFERE WITH VERDICTS.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 749

1. ————— *Immoveable property—Penal Code, s. 404.* *Held*, that s. 404 of the Penal Code (relating to the misappropriating or conversion of “property” left by a deceased person) does not apply to immoveable property. *REG. v. GIRDHAR DHARAMDAS* . . . **6 Bom. Cr. 33**

2. ————— *Bull dedicated to an idol—Penal Code, ss. 403, 429.* A bull dedicated to an idol and allowed to roam at large is not a *fera bestia*, and, therefore, *res nullius*, but, *prima facie*, the trustee of the temple where the idol is worshipped has the rights and liabilities attaching to its ownership. Such an animal can therefore be the subject of theft or criminal misappropriation. *QUEEN-EMPERESS v. NALLA* . . . **I. L. R. 11 Mad. 145**

3. ————— *Intention, proof of—Penal Code, s. 403.* *R* was a Government servant,—whose duty it was to receive certain money and to pay them into the treasury on receipt. He admitted that he had retained two sums of money in his possession for several months, when, fearing detection, he paid them into the treasury making a false entry at the time in his books with a view to avert suspicion. His explanation as to his reason for retaining the money was not credited by the Magistrate, who convicted him of criminal misappropriation under s. 403 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the conviction was right. *QUEEN-EMPERESS v. RAMAKRISHNA* . . . **I. L. R. 12 Mad. 49**

4. ————— *Property found in an open plain—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 403.* The accused, finding a gold mohur on an open plain, sold it the next day to a shroff for the full value, and appropriated the sale-proceeds. *Held*, that, in the absence of any information as to the circumstances under which the coin was lost, and as it was not improbable that the property in the coin had been abandoned by the ori-

CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATION—
contd.

ginal owner, the accused could not be convicted of criminal misappropriation under s. 403 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SITA*

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 212

5. ——— **Chowkidar obtaining money from person fraudulently—***Penal Code, ss. 383, 403, 417.* A chowkidar who obtains money from any person, either by fraudulent inducement or dishonesty, or by putting that person in fear of injury, is punishable under s. 417 of the Penal Code (cheating), or ss. 383 and 384 (extortion), but not for criminal misappropriation of public money entrusted to him as a public servant. *QUEEN v. RAMNARAIN*

3 W. R. Cr. 32

6. ——— **Use of money paid by mistake, with knowledge of mistake—***Cheating.* Where money is paid to a person by mistake, and such person, either at the time of the receipt of the money or at any time subsequently before its refund, discovers the mistake and determines to appropriate the money, he is guilty of criminal misappropriation, but he is not guilty of cheating. *QUEEN v. SHAMSOONDUR*

2 N. W. 475

7. ——— **Agent mixing his own money with those of his principal, and applying it to his own purposes.** If it be the duty of the agent of a landholder to keep the collections he makes for his master separate from his own moneys, expending thereout moneys on his master's behalf, and handing over the balance to his master, and if he, in breach of this trust, converts the money to his own use, he is amenable to a criminal prosecution. And where a landowner permits the agent to mix the collections with his own moneys, if the agent applies the moneys so collected to his own use fraudulently and dishonestly and falsifies the account so as to conceal his fraud, there is evidence of a criminal misappropriation. *QUEEN v. KARREEM BUX*

3 N. W. 30

8. ——— **Conversion—***Penal Code, s. 403.* To bring a prisoner within s. 403 of the Penal Code, there must be actual conversion of the thing appropriated to the prisoner's own use. Where, therefore, the accused found a thing, and merely retained it in his possession, he was acquitted of criminal misappropriation under the section referred to. *QUEEN v. ABDUL*

10 W. R. Cr. 23

9. ——— **Retaining by servant of money due as wages.** A servant who retains in his hands money which he was authorized to collect, and which he did collect, from the debtor of his master, because money is due to him as wages, is guilty of criminal misappropriation. *QUEEN v. BISSESEUR ROY*

11 W. R. Cr. 51

10. ——— **Misappropriation of property of deceased person—***Penal Code, s. 404.* Held, that it is not necessary for a conviction for dishonest misappropriation of property possessed by a deceased person at the time of his death, under s. 404 of the Penal Code, that the accused should

CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATION—
contd.

misappropriate it to his own use. *QUEEN v. NOBIN CHUNDER SIKKAR*

12 W. R. Cr. 39

In the matter of the petition of ENAYET HOSSEIN

11 W. R. Cr. 1

11. ——— *Penal Code, s. 404.*

Held, by MARKBY, J., that under s. 404 all the elements are required to constitute the offence which would be required to constitute the offence of criminal misappropriation in respect of a person who is alive. *QUEEN v. NOBIN CHUNDER SIKKAR*

12 W. R. Cr. 39

12. ——— **Charge, form of—***Penal Code, s. 403.* In a case in which the accused is charged with having dishonestly appropriated property under s. 403 of the Penal Code, the charge should specify the person to whom the property belonged. Where the accused is interested in the property jointly with others, he is not necessarily guilty of a criminal act if he takes possession of it and disposes of it. *QUEEN v. PARBUTTY CHURN CHUCKERBUTTY*

14 W. R. Cr. 13

13. ——— **Trust arising from duty of public servant—***Penal Code, s. 409.* S. 409 of the Penal Code does not limit the mode in which a trust arises, whether by specific order or by reason of its being part of the proper duty of a public functionary. Where, therefore, it was proved that the head clerk of an office entrusted the management of stamps, with the knowledge and sanction of his superiors, to one of his assistants, the latter was held to be guilty of criminal misappropriation by a public servant, within the meaning of s. 409, when he made away with the stamps. *QUEEN v. RAM DHUN DEY*

13 W. R. Cr. 77

14. ——— **Separate items of money—***Charge, form of.* The misappropriation of each separate item of money with which a person is entrusted is a separate offence, and the facts connected with it should form the subject of a separate enquiry. The duty of a committing officer in such a case is to select certain distinct items, to frame his charges upon them and to adduce evidence specially upon those items. *CHETTER v. QUEEN.*

15 W. R. Cr. 5

15. ——— **Refusal to pay for goods purchased—***Penal Code, s. 403.* The prisoner who took certain hides from the prosecutrix, but refused to pay for them, was held not on that account guilty of dishonest misappropriation under s. 403 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. BOYSTUM MOOCHEE*

17 W. R. Cr. 11

16. ——— **Removal of property claimed by accused—***Penal Code, s. 403.* A person having made a hole in the wall of his own house broke open a box and removed the contents to which he believed himself entitled, but as to which there was a dispute, making the removal appear to have been the act of thieves from the outside; and entrusting the property to another person, held, not guilty of criminal misappropriation. *THEWA RAM v. EMPRESS*

10 C. L. R. 187

CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATION—
concl'd.

17. — **Harvesting crops under attachment**—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 206, 403, 424.* A judgment-debtor, whose standing crops were attached, harvested them while the attachment was in force and was convicted of theft. *Held*, that the accused was not guilty of theft, but of the offence of dishonestly removing the property under Penal Code, s. 424. *Per* BENSON, J.—The offence was also criminal misappropriation within the meaning of Indian Penal Code, s. 403. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. OBAYYA* I. L. R. 22 Mad. 151

18. — **Dishonest intention**—*Indian Penal Code, ss. 403, 426—Criminal misappropriation of property—Mischief—Deterioration of the value of mortgaged property.* When the reversioner of a mortgagor sold some of the bricks of the mortgaged house which had tumbled down, and appropriated the amount, and the Magistrate convicted him of criminal misappropriation of property and mischief: *Held*, that, as no dishonest intention and no substantial deterioration of the mortgaged property was shown, the conviction was bad. *BHUBAN MOHAN BANERJEE v. TANSUK ROY SERAOGI* (1901) . . . 6 C. W. N. 34

CRIMINAL MOTION TO HIGH COURT.

See PRACTICE . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 643

CRIMINAL OFFENCE, IMPUTATION OF.

See LIBEL . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 883

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, AMENDMENT ACT (III OF 1884), s. 8, cl. 6.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 9 All. 420

s. 12.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 526A.
I. L. R. 15 Calc. 455

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, AMENDMENT ACT (IV OF 1891), s. 2.

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—TO ACCUSED ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 481

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872, VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861).

— application of—

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—GENERAL JURISDICTION—OFFENCE COMMITTED ON THE HIGH SEAS.
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 636

— Application of the Code to Police in Calcutta. The Criminal Procedure Code does

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872, VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—*concl'd.*

not apply to the Police in Calcutta unless expressly made applicable to them [s. 1, sub-s. (2)]. Cls. (p) and (s) of s. 4, Code of Criminal Procedure, do not apply to the Police in Calcutta. *SOLICITOR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA v. MADHO DHOBI* (1903) . . . 7 C. W. N. 661

s. 1.

See post, s. 496.

See BOMBAY VILLAGE POLICE ACT.
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 312

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 353

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—GENERAL JURISDICTION.
I. L. R. 10 Bom. 181
I. L. R. 1 Mad. 55

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—CATTLE TRESPASS ACT.
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 300

See MUNSIF, JURISDICTION OF.
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 131

See OFFENCE COMMITTED ON HIGH SEAS.
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 782

s. 2.

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—MADRAS—CRIMINAL.
I. L. R. 14 Mad. 121

s. 3.

See REFORMATORY SCHOOLS ACT, s. 2.
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 333
2 C. W. N. 11

s. 4.

See CATTLE TRESPASS ACT.
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 248

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES.
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 443
I. L. R. 10 All. 39

See FALSE EVIDENCE—FABRICATING FALSE EVIDENCE.
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 144

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—EUROPEAN BRITISH SUBJECTS.
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 561

s. 4 (a)—*Information to police of taking away or detaining wife.* The word “complaint” referred to in s. 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure means a “complaint” as defined by s. 4 (a) of that Code. *Jatra Shekh v. Reazut Shekh*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 483, referred to. *TARA PROSAD LAHA v. KING-EMPEROR* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 17

s. 4 (h)—“complaint”—

See post, s. 437 . . . 6 C. W. N. 437
See ADULTERY I. L. R. 30 Calc. 910

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872,
VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—concl'd.**

- s. 4 (h) "complaint"—concl'd.
 See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—
 To ACCUSED ON DISMISSAL OF COM-
 PLAINT . . . 5 C. W. N. 370
 See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COM-
 PLAINT, AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES.
 6 C. W. N. 926
 I. L. R. 30 Calc. 415
 I. L. R. 26 Bom. 150
 See FALSE CHARGE . . . 5 C. W. N. 106
- s. 4 (k)—"Inquiry."
 See s. 145 . . . 13 C. W. N. 420
- s. 4 (m)—"Judicial-proceeding."
 See s. 476 . . . 13 C. W. N. 122
- s. 4 (o)—"offence"—
 See ACT—1859—XIII, ss. 1, 2.
 I. L. R. 24 Mad. 660
 *Appeal lies against
 order made under s. 22 of the Cattle Trespass Act.*
 By s. 4 (o) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
 the word "offence" includes an act in respect of
 which a complaint may be made under s. 20 of the
 Cattle Trespass Act; and a person against whom an
 order under s. 22 of the Cattle Trespass Act is made
 is a "person convicted on a trial" and is entitled
 to appeal under s. 407 of the Code of Criminal
 Procedure. *In the matter of PONNUSAMI* (1901).
 I. L. R. 29 Mad. 517
- ss. 4 (o) and 29 (2) and Sch. II.
 See OFFENCE . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 819
- ss. 4 (o), 192, Sch. II, last clause—
 See CATTLE TRESPASS ACT (I OF 1871),
 s. 20, SCH. III. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 926
- s. 4, cls. (p), (s) do not apply to
 police in Calcutta—
 See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.
 7 C. W. N. 661
 See MAINTENANCE, ORDER OF CRIMINAL
 COURT AS TO . . . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 260
 I. L. R. 20 Mad. 470
 See REFORMATORY SCHOOLS ACT, s. 8.
 I. L. R. 14 Bom. 381
- s. 4 (r)—*Legal Practitioners Act*, s. 9—
 *Mukhtears—Authority of mukhtear to practise in
 Criminal Courts. A mukhtear is not entitled to
 practise generally and as of right in Criminal
 Courts, but can act only when he has received the
 permission of the Court to act in any particular
 proceeding. ANANT RAM, In the matter of* (1907)
 I. L. R. 30 All. 66
- ss. 4 and 476—*Jurisdiction—"Judicial
 proceeding"—Inquiry into petition against*

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872,
VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—cont'd.**

- ss. 4 and 476—concl'd.
 subordinate official. Helz, that an inquiry con-
 ducted by a Magistrate into the truth of allegations
 against a subordinate official contained in a petition
 presented to a Deputy Commissioner is a judicial
 proceeding within the meaning of s. 4 (m) of the
 Code of Criminal Procedure. *Hara Charan Mookerji
 v. The King-Emperor*, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 367,
 distinguished. *EMPEROR v. KUNA SAH* (1905)
 I. L. R. 28 All. 89
- s. 7.
 See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
 OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN
 ONE DISTRICT—MURDER.
 I. L. R. 10 Bom. 258, 263
- ss. (2), 12, 528—
 See MAGISTRATES, SUBORDINATION OF.
 I. L. R. 34 Calc. 918
- s. 11.
 See SENTENCE—GENERAL CASES.
 I. L. R. 20 Mad. 444
- s. 12.
 See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
 TRANSFER OF MAGISTRATES.
 I. L. R. 19 All. 114
- See MAGISTRATE—POWERS OF MAGIS-
 TRATES . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 389
- ss. 15, 16.
 See BENCH OF MAGISTRATES.
 I. L. R. 16 Mad. 410
 I. L. R. 20 Calc. 870
 I. L. R. 18 Mad. 394
 I. L. R. 23 Calc. 194
 I. L. R. 21 Mad. 246
- s. 17.
 See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
 WITHDRAWAL OF CASES.
 I. L. R. 14 Mad. 399
- s. 21.
 See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.
 7 C. W. N. 527
- Rules
 framed under, by Chief Presidency Magistrate
 —Rule 8—*Rule that in a Bench of two, the opinion
 of Chairman shall prevail—Inconsistency with Code*
 —*Ultra vires.* Rule 8 of the Rules framed by the
 Chief Presidency Magistrate in 1900, under s. 21 of
 the Criminal Procedure Code, is inconsistent with
 the provisions of the Code in so far as it directs
 that in a Bench composed of two members, the
 decision of the Chairman shall prevail. It is also
 arbitrary and not consonant with natural justice.
 HENRY WAKEFIELD v. HARAN SARDAR (1904)
 8 C. W. N. 862
- s. 28.
 See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
 SPECIAL ACTS—CATTLE TRESPASS ACT.
 I. L. R. 23 Calc. 442

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872,
VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 28—*concl'd.*

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.
I. L. R. 8 All. 665

s. 29 (1872, s. 8, para. 1).

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPE-
CIAL ACTS—MADRAS ACT III OF 1865.
I. L. R. 2 Mad. 161

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPE-
CIAL ACTS—OPIUM ACT.

I. L. R. 19 All. 465

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPE-
CIAL ACTS—REGISTRATION ACTS.

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 347

s. 30 (1872, s. 361).

See DEPUTY COMMISSIONER.

5 N. W. 219
7 C. W. N. 457

ss. 30, 494.

See PARDON. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1353

s. 32.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPE-
CIAL ACTS—COMPANIES ACT.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 676

ss. 32, 33 (1872, s. 309; 1861-
69, s. 45), s. 34 (1872, s. 36), s. 35 (1872,
s. 314; 1861-69, s. 46).

See SENTENCE.

s. 35.

See WHIPPING.

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 951 : 9 W. R. Cr. 41
7 B. L. R. 165 : 15 W. R. Cr. 89

Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 147, 447—Separate sentences, if lawful. Illustration in s. 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code, referred to. BURE SINGH v. EMPEROR (1904) 8 C. W. N. 305, 483

ss. 36, 107—*Magistrate to whom person is not sent under s. 107 (3) cannot exercise the power of committing to custody under s. 107 (4)—S. 36 does not confer such power. A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to remand a person to custody under s. 107 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when such person is not sent to him by another Magistrate under s. 107 (3). S. 36 of the Code cannot, when read with s. 107 (3), be construed as conferring such jurisdiction on a District Magistrate. CHIDAMBARAM PILLAI v. EMPEROR (1908)*

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 315

s. 40 (1872, s. 56).

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
TRANSFER OF MAGISTRATE DURING
TRIAL. I. L. R. 2 Calc. 117
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 132

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872,
VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 42, cl. (a).

See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.

6 C. W. N. 337

s. 45 (1872, s. 90).

See INFORMATION OF COMMISSION OF
OFFENCE.

1. ———— *Omission to give information of offence—Village accountant—Village Munsif's peon—Disobedience by public servant of direction of law. Where a village accountant and a village munsif's peon had been convicted under s. 217 of the Penal Code of having disobeyed the direction of law contained in s. 90 of the Criminal Procedure Code:—Held, that they were wrongfully convicted as not bearing the character which raises the obligation under the latter section. In the matter of RAMANIK NAYAR*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 266

2. ———— *Duty to report sudden death—Owner of house distinguished from owner of land. Under s. 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, every owner or occupier of land is bound to report the occurrence thereon of any sudden death. The head of a Nayar family was convicted and fined under s. 176 of the Penal Code for not reporting a sudden death in the family house. Held, following former decisions of the Court, that the conviction was illegal because s. 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to the owner of a house. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ACHUTHA*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 92

3. ———— *Omission to give information of offence—Agent—Khazanchi—Dewan—Agent of owner of land. Per MARKBY, J.—A khazanchi is not an "agent" within the meaning of s. 90 of the Criminal Procedure Code. A dewan may be an "agent" if his master is absent, but the provisions of s. 90 do not apply to a dewan who is acting only under the orders of his resident master. Per PRINSEP, J.—Quære: Whether, according to s. 90, an agent is only responsible for giving information of the occurrence of any sudden or unnatural death. EMPRESS v. ACHIRAJ LALL*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 603 : 3 C. L. R. 87

4. ———— *Omission to give information of offence. The provisions of s. 90 of the Criminal Procedure Code should not be put in force against one who has omitted to give information to the police of an offence having been committed in cases where the police have actually obtained such information from other sources. EMPRESS v. SASHI BHUSAN CHUCKRABUTTY. In the matter of the petition of SHASHI BHUSAN CHUCKRABUTTY*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 623

5. ———— *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 176—Omission to give information to police of offence. Where one of several persons bound to give information to the police under s. 45 of the Criminal Procedure Code gave such information as to the commission of a murder, in*

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872,
VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 45—*concl'd.*

consequence of which a police officer arrived in the village shortly after the occurrence:—*Held*, that the fact that other persons who might possibly also be bound to give that information had omitted to do so was no ground for their prosecution and conviction of an offence under s. 176 of the Penal Code. *In the matter of the petition of Sashi Bhusan Chackrabutty*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 623, relied on. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GOPAL SINGH*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 316

6. *Omission to give information of offence—Order to assist the police—Illegal order.* A Magistrate directed a landholder to "find a clue" in a case of theft "within 15 days and to assist the police." *Held*, that such order was not authorized by ss. 90 and 91 of Act X of 1872, and the conviction of the landholder for disobedience of such order was not maintainable. *EMPRESS v. BAKSHUN RAM*

I. L. R. 3 All. 201

7. *Omission to give information of offence—Specification of offence.* In a case in which the accused are charged with having omitted to give information which they were legally bound to give under s. 90 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it should appear what the offence is as to the commission of which the accused wilfully omitted to give information, that the specified offence was in fact committed by some one, and that the accused knew of its having been committed. *QUEEN v. AHMED ALI*

22 W. R. Cr. 42

8. *Omission to give information of offence—Residence—Liability of resident agent.* The duty imposed by Act X of 1872, s. 90, upon village headmen, etc., of giving information as to the occurrence of any sudden or unnatural death is intended to apply only when such occurrence takes place at or near the village of which he is headman, or in which he owns or occupies land, etc. Residence in a dwelling-house belonging to another is not occupation of land within the meaning of the section. The liability of the resident agent of an owner under the section arises when the owner is not resident and has no personal knowledge of the fact required to be reported; where the owner has such knowledge, the liability attaches to him. *In the matter of the petition of MUDHOOSOODUN CHUCKERBUTTY*

23 W. R. Cr. 60

ss. 45, 154, 161, 162.

See PENAL CODE, s. 211.

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 258

s. 47.

See EASEMENT I. L. R. 30 Calc. 918

s. 54.

See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 253

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872,
VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 54—*concl'd.*

See PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)
s. 23 I. L. R. 29 All. 377

See WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 72

See WRONGFUL RESTRAINT.

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 377

ss. 54, 55, 56 (1872, s. 102;
1861-69, s. 140), s. 57 (1872, s. 93; 1861-
69, s. 108).

See ARREST—CRIMINAL ARREST.

s. 55.

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

7 C. W. N. 661

ss. 55, 56.

See PENAL CODE, s. 332.

I. L. R. 18 All. 246

s. 59.

See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 441, 480

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 366

4 C. W. N. 252

ss. 59, 60.

See PENAL CODE, s. 225.

I. L. R. 29 All. 575

s. 61 (1872, s. 124; 1861-69,
s. 152).

See DETENTION OF ACCUSED BY POLICE.
1 W. R. Cr. 5

See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.

I. L. R. 6 All. 129

See POLICE INQUIRY 3 N. W. 275

See WRONGFUL DETENTION.

19 W. R. Cr. 36

ss. 65, 105—*Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Bom. Act IV of 1887), ss. 4, 5, 6, 7—Gambling—Keeping a common gaming house—Presumption under s. 7 of the Act.* Where the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act has provided for the manner or place of investigating or inquiring into any offence under it, its provisions must prevail and the Criminal Procedure Code must give way. Accordingly, no provision of the Code as to the authority empowered to issue a warrant for arrest or search, or the person to whom and the conditions under which such warrant may be issued can apply for the purposes of s. 7 of the Act. The authority, the persons and the conditions must be respectively those specifically mentioned in s. 6 of the Act and no other. But the special provision in s. 6 would still be subject to the general provisions of ss. 65 and 105 of the Code. *EMPEROR v. FERNAD* (1917)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 438

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872,
VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

ss. 69, 71.

See PENAL CODE, ss. 173 AND 180.
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 358

ss. 75, 76.

See PENAL CODE, s. 186.
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 896
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 302
1 C. W. N. 154

Warrant of Arrest
—Resistance—Endorsement as to bail fixing
date of appearance—Warrant if remains in force
after expiry of date—Lapse of bail—Order. Ss. 75
and 76, Criminal Procedure Code, should be read
together. S. 76 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, is
permissive. A warrant, on which there is an en-
dorsement for bail to be taken for the appearance
of the accused on a certain date, does not lapse on
the expiry of that date; after that date only the
direction to take bail lapses but the warrant con-
tinues in force until it is cancelled by the Court
which issued it or until it is executed. The arrest
of an accused on the 29th October on a warrant
issued against him with an endorsement for bail to
be taken for his appearance on the 26th October
is not illegal, and the rescuing and escape of the
accused from custody are punishable under ss. 225
and 224 of the Penal Code. *RANSHAN SINGH v.*
THE KING-EMPEROR (1909) 13 C. W. N. 1091

s. 77, para. 1 (1872, s. 161; 1861-
69, s. 77).

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CRIMINAL
CASES . . . 5 B. L. R. 274

ss. 77, 78.

See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 296

s. 79.

See ARREST—CRIMINAL ARREST.
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 457

See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.
4 C. W. N. 85

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CRIMINAL
CASES . . . 5 C. W. N. 447

s. 80.

See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 748
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 320
3 C. W. N. 741

ss. 80, 81.

See PENAL CODE, s. 186.
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 896
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 320
1 C. W. N. 154

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872,
VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 81.

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUM-
MONING WITNESSES.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 320
1 C. W. N. 154

s. 83.

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CRIMINAL
CASES . I. L. R. 20 Mad. 235, 457
I. L. R. 20 All. 124

ss. 87, 88 (1872, ss. 171, 172;
1861-69, ss. 183-185).

See INFORMATION OF COMMISSION OF
OFFENCE I. L. R. 7 Mad. 436

ss. 87, 88, 89 (1872, ss. 171, 172,
173; 1861-69, ss. 183, 184, 185)

See ABSCONDING OFFENDER.

ss. 87, 88 and 89—*Absconding
Offender—Sale of property of absconder—Illegal
sale—Suit to recover property sold from auction-
purchaser—Jurisdiction.* Where the property of
an absconding offender was attached and sold by a
Court purporting to act under s. 88 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and it turned out that the pro-
cedure culminating in the sale was irregular and
illegal, it was held that the Civil Courts had juris-
diction to entertain a suit by the owner of property
so sold to recover the same in the hands of a pur-
chaser. *MIAN JAN v. ABDUL* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 572

s. 88.

See FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY.

8 W. R. Cr. 61

See MESNE PROFITS—ASSESSMENT IN
EXECUTION, AND SUITS FOR MESNE
PROFITS . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 540

ss. 88, 89.

See REVIEW—CRIMINAL CASES.

9 B. L. R. 342

See RIGHT OF SUIT—SALE IN EXECUTION
OF DECREE . . . 8 W. R. 207

s. 90 (1872, s. 352; 1861-69, s. 188).

See PENAL CODE, s. 186.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 320
1 C. W. N. 154

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—AVOID-
ING SERVICE . 6 B. L. R. Ap. 1

s. 92 (Presidency Magistrate's
Act, 1877, s. 124).

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT
—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 523

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872, VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

ss. 94, 96.

See PRODUCTION OF PROPERTY.

7 C. W. N. 522

ss. 94, 96, 105, 106, 165.

See TRESPASS . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 433

ss. 94-99.

See INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS—CRIMINAL CASES . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 109
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 52

ss. 94, 105, 165.

See TORT . 12 C. W. N. 973

ss. 96, 97 (1872, s. 368; 1861-69, s. 114 to s. 105).

See WARRANT—SEARCH WARRANT.

ss. 96, 98, 190 (1)c, 526, 537.

See SEARCH WARRANT.
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1076

ss. 100, 562.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 476.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1030

ss. 100 (b), 195.

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 469

1. _____ s. 103—*Search by police for stolen property—Selection of witnesses to search by police.* Criminal Procedure Code, s. 103, does not justify the view that the persons called upon to witness a search are to be selected by any person other than the officer conducting the search. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMAN* . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 83

2. _____ Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 187—*Rendering assistance to a public servant—Refusal to sign search list by person who attended search under Abkari law—Liability—Party called upon to attend and witness a search.* A person was called upon by an Abkari Inspector to attend a search held under s. 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and did so. He, however, refused to sign the search list when it was prepared. On a charge being preferred against him, under s. 187 of the Indian Penal Code, of intentionally omitting to assist a public servant in the execution of his duty: *Held*, that the accused was not guilty of an offence under s. 187. Assuming that a person called upon to attend and witness a search, under s. 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is under a legal obligation to attend the search and sign the search list, the "assistance" which a person is bound, by the earlier part of s. 187 of the Penal Code, to render is *ejusdem generis* with the various forms of assistance referred to in the latter part of the section. It must have some direct personal relation to the execution of the duty by the public officer. The

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872, VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 103—*concl.*

signing of the search list required by s. 103 is an independent duty which is imposed on the witness, whereas the word "assistance," as used in the section, implies that the party who assists is doing something which, in ordinary circumstances, the party assisted could do for himself. *In the matter of RAMAYA NAIKA* (1903)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 419

s. 106 (1872, s. 489), s. 107 (1872, s. 491; 1861-69, s. 2-2), ss. 108, 109, 110 (1872, ss. 505, 506), ss. 111, 112 (1872, s. 492), ss. 113-122 (1872, s. 516), s. 123 (1872, ss. 489, 499, 507; 1861-69, ss. 290, 298).

See RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP THE PEACE.

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

See SECURITY TO KEEP THE PEACE.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 48; 11 C. W. N. 840

See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 315

1. _____ s. 106—*Order for security to keep the peace on conviction under ss. 143, 379, Penal Code—Finding, but not conviction, of criminal intimidation—Legality of order.* A conviction under s. 143 or 379 of the Penal Code, is not of itself sufficient to sustain an order under s. 106 of the Criminal Procedure Code, although such conviction, coupled with findings bringing the case within the scope of s. 106, may sustain an order thereunder. But in such case these findings must be clear and explicit, and, moreover, if the finding be that the accused was guilty of criminal intimidation, the section expressly requires that the conviction must also be for that offence in order to sustain an order under the section. *KISHORE SIRCAR v. KING-EMPEROR* (1904) . 8 C. W. N. 517

2. _____ Appellate Court cannot bind over to keep peace when lower Court not one of the class referred to in the section, and no breach of the peace committed. An accused person cannot be bound over to keep the peace under s. 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, unless he is convicted of an offence of which a breach of the peace is a necessary ingredient and unless it is found that a breach of the peace has actually occurred. An Appellate Court cannot exercise the power under the section when the accused has not been convicted by a Court such as is referred to in the section. *MUTHIAH CHETTI v. EMPEROR* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 190

s. 106 (3).

See JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 434

1. _____ *Order for security cannot be made by Appellate Court when original conviction not by one of the Courts specified in the section.* An order for security cannot be made

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872,
VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 106 (3)—*contd.*

under s. 106 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by a Court of Appeal or Revision which is one of the Courts specified in the section, when confirming the original conviction of a Court which is not one of those specified therein. *Muthiah Chetty v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 29 Mad. 190, referred to and doubted. *DORASAMI NAIDU v. EMPEROR* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 182

2. ———— Order to furnish security—Order can be passed by the appeal Court—Jurisdiction of the appeal Court. S. 106, cl. 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) makes it clear that the order for security may be made in appeal whether the original Court had jurisdiction to pass such an order or not. The word "also" in the clause plainly implies that the order may be independently made by those Courts as well as by the original Courts in the first clause; and it is neither suggested nor implied that the powers of the original Court should in any way control or limit those of the appellate on revisional authority. *Mahmudi Sheikh v. Aji Sheikh*, I. L. R. 21 Cal. 622, *Muthiah Chetty v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 29 Mad. 190, and *Paramasiva Pillai v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 30 Mad. 48, dissented from. *Dorasami Naidu v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 30 Mad. 182, referred to with approval. *EMPEROR v. BHAAUSING* (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 33

s. 107.

See BAIL . . . 11 C. W. N. 415

See MAGISTRATE—POWERS OF MAGISTRATES . . . I. L. R. 29 Cal. 389

See MISJOINDER OF PARTIES.

11 C. W. N. 472

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE . . . 7 C. W. N. 142

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE . . . 6 C. W. N. 883
7 C. W. N. 29

See RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP THE PEACE—

WHEN RECOGNIZANCE MAY BE TAKEN . . . 7 C. W. N. 32

LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE . . . 7 C. W. N. 746

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 471

See SECURITY TO KEEP THE PEACE.

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—GENERAL CASES . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 151

1. ———— Security for keeping the peace—Evidence as to likelihood of breach of the peace. Held, that facts which might be taken to establish the probability of certain persons disturbing the public tranquillity at a particular annually

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872,
VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 107—*contd.*

recurring festival, would afford no ground, after such festival had passed without the public tranquillity having been disturbed, for binding over such persons to keep the peace with a view to the possibility of their creating a disturbance at the next recurrence of the festival. *Uma Churn Santra v. Beni Madhub Roy*, 7 C. L. R. 352, referred to. *BASDEO. In the matter of the petition of* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 190

2. ———— Security to keep the peace, order for—Persons likely to commit breach of the peace—Facts justifying order—Misjoinder, if it vitiates proceeding—Illegality—Cure. The facts from which, for the purposes of s. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it may be reasonably inferred that the persons sought to be bound down are likely to disturb the public peace, must be facts of a definite nature and must show that such persons are individually and not collectively connected with them. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down applicable to all cases and each case must be determined upon its own circumstances. *Empress v. Abdul Kadir*, I. L. R. 9 All. 452, followed. The main principles applicable to a criminal trial regarding joinder of charges and the joint trial of accused persons should be applied to enquiries under s. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Where both the parties to a proceeding under s. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, were tried together (some amongst them having also been examined as witnesses in the case), and were bound down in the result of that trial: Held, that there was misjoinder of the nature condemned in *Subramania Iyer v. King-Emperor*, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 61, such as could not be cured by s. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Bachu Mullah v. Siaram Singh*, I. L. R. 14 Cal. 358, referred to. *PRAN KRISHNA SHAHA v. EMPEROR* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 180

3. ———— Wrongful act—Putni sale—Reg. VIII of 1819—Dur-putnidar under the defaulting putnidar resisting the purchaser. A putni taluk was sold under Reg. VIII of 1819. The revenue authorities and the zamindars did everything that was necessary for them to do under the regulation to put the purchaser in possession. Nevertheless a dur-putnidar under the defaulting putnidar continued to be in possession and insisted upon collecting rents from the raiyats. Held, that such act on the part of the dur-putnidar was wrongful and he was rightly bound down to keep the peace under s. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, when it was found that his act was likely to cause a breach of the peace. The fact that the dur-putnidar had brought a suit to set aside the sale made no difference, inasmuch as the effect of the putni Regulation is to render such act unlawful, until such time as the sale shall have been set aside. *BISHARAT ALI v. UMAPADA BANERJI* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 792

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872,
VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 107—*concl'd.*

4. ———— *Security to keep the peace—Measurement of land by co-sharer landlord—Legality—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 90, 188.* When one of several co-sharer landlords sought to make a measurement of lands contrary to the provisions of ss. 90 and 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the other co-sharer landlords were justified in objecting and, where no force had been used by them, they ought not to have been bound over to keep the peace under s. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, inasmuch as any likelihood of a breach of the peace was really due to the action of their co-sharer. *BHABATARAN GHOSH v. BANKUTESH LAL MITRA* (1905) . 9 C. W. N. 618

5. ———— *Subordinate Magistrate if may take proceeding at the direction of the District Magistrate, when the person informed against does not reside within the limits of the jurisdiction.* Even on the direction of the District Magistrate a Subordinate Magistrate has no jurisdiction to draw up a proceeding under s. 107, Criminal Procedure Code, against a person residing in another jurisdiction. In such a case the proceeding must take place and be brought to a conclusion before the District Magistrate himself. *NIRBEEKAR CHANDRA MUKERJEE v. THE EMPEROR* (1909) . 13 C. W. N. 580

ss. 107 and 110.

See REVIEW . I. L. R. 27 All. 192

ss. 107, 112.

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 9 All. 452

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
WITHDRAWAL OF CASES.

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 851

——— *Order for security not to be made without recording legal evidence.* An order requiring a person to furnish security has the effect of a conviction, as the person so required is liable to imprisonment if he fails to comply with the order. Such an order ought not to be passed without formal evidence being recorded. *Reg. v. Jinji Limji*, 6 Bom. H. C. Cr. C. 1, referred to. *Reg. v. Talpatram Pamabhai*, 5 Bom. H. C. Cr. C. 105, referred to. *PRATHIPATI VENKATASAMI v. EMPEROR* (1907)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 330

ss. 107, 114, 115, 125, 144, 145.

See SECRETARY TO KEEP THE PEACE.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 948

ss. 107, 114, 115, 496, 498—*Custody, detention in—Security for keeping the peace—Arrest—Bail, right to—Power to re-arrest.* Where proceedings have been instituted against a person under s. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code it is only in the special circumstances referred to in

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872,
VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

ss. 107, 114, 115, 496, 498—*concl'd.*

clauses (3) and (4) of that section that the law empowers a Magistrate to detain the person in custody, until the completion of the inquiry. S. 496 of the Code is imperative, and under its provisions the Magistrate is bound to release such person on bail or recognizances. *Quære*: Whether the proviso to s. 114 of the Code empowers a Magistrate to re-arrest a person, who has already appeared and been admitted to bail. *RAGHUNANDAN PERSHAD AND OTHERS v. EMPEROR* (1905) . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 80

ss. 107, 117, 118.

See SECURITY TO KEEP THE PEACE.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 629, 674

ss. 107, 117 (4)—*Security to keep the peace—Joint enquiry—Association—Persons acting as servants, if should be bound down—Prejudice.* Where all the acts alleged against certain persons against whom a joint enquiry under s. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was instituted were found to have been done by them for the benefit of their common master, *viz.*, with a view to extort *kabuliats* at enhanced rates from his tenants. *Held* (*HENDERSON, J., dissentiente*), that, although each of the acts alleged was not done by all of them together, yet they were associated together within the meaning of s. 117, sub-s. (4), so as to justify a joint enquiry. *Held*, further, that they could be proceeded against under s. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure notwithstanding that the acts imputed to them were committed by them not as individual members of a society, but as servants of another person. *SRIKANTA NATH SAHA v. EMPEROR* (1905) . 9 C. W. N. 895

ss. 107, 118 and 406—*Security for keeping the peace—Appeal.* *Held*, that no appeal will lie from an order under s. 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring security to be furnished for keeping the peace. *CHET RAM, IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 623

1. ———— ss. 107, 145—*Dispute relating to possession of land—Breach of the peace, likelihood of—Choice of proceedings.* When it was found that certain persons had threatened to use violence upon the complainant, if he should go upon land of which he was in possession and were endeavouring to oust him from that land, the Magistrate was justified in instituting proceedings under s. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate to proceed under s. 107 is not ousted by the fact that it appeared in the course of the inquiry that the dispute was one relating to the possession of land and that the apprehended breach of the peace was in consequence of that dispute—although ordinarily the more appropriate procedure in such cases is that provided by Chap. XII of the Criminal Procedure Code. *JAFAR MONDAL v. JARIBULLAH SAHA* (1905) 9 C. W. N. 551

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872,
VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

ss. 107, 145—*concl.*

2. ——— *Attempt to eject by force a person in possession of immovable property—Jurisdiction—Procedure.* Where certain persons wrongfully and without any *bond fide* claim to possession, sought to eject another by force from the possession of certain land, and a breach of the peace was imminent: *Held*, that a Magistrate might legally take action against the aggressors under s. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it was not necessary, on the finding that their claim was not *bond fide*, to take proceedings under s. 145 of the Code. *EMPEROR v. RAM BARAN SINGH* (1906)

I. L. R. 23 All. 406

ss. 107, 192—*Security to keep the peace—Jurisdiction of Magistrates—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 107, 192—Proceedings, initiation of.* A District Magistrate instituting proceedings under s. 107 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code has power to transfer the enquiry to any subordinate Magistrate competent to inquire into the same. The object of s. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code is to restrict the initiation only of proceedings against persons residing beyond the local limits of the jurisdiction of District Magistrates, and not to restrict their power to transfer such proceedings, after initiation, to a subordinate Magistrate. *Shama v. Seckhu Shekh*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 300; *Raghu Singh v. Abdul Wahab*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 442, distinguished. *Dinendra Nath Shanial, In re*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 351; *Satis Chandra Panday v. Rajendra Narain Bagchi*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 398, referred to. *King-Emperor v. Munna*, I. L. R. 24 All. 151, followed. The proceedings under s. 117 of the Code are intended to be precautionary and not punitive. *SURJA KANTA ROY CHOWDHRY v. EMPEROR* (1904).

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 350

s. 108.

See SEDITION . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 991

s. 109.

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

5 C. W. N. 28

7 C. W. N. 661

ss. 109 (b), 55 (b)—*Arrest without authority—Arrest by police in Calcutta—Legality—Security for good behaviour—Information—Duty of Magistrate to proceed with case—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 1 (2) (a), s. 4 (p) (s), s. 55 (b), s. 109 (b).* The accused was arrested in Calcutta by the Inspector in charge of the Colootollah thana, under the provisions of s. 55 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and placed on his trial before a Bench of Honorary Magistrates on a charge under s. 109 (b) of the Code. The Magistrates discharged the accused on the ground that he was not properly before them, as the Inspector had no authority to arrest him. *Held*, that the order of discharge should be set aside and the case

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ss. 109 (b), 55 (b)—*concl.*

be proceeded with against the accused. That the arrest of the accused by the Inspector was quite legal. That the Magistrates were also empowered to put in force the provisions of s. 109 of the Code, whenever they had credible information that the accused had no ostensible means of livelihood or was unable to give a satisfactory account of himself and was within the limits of their jurisdiction. How he came before them was immaterial. *EMPEROR v. Ravalu Kesigadu*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 124, followed. *EMPEROR v. MADHO DHOBI* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 557

ss. 109, 110—*Order under s. 110 during the continuance of an order under s. 109—Evidence.* Ss. 109 and 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code have the same object and an order under s. 110 is not valid during the continuance of an order under s. 109. For a conviction under s. 110, that a person is by habit a thief the evidence must be of such a nature as would lead to a reasonable and definite ground for coming to the conclusion that the accused is an habitual thief. *GHOLAM ALI v. EMPEROR* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 543

s. 10.

See ante, s. 109.

See post, s. 496.

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—TO ACCUSED ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT.

I. L. R. 15 All. 365

See FURTHER ENQUIRY.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 8

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

5 C. W. N. 29, 249

6 C. W. N. 163

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 392, 455, 779

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 366

I. L. R. 24 All. 148, 471

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 1 All. 666

I. L. R. 23 All. 422

1.

General repulse—

Locus pœnitentiæ.—*Security for good behaviour.* The petitioner was imprisoned for one year on failure to furnish security for his good behaviour under s. 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code. About fifteen months after his release from jail fresh proceedings of the same nature were started against him and he was again ordered to furnish security to be of good behaviour. *Held*, that the order should be set aside as the petitioner had not had a sufficient *locus pœnitentiæ*. *JUNAB ALI v. EMPEROR* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 783

s.c. 8 C. W. N. 939

2.

Security for good behaviour—The taking of sureties without personal bonds or recognizances illegal. *Held*, that there is

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no provision of law by which a person required to find security to be of good behaviour can be called upon to provide sureties for his good behaviour without at the same time entering into his own bond for that purpose. *EMPEROR v. UDMI* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 262

3. ————— *Security for good behaviour—Subsequent conviction—Forfeiture of bond—Imprisonment for unexpired portion of the period for which security had been given. Held,* that where a person has given security for good behaviour and his security is subsequently forfeited, the amount of his forfeited bond may be exacted, but he cannot be also committed to prison for the unexpired portion of the term for which security had been taken. *EMPEROR v. JAGDEO SINGH* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 629

4. ————— s. 110 (a), (f)—*Bad livelihood—Evidence, how to be considered where several persons are proceeded against and their association is proved—General repute, evidence of—How far admissible in a charge under cl. (f)—Judgment in appeal—Defects of.* Where in a proceeding under s. 110, Criminal Procedure Code, it was clearly established that the petitioners, who were members of the same family being the father and his three sons, were associated together and formed a gang, and the evidence against all of them was the same: *Held,* that the case was one in which the evidence against the petitioners could rightly be dealt with together and that any minute inquiry into the complicity of each of the accused individually was not necessary. How far evidence of general repute may be taken into consideration in establishing the charge under cl. (f) discussed. *Akhoy Kumar v. The Queen-Empress*, 5 C. W. N. 249, *Wahed Ali Khan v. The Emperor*, 11 C. W. N. 789, referred to and explained. *PARASULLA v. THE KING-EMPEROR* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 244

5. ————— s. 110 (e)—*Abatement—Abetment of the commission of offences involving a breach of the peace—Residence—Jurisdiction. Held,* that where under the orders and with the connivance of the zamindar various acts of oppression are committed, such conduct of the zamindar would bring him within the scope of cl. (e) of s. 110, Criminal Procedure Code. *Held,* also, that for the purpose of proceeding under s. 110, Criminal Procedure Code, a Magistrate has jurisdiction to try a person, who has a residential house and frequently resides for the purpose of his business, within the local limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction, provided acts of oppression (the subject of the charges under s. 110) are committed, while he so resides. *KASI SUNDER ROY v. EMPEROR* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 419

————— ss. 110, 112, 190, 191 and 526—*Transfer—Security for good behaviour. Where a Magistrate refused to admit to bail a person against*

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ss. 110, 112, 190, 191 and 526—*concl.*

whom proceedings were pending under s. 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that "the accused is said to be a dangerous and violent man, who might use his liberty for the purpose of intimidating witnesses," the High Court declined to direct a transfer of the proceedings. Magistrates are left a very wide discretion as to the kind of information upon which they may act in instituting proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Code, and they are not bound to disclose its source. The provisions of s. 19 (c) and s. 191 do not apply to such proceedings. *MITHU KHAN, In re* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 172

————— ss. 110 (e), 112, 107—*Enquiry under s. 107 illegal without issuing notice under s. 112.* A Magistrate before taking action under s. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is bound to issue the notice required by s. 112 and his omission to do so is an illegality which will render the subsequent proceedings invalid. A notice issued with reference to s. 110 (e) is not sufficient as a preliminary to the Magistrate making an order under s. 107. *KRISHNASWAMI THATHACHARI v. VANAMAMALAI BHASHIAKAR* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 282

————— ss. 110, 117, 192, 256, 528, 529 (f), 540.

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 243

1. ————— ss. 110 and 118—*Security for good behaviour—Delegation of inquiry into sufficiency of security. Held,* that it is not competent to a Magistrate, who has passed an order under s. 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to delegate to another officer the duty of inquiring into the sufficiency of the security tendered, but such inquiry must be made by the Court by which the original order was passed. *Queen-Empress v. Pirithi Pal Singh*, All. Weekly Notes (1898) 154, and *Emperor v. Tota*, I. L. R. 25 All. 272, followed. *EMPEROR v. BALWANT* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 293

2. ————— *Security for good behaviour—Fresh proceedings taken immediately after the period of a previous security bond has expired—Locus penitentie.* Ranjit was bound over to be of good behaviour for a period of three years, which term expired on the 13th of June 1905. On the 20th of June 1905 fresh proceedings were started against him under s. 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Held,* that the interval was not long enough to give Ranjit any opportunity of showing that he was willing to adopt an honest livelihood, and that evidence relating to events prior to the 13th of June 1905 was inadmissible in support of a fresh order under s. 110. *Emperor v. Husain Ahmad Khan*, All. Weekly Notes (1905) 34, followed. *EMPEROR v. RANJIT* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 306

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872, VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

ss. 110 and 526—*Security for good behaviour—Transfer.* Held, that proceedings under s. 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be transferred to any Court outside the district within which such proceedings have been lawfully instituted. *In the matter of Amar Singh*, I. L. R. 16 All. 9, and *In the matter of Gudar Singh*, I. L. R. 19 All. 291, followed. *EMPEROR v. MAHENDRA SINGH* (1907) I. L. R. 30 All. 47

s. 112.

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 471

s. 114.

See PENAL CODE, s. 332.
I. L. R. 18 All. 246

S. 114, proviso—*Re-arresting person admitted to bail, if legal. Quære:* Whether the proviso to s. 114 gives a Magistrate power to re-arrest a person, who has already appeared, and has been admitted to bail. *RAGHUNANDAN PERSHAD v. EMPEROR* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 779

s. 115.

See *post*, s. 496.

s. 117.

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—CHARACTER I. L. R. 23 Calc. 621
I. L. R. 25 All. 273

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.
5 C. W. N. 249
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 392, 779

s. 117 (4)—*Parties in conflict with one another cannot be dealt with in one enquiry—Such joinder illegal.* Two or more persons are not 'associated together in the matter under enquiry' within the meaning of s. 117 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when there is a conflict between them, and they cannot therefore be dealt with in the same enquiry under the provisions of that section. Such a joinder is not a mere irregularity, but an illegality, which will vitiate the proceedings. *GANAPATHI BHATTA v. EMPEROR* (1908) I. L. R. 31 Mad. 276

ss 117, 118.

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.
I. L. R. All. 452

s. 118.

See *ante*, ss. 107, 110.

See RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP THE PEACE—WHEN RECOGNIZANCE MAY BE TAKEN.
7 C. W. N. 32

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES—SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR I. L. R. 23 All. 80

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s. 118—*concl'd.*

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.
I. L. R. 25 All. 273
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 471

ss. 118, 123.

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES I. L. R. 23 Calc. 249

s. 119.

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.
I. L. R. 24 All. 148

s. 122.

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.
6 C. W. N. 593
I. L. R. 25 All. 131
13 C. W. N. 80

1. *Security for good behaviour—Power of Magistrate to refuse to accept surety offered.* Held, that the fact that a proposed surety has on one occasion offended against the law and been punished for an offence under the Indian Penal Code does not of itself render such person for ever afterwards unfit to be surety for a party, who is required to give security for good behaviour. *EMPEROR v. RAGHUNATH SINGH* (1904) I. L. R. 26 All. 189

2. *Oaths Act (X of 1873), s. 4—Security for good behaviour—Inquiry into fitness of surety—Power of Magistrate in such inquiry to take evidence upon oath.* Held, that a Magistrate in inquiring under the provisions of s. 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure into the fitness of a surety tendered in obedience to an order under Ch. VIII of the Code, has power to record evidence upon oath or solemn affirmation. *Queen-Empress v. Prithipal Singh*, All. Weekly Notes (1898) 154, and *Emperor v. Tota*, All. Weekly Notes (1903) 36, referred to. *EMPEROR v. GHULAM MUSTAFA* (1904) I. L. R. 26 All. 371

s. 123.

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 878

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.
I. L. R. 25 All. 375

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT GENERALLY.
I. L. R. 3 All. 422

1. *Committal to prison for failure to give security to be of good behaviour—"Sentence of imprisonment."* When a person is committed to prison under s. 123 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for failure to give security to be of good behaviour, he is not undergoing a "sentence of imprisonment" within the meaning of s. 397 of the Code. *EMPEROR v. MUTHUKOMARAN* (1904) I. L. R. 27 Mad. 525

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VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 123—*concl'd.*

2. ————— *Reference to High Court by Presidency Magistrate—Presidency Magistrate, whether should record evidence in a case under s. 110, where he has to make reference to the High Court—S. 362—Evidence of repute—Association with bad characters—Previous conviction, value of, as evidence.* S. 362, Criminal Procedure Code, does not apply to a case under s. 110, Criminal Procedure Code, in which the Presidency Magistrate has to make a reference to the High Court under s. 123 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, so as to absolve him from the duty of recording evidence. But the record of evidence by the Presidency Magistrate in such a case, need not be as full as in a similar case in the Court of a Mofussil Magistrate. Evidence of association with bad characters against the accused in a proceeding under s. 110, Criminal Procedure Code, is evidence of reputation, but such reputation can only be based upon association with proved bad characters and not with reputed bad characters. Previous convictions are not substantive evidence in a case under s. 110, Criminal Procedure Code, though they may have an effect in deciding for what length of time the accused is to be bound down. *Shaik Babu v. Emperor, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1036*, distinguished. *Schein v. Queen-Empress, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 799*, and *Emperor v. Tula Khan, I. L. R. 30 All. 334*, referred to. *EMPEROR v. NEPAL SHIKARY (1908)* **13 C. W. N. 318**

1. ————— **ss. 123, 397—Sentence of imprisonment on person already in prison under s. 123.** A person committed to prison under s. 123 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not undergoing a 'sentence' of imprisonment. Where such a person is convicted of an offence and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, such term cannot, under s. 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, be made to commence on the expiry of the period for which he has been committed to prison under s. 123, but must commence from the date of the order. *Emperor v. Muthukumara, I. L. R. 27 Mad. 525*, followed. *King-Emperor v. Tulakhan, I. L. R. 30 All. 334*, dissented from. *JOGI KANNIGAN v. EMPEROR (1908)* **I. L. R. 31 Mad. 515**

2. ————— *Act IX of 1894, s. 3 (3)—Security for good behaviour—Imprisonment on failure to find security—"Sentence."* Held, that where a person is ordered by a Magistrate to be "detained in prison" pending the orders of the Sessions Judge under s. 123 of the Code of Criminal Procedure such person must be considered as a person undergoing a sentence of imprisonment and not merely as an under-trial prisoner detained in custody. Held, also, that an order for imprisonment on failure to furnish security for good behaviour is a "sentence" within the meaning of s. 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Queen-Empress v. Diwan Chand, Punjab Rec. 1895 Cr. J. 45*, referred to. *EMPEROR v. TULA KHAN (1908)*

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VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 125.

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 455

1. ————— *District Magistrate's power to cancel bonds for keeping the peace.* The jurisdiction conferred by s. 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not an appellate or revisional, but an original jurisdiction in the exercise of which the District Magistrate may cancel any bond for keeping the peace, when it is made to appear that by reason of circumstances arising subsequent to the date of the execution of the bond the continuance of the latter is not necessary. An order for cancelling a bond cannot be made before it has been executed. No appeal lies to the District Magistrate in the case of orders to keep the peace; but in a proper case, he may make a reference to the High Court under the provisions of s. 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *BARKA CHANDRA DEY v. JANMEJOY DUTT (1905)* **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 948**
s.c. 9 C. W. N. 860

2. ————— *Security to keep the peace—Power of the District Magistrate to cancel a security bond.* A District Magistrate has power under s. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to direct the cancellation of a bond to keep the peace executed on an order by a Subordinate Magistrate, on other grounds than that the bond is no longer necessary. *Barka Chandra Dey v. Janmejoy Dutt, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 948*, overruled. *NABU SARDAR v. EMPEROR (1906)* **I. L. R. 34 Calc. 1**

————— **s. 127 (1872, s. 480).**

See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 42

————— **s. 133 (1872, s. 521 : 1861-69, s. 308), ss. 134 to 141 (1872, ss. 522 to 525 : 1861-69, ss. 309 to 311).**

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—
ORDERS OF CRIMINAL COURTS.

6 B. L. R. 643
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 293

See JUDICIAL OFFICERS, LIABILITY OF.

2 Bom. 407
4 Bom. A. C. 150
5 Mad. 345
4 B. L. R. A. C. 37
13 W. R. 13
7 B. L. R. 449
16 W. R. 63

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—
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WITH.

See JURY—JURY UNDER NUISANCE SEC-
TIONS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.
I. L. R. 16 All. 158

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See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE . 5 C. W. N. 173, 566
7 C. W. N. 117

I. L. R. 23 All. 159

See PENAL CODE, s. 188.

10 C. L. R. 193

12 C. L. R. 231

I. L. R. 13 All. 577

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 9

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 475

See PUBLIC NUISANCE.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 930

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 283

1. ———— *Bonâ fide claim of title—Magistrate's jurisdiction—Stay of proceeding for a limited time to give defendant opportunity to bring civil suit—Prima facie case for exercise of jurisdiction—Limitations to its exercise—Test of bonâ fides.* In a proceeding instituted against the petitioner under s. 133, for certain acts which were complained of as a nuisance committed in a public place, the petitioner raised a question of title, and the Magistrate, believing it to have been raised *bonâ fide*, stayed the proceeding, giving the petitioner two months' time to establish his claim in a civil suit: *Held*, that the Magistrate had acted properly and in strict accordance with the ruling in *Luckhee Narain Banerjee v. Ram Kumar Mukherjee*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 564. *BELAT ALI v. ABDUR RAHIM* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 143

2. ———— *Order directing removal of certain buildings—Obstruction to public way—Bonâ fide question of title—Procedure—Jury, reference to—Question for their decision—Magistrate, duty of—Misdirection.* A Magistrate acting under s. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should first of all satisfy himself as to the *bonâ fides* of the claim, if any, and then determine whether the parties should be referred to the Civil Court. *Preo Nath Dey v. Gobordhone Malo*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 279; *Queen-Empress v. Bissessur Sahu*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 562, referred to. When a jury is claimed and appointed, they have only to try the question whether the Magistrate's conditional order is reasonable and proper. Where the question referred to the jury was "whether there was a public right of way": *Held*, that that was not a proper reference. *MATUKDHARI TEWARI v. HARI MADHAB DAS* (1905) 9 C. W. N. 72

3. ———— *Order for removal of obstruction on public land—Defence raising question of title—Procedure.* When in a matter under s. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the person called upon to show cause raises a question of title it is for the trying Magistrate to decide whether the question so raised is raised *bonâ fide*. But the trying Magistrate ought not to go further and

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s. 133—*contd.*

decide whether the title set up does or does not exist. *EMPEROR v. DOST MUHAMMAD* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 98

4. ———— *Procedure—Obstruction to a public way—Jury.* Where, at the request of a person, upon whom a notice has been served under s. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a jury is appointed under s. 138 of the Code, it is within the competence of the jury to decide as to the validity of an objection that the way alleged to have been obstructed is not a public way. It is not for the Magistrate to decide whether such an objection is raised *bonâ fide* before referring it to the jury. *Kailash Chander Sen v. Ram Lall Mitra*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 869. *Held*, also, that there is no special procedure laid down by the Code to be adopted by a jury appointed under s. 138 in coming to a finding on the question submitted to them. *Queen-Empress v. Khushali Ram*, I. L. R. 18 All. 158, referred to. *Held*, also, that a person, who has applied for a jury under s. 138, is bound by the verdict of the jury, and cannot afterwards raise such a plea as that the obstruction was caused in the exercise of a *bonâ fide* claim of right. *In the matter of Lachman*, All. Weekly Notes (1900) 180, followed. *EMPEROR v. RAM BILAS* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 364

ss. 133, 135, 137, 138, 141—*Conditional order under s. 133—Application to show cause and also for the appointment of a jury—Illegality—Jury failing to do their duty—Magistrate's power to make order absolute without taking evidence.* The party against whom a conditional order under s. 133, Criminal Procedure Code, is made cannot both show cause against the order and ask for the appointment of a jury. S. 135, Criminal Procedure Code, gives the person against whom the conditional order is made the right to adopt either of these alternatives. If he adopts the former alternative, the Magistrate is bound to take action under s. 137, and if he adopts the second alternative, then the Magistrate is bound to take action under s. 138. Both ss. 137 and 138 are imperative in their terms. The Magistrate has no discretion in the matter. Where the petitioners against whom a conditional order under s. 133, Criminal Procedure Code, was made, applied to the Magistrate for showing cause against the order and also for the appointment of a jury but in the end elected to proceed with the application for the appointment of a jury, but the jury failing to submit their verdict within the ample time granted them by the Magistrate, the Magistrate proceeded under s. 141 to make the order absolute: *Held*, the Magistrate was justified in making the order absolute without taking evidence under s. 137, the petitioners not having taken any action, after the jury had failed to perform their duty, to move the Magistrate for taking evidence in

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— ss. 133, 135, 137, 138, 141—*concl'd.*

their behalf. *Semble* : The petitioners might have been allowed, after the jury had failed to perform their duty, to revert to their application for showing cause and to adduce evidence, if they had moved the Magistrate for that purpose. *KISHORI LAL PANURI v. THE EMPEROR* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 387

— ss. 133, 136, 140—*Where an order under s. 133 is not complied with, prosecution sustainable under s. 136 without notice under s. 140—Order under s. 133 cannot direct works to be done which are not necessary for the safety of the public.* Where an order issued by a Magistrate under s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not complied with or protested against within the time fixed by the order, a prosecution of the person disobeying under s. 136 is sustainable without notice under s. 140. Where a well adjoining a road is dangerous to the public as well as to the existence of the road, an order under s. 133 can direct the construction of such works only as are necessary for the safety of the public and not of the works necessary for the safety of the road. *Queen-Empress v. Bishambar Lal*, **I. L. R. 13 All. 577**, approved. *ALUVALA GURUVIAH v. EMPEROR* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 280

— ss. 133, 137.

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUMMONING WITNESS . **6 C. W. N. 548**

— ss. 133 and 137—*Order to show cause—Accused appearing—Starting proceedings.* Where a person ordered to show cause under s. 133, Criminal Procedure Code, appears and shows cause, the Magistrate is bound to take evidence as in a summons case, *i.e.*, the complainant has to start proceedings by adducing evidence and then the party showing cause may produce his own evidence, if so advised. When this has been done, but not before, the Magistrate can make the conditional order absolute if he finds sufficient reason for doing so. *Srinath Roy v. Ainaddi Halder*, **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 395**, followed. *KING-EMPEROR v. HINGU* (1909) . . . **I. L. R. 31 All. 453**

— ss. 133, 342, 488—*“Accused person”*

—*Person against whom proceeding under s. 193 taken—Examination on oath—False evidence—Perjury—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 193.* A person against whom proceedings under s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code are taken is not an accused person, and he commits an offence under s. 193 of the Penal Code, if he makes a false statement during his examination on oath in the proceedings. *The Queen-Empress v. Mona Puna*, **I. L. R. 16 Bom. 661**; *Jhoja Singh v. Queen-Empress*, **I. L. R. 23 Calc. 493**; and *Queen-Empress v. Matasaddi Lal*, **I. L. R. 21 All. 107**, distinguished. *HIRANANDA OJHA v. EMPEROR* (1905)

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V OF 1898 (X OF 1882, X OF 1872,
VIII OF 1869, XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

— ss. 136, 140 (1872, s. 525 : 1861-69, s. 311).

See RIGHT OF SUIT—JUDICIAL OFFICERS SUITS AGAINST . **8 Bom. A. C. 94**

s. 137.

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—DECLARATION OF TITLE.

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 460

s. 136.

See VERDICT OF JURY. **6 C. W. N. 886**

s. 139.

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE . . . **5 C. W. N. 566**
6 C. W. N. 886

s. 140.

See PENAL CODE, s. 188.

I. L. R. 13 All. 377

— s. 144 (1872, s. 518 ; 1861-69, ss. 62, 63).

See BREACH OF THE PEACE.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 154, 793

See FINE . . . **7 W. R. Cr. 37**

See JUDICIAL OFFICERS, LIABILITY OF.

4 B. L. R. A. C. 37 : 13 W. R. 13
7 B. L. R. 449 : 16 W. R. 63

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—PUBLIC WAYS, OBSTRUCTION OF.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 20

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS.

11 C. W. N. 79

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 17 All. 485

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 935

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 471

See NUISANCE—PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER PENAL CODE . **I. L. R. 8 All. 99**

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 402

— proceeding under—

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—POWER TO GRANT SANCTION.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 18

See SECURITY TO KEEP THE PEACE.

11 C. W. N. 121

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872, VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 144—*contd.*

proceeding under—*concl.*

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CHARTER ACT, s. 15—CRIMINAL CASES.

21 W. R. Cr. 26

22 W. R. Cr. 24, 78

23 W. R. Cr. 34

24 W. R. 80

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 293

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 580

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 80

1. ———— **Removal of Idol—Order directing or forbidding removal of idol and celebration of a festival at a certain place—Jurisdiction of Criminal Court** Where one party applied to a Magistrate for an order directing the other party to take some idols which were in their possession and custody to the residence of the applicant for worship during a certain festival in accordance with an alleged custom and usage of long standing: *Held*, that a Criminal Court has no power to decide the question of any such right as claimed by the applicant, much less to assume it, and proceed to make an order thereon under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *KAMAL NARAIN ADHIKARI v. RAJA JOTINDRA MOHAN ROY* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 376

2. ———— **Holding hāt—Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Order to hold hāt on certain days, if legal.** S. 144 does not empower a Magistrate to direct that a hāt be held on certain days only of the week. If his object is thereby to prevent the hāt from being held on certain other days of the week, he has power, under the section, to make an order prohibiting the party from holding the hāt on those days. *SHAMANAND DAS PAHARAJ v. EMPEROR* (1904) I. L. R. 31 Calc. 350 8 C. W. N. 781

3. ———— **Order prohibiting holding of hāt within a certain area—Proper procedure.** Where an order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, enjoined the petitioner not to establish a rival market within a quarter of a mile of a certain market place: *Held*, that it was not a proper order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, as it did not mention any limits of time and there was nothing in the order to indicate whether the petitioner would be entitled to hold any market at any time within a quarter of a mile. The object of s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, is not that orders should be made prescribing the holding of hāts indefinitely within a certain area for two months. The proper way of preventing a breach of the peace is to proceed under s. 107, Criminal Procedure Code. *BIDHU RANJAN MAZUMDAR v. RAMESH CHANDRA RAI* (1906) 11 C. W. N. 223

4. ———— **Collection of rent—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 188—Collection of rent—Disobedience of order.** An order cannot be passed under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, prohibit-

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872, VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 144—*contd.*

ing a person from collecting rents from tenants. Disobedience of such an order would not render a person liable to prosecution under s. 188 of the Penal Code. *PREM CHAND SINGH ROY v. DHARMADASS SINGH ROY* (1905) 9 C. W. N. 392

5. ———— **Material facts—Jurisdiction—Tenant—Sub-tenant—Omission to state material facts in the order.** Before a Magistrate can take action under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code he must be of opinion that immediate prevention or speedy remedy is necessary, and when he has made up his mind that it is so, he must state the material facts in the order. Where, therefore, a Magistrate passed an order directing the second party not to interfere with the first party in the cultivation of his khas lands or the collection of rents from his under-tenants, and it did not appear from the proceedings that he was of opinion that immediate prevention or speedy remedy was necessary and the order made did not state the material facts of the case: *Held*, that the order was bad and must be set aside. *KAROOLAL SAJAWAL v. SHYAM* (1905) I. L. R. 32 Calc. 935 9 C. W. N. 864

6. ———— **Division of crops—Irrevocable order.** An order for division of crops between the tenants and a rival zamindar does not come within the purview of s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, nor is a Magistrate empowered to make an order of an irrevocable nature under that section. *UMATAL FATIMA v. NEMAI CHARAN BANNERJEE* (1905) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 154

7. ———— **Limitation of time—Prohibitory order without express limitation of time—Legality of the order.** An order under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not bad because it does not state that its operation is confined to two months, or some shorter period, from the making thereof. Unless there is something in the order which shows that it was intended that it should remain in force for more than two months, it must be presumed that the order is to be limited to two months as required by cl. (5) of the section. *Gulam Mohamad v. Bhuban Mohun Moitra*, 2 C. W. N. 422; *Ranjit Singh v. Luchman Prosad*, 7 C. W. N. 140, and *Bidhu Ranjan Majumdar v. Ramesh Chandra Rai*, 11 C. W. N. 223, discussed. *RAM NATH CHOWDHRY v. EMPEROR* (1907) I. L. R. 34 Calc. 897

8. ———— **Disputed possession—When order should not be passed under—Question of possession disputed—Proper procedure—S. 145, Criminal Procedure Code.** In a dispute regarding land when the question of possession is disputed between the parties, the proper procedure to be adopted by the Magistrate is to pass an order in a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, deciding the question of possession on evi-

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 144—*contd.*

ence, and not an order in a proceeding under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code. Where in a proceeding under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, holding that the 1st party were in possession, directed the 2nd party to refrain from interfering with that possession but the District Magistrate in revision, holding that the 2nd party were entitled to possession, directed them to continue in possession and prohibited the 1st party from interfering with their possession: *Held*, that both orders were bad in law. **PARKAR MAHTON v. RAM KHELWAN (1906)** . 11 C. W. N. 271

9. — Embankment, erection of—
Stopping the erection of an embankment which may cause loss to others—Legality—Executive order—Magistrate explanation supplementing the order passed. Order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be passed where the object of the order is merely to prevent pecuniary loss to any person. *Prayag Sing v. The Empress, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 103, Isab Mondal v. The Emperor, 8 C. W. N. 373*, followed. Where the Deputy Commissioner ordered the petitioner to stop the erection of an embankment on the ground that the erection might cause great loss to the opposite party and in his explanation to the High Court submitted that his order was an executive order having for its object the prevention of a disturbance of the peace: *Held*, that the order was illegal and should be set aside, inasmuch as it could not have been passed under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, its object being merely to prevent loss to the opposite party. **RAM AUTAR SAHU v. KISHNUPUT RAM CHAUBEY (1908)**
13 C. W. N. 188

10. — Order issuing notice under
—Subsequent confirmation of the order on cause shown, whether extends the period of operation of the first order. Where the Magistrate made an order issuing notice under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, against a person not to do a certain thing and directed him to show cause on a subsequent day against the order and on such cause being shown he refused to withdraw the order: *Held*, that the order issuing the notice was an order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, and as such could remain in force for two months from its date and the confirmation of the said order on a subsequent day on cause being shown could not extend the period of its operation beyond these two months. **J. A. THOMSON v. THE EMPEROR (1908)**
13 C. W. N. 195

11. — ss. 144, 435 (3)—Reaping of crops—*Order restraining raiyats from reaping crops for securing payment of rent to Government or landlord—Breach of the peace, apprehension of, owing to interference with lawful rights—Revision, power of the High Court.* S. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not give jurisdiction to a Magistrate to pass an order preventing raiyats from reaping the

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 144—*concl.*

crops they have sown from an apprehension that, if they are allowed to reap, Government or other landlord might lose rent and the latter in attempting to prevent the raiyats from reaping might cause a breach of the peace. Such an order being clearly outside the scope of s. 144, it is competent to the High Court to reverse such order notwithstanding s. 435 (3) of the Code. **ISAB MONDAL v. EMPEROR (1904)** . 8 C. W. N. 373

s. 145 (1872, s. 530; 1861-69 s. 318)

See BENCH OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 754

See BREACH OF THE PEACE.

See COSTS . 8 C. W. N. 178.

See DISPUTE RELATING TO LAND.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 774

See EJECTMENT, SUIT FOR.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 339

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—CRIMINAL COURT, PROCEEDINGS IN.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 187

See FISHERY I. L. R. 35 Calc. 117

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT.

11 C. W. N. 743

LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURTS, 1835,
CL. 29 . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 188

See LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877).

12 C. W. N. 840

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 47 (1859,
s. 1, CL. 7) . 8 W. R. 490

9 W. R. 480

3 N. W. 171

6 C. L. R. 93

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 709

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 648

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 731

See MAGISTRATE—POWERS OF MAGISTRATE I. L. R. 29 Calc. 242, 885

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 287

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE . 7 C. W. N. 142

See PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 249

See POSSESSION—NATURE OF POSSESSION

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 378

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 208

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 33

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO.

See RECEIVER I. L. R. 30 Calc. 593

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—

GENERAL RULES FOR EXERCISE OF
I. L. R. 24 All. 443

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 145—*contd.*

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*
MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

I. L. R. 25 All. 537

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 471

See SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT (I OF 1877).

I. L. R. 30 All. 331
12 C. W. N. 696

See TOLLS . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 986

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—
GROUND FOR TRANSFER.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 709

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUM-
MONING WITNESSES.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 508

1. ———— *Manager or agent, possession of.*
There is jurisdiction under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code to make an order in favour of a person, who claims to be in possession of the disputed land as agent to or manager for the proprietors, when the actual proprietors are not residents within the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. *Jhabu Singh v. Rutherford*, 7 C. W. N. 208, overruled. *Newaz Ali v. Ram Ballabh Chakravarti*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 916 note, and *Brown v. Prithiraj Mandal*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 423, distinguished. *DHONDHAI SINGH v. FOLLET* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 48

2. ———— *Refusal to examine witnesses—Interference by High Court.* Where in a proceeding under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code the trying Magistrate refused to examine certain witnesses on behalf of one of the parties, who were present in Court: *Held*, that the trying Magistrate had acted in contravention of the provisions of s. 145, c. 1 (4) of the Code, and the High Court had power to interfere. *MANMOTHA NATH MITTER v. BARODA PRASAD ROY CHOWDHRY* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 685

3. ———— *Non-service of copy of order under cl. (3)—Want of jurisdiction.* Where a copy of an order as contemplated by s. 145, cl. (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, was not published in some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute: *Held*, that the order passed should be set aside inasmuch as the provisions in cl. (3) of s. 145 are of a mandatory character, and the failure to publish a copy of the order in accordance with the provisions of the latter part of cl. (3) affects the jurisdiction of the Court. *Held*, further, that the proceedings drawn up in the case did not show that there was such an immediate danger of a breach of the peace as would justify proceedings under s. 145. *JANU MANJHI v. MANIR- UDDIN* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 590

4. ———— *Notice of the date of proceeding and copy of the order drawn up under s. 145 (1), service of—Allegation of their non-receipt*

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 145—*contd.*

—*Magistrate's duty—Ex parte proceeding.* Where in a proceeding under s. 145, an allegation was made by the first party of the non-receipt of the notice of the date of trial and of the copy of the order under cl. (1) of that section, but the Magistrate without making any investigation as to the truth or otherwise of the allegation proceeded to determine the case upon the written statement of the opposite party and passed an order in favour of that party: *Held*, that, before proceeding with the matter, the Magistrate was bound to be satisfied that the notice of the proceeding and the copy of the order drawn up by him were duly served on the first party. The order passed in favour of the opposite party was set aside. *SRIPATI CHARAN MUNDLE v. RAM KUMAR BAGDI* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 76

5. ———— *Possession—Ex parte order—Service of, proof of—Order passed on the evidence of person not called by either party.* A Magistrate should not accept the written return merely of the serving peon as a sufficient proof of service of his order under cl. 1 of s. 145. An order for possession under s. 145, passed on the evidence only of a person who was not called by either party, was bad. *JOGENDRA NATH RAI v. ABU SHAIKH* (1904).

8 C. W. N. 719

6. ———— *cl. (4)—Order of possession on documentary evidence alone, without examination of witnesses how far proper.* Where in a proceeding under s. 145, the Magistrate considered that a decree of the year 1881 in favour of one of the parties was conclusive on the question of possession and therefore refused to receive oral evidence from the other party: *Held*, that the Magistrate ought to have taken evidence. The order was accordingly set aside. *LOWSEN SANTAL v. KALI CHARAN SANTAL* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 719

7. ———— *Order without evidence—Time for filing written statement, application for—Adjournment—Discretion.* A Magistrate cannot pass an order under s. 145 without some evidence, although the case is decided *ex parte*. A Magistrate has discretion to refuse an application for time to file a written statement in a proceeding under s. 145. *GOBIND CHANDRA CHAKRABUTTY v. NIBARAN CHANDRA BHUTTACHARJI* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 642

8. ———— *Partition, suit for, pending—Property declared joint—Order under the section if could be properly passed before actual partition—Jurisdiction.* Where in a suit for partition certain properties have been declared to be joint and partition has been ordered to be effected, the properties must, until that jointness is disturbed by actual partition in the suit, be treated as having been declared by the Civil Court to be joint. No order under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be made, whilst the suit is still pending, in regard to

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CODE CAT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 145—*contd.*

such properties. *DHARANI KANTA LAHIRY CHOW-
DHRY v. GIRJA KANTA LAHIRY CHOWDHRY* (1904)
8 C. W. N. 485

9. *Partnership pro-
perty—Dispute among partners for exclusive control—
Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Dispute relating to right
of management not a dispute relating to possession
—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 253.* A dispute
between co-partners claiming exclusive control of
the partnership business does not come within the
purview of s. 145. *RADHA RAMAN GHOSE v. BALI-
RAM RAM* (1904) . . . **8 C. W. N. 885**

10. *Jurisdiction of
Magistrate—Parties—Manager—Title—Possession—
Encroachment.* The fact that the Manager and not
his employer, the Zamindar, has been made a party
to a proceeding under s. 145 of the Criminal Proce-
dure Code is a mere irregularity, or at most an error
of law, which does not affect the Magistrate's juris-
diction. *Dhondhai Singh v. Follet*, **I. L. R. 31 Calc.
48**, referred to. Where a party claims no easement
or customary right, any intermittent acts of en-
croachment on his part, such as cutting a few trees
or felling some underwood, would not affect the
title or possession of the superior landlord. *Framji
Cursetji v. Goculdas Madhowski*, **I. L. R. 16 Bom. 338**;
Agency Company v. Short, **L. R. 13 App. Cas. 793**,
referred to. *BHOLANATH SINGH v. WOOD* (1905)
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 287

11. *Process—Magis-
trate—Extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court—
Prejudice—Charter Act (24 and 25 Vict. c. 104) s. 15.*
It is not obligatory on a Magistrate to assist parties
to a proceeding under s. 145 of the Criminal Proce-
dure Code in producing their witnesses, and they
cannot claim as a matter of right that process should
be issued by the Court to enable them to bring for-
ward their evidence. *Harendra Narain Singh v.
Bhobani Prsa Baruani*, **I. L. R. 11 Calc. 762**; *Ram
Chandra Das v. Monohar Roy*, **I. L. R. 21 Calc.
29**; *Madhab Chandra Tanti v. Martin*, **I. L. R. 30
Calc. 508** note; *Surja Kanta Acharjee v. Hem Chandra
Chowdhury*, **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 508**, and *Radhanath
Singh v. Mangal Gurari*, **2, C. L. J. 86** note, dissen-
ted from. *Manmatha Nath Mitter v. Burada
Prasad Roy*, **I. L. R. 31 Calc. 685**, referred to.
The powers of superintendence under s. 15 of the
Charter Act should, in cases under s. 145 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, be exercised with cau-
tion; and the Court ought not to interfere un-
less satisfied that the party has been prejudiced
by the proceedings in the Court below. *Sukh Lal
Sekh v. Tara Chand Ta*, **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 68**,
followed. Where a party had obtained summonses
upon his witnesses, and on the failure of some of
them to appear, applied for fresh summonses
against them, which the Magistrate refused, and
where it was further alleged that he had refused to
allow a witness to prove certain documents: *Held*,

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 145—*contd.*

that there was nothing to show that the absent wit-
nesses could not have been made to attend without
the assistance of the Court, nor whether they were
material witnesses, nor that any questions were
put to the witness which were improperly dis-
allowed, and that the party was not, therefore,
shown to have been prejudiced. *TARA PADA
BISWAS v. NURUL HUQ* (1905)
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1093

12. *cl. (1)—Grounds to satisfy
Magistrate as to necessity of taking proceedings—
It must be specifically stated in the initial order—
Police-report, reference to—Effect.* When the ini-
tial order made under s. 145, cl. (1) of the Criminal
Procedure Code does not state in express terms the
grounds upon which the Magistrate is satisfied that
a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exist-
ed but such grounds appear in the police-report
on which the order is founded and to which it
makes reference,—there is substantial compliance
with the provisions of s. 145, cl. (1) of the Criminal
Procedure Code. *KHOSH MAHOMED SIRCAR v. NA-
ZIR MAHOMED* (1905) . . . **9 C. W. 1065**

13. *Immoveable pro-
perty, dispute as to—Possession—Title—Costs—
Damages.* Proceedings under s. 145 of the Criminal
Procedure Code were instituted with reference to
a *bund* erected by the second party upon land
claimed both by the first and second parties. The
Magistrate treated the case as if it were solely one
of title and made an order directing the removal of
the *bund*, and he further awarded one of the parties
Rs 50 for the damage done to his crops as well as
for costs in the case. *Held*, that the entire order
was illegal and should be set aside, including the
order as to costs. *PRAYAG MAHATON v. GOBIND
MAHATON* (1905). . . **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 602**
s.c. 9 C. W. N. 862

14. *Possession given
by Civil Court—Practice.* Where the petitioner had
eight days before the institution of proceedings
under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code been
put in possession of a portion of the disputed plots
of land by the Civil Court in execution of a decree
establishing his right to the same. *Held*, it was the
duty of the Magistrate in the proceedings under s.
145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to find pos-
session of the portion in accordance with the decree
of the Civil Court. The order so far as it directs
the attachment of the disputed land covered by that
decree is without jurisdiction. *GULRAJ MARWARI
v. SHEIKH BHATTOO* (1905) **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 796**

15. *Definition—
“Crops or other produce of land”—Crops severed from
the land not within the definition—Jurisdiction.* *Held*
that the words “crops or other produce of land” as
used in s. 145 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
do not include crops, which have been severed from
the land upon which they grew. A Magistrate has

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 145—contd.

therefore no jurisdiction to attach under s. 146 of the Code a crop of mahua no longer growing on the trees. *Ramjan Ali v. Janardhan Singh*, I. L. R. 30 Cal. 110, followed. *CHAURASI v. RAMA SHANKAR* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 266

16. ——— *Enquiry to be held before issuing preliminary order under—Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Failure of jurisdiction where Magistrate refuses to receive evidence which party is entitled to adduce under s. 145 (5).* In order that a Magistrate may have jurisdiction to act under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he must be satisfied from a Police report, or other information, that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land, etc. Where there is no police report the statement of interested parties ought to be received with great caution and ought not to be acted upon, unless they are corroborated by the testimony of less interested persons. The opposite party also ought to be given an opportunity of cross-examining the party making such statements before the Magistrate takes any action on them. Under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a party who is required by a preliminary order to attend at the Magistrate's Court, is entitled to show that no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists or had existed, and it is not open to such Magistrate to refuse to receive such evidence, when tendered. Where the Magistrate refuses to receive such evidence his order will be set aside as having been passed without jurisdiction. *Per DAVIES, J.*—A Magistrate acts *ultra vires* in clubbing together disputes relating to a large number of villages and treating them as one. Each village must stand on its own footing and the Magistrate should satisfy himself that a dispute existed in respect of all the villages. He should ascertain, as regards each village, which party was in possession at the date of the order and confirm that possession. The object of Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure being to procure prompt action to avert breaches of the peace the Legislature could not have contemplated under that chapter wholesale proceedings in regard to a large number of villages which, if the procedure above stated be adopted, would entail a prolonged enquiry. *KUMARA TIRUMALRAJA v. SOWCAR LODD, GOVIND DOSS KRISHNA DOSS* 1906) . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 561

17. ——— *Dispute concerning land—Omission to publish a copy of the initiatory order at or near the subject of dispute—Jurisdiction—Procedure—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898). s. 145, cls. (1) and (3)—Revision—Power of High Court to interfere in revision—Prejudice—Charter Act (24 and 25 Vict. c. 104), s. 15.* Where the Magistrate drew up an initiatory order under s. 145, cl. (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, but omitted to direct the publication of a copy of it at or near the subject of dispute, and it was not so

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 145—contd.

published in accordance with cl. (3) of that section: *Held*, that the provisions as to the publication of a copy of the order in s. 145, cl. (3) of the Code, is directory, and relates to a matter of procedure only and not of jurisdiction: that if cl. (1) of s. 145 has been complied with, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to deal with the case, and the mere fact that he omitted to have a copy of such order published by affixing it to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute does not deprive him of jurisdiction, but is an irregularity in his procedure. The power of interference of the High Court in cases under s. 145 of the Code is only under s. 15 of the Charter Act. It is discretionary and ought in such cases to be exercised with every caution. Where a lower Court has proceeded with irregularity the High Court should not interfere, unless it can be shown that some one has been materially prejudiced by such irregularity. If, however, the subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction the High Court will interfere. Where the parties were duly served and appeared and the case was contested before the Magistrate, and it was only subsequently discovered by searching the records that a copy of the initiatory order had not been published locally and where it was not suggested that any one had been in the least prejudiced by the omission, it was *held*, that the High Court ought not to interfere under s. 15 of the Charter Act. *Per GHOSE, J.*—The Magistrate acquires jurisdiction under the conditions of cl. (1) have been fulfilled and cls. (3) and (4) lay down the procedure by which the jurisdiction is to be exercised, but the procedure prescribed is mandatory and not simply directory. When a Magistrate fails to comply with cl. (3) he does not act without jurisdiction, but illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction and the High Court has the power to interfere under the Charter Act. But such non-compliance is not an illegality, which makes it obligatory upon the Court to interfere, unless some prejudice to any party has been thereby occasioned. *Janu Manjhi v. Maniruddin* 8 C. W. N. 590, *Nawab Khajah Solemollah v. Ishan Chandra Das*, 9 C. W. N. 909 and *Hari Kishen Bhagat v. Kashi Prosad Singh*, *Unreported Cr. Rev. 472 of 1905*, overruled. *SUKH LAL SHEIKH v. TARA CHAND TA* (1905)

I. L. R. 33 Cal. 68
9 C. W. N. 1046

18. ——— *Police-report—Likelihood of breach of peace—Interference by High Court—Subject-matter of dispute not clearly defined—Trees, dispute as to.* The High Court may interfere in a proceeding instituted by a Magistrate under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, when the police-report on which the proceeding is based states in the vaguest terms that each of the parties claims a certain right, and that inasmuch as both the parties are men of substance there might be a breach of the peace. Before a proceeding is drawn

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 145—*contd.*

up under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, the subject-matter of the dispute must be clearly determined. *SURJAKANTA ACHARJA v. JAGAD-INDRA NATH ROY* (1906) 11 C. W. N. 198

19. Joint property—

Exclusive possession, claim to—Jurisdiction. Proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be instituted with respect to a dispute between two parties having joint rights to the land in dispute, each claiming exclusive possession thereof. *MAKHAN LAL ROY v. BARADA KANTA ROY* (1906) 11 C. W. N. 512

20. Police-report stat-

ing possibility of a breach of the peace. Where proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, were instituted on a police-report which showed that the two parties were disputing about the possession of a tank and that they were big zemindars, and which stated that though there was nothing to show that there was a likelihood of a breach of the peace, yet it was not impossible that there should be a breach of the peace: *Held*, that the police-report, as it is, cannot be and ought not to be the foundation of a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code. The opinion expressed by the police-officer without sufficient materials ought not to be the ground for the institution of the proceedings. Every case in which the question as to the likelihood of a breach of the peace that should justify the initiation of proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, arises, must be judged on its own merits. *MAHARAJ BAHADUR SINGH v. RAJA RANJIT SINGH*. (1906) 11 C. W. N. 835

21. Omission of

Magistrate to state grounds for passing order is an irregularity and does not render the proceedings void, if no prejudice caused thereby. The omission of a Magistrate, in his order initiating proceedings under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to state the grounds on which he is satisfied that there was a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, is an irregularity, and will not, when the party is not prejudiced in the conduct of the inquiry by such omission, render the proceedings of the Magistrate void. Want of notice to one party in possession cannot be set up by another party who had notice and who appeared in the proceedings. *CHIN-NAFFUDAYAN, In the matter of*. (1907) 11 C. W. N. 30 Mad. 548

22. Possession—

Dispute concerning land—Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Proper question for determination—Actual possession—Decision based not on oral evidence but on settlement proceedings. The only question, which a Magistrate has to decide in a proceeding under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is as to who is in actual possession of the disputed land. Where the Magistrate, while holding that the oral

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 145—*contd.*

evidence of actual possession was in favour of one party, proceeded to discuss and decide as to the legal effect under the Bengal Survey Act, of a recent order of an Assistant Settlement Officer passed in an inquiry into a boundary dispute between the parties, awarding possession to the opposite party and also as to the maintainability under the circumstances of proceedings under s. 145 of the Code, the civil remedies available to the defeated party, the legality of the above order and his power to set the same aside and directed the first part to be maintained in possession in accordance with such order: *Held*, that the Magistrate had acted without jurisdiction in going into these matters instead of determining the question of actual possession on the evidence in the case. *KOCHAI FAKIR v. ROMESH CHANDRA BISWAS* (1908) 11 C. W. N. 35 Calc. 795

23. Magistrate hold-

ing inquiry under s. 145 cannot direct Subordinate Magistrate to take evidence—Order based on such evidence void as made without jurisdiction. A Magistrate holding an enquiry as to possession under s. 145, clause 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is bound to take the evidence himself and cannot delegate to a Subordinate Magistrate the duty of recording such evidence. An order of such Magistrate based solely and substantially on evidence recorded by a Subordinate Magistrate is not an order based on legal evidence and is void as made without jurisdiction. *In re Baikant Kumar* 3 C. L. R. 134, referred to. *Kolha Koer v. Muneswar Tewari*, 1. L. R. 34 Calc. 849, referred to. *ARUMUGA GOVINDAN v. VENKATASUBBIE* (1907) 11 C. W. N. 31 Mad. 82

24. Mere delivery of

certificates to purchaser at Court sale without proof of delivery of actual or symbolical possession of property not sufficient to prove possession. A purchaser at a Court sale of immoveable properties, to whom delivery certificates have been granted, but to whom possession either actual or symbolical was not delivered cannot, on the strength of such certificates alone, be declared to be in possession of such properties in proceedings under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Gulraj Marwari v. Sheikh Bhatoo*, 1. L. R. 32 Calc. 796, distinguished. *Kunja Behari Das v. Khetro Pal Singh Roy*, 6 C. W. N. 38, distinguished. *RAGAVA AIYANGAR v. KRISHNASAMY AIYAR* (1908) 11 C. W. N. 31 Mad. 416

25. Possession by

the Manager of a joint Hindu family can be protected by a Magistrate by proceedings under s. 145 of the Code. The managing member of a coparcenary governed by the Mitakshara law has a recognised position of superiority with well-defined rights of management and possession independent of the consent of the other members of the coparce-

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 145—*contd.*

nary. A Magistrate has jurisdiction to protect a manager in such possession by proceedings under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Sri Mohan Thakur v. Narsing Mohan Thakur*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 259, referred to and approved. *BHASKARI KASAVARAYADU v. BHASKARAM CHALAPATIRAYUDU* (1908). I. L. R. 31 Mad. 318

26. *Enquiry*, "proceeding under s. 145 whether—Part-heard proceeding under s. 145—Transfer of trying Magistrate—Successor." Proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, are enquiries within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under that Code enquiry means not only an enquiry into an offence, but extends to enquiry into matters which are not offences. When in the course of a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, one Magistrate is transferred and another comes in his place, the latter, if of competent jurisdiction, can deal with the proceeding under s. 350, Criminal Procedure Code. S. 350, Criminal Procedure Code, ought to be construed with all reasonable liberality. *ALI MAHOMED KHAN v. TARAK CHANDRA BANERJEE* (1908). 13 C. W. N. 420

27. *Proceeding under—Postponement sine die, if legal—Regulation VII of 1882, s. 34.* A Magistrate has no power to postpone *sine die* a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, on the ground that the estate or area in which the land in dispute is situate is under settlement by the revenue authorities under the provisions of Regulation VII of 1882. *ABDUL RAUF MIA v. RAHOMUDDIN BHUIA* (1908). 13 C. W. N. 104

28. *Proceeding under—Postponement sine die, whether legal—Attachment pending disposal—Solenamah previously executed and confirmed by decrees, how far binding.* A Magistrate has jurisdiction to postpone *sine die* a proceeding drawn up under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code. Where a Magistrate after drawing up a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, issued an order for attachment of the disputed land till the disposal of the case and subsequently he postponed the proceeding *sine die*: Held, that the postponement *sine die* did not operate as a withdrawal of the order of attachment which continued in force till the disposal of the case. How far the Magistrate in passing final orders in a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, was bound to act in accordance with a *solenamah* previously executed by the parties and confirmed by the decrees of Civil Courts considered. *GURU DAS HAZRA v. G. L. WEATHERAL* (1908). 13 C. W. N. 601

29. *Cl. (5)—Transfer of a proceeding under s. 145—The power of Magistrate to quash proceeding upon transfer.* Where a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 145—*contd.*

drawn up by a Deputy Magistrate was transferred by the District Magistrate to his own file and then summarily quashed: Held, that the District Magistrate could only quash the proceeding in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (5), of s. 145. Criminal Procedure Code, on facts being brought to his notice which were sufficient to satisfy him that no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed. That his order quashing the proceeding on the sole ground that he thought that the letter addressed to him by one of the parties contained an admission that the other party was in actual possession of the land in dispute, was without jurisdiction and should be set aside. *Semble*: If the District Magistrate after transferring to his own file a proceeding under s. 14, Criminal Procedure Code, drawn up by a Subordinate Magistrate, quashed the proceeding on a full consideration of all the facts and after hearing the objections, if any, of the parties, the High Court would not interfere with the order quashing the proceeding. *TARA CHARAN SARKAR v. BENGAL COAL CO. LD.* (1908). 13 C. W. N. 125

s. 145 (1)

See BREACH OF THE PEACE

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 352

ss. 145 (1) and 439 (3)—*Revision—Jurisdiction to interfere with an order purporting to be passed under s. 145.* Where an order purporting to be passed under s. 145 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure after evidence recorded which satisfied the Magistrate that there existed a dispute likely to occasion a breach of the peace in respect of certain immoveable property, was found to be insufficient or defective in the sense that it gave no information as to the subject of the dispute and left the persons to whom it was issued quite in the dark as to the property in regard to which they had to set forth their respective claims, it was held, that the inadequacy of such order gave the High Court jurisdiction to interfere. *Mohesh Sowar v. Narain Bag*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 981 and *Sukru Dosadh v. Ram Pergash Singh*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 443, followed. *In re T. A. MARTIN* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 296

s. 145, cl. (1), s. 148.

See JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATE.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 771

Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Dispute relating to a kutcherry—Initiatory order—Omission to state the grounds of the apprehension of a breach of the peace—References to information obtained in a local inquiry not recorded—Order as to costs. If the Magistrate omits in the initiatory order under s. 145, cl. (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, to state the grounds of his being

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

— s. 145, cl. (1), s. 148—*concl'd.*

satisfied as to the likelihood of a breach of the peace, the final order is without jurisdiction. Where, therefore, the initiatory order merely referred to some information which was obtained during the course of a local inquiry held by himself, but had not been reduced into writing: *Held*, that the proceedings under s. 145 were bad in law. In a case initiated upon a police report or other information, which has been reduced into writing, reference can be made to the materials upon which the Magistrate acted, to ascertain whether there were in fact grounds upon which he might have acted, but even then it is his duty to state the grounds, upon which he was satisfied that there was a likelihood of a breach of the peace. *Queen-Empress v. Gobind Chandra Das*, I. L. R. 20 Calc 520; *Dhanput Singh v. Chatterput Singh*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 513; *Mohesh Sowar v. Narain Bag*, I. L. R. 27 Calc 981, and *Jogomohan Pal v. Ram Kumar Gope*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 416, referred to. *NIITYANAND ROY v. PARESH NATH SEN* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 771 s.c. 9 C. W. N. 621

— s. 145, cls. (1), (3).

See POSSESSION. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 68

— s. 145, cls. (1), (6).

See JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 552, 602

See WITNESSES.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1093

— s. 145, cls. (1), (6)—*Magistrate—Omission to record initiatory order—Arbitration, reference to.* Where proceedings under s. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code were instituted against the parties and on their appearance the Magistrate, considering that the dispute came within s. 145 of the Code, treated the case as one instituted under the latter section, and adjourned it for the evidence of their respective claims to actual possession, without recording an order under sub-s. (1): *Held*, that the drawing up of a formal order under sub-s. (1) was absolutely necessary to the initiation of proceedings under s. 145 and the omission to do so rendered them bad for want of jurisdiction. S. 145 does not contemplate that the question of actual possession should be delegated, even by the consent of the parties, to arbitration. It directs the Magistrate himself to receive the evidence produced by the parties, and to come to a decision in consideration thereof. *BANWARI LALL MUKERJEE v. HRIDAY CHAKRAVARTI* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 552

— s. 145, cls. (3) and (4)—*Possession, enquiry as to—Notice—Local service—Condition precedent to exercise of jurisdiction—Revision by High Court.* The publication of a notice locally under sub-s. (3) of s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code is a

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*cont'd.*

— s. 145, cls. (3) and (4)—*concl'd.*

condition precedent to the exercise of a Magistrate's jurisdiction in an enquiry as to possession under cl. (4) of that section. *Janu Manjhi v. Maniruddin*, 8 C. W. N. 590, approved. *KHAJAH SOLEMOLLAH v. ISHAN CHANDRA DAS SARKAR* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 909

— ss. 145, 192 (2) and 529 (f)—*Dispute concerning land—Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Pendency of a civil suit for possession of the disputed land—Subsistence of prohibitory order on the date of the proceeding—Transfer of case without jurisdiction—Likelihood of a breach of the peace.* The pendency of a suit under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) with regard to certain land in dispute does not oust the Magistrate's jurisdiction to take proceedings under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of the same land, if he finds reasonable grounds for apprehending a breach of the peace. The fact that on the date of the initiation of the proceedings under s. 145 of the Code there was a subsisting order under s. 144, the terms of which were not before the Court, passed against the landlords in a proceeding to which the tenants, through whom they claimed to be in possession, were not parties, does not justify the Court in setting aside the proceedings under s. 145, in respect of the same subject-matter of dispute, as without jurisdiction. A transfer by a first class Magistrate of a case under s. 145 erroneously and in good faith, does not vitiate the proceedings by reason of the provisions of s. 529 (f). *Albar Ali Khan v. Domi Lal*, 4 C. W. N. 821, followed. Section 145 requires that the Magistrate before initiating proceedings thereunder, must be satisfied, on the materials before him, that there is fear of a breach of the peace with regard to some immoveable property between the parties. Where the Magistrate initiated proceedings under s. 145 on a police report on which he was satisfied that there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace, and there was evidence on the record of a probability of such breach of the peace, the High Court refused to set aside the final order as without jurisdiction. *KISHORI LAL ROY v. SRINATH ROY* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 370

— ss. 145, 435 and 537—*Revision—Procedure—Irregularity not prejudicial to either party.* In the course of proceedings commenced under s. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was found by the Magistrate that there was a dispute relating to land and likely to cause a breach of the peace between the two parties before him. After giving both an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate passed an order under s. 145 of the Code maintaining one party in possession. *Held*, that, notwithstanding that the procedure of the Magistrate was in some respects defective, there was no cause for the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, inasmuch as the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

ss. 145, 435 and 537—*concl'd.*

parties had been given an opportunity of representing their respective cases, and there was nothing to show that the irregularities in procedure, which had occurred, had caused any prejudice to either. *In the matter of T. A. Martin, I. L. R. 27 All. 296*, referred to. *DEBI PRASAD v. SHEODAT RAI* (1907) . I. L. R. 30 All. 41

ss. 145, 146.

See JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 796

See LANDLORD AND TENANT

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 796, 856

ss. 145, 136—*Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Order on written statement without any evidence—High Court, jurisdiction of.* Sub-s. (i) is not the only provision in s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which lays down what matters relate to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. There are other provisions in the section, the contravention of which affects his jurisdiction, and so gives the High Court power to interfere. Where the Magistrate passed an order under s. 146 of the Code, only upon the written statements of the parties and without taking any evidence: *Held*, that the order was without jurisdiction and that the High Court had power to set it aside. *Surjya Kanta Acharjee v. Hem Chunder Chowdhry, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 508*, followed. *Sukh Lal Sheikh v. Tara Chand Ta, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 68*, explained. *KOLHA KOER v. MUNESWAR TEWARI* (1907) . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 840

Ch. XII (ss. 145 to 148)—

See POSSESSION—ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE I. L. R. 28 Calc. 416

See REVISION, CRIMINAL CASES—GENERAL RULES FOR EXERCISE OF POWER. I. L. R. 24. All. 315

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUMMONING WITNESSES I. L. R. 30 Calc. 508

ss. 145 and 435—*Statute 24 and 25 Vict., Cap. CIV, s. 15—Order under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code—Revision—Powers of High Court.* Where proceedings are in intention, in form and in fact proceedings under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure by a Magistrate duly empowered to act under that chapter, the High Court has no power to send for those proceedings either under the Code or under s. 15 of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861. *Daulat Koer v. Romeswari Koeri, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 625*. In re *Pandurang Govind, I. L. R. 24 Bom. 527*, and *Baldeo Baksh Singh v. Raj Bullam Singh, 2 A. L. J. 274*, referred to. *Maharaj Tewari v. Har Charan Rai, I. L. R. 26 All. 144*, followed. *JHINGAI SINGH v. RAM PARTAB* (1908) I. L. R. 31 All. 150

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 146 (1872, s. 531; 1861-69, s. 319).

See *ante*, s. 145 . 13 C. W. N. 606

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 184 AND SCH. III . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 86

See DAMAGES—REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES I. L. R. 6 Mad. 426

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ss. 23 AND 28, AND SCH. II, ARTS. 120, 142 AND 144 I. L. R. 26 Mad. 410

See LIMITATION ACT (1877, ART. 47; 1871, ART. 46) . 7 N. W. 35 I. L. R. 20 All. 120

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—

ATTACHMENT OF PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 110

DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION . 3 C. W. N. 329

5 C. W. N. 105

6 C. W. N. 710

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 297

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 41

7 C. W. N. 118

LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE.

7 C. W. N. 29

Attachment of property by Magistrate under s. 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code—Order relating to the management of such property—Interference by High Court—*Jurisdiction—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 145, 146 and 435—Charter Act (24 & 25 Vict., c. 104), cl. 15.* Where a subordinate Magistrate passed an order, under s. 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code, attaching certain lands, the subject-matter of proceedings under s. 145 of the Code, and in management of this property granted a lease for a term of years at a certain annual rent, and subsequently, on the application of the lessee, the District Magistrate cancelled that lease and granted a fresh lease at a much lower rent: *Held*, that no question of jurisdiction arose in the matter. The High Court, in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, will not interfere with an order relating to the management of property under attachment by reason of an order under s. 146 of the Code. A remedy can easily be obtained from a Civil Court. *LOKENATH SHAH CHOWDHRY v. NEDU BRSWAS* (1902)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 382: s.c. 6 C. W. N. 469

ss. 146 (1), 148 (3)—*Attachment—Each party in possession of different portions of land—Costs—Magistrate's discretion—Revision by High Court—What costs should not be allowed—When each party is found to be in possession of*

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 146—*concl'd.*

different portions of the disputed land, a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to order attachment under s. 146 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. A wide discretion as to costs is given to a Magistrate by s. 148 (3) of the Code and the High Court has no power in revision to interfere with his exercise of that discretion. Additional costs incurred for extra fees and travelling and other expenses of a like nature incurred by reason of bringing pleaders or counsel from a distance ought not to be allowed. *RAJENDRO NARAYAN ROY v. MAHOMED ARZUMAND KHAN* (1905) . . . **9 C. W. N. 887**

s. 147 (1872, s. 532; 1831-69, s. 320).

See EASEMENTS **I. L. R. 23 Calc. 55**

See ONUS OF PROOF—EASEMENTS.
21 W. R. 140
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 52
2 C. L. R. 555

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—DISPUTES AS TO RIGHT OF WAY, WATER, ETC.
15 C. W. N. 67, 335

1. ———— *Construction of the words "concerning any land"—Landlord and Tenant—Right of tenant to enclose cultivable land by a wall.* The enclosing by a tenant of cultivable lands by a wall instead of a hedge is not *prima facie* an interference with the landlord's rights and ought not to be interfered with under s. 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by a Magistrate, being a matter to be settled by a Civil Court. In such cases, if a breach of the peace is apprehended, security must be taken from the party in possession. The words "concerning the use of land" in s. 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be qualified, and the section construed as if it contained words that the user to which the dispute relates is a user by a party other than the party in possession. *The Empress v. Ganapat Kalwar*, **4 C. W. N. 779**, not followed. *Subba v. Trincal*, **I. L. R. 7 Mad. 461**, referred to and followed. *ARUNACHELLAM CHETTIAR v. CHIDAMBARAM CHETTI* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 97

2. ———— *Dispute as to right to use a mosque within the section—Charter Act, s. 15.* An order, under s. 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, declaring possession to be with a certain person is illegal when there has been no enquiry as to the party in possession and will be set aside under s. 15 of the Charter Act. A dispute as to the right to use a mosque between persons claiming to be entitled to officiate as Kazi therein is a dispute coming within s. 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *KADER BATCHA v. KADER BATCHA ROWTHAN* (1905) . . . **I. L. R. 29 Mad. 237**

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 147—*concl'd.*

3. ———— *Rights contemplated by the section, not merely easements—Form of final order in a proceeding under s. 147—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 26.* Where the Magistrate in a proceeding under s. 147, Criminal Procedure Code, disposed of the case by his final order which ran thus: "Srimanta Bera claims a prescriptive right to pass the water of his tank over the paddy land on the south. He has entirely failed to prove exercise of the right uninterruptedly for twenty years. His claim is therefore disallowed." Held, that by his order the Magistrate has not decided the case one way or the other and that the case must be sent back to him to pass a proper order on concluding his enquiry. That the Court in passing orders under s. 147, Criminal Procedure Code, should adopt the form No. 24 in Sch. V of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That the right contemplated by s. 147, Criminal Procedure Code, is certainly of a more elastic description than the right which has to be strictly proved in terms of s. 26 of the Limitation Act. *SRIMANTA BERA v. INDRA NARAYAN PRODHAN* (1909) . . . **13 C. W. N. 859**

4. ———— *Use of water, dispute relating to—Erection of bund by one party—Order by Magistrate for its removal under police supervision—Injunction by Civil Court restraining the opposite party from interfering with the bund—Subsequent order by Magistrate directing its removal by the police.* S. 147 of the Criminal Procedure Code contemplates orders directed to the parties to the dispute, and does not enable a Magistrate to enforce his orders, passed thereunder, through the agency of the police. An order passed some time after the termination of the proceeding under s. 147 of the Code, directing the removal of a bund by the police, is without jurisdiction. *Pasupati Nath Bose v. Nando Lal Bose*, **5 C. W. N. 67** and *Lalit Chandra Neogi v. Tarini Persad Gupta*, **5 C. W. N. 335**, distinguished. *DALMIER PURI v. KHODADAD KHAN* (1909) **I. L. R. 36 Calc. 923**

s. 148 (1872, s. 533).

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—

COSTS.

LOCAL INQUIRY.

TRANSFER OR WITHDRAWAL OF PROCEEDINGS . **5 C. W. N. 686**

——— **s. 148 (3)—Award of costs may be made within a reasonable time after disposal of the main question.** An award of costs under s. 148 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should, in the usual course, be contemporaneous with the decision of the main question. Where, however, circumstances require the postponement of the award of costs, it should be made within a reasonable time after the disposal of the principal subject

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 148 (3)—*concl'd.*

of the proceeding in the presence of both parties.
VYTHIANADA TAMBIRAN v. MAYANDI CHETTY (1906).

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 373

s. 154.

See FIRST INFORMATION.

11 C. W. N. 554

See INFORMATION OF COMMISSION OF
OFFENCE. . . 6 C. W. N. 921
7 C. W. N. 345

Informant reproducing statements made by another—Admissibility.
Where certain statements relating to the commission of an offence were made by one J to H, and the latter took the information so obtained to an officer in charge of a police station, and it was recorded: *Held*, that the statement recorded being a reproduction by the informant of the statements made to him by another person were inadmissible as a first information. *EMPEROR v. DINA BANDHU MOITRA* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 218

ss. 155 and 156 (1872, ss. 109, 110; 1861-69, s. 133).

See OPIUM ACT, s. 9.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 691

See POLICE INQUIRY.

2 B. L. R. S. N. 6: 10 W. R. Cr. 49

ss. 156, 157, 159 (1872, ss. 114, 115; 1861-69, s. 135)

See PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF

7 Bom. Cr. 50

ss. 156, 159.

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—POWER OF, AND PRELIMINARIES TO, DISMISSAL.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 923

s. 157.

See ACCUSED PERSON, RIGHT OF.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 189

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 74.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 189

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—STATEMENTS TO POLICE OFFICERS.

2 C. W. N. 702

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 596

s. 160 (1872, s. 118).

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 121: 8 C. L. R. 300

See POLICE INQUIRY.

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 274

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUMMONING WITNESSES.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 320

1 C. W. N. 154

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

ss. 160, 202, 203—*Complaint—*

District Magistrate, dismissal by, when complainant examined by a Subordinate Magistrate—Police-officer's power to require attendance of witnesses—Women, examination at their own houses—Police-officer, charges against—District Superintendent of Police, enquiry by. Where on a complaint being made, a Deputy Magistrate examined the complainant and the papers were then laid before the Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the complaint: *Held*, that the order of dismissal was wrong. Where the police had taken a number of women (stated to be related to certain absconders) from their village to the police station on the pretext that they wished to examine them, it was pointed out that the proper course was to hold the examination at their own houses. The inadvisability of directing a District Superintendent of Police to enquire into the truth of charges laid against a Sub-Inspector of Police was also pointed out. *HALADHAR BHUMIJ v. SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE, HURA OUTPOST* (1905) 9 C. W. N. 199

s. 161 (1872, ss. 118, 119).

See ACCUSED PERSON, RIGHT OF.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 14

I. L. R. 19 All. 390

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 216

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 121

I. L. R. 15 All. 11

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 544

See FALSE EVIDENCE—CONTRADICTORY STATEMENT . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 349

ss. 161, 162 (1872, s. 119).

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—STATEMENTS TO POLICE OFFICERS.

See WITNESS . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 560

s. 162.

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE . . . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 50

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—POLICE EVIDENCE, ETC. I. L. R. 28 Calc. 348

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 157.

13 C. W. N. 197

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 483

s. 162—*Bombay City Police Act (IV of 1902), s. 63—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 24 and 167—Amended Letters Patent, 1865, cl. 26—Statement made by a witness to and taken down in writing by a Police-officer—Admissibility in evidence—Confession of accused, admissibility of.* One P, an entry clerk in the General Post Office, Bombay, was charged with having committed theft in respect of a registered letter. S, a friend of the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 162—*contd.*

accused, had made a statement to a Police-officer, which the latter had taken down in writing. At the trial *S* denied having made the statement, whereupon the presiding Judge admitted the statement in evidence both to discredit *S* and also as evidence against *P*, in that it contained statements made to the Police corroborating confessions made by *P*. These confessions were also used in evidence against *P*. On the application by *P*'s counsel, the Advocate General certified under clause 26 of the Amended Letters Patent that the said document was wrongly admitted. On a review of the Full Bench: *Held*, having regard to s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), the said document ought not to have been admitted or used in evidence against the accused. *Per* RUSSELL, *Ag. C. J.*—The document might be used to contradict the witness not by putting in the statement, but by putting it in the hands of the Police-officer to refresh his memory and to get him to contradict the statement of *S*. *Per* CHANDAVARKAR, *J.*—It is the statement contained in the writing, which only could be used and that only to impeach the credit of such witness in the manner provided by the Evidence Act (I of 1872). *Per* BATTY, *J.*—The writing might have been used for the purpose of refreshing the memory of the witness cross-examined as to the fact of the statement either on behalf of the prosecution or on behalf of the defence, provided that it was treated by the prosecution only for the purpose of impeaching the credit or in corroboration of the witness, who made it. *Per* BEAMAN, *J.*—The writing ought not to have been admitted at all, or its contents to have been allowed to be used by the prosecution for the nominal purpose of contradicting the witness. *EMPEROR v. NARAYAN RAGHUNATH PATRI* (1907)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 111

ss. 162, 164.

See COPIES OF DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 466

ss. 162, 172—Police Diaries.—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 145, 161—Statements of witnesses recorded by police-officers. Oral statements of witnesses to a police-officer, even though entered in the diary under s. 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code, are admissible under the provisions of s. 162 of that Code and of that section only, and the provisos as to the cross-examination of the police-officer under ss. 161 and 145 of the Evidence Act, which refer to his own statements, do not apply to the statements of the witnesses. The proper procedure is for the accused, at the time the witness, whose statement is so recorded, appears before the Court, to ask the Court to refer to such writing, and, if necessary, furnish the accused with copies. It is open to the defence to ask the police-officer or any other person whether certain statements were made to him by the witnesses for the purpose of impeaching their credit under s. 155 of the Evidence Act,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

ss. 162, 172—*conclld.*

but the police-officer cannot be asked to refresh his memory from diaries, which are inadmissible unless admitted under the provisions of s. 162 of the Code and used in the cross-examination of the witnesses. It would be quite improper to accept the police officer's perfunctory reading of his diary as proof of the statement. It is only when they have been properly brought in under the provisions of s. 162 that they can be subsequently proved by the police-officer under the provisions of the Evidence Act, if the witness denies making them. But this does not authorize their use for the first time for the purpose of refreshing the police-officer's memory. *In the matter of the petition of Kali Charan Chunari*, *I. L. R. 8 Calc. 154*; and *In the matter of the petition of Jhabboo Mahton*, *I. L. R. 8 Calc. 739*, referred to. *DADAN GAZI v. EMPEROR* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1023

ss. 162, 288, 289, 292—Reply, prosecutor's right of—Deposition of witnesses before committing Magistrate—Evidence adduced by accused. In a Sessions trial before the High Court, the accused, before he was asked by the Court under s. 289 of the Criminal Procedure Code whether he meant to adduce evidence, put in as evidence on his own behalf the depositions of certain witnesses taken before the committing Magistrate, which formed part of the record sent up by the Magistrate. *Held*, that this could not be said to be "evidence adduced by the accused" after the case for the prosecution had been closed and that the prosecution was therefore not entitled to reply under s. 292. *EMPEROR v. ROBERT STEWART* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1050

ss. 162, 297, 367.

See CHARGE. **I. L. R. 36 Calc. 281**

s. 163.

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS UNDER THREAT OR PRESSURE.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 775

See EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, ss. 8, 24 to 27.

I. L. R. 31 All. 592.

s. 164 (1872, s. 122).

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE.

See FALSE EVIDENCE.

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 421

I. L. R. 22 All. 115

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—GROUND FOR TRANSFER.

5 C. W. N. 864

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 483

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 164—*contd.*

1. ———— *Power of Magistrate—Statement of person appearing as witness.* S. 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872) authorizes a Magistrate to record the statement of a person who appears before him as a witness, as well as the confession of a person accused of an offence. *EMPRESS v. MALKA*

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 643

2. ———— *Refusal to sign statement—Penal Code, s. 180.* S. 180 of the Penal Code does not apply to statements made under this section. *EMPRESS v. SERTAPA.*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 15

3. ———— *Confession, recording of, in presence of another Magistrate or person, and questioning of confessing prisoner by such Magistrate or person—Police custody, bearing of, on confession—Circumstances rendering confession invalid.* Where at the foot of a confession recorded, there was a memorandum signed by the recording Magistrate to the effect that he believed it was voluntarily made and the Sessions Judge held not only that that was the case but was also convinced that the confessing statements were true and formed a good basis for conviction: *Held*, that that did not preclude an Appellate Court from inquiring for itself into the character of the confession; on the contrary, it was a duty clearly incumbent on the Court of Appeal to take into consideration the circumstances which led up to the confession when its truthfulness and spontaneity were questioned by the defence. Where it was found that directly or indirectly pressure was brought to bear upon the accused through his relatives to make a confession and that the Police interviewed the accused in hajut several times and the District Magistrate himself impressed upon the accused the advisability of making a confession and the accused was kept in hajut for a long time, a portion of which he had to spend in a solitary cell, and the confession was recorded in the immediate presence of the District Magistrate who was personally interested in the case against the accused and some answers were elicited from the accused by some incriminating questions put to him and the accused retracted the confession as soon as he got an opportunity to do so in Court: *Held*, that the confession was not voluntary and was not admissible in evidence against the accused. Where, in recording a confession, the only preliminary questions put to the accused were—"Do you know who I am? Any statement you make will be of your own free will. You are under no compulsion, I understand. What do you wish to say?" *Held*, that this was no compliance either with the letter or the spirit of the law on the vital point of questioning the accused before recording his confession. A Magistrate before recording the confession of an accused asked him several questions in order to satisfy himself that the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 164—*concl'd.*

confession was being voluntarily made, but omitted to ask whether the accused was brought from Police custody and it appeared that the accused was in Police custody for 8 days immediately before making the confession and that he was previous to this for a considerable period in hajut in a solitary cell, that he was confronted with another accused who had made a confession of a similar offence, that the Magistrate before recording the confession read the statements alleged to have been made by the accused to a police-officer, and during the recording of the confession, another Magistrate questioned the accused; and the confession was retracted as soon as the accused got an opportunity to do so in Court: *Held*, that the confession was not voluntarily made and was not admissible in evidence. When an accused person is brought before a Magistrate to get his confession recorded, it is highly irregular for the Magistrate to peruse the alleged statements of the accused made to and recorded by a police-officer, before proceeding to question the prisoner. *Emperor v. Radhe Halwai*, 7 C. W. N. 220, approved. The fact and duration of Police custody of a confessing accused has a material bearing on the question whether the confession is voluntary or not. There is no warrant or justification for the intervention of a third party as a questioner, directly or indirectly, of a confessing prisoner. *JOGJIBAN, SANTOSH AND SURENDRA v. EMPEROR* (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 861

ss. 164, 202, 222, 234, 364.

See CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1085

s. 165.

See OPIUM ACT, s. 9.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 691

s. 167 (1872, s. 124; 1861-69, s. 152).

See DETENTION OF ACCUSED BY POLICE.

1 W. R. Cr. 5

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 98

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 32

7 C. W. N. 457

See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.

I. L. R. 6 All. 129

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—STATEMENTS TO POLICE-OFFICERS.

I. L. R. 19 All. 390

See POLICE CUSTODY.

11 C. W. N. 554

See POLICE INQUIRY . 3 N. W. 275

See WRONGFUL DETENTION.

19 W. R. Cr. 36

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V. OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

ss. 168, 170 (1872, s. 123).

See ACCUSED PERSON, RIGHT OF.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 189

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 74.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 189

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
POWERS OF MAGISTRATES 10 Bom. 70

ss. 169, 173, para. 2 (1872, s.
126; 1861-69, s. 154).

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—POLICE
EVIDENCE, DIARIES, PAPERS, ETC.

8 W. R. Cr. 87
13 W. R. Cr. 22

s. 172.

See ACCUSED PERSON, RIGHT OF.

I. L. R. 19 All. 319

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 14

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—STATE-
MENTS TO POLICE OFFICERS.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 610, 612 note

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 642

I. L. R. 19 All. 390

Compromise—Assault
in the course of which one of the persons assaulted
received fatal injuries. Three persons assaulted
three others, with the result that one of the persons
assaulted died. *Held*, that it was not competent
to the survivors to compound the case with their
assailants in respect of the injuries caused to the
person deceased. *EMPEROR v. SULTAN SINGH* (1909)
I. L. R. 31 All. 606

s. 173.

See ACCUSED PERSON, RIGHT OF.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 189

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COM-
PLAINT, AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 410

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 74.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 189

s. 176 (1872, s. 135)—*Enquiry into*
cause of Death—Report by Magistrate—Judicial
proceeding—Power of High Court under s. 296,
Criminal Procedure Code—Coroner's Inquest.
Where the Magistrate of a division held an enquiry,
under s. 135 of the Criminal Procedure Code, into
the cause of the death of a person found dead under
suspicious circumstances, and, without making a
specific charge against any person, drew up a report
embodying the result of his enquiry, and sent the
report to the Magistrate of the district, and sub-
sequently proceedings were taken against one of
the witnesses, which ultimately resulted in an
acquittal, *Held*, by the High Court, that, there
being nothing in the language of s. 135 requiring the
Magistrate holding such an enquiry either to make a
report or to come to a finding, the report actually
sent could not be considered as part of a judicial

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V. OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 176—*concl.*

proceeding, and that therefore the High Court had
no power to send for it under s. 296 of the Criminal
Procedure Code. No analogy exists between a
Coroner's inquest and an enquiry into the cause of
death under the Criminal Procedure Code. *In the*
matter of TROYLOKHONATH BISWAS

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 742

s. 177 (1872, s. 63).

See MAINTENANCE, ORDER OF CRIMINAL
COURT AS TO. I. L. R. 24 Calc. 638
1 C. W. N. 577

s. 178 (1872, s. 63).

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

I. L. R. 3 All. 258

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—
GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 643

s. 179.

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN
ONE DISTRICT—CRIMINAL BREACH OF
TRUST. I. L. R. 19 All. 111

s. 180 (1872, s. 66; 1861-69, ss.
31, 31 A).

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN
ONE DISTRICT—DACOITY.

I. L. R. 9 All. 523

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN
ONE DISTRICT—KIDNAPPING.

I. L. R. 18 All. 350

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN
ONE DISTRICT—RECEIVING STOLEN PRO-
PERTY. 4 Bom. Cr. 38

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN
ONE DISTRICT—THEFT.

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 307

s. 182 (1872, s. 67).

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 687

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 858

2 C. W. N. 577

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
OFFENCES COMMITTED DURING JOURNEY

13 B. L. R. Ap. 4

25 W. R. Cr. 45

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN
ONE DISTRICT—DACOITY.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 50

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 182—conclld.

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN
ONE DISTRICT—THEFT.

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 171

1. ————— “Local area,”
meaning of—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 531.*
The words “local area” used in s. 182 only apply to
a “local area” over which the Criminal Procedure
Code applies, and not to a local area in a foreign
country or in other portions of the British Empire to
which the Code has no application; and similarly s.
531 only refers to districts, divisions, sub-divisions,
and local areas governed by the Code of Criminal
Procedure. In the matter of BICHITRANUND
DASS v. BHUGGUT PERAI. In the Matter of
BICHITRANUND DASS v. DUKHIA JANA

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 667

2. ————— “Local area,”
meaning of. The expression “local area” includes,
and was intended to include, a “district.” PU-
NARDEO NARAIN SINGH v. RAM SARUP ROY

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 858

2 C. W. N. 577

3. ————— Offence punishable
by law—*Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Criminal Pro-
cedure Code, s. 145.* S. 182 relates only to cases of
offences which are punishable by law. A case under
s. 145 of the Code is not a case relating to an offence
HURBULLUBH NARAIN SINGH v. BAJRANG DASS

3 C. W. N. 148

s. 185 (1872, s. 69).

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN
ONE DISTRICT—CRIMINAL BREACH OF
TRUST . I. L. R. 19 All. 111

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—
GROUND FOR TRANSFER.

22 W. R. Cr. 6

s. 186 (1872, s. 157).

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CRIMINAL
CASES . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 340

s. 188.

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 423

I. L. R. 24 All. 256

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT
—NATIVE INDIAN SUBJECTS.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 178

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY
IN ONE DISTRICT—ABETMENT.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 105

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 287

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 188—conclld.

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY
IN ONE DISTRICT—CRIMINAL BREACH
OF TRUST . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 147

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY
IN ONE DISTRICT—KIDNAPPING.

I. L. R. 19 All. 109

s. 190.

See ABSCONDING OFFENDER.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 417

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COM-
PLAINT, AND NECESSARY PRELIMI-
NARIES . 3 C. W. N. 65, 491

4 C. W. N. 367, 560

5 C. W. N. 488

6 C. W. N. 202, 926

I. L. R. 21 All. 109

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 148

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 786

See MAGISTRATE. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 449

s. 190 (b), (c)—*Cognizance of a case
against persons not named in the first information—
Cognizance taken upon subsequent Police-report
and upon evidence given during Police investigation—
Magistrate's own knowledge.* A Magistrate in
issuing warrants against persons not named in
the complaint for first information but mentioned
in a report subsequently made by the Police after
investigation as persons implicated, takes cogniz-
ance of the case under cl. (b), and not under cl. (c) of
s. 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. RAJANI
KANTO CHATTERJI v. EMPEROR (1904)

8 C. W. N. 864

s. 191.

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COM-
PLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES.

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 334

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 707

I. L. R. 18 All. 465

I. L. R. 21 All. 109

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 148

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 786 : 3 C. W. N. 65, 491

6 C. W. N. 202

See DEFAMATION—IMPUTATION ON A
WIFE . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 151

See FALSE CHARGE.

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 707

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 51

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 13 All. 345

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 148

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 788 : 3 C. W. N. 491

I. L. R. 21 All. 109

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 146

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 191—*conclld.*

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 392

ss. 191, 198 (1872, s. 142; 1861-69, s. 68).

See COMPLAINANT.

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 340

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 336

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 379

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES.

8 W. R. Cr. 9

11 W. R. Cr. 1

19 W. R. Cr. 4

1 C. L. R. 523

5 B. L. R. 274; 13 W. R. Cr. 27

4 B. L. R. Ap. 1; 13 W. R. Cr. 1

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 379

I. L. R. 18 All. 465

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 336

See JUDICIAL OFFICERS, LIABILITY OF.

3 Bom. A. C. 36

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SANCTION.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 712

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CRIMINAL CASES

16 W. R. Cr. 50

8 Bom. Cr. 113

4 B. L. R. Ap. 1

ss. 191, 537—*Procedure—Omission of Magistrate to inform accused of his right to be tried by another Court—Illegality.* The omission on the part of a Magistrate to inform an accused person to whom the provisions of s. 191 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable of his right to have the case tried by another Court amounts to more than a mere irregularity to which s. 537 of the Code will apply; but a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence under s. 190, cl. (c), of the Code is not competent to try the case unless and until he has informed the accused, before taking any evidence, that he is entitled to have his case tried by another Court. *EMPEROR v. CHEDI* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 212

s. 192 (1872, s. 44; 1861-69, s. 273).

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 14 All. 346

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

2 N. W. 21, 401

6 Mad. Ap. 41

7 Mad. Ap. 2

1 N. W. Ed. 1873, 306

4 Mad. Ap. 40

3 N. W. 126

5 Bom. Cr. 69

4 C. W. N. 821

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 798

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 449

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 192—*conclld.*

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—REFERENCE BY OTHER MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 4 All. 366

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—CATTLE TRESPASS ACT.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 300, 442

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—TRANSFER OR WITHDRAWAL OF PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 8 8

5 C. W. N. 686

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—GENERAL CASES

I. L. R. 19 All. 249

I. L. R. 24 All. 151

ss. 192, 204, 528—*Transfer of case to Subordinate Magistrate—Refusal by trying Magistrate to issue process—Process, if can be issued by any other Magistrate—Joint Magistrate, power of—Discharge—Transfer of whole case.* The police sent up a report in B form to the Joint Magistrate against certain persons, and subsequently on the order of the Joint Magistrate in an A form against some of them. These latter were convicted by a Deputy Magistrate, to whom the case was made over for disposal. An application for processes against the remaining persons mentioned in the original B form was refused by the trying Deputy Magistrate as unnecessary: *Held*, that a subsequent order by the Joint Magistrate for the issue of processes against these persons was without jurisdiction. The order making over the case to the Deputy Magistrate was in these terms: "To B—for disposal." *Held*, that the whole case had been made over. *In the matter of Golabdi Sheikh, 4 C. W. N. 827; s.c. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 979; Moul Singh v. Mahabir Singh, 4 C. W. N. 242; Radhabullav Roy v. Binode Behari Chatterjee, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 449, referred to. HENDERSON, J.*—The order of the Deputy Magistrate refusing to issue process as unnecessary amounted to a discharge. Where no reservation is made in the order transferring a case to another Magistrate, it should be concluded that the whole case had been made over. *AJAB LAL KHIRHER v. EMPEROR* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 783

s. c. 9 C. W. N. 810

ss. 192, 242, 244, 246, 529 (f) 556.

See JURISDICTION I. L. R. 36 Calc. 869

s. 193 (1872, s. 231; 1861-69, s. 359).

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.

5 C. W. N. 630

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 193—*contd.*

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

W. R. 1864, Cr. 3

13 W. R. Cr. 17

19 W. R. Cr. 43

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 351

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 570

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 352

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 352

I. L. R. 22. Calc. 50

ss. 193, 467—Sanction to prosecute application for—Refusal by trying Magistrate—Sanction, granting of, by Sessions Judge—Notice if necessary or desirable—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 193, 467—Forgery and Perjury—Discretion, exercise of, sound and judicial. Where a trying Magistrate refused sanction to prosecute a witness for perjury and forgery, but the Sessions Judge on an application made to him, without issuing a notice upon the person against whom sanction was applied for, granted sanction for his prosecution: *Held*, that the trying Magistrate having refused sanction, the Sessions Judge, in the exercise of sound discretion, should have called upon the person, against whom sanction was applied for, to show cause before granting sanction to his prosecution. *RAGHUBIR SINGH v. JOGESHWAR TEWARY* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 643

s. 195 (1872, ss. 467 to 470; 1861-69, ss. 168 to 170; Presidency Magistrate's Act, 1877, s. 41).

See *post*, ss. 439, 476.

See *post*, s. 476 7 C. W. N. 423

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACT—

PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATE'S ACT

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 466

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODES 6 N. W. 124

I. L. R. 15 All. 61

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 50

I. L. R. 25 All. 534

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 647.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 311

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT, AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 415

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

13. C. L. R. 117

See DEFAMATION—IMPUTATION ON A WIFE I. L. R. 25 Bom. 151

See FALSE CHARGE 5 C. W. N. 106

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.

5 C. W. N. 615, 630

W. R. 1864, Cr. 15

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 223

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, CL. 15.

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 105

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 195—*contd.*

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 178.

I. L. R. 10 All. 350

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—

POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 131

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—REFERENCE BY OTHER MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 461

See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

I. L. R. 9 All. 59

See PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860).

I. L. R. 30 All. 52

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 184

See PENAL CODE, s. 203.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 217

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 730

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 349

I. L. R. 16 All. 80

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 124

I. L. R. 23 All. 249

I. L. R. 15 All. 128

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 765

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 139

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION.

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 766

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 50

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 205

1. ——— Charter Act—Revocation of sanction—Power of High Court. Under sub-s. (6) of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a petition by way of appeal lies to the High Court in every case in which a Civil or Criminal Court subordinate to it, within the meaning of sub-s. (7) (a) gives or refuses a sanction, whether in respect of an offence committed before it or of one committed before a Court subordinate to it, and, in the latter case, whether it gives a sanction refused by the Subordinate Court or revokes a sanction accorded by such Court. Under cls. (b) and (c) of sub-s. (1), the sanction may be accorded in the first instance by the Court to which the Court in which the offence was committed is subordinate, even though no application for sanction has been made to the latter Court. For the purposes of cls. (b) and (c) of sub-s. (1), a sanction accorded by the High Court would operate as a sanction accorded by a Court subordinate to it, such as the District Court. An order passed by an Appellate Court is, in law, the order which ought to have been passed by the Subordinate Court, and will, in consequence, have the same efficacy and operation as the order which ought to have been passed by the latter. S. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the High Court, as a Court of revision, may exercise the powers

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 195—*contd.*

conferred on a Court of Appeal by s. 195. In a case in which both the Original Criminal Court and the Appellate Criminal Court refuse sanction, the High Court, as a Court of revision, may call for the record and, if the refusal proceeds on an error of law, it may accord the sanction, which ought to have been granted by the Appellate Criminal Court and such sanction will be operative for the purposes of cl. (b) and (c) of sub-s. (1). A plaintiff in a suit applied for attachment before judgment and filed an affidavit in support of that application, in which he stated that the defendants intended to alienate their properties with *mala fide* intentions. He did not state in the affidavit that this statement was based on what he had been told. He was, however, orally examined, and then deposed that he had heard that the defendants were intending to alienate property. The petition was dismissed. Thereupon sanction was asked for, the Subordinate Judge according sanction only for an offence under s. 199 of the Indian Penal Code, and refusing sanction for offences under ss. 193, 196 and 200. The sanction accorded was not based on the oral evidence, but on the statement in the affidavit. The defendants appealed (under s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) against the refusal to grant sanction for offences under ss. 193, 196 and 200, to the District Judge who accorded sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner under those sections also. *Held*, on revision, that the District Judge had not exercised a sound discretion in according the sanction, for although the petitioner had not stated in his affidavit that the statements therein were made on hearsay, he had stated so in his oral evidence and the affidavit was not inconsistent with that evidence. *Quære*: Whether a Village Magistrate is a Magistrate within the meaning of s. 197, cl. (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, as that expression is defined in the Imperial General Clauses Act. *PALANIAPPA CHETTI v. ANNAMALAI CHETTI* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 27 Mad. 223

2. *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 193—Extension of time under s. 195—Judge on Original Side, is "High Court," within the meaning of s. 195, sub-s. (6).* A Judge sitting on the Original Side, who granted sanction to prosecute under s. 193 of the Penal Code, is a "High Court" within the meaning of sub-s. (6) of s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Fakiruddin v. G. L. Garth*, 3 C. W. N. 91, referred to. He may, therefore, extend the time for such prosecution, if good cause be shewn. *Darbari Mandar v. Jagoo Lal*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 573, dissented from. *Joydeo Singh v. Harihar Pershad Singh*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 577; *Mangoram v. Behari*, I. L. R. 18 All. 358; *Karuppana v. Sinna Gounden*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 480; *In re Muthu Kudum*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 191, referred to. *DINOBANDHU NANDY v. HURBYMUTTY DASSEE* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 797

3. *Power of superior Court to revoke sanction after complaint lodged.* P

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 195—*contd.*

obtained sanction from a Stationary Sub-Magistrate to prosecute S for offences under ss. 211 and 193, Penal Code, alleged to have been committed before that Magistrate. P did not prefer any complaint in pursuance of the sanction, but the police, relying on it, preferred a charge sheet to the Joint Magistrate against the accused in respect of the alleged offence under s. 211. The Joint Magistrate struck the case off his file, giving as his reason for so doing that he *suo motu* quashed the Sub-Magistrate's sanction under s. 195 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Held*, that the Joint Magistrate's action in striking the case off his file was legal and proper, though the reason given by him for so doing was erroneous and his act in quashing the sanction *ultra vires*. A Joint Magistrate, though authorized under s. 407 (2) to entertain appeals preferred by persons convicted on a trial by the Stationary Magistrate, is not the Court to which appeals from the Court of the Stationary Magistrate ordinarily lie, within the meaning of s. 195 (7). The Court, to which the Court of the Stationary Magistrate is, within the meaning of s. 195 (6) and (7), subordinate is that of the District Magistrate. *Eroma Variar v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 656, and *Sadhu Lal v. Ram Churn Pasi*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 394, followed. The Joint Magistrate could not, therefore, revoke the sanction given by the Stationary Sub-Magistrate, the District Magistrate alone having the power to revoke or grant a sanction given or refused by the Stationary Sub-Magistrate. Nor was it competent to a District Magistrate, under s. 407, to direct that applications for revoking or granting a sanction given or refused by a Sub-Magistrate may be presented to the Joint Magistrate. Whether the Court authorized to exercise such a power under sub-s. (6) can exercise it *suo motu*, as if it were a Court of revision, where no application has been made to it either to give a sanction which has been refused or to revoke a sanction which has been given. *Quære*: The course pursued by the police in sending a police report in respect of the offence was contrary to law; but whether, on the strength of the sanction accorded to P, a police officer or other stranger might have preferred a complaint against S. *Quære*: The mere fact that a complaint has been made, in pursuance of sanction, will be no bar to a Court competent under sub-s. (6) to deal with an application for revoking such sanction, entertaining such application and disposing of it according to law, even if the complaint in pursuance of the sanction has been preferred to itself. *In the matter of SUBBAMMA* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 27 Mad. 124

4. *Whether a sanction granted to a particular person could be availed of by some other person.* A sanction for prosecution expressly given to a particular applicant cannot be availed of by some other person against that persons wish and without his authority. *Giridhari Mondul*

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.

s. 195—contd.

v. Uchit Jha, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 435; *Baperam Surma v. Gouri Nath Dutt*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 474; *In re Banarsi Das*, I. L. R. 18 All. 213; *Kali Kinkar Sett v. Nritya Gopal Roy*, 8 C. W. N. 883, and *Durga Das Rukhit v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 820, referred to. **JOGENDRA NATH MOOKERJEE v. SARAT CHANDRA BANERJEE** (1905).

**I. L. R. 32 Calc. 351
s.c. 9 C. W. N. 277**

5. **False Charge—False information—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 182, 211.** The accused, a railway station-master, sent the following telegram to a head-constable of the Railway Police:—"A bag of paddy was stolen from my goods-shed last night. Thief was caught. Please come; prosecute him." The head-constable inquired into the matter and reported it to be false. The Inspector of Police, in submitting the case to the District Magistrate, recommended that the station-master should be called upon to show cause why he should not be prosecuted under s. 182 or s. 211 of the Penal Code. A judicial inquiry was held by a Deputy Magistrate, and the District Magistrate sanctioned the prosecution of the accused. The accused was tried and convicted under s. 182 of the Penal Code by an Assistant Magistrate with second class powers: *Held*, that the sanction given by the District Magistrate was sufficient; that a prosecution for a false charge might be under s. 182 or s. 211 of the Penal Code, but if the false charge was a serious one, the proper course would be to proceed under s. 211. *Held*, further, that the present case not being a serious one, it was quite legal to prosecute the accused under s. 182 of the Code. *Bhokteram v. Heera Kalita*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 184; *Russik Lal Mullick*, *In re*, 7 C. L. R. 382, followed. **EMPEROR v. SARADA PRASAD CHATTERJEE** (1905).

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 180

6. **Sanction to prosecute, notice of application for sanction—Practice.** When an application is made to a Court under s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for sanction to prosecute, although it is not legally necessary that notice of such application should be given to the opposite party before orders are passed thereon, nevertheless it is highly desirable that such notice should be given. *Pampapati Sastri v. Subba Sastri*, I. L. R. 2 Mad. 210; *In re Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, 4 Bombay Law Reporter 750; *Mangar Ram v. Behari*, I. L. R. 18 All. 358, and *Maula Baksh v. Niazo*, All. Weekly Notes, 1904, 171, referred to. **INAYAT ALI v. MOHAR SINGH** (1905).

I. L. R. 28 All. 142

7. **Application for sanction to prosecute—Dismissal of the application for default—Appellate Court cannot grant sanction on appeal—Dismissal of application for default not permissible—Review of order not permissible under the Code.** An application was made by the Public

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.

s. 195—contd.

Prosecutor of Belgaum to the Subordinate Judge of Gokak for sanction to prosecute one *G* for offences committed in his Court. The Public Prosecutor failed to appear in the Court on the day and at the hour fixed for the hearing of the application. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the application as for default. On an application being made to review this order the Subordinate Judge declined to do so. On appeal, however, the District Judge granted the sanction under s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898). *Held*, that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to accord the sanction on appeal, under s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) inasmuch as there was no sanction given or refused by the Subordinate Judge. The only jurisdiction, which the District Judge had under the circumstances was to revise the order passed by the Subordinate Judge dismissing the application as for default. *Held*, further, that there was no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) which warranted the Subordinate Judge in rejecting or dismissing the application of the Public Prosecutor, because of his failure to appear at the time the application was called on for dismissal. The Subordinate Judge was bound to consider the application on its merits, even though the party, who made it, was not there to help the Court. *Held*, also, that the Subordinate Judge had no power to review his order because the Criminal Procedure Code contained no provision giving jurisdiction to a Court to review orders passed under it. **GOPAL SIDDESHWAR DESHPANDE**, *In re* (1908) **I. L. R. 32 Bom. 203**

8. **Sanction to prosecute—Jurisdiction to grant or revoke sanction.** Application was made under s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to a Magistrate of the 3rd class, who tried the original case, for sanction to prosecute the complainant. This application was refused. A further application was then made to the District Magistrate, who granted sanction. *Held*, that the Sessions Judge had no power to set aside the order of the District Magistrate granting sanction. **RAM DENI v. NAND LAL RAI** (1908).

I. L. R. 30 All. 109

9. **Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 195—Sanction for prosecution, whether should be given during pendency of civil litigation involving a decision of the same matter—Delay—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 182 and 211, offences under.** Where on an information lodged to the Police by the petitioner alleging that there had been a burglary in his house and a sum of money and a mortgage bond had been stolen and that he suspected one *K* and his brother-in-law one *B* who, he said, would be benefited by the loss of the mortgage bond, the Deputy Commissioner directed an enquiry by a Deputy Magistrate who on enquiry found the information to be false and submitted his report to the Deputy Commissioner and

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.

— s. 195—contd.

the Deputy Commissioner directed the prosecution of the petitioner under s. 211, Indian Penal Code, but this order having been set aside by the High Court, the Deputy Commissioner returned the record of the case to the Deputy Magistrate who had held the enquiry and the Deputy Magistrate on the examination of two more witnesses tendered by the petitioner ordered his prosecution under ss. 182 and 211, Indian Penal Code: *Held*, that the order for prosecution was not bad in law under s. 476, Criminal Procedure Code. *Begu Singh v. The Emperor*, 11 C. W. N. 568: s. c. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 551; *Rahimdulla v. The Emperor*, I. L. R. 31 Mad. 140, explained. It would be a dangerous doctrine to lay down any hard and fast rule to the effect that a criminal trial or enquiry should of necessity be stayed simply because a civil suit has been instituted between the parties in which some or all the matters materially in issue in the criminal case would have to be determined, until the civil litigation was finally decided. *Jadu Lal v. Lewis*, 11 C. W. N. 712: s. c. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 848, explained. It is very desirable in the ends of justice that when a competent Court has taken upon itself the responsibility of ordering a prosecution under s. 476, Criminal Procedure Code, that that prosecution should be entertained as speedily as possible while the evidence on both sides is fresh. *Hem Chandra v. Atul Behary*, I. L. R. 35 Cal. 909, followed. But a Court may well hesitate to give sanction under s. 195, Criminal Procedure Code, to a private individual to prosecute his adversary for an offence alleged to have been committed during the pendency of a civil litigation before it has terminated. Where in his information to the Police, the petitioner did not name any one as the actual offender but what he did was to report that a burglary or theft had taken place in his house and that he suspected that the opposite party had instigated it: *Held*, that the order for prosecution of the petitioner under s. 211, Indian Penal Code, was justified, as it was found by the Magistrate that as a matter of fact no burglary or theft had at all taken place as alleged by the petitioner. *BROJIBASHI PANDA v. THE EMPEROR* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 398

10. — Sanction to prosecute—*Appeal*. *Held*, that when sanction to prosecute has been granted by a Court under the provisions of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, only one appeal from such order will lie under that section. *Salig Ram v. Ramji Lal*, I. L. R. 28 All. 554, *Emperor v. Serh Mal*, *Weekly Notes*, 1908, p. 120, and *Muthuswami v. Mudali v. Veeni Cheetti*, I. L. R. 30 Mad. 382, referred to. *KANHAI LAL v. CHADAMI LAL* (1908) . I. L. R. 31 All. 48

— s. 195, sub-s. (1) cl. (b).

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION.

11 C. W. N. 909

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.

— s. 195, cls. (4), (6).

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION.

11 C. W. N. 195

ss. 195 cl. (4), 234, 330 cl. (1), 537.

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 808

— s. 195 (6).

See APPEAL, CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 382

1. — s. 195, cl. (6) "High Court," meaning of—*Execution of time—Appeal, right of—Jurisdiction*. An appeal lies from an order, which purports to extend the period of an old sanction, but in effect is an order granting a new sanction to prosecute. "High Court" in s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) does not mean a Judge sitting on the Original Side of the Court, but it means a Civil Appellate Bench of the Court; a Judge sitting on the Original Side has consequently no jurisdiction to entertain an application for extending the time during which a sanction under s. 195 of the Code is to remain in force. Such time cannot be extended after it has expired. *In re Muthukundam Pillai*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 190, and *Karuppana Servagaran v. Sinna Gounden*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 480, dissented from. *KALI KINKAR SETT v. DINOBANDHU NANDY* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 379

s.c. 9 C. W. N. 321

2. — *Appeal—Remand*.

The powers conferred under s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are of a very special nature and no inherent jurisdiction can be attributed to any Court in the exercise of such powers, unless it is incident to their proper exercise. A Court to which an appeal is presented against an order granting or refusing sanction under s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has no power to remand the case for a fresh inquiry. *RAMA AYYAR v. VENKATACHELLA PADAYACHI* (1907) . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 311

— s. 195, cls. (6), (7)—*Appeal against order of District Court granting sanction—Power of High Court on such appeal*. An appeal lies to the High Court against an order of the District Judge granting sanction under cls. 6 and 7 of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Where such order has revoked the sanction granted by the Munsif for prosecution under certain sections of the Penal Code, but granted sanction to prosecute under other sections, it is competent to the High Court on appeal, therefrom, not only to revoke the sanction granted, but also to grant the sanction refused. *KANNAMBATH IMBICHI NAIR v. MANATHANATH RAMAR NAIR* (1906) I. L. R. 29 Mad. 122

— s. 195 (7) (c)—*Sanction to prosecute—Granted by Collector—Set aside by District Judge—Jurisdiction*. Where a Collector granted sanction

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 195 (7) (c)—*conclld.*

for prosecution for perjury in a case in which no appeal lay, and the District Judge revoked the sanction: *Held* that under cl. (c) of sub-s. 7 of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the District Judge, as being the principal court of original jurisdiction, had jurisdiction to revoke the sanction. *WAZIR MUHAMMAD v. HUB LAL* (1909)

I. L. R. 31 All. 313

ss. 195, 196, 197, 215, 436—Sanction—Notice to accused—Reference to High Court—Revisional powers. S. 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to a case in which a commitment in question has not been made under any one of the four sections therein specified, but has been made under the directions of the High Court under s. 526 (1) iv. An order of a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate passed under s. 436, directing commitment, may be quashed by the High Court in the exercise of its revisional powers, though not under s. 215. But an order passed by the High Court itself under s. 526 cannot be so revised. Sanction accorded by Government under s. 197 is not null and void for the reason that no notice was given to the accused to show cause why it should not be given. It is a matter left to the discretion of Government whether such opportunity should be given to the person concerned before sanctioning his prosecution. There is a marked distinction between the classes of offences dealt with in s. 195, cls. (b) and (c), and those dealt with in s. 197. A Court granting sanction under s. 195 (b) and (c) does so in connection with offences committed in or in relation to any proceeding in such Court, and the Court therefore acts in its judicial capacity in granting the sanction on legal evidence. But the Government, in according or withholding sanction under s. 197 (for the prosecution of a public servant in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by him as such public servant), acts purely in its executive capacity and the sanction need not be based on legal evidence. The Criminal Procedure Code does not prescribe any particular form for the sanction required by s. 197 as it does in the case of a sanction accorded under s. 195. *In the matter of KALAGAVA BAPIAH* (1904) . . . **I. L. R. 27 Mad. 54**

ss. 195, 200 (b)—Initiation of proceedings—Prosecution by another without authority—Presidency Magistrate—Practice. Under a sanction to prosecute expressly restricted to a certain person, the prosecution may be initiated by another person expressly authorised by him to whom the sanction was granted; but such authority must be a matter of record so as to enable the accused to challenge its validity both before the Magistrate also on appeal or revision. A Presidency Magistrate is not excused by s. 200, cl. (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code from recording the neces-

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

ss. 195, 200 (b)—*conclld.*

sary evidence of such authority. *KALI KINKAR SETT v. NRITYA GOPAL ROY* (1905)

**I. L. R. 32 Cal. 469
s.c. 9 C. W. N. 321**

ss. 195 (1), cl. (b), 432, 433 (1).

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION.

I. L. R. 33 Cal. 193

ss. 195, 235—No sanction required when the actual offence charged is not one for which sanction is necessary under s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, though the facts alleged disclose an offence for which no prosecution can be entertained without sanction under that section. The agent of a decree-holder accompanied an Amin to execute the decree and was obstructed and assaulted in endeavouring to effect execution. The agent applied to the Court for sanction to prosecute for an offence under s. 186 of the Penal Code, and on the sanction being refused, he presented a complaint against the party, who assaulted him, for offences under ss. 323 and 355 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that no sanction under s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was necessary, although the facts alleged disclosed an offence under s. 186 of the Penal Code. When in the course of the commission of an offence, for which no prosecution can be entertained without sanction, other offences which may form the subject of separate charges under s. 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and for which no sanction is required, are committed, a complaint in respect of the latter offences can be entertained without sanction being obtained for the former. *KRISTNA PILLAI v. KRISHNA KONAN* (1907) . . . **I. L. R. 31 Mad. 43**

ss. 195, 439.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 622.
I. L. R. 31 All. 38

1. **Sanction to prosecute—Revision—Appeal—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 211.** *Held*, that an application made under cl. 6 of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may properly be regarded as an application by way of appeal, though it is not material by what name the application is called in pursuance of which the appellate Court revokes (or grants) a sanction granted (or refused) by a subordinate Court. *Mehdi Hassan v. Tota Ram*. **I. L. R. 15 All. 61**, discussed. *Held*, also, that to constitute the offence provided for by s. 211 of the Indian Penal Code it is sufficient that a false complaint should be made against any person. It is not necessary that summons should be issued upon such complaint. *HARDEO SINGH v. HANUMAN DAT NARAIN* (1904) . . . **I. L. R. 26 All. 244**

2. **Civil Procedure Code, s. 622—Revision—Sanction to prosecute—**

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

ss. 195 and 439—concl'd.

Jurisdiction. Where sanction to prosecute is granted under the provisions of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by a Civil Court, the High Court has no jurisdiction in the exercise of its revisional powers on the Criminal side to interfere with such an order. *Nazir Hasan v. Dost Muhammad*, I. L. R. 26 All. 1, overruled. *In the matter of the petition of Bhup Kunwar*, I. L. R. 26 All. 249; *In re Chennana Goud*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 139; *Flower v. Lloyd*, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 297, and *Diss Urban Sanitary Authority v. Aldrich*, L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 179, referred to by KNOX, J. *SALIG RAM v. RAMJI LAL* (1906) I. L. R. 28 All. 554

3. ———— *Sanction to prosecute—Revision—Powers of High Court.* An application under s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for sanction to prosecute was made to and granted by a Magistrate of the first class. A further application under s. 195 of the Code to revoke the sanction was made to the Sessions Judge, but was rejected. *Held*, that the High Court had power to send for the record of the case under s. 435 and to interfere, if necessary, under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with these orders. *Kusal v. Badri*, *Weekly Notes* (1907) 283, overruled. *Muthuswami Mudali v. Veeni Chetti*, I. L. R. 30 Mad. 382, referred to. *EMPEROR v. SERH MAL* . . . I. L. R. 30 All. 243

1. ———— ss. 195, 476—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 193, 210—Sanction to prosecute—Refusal by Subordinate Judge—District Judge on appeal may institute proceedings under s. 476—Court—Interpretation.* An application was made to a Subordinate Judge for sanction to prosecute L for offences punishable under ss. 193 and 210 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860). The Subordinate Judge refused to grant the sanction. On appeal, the District Judge varied the order and directed the lower Court to prosecute L for an offence under s. 210 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the District Judge had jurisdiction to pass an order under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898); that it was not competent to him to direct the Subordinate Judge to prosecute L for an offence under s. 210 of the Penal Code and that he should himself have proceeded according to cl. (b) of s. 195 read with s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The word "Court" in s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code includes within its scope the other Courts, to which such Court is subordinate, referred to in s. 195 of the Code. *Begu Singh v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 551, dissented from. *In re LAKSHMIDAS LALJI* (1907) I. L. R. 32 Bom. 184

2. ———— *Sanction to prosecute and order for prosecution—Offence against public justice—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 209—Offence committed before Small Cause Court—Sanction granted by such Court revoked by District Judge—High Court or District Judge, if may order*

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

ss. 195, 476—concl'd.

prosecution under s. 476—High Court if may grant sanction under s. 195, or set aside order revoking sanction—Powers of revision—Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908), s. 115—Acting illegally in exercise of jurisdiction. Where a Small Cause Court Judge granted sanction to the District Magistrate to prosecute the petitioner for an offence under s. 209, Indian Penal Code, and the sanction was revoked by the District Judge on the ground that a sanction could not be granted to a third party, but the District Judge nevertheless ordered the prosecution of the petitioner under s. 476, Criminal Procedure Code, there being, in his opinion, a *prima facie* case against the petitioner, *Held*, that neither the District Judge nor the High Court had power to order the prosecution of the petitioner under s. 476, Criminal Procedure Code. *Begu Singh v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 551, followed. That the High Court was not, for the purposes of s. 195 of the Code, the Court to which the Small Cause Court was subordinate, and so could not grant sanction under cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of s. 195. That the High Court had jurisdiction to set aside the order of revocation and to restore the original sanction, under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, the District Judge having acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in revoking the sanction which had been properly granted to the District Magistrate. *Quære*: Whether the High Court had power under cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) of s. 195, to interfere with the order of the District Judge revoking the sanction. *Hamiyuddi Mondal v. Damodar Ghose*, 10 C. W. N. 1026, is on this point in conflict with *Girija Sankar Roy v. Benode Sheikh*, 5 C. L. J. 222, and has been dissented from by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in *Muthu Swami Mudali v. Veeni Chetti*, I. L. R. 30 Mad. 383. There is nothing in the statute law to limit the grant of sanction to a party to the proceeding in connection with which the offence aimed at was committed. Sanction to prosecute for an offence against public justice may best be granted to a public officer, for there can be no better recipient of such sanction. *In re Chandra Kanto*, 3 C. W. N. 3, distinguished. The principles relating to the grant of sanctions to prosecute and the reasons for the safeguards provided by ss. 195 and 476, indicated. "Offences against public justice ought to be pressed primarily in the interests of public justice and never as a means of satisfying a private grudge." *RAM PROSAD MALLA v. RAGHUBAR MALLA* (1909)

13 C. W. N. 1038

ss. 195, 537—*Sanction, want of, only an irregularity and not fatal to the prosecution.* The general provisions of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ought not to be so construed as to nullify the special provisions of s. 537 (b). The want of sanction required by s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not fatal to

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

ss. 195, 537—*concl'd.*

a prosecution, unless the accused is prejudiced there-
by. *Raj Chunder Mozumdar v. Gour Chunder
Mozumdar*, 1. L. R. 22 Calc. 176, dissented from.
ISMAL ROWTHER v. SHUNMUGAVELU NADAN (1905)
1. L. R. 29 Mad. 149

s. 196.

See DEFAMATION—IMPUTATION ON A
WIFE . . . 1. L. R. 25 Bom. 151

See JOINDER OF CHARGES.

1. L. R. 25 Bom. 90

ss. 196, 200.

See SEDITION . . . 1. L. R. 35 Calc. 141

ss. 196, 4 (b), 200, 225, 287, 537
—*Indian Penal Code—Act XLV of 1860, ss. 109,
114, 124 (a).—Evidence Act I of 1872, s. 14 (a).—
Sanction under s. 196, Criminal Procedure Code,
form of—Sanction to prosecute under s. 124 (a) will
authorise prosecution under ss. 124 (a) and 114,
Indian Penal Code—Complaint by Police officer not
a police report under s. 4 (b), Criminal Procedure
Code—Defects in complaint cured under s. 537,
Criminal Procedure Code—Irregular order to
investigate after cognisance under s. 200, Criminal
Procedure Code—Defective charge under s. 124 (a),
Indian Penal Code, curable under ss. 537 and 225,
Criminal Procedure Code—Intention of speaker may
be gathered from speeches other than those charged—
Admissibility of speeches to prove object of conspi-
racies—Statement forwarded by accused admissible
under s. 287, Criminal Procedure Code—Requisites of
offence under s. 124 (a), Indian Penal Code.
S. 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code only re-
quires that the complaint should be made upon
authority from the Local Government and not that
the actual complaint must be expressly authorised
by the Local Government. The Court has only to
see whether the complaint is made by order or
under authority of Government. *Queen-Empress
v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, 1. L. R., 22 Bom. 122,
referred to. Where a Police officer files a complaint
in a non-cognisable case or regarding an offence
of which it is not his duty to report, such com-
plaint is a complaint within s. 4 (b) of the
Criminal Procedure Code and is not a police report.
King-Emperor v. Sada, 1. L. R., 26 Bom. 150,
referred to. A complaint is not defective be-
cause it did not set out the speeches or alleged
seditious words which form the subject-matter
of the subsequent charge. Even if such omission
is a defect, it is an irregularity which will be cured
by s. 537 (a) unless it has occasioned a failure
of justice. When a magistrate, after duly taking
cognisance of a case under s. 200, Criminal
Procedure Code, makes an order to investigate
not authorised by law, such unauthorised order
does not vitiate subsequent proceedings. A charge*

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

ss. 196, 4 (b), 200, 225, 287, 537—
concl'd.

of an offence under s. 124 (a) is defective if it does
not set out the speeches alleged to be seditious;
but such defect does not, under ss. 537 and 225
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, vitiate the pro-
ceedings and any objection on the ground of such
defect ought to be taken as early as possible.
Where certain speeches form the subject-matter of a
charge for sedition and when such speeches form
part of a series of speeches or lectures on one topic,
delivered within a short period of time, any of such
speeches or lectures will be admissible, under s.
14 of the Evidence Act, as evidence to prove the
intention of the speaker in respect of the speeches
which form the subject of the charge. *Queen-
Empress v. Jogendra Chunder Bose*, 1. L. R. 19
Calc. 35, and *Emperor v. Phanendra Nath
Mitter*, 1. L. R. 35 Calc. 945, referred to. The
offence of abetting under s. 109, Indian Penal
Code, plus presence of the abettor on the occasion
of the crime abetted is, constructively, under
s. 114, the offence abetted; and a sanction, under
s. 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to prose-
cute for an offence under s. 124 (a) will autho-
rise a complaint under s. 124 (a) and s. 114.
Where an agreement exists between two parties,
in pursuance of which speeches are delivered by
them, such speeches are admissible to prove the
object of the agreement. *CHIDAMBARAM PILLAI v.
EMPEROR* (1908) . . . 1. L. R. 32 Mad. 3

s. 197 (1872, s. 466; 1861-69, s.
167: Presidency Magistrate's Act, 1877,
s. 39).

See FALSE CHARGE . . . 1. L. R. 19 Bom. 51

See ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL.

1. L. R. 30 Calc. 927

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—
BOMBAY—CRIMINAL.

1. L. R. 9 Bom. 288

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIM-
INAL CASES . . . 1. L. R. 15 Mad. 36

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION.

1. ———— *Acts done by public
servant—Sanction to prosecution—Mahalkari.* S.
466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure extends
to all acts ostensibly done by a public servant,
i.e., to acts which would have no special signi-
fication except as acts done by a public servant;
therefore, a Mahalkari charged with fabricating the
proceedings of a case decided before himself could
not be tried on that charge except with the sanction
specified in that section. Para. 1 of s. 466, which
mentions a sanction by Government or its deputy,
is intended to apply, at least chiefly, to the cases
of persons specially responsible to Government,
such as accountants who have failed in their duty;
and para. 2, which speaks of sanction by Govern-

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 197—*contd.*

ment alone, to persons professing to exercise certain authority, and with that pretext doing an act which is impeached by a subject, on the ground of its being wholly unwarranted, or of an excess or impropriety of some kind. A Mahalkari falls within the class of public servants contemplated in para. 1 of s. 466; a sanction for his prosecution by the District Magistrate is, therefore, sufficient. *EMPRESS v. LUKSHMAN SAKHARAM*

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 481

2. *Sanction under, whether should specify the offence with precision—Substantial compliance with the terms of the sanction.* Under s. 197, Criminal Procedure Code, the Government in granting sanction need not specify the offences with the same precision as is necessary in framing a charge. Where the order of the local Government sanctioning the prosecution of the accused directed the Inspector-General of Registration to instruct the District Registrar to institute a prosecution according to law and the District Registrar being himself the District Magistrate took cognizance of the case against the accused and summoned him and directed the actual trial to take place before a special Magistrate to be appointed by the local Government: *Held*, that although taking cognizance of the case as District Magistrate was not the same thing as initiating the prosecution as the District Registrar, still the prosecution was instituted in substantial accordance with the order of Government. *Reg. v. Vinayak Divakar, 3 Bcm. H. C. R. Crown Cases 32, distinguished. GIRWARDHARI LAL v. THE KING-EMPEROR (1909)*

13 C. W. N. 1062

3. *Sanction not necessary to prosecute a Village Magistrate for making a false record.* Sanction under s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not required to prosecute a Judge for any act, which is not done by him as such Judge. *Municipal Commissioners for the City of Madras v. Major Bell, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 15, 23, referred to.* A Village Magistrate, in trying a case, is not bound to make any record; and in fabricating a false record of an alleged criminal case, which had no existence, he is not acting as a Judge. No sanction is required under s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for prosecuting him for such offence. *PALANIADY PILLAI v. ARUNACHELUM PILLAI (1908)*

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 255

ss. 197, 537—No sentence of competent Court to be reversed for want of sanction under s. 195. The words 'subject to the provision hereinbefore contained' in s. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must not be construed in such a way as to nullify the provisions of cl. (b) of the same section that no sentence of a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed on appeal

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 197—*concl.*

'for want of any sanction required by s. 195.' Want of sanction under s. 195 is no ground on appeal for setting aside a conviction after trial for any offence mentioned in the section. *PERUMALLA NAYUDU v. EMPEROR (1907)*

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 80

s. 198.

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASE—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 25 All. 534

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT, AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES.

I. L. R. 25 All. 132, 209

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 43

I. L. R. 10 All. 39

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 379

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 336

See DEFAMATION—IMPUTATION ON A WIFE.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 151

Defaming a Hindu Widow—Complaint by brother, if cognizable—"Person aggrieved." Where imputations were made against the character of a Hindu lady, a widow who was residing in the house, and under the charge of her brother: *Held*, that, having regard to the circumstances and conditions under which people live in this part of India, the brother was a person aggrieved within the meaning of s. 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it was competent to a Court to take cognizance of the offence of defamation upon his complaint. *Chhotalal Lalubhai v. Nathabhai Bechar, I. L. R. 25 Bom. 151, dissented from. Brahmanna v. Ramakrishna, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 250, distinguished. THAKUR DAS SUR v. ADHAR CHANDRA MISRI (1904).*

I. L. R. 32 Cal. 425

8 C. W. N. 515

s. 199 (1872, s. 478).

See ADULTERY.

24 W. R. Cr. 18

I. L. R. 5 All. 233

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 415

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 910

See DEFAMATION—IMPUTATION ON A WIFE.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 151

s. 199—Complaint, information to Police by husband if a—Taking away or detaining a married woman with criminal intent—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 498. The word "complaint" referred to in s. 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, means a "complaint" as defined by s. 4, cl. (a) of that Code. *Jatra Sheikh v. Reazat Sheikh, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 483, referred to. TARA PRASAD LAHA v. KING-EMPEROR (1904).*

8 C. W. N. 17

ss. 199, 238—Charge of kidnapping and conviction for enticing married woman—No complaint by husband—Legality. The provision in

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

ss. 199, 238—*concl'd.*

s. 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under s. 498 of the Indian Penal Code except upon a complaint made by the husband of the woman, means a complaint by the husband of an offence under s. 498, not any complaint made by the husband. An accused was charged with kidnapping or abducting a woman under s. 366, Indian Penal Code, but the Sessions Judge, holding that the prosecutions had failed to prove either kidnapping or abduction, convicted the accused, on the evidence, of an offence under s. 498. In doing so he purported to act under s. 238 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The complaint before the Court had been made by the husband, but was only general in terms. *Held*, that the conviction was bad. *Empress v. Kallu*, I. L. R. 5 All. 233, followed and approved. *BANGARU ASARI v. EMPEROE* (1904) I. L. R. 27 Mad. 61

**s. 200 (1872, ss. 44, 144; 1861-69,
s. 273).**

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—POWER OF, AND PRELIMINARIES TO, DISMISSAL.

2 B. L. R. S. N. 6: 10 W. R. Cr. 49
7 Mad. Ap. 31
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 141

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT, ETC. I. L. R. 10 All. 39
I. L. R. 18 All. 221
3 C. W. N. 17
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 410
11 C. W. N. 170

See COMPLAINT—POWER TO REFER TO SUBORDINATE OFFICERS.

3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 67
8 B. L. R. 19
9 B. L. R. F. B. 148

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.
7 Mad. Ap. 25

See DYING DECLARATION.
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 659

See FALSE EVIDENCE—CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS 6 C. W. N. 840

Sanction for prosecution given to a particular person—Prosecution, if it can be started by one authorised by him—Authority to be a matter of record—Duty of Presidency Magistrate to record evidence of such authority. When sanction for prosecution is given to a particular person, the prosecution may be initiated by a person expressly authorised by such person, but the authority must be a matter of record, so as to enable the accused to challenge its validity both before the Magistrate and also on appeal or revision. Cl. (b) of s. 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not relieve a Presidency Magistrate from the

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 200—*concl'd.*

necessity of recording the necessary evidence of such authority. Proceedings instituted against an accused by a Presidency Magistrate without exhibiting or recording such authority were quashed. *KALI KINKAR SETT v. NRITYA GOPAL ROY* (1904)
8 C. W. N. 883

**s. 202 (1872, s. 146; 1861-69,
s. 180).**

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—POWER OF, AND PRELIMINARIES TO, DISMISSAL.

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 114
6 C. W. N. 295

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES.
21 W. R. Cr. 44

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 334
1 C. W. N. 17
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 410

See COMPLAINT—POWER TO REFER TO SUBORDINATE OFFICERS.

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 282
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 161
I. L. R. 20 Mad. 387
4 C. W. N. 305

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS—IRREGULARITY I. L. R. 25 Mad. 546

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 167
4 C. W. N. 604

See PLEADER—APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE 8 Bom. A. C. 202

See POLICE INQUIRY.
2 B. L. R. S. N. 6: 10 W. R. Cr. 49
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 161

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 167

s. 203.

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT.

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES.

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 334
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 600
3 C. W. N. 17
6 C. W. N. 843

See COMPLAINT—REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT.

See DEFAMATION . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 167

1. Dismissal of complaint no bar to Magistrate rehearing complaint. On a reference by the Sessions Judge as to whether it was competent to a Magistrate, after dismissing a

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 203—*contd.*

complaint under s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to rehear the complaint, when such order of dismissal had not been set aside by a higher Court: *Held* (SUBRAHMANIA AYYAR and DAVIES, JJ., dissenting), that the dismissal of a complaint under s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not operate as a bar to the rehearing of the complaint by the same Magistrate, even when such order of dismissal has not been set aside by a competent authority. *Mahomed Abdul Mennan v. Panduranga Row*, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 256, dissented from. *Dwarka Nath Mondul v. Bani Madhab Banerjee*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 652, and *Mir Ahwad Hossein v. Mahomed Askari*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 726, approved and followed. *Per* SIR ARNOLD WHITE, C. J.—The power to enquire into an offence must be held to exist in a Magistrate until something has occurred to divest the Magistrate of this jurisdiction. An order under s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not a judgment to which the provisions of s. 369 will apply. The principle of *autrefois acquit* will not apply as there is no trial when the complaint is dismissed under s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The provisions of ss. 147, 400, 215 and 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1872 compared with the corresponding ss. 203, 403, 253 and 242 of the present Code. The alterations in the present Code in regard to the sections under consideration, were merely drafting alterations and were not intended to effect and did not effect any alteration in the law as laid down by the old Code. *Per* BENSON, J.—The decisions in *Queen-Empress v. Adam Khan*, I. L. R. 22 All 106, *Niratan Sen v. Jogesh Chundra Bhattacharjee*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 983, and *Mahomed Abdul Mennan v. Panduranga Row*, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 255, do not apply, as in those cases it was not the same, but different Magistrate, who proceeded to rehear the complaint. There is no bar under the Code to the complaint being reheard, unless the proceedings have reached such a state of finality that an acquittal or an order operating as such under the Code is recorded. *Per* MOORE, J.—The maxim *nemo bis vexari* has no application to an order under s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, though it may be a good argument, where an accused has been discharged under ss. 253 and 259 of the Code. *Per* SUBRAHMANIA AYYAR, J.—Although the technical doctrine of *autrefois acquit* will apply only to acquittals, the principle underlying such doctrine, that a person should not, in respect of an offence, be in jeopardy of prosecution more than once, applies to cases where the prosecution failed to reach the stage of acquittal without any fault on the part of the accused, unless its application is precluded by the provisions of the Code. Acquittal in common law means an acquittal after verdict or sentence. The Legislature having by ss. 333, 494 and 248 of the Code of Criminal Pro-

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 203—*concl.*

cedure given the term a wider significance, the explanation to s. 403 was intended to guard against the term being applied to cases where the plea of *autrefois acquit* was not technically applicable and not to bar the application of the aforesaid analogous principle, where justice required it. There being thus no legal provision to the contrary, an order dismissing a complaint or discharging the accused must, on the above principle, operate as a bar to further enquiry into the same matter as long as such order remains in force. Orders under ss. 203, 253 and 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stand on the same footing as regards the application of this doctrine. There is no inherent power in a Magistrate to revise his own order of dismissal or discharge. *EMPEROR v. CHINNA KALIAPPA GOUNDEN* (1905). . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 126

2.—*Complaint—Jurisdiction—Dismissal of complaint no bar to the cognizance of a fresh complaint in pari materia.* There is nothing to prevent a Magistrate from entertaining a second complaint made against the same person even though the second complaint may be connected with a previous complaint which has already been dismissed under the provisions of s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Queen-Empress v. Umedan*, All. Weekly Notes (1895) 86, followed. *Dwarka Nath Mondul v. Bani Madhab Banerji*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 652, and *Mir Ahwad Hossein v. Mahomed Askari*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 726, referred to. *Queen-Empress v. Adam Khan*, I. L. R. 22 All. 106, distinguished. *EMPEROR v. MEHRBAN HUSAIN* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All. 7

ss. 203, 204 (1872, s. 147). ;

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL.

24 W. R. Cr. 75

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—POWER OF AND PRELIMINARIES TO DISMISSAL . . . 4. C. L. R. 534

2 B. L. R. S. N. 6 : 10 W. R. Cr. 49
10 B. L. R. Ap. 26

See COMPLAINT—REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT.

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 405
7 Mad. Ap. 16

ss. 203, 435, 439—*Complaint—Complaint, dismissal of—Revival of proceedings—Illegality.* When an original complaint is dismissed under s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no fresh complaint on the same facts can be entertained so long as the order of dismissal is not set aside by a competent authority. *Mir Ahwad Hussein v. Mahomed Askari*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 726, differed from. *ABDUL MENAN v. PANDURANGA ROW* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 255

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

ss. 203, 437.

See COMPLAINT . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 415

See FURTHER INQUIRY 11 C. W. N. 316

ss. 203, 437 and 439—*Complaint, dismissal of—Presidency Magistrate—Jurisdiction of High Court to order further enquiry on the merits—Charter Act (24 and 25 Vict., c. 104), s. 15.* Where a complaint has been dismissed by Presidency Magistrate under s. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court has no power to direct a further enquiry under ss. 437 and 439 of the Code, but only under s. 15 of the Charter Act (24 and 25 Vict., c. 104). The question of the propriety or the impropriety of the order of dismissal does not strictly come within the authority vested in the Court thereunder. DEBI BUX SHROFF v. JUTMAL DUNGARWAL (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1282

s. 204 (1872, s. 148).

See POLICE ACT, 1861, s. 29.

25 W. R. Cr. 20

ss. 204, 205.

See PARDANASHIN WOMEN.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 533

s. 205.

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PENAL CODE,
s. 174 . . . 5 C. W. N. 131

s. 206, et seq.—*Discharge—Practice—Powers and duties of Magistrate inquiring into case triable by the Court of Session discussed.* Under Ch. XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate inquiring into a case triable by the Court of Session has a wide discretion in the matter of weighing the evidence produced on one side or the other, the remedy for an erroneous exercise of such discretion being provided in the powers conferred on Sessions Judges and District Magistrates by s. 436 of the Code. But in the exercise of such discretion, if the question of discharge, or commitment, is one merely of probabilities, the inquiring Magistrate ought rather to leave the decision thereof to the Court of Session than to make an order of discharge, because in his opinion the accused ought to have the benefit of the doubt. *Chiranjil Lal v. Ram Lal, All. Weekly Notes (1904) 5*, discussed. *Queen-Empress v. Duke, All. Weekly Notes (1899) 135*, referred to by KNOX, *J. FATTU v. FATTU (1904)* . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 564

s. 208 (1872, ss. 190, 357, 362;
1861-69, ss. 193, 207).

See ACCUSED PERSON. 5 C. W. N. 110

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—POWER OF AND PRELIMINARIES TO DISMISSAL . 16 W. R. Cr. 48

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 6 All. 477

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 208—*concl.*

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—COMMITMENT TO SESSIONS COURT.

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 240

I. L. R. 20 All. 264

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES—CROSS-EXAMINATION . . . 19 W. R. Cr. 53

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUMMONING WITNESSES. 4 B. L. R. Ap. 1

23 W. R. Cr. 9

I. L. R. 3 All. 392

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 329

Procedure—Witnesses

—Duty of Magistrate inquiring into a case triable by the Court of Session to summon and examine witnesses asked for by the accused. The accused, against whom an inquiry with regard to an alleged offence under s. 330 of the Penal Code was being held by a Magistrate of the first class, asked the Magistrate to summon certain witnesses for the defence; but the Magistrate without summoning such witnesses passed an order committing the accused to the Court of Session. *Held*, that the Magistrate was bound to take all such evidence as the accused was prepared to produce before him, and that the order of commitment was bad in law. *Queen-Empress v. Ahmadi, I. L. R. 20 All. 264*, followed. *EMPEROR v. MUHAMMAD HADI (1904)*

I. L. R. 26 All. 177

ss. 208, 215, 347.

See COMMITMENT I. L. R. 36 Calc. 48

s. 209 (1872, s. 195: Presidency Magistrate's Act, 1877, s. 87).

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

I. L. R. 5 All. 161

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 84

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 136

See EXAMINATION OF ACCUSED PERSON.

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 636

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—COMMITMENT TO SESSIONS COURT.

I. L. R. 5 All. 161

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 372

See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 376

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 59

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 121: 4 C. L. R. 305

ss. 209, 210.

See REVISION, CRIMINAL CASES—DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED . 7 C. W. N. 77

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 210.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—COMMITMENT TO SESSIONS COURT.

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 372

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES—CROSS-EXAMINATION . **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 642**

ss. 210, 211 (1872, ss. 199, 200; 1861-69, s. 227).

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUMMONING WITNESSES **4 B. L. R. Ap. 1**
I. L. R. 19 All. 502

ss. 210, 212.

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES—GENERALLY.
I. L. R. 18 All. 380

s. 213.

See ACCUSED PERSON . **5 C. W. N. 110**

ss. 213, 214.

See CORONER . **7 C. W. N. 889**

ss. 214, 152 (1872, s. 197).

See COMMITMENT.

s. 215.

See ACCUSED PERSON . **5 C. W. N. 110**

See COMMITMENT.

Commitment to the Sessions, if may be quashed by High Court—Evidence not sufficient to be left to a jury—Point of law—Records called for by Sessions Judge—Magistrate, if bound to stay proceedings—Abetment. Where the evidence upon which a Magistrate ordered the commitment of the accused to the Sessions for trial upon charges of abetment of offences under ss. 193, 196 and 471, Penal Code, was that (i) a servant in the employ of the accused gave false evidence and produced forged documents at the trial of certain rent suits, in which the accused was the plaintiff, (ii) that the accused was present actively prosecuting those suits, (iii) that the evidence, if believed, would have supported his case, (iv) that the accused sometimes made collections and had sometimes tested collection papers: *Held* by HARRINGTON, J. (agreeing with HENDERSON, J.), that this just stopped short of a case which could properly be left to a jury. Commitment was accordingly quashed. *HARRINGTON, J.*—The test, which should be applied to decide whether a committal ought or ought not to be made on the facts is this—assuming that the whole of the evidence telling against the accused is true, is there a case which a Judge at a trial could leave to a jury? If the evidence is such that a Judge would have been bound to rule that there was no evidence on which a jury could convict, then a committal ought not to be

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 215—*concld.*

made. If there is any evidence which calls for an answer, however great the preponderance in favour of the prisoner may be, then the committal is proper. *SHEOBUX RAM v. EMPEROR* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 829

ss. 215, 436—S. 215 applies only to a commitment actually made and not to order by Sessions Judge directing committal. The provisions of s. 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply only to a commitment actually made and not to a case where a Sessions Judge, in exercise of the powers vested in him by s. 436 of the Code, sets aside an order of discharge made by a Magistrate and directs a committal to the Session. In such cases the High Court may consider the facts, as well as the questions of law involved, to determine whether the Sessions Judge has exercised a proper discretion. *Pirithi Chand Lal v. Sampatia*, **7 C. W. N. 327**, referred to. *MUTHIA CHETTY v. EMPEROR* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 224

s. 216 (1872, s. 359; 1861-69, s. 228).

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—WITNESS. **6 Mad. Ap. 9**

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUMMONING WITNESSES . **4 B. L. R. Ap. 1**
I. L. R. 3 Calc. 573
I. L. R. 4 All. 53
I. L. R. 8 All. 668

s. 221.

See PRISONER . **I. L. R. 11 Calc. 106**

ss. 221 and 222.

See CRIMINAL TRESPASS.
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 391

s. 221 (1872, s. 439), ss. 222 to 226 (1872, s. 446), s. 227 (1872, s. 245), s. 228 (1872, s. 447), ss. 229, 230 (1872, s. 450), ss. 231, 232.

See CHARGE.

s. 221, sub-s. 2 and s. 225—*Rioting*

—Omission to set out the common object of an unlawful assembly—Prejudice to the accused. In all cases in which there is a charge under s. 147 of the Penal Code, the common object ought to be stated. But the omission to set out the common object does not necessarily make the conviction bad. It is necessary to see whether or not the accused has been misled by the omission, and the omission has caused a failure of justice. In a case under s. 147 of the Penal Code in which the facts were very simple and there were distinct findings by the lower Court as to the part which each of the accused took in the rioting: *Held*, that the accused were not prejudiced by the omission to set out in the charge the common

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

_____ s. 221, sub-s. 2 and s. 225—*concl'd.*
object of the assembly. *BUDHU v. LACHMINAI*
(1905) 9 C. W. N. 599

_____ s. 222.

See CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1085

See DEFAMATION I. L. R. 30 Calc. 402

_____ s. 222 (2)—*Criminal misappropriation—Charges, joinder of—More than three acts of misappropriation in one charge.* Where a charge against an accused person, which resulted in his conviction under s. 403 of the Penal Code, recited that the accused realized by certain rent receipts, 23 in number, the sum of R103, of which the accused misappropriated the sum of R67: *Held*, that the charge came within s. 222, cl. (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and was properly framed. *Emperor v. Gulzari Lal*, I. L. R. 24 All. 254, relied on. *SAMIRUDDIN SARKAR v. NIBARAN CHANDRA GHOSE* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 807

_____ s. 222A.

See OFFENCE RELATING TO DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 560

8 C. W. N. 412

_____ ss. 222, 234—*Criminal breach of trust—Joinder in one trial of charges for two distinct items with another for a gross sum is not illegal—Construction of statute.* Under s. 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a charge of criminal breach of trust in respect of a gross sum, without specifying the items, is a charge for one offence within the meaning of s. 234. S. 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply only to cases where there is a general deficiency and the prosecution is unable to specify the particular items of the deficiency, but also to cases where the items may be, but are not, specified. The joinder in one trial of charges of criminal breach of trust in respect of two distinct items with a charge in respect of a gross sum (the items constituting which may be, but are not, specified) is a joinder of only three charges, and is not bad as contravening the provisions of s. 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. "The essence of a code is to be exhaustive on the matter in respect of which it declares the law and it is not the province of a Judge to disregard or go outside the enactment according to its true construction." *Subramania Aiyar v. King-Emperor*, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 61, distinguished. *THOMAS v. EMPEROR* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 558

_____ ss. 222, 239—*Successive breaches of trust—Joinder of charges—Joint trial—Same transaction—'Transaction,' meaning of.* Where the accused persons were jointly in charge of trust funds, so that one could not act without the connivance of the other and each of them misappropriated sums

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

_____ ss. 222, 239—*concl'd.*

of money from the trust funds to his own use, thus evidently carrying through their object in concert, the fact that they carried out their scheme by successive acts done at intervals, alternately taking the benefits, did not prevent the unity of the project from constituting the series of acts one transaction, i.e., the carrying through of the same object which both had from the first act to the last; and there was no objection to there being tried jointly at one trial. S. 222 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) clearly admits of the trial of any number of acts of breach of trust committed within the year as amounting only to one offence. The section does not require any particular formulation of the accusation, but only enacts that it is sufficient to show the aggregate offence without specifying the details. It dispenses with the necessity of amplification; it does not prohibit enumeration of the particular items in the charge. S. 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) admits of the joint trial when more persons than one are accused of different offences committed in the same transaction. It suffices for the purpose of justifying a joint trial that the accusation alleges the offences committed by each accused to have been committed in the same transaction, within the meaning of s. 239. It is not necessary that the charge should contain the statement as to the transaction being one and the same. It is the tenour of the acquisition and not the wording of the charge that must be considered as the test. In s. 239 of the Code, a series of acts separated by intervals of time are not excluded, provided that those jointly tried have throughout been directed to one and the same objective. If the accused started together for the same goal, this suffices to justify the joint trial, even if incidentally, one of those jointly tried has done an act for which the other may not be responsible. The foundation for the procedure in s. 239 is the association of two persons concurring from start to finish to attend the same end. No doubt, if it were attempted to associate in the trial of a person, who had no connection whatever with the transaction at a time when one or more of the series of the acts alleged had been done, then that would be outside the provisions of the section. "Transaction" means "carrying through" and suggests not necessarily proximity in time, so much as continuity of action and purpose. *EMPEROR v. DATTO* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 49

_____ s. 223—*Attempt to cheat, charge for—Omission of name of person deceived and statement of manner in which deception practised—Defect—Prejudice—Misdirection.* In the trial of the accused on the charge of attempting to cheat, it was a serious defect and one which placed the accused at a considerable disadvantage in the conduct of his defence, that the formal charge was silent as to the person upon whom the alleged attempt to cheat was made, and also as to the manner in which it was intended by the accused to influence the con-

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 223—*concl'd.*

duct of that person, and that these omissions were remedied until the close of the case for the prosecution. *EMPEROR v. IMAM ALI SIRCAR* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 278

s. 225.

See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 276

ss. 225, 233, 234, 235, 236 and 237—*Charges—Joinder of charges—Misjoinder of charges—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 124A and 153A—Sedition—Promoting enmity, etc., between classes—Publication, what constitutes.* The accused was charged at one trial with having committed offences punishable under ss. 124A and 153A of the Indian Penal Code, on two charges, one with respect to each of the two articles he published on different dates in his newspaper called the *Hind Swarajya*. At the trial there was no other evidence of the publication of the newspaper in Bombay except the declaration made by the accused under the Press Act, and the depositions of witnesses who received the newspaper in Bombay as Government servants in their capacity as such. The accused was convicted on both the charges and sentenced separately on each of them. It was contended in appeal that there was no evidence of the publication of the newspaper in Bombay, and that there was a misjoinder of charges vitiating the trial. *Held*, that the evidence on record was sufficient to prove the publication of the newspaper in Bombay. *Held*, further, that the trial was not bad as there had been no misjoinder of charges. *Per CHANDAVARKAR, J.* :—It is true that the Magistrate framed two charges, one with respect to each of the two articles. But in each charge the offences are mentioned as being those punishable under ss. 124A and 153A of the Indian Penal Code, so that the accused had distinct notice of the charges he had to answer, and he could hardly have been prejudiced by the somewhat informal mode in which the charges were drawn up. The defect, if any, was no more than a mere irregularity, cured by the provisions of s. 225 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code which directs that where an accused person is alleged to have done two or more acts, each of which may fall within the definition of an offence under one or another section of the Indian Penal Code, the section or sections in either case being the same, the joinder of the charges under those sections is illegal. Substantially the acts amount in such a case to offences punishable under the same sections of the Indian Penal Code and therefore they are offences of the same kind. *Per HEATON, J.* :—S. 234 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not say that at most a trial must be limited to three charges : it says it must be limited to three offences and that the offences must be of the same kind. The "offence" as defined by the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

ss. 225, 233, 234, 235, 236 and
237—*concl'd.*

Code itself, is the act or omission made punishable. The offences in this case were two in number, namely, the publication of two articles on two different dates. These two offences were, as charged, punishable under the same section of the Indian Penal Code, and were, therefore, offences of the same kind. The word "section" in s. 234 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not invariably to be read as singular. It is not the intention of the Code of Criminal Procedure, either express or implied, to exclude from the operation of s. 234 of the Code an offence because it is made the subject of more than one charge. Charging one act or series of acts under more than one section of the Indian Penal Code, is a proceeding provided for in s. 235 (cl. 2) and in s. 236 of the Criminal Procedure Code and is also provided for in section 71 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court may charge an offence twice over under two different sections but by so doing it cannot increase the sentence which may be imposed. That principle is not offended by trying together separate offences for each of which there is more than one charge. *EMPEROR v. TRIBHOVANDAS* (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 77

ss. 225, 537.

See PENAL CODE, s. 124A.

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 384

ss. 226, 227—*Addition to or alteration of—Indictment, subject-matter of—Cheating—Property—Money—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 420.* The Sessions Court is not a Court of original jurisdiction, and though vested with large powers for amending and adding to charges can only do so with reference to the immediate subject of the prosecution and committal, and not with regard to matter not covered by the indictment. The accused was put upon his trial before the Sessions Court on charges under ss. 471 and 411 of the Penal Code. Upon motion to the High Court it was held that a previous acquittal covered the charge under s. 471, and that the accused could be tried only under s. 411. When the case came to trial, the Sessions Judge amended the charge to one under s. 411 :—*Held*, that the Judge had full power under the law to amend the charge, and that the High Court did not intend to fetter his discretion. The word "property" in s. 420 of the Penal Code includes money. *BIRENDRA LAL BHADURI v. EMPEROR* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 22
s. c. 8 C. W. N. 784

s. 227.

See ADULTERY . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 415

ss. 227, 228, 229.

See CHARGE—ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF CHARGE . 6 C. W. N. 72

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

ss. 227, 228, 199, 238, 537—*Charge—Addition of a charge—Irregularity—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 363, 366, 498.* The accused was tried on charges under ss. 363 (kidnapping from lawful guardianship) and 366 (kidnapping a woman) of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860). At the conclusion of the evidence to establish those charges and after the evidence for the defence had been recorded, the Court added a charge under s. 498 (enticing a married woman) of the Code, notwithstanding the objection by the accused's counsel. The trial ended in conviction of the accused on all the three charges. The accused appealed contending that the procedure adopted was contrary to the provisions of s. 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to the spirit of s. 238 of the Code:—*Held*, (i) that the procedure adopted in the case was not regular. The additional charge framed at the stage it was framed, notwithstanding the objection by the accused's counsel, was prejudicial to the accused; (ii) that the conviction under s. 498 of the Indian Penal Code should be set aside: and further investigation be made into the remaining charges. *EMPEROR v. ISAF MAHOMED* (1906).

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 218

ss. 227, 233, 234—*Joinder of more than three offences in one trial illegal—Trial not validated by striking out charge to cure such defect after case closed, though before judgment—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 478, 480—Offence of using false trademark—No acquisition of the trademark in the sense used in the English Act necessary under s. 878 of the Penal Code.* A person selling soap not manufactured by P, in a box which bears the name of P as a soap manufacturer, uses a false trademark and is guilty of an offence under s. 480 of the Penal Code. It is not necessary to constitute an offence under s. 473 that trademark in the sense in which the word is used in the English Patents, Designs and Trademarks Acts should have been acquired; and the mark is none the less a false mark because it appeared on the box and not on the goods. Under ss. 233 and 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a person cannot be charged with more than three offences at one trial; and the defect cannot be cured, after the accused had pleaded and the case had closed, by amending the charges so as to reduce it to three offences. Although the words in s. 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are wide enough to warrant a Court in altering a charge by striking out one of the charges at any time before judgment, the section does not warrant the striking out of a charge for the purpose of curing an illegality already committed and after the mischief which the Legislature intended to guard against had been done. *Subrahmanya Aiyar v. King-Emperor, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 61*, referred to and explained. *MANAVALA CHETTY v. EMPEROR* (1906).

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 569

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 230.

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—NATURE, FORM AND SUFFICIENCY OF SANCTION . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 905

s. 232.

See ERROR . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 481

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 63
7 C. W. N. 301

s. 233 (1872, s. 452).

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 273
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 128
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 537
1 C. W. N. 35
4 C. W. N. 656
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 104

1. *Charge—Charge not distinguishing separate offences alleged against accused—Charge held to be bad in law.* Certain persons who were alleged by the prosecution to have committed three, if not four, separate dacoities in the course of the same night, were charged to the effect that they on or about the 12th December at Dubri "committed dacoity and therefore committed an offence punishable under s. 395 of the Penal Code." *Held*, that the charge ought to have specified each alleged dacoity separately, and that in the form in which it was drawn it was not merely irregular, but bad in law; and a new trial was ordered. *Subrahmanya Ayyar v. King-Emperor, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 63*, referred to. *EMPEROR v. FATTU* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 195

2. *One charge for cheating several persons on different occasions, bad.* Where one charge was framed against two persons charging them with cheating the complainant and two others on three different occasions. *Held*, that the charge was bad in law. *Gul Mahomed Sircar v. Chekaru Mandal, 10 C. W. N. 53*, and *Johan Subarna v. King-Emperor, 10 C. W. N. 520*, followed. *SRISH CHANDRA MUKERJEE v. EMPEROR* (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 1067

ss. 233, 234 (1872, s. 453), and s. 235 (1872, s. 454).

See JOINDER OF CHARGES.

See JOINT TRIAL . . . 11 C. W. N. 1128

See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.

1. *Simultaneous trial—Procedure—Irregularity, if it vitiates trial—Prejudice.* Where in two cross-cases of rioting and grievous hurt a Magistrate tried the cases separately but almost simultaneously, that is, the Magistrate examined the witness in the one case on certain days and the witnesses in the other on certain other days, and examined some of the accused in the one

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

ss. 233, 234 and 235—*concl'd.*

case as witnesses for prosecution in the other and after framing charges against the accused in the one case on a certain day framed charges against the accused in the other case on a different day and subsequently heard the arguments in both the cases on one day and disposed of both the cases on one and the same day, separate judgments being given in each of the cases: *Held*, that this mode of trial and the procedure adopted by the Magistrate did not vitiate the trial, and the accused were not in any way prejudiced thereby. *Subrahmanya Ayyar v. King-Emperor*, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 61; *In the matter of Chakowri Lall*, 13 C. L. R. 275, distinguished. *Queen-Empress v. Chandra Bhuiya*, I. L. R. 20 Cal. 537, referred to. *SAHADEV AHIR v. EMPEROR* (1904). 8 C. W. N. 344

2. ———— *Joint trial—Two offences of receiving property stolen from different persons at different times.* One trial for having been found in possession of stolen properties belonging to two different persons, and stolen at different times, is illegal. *Nanda Kumar Sirkar v. The Emperor*, 11 C. W. N. 1123, followed. *Subramania Iyer v. The King-Emperor*, 5 C. W. N. 866: s.c. I. L. R. 25 M. d. 61, referred to. *Manu Miya v. The Empress*, I. L. R. 9 Cal. 371, not followed. *ALI MAHOMED v. THE EMPEROR* (1908). 13 C. W. N. 418

3. ———— *Joinder of charges in respect of several offences committed within a year against different persons, whether legal—Extortion.* A person successively committing within the space of twelve months, several offences of the same kind, e.g., extortion, against different persons, may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, any number of them not exceeding three. *Nanda Kumar Sirkar v. The Emperor*, 11 C. W. N. 1128, doubted and distinguished. *Manu Miya v. The Empress*, I. L. R. 9 Cal. 371. *Queen-Empress v. Jwala Prasad*, I. L. R. 7 All. 174; *Queen-Empress v. Dhondi*, R. t. Un. Cr. C. 331, followed. *BHAGWAN SINGH v. THE EMPEROR* (1908). 13 C. W. N. 507

ss. 233, 234, 235.

See JOINDER OF CHARGES.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 328

ss. 233, 235—*Joinder of charges—One transaction—Prosecution's duty to prove—Receiving and retaining different articles of stolen property.* Where the accused in one count were charged with having dishonestly received or retained eight sets of cooking utensils belonging to and stolen from eight different persons on eight different dates and thereby having committed an offence punishable under s. 411 of the Penal Code, and in another count were charged with having aided and abetted one another in the commission of the said offence under s. 411 of the Penal Code, and thereby com-

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

ss. 233, 235—*concl'd.*

mitted an offence under ss. 109, 114 and 411 of the Penal Code and were convicted in a single trial: *Held*, that in the absence of evidence that the acts of receiving or retaining were so connected together as to form one transaction, the charges framed and the single trial held with respect thereto were illegal. That the mere fact that there was no evidence of separate receipt or retention did not justify the joinder of charges. It lay upon the prosecution to establish the facts, which would justify such a procedure. The dishonest receipt or retention of each article constituted a separate offence and the accused could only be tried for three of such offences committed within one year, unless it were shown that the receipt or retention of all the articles was so connected as to form one transaction. *RAM SARUP BENIA v. EMPEROR* (19.5)

9 C. W. N. 1027

2. ———— *Transaction, whether one—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 478 and 420.* The petitioner, a jamadar in the service of a firm, was entrusted with two cheques for encashment on the 20th September and told to pay thereby the freight and take delivery of certain goods from the Railway Company. He cashed the cheques on the 21st idem and on the 22nd, when asked by the firm, denied having done so. On the 26th idem he induced, under promise of immediate payment, a clerk of the Railway to give him delivery of the goods, and then without making payment he absconded. He was charged with the offences of criminal misappropriation and cheating under ss. 408 and 420, Indian Penal Code, and was tried for the offences in one trial: *Held*, that the offence under s. 408, Indian Penal Code, was committed against the firm and was complete before the petitioner cheated the Railway Company, and therefore the two offences could not be tried together as they were not committed in one transaction. *PARMESHWAR LAL v. THE EMPEROR* (19.9). 13 C. W. N. 1089

ss. 233, 235, 483.

See MISJOINDER OF CHARGES.

I. L. R. 35 Cal. 161

ss. 233 to 239.

See JOINDER OF CHARGES.

See JOINT TRIAL I. L. R. 33 Cal. 292

1. ———— ss. 233, 239—*Joint trial of different accused—Receiving stolen property at different times and from different persons—Same transaction—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 411.* A theft was committed of certain property, including ornaments. S was one of the persons who received the stolen property from the thieves. S disposed of the property to several persons, and being indebted to J he gave a portion of the property to

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
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ss. 233, 239—*contd.*

J in satisfaction of his debt. *K* was found to have in his possession a portion of the property identified as stolen in the same theft, but there was nothing to show when he received it and from whom. Under these circumstances the three persons *S*, *J* and *K* were tried together at one trial on charges of receiving stolen property knowing it to be stolen: *Held* by *RUSSELL* and *BATTY, JJ.*, that the three offences against the three accused *S*, *J* and *K* were distinct offences, which could not be regarded as offences committed in the same transaction within the meaning of s. 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that the trial of the three accused together was in contravention of the provisions of s. 233 of the Code, and was therefore illegal. *Per BATTY, J.*—"The offence punishable under s. 414 of the Penal Code is that of voluntarily assisting in disposing of stolen property and therefore must necessarily form part of the same transaction as the receipt by the person to whom it is so disposed of. It necessarily involves manifest criminality in both persons at one and the same time, when both offences are committed. The words of s. 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898, are, to say the least of it, ambiguous, if intended to include in the same transaction a series of acts one or more of which had been done at a time before the parties to the subsequent acts had anything to do with that transaction. The illustrations to the section seem to suggest that the persons to be jointly tried must have been associated from the first in the series of acts, which form the same transaction. The inevitable result appears to be that the proceedings of the Magistrate were illegal and a nullity There has been no legal trial. There has therefore been no legal acquittal and there is therefore neither an appeal against acquittal nor an acquittal to reverse and the question whether the accused should now be legally tried is a question not for judicial decision, but for the consideration of the authorities, with whom it rests to proceed with a prosecution." *Subrahmanya Ayyar v. King-Emperor, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 61, followed. EMPEROR v. JETHALAL (1905)*

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 449

2. ——— Charges—Misjoinder—Same transaction, what is—Circumstances showing occurrence did not form the same transaction. Where the accused, more than five in number, after having obstructed certain Civil Court peons in the execution of a decree, held a consultation, and then at the instance of two of them, all of them, with the exception of one or two, proceeded to the kutchery of the decree-holder in order to beat his son and his tehsildar, and brought out the tehsildar whom they took to the house of the judgment-debtor where they had obstructed the Civil Court peon, and violently assaulted him there: *Held*, that the two occurrences, the one of obstructing

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ss. 233, 239—*concl.*

the execution of the decree and the other of assaulting the tehsildar, did not form one transaction and the accused could not be tried on charges arising out of both the occurrences at one trial. The second occurrence was clearly the result of an after-thought and there was then no further intention to obstruct the execution of the decree in the course of which the incidents of the first occurrence took place and it cannot be said that there was any continuity in the ideas or methods of the rioters. The fact that all the accused did not take part in the second occurrence and that the common object in respect of it was different from that in respect of the first occurrence shows that the two occurrences did not form parts of the same transaction. *Umed Dholchand v. Pir Saheb, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 134, 135, distinguished. LASKARI v. THE KING-EMPEROR (1909)* . . . **13 C. W. N. 1113**

3. ——— ss. 233 to 237 and 239—

Charges, joinder of charges—Privy Council, leave to appeal to, in criminal case—Practice and procedure. The accused was charged with an offence punishable under s. 124A of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 186) in respect of an article which he published in his newspaper and also with offences punishable under ss. 124A and 153A of the Code with regard to another article which he published in the same newspaper. For all these offences he was tried at one trial, and was convicted and sentenced for each of them. *Held*, that there was no irregularity in the trial on the ground of misjoinder of charges. Ss. 234, 235, 236 and 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, mentioned as exceptions in s. 233 of the Code, are not mutually exclusive. If it had been intended that s. 235 (2) or s. 236 could not be made use of in co-operation with s. 234, this intention could have been easily expressed. If the exceptions are mutually exclusive, the provisions of ss. 233 or 237 could never be invoked to prevent a miscarriage of justice arising from a failure to make good all the details of a charge joined with two other charges under s. 234. The Legislature could hardly have intended that a joint trial of three offences under s. 234 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, should prevent the prosecution from establishing at the same trial the minor or alternative degrees of criminality involved in the acts complained of. Ss. 235 (2) and 236 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, may be resorted to in framing additional charges where the trial is of three offences of the same kind committed within the year. Before granting a certificate for leave to appeal to the Privy Council the Court must be satisfied that there is reasonable ground for thinking that grave and substantial injustice may have been done by reason of some departure from the principles of natural justice. *Ex parte Carew, [1897] A.C. 719, and Dinizulu v. Attorney-General of Zululand, 61 L. T. 740, followed.*

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

ss. 233 to 237 and 239—*concl'd.*

In re BAL GANGADHAR TILAK (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 221

ss. 233, 537.

See JOINDER OF CHARGES.

11 C. W. N. 54

s. 234.

See ante, s. 222 (2).

See ante, ss. 233, 234.

Penal Code, s. 409—

Criminal breach of trust—Form of charge. In a charge of criminal misappropriation there were three counts. Each count specified the sum of money alleged to have been misappropriated by the accused on a particular day; but in two out of the three cases the total sum consisted of three separate items in each instance. *Held*, that a charge so framed did not offend against s. 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *King-Emperor v. Gulzari Lal I. L. R. 24 All. 254*, followed. *EMPEROR v. ISHTIAQ AHMAD* (1905) . I. L. R. 27 All. 69

ss. 234 and 235—*Charge—Misjoinder of charges—Illegality.* An accused person was charged with and tried for, first, three separate acts, of criminal misappropriation committed within a year, and, secondly, two separate offences of forgery with intent to conceal two of such acts of criminal misappropriation. *Held*, that this was an illegality not covered by the provisions of s. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *EMPEROR v. MATA PRASAD* (1908) . I. L. R. 30 All. 351

ss. 234, 239—*Charges, misjoinder of—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 225 and 379, charges under—Joinder—Illegality.* Where one of the accused caught in the act of committing theft, was rescued by others while being taken to the thana by the complainant and some of the rescuers snatched away some clothes from the person of the complainant and the Magistrate tried all the accused jointly, two of them on charges under ss. 225 and 379, Indian Penal Code, two on a charge under s. 379, Indian Penal Code, and the remaining two on a charge under s. 225, Indian Penal Code: *Held*, that the trial was illegal being vitiated by misjoinder of charges. Two separate trials were directed, one in respect of the original charge of theft and the other in respect of the rescuing and the theft committed in the course of the rescuing. *TILUKDHARI MAHTON v. EMPEROR* (1909) . 13 C. W. N. 804

1. s. 235—*Joint trial of two persons on different charges—Same transaction—Confession by co-accused, admissibility of—Previous conviction for one offence, does not affect a second trial for a distinct offence—Queen's coin, counterfeit, possession and delivery of—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 40, 243.* C, who was in possession of a number of counterfeit Queen's coins, delivered some of them

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 235—*concl'd.*

to P with a view to their being changed for good money, and being found in possession of the rest was tried and convicted under s. 243 of the Penal Code. Subsequently C and P were tried together, C under s. 240, Penal Code, for making over the coins to P and P under s. 243, Penal Code: *Held*, that the delivery of the counterfeit coins by C to P was a distinct offence from that for which C was previously convicted, and C could be subsequently tried for this offence. That the joint trial of C and P was, having regard to the provisions of s. 239, read with the first clause of s. 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, permissible in law. That P might have been tried with C for abetting an offence under s. 240, Penal Code, inasmuch as he received the counterfeit coin with the deliberate intention of committing a fraud by passing it off as genuine Queen's coin, and his conviction could be legitimately altered to one under s. 240 read with s. 109, Penal Code. *PROSUNNO KUMAR DAS v. EMPEROR* (1904) . 8 C. W. N. 717

2. *Illegal gratification—Taking bribe of Rs 2 for the registration of each of seven documents presented together, whether one offence—One transaction.* Where the accused, a Sub-Registrar, was charged in one count with having received a bribe of Rs 2 for each of seven *kobalas* presented together for registration, which were executed by one person in favour of seven different persons: *Held*, that the count did not amount to a charge of seven separate offences and there was no misjoinder of charges, having regard to the provisions of s. 235, Criminal Procedure Code. The question whether what was alleged in the count amounted to seven separate offences and seven different charges is one of fact. If the accused attempted to obtain Rs 2 separately for each of the *kobalas* and was willing to register any of them on the receipt of the sum, then there would be seven separate offences. But if he was not willing to register any one of the *kobalas* unless Rs 2 for each of the *kobalas* were paid then there would be one offence in one transaction. *Johan Subarna v. King-Emperor*, 10 C. W. N. 520, referred to. *GIRWARDHARI LAL v. THE KING-EMPEROR* (1909) . 13 C. W. N. 1062

ss. 235, 239—*Different transactions—New trial—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 403, 414, 420, 471.* On the 23rd August 1903 the appellant obtained a payment from the firm of S. R. R. D. of Rs 5,000 in currency notes of Rs 500 each on a hundi by falsely representing himself to be a darwan of the firm of H. R. R. C. On the 22nd January 1904 the appellant, accompanied by S. T., went to a shop and purchased some silk, and in payment S. T. gave a note of Rs 500, which was one of the notes received by the appellant on the 23rd of August. The appellant and S. T. were tried jointly and were convicted,—the appellant under ss. 240, 471 and 403 of the Penal Code, with

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
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regard to the occurrence of the 23rd August, and *S. T.* under ss. 403 and 414 of the Penal Code with regard to the occurrence of the 22nd January. *Held*, that the joint trial was bad in law, and that a new trial should be held by a different Magistrate. *HIRA LAL THAKUR v. EMPEROR* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1053
S C. W. N. 715

ss. 235, 307.

See JOINDER OF CHARGES.

11 C. W. N. 715

s. 236 (1872, s. 455).

See AUTREFOIS ACQUIT.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 377

See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL
CASES—RIOTING.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 955

See FALSE EVIDENCE—CONTRADICTORY
STATEMENTS.

13 B. L. R. 324, 325 note

Alternative charges. S. 455 of Act X of 1872 applies to cases in which not the facts are doubtful, but the application of the law to the facts is doubtful. *QUEEN v. JAMURHA*

7 N. W. 137

ss. 236, 237 (1872, s. 456), and
238 (1872, s. 457).

See CHARGE—ALTERATION OR AMEND-
MENT OF CHARGE.

I. L. R. 8 All. 665

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 200

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 369

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 863; 3 C. W. N. 653

s. 238 (1872, s. 457).

See ADULTERY . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 415

See CONVICTION . 11 Bom. 240
12 Bom. 1

See VERDICT OF JURY—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 871

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 215

1. "Minor offence,"
conviction of, without formal charge—*Penal Code*
(Act XLV of 1860), ss. 365, 366 and 376—*Criminal*
Procedure Code (1882), s. 307. An offence under s.
365 of the Penal Code is, within the meaning of s. 238
of the Criminal Procedure Code, a minor offence as
compared with offences under ss. 366 and 376 of
the Penal Code; and the High Court in dealing
with a case under s. 307 of the Criminal Procedure
Code can convict an accused of the former offence
without a formal charge having been framed. *Per*
BANERJEE, J.—The words "minor offence" have
not been defined by law; they are to be taken not

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
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VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 238—concl'd.

in any technical sense, but in their ordinary sense.
QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SITANATH MANDAL

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 1006

2. *Penal Code* (Act XLV
of 1860), ss. 366, 498—*Cognizance of offence by Court*
—*Criminal Procedure Code* (1882), s. 199—*Enticing*
away married woman—Conviction for minor offence
where evidence is insufficient for grave offence. The
complainant charged the accused with an offence
under s. 366 of the Penal Code in respect of his wife.
The Deputy Magistrate convicted the accused of an
offence under s. 498 of the Penal Code, and sen-
tenced him to one month's rigorous imprisonment.
The Sessions Judge, being of opinion that the
Deputy Magistrate had no jurisdiction to convict
the accused under s. 498, there being no complaint
by the husband under s. 199 of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code, and that the offence did not fall under
s. 238 of the Criminal Procedure Code, referred the
case to the High Court. *Held*, that such a case is
within the intention of s. 238. The intention of
the law is to prevent Magistrates inquiring of their
own motion into cases connected with marriage
unless the husband or other person authorized
moves them to do so. But when the husband is
complainant and brings his complaint under s. 366,
a conviction under s. 498 may properly be had if
the evidence be such as to justify a conviction for
the minor offence, and yet insufficient for a convic-
tion for the graver one. *JATRA SHEKH v. REAZAT*
SHEKH . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 483

s. 239.

See ante, s. 107.

See BANKERS . I. L. R. 16 All. 88

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 9 All. 452

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 537

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 104

See JOINDER OF CHARGES.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 491

1 C. W. N. 35

ss. 239, 537.

See JOINT TRIAL.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1256

s. 242.

See ERROR . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 481

s. 243 (1872, s. 208).

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COM-
PLAINT—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL.

23 W. R. Cr. 63

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COM-
PLAINT—GROUND FOR DISMISSAL.

22 W. R. Cr. 40

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

ss. 243, 252—*Trial of a warrant case as a summons case not a mere irregularity.* Where a Magistrate in trying a warrant case does not adopt the course prescribed by s. 252 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but convicts the accused on his own admission without taking evidence and without framing a formal charge, such procedure is not a mere irregularity and the conviction will be set aside. *EMPEROR v. CHINNAPAYAN* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 372

s. 244 (1872, ss. 207, 361 1861-69, ss. 262, 266).

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—GROUND FOR DISMISSAL.
I. L. R. 5 Mad. 160

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES—GENERALLY.

4 Mad. Ap. 29
4 B. L. R. Ap. 77
7 B. L. R. [568 note
13 W. R. Cr. 63
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 121

s. 245 (1872, s. 221).

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—TO ACCUSED ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT . . . 22 W. R. Cr. 12
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 581
I. L. R. 10 Bom. 199

s. 247 (1872, ss. 205, 212; 1861-69, s. 259).

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL.
19 W. R. Cr. 52
23 W. R. Cr. 63
24 W. R. Cr. 64
25 W. R. Cr. 63
4 C. W. N. 346

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—GROUND OF DISMISSAL.

4 Mad. Ap. 41
I. L. R. 5 Mad. 160
13 C. L. R. 303
I. L. R. 7 Mad. 356
4 C. W. N. 26

ss. 247, 253.

See JOINDER OF CHARGES.

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 91

s. 248 (1872, s. 210).

See COMPLAINANT I. L. R. 2 Bom. 653

See COMPLAINT—REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT.
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 711

See COMPLAINT—WITHDRAWAL OF COMPLAINT AND OBLIGATION OF MAGISTRATE TO HEAR IT.

4 B. L. R. F. B. 41
I. L. R. 5 Mad. 378
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 600

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 248—*concl'd.*

See COMPOUNDING OFFENCE.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 551

s. 250 (1872, s. 209; 1861-69, s. 270).

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—TO ACCUSED ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT.

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—FOR LOSS OR INJURY CAUSED BY OFFENCE . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 164

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—POWER OF AND PRELIMINARIES TO DISMISSAL.

2 B. L. R. S. N. 15

See COMPLAINT—WITHDRAWAL OF COMPLAINT AND OBLIGATION OF MAGISTRATE TO HEAR IT.

4 B. L. R. F. B. 41

See FALSE CHARGE.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 479

1. Order for compensation. The question whether the discretion given by s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been rightly exercised, must always depend upon the facts of the particular case. If the false charge is of such a nature that a prosecution is necessary on grounds of public policy, it may well be that a Magistrate would exercise his discretion wrongly if, instead of sanctioning a prosecution, he awarded compensation. If the false charge is one, which does not render it necessary on grounds of public policy that a prosecution should be sanctioned, a Magistrate, who makes an order for compensation, cannot be said to exercise his discretion wrongly. *In the matter of TAMMI REDDI* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 59

2. Complaint—Compensation for frivolous or vexatious complaint—Order for compensation dependent on existence of a "complaint." Ram Padarath, a Civil Court chaprasi, made a report that in endeavouring to execute a warrant for the arrest of a certain judgment-debtor, he had met with resistance from the judgment-debtors, who had escaped. This report was laid before the District Judge, who directed that the papers should be laid before the District Magistrate with a view to the institution of a case under s. 225 (B) of the Penal Code. Such proceedings were accordingly instituted; and the case came before the Joint Magistrate, who acquitted the accused and ordered that Ram Padarath should pay Rs50 as compensation to the judgment-debtor. *Held*, that, there being no complaint in the case within the meaning of s. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the order awarding compensation was illegal. *Bharat Chunder Nath v. Javed Ali Biswas*, I. L. R. 20 Calc.

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

— s. 250—*concl'd.*

481, followed. *RAM PADARATH, In the matter of the petition of (1904)* . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 183

3. ————— *Frivolous or vexatious complaint—False complaint—Act X of 1882, s. 560. Held,* that s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is equally applicable to a case, which is deliberately false as to one which cannot be said to be more than frivolous or vexatious. *Manjhi v. Manik Chand, All. Weekly Notes (1896) 180 quoad hoc*, overruled. *Adikkun v. Alagan, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 237*, and *Beni Madhub Kurmi v. Kumud Kumar Biswas, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 123*, followed. *EMPEROR v. BINDESI PRASAD (1904)*

I. L. R. 26 All. 512

4. ————— *Frivolous Complaint—Jurisdiction—Complaint dismissed without issue of process. Held,* that s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to a case in which a complaint is dismissed without any process being issued for the attendance of the person against whom such complaint is made. *BHAGWAN SINGH v. HARMUKH (1906)*

I. L. R. 29 All. 137

5. ————— ss. 250, 423 (1) (d)—*Frivolous complaint—Compensation—Appeal—Powers of Appellate Court. Held,* that an Appellate Court is not empowered to grant compensation under s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in view of the express terms of s. 250, "Magistrate by whom the case is heard." S. 423 (1) (d) cannot be taken to confer such power. *BALLI PANDE v. CHITTAN (1906)* . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 625

— s. 252—*Accused, right of, to cross-examine prosecution witness before charge—Warrant case. In a case under s. 380 of the Penal Code: Held,* that opportunity should be given to an accused, if he so desires, to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, even though a charge may not be framed. *ASHIRBAD MUCHI v. MAJU MUCHINI (1904)* . . . 8 C. W. N. 838

— s. 253.

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 211

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

See MAGISTRATE—WITHDRAWAL OF CASES.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 693

— Order of discharge not a 'judgment'—*Competency of Magistrate after discharge to take proceedings. It is competent to a Magistrate, who has discharged an accused under s. 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to take fresh proceedings and issue process against the person discharged in respect of the same offence without such order being set aside by a higher Court. Per PINHEY, J.—An order of discharge is*

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

— s. 253—*concl'd.*

not a 'judgment.' A 'judgment' is an order in a trial terminating in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused. The principle of *autrefois acquit* can have no application where an accused is discharged under s. 253, as there can be no trial, when the accused is discharged. *EMPEROR v. MAHESWARA KONDAYA (1908)* . . . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 543

— ss. 253, 259 (1872, s. 215; 1861-89, s. 250).

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—POWER OF AND PRELIMINARIES TO DISMISSAL . . . 8 Mad. Ap. 5

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 389

I. L. R. 2 All. 447

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 329

23 W. R. Cr. 9

See COMPLAINT—REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT . . . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 64

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—COMMITMENT TO SESSIONS COURT.

I. L. R. 21 All. 265

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 67

— s. 254 (1872, s. 216; 1861-89, s. 250).

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—COMMITMENT TO SESSIONS COURT.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 429

1 C. W. N. 414

See ERROR . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 481

— Framing charge on complainant's evidence—*Dismissal of charge without further evidence—Proper course—Same order on two charges. If a Magistrate has framed a charge against an accused person, on hearing complainant's evidence, he is not entitled to pass any final orders on that charge without taking further evidence. Where there are two distinct charges between distinct individuals, a Magistrate is not entitled to pass one order so as to affect both. BELLEW v. PARKER (1903)*

7 C. W. N. 521

— s. 255 (1872, s. 217), s. 256 (1872, s. 218), and s. 257 (1872, s. 362).

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUMMONING WITNESSES.

— s. 256.

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES—CROSS-EXAMINATION . . . 6 C. W. N. 424

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 257.

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—
SUMMONING WITNESSES.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 418

EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES—
CROSS-EXAMINATION.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 594

ss. 257, 349.

See WITNESS . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1093

ss. 257, 537—Refusal of Magistrate to issue process to witnesses, where none of the grounds mentioned in s. 257 exist, is illegal. The refusal of a Magistrate to issue process to witnesses named by the accused, when such refusal, in regard to any particular witness, is not based on any of the grounds mentioned in s. 257 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is an illegality, which cannot be cured by s. 537 of the Code. A conviction under such circumstances is illegal and will be set aside. *Emperor v. Purushottam*, I. L. R. 26 Bom. 418, followed. *NARANA MUDALY v. EMPEROR* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 131

**s. 258 (1872, s. 220; 1861-69,
s. 255).**

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COM-
PLAINT—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL.

5 C. L. R. 35

(1872, s. 220)—Conviction or acquittal—Magistrate, powers of. Although the explanation to s. 220 provides that, if a charge is drawn up, the prisoner must be either convicted or acquitted, it does not require that the conviction or acquittal should be by the Magistrate who drew the charge. *EMPRESS v. KUDRUTOOLAH*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 495 : 2 C. L. R. 2

s. 259 (1872, s. 215, expl. 1).

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COM-
PLAINT—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 102

See COMPOUNDING OFFENCE.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 551

Complaint—Absence of complainant at hearing—Discharge of accused—Revival of proceedings on fresh complaint—Jurisdiction. Where an order of discharge under s. 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been passed by a Magistrate, such order will not preclude him from proceeding with the case on a fresh complaint. An order of discharge under s. 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not an acquittal nor has it the effect of an acquittal under s. 403. *CHINNATHAMBI MUDALY v. SALLA GURUSAMY CHETTY* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 310

s. 260 (1872, s. 222).

See BENCH OF MAGISTRATES.

21 W. R. Cr. 12

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 260—concld.

See CATTLE TRESPASS ACT, s. 20.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 248

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 269

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 459

5 C. W. N. 252

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 83

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
TRANSFER OF MAGISTRATE DURING
TRIAL . . . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 117

See SUMMARY TRIALS.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 409

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 67

s. 261.

See BENCH OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 142

s. 262 (1872, s. 226).

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRI-
SONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.

I. L. R. 6 All. 61

See SENTENCE—SOLITARY CONFINEMENT.

I. L. R. 6 All. 83

s. 263 (1872, s. 227).

See SUMMARY TRIAL . 6. C. W. N. 40

1. s. 263, cl. (h)—Recording reasons for a conviction—Practice of High Court on revision. Under cl. (h) of s. 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code, although a Magistrate is not required to record any evidence, he should, in recording his reasons for the conviction, state them, so that the High Court, on revision, may judge whether there were sufficient materials before him to support the conviction. Where they were not so stated, the High Court on motion set the conviction aside. *In the matter of the petition of PANJAB SINGH. EMPRESS v. PANJAB SINGH.*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 579

2. Summary trial, Nature of—Magistrate's statement of the reason for a conviction. Under s. 263 (h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), a Magistrate in recording his reasons for a conviction must state them so that the High Court on revision may judge whether there were sufficient materials before him to support the conviction. *Empress v. Panjab Singh, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 579*, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SHIDGAUDA* . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 97

LALIT MOHAN SAHA v. CHUNDER MOHAN ROY.

3 C. W. N. 281

3. Reasons for finding of Magistrate in case of conviction to be recorded—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 227.

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*concl'd.***

s. 263, cl. (h)—*concl'd.*

cl. (h). A Magistrate, in cases where no appeal lies, is bound to record a brief statement of his reasons for convicting an accused. *In the matter of the petition of RADOINATH SHAHA. EMPRESS v. RADOINATH SHAHA* . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 195

4. *Summary trial.* A summary trial under s. 227, Criminal Procedure Code, being intended to apply only to short and simple cases, where little evidence is needed: *Held*, that the proceedings of a Magistrate thereunder, covering more than 130 pages and occupying seven days, were an abuse of the law. *Held*, also, that a *bonâ fide* claim of title deprives a Magistrate of jurisdiction to deal with a criminal charge in a summary way. *ISSUR CHUNDER MUNDLE v. ROHIM SHEIKH* . . . 25 W. R. Cr. 65

5. *Case in which appeal lies.* Where a Magistrate of the first class passes a sentence of imprisonment and fine, his order is appealable. He cannot, therefore, in such a case, make up his record in the manner described by s. 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *In the matter of SHER MAHOMED* 2 C. L. R. 511

6. *Record of reasons for conviction.* Although generally it is not necessary, in cases in which no appeal lies, for a Magistrate to record the reasons for passing his judgment, yet, under cl. (h) of s. 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in case of conviction, he ought to enter, in the register to be kept under that section, a brief statement of the reasons for such conviction; but an omission to do so may, under some circumstances, be remedied at a subsequent time. *In the matter of DOWLAT SINGH* 6 C. L. R. 273

s. 264 (1872, s. 228).

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—JUDGMENT, DEFECTS IN.

I. L. R. 1 All. 680

Record of evidence in appealable cases. Under Act X of 1872, s. 228, Magistrates are not bound to record the substance of every separate deposition, but to state generally what is the substance of the witnesses' evidence. *KRISTODHONE DUTT v. CHAIRMAN OF MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS OF SUBURBS OF CALCUTTA* 25 W. R. Cr. 6

s. 267 (Act X of 1875, s. 32).

See JURY—JURY UNDER HIGH COURT'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 232

s. 268 (1872, s. 232).

See ASSESSORS . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 514
I. L. R. 13 All. 337
6 C. W. N. 715

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*concl'd.***

s. 268—*concl'd.*

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 15 All. 136

See INSANITY

10 B. L. R. Ap. 10

s. 269 (1872, s. 233).

See JURY—JURY IN SESSIONS CASES.

24 W. R. Cr. 18

4 C. L. R. 405

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 632

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 598

See VERDICT OF JURY—POWER TO INTERFERE WITH VERDICTS.

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 42

Trial by Jury—Trial with the aid of assessors—Difference in the modes of trial—Accused if prejudiced can complain—Practice—Procedure. The accused were tried with a jury on charges of murder (ss. 302, 109, Indian Penal Code), and with the aid of jurors as assessors on charges of rioting, grievous hurt and hurt (ss. 147, 148, 326 and 323 of the Code) respectively. The Judge charged the jury and asked for their verdict on both the charges in the manner prescribed for jury trials. He agreed with the verdict and sentenced the accused to various terms of imprisonment. The accused appealed on the grounds that the learned Judge erred in omitting to take the opinion of the jurors as assessors on the second charge and to write a judgment. *Held*, that the law makes no distinction as to the procedure at the trial between a trial by a jury and one with the aid of assessors except as to the summing up in the case of the former and the manner in which the verdict in the former and the opinions of the assessors in the latter are respectively taken. It is at this latter point that there is a departure of ways, and if the accused who is tried does not intervene at that crucial point, and get the procedure applicable to trial with the aid of assessors enforced, he cannot be heard to complain. *EMPEROR v. MAVSING* (1909)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 423

s. 270 (1872, s. 235, 1861-69, s.

360).

See COMPLAINANT . 5 Bom. Cr. 85

See COUNSEL . 11 Bom. 102

s. 271—*Plea of guilty by accused if must be accepted.* The provision of s. 271, Criminal Procedure Code, clearly leaves it open to the Court, after an accused has pleaded guilty, to refuse to accept the plea and lay the case before the jury or assessors, or in the case of a Magistrate to try the question of the accused's guilt himself. *SUKDEV TEWARI v. THE KING EMPEROR* (1909)

13 C. W. N. 552

ss. 271, 342.

See EVIDENCE ACT (I OF 1872), s. 30.

I. L. R. 30 All. 540

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 272, prov. (1872, s. 265).

See ASSESSORS . . . 22 W. R. Cr. 34
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 514

s. 273.

See PENAL CODE, s. 372.
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 97

(Act X of 1875, s. 14)—*Ordinary original criminal jurisdiction.* Applications under s. 14 of Act X of 1875, Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 273, should be disposed of by the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original criminal jurisdiction. *In the matter of the petition of CHAROO CHUNDER MULLICK. CHAROO CHUNDER MULLICK v. EMPRESS* . . . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 397

ss. 274, 276 (Act X of 1875, s. 33).

See JURY—JURY UNDER HIGH COURT'S
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 462

ss. 274, 451 (6)—*Notification No. 1693—VI-545A-10 of 1884—Trial held by a jury consisting of a larger number than that prescribed by law—Illegality.* Where the Local Government had by notification under s. 274 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directed that in trials by jury before a Court of Session the jury should consist of five; *Held*, that a trial before a District Magistrate under s. 451 of the Code with a jury consisting of seven persons was held before a tribunal not properly constituted and must be set aside. *EMPEROR v. GEORGE BOOTH* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 211

ss. 276 to 279.

See JURY—JURY IN SESSIONS CASES—
CHOOSING JURY . . . 7 C. W. N. 188

s. 278 (1872, s. 244; 1861-69, s. 344).

See JURY—JURY IN SESSIONS CASES.
16 W. R. Cr. 86

ss. 284, 285.

See ASSESSORS . . . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 514
I. L. R. 13 All. 337
I. L. R. 21 All. 106
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 694

s. 285.

See ASSESSORS . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 523
6 C. W. N. 715

s. 287 (1872, s. 248; 1861-69, s. 366).

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—EXA-
MINATION AND STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED.
14 W. R. Cr. 10
15 W. R. Cr. 83
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 352

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—EVI-
DENCE AND WITNESSES.
3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 59

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 288 (1872, s. 249).

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS SUBSE-
QUENTLY RETRACTED.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 123
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 295; 4 C. W. N. 129

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO
MAGISTRATES . . . 7 C. W. N. 345

See, EVIDENCE CRIMINAL CASES—DEPO-
SITIONS . . . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 123
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 361
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 414

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 352

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMI-
NATION OF WITNESSES—GENERALLY.
I. L. R. 7 All. 862

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EXA-
MINATION OF WITNESSES—CROSS-EXA-
MINATION . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 642

1. **Depositions taken before
Committing Magistrate—Evidence before
Sessions Judge—Discretion of Sessions Judge.** The purpose of s. 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended by s. 20 of Act XI of 1874, is to make depositions given before Magistrates in the preliminary inquiry evidence in the trial before the Court of Session, only when the Sessions Judge determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that they are to be used in this way. But the exercise of this discretion, considering it as a matter of fact or law, is open to review by the Appellate Court. *REG. v. ARJUN MEGHA* . . . 11 Bom. 281

2. **Former deposition
of witness—Evidence Act, s. 80.** The confession of a witness in the shape of a former deposition can be used as evidence against a prisoner only on the condition prescribed by s. 249, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872,—that is, it must have been duly taken by the committing officer in the presence of the person against whom it is to be used. The certificate of the Magistrate appended to such confession in order to afford *prima facie* evidence, under s. 80 of the Evidence Act, of the circumstances mentioned in it relative to the taking of the statement ought to give the facts necessary to render the deposition admissible under s. 249. *QUEEN v. NUSSURUDDIN* . . . 21 W. R. Cr. 5

3. **Depositions taken
before Magistrate.** A Court of Session is not at liberty, under Act X of 1872, s. 249, to ground its judgment on the depositions taken by the Magistrate without taking the examinations of the witnesses afresh. *QUEEN v. MAJIDHUR ROY*
24 W. R. Cr. 11

4. **Witnesses before
committing Magistrate.** On the trial of a prisoner for the murder of his wife and child, the witnesses for the prosecution gave evidence contradicting

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 288—*contd.*

the evidence given by them before the committing Magistrate; and the Sessions Judge, purporting to act under s. 249, Act X of 1872, discarded the evidence taken before himself, and grounded his judgment on the evidence given before the Magistrate, and on this evidence convicted the prisoner and sentenced him to death. On appeal by the prisoner: *Held*, that s. 249 did not warrant such a course of proceeding. That section merely authorizes the Court to take a particular statement, made by a witness before the Magistrate as the true statement, notwithstanding that it is denied, or a statement inconsistent with it was made by the witness before the Judge, only if the Judge should see that the original statement was worthy of belief, and does not mean that the Court should discard wholly the testimony of witnesses before it and have recourse to the testimony of the same persons given before another officer. *QUEEN v. AMANULLA*

12 B. L. R. Ap. 15: 21 W. R. Cr. 49

See *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JADUB DASS*
I. L. R. 27 Cal. 295

5. ———— *Use in Sessions Court of evidence taken before the committing Magistrate.* Although under certain circumstances a Court of Session may use evidence given before the committing Magistrate as if it had been given before itself, it is not proper for a Court of Session to base a conviction solely upon such evidence, there being no other evidence on the record to corroborate it. *Queen v. Amanulla*, 12 B. L. R. Ap. 15, *Queen-Emress v. Bharamappa*, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 123, and *Queen-Emress v. Dhan Sahai*, I. L. R. 7 All. 862, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JEORHI* . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 111

6. ———— *Duty of Sessions Judge as to evidence taken before the Magistrate.* Sessions Judges should act with great caution in exercising the discretion given to them by s. 288, Code of Criminal Procedure, in admitting evidence given by a witness before the committing Magistrate. Where at a Sessions trial the Sessions Judge admitted, under s. 288, Code of Criminal Procedure, such evidence, without any inquiry as to the allegation made by the witness that her statement before the Magistrate was made under pressure and threat by the police:—*Held*, that the District Judge should not have placed reliance on the evidence as given before the Magistrate, and that he would have shown a better discretion if he had first made some inquiry by examining the police officer as to the restraint and pressure under which the statement was alleged to have been made. A witness was not examined in the Sessions Court with regard to the particular statements made by him before the committing Magistrate, and he did not repeat those statements before the Sessions Court. *Held*, that the Sessions Judge could not properly

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 288—*contd.*

admit such statements in evidence under s. 288, Criminal Procedure Code. Where a witness was examined in the Sessions Court and had shown no disposition in any way to resile from any statement he had made before the committing Magistrate, the admission of that deposition by a Sessions Judge under s. 288, Code of Criminal Procedure, was improper. *Queen v. Amanulla*, 12 B. L. R. Ap. 15: 21 W. R. Cr. 49, and *Queen-Emress v. Dan Sahai*, I. L. R. 7 All. 862, followed. Where a medical officer gave evidence before the committing Magistrate and it was not certified that the evidence was given in presence of the accused:—*Held*, that the admission of such evidence by the Sessions Judge under s. 288, Code of Criminal Procedure, was also improper. Where the police had kept a witness under surveillance for four days and the Sessions Judge considered that they were justified under the circumstances of the case:—*Held*, that there is no warrant in law for the police to keep the witness under such restraint, and that statements so obtained can hardly be regarded as voluntary. *BAJRANGI LAL v. EMPRESS*

4 C. W. N. 49

7. ———— *Previous statement to committing Magistrate retracted in Sessions Court—Use of such statement by Sessions Court as substantive evidence.* Where a witness who has made a statement before the committing Magistrate subsequently resiles from that statement in the Court of Session, the statement made before the committing Magistrate can be used under s. 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to contradict the witness; but the use of such statement as substantial evidence of the facts alleged by the witness on the prior occasion is fraught with the gravest peril, and could never have been the intention of the Legislative. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NIRMAL DAS*
I. L. R. 22 All. 445

8. ———— *Admissibility of evidence—Statement of approver made before committing Magistrate and afterwards retracted in the Court of Session.* Pardon was tendered by a Magistrate to one of several persons who were being tried before him for dacoity. The pardon was accepted, and the person to whom it was tendered made a statement as a witness before the Magistrate. The case having been committed to the Court of Session, the approver in that Court totally repudiated his statement made before the Magistrate. *Held*, that this repudiation did not prevent the Sessions Court from considering the evidence of the approver under the provisions of s. 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SONBU*
I. L. R. 21 All. 175

9. ———— *Depositions in former case—Refusal to allow cross-examination of witnesses.* A, B, and C having been charged with murder before a Magistrate, two vakils pre-

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 288—*contd.*

sented their vakalutnamahs, and applied to be allowed to conduct the defence of the accused. The Magistrate refused permission, and, after recording the depositions of the witnesses, committed the accused to take their trial before the Sessions Court. In the Court of the Magistrate the only material evidence for the prosecution was that of three witnesses, who, on being examined in the Sessions Court, denied all knowledge of the facts to which they had deposed before the Magistrate. Two of them denied having made the statements recorded, while the third admitted the statements attributed to him, but asserted they were false and made under pressure. The Sessions Judge, disbelieving the statements made in his Court, thereupon, under s. 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872 (as amended by s. 20 of the Amending Act), used the previous depositions as evidence in the case, and mainly upon these convicted the accused of murder and sentenced them to transportation for life. Against this conviction and sentence the prisoners appealed to the High Court on the ground that the previous depositions ought not to have been used as evidence in the case, as the Magistrate had refused to allow their pleaders to appear and cross-examine the witnesses who made the depositions. The High Court affirmed the convictions and sentence. *In the matter of DHAM MUNDUL* 6 C. L. R. 53

10. *Evidence—Previous statement, admissibility of—Contradictory statements—Depositions before the committing Magistrate—Practice.* In a trial before a Court of Session counsel for the prisoner is not entitled to refer to the depositions given before the committing Magistrate for the purpose of contradicting the witnesses before the Sessions Court, without drawing their attention to the alleged contradictions in their previous depositions and giving them an opportunity of explaining the same. *Empress v. Haran Chunder Mitter*, 6 C. L. R. 390, overruled. *EMPEROR v. ZAWAR RAHMAN* (1904).

I. L. R. 31 Cal. 142

11. *Evidence—Statements made before Magistrate retracted before Court of Session.* In a capital case certain witnesses, who had stated before the committing Magistrate that they had seen the accused striking the deceased, withdrew their statements before the Court of Session and gave evidence exculpating the accused. The Sessions Judge, considering the evidence given before him by these witnesses to be untrue and acting under s. 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, admitted in evidence the statements of these witnesses made before the committing Magistrate. *Held*, that such statements were rightly admitted and when admitted were on the same footing as the other evidence on the record. *Queen-Empress v. Dhan Sahai*, I. L. R. 7 All. 862, *Queen-Empress v.*

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 288—*concl'd.*

Jeochi, I. L. R. 21 All. 111, *Queen-Empress v. Jawahir*, All. Weekly Notes (1888) 356, *Queen-Empress v. Nirmal Das*, I. L. R. 22 All. 445, and *Umar v. Empress*, 22 Panj. Rec. Cr. J. 132, referred to. *EMPEROR v. DWARKA KURMI* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 683

1. ss. 288, 292—Right of reply
—*Defence putting in evidence, depositions of witnesses and statements by accused made before the committing Magistrate—Matters of record.* In a trial at the Sessions, the depositions of witnesses before the committing Magistrate, tendered by the accused, may be treated by the presiding judge as evidence under s. 288, but that will not entitle the prosecution to a reply under s. 292 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *EMPEROR v. ROBERT STEWART* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 528

2. *Adducing evidence*
—*Documents put in during cross-examination by the accused of witnesses for the Crown—Right of reply.* During the cross-examination of a witness for the Crown certain documents were put in evidence by counsel for the accused, which were not part of the record sent to the Court by the committing Magistrate. No witnesses were called for the defence. The Crown claimed the right of reply. *Held*, that as the documents put in during the cross-examination of a witness for the Crown were tendered and relied upon by the defence as distinct from the evidence actually tendered by the prosecution and submitted for cross-examination, they must be regarded as evidence adduced by the accused, and that therefore the Crown had the right of reply. *EMPEROR v. BHASKAR* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 421

s. 289.

See RIGHT OF REPLY.

Meaning of words
“no evidence” in section. The words “no evidence” in the second and third clauses of s. 289 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882) must not be read as meaning “no satisfactory, trustworthy, or conclusive evidence.” If there is evidence, the trial must go on to its close; when in trials by jury, the jury, and in other trials the Judge, after considering the opinions of the assessors, have to find on the facts. It is only in the absence of any evidence as to the commission of the offence by the accused that the Court can record an acquittal without allowing the trial to go on, or obtaining the opinion of the assessors, or that the Court can direct the jury, without going into the defence to return a verdict of not guilty. *Queen-Empress v. Munna Lal*, I. L. R. 10 All. 414, approved. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. VAJIRAM*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 414

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

ss. 289, 290 (1872, s. 251).

See COUNSEL . . . 11 Bom. 102

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 10 All. 414

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 252

See SESSIONS JUDGE, POWER OF.

I. L. R. 10 All. 414

Procedure—Absence of witnesses for defence. If an accused has not his witnesses present, the Judge should, under s. 251, Criminal Procedure Code, if he sees grounds for proceeding, first call upon him for his defence and then postpone the case. *QUEEN v. JUMIRUDDIN*

23 W. R. Cr. 58

s. 290.

See RIGHT OF REPLY.

s. 291 (1872, s. 363; 1861-69, s. 375).

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUMMONING WITNESSES 23 W. R. Cr. 56

I. L. R. 8 All. 668

s. 292 (1872, s. 252).

See ante, ss. 288, 292.

See COUNSEL . . . 11 Bom. 102

See RIGHT OF REPLY.

s. 297.

See CHARGE TO JURY—SUMMING UP IN GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 644

See VERDICT OF JURY—POWER TO INTERFERE WITH VERDICTS.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 252

s. 297 (1872, s. 255, para. 1; 1861-69, s. 379) and s. 298.

See CHARGE TO JURY.

See CHARGE TO JURY—MISDIRECTION.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 379, 782

ss. 297, 537.

See CHARGE TO JURY.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 44

ss. 298, 302.

See VERDICT OF JURY—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 735

ss. 300, 301, 303.

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—VERDICT OF JURY, AND MISDIRECTION.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 485

ss. 300-303, 306, 307 (1872, s. 263).

See RIGHT TO BEGIN . 20 W. R. Cr. 33

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 303.

See CHARGE TO JURY—SUMMING UP IN SPECIAL CASES—RIOTING.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 955

See THUMB MARK I. L. R. 32 Calc. 759

See VERDICT OF JURY—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 140

7 C. W. N. 135

ss. 303, 304—*Judge—Jury—Misunderstanding the law—Verdict mistaken or ambiguous—Powers of the Judge to question the Jury.* S. 304 of the Criminal Procedure Code obviously contemplates cases where the verdict delivered is not in accordance with what was really intended by the jury. It has no application where there is no accident or mistake in the delivery of the verdict and the mistake lies in the misunderstanding of the law by the jury. If such a mistake results in an erroneous verdict, it can be corrected only by the Judge disagreeing with the jury and referring the case under s. 307 of the Code to the High Court. *EMPEROR v. KONDIBA* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 412

s. 307.

See HABEAS CORPUS, WRIT OF.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 286

See JURY, TRIAL BY.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 469

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 9 All. 420

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES . 7 C. W. N. 135; 345

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—VERDICT OF JURY AND MISDIRECTION.

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 269

See VERDICT OF JURY—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 140

See VERDICT OF JURY—POWER TO INTERFERE WITH VERDICTS.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 128

Procedure of High Court on reference under—'Opinion' of jury, what is. Where the Sessions Judge disagreeing with the jury, refers a case to the High Court under s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court is to form its own opinion on the evidence. The 'opinion' of the jury in s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the conclusion of the jury, and not the reasons on which that conclusion is based. *Per SIR SUBRAHMANYA AYYAR, Offg. C. J., and BODDAM, J.*—In references under s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, although it may be expedient to have before the Court the reasons of the jury for the view taken by them, when any have been given, the circumstance that no such reasons have been a certain does not warrant this Court

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 307—concl'd.

to decline to go into the evidence and to arrive at its own judgment, after giving due weight to the views taken by the Judge and the jury as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. *EMPEROR v. CHELLAN* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 91

ss. 307, 310—Accused cannot be asked to plead to prior convictions when case referred to High Court under s. 307, before the High Court convicts on such reference. Ss. 307 and 310 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly provide that an accused is not to be asked to plead to prior convictions until he has been convicted on the charge under trial. Where a Court of Session makes a reference to the High Court under s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is no conviction or acquittal in the Sessions Court and it is only after conviction by the High Court that the accused can be asked to plead to prior convictions. *EMPEROR v. KANDASAMI GOUNDAN* (1904)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 134

ss. 307, 337 (4).

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 629

s. 309 (1872, s. 255, para. 1, and s. 261; 1861-69, s. 324).

See ASSESSORS.

s. 310.

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

13 C. L. R. 110

Trials before jury or assessors—Record—Previous convictions. In trials before a jury or assessors the record should invariably show that reference to a previous conviction was not made until the accused had been convicted of the subsequent offence. *KRISTO BEHARY DASS v. EMPRESS* . . . 12 C. L. R. 555

See *BEPIN BEHARY SHAW v. EMPRESS*.

13 C. L. R. 110

s. 326.

See JURY—JURY IN SESSIONS CASES—CHOOSING JURY . . . 7 C. W. N. 188

s. 332 (1872, s. 414; 1861-69, s. 354).

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

8 W. R. Cr. 83

See JURY—JURY IN SESSIONS CASES.

6 C. W. N. 887

s. 334—Verification of statements of accused made during examination—Admissibility of—Record of examination—Certificate on first page only—Defect, curability of. The accused having stated in his examination before the committing

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 334—concl'd.

Magistrate that the boy had fallen from a terrace and his respiration had stopped and that he had buried his ornaments under a tree, a Sub-Deputy Magistrate was deputed to verify these statements. He took the accused to the place of occurrence and the accused pointed out to the Sub-Deputy Magistrate a place on the roof of his house from which he said the boy had fallen and also a place where he said he had buried the body of the boy: *Held*, that the statements made before the Sub-Deputy Magistrate were inadmissible in evidence. *Queen-Empress v. Viran*, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 224; *Queen-Empress v. Bhairab Chunder Chuckerbutty*, 2 C. W. N. 702, followed. In recording the examination of the accused, which was taken on two several occasions, the Magistrate made the certificate required by s. 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the first page of the record only, although the record of the examination taken on the first day alone extended over two pages and that taken on the second day was written entirely on the second page: *Held*, that the defect was cured by the evidence of the Magistrate. *EMPEROR v. RAJONI KANTO KOER* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 22

s. 337 (1872, s. 347; 1861-69, s. 209).

See APPROVERS . . . I. L. R. 11 All. 79
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 493

See CHARGE TO JURY—MISDIRECTION.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 642
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 782

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE . . . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 50

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION AND STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 610
I. L. R. 2 All. 260
I. L. R. 10 Bom. 190
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 213

See PARDON . . . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 675
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 321

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—PERSONS COMPETENT OR NOT TO BE WITNESSES.
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 422

ss. 337, 338—Accomplice—Pardon—Grant of conditional pardon—The pardoned accomplice giving full and true story of the crime, but retracting it in cross-examination before the Sessions Court—Order of Sessions Court to committing Magistrate to withdraw the pardon—Forfeiture of pardon—Trial of accused for the offence—Commitment—Conviction on his plea of guilty—Irregularity—Illegality—Practice and Procedure. The accused was one of several persons accused of murder. He accepted a tender of pardon made to him by the committing Magistrate on the conditions set out in s. 337 of the Criminal Procedure

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1881)—*contd.*

ss. 337, 338—*contd.*

Code. He was examined as a witness for the Crown before the committing Magistrate, and he made a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relating to such offence. He repeated them in his examination-in-chief before the Sessions Judge, but resiled from his statements in cross-examination. At the conclusion of the trial, in which the accomplices were convicted of murder, the Sessions Judge sent the pardoned accomplice in custody to the committing Magistrate with an order directing that he should be committed for trial for the same murder. The Magistrate accordingly withdrew the pardon and committed the accused to the Sessions Court to take his trial for the murder aforesaid. The Sessions Judge convicted the accused of murder on what was described as his plea of guilty and he was sentenced to transportation for life. On appeal: *Held*, by ASTON, J., that the Sessions Judge had no authority under the Code of Criminal Procedure to order the accused to be committed for trial for the murder in respect of which a pardon had been tendered; and further, that the accused's trial was conducted with material irregularity, which seriously prejudiced the accused and occasioned a failure of justice. *Held*, by BEAMAN, J., that the Sessions Judge, who presided at the first trial, had no power to make the order purporting to have been under s. 339 of the Criminal Procedure Code, directing the commitment of the accused on the ground that he had forfeited his pardon; and that the procedure adopted was both wrong and illegal. *Per* ASTON, J.—It is open to a pardoned accomplice, if placed on trial as an accomplice, who has forfeited the pardon already accepted by him, to plead in bar of trial that he did comply with the condition on which the tender of pardon was made, and such plea in bar of trial would have to be gone into and decided before the accused is called on to enter his plea in defence to the charge of having committed the offence in respect of which the pardon was tendered. S. 339 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not enact that a person who had accepted a tender of pardon, renders himself liable to be tried for the offence in respect of which pardon was tendered, if he gives false evidence; what the section says is that he renders himself so liable (or forfeits the pardon) if by giving false evidence he has not complied with the condition on which the tender was made. *Per* BEAMAN, J.—At the termination of the trial in which the pardon was given, the accomplice must be discharged by the Court. Then if so advised, the Crown may re-arrest and proceed against him for the offence in respect of which he was given a conditional pardon. When put upon his trial for that offence, he may plead to a competent Court his pardon, in bar. And that is a plea that the Court would be bound to hear and decide upon before going further and putting him on his defence. In deciding it the Court would have

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1881)—*contd.*

ss. 337, 338—*concl'd.*

to raise the issues whether he had or had not complied with the conditions of the pardon, whether he had or had not made a full and true disclosure of the whole facts. And where, after having admittedly done that he had at a later stage recanted, that recantation amounted to giving false evidence within the meaning of s. 339 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and worked a forfeiture of the pardon. *EMPEROR v. KOTHIA* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 611

ss. 337 (2), 339—*Accused to whom pardon is tendered ought to be examined as a witness and not be put into the dock at once.* An accused person, to whom pardon has been tendered, and who has accepted such pardon, ought not, when he shows an intention not to give the evidence, which he has led the prosecution to expect, to be put back into the dock without being examined as a witness. He should under such circumstances, be examined as a witness as directed by s. 337 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and then dealt with under s. 339 of the Code. Such a person should, if tried, be tried separately and after the trial of the other accused is over. *Queen-Empress v. Ramasami*, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 321, followed. *ARUNACHELLAM v. EMPEROR* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 272

s. 338 (1872, s. 348).

See APPROVERS . I. L. R. 7 All 180
I. L. R. 14 All 502

See PARDON . 7 W. R. Cr. 114
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 936

s. 339 (1872, s. 349).

See APPROVERS.

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 50

See EVIDENCE . 13 C. W. N. 501

See PARDON . I. L. R. 11 All 79
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 492
I. L. R. 20 All 529
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 675
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 321

1. Pardon—Pardon granted after accused has had an opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution—Withdrawal of pardon and subsequent commitment. Where a pardon was tendered by a Magistrate to an accused person after he had had an opportunity as an accused person of cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution, and on its appearing that he had not made a full and true disclosure of the facts of the case, such pardon was withdrawn and he was committed along with his co-accused to the Court of Session: *Held*, that the commitment was not open to objection. *Queen-Empress v. Brij Narain Man*, I. L. R. 20 All. 529, followed. *EMPEROR v. BUDHAN* (1906) . I. L. R. 29 All 24

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.

. 339—contd.

2. *Full and true disclosure by approver—No condition precedent to pardon—Procedure on trial of approver.* Under s. 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898, the making of a full and true disclosure by the approver is not a condition precedent to the pardon but making an incomplete and false disclosure is a condition subsequent by which the pardon, which has become operative before such disclosure, is forfeited. There is no necessity for withdrawing the pardon and such withdrawal has no effect. *Queen-Empress v. Ramasami*, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 321, considered. *Queen-Empress v. Sudra*, I. L. R. 14 All. 336, followed. *Queen-Empress v. Natu*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 137, followed. Where a pardon is tendered and the approver is afterwards put on his trial, he ought to be asked if he relies on the pardon as a bar to his trial; and if he does so rely, the prosecution should first prove that the pardon has been forfeited by an incomplete or false disclosure. When this course is not adopted, the conviction is illegal and will be set aside. *King-Emperor v. Bala*, I. L. R. 25 Bom. 675, followed. *King-Emperor v. Kothia*, I. L. R. 30 Bom. 611, followed. The transaction is one of the utmost good faith and the approver commits a breach of the condition if he fails to make a full and true disclosure throughout. The condition is broken if he withdraws before the Sessions Court or on cross-examination statements made before the committing Magistrate or in his examination-in-chief respectively. *KULLAN v. EMPEROR* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 173

3. *s. 339, cl. 3—How sanction of High Court under section obtainable.* The sanction of the High Court under s. 339 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be obtained only by motion on behalf of the Crown. *Queen-Empress v. Manik Chandra Sarkar*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 492, followed. *EMPEROR v. MADIGA NALLAVADU* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 47

s. 340.

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

I. L. R. 25 All. 375

ss. 340, 341 (1872, s. 186).

See ADVOCATE . 7 Mad. Ap. 41

See ATTORNEY . 7 Mad. Ap. 41

See INSANITY . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 262

See PLEADER—APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE . 7 Mad. Ap. 37, 41

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 493

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 661

I. L. R. 21 All. 109

1. *Deaf and dumb person—Procedure.* G was convicted by the Joint Magistrate of house-breaking by night, with intent to commit theft, and the case referred under the provisions of s. 186 of Act X of 1872 to the High

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.

ss. 340, 341—contd.

Court for orders. It appeared that G, whose understanding was of the most limited character, was caught at night in a house with some anklets in his possession. He was a lad of 15 or 16 years of age, and had been deaf and dumb from his birth. He sometimes lived with his father and sometimes by begging, and there was little doubt that hunger had driven him to break into the house. He had never been in arrest before. The Court recommended that he should be made over to his father. *QUEEN v. GANGA* . 7 N. W. 131

2. *Deaf and dumb person—Ability to understand charge.* In the case of an accused person who was deaf and dumb, the Deputy Magistrate who tried and convicted him considered that he did not understand the proceedings, and accordingly referred the case to the Magistrate under s. 186 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate considered that the accused did understand what he was charged with. *Held*, that the finding of the Magistrate must prevail and s. 186 did not apply. *DOOBRI HULWAI v. ANONYMOUS* . 19 W. R. Cr. 37

3. *Deaf and dumb persons, trial of.* The High Court under the circumstances of this case, which came before it under the last clause of s. 186 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, set aside the conviction of the prisoner, who was deaf and dumb, and directed that he be admonished and discharged. *DWARKANATH HALDAR v. NODER CHAND KANTE* . 22 W. R. Cr. 35

4. *Deaf and dumb person, trial of.* The High Court may, under s. 186, Criminal Procedure Code, in the trial of a person who is deaf and dumb, and who cannot understand the proceedings against him, or plead to the charge, treat the proceedings as amounting to a sufficient trial and pass sentence upon the prisoner according to the facts which seem to be established in the course and as the result of those proceedings. In this case the Court had no doubt that the prisoner was guilty; but, before passing final orders, it gave the prisoner a further opportunity of being heard, and accordingly directed the Magistrate to give him notice. *QUEEN v. BOWKA HARI*

22 W. R. Cr. 35

He was subsequently convicted by the Magistrate, and this conviction was confirmed by the High Court. *QUEEN v. BOWKA* . 22 W. R. Cr. 72

5. *Deaf and dumb—Accused person unable to understand proceedings in Court, commitment of—Report by Magistrate of such proceedings to High Court—Power of High Court to pass final orders on such report—Discretion of High Court to order Sessions trial to be held—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 341 and 471—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), s. 302.* An accused person who had been for some time

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

ss. 340, 341—*concl'd.*

confined in a lunatic asylum was tried and committed to the Sessions by a Deputy Magistrate on a charge of murder. The accused was deaf and dumb, and could not be made to understand the proceedings which had been taken. On the proceedings being forwarded to the High Court under s. 341 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was held that the law does not contemplate that the Sessions trial should necessarily take place. That it is discretionary with the High Court on a commitment made to order the Sessions trial to be held, and the High Court must consider whether any benefit would be likely to result especially to the accused by such trial. The High Court in this case, having come to the conclusion that no benefit would be likely to result to the accused by his being tried by the Court of Sessions, found that the accused was guilty of the alleged murder, but that he was by reason of unsoundness of mind not responsible for his action and directed him to be kept in the district jail to await the orders of Government. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SOMER BOWRA*. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 368 4 C. W. N. 421

6. ———— "Accused," meaning of—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 123—Person liable to imprisonment in default of giving security.* The term "accused" in s. 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies to a person who is liable under s. 123 of that Code to imprisonment in default of giving security. *NAKHI LAL JHA v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 656

s. 342 (1872, ss. 193 and 250; 1861-69, s. 202).

See *CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE*. I. L. R. 5 All 253

See *CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS SUBSEQUENTLY RETRACTED.*

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 295

See *EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION AND STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED*. I. L. R. 10 Mad. 295
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 49
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 295

See *EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS.*

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 68

See *EXAMINATION OF ACCUSED PERSON.*

16 W. R. Cr. 21

1 C. L. R. 436

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 96; 6 C. L. R. 521

7 C. W. N. 345

See *FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERALLY.*

I. L. R. 19 All. 200

See *PENAL CODE, s. 182.*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 451

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 342—*cont'd.*

See *TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—GROUND FOR TRANSFER.*

5 C. W. N. 864

See *WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—PERSON COMPETENT OR NOT TO BE WITNESS.*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 661

I. L. R. 20 All. 426

1. ———— "Accused," meaning of. By the word accused in s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882) is meant a person over whom the Magistrate or other Court is exercising jurisdiction. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MONA PUNA*. I. L. R. 16 Bom. 661

JHOJA SINGH v. QUEEN-EMPRESS.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 493

QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MUTASADDI LAL.

I. L. R. 21 All. 107

2. ———— Examination of the accused—*Nature of examination.* It is improper on the part of a Judge, when examining a prisoner under s. 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to cross-examine him. The only questions which are permissible are such as will enable the prisoner to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. *HURRY CHURN CHUCKERBUTTY v. EMPRESS*. I. L. R. 10 Calc. 140

3. ———— Examination of accused person—*Power of Magistrate to question the accused.* Where a Magistrate, before evidence taken for the prosecution, put questions to the accused of the nature of a cross-examination, such procedure was illegal, as it could not be said that the questions were put "for the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing against him in the evidence" within the meaning of s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HAWTHORNE*. I. L. R. 13 All. 345

4. ———— Sessions trial—*Accused persons, examination of.* Questions put by the Court to an accused person under the provisions of s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, must be strictly limited to the purpose described in that section, i.e., "of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him." The evidence referred to in that section is the evidence already given at the trial at the time when the Court puts questions to the accused. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HARGOBIND SINGH*. I. L. R. 14 All. 242

5. ———— Examination of accused—*Filling gap in prosecution evidence by questioning accused—Charge of defamation—Failure to prove making and publication—Irregularity.* Eight persons were charged with defamation by making and publishing a certain petition regarding the conduct of the complainant. Though other evidence was adduced by the prosecution, it was not

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

— s. 342—*concl'd.*

proved that the accused made and published the matter, which was alleged to be defamatory. The Magistrate, however, asked the accused, if they had signed the petition, and accepted their answers as proving that they had, and as relieving the prosecution from proving the making and publication of the alleged defamatory matter by the accused. He convicted the accused. *Held*, that the convictions must be set aside. A gap in the evidence for the prosecution cannot be filled up by any statement made by the accused in his examination under s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The omission to prove the making and publication of defamatory matter is more than an irregularity; it is a defect, which vitiates the conviction. *MOHI-DEEN ABDUL KADIR v. EMPEROR* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 238

6. — *Statement of accused under that section—Misdirection.* A gap in the evidence for the prosecution cannot be filled up by any statement made by the accused in his examination under s. 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is a misdirection to ask the jury to consider a document, purporting to be proved by such a statement as evidence against the accused. *BASANTA KUMAR GHATTAK v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 49

7. — *Witness—Accused person calling as witnesses persons charged with him and awaiting a separate trial for same offence—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 132.* The accused D, a European British subject, was charged, together with others who were natives of India, under ss. 384, 385 and 389 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1890), with conspiring to commit extortion. D claimed to be tried by a mixed jury under s. 450 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898). The other accused, who were natives of India, then claimed to be tried separately under s. 452. The trial of D then proceeded, and at the close of the case for the prosecution he proposed to call as his witnesses the persons who had been charged with him and who were awaiting their trial. They objected to be called. *Held*, that he was entitled to call them as witnesses and to examine them on oath. The words "the accused" in cl. 4 of s. 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) means the accused then under trial and under examination by the Court. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DURANT*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 213

— s. 343 (1872, s. 344).

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 260

— s. 344—*Adjournment of Criminal case—Power of Court to order costs of the day to be paid by the party for whose benefit an adjournment is granted.* *Held*, that a Magistrate in granting an adjournment under the provisions of s. 344 is com-

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

— s. 344—*concl'd.*

petent under the same section to order the costs of the day to be paid by the party in whose favour the order for adjournment is made. *Shew Prosad Poddar v. The Corporation of Calcutta*, 9 C. W. N. 18, followed. *King-Emperor v. Chhurbraj Singh*, All. Weekly Notes (1902) 59, discussed and doubted. *MATHURA PRASAD v. BASANT LAL* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 20

— s. 344, para. 1 (1872, s. 219; 1861-69, s. 253).

See ante, s. 145 . . . 13 C. W. N. 601

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 375

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUMMONING WITNESSES.

4 B. L. R. Ap. 71

7 B. L. R. 564

2 N. W. 148, 394

— (1872, s. 194; 1861-69, s. 224).

See BAIL . . . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 68, 69

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 455

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CRIMINAL CASES . . . Bom. Cr. 31

— (Presidency Magistrate's Act, 1877, s. 124).

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL.

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 523

— ss. 344, 497, 498.

See BAIL . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 166, 173

— s. 345 (1872, s. 188).

See ante, s. 198.

See COMPOUNDING OFFENCE.

See DEFAMATION—IMPUTATION ON A WIFE
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 158

— s. 347 (1872, s. 221; 1861-69, s. 256).

See CHARGE—ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF CHARGE.

1 N. W. Ed. 1873, 307

— *Stay of proceedings after charge is drawn up—Committal for trial—Magistrate, powers of.* S. 221 of the Criminal Procedure Code authorizes a Magistrate, after a charge has been drawn up, to stop further proceedings and commit for trial. *EMPRESS v. KUDRUT-OOLLA* . . . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 495; 2 C. L. R. 2

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

ss. 347, 349 (1872, s. 46, paras. 1,
2, and 3; 1861-69, s. 277).

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 305

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 377

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 196

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
REFERENCE BY OTHER MAGISTRATES.

s. 349.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
COMMITMENT TO SESSIONS COURT.

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 355

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 240

See PRISONER . . . 7 Bom. Cr. 31
7 W. R. Cr. 38

Case submitted to District or Sub-divisional Magistrate with regard to sentence—Such Magistrate not competent to return case to Magistrate, who submitted it. Where a Magistrate of the second or third class has submitted a case to the District or Sub-divisional Magistrate under s. 349 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is not competent to the District or Sub-divisional Magistrate to return the case to the submitting Magistrate, if in his opinion the reference was unnecessary. *Imperatrix v. Abdulla*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 240; *Queen-Empress v. Viranna*, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 377; *Dula Faquer v. Bhagirat Sircar*, 6 C. L. R. 276; and *Queen-Empress v. Havia Tellapa*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 196, followed. *EMPEROR v. THAKUR DAYAL* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 344

s. 350 (1872, s. 328).

See ante, s. 145 . . . 13 C. W. N. 420

See BENCH OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 870

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 394

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 194

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 246

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

23 W. R. Cr. 59

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 112

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 50

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUM-
MONING WITNESSES.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 863

1. Magistrate deciding case on evidence taken by his predecessor—Case under s. 530, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872. In a case under s. 530, Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court set aside the proceedings of a Deputy Magistrate, who, on succeeding his predecessor who had gone into the case, instead of recalling the witnesses *de novo* and examining them himself, decided the question of possession on the evidence which had been taken by his predecessor. *GURU CHURN SEN v. KALI NATH DASS BISWAS* 23 W. R. Cr. 62

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 350—*contd.*

2. Evidence heard by one Magistrate and case decided by another—Irrregularity not prejudicing accused. In two cases, in one of which the evidence was taken entirely by one Deputy Magistrate, whilst the decision was passed by another, and in the other of which, although the Deputy Magistrate who decided the case heard part of the evidence, he decided it on the same grounds as the first case, the High Court declined to interfere, because the accused was not said to have been prejudiced by the decision in either case. *THAKUR DAS MANJHI v. NANDAR MUNDUL*. *UJAL MUNDUL v. NANDAR MUNDUL* 24 W. R. Cr. 12

3. Transfer of case by subordinate Magistrate to District Magistrate—District Magistrate deciding on evidence taken by subordinate—Magistrate, jurisdiction of—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 182, 349. S. 350 of the Criminal Procedure Code was intended to provide for a case where an inquiry or trial has been commenced before one incumbent of a particular magisterial post, and that officer ceases to have jurisdiction in that post, and is succeeded by another officer. A subordinate Magistrate, having taken all the evidence for the prosecution and for the defence, sent the case to the Magistrate of the District, not on the grounds mentioned in s. 349 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the District Magistrate, observing that none of the accused asked to have the witnesses re-heard, gave judgment upon the evidence taken by the subordinate Magistrate. The Sessions Judge refused to interfere in revision with the District Magistrate's proceedings on the ground that they were covered by s. 350 of the Code. Held, that this view was erroneous, that neither under s. 192 nor under s. 349 was there any transfer to the District Magistrate by his subordinate, that s. 350 was inapplicable, and that the order passed by the District Magistrate must be quashed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RADHE* . . . I. L. R. 12 All. 66

See *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BASHIR KHAN*
I. L. R. 14 All. 346

4. Evidence recorded partly by one Magistrate and partly by another—Proceedings for recognizance to keep the peace—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 491. Notwithstanding the introduction into the section of the words "the accused person" and "conviction," the provisions of s. 323 of the Criminal Procedure Code apply to an inquiry instituted under s. 491, with a view to enforcing the giving of security against a breach of the peace; and in such a case, where the Magistrate by whom only part of the evidence has been taken is succeeded by another Magistrate while such inquiry is pending, the person called upon to show cause why he should not give security may insist, before the latter, upon the recall and re-examination of the witnesses whose

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 350—*concl'd.*

evidence has been already taken by the former Magistrate. *BARODA KANT ROY v. KARIMUDDI MOONSHEE* **4 C. L. R. 452**

5. Trial de novo—

Case of Defamation—Final orders should be by Magistrate, who examines complainant. Where on a transfer of a case the accused do not apply for a trial *de novo* the action of the Magistrate, in convicting the accused on the evidence recorded partly by the former Magistrate and partly by himself, is not strictly without jurisdiction. It is most desirable, however, in a case of defamation that the examination and cross-examination of the complainant should be held in the presence of the Magistrate who has seizin of the case and passes final orders therein. *BRINDABAN CHANDRA DAS v. ISHAQUDDIN CHOWDERY* (1909)

13 C. W. N. 550

6. Application of

section to cases withdrawn from one Magistrate and transferred to another—'Trial,' what is within s. 350 (a). The words of s. 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable to cases in which the case under enquiry on trial is withdrawn from one Magistrate, who thereupon ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein and is transferred to another. A preliminary enquiry by a Magistrate into a case exclusively triable by the Court of Session is not a 'trial' before framing a charge within s. 350 (a) and, where such an enquiry is transferred, the Magistrate is not bound to rehear the case *de novo*. *Mohesh Chandra Saha v. Emperor, I. L. R. 35 Calc. 457*, followed. *PALANIANDY GOUNDAN v. EMPEROR* (1908) . . . **I. L. R. 32 Mad. 218**

ss. 350, 528.

See TRANSFER . . **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 457**

s. 351 (1872, s. 104; 1861-69, s.

1. Preliminary Inves-

tigation. A Magistrate is not justified by s. 206 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in taking a person, without any previous notice or summons, from among the audience or attendant witnesses in open Court, and placing him in the dock to be immediately tried upon a charge which has already been commenced to be entertained against other prisoners, and on which evidence has already been given. That section applies to investigations preliminary to commitment for a subsequent trial, and not to cases where the trial is actually being proceeded with. *QUEEN v. SUTHERLAND. QUEEN v. NARAIN SINGH*

14 W. R. Cr. 20

2. Offence disclosed

by evidence of witness in course of case—Powers of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 191, cl. (c). A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence against a witness in a case which is pending before

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 351—*concl'd.*

him upon the facts disclosed by the evidence of another witness does so under s. 191, cl. (c), of the Criminal Procedure Code, and not under s. 351. *KHUDIRAM MOOKERJEE v. EMPRESS*

1 C. W. N. 105

s. 352 (1872, s. 187; 1861-69, s. 279).

See COURT **1 Agra Cr. 17**

s. 355.

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 269

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—DEPOSITIONS **W. R. 1864, Cr. 18**

See MAINTENANCE, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO . . **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 361**

s. 356 (1872, s. 334).

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES.

20 W. R. Cr. 14

ss. 357 and 362, para. 1 (1872, s. 335; 1861-69, s. 196).

See PRACTICE—CRIMINAL CASES—EVIDENCE, MODE OF RECORDING.

5 Mad. Ap. 9

ss. 359 and 362, para. 2 and s. 361 (1872, ss. 338-340; 1861-69, s. 198).

See INTERPRETER . . **16 W. R. Cr. 71**

s. 360 (1872, s. 339; 1861-69, s. 199).

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—DEPOSITION . . **I. L. R. 13 Calc. 121**

See FORGERY . . **I. L. R. 36 Calc. 955**

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SWEARING OR AFFIRMATION OF WITNESSES **13 W. R. Cr. 17**

Witnesses not understanding depositions when read over—Ground for setting aside conviction. S. 339 of Act X of 1872 being for the protection of witnesses only, the fact that witnesses did not understand their depositions when read over, although they may not have required them at the time to be interpreted, affords no ground for an application by the accused to set aside a conviction. *In the matter of OKHOY KUMAR* **7 C. L. R. 393**

s. 362.

See ante, s. 123 . . . **13 C. W. N. 318**

1. Presidency Magistrate, recording of reasons for conviction by—Law as to recording of evidence—Appealable and non-

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1889; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 362—*concl'd.*

appealable cases, difference in procedure in—Revision, adequate materials for. In a case in which the Chief Presidency Magistrate convicted certain persons and sentenced them each to 21 days' rigorous imprisonment, he recorded evidence very meagrely: *Held*, that under s. 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it was not obligatory on the Magistrate to record evidence in this case; that the "brief statement of reasons for conviction" recorded by the Magistrate under s. 370 (i) of the Criminal Procedure Code was sufficient, in this case, to satisfy a Court of Revision that there were materials before the Magistrate to support the conviction. *EMAMDU v. KING-EMPEROR* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 839

2. *Recording of evidence by a Presidency Magistrate.* A Presidency Magistrate is bound to record evidence only in cases coming under s. 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898). He is not bound to record evidence in any summons cases or warrant cases or cases in which enquiries have to be made as in summons cases or warrant cases, except where he may impose a fine exceeding two hundred rupees or imprisonment for a term exceeding six months. It is, however, desirable that he should keep some record of the statements made by witnesses or that his judgment should indicate what those statements are, so that the High Court as a Court of revision may judge of the propriety or legality of the order passed by him. *Schein v. Queen-Empress*, 1. L. R. 16 Calc. 199 referred to. *SHEIK BABU v. EMPEROR* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1036

ss. 362, 370, cl. (i)—*Judgment—Record of reasons for conviction—Evidence—Sentence of imprisonment.* S. 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code prescribes that the evidence in appealable cases, that is, in which a Presidency Magistrate imposes a fine exceeding Rs 200 or imprisonment for a term exceeding six months, shall be duly recorded. There is no obligation in law to record evidence in other cases; the discretion rests with the Magistrate. Under the provisions of s. 370, cl. (i) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate should state the reasons for conviction in such a manner that the High Court on revision may judge whether there were sufficient materials before him to support the conviction. The law does not demand a full and complete statement of reasons, but only a brief one. *EMAMAN v. EMPEROR* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 983

s. 364 (1872, s. 346; 1861-69, s. 205).

See CHARGE TO JURY—MISDIRECTION.
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 642

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1889; XXV OF 1861)—*cont'd.*

s. 364—*concl'd.*

See CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1085

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION AND STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED.

See EXAMINATION OF ACCUSED PERSON.
8 W. R. Cr. 55
1 B. L. R. S. N. 13
7 B. L. R. Ap. 62

ss. 366, 367.

See JUDGMENT—CRIMINAL CASES.
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 121
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 5 02

See SENTENCE—GENERAL CASES.
I. L. R. 14 All. 242

Mode of delivering judgment and its contents—Judgment written and delivered after conviction of prisoners—Defect vitiating conviction. Where a judgment in a criminal trial was written and delivered some days after the prisoners were convicted and sentenced: *Held*, that this was a violation of ss. 366 and 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and was more than an irregularity. It was a defect, which vitiated the convictions and sentences. *Queen-Empress v. Har-gobind Singh*, 1. L. R. 14 All. 242, approved. *BANDANU ATCHAYYA v. EMPEROR* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 287

s. 367.

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED—EFFECT OF DISCHARGE. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 723

See JUDGMENT—CRIMINAL CASES.
7 C. W. N. 30
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 534

1. **ss. 367, 369 (1872, s. 464, para. 1)—*Omission to order re-trial when annulling conviction—Subsequent addition to judgment*** When a Sessions Judge on appeal annuls the conviction of a Magistrate for want of jurisdiction, and omits to order a re-trial at the time under s. 284 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he is not precluded by virtue of s. 464 from passing such an order subsequently. *In the matter of the petition of RAMI REDDI.* I. L. R. 3 Mad. 43

2. *Alteration of illegal sentence.* A Sessions Judge has no power, under s. 464, Code of Criminal Procedure, to alter or set aside a conviction and sentence once made and signed by him. The sentence in this case was altered on reference to the High Court. *QUEEN v. PORAN MAL* . . . 23 W. R. Cr. 49

ss. 367, 424.

See RIOTING. I. L. R. 38 Calc. 158

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 369.

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 102

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED—EFFECT OF DISCHARGE. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 726

See REVIEW—CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 7 All. 672

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 176

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 42

s. 370.

See JUDGMENT—CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 174

See PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATE.

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 272

4 C. W. N. 201

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 131; 461

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—JUDGMENT, DEFECTS IN.

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 272

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 131

4 C. W. N. 201

Presidency Magistrate

—Judgment, recording of—Evidence, taking down of—Reasons for conviction, recording of. Although s. 370 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers a Presidency Magistrate to record a brief statement of his reasons for his conviction instead of a judgment, this must be done in such a manner that the High Court in revision may be in a position to judge whether there were sufficient materials before him to support the conviction. Where a Presidency Magistrate convicted and sentenced the accused to a term of imprisonment under ss. 61 and 74 of Beng. Act VII of 1878, but did not in his judgment give either the substance or a summary of the evidence and there was nothing on the record to show that the accused had been previously convicted, the High Court set aside the conviction on the ground that the judgment was defective. *TOOLSEY KAHARIN v. EMPEROR* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 587

s. 374 (1872, s. 287, para. 1).

See CONFESSION—CONFESSION TO MAGISTRATE. . . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 50

Reference to High Court.

The High Court as a Court of reference can, under s. 287, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, only deal with cases in which a sentence of death has been passed. *QUEEN v. OMAN* . . . 5 N. W. 130

1. **s. 376 (1872, s. 288)—Culpable homicide not amounting to murder—Reference to High Court for confirmation of sentence of death—New trial, order for—Murder, conviction on charge of.** Under s. 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872, the High Court, to which a reference is

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 376—*concl'd.*

made by a Court of Session for confirmation of a sentence of death on conviction of murder, cannot, in the absence of an appeal, alter the conviction to one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, if it be of opinion that the evidence does not establish the former, but the latter offence. It must order a new trial for that purpose. Where the prisoners were tried on two charges of murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and the opinion of the assessors was taken on both charges, but the Sessions Judge, being of opinion that the evidence established the former charge, recorded a conviction and sentence for murder only, the High Court being of opinion, on a reference under s. 287 of Act X of 1872, that the offence proved was culpable homicide not amounting to murder, did not order a new trial *ab initio*, but directed the Sessions Judge to complete the trial by recording a finding on the second charge of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *REG. v. BALAPA BIN DANDAPA*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 639

2. **(1872, s. 288, and s. 287)—Conviction by verdict of jury—Facts of case.** Where a case is referred to the High Court under s. 287, Act X of 1872, the Court is bound, under s. 288 of the same Act, to go into the facts of the case, although the conviction was by the verdict of a jury. *QUEEN v. JAFFIR ALI*

19 W. R. Cr. 57

3. **Power of High Court to go into facts—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 375—Reference under s. 374—Appeal in jury trial.** Although the trial of an accused is by a jury, ss. 375 and 376, Criminal Procedure Code, show that in a case submitted for confirmation of sentence of death under s. 374, the High Court must deal with the case upon the facts, as well as with reference to any questions of law arising in it, and that its powers are not limited in the way they are in an appeal from a conviction in a trial by jury. But in an appeal against a conviction in a trial by a jury, it is not open to the High Court to go into the facts, and the appeal must only be limited as laid down in ss. 418 and 423, cl. (d), Criminal Procedure Code, to points of law, notwithstanding the appeal is heard along with a reference made under s. 374, Criminal Procedure Code, in the case of a co-accused. *Queen v. Jaffir Ali*, 19 W. R. 57, approved of. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHATRA-DHARI GOALA* . . . 2 C. W. N. 49

s. 380 (1872, s. 18)—Enhancement of sentence. When an Assistant Sessions Judge passes a sentence of more than three years' imprisonment, the Sessions Judge cannot enhance it. *EMPRESS v. RAMA PREMA* . . . I. L. R. 4, Bom. 239

s. 384 (1872, s. 303).

See WARRANT OF COMMITMENT.

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 396

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 386.

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—
COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OR INJURY
CAUSED BY OFFENCE.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 139
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 238

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—
TO ACCUSED ON DISMISSAL OF COM-
PLAINT . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 979

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 935

ss. 383, 387, 389 (1872, s. 307).

See ACT XXI OF 1856.

8 B. L. R. Ap. 47
17 W. R. Cr. 7

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—
FOR LOSS OR INJURY CAUSED BY OF-
FENCE . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 164

See FINE . . . 5 Bom. Cr. 63
9 W. R. Cr. 50
I. L. R. 2 Calc. 478

s. 388.

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—TO
ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT.
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 127

s. 391, para. 1 (1872, s. 310).

See WHIPPING . . . 7 Mad. Ap. 30
20 W. R. Cr. 72
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 465

ss. 394, 395—Magistrate cannot
award imprisonment in lieu of whipping when on
a certificate of the medical officer before infliction
of whipping the sentence of whipping is reduced.
The power of a Magistrate under s. 395 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure to award imprisonment in lieu
of whipping is confined to cases in which under
s. 394 a sentence of whipping is wholly or partially
prevented from being executed. Such power
only exists when, under s. 394 (1) a medical officer
present certifies that the offender is not in a fit state
of health to undergo such punishment or when under
s. 394 (2) during the execution of the sentence a
medical officer certifies that the offender is not in a
fit state of health to undergo the remainder of the
sentence. There is no provision of law, which autho-
rises a medical officer to certify, before the inflic-
tion of whipping, that the prisoner is fit to undergo
only a smaller number of stripes than that actually
ordered. Where in consequence of such a certificate
a smaller number of stripes is inflicted, the Magis-
trate has no power to award imprisonment in lieu
of the whipping not inflicted. THE PUBLIC PROSE-
CUTOR (1907) . . . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 84

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 395.

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRI-
SONMENT GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 11 All. 308

See SENTENCE—WHIPPING.

I. L. R. 11 All. 308
I. L. R. 21 All. 25

ss. 396, 397 (1872, ss. 316, 317;
1881-69, ss. 47, 48).

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRI-
SONMENT GENERALLY.

3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 50
12 W. R. Cr. 47
I. L. R. 20 All. 1

s. 399.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 94

See REFORMATORY SCHOOLS ACT, s. 2.
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 333
2 C. W. N. 11

s. 403 (1872, s. 460).

See AUTREFOIS ACQUIT, PLEA OF.

7 N. W. 371
2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 67
13 W. R. Cr. 42
I. L. R. 10 Bom. 181
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 377

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COM-
PLAINT—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 211

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED—EFFECT
OF DISCHARGE I. L. R. 29 Calc. 726

See MAGISTRATE—RE-TRIAL OF CASES.
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 412

1. *Acquittal—Re-trial*
—Interference of the High Court—Criminal Proce-
dure Code, s. 530. Where an offence is tried by a
Court without jurisdiction, the proceedings are
void under s. 530 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, Act X of 1882, and the offender, if acquitted,
is liable to be re-tried under s. 403. It is, therefore,
not necessary for the High Court to upset the ac-
quittal before the re-trial can be had. QUEEN-
EMPRESS v. HUSEIN GAIBU

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 307

2. *Previous acquittal.*
Upon a charge of dacoity, the Magistrate, having
split up the charge, convicted the accused of rioting,
using criminal force, and misappropriating the prop-
erty of a deceased person. On appeal the Sessions
Court reversed the conviction, holding that the
offence, if any, was dacoity, but that the facts
alleged being incredible, there was no need to order
a committal. The complainant thereupon lodged a
fresh complaint of dacoity based on the same facts

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

_____ s. 403—*contd.*

before another Magistrate. *Held*, that the judgment of the Sessions Court was no bar to further proceedings. *VIRANKUTTI v. CHIYAMU*.

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 557

3. _____ and s. 437—*Different charges arising out of same transaction—Acquittal—Further inquiry—Re-trial.* *E*, being charged with theft and mischief in respect of certain branches cut from a tree claimed by the complainant, was tried by a Subordinate Magistrate on the charge of mischief, and acquitted on the ground that, as against the complainant, *E* had title to the tree. On the application of the complainant, the District Magistrate directed further enquiry into the case under s. 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and on a reference to the Court of Session the Sessions Judge held that, as no inquiry into the charge of theft had been held, the order was legal. *Held*, that the District Magistrate has no power to pass such an order under s. 437, and that a trial on the charge of theft was barred by virtue of s. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ERRAMREDDI*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 296

4. _____ *Previous conviction or acquittal—Second trial upon the same facts for a different offence—Penal Code, ss. 486 and 487—Bengal Excise Act (Bengal Act VII of 1878), s. 61—Merchandise Marks Act (IV of 1889), ss. 6 and 7—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 235.* The accused had been prosecuted and convicted under s. 61 of the Bengal Excise Act (Bengal Act VII of 1878), and the proceedings were instituted against him under ss. 486 and 487 of the Penal Code, and ss. 6 and 7 of the Merchandise Marks Act (IV of 1889). On an application to quash the proceedings on the ground that the accused had been at the first trial put in peril of a conviction for the latter offences, and therefore the first trial operated as a bar to the institution of the present proceedings:—*Held* the provisions of s. 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code did not operate as a bar to the institution of the present proceedings. Under the second part of that section, the fact of the accused having been charged at the first trial with one offence only, did not prevent the institution of a separate proceeding in respect of some other offence which was disclosed during the course of the first trial. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CROFT*

I. L. R. 23 Cal. 174

5. _____ *Charge of an offence under s. 414 of the Penal Code—Previous conviction under s. 411 in respect of other property stolen at the same time and from the same person.* *Held*, that where a person had been convicted under s. 411 of the Penal Code in respect of certain property stolen on a particular occasion from a particular person, he could not subsequently be tried for an offence under s. 414 of the Code in respect of other property stolen on the same occasion from the same person. *Queen-Empress v. Makhan*,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

_____ s. 403—*contd.*

I. L. R. 15 All 317, referred to. *EMPEROR v. MIAN JAN* (1906) . I. L. R. 28 All. 313

6. _____ s. 403 (1) and *Explan. and s. 215—Want of jurisdiction in trying Magistrate—Setting aside of conviction by Appellate Court—Fresh commitment if allowable—Autrefois acquit.* Where a conviction by a Magistrate, who had no jurisdiction to try the case, has been set aside by the Appellate Court, s. 403, Code of Criminal Procedure, is no bar to a fresh commitment of the accused by a competent Magistrate. The fact that the Appellate Court did not order a fresh trial in positive terms is no ground for inferring that the Court had decided that such trial should not be held. *ABDUL GHANI* (1902) . 6 C. W. N. 640

7. _____ s. 403 (1)—*No complaint—Order of acquittal, whether bar to new trial.* A soldier from Burma sent an intimation to the District Magistrate that he had authorized his brother to file a complaint against the accused for enticing away his wife. When the case came on for hearing, it appeared that the brother had no such authority and the Magistrate acquitted the accused. The complainant then filed a complaint personally. *Held*, that the previous acquittal was no bar to the trial of the present complaint inasmuch as the finding of the Magistrate amounted to this that there was no complaint before him. *Queen-Empress v. Balwant*, I. L. R. 9 All. 134, referred to. *EMPEROR v. UMAR-UD-DIN* (1909)

I. L. R. 31 All. 317

8. _____ s. 403 (4)—*Previous acquittal—Acquittal by assessors on charge of abetment of dacoity with murder—Subsequent conviction by jury of receiving stolen property—Court competent to try the offence subsequently charged.* Five persons were charged before a Sessions Judge sitting with assessors, with having committed dacoity with murder under s. 396, Indian Penal Code, and a sixth, with abetting them. The abettor was acquitted. He was, however, subsequently charged before the Sessions Judge, sitting with a jury, with receiving stolen property knowing that it had been obtained by dacoity under s. 412 of the Indian Penal Code. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the accused was convicted and sentenced. The facts on which the accused was convicted of receiving stolen property were the same as those upon which he had been acquitted of abetment of dacoity with murder, the dacoity by which the stolen property was alleged to have been received being the same as that which had formed the subject of the previous charge. On its being contended that the Court had power to try the accused a second time under sub-s. (4) of s. 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code, inasmuch as a charge of receiving stolen property must be tried by jury, and that in consequence the Court

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

— s. 403—*concl'd.*

by which the accused had first been tried was not a Court competent to try the present charge: *Held*, that the conviction was bad. *KING-EMPEROR v. KRISHNA AYYAR* (1901) I. L. R. 24 Mad. 641

— s. 404.

See REMAND—CRIMINAL CASES.

3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 62

6 B. L. R. 698

9 B. L. R. Ap. 81

— s. 404 (1872, s. 282 and s. 286, illus. (d); 1861-69, s. 422), s. 406 (1872, s. 267), ss. 407, 408, 410-418 (1872, s. 271; 1861-69, s. 408), ss. 411, 412, and 413 (1872, s. 273; 1861-69, s. 411).

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODES.

— s. 407 (1872, s. 266, 1861-69, s. 412).

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3 Bom. Cr. 18

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 465

See DEPUTY COMMISSIONER.

16 W. R. Cr. 1

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—POWER TO GRANT SANCTION.

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 487

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 394

— ss. 407, 428—*District Magistrate may withdraw part-heard appeals—Such Magistrate not bound to examine witnesses summoned.* S. 407 of the Criminal Procedure Code places no restriction on the power of the District Magistrate to withdraw appeals from a Subordinate Magistrate, and it is competent to him to withdraw part-heard Appeals. There is nothing in s. 428 of the Code, which renders it obligatory on the District Magistrate so withdrawing an appeal to examine witnesses summoned by the Subordinate Magistrate, from whom the appeal is withdrawn. *ALAGU AMBALAM v. EMPEROR* (1908)

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 277

— s. 408 (1872, s. 270; 1869, s. 445 C).

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 513

— ss. 408, 435.

See JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 136

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869 XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

— ss. 411, 412 (Presidency Magistrate's Act, 1877, s. 167).

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACTS—PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATE'S ACT.

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 85

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 30

— s. 417 (1872, s. 272).

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACQUITTALS, APPEALS FROM.

(Presidency Magistrate's Act, 1877, s. 168).

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CHARTER ACT, s. 15—CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 447

— s. 418.

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACQUITTALS, APPEALS FROM.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1029

See CHARGE TO JURY—MISDIRECTION.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 626

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES . I. L. R. 9 All. 420

See VERDICT OF JURY—POWER TO INTERFERE WITH VERDICTS.

I. L. R. 9 All. 420

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 86

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 243

— ss. 418, 419, 420, 421 (1872, s. 278), s. 422 (1872, s. 279), and s. 423 (1872, ss. 280, 284; 1861-69, ss. 419, 427).

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

— s. 421.

See APPEAL, ADMISSION OF.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 385

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

5 C. W. N. 332

See JUDGMENT—CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 534

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 92

I. L. R. 17 All. 241

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 540

See PRACTICE . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 178

See REVIEW—CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 732

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—JUDGMENT, DEFECTS IN.

I. L. R. 8 All. 514

1. — *Appeal—Summary dismissal—Reasons, if to be recorded.* It is not neces-

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869 XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 421—contd.

sary where an appeal is summarily dismissed under s. 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the Magistrate to give any reasons for his decision. It must be taken, if he does dismiss an appeal summarily, that he considered there were no sufficient grounds for interfering. *Rash Behari Das v. Bal Gopal Singh*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 92, followed. *NITYA PAL v. BENIMADHAV GHOSE* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 623

2. *Summary rejection of appeal.* Where a petition of appeal signed by a pleader is presented to a Magistrate by the party in person, the appeal cannot be dismissed without giving the pleader a reasonable opportunity to appear. Where the conviction is based on the evidence of witnesses whose credibility is impeached by the accused on reasonable grounds, the appeal should not be summarily rejected under s. 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure without sending for the records. *RANGACHARLU v. EMPEROR* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 233

s. 422.

See PRACTICE—CRIMINAL CASES—RULE TO SHOW CAUSE . 7 C. W. N. 80

s. 423 (1872, ss. 280-284; 1861-69, ss. 419, 427).

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACQUITTALES, APPEAL FROM.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1029

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 1; 478

See AUTREFOIS ACQUIT, PLEA OF.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 377

See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL CASES—FORGERY.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 822

See CHARGE TO JURY—MISDIRECTION.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 626

See COMMITMENT . I. L. R. 8 All. 14

I. L. R. 15 All. 205

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 350, 975

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 172

4 C. W. N. 166

See COMPLAINT—REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 528

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 104

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 25 All. 534

I. L. R. 23 All. 497

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 421

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 724

5 C. W. N. 432

See FIRST OFFENDERS.

I. L. R. 24 All. 306

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 423—contd.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—REFERENCE BY OTHER MAGISTRATES.

12 Bom. 234

See MAGISTRATE—RE-TRIAL OF CASES.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 412

See RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP THE PEACE—

MAGISTRATE WITH POWERS OF APPELLATE COURT.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 393

CANCELLING ORDER.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 101

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES . I. L. R. 9 All. 420

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—COMMITMENTS . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 580

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 84

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 730

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 6, 746

3 C. W. N. 598, 601

See SENTENCE, ENHANCEMENT OF.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 103

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 439

I. L. R. 17 All. 67

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 175

See SENTENCE—POWER OF HIGH COURT AS TO SENTENCES—ENHANCEMENT.

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 633

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 751

I. L. R. 18 All. 301

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 63

7 C. W. N. 301

See VERDICT OF JURY—POWER TO INTERFERE WITH VERDICT.

I. L. R. 9 All. 420

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 252

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 711

1. (1872, s. 284)—*Annulling conviction—Omission to make order for re-trial—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 464.* When a Sessions Judge in appeal annuls the conviction by a Magistrate for want of jurisdiction, and omits to order a re-trial at the time under s. 284 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he is not precluded by s. 464 from passing such an order subsequently. The order annulling the conviction in such a case does not amount to an order of acquittal. *In the matter of the petition of RAMI REDDI* I. L. R. 3 Mad. 48

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

2. — s. 423 (a) and ss. 247, 404, 417—*Acquittal—Appeal—Powers of District Magistrate*. S. 423 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies only to a High Court. A second class Magistrate, having held that a *prima facie* case had been established against the accused in a case of mischief, adjourned the trial to enable the accused to adduce evidence. On the day to which the trial was adjourned, the complainant not being present, the Magistrate acquitted the accused under s. 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The District Magistrate entertained an appeal from this order under s. 423 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reversed it, and directed a re-hearing on the ground that the complainant and his vakil had appeared before the Court shortly after the case had been dismissed by the second class Magistrate. *Held*, that the order of the District Magistrate was illegal. *RANGASAMI AIYYANGAR v. NARASIMHULU NAYAK*. I. L. R. 7 Mad. 213

3. — s. 423—*Order directing payment of costs, under Court-fees Act, not an enhancement of sentence—Court-fees Act (VII of 1870)*. An order under s. 31 of the Court-fees Act directing the accused, on appeal against conviction, to pay the costs of the complainant is not an enhancement of the sentence. *Madan Mandal v. Haran Ghose*, I. L. R. 20 Cal. 637, approved. *Queen-Empress v. Tangavelu Chetty*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 153, dissented from. *EMPEROR v. KARUPPANA PILLAI* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 188

— ss. 423 (1), 528—*Appellate Court can itself try the offender—Cognizance in such cases under s. 190 (b) and not 190 (c)—S. 423 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ought to be read with s. 528 of the Code*. The provisions of s. 423 (1) (b) do not preclude an Appellate Court, when it reverses the finding and sentence under appeal, from trying the offender itself, if the offence is one ordinarily triable by it. In such cases, the Appellate Court takes cognizance under s. 190 (b) and not s. 190 (c). *EMPEROR v. MANIKKA RAMANI* (1906). I. L. R. 30 Mad. 228

— ss. 423 (1) (d), 439, 517, 522.

See REVISION. I. L. R. 36 Cal. 44

— s. 423 (2)

See PENAL CODE, s. 409.

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 79

— ss. 423, 439.

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 36 Cal. 994

— ss. 423, 457, 537, cl. (a).

See RIOTING. I. L. R. 33 Cal. 295

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

— s. 424.

See JUDGMENT—CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 11 Cal. 449

I. L. R. 13 Cal. 110

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 11

I. L. R. 22 Cal. 241

I. L. R. 23 Cal. 420

I. L. R. 19 All. 506

1 C. W. N. 169

— s. 426 (1872, s. 261; 1861-69, s. 421).

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT GENERALLY.

3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 50

— s. 427 (Presidency Magistrate's Act, 1877, s. 168).

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACQUITTALS, APPEALS FROM.

I. L. R. 9 All. 528

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CHARTER ACT, 24 & 25 VIC., c. 104, CL. 15—CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 7 Cal. 447

— s. 428 (1872, s. 282; 1861-89, s. 422).

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

6 Bom. Cr. 64

6 B. L. R. 483

I. L. R. 27 Cal. 372

4 C. W. N. 497

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 15 All. 136

See PENAL CODE, s. 182.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 451

See CRIMINAL CASES.

1. — (1872, s. 282). Observations as to the exercise by an Appellate Court of the powers conferred on it by s. 282 of Act X of 1872 (Criminal Procedure Code). *EMPRESS v. FATEH*
I. L. R. 5 All. 217

2. — *Enquiry as to place where assault was committed—Power of Appellate Court*. A case of assault, tried by the Assistant Magistrate of Purneah, was appealed to the Sessions Judge of that district, who ordered an inquiry and found that the assault had been committed in Maldah, and thereupon released the accused, as the Magistrate of Purneah had no jurisdiction. *Held*, that the Judge had no jurisdiction under s. 70, Criminal Procedure Code, to make such an order, the accused not having been prejudiced in his defence, and, further, that he ought not to have ordered the inquiry as to the place where the assault was committed, that question having no bearing on the guilt or innocence of

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 428—*concl'd.*

the accused—s. 232, Criminal Procedure Code.
MOHAMED GOLAB v. MOHABEER SINGH

23 W. R. Cr. 34

3. ————— Confinement—

Abetment—Evidence—Appeal Court—Misjoinder—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 347. A head constable in charge of a police out-post agreed to drop proceedings against K, who had been arrested on a certain charge, on condition that K paid to him a sum of money. The head constable sent away K in charge of two chowkidars to procure the money. In order to effect this object the chowkidars subsequently confined K at various places and maltreated him. *Held*, that it would be impossible to hold the head constable guilty of abetting an offence under s. 347 of the Penal Code in the absence of proof that he gave definite orders to that end. Wherein an appeal a Sessions Judge is of opinion that the evidence of witnesses, who were not examined in the lower Court, is necessary; he should proceed under s. 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Where in showing cause against a rule obtained by a petitioner, an objection as to misjoinder, which formed no portion of the rule, was taken by the Crown for the first time, the High Court declined to give effect to it. *EMPEROR v. LUCHMAN SINGH* (1904) **I. L. R. 31 Cal. 710**

s. 429.

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT.
CL. 36 **I. L. R. 15 Bom. 452**

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 84

See VERDICT OF JURY—POWER TO INTERFERE WITH VERDICTS.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 452

s. 430 (1872, s. 285: 1861-69, s. 428).

See REVIEW—CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 732

See SENTENCE—POWER OF HIGH COURT AS TO SENTENCES—MITIGATION.

**B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 484
6 W. R. Cr. 6**

s. 431.

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 714

s. 432.

See RIGHT TO BEGIN.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 380

s. 434 (Act X of 1875, s. 101).

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO POLICE OFFICERS **I. L. R. 2 Bom. 61**

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 434—*concl'd.*

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT CRIMINAL CASES **I. L. R. 8 Bom. 200**

See REVIEW CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 7 All. 672

See RIGHT TO BEGIN **9 B. L. R. 417
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 200**

s. 435, para. 1 (1872, ss. 294, 295, para. 1; 1861-69, s. 405).

See DEKHAN AGRICULTURISTS RELIEF ACT, s. 53 **I. L. R. 15 Bom. 180**

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 477

See MAGISTRATE—GENERAL JURISDICTION **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 449**

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 416

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES **I. L. R. 24 All. 346**

See REFORMATORY SCHOOLS ACT, s. 8.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 381

See REVISION, CRIMINAL CASES—GENERAL RULES FOR EXERCISE OF POWER **I. L. R. 24 All. 315**

MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 41, 139

I. L. R. 25 All. 537

See SENTENCE—POWER OF HIGH COURT AS TO SENTENCES—MITIGATION.

**B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 484
6 W. R. Cr. 6**

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF. **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 633**

1. ————— “*Inferior Criminal Court.*” The words “inferior Criminal Court” in s. 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code mean inferior so far as regards the particular matter in respect to which the superior Court is asked to exercise its revisional jurisdiction. *In the matter of the petition of NOBIN KRISTO MOOKERJEE. NOBIN KRISTO MOOKERJEE v. RUSSICK LALL LAHA* **I. L. R. 10 Calc. 268**

2. ————— and s. 437—*District Magistrate—Power to revise proceedings of Sub-Divisional Magistrate of the first class—“Inferior,” “Subordinate” Magistrates—Reason of distinction.* Under s. 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a District Magistrate has power to call for and examine the record of a proceeding before a Sub-Divisional Magistrate of the first class. *Nobin Kristo Mookerjee v. Russick Lall Laha, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 268*, dissented from. *In re PADMANABHA* **I. L. R. 8 Mad. 18**

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 435—concl'd.

3. ——— *Further inquiry—Inferior Criminal Court—Magistrate of the district, powers of.* A Magistrate of a district is competent, under s. 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to call for and deal with the record of any proceeding before any Magistrate of whatever class in his own district. *OPENDRO NATH GHOSE v. DUKHINI BEWA* . . . **I. L. R. 12 Calc. 473**

4. ——— *Record of inferior Court—Explanation of order passed.* Where a Sessions Judge has, under s. 295 of Act X of 1872, called for the record of an inferior Court, he is, before referring the case to the High Court for orders, bound to call upon the inferior Court for an explanation of the order passed, and should submit such explanation, together with the rest of the record, to the High Court. *MAILANDI FAKIR v. TARIPULLA PRAMANIK* . **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 644**

5. ——— *Power of Joint Sessions Judge.* A Joint Sessions Judge has no power to act in cases of an order of a Magistrate as to possession of land made without judicial inquiry, under s. 295, which applies only to the Sessions Judge of the division. *SHONIDOO NOSHYO v. RUNG LAL JHAH* **25 W. R. Cr. 21**

6. ——— *Power of local Legislature—Power of revision by High Court—Order concerning a ferry purporting to be made under s. 145.* The local Legislature has power to overrule a statutory power conferred on the High Court; but this was not the object and result of the legislation expressed in s. 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. *Empress v. Burah*, **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 172; L. R. 5 I. A. 178**, referred to. The terms of s. 435 mean that orders under the exempted sections mentioned in cl. (3) must have been passed with jurisdiction. If such orders are challenged as made without jurisdiction, the mere fact of their purporting to be passed under the exempted sections would not bring them within those sections so as to debar the exercise of powers by the High Court under s. 15 of the Charter Act. *Abayeswari Debi v. Sidheswari Debi*, **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 80**, *Ananda Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Stephen*, **I. L. R. 19 Calc. 127**, *Roop Lal Das v. Manook*, **2 C. W. N. 572**, and *Queen-Empress v. Pratap Chunder Ghose*, **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 852**, followed. *HURBULUBH NARAIN SINGH v. LUCHMESWAR PRASAD SINGH* . . . **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 188**

7. ——— *Revision—Executive order—Order of District Magistrate dismissing a head-man.* Held, that an order passed by a District Magistrate under the rules framed by Local Government under s. 45 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an executive order and not subject to the revisional powers of the High Court. *DAMMA, In the matter of the petition of* (1907) . . . **I. L. R. 29 All. 563**

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 435 (2).

See ante, s. 144.

ss. 435, 436, 438 (1872, ss. 295, 296; 1861-69, s. 434).

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE **3 Bom. Cr. 1**

See COUNSEL . . . **9 B. L. R. 417**
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 64

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—BOMBAY—CRIMINAL.
I. L. R. 24 Bom. 471

See PLEADER—APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE OF . . . **6 B. L. R. Ap. 46**

See PRIVATE PROSECUTOR.
6 B. L. R. Ap. 46

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES.

See RIGHT TO BEGIN . . . **9 B. L. R. 417**

ss. 435 and 437—*Sessions Judge can order further inquiry on the ground of misappreciation of evidence.* Under ss. 435 and 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Sessions Judge has power to direct further inquiry by a Subordinate Magistrate when, in his opinion, an accused has been discharged by such Magistrate in consequence of an improper appreciation of evidence. *Lakshmi Narasappa v. Mekala Venkatappa*, **I. L. R. 31 Mad. 133**, dissented from. *Queen-Empress v. Balasinnatambi*, **I. L. R. 14 Mad. 334**, followed. *VENKATA SUBBA REDDI v. AYYALU REDDI* (1908) . . . **I. L. R. 32 Mad. 214**

1. ——— ss. 435, 437—439—*District Magistrate cannot under s. 437 set aside an order of discharge on the ground that the lower Court had not appreciated the evidence properly.* Where a District Magistrate taking action under s. 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure comes to the conclusion that the evidence for the prosecution is reliable, and that the lower Court has erred in disbelieving such evidence and discharging the accused, the proper course for him is to refer the matter for orders to the High Court, which can deal with it under s. 439. It is not open to him to set aside the order of discharge himself on the ground that the lower Court had misappreciated the evidence. *Queen-Empress v. Amir Khan*, **I. L. R. 8 Mad. 337**, followed. *Haredass Sanjal v. Sarituilla*, **I. L. R. 15 Calc. 621**, followed. When a Court competent to decide whether the accused is guilty or not holds that he is not guilty on a consideration of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, that finding should, if at all, be set aside only by a Court competent to set aside such finding of fact, that is by the High Court under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with s. 423. *LAKSHMINARASAPPA v. MEKALA VENKATAPPA* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 133

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*concl'd.***

ss. 435, 437—439—*concl'd.*

2. *District Magistrate has power under s. 437 to order further enquiry when accused discharged on misappreciation of evidence—Further inquiry may be by another Magistrate.* On the question of the extent of the powers of interference of the High Court and a District Magistrate or Sessions Judge, under s. 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when an accused is improperly discharged on a misappreciation of evidence by a Subordinate Magistrate:—*Held*, by WALLIS and MUNRO, JJ. (SANKARAN-NAIR, J., dissenting), (i) That the powers of interference of the High Court and the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge are co-extensive under s. 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and they can set aside an order of discharge for reasons other than those which will justify the High Court in interfering on revision. (ii) That the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate cannot, in the exercise of the power to order further inquiry, under s. 437, himself frame the charge or order the Subordinate Magistrate to frame the charge and try the accused. The District Magistrate may, under the other part of the section, make the further inquiry himself and frame a charge in the course of such inquiry. (iii) The Sessions Judge or District Magistrate is not bound to refer the case to the High Court in a case of difference of opinion, owing to mere misappreciation of evidence but would be justified in ordering a reconsideration of the same evidence. (iv) Where the Subordinate Magistrate had dealt with the case in an unsatisfactory way, further inquiry by another Magistrate may be ordered; and such Magistrate may, if necessary, retake the evidence taken before the first Magistrate. *Hari Dass Sanyal v. Saritulla*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 608, dissented from. *Per SANKARAN-NAIR, J.*—Where the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate differs from the conclusion of the Subordinate Magistrate on the evidence, the only question is whether there should be a retrial and no useful purpose is served by a further inquiry. The Sessions Judge or District Magistrate must, in such cases, refer the matter to the High Court under s. 433 and cannot order further inquiry under s. 437. The powers conferred on District Magistrates and Sessions Judges by s. 437 are not wider than the powers conferred on High Courts by s. 439. *NARAYANASWAMY NAIDU v. EMPEROR* (1909)

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 220

ss. 435, 439—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 193—Intentionally giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding—Absence of discussion of evidence for the defence—Explaining away the statement of the accused to his prejudice—Assignment of perjury—Proof—Misreading of documentary evidence—Fundamental errors in principle.* The Evidence Act (I of 1872) does not provide that there must be corroboration to support a conviction, but in ordinary cases and

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*concl'd.***

ss. 435, 439—*concl'd.*

where the provisions peculiar to Indian Law do not apply, a rule, which is founded on substantial justice, may well serve as a safe guide to those, who have to administer the criminal law in India. *EMPEROR v. BAL GANGADHAR TILAK* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 479

ss. 435 to 439.

See PRACTICE . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 643

s. 436.

See COMMITMENT I. L. R. 10 Bom. 319

I. L. R. 8 All. 14

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 136

*See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.*

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 75

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—

COMMITMENTS . 7 C. W. N. 327

DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

7 C. W. N. 77

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 633

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 225

Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 209, 436, 532—Discharge of accused of an offence triable exclusively by Court of Session—Murder—Commitment made by District Magistrate—"Order him to be committed for trial," meaning of—Magistrate, competency of, to himself commit—Magistrate, power of—Evidence of witness partly against and partly in favour of accused—Evidence of witness as to what he heard from deceased—Hearsay evidence—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 6, 8, 11, 14. Under s. 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate have co-ordinate powers either to order a commitment upon the evidence already taken or to direct a fresh inquiry. *Queen-Empress v. Krishnabhat*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 319, referred to. It is improper to accept a portion of the evidence given by a witness which is in support of the case for the prosecution and to discard or discredit the other portions which go against it; and, so far as the accused is concerned, he is entitled to ask the Court to consider all the facts deposed to by that witness and to show to the Court that his evidence, taken as a whole, is in material contradiction of the evidence of the other witnesses. A statement of a witness as to what he heard from the deceased, when it does not relate to the cause of his death or the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, is hearsay and is not admissible; proof must be given in the ordinary way, viz., by evidence of a primary

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

ss. 436—contd.

character, and not by hearsay testimony. *QUEEN-
EMPRESS v. SURENDRA NATH SARKAR* (1901)

**I. L. R. 28 Calc. 397
s.c. 5 C. W. N. 574**

ss. 436, 287, 288—*District Magistrate may, under the section himself, commit for trial—Committing Magistrate in ss. 287, 288 means Magistrate, who held preliminary enquiry.* Under s. 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is competent to a District Magistrate to make a committal himself or to direct a Subordinate Magistrate to make a committal. The words "Committing Magistrate" in ss. 287, 288 mean merely the Magistrate holding the preliminary inquiry. Where, therefore, the District Magistrate himself commits for trial, the evidence recorded by the Subordinate Magistrate, who held the preliminary inquiry, will be receivable as evidence under ss. 287, 288 of the Code. *SESSIONS JUDGE OF MANGALORE v. MALINGA* (1907) . **I. L. R. 31 Mad. 40**

ss. 436, 437.

*See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT
—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL.*

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 211

ss. 436, 438 (1872, s. 296; 1861-69, s. 435).

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

8 W. R. Cr. 41, 61

15 W. R. Cr. 61

4. B. L. R. A. Cr. 1

9 B. L. R. 337, 339

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—COMMITMENT TO SESSIONS COURT.

9 Bom. 169

4 Mad. Ap. 61

5 B. L. R. Ap. 48

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES.

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 65

W. R. 1864, Cr. 3

9 Bom. 170

8 W. R. Cr. 41

1. _____ *Power of a Sessions Court to order committal of accused discharged by a Magistrate.* An order by a Judge under s. 296 of Act X of 1872, directing a Magistrate to commit an accused person, who has been discharged at a preliminary enquiry, to take his trial in a Court of Session, must specify the particular act constituting the offence charged. The Judge cannot direct a committal for offences with which the accused was in no way charged before the Magistrate. *QUEEN v. TARUCKNATH MOOKERJEE*
10 B. L. R. 285; 19 W. R. Cr. 30

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

ss. 436, 438—contd.

2. _____ *Order of committal of persons discharged under s. 215.* A complaint was preferred before the Assistant Magistrate against two persons of an offence under s. 409 of the Penal Code. After inquiry they were discharged under s. 215. *Held*, that the Sessions Court had no power to subsequently direct their committal under s. 296. *ANONYMOUS* . **7 Mad. Ap. 28**

3. _____ *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 4—Sessions case, definition of—Charges under Penal Code, ss. 380, 457.* The appellant, after his discharge by the Assistant Magistrate upon a charge under s. 457 of the Penal Code, was committed to the Sessions Court by order of the Sessions Judge under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 296, upon charges under ss. 380 and 457 of the Penal Code. *Held*, by the Full Bench (SPANKIE, J., and OLDFIELD, J., dissenting), that the commitment was illegal, and that "Sessions case," within the meaning of s. 296 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is a case exclusively triable by the Court of Session. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. KANCHAN SINGH*

I. L. R. 1 All. 413

EMPRESS v. TARA CHAND BAGDI **7 C. L. R. 168**

4. _____ *Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Commitment to Sessions—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), ss. 427, 435.* The Sessions Judge has no power to commit to the Sessions a case in which persons were convicted by the Deputy Magistrate of an offence under s. 457 of the Penal Code: such a case being one triable by the Deputy Magistrate, ss. 427 and 435 of Act XXV of 1861 do not apply. *QUEEN v. HAKIM SIRDAR* . **2 B. L. R. S. N. 2; 10 W. R. Cr. 35**

5. _____ *Revival of proceedings after discharge—Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Sessions case—Fresh evidence.* A Deputy Magistrate having dismissed a case instituted under s. 380 of the Penal Code without taking certain evidence which in his opinion would have been of little value, the Magistrate of the district, on the application of the complainant, took such evidence, and committed the accused for trial before the Sessions Court. *Held*, on reference to the High Court, that as the words "Sessions case" in s. 296 of the Criminal Procedure Code had reference only to a case triable exclusively by a Court of Session, the Magistrate's action could not be supported under that section, but that (as further evidence in addition to that taken by the Deputy Magistrate was forthcoming) it was sustainable on the principle laid down in *Empress v. Donnelly*, **I. L. R. 2 Calc. 405**. *EMPRESS v. HURR DOYAL KARMOKAR* . **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 16**

s.c. ISHEN CHUNDER KARMOKAR v. HURRY DOYAL KARMOKAR . **3 C. L. R. 263**

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

ss. 436, 438—contd.

6. ————— *Revival of proceedings after discharge—Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Fresh evidence—Procedure.* A Magistrate has no power to remand a criminal case to a Subordinate Magistrate for re-trial after the case has once been dismissed; the courses open to him are (i) to accept a fresh complaint supported by fresh evidence, which was not before the Court when the case was dismissed; or (ii) if there be no additional evidence to be procured, to report the case for the orders of the High Court under s. 296 of Act X of 1872. *In the matter of the petition of DIJAHUR DUTT* . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 647

7. ————— *Discharge of accused persons under s. 215—Revival of proceedings at the instance of the Court of Session—Commitment of accused persons.* Certain persons were charged under s. 417 of the Penal Code, and were discharged by the Magistrate inquiring into the offence, under s. 215 of Act X of 1872. The Court of Session, considering that the accused persons had been improperly discharged, forwarded the record to the Magistrate of the district, suggesting to him to make the case over to a Subordinate Magistrate, with directions to enquire into any offence, other than the offence in respect of which the accused persons had been discharged, which the evidence on the record showed to have been committed. The Subordinate Magistrate to whom the case was made over made an inquiry, and committed the accused persons for trial before the Court of Session on charges under ss. 363 and 420 of the Penal Code. It was contended that the Court of Session was not competent to "direct the accused persons to be committed" under s. 296 of Act X of 1872, the case not being a "Sessions case" within the meaning of that section, and that the commitment was consequently illegal. *Held*, that there was no "direction to commit" within the meaning of that section, that is to say, to send the accused persons at once to the Sessions Court, without further inquiry, and whether or not the inquiry was made in consequence of the suggestions of the Court of Session was immaterial, and that the inquiry upon the charges under ss. 363 and 420 of the Penal Code was rightly held by the Subordinate Magistrate, and the commitment could not be impeached. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. BHUP SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 570

8. ————— *Discharge by Magistrate—Order of commitment by Sessions Judge—Omission to call on accused to show cause against such commitment—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), ss. 296, 283.* A Sessions Court has no power, under s. 296 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to direct the commitment of a person discharged by a Deputy Magistrate, without first giving such person an opportunity of showing cause against such commitment. But under s. 296, as amended by Act XI of 1874, the Court

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

ss. 436, 438—contd.

has power to direct the subordinate Court to enquire into any offences for which it considers a commitment should be ordered. When, however, a trial under such a commitment made by order of a Sessions Judge has been duly held, and no actual failure of justice has been caused by the error of the Sessions Judge, s. 283 of the Criminal Procedure Code would be a bar to the reversal of his judgment. *EMPRESS v. KHAMIR*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 662; 10 C. L. R. 8

9. ————— *Commitment by Sessions Judge—Offence of cheating—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 4.* An order of commitment by a Sessions Judge under s. 296 of the Criminal Procedure Code is bad in form if it does not specify the offence for which the parties are to be committed for trial at the Sessions. A trial for the offence of cheating is not a Sessions case within the meaning of s. 296, having regard to the first portion of the definition of Sessions case in s. 4 of the Code, which must be read as if the word "only" followed the words "triable by a Court of Session." *JOY KURN SINGH v. MAN PATUCK* . . . 21 W. R. Cr. 41

10. ————— *Summoning or giving notice to accused person.* The Sessions Judge under s. 296, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, made an order upon the Deputy Magistrate for the commitment of the accused who had previously been discharged by the Deputy Magistrate, but it was alleged that such order of the Sessions Judge was made without calling upon the petitioners to show cause in the matter. *Held*, that although there is nothing in s. 296 with regard to summoning or giving notice to the accused person, no person should be affected in his personal liberty without having opportunity given him to answer the charge for which he is arrested and put into prison. The Court accordingly was of opinion that, if the accused had no opportunity given them of meeting the charge, the commitment was not a good commitment. *In the matter of the petition of BUNDHOO*

22 W. R. Cr. 67

NOWAB SINGH v. KOKIL SINGH

24 W. R. Cr. 70

In the matter of DWARKANATH BHATTACHARJEE

1 C. L. R. 93

11. ————— *Order of committal—Illegal commitment—Irregular procedure.* Where an accused person had been discharged by a Sub-Magistrate, and the District Magistrate directed the committal of the accused to the Court of Session under s. 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, without calling upon him to show cause why he should not be committed:—*Held*, that the order of committal and the commitment made thereunder were illegal. *QUEEN v. KANJAMALAI PADAYACHI*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 372

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

ss. 436, 438—*concl'd.*

12. ———— *Order by the District Magistrate under s. 436 for committal of a person discharged by first class Magistrate under s. 209—Validity of such commitment—Ultra vires.* Where a Magistrate of the first class discharged, under s. 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), a person charged with an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session, and the District Magistrate directed him under s. 436 to commit the accused to the Court of Session, and a commitment was made, but the Sessions Judge referred the case under s. 215 for the order of the High Court:—*Held*, that the order of the District Magistrate under s. 436 was not *ultra vires*, and that the commitment thereunder to the Court of Sessions was good and could not be quashed under s. 215. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PRIYA GOPAL* . . . **I. L. R. 9 Bom. 100**

s. 437.

See ante, s. 203 . . . **13 C. W. N. 193**

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 102

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 457

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED—EFFECT OF DISCHARGE . . . **I. L. R. 29 Calc. 726**

See DISTRICT MAGISTRATE.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1090

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 75

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE . **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 395**

1 C. W. N. 217

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 425

3 C. W. N. 113

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 41

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

I. L. R. 24 All. 148

1.

“*Inferior*”—

“*Subordinate*”—*First class Magistrate—Magistrate of District.* A Magistrate of the first class is, within the meaning of s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code, “subordinate” to the Magistrate of the District, who is, therefore, competent to call for the record of the former, and to deal with it under s. 437. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LASKARI*

I. L. R. 7 All. 853

2.

“*Inferior*”—

Subordinate Magistrate of first class—Magistrate of District. The Court of a Magistrate of the first class is inferior and subordinate to that of the District Magistrate,—s. 17 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882) expressly providing that all Magis-

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 437—*contd.*

trates of whatever class shall be subordinate to the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate is superior, in respect of executive as well as judicial functions, to all other Magistrates. The term “inferior” as used in the Code means statutorily incompetent to hold or exercise equal powers, and carries with it the idea of subordination, which latter means “inferior in rank.” *Nobin Kristo Mookerjee v. Russick Lal Laha*, **I. L. R. 10 Calc. 268**, *Queen-Empress v. Nawab Jan*, **I. L. R. 10 Calc. 551**, dissented from. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PIRYA GOPAL*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 100

3. ———— *Further inquiry—Different charges arising out of same transaction—Acquittal—Further inquiry—Re-trial.* *E*, being charged with theft and mischief in respect of certain branches cut from a tree claimed by the complainant, was tried by a subordinate Magistrate on the charge of mischief, and acquitted on the ground that, as against the complainant, *E* had title to the tree. On the application of the complainant, the District Magistrate directed further inquiry into the case under s. 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and on a reference to the Court of Session the Sessions Judge held that, as no inquiry into the charge of theft had been held, the order was legal. *Held*, that the District Magistrate had no power to pass such an order under s. 437. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ERRAMREDDI*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 293

4.

Penal Code, ss.

497, 498—*Marriage insufficiently proved—Discharge of accused—Re-trial ordered—Wife ordered to be examined on re-trial.* In an inquiry into a case of alleged adultery and enticing away a married woman for illicit purposes, the complainant refused to examine his wife as to the marriage; the Deputy Magistrate declined to frame a charge, and discharged the accused. The Sessions Judge directed a re-trial to be held by another Deputy Magistrate, and ordered that the evidence of the wife should be taken as to the marriage. *Held*, that the Sessions Judge in ordering a re-trial had not exercised a proper discretion, he having admitted, that the prosecution had failed to prove the marriage, and it not being alleged that any evidence was tendered by the prosecution and not taken by the Deputy Magistrate. *CHUNDER NATH GHOSH v. NUNDOLOLL CHATTERJEE*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 81

5.

Further inquiry—

Proceedings against accused—Notice. No order affecting an accused in a criminal matter should be made without giving him notice, so as to enable him to appear and show cause against it. A Sessions Judge has no power under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code to direct a particular Magistrate by name to make the further inquiry contemplated by that section. The further inquiry contemplated

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882 ; X OF 1872 ;
VIII OF 1869 ; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 437—contd.

by s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code is an inquiry upon further materials, not a re-hearing of the matter upon the same evidence which was before the Magistrate who held the first inquiry. *In the matter of the petition of CHUNDI CHURN BHATTACHARJEA. CHUNDI CHURN BHATTACHARJEA v. HEM CHUNDER BANERJEA*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 207

6. — Further inquiry—
Power of District Magistrate to direct—"Inferior Criminal Court"—Notice to accused. The words "Inferior Criminal Court" in s. 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code mean inferior so far as regards the particular matter in respect to which the superior Court is asked to exercise its revisional jurisdiction. A criminal charge instituted before a Magistrate of the first class was finally disposed of by him by an order discharging the accused. Subsequently the Magistrate of the district, proceeding under s. 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directed a further inquiry to be made by a subordinate Magistrate. This order was made without notice to the accused. *Held*, that the Magistrate of the district had no jurisdiction to direct a further inquiry. *Semble*: That, as a matter of strict law, the accused was not entitled to be heard by the District Magistrate before granting the order directing the inquiry. *In the matter of the petition of NOBIN KRISTO MOOKERJEE. NOBIN KRISTO MOOKERJEE v. RUSSICK LALL LAHA* . . . **I. L. R. 10 Calc. 268**

7. — Further inquiry.
A Deputy Magistrate having discharged a person accused of an offence, on the ground that the evidence was insufficient for conviction, the Magistrate of the district recorded an order stating that, in his opinion, the accused had been improperly discharged, and directing under s. 437, Criminal Procedure Code, that further inquiry should be made, and the accused called on to enter upon his defence. The accused was not called upon to show cause why a further inquiry should not be made, but a summons in the terms of s. 68 of the Criminal Procedure Code was issued to him. On his appearance he was tried by the Magistrate of the district, convicted and sentenced. The witnesses for the prosecution were not recalled, but the Magistrate relied upon their evidence as recorded in the first trial, and also upon the statement of a witness for the defence which was not receivable in evidence. *Held*, that the proceedings of the Magistrate of the district were irregular, *first*, because notice to show cause why action should not be taken against him in the terms of s. 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not served upon the accused person before proceedings, ostensibly under that section, were commenced; and, *secondly*, because the subsequent proceedings of the Magistrate were not such as are contemplated by the provisions of s. 437, inasmuch as the conviction

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
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s. 437—contd.

was practically based upon evidence which was not recorded in the course of a "further inquiry" before the Magistrate of the district, but upon evidence which was recorded by the Deputy Magistrate, and had been adjudicated upon by that officer; and such irregularities were fatal to the conviction. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HASNU* . . . **I. L. R. 6 All. 367**

8. — Discharge—Order for further inquiry—Trial for minor offence—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 253. A Magistrate having, under s. 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, discharged a person accused of rioting, an order for further inquiry was made by the Court of Session under s. 437. *Held*, that, the offence of rioting not being proved, the Magistrate was competent to try the accused for the offence of assault. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PAPADU* . . . **I. L. R. 7 Mad. 454**

9. — Further inquiry—
Power of District Magistrate to direct—"Subordinate Magistrate"—Compoundable offence. A criminal charge under s. 448 of the Penal Code having been instituted, the accused was sent up by the police before a Deputy Magistrate of the first class. Previous to any evidence being taken, the complainant intimated to the Magistrate that the case had been amicably settled, and that he did not wish to proceed further in the matter, upon which the Magistrate recorded an order, "Compromised; defendant acquitted." Subsequently the Magistrate of the district, relying upon ss. 248 and 259 and professing to act under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code, directed the Deputy Magistrate to send up the parties and proceed regularly with the case. *Held*, further, that, in addition to the Magistrate's order not being warranted by the fact, it was *ultra vires*, inasmuch as the Deputy Magistrate was a Magistrate of the first class and not "inferior" to the District Magistrate, and to give the District Magistrate jurisdiction to call for a record under s. 435 from another Magistrate and to act under s. 437, the latter must be inferior. *Nobin Kristo Mookerjee v. Russick Lall Laha, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 268*, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NAWAB JAN* . . . **I. L. R. 10 Calc. 551**

10. — Discharge of accused—Further inquiry, power to direct. An accused, having been discharged after a full inquiry before a competent Court, is entitled to the benefit of such discharge, unless some further evidence is disclosed. Consequently, an order made by a District Judge directing a further inquiry to be held under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code in a case where a Magistrate had discharged the accused under s. 253 was not warranted by law, when there had been a full inquiry by a competent Court and when no further evidence was disclosed, such order being based merely upon the ground that, in the opinion of the District Judge, the evidence recorded was suffi-

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

— s. 437—*contd.*
cient for the conviction of the accused. **JEEBUN-KRISTO ROY v. SHIB CHUNDER DASS**
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1027

11. ————— *Power of District Magistrate to direct further inquiry by Magistrate of the first class—"Inferior Magistrate."* Where a District Magistrate called for the record of a case in which a Magistrate of the first class had discharged certain accused persons and directed another Magistrate of the first class to make further inquiry into the case :—*Held*, following **Nobin Kristo Mookerjee v. Russick Lal Laha, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 263**, and **Queen-Empress v. Nawab Jan, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 551**, that the District Magistrate's order was *ultra vires* and illegal. **JHINGURI v. BACHU**
I. L. R. 7 All. 134

12. ————— *Further inquiry—Re-trial—District Magistrate, powers of.* Where an accused person has been discharged by a Magistrate, further inquiry cannot be directed, under s. 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the ground that the Magistrate has not rightly appreciated the credit due to the witnesses. Further inquiry should only be directed when other witnesses might have been examined, or when the witnesses have not been properly examined; and inasmuch as s. 437 does not direct that the evidence already taken should be taken again, the further inquiry should ordinarily be made by the Magistrate who made the original inquiry. Where a District Magistrate, being of opinion that a subordinate Magistrate had, without just cause, refused credit to the witnesses in a certain case and had improperly discharged an accused person, directed a further inquiry by another Magistrate, and the accused was on the same evidence re-tried and convicted :—*Held*, that the conviction must be quashed. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. AMIR KHAN**
I. L. R. 8 Mad. 336

13. ————— *Further inquiry—Power of District Magistrate to suggest a committal.* A District Magistrate who refers a case to a subordinate Magistrate for further inquiry has no authority to fetter him in the exercise of his judicial discretion as to the question whether the case should or should not be committed to the Court of Session. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MUNISAMI**
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 39

14. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 145—"Complaint"—District Magistrate, power of, to order further inquiry—Dispute concerning land.* S. 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not give power to order a further inquiry in a case under s. 145 of that Code. **CHATHU RAI v. NIRANJAN RAI**
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 729

15. ————— *Further inquiry, order of, without notice to the accused—Magistrate, power of, to order further inquiry which had been refused by his predecessor.* One *M* was tried and

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

— s. 437—*contd.*
discharged by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and the complainant moved the District Magistrate for a further inquiry not only against *M*, but also against other persons who were charged with being connected with the same offence, and the District Magistrate expressly directed a further inquiry only as against *M*, who was tried and convicted by the Sessions Judge. The complainant then moved the District Magistrate for further inquiry against the other persons, and the District Magistrate, a different officer, without giving them notice, ordered a further inquiry to be made. *Held*, that the District Magistrate was not competent, on the face of his predecessor's order, to direct a further inquiry, which had already been practically refused. That in the circumstances of the case the Sessions Judge was the proper officer to direct a further inquiry. **RATTO SINGH v. KARI SINGH**
4 C. W. N. 100

16. ————— *Jurisdiction of District Magistrate to order further inquiry in a proceeding under s. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.* A District Magistrate has, strictly speaking, no power under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882) to order a further inquiry into a proceeding under s. 133 of the Code, which has been practically dropped by a Subordinate Magistrate, the proper course being to refer the matter to the High Court. **INDRA NATH BANERJEE v. QUEEN-EMPRESS**
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 425
2 C. W. N. 113

17. ————— *"Further inquiry"—Sessions Judge, jurisdiction of.* It is competent to a Sessions Judge acting under the Criminal Procedure Code, s. 437, to direct further inquiry to be held where additional evidence is not forthcoming. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BALASINNATAMBI**
I. L. R. 14 Mad. 334

18. ————— *Power of Sessions Judge to order further inquiry.* A Sessions Judge is not competent under s. 437, Criminal Procedure Code, to direct the re-opening of the proceedings, merely because, in his opinion, the Subordinate Magistrate has not rightly appreciated the credit due to the witnesses. "Further inquiry" under that section means the taking of additional evidence, not the re-hearing of the same evidence. **DARSUN LALL v. JUMUK LALL**
I. L. R. 12 Calc. 522

19. ————— *Inquiry—Further inquiry—Fresh inquiry—Jurisdiction—Notice—District Magistrate—Subordinate Magistrate.* When a complaint has been dismissed under s. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), or an accused person discharged by a Subordinate Magistrate, the District Magistrate has power, under s. 437 of the Code, to direct any Magistrate subordinate to him to make further inquiry into the com-

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
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s. 437—*contd.*

plaint dismissed, or into the case of the accused person discharged, even though there be no additional evidence disclosed, or allegation that such exists. The term "further inquiry" in s. 437 is not restricted to "inquiry upon further materials or further or additional evidence." Before directing further inquiry under s. 437, it is not obligatory on the District Magistrate to give notice to the person discharged, or against whom the complaint was dismissed. When an order directing such inquiry is made, the Subordinate Magistrate to whom it is directed has jurisdiction, and is bound to carry it out. Such order remains in force until it is duly set aside or withdrawn. Difference between the powers of the District Magistrate under the former Criminal Procedure Code (Act X, 1872) and the present one (Act X, 1882) pointed out. *Empress v. Gowdapa*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 535, explained. *Chundi Churn Bhattacharjee v. Hem Chunder Banerjee*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 207, commented on; and *Jeebunkristo Roy v. Shib Chunder Das*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1027, *Queen-Empress v. Hosein*, I. L. R. 6 All. 367, and *Queen-Empress v. Amir Khan*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 336, commented on and doubted. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DORABJI HORMASJI*
I. L. R. 10 Bom. 131

20. ———— "*Further inquiry*"—*Practice—Notice to show cause.* Held, by the Full Bench, that, when a Magistrate has discharged an accused person under s. 253 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court or Court of Session under s. 437 has jurisdiction to direct further inquiry on the same materials, and a District Magistrate may, under like circumstances, himself hold further inquiry or direct further inquiry by a Subordinate Magistrate. *Queen-Empress v. Dorabji Hormasji*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 131, referred to. *Empress v. Bhole Singh*, All. W. N. (1883) 150, *Queen-Empress v. Hasnu*, I. L. R. 6 All. 367, *Chundi Churn Bhattacharjee v. Hem Chunder Banerjee*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 207, *Jeebun Kristo Roy v. Shib Chunder Das*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1027, *Darsun Lall v. Jamuk Lall*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 522, and *Queen-Empress v. Amir Khan*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 336, dissented from. In exercising the powers conferred by s. 437, Sessions Judges and Magistrates should, in the first place, always allow the person who has been discharged an opportunity of showing cause why there should not be further inquiry before an order to that effect is made, and, next, they should use them sparingly and with great caution and circumspection, especially in cases where the questions involved are mere matters of fact. As to the mode in which their discretion should be regulated under such circumstances, the remarks of STRAIGHT and TYRELL, JJ., in *Queen-Empress v. Gayadin*, I. L. R. 4 All. 148, in reference to appeals from acquittals, are applicable. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHOTU*
I. L. R. 9 All. 52

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 437—*contd.*

21. ———— *Orders for further inquiry—Order to the prejudice of an accused person—Notice to show cause.* Before any order is made to the prejudice of an accused person under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code, notice should be given to that person to appear and show cause why the order should not be passed. *Queen-Empress v. Chotu*, I. L. R. 9 All. 52, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. AJUDHIA*
I. L. R. 20 All. 339

22. ———— *Power to order further inquiry—"Accused person"—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 437.* Held, that a person against whom proceedings under Ch. VIII (relating to security for good behaviour) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are being taken is "an accused person" within the meaning of s. 437 of the Code. *Queen-Empress v. Mona Puna*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 661, and *Jhojha Singh v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 493, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MUTASADDI LAL*
I. L. R. 21 All. 107

23. ———— *Complaint, dismissal of—Revival of proceedings—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 437.* A complaint was made before a Magistrate of the first class of an offence punishable under s. 323 of the Penal Code. The Magistrate recorded a brief statement by the complainant, but did not ask him if he had any witnesses to call. An order was passed directing that "a copy of the petition of complaint should be sent to the police station, calling for a report on the matter," and on receipt of the report the Magistrate dismissed the complaint under s. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code. There was nothing in the Magistrate's original order to show that he saw reason to distrust the truth of the complaint, nor did he direct any local investigation to be made by a police officer for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint. Subsequently to the dismissal of the complaint, the same complainant brought a fresh charge upon the same facts against the same persons in the same Court, and upon this charge the accused were tried, convicted, and sentenced. Held, that the Magistrate in ordering a further inquiry, on receiving the complainant's second petition, did not act contrary to any provision of the law, and that, considering the circumstances under which the first complaint had been dismissed, a further inquiry was necessary. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PURAN*
I. L. R. 9 All. 85

24. ———— *Notice to accused—Discharge by Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 437.* No notice to an accused person is necessary in point of law before an order under s. 437 can be passed; but as a matter of discretion, it is proper that such notice should be given. Held by the majority of the Full Bench (PRINSEP, WILSON,

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 437—contd.

TOTTENHAM, NORRIS, PIGOT, and O'KINEALY, JJ.), that after an inquiry by a subordinate Magistrate and the discharge of an accused person, a Sessions Judge or Magistrate has jurisdiction, under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to order a "further inquiry" or a re-hearing upon the same materials which were before the subordinate Magistrate, i.e., when no further evidence is forthcoming. But (PRINSEP, J., dissenting) the words "further inquiry" in that section mean the inquiry preliminary to trial which regularly results in a charge or discharge and do not include the trial. And if on the evidence taken the accused ought to be committed, then, in a case triable only at the Sessions, the proper course is to commit under s. 436; in other cases to refer to the High Court. *Per* PRINSEP, J.—The word "inquiry" includes a trial, and the "further inquiry" would, therefore, allow of the framing of a charge and the cross-examination of witnesses for the prosecution. *Per* PETHERAM, C.J., and GHOSE, J.—The power given by s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code to order a further inquiry is confined to cases in which the revising officer is satisfied, for one of the reasons mentioned in s. 435, that the subordinate officer has proceeded on insufficient materials, and that with a more exhaustive inquiry further material would be forthcoming. It was not intended that such an enquiry should be granted simply for the reconsideration of evidence. *In the matter of HARI DASS SANAYAL v. SARITULLA*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 608

25.

Further inquiry
—*Notice to the accused—Practice.* Before making an order for further inquiry under s. 437, Criminal Procedure Code, a notice should be given to the accused person to give him an opportunity of being heard upon the question whether any further inquiry should be made. *Hari Das Sanayal v. Saritulla*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 608, followed. JAIJAI RAM v. SUPHAL SINGH . **2 C. W. N. 196**

26.

Notice—Discretion of Court—Further inquiry. Although there is nothing in s. 437 rendering it incumbent to give notice before directing a further inquiry, yet a Court would not be exercising a proper discretion if, before ordering a further inquiry, it did not give notice to the accused to show cause against such order. Where, therefore, a further inquiry was directed without such previous notice to the accused, the High Court set aside the order. *Hari Dass Sanayal v. Saritulla*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 608, followed. *In the matter of AMIN KARIADAR*

3 C. W. N. 249

RATTI SINGH v. KARI SINGH . **4 C. W. N. 100**

27.

Further inquiry
—*Wrongful confinement—Wrongful restraint—Malice—Penal Code, ss. 340, 342.* The accused as abkari inspector visited a toddy shop, where the

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 437—contd.

complainant and one D were employed as agents for the sale of toddy. Having reason to suspect that an offence under the Abkari Act (Bombay Act V of 1878) had been committed, the accused made an inquiry, in the course of which the complainant made certain statements implicating his fellow-servant. The accused thereupon resolved to prosecute D and make the complainant a witness in the case. In order to prevent him being tutored, the accused ordered his sepoy to bring the complainant to his camp, and there detained him during the night, and on the following morning sent him in charge of a sepoy to a Magistrate's Court, where the complainant repeated the statements made by him before the accused. He was then allowed to go away. The accused prosecuted D, and in the course of his trial admitted in his deposition that he had ordered his sepoy to bring the complainant to his camp, and had detained him there during the night. After the termination of D's trial, the complainant charged the accused with wrongful confinement under s. 342 of the Penal Code. The accused pleaded that the complainant had voluntarily come to his tent to have his statements reduced to writing, and that he had of his own accord stopped in his camp during the night. The trying Magistrate held this plea proved, and discharged the accused under s. 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882). The Sessions Judge held that, though the accused had detained the complainant in his camp during the night, still he was not guilty of any offence under the Penal Code, as he had acted without malice and to the best of his judgment. He, therefore, declined to interfere or order any further inquiry. *Held*, by the High Court on revision, that the trying Magistrate had wrongly omitted to take into consideration the admissions made by the accused in his deposition in D's case. Those admissions had an important bearing on the present case. They were admissible in evidence against the accused, and as they were left out of consideration, the inquiry was necessarily incomplete and imperfect. Further inquiry was, therefore, ordered. *DHANIA v. CLIFFORD*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 376

28.

Order of Sessions Judge rejecting application under s. 437—Subsequent order of District Magistrate granting similar application—Practice. Where a Sessions Judge has passed orders under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a District Magistrate acting under the same section should not pass orders of a contrary kind, but if he thinks that the Judge's orders were wrong, he should submit them to the High Court through the medium of the Public Prosecutor. *Queen-Empress v. Shere Singh*, I. L. R. 9 All. 362, referred to. Where a Sessions Judge had, under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code, refused to order further inquiry into the case of an accused person who had been discharged, the High

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 437—*contd.*

Court set aside a subsequent order of the Magistrate of the district passed under the same section and ordering further inquiry into the same case. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PIRTHI*. I. L. R. 12 All. 434

29. *Jurisdiction of Sessions Judge and Magistrate to grant further inquiry—Power of the Sessions Judge to interfere with orders passed by the District Magistrate.* Both the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate are competent, under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to order a further inquiry; but the Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to review an order made by the District Magistrate under that section refusing a further inquiry. It is open to the Sessions Judge to refer the matter to the High Court under s. 438. *DARBARI MANDAR v. JAGOO LAL*. I. L. R. 22 Calc. 573

30. *Further inquiry of offence not charged against other persons not before Magistrate—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 203, 204, and 437—Penal Code, ss. 144 and 426.* On a complaint made to the Deputy Magistrate, he convicted one of the accused, H, of mischief. On application made to the Sessions Judge, he directed a further inquiry to be made by the Magistrate into another offence, under s. 144 of the Penal Code, in respect of H, no charge of any such offence having been made at any time against him. The Sessions Judge also directed a further inquiry against other persons, who apparently were mentioned in the complaint, but who had not been summoned to appear before the Magistrate. *Held*, that the order of the Sessions Judge was without jurisdiction, not being within the powers described by s. 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *HAR KISHORE DASS v. JUGUL CHUNDER KARYARATHNA BHUTTACHARJEE*. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 658

31. *Power of superior Magistrates to direct a Subordinate Magistrate to issue warrants previously issued and cancelled by such subordinate Magistrate.* Where a Sub-Divisional Magistrate issued warrants for the apprehension of some accused persons for trial, and afterwards cancelled the warrants, and a District Magistrate, purporting to act under s. 437, Criminal Procedure Code, directed the said Sub-Divisional Magistrate to re-issue the warrants:—*Held*, that the Magistrate's order directing the Sub-Divisional Officer to re-issue the warrants against the accused was *ultra vires*. *Held*, also, that s. 437, Criminal Procedure Code, does not contemplate a case of a Magistrate directing a subordinate Magistrate to issue warrants for the apprehension of a person. *Held*, further, that the order complained against was not authorized by s. 437, Criminal Procedure Code, and should, therefore, be set aside. *In the matter of the petition of GURU CHARAN AICH*. 1 C. W. N. 650

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 437—*contd.*

See *INDERJIT SINGH v. THAKUR SINGH*

2 C. W. N. 290

32. *Order directing accused, against whom a warrant of arrest had issued, not to be tried—Issue of warrants, when no further proceedings taken, effect of.* Where after the issue of warrant of arrest against certain persons the Magistrate does not think it proper to proceed further:—*Held*, that the termination of proceedings against them is in effect an order of discharge and is, therefore, subject to revision under s. 437, Criminal Procedure Code. *MOUL SINGH v. MOHABIR SINGH*. 4 C. W. N. 242

33. *Order for further inquiry in case of discharge of person called upon to give security for good behaviour—Further inquiry, power to order, in such proceedings—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 110 and 437.* A further inquiry cannot be made into the case of a person against whom proceedings under s. 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been taken, and who has been discharged. If it be considered by the Magistrate that it is necessary to institute further proceedings, he is competent to do so under the law, on fresh information received. The further inquiry which can be ordered under s. 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is into a complaint which has been dismissed or into the case of any accused person who has been discharged. Proceedings under s. 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be regarded as on a complaint, nor can they be regarded as a case in which any accused person has been discharged, for the terms "accused person" and "discharge" in s. 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly refer to a person accused of an offence who has been discharged from a charge of that offence within the terms of Ch. XIX of the Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. IMAN MONDAL*. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 662

34. *Further inquiry—Magistrate, power of, to direct further inquiry into offences, some of which formed component parts of an offence of which accused was acquitted—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 147, 323, 342—Rioting, acquittal of.—Fresh trial for causing hurt.* Where an accused person was tried on a charge of being a member of an unlawful assembly with the common object of assaulting the complainant, but was acquitted of the offence of rioting, and, subsequent thereto, the District Magistrate directed a further inquiry into the offences under ss. 323 and 342, Indian Penal Code, committed in the same occurrence: *Held*, that, the offence under s. 323, Indian Penal Code, being one of the offences which formed the subject of the previous trial, the matter could not be re-opened until the order of acquittal had been set aside. *Held*, also, that no order within the terms of s. 437, Criminal Procedure Code, having been passed in respect of

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.

s. 437—contd.

the offence under s. 342, Indian Penal Code, the District Magistrate was not competent to order further inquiry in regard to that offence. *JALIRAM ALOM GANBURAH v. RAJKUMAR UMAR SINGH* (1900) **5 C. W. N. 72**

35. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 4, 110, 437—Discharge of persons called upon to furnish security for good behaviour—Further inquiry, order for, if legal—Complaint—“Discharge,” meaning of—Magistrate, jurisdiction of Procedure.* S. 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the only law which authorizes a Magistrate to re-open proceedings in which a person has been released. The further inquiry which can be ordered under s. 437, Criminal Procedure Code, is into a complaint which has been dismissed, or into the case of any accused person who has been discharged. Proceedings under s. 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be regarded as on a complaint, nor can they be regarded as a case in which any accused person has been discharged. The terms “accused person” and “discharge” in s. 437 refer to a person accused of an offence who has been discharged of a charge of that offence within the terms of Ch. XIX of the Code. *IMAN MANDAL v. EMPRESS* (1900) **6 C. W. N. 163**

36. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 202, 203, 422 and 437—Dismissal of complaint—Further inquiry, order for—Refusal by High Court—Subsequent order by Sessions Judge, propriety of.* Where, a complaint being dismissed under s. 203, Code of Criminal Procedure, the complainant was directed to be prosecuted under s. 211, Indian Penal Code, and her application to the High Court for a further inquiry was refused, but the Sessions Judge, on trial, having acquitted her of the charge under s. 211, Indian Penal Code, ordered further inquiry into her complaint: *Held*, that the refusal by the High Court to order further inquiry was no bar to the Sessions Judge's order for further inquiry, as fresh evidence had been brought to light and the order of the Sessions Judge was made upon materials totally different from those which were before the High Court. *BEPIN BEHARI DE v. NENDI HARIANI* (1902) **7 C. W. N. 80**

37. *Further enquiry, order for, by Sessions Judge. Proper grounds not stated—Discharge in substance though not in form—Sessions Judge, competency of, to order further enquiry.* Where an order was passed by a Deputy Commissioner—which was in substance, though not in form, an order of discharge: *Held*, that a Sessions Judge could on the complainant's motion direct a further enquiry under s. 437. An order of the Sessions Judge so passed not stating proper grounds for directing a further enquiry was set aside as bad. *NAGENDRA NATH SEN v. KORB* (1904) **8 C. W. N. 456**

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.

s. 437—contd.

38. *Jurisdiction—Accused—Discharge—Omission to state reasons in the order for further inquiry.* It is not, as a matter of law, obligatory on a District Magistrate to issue a notice upon the accused before directing a further inquiry under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but according to the general principle of criminal jurisdiction, no order prejudicially affecting an accused should be passed without giving him an opportunity of being heard. It is not ordinarily desirable that a District Magistrate should make a detailed examination of the evidence and give elaborate reasons for ordering a further inquiry, but it is desirable that he should give enough reasons to show that his order is a proper one. *WAHED ALI v. EMPEROR* (1905) . . . **I. L. R. 32 Cal. 1090**

39. *Revision—Practice—Lower Court having concurrent jurisdiction in revision with the High Court.* Where the Magistrate of the District dismissed a complaint under the provisions of s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court declined to entertain an application by the complainant asking for further inquiry under s. 437 of the Code, when no application for that object had been made to the Sessions Judge. *Emperor v. Kalicharan*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1904) 232, followed. *GULLAY v. BAKAR HUSAIN* (1905) . . . **I. L. R. 28 All. 268**

40. *Further inquiry, grounds for ordering—Perusal of evidence—Statement of reasons.* It is the duty of the Judge, before directing a further inquiry against a person who has been discharged, to peruse the evidence and state the grounds which induce him to make the order. *ABINASH CHANDRA MITRA v. THE EMPEROR* (1907) **13 C. W. N. 76**

s. 438.

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO **5 C. W. N. 71**

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES . . . **I. L. R. 24 All. 346**
I. L. R. 25 All. 128
I. L. R. 9 All. 362
I. L. R. 10 All. 146
I. L. R. 23 Cal. 249, 250

Revision—Practice—Sentence reduced by Sessions Judge—Application by District Magistrate asking for enhancement. As a general rule of practice the High Court will not entertain a reference from a District Magistrate, which has for its object the enhancement, of a sentence, which has been reduced by the Sessions Judge. *Queen-Empress v. Shere Singh*, **I. L. R. 9 All. 362**, *Queen-Empress v. Zor Singh*, **I. L. R. 10 All. 146**, and *Queen-Empress v. Jahandi*, **I. L. R. 23 Cal. 249**, referred to. *EMPEROR v. JAMNA BAI* (1905) **I. L. R. 28 All. 91**

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 439 (1872, s. 297; 1861-69, s. 426).

See COMMITMENT . I. L. R. 8 All. 14
I. L. R. 15 All. 205

See COMPLAINT—REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT.
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 528
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 126
1 C. W. N. 49
4 C. W. N. 46

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 127
2 C. W. N. 572

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—COSTS.
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 387

See PRACTICE—CRIMINAL CASES—REVISION . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 827

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES . I. L. R. 24 All. 346

See REFORMATORY SCHOOLS ACT (VIII OF 1897), ss. 8, 9, 16 . 5 C. W. N. 210

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES.

See REVIEW—CRIMINAL CASES.
I. L. R. 10 Bom. 176

See SENTENCE—POWER OF HIGH COURT AS TO SENTENCES.

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 633

1. _____ Sanction to prosecute—High Court's powers of revision—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 195—Sanction to prosecute—Sanction granted by a Civil Court. Where sanction to prosecute in respect of several offences under various sections of the Penal Code was granted by a Munsif, and his order was upheld by the District Judge in revision: *Held*, that the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere in revision under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *In re Chennanagoud*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 139, dissented from. *Held*, also, that it is not expedient that a sanction to prosecute should be given to a debtor to use against his creditor. *NAZIR HASAN v. DOST MUHAMMAD* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 1

2. _____ Sanction to prosecute, power of Appellate Court to grant—Rule on District Magistrate to show cause—Right of opposite party to be heard—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 195, 439. The power of granting sanction by an Appellate Court ought to be exercised carefully, especially when sanction is refused by the Court of first instance. Where sanction had been granted by the Sessions Judge to prosecute the petitioner for the purpose of public justice, and a Rule had been issued by the High Court upon the District Magistrate only to show cause why the sanction should not be set aside, it was held at the hearing of the Rule that

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 439—*contd.*

the opposite side had no *locus standi* and should not be heard. *JHALAN JHA v. BUCHAR GOPE* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 811

3. _____ Revision—Order directing prosecution, made by a Munsif—Jurisdiction of the Criminal Bench to interfere—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622. The Criminal Bench of the High Court has no authority to interfere, under s. 439, with the proceedings of a Munsif taken under s. 476. The Civil Bench should be moved under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Eranholi Athan v. King-Emperor*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 98; *In re Chennanagoud*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 198, followed. *KALI PROSAD CHATTERJEE v. BHUBAN MOHINI DAS* (1904) . 8 C. W. N. 73

4. _____ Revision—Order of acquittal—Practice. Although the High Court has the power to interfere in revision with an original or appellate judgment of acquittal, it will ordinarily not do so. *QATYUN ALI v. FAIAZ ALI* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 359

5. _____ Revision—Practice—Discretion of Court. Unexplained delay in applying for revision of an order passed to the prejudice of the applicant is a reason for the High Court, in the exercise of its discretion, declining to interfere. *EMPEROR v. JAGAN NATH* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 468

6. _____ Revision—Practice—Discretion of Court as to entertainment of application in revision. *Held*, that it is not the practice of the High Court to entertain an application for revision on the criminal side, where there exists a lower Court having concurrent revisional jurisdiction, unless a similar application has first been made to the lower Court and has been rejected. *Emperor v. Kali Charan*, All. Weekly Notes (1904) 233, and *Gullay v. Bakar Husain*, I. L. R. 28 All. 268, followed. *SHAFQAAT-UL-LAH v. WALI AHMAD KHAN* (1907) . I. L. R. 30 All. 116

7. _____ Reference to High Court—Enhancement of sentence—Practice of the High Court to accept the conviction as conclusive. It has been the invariable practice of the Bombay High Court, in cases that come before it for enhancement of sentence, to accept the conviction as conclusive and to consider the question of enhancement of sentence on that basis. *EMPEROR v. CHINTO BHAIRAVA* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 162

8. _____ ss. 439 and 476—High Court's powers of revision—Order passed by a Munsif directing the prosecution of a party to a civil suit. Where a Munsif acting under s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directed the prosecution of a party to a civil suit pending before him, it was held by *STANLEY C.J.*, and *BLAIR, J.*, that the High Court had no jurisdiction in the exercise of

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 439—*concl'd.*

its revisional powers on the criminal side under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to interfere with such order. *Eranholi Athan v. King-Emperor*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 8; *Kali Prosad Chatterjee v. Bhuban Mohini Dasi*, 8 C. W. N. 73; and *Emperor v. Muhammad Khan*, All. Weekly Notes (1902) 202, referred to. *Per BANERJEE, J. (contra)*.—The High Court has power under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to revise an order made under s. 476 of the Code, whether such order be made by a Civil, Criminal, or Revenue Court. *Emperor v. Muhammad Khan*, All. Weekly Notes (1902) 202; *In the matter of the petition of Mathura Das*, I. L. R. 16 All. 80; *In the matter of the petition of Alamdar Husain*, I. L. R. 23 All. 249; *Khepu Nath Sikdar v. Grish Chunder Mukerji*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 730; *Chaudhuri Mahomed Isharul Haq v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 349; *Queen-Empress v. Srinivasulu Naidu*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 124; *Queen-Empress v. Rachappa*, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 109; *In re Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, I. L. R. 26 Bom. 785; *Eranholi Athan v. King-Emperor*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 98; and *Kali Prosad Chatterjee v. Bhuban Mohini Dasi*, 8 C. W. N. 73, referred to. BHUP KUNWAR, *In the matter of the petition of* (1904) . I. L. R. 26 All. 249

ss. 439 and 522—Revision—Powers of High Court—Reversal of order under s. 522. Held, that under s. 439 and s. 423 (1) (d), the High Court has power, as a Court of revision, to reverse an order passed by a subordinate Court under s. 522 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Ram Chandra Mistry v. Nobin Mirdha*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 630, distinguished. MANKI v. BHAGWANTI (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 415

s. 440.

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—ACQUITTALS . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 363

s. 443.

See ante, s. 107 . 13 C. W. N. 151

s. 443 et seq.—European British subject—Claim of status as a European British subject without claim to be tried by a jury—District Magistrate—Jurisdiction. One G. P. who was sent for trial before a District Magistrate on charge of rioting under s. 147 of the Penal Code, claimed that he was a European British subject, but did not ask to be tried by a jury. The Magistrate after inquiry found that G. P. was not a European British subject, tried and convicted him under s. 147, but passed upon him a sentence, which as District Magistrate he could legally have passed upon a European British subject. G. P. appealed to the Sessions Judge. The Sessions Judge, on the question being again raised, found that G. P. was a European British subject, and thereupon set aside his conviction and sentence and directed that he should be retried by the District Magistrate. Held, that this procedure was erroneous, inasmuch as the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 443—*concl'd.*

appellant had never claimed to be tried by a jury and the Magistrate, who had tried and convicted him, was competent to try him as a European British subject and had passed a sentence, which was not in excess of his powers as a Magistrate trying a European British subject; the Sessions Judge on finding that the appellant was a European British subject should have gone on and heard his appeal on the merits. *Empress of India v. Berrill*, I. L. R. 4 All. 141, distinguished. *EMPEROR v. GEORGE POWELL* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 397

ss. 443, 444 (1872, s. 72).

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—MERCHANT SEAMEN'S ACT, 1859 . . . 4 Mad. Ap. 23
7 Mad. Ap. 32

ss. 443-463 (1872, ss. 71-88).

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—EUROPEAN BRITISH SUBJECTS.

14 B. L. R. 106

I. L. R. 4 All. 141

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 561

ss. 447, 449—Aden Courts Act (II of 1864), ss. 17, 20, 22, 23—Resident's Court at Aden—Sessions Court—Transfer of case to the High Court—Jurisdiction of the High Court to transfer a case to itself from the Court of the Resident at Aden—Letters Patent, cl. 29. It is not competent to the Resident at Aden, to whose Court as a Court of Session a case is committed under s. 447 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, to transfer the case to the High Court, under the provisions of s. 449 of the Code, on the ground that the offence cannot be adequately punished by him. The powers of the Court of Session conferred upon the Resident at Aden by the Aden Courts Act (II of 1864) are not merely such as are defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898; but such as are provided expressly in the Act itself. And s. 449 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, cannot affect those provisions. The High Court of Bombay can, under cl. 29 of the Amended Letters Patent, transfer to itself a case pending in the Court of Session at Aden. *EMPEROR v. ROBERT COMLEY* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 575

s. 451.

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—EUROPEAN BRITISH SUBJECT.

I. L. R. 25 All. 511

"Europeans," meaning of. The word "Europeans" in s. 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure means persons born in Europe. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MOSS* . I. L. R. 16 All. 88

s. 452 (Act X of 1875, s. 37).

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 160

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

ss. 452—*concl.*

See JURY—JURY UNDER HIGH COURT'S
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 232

ss. 453, 454.

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
EUROPEAN BRITISH SUBJECTS.

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 561

s. 454 (1872, s. 84).

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 308

*Privilege of European
British subject—Waiver of privilege.* The provisions of s. 72 of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the kind of Court which shall have jurisdiction and shall not have jurisdiction to inquire into a complaint or try a charge against a European British subject constitute a privilege, that is to say, they are not so much words taking away jurisdiction entirely, as words which confer on the British subject a right to be tried by a certain class of Magistrates and by no others, which right the Code enables him to give up. S. 84 of the Criminal Procedure Code must be construed strictly with s. 72, and before a European British subject can be considered to have waived the privilege conferred upon him by s. 72, it must appear that his rights under that section have been distinctly made known to him, and that he must have been enabled to exercise his choice and judgment whether he would or would not claim those rights. The waiver of privilege spoken of in s. 84 must be an absolute giving up of all the rights, with reference to Ch. VII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which a European British subject has; and the words "dealt with as such before the Magistrate" mean everything contained in the chapter,—that is to say, the tribunal having cognizance of the case, the procedure, and also the punishment to which the accused would be liable. *In the matter of the petition of QUIROS. EMPRESS v. ALLEN*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 83; 6 C. L. R. 463

s. 456.

See HABEAS CORPUS, WRIT OF.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 286

s. 464 (1872, s. 423), s. 465 (1872, s. 45), s. 466 (1872, s. 426), ss. 467 to 471 (1872, s. 430), and s. 473 (1872, s. 432).

See INSANITY.

s. 465.

See CHARGE TO JURY—SUMMING UP IN
SPECIAL CASES—UNSOUNDNESS OF
MIND . . . 19 W. R. Cr. 26

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

ss. 471 and 473.

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—
ORDERS OF CRIMINAL COURT.

22 W. R. 329

s. 476 (1872, s. 471; 1861-69, s. 171).

See *ante*, s. 439.

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PROCEDURE.

4 N. W. 86

9 W. R. Cr. 3

5 B. L. R. 100; 13 W. R. Cr. 66

13 W. R. Cr. 45

15 W. R. Cr. 2, 88

See FALSE CHARGE . . . 5 C. W. N. 106

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 30

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.

5 C. W. N. 630

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 42

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—RE-
FERENCE BY OTHER MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 461

See PENAL CODE, ss. 182, 211.

13 C. W. N. 398

See PROSECUTION, ORDER FOR.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 114, 133

See REMAND—CRIMINAL CASES.

6 B. L. R. 698

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—MIS-
CELLANEOUS CASES.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 730

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 349

I. L. R. 16 All. 80

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 124

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 869

3 C. W. N. 589

I. L. R. 23 All. 249

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 785

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 98

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—NATURE
OF FORM AND SUFFICIENCY OF SANCTION.

I. L. R. 25 All. 234

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 570

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 225

7 C. W. N. 708

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1183

1. *Act XXIII of
1861, s. 16—Sending case for investigation by
Magistrate.* A Subordinate Judge, finding that
a person had made a false verification of a
plaint, sent his case for investigation to a Magis-
trate of the district, who refused to investigate
it on the ground that the alleged offence wa
one triable exclusively by the Court of Session.
to which the Subordinate Judge himself should.

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 476—*contd.*

under s. 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, have committed it. *Held*, that the Magistrate of the district was bound to proceed with the investigation of the case according to s. 16 of Act XXIII of 1861. *REG. v. AMRUTA NATH* 7 Bom. Cr. 29

2. *Preliminary enquiry—Procedure.* Under s. 471, Criminal Procedure Code, the Court must first make a preliminary enquiry to satisfy itself that a specific charge coming under the sections mentioned in it ought to be preferred against the accused; and after being so satisfied, it must either commit the case or send the case to the Magistrate for enquiry, whether a committal should be made or not. *In the matter of the petition of KALI PROSUNNO BAGCHEE*

23 W. R. Cr. 39

3. *Power of High Court as Civil Court to interfere with order under s. 471.* Where a Civil Court directs an inquiry to be made by the Magistrate of the district under s. 471 of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect to the evidence given by the witnesses in a case before it, the High Court cannot as a Civil Court on appeal interfere. See *Queen v. Baijoo Lall*, I. L. R. 1 Calc. 450. *UMBICA SUNDURI CHOWDRAIN v. AJITULLA MONDUL* . . . 8 C. L. R. 148

4. *Act XXIII of 1861, s. 16—Order sending case to Magistrate for enquiring into offence of giving false evidence—Preliminary enquiry—Vagueness of charge.* Although s. 16 of Act XXIII of 1861 gives Civil Courts powers similar to those conferred on Civil and Criminal Courts alike by s. 471, of the Criminal Procedure Code, the whole law as to the procedure in cases within those sections is now embodied in s. 471 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In a suit brought to recover possession of certain property, the Judge decided one of the issues raised in the plaintiff's favour, but on the important issue as to whether the plaintiff ever had possession, he found for the defendant. The plaintiff was not examined, but on the issue as to possession he called two witnesses. The Judge disbelieved their statements, and, considering that the plaintiff had failed to prove his case, gave judgment for the defendant without requiring him to give evidence on that issue. In the concluding paragraph of his judgment, the Judge directed the depositions of the two witnesses above referred to, together with the English memoranda, of their evidence, to be sent to the Magistrate, with a view to his enquiring whether or not they had voluntarily given false evidence in a judicial proceeding; and he further directed the Magistrate to enquire whether or not the plaintiff had abetted the offence of giving false evidence, on the ground that, as the witnesses were the plaintiff's servants, he must personally have influenced them, and also to enquire whether the plaint which the plaintiff had attested contained

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 476—*contd.*

averments which he knew to be false. On a motion to quash this order: *Held*, that, under s. 471 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Judge had no power to send a case to a Magistrate except when, after having made such preliminary enquiry as may be necessary, he is of opinion that there is sufficient ground (*i.e.*, ground of a nature higher than mere surmise or suspicion) for directing judicial enquiry into the matter of a specific charge, and that the Judge is bound to indicate the particular statements or averments in respect of which he considers that there is ground for a charge into which the Magistrate ought to enquire, and that the order was bad because the Judge had made no preliminary enquiry, and because it was too vague and general in its character. *QUEEN v. BAIJOO LALL. In the matter of the petition of BAIJOO LALL*

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 450

5. *Power of and procedure of Court in making order under section—Order directing prosecution.* Before a Court is justified in making an order under s. 476, directing the prosecution of any person, it ought to have before it direct evidence, fixing the offence upon the person whom it is sought to charge, either in the course of the preliminary enquiry referred to in that section or in the earlier proceedings out of which the enquiry arises. It is not sufficient that the evidence in the earlier case may induce some sort of suspicion that the person had been guilty of an offence; but there must be distinct evidence of the commission of an offence by the person who is to be prosecuted. *Queen v. Baijoo Lall*, I. L. R. 1 Calc. 450, and *In the matter of the petition of Kali Prosunno Bagchee*, 23 W. R. Cr. 33, followed. *In the matter of the petition of KHEPU NATH SIKDAR v. GRISE CHUNDER MUKERJI* . . . I L. R. 16 Calc. 730

6. *Offence against public justice—Contempt of Court—Prosecution procedure.* That Court, civil or criminal, which is of opinion that there is sufficient ground for enquiring into a charge mentioned in ss. 467, 468, 469, Act X of 1872, may not, except as is provided in s. 472, try the accused person itself for the offence charged. *QUEEN v. KULTARAN SINGH*

I. L. R. 1 All. 129

ANONYMOUS . . . 7 Mad. Ap. 28

Nor can he try a person for the abetment of such an offence. ANONYMOUS . . . 7 Mad. Ap. 28

7. *The Court, civil or criminal, which is of opinion that there is sufficient ground for enquiring into a charge mentioned in ss. 467, 468, 469 of Act X of 1872, is not precluded by the provisions of s. 471 from trying the accused person itself for the offence charged.* *QUEEN v. JAGAT MAL* . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 166

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 476—*contd.*

8. ————— S. 471, Act X of 1872, does not deprive the Court, which possesses the power of trying an offence mentioned in ss. 467, 468 and 469, of the power of trying it when committed before itself. *QUEEN v. GUR BAKSH*

I. L. R. 1 All. 193

9. ————— *Institution of criminal prosecution pending appeal in Civil Court.* If, in the course of a proceeding, either civil or criminal, a Judge or Magistrate finds clear ground for believing that either the parties to the proceeding or their witnesses have committed perjury or any other offence against public justice, he is justified in directing criminal proceedings against such person under s. 471 of the Criminal Procedure Code without any further enquiry than that which he has already held in his own Court. As a matter of discretion and propriety, it is right for a Court, before committing a person on a charge of perjury upon his own uncontradicted statement, to await the hearing of the appeal, where an appeal is pending, in the case in which he is charged with such perjury. *In the matter of MUTTY LALL GHOSE.*

I. L. R. 6 Cal. 308

10. ————— *Power to commit for offences.* S. 471 deals with a more extended class of cases, viz., all those mentioned in ss. 467, 468, and 469, in which not merely a Civil Court, but any Court, Civil or Criminal, and whether possessing or not possessing the power to commit to the Court of Session, is of opinion that there is sufficient ground for holding an enquiry; and it enacts the procedure to be followed by the Court which may elect to adopt one of two courses, that is to say, it may either commit a case to the Court of Session, if and where it has the power to do so, or, if it has not that power or is not disposed to exercise it, it may send the case to a Magistrate having power to try or commit for trial the accused person for the offence charged. *EMPRESS v. POPAT NATHU*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 287

11. ————— *Offence under.* Where a Court thinks that there is sufficient ground for enquiring into a charge mentioned in s. 467, 468, or 469, of Act X of 1872, it should proceed under s. 471 of that Act. Attention of the Court of Session in this case directed to *Queen v. Baijoo Lall*, I. L. R. 1 Cal. 450. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. GOBARDHAN DAS.*

I. L. R. 3 All. 62

12. ————— *Preliminary enquiry.* An order made under s. 471 of Act X of 1872, sending a case for enquiry to a Magistrate is not necessarily bad because the Court did not make a preliminary enquiry before making such order. The law requires only such preliminary enquiry as "may be necessary." *Held*, therefore, where a Munsif, being of opinion that both the parties to a suit tried by him had given false evi-

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 476—*contd.*

dence therein on certain points, sent the case for enquiry to the Magistrate under s. 471 of Act X of 1872, with a proceeding embodying the facts of the case, and charging the parties respectively with giving false evidence on such points, and there was nothing to show that any enquiry that the Munsif could have made was necessary or would have put the Magistrate into a better position for dealing with the case than he was in, that the Munsif's proceedings were not bad because he did not hold a preliminary enquiry. *EMPRESS v. JUALA PROSAD.*

I. L. R. 5 All. 62.

13. ————— *Judicial proceeding—Records of case called for by District Magistrate in his executive capacity.* Though an order passed after records have been called for, for any of the purposes specified in s. 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, may be a "judicial proceeding" for the purposes of s. 476 (as to which the Court gave no ruling), where a District Magistrate called for such records, in his executive capacity to see whether an application for an inquiry into the conduct of a police constable should be granted, and passed an order thereon, sanctioning his prosecution: *Held*, that there was no judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 476, and that the order must be set aside. *SANGILIA PILLAI v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE OF TRICHINOPOLY (1901)*

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 659

14. ————— *Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 195, 476—Revocation of sanction—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 183.* The Nazir of a Subordinate Judge's Court reported against the petitioner for having resisted him in the execution of a decree, whereupon the Subordinate Judge granted sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner under s. 183, Indian Penal Code. On an application made to the District Judge for revocation of the sanction, he made an order revoking the sanction, and sent the case, under s. 476, to the District Magistrate for inquiry or trial. *Held*, that, in granting the sanction, the Subordinate Judge did not act judicially, and the District Judge, in revoking the sanction, was not holding a judicial proceeding, and the order under s. 476, Code of Criminal Procedure, was consequently bad. *JADU NATH MAHTA v. JAGADISH CHANDRA DEB (1902)* . 7 C. W. N. 423

15. ————— *Preliminary Inquiry—Sanction for prosecution—Insufficiently stamped document presented for registration—Document impounded and sent to Collector—Denial of execution—Inquiry by Deputy Collector—Collector, whether a Revenue Court—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 471—Stamp Act (11 of 1899), ss. 38, 40, 42.* The petitioner presented a *kabuliyat*, purporting to have been executed in his favour by one B, for registration. The Sub-Registrar thought the document was insufficiently stamped, impounded it, and sent it to the Collector for orders. The Col-

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 476—*contd.*

lector called on *B* to pay the deficient stamp duty and penalty. *B* submitted a petition denying execution, and the Collector ordered the Deputy Collector to inquire into the fact of the execution. The Deputy Collector reported that the petitioner had failed to prove the execution of the *kabuliyat* by *B*, and that it was not genuine. Upon that report, and after hearing the parties, the Collector made an order sanctioning the prosecution of the petitioner under s. 471 or some cognate section of the Penal Code. In his order the Collector stated that the inquiry by the Deputy Collector was held on his behalf as a Revenue Court under s. 476, Code of Criminal Procedure. *Held*, that the order for prosecution was made without jurisdiction, as neither the Collector nor the Deputy Collector acted as a Court, and the inquiry by the latter was not a judicial inquiry, having been held solely for the purpose of determining who should be called on to pay stamp duty. *KEDAR NATH GHOSH v. EMPEROR* (1903). **7 C. W. N. 795**

16. *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 193—Complaint—Procedure.* An Assistant Collector trying a rent suit came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had committed perjury, and accordingly submitted the record to the Collector of the District "for starting a case under s. 193 of the Penal Code." The "Collector" ordered "that a case under s. 193 of the Penal Code be initiated against Sunder Sarup and made it over for decision to Maulvi Abdul Rafi-ud-din, Magistrate of the first class." *Held*, that, although the order of the Assistant Collector could not be regarded as an order under s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it fell within the definition of a complaint, and the Collector, who was also the District Magistrate, had power as Magistrate to take action upon it and pass the order, which he had passed. *In the matter of the petition of Alamdar Hussain, I. L. R. 23 All. 249*, followed. *EMPEROR v. SUNDER SARUP* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 514

17. *Perjury committed before Munsif—Order for prosecution by his successor in office—Legality.* An order for prosecution passed by a Munsif, when the alleged offence of perjury was committed before his predecessor in office, does not fall within s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *In the matter of KRISHNA GOVINDA DUTT* (1905). **9 C. W. N. 859**

18. *"Judicial proceeding"—Local enquiry, not authorised by law—Ss. 100, 552—Custody of female child—Rival claim of husband and mother—Question for Civil Court—Proceeding before Deputy Magistrate—Order for prosecution for perjury by District Magistrate.* An application was made before the District Magistrate on behalf of a mother for the recovery of the custody of a female child from her grandfather *G*, who was thereupon called upon by a Deputy Magistrate to show

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 476—*contd.*

cause. *G* declared before the Deputy Magistrate that the child had been already married to *R*. The Deputy Magistrate examined *R* and *G*, and having satisfied himself that the marriage had actually taken place submitted the case for orders before the District Magistrate, who dismissed the application. The District Magistrate upon a subsequent application, in which the story of the marriage was challenged as false, held a local enquiry and came to the conclusion that *G* and *R* had given false evidence before the Deputy Magistrate and ordered their prosecution for perjury. *Held*, that the alleged offence of perjury had not been brought to the notice of the District Magistrate in a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the order for prosecution was made without jurisdiction. The local enquiry held by him was one which in the circumstances of the case he was not authorised by law to make. Questions as to legal guardianship should be determined by the Civil Court. *Eranholi Athan v. King-Emperor, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 98*, distinguished. *GODAT SHAH v. EMPEROR* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 1080

19. *Offence in the course of Resistance to delivery of possession—Jurisdiction—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 328.* Where in an execution case a warrant for the delivery of possession of lands was entrusted for execution to the Nazir, who went to the spot, but was obstructed by the opposite party to the suit, and on his reporting the matter, the Munsif held an enquiry under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code and sent the accused to the Magistrate for trial under s. 186 of the Penal Code: *Held*, that the "judicial proceeding" in the case determined when the Munsif finally decided the case, there being no further question left for determination as to the rights of the parties to the suit upon which evidence could have been legally taken, that the obstruction was not therefore brought to the notice of the Munsif in the course of a "judicial proceeding," and that he had no jurisdiction under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code to hold an enquiry. *HARA CHARAN MOOKERJEE v. EMPEROR* (1905)

**I. L. R. 32 Calc. 367
s.c. 9 C. W. N. 364**

20. *Power to direct proceedings conferred on Court and not on Magistrate trying—Dismissal of complaint without adjudication no bar to proceedings under.* The power to direct a prosecution under s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is conferred on the Court and not on the individual Magistrate, who tried the case. Such power is not ousted by the dismissal, without adjudication of a complaint by the party in respect of the same offence under a sanction previously given by the Court. *RUNGA AYYAR v. EMPEROR* (1905). **I. L. R. 29 Mad. 331**

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 476—*contd.*

21. ———— *Order for prosecution—Power of successor in office to make order—"Court."* The summary power conferred by s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) can be exercised by the Judge who tries the case in the course of the trial of which the alleged offence is committed, and such power is exercisable only at, or immediately after, the conclusion of the trial; an application for sanction under s. 195 of the Code can be made later on as an entirely different and independent proceeding. To give true effect to the whole of the language of s. 476 the expression "Court" can only mean the Judge who tries the case. *Krishna Gobinda Dutt, In the matter of, 9 C. W. N. 859*, is rightly decided. *Per GEIDT, J.*—The terms of s. 476 indicates that the desirability of prosecuting the offender must be present to the mind of the Court during the proceedings in the course of which the offence was committed or brought to its notice. It was never intended that when the proceedings had terminated, the attention of the Court should be subsequently drawn by some private person to the fact that in those proceedings there had been committed some offence in contempt of the Court's authority or against public justice which deserved punishment. But no universal rule can be laid down that in no case can the order for a prosecution be made by an officer other than that before whom the offence was committed. *Emperor v. Molla Fazla Karim, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 193*, and *Dharamdas Kamar v. Sagore Santra, 11 C. W. N. 119*, referred to. *BEGU SINGH v. EMPEROR (1907) I. L. R. 34 Calc. 551*

22. ———— *Order under section must be made during or immediately after the conclusion of the proceedings.* On a reference to the Full Bench whether a Magistrate has jurisdiction to take action *suo motu* under s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure more than two months after the termination of the proceedings before such Magistrate. *Held (MILLER, J., dissenting)*, that it was the intention of the Legislature in enacting s. 476 that an order under the section should be made either at the close of the proceedings or so shortly thereafter that it may reasonably be said that the order is part of the proceeding. *Bequ Singh v. Emperor, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 551*, referred to and followed. *In re Subbaraya Vathiar, 15 Mad. L. J. 489*, referred to and followed. The earlier enactments and corresponding English Acts on the subject considered and discussed. *RAHIMADULLA SAHIB v. EMPEROR (1937) I. L. R. 31 Mad. 140*

23. ———— *Action under, must be taken at or immediately after the conclusion of the judicial proceedings.* On the question whether a Court has jurisdiction to take action under s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at any time after the conclusion of

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1893 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 476—*contd.*

the judicial proceeding in the course of which the offence is committed:—*Held*, by the Full Bench (*MILLER, J.*, dissenting), that the power conferred by s. 476 can be exercised by the Court only in the course of the judicial proceeding or at its conclusion or so shortly thereafter as to make it really the continuation of the same proceeding in the course of which the offence is committed. *Rahimadulla Sahib v. Emperor, I. L. R. 31 Mad. 140*, followed. *In re Lakshmidas Lalji, I. L. R. 32 Bom. 184*, not followed. *Per ARNOLD WHITE, C. J.*—S. 476 is a self-contained section. Sub-s. (1) gives the Court power to put the law in motion and sub-s. (2) provides the procedure to be followed when the law has been put in motion. *Per MILLER, J.*—There is nothing to make s. 476 inapplicable to any case to which the language of the section applies. The procedure provided by the section is not incompatible with the commencement of action by the Court after the close of the proceeding in the course of which an offence is committed or disclosed. *Per SANKARAN-NAIR, J.*—A Court may grant sanction at any time and to any person whom it considers fit to carry on the prosecution and who is entitled to proceed under s. 190, Criminal Procedure Code. The order under s. 476 is a judicial proceeding and not a complaint under s. 195. *Per PINHEY, J.*—Ss. 195 and 476 must be read together and s. 476 prescribes the procedure to be adopted by the Courts when making a complaint, it was however the intention of the Legislature to restrict their power in this direction and only to suffer it when promptly exercised. The decision in the case of *Rahimadulla Sahib, I. L. R. 31 Mad. 140*, does not decide that the final order under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code must issue at once. The Court must commence to take action under the section promptly, in which case it may be considered as a continuation of the proceedings; and although the final order may be delayed for some time by necessary enquiries, the order will not be bad for want of jurisdiction. *AYYAKANNU PILLAI v. EMPEROR (1908)*

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 49

24. ———— *Jurisdiction of High Court—Civil jurisdiction—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622—Charter Act (24 and 25 Vict., c. 104), s. 15—Nature of High Court's revisional jurisdiction—Criminal proceedings, stay of, pending civil appeal—Stay not justifiable, when it would defeat ends of justice.* Where the District Judge has initiated proceedings under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code: *Held, first*, that it is doubtful, if the High Court exercising civil jurisdiction has power to stay the criminal proceedings. *Held, secondly*, that the provisions of s. 15 of the Charter Act of 1861 do not appear to give the High Court power to interfere in the case; *Raj Kumar Debi v. Bama Sundari Debi, I. L. R. 23 Calc., 610*

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 476—*contd.*

followed. *Held, thirdly*, that the High Court must have regard to the nature of the revisional jurisdiction and must not allow what would virtually be an appeal from the order; *In re Alamdar Husain*, I. L. R. 23 All. 249, followed in principle. *Held, lastly*, that when on the evidence in a case, the Court below is of opinion that it is the highest degree desirable that the enquiry should be conducted both in the interests of justice as well as of the accused and of all parties concerned as speedily as possible, the High Court would not be justified in staying proceedings, merely because a civil appeal from the judgment, out of which the criminal proceedings were initiated, is pending in the High Court. *In re Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, I. L. R. 26 Bom. 785, followed. *HEM CHANDRA RAY v. ATAL BEHARI RAY* (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 909

— ss. 476 and 4 (m).

See COMPLAINT . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 72

— ss. 476, 195—*Complaint—Assault—Public servant, resistance to authority of—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 195, 476—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 183, 352.* A Munsiff of Pabna held an inquiry under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and having come to the conclusion that the accused had committed various offences under the Penal Code in connection with certain execution proceedings in his Court sent the case for trial to the District Magistrate, who in turn transferred the case to a Deputy Magistrate for disposal. The accused were tried under ss. 183 and 352 of the Penal Code. The Deputy Magistrate without considering the case on its merits, acquitted the accused on the ground that there was no sanction as required by law for the prosecution of the accused. On appeal by the local Government against the acquittal: *Held*, with regard to the charge under s. 183 of the Penal Code, that, as the Munsiff had acted under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it was incumbent on the Deputy Magistrate under cl. (2) of that section to proceed with the case according to law. *Held*, also, that the charge under s. 352 of the Penal Code required no sanction. *Ishri Prasad v. Sham Lal*, I. L. R. 7 All. 871, referred to. *EMPEROR v. ARJAN PRAMANIK* (1904) I. L. R. 31 Calc. 684 s.c. 8 C. W. N. 586

— ss. 476, 435, 439—*Power of High Court to interfere in proceeding under s. 476—Madras Act III of 1869, scope of—Judicial Proceedings—Pleader, propriety of imputations made by.* The High Court has power to revise proceedings under s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when such proceedings are null and void for want of jurisdiction. *Erankoli Athan v. King-Emperor*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 98, referred to and distinguished. Madras Act III of 1869 does not

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 476—*concl.*

authorise the issuing of summons in a departmental inquiry for bribery. The pendency of an appeal by the accused, who had paid the fine imposed on him, would not give any Court authority or power to arrest him or to take recognizances from him for appearing at any further enquiry. The presenting of a petition imputing improper motives to a Magistrate, who is illegally detaining a person to take recognizances from him to enforce his attendance for the foregoing purpose will not justify any action by such Magistrate under s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the offence is not committed in the course of a *judicial proceeding*, nor is it brought to his notice in the course of such proceeding. *SURYA-NARAYANA ROW v. EMPEROR* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 100

— s. 477 (1872, s. 472; 1861-69, s. 172).

See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 434

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PENAL CODE,

s. 175 . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 24

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 68

See DISTRICT JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 6 All. 103

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.

5 C. W. N. 615, 630

See FALSE EVIDENCE—CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS . 4 B. I. R. A. Cr. 9

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

3 B. I. R. A. Cr. 85

I. L. R. 2 All. 398

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 570

— *Power of commitment by Sessions Judge—False evidence.* Under s. 472, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, before a Sessions Judge can commit a person to the Court of Session, it is necessary that the offence should have been committed before the Sessions Court, and that it be one within the cognizance of, and triable exclusively by, that Court. The offence of intentionally giving false evidence (s. 193, Penal Code) not being triable exclusively by the Sessions Court is not one in which the Sessions Judge can convict. *QUEEN v. BUNDHOO BANERJEE* . 21 W. R. Cr. 37

— s. 478 (1872, s. 474).

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 581

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—DISCRETION IN GRANTING SANCTION.

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 224

I. — *Power of Civil Court to commit to Court of Session.* The power of a Civil Court to commit a case to the Court of Session, after completing the preliminary enquiry,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

— s. 478—*concl'd.*

is given by s. 474 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is restricted to the class of cases provided for in that section, *viz.*, where offences, exclusively triable by a Court of Session, are committed before the Civil Court. *EMPRESS v. POPAT NATHU*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 287

2. ————— *Power of Civil Court to order commitment.* A Civil Court has no power to order the commitment of persons for offences under ss. 471, 465, and 193 of the Penal Code without holding the preliminary enquiry required by s. 474 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *QUEEN v. RUNGATOONEE*

22 W. R. Cr. 52

3. ————— *Sanction for prosecution, effect of—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 195—Civil Court's power to proceed under s. 478 after sanction given to a private person—Dismissal of a complaint by a private person, effect of.* The granting of a sanction to a private person under cl. (c) of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882) does not debar a Civil Court from proceeding under s. 478; nor can the dismissal by a Magistrate of a complaint made by a private person be held to be a bar, till set aside, to a proceeding under that section. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SHANKAR*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 384

4. ————— *Forged documents filed in Court—Order of commitment for trial—"Any such offence" in s. 478, meaning of—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 195.* Certain documents were filed annexed to a petition in a suit pending before a Munsif, but were not given in evidence. The Munsif, on suspicion that they had been tampered with, held an enquiry and committed the petitioners for trial by the Court of Session. *Held*, that it was a proper commitment under s. 478 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The words "any such offence" in that section mean an offence referred to in s. 195 of the Code, and not an offence referred to in that section qualified by the circumstances under which it is committed. *AKHIL CHANDRA DE v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 1004

s. 480.

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PENAL CODE.
s. 175 . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 24
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 63

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PROCEDURE.
I. L. R. 11 All. 361

See WITNESS—CIVIL CASES—DEFAULTING WITNESSES . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 63

ss. 480, 481 (1872, s. 435; 1861,

s. 21).

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PENAL CODE,
s. 228 . . . 10 Bom. 69

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PROCEDURE.
1 N. W. 162; Ed. 1873, 241
I. L. R. 11 All. 361

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*cont'd.*

ss. 480, 481, 482 (1872, ss. 435, 436; 1861-69, s. 163).

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—CONTEMPTS GENERALLY . . . 6 Mad. Ap. 14

See MUNSIF, JURISDICTION OF.
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 131

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.
6 Mad. Ap. 16

— Sub-Registrar—Offence during judicial proceeding—Penal Code, s. 228. A was charged before an Assistant Magistrate by a Sub-Registrar with having committed an offence under s. 228 of the Penal Code, and fined. *Held*, that the Sub-Registrar should have tried the matter himself under ss. 435 and 436 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and as the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction, the order must be quashed. *In the matter of the petition of SARDHARI LAL*

13 B. L. R. Ap. 40; 22 W. R. Cr. 10

s. 485.

See COMPLAINANT.
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 600

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PENAL CODE,
s. 175 . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 24
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 63

See PENAL CODE, s. 179.
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 600

s. 487, para. 1 (1872, s. 473).

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PENAL CODE,
s. 175 . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 24
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 63

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 380
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 262

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 766
7 C. W. N. 708

1. ————— *Giving false evidence in judicial proceeding—Power of Magistrate—Offence in contempt of Court—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 435.* The offence of intentionally giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding cannot be tried by the Magistrate before whom the false evidence is given; this offence, being an attempt to pervert the proceedings of the Court to an improper end, is a contempt of its authority (ss. 435, 436, 471, 472, and 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). *REG. v. NAVRANBEG DULABAG*

10 Bom. 73

(*Contra*) *QUEEN v. RAMLOCHUN SINGH*
18 W. R. Cr. 15

2. ————— *Judicial proceeding—Sanction to prosecute—Criminal appeal, Hearing of, by District Judge who has granted sanction to*

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 487—contd.

prosecute—Penal Code, s. 210. A complainant applied to a Munsif for sanction to prosecute a decree-holder for an offence under s. 210 of the Penal Code, and upon the Munsif's refusing such application preferred an appeal to the District Judge, who granted the sanction asked for. The decree-holder having been prosecuted and convicted before a Deputy Magistrate, preferred an appeal which came on for hearing before and was disposed of by the same District Judge who had granted the sanction. *Held*, that the words "shall try any person," as used in s. 487 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, include the hearing of an appeal, and that the hearing of the appeal from the order of the Munsif refusing sanction was a judicial proceeding within the meaning of the Code, and consequently that, under the provisions of s. 487, the District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against the judgment and sentence passed by the Deputy Magistrate. *In the matter of MADHUB CHUNDER MOZUMDAR v. NOVODEEP CHUNDER PUNDIT*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 121

Overruled by *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SARAT CHANDRA RAKHIT* . . . **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 766**

3. *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 193—False evidence, sanction for prosecution for—Jurisdiction of Sessions Judge—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 195.* A Sessions Judge who has directed the trial of a person for the offence of giving false evidence committed in the course of a judicial proceeding of a criminal nature before him cannot try the case himself. *Empress v. Ganga Din, All. W. N. (1884) 329*, distinguished. *QUEEN EMPRESS v. MAKHUM* . . . **I. L. R. 14 All. 354**

4. *Judicial proceeding—Magistrate, jurisdiction of—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 4 and 195.* A Magistrate, who has refused to set aside an order sanctioning a prosecution on the charge of perjury, has no jurisdiction under Criminal Procedure Code, s. 487, to try the case himself. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SESHADRI AYYANGAR* . . . **I. L. R. 20 Mad. 383**

5. *Disobedience of order under s. 518, Criminal Procedure Code—Penal Code, s. 188.* A second class Magistrate, who issues an order under s. 518 of the Criminal Procedure Code, has no jurisdiction to punish for its disobedience by reason of s. 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *REG. v. RANCHHOD DIAL*

10 Bom. 424

6. *Offence committed in contempt of Court—Sessions case—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 4—Sessions Judge and Assistant Sessions Judge.* To make a case a "Sessions case" within the meaning of s. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is not necessary that it should be triable exclusively by the Court of Session. For the purposes of s. 473 of the Code, an Assistant Sessions Judge is a different Court from the Sessions

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 487—contd.

Judge. Accordingly, an offence, which is committed in contempt of the Sessions Judge's authority, is cognizable by an Assistant Sessions Judge. *REG. v. GULABDAS KUBERDAS* . . . **11 Bom. 98**

REG. v. RAMAJIRAV JIVBAJIRAV . . . **12 Bom. 1**

7. *Information, by accused of offence—Report by a police of falsity of information—Sanction by District Magistrate on police report—Jurisdiction of Magistrate to try the case—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 182.* The accused gave certain information to the police, who, after investigating the matter, reported that the information given was false, and constituted an offence under s. 182 of the Penal Code. The District Magistrate on this sanctioned the prosecution of the accused, who was convicted and sentenced under that section. The accused appealed against the conviction and sentence. His appeal was heard and dismissed by the District Magistrate, who had previously sanctioned his prosecution. On revision the accused contended that the District Magistrate having sanctioned his prosecution on the police report, was not competent to hear the appeal. *Held*, that s. 487 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not apply, as the offence was not committed before the District Magistrate, nor was it in contempt of his authority nor brought to his notice in the course of a judicial proceeding. *RAMASORY LALL v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . **I. L. R. 27 Calc. 452**
4 C. W. N. 594

8. *and s. 471—Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Giving false evidence.* A witness charged with having given false evidence in a criminal proceeding before a Magistrate of the first class was tried and convicted of that charge by that Magistrate, and the conviction was confirmed on appeal by the Sessions Judge. *Held*, that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate was not barred by the operation of s. 473, Act X of 1872, the giving of false evidence in the presence of a Court not being an offence committed in contempt of the authority of the Court within the meaning of that section. The Magistrate's jurisdiction in such a case was, however, held barred by s. 471 of the Code, the Magistrate being bound under that section either to commit or send the case for enquiry to another Magistrate. *In the matter of the petition of SUFATULLAH* . . . **22 W. R. Cr. 49**

9. *"Court"—Construction.* The prohibition in s. 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872) is a personal prohibition. *ANONYMOUS CASE*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 305

10. *Offence against public justice—Contempt of Court.* An offence against public justice is not an offence in contempt of Court within the meaning of s. 473, Act X of 1872. *QUEEN v. KALTARAN SINGH*

I. L. R. 1 All. 129

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*cont'd.*

s. 487—*cont'd.*

QUEEN v. JAGATMAL. . . I. L. R. 1 All. 162

11. ———— *Offence under Penal Code, s. 185 Illegal bid for property offered for sale by public servant.* The public servant concerned in an offence described in s. 185 of the Penal Code is not competent himself to try the person committing such offence. QUEEN v. JAGANATH . . . 7 N. W. 133

12. ———— *Giving false evidence.* Giving false evidence is "an offence committed in contempt of the authority" of a Court within the meaning of s. 473 of Act X of 1872. *Reg. v. Navranbeg Dulabeg*, 10 Bom. 73, and *Anonymous case*, 7 Mad. Ap. 17, followed. *Queen v. Kallaran Singh*, I. L. R. 1 All. 129, and *Queen v. Jagatmal*, I. L. R. 1 All. 162, dissented from. Where the accused was, by a Magistrate, first class, committed for trial by the Sessions Court on a charge of having given false evidence in a judicial proceeding before the Sessions Judge, there being no Assistant Sessions Judge or Joint Sessions Judge:—*Held*, that the commitment could not be quashed, there being no error in law, and the case must, therefore, be transferred for trial to another Court of Session. In such a case as the above, the better course would be for the Magistrate to try the case himself, and, if he is incompetent to pass a sufficient sentence, for the Sessions Judge to refer the case to the High Court for enhancement of sentence. *REG. v. GAJI KOM RANU* . . . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 311

13. ———— *Nuisance, injunction to discontinue.* S. 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which, except as therein provided, forbids a Court to try any person for an offence committed in contempt of its own authority, is not limited to offences falling under Ch. X of the Penal Code, but extends to all contempts of Court. *REG. v. PARSAPA MAHADEVAPA* I. L. R. 1 Bom. 339

14. ———— *Offence against public justice—Contempt of Court—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 471—Penal Code, s. 193.* *Held* (STUART, C.J., dissenting), that an offence under s. 193 of the Penal Code, being an offence in contempt of Court within the meaning of s. 473 of Act X of 1872, cannot under that section be tried by the Magistrate before whom such offence is committed. *Queen v. Kallaran Singh*, I. L. R. 1 All. 129, and *Queen v. Jagatmal* I. L. R. 1 All. 162, overruled. *Per* STUART, C.J.—A Magistrate before whom such an offence is committed, if competent to try it himself, is not precluded from so doing by the provisions of s. 471 of Act X of 1872. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. KASHMIRI LAL* . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 625

15. ———— *Penal Code, s. 174—Contempt of Court.* Where a settlement officer, who was also a Magistrate, summoned

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*cont'd.*

s. 487—*concl'd.*

as a settlement officer a person to attend his Court, and such person neglected to attend, and such officer as a Magistrate charged him with an offence under s. 174 of the Penal Code, and tried and convicted him on his own charge:—*Held*, that such conviction was, with reference to ss. 471 and 473 of Act X of 1872, illegal. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. SUKHARI*

I. L. R. 2 All. 405

16. ———— *False charge—Contempt—Prosecution—Charge—Act X of 1872 (Criminal Procedure Code), ss. 468, 473.* B charged certain persons before a police officer with theft. Such charge was brought by the police to the notice of the Magistrate having jurisdiction, who directed the police to investigate into the truth of such charge. Having ascertained that such charge was false, such Magistrate took proceedings against B on a charge of making a false charge of an offence, an offence punishable under s. 211 of the Penal Code, and convicted him of that offence. *Held*, that as such false charge was not preferred by B before such Magistrate, the offence of making it was not contempt of such Magistrate's authority, and the provisions of ss. 468 and 473 of Act X of 1872 were inapplicable, and such Magistrate was not precluded from trying B himself, nor was his sanction or that of some superior Court necessary for B's trial by another officer. *Empress v. Kashmiri Lal*, I. L. R. 1 All. 625, distinguished. *EMPRESS v. BALDEO* I. L. R. 3 All. 322

17. ———— *Sanction to prosecute granted by District Judge—Power of same person as Sessions Judge to try the offence.* A District Judge who has, on hearing a civil appeal, sanctioned the prosecution of a party for forgery is not debarred by s. 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872) from trying the offence in his capacity of a Sessions Judge. *EMPRESS v. D'SILVA*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 479

18. ———— *Perjury—Contradictory statements—Power of trial by Sessions Court before which one of such statements was made.* A prisoner who had made certain contradictory statements on oath before a Magistrate and a Court of Session, respectively, was convicted by the same Court of Session on a charge, in the alternative, of giving false evidence either before a Magistrate or before the Court of Session. *Held*, that the Court was precluded by s. 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code from trying the charge. *SUNDRIAH v. QUEEN* I. L. R. 3 Mad. 254

s. 488 (1872, s. 536; 1861-69, s. 316).

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

7 W. R. Cr. 10 : 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 88

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 488—contd.

See HINDU LAW—MAINTENANCE.

13 C. W. N. 150

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS:

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 400

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 40

See MAINTENANCE, ORDER OF CRIMINAL
COURT AS TO . I. L. R. 25 All. 545

See MAINTENANCE, SUIT FOR.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 479

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—MAINTENANCE.

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 736

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 70

See WITNESS—CIVIL CASES—PERSON
COMPETENT TO BE WITNESS.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 781

I. L. R. 18 All. 107

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—PERSONS
COMPETENT, OR NOT, TO BE WITNESSES

I. L. R. 18 All. 107

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 781

1. ———— "*Cruelty*." The word "*cruelty*" in s. 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not necessarily limited to personal violence. *Kelly v. Kelly*, L. R. 2 P. D. 56, and *Tomkins v. Tomkins*, 1 S. & T. 168, referred to. *RUKMIN v. PEARE LAL* . I. L. R. 11 All. 480

2. ———— Maintenance—"Living in adultery." Held, that the fact that a woman, who applied for an order for maintenance against her husband had given birth to an illegitimate child some two years before the date of her application, was not a reason for refusing to make an order for maintenance, it being found that since that time she had been living with her parents and leading a chaste and respectable life. *Empress v. Nandan*, All. Weekly Notes (1881) 37; *Pebition of Kashi Sheodiala*, All. Weekly Notes (1881) 62, and *Empress v. Daulat*, All. Weekly Notes (1881) 113, referred to. *KALLU v. KAUNSLIA* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 326

3. ———— Maintenance—*Effect of Civil Court decree in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights upon an order for maintenance passed by a Magistrate.* A husband, against whom an order had been passed by a Magistrate under s. 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing him to pay a monthly allowance of R4-8 for the maintenance of his wife, brought a suit against his wife for restitution of conjugal rights. The suit was compromised and a consent decree passed whereby the petitioner was to pay the respondent R4-4 per mensem and

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 488—concld.

to provide a house for her to live in near his own. Held, that this decree of the Civil Court superseded the order of the Magistrate passed under s. 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *In re Bulakidas*, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 484, followed. *NUR MUHAMMAD v. AYESHA BIBI* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 483

4. ———— Magistrate has a discretionary power in granting maintenance—*Refusal to grant when woman guilty of adultery with one of lower caste not a wrong exercise of such discretion.* Under s. 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate has a discretionary power to award maintenance, and such discretion is not wrongly exercised, when a Magistrate refuses maintenance to a woman, who for adultery with one of a lower caste, is expelled from caste and has thus made it impossible for her husband to live with her. *PONNAYEE v. PERIYA MOOPPAN* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 185

s. 488, cl. (4).

See ADULTERY, LIVING IN.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 332

ss. 488 and 489—*Maintenance of child—Power to cancel an order for maintenance.* Held, that where an order has once been passed by a competent Court under s. 488 for the payment of maintenance for a child, the only power that exists of modifying such an order is that given by s. 499 of the Code. *BUDDHA v. DABAL* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 11

s. 491.

See CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 307

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 290

See FOREIGNERS. I. L. R. 18 Bom. 636

See HABEAS CORPUS, WRIT OF.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 26:

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, CL. 15

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 555

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CRIMINAL
CASES . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 636

s. 493 (1872, s. 60).

See COUNSEL . . . 11 Bom. 102

s. 494.

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 35

See PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.

I. L. R. 8 All. 291

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—PERSONS
COMPETENT OR NOT TO BE WITNESSES.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 422

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 495 (1872, s. 59).

See BOMBAY DISTRICT POLICE ACT, 1867.
s. 23 . . . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 534

See COUNSEL . . . 11 Bom. 102
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 59; 6 C. L. R. 374

See GAMBLING—BOM. ACT IV OF 1887.
I. L. R. 26 Bom. 533

s. 496 (1872, ss. 194, 204, para-
1; 1861-69, s. 224).

See BAIL . . . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 63, 69

See RECOGNIZANCE TO APPEAR.
6 N. W. 366

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CRIMINAL
CASES . . . 5 Bom. Cr. 31

*Bail, right of person
arrested to—Magistrate's power to detain in custody
till completion of enquiry—Re-arresting person ad-
mitted to bail, if legal. The law does not empower
a Magistrate to detain in custody, until the com-
pletion of the inquiry, a person against whom
proceedings are pending under s. 107 or s. 110. S.
496 of the Code is imperative and the Magistrate is
bound to release such person on bail or recogniz-
ance. Quare: Whether the proviso to s. 114 gives
a Magistrate power to re-arrest a person, who has
already appeared and has been admitted to bail.
RAGHUNANDAN PERSHAD v. EMPEROR (1904)*

8 C. W. N. 779

s. 497 (1872, s. 389; 1861-69,
s. 212).

See BAIL.

1 B. L. R. S. N. 23; 10 W. R. Cr. 34

See JUDICIAL OFFICERS, LIABILITY OF.
3 Bom. A. C. 36

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 549

s. 493 (1872, s. 390; 1861-69, s.
433).

See BAIL . . . 1 B. L. R. A. Cr. 7
23 W. R. Cr. 40
24 W. R. Cr. 8
3 C. L. R. 404, 405 note
I. L. R. 1 All. 151

s. 503 (1872, s. 330).

See COMMISSION—CRIMINAL CASES.
I. L. R. 15 Calc. 775

ss. 503 to 507 (Act X of 1875,
s. 76).

See COMMISSION—CRIMINAL CASES.
I. L. R. 24 Cal. 151

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 509 (1872, s. 323).

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—DE-
POSITIONS . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 720
I. L. R. 10 All. 174
I. L. R. 18 Calc. 129

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—MEDI-
CAL EVIDENCE . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 739

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EX-
AMINATION OF WITNESSES—GENERALLY.
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 455

s. 510 (1872, s. 325; 1861-69,
s. 370).

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—CHE-
MICAL EXAMINER 6 B. L. R. Ap. 122
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1026

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—MEDI-
CAL EVIDENCE . . . 12 W. R. Cr. 2

s. 511.

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—PRE-
VIOUS CONVICTIONS.
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 689

s. 512 (1872, s. 327).

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—DEPO-
SITIONS . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1097
I. L. R. 8 All. 672

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EX-
AMINATION OF WITNESSES—GENERALLY.
21 W. R. Cr. 12, 61
22 W. R. Cr. 33
12 C. L. R. 120

s. 513—(Fitness of surety).

See SURETY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.
13 C. W. N. 80

s. 514 (1872, s. 502).

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIM-
INAL PROCEDURE CODE.
I. L. R. 2 Mad. 169

See BAIL-BOND, FORFEITURE OF.
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 749

See RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP THE PEACE—
FORFEITURE OF RECOGNIZANCES
11 Bom. 170
10 C. L. R. 571
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 865

s. 514, paras. 1 to 4 (1872, ss.
396, 397; 1861-69, s. 219).

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PENAL CODE,
s. 174 . . . 1 B. L. R. A. Cr. 1

See RECOGNIZANCE TO APPEAR.
22 W. R. Cr. 74
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 77
4 Mad. Ap. 44
2 C. W. N. 519
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 107

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 514—*contd.*

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

I. L. R. 21 All. 86

—Security to keep the peace—*Forfeiture of recognizance—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 107, sch. V, No. 10. Held*, that the mere fact that no immediate action under s. 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is taken against a person under recognizances to keep the peace or against his surety, on the conviction of the former of an offence involving a breach of the peace, is no bar to the taking of such proceedings at a subsequent time, as, for example, after the time for appealing has expired, or after an appeal by the principal has been dismissed. *In re Ram Chunder Lalla*, 1 C. L. R. 134, and *In re Purbutti Churn Bose*, 3 C. L. R. 406, dissented from. *EMPEROR v. RAJA RAM* (1904) I. L. R. 26 All. 202

ss. 514 to 516 (1872, s. 398; 1861-69, s. 221).

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—MADRAS ABKARI ACT. I. L. R. 18 Mad. 48

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUMMONING WITNESSES. 2 N. W. 113

s. 514, Sch. V, Form XI

See SURETY BOND.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 562

s. 517 (1872, s. 418; Act X of 1875, s. 115), ss. 518 to 520 (1872, s. 419), ss. 521, 523 (1872, ss. 415, 416; 1861-69, s. 131), s. 524 (1872, s. 417; 1861-69, s. 132) and s. 525.

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 690
I. L. R. 9 Mad. 448

See OBSCENE PUBLICATION.

I. L. R. 3 All. 837

See STOLEN PROPERTY—DISPOSAL OF, BY THE COURT. I. L. R. 25 Bom. 702

1. —Disposal of property—Order to as disposal of property as to which no offence has been committed—Property found by police in possession of accused—Magistrate, power of. The accused was convicted of criminal breach of trust in respect of certain money belonging to the complainant, and, on his conviction, the Magistrate made an order, under s. 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directing that an amount equal to the moneys embezzled should be repaid to the complainant out of certain sums of money found by the police on the person of the accused. *Held*, that the Magistrate had no power to make the order under s. 517 of the Criminal Procedure Code, there being nothing to show that any offence had been committed with regard to the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 517—*contd.*

property, or that it had been used for the commission of any offence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. FATA CHAND*. I. L. R. 24 Calc. 499

FATEH CHAND v. DURGA PRASAD

1 C. W. N. 435

2. —Proper order to make in respect of property in regard to which no offence is proved—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 523. Where, at the trial of a case, the accused is acquitted and some property, the subject-matter of the charge, was found by the police during investigation to be in the possession of persons accused of the offence, and was brought before the Court: *Held*, that the proper order to make in this case is an order under s. 517, Criminal Procedure Code. *Held*, also, that the money in this case having come from the possession of the petitioners and no offence having been found at the trial to have been committed in respect of it, it should be returned to the party or parties from whose possession it came. *In the matter of the petition of MATI GHOSE* 1 C. W. N. 561

3. —Disposal of property by Magistrate. Under the provisions of s. 517 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) the Magistrate has power to pass an order regarding the property produced before or in custody of the Court, even though no offence has been committed in respect of it. *Surendra Nath Sarma v. Rai Mohan Das*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 690, referred to. *RUSSEL BIBE v. AHMED MOOSAJEE* (1906) I. L. R. 34 Calc. 347

4. —Confiscation—Order of confiscation of boats under—Whether legal. A boat cannot be regarded as an instrument for the commission of an offence such as is contemplated in s. 517 of the Criminal Procedure Code. An order confiscating two boats alleged to have been used by persons who had gone to commit a theft, was set aside. *JARIF GAZI v. EMPEROR* (1904). 8 C. W. N. 887

5. —False charge of theft—Objects found in complainant's premises—Conviction under s. 182, Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)—Confiscation—Legality. Accused was convicted under s. 182 of the Penal Code for having given false information charging one B with the theft of some ornaments. The ornaments had been found upon search in the accused's own premises. Whilst convicting the accused the Magistrate passed an order confiscating the ornaments. *Held*, that such an order could not be made under s. 517 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The object of the section is to enable the Magistrate to direct property to be given to some person to whom it appears to belong or to allow it to continue in the possession of the person, in whose possession it was found or to make some order of that character. *LAKSHMI NARAYAN DUTTA v. INSPECTOR UREAGAN* (1905) 9 C. W. N. 597

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.

— s. 517—concl'd.

6. ——— *Property used for commission of offence—Confiscation—Printing press.* The first part of s. 517 of the Criminal Procedure Code refers to cases of offences relating to property or documents, *e.g.*, where the Court directs, as in cases of theft or criminal misappropriation or offences of similar description, that the property stolen or misappropriated be restored to its owner. The words "which has been used for the commission of any offence" refer to cases of the same nature, *i.e.*, to instruments like guns or swords produced in Court. A printing press cannot be said to have been used for the commission of sedition, inasmuch as the offence consists in the publication, and not the printing, the press being only a remote instrument. *ABINASH CHANDRA BHATTACHARJEE v. EMPEROR* (1907) **I. L. R. 34 Calc. 986**

1. ——— ss. 517, 520—*Criminal misappropriation—Acquittal—Delivery of possession.* Where, on a charge of criminal misappropriation of an elephant, the accused denied the ownership of the complainant, claimed the animal, and were acquitted: *Held*, that the elephant, although found to belong to the complainant, should be delivered to such one of the accused persons in whose possession it was found at the time the criminal proceedings were instituted. *Surendra Nath Surma v. Rai Mohan Dass*, 7 C. W. N. 634, doubted and distinguished. *BALORAM GOGAI v. CHINTARAM KOLTA* (1905) **9 C. W. N. 549**

2. ——— *Order for the disposal of property regarding which an offence has been committed—Half currency notes.* When a question arises between two persons, who shall bear a loss resulting from the fraud of a third, the one who has been guilty of negligence shall suffer. Hence, where A made over to B halves of certain currency notes as security for payment to B of the price of goods delivered, having previously parted with the other halves to C: *Held*, that B was entitled to recover possession of the halves originally made over to him, from C, to whom they had been delivered under an order of the Court or to obtain compensation from C, if C had parted with them, inasmuch as it was C's negligence, which enabled A to perpetrate a fraud upon B. *Foster v. Green*, 7 H. & N. 881, followed. *ABDUR RAZZAQ v. RAHMATULLAH* (1905) **I. L. R. 27 All. 630**

— ss. 517, 523—*Sections not applicable, where there was no trial and no evidence recorded.* When a person charged before the Magistrate with criminal breach of trust in respect of certain jewels died before trial and before any evidence was recorded and the alleged owner of the jewels, which were recovered by the Police from the pledgees and sent to the Magistrate along with the charge sheet, applied to be put in possession of them under ss. 517 and 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after enquiry as to their ownership.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.

— ss. 517, 523—concl'd.

Held, that s. 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not apply to the case. *Held*, further, that as there was no evidence or finding about ownership, s. 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not apply and that the Magistrate was not bound to hold an inquiry simply to determine the ownership of the jewels. *In the matter of KUPPAMMAL* (1906) **I. L. R. 29 Mad. 375**

— ss. 520 (1872, s. 419)—*Government currency note, theft of—Court of appeal.* A Government currency note was stolen from A and cashed by B in good faith for C. On the conviction of C for theft, the Magistrate ordered the note to be given to B. A appealed to the Sessions Judge, who was of opinion that he was not competent to interfere as a Court of appeal under s. 419 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but submitted the case for the orders of the High Court. *Held*, that the case could be disposed of by the Judge under s. 419 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and that the words "Court of appeal" in that section are not necessarily limited to a Court before which an appeal is pending. *EMPRESS v. JOGCESSUR MOCHI* **I. L. R. 3 Calc. 379**

S.C. *In the matter of MICHELL* . 1 C. L. R. 339

— s. 522 (1872, s. 534).

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 630

2 C. W. N. 225

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 724

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—DISPOSSESSION BY CRIMINAL FORCE.

1. ——— "Criminal force," *meaning of—Order for restoration of immoveable property.* The term "criminal force," as used in s. 522 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, must be understood as defined in s. 350 of the Penal Code; and, to justify an order for the restoration of possession of immoveable property under s. 522, Criminal Procedure Code, the dispossession must have been by the actual use of criminal force, and not merely by the show of such force. *Ram Chandra Borai v. Jityandria*, 2 C. W. N. 305, and *Ishan Chandra Kolla v. Dina Nath Bhadak*, 4 C. W. N. 397, followed. *SRIHARI SHOME v. LAL KHAN* (1900) **5 C. W. N. 250**

2. ——— *Right of way, interference with—Order to remove obstruction, legality of—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 114, 241.* *Held*, by the Full Bench (AMBER ALI, J., and BRETT, J., dissenting) that a Magistrate, while convicting an accused under ss. 311 of the Penal Code for wrongfully restraining a person by the erection of a hut or by similar act of obstruction, has no jurisdiction to order that the hut or other means of

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.

s. 522—concl'd.

obstruction should be removed. *Debendra Chandra Chowdhury v. Mohini Mohan Chowdhry*, 5 C. W. N. 432, overruled. Held, further, by the Full Bench that, whereas in this case criminal force had been used by the accused to the complainant when the latter objected to the obstruction, which interfered with his right of way over a path, and this constituted the offence of wrongful restraint, of which offence the accused had been convicted, an order for the removal of the obstruction could be passed under s. 522 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *MOHINI MOHAN CHOWDHRY v. HARENDRA CHANDRA CHOWDHRY* (1904) . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 691

s.c. 8 C. W. N. 538

s. 523 (1872. ss. 415, 416).

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 552

See TREASURE TROVE.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 668

1. ———— Property seized by

police—Seizure of property on suspicion—Magistrate, duty of—Procedure. By the provisions of s. 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is not intended that any final steps should be taken by the Magistrate, nor is he bound to take any final steps to ascertain whether the property seized on suspicion belongs to the person in whose possession it was found until after the expiry of the six months mentioned in the section; but when the proclamation has been issued, and the six months have expired, then under the provisions of s. 524, the person in whose possession the property was found can come forward and show that it is his own. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MAHALABUDDIN*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 761

2. ———— Property seized by

the police pending an inquiry or trial under a search-warrant issued by the Court—Magistrate's power to deal with such property where no offence is committed—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 517. S. 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882) does not apply to property which is produced before a Court in the course of an inquiry or trial under a search-warrant issued by itself under s. 96 of the Code. To such property s. 517 alone would apply; and if no offence is found in respect thereof, the Court can make no order. The property must be given back into the possession from which it came. The scope of s. 523 must be confined to property seized by the police of their own motion in the exercise of the powers conferred on them by law, for instance under s. 51, 54, 164, or 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Per TELANG, J.*—Under s. 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate is bound to institute an inquiry before making any order touching the right, not of property, but of possession to the property, seized by the police. *In re RATAN LAL RANGILDAS*

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 748

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—contd.

s. 523—concl'd.

3. ———— Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 517, 523—Disposal of property taken by police as stolen property—Adjudication of theft case, whether absolutely necessary before order for disposal of property—Stay of proceedings in case—Speedy remedy, whether it may justify order made at request of parties—Jurisdiction. A Magistrate has jurisdiction to make an order under s. 523 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for disposal of property taken charge of by the police as stolen property, when he considers that an immediate order is necessary to save the property from possible loss or decay before a formal adjudication of the case of theft, especially when the case has broken down by reason of non-prosecution and when both the parties apply to the Magistrate for such an order. *NASIB ALI MOJUMDAR v. RUKHMINI MOHAN ENDA* (1901) . 5 C. W. N. 415

ss. 523, 524.

See FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY.

9 W. R. Cr. 13

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUMMONING WITNESSES . 18 W. R. Cr. 5

s. 524.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—PROPERTY AT DISPOSAL OF GOVERNMENT.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 668

See TREASURE TROVE.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 668

s. 526.

See ACCUSED PERSON . 5 C. W. N. 110

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACTS—BURMA COURTS ACT.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 667

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 375

5 C. W. N. 252

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—BOMBAY—CRIMINAL.

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 333

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—MADRAS—CRIMINAL.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 39

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 44

4 C. W. N. 604

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

I. L. R. 16 All. 9

I. L. R. 19 All. 291

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 392

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 233; 11 C. W. N. 507

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 904

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 526—*contd.*

1. ———— *Transfer—Fair trial—Reasonable apprehension.* It is expedient for the ends of justice to direct the transfer of a criminal case from one Court to another if circumstances have so transpired as to lead the accused to entertain a reasonable apprehension that he may not have a fair trial. In making such an order the High Court considered the convenience of the other side and directed the Crown to pay the expenses of his witnesses. *KHETU PANDAY v. MOHIN NATH BISHI* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 75

2. ———— *Transfer—Rioting—Possession, question of—Magistrate forming his opinion before trial.* The High Court made an order transferring a case of rioting from the file of a Magistrate who, before the trial commenced, had expressed a decisive opinion on the question of the possession of the property in relation to which the riot was said to have taken place, that being a most important question in the case. *SITA NATH MONDAL v. EMPEROR* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 641

3. ———— *Transfer—Heavy bail—Fair trial, reasonable apprehension of not having.* Where in a case of an alleged petty theft the Magistrate issued warrants in the first instance and then exacted heavy bail from the accused persons: *Held*, that the accused were justified in apprehending that they would not have a fair trial before the Magistrate. The case was accordingly transferred. *GIRISH CHANDRA GHOSE v. CHANDRA MONI DAST* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 589

4. ———— *Transfer—Refusal to allow cross-examination before charge—Bonâ fide mistake of law—Not ground of transfer.* Where a Magistrate refused to allow the accused to cross-examine some of the prosecution witnesses, the Court observed that, as he had acted *bonâ fide* from a mistaken view of the law, there was no ground for transfer. *ASHIRBAD MUCHI v. MAJU MUCHI* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 838

5. ———— cl. (8)—*Transfer—Adjournment—"Commencement of hearing," meaning of—Trial commenced before one Magistrate—Transfer of Magistrate—Case taken up by another Magistrate—Application for adjournment, if can be made to him—Grounds for allowing transfer—Possible apprehension of bias.* The words "commencement of the hearing" in s. 526, cl. (8) of the Criminal Procedure Code mean the commencement of the hearing in the Court objected to, i.e., in the Court to which the notification subsequently referred to in the section applies or is made. A Magistrate was transferred at a certain stage of a case which he was trying, and it was then taken up by the District Magistrate. The prosecution wishing to obtain a transfer of the case applied to him for an adjournment at the earliest possible time. The District

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 526—*contd.*

Magistrate rejected the application, and proceeding with the trial acquitted the accused. *Held*, that the application fell within s. 526, cl. (8) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and should not have been refused and all the proceedings before the District Magistrate subsequent to the refusal were bad and should be set aside. *Surat Lal Chowdhuri v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 211, followed. The transfer was sought by the prosecution on the allegation that the Bettiah Raj, which was under the Court of Wards, had an interest in the case, and the District Magistrate, who was one of the chief executive authorities connected with the Court of Wards, ought not to try it. *Held*, that there were sufficient grounds for granting a transfer. Where it is impossible to prevent persons from having an apprehension that there might be some bias in the mind of the Magistrate inclining him to look with favour upon the interest of any party, a transfer should be granted. *KISHORI GIR v. RAM NARAYAN GIR* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 77

6. ———— cl. (8)—*Adjournment of case—Supplementary case, disqualification of Sessions Judge to try.* The accused were committed for trial on the 12th December 1903. Trial was fixed for the 3rd February 1904 before the Sessions Judge. On the 3rd February the accused asked the Judge to refer the case to the High Court for transfer, on the ground that the Judge had previously convicted other accused persons on the same facts. This was refused. The accused thereupon applied under s. 526, cl. (8), of the Criminal Procedure Code, for an adjournment of the case, on the ground that the High Court would be moved for a transfer. This was also refused. The case proceeded, and after the case for the prosecution was concluded, two witnesses were examined on behalf of one of the accused and the case was adjourned till the 16th February. Between the 3rd and 16th February no application was made to the High Court for a transfer. The case was concluded on the 16th February and the accused were convicted. *Held*, that the Sessions Judge was not disqualified from trying the case. That the accused had reasonable time for applying to the High Court before they were required to enter upon their defence on the 16th February and, as they abstained from doing so, the proceedings of the Sessions Judge were not void. *JOHARUDDIN SARKAR v. EMPEROR* (1904) I. L. R. 31 Calc. 715
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 910

7. ———— *Reasonable apprehension in the mind of the accused—Incidents and circumstances calculated to create apprehension.* A Magistrate is bound to postpone the hearing of a case for the purpose of enabling a party to apply to a higher Court for a transfer and his refusal to do so renders the subsequent proceedings voidable, if not

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 526—*contd.*

void. *Queen Empress v. Gayitri Prosunno Ghosal*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 455, *Surat Lal Choudhry v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 211, and *Kishori Gir v. Ram Narayan Gir*, 8 C. W. N. 77, followed. If the words used by and the actions of a judicial officer, though susceptible of explanation and traceable to a superior sense of duty, are calculated to create in the mind of the accused an apprehension that he may not have an impartial trial, the case should be transferred to some other Judge for trial. *Dhone Kristo v. King-Emperor*, I. L. R. 31 Calc. 715, and *Joharuddin v. Emperor*, 8 C. W. N. 910, referred to. Confidence in the administration of justice is an essential element in good government and a reasonable apprehension of failure of justice in the mind of the accused should be taken into consideration on an application for transfer. *Narain Chandra Banerjee v. The Howrah Municipality*, 10 C. W. N. 441, explained. *Held*, per HOLMWOOD, J.—The case should be transferred in view of the technical objection that may be taken to the validity of the Magistrate's final decision, owing to his having refused time to apply for a transfer. The views of BRETT, J., as expressed in *Narain Chandra Banerjee v. The Howrah Municipality*, 10 C. W. N. 441, concurred with. *KALI CHARAN GHOSE v. EMPEROR* (1906). I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1183

ss. 526 and 527—*Transfer—Plea that applicant wishes to summon the trying Magistrate as a witness.* In an application for the transfer to another Court of a criminal case pending against them the applicants alleged that the evidence of the trying Magistrate would be required by the accused touching certain matters connected with the case. *Held*, that inasmuch as the Magistrate was bound under s. 257 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to issue a summons, unless he considered that the application for a summons was made for the purpose of vexation or delay, or for defeating the ends of justice, and it was not proper to leave the decision of such a question to the Magistrate, whose evidence was required, the application for transfer ought to be granted. *EMPEROR v. ABDUL LATIF* (1904).

I. L. R. 26 All. 536

s. 526 (Act X of 1882, s. 147; Act X of 1872, s. 64; Presidency Magistrate's Act, 1877, s. 181), ss. 527 and 528 (1872, ss. 47, 48).

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE.

ss. 526, 528—*Transfer, grounds for—Bias—Cumulative effect of acts not justifying a transfer by themselves.* Although each of the circumstances alleged may not by itself be sufficient to show that there was bias on the part of the Magistrate, a transfer would nevertheless be justified, where, having regard to all the circumstances taken together, the accused might not unreasonably, ap-

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872; VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 526—*concl.*

prehend that he would not have a fair trial. *NITYA-NANDA KANARAR v. EMPEROR* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 619

s. 526A.

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 375

Application for postponement of case in order to apply for transfer of case—Discretion of Magistrate in granting adjournment—Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (III of 1884), s. 12. M, the complainant, on the 19th November 1887, made an application to the Deputy Magistrate, under s. 526A of the Criminal Procedure Code, for the postponement of his case against G to enable him to apply to the High Court under s. 526 for a transfer of the case from the file of the Deputy Magistrate to that of another officer. On the same date the Deputy Magistrate refused the application and proceeded with the case acquitting G. *Held*, that having regard to the words "the Court shall exercise, etc." in s. 526A, the order of the Deputy Magistrate of the 19th November refusing to grant the application was illegal. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GAYITRI PROSUNNO GHOSAL*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 455

s. 528.

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT, AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES . . . 5 C. W. N. 488

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 192, 204, 528 . . . 9 C. W. N. 811

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—WITHDRAWAL OF CASES.

I. L. R. 3 All. 749

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 851

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 399

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 94

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 549

See MAGISTRATE—

POWERS OF MAGISTRATE.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 130

WITHDRAWAL OF CASES.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 693

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—TRANSFER OR WITHDRAWAL OF PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 898

5 C. W. N. 686

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—GENERAL CASES . . . 7 C. W. N. 114

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 317

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 394

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 918

Transfer—Penal Code s. 193—False evidence—Affidavit of accused person in support of an application for transfer. *Held*, that

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 528—*concl'd.*

where an accused person applies for the transfer of the case pending against him to some other Court, supporting his application by an affidavit, he cannot, or at least ought not to be, prosecuted under s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code in respect of statements made therein. *In the matter of the petition of Barkat, I. L. R. 19 All. 200*, followed. *EMPEROR v. BINDESHRI SINGH* (1906).

I. L. R. 28 All. 331

ss. 528 and 537—*Transfer—Notice—Reasons for transfer not recorded, the transfer being obligatory—Police officer against whom a complaint was made called upon to submit an explanation.* A complaint was made in the Court of a Deputy Magistrate accusing a Sub-Inspector of Police of offences under ss. 323 and 384 of the Penal Code. The Deputy Magistrate brought the complaint to the notice of the District Magistrate, who, without recording his reasons for so doing, but in obedience to an order of Government, transferred the case to his own file. The District Magistrate also called upon the officer accused to report as to any reason which he knew for the complaint having been made against him. This report was placed on the record, and was used, as the Magistrate stated in his order, to supply grounds for cross-examining the witnesses produced by the complainant. *Held*, that omission on the part of the Magistrate to record his reasons for transferring the case was not under the circumstances more than an irregularity, and that his action in calling for a report from the Sub-Inspector and the use made of that report were not improper. *Baidya Nath Singh v. Muspratt, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 141*, dissented from. *Held*, also, that where a District Magistrate transfers a case from the file of a subordinate Magistrate to his own, it is not necessary that he should issue notice to the complainant before doing so. *DUKHI KEVAT, In re* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 421

s. 529.

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

4 C. W. N. 821

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
SPECIAL ACTS—CATTLE TRESPASS ACT.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 300; 442

See PARDON . I. L. R. 20 All. 40

s. 529 (f).

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL
COURT AS TO—TRANSFER OR WITH-
DRAWAL OF PROCEEDINGS.

5 C. W. N. 686

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 530 (1872, s. 34).

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

22 W. R. Cr. 43

23 W. R. Cr. 33

1 C. L. R. 434

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 307

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 443

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 502

5 C. W. N. 252

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 675

cl. (j).

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL
COURT AS TO—TRANSFER OR WITH-
DRAWAL OF PROCEEDINGS.

5 C. W. N. 686

s. 531.

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 312

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 200

I. L. R. 17 All. 36

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 640

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—
GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 667

Section applies to cases where Magistrate tries in respect of offences committed outside his jurisdiction. There is nothing in the language of s. 531 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to confine its operation to cases where offences committed within the jurisdiction of a Court are tried by such Court outside the limits of the local area of its jurisdiction. A finding, sentence or order regularly passed by a Court in the case of an offence committed outside its local area, cannot be set aside when no failure of justice has taken place. *EMPEROR v. DORAISWAMY MUDALI, 1906 I. L. R. 30 Mad. 94*

s. 532 (1872, s. 33).

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 3 All. 258

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 200

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 402

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—
BOMBAY CRIMINAL.

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 288

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—
NATURE, FORM, AND SUFFICIENCY OF
SANCTION . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 112.

s. 533.

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO MAGIS-
TRATE .

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 224

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 539

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 595

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 862

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 549

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 495

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 221

2 C. W. N. 702

3 C. W. N. 387

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 533—*concl'd.*

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 15

See FALSE EVIDENCE—CONTRADICTORY
STATEMENTS . . . 6 C. W. N. 840

s. 536.

See VERDICT OF JURY—POWER TO INTER-
FERE WITH VERDICTS.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 243

s. 537 (1872, ss. 283, 300; 1861-
69, ss. 426, 439).

See *ante*, ss. 107, 233, 234.

See ABSCONDING OFFENDER.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 3

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 955

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 1

See ASSESSORS . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 694
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 523

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COM-
PLAINT—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 983

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COM-
PLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES . . . 5 B. L. R. 660

See COMPLAINT—POWER TO REFER TO
SUBORDINATE MAGISTRATE.

3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 67

5 B. L. R. 160

7 B. L. R. 513

9 B. L. R. 146, 147 note

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 104

See CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 391

See EMIGRATION ACT.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 611

See FALSE EVIDENCE—CONTRADICTORY
STATEMENTS . . . 6 C. W. N. 840

See JOINDER OF CHARGES.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 273

I. L. R. 14 All. 502

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 395

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 413

4 C. W. N. 656

5 C. W. N. 294, 866

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 385

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 125

See JUDGMENT—CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 353

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 121

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 502

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.*

s. 537—*concl'd.*

See JURY—JURY IN SESSIONS CASES—
CHOOSING JURY . . . 7 C. W. N. 188

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 598

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 328

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPE-
CIAL ACTS—CATTLE TRESPASS ACT.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 442

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL
COURT AS TO—LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH
OF THE PEACE I. L. R. 20 Calc. 520

5 C. W. N. 544

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL
COURT AS TO—PARTIES TO PROCEED-
INGS . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 404

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—JUDG-
MENT, DEFECTS IN.

I. L. R. 1 All. 680

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 272

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—EXPIRY
OF SANCTION I. L. R. 22 Calc. 176

13 C. W. N. 942

See SENTENCE—POWER OF HIGH COURT
AS TO SENTENCES—REVERSAL.

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 459

5 B. L. R. 39

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

19 W. R. Cr. 43

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUM-
MONING WITNESSES.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 863

2 C. W. N. 465

1. ———— "Court of compe-
tent jurisdiction." Meaning of the expression "a
Court of competent jurisdiction" in s. 537 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, considered. QUEEN-EM-
PRESS *v.* KRISHNABHAT . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 319

2. ———— *Summons, issue
of—Fresh summons issued on the same information
—Irregularity in procedure.* Where on an inform-
ation a summons is issued to the accused, and
owing to its disclosing no offence, a fresh summons
is issued without any fresh or supplemental in-
formation, the error, omission or irregularity in
the fresh summons is not sufficient under s. 537
of the Criminal Procedure Code, to upset the
finding and sentence unless it has in fact occa-
sioned "a failure of justice," that is, unless it has
unfairly affected the accused's defence on the
merits. EMPEROR *v.* JEEVANJI (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 611

s. 540 (1872, s. 192).

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 167

4 C. W. N. 604

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 540—*concl'd.*

See PENAL CODE, s. 182.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 451

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 167

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—

SUMMONING WITNESSES.

6 C. W. N. 98

EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES—
EXAMINATION BY COURT.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 387

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES—CROSS-EXAMINATION

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 245

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 288

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUMMONING WITNESSES . 21 W. R. Cr. 61

I. L. R. 8 All. 668

Order of examination of witnesses. It is not intended by s. 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, that a Judge shall reverse the order of a Sessions trial and call the witnesses summoned for the defence before the case for the prosecution is closed. *QUEEN-EMPERESS v. HARGOBIND SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 14 All. 242

ss. 545, 546 (1872, s. 308; 1861-69, s. 44).

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—

FOR LOSS OR INJURY CAUSED BY OFFENCE . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 305

See DEATH BY RASH OR NEGLIGENT ACT.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 302

See FINE . . . 3 C. L. R. 404, 405 note

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 352

I. L. R. 19 All. 112

s. 548 (Presidency Magistrate's Act, 187 s. 170)—*Prosecutor, rights of—"Person affected by an order"—Application for copy of order and depositions, refusal of—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), ss. 7, 45.* All prosecutors whose charges are dismissed by the Presidency Magistrate are affected by the order of discharge, and are therefore entitled, under s. 170 of the Presidency Magistrate's Act, to obtain copies of the order made by, and of the deposition taken before, the Magistrate. *In the matter of the EMPRESS v. DINONATH ROY*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 166; 10 C. L. R. 190

s. 551—*Unlawful detention for an unlawful purpose—Infant, custody of.* A Hindu girl, under the age of 14 years, went of her own accord to a Mission house, where she was received and allowed to remain. The mother and husband of the girl thereupon applied to the Magistrate, who took proceedings under s. 551 of the Criminal Pro-

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 551—*concl'd.*

cedure Code. The lady superintendent of the Mission house denied that the girl was legally married, and alleged that she was practically being brought up with the connivance of the mother to a life of prostitution. The Magistrate, after recording evidence, found that the girl was legally married; and that, although she went to and remained in the Mission house of her own free will, there was, under the circumstances, an unlawful detention for an unlawful purpose. He further found that there were no facts established which would disentitle the husband or the mother to the custody of the girl, and passed an order under the section directing the girl to be restored to her mother. *Held*, that, upon the facts as found by the Magistrate, as it was immaterial whether the girl did or did not consent to remain at the Mission house, there was an unlawful detention within the meaning of these words as used in the section, as the girl was kept against the will of those who were lawfully entitled to have charge of her. *Held*, also, that s. 551 applying only, as it does, to women and female children, must not be construed so as to make it include purposes which, although not unlawful in themselves, might only become so when entertained towards a child in opposition to the wishes of its guardian, but that the purpose, whether entertained towards a woman or a female child, must be in itself unlawful. *Held*, consequently, that in the circumstances of the case there was no detention for an unlawful purpose, and that the Magistrate had no power to make the order. *Held*, further, that, although the Magistrate had no power under the section to make the order he did, it did not follow that the Court should direct the girl to be restored to the custody of the lady superintendent, even if it had the power to do so, and that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, there was nothing to justify such an order being passed. *ABRAHAM v. MAHTABO*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 487

s. 552.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 476, 552 . . . 9 C. W. N. 1030

s. 556 (Act X of 1882, s. 555).

See BENCH OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 194

See MAGISTRATE—GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 238

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

7 C. W. N. 708

1. *Meaning of "personally interested"—Sub-Committee of Municipal Board advising a prosecution.* *Held*, that a Magistrate, who had been a member of a Sub-Committee of a Municipal Board, which recommended the

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*contd.***

s. 556—*concl'd.*

prosecution of a certain person for an alleged obstruction caused by him in a public thoroughfare, was not, by reason, only of this fact, "personally interested" in the case afterwards initiated against such person so as to be debarred under s. 556 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from trying it. *The Queen v. Handsley, L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 383*, referred to. **EMPEROR v. MOHAN LAL (1905)**

I. L. R. 27 All. 25

2. ———— *Meaning of "personally, interested"*—Magistrate making himself a witness in a case which he is trying. On a day when the Courts were closed for the Christmas holidays two persons came to a Magistrate's private house, and there made an oral complaint to him. When the Courts reopened the same persons filed a written complaint in the Magistrate's Court, which resulted in certain persons being put upon their trial before the same Magistrate for an offence under s. 323 of the Penal Code. During the course of the trial the Magistrate considered it his duty to record his own evidence as to the circumstances attending the making of the oral complaint at his house, and he was duly cross-examined and re-examined. *Held*, that the Magistrate could not be considered to be "personally interested" in the case within the meaning of s. 556 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *In the matter of petition of Ganeshi, I. L. R. 15 All. 192*, and *The Queen v. Handsley, L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 383*, followed. *Hari Kishore Mitra v. Abdul Baki Miah, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 920*; *Grish Chandra Ghosh v. Queen-Empress, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 857*; *Queen-Empress v. Manikam, I. L. R. 19 Mad. 263*, and *Serjeant v. Dale, L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 558*, referred to. **EMPEROR v. NANHE (1905) . I. L. R. 27 All. 33**

s. 557.

See PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATE.

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 490

s. 558 (1872, s. 539: 1861-69, s. 444).

See ARMS ACT, 1878, s. 19.

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 473

See BENGAL ACT VI OF 1865.

B. L. R. A. Cr. 39

See GENERAL CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1898, s. 6. **I. L. R. 6 Mad. 336**

s. 560.

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—TO ACCUSED ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT.

s. 562.

See FIRST OFFENDERS.

I. L. R. 24 All. 306

Power conferred by section not confined to Courts of first instance. The

**CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ACT
V OF 1898 (X OF 1882; X OF 1872;
VIII OF 1869; XXV OF 1861)—*concl'd.***

s. 562—*concl'd.*

power of passing orders under s. 562 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not confined to Courts of first instance. *Emperor v. Birch, I. L. R. 24 All. 376*, approved. **NARAYANASWAMI NAIDU v. EMPEROR (1906) . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 587**

s. 565 (4)—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1960), ss. 176, 177—*Meaning of words "for the commission of an offence."* The second part of s. 176 of the Penal Code, which provides an aggravated punishment for omitting to give notice to a public servant, when such notice is required for preventing the commission of an offence, applies only when the object is to prevent the commission of a particular offence, and not of offences generally. The notice of residence required to be given by convicted persons under s. 565 (4) is not required for preventing the commission of any particular offence and the failure to give such notice must be dealt with under the first part of s. 176 of the Penal Code. **EMPEROR v. HUSSAIN BEG (1903)**

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 548

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

See COMPROMISE **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1010**

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 107.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 350

See EVIDENCE . **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1010**

effect of striking off—

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—STRIKING OFF PROCEEDINGS . **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 867**

expenses of—

See HINDU LAW—ALIENATION—ALIENATION BY WIDOW—WHAT CONSTITUTES LEGAL NECESSITY . **6 C. W. N. 648**

institution of—

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES.

See FALSE CHARGE.

revival of—

See COMPLAINT—REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT. *See* CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1898, ss. 436, 438 (1872, s. 296).

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 16, 647

I. L. R. 2 All. 570

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT AND RE-TRIAL.

stay of—

See HIGH COURT, POWER OF.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 226

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS—*contd.*

— withdrawal of—

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—
WITHDRAWAL OF CASES.

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL
COURT AS TO—TRANSFER OR WITH-
DRAWAL OF PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 898

1. ——— Dispute as to right to give girl in marriage. The practice of instituting criminal proceedings with a view to determining disputes arising in cases as to the right to give a girl in marriage condemned. *In the matter of* EMPRESS v. ABDOL KURREEM

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 10 : 3 C. L. R. 81

2. ——— Waiver—Waiver or consent by Prisoner—Recording statements of Witnesses. The jailor of a district jail being accused by one of the jail clerks of falsifying his accounts and defrauding the Government, the matter was enquired into by the District Magistrate, and the jailor was, by the Magistrate's order, placed on trial before a Bench of Magistrates, consisting of the District Magistrate himself, L, the Officiating Superintendent of the jail, and three other Honorary Magistrates. The prisoner and his pleaders were alleged to have stated before the commencement of the trial on being questioned that they had no objection to the composition of the Bench, but after the charges had been framed, the prisoner's counsel objected to the Bench as formed. The District Magistrate directed the Government pleader to prosecute, and both the District Magistrate and L gave evidence for the prosecution. After the case for the prosecution was closed, two formal charges were drawn up, namely, that the prisoner had debited Government with the price of more oil-seed than he actually purchased, and that he had received payment for certain oil at a higher rate than he credited to Government. The moneys, the receipt of which were the subject of the first charge, were obtained by the prisoner on the strength of certain vouchers which he had induced L to sign as correct, and L had sanctioned the sale at the rates credited to Government. Upon the prisoner's giving the names of the witnesses, he intended to call in his defence, L was deputed by his brother Magistrates to examine some of them who were connected with the jail, in order "to guard against deviation," and the depositions so taken were placed on the record, "to be used by either party, though not themselves, as evidence." The prisoner was convicted. On a motion to quash the conviction:—*Held*, that the recording the statements of the prisoner's witnesses was irregular. Criminal proceedings are bad unless they are conducted in the manner prescribed by law, and if they are substantially bad, the defect will not be cured by any waiver or consent of the prisoner. QUEEN v. BHOLA-NATH SEN I. L. R. 2 Calc. 23 : 25 W. R. Cr. 57

3. ——— Waiver—Want of jurisdiction. No person can by waiver or consent enable a Magistrate or a Judge to try a case which

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS—*contd.*

he is disqualified to try by some circumstance not personal to the accused. *In the matter of the* petition of QUIROS. EMPRESS v. ALLEN

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 83 : 6 C. L. R. 463

4. ——— Bias of Judge—Magistrate's jurisdiction where complainant is his private servant—Legality of conviction and sentence passed by such Magistrate in such a case. The mere circumstance that a trying Magistrate is the master of the complainant does not deprive the Magistrate of his jurisdiction, though it is expedient that such a complaint should be referred to another Magistrate. *In re the petition of* BASAPA I. L. R. 9 Bom. 172

5. ——— Summary jurisdiction wrongly exercised—Unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons—Splitting offence—Right of appeal, deprivation of. No Magistrate is entitled to split up an offence into its component parts for the purpose of giving himself summary jurisdiction. If a charge of an offence not triable summarily is laid and sworn to, the Magistrate must proceed with the case accordingly, unless he is at the outset in a position to show from the deposition of the complainant that the circumstances of aggravation are really mere exaggeration and not to be believed. Therefore, a Magistrate, when he has before him a person charged with having been armed with a deadly weapon while a member of an unlawful assembly, is not at liberty to disregard that part of the charge which charges the prisoner with having been armed with a deadly weapon, and so to give himself jurisdiction to try the case summarily, and then by inflicting a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding three months to deprive the prisoner of his right of appeal. EMPRESS v. ABDOL KARIM. EMPRESS v. GOLAM MAHOMED

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 18 : 3 C. L. R. 44

6. ——— Exercise of summary jurisdiction after inquiry into charge which cannot be tried summarily—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 260—Summary procedure under Penal Code, s. 323, after enquiry into charges under ss. 147 and 324. A first class Magistrate took a case on his file and commenced a regular enquiry therein under ss. 147 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code; but after hearing evidence and being of opinion that only an offence under s. 323 of the Indian Penal Code had been made out, he proceeded to deal with the case summarily. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the evidence adduced was not sufficient to justify a committal, but clearly disclosed an offence over which he had summary jurisdiction, the Magistrate was right in acting as he did. Such a course is different to disregarding part of a charge for the purpose of dealing with a case summarily. The High Court will not interfere where a Magistrate has *bona fide* acted in the interests of justice. EMPRESS v. ABDOL KARIM, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 18, distinguished. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RANGAMANI

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 459

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS—*contd.*

7. ———— **Objectionable procedure—**
Accused affirmed and examined—Appointment of Magistrate who convicted accused, to be Crown Prosecutor—Right of prisoners to converse privately with pleader—Magistrates sitting on bench in Judge's Court during trial. Upon an inquiry which the High Court directed the Sessions Judge to make into an allegation that a confession was made under such circumstances as to be inadmissible in evidence, the prisoners were ordered to be, and were, solemnly affirmed and the prosecution neither objected to the form of the order nor to the affirmation of the prisoners, and, moreover, cross-examined them, but objected to their evidence being used upon the return of the inquiry. It was held that the objection, though possibly good if taken in time, was too late, and that the evidence of the prisoners might be used, whether the order directing them to be affirmed was correct or otherwise. The appointment of the Magistrate, who, in the first instance, had tried and convicted the accused, to be Crown Prosecutor to conduct an enquiry subsequently directed in the same case, censured as being unprecedented and objectionable. A Public Prosecutor should be without a personal interest in the cases which he conducts. Prisoners should be allowed to have free converse with their vakils out of the hearing of the police officers in charge of such prisoners. It is undesirable that Magistrates whose decisions are under appeal, or who have been engaged in promoting the prosecution, or police officers concerned in a case, should sit on the bench beside, or converse privately in Court with, the Judge who is engaged in trying the prisoner's appeal. If the Appellate Judge wishes to ascertain any facts relating to the case from the Magistrate who convicted the accused, he should examine the Magistrate upon oath or solemn affirmation, in the same manner as an ordinary witness. *REG. v. KASHINATH DINKAR*

8 Bom. Cr. 126

8. ———— **Magistrate actively employed in prosecution—Judge on appeal.** Where a Magistrate took an active part in the prosecution of the prisoners, and recorded the evidence of the material witnesses preliminary to deciding whether the case should go to trial or not, and by whom it should be tried, it was held that he was not a proper Court to hear the appeal from the conviction come to in the case. *In the matter of the petition of HET LALL ROY*

22 W. R. Cr. 75

9. ———— **Trial by Magistrate instituted by him as Collector.** The District Magistrate should not himself try a case in which he instituted the prosecution as Collector. *QUEEN v. NADI CHAND PODDAR*

24 W. R. Cr. 1

10. ———— **Interest of Magistrate in convicting prisoner—Penal Code, s. 188—Beng. Act V of 1876, s. 256—Disobedience of lawful order—Disqualification of Judge.** On the 29th of March 1883, the Municipal Commissioners of Commillah at a meeting issued an order under s. 256 of the Bengal Municipal Act of 1876. The accused

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS—*contd.*

was tried and convicted before the District Magistrate under s. 188 of the Penal Code, and fined R100 for having disobeyed that order. The Magistrate, who tried and convicted the accused, was present as Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners at the meeting of the 29th of March, when the order was passed for disobedience of which the accused was tried and convicted. *Held*, that the conviction was illegal and must be set aside. *Sergeant v. Dale, L. R. 2 Q.B.D. 558*, cited and followed. *KHARAK CHAND PAL v. TARACK CHUNDER GUPTA*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1030

11. ———— **Irregularity—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 439.** Where a Deputy Magistrate did not draw up a charge in accordance with s. 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but gave the accused clearly to understand the nature of the charges made against them, the irregularity was held to fall within s. 439 of that Code. *BHUGWAN v. DOYAL GOPE*

10 W. R. Cr. 7

12. ———— **Preliminary inquiry—Perjury.** It is necessary to a proper preliminary enquiry that the accused (or, under certain circumstances, his agent) should be present; that the witnesses whose evidence is to be the foundation of the commitment should be examined before him; and that he should have the opportunity of cross-examining them. It is essential, too, in a case of perjury, that he should know at what period he ceased to be a witness and his position was changed to that of the accused. *QUEEN v. KALICHURN LAHOOREE*

9 W. R. Cr. 54

13. ———— **Summons—Omission to comply with formalities before service of summons.** The omission to comply with prescribed formalities before issuing the summons will not vitiate the proceedings after summons, so as to enable a complainant to re-open the case. *EASTERN BENGAL RAILWAY COMPANY v. KALIDAS DUTT*

23 W. R. Cr. 63

14. ———— **Contempt of Court—Postponement of final order—Irregular procedure.** Where a Magistrate in whose presence contempt was committed took cognizance of the offence immediately, but, in order to give the accused an opportunity of showing cause, postponed his final order for some days:—*Held*, that such action, though it might be irregular, was not illegal, and as the accused had not been in any way prejudiced, was covered by s. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PAIAMBAR BAKSHI*

I. L. R. 11 All. 361

15. ———— **Commitment—Irregular Commitment—Want of jurisdiction—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 33, 63.** S. 33 of Act X of 1872 contemplates the contingency of a case which has been enquired into at the proper place, as indicated by s. 63 of that Act, being committed to the proper Court of Session by a particular Magistrate not duly empowered by law to make such commitment, and not of a case which has been enquired into in a district in which it was not committed, being com-

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS—*cont'd.*

mitted to the proper Court of Session as indicated by that section, by a particular Magistrate duly empowered by law to make such a commitment. Consequently, where a Magistrate enquires into and commits for trial an offence which has not been committed in his district, and the Court of Session for that district accepts such commitment because the prisoner has not been prejudiced thereby, and tries him for such offence, the proceedings in such case are illegal *ab initio*. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. JAGAN NATH* I. L. R. 3 All. 258

16. ——— Jurisdiction—Irregularity in holding trial without jurisdiction—*Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 531—Sessions Judge, jurisdiction of—Appeal presented within, but heard outside, the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Sessions Court.* A criminal appeal was presented to the Sessions Judge of the Baijnor-Budaun Division at Baijnor within the Sessions division, but was heard by the said Judge at Moradabad, at which place he was empowered to exercise civil, but not criminal jurisdiction. *Held*, that the trial of such appeal at Moradabad was an irregularity, but no failure of justice being shown to have been occasioned thereby, it was covered by s. 531 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and did not render the trial of the appeal a nullity. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. FAZL AZIM* I. L. R. 17 All. 36

17. ——— Title, question of—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 491, 530—Dispute likely to cause breach of the peace—Decision on title by Civil Court—Police report, incorporation of, by reference.* On the 20th of March 1879, A applied to have certain lands, which he had lately purchased, registered in his name. The order of the Deputy Collector, declaring that A had proved possession and was entitled to registration, was not passed until the 24th December 1879. Prior to A's purchase, B and C had, on the 6th March 1879, obtained registration of the same property. The proceedings were sent to the Commissioner, who, on the 29th September 1880, declared A to be entitled to the land; and in October the registration in the names of B and C was cancelled, and A's name was finally registered. In July 1880, proceedings under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code were commenced upon the petition of certain raiyats, who alleged that other raiyats, at the instigation of A, were going to do acts which would lead to a breach of the peace. The Deputy Magistrate, the same person who, as Deputy Collector, had decided the land-registration case in favour of A, proceeded under s. 530 to consider the question as to who was in possession, and found B and C were in possession. *Held*, that the Deputy Magistrate could not, in these proceedings, set aside the order which he had made in the registration case, as that order could only be set aside in a regular suit. The proceedings recorded by the Deputy Magistrate did not set forth in express language that he was satisfied that a dispute likely to create a breach of the peace existed in respect of the land in question between A on the one side and B and C on the other, nor

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS—*cont'd.*

did it set forth the grounds upon which he was so satisfied that such dispute existed. *Held*, that the proceeding was therefore defective. In the proceedings the Magistrate referred to a police report, which, however, did not show that a breach of the peace was imminent. *Held*, that, although this report might be taken to be incorporated by reference, yet that it was not sufficient to justify the order. *Per FIELD, J.*—Unless the parties are able to show that there is such a dispute as is likely to induce a breach of the peace, the Magistrate should hold his hand and not proceed further. When the rights of the parties have been determined by a competent Court, the dispute is at an end, and it is the duty of the Magistracy to maintain the rights of the successful party, and the proper course for the Magistrate to pursue, if the defeated party does any act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace, is to take action under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and require from such person security to keep the peace. *In re GOBIND CHUNDER MOITRA*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 835: 8 C. L. R. 217

18. ——— Charges distinct and separate, simultaneously tried—*Consent by pleaders to irregular procedure.* Members of two opposing parties in a riot were, under two distinct commitments, sent up for trial before the Sessions Judge and jury. After the close of the case for the prosecution in one of these cases, the Sessions Judge, with the consent of the pleaders representing the accused, postponed the taking of the evidence for the defence, and proceeded to examine the witnesses for the prosecution in the counter-case before the same jury. The Court then took the evidence of the witnesses for the defence in the first, and in the counter-case, in the order named, and after hearing the address of the various pleaders for the defence and the reply of the Government pleader, proceeded to sum up the fact in both cases to the jury, who returned a verdict in respect of all the accused. *Held*, that the procedure resorted to by the Judge was a practical violation of the salutary rule which necessitated the keeping of trials in such cases distinctly separate, and that its adoption having materially prejudiced the interests of the accused, the convictions should be set aside. *Queen v. Bazu, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 750, distinguished.* *Held*, further, that the defect in the procedure could not be cured by the consent of the pleaders for the defence to the arrangement suggested by the Court. *HOSSEIN BUKSH v. EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 96: 6 C. L. R. 521

19. ——— Power of High Court—*Joint charge—Parties in riot on opposite sides.* A Magistrate should not send up joint charges to the Sessions Court against persons who take part in a riot on opposite sides, as they have not a common object. But where a person had been so jointly charged and rightly convicted by the Sessions Court—*Held* (MACPHERSON, J., dissenting), that, as the prisoner had not been preju-

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS—*contd.*

diced by the mistake of the Magistrate, there was no sufficient ground for setting aside his conviction or ordering a new trial. *QUEEN v. BAZU*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 750 : 8 W. R. Cr. 47

20. ———— *Joint trial of persons charged with distinct offences.* Trial of fourteen persons together charged with distinct offences (committing public nuisances) under ss. 290, 291 of the Penal Code, held to be an irregularity calculated to prejudice the accused. Convictions quashed. *PULISANKI REDDI v. QUEEN*

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 20

21. ———— *Irregularity in criminal trial—Improper joinder of charges—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 233 and 537.* *Semble* (per *PETHERAM, C.J.*): That if a man were tried for four specific offences of the same kind at one trial, such procedure would not be merely an irregularity which could be cured by s. 537 of the Code, but a defect in the trial which would render the whole trial inoperative, unless possibly it could be cured by some subsequent proceeding by striking out some portion of the charge. *In the matter of LUCHMINARAIN* **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 128**

22. ———— *Offences of same kind not within year—Failure of justice—Application of s. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure—Power of Full Bench to send case back to referring Bench for final disposal—Rules of the High Court, Calcutta, Appellate Side, Ch. V, Rule 5—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 233, 234 and 537.* Held, that s. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be applied to any case in which the trial has been held on charges joined together contrary to s. 234 of that Code. *In the matter of Luchminarain*, **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 128**, *Queen-Empress v. Chandi Singh*, **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 395**, and *Raj Chunder Mozumdar v. Gour Chunder Mozumdar*, **I. L. R. 22 Calc. 176**, overruled. *In the matter of ABDUR RAHMAN* **I. L. R. 27 Calc. 839**
4 C. W. N. 656

23. ———— *Misjoinder of parties.* A misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the proceedings, but is an irregularity which requires that the Court should consider whether under the terms of s. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. *KALI PROSAD MAHISAL v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 7**

KARUKALAL v. RAM CHARAN PAL

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 10

24. ———— *Cross-cases—Irregularity in criminal trial—Rioting, counter charges of—Cross-cases taken together—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 537—Irregularity prejudicing the accused—"Failure of justice."* A Magistrate, there being counter charges of rioting and assault before him, took up and tried one of such cases, and having heard the evidence for the prosecution called on the counter case, and in this latter case examined as witnesses some of the accused in the

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first case, eventually convicting the accused in the first case. Held, that such a procedure constituted a grave irregularity, but that, under the circumstances of the particular case, the irregularity was cured by s. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *BACHU MULLAH v. SIA RAM SINGH*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 358

25. ———— *Joint trial—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 107, 112, 117, 118, 239, 537—Opposing factions dealt with in one proceeding.* Upon general principles, every person is entitled, in the absence of exceptional authority conferred by the law to the contrary effect, when required by the judiciary either to forfeit his liberty or to have his liberty qualified, to insist that his case shall be tried separately from the cases of other persons similarly circumstanced. Where an order has been passed under s. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code requiring more persons than one to show cause why they should not severally furnish security for keeping the peace, the provisions of s. 239 read with s. 117 are applicable, subject to such modifications as the latter section indicates, and to such procedure as the exigencies of each individual case may render advisable in the interests of justice. A joint inquiry in the case of such persons is, therefore, not *ipso facto* illegal; and even in cases where one and the same proceeding taken by the Magistrate under ss. 107, 112, 117, and 118 improperly deals with more persons than one, the matter must be considered upon the individual merits of the particular case, and would at most amount to an irregularity which, according to the particular circumstances, might or might not be covered by the provisions of s. 537. *Queen-Empress v. Nathu*, **I. L. R. 6 All. 214**, and *Empress v. Batuk*, **All. W. N. (1884) 54**, referred to. Where according to the nature of the information received by the Magistrate, there were two opposing parties inclined to commit a breach of the peace:—Held, applying by analogy the principles relating to the trial of members of opposing factions engaged in a riot, that the Magistrate acted irregularly in taking steps against both parties jointly, and in holding the inquiry in a single proceeding. Such procedure is not *ipso facto* null and void, but only where the accused have been prejudiced by it. *Empress v. Lochan*, **All. W. N. (1881) 98**, and *Hossein Buksh v. Empress*, **I. L. R. 6 Calc. 96**, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ABDOL KADIR*

I. L. R. 9 All. 452

26. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 535 and 537—Joint trial for separate offences—Irregular procedure.* A Magistrate tried A for theft and B and C for rescuing A from lawful custody, and convicted A, B, and C in one trial. A appealed, and B and C appealed separately. No objection was taken in the petitions of appeal to the procedure of the Magistrate. Held, on revision, that the convictions might stand. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KUTTI* **I. L. R. 11 Mad. 441**

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27. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 233, 234, 537—Separate charges for distinct offences.* Five persons were charged with having committed the offence of rioting on the 5th December; four out of those persons and one F were charged with having committed the offence of criminal trespass on the 9th December. These two cases were taken up and tried together in one trial, and were decided by one judgment. *Held*, that the trial was illegal, and the defect was not cured by s. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *In the matter of the petition of CHANDI SINGH. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHANDI SINGH* I. L. R. 14 Calc. 395

See BISHNU BANWAR v. EMPRESS

1 C. W. N. 35

28. ————— *Code of Criminal Procedure, ss. 233 and 537—Obtaining a minor for prostitution—Penal Code, ss. 372, 373—Misjoinder of charges—Immaterial irregularity.* A woman, being a member of the dancing girl caste, obtained possession of a minor girl and employed her for the purpose of prostitution; she subsequently obtained in adoption another minor girl from her parents, who belonged to the same caste. She and the parents of the second girl were charged together under ss. 372, 373 of the Penal Code. The charges related to both girls. *Held*, (i) that the two charges should not have been tried together, but irregularity committed in so trying them had caused no failure of justice; (ii) that ss. 372, 373 of the Penal Code may be applicable in a case where the minor concerned is a member of the dancing girl caste. *Per* MUTTUSAMI AYYAR, J.—It would be no offence if the intention was that the girl should be brought up as a daughter, and that, when she attains her age, she should be allowed to select either to marry or follow the profession of her prostitute mother. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMANA* I. L. R. 12 Mad. 273

29. ————— *Irregularity prejudicing the accused—Rioting, counter charges of—Cross-cases tried together—Evidence in one case considered in the other—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 233, 239, 537—Illegality—Fight between two parties not “transaction”—“Joinder of charges.”* Where two cross-cases of rioting and grievous hurt were committed separately for trial before a Sessions Judge, who, having heard the evidence in the first case, heard the evidence in the second case, examined some of the accused in the one case as witnesses for the prosecution in the other and *vice versa*, and subsequently heard the arguments in both the cases together, and the opinions of the assessors (who were the same in both the cases) were taken at one time, and both the cases were dealt with in one judgment:—*Held*, that this mode of trial, although irregular, did not prejudice the accused in their defence, and that, under such circumstances, a re-trial was not made necessary by reason of such irregularity. *Queen v. Bazu, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 750 : 8 W. R. Cr. 47, and Queen v. Surroop Chunder Paul, 12 W. R. Cr.*

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75, approved. Nor did the examination of the accused, who were on their trial in one case as witnesses for the prosecution in the other, affect the validity of their conviction. Observations in *Bachu Mullah v. Sia Ram Singh, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 358*, dissented from. *Hussein Buksh v. Empress, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 96*, considered and distinguished. *Semble*: A fight between two parties cannot be treated as a ‘transaction’ within the meaning of s. 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the law as contained in that section, the two parties cannot regularly be charged in the same trial. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHANDRA BHUIYA*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 537

30. ————— *Aggregate sentence instead of separate sentences—Material error or defect.* Two prisoners, having been convicted by an Assistant Judge of forgery and other offences, were sentenced each to an aggregate amount of punishment which the Court was competent to inflict, but without specifying the several penalties awarded for each offence. On reference by the Sessions Judge under s. 434 of the Criminal Procedure Code:—*Held*, that it was an irregularity on the part of the Assistant Sessions Judge not to pass a separate sentence under each independent head of the charge, but that it was not an error or defect in consequence of which the High Court could reverse or alter the sentence on revision. *REG. v. VINAYAK TRIMBAK. 2 Bom. 414 : 2nd. Ed. 391*

31. ————— *Pending case—Case not finally disposed of—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 537.* S. 537 does not apply to a pending case, but only to a case which has been finally disposed of. *NIL-RATAN SEN v. JOGESH CHANDRA BUTTACHARJEE* I. L. R. 23 Calc. 933 : 1 C. W. N. 56

32. ————— *Irregularity—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 537 (1872, 233; 1861-69, ss. 426, 437).—Irregularity prejudicing prisoner in his defence.* An omission by a Magistrate to hold a preliminary inquiry on a charge under s. 307 of the Penal Code of attempting to murder was, on appeal by the prisoner to the High Court, held to be an irregularity which prejudiced the prisoner in her defence and the proceedings were ordered to be quashed, and a new trial held. *QUEEN v. ITWARYA* 14 B. L. R. 54 : 22 W. R. Cr. 14

33. ————— *Irregular appointment of jurors.* Where the Magistrate had appointed as jurors persons who had been appointed by the opposite party, it was held to be an error affecting the merits of the case. *SHATYANUNDO GHOSAL v. CAMPERDOWN PRESSING CO. 21 W. R. Cr. 43*

34. ————— *Irregular selection of jurors—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 240. Per FIELD, J.—Irregularities under s. 240 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the selection of the jurors, and in the admission of the deposition of a medical witness, treated, it not being shown that the prisoners had been thereby prejudiced, as being objections which ought not to be entertained for the purpose of interfering with the verdict, regard*

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being had to the provisions of s. 283 of the Criminal Procedure Code and s. 167 of the Evidence Act. *In the matter of the petition of JHUBBOO MAHTON. EMPRESS v. JHUBBOO MAHTON*

I. L. R. 8 Cal. 739 : 12 C. L. R. 233

35. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 283—Penal Code, s. 181—Irregular trial—Legal Practitioners Act (XVIII of 1879).* Where three persons were tried together and convicted, under s. 181 of the Penal Code, of having made false statements on solemn affirmation, about the same matter, in the course of an inquiry into the conduct of a pleader under the provisions of the Legal Practitioners Act :—*Held*, that the trial of the three prisoners together was a grave error of procedure vitiating the trial. *KOTHE SUBHA CHETTI v. QUEEN*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 252

36. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 283, and s. 144—Omission to reduce complaint to writing.* Acting in violation of s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, in not reducing the complaint to writing is not an irregularity for which an Appellate Court has power to reserve the judgment or sentence under s. 283. *ANONYMOUS*

7 Mad. Ap. 25

37. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 283—Irregularity in trial before Magistrate.* Where a person summoned to answer a charge of criminal trespass appeared and filed a written statement, and the Magistrate proceeded accordingly without recording a proceeding under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it was held that the irregularity was covered by s. 283 of the Code, the rule therein laid down being intended to extend to all proceedings before Magistrates. *GOUB MOHUN MAJEE v. DOOLUBH MAJEE*

22 W. R. Cr. 81

38. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 283 and s. 278—Error in omission to fix time for hearing.* Where the Appellate Court did not fix a reasonable time for the appearance of the appellant or his counsel as required by s. 278, Act X of 1872, the error was held to invalidate the proceedings. *In the matter of the petition of HUR PERSHAD*

24 W. R. Cr. 60

39. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 283—Irregularity in trial—Conviction on wrong charge under Act XXI of 1856, s. 44.* The accused, who held a license for the sale of imported liquors, sold country spirit, and was charged and convicted by the Assistant Magistrate under s. 44, Act XXI of 1856. The Assistant Magistrate on the same day found that the conviction should have been under s. 48 of the Abkari Law, and recorded a note to that effect. *Held*, that, as it was clear from the evidence recorded and from the answer of the accused that he was not misled as to the charge against him, and consequently in no way prejudiced by the erroneous description of the offence contained in the conviction, the conviction should be altered so as to bring it under s. 48, Act XXI of 1856. *QUEEN v. DIGAM-BUR SHAHA*

24 W. R. Cr. 3

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40. *Irregularities in reception of evidence.* The reception, as evidence against an accused person, of a confession which ought not to have been proved, and which is not in accordance with the law, and the grounding of a case against him upon such confession, must be held to be irregularities which seriously prejudice the prisoner. *QUEEN v. CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE*

24 W. R. Cr. 42

41. *Evidence given at previous trial treated as examination-in-chief—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 353, 537—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 167.* At the trial of a party of Hindus for rioting, the Magistrate, instead of examining the witnesses for the prosecution, caused to be produced copies of the examination-in-chief of the same witnesses which had been recorded at a previous trial of a party of Mahomedans, who were opposed to the Hindus in the same riot. These copies were read out to the witnesses, who were then cross-examined by the prisoners, and no objection to this procedure was taken on the prisoners' behalf. The accused were convicted. *Held*, that, although the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was irregular, the irregularity was cured by the provisions of s. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code and of s. 167 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872), as it was not shown that there had been any failure of justice or that the accused had been substantially prejudiced, and as the matters elicited in cross-examination were sufficient to sustain the conviction. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NAND RAM*

I. L. R. 9 All. 609

42. *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 203—"Examining"—Written complaint attested by complainant on oath—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 537.* Where a deposition in the shape of a complaint is made orally or in writing and is sworn to, the requirements of s. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code in regard to the examination of the complainant are sufficiently satisfied. *Held*, therefore, where a Magistrate dismissed a complaint of criminal breach of trust without examining the complainant on oath, but after the complainant had sworn to the truth of the matters alleged in the complaint, that the provisions of s. 203 had been sufficiently complied with, and, if not, that the irregularity was covered by the terms of s. 537. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MURPHY*

I. L. R. 9 All. 666

43. *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 268, 428, 537—Material irregularity—Assessors, statement of deceased person not proved in presence of.* Where in a trial for murder held with assessors the Court relied on a statement made by the deceased, and the evidence necessary to prove such statement was not recorded until after the close of the trial and the discharge of the assessors :—*Held*, that this amounted to a material irregularity which was not covered by s. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAM LALL*

I. L. R. 15 All. 136

44. *Irregularity in omitting to call on accused for defence—Criminal*

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Procedure Code (1882), s. 289, s. 423, cl. (d), and s. 537—Misdirection to jury. The formality of calling upon an accused person to enter on his defence under the provisions of s. 289 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not a mere formality, but is an essential part of a criminal trial. Omission to do so occasions a failure of justice, and is not cured by s. 537 of the Code. To allow the jury to pronounce their verdict before the accused is called upon to enter on his defence is a misdirection, though the Judge omits to charge the jury at all. In such a case, cl. (d) of s. 423 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not stand in the way of the Appellate Court's interfering with the verdict of the jury. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. IMAM ALI KHAN alias NATHU KHAN* I. L. R. 23 Cal. 252

45. *Irregularity in omitting to examine witnesses—Trial by jury before Sessions Judge—Verdict of acquittal allowed after examination of some only of the witnesses for the prosecution.* Certain persons were tried in a Sessions Court for the offence of dacoity. Seven witnesses had been examined for the prosecution by the committing Magistrate and were bound over to give evidence at the trial. After five witnesses had been examined, the Judge asked the jury whether they wished to hear any more evidence, and, on their stating that they did not believe the evidence and wished to stop the case, the Judge recorded a verdict of acquittal. *Held*, that the procedure adopted was wrong, and that no final opinion as to the falsehood or insufficiency of the prosecution evidence ought to have been arrived at until the two remaining witnesses had been examined. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMALINGAM*

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 445

46. *Irregularity in recording evidence in summons case—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), ss. 260 (d), 355, and 537—Evidence recorded by Native Magistrate in English.* A Native Sub-Magistrate, who had not been authorized to take down evidence in English, recorded the memorandum of the substance of the evidence taken under s. 355 in that language. *Held*, that there was no provision in the Code prohibiting this procedure, and that, at any rate, it was merely an irregularity which would not vitiate the trial. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GOPAL GOUNDAN*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 269

47. *Right of accused to have witnesses re-summoned and re-heard—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 350 (a), s. 537—Right to have witnesses summoned and re-heard—Irregularity—Refusal to recall witnesses.* An accused person does not lose the right of having the witnesses re-summoned and re-heard under proviso (a), s. 350 of the Criminal Procedure Code, because an interlocutory application for enforcing the attendance of certain witnesses has been made and granted not at the trial, but before the trial and with a view to the trial. S. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot cure the defect in the proceedings by reasons of the Magistrate's refusal to

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re-summon and re-hear the witnesses in contravention of proviso (a), s. 350. *GOMIR SIRDA v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* I. L. R. 25 Cal. 863

2 C. W. N. 465

48. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 283—Material error.* Where the Court, without having first heard the evidence for the prosecution, examines the witnesses for the defence, he commits an irregularity; but if the prisoners are not materially prejudiced thereby, the conviction will not be set aside. *In the matter of TURIBULLAH* 4 C. L. R. 338

49. *Acquittal of accused without consulting assessors—Error or defect in proceedings—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 283, 300.* *Held*, where without asking the opinion of the assessors a Court of Session acquitted an accused person, after his defence had been heard, that such omission, although a serious irregularity, was not such an error or defect in the proceedings as was, with reference to the provisions of ss. 283 and 300 of Act X of 1872, a ground for revisional interference. *In the matter of the petition of NARAIN DAS* I. L. R. 1 All. 610

50. *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 289, 537—"No evidence"—Acquittal of accused without taking opinions of assessors.* The words "there is no evidence" in s. 289 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, cannot be extended to mean *no satisfactory, trustworthy, or conclusive evidence*; but the third paragraph of the section means that if at a certain stage of a sessions trial the Court is satisfied that there is not on the record any evidence which, even if it were perfectly true, would amount to legal proof of the offence charged, then the Court has power, without consulting the assessors, to record a finding of not guilty. But if a Court acts only because it considers the evidence for the prosecution unsatisfactory, untrustworthy, or inconclusive, it acts without jurisdiction, and its order discharging the accused is illegal. Even if not illegal for want of jurisdiction, such action is a serious irregularity, which may, or perhaps must, have caused a failure of justice within the meaning of s. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *In the matter of the petition of Narain Das*, I. L. R. 1 All. 610, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MUNNA LALL* I. L. R. 10 All. 414

51. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 537 and s. 310—Charge of previous conviction joined with theft in jury case.* Where in a trial by jury the Sessions Judge call upon the accused to answer at the same time a charge of theft and also a charge of having been previously convicted, the High Court refused to interfere, it not appearing that a failure of justice had been caused by the irregularity. *BEPIN BEHARY SHAHA v. EMPRESS* 13 C. L. R. 110

52. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 537—Omission to read over charge.* An omission to read and explain the charge to the prisoner, *held* not, under the circumstances,

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to prejudice the prisoner, and therefore to be immaterial. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. APPA SUBHANA MENDEE* . . . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 200

53. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 537 and s. 195—Irregularity in criminal case—Prosecution of witness for disobedience to summons without sanction.* Where a witness was prosecuted for disobedience to a summons without sanction previously obtained under s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court refused to interfere, there being no evidence that the want of sanction had occasioned a failure of justice. *KALLY MOHUN MOOKERJEE v. EMPRESS* . . . 13 C. L. R. 117

54. *Re-trial—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 530 (1872, s. 34), s. 403—Acquittal—Interference of the High Court.* Where an offence is tried by a Court without jurisdiction, the proceedings are void under s. 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Act X of 1882, and the offender, if acquitted, is liable to be re-tried under s. 403. It is, therefore, not necessary for the High Court to upset the acquittal before the re-trial can be had. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HUSSEIN GAIBU* . . . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 307

55. *Summary trial—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 34—Trying summarily case which ought not to have been so tried.* A Magistrate having adopted the summary procedure prescribed by Ch. XVIII, Criminal Procedure Code, in the case of an offence which he had no power to try summarily, the High Court set aside the proceedings as being void under s. 34, cl. 4, of that Code. *In the matter of the petition of KHETTER MOHUN CHOWRUNGHEE* . . . 22 W. R. Cr. 43

See *QUEEN v. JODOONATH SHAHA*.

23 W. R. Cr. 33

See *CHUNDER SEEKOR SOOKUL v. DHURM NATH TEWARIE* . . . 1 C. L. R. 434

56. *Trial without Complaint.* Where there was irregularity in the preliminary proceedings, there having been no complaint as provided by the Procedure Code, the Court set aside the proceedings, though the amount of punishment would not be affected by the defect. *QUEEN v. MAHIM CHANDRA CHUKERBUTTY*

5 B. L. R. A. Cr. 67

57. *Criminal Procedure in the Laccadive Islands—Irregularity in criminal trial—Scheduled District Act (XIV of 1874), ss. 1 to 7 and 11—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 1, 2—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 1—Laws Local Extent Act (XV of 1874), ss. 3, 4.* The Scheduled Districts Act having been extended to the Laccadive Islands, but no notifications having been made under that Act with regard to the criminal law to be administered there, the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code are in force. Accordingly, where the Sub-Collector of Malabar, as such, tried and sentenced certain persons on one of the Laccadive Islands, not observing the proce-

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dures prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code:—*Held*, that the proceedings were void and should be quashed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHERIA KOYA* . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 353

58. *Transfer of criminal case—Irregularity in criminal trial—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 192—Case transferred after the evidence for the prosecution has been recorded and heard by different Magistrate on that evidence.* A Magistrate to whose Court a case under s. 355 of the Penal Code had been transferred at a stage when all the evidence for the prosecution had been taken did not re-summon the witnesses for the prosecution, but proceeded to act on their evidence as if it had been taken before himself. *Held*, that, whether such procedure amounted to an irregularity or illegality or not, it was sufficiently prejudicial to the accused to warrant the conviction being quashed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BASHIR KHAN*

I. L. R. 14 All. 343

See *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RADHE*.

I. L. R. 12 All. 66

59. *Application for transfer—Adjournment of case—Ground for adjournment—Order of transfer by High Court brought to notice of Court by telegram to vakil—Absence of witnesses—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), ss. 344, 526, and 526A.* The trial of a charge under s. 193, Penal Code, was fixed for the November sessions, but on the 17th October 1895, on prisoner's application, the trial was adjourned to the 2nd December 1895. On 20th November, the prisoner's vakil put in a petition, alleging that he had moved the High Court for a transfer, of the case. On this petition coming on for disposal, the prisoner's vakil moved orally for an adjournment under s. 526A, Criminal Procedure Code, which was refused. On the 30th November, the prisoner's vakil put in a petition, in which he prayed for an adjournment under s. 526A. This petition was refused, and the trial began on the 2nd December, and judgment was written and pronounced on the 5th December. In the meantime, an application had been made to the High Court for a transfer, and that petition was disposed of on the 4th December by an order granting the transfer prayed, the High Court apparently being not aware that the trial was at that time proceeding before the Sessions Court. On the 5th December, after the trial in the Sessions Court was concluded, and before judgment was delivered, a fresh petition was presented for an adjournment on the ground that a telegram had been received from the High Court transferring the case, but the Sessions Judge refused to act upon it in the absence of orders from the High Court, and delivered judgment convicting the prisoner. During the trial before the Sessions Court, the prisoner applied for an adjournment on the ground that two witnesses for the defence were absent, one being too ill to attend, the other not having been served with the summons; but the Sessions Judge, considering the application was made merely for purposes of delay and to defeat the ends of justice,

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and that their evidence would not be material, refused to adjourn the case for their evidence to be recorded. *Held*, that s. 526A, Criminal Procedure Code, is imperative, but that the object of ss. 344 and 526, when read together, is merely to give a party reasonable time to move the High Court and obtain its orders; and that in the present case there was sufficient time for such application to have been made, if due diligence had been observed. *Held*, also that the order for transfer made on the 4th December, which, in fact, did not reach the Judge till after judgment was pronounced, did not vitiate the proceedings; and that the Sessions Judge was not wrong in refusing to adjourn the case on the strength of a telegram said to have been received by prisoner's vakil stating that the High Court has ordered a transfer. *Held*, further, that the Sessions Judge ought not to have refused to adjourn the case in order to obtain the evidence of the two absent witnesses, and that their evidence was material and must be recorded and certified to the High Court under s. 428, Criminal Procedure Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. VIRASAMI*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 875

60. ——— Commitment—Criminal Procedure Code, Act X of 1882, s. 531 and s. 177—*Trial in a wrong Sessions division—Jurisdiction.* The order of a Magistrate committing a case to the Court of Session is an order of a Criminal Court within the meaning of s. 531 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (X of 1882). If such an order, contrary to the requirements of s. 177, directs the commitment to be made to a Court of Session which has no territorial jurisdiction, it is not to be set aside unless it appears that the error occasioned a failure of justice. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. THAKU*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 312

61. ——— Jurisdiction—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 530, cl. (p)—*Offence originally cognizable by a second class Magistrate subsequently non-cognizable by reason of an aggravating circumstance—Duty of inferior Court.* The accused were charged before a Magistrate of the second class with causing grievous hurt as members of an unlawful assembly under ss. 149 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code. The evidence showed that one of the accused had used an axe in causing the hurt. The Magistrate apparently ignored this fact, and he convicted the accused under s. 325 of the Code. The accused appealed. The District Magistrate who heard one appeal and the first class Magistrate who heard the rest of the appeals, were both of opinion that the offence committed by the accused was one of causing grievous hurt with a dangerous weapon within the meaning of s. 326 of the Penal Code, and as such beyond the jurisdiction of the second class Magistrate. But they did not think it proper under the circumstances of the case to quash the convictions. The Sessions Judge, on examining the record of the case, was of opinion that, as the offence committed by the accused was not cognizable by the trying Magistrate, his proceedings were void *ab initio* under s. 530 of the Cri-

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iminal Procedure Code. He, therefore, referred the case to the High Court, and recommended that the convictions under s. 325 should be set aside. *Held*, that the proceedings before the second class Magistrate were not void *ab initio*, as he had jurisdiction to try the accused for offences punishable under ss. 149 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code, with which they were originally charged. *Held*, also, that, though it was the duty of the trying Magistrate, when the evidence disclosed a circumstance of aggravation, such as the use of a dangerous weapon, which made the offence cognizable by a higher Court, to adopt the proper procedure to send the case to the higher Court, still it was not necessary to quash the proceedings, as the accused were not in any way prejudiced, and the sentences were not inadequate. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GUNDYA*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 502

62. ——— Irregularity—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 4, 530, and 537—*Third class Magistrate taking cognizance of case on receipt of a yadast from a revenue officer and convicting accused without examining complainant.* A revenue officer sent a yadast to a third class Magistrate, charging a certain person with having disobeyed a summons issued by the revenue officer. The third class Magistrate thereupon tried and convicted the accused under s. 174 of the Penal Code. The District Magistrate referred the case on the ground that the conviction was bad under s. 530 (k) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Held*, that, as the yadast amounted to a complaint within the meaning of s. 4, although the complainant was not examined on oath as required by s. 200, the conviction was not illegal. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MONU*

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 443

63. ——— Irregularity in criminal trial—Prisoner charged with two offences, one of which was committed outside jurisdiction—Objection to jurisdiction taken before Magistrate and in Sessions Court—Criminal Procedure Code (X of 1882), ss. 531, 532. The accused was charged under s. 498 of the Penal Code (XLV of 1860) with having enticed away a married woman, and under s. 497 with having committed adultery. The woman alleged to have been enticed away resided in Bombay, but the alleged adultery took place at Khandala outside the jurisdiction. At the enquiry before the Magistrate in Bombay, objection was taken as to his jurisdiction with regard to the charge of adultery. The Magistrate, however, overruled the objections and committed the accused for trial. At the trial an application was made, on behalf of the accused, under s. 532 of the Criminal Procedure Code (X of 1882) that the commitment should be quashed and a fresh enquiry directed on the ground that an objection had been taken to the Magistrate's jurisdiction. *Held*, refusing the application, that the commitment being an order (see *Queen-Empress v. Thaku*, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 312) under s. 531 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the commitment should not be quashed unless a failure of justice would be caused by proceeding with the trial. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. INGLE*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 200

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS—contd.

64. ————— *Irregularity in Commitment—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), ss. 532 and 537—Commitment to Sessions Court by Magistrate having no jurisdiction over place where alleged offence was committed.* A Magistrate who commits a case for trial by a Sessions Court does so in the exercise of powers duly conferred upon him, and the fact that he had no territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged offence was committed, and that an objection to the committal on this ground was taken before the commitment, is no ground for the Court to which the commitment is made quashing it under s. 532 nor under s. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Queen-Empress v. Ingle, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 200*, followed. *QUEEN-EMPREESS v. ABBU REDDI*

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 402

65. ————— *Stay of criminal proceedings pending civil litigation—Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 278—Inquiry into claim to attached property—Subsequent civil suit by claimant to establish his right to the property—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 478.* It is not an invariable rule that criminal proceedings should be stayed during the pendency of civil litigation regarding the same subject-matter. Certain property was attached in execution of a decree. Thereupon accused No. 1 applied to have the attachment raised on the ground that he had purchased the property from the judgment-debtor under a sale-deed executed long before the date of the attachment. In the summary inquiry, which was made under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), he produced the sale-deed, and accused No. 2 was called as his witness and supported his claim. The Subordinate Judge found that the deed was a forgery and rejected the claim. Proceeding then under s. 478 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), he held the inquiry directed by that section, and committed both the accused to the Sessions Court on charges of perjury and forgery. During the pendency of the inquiry under s. 478, the accused No. 1 filed a civil suit to establish the genuineness of the sale-deed and set aside the attachment. He also applied to the High Court to quash the commitment or stay the criminal proceedings, pending the disposal of the civil suit. *Held*, refusing the application, that the mere fact that a regular suit was filed to establish the genuineness of the sale-deed was not a sufficient ground for quashing the commitment, or for adjourning the trial pending the hearing of the civil suit. *In re DEVI VALAD BHAVANI I. L. R. 18 Bom. 581*

66. ————— *Power of the High Court to stay proceedings before Magistrate pending a civil suit.* *Per RAMPINI, J.*—The High Court has no power to direct that criminal proceedings in the Court of a Magistrate should be stayed, until the disposal of a civil suit, in which the question at issue in the criminal proceedings shall have been decided. *In the matter of Ram Prosad Hazra, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 426*, followed. It is very doubtful if the High Court has any power to pass an

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order quashing the proceedings before a Magistrate. No section of the Criminal Procedure Code expressly authorizes the High Court to quash pending proceedings. *Per GHOSE, J.*—A proceeding in a Criminal Court should not, as a general rule, be stayed pending the decision of the civil suit in regard to the same subject-matter; but ordinarily it is not desirable, if the parties to the two proceedings are substantially the same, and the prosecution is but a private prosecution, and the issues in the two Courts are substantially identical, that both the cases should go on at one and the same time. It is open to the Magistrate, having regard to the facts of the case before him, to consider whether it is not desirable that the proceedings in his Court should be stayed, till the decision of the civil suit or for a limited period of time; and it is also open to him to put the defendant on terms as to appearance or otherwise, if he does stay proceedings. The High Court has the power to order a Magistrate to stay proceedings in his Court, if a sufficient cause in that behalf is made out. But inasmuch as the Legislature has given him the power to regulate the proceedings in his own Court, the direction should ordinarily be left to him either to stay proceedings or not as he, in the circumstances of each case, may think right and proper. *RAJ KUMARI DEBI v. BAMA SUNDARI DEBI*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 610

67. ————— *Stay of, pending civil suit.* Upon an application in revision to stay criminal proceedings pending in a Magistrate's Court, until the disposal of a civil suit in regard to the same subject-matter: *Held*,—that the High Court ought not to interfere except on good cause shown. That, as this was not a private prosecution but one directed by the District Judge in what he believed to be the interests of justice, and as the witnesses were related to the accused, it was desirable that the evidence should be recorded without delay and that the Magistrate should proceed forthwith to make the preliminary inquiry prior to commitment. *DWARAKA NATH RAI CHOWDHRY v. EMPEROR (1904)*

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 858

68. ————— *Stay of proceedings—Duty of Magistrate receiving reliable, though not official, information that proceedings are stayed.* When a rule is issued by the High Court and proceedings stayed, Magistrates, on receiving reliable information thereof, should stay their hands then and there. So where it was brought to the notice of the Magistrate by the muktear for the accused who had received telegrams from counsel and vakil, informing him of the issue of the rule directing stay of proceedings by the High Court, and the Magistrate refused to look at the telegrams and to stay proceedings, but on the other hand proceeded with the enquiry, it was held that the Magistrate had acted improperly, that he should not have proceeded with the enquiry, and in case he entertained any doubt as to authenticity of the telegrams, the proper course for him was to send a

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telegram to the Registrar of the High Court to ascertain the truth. *RATNESSARI PERSHAD NARAYAN SINGH v. EMPRESS* . . . 2 C. W. N. 498

See *ANANT RAM MARWARI v. MANSOOR ROY* . . . 2 C. W. N. 639

69. ———— *Impropriety of applications for stay of proceedings, on the pretence of moving the High Court for transfer.* Observations with regard to the impropriety of applications for the stay of proceedings on the ground of moving the High Court for transfer, when the applicant has no such intention. *GUNAMONY SAPU v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . 3 C. W. N. 758

70. ———— *Adoption by Sessions Judge of wrong procedure—Trial with jury instead of assessors—Rejection of confessional statement without enquiry under s. 533, Criminal Procedure Code—Charge under Penal Code, ss. 595, 596 and 412—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 164, 307—Procedure of High Court on reference under s. 307.* Ten persons were committed to a Sessions Court charged with offences under the Penal Code, ss. 395 and 396, and some of them were also charged with offences under s. 412. One of the accused had made a confessional statement before the Magistrate who recorded it, but did not make on it a memorandum to the effect stated in Criminal Procedure Code, s. 164, and did not admit it in evidence for the reasons that the accused was produced from the custody of the police in which he had been detained for five days, and there was a proposal on the part of the police to treat him as an approver. It appeared that a perusal of the preliminary register would have shown that the accused were either guilty under s. 396 or not guilty under s. 395 at all. The accused were tried by the Sessions Judge with a jury. The confessional statement was not admitted in evidence. The jury found the accused not guilty of dacoity, but the Judge, disagreeing with the verdict, referred the case to the High Court under Criminal Procedure Code, s. 307. *Held*, (i) that the procedure adopted by the Judge was wrong, and that he should have tried the accused with the aid of assessors under Indian Penal Code, s. 396; (ii) that the Judge should have enquired under Criminal Procedure Code, s. 533, whether the confessional statement had been duly made; and (iii) that, under the circumstances, the High Court should determine on the evidence on record, after giving due weight to the opinions of the Judge and the jury, whether the accused were guilty under s. 395. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ANGA VALAYAN* . . . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 15

71. ———— *Right to institute prosecution—Convicted person.* There is no rule that a convicted person cannot institute criminal proceedings. *QUEEN v. MADHUB CHUNDER GIRI* . . . 21 W. R. Cr. 13

72. ———— *Suit in Civil Court.* Civil proceedings do not constitute a bar to a prosecution in a Criminal Court. *MADHUB KYBURTHO v. KESHUB SINGH* . . . 9 W. R. Cr. 22

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73. ———— *Perjury or forgery committed in a civil suit. Stay of criminal proceedings pending civil suit—Sanction to prosecution.* Criminal Proceedings for perjury or forgery arising out of a civil litigation should not, as a rule, go on during the pendency of the litigation. *In re NANA MAHARAJ* . . . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 729

74. ———— *Sunday—Legality of proceedings.* Criminal proceedings taken by a Magistrate are not necessarily illegal by reason of having been taken on a Sunday. *In the matter of the petition of SINCLAIR* . . . 6 N. W. 177

75. ———— *Complaint disclosing graver offence—Summary trial—Complaint disclosing facts constituting offence of a graver nature—Process, issue of, for minor offence, if proper—Procedure—Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 260, 530 (g)—Irregularity or illegality—Transfer of a case upon order for re-trial, without issuing a rule.* A Magistrate is bound to proceed and regulate his proceedings at the trial as for the offence made up of the facts complained of, if on the examination of the complainant there is no reason to believe that the complaint is exaggerated or false and process is issued for the attendance of the accused. When a Magistrate deliberately disregards the offence actually complained of, it becomes no question of mere irregularity, but his proceedings are absolutely void under the provisions of s. 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court, without issuing a rule, directed a transfer of the case to some other Magistrate, in ordering re-trial. *KAILASH CHUNDER PAL v. JOYNUDDI* (1900) . . . 5 C. W. N. 252

76. ———— *Duty of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure—Procedure in Magistrate's Court—Information filed against an accused, but no summons, issued—Case must be disposed of by Magistrate, although no summons applied for by complainant—Search-warrant—Property seized by police under warrant—Claim by third party—Inquiry by Magistrate as claim of third party—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), s. 523.* Where an information is filed against a person, the Magistrate is bound to dispose of the case, and, if no evidence is offered against the person accused, he must be discharged. The complainant, by omitting to take out a summons against such person, cannot keep a charge hanging over him for an indefinite time. The summons is merely the means of procuring the attendance of the accused; but, if he appears of his own accord without a summons, he is entitled to require that the complaint shall be either proceeded with or dismissed. Where property seized under a search-warrant, the Magistrate must proceed to make inquiry so as to enable him to dispose of it. If a third party appears and alleges that the property seized is his and is not the subject-matter of the offence charged, the Magistrate is bound to hear that party, and, if necessary, restore the property to its owner. Magistrates must.

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take care that the proceedings in their Courts are conducted with such reasonable expedition as will prevent the parties from being improperly harassed by undue delay. *In re Ratanlal Rangildas*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 748, doubted. *In the matter of LAKSHMAN GOVIND NIRGUDE* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 552

77. ————— **Irregularity—Failure to “record reasons” for postponing issue of process and inquiring into case—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 202.** By s. 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code, if a Magistrate is not satisfied as to the truth of an offence, he may, when the complainant has been examined, “record his reasons, and may then postpone the issue of process” and inquire into the case. *Held*, that the failure on the part of a Magistrate to record his reasons is at most an irregularity, and, unless it in fact occasions a failure of justice, is not a ground for setting aside his order. *KING-EMPEROR v. ALA-GARISAMI PATHAN* (1901) I. L. R. 25 Mad. 546

78. ————— **Misjoinder—Joint trial—Misjoinder of parties—Discharge of accused on ground of misjoinder by Sessions Judge—Direction that accused be re-tried—Jurisdiction—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 233, 239, 423 and 537—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 411, 414 and 109.** M and K were convicted at the same trial of receiving stolen property, namely, currency notes, as well as of assisting in concealing or disposing of such notes, which they knew or had reason to believe were stolen property. Each of them was charged with the same offences only in respect of a currency note of Rs. 500, but in respect of the charges on two other notes of Rs. 100 each the charges against each of them related only to one of these notes. *Held*, that there had been a misjoinder of parties, the transactions being altogether separate and distinct against each of them. *Held*, further, that the Sessions Judge, in discharging one of the accused on the ground of misjoinder of parties, had power to add to that order a direction that the accused should be re-tried. It was not obligatory on him to leave to the discretion of the Magistrate the course which should be taken in such a matter, and it was not intended by the order of discharge in the case of *Queen-Empress v. Chandi Singh*, I. L. R. 14 Cal. 395, to free the accused in that case from the consequences of his acts or to declare that no order for re-trial could be passed in such a case. *Queen-Empress v. Fakirapa*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 491, and *Empress of India v. Murari*, I. L. R. 4 All. 147, referred to. *KUMUDINI KANTA GUHA v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Cal. 104

79. ————— **Necessity for charge, finding and sentence—Insolvency Act (11 & 12 Vict., c. 21), ss. 47 and 50—Offence under s. 50 a criminal offence—Charge, etc., must be framed to sustain conviction and sentence—Opposing creditors—Grounds of opposition should be stated in clear terms—Practice—Procedure.** Insolvents were found guilty,

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under s. 50 of the Indian Insolvent Act, of wilfully preventing or purposely withholding the production of certain papers relating to their affairs, and sentenced to three months' imprisonment. *Held*, that the proceedings, so far as they resulted in imprisonment, amounted to a criminal case. *Held*, further, following *ex parte Van Sandau*, 1 Phillips 445, that “in all criminal cases it is necessary that there should be a charge, a finding and a conviction, as a foundation for the sentence”; and that, as there was no charge, the order for imprisonment was wrongly made. S. 47 of the Insolvency Act provides the machinery by which the grounds of opposition to a debtor's discharge may be inquired into and precisely defined before the hearing. *In re VALLABHDAS JAIRAM* (1903)

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 394

80. ————— **Powers of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 530—Trial of an accused by Magistrate not empowered by law—Charge of giving false evidence under s. 193, Indian Penal Code—Trial by First-class Magistrate though facts disclosed offence under s. 194 as well—Jurisdiction.** Certain witnesses made statements in a preliminary inquiry before a Magistrate, in a case of alleged murder, and contradicted those statements at the trial before the Court of Session. The latter then sanctioned their prosecution for giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding, an offence punishable under s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and triable by a Magistrate of the first class. The Deputy Magistrate, by whom they were tried, convicted them, and the accused appealed, the appeals being transferred to another Sessions Court for hearing. The Sessions Judge held that, inasmuch as the false statements had been made in connection with a charge of murder, the offence for which the accused should have been tried fell under s. 194, Indian Penal Code, and that, in consequence, they could be tried only by a Court of Session, and not by a Magistrate of the first class. He considered their trial by a first class Magistrate to be void under s. 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and set aside their conviction, committing one of them for trial by a Court of Session on a charge under s. 194 of the Indian Penal Code, and making no order in respect of the other accused, as he considered the imprisonment already undergone was sufficient. *Held*, that the order was wrong, as the proceedings of the First-class Magistrate were not void within the meaning of s. 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Queen-Empress v. Gundya*, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 502, referred to. *KING-EMPEROR v. AYYAN* (1901)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 675

81. ————— **Proceedings in wrong place—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 531.** S. 531 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies to a case where a Magistrate who has authority to commit a case for trial does so, but has not territorial jurisdiction in the place where the offence to be tried is alleged to have been committed. *RAYAN KUTTI v. EMPEROR* (1903)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 640

CRIMINAL RASHNESS OR NEGLIGENCE.

See DEATH BY RASH OR NEGLIGENT ACT.
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 302

CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION.

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF.
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 30

See JURISDICTION.

Practice—Criminal revisional jurisdiction—Concurrent jurisdiction of District Magistrate, Sessions Judge and High Court—Application to be made to former first for reference to High Court—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 435, 438, 439. The High Court refused to entertain an application for the revision of an order of a first-class Magistrate against which no application had been previously made to the Sessions Judge with a view to his referring the matter to the High Court. The practice of first applying to the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate should be followed in all cases where they have concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court, even when such jurisdiction is not final. *Queen-Empress v. Reolah*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 887, relied on. *In re BHUYAN ABDUS SOBHAN KHAN* (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 753

CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES . . . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 536

See JURISDICTION I. L. R. 36 Calc. 833

See PENAL CODE, ss. 441, 442, 447.

See PENAL CODE . . . 8 C. W. N. 305

See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.
I. L. R. 2 All. 101

See THEFT . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 388, 402

1. ———— Penal Code, s. 441—*Intention to annoy*. To bring an act of trespass within the meaning of the Penal Code, s. 441, the entry upon the land must be with the intent to annoy, which means with the purpose of annoying the person in possession. *In the matter of the petition of SHIB NATH BANERJEE* . . . 24 W. R. Cr. 58

2. ———— *Intention to annoy*
—*Being on land in assertion of title*. Where the trespass (if any) was not committed with the intent to commit an offence, or intimidate, insult, or annoy the persons in possession, but in the *bona fide* assertion of a claim of title, this does not amount to criminal trespass. *QUEEN v. SEITH ROSHUN LAL* . . . 2 N. W. 82

3. ———— *Intention to annoy*
—*Causing loss or injury*. A built a hut on portion of certain disputed land to which he laid claim and was, on the prosecution of another claimant to the land, convicted of criminal trespass under s. 441 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the conviction was

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bad, as in erecting the hut it was not the intention of the accused to annoy. Loss or injury would naturally cause annoyance, but not the kind of annoyance contemplated by s. 441 of the Penal Code. *SHUMBHU NATH SARKAR v. RAM KAMAL GUHA* . . . 13 C. L. R. 212

4. ———— *Intention to annoy*
—*Enclosing and cultivating portion of burial-ground*. Defendant was convicted of criminal trespass for having enclosed and commenced to cultivate a portion of a burial-ground. *Held*, that the conviction was right. The person (corporate) in possession of the burial-ground is the portion of the public entitled to use the burial-ground, and the act of ploughing up the burial-ground was evidence of intent to annoy such person, the defendant not being one of the portion of the public entitled to its use. ANONYMOUS . . . 6 Mad. Ap. 25

5. ———— *Intention to annoy*
—*Taking portion of public foot-path as one's own land*. Defendant was convicted of criminal trespass for including in his own land a portion of a public foot-path. *Held*, that, as the public generally were entitled to the use of the foot-path, there was no illegal entry of the defendant on property in the possession of another with intent to annoy the person in possession, and consequently that the defendant was wrongly convicted. ANONYMOUS . . . 6 Mad. Ap. 26

6. ———— Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 341, 352, 448—*Wrongful restraint, house-trespass, and assault—Entry into premises purchased at a Sheriff's sale, whether lawful*. That the entry by a person into premises purchased by him at a Sheriff's sale for the purpose of acquiring possession is not an unlawful entry within the meaning of s. 441 of the Penal Code. *CHAROO CHUNDER MUTTY LALL v. QUEEN-EMPRESS. HOSSENEE v. SARAT CHANDRA HALDAR* . . . 4 C. W. N. 47

7. ———— *Intention to annoy*
—*Person not in actual possession of house*. For a legal conviction under s. 441, of the Penal Code of criminal trespass, there must be an intention to intimidate, insult, or annoy a person in actual possession. To enter a house where the owner is only in constructive possession is not sufficient. *ISWAR CHUNDER KARMAKAR v. SITAL DAS MITTER* . . . 8 B. L. R. Ap. 62

S. C. ISHUR CHUNDER KARMAKAR v. SEETUL DOSS MITTER . . . 17 W. R. Cr. 47

QUEEN v. KALINATH NAG CHOWDHRY . . . 9. W. R. Cr. 1

QUEEN v. CHOORAMONI SANT . . . 14 W. R. Cr. 25

8. ———— *Intention to annoy*
—*Forcible entry*. A person who forcibly enters upon property in the possession of another, and erects a building thereon, or does any other act with intent to annoy the person so in possession, is guilty of criminal trespass within the meaning of

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s. 441 of the Penal Code, without reference to the question in whom the title to the land may ultimately be found. *QUEEN v. RAM DYAL MUNDLE* 7 W. R. Cr. 28

9. ————— *Land dispute—Title to land, failure to prove.* *Held*, by JACKSON, J. (setting aside the order of the Magistrate; MARKBY, J., dissenting), that a Magistrate ought not to decline to go into a case of criminal trespass under s. 441 of the Penal Code? because the complainant did not make out his title to the land: the offence may be committed in respect of property in a person's possession, even though such possession may not have originated in right. *QUEEN v. SURWAN SINGH* 11 W. R. Cr. 11

10. ————— *Entry into family dwelling-house.* Entrance of a member of a Hindu joint family into the family dwelling-house is not criminal trespass. The entry of a stranger into a family dwelling-house, with the permission and license of one of the members, is not criminal trespass. *In the matter of the petition of PRANKRISHNA CHANDRA* 6 B. L. R. Ap. 80

FRANKRISTO CHUNDER, v. BISSONATH CHUNDER 15 W. R. Cr. 6

11. ————— *Entry into market with intention to avoid payment of market dues.* Entry of a local fund market with intent to evade payment of market dues is not a criminal trespass. *QUEEN v. VARTHAPPA* 1 I. L. R. 5 Mad. 382

12. ————— *Unlawful entry to exhibition building.* Where the accused secretly entered an exhibition building without having purchased a ticket, and was there apprehended—*Held*, that such entry, when unaccompanied by any of the intents specified in s. 441 of the Penal Code, did not amount to criminal trespass or any other criminal offence. *REG. v. MEHERVANJI BEJANJI* 6 Bom. Cr. 6

13. ————— *Entry in property and cutting trees.* The entry by one man on another's property, accompanied by the cutting down of trees on that property, is criminal trespass. *QUEEN v. JEENUT BEBEE* 1 W. R. Cr. 46

14. ————— *Entering on land after decree giving another possession.* Accused was ejman of complainant's family. Complainant obtained a decree setting aside an alienation made by accused. In execution, complainant obtained possession from the alienee. The accused entered on this land. *Held*, that he had not committed the offence of criminal trespass. *ANONYMOUS* 6 Mad. Ap. 19

15. ————— *Re-entry into, or remaining on, land from which person has been ejected by civil process.* Certain immovable property was the joint undivided property of C, G, and a certain other person. R obtained a decree against G, for the possession of such property, and such property was delivered to him in the execution of that decree in accordance with the provisions of

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s. 264 of Act X of 1877. C, in good faith, with the intention of asserting her right, and without any intention to intimidate, insult, or annoy R, or to commit an offence, and G, in like manner, with the intention of asserting the right of his co-owners, remained on such property. *Held*, that, under such circumstances, they could not be convicted of criminal trespass. Re-entry into or remaining upon land from which a person has been ejected by civil process, or of which possession has been given to another for the purpose of asserting rights he may have solely or jointly with other persons, is not criminal trespass, unless the intent to commit an offence, or to intimidate, insult, or annoy, is conclusively proved. *In the matter of the petition of GOBIND PRASAD* 1 I. L. R. 2 All. 495

19. ————— *Entry on land in exercise of claim of right—Mischief.* If a person enters on land in the possession of another in the exercise of a *bona fide* claim of right, and without any intention to intimidate, insult, or annoy such other person, or to commit an offence, then, though he may have no right to the land, he cannot be convicted of criminal trespass. So, also, if a person deals injuriously with property in the *bona fide* belief that it is his own, he cannot be convicted of mischief. The mere assertion, however, in such cases of a claim of right is not in itself a sufficient answer to charges of criminal trespass and mischief. It is the duty of the Criminal Court to determine what was the intention of the alleged offender, and if it arrives at the conclusion that he was not acting in the exercise of a *bona fide* claim of right, then it cannot refuse to convict the offender, assuming that the other facts are established which constitute the offence. *EMPEROR OF INDIA, v. BUDH SINGH* 1 I. L. R. 2 All. 101

17. ————— *Acting in exercise of right of distraint—Rent Act (Beng. Act VIII of 1869), ss. 72, 74, 76.* A, the servant of B, was convicted of criminal trespass in going upon the land of C, one of B's tenants, and preventing him from cutting his crops. B was convicted of abetment of criminal trespass. A and B pleaded that they were acting in the exercise of the legal right of distraint. It appeared that no written demand under s. 72 of the Rent Act (Bengal Act VIII of 1869) for the amount of the arrears, together with an account exhibiting the grounds on which demand had been made, was served on C, and that no written authority under s. 76 had been given by B to A. *Held*, that it lay upon A and B to show that they had conformed to the provisions of the law, or at least had acted with the *bona fide* intention of distraining the complainant's crops; and that the conviction was right. *Held*, also, that as under s. 74 standing crops and ungathered products may, notwithstanding distraint, be reaped and gathered by the cultivator, A had no right, even if he was acting *bona fide*, to restrain C from cutting his crops. *JHUMUK NONIAH v. SHADASHIB ROY* 1 I. L. R. 7 Cal. 26

CRIMINAL TRESPASS—*contd.*

18. ————— *Following up wounded game.* A, who had been warned off the lands of B, subsequently, having shot a deer near the boundary of B's land, and the deer having run on to B's land, followed it on to such land for the purpose of killing it. *Held*, that his doing so was not a criminal trespass. *In the matter of the petition of CHUNDER NARAIN v. FARQUHARSON*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 837

19. ————— *Plying boat for hire near public ferry.* A person plying a boat for hire at a distance of three miles from a public ferry cannot be said, with reference to such ferry, to commit "criminal trespass" within the meaning of that term in s. 441 of the Penal Code. *MUTHRA v. JAWAHIR*

I. L. R. 1 All. 527

20. ————— *Continuing exercise of right of fishery after prohibition.* An act does not amount to criminal trespass under s. 441 of the Penal Code, unless it was committed with an intention of committing some offence, or of intimidating, insulting, or annoying some one. Where a party had been exercising a right of fishery for a considerable time, alleging a prescriptive right, the mere fact of continuing to do so after a notice of prohibition is not criminal trespass. *In the matter of the petition of SHISTIDHUR PARUI*

9 B. L. R. Ap. 19

SRISTEEDHUR PAROEE v. INDROBHOOSUN CHUCKERBUTTY

18 W. R. 25

21. ————— *Infringement of exclusive right of fishery in public river.* The unlawful infringement of a right of exclusive fishery in a part of a public river is not an offence which can be brought within the definition of criminal trespass in the Penal Code. *EMPRESS v. CHARU NAYIAH*

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 354

22. ————— *House trespass—Possession of property the subject of criminal trespass—Penal Code, ss. 441, 442, and 443.* C, a rate-payer in a municipality, who had filed a petition against an assessment which in his absence had been dismissed, entered a room where a Committee of the Municipal Commissioners were seated hearing and deciding petitions in assessment matters, ostensibly with the object of presenting a petition for the revision of his assessment. The Chairman of the Committee ordered him to leave the room, and on his refusal to do so, he was turned out. Outside the room in the verandah, he addressed the crowd complaining that no justice was to be obtained from the Committee. C was prosecuted on these facts at the instance of the Chairman of the Committee, and convicted of house trespass under s. 448 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the conviction was wrong, and that no offence had been committed. The prosecution was bound to prove in order to support a conviction of a charge under s. 441 or s. 442 that the property trespassed upon was at the time in the possession of a complainant who could compound the offence under s. 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the complainant had failed to

CRIMINAL TRESPASS—*contd.*

prove that the room was in his possession, and had in fact shown that he was merely sitting in it with other persons at the invitation and with the consent of the person, whoever he might be, who had the immediate right to such possession. *Held*, further, that even if the complainant could be held to be in possession of the room, there was no evidence of any intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult, or annoy any person, it appearing that the object of the accused in going into and remaining in the room was to endeavour to induce the complainant and his colleagues to reconsider their decision, the verbal insult on which the conviction was based having been uttered after C had left the room. *CHANDI PERSHAD v. EVANS*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 123

23. ————— *Penal Code, ss. 441, 456, 457, and 509—Lurking house trespass by night—Intrusion on privacy—Intention—Charge, form of—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), ss. 221, 222, and 537.* A conviction for lurking house trespass by night under s. 456 of the Penal Code is not bad for want of the specification of the intention in the charge, but one under s. 457 cannot be sustained without such specification. In a charge under the former section, though a guilty intention must be proved, it is not necessary to prove which of the several guilty intentions the accused had; it will be enough if it is shown that the intention must have been one or other of those specified in s. 441, though it may not be certain which it was. An accused person, the landlord of a house in which he occupied the lower flat, was found in the middle of the night in the room of the complainant, one of his tenants, upstairs, in which the complainant and his wife were at the time sleeping. Upon being detected, the accused was subjected to very severe statement, but did not utter a word of protestation of innocence or make any show of remonstrance, and when questioned said, "I have committed a fault, pardon me." He was arrested upon a charge under s. 456 of the Penal Code, the criminal intention alleged being that of committing theft. The charge framed by the Magistrate did not specify any intention, and the Magistrate came to the conclusion that the trespass was not committed by the accused, who was a wealthy man with that intention. He found, however, that the complainant had suppressed some important facts, and that he was not in his wife's room when the accused entered it, and relying on the decision in *Koilash Chandra Chakrabarty v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 657, he convicted the accused. On appeal, the Sessions Judge, though finding that the Magistrate's views were against the evidence, upheld the conviction without finding what specifically was the intention with which the entry was made. In revision, it was contended that the conviction was bad (i) because no guilty intention was set out in the charge; (ii) because no such intention was proved by the evidence; and (iii) because no such intention was specifically found by the Sessions Judge. *Held*, that the first contention

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was not sustainable for the reasons above stated. Even if it had been necessary to specify the intention in the charge, it would have to be shown under the provisions of s. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the omission had occasioned a failure of justice, and, having regard to the nature of the charge and the line of defence adopted, the accused had not in any way been prejudiced in his defence. *Held*, as regards the second contention, that though it was not certain what the precise intention of the accused was in committing the trespass, it was clear that it must have been with one or other of the intentions specified in s. 441 of the Penal Code, as, judging from the time, the place, and manner in which the trespass was committed and the conduct of the accused when discovered, it was impossible to suppose that the trespass could have been committed either unintentionally or with any innocent intention, and that it must have been committed with the intention of committing some offence, but that the accused was entitled to have it taken that it was with the least possible culpable intention, namely, an offence under s. 509 of the Penal Code. *Held*, as regards the third contention, that in exercising its powers under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is open to the High Court to alter any finding and confirm a conviction, and that, if the evidence on the record in a case be sufficient to warrant a conviction, the Court would not be justified in setting such conviction aside, merely because the view taken of the evidence by the lower Court is not sustainable, or some fact which ought to have been found by that Court is not found, or found incorrectly. *BALMAKAND RAM v. GHAN-SAMRAM* . . . I. L. R. 22 Cal. 391

24. ————— Penal Code, s. 443—*Disobedience of illegal order of Municipal Commissioners*. The accused were convicted of criminal trespass under s. 443 of the Penal Code, for driving their carts across an open green in violation of an order issued by the Municipal Commissioners. *Held*, that there was nothing to show that the Municipal Commissioners had authority to issue such an order, and that the breach of it was not criminally punishable. *ANONYMOUS* . . . 5 Mad. Ap. 38

25. ————— Penal Code, s. 447—*Cultivating waste land in village*. The defendant was convicted, under s. 447 of the Penal Code, for cultivating village waste land which he had been ordered by the Subordinate Collector to refrain from cultivating. The High Court upheld the conviction. *ANONYMOUS* . . . 5 Mad. Ap. 17

26. ————— Penal Code, ss. 441 and 466—*House-breaking by night—Intent*. When a stranger, uninvited and without any right to be there, effects an entry in the middle of the night into the sleeping apartment of a woman, a member of a respectable household, and, when an attempt is made to capture him, uses great violence in his efforts to make good his escape, a Court should presume that the entry was made with an intent such as is provided for by s. 441 of the Penal Code. An accused person in the middle of the night effect-

CRIMINAL TRESPASS—*contd.*

ed an entry into a house occupied by two widows, members of a respectable family. On an alarm being given and an attempt made to capture him, he made use of great violence and effected his escape. Upon these facts he was charged with offences under ss. 456 and 323 of the Penal Code. The defence set up was an *alibi*, which was disbelieved by both the lower Courts. Neither Court found specially what was the intention with which the accused entered the house, but it was suggested that it was probably for the purpose of prosecuting an intrigue with one of the women. There was no evidence that he had been invited by her to go there. The lower Courts convicted the accused under s. 456. It was contended that, as the prosecution had failed to prove that the entry was made with intent to commit any offence, the conviction was illegal. *Held*, that, under the circumstances of the case, the Court ought to presume that the entry was effected with such intent as is provided for by s. 441, and that the conviction should be upheld. *In the matter of the petition of KOILASH CHANDRA CHAKRABARTY. KOILASH CHANDRA CHAKRABARTY v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* I. L. R. 16 Cal. 657

27. ————— During the pendency of a civil suit, certain persons, on behalf of the plaintiff, went on to the premises belonging to the defendant for the purpose of making a survey and for getting materials for a hostile application against the defendant. They went (some of them armed) without the permission of the defendant, and in his absence and when the defendant's servant objected to their action, they persisted in their trespass and endeavour to prevent opposition by making false statements as to the authority under which they were acting. *Held*, that their actions amounted to criminal trespass. *GOLAP PANDEY v. BODDAM* . . . I. L. R. 16 Cal. 715

28. ————— Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 441, 456, and 509—*House breaking by night—Intent—Intrusion upon privacy*. The accused in the middle of the night effected an entry into a room occupied by four women. On an alarm being given, and an attempt made to capture him, he escaped. He was charged with an offence under s. 456 of the Penal Code. The defence set up was disbelieved by both the lower Courts. Neither Court found specifically what was the intention with which the accused entered the room, but it was suggested that it was probably for the purpose of prosecuting an intrigue with one of the women. There was no evidence that he had been invited by her to go there. The lower Courts convicted the accused under s. 456. It was contended that, as the prosecution had failed to prove that the entry was made with intent to commit any offence, the conviction was illegal. *Held*, that the facts proved were good evidence of an intent and of an intrusion on privacy within the meaning of s. 509 of the Penal Code, and that, therefore, the intent to commit an offence within the meaning of s. 441 was made out. *Balmakand Ram v. Ghun-*

CRIMINAL TRESPASS—contd.

samram, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 391, followed. PREMA-NUNDO SHAHA v. BRINDABUN CHUNG

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 994

29. ——— Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 448—*Intent*. Although a trespasser knows that his act, if discovered, will be likely to cause annoyance, it does not follow that he does the act with that intent. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAYAPAYACHI*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 240

30. ——— Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 451—*House trespass with intent to commit adultery—Evidence*. To sustain a conviction under s. 451 of the Penal Code for the offence of house trespass with intent to commit an offence, the prospective offence being adultery, it is necessary to show that there has been no consent or connivance on the part of the husband of the woman, the intent to commit adultery with whom is charged against the accused. *BRIJ BASI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 19 All. 74

31. ——— House trespass—Act XLV of 1860 (Indian Penal Code), s. 457—*House trespass by night with intent—Alleged intent, theft—Proved intent, adultery with complainant's wife—Evidence*. Where, on a charge under s. 457 of the Indian Penal Code, it was proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the accused did enter the complainant's house in order to have sexual intercourse with a woman who he knew was the wife of the complainant, and further that he did so without the husband's consent, and the accused was convicted: it was held, that the conviction was proper. It was not necessary under the circumstances that the complainant should bring a specific charge of adultery. *Brij-basi v. The Queen-Empress, I. L. R. 19 All. 74*, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KANGLA (1900)*

I. L. R. 23 All. 82

32. ——— Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 441, 448—*House trespass—Entry into house—Intent to annoy*. The accused No. 1, who held a decree against a certain judgment-debtor, went with his son, accused No. 2, and a Civil Court bailiff to execute a warrant. Finding the door of the judgment-debtor's house shut, they entered his compound by passing through the complainant's house without his consent and notwithstanding his protest. *Held*, that the accused's act amounted to criminal trespass, for, when they trespassed on the complainant's house notwithstanding his protest, they must, as reasonable men, have known that they would annoy him. There is no presumption that a person intends what is merely a possible result of his action or a result which, though reasonably certain, is not known to him to be so; but it must be presumed that when a man voluntarily does an act, knowing at the time that in the natural course of events a certain result will follow, he intends to bring about that result. *Queen v. Hicklin, L. R. 3 Q. B. 375; Queen v. Martin, 8 Q. B. D. 58; Reg. v. Lobett, 9 C. & P. 466; Freeman v. Pope, L. R. 5 Ch. 538; and Ez*

CRIMINAL TRESPASS—concld.

parte Mercer, In re Wise, 17 Q. B. D. 290, referred to. EMPEROR v. LAKSHMAN RAGHUNATH (1902)

I. L. R. 56 Bom. 558

33. ——— Trespass on land—*Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 447—Trespass upon land used as a path way—Question of title to the land*. In a case brought against the accused for trespass upon land used by the complainant as a pathway, when a question of title to the land is raised between the parties, the accused cannot be convicted under s. 447, Criminal Procedure Code, merely on the finding that the complainant has been using the pathway for more than six months, the question of title being left undecided. *RABI LOCHAN v. PURNA CHANDRA DAY (1906)*

11 C. W. N. 171

34. ——— *Mischief—Claim of title by the accused to the land—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 447 and 426—Dispute of a civil nature—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 522—Order giving possession—Dispossession by show of force*. Where it was found that the complainant was all along in possession of a plot of land which he had sowed with paddy and the accused had failed in certain previous proceedings before the Assistant Superintendent of the Survey to get this plot included in his holding: *Held*, that the accused's going upon the land with a body of men and ploughing up the paddy seedlings in spite of the remonstrances of the complainant's servants, constituted offences under ss. 447 and 426, Indian Penal Code, even though he did so under a claim of title to the land. That under the circumstances the fact that the accused set up a title to the land did not make the case against him one of a civil nature, and take it outside the jurisdiction of a Criminal Court. *Semble*: Under s. 522, Criminal Procedure Code, whenever an accused is convicted of an offence attended by show of force, the Court has the power to order the person who has been dispossessed by the accused of any immoveable property by such show of criminal force to be restored to the possession of the same. *Ram Chandra Boral v. Jityandria, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 434, and Ishan Chandra Kalla v. Dina Nath Budhak, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 174, doubted. CHHAKOO MONDAL v. EMPEROR (1906)*

11 C. W. N. 487

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3 B. L. R. A. C. 261

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_____ Judgment-debt in name of Secretary of State for India in Council—*Insolvency Act (11 & 12 Vic., c. 21), s. 62*. A judgment-debt due to the Secretary of State for India in Council, arising out of transactions at a public sale of opium held by the Secretary of State for India in Council, is a debt in respect of Crown property, and therefore a "debt due to our Sovereign lady the Queen" within the meaning of s. 62 of the *Insolvency Act*. In determining whether or no a debt falls under the denomination of a Crown debt, the question is not in whose name the debt stands, but whether the debt, when recovered, falls into the coffers of the State. Principle in *Secretary of State for India in Council v. Bombay Landing and Shipping Company*, 5 Bom. O. C. 23, followed. *JUDAH v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 445

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CROWN LANDS.

_____ *Alienation of Crown lands—22 & 23 Vict., cap. 41, etc.—Power of Governor in Council to alienate through authorised agent under dharkast rules—Alienation so made binding and irrevocable—Jurisdiction of Civil Court to determine validity of grant under dharkast rules—Assignment of waste, duly made in accordance with dharkast rules, not liable to revision by anyone.* The Civil Courts have jurisdiction to determine whether a grant of land, alleged to have been made by an officer on behalf of the Crown, is binding on the Crown or persons claiming under it subsequent to the grant; and the mere fact that the alleged grant purports to have been made under the *dharkast* rules does not affect that jurisdiction. A grant which purports to have been made under the *dharkast* rules by an officer empowered by them to make it, is a grant made by a person authorised in that behalf, and has the validity of a grant made by the Governor in Council. Such an officer is an agent generally or specially appointed by the Governor in Council in that behalf; and his acts, if within the scope of his

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authority, are as binding on the Crown as if they had been done by the Governor in Council. Where such a grant has been made, the action of the officer to whom an appeal lies with reference to it, is final and binding on the Government, if his act was within the scope of his authority. His action is not subject to any other control. And when the proposal of an applicant is accepted by an officer duly authorised in that behalf by the *dharkast* rules, and the acceptance is communicated to the applicant, there is a valid contract and disposal of the land (unless the grant was procured by fraud, misrepresentation or mutual mistake as to any matter of fact essential to the agreement). Such a grant cannot, therefore, be annulled or revoked by the officer who made the grant, by his successor in office, or even by the Governor in Council. Such a grant is subject, under the rules, only to one condition, namely, it may be revoked or annulled by an officer of a higher grade, on an appeal being preferred to him. Observations by BHASHYAM AYYANGAR, J., on alienations by the Crown under the Statutes 21 & 22 Vict., cap. 106; 22 & 23 Vict., cap. 41; 32 & 33 Vict., cap. 29, and 33 & 34 Vict., cap. 59, under Act XV of 1895 (India), and under the *dharkast* rules. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL v. KASTURI REHDI (1902)

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See MAINTENANCE, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO . I. L. R. 11 All. 480

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11 Moo. I. A. 551
8 W. R. P. C. 3
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 164
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CRUELTY TO ANIMALS;

See PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT (XI OF 1890).

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 881
1 C. W. N. 642

CULPABLE HOMICIDE.

See CHARGE TO JURY—SUMMING UP IN SPECIAL CASES—CULPABLE HOMICIDE.
6 B. L. R. Ap. 86, 87 note
9 W. R. Cr. 72

CULPABLE HOMICIDE—concl'd.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 376 (1872, s. 288).

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 639

See HURT—GRIEVOUS HURT.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 49

See JURY, TRIAL BY.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 531

See MURDER.

See VERDICT OF JURY—GENERAL CASES.
1 W. R. Cr. 50
21 W. R. Cr. 1

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 215

conviction for, on charge of murder.

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACQUITTALS, APPEALS FROM.

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 273

1. ——— Provocation—Beating—Deliberation. A person who beats another brutally and continuously, so that death results, is guilty of murder, or culpable homicide not amounting to murder, according as there may or may not have been grave provocation. QUEEN v. TEPPA FAKHER

5 W. R. Cr. 78

2. ——— Penal Code, s. 300. Culpable homicide, though committed under provocation, will amount to murder, unless it is proved not only that the act was done under the influence of some feeling which took away from the person doing it all control over his actions, but that that feeling had an adequate cause. QUEEN v. HARI GIRI . 1 B. L. R. A. Cr. 11: 10 W. R. Cr. 26

3. ——— Grave and sudden provocation—Murder. Culpable homicide not amounting to murder is when a man kills another on being deprived of self-control by reason of grave and sudden provocation. But when the act is done after the first excitement had passed away, and there was time to cool, it is murder. QUEEN v. YASIN SHEIKH 4 B. L. R. A. Cr. 6: 12 W. R. 68

4. ——— Penal Code, s. 300. The provocation contemplated by s. 300 of the Penal Code should be of a character to deprive the offender of his self-control. In determining whether it was so, it is admissible to take into account the condition of mind in which the offender was at the time of the provocation. EMPRESS v. KHOGAYI
I. L. R. 2 Mad. 122

5. ——— Sudden provocation—Penal Code, s. 300, excep. 1. To enable a person to plead the extenuating circumstances provided for in s. 300, Penal Code, excep. 1, the provocation and its effects must be sudden as well as grave, and the deprivation of the power of self-control must continue in order to benefit a man who kills another under circumstances of grave provocation. QUEEN v. BECHOO SAOUT

19 W. R. Cr. 35

6. ——— Grave provocation—Interval between provocation and attack,

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Where a man suddenly cut his wife's throat, it was held that, in order to establish that the act was not done under grave provocation so as to bring the case under excep. 1 of s. 300 of the Penal Code, it is not sufficient to state that the deceased ceased abusing the prisoner then, but it is necessary to show what interval elapsed between the time when the deceased ceased to speak and the instant when the prisoner attacked her. The offence in this case held to be culpable homicide. *QUEEN v. NOKUL NUSHYO* 7 W. R. Cr. 72

7. ———— *Sudden fight.*
Where it appeared in the case of a person charged with murder that while smarting from a severe blow from a stick in the midst of a sudden fight, and possibly apprehensive of future violence, finding a knife at hand, he took it up, and in the *melée* inflicted the wound which caused the death of the deceased :—*Held*, that, under the circumstances, the accused was guilty, under the Penal Code, s. 304, of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *QUEEN v. SOMIRUDDIN* 24 W. R. Cr. 48

8. ———— *Hasty and fatal blow.*
The prisoner, having struck the deceased a hasty but fatal blow with a stick in his hand at the time for abusing his mother, was held guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *QUEEN v. SULEEM* 1 W. R. Cr. 23

9. ———— *Grave provocation.*
The prisoners found the deceased lying in the same bed with their sister and ill-treated him, from the effects of which ill-treatment he died. *Held*, that the provocation was sufficiently grave to justify a conviction of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *QUEEN v. KASSEEMODDEEN* 4 W. R. Cr. 38

QUEEN v. MAITHYA GAZEE 6 W. R. Cr. 42

10. ———— *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 304—Culpable homicide not amounting to murder—Grave and sudden provocation.*
A person accused of murder under s. 302 of the Penal Code pleaded in defence that he had found his sister having illicit connection with a man named Thakuri, and had in a fit of passion killed them both on the spot. The statement being accepted was held to be a good plea of grave and sudden provocation so as to reduce the offence to one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *QUEEN-EM-PRESS v. CHUNNI* I. L. R. 18 All. 497

11. ———— *Grave provocation—Husband finding wife in adultery.*
Two prisoners confessed that having caught the deceased in the act of having sexual intercourse with the wife of one of them, they then and there killed him. *Held*, that the grave provocation given reduced the crime from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *QUEEN v. GOUR CHUND POLIE* 1 W. R. Cr. 17

12. ———— *Grave provocation—Husband finding wife in adultery.*
Where a

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prisoner confessed that he did not suspect his wife's fidelity; that he left home on business; that on his return he saw what convinced him of his wife's infidelity; and that, maddened at the sight, he killed both her and her paramour :—*Held*, that he was guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and that the case was one in which he ought to be treated with lenity. *QUEEN v. BOODHOO* 8 W. R. Cr. 38

13. ———— *Grave provocation—Husband seeing wife seduced to adultery.*
The wife of the prisoner had been forcibly taken to the house of the deceased, a native physician, who alleged that her presence was necessary to the due performance of certain incantations. The prisoner, armed with a sword, and watching from the roof of the house, saw his wife being actually violated by the deceased. He jumped down from the roof, and struck deceased with his sword in several places, from the effects of which he died. *Held*, that the prisoner's conviction for murder could not be sustained. The offence committed was culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *QUEEN v. RAMTAHAL KAHAR* 3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 33

14. ———— *Grave provocation—Husband seeing wife in adultery—Deliberation.*
On a certain evening, M, a common workman, saw N committing adultery with his (M's) wife, and on the following morning, while labouring under the excitement provoked by their misconduct, came upon them eating food together, while his wife had neglected to provide food for M. M took up a bill-hook and killed N on the spot. *Held*, that, if M connected the subsequent conduct of N and his wife with their misconduct on the preceding evening and regarded it as implying an open avowal of their criminal relations, which, under the circumstances, he might have done, the provocation was sufficiently grave and sudden to deprive him of self-control, and to reduce the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *BOYA MUNIGADU v. QUEEN* I. L. R. 3 Mad. 33

15. ———— *Right of private defence—Penal Code, ss. 97, 99, and 104.*
When the accused whose property had frequently been stolen, went out with a latee to watch his property, and with the latee struck a thief, who died from the effects of the blows, it was held (having regard to the nature of the injuries inflicted and to the subsequent conduct of the accused) that the case did not fall within the 4th exception to s. 99, and that the prisoner was not guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, but was protected by ss. 97 and 104 of the Penal Code, and had not exceeded the legal right of private defence of property. *QUEEN v. MOKKE* 12 W. R. Cr. 15

16. ———— *Search by police for stolen property—Apprehended violence.*
A head constable, making an investigation into a case of house-breaking and theft, searched the tents of

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certain gipsies for the stolen property, but discovered nothing. After he had completed the search, the gipsies gave him a certain sum of money, which he accepted, but, at the same time, not deeming it sufficient, he demanded a further sum from them. They refused to give anything more on the ground that they were poor and had no more to give. Thereupon he unlawfully ordered one of them to be bound and taken away. On his subordinates proceeding to execute such order, all the gipsies in the camp, men, women, and children, turned out, some four or five of the men being armed with sticks and stones, and advanced in a threatening manner towards the place where such gipsy was being bound and the head constable was standing. Before any actual violence was used by the crowd of advancing gipsies, the head constable fired with a gun at such crowd, when it was about five paces from him, and killed one of the gipsies, and, having done so, ran away. Any apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence of the acts of such crowd would have ceased had he released the gipsy he had unlawfully arrested and withdrawn himself and his subordinates, or had he effected his escape. *Held*, that such head constable had not a right of private defence against the acts of such gipsies, as those acts did not reasonably cause the apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be their consequence, and such head constable was guilty of culpable homicide amounting to murder. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. ABDUL HAKIM*. I. L. R. 3 All. 253

17. **Killing outlaw while endeavouring to escape—*Penal Code, s. 300, excep. 3.*** The prisoners, fearful of being punished if they allowed him to escape, and thinking that they were acting lawfully, in furtherance of a plan arranged for them by a police constable and the lumberdar of a village for the capture of an outlaw, for whose arrest a reward had been offered, and in pursuance thereof killed him while endeavouring to escape. *Held*, that the offence committed came under the third exception in s. 300 of the *Penal Code*, and was culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *QUEEN v. AMAN*. 5 N. W. 130

18. **Unpremeditated assault—*Penal Code, s. 300, excep. 4.*** An unpremeditated assault, ending in an affray in which death is caused, committed in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, comes within excep. 4 of s. 300 of the *Penal Code*. It is immaterial which party offered the provocation or committed the first assault. *QUEEN v. ZALIM RAI*. 1 W. R. Cr. 33

19. **Inflicting injury not sufficient to cause death—*Want of intention to cause death—Penal Code, ss. 299, 300.*** Where the prisoner knocked his wife down, put one knee on her chest, and struck her two or three violent blows on the face with the closed fist, producing extravasation of blood on the brain, and she died in consequence, either on the spot, or very shortly afterwards:—*Held*, that, there being no intention to

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cause death, and the bodily injury not being sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence committed by the prisoner was not murder, but culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *REG. v. GOVINDA*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 342

20. **Grievous hurt—*Blow causing injury not intended.*** An accused struck a woman, carrying an infant in her arms, violently over head and shoulders. One of the blows fell on the child's head, causing death. *Held*, that the accused was not guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, but had committed hurt on the infant under circumstances of sufficient aggravation to bring the offence within the definition of grievous hurt. *EMPRESS v. SAHAJE RAO*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 623: 2 C. L. R. 304

21. **Death from violent attack.** Where death has resulted from a violent attack, the Magistrate is bound to commit to the Court of Session, on a charge of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Conviction of grievous hurt in such a case is contrary to law. *In the matter of GORI NATH SHAHA*. 1 C. L. R. 141

22. **Consenting to act likely to cause death—*Murder—Penal Code, s. 300, excep. 5.*** Excep. 5 to s. 300 refers to cases where a man consents to submit to the doing of some particular act, either knowing that it will certainly cause death, or that death will be the likely result; but it does not refer to the running of a risk of death from something which a man intends to avert if he possibly can do so, even by causing the death of the person from whom the danger is to be anticipated. *PER BROUGHTON, J.*—Excep. 5 to s. 300 is not applicable to the case of a premeditated fight, but points to a different character, such as suttee. *EMPRESS v. ROHIMUDDIN*. I. L. R. 5 Calc. 31: 4 C. L. R. 285

23. **Rioting—*Unlawful assembly—Fight between two contending factions each armed with deadly weapons—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 300, excep. 5.*** Where death results in a fight between two bodies of men deliberately fighting together, a greater proportion of the men composing both sides being armed with deadly weapons, and it being further apparent from the evidence that the man slain was an adult, and that no unfair advantage was taken by the one side or the other during the fight, the offence committed is culpable homicide, but does not amount to murder. *SANSHERE KHAN v. EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 154: 8 C. L. R. 158

24. **Penal Code, s. 300, cl. 5, and ss. 149 and 307—*Murder, attempt, to commit—Rioting armed with deadly weapons—Pre-arranged fight.*** In a case in which it was found that all the accused were guilty of rioting armed with deadly weapons, that the fight was premeditated and pre-arranged, a regular pitched battle or trial of strength between the two parties concerned in the riot, and that one of the accused in the course

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of the riot, and in prosecution of the common object of the assembly, killed or attempted to kill a man under such circumstances that his act amounted to an attempt to murder, the question arose whether that act could be said to bear a less grave character by reason of excep. 5 to s. 300 of the Indian Penal Code. *Per Curiam.*—*Held*, that upon such finding the case did not fall within the exception. *Per* PIGOT, J. (PETHERAM, C.J., and MACPHERSON, J., concurring)—The 5th exception to s. 300 should receive a strict and not a liberal construction; and in applying the exception it should be considered with reference to the act consented to or authorized, and next with reference to the person or persons authorized, and as to each of those some degree of particularity at least should appear upon the facts proved before the exception can be said to apply. *Shamshere Khan v. Empress*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 154, and *Queen v. Kukier Mather*, unreported, dissented from, so far as they decide that from such a finding as the above consent to take the risk of death is inferred. *Per* O'KENTALLY, J.—Before excep. 5 can be applied, it must be found that the person killed, with a full knowledge of the facts, determined to suffer death, or take the risk of death; and that this determination continued up to, and existed at, the moment of his death. *Queen v. Kukier Mather*, unreported, observed on. *Per* GHOSE, J.—No general rule of law can be laid down in determining in cases of this description whether the person killed or wounded suffered death or took the risk of death with his own consent, it being a question of fact, and not of law, to be decided upon the circumstances of each case as it arises. *Shamshere Khan v. Empress*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 154, and *Queen v. Kukier Mather*, unreported, observed on, and the propositions of law laid down therein concurred with. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NAYAMUDDIN*. I. L. R. 18 Calc. 484

25. ——— Subjecting person of full age to emasculation. When a man of full age (i.e., above 18 years) submits himself to emasculation, performed neither by a skilful hand, nor in the least dangerous way, and dies from the injury, the persons concerned in the act are guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *QUEEN v. BABOOLUN HJRAH*. 5 W. R. Cr. 7

26. ——— Knowledge of likelihood to cause death—*Pre-meditation*. Where a person snatches up a log of heavy wood, and strikes another with it on a vital part, with so much force and vindictiveness as to cause that other person's death almost on the spot, the act must be held to have been done with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death; but if done without pre-meditation, in the heat of passion on a sudden quarrel, the offence committed is culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *QUEEN v. RAJOO GHOSE*

7 W. R. Cr. 108

27. ——— Taking persons in old boat—*Negligence*—*Penal Code*, s. 299. Certain persons whom the accused, a ferryman, was rowing across a river were drowned by the sinking

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of the boat which was an old one with holes in it over which planks had been nailed. *Held*, that the prisoner could not be convicted of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, unless it could be shown that he acted with the knowledge that he was likely, by taking them in the boat, to cause death within the terms of s. 299 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. MAGENEE BEHARA*. 11 W. R. Cr. 8

28. ——— The knowledge that an act is likely to cause death does not constitute culpable homicide amounting to murder. It must be shown that the act was committed with the knowledge that it must in all probability cause death. *QUEEN v. GIRDHAREE SING*. 6 N. W. 26

29. ——— Act likely to cause death—*Penal Code*, ss. 304 and 304 A—*Assault on thief*. The prisoners assaulted a thief so severely that he died. One hundred and forty-one marks of separate blows were found on the body of the deceased, and several of his ribs were broken. *Held*, that s. 304 A of the Penal Code was not applicable to the circumstances of the case, and that, taking the offence out of the category of murder, it must still come under s. 304. *QUEEN v. MAN*. 5 N. W. 235

30. ——— Causing death by branding a thief—*Dangerous act*. Causing death by branding a thief without the knowledge that the act was so imminently dangerous that it would in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, is punishable under s. 304 of the Penal Code as culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *QUEEN v. KHEDUN MISSER*. 7 W. R. Cr. 54

31. ——— *Penal Code*, s. 304 A—*Administering milk to child in such quantity as to kill it—Rash and negligent act—Knowledge of consequences*. Where there was medical evidence to show that milk had been administered to a child in such quantities as to kill it, but there was no evidence to show that the milk was administered by the orders of the mother, or that she knew the quantity that was being administered:—*Held*, that there was not sufficient evidence to bring her within s. 304 A of the Penal Code. The Sessions Judge found that the mother could not have been ignorant of the fact that her child was being over-fed, or of the probable consequences of such over-feeding; such feeding was inconsistent with the terms of s. 304 A which provides for the causing of death by any rash or negligent act, not amounting to murder. What a man does with the knowledge that the consequences will be likely to cause death cannot be reduced to a simply rash and negligent act. *QUEEN v. PEMKOER*. 5 N. W. 38

32. ——— Intention to cause injury likely to result in death—*Causing death by rash act—Culpable rashness—Culpable negligence*. Prisoner killed his mother by beating and kicking her. The Sessions Judge found that the death resulted from brutal beating and kicking, but ac-

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quitted of culpable homicide, because the violence was not such as the prisoner must have known to be likely to cause death. *Held*, that this was no ground for acquitting of culpable homicide not amounting to murder: the question for the Judge was whether the act was done with the intention of causing bodily injury which was likely to cause death. The Sessions Judge convicted the prisoner on the charge of causing death by a rash act. *Held*, that the section was wholly inapplicable. "Culpable rashness" and "culpable negligence" distinguished. *QUEEN v. NIDAMARTI NAGABHUSHANAM* . . . 7 *Mad.* 119.

33. ————— *Penal Code, ss. 299, 304, and 323—Voluntarily causing hurt—Spleen disease.* Where a person hurt another, who was suffering from spleen disease, intentionally, but without the intention of causing death, or causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, or the knowledge that he was likely by his act to cause death, and by his act caused the death of such other person:—*Held*, that he was not guilty of culpable homicide and properly convicted under s. 323 of the Penal Code of voluntarily causing hurt. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. FOX* . I. L. R. 2 *All.* 522

34. ————— *Penal Code, ss. 304, 325—Voluntarily causing hurt—Causing death by negligence—Spleen disease.* B voluntarily caused hurt to N, who was suffering from spleen disease, knowing himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt, but without the intention of causing death, or causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, or the knowledge that he was likely by his act to cause death, and caused grievous hurt to N, from which N died. *Held*, that B ought not to be convicted under s. 304A of the Penal Code of causing death by negligence, but under s. 325 of that Code of voluntarily causing grievous hurt. *EMPRESS v. O'BRIEN* . I. L. R. 2 *All.* 766

35. ————— *Rash or negligent act—Penal Code, ss. 304A, 323—Causing death by a rash or negligent act—Voluntarily causing hurt.* A person, without the intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, or the knowledge that he was likely by his act to cause death, or the intention to cause grievous hurt, or the knowledge that he was likely by his act to cause grievous hurt, but with the intention of causing hurt, caused the death of another person by throwing a piece of a brick at him, which struck him in the region of the spleen, and ruptured it, the spleen being diseased. *Held*, that the offence committed was not the offence of causing death by a rash or negligent act, but the offence of voluntarily causing hurt. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. RANDHIR SINGH* . I. L. R. 3 *All.* 597

36. ————— *Penal Code, ss. 299, 300, 302, 304A, 325—Causing death by rash or negligent act—Grievous hurt.* Where a person struck another a blow which caused death, without any intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, or the

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knowledge that he was likely by such act to cause death, but with the intention of causing grievous hurt:—*Held*, that the offence of which such person was guilty was not the offence of causing death by a rash act, but the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt. *Queen v. Nidamarti Nagabhushanam*, 7 *Mad.* 119, *Queen v. Pemkoer*, 5 *N. W.* 23, *Queen v. Man*, 5 *N. W.* 235, *Empress v. Ketabdi Mundul*, I. L. R. 4 *Calc.* 764, *Empress v. Fox*, I. L. R. 2 *All.* 522 and *Empress v. O'Brien*, I. L. R. 2 *All.* 766, followed. The offences of murder, culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and causing death by a rash or negligent act, distinguished. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. IDU BEG*

I. L. R. 3 *All.* 776

37. ————— *Penal Code, s. 304A—Doing act with rashness and negligence.* Where an accused was charged with culpable homicide, and the evidence showed that the deceased had an enlarged spleen, and that his death was caused by rupture of the spleen occasioned by blows inflicted by the accused on the body of the deceased:—*Held*, that it was not sufficient, in order to find the accused guilty of a rash act under s. 304A of the Penal Code, that the jury should be satisfied only of the prevalence of the disease of enlargement of the spleen in the district, and infer therefrom criminal rashness in beating the deceased; but that they should also be satisfied that the accused was aware of the prevalence of such disease in the district, and also aware of the risk to life involved in striking a person afflicted with that disease. *EMPRESS v. SAFATULLA* . I. L. R. 4 *Calc.* 815

38. ————— *Penal Code, s. 304A—Penal Code, ss. 336, 337, and 338—Rashness—Negligence.* S. 304A of the Penal Code does not apply to a case in which there has been the voluntary commission of an offence against the person. If a man intentionally commits such an offence, and consequences beyond his immediate purpose result, it is for the Court to determine how far he can be held to have the knowledge that he was likely by such act to cause the actual result; and if such knowledge can be imputed, the result is not to be attributed to mere rashness; if it cannot be imputed, still the wilful offence does not take the character of rashness, because its consequences have been unfortunate. Acts, probably or possibly involving danger to others, but which in themselves are not offences, may be offences under s. 336, 337, 338, or 304A if done without due care to guard against the dangerous consequences. Acts which are offences in themselves must be judged with regard to knowledge, or means of knowledge, of the offender and placed in their appropriate place in the class of offences of the same character. *EMPRESS v. KETABDI MUNDUL*

I. L. R. 4 *Calc.* 764

39. ————— *Culpable homicide not amounting to murder—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 304—Act done with the knowledge that death would be a probable result.* Where the

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prisoner by gripping and squeezing the testicles of deceased reduced them to a pulpy condition, thereby causing an injury which resulted in death due to the shock so inflicted on the nervous system:—*Held, per DAVIES, J.*, that the death was an unforeseen result for which prisoner could not be held liable, and that she ought to be convicted under s. 323, Penal Code. *Held per SUBRAMANIA AYYAR and BENSON, JJ.*, that death was a probable consequence of the prisoner's act and that she was guilty under s. 304, Penal Code, of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KALIYANI* . . . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 356

40. ————— *Penal Code, s. 304A—Act done in course of dispute.* In the course of a trivial dispute the accused gave the deceased a severe push on the back which caused him to fall to the road below, a distance of two and a half cubits. In falling the deceased sustained an injury from which tetanus resulted, which caused his death on the fifth day after. *Held*, that on these facts the accused was not guilty of the offence described in s. 304A of the Penal Code, nor of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, because there was no likelihood of the result following, and *a fortiori*, no designed causing of it. *REG. v. ACHARIYA* . . . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 224

41. ————— *Penal Code, s. 304A—Causing death by a rash or negligent act.* N, a servant of a railway company, charged with moving some trucks by coolies on an incline, discharged his duty negligently, and in consequence lost control of the trucks. Under his orders, one of the coolies attempted to stop the trucks, and was killed in such attempt. *Held*, that A had caused the coolie's death by his negligence, within the meaning of s. 304A of the Penal Code. *Reg. v. Longbottom, 3 Cox C. C. 439, Reg. v. Swindal, 2 C. & K. 230, Reg. v. Williamson, 1 Cox C. C. 97, referred to. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NAND KISHORE* . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 248

42. ————— *Surgical Operation—Causing death by a rash and negligent act—Kobiraj—Unskilled medical practitioner—"Good faith"—"Accepting risk"—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 304A, 88, and 52.* A kobiraj operated on a man for internal piles by cutting them out with an ordinary knife. The man died from hæmorrhage. The kobiraj was charged, under s. 304A of the Penal Code, with causing death by doing a rash and negligent act. It was contended that, inasmuch as the prisoner had performed similar operations on previous occasions, it was not a rash act within the meaning of that section, and that at all events he was entitled to the benefit of s. 8 of the Penal Code, as he did the act in good faith, without any intention to cause death, and for the benefit of the patient, who had accepted the risk. *Held*, that, as the prisoner was admittedly uneducated in matters of surgery, and having regard to the meaning of "good faith" as defined in s. 52 of the Penal Code, he was not entitled to

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the benefit of s. 88. *Held*, further, that s. 88 did not apply to the case, as it was not shown by the accused, on whom the burden of proving that fact lay, that the deceased knew the risk he was running in consenting to the operation, and he could not therefore be said to have accepted the risk. *Held*, also, that, under the circumstances, the conviction under s. 304A was a proper one. *SOOKAROO KOBIRAJ v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 566

43. ————— *Causing death by a criminal act—Penal Code, s. 304A.* Where death is caused by an act being in its nature criminal, s. 304A of the Indian Penal Code has no application. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DAMODARAM* . . . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 56

44. ————— *Form of conviction—Penal Code, s. 300—Exceptions.* When a Judge convicts on the charge of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, he should record under which of the exceptions in s. 300 of the Penal Code the case falls. *GOVERNMENT v. KALIKA MISSEER* . . . 1 Agra. Cr. 3

CULTIVATOR.

See PASTURAGE . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 503

See STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. II, ART. 13.
I. L. R. 6 Bom. 691
I. L. R. 5 All. 360
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 73
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 546

CUMULATIVE SENTENCE.

See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCE.

See WHIPPING . . . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 951
7 B. L. R. 165
5 Bom. Cr. 83
20 W. R. Cr. 72

CURATOR.

————— under Act XIX of 1841.

See CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION—RIGHT TO SUE OR EXECUTE DECREE WITHOUT CERTIFICATE.

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 437

CUSTODY.

See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.

————— of lunatic.

See LUNATIC . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 978

CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.

See DIVORCE ACT, s. 41 6 B. L. R. 318

See HINDU LAW—GUARDIAN.

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, CL. 15 . . . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 555

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—GUARDIAN.

See MAINTENANCE, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT FOR . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 374

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 461

See MALABAR LAW—CUSTODY OF CHILD
7 Mad. 179

See MINOR—CUSTODY OF MINOR.

CUSTODY OF CHILDREN—*contd.*

1. ——— Father's right to custody—*Legitimate children—English law previous to Stat. 2 & 3 Vic., c. 39.* The father, if a proper person, cannot be deprived of his legal right to the custody of his legitimate children of whatever age. 2 & 3 Vic., c. 39, which gives a discretionary power to a Judge in England, has not been extended to this country; therefore the law applicable to cases which occurred in England previous to the passing of that statute is applicable here. *In the matter of HOLMES* 1 Hyde 99

2. ——— Jurisdiction of High Court—*Improper guardian.* The High Court, in its equitable jurisdiction, has authority to interfere with the legal right of a father to the custody of his child, if he be an improper person. *In re CARRAU* 1 Hyde 143

3. ——— *Hindu father, convert to Christianity.* A Hindu father is not deprived of his right to the custody of his children by reason of his conversion to Christianity. *MUCHOO v. ARZOON SAHOO* 5 W. R. 235

4. ——— Parent's or guardian's right to custody of infant—"Habeas Corpus"—*Criminal Procedure Code (1832), s. 491.* In Courts of equity a discretionary power has always been exercised to control the father's or guardian's legal rights of custody. *Queen v. Gynghall, [1893] 2 Q. B. 232*, approved. *Held*, that this was not a case in which the Court would, having due regard to the interests and well-being of the child in question, assist the parent in exercising his legal rights of custody. The modern equitable doctrine cited in *Seton on Decrees, Vol. II, p. 814*, approved. *In the matter of JOSH Y ASSAM* I. L. R. 23 Calc. 290

5. ——— Custody of mother—*Taking child from place to place.* A mother cannot have a right to the custody of her legitimate children adversely to the father. Ordinarily the custody of the mother is the custody of the father, and any removal of the children from place to place by the mother ought to be taken to be consistent with the right of the father as guardian, and not as a taking out of his keeping. *In the matter of the petition of PRANKRISHNA SURMA. EMPRESS v. PRANKRISHNA SURMA* I. L. R. 8 Calc. 969
11 C. L. R. 6

6. ——— Order by criminal Court—*Question for Civil Court.* A father having applied to a Criminal Court for the custody of his child, who was eleven years old and had always lived with the mother, and the Court having caused the child to be delivered up to the father:—*Held*, that the Court was in the wrong, the question being one that ought to be decided in the Civil Court. *KOOLSUN BIBEE v. EDOO* 25 W. R. Cr. 35

7. ——— Order of Magistrate as to custody of illegitimate child—*Ground for stopping maintenance under order of Magistrate.* There is nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code

CUSTODY OF CHILDREN—*contd.*

which would warrant a Magistrate in ordering a mother to surrender her illegitimate child to its father, although such child be of the age of maturity. A refusal by the mother to make over the custody of the child in such a case would be no ground for stopping an allowance previously ordered. *LAL DAS v. NEKUNJO BHAISHIANI*
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 374

8. ——— Appointment of Guardian—*Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), ss. 9 and 17—Application by a Christian father to be appointed guardian of his Hindu minor son—Matters to be considered by the Court in appointing guardian.* A, who was originally a Hindu, but afterwards became a Christian and abandoned his family residence, applied to be the guardian of the person of his minor son. On the objections of the paternal and maternal uncles of the boy that under the circumstances of the case the father was not fit and proper person to be appointed the guardian of the minor:—*Held* although the father is *primâ facie* entitled to the custody of his infant child, he can be deprived of such parental right if the circumstances justify it; therefore in a case where a child who was brought up as a Hindu, and who expressed a desire to remain a Hindu, and was living with his Hindu relation, who was maintaining him and was looking after his education properly, it would not be to the welfare of the child that he should be handed over to the father and brought up in the Christian faith, and that the Court below, under the circumstances of the case, was right in dismissing the application. *MOKOOND LAL SINGH v. NOBODIP CHUNDER SINGHA*
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 881
2 C. W. N. 379

9. ——— Mother's right to custody—*Practice—Custody of child, application for—Notice of application—Divorce Act (IV of 1869), s. 42.* A petition for judicial separation by a wife contained a statement in the body thereof to the effect that the petitioner was desirous of having the custody of a child born of the marriage, but contained no prayer to that effect. The respondent appeared and filed an answer to the petition, in which he expressly noticed that portion of the petition. Pending the hearing of the petition, an application was made by the petitioner for the custody of the child *pendente lite*, which was opposed by the respondent and refused. After decree made for judicial separation, the respondent not appearing at the hearing, an application was made by the petitioner under the provisions of s. 42 of the Act, for the custody of the child. No notice of such application was given to the respondent: *Held*, that it was the more correct procedure, having regard to the provisions of s. 42, not to include a prayer for the custody in the original petition, and that, following the decision in *Horne v. Horne, 30 L. J. P. and M. 200*, and *Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 30 L. J. P. and M. 200 note*, it was unnecessary under the circumstances to give further notice of the appli-

CUSTODY OF CHILDREN—*concl.*

cation to the respondent. *Held*, further, on the merits that the petitioner was entitled to the order asked for. *LEDLIE v. LEDLIE*

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 473

10. *Change of religion—Education and prospects of minor—Conduct of natural guardian—Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)—Habeas Corpus—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 491.* *S*, a girl fifteen years of age, had, for the last eight years, with her mother the petitioner's consent been boarded and educated first at the American Marathi Mission School and then at the Methodist Zenana Mission School, of which latter school the respondent was the superintendent. The petitioner during that time had never contributed anything towards the expenses of her daughter's board and education, and was quite unable to do so, being a servant in receipt of a salary of only 8 annas a month, and with no home of her own. *S* in the meantime had become a Christian and assumed the name of Sarah Hettie Houghton, and would soon be in a position, if allowed to complete her education as she herself desired to do, to earn her own livelihood by teaching. The petitioner now applied under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, X of 1882, for an order on the respondent to show cause why *S* should not be delivered over to the custody of her mother, the petitioner. *Held*, that, even assuming that *S*, not being sixteen years of age, was too young, according to the authorities, to be able to decide for herself where she would reside, it was the duty of the Court to refuse the present application, the Court not being satisfied that the application was made *bonâ fide* by the petitioner, and the petitioner being a servant, earning only 8 annas a month as wages, a pauper, and having no home of her own. *Held*, further, that, according to the doctrine governing Courts of Equity in such cases, the petitioner by her conduct during the last eight years had precluded herself from demanding that her child should now be given up to her, to do which would, under the circumstances, be manifestly most detrimental to the welfare of the child herself. The true principle deducible from the authorities by which the Court should be guided in such cases is that the Court is to judge upon the circumstances of each particular case, and that the welfare of the infant, irrespective of its age, is the main feature to be regarded. *Semble*: A boy of fourteen and a girl of sixteen have a right to choose their own residence. The provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act VIII of 1890 and the cases on the subject in the English and Indian Courts considered. *In the matter of SAITHRI JAINDOO v. ABRAMS*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 307

11. *Guardian—Act IX of 1861—Marriage of Mahomedan mother with Christian in Mahomedan form.* A child, the offspring of a Christian marriage, was living after her father's death under the protection of her mother. A married man, a Christian, came to live with her mother, and, in order to legalize

CUSTODY OF CHILDREN—*concl.*

their intercourse, he and the mother became Mahomedans, and were married in Mahomedan form. About three years after, when the child had attained the age of fourteen, some of her relatives applied for an order, under Act IX of 1861, that the girl be removed from the guardianship of the mother and her second husband and placed under a Christian guardian. The girl deposed that she wished to remain with her mother and to become a Mahomedan. *Held*, by the High Court in granting the application and appointing a guardian in place of her mother that a Judge, in the exercise of his jurisdiction under the Act, is justified in having respect to the religion professed by the father of a minor and in passing such orders with regard to the custody of the person of such minor as he may hold to be in accordance with what would have been the minor's father's wishes had he been alive to express them. Where a mother under colour of a change of religion forms a connection or leads a life which, by persons professing her husband's faith, would be deemed immoral, she thereby ceases to be a proper person to be entrusted with the education of the children of her deceased husband. If the Court finds a case made out for its interference, it will not be deterred from the exercise of its powers because the persons setting it in motion may be actuated by motives other than the interests of the minor. Special leave having been given to appeal to the Privy Council, the order was upheld. *SKINNER v. ORDE*

10 B. L. R. 125

14 Moo. I. A. 309 : 17 W. R. 77

s. c. In High Court

2 N. W. 275

12. *Parent and child—Interference with natural rights for the benefit of the child—Equity and good conscience.* Plaintiff, a Brahmin widow, sued to recover her illegitimate infant child from defendant, to whom she had entrusted it since its birth for nurture. *Held*, that, it being proved that the plaintiff was leading an immoral life, the suit was rightly dismissed. *VENKAMMA v. SAVITRAMMA* . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 67

CUSTODY OF WIFE.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—CUSTODY OF WIFE . . . 5 B. L. R. 557
13 B. L. R. 160

CUSTOM.

See ADOPTION . . . 11 C. W. N. 147

See BABUANA GRANT . . . 12 C. W. N. 966
13 C. W. N. 1013

See BHALE SULTAN CHATTRI TRIBE. . . I. L. R. 30 All. 1

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE 1882, s. 584. . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 24

See COPYRIGHT ACT, s. 6. . . 10 C. W. N. 134

See CUSTOM OF TRADE. . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 561

CUSTOM—*contd.*

- See HINDU LAW . I. L. R. 28 All. 170
 I. L. R. 30 All. 1
 I. L. R. 36 Calc. 590
 I. L. R. 33 Bom. 693
- See HINDU LAW—ADOPTION.
 I. L. R. 29 All. 109, 495
- See HINDU LAW—
 CUSTOM :
 See HUSBAND AND WIFE.
 I. L. R. 31 Bom. 366
- INHERITANCE—MIGRATING FAMILIES.
 I. L. R. 29 Calc. 433
- See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
 I. L. R. 31 Mad. 17
 I. L. R. 29 Mad. 24
- See MAHOMEDAN LAW.
 I. L. R. 28 All. 496
- See MAHOMEDAN LAW—CUSTOM.
- See MALABAR LAW—CUSTOM.
- See MORTGAGE . 10 C. W. N. 778
- See NON-OCCUPANCY RAIYAT.
 I. L. R. 34 Calc. 516
- See NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT
 ACT (XII of 1881), CH. II AND S. 93.
 I. L. R. 23 All. 270
- See OCCUPANCY HOLDING.
 11 C. W. N. 83
- See OCCUPANCY HOLDING, TRANSFERABI-
 LITY OF . 11 C. W. N. 83
- See PAKKI ADAT AGENCY.
 I. L. R. 33 Bom. 364
- See PRACTICE . 10 C. W. N. 230
- See PRE-EMPTION.
 I. L. R. 28 All. 434, 688
 I. L. R. 29 All. 295
 I. L. R. 31 All. 533, 539
- See PRESCRIPTION — EASEMENTS — PRI-
 VACY . 5 C. W. N. 147
- See PUBLIC NUISANCE.
 I. L. R. 30 All. 181
- See "PUBLIC STREET."
 I. L. R. 32 Mad. 478
- See RAIYAT . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 24
- See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—TRANSFER OF
 RIGHT . 6 C. W. N. 181, 861
- See RIGHT TO USE OF WATER.
 I. L. R. 29 Calc. 100
- See RIPARIAN OWNER.
 I. L. R. 35 Calc. 851
- See SUCCESSION . L. R. 30 I. A. 190
- See USAGE . 13 C. W. N. 541

CUSTOM—*contd.*

excluding daughters from in-
 heritance.

See OUDH ESTATES ACT.

I. L. R. 31 All. 457

excluding females.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—INHERITANCE.

I. L. R. 31 All. 557

exclusion of—

See LEASE—CONSTRUCTION.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 883

evidence of—

See HINDU LAW . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 943

family custom.

See INHERITANCE . 8 C. W. N. 81

transfer of non-transferable
 holding.—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

8 C. W. N. 235

1. ———— Origin of custom. A custom, to
 be valid, must be ancient, must have been continued
 and acquiesced in, and must be reasonable and cer-
 tain. LALA *v.* HIRA SINGH . I. L. R. 2 All. 49

2. ———— Effect of custom—Written
contract. Custom cannot affect the express terms
 of a written contract. INDUR CHUNDER DUGAR
v. LACHMI BIBI . 7 B. L. R. 682 : 15 W. R. 501

3. ———— Custom contrary
to law of inheritance. Custom, when it is ancient,
 invariable, and established by clear and positive
 proof, overrides the usual law of inheritance. KUS-
 TOORA KOOMAREE *v.* MONOHUR DEO. GOVERNMENT
v. MONOHUR DEO . . . W. R. 1864, 39

4. ———— Family custom—*Intermarria-*
ges. To establish a family custom at variance
 with the ordinary law of inheritance, it is neces-
 sary to show that the usage is ancient and has
 been invariable, and it should be established by clear
 and positive proof. NUGENDER NARAIN *v.* RUGHOO-
 NATH NARAIN DEY . . . W. R. 1864, 20

5. ———— Customs regulating
succession, proof of. If it is contended that the
 succession to property is regulated by any special
 family custom, that custom ought to be alleged and
 proved with distinctness and certainty. SERTMAN
 UMAH *v.* PALATHAN VITIL MARYA COOTHY UMAH
 15 W. R. P. C. 47

6. ———— Custom contrary to Hindu
 Law. Where a custom according to which the
 Rajahs of Beerbhoom had granted a right to a
 share of property described as "Bhabak mehals"
 appeared to have been always recognized by the
 Courts, it was maintained, notwithstanding that it
 was in contravention of the ordinary Hindu law.
 NIL MAHDUB GOSSAMEE *v.* CHUNDER MOOKHEE
 GOSSAMEE . . . 22 W. R. 397

CUSTOM—*contd.*

7. ——— Custom contrary to Limitation Acts. No custom can be admitted to override the provisions of the Limitation Act, *MOHANLAL JECHAND v. AMRATLAL BECHARDAS*

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 174

8. ——— Converts—Inheritance—Converts from Hindu to Mahomedan religion—Custom at variance with law. The general presumption, arising from the intimate connection between law and religion in the Mahomedan faith, is that the Mahomedan law governs converts from the Hindu religion to Mahomedanism. But a well-established custom in the case of such converts to follow their old Hindu law of inheritance would override that general presumption, and a usage establishing a special rule of inheritance as regards a special kind of property would be given the force of law, even though it be at variance with both Hindu and Mahomedan laws. *MAHOMED SIDICK v. HAJI AHMED. HAJI ABDULA HAJI ABDSTATAR v. HAJI AHMED*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 1

9. ——— Custom of trade—Notoriety and definiteness of custom—Requirements of a binding custom of trade. Suit for damages for breach of a contract to let horses on hire. The plaintiff hired a pair of horses at Ootacamund from the defendant for a period of six months, and on one occasion drove them beyond the municipal limits of the station; on their return, the defendant took away the horses from the plaintiff, which was the breach complained of. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff's use of the horses as above was contrary to the local custom of the trade. *Held*, that, since the alleged custom was not shown to be either certain or invariable or so notorious that persons should be held to enter into agreements with reference to it, it formed no defence to the action. *PRICE v. BROWNE*

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 420

10. ——— Sale—Exchange—Trade usage—Contract Act, ss. 49, 77, 92, 151—Delivery of cotton to cotton press—Transfer of Property Act, s. 118—Ownership of cotton. According to mercantile usage in the cotton trade in Tuticorin, where a dealer delivers cotton to the owner of a cotton press, not in pursuance of any special contract, the property in the cotton vests in the owner of the cotton press, who is bound to give the merchant in exchange cotton of like quantity and quality. The transaction is not a sale, but an agreement for exchange. Where, therefore, cotton thus delivered was accidentally destroyed by fire:—*Held*, that the loss fell on the owner of the press. *VOLKART BROTHERS v. VETTIVELU NADAN*

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 459

11. ——— Mercantile usage—Evidence of custom. Proof of mercantile usage needs not either the antiquity, the uniformity, or the notoriety of custom which, in respect of all these, becomes a local law. The usage may be still in course of growth; it may require evidence for its support in each case; but in the result it is enough if it appear to be so well known and

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acquiesced in that it may be reasonably presumed to have been an ingredient tacitly imported by the parties into their contract. *JUGGOMOHUN GHOSE v. MANIK CHUND*

4 W. R. P. C. 8
7 Moo. I. A. 263

12. ——— Family usage—Custom repugnant to law. Evidence of the acts of a single family, repugnant or antagonistic to the general law, will not establish a valid custom or usage enforceable in a Court of Justice. *Tara Chant v. Reeb Ram*, 3 Mad. 50, followed. *MADHAVRAV RAGHAVENDRA v. BALKRISHNA RAGHAVENDRA*

4 Bom. A. C. 113

13. ——— Family custom—Intermarriages. A family custom as to intermarriages, being matter of family history, may be proved by declarations made by members of the family. *NUGGENDUR NARAIN v. RUGHONATH NARAIN DEY*

W. R. 1864, 20

14. ——— Mosques—Mahomedan law of succession—Law in Malabar as to right to superintend mosques. In Malabar, when the right to superintend a mosque is in dispute, the Mahomedan law of succession must be applied, unless a custom to the contrary is proved. Proof that the management of most mosques in a certain district is in the hands of persons, who would inherit under the Maramakkatayam law, will not warrant a finding of the existence of such a custom in such district. *KUNHI BIVI v. ABDUL AZIZ*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 103

15. ——— Land separated from estate by change in course of river. When a party claims land separated from his estate by a change in the course of a river upon the ground of immemorial custom, he must prove such custom. The canoongo papers are not sufficient evidence to prove immemorial custom. The proceedings shewing that such custom obtains on the banks of one river will be no evidence to prove that it obtains on the banks of another. *RAI MANIK CHAND v. MADHORAM*

3 B. L. R. P. C. 5
11 W. R. P. C. 42

13 Moo. I. A. 1

See also *BISSESSURNATH v. MOHESAR BUX SINGH*

11 B. L. R. 265
18 W. R. 160

L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 34

16. ——— "Haqq-i-chaharum"—Private sale—Sale in execution of decree. Proof of a custom whereby the zamindar of a village is entitled to one-fourth of the purchase money when a house in the village is sold privately is not proof of a similar custom in respect of sales in execution of decrees. *KALIAN DAS v. BHAGIRATHI*

I. L. R. 6 All. 47

17. ——— Right to timber washed ashore—Wreck—Lords of manor. Where a plaintiff sued for damages for value of timber carried away by Government after being washed on to his estate, and to have his right declared as against Government to all timber that in the future may be

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washed on to his estate. *Held*, that it was not necessary for plaintiff to produce documentary evidence in support of the right, or some decree or decision of competent authority establishing the custom. Lords of manors are allowed to establish rights to wrecks, etc., by long-continued and adverse assertion of, and enjoyment under, such claim; and the plaintiff was entitled to have the question tried by the evidence he had adduced. **CHUTTUR LALL SINGH v. GOVERNMENT . . . 9 W. R. 97**

18. ——— Local custom—Observations on the use of books of history to prove local custom. Observations on the use of books of history to prove local custom, and on the position as heads of their caste by custom of the representatives of the ancient sovereigns of the West Coast. **VALLABHA v. MADUSUDANAN . . . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 495**

19. ——— Local custom—*Bom. Reg. IV of 1827, s. 26.* By s. 26, Regulation IV of 1827 (Bombay), the usage of the district in which a suit may arise takes precedence over the law of the defendant in the determination of civil suits. By local custom in the Broach district, waqf land left as a religious endowment may be mortgaged, although such practice is contrary to Mahomedan law. **ABAS ALI ZENUL ARADIN v. GHULAM MUHAMMAD . . . 1 Bom. 36**

20. ——— Custom as to transferability of tenures. In an enquiry as to whether tenures of a certain class are transferable according to local custom, it is sufficient if there is credible evidence of the existence and antiquity of the custom, and none to the contrary; there is no necessity for the witnesses to fix any particular time from which such tenures became transferable. **JOY KISHEN MOOKERJEE v. DOORGA NARAIN NAG . . . 11 W. R. 349**

21. ——— Proof of existence of custom—Information derived from deceased persons—Evidence Act, 1872, s. 32, sub-s. (5), ss. 49 and 60. A witness may state his opinion as to the existence of a family custom (in this case primogeniture) and give as the grounds thereof information derived from deceased persons. But it must be independent opinion based on hearsay, and not on mere repetition of hearsay. See Evidence Act, 1872, s. 32, sub-s. (5), ss. 49 and 60. Its weight depends on the character of the witness and of the deceased persons. **GARURUDHWAJA PARSHAD SINGH v. SAPARANDHWAJA PARSHAD SINGH . . . I. L. R. 27 I. A. 238**

22. ——— Bhagdari tenures—Custom of inheritance to bhagdari tenures in the Broach district. The custom in the Broach district of male first cousins succeeding to property held on the bhagdari tenure in preference to daughters or sisters upheld in a case in which the bhagdars were Mahomedans. **BAI KHEDU v. DASU LALL . . . 5 Bom. A. C. 123**

23. ——— Bhagdari tenures in Broach—Inheritance—Special custom—Priority of nearest male relative to daughter or sister. The

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plaintiff, as heir of her father (a deceased Hindu bhagdar), sued the sons of sisters of her father's paternal uncle for possession of certain bhagdari lands situate in a village in the Broach collectorate. The defendants pleaded that they were entitled to the property under a special custom regulating the succession to bhagdari lands in the collectorate of Broach, under which custom, on the death of a bhagdar, whether Hindu or Mahomedan, without male issue, his nearest male relations (after the death of his widow), whether sprung through male or female relatives of the deceased bhagdar, succeeded to his bhagdari lands to the exclusion of his daughter or sister. *Held*, that the custom alleged was sufficiently proved, and that the defendants were entitled to retain possession of the bhagdar lands in question. *Per Curiam*.—The custom alleged being if not universal at least general in the Broach collectorate, it should, in the case of any particular village, at any rate on evidence being given of its continuance in other similar adjacent villages, if not in the particular village itself (though it would always be more satisfactory if this could be done), be held still to survive, unless and until the opposite party proved the adoption of some other custom, or of the ordinary rules of inheritance, in the particular village, or, failing such proof, the general prevalence of such rules or such opposing custom in other similar adjacent villages. *Quære*: Whether males sprung of male relatives of a deceased bhagdar have priority over males sprung of female relatives of the same. *Quære*: Whether a daughter or sister of a deceased bhagdar is wholly excluded, by the custom, from the line of inheritance, or would, on failure of male relations, succeed to the bhagdari lands. **PRANJIVAN DAYARAM v. BAI REVA . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 482**

24. ——— Wajib-ul-urz—Evidence of village custom. A *wajib-ul-urz* is not a mere contract; it is a record-of-rights made by a public servant; and therefore, without attestation or execution by the proprietors of the mouzah, it is entitled to weight as evidence of village custom. **DABEE DUT v. ENAIT ALI . . . 2 N. W. 395**

25. ——— Cess, levy of—Wajib-ul-urz. *Held*, that the mention of the cess in a *wajib-ul-urz* is not conclusive proof of the custom or usage which gives the right to levy the cess against persons not parties to it. **RAM CHUND v. ZAHOO ALI KHAN . . . 1 Agra 134, 135**

26. ——— The *wajib-ul-urz* binds co-parceners who have verified and attested it, and is so far evidence of custom between co-parceners, but is not a conclusive evidence of custom between co-parceners and their tenants who were no parties to it. **PUCHOO v. MAHOMED TALA ASSUDOLAH . . . 2 Agra 217**

27. ——— Wajib-ul-urz—Mahomedan law. It having been alleged that an estate, by custom, descended to a single heir in the male line, the High Court, concurring with the

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Court of first instance, found that this custom had not been proved to prevail in the family. On an appeal contesting this finding, it was argued, among other objections, that the High Court had not given sufficient effect to an entry in the *wajib-ul-urz* of a zamindari village, the principal one comprised in the family estate now in dispute; the last owner of that estate who held all the shares in the village having caused an entry to be made to the effect that his eldest son should be his sole heir, the others of the family being maintained. *Held*, that, though termed an entry in a *wajib-ul-urz*, the document was not entitled to the name, but was rather in the nature of a testamentary attempt to make a disposition contrary to the Mahomedan law of descent. **MOHAMMAD ISMAIL KHAN v. FIDAYAT-UN-NISSA** . . . **I. L. R. 8 All. 516**

28. ————— *Suit by landholder for declaration of right to take land from occupancy-tenant for cultivation of indigo—Wajib-ul-urz, construction of.* The zamindars of a village sued an occupancy-tenant for a declaration of their right to maintain a custom which was thus recorded in the *wajib-ul-urz* :—“When necessary, one or two *bighas* out of the tenants' lands are taken with their consent (*ba khashi*) for sowing indigo.” Upon the basis of this entry, they claimed to be entitled to take a portion of the occupancy-holding at a certain period of the year, for the purpose of cultivating indigo. *Held*, by the Full Bench, that the word “*khashi*” used in the *wajib-ul-urz* indicated that the land was only to be taken with the occupancy-tenant's consent, and the document created no right of the nature alleged, namely, to take the land despite the tenant. **SHEOBARAN v. BHAIRU PRASAD** . . . **I. L. R. 7 All. 880**

29. ————— *Pre-emption—Wajib-ul-urz—Onus probandi.* A *wajib-ul-urz* prepared and attested according to law, is *prima facie* evidence of the existence of any custom of pre-emption which it records, such evidence being open to be rebutted by any one disputing such custom. **ISRI SINGH v. GANGA** . . . **I. L. R. 2 All. 876**

But such a custom is not established by one instance. **TOTA RAM v. MOHAN LAL** **2 Agra 120**

30. ————— *Pre-emption—Wajib-ul-urz.* An unsigned *wajib-ul-urz* is not binding on the co-sharers, and cannot originate a right of pre-emption if no prior usage existed. To prove usage, it is not necessary that documentary evidence should be adduced. **JOYKISHORE SINGH v. THAKOOR DASS** . . . **3 Agra 75**

31. ————— *Pre-emption—Wajib-ul-urz.* *Held*, that occasional instances, in which a claim to pre-emption on the ground of vicinage may have been admitted, or for special reason the vendors submitted to the claim, are not sufficient to prove the custom of pre-emption in a *mahallah*; but repeated instances of the assertion of pre-emption as a right and of its recognition or enforcement, ranging over a long period of time and in various places should be shown. **SHEO CHURN KANDOO v. GOODUR BURNWAR** . . . **3 Agra 138**

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32. ————— *Suit for pre-emption—Evidence—Decrees enforcing right.* In a suit for pre-emption based on custom, evidence of decrees passed in favour of such a custom, in suits in which it was alleged and denied, is admissible evidence to prove its existence. The most satisfactory evidence of an enforcement of a custom is a final decree based on the custom. **Gujju Lal v. Fateh Lal**, **1. L. R. 6 Cal. 171**, distinguished. **Koodottoollah v. Mohinee Mohun Shaha**, **5 Rev. Civ. and Cr. Rep. 290**, **Sheo Churn Kandoo v. Goodur Burnwar**, **3 Agra 138**, and **Lachman Rai v. Akbar Khan**, **1. L. R. 1 All. 440**, referred to. **GURDAYAL MAL v. JHANDU MAL** . . . **I. L. R. 10 All. 585**

33. ————— *Pre-emption—Proceedings in former suits.* The proceedings in two former suits, where, under similar circumstances, though the exercise of the right was disputed on other grounds, the right of pre-emption was admitted to exist, may be received in evidence in support of the custom. **MADHUB CHUNDER NATH BISWAS v. TOMEE BEWAH** . . . **7 W. R. 210**

34. ————— *Pre-emption—Wajib-ul-urz—Evidence of contract and custom—Act XIX of 1873, s. 91—Beng. Reg. VII of 1822, s. 9, cl. (i).* The *wajib-ul-urz* of a village is a document of a public character, prepared with all publicity, and must be considered as *prima facie* evidence of the existence of any custom which it records. Its record of the existence of a custom of pre-emption is sufficiently strong evidence to cast on those denying the custom the burden of proof; and in the same manner, when it records a contract of pre-emption between the shareholders, there is a presumption that it is binding on the shareholders. Looking to the public character of the document, and the way it is prepared, and that all shareholders, whether signing it or not, must be presumed to have assented to its terms, the inferences to be deduced from it cannot be disregarded except when they are rebutted by evidence of an opposite character. A suit to enforce the right of pre-emption, which was based on contract and custom as evidenced by the *wajib-ul-urz* of a village, was dismissed by the lower Courts on the ground that any contract which might be founded on the *wajib-ul-urz* was not binding on the vendor-defendant, as that document did not bear his signature, and the lower Appellate Court attached no weight to the *wajib-ul-urz* as proof of the custom of pre-emption, because it was drawn up when Regulation VII of 1822 was in force, and at that time there was no legal presumption of its accuracy. The claim was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff's evidence did not prove the existence of a custom of pre-emption in the village. *Held*, that the lower Appellate Court had erred in dealing with the evidence, and that, although this particular *wajib-ul-urz* was made before Act XIX of 1873 came into force, yet the weight which would attach to its entries, both as proof of the contract as well of customs was very

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strong. *Isri Singh v. Ganga*, 1. L. R. 2 All. 876, referred to. *MUHAMMAD HASAN v. MUNNA LAL*,
I. L. R. 8 All. 434

35. ———— **Cess—Record of cess by settlement officer.** The fact that a cess leviable in accordance with village custom has been recorded by a settlement officer is important evidence of the custom, but not conclusive proof of it. *Held*, on the evidence in this case, that the village customs set up was not established. *LALA v. HIRA SINGH*
I. L. R. 2 All. 49

36. ———— **Manorial Dues and Cesses.** The plaintiffs, zamindars, sued for a declaration of their ancient rights, as against all the tenants of a certain village, to appropriate all trees of spontaneous growth and the fruits of other trees planted by the tenants; also to receive as manorial tribute a certain number of ploughs annually and a certain offering of poppy-seed and other farm-produce on the occasion of the marriage of persons of the lower caste of tenants, with a further right to levy a certain proportion of the produce of the sugar-cane manufactories and fields in the village. The lower Courts having decreed the suit on vague and general parol evidence as to the existence of the said customs:—*Held*, (a) that, where a custom regarding several cesses is alleged, the existence of the custom regarding each cess should be tried as a separate issue; (b) that parol evidence as to the existence of such customs should be tested by ascertaining the grounds of the witness's opinion; (c) that the best proof of custom is instances in which it has been acted on and documentary evidence that it has been enforced; (d) that a custom, to be good, must be definite. *LACHMAN RAI v. AKBAR KHAN*
I. L. R. 1 All. 440

37. ———— **Dhardhura—Alluvial land.** *Quære*: What is the extent of the applicability of the custom of dhardhura in regular to alluvial land overriding the provisions of Regulation XI of 1825. *NASEER-OD-DEEN AHMED v. OOMEDEH*
3 Agra 1

38. ———— **Dhardhura, applicability of custom of—Accretion.** The custom of dhardhura applies to lands thrown up or formed by fluvial action either in one year or in the course of a number of years. Whether it is equally applicable to *chuckee* formations or tracts of lands severed by a sudden change in the course of a river, and yet preserving their identity of site and surface after the severance, must be determined by proof of the extent of the custom. *KATIYANEE v. MAHOMED SHURUF-OD-DEEN*
3 Agra 189

39. ———— **Dhardhura.** The custom of dhardhura is, when applied to lands gained otherwise than by gradual accretion, opposed to equity; and such a custom must be proved, not by the vague assertions of witnesses, but by a sufficient enumeration of instances. *ISREE SINGH v. SHURUF-OD-DEEN* 1 N. W. 142: Ed. 1873, 224

40. ———— **Dhardhura—**
Beng. Reg. XI of 1825, ss. 2, 4 (ii). The question

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whether the custom of dhardhura applies to lands gained by gradual accretion only, or also to lands which have been separated from a mouzah by a sudden change of stream, must be determined in each case on the evidence; for although the Court would be disposed to scrutinize with care evidence in regard to a custom which would have the effect of passing from one owner to another lands long held and enjoyed, and of which the character is in no way altered by river action, yet it cannot be said that such a custom can in no case be established and given effect to. *KATIYANEE v. MAHOMED SHURFODDEEN*, 3 Agra 189, *Isree Singh v. Shurfoodeen*, 1 N. W. 142, and *Rajendur Pertab Sahee v. Laljee Sahoo*, 20 W. R. 427, referred to. *SIBT ALI v. MUNIR-UD-DIN*
I. L. R. 6 All. 479

41. ———— **Customary right—Privacy—Right of building and to interfere with erection of building.** A customary right of privacy under certain conditions exists in India and in the North-Western Provinces, and is not unreasonable, but merely an application of the maxims *sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas* and *aedificare in tuo proprio solo non licet quod alteri noceat*. In the case of a building for parda purposes, newly erected without the acquiescence of the owner of an adjacent building site, a custom preventing such owner from so building, as to interfere with the privacy of the first new building, would be unreasonable and consequently bad in law. But if such adjacent owner, without protest or notice, allowed his neighbour to erect and consequently to incur expenses in connection with a building for the use of pardanashin women, a custom preventing him from interfering with the privacy of such new building would not in India be unreasonable. *GOKAL PRASAD v. RADHO*
I. L. R. 10 All. 358

42. ———— **Customary right—Facts necessary to establish the existence of a customary right—Easement—Easement Act, ss. 4 and 18.** The plaintiff sued for possession of a piece of land which, he alleged, formed part of the courtyard of his kothi and for demolition of a chabutra thereon. The defendants denied the plaintiff's title, and alleged that they always used the chabutra as a sitting place, and that during the Moharram the tazias and alums were exhibited upon the chabutra, and a takht was placed upon it. The Court of first instance found that the defendants had a right to use the land in the manner claimed during the Moharram. The lower Appellate Court, on the question of the defendant's right to use the said land in the manner claimed by them, found as follows:—"That various mirasis, whose connection with each other is not established, have within a period of twenty years or so placed tazias upon land and sung there." *Held*, that this finding of fact did not necessarily in law lead to the conclusion that there was a local custom by virtue of which the easement now claimed by the defendants was acquired. Where a local custom excluding or limiting the general rule of law is set up, a Court should not decide that it exists unless such Court

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is satisfied of its reasonableness, and its certainty as to extent and application, and is further satisfied by the evidence that the enjoyment of the right was not by leave granted, or by stealth, or by force, and that it had been openly enjoyed for such a length of time as suggests that originally, by agreement or otherwise, the usage had become a customary law of the place in respect of the persons and things which it concerned. *KUAR SEN v. MAMMAN* I. L. R. 17 All. 87

Reversing on appeal, under the Letters Patent, *MAMMAN v. KUAR SEN* I. L. R. 16 All. 178

43. *Custom of burial—Local custom—Right claimed by a certain section of Mahomedans to bury their dead in a certain locality—Right of burial.* Where a certain section of the Mahomedan community had been for many years in the habit of burying their dead near a darga in plaintiff's land, and the plaintiff sued for an injunction restraining them from exercising this right in future:—*Held*, that the right of burial claimed by the defendants was not an easement, but a customary right, which, being confined to a limited class of persons and a limited area of land, was sufficiently certain and reasonable to be recognized as a valid local custom. *MOHIDIN v. SHIVLINGAPPA* I. L. R. 23 Bom. 666

44. *Usage imported as term of a contract—Practice on a particular estate.* In order that the practice on a particular estate may be imported as a term of the contract into a contract in respect of land in that estate, it must be shown that the practice was known to the person whom it is sought to bind by it, and that he assented to its being a term of the contract; and when the person sought to be bound by the practice is an assignee for value of rights under that contract, it must also be shown that he and all prior assignees (if any) for value knew that the practice was a term of the original contract. *MANA VIKRAMA v. RAMA PATTAR* I. L. R. 20 Mad. 275

45. *Validity of custom—Power of some of Mirasidars to bind Co-owners of village lands.* A custom that some only of the mirasidars of a village should bind the co-owners of the village lands is valid. *ANANDAYAN v. DEVARAJAYAN* 2 Mad. 17

46. *Usage of mangrove—Policy of insurance—Evidence of average loss—Certificate of mahajans.* An alleged usage that the mahajans' certificate is deemed to be conclusive evidence against the under-writer without production of manifest and account sales, and that upon proof of the certificate alone and of the policy the owner is entitled to recover his average loss, cannot be upheld, such not being a reasonable usage. *RANSORDAS BHAGILAL v. KESRISING MOHANLAL* 1 Bom. 229

47. *Unreasonable custom—Broker varying contract.* A custom which allows a broker to deviate from his instructions is

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unreasonable, and the Courts of law will not enforce it. *ARLAPA NAIK NARSI KISHAVJI AND COMPANY* 8 Bom. A. C. 19

48. *Evidence of custom—Evidence Act (1 of 1872), ss. 13 (a), 32 (7)—Document, statement in—Admissibility against person not a party to it—Statement of deceased person—Right or custom, evidence of—Nakdi or bhaoli rent.* To prove or disprove a right or custom, it is not enough to adduce evidence of a transaction in which or in the course of which the right or custom was asserted or denied. The transaction will be relevant under s. 13, cl. (a) of the Evidence Act, if it be one by which the right or custom was asserted or denied. When the question was whether a tenant held lands under the *nakdi* or *bhaoli* system of rent and the Court based its decision on a statement contained in a *hebanama* executed by the deceased grandfather of the tenant: *Held*, that the *hebanama* was not admissible in evidence under s. 32 (7) read with s. 13, cl. (a) of the Evidence Act. *BANSHI SINGH v. MIR AMIR ALI* (1907) 11 C. W. N. 703

49. *Finding in favour of existence of custom based upon insufficient evidence—Second appeal—Practice.* *Held*, that, where a question arises as to the existence or non-existence of a particular custom, and the lower Appellate Court has acted upon illegal evidence or on evidence legally insufficient to establish an alleged custom, the question is one of law, and the High Court is entitled in second appeal to consider whether the finding is based upon sufficient evidence. *Hashim Ali v. Abdul Rahman*, I. L. R. 28 All. 698, approved. *Raj Narain Mitter v. Budh Sen*, I. L. R. 30 All. 388, referred to. *RAM BILAS v. LAL BAHADUR* (1908) I. L. R. 30 All. 311

CUSTOM OF TRADE.

See CONTRACT 8 C. W. N. 57
I. L. R. 30 Bom. 1,205

See CUSTOM I. L. R. 14 Mad. 420
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 459
4 W. R. P. C. 8
7 Moo. I. A. 263

See DAMAGES—SUITS FOR DAMAGES—BREACH OF CONTRACT. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 323

See SALE BY AUCTION. I. L. R. 16 Calc. 702

CUSTOMARY RIGHT.

See CUSTOM.

See BURIAL I. L. R. 23 Bom. 666

See EASEMENT I. L. R. 17 All. 87

See PRIVACY I. L. R. 10 All. 358

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—PRE-EMPTION. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 575

CUTCHI MEMONS.

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—SPECIAL LAWS—CUTCHI MEMONS.

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 115
I. L. R. 10 Bom. 1

CUTCHI MEMONS—contd.

See HINDU LAW—JOINT FAMILY—DEBTS
AND JOINT FAMILY BUSINESS.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 189

See HINDU LAW—MARRIAGE—EVIDENCE
AS TO, AND PROOF OF, MARRIAGE.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 485

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—CUTCHI MEMONS.

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 452

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 115, 158

See PROBATE—POWER OF HIGH COURT
TO GRANT, AND FORM OF.

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 452

See WILL—VALIDITY OF WILL.

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 1

1. Succession—Marriage in approved form—Hindu Law. In the absence of proof of any special custom of succession, the Hindu Law of inheritance applies to Cutchi Memons. The legal consequences of the classes of marriage, the approved and disapproved, in relation to inheritance, vary according as their leading characteristics are blameworthy or not, and suggest the inference that it is the quality and not the form of marriage that decides the course of devolution; where the marriage is approved the husband and his side come in, where disapproved, they do not. *Ashabai v. Haji Tyeb Haji Rahimtulla*, I. L. R.

I MEMONS—concl.

9 Bom. 115, followed. *In the goods of Mulbai Karim Khatav v. Pardhan Manji*, 2 Bom. H. C. 276, and *The case of the Khojahs and Memom Cutchis*, 2 Morley's Dig. 431, referred to. *Moosa Haji Joonas v. Haji Abdul Rahim* (1905)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 197

2. Succession—Hindu

Law—Sons administering the property of their deceased father. Among the Cutchi Memons, who are governed by Hindu Law, the sons as heirs are entitled to the estate of their deceased father, subject to the payment of his debts. They are, therefore, entitled to take possession of their father's property, to administer it, and to pay debts without being liable to account to the Court otherwise than as heirs. *Veerasokkaraju v. Pappiah*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 792, followed. *Haji Saboo v. Ally Mahomed* (1904)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 270

CYPRES DOCTRINE.

See WILL . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 214

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 261

CYPRES PERFORMANCE.

See WILL—CONSTRUCTION . 1 Mad. 429

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 303 : L. R. 3 I. A. 32

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 591

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 193